India needs nuanced approach postUNHRC Vote on Sri Lanka

Gautam Sen April 4, 2014

The Sri Lankan Government recently extended the period of investi ation for its !residential "ommission #!"$ that is pro%in the cases of alle ed disappearances in its northern and eastern provinces& The extended period is from 1'() to 200'* earlier, the investi ations +ere limited to the period %et+een 1''0 and 200'& The extension +as ranted via amendment throu h a !residential ,arrant on -arch 2., 2014& The !" +as appointed %y the overnment as follo+/up to its Lessons Learnt 0 1econciliation "ommission #LL1"$, esta%lished in the aftermath of the 2ourth 3alam ,ar& The !" +as appointed to counter international pressure as +ell as to ascertain the fate of those people +ho surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army over the period and disappeared& At the same time, it sou ht to address persistent demands of Sri Lankan Tamils, from +ithin the country and outside, for a credi%le pro%e on the many instances of human ri hts violations& The LL1"4s recommendations, and the su%se5uent steps taken %y the overnment, had not enerated ade5uate confidence amon the international community on the Sri Lankan overnment4s response to the a%ove/mentioned issues& The revised period of pro%e for the !" is si nificant %ecause the extended period no+ oes as far %ack as the anti/Tamil riots in "olom%o in 1'(), +hile also coverin periodic civil strife and state/sponsored armed action in Sri Lanka, the 6ndian !eace/ 7eepin 2orce #6!72$ 4s operations on the island in concert +ith Sri Lankan forces, and, finally, the full/scale +ar %et+een the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Li%eration Ti ers of Tamil 3lam #LTT3$, +hich ended +ith the crushin defeat of the latter in -ay 200'& The import of the overnment4s decision +as in the timin , as it +as notified %efore the final votin on the latest 8S/%acked resolution in the 8nited 9ations :uman 1i hts "ouncil #89:1"$ at Geneva, +hich mandates an international pro%e on Sri Lankan +ar crimes& Thou h 6ndia a%stained on the resolution in the vote taken on -arch 2;, it has %een passed in the 89:1" +ith 2) countries supportin it, 12 a%stainin , and another 12 votin a ainst it& Thus, the Sri Lankan overnment4s decision to stretch the period of its internal pro%e %ack to 1'(), intends to address internal criticism of the 6!724s performance +hen the latter had exercised operational control over the inte rated north/eastern province, and to %rin it +ithin the purvie+ of the "ommission4s

