Brokering Authority: Translating knowledge, policy and practice in forestry institutions in Indonesia

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By Steve Rhee Dissertation Director: Professor Michael R. Dove

December 2006

 2007 by Suk Bae Rhee All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my doctoral committee, Michael Dove, Carol Carpenter and Arun Agrawal, for their unending support of my doctoral research and for their mentoring and contributions to my personal and intellectual growth. Several faculty members at Yale have also supported my intellectual development during my graduate research. Within the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, I would like to thank Bill Burch, John Wargo, Mark Ashton, and Lisa Curran for their support and guidance in different phases of my graduate work. I would like to express special thanks to Amity Doolittle for her years of advising, friendship, and intellectual feedback. Thank you also to Elisabeth Barsa, Ann Prokop and Charles Waskiewicz for their tireless administrative support. In other departments at Yale, I would like to thank Jim Scott, Eric Worby, Deborah Davis, and Helen Siu for their support at different stages of the dissertation process. Multiple individuals and institutions in Indonesia were instrumental in my dissertation research. I am especially grateful to CIFOR and particularly Lini Wollenberg, Bruce Campbell, Bev Sitole, Yemi Katerere and David Kaimowitz for their encouragement and intellectual guidance. I would especially like to thank Lini Wollenberg for inviting me to CIFOR to collaborate with and be part of her research team, as well as for her guidance and support. I owe many thanks to Bruce Campbell, Bev Sitole, Yemi Katerere and David Kaimowitz for their personal and intellectual support and helping me feel part of CIFOR. I am also grateful for the time and effort on the part of many other friends at CIFOR, most notably Dina Hubudin, Moira Moeliono, Godwin Limberg, Ramses Iwan, Made Sudana, Asung Uluk, Njau Anau, Tony Djogo, Koen Kusters, William Sunderlin, Chris Barr, Trish

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Shanley, Kristof Obizinski, Citlali Lopez, Yani Saloh, Widya Prajanthi and Petrus Gunarso. I would also like to extend a very special thanks to the administrative staff of CIFOR. I am also deeply indebted to the villagers and government officials in Malinau, especially the villagers of Long Loreh and the family of Merang Lian, for their hospitality, untiring patience with my questions, and willingness to allow me to participate in their lives. I would also like to thank Bernard Sellato and Lars Kaskija for providing me their unpublished research reports on Malinau and different Dayak groups. I would also like to thank the Ministry of Forestry, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), the international donor and NGO community and Indonesian NGO community for facilitating and assisting in this research. I would especially like to thank Reed Merrill, Tim Brown, Tim Nolan, Yvan Biot and Hiroshi Nakata. Deep appreciation goes to my family and friends. Many thanks to my mother, Joe Rhoden, and Chris Haney for their unending love and laughter. I would also like to thank Eva Garen and others in the Dove Carpenter Doctoral Lab for their intellectual and personal support. This research would not have been possible without the generous financial support of many organizations throughout the course of my research. My Masters and pre-dissertation field research was generously funded by the G. Evelyn Hutchinson Prize from the Yale Institute of Biospheric Studies (2001), the Charles Kao Fund at Yale (2001), the Yale Center for International and Area Studies (2001), the Council on Southeast Asian Studies at Yale (2001, 2000, and 1999), the Tropical Resources Institute at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (2001 and 1999), the Program in Agrarian Studies at Yale (2001, 2000, and 1999), and the Fulbright-Hays Group Projects Abroad Program (2000).

My dissertation field research was generously funded by the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Program, US Education Department (2002-3); the International Dissertation Research Fellowship, the Social Science Research Council (20023); the Program in Science and Technology Studies, National Science Foundation (Award Number 0220408, 2002-3); the Teresa Heinz Scholars for Environmental Research, The Teresa and John III Heinz Foundation (2002-3); and the Science to Achieve Results (STAR) Fellowship, US Environmental Protection Agency, 2003-6 (Award Number U-91610501-1). Further, my graduate studies would not have been possible without the generous support of Yale. During my Masters study I received a Full Fellowship for a Master's degree from the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (1998-2000). In my doctoral studies, Yale provided me a Fellowship for Ph.D. study from the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2000-2004). Any errors in this dissertation are entirely my own.

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Abstract Brokering Authority: Translating Knowledge, Policy and Practice in Forestry Institutions in Indonesia Steve Rhee 2007 This dissertation examines the nexus of research, policy and practice from village to global levels regarding forest management and local communities control over forest resources and improved local livelihoods in Indonesia. I investigate how problems and solutions are articulated; how these articulations are transformed in practice; how practice is translated into knowledge or policy; and how particular interpretations of practices become authoritative. In doing so, I examine the culture of and relationships between forestry institutions in Indonesia, highlighting the role of brokers of authority -- individuals and/or organizations that skillfully translate social reality into an order that not only resonates with the different logics, interests, and expectations of relevant institutions, but also recruits support for their interpretation to become authoritative. The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and the Donor Forum on Forestry in Indonesia (DFF) are the key interlocutors studied, and CIFORs applied research activities in Indonesian Borneo and the landscape of international aid-related forestry institutions are the contexts within which they are examined. With respect to CIFOR, I investigate in one analytical frame (1) project plans and intentions, (2) the context within which activities take place and the relationships between the different actors, and (3) how the difference between plan and outcome is addressed to a broader public. I show that although activities do not proceed as planned, CIFORs reporting and publishing of unintended outcomes incorporates this unraveling into an authoritative

narrative of prescriptions for CIFORs interpretive community. Essential to legitimizing and mobilizing support for these prescriptions and CFIOR more generally is their articulation through the vehicle of self-critical reflection. I also examine the tension between order and disjuncture in the landscape of aidrelated forestry institutions in Indonesia. I analyze how the order or narrative of reform agreeable to both donors and the Indonesian government was crafted and maintained by the DFF in its brokering role, while no actual progress was made on agreed upon commitments. Moreover, I investigate the structural dynamics that explain this lack of progress and the ineffectiveness of aid in Indonesia. In doing so, I reveal the disconnect between knowledge, policy and practice, as well as how these disjunctures are maintained.

TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figuresv List of Tables.v Acronyms and Glossaryvi Acknowledgements...ix Preface1 Chapter 1: Introduction8 Dissertation Topic..8 Context and Setting of the Dissertation...18 Indonesias Relevance...18 The landscape of international aid-related forestry institutions 19 CIFOR and CIFOR in Malinau..20 CIFOR as linked to and as part of the landscape of aid-related forestry institutions27 Significance of the dissertation31 Summary of dissertation chapters36 Chapter 2: Theoretical Considerations and Research Methodology42 Introduction..42 Analytical Tools and Theoretical Considerations42 Poststructural political ecology and powerful institutions.44 Studies of science and scientific communities...47 Articulations, collaborations and local transformations of interventions..51 Institutional ethnographies that integrate structural-discursive and actor-oriented approaches..54 Research Methodology61 Overview of Methods61 Rationale of Methods.65 My Positionality.66 Methodological, theoretical and moral implications of studying up..70 Reflexivity, the politics of representation, and the call to study up.71 Issues related to studying up73 Audiences.74 Chapter 3: The Research Context: The forest and institutional landscapes in the context of Indonesias political-economic transitions.80 Introduction80 Indonesia: From centralization towards decentralization..80 A difficult transition to decentralization: the legacy of the New Orders Institutions...82 The New Orders development ideology and the marginalization of forest dependent people.84 Territorialization initiatives of the New Order86

Decentralization in process: Uncertainty and Ambiguity89 Broader political economic context of forestry and international forestry aid..93 Political economic drivers of deforestation.93 Summary of international donors, activities and trends...98 Malinau and Decentralization..106 Brief description of people and place107 Decentralization processes in Indonesia related to forestry and community management...115 CIFOR in Malinau: institutional arrangements and plans...120 Formal institutional relationships..120 CIFOR activities in Malinau, particularly Adaptive Collaborative Management.126 Chapter 4: Locating CIFOR locally: Relationships and perceptions of villagers, district government and CIFOR in Malinau..132 Introduction..132 Decentralization processes and dynamics of village-government relations132 Villagers perceptions of their relations with district government132 Patron-client...132 Social structures in which relationships are embedded.134 District governments relationship with and perceptions of villagers...139 Unconcerned with villagers aspirations139 Government knows better..140 Visions of development: revenue, infrastructure, and payment for environmental services...142 Summary of background, context and village-government relationships.145 Perceptions and relationships between CIFOR, villagers and local government147 District governments perceptions and relationship with CIFOR: fragile, tenuous and constrained.147 District government does not use CIFORs research.148 District government is heterogeneous, which affects the relationship with CIFOR149 Role of CIFOR is fragile and constrained..151 CIFOR is not a powerful actor, not integral and has different priorities.151 Example of constraining: Mapping and evolution of district governments perceptions..154 Constraining and destabilizing continue to be factors...158 District government constrains but maintains engagement...160 Summary of district government perceptions and relationship with CIFOR166 Villagers perceptions and relationship with CIFOR: a key interlocutor of whom much is expected but who has been unable to deliver...169 CIFOR as interlocutor: Bridge, information source, confidant, advocate.169 Villagers disappointment with CIFOR: lack of tangible benefits175 Expectations unmet: Unfounded assumptions and unsupportive institutional environment...177

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Case study of articulation and alienation: Setulang, Setarap, Sentaban and CIFOR...187 Summary of analysis of perceptions and relationships regarding CIFOR.195 Chapter 5: Locating CIFOR globally: How CIFOR attempts to have global influence and address its role in Malinau..199 Introduction..199 CIFOR writes about the politics of relationships and critically reflects on its role.200 CIFOR writes about power relations in Malinau...200 CIFOR writes self-critical reflections of experience in Malinau...201 CIFOR writes about political role of research and the institutions in Malinau..201 CIFOR writes about intra-institutional issues207 CIFOR advocates and articulates changes based on and legitimized by Malinau field experience and through the vehicle of self critique...209 Analysis of how CIFORs articulation of change works.222 CIFORs position and leverage in the international community...223 CIFORs use and refashioning of mainstream discourse: boundary objects.224 CIFORs long-term presence in Malinau: The cachet of being there226 Summary of Analysis and Conclusion...227 Preface to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7..230 Chapter 6: Forestry and The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI): Crafting and maintaining the master metaphor of forestry reform in Indonesia233 Introduction..233 The CGI and forestry as a CGI agenda item234 The CGI and its importance...234 Forestry as a top tier issue at the CGI....238 Analysis of CGI statements and their evolution..241 Coalescing the master metaphor: The Removing the Constraints seminar241 The master metaphor materializes and evolves.246 The platform of the master metaphor.246 An analysis of the evolution of the master metaphor250 Donors and the lack of progress.250 GOI and the lack of progress.258 Overall analysis of donor and government statements..265 Evaluations and assessments: An analysis of the 1998 IMF forestry conditionalities, the relationship to the CGI experience and institutional amnesia....267 Conclusion...273

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Chapter 7: The Donor Forum on Forestrys role as broker: Institutional relationships, incentives and logics that explain the disjuncture in Indonesian forestry reform.274 Introduction..274 Perceptions of the DFF by the usual suspects..283 The usual suspects perception of the DFF..283 The usual suspects perceptions of the CGI and their relationship with their respective donor agencies..288 A case of dual identities.288 Institutional incentives of donors...292 The usual suspects perceptions of their relationship with MOF296 Perceptions of the DFF by central government agencies.301 The Ministry of Forestrys perceptions of DFF.301 MOFs negative perception of the international aid agenda..306 Other central government agencies perceptions of the DFF307 Perceptions of the DFF by the diplomatic corps..311 Donors skeptical and cautious engagement with forestry issues..311 Institutional arrangements that work against a concerted effort by donors...315 Perceptions of DFF by Indonesian NGOs...318 Summary of analysis and conclusions.324 Chapter 8: CIFOR researchers experiences practicing science.328 Introduction..328 Description and analysis of CIFOR researchers experiences.329 Impact-oriented science.329 Evolution of the idea of impact-oriented science at CIFOR..329 Researchers experiences and thoughts on implementing impact-oriented science..334 Nature, timing and timeframes of research334 Simplification and translation: media, donors and credibility...336 Audiences...336 Communication: simplification and credibility.340 Priority Setting...347 Donor-driven..349 Natural and social sciences354 Programme strategies and their implications.358 Partnerships and capacity building362 Theory of partnerships and capacity building in CIFOR...362 Reality of partnerships and capacity building363 Perceptions of tradeoffs and institutional incentives.368 Conclusion...372 Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusions..374 Summary..374 Conclusions..381 Bibliography.392

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List of Figures Figure 1: Map of Indonesia in the context of Southeast Asia9 Figure 2: Map of the Malinau District in Borneo10 Figure 3: Map of the District of Malinau in East Kalimantan, Indonesia11 Figure 4: Map of Ethnic Groups in Malinau..111

List of Tables Table 1: Indonesias Membership in International Conservation Treaties..99 Table 2: Indonesias MOUs/Agreements to Curb Illegal Logging100 Table 3: Summary of Funding for Donor Projects in the Forestry Sector.105

PREFACE FORGING LINKS This dissertation is an ethnography of forestry institutions in Indonesia. I analyze the relationship between local and global dynamics of international conservation and development interventions and the role of research in these interventions. My interest in this topic stems from and has evolved with my professional and academic experiences. The roughest contours of my dissertation topic were shaped by two formative work experiences. From 1993 to 1996 I served as science teacher and teacher trainer with the Peace Corps in Nepal. I was fresh out of college with an undergraduate degree in anthropology and was nave and earnest enough to think that helping people was straightforward. My Peace Corps experience was illuminating in several ways. I had my first glimpse of the elusiveness of sustainable development: During my first year, I taught math, science and English in a rural Nepalese school in the western Terai. During my second year, I was a teacher trainer at a district Secondary Education Development Unit (SEDU), where science teachers throughout the district would come for two-month trainings on the curriculum content and teaching methods that were more student-oriented and participatory, and less passive learning and rote memory focused. The sustainability element of my Peace Corps service was supposed to be during this period of training teachers the metaphor being give a man a fish; you have fed him for today. Teach a man to fish, and you have fed him for a lifetime. In hindsight, given that I myself had never been a teacher (the assumption was my Western education had sufficiently prepared me), it was altogether dubious what I could offer. There were incentives for teachers to attend (e.g., per diem and added credentials), but few if any to use the training

materials in their own schools. Granted, there were always one or two individuals who were deeply committed to teaching and absorbed and improved upon what the trainers offered. By and large, however, teachers in Nepal were part of an education system that did not integrate or reward using the materials taught in teacher trainings, and indeed there were strong disincentives to using them. To return to the fishing metaphor, I might have been teaching a man how to fish, but he lived in desert, which is to say that the teacher trainings ignored the broader educational system and problems therein. In addition to these direct experiences of grappling with issues of sustainable development, by virtue of living in Nepal, a country heavily dependent on international aid, I observed lots of development debris littered throughout the country: rusted village water pumps due to the unavailability or costliness of replacement parts, empty school buildings because there were no teachers, putrid school latrines because of a lack of maintenance, and libraries of unopened books behind locked cabinets because the principal did not want the books damaged. Due to my Peace Corps training I spoke fluent Nepali and spent the vast majority of my time living and working with people in rural settings. It was at that time unclear to me how international development workers based in Kathmandu could do or know much, particularly given that most did not speak Nepali and rarely seemed to leave Kathmandu. The situation became somewhat clearer once I started working for an international NGO. In Indonesia for one year (1997-1998) I worked for CARE International Indonesia as a program advisor writing proposals and donor reports, preparing training manuals for projects and conducting project evaluations. This was quite an ambivalent experience for me. On the one hand, I found the work extremely satisfying I learned a lot, and I felt I was

contributing to a good cause. On the other hand, I was astonished that someone, such as myself, with no field experience in Indonesia and a minimal understanding of the country at the time was allowed to handle the aforementioned tasks. Perhaps even more astonishing was the limited amount of verifiable and verified data that was required in donor reports and proposals. I drew upon in-house expertise of CARE staff and consulted various government and aid-related publications, but there seemed to be little demand for or interest in rigorous, groundtruthed studies to inform reports and proposals. This period was an extremely busy one for CARE in 1997-98 Indonesia was experiencing multiple crises: the economic crisis related to the devaluation of the rupiah, the related political instability resulting in the fall of the 32-year Suharto regime, and the El Nino related drought. These multiple crises were a boon for CARE, which had focused on community development in water, environment and health sectors and whose original mandate in Indonesia and elsewhere was disaster relief. These multiple crises meant both increased international attention to and financial resources available for NGOs such as CARE. Indeed, donors regularly came to CARE to request that CARE submit proposals for various funds made available because of these crises, e.g., distribution of rice throughout Indonesia donated from the US due to perceived shortage. This was a period of frenzied proposal writing, during which expediency trumped fact-checking, which donors seemed to encourage as well. Submitting proposals during the window of opportunity took precedence over everything else. Indeed, I recall asking the CARE Country Director a seasoned development practitioner with over 30 years of experience -- whether CARE had the capacity to implement all of the projects we were submitting proposals for. She admitted that CARE did not, but that Indonesia was in the international aid limelight and thus CARE

had to take advantage of it now before the international community moved its attention elsewhere. My village level experience in Peace Corps juxtaposed to my experience in international NGO institutional culture piqued my interest in examining the relationship between field and institutional realities, which is what I explored in Masters work at Yale (1998-2000). My motivation for exploring these issues was to learn to be a better practitioner; I never planned on being an academic. Before starting the Masters degree, I assumed that reconciling these two realities would be feasible and just required better management skills. During Masters studies, through work with the individuals who are on this dissertation committee Michael Dove, Carol Carpenter and Arun Agrawal as well as others at Yale, I was quickly disabused of this. In addition to becoming aware of the complexities of the relationship between field and institutional realities, I also realized that being a better practitioner would require a deeper and broader understanding of the issues raised in my Masters work, and thus I pursued those issues in the doctoral program. As a Masters student, I was fortunate enough to establish an institutional relationship with CIFOR in 1999 to collaborate with Dr. Eva Wollenberg and her team in Malinau, East Kaimantan (Indonesian Borneo) on the then recently initiated Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) project, which was a participatory action research initiative focused on empowering local communities and improving their negotiating skills. During the summer of 1999, I conducted fieldwork for my Masters degree project in Indonesia, collaborating with CIFOR and also examining the broader landscape of institutions. Through CIFOR and Yales network, I was able to build upon the contacts I had established during my previous

work in Indonesia with CARE International as a program advisor. Collaborating with CIFOR proved productive and informative for multiple reasons, and one issue in particular became a central concern of my dissertation research, viz., the role of science and research in international conservation and development interventions, which I examine and elaborate upon in this dissertation. Since the summer of fieldwork in 1999, I have maintained my institutional affiliation with CIFOR and continued to collaborate with Dr. Wollenberg and her team, as well as others at CIFOR, including Dr. Bruce Campbell and Dr. Yemi Katerere. Over the years, my research project has expanded in breath and depth, building upon my previous research and maintaining my commitment to fieldwork in the ethnographic and anthropological traditions. My primary affiliation with CIFOR has been through Dr. Wollenberg to collaborate with the ACM team in Malinau, East Kalimantan. This affiliation was articulated through a boilerplate CIFOR internship agreement with a proposal of my research appended to it. According to this agreement, Dr. Wollenberg was formally my advisor at CIFOR and institutionally accountable for me at CIFOR, although the reality was a much more relaxed and fluid relationship 1 . CIFOR did not provide me monetary compensation to conduct my research, but did provide me with logistical assistance and office space, which was equally as important. Even more importantly, CIFOR researchers and staff helped me feel that I was part of the institution, and in particular Dr. Wollenberg treated me as one of the ACM team members. And, indeed, I very much felt that I was a part of the institution from a personal and professional standpoint. Further, I shared interests with and learned immensely from CIFOR researchers and their ongoing projects.

