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Hydrogen Embrittlement Threat Assessment Gael 22Cr Duplex Stainless Steel Riser

Author(s): Corporate Author: ETP Category: Document No: Retention: Keywords:

Simon Bowcock, Lee Smith, Paul Marsay, Vijay Ramappa BP 36 - Materials Selection S-UEC-nnnn-yy

Date: Checked by: Approved by: Revision No:

10 Dec 2012 John Martin James D Burk 2

10 years BP Internal Security: HISC, duplex stainless steel, hydrogen embrittlement

This document is classified BP Internal. Distribution is intended for BP authorized recipients only.

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REVISION: 001

DATE: 01-Jan-10

STATUS: This revision table is optional for Technical notes

QA Form.doc

APPROVED BY: Name of Approver

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Hydrogen Embrittlement Threat Assessment - Gael 22Cr Duplex Stainless Steel Riser
Scope
The scope of the assessment covers the submerged duplex stainless steel section of the GAEL Riser (R2), as indicated on the marked-up isometric drawing in Appendix A. The connecting tie-in spool is fabricated from carbon steel material, therefore, is not relevant to this assessment.

Background and Approach

Following concerns raised by the North Sea Materials and Corrosion TA, a review was requested for a duplex stainless steel riser on the ETAP platform prior to conducting an ILI campaign and the associated cleaning activities. There is now a general action to review all subsea duplex stainless steel components for susceptibility to the failure mechanism commonly referred to as HISC (Hydrogen Induced Stress Cracking); which is in fact a hydrogen embrittlement threat that should not be confused with the unrelated cracking mode of hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) in carbon steel plate products. A preliminary screening approach for the assessment of the hydrogen embrittlement threat for the GAEL 22Cr UNS S32205 oil export riser has been developed and applied. This screening process relies upon establishing if any of the three elements influencing hydrogen embrittlement have, or might, change for the worse in the foreseeable future. These three elements are: Material susceptibility Extent of hydrogen charging Magnitude of applied and residual stresses

The elements are illustrated graphically in figure 1 which highlights that where all three elements interact detrimentally, cracking is possible.

Figure 1 Venn diagram highlighting the potential for cracking due to the interaction of the three major elements dictating the likelihood of HISC. For new build items, BP ETP GP 36-20 mandates the application of DNV F112 (following the guidance of GN 36-025). This is a stress based validation approach. The current screening method is intended to determine if a DNV F112 analysis is required in present instances for the existing GAEL riser.

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Data inputs, including inspection data, for the review were taken from the available files in the Pipeline Validation Project SharePoint [1].and the Subsea and Pipelines documentum [2]. This was under the guidance of BP North Sea pipeline engineers to identify pertinent documents for consideration. Note, If any of the assumptions within this document change (for instance additional sacrificial anodes are installed) then the findings of this document may no longer be valid and, as a minimum, a further screening assessment will be required. This assessment does not consider any upset scenarios where the riser pressure or temperature has the potential to exceed the maximum historical operating conditions (for instance, the PSV lift case). Under these scenarios, the riser may be able to reach a stress regime greater than has been previously experienced, which could leave the riser susceptible to HISC.

Hydrogen Source
The probability for hydrogen to have been absorbed by the duplex stainless steel riser has been assessed based on the following assumptions: Riser is directly coupled to the sacrificial anode pipeline cathodic protection system, with a measured potential of approximately -1030mV (assumed to be with reference to Ag/AgCl). Measured CP is in line with the expectation from the sacrificial anodes and the inspection results demonstrate that this is unchanged in recent years (inspected 2007/ 2010). Anodes are in acceptable condition (25-50% consumption). Riser is coated with thermally sprayed aluminium (TSA), which, unlike a paint coating system, will not shield the underlying duplex stainless steel from the CP. As a result, the duplex stainless steel has not been shielded from CP. Whilst TSA typically includes a sealant, this would only be expected to give marginal (insignificant) shielding of the CP. Thus, coating break down does not pose an increased threat for hydrogen charging and embrittlement. It has been assumed that the riser has been coated in accordance with the requirements of the Specification for Thermally Sprayed Aluminium (TSA) coatings [9] There are no plans to add any additional anodes to the pipeline, instead consumed anodes will be replaced on a like-for-like basis. Replacement anodes will likely bring a transient decrease in cathodic protection potential. This could result in a short term increase in hydrogen charging rates. However, this is expected be insignificant compared with the hydrogen charging experienced since installation. The jacket is protected by sacrificial anodes and not by an impressed current system, which could interfere with the CP of the riser and increase hydrogen charging due to over protection. Again, CP readings taken from the riser are in the range expected.

