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Tanya Richardson Lovern PHIL 4020 13 March 2014 Second Draft In Being and Nothingness Jean-Paul Sartres analysis of sexual desire is one of the major themes. Sartres philosophy on romantic loving and sexual desire based off his theories in Being and Nothingness will be examined in this paper. In order to better understand Sartres perspective on the all-encompassing topic of human relations there needs to be an understanding of his existentialist philosophy. For the purpose of this paper Sartres ideas of transcendence vs. facticity is emphasized. Transcendence1 is the human being giving themselves to the concepts of the world, and facticity2 is the idea of just simply existing in the world without consciousness of it. Which brings about Sartres use of the terms for-itself and in-itself. In order to differentiate between the two ideas for example; humans will represent the for-itself and plants will represent the in-itself. The plant is the in-itself because it grows without full consciousness of its growth. The human is the for-itself because it is fully aware of its growth and reacts to the world.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966); 634. 2 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966); 631.

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Sartre believes self-discovery to be a very important aspect of understanding oneself. He believes that the only way for a person to objectively make a journey through self-discovery is by possessing another persons essence. In order to fully understand the self objectively there must be further research done on another person so that the self can understand themselves more than merely subjectively. Sartre argues in Being and Nothingness that in order to possess someone a person must want, to some degree, to be united with or bound to that lover. Sartre means that a person wants to possess their lover but not by completely controlling them. If a person were to completely control their lover then the objectivity that the person seeks would be completely destroyed. Basically, Sartre is describing the idea that by completely controlling a lover the person loses out on all objectivity that the person need to fully understand themselves. So the person would not be able to learn anything from their lover. Sartre describes in Being and Nothingness the want to find life in the will of a lover. According to Sartre a persons lover is the justification of their reason to be living which is Sartres explanation of the joy of love. Sartre also believes loving to be the act of deception amongst two people because it is the demanding to be loved by another person. According to Sartres philosophy the more a person gives significance to another, the more likely it is that the other person will reciprocate those feelings. Sartre determined that the essential problem of sexuality is the question of whether it is a contingent accident bound to our physiological nature or a necessary structure of being for-itself-for-others?3 This question leads Sartre to his analysis of the nature of desire. Sartres analysis of desire is revealed to be very different from the simple physical desires. The view
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Being and Nothingness p. 384 (will utilize footnotes to explain these concepts)

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Sartre takes on sexual desire is based off of sexual love. This meaning a person desires another person not simply based off of the need to physically relieve themselves but human relations. Sartre describes human sexuality in abstract terms of the broadest sense, and begins to turn the conversation of sexual desire into a discussion of subject-object relation.4 This broad discussion of human sexual desires is where many critics, like those in Philosophy of Sex (Alan Soble), begin to define and explain Sartres ideals on the phenomenon of double reciprocal incarnation5 and auto-erotic masturbation6. THESIS: The focus of this paper is to give an analysis of Sartres theories on sexual desire and romantic loving in Being and Nothingness in order to determine the meaning of human sexual existence. 2. The Analysis and Explanation of the Thesis Sexual desire for Sartre has less to do with the idea of actual sex organs and more so deals with the Being. Sartre believes that human sexual desire is a desire to become more conscious of another human being. He states that This is because when we do de sire a woman, we do not keep ourselves wholly outside the desire; the desire compromises me; I am the accomplice of my desire.7 Sartre is explaining the idea that normal desires and sexual desires take on a different form of human consciousness. When a person is hungry they will eat to satisfy the void, but sexual desire, according to Sartre, hinders human consciousness. Sartre states:

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Being and Nothingness p 406-408; double reciprocal incarnation See FN # 23. 6 Philosophy of Sex. general ref. Soble 7 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966); 388.

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Let any man consult his own experience; he knows how consciousness is clogged, so to speak, by sexual desire; it seems that one is invaded by facticity, that one ceases to flee it and that one slides toward a passive consent to the desire. At other moments it seems that facticity invades consciousness in its very flight and renders consciousness opaque to itself. It is like a yeasty tumescence of fact (Sartre, 1966). Sartre is describing his ideas of sexual desire as being something that overwhelms the being. Sexual desire not only controls the body but it also becomes a part of the mind. Robert D. Cumming, The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, helps to explain Sartres theory on the Caress as form of basically showing ones affection to their mate. Sartre states that (Sexual) Desire is expressed by the caress as thought is by language.8 According to Sartre, The fundamental problem of sexuality can therefore be formulated thus: is sexuality a contingent accident bound to our physiological nature, or is it a necessary structure of being-for-itself-for-others?9 3. The Arguments in Support of the Thesis Thomas Nagel10, Sexual Perversion, also analyses Sartres analysis of sexuality.11 (Working on Nagels critic. More to come.)