In mid-2004 this official role shifted to Dr. Yemi Katerere since my research concerns at that time resonated closely with his interests. I maintained a close relationship with the ACM team, however.

With respect to research agendas, although there was overlap in research interests and collaboration between CIFOR and myself, I maintained my own research project and was not an integral component of any CIFOR research project. My research agenda evolved over time, and CIFOR was flexible and generous in accommodating the evolution in research emphases. In addition to collaborating with CIFOR on ACM in Malinau as well as other initiatives, I also spent extended periods carrying out components of my research that were independent of the shared research interests with CIFOR, e.g., research regarding the international donor community and government agencies involved in forestry issues in Indonesia. CIFOR was flexible and understanding in my fluid engagement with the institution. In addition to this affiliation with CIFOR, viz., as a graduate student conducting collaborative research with CIFOR, my relationship with CIFOR also included at times working on CIFOR initiatives that were tangential to my primary research project, but informative and rewarding nonetheless. For example, on several occasions I assisted CIFOR researchers to develop proposals -- usually under tight deadline -- on topics beyond the immediate scope of my research project. Working on these initiatives that were priorities for CIFOR not only helped me build rapport and social capital with CIFOR researchers and staff, but often proved the most productive way to learn about the institution. As Mosse (2005: 12) observes, it is virtually impossible to sustain long-term participant observation in the absence of making a practical contribution.being a member of the community and having a certain status (Mosse 2005: 12). Mosses observation loomed prominently not only in my relationship with CIFOR, but also with other forestry-related institutions as well. To gain the access and depth

necessary to complete my dissertation research successfully, I looked for ways to embed myself in the practitioner community through activities that they perceived as practical contributions, e.g., providing training materials to the Ministry of Forestry regarding policy analysis, participating in an assessment of the Donor Forum on Forestry, and helping to write an assessment of Indonesias tropical forests and biodiversity. In addition to being vital to my dissertation research, these experiences proved professionally beneficial and productive. I gained not only a better understanding the logic of the practitioner community by directly practicing it, but also additional credibility and legitimacy by working with that communitys members on their priorities. In this regard, I was both an insider and outsider to the practitioner community concerned with Indonesias forests, and although I attempt a dispassionate, academic analysis in this dissertation, [t]here is no position from which I can analyse the circuitry of project and policy processeswhich does not place me within it as a member of the communities I describe (Mosse 2005: 11). Thus, my analysis is an interested interpretation, whose objectivitycannot be that derived from standing above the fray or of suppressing subjectivity, but rather that which comes from maximizing the capacity of actors to object to what is said about them (to raise concerns, insert questions and interpretations) (Latour 2000) (Mosse 2005: 14). And thus, the task of this dissertation, of knowledge production and circulation generally, is forging links between different knowledges that are possible from different locations (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 39 cited in Mosse 2005). It is in this spirit of forging links between different knowledges that I write and present this ethnography of forestry institutions in Indonesia.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION I. Dissertation Topic Capitalizing on opportunities made possible through de facto decentralization in Indonesia starting in mid-2000, village leaders of several forest dependent Dayak 1 communities in Malinau, East Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) (see Figures 1, 2 and 3) used maps of village territories to sell felling rights to entrepreneurial timber companies. These agreements created unprecedented benefits for these villages. For several villages, three years of fees generated through these timber companies averaged USD 1,000 2 per household compared to USD 1,500 annually per village from large-scale timber companies that had operated under the previous centralized regime (Wollenberg et al. [In press]). At the same time, these agreements created and exacerbated inter- and intra-village conflicts. Unclear territorial rights to forests preceding and during the transition toward decentralization, as well as an ambiguous institutional environment, led to increased boundary disputes between villages, as well as intra-village jealousies and accusations (Wollenberg et al. [In press]). Indeed, village heads often negotiated unofficial benefits for themselves with these entrepreneurial timber companies (Wollenberg et al. [In press]).

"Dayak" is an umbrella term referring to the indigenous, upland, and forest dependent groups of Borneo. At least six villages in the Malinau watershed used maps to justify claims to forests and negotiate with these timber concessionaires (Limberg [forthcoming]). The quantity paid was Rp. 8.2 million or USD 965, using an exchange rate of 8,500.

Figure 1: Map of Indonesia in the context of Southeast Asia

Source: CIA World Factbook (http://sportsforum.ws/sd/factbook/geos/id.html)

Figure 2: Map of the Malinau District in Borneo

Source: Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]

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Figure 3: Map of the District of Malinau in East Kalimantan, Indonesia

Source: Barr et al. 2001

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In several cases, the maps of village territories used to broker deals with these timber companies were made in collaboration with the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) as part of one of its applied research initiatives. This initiative attempts to empower communities to increase their control and access over forest resources and to help communities resolve conflicts. Started just prior to decentralization in 1999, mapping was initiated by CIFOR at the request of the 27 villages in the Malinau watershed. Representatives from each of the villages were trained in mapping technologies so that villages could use the maps as bargaining tools and in the resolution of boundary disputes. For CIFOR, mapping was intended to diminish conflicts between actors caused by competing claims to land and rich natural resources, empower local villagers and lead to improved livelihoods and healthier forests (Rocheleau 1995, Sirait et al. 1994; cf. Fox 1998, Peluso 1995). These expectations were only partially met, and many unintended effects resulted. As the mapping exercise progressed in 1999 and 2000, de facto decentralization ensued and the district government of Malinau 3 began issuing licenses for small-scale timber concessionaires with short time horizons, provided that the villages claiming the forest areas agreed. A key justification for villages claims to forested areas was the maps created with the facilitation of CIFOR. Although CIFOR had made explicit that these maps were not legal or authoritative, villagers used and were allowed to use them as tools of legitimizing claims anyway. Permits and justifications for these timber concessions were approved by the district government. How would CIFOR address the unintended effects of its mapping exercise? Would these unintended effects be ignored? Would they be explained away and the mapping

In late 1999 the Malinau district was formed out of a division of the much larger Bulungan district and accordingly a new district government was formed. Please see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of this.

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exercise considered a success? Or would the mapping exercise be considered a failure? CIFOR did none of the above, but instead wrote an article about the mapping in Malinau, critically reflecting on their experience as facilitators and relationships with villagers and other local actors, as well as articulating a set of recommendations or suggestions for others who plan to conduct similar exercises (Anau et al 2003). CIFOR published the article and also circulated it through various information clearinghouses such as Participatory Avenues. 4 Instead of success or failure, CIFOR used its mapping experience as data, and it became science and lessons learned. In doing so, CIFOR attempted to translate its experience into authoritative knowledge and practitioner policy. CIFOR attempted to do this in part by leveraging its position as an international research institute, but equally as importantly by connecting to and articulating with the concerns of the broader community of international conservation and development institutions interested in forests, the empowerment of forest dependent people and tools to achieve that empowerment such as community mapping. CIFORs mapping exercise in Malinau and the way in which CIFOR addressed that experience raise a series of issues that are the central concerns of this dissertation, viz., the connections between (1) institutional logics and relationships, (2) the making and maintaining of authoritative interpretations, and (3) the translation between knowledge, practice and policy. CIFORs authority locally was limited and fragile the use of the maps (and thus the meaning of the maps) by both villagers and the district government was out of the control of CIFOR. However, at the international level, CIFOR attempted to make itself and its experience authoritative through the idiom of science and forging links with its

www.iapad.org

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community of conservation and development practitioners, or its interpretive community (Mosse 2004). The authority of CIFOR and its knowledge was not a given, but rather had to be made. Thus, examining how certain interpretations become authoritative -- or not -- also requires an understanding of the broader landscape of institutions that CIFOR shares concerns and interests with. CIFOR and its applied research initiative in Malinau are indicative of the nexus of international, national and local concerns over sustainable forest management and forest-dependent people's livelihoods in Indonesia and elsewhere. Since the late 1990s international agencies in Indonesia have funded and implemented forestry sector projects aimed at sustainable use by multiple stakeholders through grants totaling approximately USD 300 million (Rhee et al. 2004). The Indonesian government has also articulated similar concerns and priorities. The Ministry of Forestrys (MOFs) five priorities to reform the forestry sector include strengthening the process of forest sector decentralization, and the Ministry considers social forestry as one of the cross-cutting issues in the sector (Ministry of Forestry Statement December 2003). Thus both the government and international community agree upon a master metaphor (Mosse 2004) of forest reform, which includes decentralized forest governance and local community management. Even though there is a significant community or landscape of institutions, including CIFOR, that shares an authoritative interpretation of and interest in forestry reform in Indonesia, the reality dramatically differs from this master metaphor (Mosse 2004) of reform. Indonesia loses more than 2.4 million hectares per year the highest rate in the world. From 1985 to 2000 Indonesia lost 25 million hectares of forest the size of the

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United Kingdoms land area (Barber and Schweithelm 2000). Given the persistence of both the narrative of forest reform and the reality of deforestation, examining how policy and practice are reconciled, and how the disjuncture is maintained, is vital to this study. Thesis of Dissertation This dissertation examines the nexus of research, policy and practice from village to global levels with respect to forest management generally and local communities control over forest resources and improved local livelihoods in Indonesia specifically. I investigate how problems and solutions related to forest management and community forestry -- broadly defined -- in Indonesia are articulated; how these articulations are operationalized and transformed in practice; how practice is translated into knowledge or policy; and how particular interpretations of practices become authoritative. This study investigates how knowledge is produced, circulated and becomes authoritative, as well as how knowledge is put into practice and the effects of that knowledge for forest dependent communities. In short, I examine the institutional culture of and relationships between forestry institutions in Indonesia, particularly those with an interest in decentralized forest governance and community forestry. In doing so, I demonstrate that the disconnect or disjuncture between knowledge, policy and practice is reconciled by brokers of authority individuals and/or organizations that skillfully translate the disjuncture into an order that not only resonates with the logics and expectations of relevant institutions, but also recruits support for their interpretation to become authoritative (Mosse 2005). I examine how and why certain individuals and institutions become brokers and how (un)successful brokering is carried out, or in other words the social processes by which order is created and maintained out of the

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disjuncture between knowledge, policy and practice and between institutions through translations across institutional realities and languages (Mosse 2005). The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and its applied research initiatives in Malinau, East Kalimantan are focal points through which these issues are examined, i.e., an intensive case study and a window through which I study the relationships of other forestry institutions in Indonesia, e.g., the international donor community involved in forestry and the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry. This study attempts not only to focus on and link CIFOR and CIFORs activities in Malinau to the broader landscape of aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia, but also to examine this institutional landscape equally as deeply. Research Questions Through an institutional ethnography 5 of CIFOR and the broader landscape of international-aid related forestry institutions 6 in Indonesia, I aim to address the following questions: How are research concerns selected and how is knowledge about those concerns produced within CIFOR and then disseminated?

I follow Eybens (2003:4) use of ethnography, which is informed by Comaroff and Comaroff: Comaroff and Comaroff define ethnography as the study of meaningful practice produced in the interplay of subject and object, of the contingent and contextual. Even macro-historical processeshave their feet on the ground and are therefore suitable cases for treatment (Comaraoff and Comaroff 1992, cited in Eyben 2003). Ethnography in this sense revalidates the importance of being there in a particular place and time. It validates individual agency, that is the difference each one of us can make, even as a member of a donor community.

I use the term institutions in two different, yet related ways, articulated clearly by Hobley (1996: 12): Institutions can be considered to be (i) regulatory arrangements such as customs or sets of rules, values or practices accepted by members of a particular group and which tend to lead to repetition of patterns of behavior; and (ii) organizational arrangements which include ordered groups of people such as a family, farm, private firm, non-profit or governmental agency (Gibbs, 1986, quoted in Fox, 1991: 60; Uphoff, 1986, 1992). In forestry there are several important levels of interpretation of what constitutes an institution, which will be discussed here in the light of decentralization policies: namely, property rights institutions; the formal institutions covert and overt; and the non-formal institutions for resource management (extant or new).

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What are the effects of CIFORs knowledge production for forest dependent communities in the context of a rapidly changing political landscape in Indonesia?

How do global, national and local institutions ideas of forest management and improved local livelihood articulate with each other, e.g., international forestry institutions and government agencies in Indonesia?

How do institutional structure and culture influence the framings of forest management problems and solutions?

How do actors translate these framings into practice, and how does practice inform these framings?

How do certain knowledges, policies and practices become authoritative? What processes of translation, interpretation and articulation are entailed, and how do they engage broader political-economic and institutional dynamics? The answers to these questions required an ethnographic focus on how knowledge is

produced, used and transformed at local, regional, national and international levels, as well as attention to the relationship between local level natural resource uses with regional, national and global political economy. This translated into more than 24 months (August 2002August 2004) of multisited fieldwork in Indonesia using a suite of methods: participant observation, interviews, document analysis in various contexts ranging from villages to Ministry offices. My intermittent work as a practitioner in Indonesia since 1996 also assisted my understanding of important institutional, cultural and political economic dynamics. Since 1999 and particularly during the continuous 24 month period, I conducted research with and on CIFOR and its applied research initiatives in Malinau, East Kalimantan. In addition to serving as an intensive case study, CIFOR also provided me an entry point to study other aid-

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related forestry institutions in Indonesia. The formal institutional collaboration I had with CIFOR not only allowed me to understand CIFOR, but also to build relationships with other institutions and examine their relationships, logics and practices. II. Context and Setting of the Dissertation A. Indonesias Relevance Indonesia is renowned for the importance of its forest resources as well as the rate of its loss, and thus commands significant international attention. Indonesias forests are not only among the most biologically diverse in the world, but also contribute significantly to the national economy. Indonesias wood-based industry is ranked third in overall non-gas and oil export value, after electronics and textiles. Further, approximately 40 million Indonesians depend directly on forest resources (timber, rattan, firewood, etc.) and millions of others reap indirect benefits (World Bank 2001, Bennett and Walton 2003). Until the fall of the 32-year New Order regime in May 1998, these forest dependent communities were marginalized by a highly centralized state, characterized by authoritarian rule and aggressive exploitation of the nations natural resources. The significance of Indonesias forest resources is matched only by its destruction. In 2003, the rate of deforestation in Indonesia was the highest in the world, conservatively estimated at 2.4 million ha/year 7 . This figure represents a dramatic increase from previous years, which was already shocking for the international community. Indonesia has also undergone immense social, economic and political changes, which began in 1997 and continue to the present. During the Asian financial crisis that started in 1997, Indonesia saw the rupiah lose 80% of its value and the flight of working capital.

It is important to note that there is not consensus on this figure since data remain unreliable. Estimates range from the World Banks 2.4 million hectares/year to the Ministry of Forestrys 3.6 million hectares/year.