Based on this data, extracted from the GAEL riser databases, the duplex stainless steel riser has been constantly exposed to cathodic protection and hydrogen charging since installation in 1997. The threat of hydrogen embrittlement is not specifically related to duration of exposure, especially after the first few weeks of installation; hydrogen embrittlement of the surface is the dominant factor and this happens quickly where the material is exposed to CP. Exposure duration can influence the depth of hydrogen penetration (and the risk of internally initiated cracking). In the present instance the riser thickness of >30mm and the lack of internal stress concentrations (such as weldolets, barred tees, etc.) makes this threat not credible. In other words, hydrogen from the external surface is not expected to have diffused to the internal surface. This is collaborated by hydrogen depth profile measurements taken from Foinaven super duplex stainless steel components retrieved after 15yrs subsea. A successful organic paint system can provide isolation from the CP, however, any damage to the coating will result in increased hydrogen charging and an increased threat of hydrogen embrittlement, which becomes more likely as the infrastructure ages and the coating continues to degrade. The thermally sprayed aluminium coating is actually intended to provide sacrificial protection to the riser (by the application of localised cathodic protection), thus the cathodic protection has been permanently present (still predominantly driven by the sacrificial anodes on the pipeline). Overall, the contribution made to the hydrogen embrittlement threat by the amount of hydrogen charging is considered to be no different today than it was since installation.
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Material
The susceptibility of the duplex stainless steel, as employed for the riser, to HISC has been assessed based on the following assumptions: The submerged elements of the riser are constructed from material designated in the GAEL riser databases as 2205, comprising line pipe, induction formed bend and weld neck flange: The submerged section of line pipe is assumed to have been purchased in accordance with the requirements of Specification for Duplex Stainless Steel seamless Line Pipe B-210X-18-09-050 [4]. The submerged induction formed bend is assumed to have been purchased in accordance with the requirements of Specification for Induction Bends for pipelines and risers (Duplex Stainless Steel) B-210X-18-09-051 [5]. The Gael riser databases indicate that the bend is a seamless product (i.e. made from seamless pipe). The flange connection interfacing with the carbon steel spool and flowline is not detailed in any of the GAEL databases provided. However, this is assumed to be a forged flange purchased in accordance with the requirements of Specification for Subsea Fittings and Flanges B-210X-1809-052 [6]. It is assumed that the fabrication and welding of the riser was carried out in accordance with Specification for welding and inspection carbon steel pipeline risers and prefabricated spools B210X-18-09-023 [7]. Any material certificates from the original fabrication have not been available for this review (including microstructural images).

The riser pipe and bends are all manufactured from wrought product which is expected to have a fine microstructure and favourable orientation for resistance to HISC. The forged flange is likely to have a coarse microstructure, but with a favourable orientation. This is considered less resistant to HISC than the pipe, but not as susceptible as some of the failed Foinaven components from the late 90s, which had a combination of coarse microstructure and unfavourable orientation. Although there are no material certificates available for review, it is considered unlikely that there are any deleterious microstructural conditions that might further exacerbate the threat of HISC. Intermetallic phases, whilst degrading toughness and corrosion resistance, are not believed to significantly affect susceptibility to HISC. Nitride phases may increase susceptibility, but these are less likely in the typically lower nitrogen 22Cr duplex stainless steel grades than they are in the higher nitrogen super duplex stainless steel grades. In summary, the riser pipe and bends are likely to have (for duplex stainless steel) good resistance to HISC whilst the flange is likely to have somewhat less resistance. In the context of DNV F112, the pipe and bend have a material quality factor of 100% and the flange a material quality factor of 85% (these factors are used to adjust the nominal safe allowable stress for avoidance of HISC).