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966); 390. 9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966); 384. 10 Nagel believes that sexual activity between familiar partners is perverted because he means that sexual activity that involves his level of elevation is better between strangers. He rationalizes this idea with that notion that most married couples lose sexual interest in each other over time. ; POS 11.

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4. The Examination of Objections to the Thesis Roger Taylors, Sexual Experience12, essay gives an analytic perspective on human sexuality13. Taylor is a critic of Jean-Paul Sartres theory on sexual desire. Taylor believes that Sartres claim of sexual desire being essentially intentional because the only way a person can experience sexual desire is if other persons are the object of the that persons desires or the other is the occasion for sexual desire being elicited14. According to Taylors explanation of Sartres theory, Sartre views sexual desire as a desire to engage another person in relations. Taylor believes that Sartre is saying the only way to achieve sexual desire is that another person must be present, but this aspect of Sartres theory is where Taylor believes it to be flawed 15. Taylor gives a surface argument of Sartres theory by only arguing that Sartres analysis of sexual desire had errors instead of analyzing the true nature of the existence of sexual desire 16. One part of Taylors thesis deals with love and sexual desire while the second part is his attempt to critique Sartres theory17.

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Nagel argues that paradigmatic sexual activity involves not only desiring for another but also such elements as: desiring that the other recognize ones desire, the desire that the other be aroused by the others recognition of ones desire, and (to achieve reciprocity) the recognition that the other also intends to arouse, in turn, by making one aware of the others desire (Soble, 1980, p. 7) 12 Philosophy of sex, p. 59 13 Philosophy of sex, p. 5 Soble 14 Philosophy of Sex, p. 5 Soble 15 Philosophy of Sex, p. 6 Soble 16 Philosophy of Sex, p. 6 Soble 17 Philosophy of Sex, p. 59

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5. The Response to the Objections

According to Robert Solomon, Sexual Paradigm, sexual desire can be defined by its aims and objects18. Solomon believes that desire for sexual intercourse is the key reason for sexuality.19 Solomon is one of the critics of Sartre who stated Sexuality has an essential bodily dimension and this might well be described as the incarnation or submersion of a person into his body (Solomon, 91). (20More to come21)22 Hugh Wilders, The Language of Sex and the Sex of Language, discussion of the analogy between linguistic communication and sexual communication23. (More to come) Janice Moulton enters her reply to Nagel and Solomon in Sexual Behavior: Another Position (24). Moulton points out that Nagel in his analysis of Sartres theory focuses mostly on the sexual exchange between two people who are strangers25. 26

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Philosophy of sex p. 90 Philosophy of Sex p. 90 20 Solomon and Nagel find errors with Sartres Auto-erotic masturbation. POS, 10 21 Solomon agrees with Nagel that the form of sexuality is Sartrean, that sexuality is essentially a relation between persons and involves the reciprocal recognition of intentions. Solomon argues that a specification of the form of sexuality alone does not distinguish sexuality from other human activities (Soble, 1980, p. 9). 22 According to Solomon the content of sexuality is the goal of desire is the reason people will enter into a sexual union with another. ; POS 9. Solomon claims in his essay that Nagels view of the content of intentions is completely narrow.
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Philosophy of Sex p. 10 Moulton argues that because both Nagel and Solomon hold to a Sartrean view of the form of sexuality, their analyses are better suited to an account of flirtation and seduction (p.11) 25 POS, 11

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Outline: Alan Goldman, Plain Sex, sides with Taylor against Nagel and Solomon27. Sara Ann Ketchum, The Good, the Bad, and the Perverted, pokes a hole in Nagel and Solomons accounts of human sexuality by outlining the issue of rape28. Final critic: L. Nathan Oaklander, Sartre on Sex, helps to round out the overall analysis of sexuality that is centrally based off of Sartres view point in Being and Nothingness29.