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Further, with the call for political reform by various segments of society after the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the enactment of a set of decentralization laws in 1999, the central governments control over regional affairs, including natural resource extraction, was reduced, while the authority of the provincial and, particularly, district governments was vastly increased. The implementation of decentralization laws has been ad hoc, in many cases resulting in regionalized or localized systems of corruption, collusion and nepotism. B. The landscape of international aid-related forestry institutions As I discuss in detail in Chapter 3, the global response to Indonesias multifaceted forestry crisis has been substantial. The community of bilateral and multilateral donors has taken a particular interest in Indonesias forests and forest dependent communities. Since 1999, Indonesias donors, collectively known as the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), have placed the forestry crisis and forestry reform onto the agenda of the annual meetings between the Indonesian government and its donors. That forestry has been on the agenda is significant considering that normally only five items are discussed and pledged to; forestry was in effect raised to the highest levels of diplomatic discussion. Moreover, in 2000 the CGI with GOIs agreement established the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF) to assist GOI in carrying out agreed upon commitments and to monitor progress (World Bank 2001). International assistance to the forestry sector in Indonesia for the most recent six year period totals approximately USD 300 million, mostly in the form of grants. By and large, this funding has been used to implement or support forestry sector projects aimed at sustainable use by multiple stakeholders, which is in accordance with global priorities of decentralized forest governance and community forestry broadly defined (Fairhead and Leach 2003) . International aid has been provided to the Indonesian forestry sector since the 1970s, and

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thus the international aid community has been involved in forestry issues in Indonesia for quite some time, although since 1999 this involvement has intensified and been more coordinated. The multilateral and bilateral donor community through the CGI and DFF has formally committed to coordinating and collaborating with each other and GOI, as well as acting as a focal point for other institutions to engage in the Indonesian forestry sector at an international level. Part of this dissertation examines the CGI and DFFs involvement in Indonesias forestry crisis and forestry reform. More specifically, I analyze their incentives, logics and practices of these institutions to illuminate how a master metaphor (Moose 2004) of forest reform was fashioned and maintained by the donor community and government, and how this master metaphor evolved to incorporate the concomitant lack of progress on agreed upon commitments. The in-depth examination of this landscape of aidrelated forestry institutions also illuminates the broader political-economic and institutional dynamics at play and is a useful complement to the intensive case study of CIFOR and its activities in Malinau. C. CIFOR and CIFOR in Malinau CIFOR and its applied research initiatives in Malinau provide an extremely robust case study to ground and localize the broader political-economic dynamics discussed earlier. In this section, I review the history and mission of CIFOR and provide a sense of the institution's priorities and lens through which it justifies those priorities, viz., as an applied research institute that influences policy decisions regarding tropical forest management and the livelihoods of forest dependent people. CIFOR is one of 15 research institutions supported by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which

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is an alliance of countries, international and regional organizations, and private foundations that mobilizes science to reduce poverty, foster human well being, promote agricultural growth and protect the environment (www.cgiar.org/who/index.html). The CGIAR refers to the consortium of donors that fund the CGIAR Centers, which is a loose network of applied research institutions that are headquartered around the world and whose interests cover a broad spectrum of natural resource issues. The CGIAR was established in 1971 by multilateral institutions, led by the World Bank and co-sponsored by the FAO and UNDP, as a means to consolidate and spread the international agricultural research that had been conducted in response to concern in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s that many developing countries would succumb to famine (www.cgiar.org/who/history/index.html). Until the late 1980s CGIAR Centers primarily focused on increasing productivity of food crops through the promotion of capital and technology intensive agriculture, and the genetic manipulation and breeding of crops to create High Yield Varieties (Baum 1986). Past CGIAR activities such as the controversial Green Revolution developed and managed by, inter alia, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) often de-legitimized long-standing, local knowledge and techniques of resource management through a myopic focus on the modernization of agriculture and technological fixes that ignored broader political economic relations and existing social systems of production (Dove 1993; Dove and Kammen 1997; Lansing 1991; Yapa 1993, 1996). CIFOR, however, divorces itself from these past activities, making explicit the ways in which it differs from its colleague institutions. This is perhaps best exemplified in the claim that CIFOR will not

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"engage in development of high-yielding varieties of trees through genetic engineering, or through more conventional tree-improvement programmes. Contentious issues of Plant Variety Rights and Intellectual Property Rights are thus likely to be less relevant to CIFOR than to other CGIAR Centers" (CIFOR 1996: 67). Based in Indonesia with regional offices in Brazil, Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe, CIFOR was created in 1993 to conduct applied research on tropical forests. Unlike organizations that have explicit development agendas, such the World Bank and USAID, and international non-governmental organizations, such as CARE and OxFam, CIFOR does not carry out direct development interventions, but rather conducts applied research. According to its charter, CIFOR's mission "is to contribute to the sustained well-being of people in developing countries, particularly in the tropics, through collaborative strategic and applied research and related activities in forest systems and forestry, and by promoting the transfer of appropriate new technologies and the adoption of new methods of social organization, for national development" (CIFOR 1996: 18). In 2004 CIFOR consisted of a total of 170 staff, 47 of which were internationally recruited staff (senior scientists and management) and research fellows. It is governed by an international board of trustees with 15 members from 12 countries. The disciplinary backgrounds of CIFORs research staff include both the natural and social sciences, with approximately two-thirds having natural science backgrounds in 2004 8 . CIFOR is structured into three research programmes: (1) Forest Governance, (2) Forests and Livelihoods, and (3)

This, however, is not to imply that two-thirds of CIFORs research is natural science in orientation or that the disciplinary backgrounds of research staff predicate what they currently conduct research on.

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Environmental Services and Sustainable Use of Forests 9 . CIFOR research staff in these three programmes work in over 30 countries and have links to more than 300 researchers in 50 international, regional and national organizations. With respect to CIFORs annual budget, for 2004 grants totaled USD 14,951,000, of which USD 7,479,000 was restricted funding and USD 7,472,000 unrestricted funding 10 (CIFOR 2004). The top donors were the Netherlands (11%), the United Kingdom (11%) and the World Bank (10%), European Commission (8%), Norway (7%), Sweden (6%), Germany (5%), USA (5%), Japan (5%), and Canada (4%) (CIFOR 2004). Precisely because of CIFOR's position as one of the seminal global knowledge organizations on tropical forests, understanding how and why certain research concerns are selected and implemented has deep implications for forestry institutions and forest-dependent people in Indonesia and elsewhere. In its early years, CIFOR's assumed modus operandi was that good research would sell itself, or in other words that scientifically rigorous research would contribute to methods and (inter)national policies that would improve the well being of both forest-dependent communities and tropical forests. In the last five years, CIFOR has focused much more on increasing the impact or influence of its research. This change was related to an increased demand from external actors, e.g., donors and NGOs, for CIFOR to demonstrate impact, as well as a general decrease in funds for environmental issues and a perceived financial crisis at CIFOR. As I examine in this dissertation, particularly Chapter 8, CIFORs emphasis on research with impact or impact-oriented science has translated into CIFORs being more explicitly politically engaged relative to its early years. That said, CIFOR does not engage in

Please see Chapter 8 for a detailed description and analysis of these programmes.

10

Restricted funding refers to funding that has been allocated for a particular project and/or activity. CIFOR depends on CGIAR funding for approximately 85% of its budget.

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the politics of natural resource use directly in the same ways that an advocacy organization such as Greenpeace does, which is unsurprising in part given CIFORs funding dependency on multilateral and bilateral agencies and its idealized role as an impartial research organization. Further, CIFOR works with national governments of host countries, e.g., Indonesia; indeed, much of what CIFOR attempts to effect is at the level of national policy. Hence, CIFOR may be limited in public discourse with respect to identifying and exposing certain actors as responsible for destructive policies and practices. In essence, maintaining an apolitical, research stance may allow CIFOR to work in nations whose governments would be inhospitable to more politically oriented organizations. This is explicitly stated in the Strategic Plan in the section entitled "CIFOR's Comparative Advantage." Two statements are revealing in this regard: "When capital investments in research capacity are required, this will be the domain of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies." And "determining 'what' research is needed is mainly the task of societies in the tropics. CIFOR's role will lie more in assisting the accomplishment of this research through effective partnerships" (CIFOR 1996: 32). As part of the host country agreement with the Government of Indonesia (GOI), in 1996 CIFOR was provided privileged access to a large forested area in the then Bulungan District, East Kalimantan (now Malinau District) to conduct long-term applied research on forest related-issues. The forested area, first known as the Bulungan Research Forest and then renamed as the Malinau Research forest in 2003 due to the division of the Bulungan District, is approximately 302,900 hectares and is adjacent to Kayan Mentarang National Park. While CIFOR has privileged access to this region of forest indeed, it is recognized

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through Ministerial Decree it is not exclusive access; government approved actors, including forest concessionaires, may operate there. With decentralization, district-level governments previously rubber stamps of the central government gained a broad range of decision-making authority, and thus in 2002 CIFOR initiated and signed an MOU with the district government. The official agreements between CIFOR, GOI and the Malinau district government signify, at least in public discourse, a recognition and willingness to engage in collaborative research on a host of forest-related issues and to apply research results. As I discuss in Chapter 4, most of CIFORs prescriptions and recommendations have not been adopted by district government whether in policy or practices. The Malinau District of East Kalimantan and CIFORs applied research initiatives there are indicative of the aforementioned broader political economic dynamics and related issues in the forestry sector, as well as being representative of international concern over Indonesias forests. Ad hoc decentralization processes, valuable forests (from both commercial and conservation perspectives), opportunistic logging, and social conflict are all at play and interrelated in Malinau. CIFOR has brought international attention to Malinau since 1996, when CIFOR started its research in the area. Under the general mandate to improve the sustainability of forest and to help alleviate poverty, CIFOR has conducted a broad suite of activities in Malinau funded by various donors and led by various CIFOR scientists with different disciplinary backgrounds that taken as a collective embrace a multidisciplinary or integrated approach and that have evolved through time (Sayer and Campbell

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2004; Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]. Most of CIFORs activities have focused on the Malinau watershed (approximately 500,000 ha) of the district 11 . CIFORs Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) 12 initiative in Malinau is of particular interest in this dissertation 13 . The reasons are its direct focus on empowering forest dependent communities to increase their access and control over forest benefits and decisions (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 21) and to help communities create systems for settling differences among themselves (e.g. boundaries, effective representation) and to negotiate with external parties to reach agreements that were more just for communities (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]: 5). In doing so, it attempts to address one of the central concerns of Indonesias forest crisis and reform, as well as one of the central concerns of this dissertation, viz., the relationship between forests and forest dependent people. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 4, ACM in Malinau focuses on the 27 villages in the Malinau watershed, with certain villages being sites of more intense activities than others. The ACM team employs an action research approach in which they act as researchers, facilitators and information resources. Initiated in 1997, ACM activities have included the following (Wollenberg et al. 2004):

The Malinau watershed falls outside of and is adjacent to the official Malinau Research Forest recognized in the original GOI decree. CIFOR, the district government and the central government are aware of this and find it unproblematic. In Chapter 3, I explain the reasons that account for the fact that most of CIFORs activities occur outside of the official Malinau Research Forest. As I explain in Chapter 5, the ACM research initiative in Malinau is affiliated with a larger program at CIFOR referred to by the same name (ACM), yet differs from many of the initiatives in the larger program, although concepts and methods were shared and synergies developed (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]). Unlike the larger program, ACM in Malinau did not attempt to test ACM approaches to understand their effectiveness and did not develop indicators and monitoring systems with different stakeholders, nor promote collaborative management per se (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b:5).
13 12

11

At CIFOR I was mostly closely affiliated with this initiative and have worked with this team since 1999, when I began my collaboration with CIFOR.

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Village surveys and monitoring to understand local concerns and conditions Participatory mapping and inter-village agreements Community and district government legal awareness and policy dialogue Community participation in district land use planning Community participation in village economic development and land use The case of CIFOR and Malinau is even more intriguing and informative because of

CIFORs focus on research and knowledge production versus a more straightforward development project intervention, which often puts less explicit emphasis on evidence and scientific rigor. Moreover, CIFORs applied research in Malinau is linked to the broader landscape of forestry related institutions in multiple ways. Given CIFORs position as an international applied research institute, part of its mission is to provide knowledge to other forest-related institutions. Indeed, for CIFOR not only are knowledge production and dissemination institutional priorities, but so is the applicability of context-specific research to other regions. Further, CIFORs research priorities of improved local livelihoods, local peoples control and access to forest resources and improved forest management all articulate with the priorities and concerns of other forestry related institutions in Indonesia, including the Ministry of Forestry. Lastly, that CIFOR has worked in Malinau consistently for over ten years and both during and after the Suharto regime gives it a deeper history and perhaps a deeper understanding of relevant dynamics in Indonesia vis--vis other international forest related institutions. D. CIFOR as linked to and as part of the landscape of aid-related forestry institutions In addition to being an intensive ethnographic case study, CIFOR and its work in Malinau are an entry point to examine the relationships, logics and practices of other aid-

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related forestry institutions in Indonesia. It is important not only to locate CIFOR in the broader landscape of aid-related institutions within which it operates in Indonesia, but also to have an equally deep understanding of the landscape itself a landscape which CIFOR is part of. To this end, this dissertation also examines the CGI and DFF with respect to their interest in the forestry crisis and reform in Indonesia. In doing so, this dissertation examines the dynamics that influence the use of CIFORs research in Indonesia (or lack thereof), as well as how this broader landscape of institutions influences, or does not influence, CIFOR, e.g., research priorities, research products (content and format), and target audiences. This dissertation attempts to be more than an ethnography of CIFOR, but rather an institutional ethnography about the relationships, logics and practices that emerge out of the global concern over Indonesias forests and forest dependent communities. And as part of that institutional ethnography, I pay particular attention to CIFOR to understand the role of research and knowledge at local, national and global levels. Understanding the relationships, incentives and logics of aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia and their engagement with other actors such as national government reveals whether and/or to what extent CIFOR influences and is influenced by (informs and is informed by) these other institutions. An unfounded assumption is the linear knowledge-topolicy-to-practice model, e.g., the assumption that if CIFOR makes an evidence-based recommendation regarding forest policy and practice in Indonesia, it will be implemented by the Indonesian authorities and supported by the larger community of aid-related forestry institutions. As this dissertation attempts to demonstrate, this is clearly not the case, and the extent to which CIFORs research recommendations will influence other institutions or

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CIFOR itself depends greatly on whether significant institutional and inter-institutional changes take place. One argument I make in this dissertation is that the logic of each aid-related forestry institution undermines their agreement to collaborate and coordinate with one another, the lack of which, according to these same agencies, has significantly contributed to the ineffectiveness of aid in the forestry sector 14 . Moreover, in the face of this ineffectiveness, these institutions maintain a public discourse of striving or trying that is sufficient to keep aid flowing. Evidence of this is the approximately USD 60 million/year for the past five to seven years that Indonesia has received through bilateral and multilateral grants, while the forestry sector continues to generate revenue of over USD 4 billion through practices that violate the commitments made by government with respect to reform in the forestry sector. Conversely, this dissertation also examines the reasons for the Indonesian governments involvement in aid-related forestry interventions, particularly considering that they potentially threaten, or at least critique, the USD 4 billion industry. Understanding these relationships and logics sheds light on how CIFOR engages this broader landscape of aid-related forestry institutions. As discussed in Chapter 8, CIFOR interacts with the aid-community and government in Indonesia, but does so in a targeted and strategic fashion. CIFOR attends the annual CGI meetings as part of the civil society contingent to press for certain priorities, e.g., forest industry reform related to money laundering and the banking sector. In addition, CIFOR publishes articles in the mass media in

In her ethnography of the donor community in Bolivia, Eyben (2003: 2) makes an analogous comment: by their nature, bureaucratic organizations find it difficult to learn through reflectionoperating at the global level, in a world of paradox and surprise, the pressure grows to pass themselves off as infallible and therefore deprives them of the ability to learn.it may be very difficult to admit ignorance, to dismantle systematically that unscrutinized sense of being in control.

14

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Indonesia, e.g., Jakarta Post and Kompas, just prior to the annual CGI meetings to raise awareness and the profile of forest reform during the meeting. Further, CIFOR has worked closely with members of the DFF on certain issues. In 2004, CIFOR was commissioned by the World Bank Office in Jakarta to draft a forestry issues and policy options paper to assist the Bank in its considering how to re-engage the forestry sector in Indonesia (see CIFOR 2005). Also, CIFOR has worked with members of the DFF to develop analyses related to forest finance and forest industry reform. CIFOR, however, limits its involvement in the DFF and the annual CGI meetings because CIFOR realizes that they are largely impotent institutions (see Chapters 6 and 7) that by and large have been unable to effect the change CIFOR advocates. As I discuss in Chapters 5 and 8, CIFOR places more emphasis on attempting to influence its global epistemic or interpretive community at the level of donor metropoles, e.g., USAID in Washington DC instead of the USAID Indonesia Mission, which from CIFORs purview has greater likelihood of affecting the political-economic dynamics related to forestry and forest dependent people in Indonesia. As I detail in Chapters 5 and 8, part of CIFORs explicit communication strategy is to articulate its research findings and recommendations in ways and in media palatable to its global interpretive community, e.g., articles in the International Herald Tribune and Economist to influence politicians and their constituencies, as well as inperson meetings with Ministers of Trade and Industry in Japan and the US that speak to the interests of those actors. Placing the practice of research and these institutional realities in one analytical frame reveals the vital importance of brokering across different institutional realities and languages and translating knowledge into policy and practice across multiple, disparate institutions

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and individuals (Mosse 2005). It underscores the need to examine how brokers are made and how successful brokering is carried out, as well as what and how knowledge is used or not used in policy and practice, as well as by whom and when. III. Significance of the dissertation As I elaborate in the Conclusion of the dissertation, this study attempts to benefit both academic and practitioner communities by furthering social science understanding of the knowledge, logics and practices of local, national and international forestry institutions, as well as providing analyses to foster more just and equitable arrangements for forest dependent communities, who have historically been marginalized. Beyond forestry and forestry institutions, however, this dissertation analyzes institutional dynamics that have relevance for other international bodies in other nations, specifically, and global governance related to the environment and development, generally. As detailed in Chapter 2, this study contributes to theoretical debates concerned with the culture and political economy of knowledge producing institutions, and the effects of that knowledge at global, national and local levels. This dissertation contributes to the few existing ethnographic studies regarding the culture, logic and practices of powerful institutions involved in natural resource management. The majority of ethnographic studies of powerful institutions focus on their impacts on rural communities and the broader political economic forces that influence their agendas (for a detailed discussion see Brosius 1999a, Cooper and Packard 1997, Dove 1999b, and Eyben 2003). Some scholars (Dove 1999b; Brosius 1999b, 1999c; Cooper and Packard 1997) note that powerful national and transnational institutions have traditionally been understudied from an ethnographic perspective. As Cooper and Packard (1997: 28) note, "[i]t is not hard to deconstruct the

