Intuition and Conception in Kant and Schopenhauer

Dr. Jason M. Costanzo

(Assistant Professor of Philosophy: St. Johns University, Queens NY)

Abstract To anyone familiar with both Kant and Schopenhauer, the most obvious distinction between these two philosophers involves the latters identification of the will with the thing-in-itself. It would accordingly be misleading to suggest that Schopenhauer is strictly speaking a Kantian, at least in any standard sense of the term. In spite of this, Schopenhauer both considered himself a student of Kant and likewise makes ample use of transcendental idealism within his own work. Understanding this application is certainly of interest, both from the historical perspective of his own thought, as well as from the perspective of the reception of Kant among later thinkers heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, as e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche. One specific and interesting question is then the manner in which Schopenhauer appropriates while radically altering Kants account of the nature and role of intuition and conception. In what follows, I offer a general overview and survey of the above problem. I consider first, Schopenhauers criticism of the Kantian account of intuition and conception as developed within the Critique of Pure Reason. I then turn to Schopenhauers proposed solution to the problems that he identifies and in relation to his own thought.

SCHOPENHAUERS CRITICISM OF KANT In pursuing the above problematic, I turn first to Schopenhauers Critique of Kantian Philosophy within the appendix to his World as Will and Representation. There, Schopenhauer establishes the perspective from which his criticism and analysis of intuition (Anschauung, Intuition) and conception (Abstraktion) will be made. He begins, pointing out that:
An essential difference between Kants method and that which I follow is to be found in the fact that he starts from indirect, reflected knowledge, whereas I start from direct and intuitive knowledge. (W1, pp. 452-453)1

Schopenhauer considers Kant as having accordingly neglected empirical experience, rather than intending to reject it explicitly. By way of confirmation, Schopenhauer further goes on to quote Kants initial declaration in the Prolegomena to Future Metaphysics wherein he states that:
The source of metaphysics cannot be empirical at all; its fundamental principles and concepts can never be taken from experience, either inner or outer. !"#$%&!"#!$%#&!''(!)*+,

According to Schopenhauer, such a starting point represents a fundamental misstepfor Kant is here taking as an assumption (that metaphysics isnt empirical) that which he ought to have first sought to prove. Is metaphysics really the: science of that which lies beyond the possibility of experience? (W1, p. 426.) Whether this is the case or not, the first step ought to have involved interrogation of experience in order to determine whether or not such a science is at all possible on the basis of experience. Following such an interrogation, if experience in fact revealed extant difficulties with such an approach, then it would be permissible to confidently reject metaphysics as Kant has done. But in contradistinction to Kant, Schopenhauer thinks that any such interrogation would necessarily reveal a much more positive result, as he indicates:

[T]he task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge. (W1, pp. 427-428)

Whereas Kant begins indirectly with reflection, Schopenhauer begins directly with experienceand it is precisely this move that serves to sharply divide these two thinkers. Thus Schopenhauer goes on to conclude that in consequence of his initial starting point, Kant: did not recognize the thing-in-itself directly in the will, but made a great and original step towards this knowledge. (W1, p. 422) Kants neglect of perception leads to a missed opportunity, but the more fundamental problem arises from the fact that as Schopenhauer suggests, Kant likewise:
[G]ives no theory of the origin of empirical perception (der empirischen Anschauung), but, without more ado, treats it as given, identifying it with the mere sensation to which he adds only the forms of intuition or perception, namely space and time, comprehending both under the name of sensibility. (W1, p. 445)

Although Schopenhauer is perhaps overstating the issue, there are a number of reasons to consider his criticisms relevant.2 Evidence of this is found, e.g., in the Critique and in particular in the Transcendental Logic, wherein Kant explicitly states:
Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty of cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind).3 (CPR, A50/B74)

The first source, Kant calls sensibility (Sinnlichkeit). Through this faculty, impressions are received and conditioned according to the pure a priori forms of space and time. Kant then refers to the second source as understanding (Verstand). Through understanding, pure a priori concepts or categories serve to synthesize the manifold of representations into the eventual perception of the world. As Kant will later go on to state within the first edition to the Transcendental Deduction:
Now these concepts, which contain a priori the pure thinking in every experience, we find in the categories, and it is already a sufficient deduction of them and justification of their objective validity if we can prove that by means of them alone an object can be thought. (CPR, A97)