investi ations& 6t is likely that 6ndia vie+ed this as a pressure tactic, one that appears to have %een intended to dissuade it from votin a ainst Sri Lanka at the final votin sta e of the 89:1" resolution& <ne dou%ts, ho+ever, that this not/so/su%tle pressure tactic on Sri Lanka4s part +as a crucial determinant in 6ndia4s decision to a%stain at the 89:1" vote& 9ot+ithstandin the stand taken %y 6ndia at Geneva, it has to tread cautiously %ecause the country +ill o to polls shortly and such decisions +ould %e su%=ect to critical analyses %y the contestin political parties from the point of vie+ political suita%ility& 6n 6ndia, the domestic political reality is that %oth the out oin 8nited !ro ressive Alliance #8!A$/66 as +ell as its ma=or opponent, the 9ational >emocratic Alliance #9>A$, +ill %e lookin for political support from the Tamil 9adu #T9$/%ased political parties for future overnment formation& The T9 parties cannot %e expected to fore o any opportunity of arnerin electoral support on the issue of protectin so/called Sri Lankan Tamil interests& This lo ically implies that there +ould still %e strident demands that 6ndia unhesitatin ly support the +idenin of the human ri hts violations pro%e in Sri Lanka and invoke international involvement& !resently, it seems that 6ndia, +ei hin the %alance of interests, opted a ainst an intrusive resolution on Sri Lanka, +hich +ould have had implications& 6t +ould also have had the potential to undermine the Sri Lanka4s soverei nty in the event of an international +ar crimes tri%unal %ein set up, framin char es a ainst incum%ent Sri Lankan state functionaries and ne atin that country4s constitutional processes& 9ot+ithstandin the a%ove/mentioned scenario, there is reason for 6ndia not to %e pusillanimous on a pro%e coverin the 6!72 period, from 1'(; to 1''0& The 6!72 did not face verifia%le criticism of the nature faced %y the Sri Lankan overnment or its Army durin and after the end of the 3alam ,ars, either durin the 6!724s operational period or post de/induction from the island& -oreover, there +as no instance of en/ masse uprootin of local people or forced disappearances in any of the operational areas of the four 6ndian Army divisions deployed in Sri Lanka durin the period concerned& The local, 6ndian and international media had %road access to the operational ?one and had extensively covered the operations and 6!72/ initiated reconstruction/cum/reha%ilitation activities& The poi nant %ook @roken !almyrah %y 1a=ini Thirana ama and three other university teachers from Aaffna is perhaps the only documented material availa%le in the pu%lic domain that could %e a credi%le reference durin such a pro%e vis/B/vis the 6!724s actions& Therefore, such an investi ation is unlikely to dama e the reputation of 6ndian armed forces deployed under <! !a+an, the code name of the armed action initiated for disarmin the LTT3 and th+artin the latter4s military activities detrimental to Sri Lanka4s unity, and %oth countries4 security, conse5uent to the 6ndo/Sri Lanka Accord of 1'(;& 9evertheless, it must %e remem%ered that there +ould %e political and diplomatic ramifications of an expanded pro%e on 6ndia/Sri Lanka relations, as proposed to %e undertaken %y the !" at this =uncture, +hich have to %e suita%ly re istered %y 9e+ >elhi %efore "olom%o& 6t +ould appear that 6ndia accorded preponderance to the %roader interests of national soverei nty %efore its final stand on the 89:1" resolution& 6ndia4s !ermanent 1epresentative to the 89 <ffices at Geneva indicated 6ndia4s firm %elief that adoptin an intrusive approach that undermines soverei nty and institutions is counter/productive& 9e+ >elhi also cannot %e o%livious to the likelihood of parallels %ein dra+n in the future %y some countries inimical to 6ndia, to push for similar pro%es in Aammu 0 7ashmir, the 9orth/eastern states or even in the Left/+in extremist violence affected re ions& 2or example, there

have %een critical references in the recent past from the 89 1apporteur on :uman 1i hts on the invokin of the Armed 2orces Special !o+ers Act #A2S!A$ in these trou%led areas, and some political roups, %oth +ithin and outside the country, had tried to capitalise on this& Thus, the -ost pra matic approach +ould %e to "ontinue to exert pressure <n the Sri Lankan Government to attempt an 3ffective 6nternal institutional approach to+ards an 3ffective follo+/up of the LL1"4s 1ecommendations and @road/%asin the ,ork of the present Three/mem%er !" 1 %y includin in it eminent Sri Lankans #=urists, administrators/servin or retired/and social activists$ across the socio/political spectrum* in particular, Sri Lankans other than those +ithin the coterie of !resident 1a=apakse& 6t is of utmost essence that representatives of stature nominated %y "hief -inister ,i nes+aran of the northern province of the country, %e included in the !" and the terms of reference of the %ody mandate that its deli%erations %e consensual and recommendations rendered +ithin a precise time/frame & 6ndia should, therefore, +ork out a stand +ithin an 6ndian consensual political am%it #even +hile 6ndia4s election process is on$, +hich sends out a clear messa e that lack of ade5uate follo+/up of the LL1" recommendations and the less/than/effective manner in +hich the latest !" has functioned till no+, is unaccepta%le& The !"4s pro%e has to %e revitali?ed and iven a visi%le thrust %y suita%ly expandin its composition and method of functionin & 6ts mandate must also %e made precise and time/%ound& 6ndia should not sacrifice her %roader interests/and those of the Sri Lankan Tamils/+ithout compromisin on the soverei nty and unity of its nei h%ourin island country& This may, ho+ever, %e a dauntin task iven the rass/root Sinhala political support !resident 1a=apakse still en=oys, as evident from the latest results of the elections to Sri Lanka4s +estern and southern provincial assem%lies& Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Posted by Thavam