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modes of discursive power. It is much harder to discover how discourse operates within institutions." Further, Dove states that some scholars argue that studying powerful institutions "should be at the core of the discipline [of anthropology]" (Davis 1972, Nader 1972, Scheper-Hughes 1995, cited in Dove 1999b: 239-40). This dissertation integrates an understanding of an intervention at the village level with an investigation of the institutional culture that gave rise to it, as well as analyzing the interplay between village and institutional realities. In doing so, this study interrogates the traditional and assumed boundaries between western knowledge and its non-western subjects and between experts and those ostensibly in need of expertise. Additionally, this dissertation examines the relationships, logics and practices of the broader landscape of aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia, a landscape that CIFOR is both linked to and part of. In locating all of these dynamics in one analytic frame, this dissertation builds upon poststructural political ecology studies of powerful conservation and development institutions and contributes to recent ethnographies of international development institutions that integrate structural-discursive and actor-oriented approaches (Fairhead and Leach 2003; Mosse 2004, 2005; Rossi 2004). More specifically, it examines how the intrinsic disjuncture between knowledge, policy and practice and between institutions is translated into an order or master metaphor by individuals or institutions that act as brokers or interlocutors who actively recruit support for the order such that it becomes authoritative, while the differences between knowledge, policy and practice co-exist without clashing with each other (Mosse 2005). In doing so, I examine how certain individuals and/or institutions become brokers and how and why they are able to translate adeptly across institutional realities and languages

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to fashion and maintain authoritative interpretations that accommodate the disparate interests of all actors involved while maintaining an appearance of integrity. On a related point, I investigate how the brokering of authority works such that the necessary disconnect between policy and practice is maintained to ensure that each functions accordingly, or in other words that successful policy functions to legitimize rather than orientate practice (Mosse 2004: 648) and that practice functions so that interventions on the ground are driven not by policy but by the exigencies of organizations and the need to maintain relationships (Mosse 2004: 651). Similar to these recent institutional ethnographies, this dissertation provides a more robust analysis of international conservation and development institutions, as well as of the knowledge they produce and interventions they create. In doing so, this dissertation, analogous to recent work by Fairhead and Leach (2003: 3), links contemporary debates on science, technology and society with concerns of environmental anthropology, showing how the latter can be enriched and rejuvenated through an ethnographic approach to science and policy. Further, in examining CIFOR this dissertation is one of the first ethnographies of a CGIAR Center 15 , which is significant given the effects that CGIAR-related activities, such as the controversial Green Revolution, have had for millions of farmers in developing countries (Dove and Kammen 1997, Lansing 1991, Yapa 1993). To date, there have been no detailed studies of the institutional culture within a CGIAR Center. Warren Baum (1986), a career development bureaucrat and a founding figure of CGIAR, wrote an "insider's" history of the CGIAR, but the book lacks a critical stance, reading more like a memoir:
Existing studies include Goodells work with and on the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) (1984a, 1984b, 1985), Rhoades work with and on the International Potato Institute (CIP) (1984a, 1984b; Rhodes et al. 1982), and Marglins history of the Green Revolution and its links to the Rockefeller Foundation (1996).
15

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"Like most of those who have been associated with this remarkable enterprise, I count the time that I have spent with the CGIAR as the most rewarding of my professional career" (Baum 1986: xi). Baum's book elaborates on the growth of the CGIAR since its creation in 1971 and the benefits it has brought to developing countries by increasing productivity of food crops through the promotion of capital and technology intensive agriculture, and the genetic manipulation and breeding of crops to create High Yield Varieties. Viewed from outside Baum's purview, however, the history of the CGIAR and its activities, at least until the late 1980s, are a manifestation of the high modernist vision of development rooted in Enlightenment ideas of progress. Many studies have examined the effects on local communities and logic of the agricultural development schemes promoted by the CGIAR, the most notable being Green Revolution technology developed and promoted by the IRRI to modernize agriculture and increase production (see for example Dove and Kammen 1997, Lansing 1991, Yapa 1993). In his study of the crucial role that Balinese water temples play in regulating irrigation of wet rice fields, Lansing (1991) shows how the adoption of Green Revolution technology by the Indonesian state disregarded and forced the abandonment of the water temple system. This set into motion pest outbreaks such that new seeds had to be developed constantly, which combined with the state mandate for continuous cropping of Green Revolution rice "threatened both the ecology of the terraces and the social infrastructure of production" (Lansing 1991: 117). In his argument that the epistemology of development produces poverty, Yapa (1993) shows how High Yield Variety (HYV) seeds, synonymous with the Green Revolution, induce scarcity. First, since HYV seeds cannot reproduce, farmers must purchase them

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annually. Second, the seeds can only increase yields in combination with costly inputs -chemical fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation and fuel -- and hence taxes not only the farmer's resources, but also the natural ones. Dove and Kammen (1997) investigate the epistemology of the Green Revolution, concluding that its failures are more ideological than technological. In comparing the ideological bases of forest product gathering, swidden agriculture and the cultivation of HYV seeds, Dove and Kammen (1997) show that the assumptions built into the Green Revolution not only favor and bolster centralized control and already well-off farmers, but also disallows the problematizing of the sustainability of the technology itself. This dissertation also contributes to the anthropological and sociological studies of science by examining the nexus of science and management, and moving from the laboratory sciences, which have been most examined, to the field sciences and their application, which has been least studied (Franklin 1995). The shift from laboratory to field sciences is significant because of the great variability in contextual factors that exists in field conditions, which is relatively absent in a laboratory. Hence an important contribution of the study is an examination of how a science producing institution elides or addresses that variability. This dissertation also attempts to provide practitioners with constructive theoretical and analytical considerations of their own work, which is sometimes lacking as in the case of social forestry (Dove 1995). This study attempts to go beyond academic critique; I engaged practitioners throughout the process of research and write-up, which was made possible in part through my collaboration with CIFOR. I attempted to contribute to practitioners' analysis of their own work, thereby assisting in a small, but hopefully significant way to the formulation of more productive means to devolve rights over natural resources to local

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people in a just and equitable manner. More broadly, this dissertation attempts to improve an understanding of the opportunities and constraints to integrating knowledge, policy and practice at village, national and international levels. Although geographically situated in Indonesia, this dissertation addresses similar issues in other countries, such as the global trend to promote decentralized forest governance and the frequent failure to implement it successfully (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Further, the challenges faced by CIFOR initiatives in Malinau are indicative of multi-stakeholder programs in other countries, such as Joint Forest Management in India. Hence this dissertation not only provides analyses and recommendations in the Indonesian context, but hopefully will prove useful in a global one. In attempting to speak to both academic and practitioner communities, I share Eybens (2003: 3) sentiment regarding her work as both practitioner and scholar of development in Bolivia: Like some academic political anthropologists, I have learnt to be modernist and post-modernist at the same time (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992)Understanding the ways in which poverty knowledge affects poverty policies may enhance participation in policy processes of those who until now have been excluded..commitment to and action for social change do not preclude a reflexivist stance. IV. Summary of dissertation chapters In Chapter 2, I review the literature that this dissertation engages with respect to theoretical framework and analytical tools. I also discuss how this dissertation applies and contributes to those bodies of literature. I then summarize the methods used and the justification for those methods. I also pay particular attention to the issues I encountered in

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attempting an institutional ethnography, viz., my positionality, and the methodological, theoretical and moral implications of studying up. In Chapter 3, I provide a detailed overview of the context within which the dissertation research is situated. More specifically, I describe the current political-economic situation in Indonesia, viz. the transition towards administrative and fiscal decentralization, and the institutional legacy of the New Order regime. I then move to a discussion of the current perceived forest crisis and attempts at curbing this crisis; I discuss the political economic drivers of the perceived crisis and the engagement and activities of the international aid community involved in forestry in Indonesia. To ground these national and international level dynamics, I then discuss the Malinau District of East Kalimantan and how decentralization has played out there. In the last section of this chapter, I discuss CIFORs history and activities in the district. In Chapter 4, I describe and examine the relationships and perceptions of villagers, district government and CIFOR vis--vis each other. In doing so, I try to understand the activities, influence and power of CIFOR, an international applied forestry research institute, in the context of a politically contentious forest landscape, viz., in the context of Indonesias ad hoc decentralization processes. Moreover, I analyze the perceived expectations and benefits of the actors that CIFOR engages in Malinau why they are interested in working with CIFOR and the extent to which these expectations are borne out. Further, I examine at the local level of intervention the role of a publicly funded, international research organization that should have global influence. In Chapter 5, I examine the type of global influence that CIFOR attempts to have based on its local level applied research in Malinau. Further, I attempt to demonstrate that

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although CIFOR has limited influence at the local or field level, the retelling or reporting of their local level research experience provides compelling, persuasive (policy) narratives and prescriptions to influence, in particular ways, the global community concerned with tropical forests and forest-dependent people. CIFORs field research in Malinau and CIFOR researchers critical reflections on their experiences are essential legitimizing vehicles to influence CIFORs interpretive community (Mosse 2004) 16 or epistemic community (Haas 1990) 17 of practitioners and academics. In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I move away from CIFOR to the broader landscape of aid-related forestry institutions. I describe and analyze the relationships between, and incentives and logics of, aid-related forestry institutions at the national level in Indonesia, as well as the relationship and dynamics between aid-related forestry institutions and central government agencies including, but not limited to, the Ministry of Forestry. To understand these institutional relationships, incentives and logics, I examine the origin and evolution of (1) forestry as an agenda item at the annual CGI meetings between the international donor community and the Indonesian government, and (2) the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF) and its relationship with other forestry-related institutions. In Chapter 6, I discuss and analyze how and why forestry was elevated to the highest levels of diplomatic negotiations between the international donor community and the

Mosse (2004: 646) notes that development projects need interpretive communities; they have to enroll a range of supporting actors with reasons to participate in the established order as if its representations were reality (Sayer, 1994: 374, cited in Li, 1999: 374). According to Haas (1990: 55), an epistemic community is a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect-relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values. As well as sharing an acceptance of a common body of facts, its members share a common interpretive framework, or consensual knowledge, from which they convert such facts, or observations, to policy-relevant conclusionsPresented with incomplete or ambiguous evidence, members of an epistemic community would draw similar interpretations and make similar policy conclusions...An epistemic community's power resource, domestically and internationally, is its authoritative claim to knowledge.
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government of Indonesia, viz., the annual CGI meetings, and how an agreed upon master metaphor (Mosse 2004) of forest reform was fashioned by the donor community and government. Further, I examine how this master metaphor evolved over time and was actively refashioned by both donors and the Indonesian government, as well has how the master metaphor incorporated the concomitant lack of progress on the agreed upon commitments. In short, I show how the master metaphor of the Indonesian forestry sectors problems and solutions was created, maintained and refashioned among international donors and the government, while the reality in the forest indicates a diametrically opposed trajectory. My analysis demonstrates that there is a significant performative element to CGIrelated evaluations and assessments of the forestry sector reform in Indonesia, as well as calls for reform and coordination among donor and government agencies and between donors and the government. Indeed, assessments and evaluations, as well as their attendant recommendations, are not instruments to achieve their ostensible goals of improved sustainable and equitable forest management, but rather vehicles to recruit for and maintain master metaphors. In Chapter 7, I discuss and analyze the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF), which was created by the CGI in 2000 to assist GOI in carrying out its proposed actions and monitor progress and is responsible for drafting the donor statement for the annual CGI meetings, i.e., the donors articulation of the master metaphor. I examine the DFFs history and evolution, relationships between members of the DFF, and how the DFF relates to other forest-related institutions such as government agencies, international organizations, and Indonesian NGOs. In doing so, I try to understand the institutional relationships, incentives and logics that

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explain the disjuncture 18 in Indonesian forestry reform. The DFF is an intensive case study and a window through which to examine the broader landscape of forestry institutions. More specifically, in light of the DFFs crucial role in the co-production of the master metaphor for the annual CGI meetings, I examine the DFFs position as a broker or translator (Mosse 2005) in these institutional relationships. In Chapter 8, I return to CIFOR to discuss CIFOR managers and researchers (1) conduct of impact oriented science, (2) establishment and implementation of research priorities and (3) work in partnership with other institutions and capacity building. In doing so, I examine the institutional culture and structure that frame CIFORs researchers and managers engagement with the broader political-economic dynamics and institutional landscape related to forestry and forest dependent people in Indonesia and elsewhere. In this chapter, I switch vantage points to understand from an intra-institutional perspective the logics, practices and relationships discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. I have placed this chapter after the ones that examine the political-economic dynamics and institutional landscape of aid because that context is necessary to make sense of CIFOR scientists everyday practices. In the final chapter of my dissertation, Chapter 9, I review and synthesize the major conclusions from each chapter, highlighting key analytical points regarding CIFOR, the landscape of aid-related forestry institutions active in Indonesia, and the political-economic and cultural dimensions of forest management generally and local peoples control and access to forest resources specifically. I also review the theoretical contributions of this

Lewis and Mosse (2006) explain that order can be understood as the ideal worlds that development actors aim to bring about[and] disjuncture comes from the gap between these ideal worlds and the social reality they have to relate to (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 2).

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dissertation, placing it in dialogue with contemporary debates and discussing how and where this dissertation pushes those debates.

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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

I. Introduction In this chapter, I review the literature that this dissertation engages with respect to theoretical framework and analytical tools. I then move to a discussion of my research methodology, which includes a summary of the methods used and the justification for those methods. I also pay particular attention to the issues I encountered in attempting an institutional ethnography, viz., my positionality. II. Analytical Tools and Theoretical Considerations This dissertation engages several bodies of social science literature that are concerned with the culture and political economy of knowledge producing institutions, and the effects of that knowledge at global, national and local levels in the context of international conservation and development. More specifically, my dissertation research speaks to a number of social science analyses of development and environment issues that bring the local and global into one analytical frame. This dissertation builds upon several related bodies of social science literature: poststructural political ecology; studies of local transformations of interventions; studies of science and scientific communities; and recent institutional ethnographies of development that integrate structural-discursive and actor-oriented approaches. Although drawing upon different disciplines, my theoretical framework includes several basic tenets that most, if not all, of this literature shares in varying degrees.

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The first tenet of my theoretical framework is the basic political ecology idea that natural resource issues are to a great extent a manifestation of broader political-economic forces and hence no intervention can be considered neutral, but rather, ideologically loaded (Blaikie 1985, Bryant 1992, Cooper and Packard 1997). One of the seminal figures in the field, Blaikie (1985) argues that the causes of soil erosion are not proximate or place-based, but rather due to interlinked social and political-economic relations, and hence solutions to soil erosion lie not in ostensibly neutral interventions, but rather in fundamental changes in those relations. The second tenet of my theoretical orientation is the idea that knowledge (or truth) is socially and culturally constructed through discourse 1 and related practices, and that discourse creates and maintains certain distinctions and justifies certain interventions, while obscuring certain other realties (Foucault 1980, Peet and Watts 1996, Greenough and Tsing 1994, Williams 1980). For example, Dove (1999a) details how Indonesian plantation officials consistently represent peasants pejoratively, thereby privileging the government's claim over peasants' land claims. Dove (1999a: 204) suggests that "the issues at stake in this process of privileging are not merely rhetorical: as Berry (1988: 66 cited in Li [1999]) writes: 'Struggles over meaning are as much a part of the process of resource allocation as are struggles over surplus or the labor process.' . . . [power] works more subtly through the conceptual structures by means of which the planters perceive and represent the plantation world." The third tenet is the idea of the inextricable linkage between knowledge and power (Foucault 1980, Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983). Give the dominance of high modernism,

Following Peet and Watts (1996: 14), "[a] 'discourse is an area of language use expressing a particular standpoint and related to a certain set of institutions."

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predicated upon notions of evolutionary progress executed through scientific thinking and technology (Scott 1998), analysts need to scrutinize the ostensible neutrality of science and technology. Peet and Watts (1996: 13) suggest "each society has a regime of truth, with control of the 'political economy of truth' constituting part of the power of the great political and economic apparatuses: these diffuse 'truth,' particularly in the modern form of 'scientific discourse,' through societies, in a process infused with social struggles." That said, actors do not merely impose or are imposed upon, although power relations are uneven. In this regard, I refer to Foucaults notion of power, defined as "an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from others" (Foucault 1983: 220). Power is omnipresent, is exercised on both the ruler and the ruled, and has multiple normative trajectories, e.g., power work both positively and negatively for historically marginalized groups (Darier 1999). Agrawal (2005: 221) explains that one of the prime effects of power is how certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals (Foucault 1977:98, cited in Agrawal 2005) and that power is not just about the ability to constrain certain kinds of actions, peoples, or outcomes; it is as much about the possibility of producing them. A. Poststructural political ecology and Powerful Institutions My dissertation research builds upon critical examinations of development and environmental discourses that rely on particular interpretations of Foucault's ideas of governmentality 2 and the inextricable linkage between knowledge and power (Crush 1995,

Governmentality is a contested term and has been interpreted differently by different scholars. According to Ferguson (1994: 194), governmentality is the idea that societies, economies, and government bureaucracies respond in a more or less reflexive, straightforward way to policies and plans. In this conception, the state apparatus is seen as a neutral instrument for implementing plans, while the government itself tends to appear as

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Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1994, Mitchell 1991, Peet and Watts 1996, Sachs 1992). These studies, referred to as poststructural political ecology, examine the discursive strategies and processes of knowledge production by powerful institutions such as the state and the World Bank that are essential in framing development as desirable. They argue that these institutions create and deploy certain discourses that serve the interests of the politicaleconomic elite and that constitute governable subjects. For example, in his critique of a World Bank funded livestock development program in Lesotho, Ferguson (1994) argues that even when they fail, development projects extend the reach of the state in society, and suggests that the logic of failure and reform, intervention and depoliticization are integral to perpetuating the state/development apparatus. One of Ferguson's key insights is that the strengthening of bureaucratic state power is accomplished through the ideological effect of depoliticizing poverty and the state, and articulating solutions to poverty as technical matters. In a similar vein, Mitchell (1991) demonstrates how the development industry, in this case USAID, constructs Egypt as a "development object" plagued by a food production crisis due to overpopulation, limited arable land and stagnant peasant agricultural practices to justify technical interventions that not only elide the interests of international development institutions themselves, but also the political-economic inequities that create Egypt's food problem. Analogous studies have examined the institutionalization of environmental discourses by state and global institutions (Brosius 1999a, 1999b; Buttel 1992; Eder 1996; Escobar

a machine for providing social services and engineering economic growth. According to Agrawal (2005) poststructuralists such as Ferguson use the term to signify what he [Ferguson] sees as the proliferation of oppressive state power and institutions (225). According to Agrawal (2005: 225), Fergusons reading of governmentality through the lens of bureaucratization forgoes the opportunity to explore the multiple forms of conduct in a polity and ignores questions about how subjects of development come into existence and with what consequences.