Stress
A summary of the final riser design and brief description of the design methodology adopted is given in the original project report PdR Riser &_J-Tube Design Final Report - B-211X-46-07-012 [8]. A more detailed summary of the pipe stress analysis results is covered in the Technical Note RC1 PDR Riser Analysis B-211X-46-07-005 [10]. The original pipe stress analysis for the riser was carried out to meet the requirements of the pipeline code as it stood at that time BS 8010 part 3. The system was modelled in a pipe stress analysis package Autopipe to determine longitudinal stresses, which could then be combined with hoop stresses, as required, to prove code compliance. It should be noted that Autopipe is not a finite element analysis package, but is suitable for determining stresses to prove code compliance. The results from the pipe stress analysis indicated that the highest von-mises equivalent stress in the riser was located in the bottom bend, with a value equating to 56% of the design specified minimum yield strength (DSMYS). The code allowable is 72% of DSMYS. This was for the worst operating case covering all parameters as detailed in [8].

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The wall thickness of the pipeline was selected to meet the code requirement of the hoop stress being within 60% of DSMYS. The following loading scenarios and factors were considered: The riser is supported by a dead weight support located on the PdR jacket at an elevation 13 metres above the lowest astronomical tide (LAT) and further restrained by guides at multiple locations on the jacket leg. The spool pieces and pipeline are free to move (calculations assumed a virtual anchor at a location on the pipeline where there would, in theory, be no zero axial movement). Potential sources of stress in the subsea component of the riser considered in this assessment include: o o o o o o o o Thermal expansion/ contraction of the pipeline (including transients due to start-up/ shut down and well configuration changes) Internal pressure (including transients due to start-up/ shut down and well configuration) Low cyclic stresses/ short duration peak stresses due to wave loading (including jacket movement) and slugging Residual fabrication stresses Residual FAT, installation (including fit-up) and leak test stresses Relative settlement (jacket and pipeline) Increased thermal stresses due to removal of internal deposits (such as wax) after any aggressive pigging operations. Stress concentrations which may exacerbate stresses due to applied loads.

The design documents for the GAEL pipeline were based on normal operating temperatures of 86C and a maximum operating temperature of 90C. Historical data indicates that the normal operating temperature has been as high as 80C (briefly) and has been at 70 to 75C for a period of 4 to 6 months. Normal operating temperature trend is downwards, but with some increases corresponding with the tie in of new fields, such as Machar East and Mungo. Current temperatures average 65C, again with a downwards trend. Since commissioning there have been numerous shutdowns, with a current trend of 4 to 5 per year. Thermal expansion on start-up and contraction on shut down is believed to be lower now than experienced in previous years. This is expected to bring a commensurate reduction in associated peak stresses (or at least no increases), provided that movement of the flowline is no more restricted than has been previously the case (e.g. no further burial, no further rock dumping, etc.). Internal pressure at the riser top has significantly dropped from 150 to 100 bar over the first 6 years of operation. A further drop to approximately 50 bar has been seen in the last 8 years. Again, this is likely to have resulted in a decrease in service stress, or at least no increase. Hydrogen embrittlement may exacerbate fatigue crack growth at high K (stress concentration factor) values, but is not believed to significantly influence endurance in the absence of cracks, [3]. The GAEL riser is rigid and significant fatigue loading is not anticipated from the main stress sources of; slugging, wave loading and start-up/ shut down cycles. Only external cracks are pertinent (no hydrogen diffusing to the inner wall) for synergistic hydrogen embrittlement-fatigue and any such fabrication flaws would have been easier to detect and remediate during fabrication than the internal flaws, which typically dominate corrosion fatigue assessments of dynamic risers. Crack extension of a HISC initiated defect by synergistic hydrogen embrittlement fatigue is unlikely to change the threat profile, since stresses high enough to initiate HISC will likely be high enough to result in through thickness cracking by HISC alone. It is not expected that the pipe bends or flanges will have significant manufacturing residual stresses, other than those resulting from machining, since they would all be supplied in the solution annealed condition. Fitup stresses are not expected for the pipe or pipe to flange girth welds. Welding residual stresses will be present from the girth welds between the flange and the pipe, between the pipe and the bend and at the joints between pipe lengths of the riser. Studies undertaken by the Pipeline Validation Project have indicated a wax appearance temperature of 38C. Temperature profiling of the GAEL pipeline measured a temperature drop of 15C between PdR and the Wye. This profile would suggest that minimal wax is present upstream of the Wye. Therefore aggressive
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cleaning (such as that which precedes ILI pig runs) is not expected to result in increased wall temperatures as a consequence of removing any thermal barrier from the internal wall (such as wax).Thus, it is not expected that the ILI campaign will introduce increased thermal displacements (and associated stresses) at the PdR riser. Whilst details of the flange are not available, a stress concentration will be present at the flange neck. Stress concentrations will also be present due to weld geometries and any misalignments at joints. Within the context of DNV F112, membrane + bending stresses of 90% SMYS are tolerable at welds away from other stress concentrations and at stress concentrations such as at the flange neck. If riser girth welds coincide with riser clamps (especially the lower most clamp), this would constitute increased susceptibility and would have a permitted stress of 80% SMYS. Given that the riser is rigidly fixed at the lowest clamp, this likely constitutes a high stress position of the subsea element of the riser with respect to external stresses due to pipeline displacements. Surveys of the riser and GAEL pipeline have shown no anomalies such as degradation of the clamps, settlement, buckling, etc.