It is in relation to the above account, here briefly highlighted, that Schopenhauer is led to conclude that Kant systematically confounds the respective nature of thinking and perception. For in suggesting that for empirical experience, the manifold of representations must be synthesized by concepts, Kant inevitably brings thinking into perception, as indeed, for Schopenhauer concepts involves always a universal, but perception a particular, and thus the character of perception is corrupted by the concept. Alternatively, inasmuch as a priori concepts cannot be known except by way of reflection upon experience and thus through intuition, as further reflected in Kants wellknown remark (CPR, A51/B75) to the effect that thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind, to that extent Schopenhauer likewise concludes that Kant inevitably brings perception into thinking. (W1, p. 439) In introducing intuition within the content of thinking, Schopenhauer argues that Kant taints the

universal character of thought with the particular, and in effect all manner of thinking: loses its essential character of universality and abstraction, and, instead of universal concepts, receives as its object individual things. (W1, p. 439) In other words, the universal and the particular mingle in such a way as to corrupt the very character of thinking itself. THE FORMAL AND EMPIRICAL REPRESENTATION Schopenhauers point of attack for addressing and resolving the above problems inherent to Kants account involves first a fundamental distinction within the representation of perception itself. As above discussed, Kants errors are based upon his having neglected any interrogation of experience from the very outset. In analyzing experience, with Kant, Schopenhauer first identifies sensation and sensibility. Here the two philosophers share similar views for both affirm the external existence of the thing-in-itself that is sensed and secondly, that this sensation is conditioned by the intuitive and quite pure forms of space and time lying a priori within human cognition. But it is the process that follows immediately after this initial point where these two philosophers diverge in their respective views. Whereas Kant affirms that an object is the direct result of sensibility, Schopenhauer denies thisconsidering such an object of sensibility a fundamental contradiction. For Schopenhauer, an object is never given as the direct product of sensibility, for otherwise, we would have something of an object-in-itself, an object requiring no subject, an individual thing, and yet not in time and space, because not perceptible; it is object of thinking, and yet not abstract concept. (W1, p. 444) For Schopenhauer, object can only arise after the fact of perception, and this, positively demands a relation of the sensation to its cause, and hence the application of the law of causality, and thus understanding. (W1, p. 445) As it stands, one cannot speak of objectin-itself but only of object-for-a-subject (Objekt-fr-ein-Subjekt), as translated from an unconditioned sensation into a conditioned representation through the combined intuitive operations of sensibility and understanding, the latter of which unites the pure forms of space and time (originating within sensibility) according to its own form of causality. Inasmuch as Schopenhauer distinguishes between that which is purely formal within the representation (the forms of space and time) and that which serves to intuitively unite this (causality) into the final empirical representation which is then perceived, to that extent, Schopenhauer distinguishes all representation into two kinds, viz., that of the empirical and formal (or pure) representation respectively. Within his earlier doctoral dissertation on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Schopenhauer there states first of the former that:
The first class of objects possible to our representative faculty, is that of intuitive, complete, empirical representations. (PSR, p. 31) 4

By intuitive, he means that concepts plays no part whatsoever in the resulting representation of perception. By complete is meant that such a representation is the result of the synthesis or union of intuitive forms. Finally, by empirical, is meant that perception and object arises only after the fact of this union. For Schopenhauer, representation is a purely intuitive processexcitation of the sense organs, the ordering of the data of the senses according to the forms of space and time (sensibility), receptivity

of a stimulus in the brain and the final union of space and time according to the law of causality given intuitively within human understanding. This process stands in evident contrast to Kants own above-discussed account wherein the final representation of the world is in some sense interwoven with pure abstract concepts through human understanding. From the empirical representation, Schopenhauer then distinguishes a formal or pure part, as he says:
It is the formal part of complete representationsthat is to say, the intuitions given us a priori of the forms of the outer and inner senses, i.e., of space and of time (PSR, p. 153)

According to this view, the data of the senses are first received by sensibility and immediately conditioned by the forms of space and time. This is then the ground of pure intuition. Space and time are then united according to the intuitive form of causality within human understanding. This latter point is then the ground of empirical perception and from this a representation results. According to Schopenhauer, within every such representation this step-by-step process is apparent and can in a way be subjected to phenomenological analysis, in consequence of which, the conditions for any experience may be dissected and isolated, thereby revealing that which is formal and empirical within experience as a whole. As is likewise evident from the above description, the empirical representation constitutes the ground of a posteriori experience and thus of that which is encountered within experience as object.5 On the other hand, insofar as time and space serve to condition the data of the senses prior to their union within human understanding, to that extent the formal part of the representation must be that which is pure within this experience. Schopenhauers reduction of human understanding to a purely intuitive and perceptual faculty thus serves as the basis for his resolution of the aforementioned problem that Kant brings thinking into perception. But one of the consequences of this reduction, as will be seen, is that intuition and conception are likewise now sharply divided and indeed in a way which leaves the question open as to how they are to later be mediated. To the nature of conception and the relationship between intuition and conception within Schopenhauers thought I now turn. THE ABSTRACT CONCEPT From the intuitive (formal and empirical) representation, Schopenhauer likewise distinguishes the abstract representation, as he states at the outset of his main work:
The main difference between all our representations is that between the intuitive (Intuitiven) and the abstract (Abstrakten). (W1, p. 6)