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1996; Luke 1995). For example, in tracing the history of the Penan logging campaign in Sarawak (Malaysian Borneo), Brosius (1999b) elucidates the process by which the discursive elements of the logging campaign were shifted "away from the political/moral domain and toward the domain of governmentality, managerialism, and bureaucraticization" through collaboration between the Malaysian state and Northern environmentalists (49). These studies, however, represent institutions monolithically, often fail on empirical grounds, are tautological and somewhat misinterpret Foucault (Agrawal 1996, Bebbington 2000, Cooper and Packard 1997, Moore 2000). Further, they represent local communities as merely being imposed upon and further exploited -- in focusing on the discursive power of institutions, they lock local communities within a victim script, devoid of agency. As Agrawal (1996) has noted, ironically, poststructural critiques end up using a notion of power that contradicts Foucault's. Further, the essentialized representations of powerful institutions beg many questions regarding agency within the institution and between the institution and other social actors. Instead of starting with these traditional categories of analysis, my dissertation research begins by documenting the complexities within an international institution and in the interactions between the institution and other relevant actors and then moves to analysis of these complexities. My dissertation research draws upon poststructural critiques of powerful institutions, yet provides the needed ethnographic "thickness" of an institution, examining the complexities often missed in this body of literature. My analysis of CIFOR in Malinau, East Kalimantan in Chapter 4 demonstrates empirically that an international institution, which post-structural analyses would assume has global discursive power, not only has less local influence than this literature would anticipate, but also that the position of these institutions locally is more

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fragile, negotiated and constrained by other actors and broader political-economic processes than this literature would suggest 3 . Moreover, I explain that in the case of CIFORs research initiatives in Malinau, it is abundantly clear that the discourses CIFOR creates and deploys neither merely serve the interests of the political-economic elite nor constitute governable subjects. I do, however, attempt to make the case that CIFOR does indeed have discursive authority in framing problems and solutions, but that this authority is through their publications at the level of CIFORs international epistemic (Haas 1992) or interpretive (Mosse 2004) community, members of which could more powerfully influence the trajectory of conservation and development in Malinau, compared to CIFOR itself (please see Chapter 5). It is through this refraction that perhaps CIFORs discursive formations have more authority and influence in Malinau. CIFORs discursive authority, however, is not as straightforward as that of the World Bank in Fergusons analysis. My analysis of CIFOR in Malinau and the broader landscape of aid related forestry institutions also attempts to demonstrate the productiveness of getting at the ethnographic thickness of an institution. To this end, I have attempted to document and analyze the complexities within an international institution and in the interactions between the institution and other relevant social actors, thereby opening up the implementation black box so as to address the relationship between policy and event (Moose 2004: 643). B. Studies of Science and Scientific Communities My dissertation work also builds on certain strands of the field broadly referred to as science studies. Specifically, it draws upon ethnographic studies of science (Fujimura 1992,
In the past few years, there have been several institutional ethnographies published that focus on these institutions compromises and negotiations, e.g., Goldman (2005) and the necessity of compromise and collaboration, e.g., Mosse (2005). I discuss these studies in detail later in this chapter.
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Knorr Cetina 1998, Latour and Woolgar 1986, Traweek 1988). These ethnographic accounts of scientific communities examine in detail the practices of researchers, conceptualizing scientific communities as cultural ones. They illuminate the cultural practices of scientists and examine the beliefs and logics that a certain scientific community operates on to create certain knowledges. For example, Fujimura (1992) examines interactions of scientists with divergent interests who hopped on the "molecular biological bandwagon," thereby constructing and coalescing around the "standardized package" of oncogene theory and methods. She concludes that the coalescing of the oncogene epistemic community resulted from the translatability or commensurability of the initial theory to both stabilize facts and create new opportunities in divergent fields: "The package provided both dynamic opportunities for divergent meanings and uses as well as stability" (Fujimura 1992: 201). Examining the cultural aspects of scientists' work is critical to understanding how and why certain knowledges are produced (Haraway 1991). As Scott (1998) notes in his discussion of the dialectical relationship between metis (practical knowledge) and techne (formal knowledge or "imperial" scientific knowledge), scientific research always draw upon both these forms on knowledge, but rarely is metis acknowledged as playing an integral role in this process because of its "unscientific"-ness and the hegemonic character of techne. One shortcoming of most ethnographies of scientific communities is that they do not emphasize where scientific communities are situated within the broader cultural and political-economic landscape. They do not examine how these communities and their knowledge production engage and are engaged by actors outside these communities (Franklin 1995). Other studies, however, have examined the political economy of science and scientific communities, which is often elided by virtue of science's privileged position as

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somehow separate from politics (Dove 1994, Taylor 1997, Taylor and Buttel 1992, Zerner 1996). For example, Taylor and Buttel (1992) reveal the political-economic agendas that lay behind the dominant discourse of global environmental science, which gains its universal credibility through claims of neutrality and truth. Through a social constructivist lens, Taylor and Buttel (1992) show how the choice of topics researched and methodologies employed privilege the agendas of political economic elite in developed countries through the naturalizing process of science, and also how the "the current globalization of environmental discourse. . . steers attention away from the differentiated politics and economics of socioenvironmental change" (413). As exemplified in Taylor and Buttel's article (1992), there is often a mutually reinforcing relationship between scientific findings and agendas with agendas of powerful institutions, indeed Scott (1998) has shown that this is a manifestation of high modernism. Yet, as Taylor (1997) demonstrates in his discussion of the falling out between USAID and MIT in the context of a modeling project of nomads in the Sahel, it is equally as critical to examine the disconnect between science and development institutions to understand more fully the political economic location of science and scientific communities. This dissertation draws upon both of these strands of science studies to examine CIFOR as a cultural community and also to understand the institution's political-economic and cultural articulation with the larger world within which it is embedded. Further, I examine Indonesias perceived forest crisis and attempts at forest reform as a "standardized package" to understand how CIFOR scientists and others at related forestry institutions define, legitimize, transform and deploy this standardized package (Fujimura 1992) or master metaphor (Mosse 2004).

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This dissertation contributes to previous studies by focusing on a field science instead of a laboratory science. The shift from laboratory to field sciences is significant because of the great variability that exists in field conditions, which is relatively absent in laboratories. Thompson et. al.'s (1988) detailed critique of the generally accepted theory of Himalayan environmental degradation -- that inappropriate agricultural practices fueled by population pressure cause upland deforestation and soil erosion in Nepal -- elaborates not only the multiple types of variability to be addressed in this study, but also the institutional incentives that create and fuel them, which are also an important point of investigation for the proposed research. Specifically, Thompson et al. (1988) demonstrate that the uncertainty in defining the "problem" of degradation was an integral component of the problem itself, and that this uncertainty, pervading everything from defining variables to determining causal relationships, was very much a product of institutional dynamics: Each institution conducted research on degradation based on particular framings of problems and solutions that served respective institutional incentives and interventions (see Guthman (1997) for overall historiography of environmental degradation in Nepal). They also argue that due to the remarkable biophysical, ecological and socio-cultural heterogeneity of the Himalaya, broad generalizations regarding problems and solutions are impossible, and that institutions need to embrace uncertainty, instead of obfuscating it, and move to "tinkering" with local or "embedded" realities, instead of grand interventions (Thompson et al. 1988). This dissertation investigates how forestry institutions in Indonesia, particularly CIFOR, address these issues of variability, uncertainty and institutional incentives analyzed in Thompson et al.'s study, while also providing an understanding of the institutional culture, e.g., informal interactions and negotiations, that influence their articulations.

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C. Articulations, Collaborations and Local Transformations of Interventions Substantial portions of this dissertation resonate closely with and draw strongly upon social science studies of development and environmental interventions that focus on the local transformations of these interventions (see for example Tsing (1999a,1999b, 2000a, 2000b); Moore (2000); Li (1999a, 2000); and Jasanoff (2004)). These studies focus on how articulations or collaborations between actors are created and maintained. While recognizing uneven power relations, this literature examines the localized practices or the "cultural micropolitics" (Moore 2000) through which an intervention works. In doing so, they demonstrate that interventions engender contestations, negotiations, compromises, and articulations of social actors' disparate interests. They also show that strategic maneuverings are not merely reactionary, but rather, are predicated upon "sedenterized histories" and "embedded cultural practices" (Moore 2000). These studies emphasize that interventions are co-produced at the local level by the intervening institution and local actors, thereby shifting the identities of people and the meanings of places, as well as transforming the intervention itself (Forbes 1999, Li 1999a, Pigg 1992, Tsing 2000b). Studies of environmental interventions suggest that an intervention can create possibilities for local people to shift power relations by representing themselves as, for example, primitive environmentalists or through the creation of "tradition" (Brosius 1997, Brosius et al. 1998, Conklin 1997, Li 2000, Tsing 1999a, Zerner 1994). For example, Tsing (1999a) shows how the existence of a "green" international development project creates a "field of attraction" that provides local Meratus Dayak the conceptual space to tap into the globally circulating discourse of the "ecologically noble savage" (Redford 1990) as a means to assert territorial claims. In addition to articulating themselves as noble natives, local

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people may also appropriate state discourses to assert political agency: for example, Dove (1998) shows how Kenyah Dayak in East Kalimantan deploy the state discourse of legal formality or "officialese" to assert land rights. A series of articles by Tsing (1999b, 2000a, 2000b) calls for a move away from the determinism of some political ecology analyses of environmental and development interventions and towards a more empirically-based study of interventions. To this end, this dissertation begins with an examination of CIFOR's research in East Kalimantan, as well as relationships between other aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia. Following Tsing (1999b, 2000a, 2000b), instead of structural categories as analytical starting points, I examine the articulations 4 and collaborations made possible through, for example, CIFOR's research and from there trace out their effects on identities, power relations, and control and access to natural resources. In a similar vein but with a focus more on the institution, Goldmans (2005: 43) recent ethnography concerning the World Banks articulation of a green neoliberalism framework for intervention highlights the fragile hegemony of a powerful institution such as the World Bank, and the necessity of these institutions to maintain a mastery of popular and elite consent that inculcates a moral and social authority worldwide. Indeed, Goldman (2005: 45) argues that this is perhaps why the institution currently spends more on public relations than it does research. Notable about Goldmans ethnography of the World Bank is his emphasis on the explanation of processes by whichhegemony and counterhegemony are constituted, producing the whole spectrum of political and cultural closures and

Articulation here is used in Stuart Hall's sense as noted in Tsing (1999b): it is "the form that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions" (17), and that successful articulation is "the process through which mobilization can occur: the enunciating of the situation in a new or renewed form through the bringing of interlocutors into the heart of one's own self-conception (18).

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opportunities (25), which exposes a fragile and vulnerable dominance and a terrain of the conjunctural (41, 24). Retaining a focus on interrelations, Agrawals (2005:2-3) recent work on explaining why, when, how and in what measure people come to develop an environmentally oriented subject position in his case northern India provides a dynamic and robust understanding of the effects of inextricable linkages between politics, institutions and identities. He refers to his analytical framework as environmentality, which refers to the knowledges, politics, institutions and subjectivities that come to be linked together with the emergence of the environment as a domain that requires regulation and protection (Agrawal 2005:226) 5 . A key insight from Agrawal (2005: 226) for my dissertation is that the working out of environmental politics implies concurrent changes in knowledges, politics, institutions and identities. The field of science and technology studies (S&TS) has also recently emphasized articulation, collaboration and co-production 6 as productive analytical tools in the studying the relationship between scientific knowledge and political power (Jasanoff 2004). The editor of a collection of S&TS essays that employ these analytical tools notes that through studies of emerging knowledges, research practices and political institutions, the authors demonstrate that the idiom of co-production importantly extends the vocabulary of the traditional social
Agrawal (2005: 8, italics in original) notes that environmentality is a union of environment and governmentality, but his use of governmentality differs dramatically from that of poststructuralists such as Ferguson (see Agrawal 2005: 225-229). Agrawal, as well as other recent scholars of environmental politics, interpret Foucaults notion of governmentality to mean a type of power which both acts on and through the agency and subjectivity of individuals as ethically free and rational subjects (Shore and Wright 1997: 8, cited in Moose 2005: 6).
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One lead S&TS scholar defines co-production in that field as follows: co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it and is a way of interpreting and accounting for complex phenomena so as to avoid the strategic deletions and omissions of most other approaches in the social sciences (Jasanoff 2004: 2-3).

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sciences, offering fresh analytic perspectives on the nexus of science, power and culture (Jasanoff 2004:i) In striving to do just this, my analysis of CIFOR in Malinau attempts to provide another example of the productiveness of this approach with respect to understanding the policies, practices and effects of conservation, development and research interventions. More specifically, my analysis attempts to integrate an understanding of CIFOR interventions at the village and district levels with an investigation of the interplay between village, district government and CIFORs institutional realities. In doing so, I attempt to interrogate the traditional and assumed boundaries between western knowledge and its non-western subjects and between experts and those ostensibly in need of expertise. My analysis also builds upon this literature not only by examining how the differences between plan and practice are reflected in CIFORs logic and practices, but also how CIFOR then addresses and represents these differences to the broader epistemic or interpretive community of which it is a part. D. Institutional Ethnographies that integrate structural-discursive and actor-oriented approaches My dissertation also draws upon and contributes to recent analyses of international conservation and development that investigate the relevant institutions ethnographically and take as the starting point of analysis the difference or disjuncture between policy (or theory) and practice or between plans and outcomes (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2004, 2005; Rossi 2004; Quarles van Ufford 2004). These studies attempt to integrate structuraldiscursive approaches 7 (e.g., Ferguson 1994) and actor-oriented approaches 8 (e.g., Latour

Structural-discursive approaches (Rossi 2004: 560) refer to those views that presume that behind a fiction of order we find a reality of disjuncture, this dualism being aspect of policy (Rossi 2004: 560). These approaches tend to be strongly influenced by Foucault, particularly his later work on ethnics and

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and Woolgar 1986) into one framework to more productively understand the order and disjuncture 9 that are inherent in conservation and development policy and practice, as well as how they inform each other (Rossi 2004). To this end, they attend to specific practices and negotiations between different actors and between actors and knowledge formations (Rossi 2004: 560) 10 . These studies are distinctly uncomfortable with monolithic notions of dominance, resistance, hegemonic relations and the implication of false consciousness among the developed (or the developers) (Mosse 2004: 644-5). Building on the aforementioned work of scholars who emphasize co-production and governmentality 11 (e.g. Li 1999a), these studies emphasize that governance brought by development schemes cannot be imposed, but rather requires collaboration and compromise (Mosse 2004: 645). A seminal article and book by Mosse (2004 and 2005, respectively) illustrate this approach and provide deep insights into the organizational or institutional aspects of globallocal analyses, which by and large continue to lack sufficient attention to the ethnographic details of the organizations involved. Through an analysis of a DFID rural development project that Mosse himself worked on as a consultant for over 12 years, Mosse (2004: 641)

governmentality, and attend more closely to specific practices and negotiations between different actors and between actors and knowledge formations (Rossi 2004: 560).
8

Actor-oriented approaches place emphasis on intersubjectivity, on processes of knowledge production and reproduction, and on the epistemic nature of strategic action (Rossi 2004: 560). Lewis and Mosse (2006) explain that order can be understood as the ideal worlds that development actors aim to bring about[and] disjuncture comes from the gap between these ideal worlds and the social reality they have to relate to (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 2).

The focus on practice is absolutely critical to these institutional ethnographers. Indeed, some insist that disjuncture comes first (van den Berg and Quarles van Ufford 2005, cited in Lewis and Mosse 2006: 3). For the ethnographer this means setting aside self-representations of bureaucratic rationality in order to uncover more of the inner workings of development agencies (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 3). It is important to note that Mosse and others do not use governmentality in Fergusons sense, but much more closely to that of Agrawal (2005) and others, viz., governmentalityworks through a form of positive power that wins legitimacy and empowers action (Watts 2003: 12, cited in Lewis and Mosse 2006).
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pries open the large black box that exists between policy prescriptions, on the one hand, and poverty reducing effects on the other. He pays particularly close attention to how policy ideas are produced socially, noting that authoritative interpretations have to be made and sustained socially (646), and how policy prescriptions and practices on the ground inform or do not inform each other. He argues that there is an intrinsic gap between policy and practice due to the different institutional worlds that each lives in, and that making better policy or improving implementation of policy to narrow this gap is to miss the point. He demonstrates that policy primarily functions to legitimize rather than orientate practice (Mosse 2004: 648), and that development interventions on the ground are driven not by policy but by the exigencies of organizations and the need to maintain relationships (Mosse 2004: 651). Examining closely the relationships between project activities and policy prescriptions, Mosse (2004: 645-6) argues that projects work to maintain themselves as coherent policy ideas, as systems of representations as well as operational systems, that projects do not fail; they are failed by wider networks of support and validation, and thus success and failure are policy-oriented judgments that obscure project effects (662). In sum, Mosse (2004: 663) demonstrates that policy goals come into contradiction with other institutional or system goals (Latour, 1996: 2) such that policy models are poor guides to understanding the practices, events and effects of development actors, which are shaped by the relationships and interests and cultures of specific organizational settings.