Assessment
The threat of HISC is dictated by three factors: Likelihood of hydrogen charging Susceptibility of the material Magnitude of the residual and applied stresses

The likelihood of hydrogen charging and the susceptibility of the material remain unchanged since installation in 1997. The magnitude of the residual and applied operating stresses is likely to be lower than those experienced for sustained periods during early operation and are believed to be, at worst, no greater. This includes following any ILI campaigns. As long as operating stresses (including those caused by incidental service conditions of duration no greater than, say one minute) remain lower than those experiences historically, the threat of HISC is believed to be low. This assessment does not, however, consider any upset scenarios where the riser pressure or temperature has the potential to exceed the maximum historical operating conditions (for instance, the blow down case). Under these scenarios, the riser may be able to reach a stress regime greater than has been previously experienced, which could leave the riser susceptible to HISC. In order to ensure that previously experienced sustained stresses and safe material operating limits are not exceeded, operational limits should be set, monitored and managed for the following: Temperature (<70C) Pressure (<100 Bar)

This review cannot offer any assurance for any excursions beyond these limits. In the instance that these pressure and temperature limits are exceeded for longer than one minutes, the export line is required to be shut in and inspected for the presence of any external cracks or leaks which might have developed. In addition, inspection plans should ensure that the following factors are recorded and initiate a management of change process, as appropriate: Low cathodic protection potential (<-1100mV Ag/AgCl) Degradation of the riser clamps Pinning/ restrictions of the flowline Changes in settlement Dropped objects on the riser or flowline

If the above operational restrictions and threat management practices are impractical, or cannot be maintained, then a full DNV RP F112 analysis may be required, following the guidance of GN 36-020.

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References
[1] BP Internal Link to PVP SharePoint: https://wss2.bp.com/EP/spu_subsea_north_sea/North%20Sea%20Intelligent%20Pigging%20Project/default. aspx [2] BP Internal Link to Subsea and Pipelines Documentum: \\Reuabzss002\subsea and pipelines\09 Pipelines\0. ETAP\Integrity\01 PIMS\04 DFI [3] TWI, Fatigue Data for Ferritic-Austenitic Stainless Steels Under Cathodic Protection, TWI Report 22074/2/12, June 2012 [4] Specification for Duplex Stainless Steel seamless Line Pipe B-210X-18-09-050 [5] Specification for Induction Bends for pipelines and risers (Duplex Stainless Steel) B-210X-18-09-051 [6] Specification for Subsea Fittings and Flanges B-210X-18-09-052 [7] Specification for welding and inspection carbon steel pipeline risers and prefabricated spools B-210X18-09-023 [8] PdR Riser &_J-Tube Design Final Report - B-211X-46-07-012 [9] Specification for Thermally Sprayed Aluminium (TSA) coatings B-210X-18-09-081 [10] Technical Note RC1 PDR Riser Analysis B-211X-46-07-005

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Appendix A

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