The ground of the former distinction has already been describedformal and empirical representations serve to account for the entirety of all object of perception. In consequence of this, the account of conceptual thinking must be ascribed to an entirely separate faculty, and this is precisely what Schopenhauer does. Now although he fundamentally believed that genuine knowledge arises on the basis of experience (viz., through knowledge of will and idea), it is interesting that Schopenhauer yet considered abstract knowledge as the distinguishing characteristic of

the human being over all other animals. Furthermore, the intuitive basis of Schopenhauers account of perception indicates the reasons as to why he thought that not only human beings but likewise any organism endowed with a certain degree of conscious life, must accordingly have understanding, as indeed the sole function of this faculty subsists in the union of space and time through its own form of causality, as Schopenhauer states:
The only essential distinction between the human race and animals, which from time immemorial has been attributed to a special cognitive faculty peculiar to mankind, called Reason (Vernunft), is based upon the fact that man owns a class of representations which is not shared by any animal. These are conceptions, therefore abstract, as opposed to intuitive, representations, from which they are nevertheless derived. (PSR, p. 114)

So although both human beings and animals have a share in understanding for purposes of experience and thus of representing the environment, the human being alone is privileged with a separate and distinct faculty that enables reflection upon the original and direct encounter of experience. This separate faculty of Reason has now the primary function of the: formation of the concept (das Begriff). (W1, p. 39) Through reason, the particular objects of representational experience are generalized and abstracted into a new kind of representation and object, viz., the concept. Consequently, Schopenhauer refers to concepts as universals abstracted after the fact of things (universalia post rem).6 (W2, p. 366) Of course, the primary purpose of reason isnt limited to concept formation in and of itself, but rather to the fact that through this faculty and power, we obtain the further capacity to mediate conceptually abstract and perceptually intuitive knowledge. This activity, which Schopenhauer refers to as the power of Judgment (Urteilskraft), serves now, in Humean fashion, to reunite the divide between intuition and conception, as indeed universal concepts are thought to find their ground within experience. The power of judgment likewise serves as both the cornerstone of his account regarding the principle of sufficient reason or ground as well as his response to the problem posed by Kant regarding the mutual interrelationship between concepts and intuitions. Schopenhauer thus concludes that:
The faculty of judgment is accordingly the mediator between intuitive and abstract knowledge, or between the understanding and reason. (PSR, pp. 121-122).

CONCLUDING REMARKS By way of a summary of our discussion, we have seen that although Schopenhauer appropriates the basic insights of transcendental idealism, he nonetheless criticizes Kant on a number of significant points. Principally among these (for our purposes here) is the view that Kant neglects experience and in consequence confounds the nature of thinking and perception on the basis of his melding of conception and intuition into the final representation of perception. As the focal point for this error, Schopenhauer identifies first Kants rather paradoxical notion of the object of sensibility, arguing that such an object is impossible and is the result of his failure to properly distinguish between sensibility and perception proper. For Schopenhauer, object arises only after the fact of the union of space and time according to the form of causality within human

understanding, and is the result of not the initial, but rather the final stage in the process of perception. The second more fundamental error involves Kants injection of concepts of understanding, which Schopenhauer considers purely abstract and universal, into perception, which he likewise considers entirely intuitive and as involving always only the particular. In consequence, Kant confounds thinking and perception, conception and intuition. In response to this, Schopenhauer sharply distinguishes between a formal and empirical part of representation, ascribing to sensibility the role of producing the former and to understanding the role of the latter. He likewise radically isolates intuition and conception attributing through the former the particular object of any perception and through the latter, the universal abstract object of any thought. As a final remark I should like to note that Schopenhauers above-stated criticisms are in some ways warranted, but his solution to the problem likewise leads to more fundamental difficulties. In the first place, Kants account of perception does indeed seem riddled with the problematic that what it means to think and to perceive are somehow confounded into a single process, and this seems to arise on account of his interweaving of pure concepts into the process of the synthesis of the manifold of perception itself. On the other hand, Schopenhauers radical isolation of intuition and conception leaves his own theory open to criticism inasmuch as Kants central insightthat concepts and intuitions must in some deeper sense be interwoven, gets lost. For Schopenhauer considers concepts as certain kinds of abstraction representations and hence as objects, but if indeed concept is object, then how is concept thought, particularly if such an object is radically isolated from intuition? Although Schopenhauer attempts to mediate this divide through his notion of the principle of sufficient ground or reason, it nonetheless remains a question as to whether this mediation has at all been successful.

Schopenhauer, Arthur, The World as Will and Representation, volumes I&II (W1&W2), Trans. E.F.J. Payne, New York: Dover Publications (1958) 2 For example: The effect of an object upon the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. (A20/B34) 3 Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Trans. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Alan Wood, Cambridge University Press (1999). 4 Schopenhauer, Arthur, On the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). Translated by Karl Hillebrand, New York: Prometheus Books (2006) 5 Though this does not serve to constitute the whole of all that which arises as object, as indeed, through the abstraction representation universal concepts as object likewise arise. 6 In contradistinction to the ideas of the will, which he characterizes with Plato as universals beyond thingsuniveralia ante rem.