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Ultimately, ideas that make for good policy policy which legitimizes and mobilizes political and practical support are not those which provide good guide to action (Mosse 2004: 663). Another analytical tool delineated by Mosse and others that is critical to my dissertation is the tension between order and disjuncture, and the constant work of translation and composition needed to maintain order in the face of disjuncture or difference, thereby bridging institutional relationships, logics and incentives. The tension between order and disjuncture is worth elaboration since it is a key analytical tool used in this dissertation. Specifically, Mosse notes that the ethnographic question is not whether but how development projects work; not whether a project succeeds, but how success is produced (Mosse 2005: 9). To produce success development projects must maintain control over the interpretation of events, which requires an interpretive community (Mosse 2005: 9). According to Mosse (2005: 9), development projects need to enroll a range of supporting actors with reasons to participate in the established order as if its representations were reality (Sayer 1994: 374, cited in Li 1999: 298-9). Mosse (2005: 9) explains the dynamics of enrollment in and crafting of order as follows: common narratives or commanding interpretations are supported for different reasons and serve a diversity of perhaps contradictory interestsThis is possible because of the productive ambiguity that characterizes development policys master metaphors. Mosse (2005: 9) concretizes this process of crafting and maintaining master metaphors as follows:

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it also requires the constant work of translation (of policy goals into practical interests; practical interests back into policy goals), which is the task of skilled brokers (managers, consultants, fieldworkers, community leaders) who read the meaning of a project into the different institutional languages of its stakeholder supporters, constantly creating interest and making real. The productive tension of crafting and maintaining these master metaphors or order lies in the recruitment of multiple actors, which simultaneously stabilizes and destabilizes these master metaphors: the problem is that this diversity and multiplicity of interests (and needs to be met) itself destabilizes and militates against coherence (Mosse 2005: 9). Given this tension between order and disjuncture, Mosse (2005: 9) articulates the ethnographic task as follows: The ethnographic task isto show how, despitefragmentation and dissent, actors in development are constantly engaged in creating order and unity through political acts of composition. It involves examining the way in which heterogeneous entitiesare tied together by translation of one kind or another into the material and conceptual order of a successful project. In his own work, Mosse (2005: 10) analyzes this double effect of ordering and disjuncture by examining how subordinate actors in development tribal villagers, fieldworkers, office staff, even project managers and their bosses in relation to donors create every day spheres of action autonomous from the organizing policy modelsbut at the same time work actively to sustain those models the dominant interpretation because it is in their interest to do so.

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In doing so, Mosse (2005: 10) clarifies how, paradoxically, the practices of project workers erode the models that they also work to reinstate as representations; and moreover, that because it rests on disjuncture and contradiction, the coherence and order of a successful project is always vulnerable; interpretations can fail. In this dissertation, I examine in one analytical frame (1) project plans and intentions, (2) the context within which activities take place and the relationships between the different actors engaged in CIFORs activities on the ground, and (3) how CIFOR addresses or represents the difference between plan and outcome to a broader public. In doing so, I show that although the coherence of design unravels in the practical unfolding of a project (Mosse 2004: 664), CIFORs particular reporting and publishing of unintended outcomes of their interventions incorporate and repackage this unraveling into an organized and authoritative narrative of prescriptions for CIFORs epistemic or interpretive community. CIFORs articulation of these prescriptions -- which promote an approach to international conservation and development that is adaptive, flexible and accommodating to local variation -- through the vehicle of self-critical reflections is essential to legitimizing and mobilizing support for them and CIFOR since that rhetorical mode is more palatable to CIFORs epistemic and interpretive community who are directly involved in policy and practice. Second, I examine the tension between order and disjuncture in the broader landscape of aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia. I investigate, on the one hand, the order that maintains international attention and aid in the Indonesian forestry sector in the face of the lack of progress and, on the other, the disjuncture of knowledge, policy and practice both within and between institutions, which in turn perpetuates the lack of progress on reforms.

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More specifically, I examine how the order or master metaphor (Mosse 2004, 2005) or standardized package (Fujimura 1992) of forestry reform agreeable to both the international community and Indonesian government at the highest levels of diplomatic relations was crafted and maintained to justify or legitimize aid-interventions. I also investigate how this master metaphor evolved through the active refashioning by both donors and government to address the reality that the commitments agreed upon were not being met. Moreover, I examine the structural and institutional dynamics that explain the lack of progress on the agreed upon commitments and the ineffectiveness of aid-related forestry interventions in Indonesia and consequently the disjuncture or disconnect between knowledge, policy and practice, as well as how these disjunctures are maintained. In doing so, I expand the use of Mosses framework beyond any one given development project and into the realm of multiple projects, multiple interests and multiple actors all of whom have publicly or formally bought into a particular master narrative of forest reform in Indonesia that maintains international aid and attention. My dissertation also draws upon the substantive and analytical contributions of recent work by Fairhead and Leach (2003). Their work also integrates structural- discursive and actor-oriented approaches to analyze the relationships between science, society, policy and power from local to global levels in the context of forest conservation and development in Guinea and Trinidad. Methodologically, they take a multisited and ethnographic approach.extending from international organizations and networks, through national bureaucracies, scientists and activists and their local staff and activities, to the complexities of everyday life so that they can understand the processes by which different strands of

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science and policy come to shape each other, and gain authorityin the broader social field of which they are a part (Fairhead and Leach 2003: 3). Analytically, they combine Foucauldian approaches to power and knowledge with ethnographic approaches to scientific practice, actors and networks originally associated with Latour and others (Fairhead and Leach 2003: 13). They interpret Foucaults notion of discourse and power/knowledge to mean that discourse does not merely act on individuals but also produces its subjects, through a combination of external subjection and internal subjectification, shaping desires (Fairhead and Leach 2003: 14). Fairhead and Leach (2003) take seriously the notion of science and policy as practice and that this practice needs to be studied ethnographically. In taking a practice-based approach combined with a Foucauldian discourse analytics, Fairhead and Leach (2003: 18) pay attention not only to co-production (of science and policy) but to co-endurance and covalidation, as well as what comes to be construed as Science (and policy), by whom and when, and how a composite of practices comes to acquire the authenticated signature of Science. III. Research Methodology A. Overview of Methods I conducted multi-sited fieldwork in Indonesia over a 24 month period (August 2002 through August 2004), tracing the creation, flows, types and transformations of knowledge about forests and forest-dependent people and examining the effects of that knowledge at global, national and local levels (Marcus 1995, Markowitz 2001). I divided the research period between the national capital of Jakarta, the neighboring city of Bogor, the Malinau district of East Kalimantan, and Samarinda, the capital of the province of East Kalimantan.

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Jakarta is where central government offices, such as the Ministry of Forestry, forest industry associations, national level NGOs and international forestry-related institutions and donors are located. One hour south of Jakarta by car, Bogor is where CIFOR headquarters is located; CIFOR also maintains a small office in the Ministry of Forestry in Jakarta. The Malinau district of the province of East Kalimantan is where CIFOR has conducted multiple applied research projects since the mid-1990s, including a forest co-management initiative. Since the passing of administrative and fiscal decentralization laws in 1999, district level governments have come to wield an unprecedented level of authority over district affairs. The provincial capital of East Kalimantan, the city of Samardina, is where the provincial government, regional forest industry associations, regional Indonesian NGOs and regional offices of international funded forestry projects are located. I employed a repertoire of methods most closely associated with an ethnographic and anthropological tradition (Emerson et al. 1995, Markowitz 2001): (1) participant observation, (2) semi-structured and open-ended interviews, and (3) document collection and analysis. Using this set of methods allowed me to triangulate interview, observational and documentary data and analyze the continuities and disjunctures between data sources, e.g., compare and contrast discourses and practices of various social actors. I also employed a broader set of methods associated with conceptual shifts in notions of the field. These included journalistic-type interviewing of certain informants, reading of newspapers and other documents, informal socializing and telephone and email interviews (Markowitz 2001). Employing these methods greatly enhanced my understanding of the worldviews and interactions of certain social actors in an indirect fashion, and improved interpretation of

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those occasions when direct observation and/or interaction with those actors was possible (Markowitz 2001). My informants included, but were not limited to, villagers in Malinau; CIFOR scientists and management; government officials at central, provincial and district level offices; national and international NGO representatives; international donors in the forestry sector and project staff affiliated with these donor funded projects; and forestry industry representatives. In the process of research, I attempted to ensure not only that a broad spectrum of informants were consulted, but also that I developed rapport with them over time to both cross-check information and delve deeply into key issues. The 53 interviews I conducted with villagers and government officials in Malinau formed the foundation of data for Chapter 4 regarding relationships between CIFOR and other actors in Malinau. Over 50 interviews with CIFOR scientists and staff were a key source of data for Chapter 8 regarding institutional issues within CIFOR. Further, over 50 interviews with senior national level government officials, international donors, national level NGO representatives and internationally funded project staff were the source for Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, both of which concern the institutional landscape of aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia. These interviews constitute only a small portion of the data collected, viz., other interviews, field notes, and various documents ranging from government decrees to grey literature. Equally as important, for a 24-month period I was embedded in and indeed part of the communities I write about here, and the social and cultural intimacy derived from this intense period of participant-observation was absolutely critical to ascertaining who to talk to, what questions to ask them, and how to listen and interpret the words spoken.

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On a logistical level, my collaborating with CIFOR each summer since 1999 and engaging other aid-related forestry institutions and projects over those years provided me the necessary access and institutional intimacy to conduct this study successfully. At CIFOR I had access to project documents, participated in CIFOR meetings and was a member of various working groups within CIFOR. Further, CIFOR at an institutional level and in its various research initiatives in Malinau specifically incorporates a reflexive learning component, and hence my dissertation research in part dovetailed and harmonized with institutional objectives. Indeed, I presented my preliminary findings in various forums at CIFOR, including the 2003 CIFOR Science Seminar. Given that I was at various times and in various capacities a member of CIFOR in Malinau, or at least perceived to be, I do not claim this analysis to be objective in the sense of standing above the fray or of suppressing subjectivity (Mosse 2004: 666). As I discuss below, similar to Mosse (2004: 666), I was part of the world described in this dissertation, and my analysis only attempts to add interpretations to those of actors whose experience I share. The extended 24 month field work period built on preliminary research I conducted in Indonesia during the summers of 1999, 2000 and 2001 12 . Preliminary research focused on the relationships among actors concerning control over and access to forest resources in Malinau and the effects of CIFOR's co-management initiative on these relationships, with close attention to they ways local actors represent themselves and others to justify and contest resource claims. Conducting research during those periods allowed me to track the changes of those relationships in the context of dramatic policy and governance changes in

The 1999 and 2001 research periods were solely focused on CIFOR and its co-management initiative in Malinau, East Kalimantan. During the 2000 period, I was enrolled full-time in an advanced Indonesian language program in Indonesia, and hence research was not directly focused on CIFOR, although I did carry out two weeks of fieldwork in Malinau and carried out policy research over the entirety of the summer.

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Indonesia. In combination with fieldwork, I have conducted research on the political economic history of the region and the history of Dayak settlements and migrations in the region. Through this previous research I have built strong professional relationships with local level actors in Malinau, as well as with CIFOR and other forestry institutions in Indonesia. B. Rationale of Methods I carried out my dissertation research with an ethnographic focus on how knowledge is produced, used and transformed (Dove 1999b, Markowitz 2001). It also required attention to the relationship between local level natural resource issues with regional, national and global political economy (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, Bryant 1992). As Markowitz (2001) and others argue (Dove 1999a, 1999b), ethnographic methods, the backbone of which is participant observation, are particularly well suited to addressing my dissertation research concerns, e.g., how transnational institutions link with broader aspects of society such as the state and households and the "real and potential coincidence of interests that motivate individual involvement" (Markowitz 2001: 40). Further, recent anthropological scholarship on the nature of the "field" and an examination of traditional notions of scale in studies of transnational institutions provided useful methodological insights in carrying out the study (Appadurai 1997, Marcus 1995, Markowitz 2001, Riles 2001, Tsing 2000a). Specifically, instead of assuming a "nested levels of analysis" 13 (Markowitz 2001: 41), these scholars suggest "following the project" since "[i]dentifying and tracking multidirectional flows of information, ideas and material requires constant attentiveness to the appearance of new units of analysis and fresh linkages between
Markowitz (2001: 41) notes that "to address links between macro and micro phenomena, anthropologists have traditionally used spatially derived units of analysis in which households are nested within villages, villages within regions, regions within states, and states within the global system."
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them" (Markowitz 2001: 42). In other words, beginning with a "project," in my case CIFOR's co-management initiative, allowed the "tracing out of its articulative elements" (Tsing 1999b: 38) to figure out appropriate categories of scale and "units of culture and political economy through which we make sense of events and social processes" (Tsing 2000a: 347). In light of these insights, although traditional structural and scalar categories were analytical entry points, I paid close attention to the scales and social categories that, for example, CIFOR's research initiatives in part influenced and/or generated. Although engaging in a participant observation or participant comprehension (Mosse 2005) of CIFOR and other aid-related forestry institutions provided me with the necessary access to carry out an ethnographic study, it was also the most challenging aspect of the research for several reasons, perhaps the most pragmatic reason being that elites often do not appreciate being studied (Dove 1999b, Markowitz 2001, Pierce 1995). Indeed, "participant observation is a research technique that does not travel well up the social structure" (Gusterson cited in Markowitz 2001: 42). This in part explains the relative lack of ethnographies that "study up," 14 even though the need for them was articulated over thirty years ago (Nader 1972). Even explicit calls in anthropology for political engagement and the study of "up, in and near" fall victim to "the predisposition of averting our [anthropologists'] gaze from home" (Dove 1999b: 239). C. My Positionality A critical methodological issue in conducting my research was my positionality as a researcher, i.e., "situating oneself as a researcher within a nexus of fluid interpersonal and

Dove (1999b) notes the following exceptions with respect to institutions: Douglas (1986), Fairhead and Leach (1996), Ferguson (1990), Herzfeld (1992), Thompson, Warburton and Hatley (1986), and Traweek (1988).

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institutional relationships, while simultaneously linking these evolving relationships to variable flows of money and influence" (Markowitz 2001: 41). To navigate or negotiate my positionality in CIFOR specifically and forestry institutions in Indonesia generally, I attempted to take certain measures, the first of which, of course, was being aware of it, viz., that it is not a question of whether I influenced my dissertation research, but rather how I influenced it (Pierce 1995). Secondly, I wore "multiple hats," working with CIFOR, critiquing from both inside and outside the practitioner world, analyzing and writing for different audiences at different times (Dove 1999b), and trying to contribute something that these institutions would consider practical (Mosse 2005). More generally, I employed a repertoire of methods that allowed me to obtain and triangulate data on certain issues that if approached more directly could compromise my position and credibility with CIFOR and others, but were integral to my dissertation project. Methods included journalistic-type interviewing of certain informants, reading of newspapers and other documents, informal socializing and telephone and email interviews and conversations (Markowitz 2001). Employing these methods greatly enhanced my understanding of the worldviews and interactions of certain social actors in an indirect fashion, and facilitated the interpretation of data collected during those occasions when I did directly observe and/or interact with those actors (Markowitz 2001). That said, on a daily basis I was confronted with a question that Pierce (1995: 95) raises regarding her fieldwork on issues of gender and power in a law firm: "how does ethnographic authority play out in a field setting where the relations of power and authority between researcher and subject are not so clear cut?" Unsurprisingly, the answer in my case was equally not so clear cut. From the beginning of my field research in 1999 for my Masters

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project through my extended period of field work in 2002-2004 (24 months) for my doctoral work, it was never entirely clear or definitive to what extent I would be able to study up to examine institutional realities, or to what extent members of the practitioner community, whether in CIFOR or other institutions, would be comfortable with my attempt at an analysis of institutional realities. My confidence in being able to achieve this as a researcher, the comfort level of the members of the practitioner community with my carrying out this type of research, and the way I framed my research to this community have greatly varied since I started this project in 1999. The variability is in part a function of trust and familiarity: generally, the more familiar I was with members of the practitioner community and the more trust I built with them, the more comfortable and understanding they were of my research. That said, for certain members of this community, the more familiar they became with me and my research agenda, the more threatened they felt and the less trusting they became. These perceptions, however, were not fixed or definitive, and individuals understanding or judgment of my research agenda, and consequently their interactions with me, could and sometimes did change. Thus, as my fieldwork period progressed, I almost expected an element of unpredictability or transience in the quality of my interactions with members of the practitioner community. This unpredictability in the quality of interactions was closely related to the multiple positions and identities I assumed during my fieldwork. In conveying to individuals in this community my research agenda, I would tailor or frame my research interests in ways that I felt would resonate with their interests and would militate against a defensive stance from them, while also maintaining the integrity of my research agenda. For example, I was

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concerned that I would be perceived by members of the international practitioner community in Indonesia as an academic who wanted to expose all that was deficient about this community, and thus in my initial interactions I highlighted my focus on village level and government dynamics and de-emphasized the institutional ethnography components of my research agenda, until we reached a certain level of rapport. I took this approach for several reasons. One of the most important was that in my own thinking I was unsure to what extent I would be able to -- or wanted to -- examine the institutional realities of aid-related forestry institutions. I revisited my research agenda often based on my fieldwork progress, and thus my research evolved significantly during the fieldwork period. I realized early on that my research agenda would evolve, and thus, I did not want to inadvertently alienate potential informants by articulating a research agenda that was in many ways inchoate. On a related point, through my work experience, previous periods of fieldwork in Indonesia and academic training, I knew that the practitioner community in Indonesia was coming from an institutional worldview significantly different from mine, viz., as a graduate student conducting dissertation field research. Given these differing institutional realities, I represented myself and my research project to members of the practitioner community in ways that I thought would resonate with their interests and perspectives. These were the methodological challenges in carrying out an institutional ethnography when the ethnographer is in a lesser position of power and authority vis--vis his/her subjects. Navigating my multiple positions and identities as an insider and outsider in the practitioner community in Indonesia was the most difficult at CIFOR. Because CIFOR is an applied research institute with scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds and with

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different experiences, it was difficult for me at times to gauge to what extent they would be comfortable with my studying the institution. In a sense, the institutional worldview of CIFOR scientists was too close to my own to be able to accurately and consistently draw boundaries and represent myself and my research interests in a way that consistently maintained a productive relationship and the integrity of my research agenda. Further, certain CIFOR scientists some only at certain times -- viewed a critical, reflexive gaze on the institution itself as integral to the evolution and improvement of the institution itself, while others did not share this sentiment, or shared it in differing degrees at different times. Thus, not only was my own research agenda and representation of it shifting, but so was CIFORs. Complicating this further, the comfort level of CIFORs scientists with articulating and acting on this reflexive stance also varied with individual scientist, their context, and the extent to which they were familiar and comfortable with their perception of my research agenda. D. Methodological, Theoretical and Moral Implications of studying up My study and other recent "institutional studies" on discourse, knowledge and power raise important methodological and moral issues regarding "studying up. The key issues involved in studying people and institutions with authority and power center around the power and position/authority of the researcher vis--vis the people and/or institution. I believe these issues to be sufficiently important for methodological, theoretical and moral concerns to warrant elaboration. Before discussing the issues related to studying up, I contextualize the discussion with a brief summary of the reflexive turn in anthropology and related disciplines and politics of research and representation.