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Moulton claims that sexual activity between people who know each other intimately for an extended period of time cannot be categorized in this manner. Moulton points out that sexual activity with familiar partners involve fancy items in the higher stages of Nagels theory. 11. 27 Both view sexual desire as desire for contact with another persons body and for the pleasure which such contact produces. ; POS 13 28 Ketchum is not interested in the debate between reductionists and expansionists, but instead is focused on the account that Solomon and Nagel outline the act of rape as Good Sex. Ketchum is not implying that Nagel and Solomon believe rape to be a morally good act. Neither Nagel nor Solomon discuss in detail about the issue of morality in sexual behaviors. POS 19. 29 Oaklanders main purpose in writing his essay is to give what he feels is a better explanation of Sartres view on sexuality. Terminology and theory that I need to look back into Sartres phenomenon of double reciprocal incarnation: the situation in wh ich the persons experiencing sexual desire are conscious of themselves as both subject and as object. This means that during the experience of sexual desire we are able to overcome the essential conflict that exists between ourselves and other persons that, therefore, the experience of sexual desire marks an ideal state; and that astonishing view that all sexual activity (undermines the ideal state of sexual desire because it satisfies and terminates the desire) is perverted. (Soble; 22-23)

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Footnotes FN: Christopher Hamilton, "Sexual Desire: Some Philosophical Reflections," Richmond Journal of Philosophy (2004): 27-33, FN: Raymond Belliotti, Good Sex: Perspectives on Sexual Ethics, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993). FN: Roger Taylor, "Sexual Experience," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 59-75. FN: Alan Goldman, "Plain Sex," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 119-138. FN: Alan Soble, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sex,"Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 1-56. FN: Donald Levy, "Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 169189. FN: Hugh Wilder, "The Language of Sex and the Sex of Language," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 99109. FN: Janice Moulton, "Sexual Behavior: Another Position, Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 110-118. FN: Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966).

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FN: Joshua Gamson, (Professor of Sociology at the University of San Francisco, Author of Claims to Fame: Celebrity in Contemporary America), "Popular Culture Constructs Sexuality," Introducing the New Sexuality Studies, 2011:27-31. FN: Kelly James, "Sexual Pleasure," chap. 5 in Introducing the New Sexuality, ed. Steven Seidman, Nancy Fischer, and Chet Meeks (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011). FN: L. Nathan Oaklander, "Sartre on Sex," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 190-208. FN: Linda LeMoncheck, Loose Women, Lecherous Men: A Feminist Philosophy of Sex, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 124. FN: Michael Slote, "Inapplicable Concepts and Sexual Perversion," Philosophy of Sex, ed. Robert Baker & Frederick Elliston (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1975), 261-268. FN: Robert Gray, "Sex and Sexual Perversion," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 158-168. FN: Robert Solomon, "Sex and Perversion," Philosophy of Sex, ed. Robert Baker & Frederick Elliston (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1975), 268-288. FN: Robert Solomon, "Sexual Paradigms," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 89-98. FN: Sara Ann Ketchum, "The Good, the Bad and the Perverted: Sexual Paradigms Revisited," Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980), 139-157.

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FN: Steven Seidman, "Theoretical Perspectives," chap. 1 in Introducing the New Sexuality, ed. Steven Seidman, Nancy Fischer, and Chet Meeks (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011). FN: W.M. Alexander, "Sartre and the Rationalization of Human Sexuality." (Working paper., 1998). Work Cited Alexander, W.M. "Sartre and the Rationalization of Human Sexuality." working paper. , 1998. Belliotti, Raymond. Good Sex: Perspectives on Sexual Ethics. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993. Hamilton, Christopher. "Sexual Desire: Some Philosophical Reflections." Richmond Journal of Philosophy. (2004): 27-33. Gamson, Joshua. "Popular Culture Constructs Sexuality." Introducing the New Sexuality Studies, 2011:27-31. Goldman, Alan. Plain Sex. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. Gray, Robert. Sex and Sexual Perversion. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. James, Kelly. Sexual Pleasure. Introducing the New Sexuality. Edited by Steven Seidman, Nancy Fischer, and Chet Meeks. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011.

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Ketchum, Sara Ann. The Good, the Bad and the Perverted: Sexual Paradigms Revisited. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. LeMoncheck, Linda. Loose Women, Lecherous Men: A Feminist Philosophy of Sex. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Levy, Donald. Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. Moulton, Janice. Sexual Behavior: Another Position. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. Nagel, Thomas. "Sexual perversion." Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 1 (1969): 5-17. Oaklander, L. Nathan. Sartre on Sex. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966. Seidman, Steven. Theoretical Perspectives. Introducing the New Sexuality. Edited by Steven Seidman, Nancy Fischer, and Chet Meeks. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. Slote, Michael. Inapplicable Concepts and Sexual Perversion. Philosophy of Sex. Edited by Robert Baker & Frederick Elliston. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1975. Soble, Alan. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sex. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980.

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Solomon, Robert. Sex and Perversion. Philosophy of Sex. Edited by Robert Baker & Frederick Elliston. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1975. Solomon, Robert. Sexual Paradigms. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. Taylor, Roger. Sexual Experience. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980. Wilder, Hugh. The Language of Sex and the Sex of Language. Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Edited by Alan Soble. Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980.