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1. Reflexivity, the Politics of Representation, and the Call to "Study Up" Since the mid-1980s, anthropology and related ethnographic sciences have engaged in debates about power and discourse in light of post-modern critiques and their demands for reflexivity 15 . One of the manifestations in this theoretical shift has been a debate regarding the politics of ethnographic representation. Post-modern or interpretive scholars argue that anthropologists by the very act of writing "inescapably exercise textual and social authority over the people they study, particularly people who occupy subordinate social positions" (Pierce 1995: 94). Indeed, these scholars have claimed that "representation is domination and must therefore be avoided" (Dove 1999b: 226). Their critics, however, counter that postmodern critics "employ the same conceptual tools that they attempt to deny others and that their work further inhibits the possibilities within ethnography of practice (Dove 1999b: 226). Out of these debates has come an array of concerns, inter alia, about "Who writes? For whom is the writing being done? In what circumstances?" (Said 1983: 7 cited in Dove 1999b). This debate has highlighted the awareness of the political position of both the ethnographer and the ethnography. As Alcoff (1991: 12) states, A plethora of sources have argued in this century that the neutrality of the theorizer can no longer, can never again, be sustained, even for a momentwho is speaking to whom turns out to be as important for meaning and truth as what is said. Related to this re-thinking of ethnography sparked by post-modern critiques has been a reconceptualization of what constitutes the ethnographic research "site" or "field." This reconceptualization has enlarged the "domain of ethnographic study to include transnational

A full discussion post-modernism and its effects on anthropology are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Following Dove (2001: 91), where I do use the term, I mean it to "refer to that paradigm self-characterized by 'incredulity toward metanarratives' (Lyotard 1984: xxiv)--referring here to conceptual paradigms so hegemonic as to leave little space for critique."

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and global studies" (Dove 1999b: 227; see also Brosius 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Marcus 1995) 16 . In this reformulation, traditional ethnography focusing on single locations where subjects are "automatically and naturally anchored in space" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 17) is considered insufficient to account for the multiple extra-local processes that influence the constituting of local identities and places. The conventional notion of the field site has in part been displaced by what Marcus (1995) calls "multi-sited ethnography," which "moves out from the single sites and local situationsto examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space" (Marcus 1995: 96). In addition to the heightened awareness of the politics of representation and the move to multi-sited ethnography, some scholars have called for ethnographers to "study up" (Nader 1972) and argue that it should be the core of the discipline of anthropology (Dove 1999b). The call to study people and institutions of power preceded post-modern critiques of anthropology and the related move to multi-sited ethnography. It was in part originally a moral call for anthropologists to contribute to citizens' understandings of "those who shape attitudes and actually control institutional structures" during a period in history when "so few, by their actions and inactions, had the power of life and death over so many members of the [human] species" (Nader 1972: 284). Although studying powerful institutions and people has ethical and theoretical affinities with issues raised about the politics of representation and research, there has yet to be a substantial number of ethnographies of powerful/central institutions (Dove 1999b). Perhaps most responsible for this relative dearth is ethnography's, particularly anthropology's, "centrifugal" impulse, in which even explicit calls in anthropology for political engagement and the study of "up, in and near" fall victim to "the predisposition of averting our
16

See Dove (1999b) for a summary of these reconceptualizations.

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[anthropologists'] gaze from home" (Dove 1999b: 239). At a conceptual level this centrifugal impulse is in large measure due to the "distinction between the 'self 'of the analyst and the 'other' of the subject," a distinction which "keeps study, critique, and ultimately blame safely away from those who design, fund, implement, and also study these projects" (Dove 1994a: 335, emphasis added) 2. Issues related to "Studying Up" It is within this context that I discuss specific issues related to studying institutions and people with authority and power. One critical issue mentioned earlier, and worth elaborating further, is the positionality of the researcher. In the analysis of her fieldwork on issues of gender and power in the male dominated law profession, Pierce (1995) notes that although as an ethnographer she exercised textual authority over her subjects, Pierce's authority was often challenged and negotiated because of her relatively submissive position vis--vis the male elites who were the focus of her study. In her discussion of the relationship between science studies and scientific communities, Franklin (1995: 179) concurs with Pierce's insight that ethnographers do not maintain total authority: "Many scientists remain unconvinced that scholars with no specialized expertise in their particular branch of research can contribute usefully to understanding scientific problems, and they suspect that such studies are most usefully aimed at identifying sources of public misapprehension of scientific enterprises." Yet this subordinate position can be a useful tool if the ethnographer is explicitly aware of and deploys this positionality. Pierce (1995) demonstrates not only that the classic conception of ethnographic authority obscures the multiple ways the researcher's authority and power shifts and changes, but also that these shifts and changes are a key methodological

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tool in "studying up." To navigate or negotiate positionality requires first that a researcher to be aware of it. As Dove (1999b: 239) notes, "reflexivity need not extinguish the political; it just means being conscious of it." In so doing, the ethnographer becomes aware of his/her multiple positions and identities vis--vis the institution under study and the multiple actors within the institution. He/she can then consciously move between these positions and identities, thereby disrupting norms that can uncover how power operates within institutions (Pierce 1995). For example, Pierce (195: 106) notes, "it is through the reactions I elicit in my movement between positionsthat I unsettle the boundaries between gender and power" and "uncover the operations of power and privilege that are never formally stated." Another aspect of shifting identities or wearing "multiple hats" is working with an institution, critiquing from both inside and outside the practitioner world, and analyzing and writing for different audiences at different times (Dove 1999b). For example, in relating his strategic writing for and representation of Dayak, Dove (1999b) demonstrates that it is possible to work on behalf of institution, in his case the IDRD, while also analyzing it. 3. Audiences Studying up and shifting positionalities also raise the question of the potential multiple audiences to be addressed by anthropology and other ethnographic sciences and the implications of reaching those audiences, particularly considering that those individuals in the institutions we study are more likely to read, or at least come across, what we write. That said, even though many anthropologists have demonstrated that the discipline is well-suited to conduct institutional ethnographies and there is now a growing number of them, the audience for them remains largely other academics, intentional or not. This is in part due to the fact that ethnographers have paid relatively little attention to issues of audience and

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engagement, which is somewhat ironic considering the heated debates among ethnographers over the politics of representation (Dove 1999b). In essence, these debates about the politics of representation have analyzed primarily only one side of what constitutes representation, viz., writing. Much critical attention has been paid to the act of writing and the assertion that representation is domination, and much less so about who is reading and what the effects of the circulation of representations are (Dove 1999b). As Akhil Gupta (cited in Dove 1999b: 228) has observed, there has been "very little sociology of the circulation of our [ethnographers'] representations." Reflection on the politics of readership and circulation has received very little attention even when confining this issue to the walls of the academy. For example, in her discussion of the movement in the anthropology of science to examine the linkages between the cultures of science and the cultural milieu in which they are embedded, Franklin (1995: 179) notes that "[o]ne of the most important concerns facing anthropologists of science is how to enable their work to speak to the broadest audience of scientists, social scientists, and other scholars. It remains unclear what language is needed for this to occur." Franklin's comment about audience is also notable for not mentioning non-academic ones, which points to another important issue regarding intended audiences. On those occasions when ethnographers have discussed the politics of reading, the contours of this debate reveal that the implied "normal" audience for these writings is other academics (Dove 1999b). For example, Dove (1999b) notes that in discussions regarding subjects as engaged readers of writings about them, some ethnographers make explicit that the intended audience should be academics due to a concern that subjects will react negatively to what the

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ethnographer has written 17 . Others are less concerned with the reactions of subjects, and more concerned with appropriation of their analyses by oppressive forces (Dove 1999b). For example, in expressing his concern regarding ethnographic studies of local social/sub-altern movements, Brosius (1999: 368) argues that these analyses can jeopardize movements by describing "terrains of resistance, providing maps for those who wish to subvert subaltern studies." Although Brosius' concern is well-founded in arguing that studies of social movements are in part "missing the mark," not writing about social movements, which he suggests, does little to resolve his dilemma. As Alcoff (1991: 20) notes, Even a complete retreat from speech is of course not neutral since it allows the continued dominance of current discourses and acts by omission to reinforce their dominance." Also problematic in his and other concerns of readership is the implied "'normal' ethnographic audience that makes no political use of information, whether for good or ill," usually defined as other academics, which in turn is "the tacit admission of non-engagement with the non-academic world" (Dove 1999b: 241). This tacit admission of non-engagement is all the more ironic given the heightened selfconsciousness over "ethnographic authority." This non-engagement is especially troubling with respect to ethnographies of powerful institutions and people since a key impetus in the original call to "study up" was moral call to engage with non-academic audiences (Nader 1972; see also Davis 1992; Dove 1999b; Scheper-Hughes 1995). Admittedly, the move to studying powerful institutions from an ethnographic perspective is relatively recent, yet without conscious and repeated attempts to engage, these studies could also fall victim to an impulse analogous to anthropology's "centrifugal" one, namely, the predisposition to write in
For an argument against this and a description of benefits of subjects as engaged readers, see Dove's (nd) essay "Kinds of Fields" in which he discusses Harold Conklin's practice of "reading back" to his subjects his and others' analyses of the livelihood practices of those subjects.
17

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"distant grammars" (i.e., jargon laden language), for "distant places" (i.e., the academy), and "distant times" (i.e., the flawed modernist assumption of a distinction between subject and object 18 ) (Dove 1999b) 19 . As both a preventive and corrective measure, I concur with the position argued by many scholars for an explicit ethical position and practice (Dove 1999b, Brosius 1999, Alcoff 1991, Nader 1972), captured in Dove's (1999b:233) comment that "[e]thnographic representation is in principle devoted to the representation of local perceptions, perspectives, and voice,' and, however far short of this ideal it may fall in practice, it may still be preferable to patterns of representation that , e.g., are expressly devoted to the direct ridicule of that local voice." Implied in his statement is an ethnographic practice that analyzes and critiques powerful institutions, offers "counter-representations" 20 of marginalized/sub-altern groups that contest disempowering ones and/or writes selectively for multiple audiences (Dove 1999b). As Dove (1999b: 233) argues, The concern of ethnography must often be to assert rather than question its narrative authority, to employ and contest-- but not avoid-- ethnographic representation." Perhaps one of the most illuminating reflections on positionality and studying up and their implications is Mosses (2005) recent institutional ethnography of a DFID development project in India in which he was a long-term consultant over a 12 year period. In his book, Moose (2005) devotes several pages to a discussion of his own multiple
See Agrawal (1995) and Dove (2000) for a discussion of how "indigenous knowledge" was reified and located in opposition to western knowledge by this modernist process of purification. Dove (1999b) use of "distant" refers to distance from the academy (center) to the field (periphery). Here I invert the perspective, using "distant" to refer to distance from the perspective of the field.
20 19 18

Examples of this include selectively problematizing and not problematizing essentialized representations of states, communities, etc.

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positions -- as an insider and outsider in development work and as a practitioner and academic of development in his multi-sited ethnography. With respect to being an insider, he notes that [t]here is no position from which I can analyse the circuitry of project and policy processeswhich does not place me within it as a member of the communities I describe (Moose 2005: 11). He also argues that insider status allows him to better understand the social processes of organizations, particularly since in these institutions information is a private good rather than a public asset (Mosse 2005: 11). Mosse (2005:12) elaborates that although development institutions are in the habit of dealing with criticism and the questioning of their claims and actions, they are less tolerant of research that falls outside design frameworks, that does not appear to be of practical relevance, is wasteful of time or adds complexity and makes the task of management harder. And thus, it is virtually impossible to sustain long-term participant observation in the absence of making a practical contribution.being a member of the community and having a certain status (Mosse 2005: 12). That said, Mosse does recognize the limitations of being an insider, noting that while he acquired a performative knowledge of the development project and practitioner, this also constrained the interpretive possibilities (Mosse 2005: 12). This is precisely where multipositionality is important and useful: I could use my partinsider/part-outsider position to engage in participant deconstruction (Shore and Wright 1997: 16-17), trying to wrest my thinking free from prevailing models and means-ends rationality in order to offer critical insight (Mosse 2005: 13). At the same time, stepping outside comes with risks, placing the researcher at the margins of the project community or worse yet excluded as an irrelevant, not to say disruptive, academic outsider (Mosse 2005: 13).

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The implications of these multiple positions for both the ethnographer and his potential audiences are intriguing. Mosse (2005: 14) notes that his narrative becomes the meta-narrative and that it is an interested interpretation whose objectivitycannot be that derived from standing above the fray or of suppressing subjectivity, but rather that which comes form maximizing the capacity of actors to object to what is said about them (to raise concerns, insert questions and interpretations) (Latour2000). To this end, Mosse (2005: 14), drawing on Gupta and Ferguson (1997), observes the following about knowledge production and our perceptions of it: the interpretive account that is anthropological, always coexists with other forms of knowledge (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 39), the political task [is] not sharing knowledge with those who lack it, but forging links between different knowledges that are possible from different locations... It is in this spirit of forging links between different knowledges, that I write and present my ethnography of forestry institutions in Indonesia.

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CHAPTER 3 THE RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE FOREST AND INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPES IN THE
CONTEXT OF INDONESIAS POLITICAL-ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS

I. Introduction In this chapter, I provide a detailed overview of the context within which the dissertation research is situated. I describe the current political-economic situation in Indonesia, viz., the transition towards administrative and fiscal decentralization, and the institutional legacy of the New Order regime. I then move to a discussion of the current perceived forest crisis and attempts at curbing this crisis; I discuss the political economic drivers of the perceived crisis and the engagement and activities of the international aid community involved in forestry in Indonesia. To localize these national and international level dynamics, I then discuss the Malinau District of East Kalimantan and how decentralization has played out there. In the last section of this chapter, I discuss CIFORs history and activities in the district. II. Indonesia: From Centralization towards Decentralization In Indonesia, forests are often arenas of conflict between actors with differing political power, especially in regions like Kalimantan that are rich in commercially valuable natural resources and also home to politically weak forest dependent communities (Barber et al. 1994; Dove 1993; Lynch and Talbott 1995; Poffenberger [ed.] 1990; Tsing 1993, 2005). Until the fall of Suharto in May 1998, control over natural resources lay with the authority of a highly centralized state, characterized by authoritarian rule, aggressive exploitation of the nation's natural resources, and the marginalization of forest dependent communities justified

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by national laws and policies (Lev 1973, 1985; Poffenberger [ed.] 1990; and Barber et al. 1994). The economic crisis and era of the political reform (reformasi) created dramatic changes in the laws and policies of the Indonesian government, perhaps best evinced by the passing of two key decentralization laws in 1999, viz., the Regional Autonomy Law (UU No. 22/1999) and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Balance Law (UU No. 25/1999) . These two laws de jure have significant implications for the use and management of natural resources, and, as I discuss later in this chapter, their de facto effects have also been substantial, albeit unpredictable. Even though Indonesias decentralization laws were passed in May 1999 1 , official implementation of the laws and related regulations has been slow and inconsistent, and uncertainty is great among all relevant actors as to how regional autonomy will affect authority over and access to the nations natural resources (MFEC 2000). Yet, de facto or ad hoc decentralization has been taking place since the passing of the laws actors with vested interests (e.g., local communities, government, companies, and NGOs) have been strategically maneuvering and positioning themselves, taking actions regarding natural resource use based on their own understandings of what decentralization means. This ad hoc implementation of decentralization is in large part due to institutional arrangements that are the legacy of the Suharto regime's successful efforts not only to debilitate local institutions that serve local peoples interests, but also to create a state bureaucracy accountable only upwards (Anderson 1990; Barber 1989; Dove and Kammen 2001; Winters 2002).

The decentralization laws were not officially implemented until January 2001, but ad hoc decentralization processes were initiated soon after the laws were passed in May 1999.

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A. A Difficult Transition to Decentralization: The Legacy of the New Orders Institutions Indonesia's transition is indicative of the international community's push globally for decentralized governance, although for the most part decentralized governance has not been implemented successfully (Agrawal 1998b, Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) analysis of decentralization of natural resources to local people in West Africa and South Asia points to the necessity of downward accountability of local decision makers to their constituents for successful decentralization, and the frequent absence of this mechanism in many countries ostensibly decentralizing. Although electoral processes are important to operationalize downward accountability, they also list mechanisms such as referenda, lobbying by associations, legal literacy by media and non-governmental organizations, and central state oversight of local governments (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Further, Agrawal (1998b: 22-23) suggests that success of any decentralization program requires the following three interconnected steps: "The first is the management of political relationships at the level of the central state so that some powerful actors at that level become committed to pursuing decentralization. The second is the creation of institutional mechanisms at the level of the locality that prevent elite actors at that level from cornering the increased flow of benefits directed toward lower levels of governance and administration. The final important step is the management of flows of information and creation of capacities so that the new information is used appropriately to produce goods and services for people." The institutional mechanisms necessary to carry out the three steps articulated by Agrawal were to a great extent absent in Indonesia when the decentralization laws were passed and implemented. And while a gradual transition has occurred in Indonesia, with the first direct

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elections of the president in 2004 and direct elections of other government officials such as regents (Bupati) following, the institutional arrangements that the post-Suharto governments inherited were antithetical to the type of decentralization described by Agrawal (1998b). These institutional arrangements are the legacy of the Suharto regime. Proper implementation of decentralization in Indonesia will require a difficult undoing of the institutions and incentives fostered and sedimented in the nation-state's colonial and postcolonial history. The decentralization laws themselves, their ad hoc implementation, and the subsequent inter-ethic and intra-village conflicts are by and large a result of the institutional arrangements created by the New Order regime during 32 years of centralized, authoritarian rule. The New Order regime created these institutional arrangements through myriad policies and practices -- based upon precedents set by the Dutch colonial administration -- that justified aggressive, inequitable exploitation of the nation's natural resources and the marginalization of forest dependent communities (Lev 1973, 1985). These institutions are a product of a particular form of centralized, authoritarian bureaucratic rule cultivated by Suharto and rooted in the political-economic ideology of "development" and Javanese cultural values (Anderson 1990; Barber 1989; Dove 1988, 1999b; Dove and Kammen 2001). Further, the lack of institutional mechanisms at the village level that serve villagers interest and that have fomented inter- and intra-village conflicts is due in great measure to the territorialization initiatives pursued by the New Order and predicated upon colonial antecedents. In the following, I discuss both the New Order's project of "development" and the history of territorialization as explanatory forces acting against decentralization in

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Kalimantan specifically and Indonesia generally with respect to control over and access to natural resources. 1. The New Order's "Development" Ideology and the Marginalization of Forest Dependent People The overarching political-economic ideology of Suharto's New Order regime was the project of "development," which was characterized by the two following parts, as noted by Dove (1999b: 231-232): "On the one hand this project has privileged central planning and control, western technocratic ideals, and Javanese cultural values. On the other hand, the project of development has marginalized -- as impediments to development -- all other values, including the social and economic values of minority groups like the Dayak." This particular project of "development" was embodied by Suharto himself, in being "officially known as Bapak Pembangunan (Father of Development) and his cabinet as the Kabinet Pembangunan (Development Cabinet)" (Dove 1988:33, see also Liddle 1985). This personal embodiment of "development" is also indicative of the true purpose of the New Order's development policies, which was to create economic wealth and political power to an elite few, i.e., Suharto and those within his ambit, yet articulated as nation building (Anderson 1990, Dove 1988, Liddle 1985). The New Order cast development in terms of culture, i.e., "progressive" culture that supported it and "backwards" culture that retarded it (Dove 1999b). In doing so, any opposition to the initiatives of the state was considered a sign of underdevelopment and indeed anti-nationalist. Thus, through this idiom of development, the New Order framed local communities contesting state control, such as Dayaks, as "backwards," "primitive," and

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"wasteful," thereby justifying state interventions and expropriations informed by statesanctioned notions of development (Dove 1983). Moreover, in articulating the conflict in these terms, the state cast political economic conflicts related to resource access in terms of cultural traits related to distinct groups and ordered along a trajectory of development (Dove 1999a, Li 1999b). Further, in mapping "development" onto culture, the New Order also cast any opposition to its particular brand of development as "conflicts between the welfare of the country as a whole and the self-indulgence of one particular group" (Dove 1988: 32). One important consequence of the New Order's particular brand of development and articulation of it in the idiom of culture was the institutionalization of "structural ignorance" in the state bureaucracy, defined as "the failure to perceive that which is not in one's own best interests to perceive" (Dove 1988: 28). The New Order created a state apparatus in which ignorance or denial of realities proved to be an asset for those within it (Dove and Kammen 2001). Thus, for example, the persistence of three central "myths" prevalent in Indonesian development circles regarding swidden cultivation and cultivators, viz., primitive communalism, misuse of the environment, and an isolated subsistence economy, can be understood in terms of the purposes that this ignorance serves, viz., extension into and exploitation of swidden agriculturalists' territories by "those groups with the most political and economic capital, and the greatest ability to direct and benefit from large-scale, capitalintensive, resource exploitation" (Dove 1983: 96, see also Li 1999b). Indeed, the New Order was emblematic of what Dove (1983) has referred to as a "political-economy of ignorance." And it is this "political economy of ignorance" that is the foundation of Indonesias transition to a decentralized system of governance.

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2. Territorialization initiatives of the New Order The conflicts between and within ethnic groups that have become prevalent in the post-Suharto period indicate an impotence of local institutions to serve local interests, as well as an unwillingness or indifference of supra-local institutions to mediate these conflicts. For example, conflicts between Dayak groups have been exacerbated by the growing number of outsiders who provide increased yet, differential access to profit. Intra-community conflict has resulted due to a perceived lack of accountability of leaders to their constituencies. Weak local institutions are manifestations of a particular history of New Order and Dutch attempts to establish territorial authority over land, people and resources articulated as "development" (Li 1999b, Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). This process can be glossed as territorialization, defined as the process through which "all modern states divide their territories into complex overlapping political and economic zones, rearrange people and resources within these units, and create regulations delineating how and by whom these areas can be used" (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 387). State territorialization initiatives have had a profound negative impact on local institutions in Kalimantan regarding use of and control over natural resources, especially during the Suharto regime, but also including the Dutch colonial period (Harwell 2000). One of the essential territorialization mechanisms of the New Order in Kalimantan was law. As Barber (1989: 94) notes, law was "an idiom and vehicle of state power in the New Order." Perhaps the best illustrations of law as a territorialization mechanism are the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, which turned approximately 66% of the nation-state's landmass into state property, and the Village Governance Law of 1979, which transformed local leaders from representatives of villagers to representatives of the state (Kato 1989).

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Although the Dutch colonial administration lacked the human and financial resources, as well as in part the economic interest to control Kalimantan specifically and the Outer Islands generally, they established precedents for the New Order (Lev 1985). The Agrarian Law of 1870, which was directed at the time toward state control of Java and Madura's teak forests, was the foundation upon which the Suharto regime laid claim to 66% of the nationstate's land mass as state property through the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 (Barber 1989). The Agrarian Law of 1870 declared that all "unclaimed" or "wasteland" the property of the state and defined "wasteland" as land not continuously under cultivation (Lindayati 2002). The impact would be profound in Kalimantan since swidden agriculture, the primary form of agriculture for Dayaks, is characterized by long fallows due to poor soils. With the Agrarian Law of 1870 as its legal precedent, the 1967 Basic Forestry Law delegitimized Dayak systems of land tenure by representing Dayak land tenure as either communally owned or not owned at all and hence justifying its classification as state land (Dove 1983). The Basic Forestry Law also stipulates that that state-sanctioned forest production initiatives take precedence over customary law systems (Moniaga 1993). Mayer (1996: 178) explains that "the 1967 Basic Forestry Law differentiates between 'proprietary forests' (forest growing on land that is covered by private property rights) and 'state forest' (a forest region or forest growing on land that is not covered by state-sanctioned proprietary rights)." Representing privately owned fallow fields as part of a communal land tenure system allows the government to classify these fields as "state forest" (Dove 1983). Through the 1970 implementation regulation, land regulated by local customary rights can rarely be considered "proprietary forest" under this definition (Mayer 1996). The effects of this legislation have been devastating: "traditional adat [customary] tenurial rights of millions of forest-dwelling

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and forest-dependent people have been handed over to a relatively small number of commercial firms and state enterprises" (Barber 1994: 17). In 1999, the Government of Indonesia passed a new forestry law (UU 41 1999) to replace the 1967 Basic Forestry Law and that explicitly recognizes customary (traditionally managed) forests. While the de jure recognition of customary forests in the 1999 forestry law seemed to create possibilities for local people to gain legal control and access over forests, in reality this has not materialized, even though there has been other legislation passed that supports local control and tenure 2 . Moreover, the new forestry law has not officially changed or affected the existing government claims of state forest (kawasan hutan), and thus two-thirds of Indonesia's land mass, which includes 90% of Kalimantan, remains controlled by the Ministry of Forestry, regardless of whether there is actually any forest there. Through Law No. 5/1979 on Village Governance, the New Order government enforced a uniform administration system on all villages throughout Indonesia, transforming the role of the village head from a representative of villagers to a representative of the state at the village level, thereby dismantling local forms of order and regulation (Kato 1989; Li 1999). This law also created the implementation of village government structures such as the LMD (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa or village legislative body) that delegitimized local forms of regulation and governance, establishing state authority over village affairs. Through this law, the Suharto regime turned the village into the fundamental unit of state administration and control of its populace and nested it within a national bureaucratic hierarchy accountable only upwards and towards the center, instead of downwards to a
2

For example, the regulation from the Minister of Agrarian Affairs/Head of the Bureau of Lands No. 5/1999 Guidelines to Resolve Adat (Customary) Communal Rights Conflicts, notes that the National Land Agency will accept the registration of Adat lands and treat them as a communal and non-transferable right.

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constituency (Li 1999b). Related to this, New Order programs for "isolated" or "backwards" villagers such as resettlement have only further strengthened the state's control over people and territories, removing people from regions rich in forest resources and placing them within the state's purview (Dove 1983, Li 1999b). In the post-Suharto reformasi period and particularly with the transition to decentralization, the uniform administration system of villages has to a great extent unraveled and been discarded. And indeed in some regions of Indonesia there is a rejuvenated public celebration and embrace of traditional institutions, e.g., the re-introduction of the nagari system in Padang West Sumatra. That said, in many places, e.g., Malinau, the New Order significantly frayed the social fabric and weakened locally meaningful institutions, and thus with reformasi and decentralization, the vacuum left by the discarding of the uniform administration system has been filled by a different, but equally pernicious and unaccountable, system of patronage or KKN, the popular Indonesian acronym for corruption, collusion and nepotism. Indeed, the abuse of the new found authority of Regents (Bupatis) in the context of a weak or non-existent system of downward accountability in many districts was so prevalent that it led to the coining of the phrase raja kecil or little king to describe how Regents acted like the Suharto regime at a district level. B. Decentralization in process: Uncertainty and Ambiguity Decentralization 3 and community control and management of natural resources in Indonesia remain problematic, and the forces working against them are many, with deep historical roots. Decentralization processes in Indonesia continue to be plagued by

"Decentralization" is used here in the normative sense, as Agrawal (1998b: 4) defines it: "an umbrella term that refers to multiple processes of relaxation of control by a central authority[that] aims to achieve one of the central aspirations of modernity: democratization, or the desire that humans should have a say in their own governance."

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uncertainty and ambiguity for all actors involved. To date, only a fraction of the implementing regulations have been passed and/or implemented with respect to the roles and responsibilities of district, provincial and national governments. Decentralization in Indonesia has been characterized by an extreme lack of coordination among the various levels and agencies of government. Decentralization in Indonesia is an attempt to resolve the long-standing problem of resource wealth flowing to the central government without equitable distribution at the regional level (see Dove and Kammen 2001 for analysis of inequitable flows). It is a reactionary measure that attempts to ensure that those regions that have natural resources and bear the costs of their management in turn gain the benefits from those resources (Down to Earth 2000, MFEC 2000). Prior to decentralization, the most resource-rich regions received little benefit from the immense profits that those resources created for the Suharto regime and those within his ambit (Dove and Kammen 2001). Moreover, the Suharto regime accrued its riches at the expense of the millions of forest dependent communities in Indonesia, turning them into squatters and criminals (Barber 1989; Dove 1983; Lynch and Talbott 1995; Peluso 1992; Poffenberger [ed.] 1990). The reactionary ethos of decentralization is captured in the ambiguity of the laws themselves. The Regional Autonomy Law (UU No. 22/1999) transfers responsibility and decision-making authority for the management of natural resources from the central government to provincial (propinsi) and regency/municipal (kabupaten/kotamadya) governments. Under this law, the hierarchical government structure is replaced by a parallel organizational structure between regency, provincial and the central governments (Article 4/Paragraph 2). The law provides wide ranging authority to kabupaten (regency)

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governments to control and govern all sectors, except international politics; national security; judiciary, monetary and fiscal concerns; environmental concerns; and religion (Article 11/ paragraph 2). However, the system of shared responsibility between the three levels of government with regard to natural resource management and conservation is entirely unclear (Down to Earth 2000). That said, certain local actors have taken advantage of the ambiguous policy context, and ad hoc decentralization is occurring, based on local understandings of the new legal environment, even though the existing legal framework may not support their actions (Rhee 2000). As I discuss in detail later in this chapter, in the area of East Kalimantan where I conducted my dissertation research, ad hoc decentralization created opportunities for local government officials, village elite and companies to enter the area, while exacerbating inter- and intra-village conflict (Rhee 2000). The Intergovernmental Fiscal Balance Law (UU No. 25/1999) delineates the natural resource revenue sharing allocations and the levels of government that will manage them. Under the natural resource allocation system stipulated in the new law (Chapter 3, Article 6), provincial governments will receive 80% of the tax revenues from fisheries, forestry and mining, 15% of the oil revenue, and 30% of gas revenue (Sondakh 2000, NRM 2000). Of the 80% from fisheries, forestry and mining, 32% goes to the producing regency/municipality, 32% to other regencies in the province, and 16% to the provincial government (Sondakh 2000). The central government, however, still retains a major share of oil (85%) and gas (70%) revenue, which constitutes the majority of the nation's natural resource earnings (Sondakh 2000). Also, due to the unequal distribution of natural resources in Indonesia, the impacts of this natural resource-based revenue allocation system will differ throughout the country. For example, only four provinces gain significantly from natural

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resource-based revenue sharing, whereas ten natural resource poor provinces obtain little under these resource revenue sharing formulas (NRM 2000). While the regional autonomy legislation takes important steps toward initiating decentralization in Indonesia, the laws are vague, filled with loopholes, and contradict previously passed legislation and regulations (Down to Earth 2000). The level of uncertainty and disparity in perceptions regarding decentralization and its implications were captured in a study carried out from December 1999-February 2000 by the Institutional Task Force for Forestry Sector Decentralization under the auspices of the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (MFEC 2000) 4 . This study revealed that there is no consensus on what decentralization means, how it should be implemented, and how roles and responsibilities are to be divided. The results of this study also show that central government and regional government officials have significantly different opinions regarding virtually every aspect of authority over and responsibility for forests (MFEC 2000). Ambiguity and uncertainty continue to be central themes in the process of decentralization. For example, in a workshop I attended in East Kalimantan in September 2002 that aimed to improve coordination between district and provincial governments for better forest management, province level and district level officials agreed not to discuss the division of authority between districts and the province with respect to forest resources, which effectively precluded substantive discussion of coordination. The reason for this is that the implementation of decentralization laws and regulations regarding logging permits and revenue sharing between district and provincial governments remains unclear and ad hoc. This ambiguity in decentralization processes provides both district and provincial
4

In this study, the task force conducted interviews and group discussions with central and regional representatives of government agencies, legislative bodies, NGOs, universities, and communities, and held a three-day workshop with regional government representatives from six provinces (MFEC 2000)

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governments room to maneuver to attempt to profit from issuing permits, taxes from logging, and informal payments or bribes. III. Broader Political Economic Context of Forestry and International Forestry Aid 5 A. Political Economic Drivers of Deforestation In this section of the chapter, I provide a brief summary of the perceived crisis in the Indonesian forestry sector, paying particular attention to the political economic dimensions, to contextualize the role of international-aid related interventions in the forestry sector. Indonesia is renowned for both its forest resources and the rate of its loss. Indonesias state controlled forest estate (kawasan hutan) is vast, covering about two-thirds of the nations land 120 million hectares encompassing not only actually forested areas, but also millions of hectares of agricultural land, mining operations, upstream villages and downstream towns (Bennett and Walton 2003). The forests are also diverse with links to national economy and local incomes, export earnings and domestic trade, small scale livelihoods and vast industrial enterprises, foreign and domestic investment, private and state management, and security and conflict issues (Bennett and Walton 2003). From a biophysical perspective, Indonesias forests are among the most extensive, complex, diverse and valuable in the world. They account for approximately 10% of the worlds remaining forests and are important to the survival of Indonesias biodiversity. Indonesia is home to 25% of the worlds fish species, 17% of birds, 16% of reptiles and amphibians, 12% of mammals and 10% of plants (Lele et al. 2000). Further, Indonesias forests are a globally important climatic resource, both as an atmospheric filter and as a sink for carbon that would otherwise contribute to global warming.

This section draws heavily on and is in part a summary of Rhee et al.s (2004) assessment of biodiversity and tropical forests in Indonesia.

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Moreover, approximately 40 million Indonesians depend directly on forest resources (timber, rattan, firewood, etc.) and millions of others reap indirect benefits (World Bank 2001, Bennett and Walton 2003). Further, Indonesias forest based industries contribute significantly to the national economy, although long term sustainability hinges on a significant increase in supply of timber and fiber. Indonesias wood-based industry is ranked third in overall non-gas and oil export value, after electronics and textiles. In 2001, woodbased exports were valued at more than USD 4.23 billion, and accounted for almost 10% of Indonesias non-gas and oil revenues (Bennett and Walton 2003). The significance of Indonesias forest resources is matched only by its destruction. In 2003, the rate of deforestation in Indonesia was the highest in the world, conservatively estimated at 2.4 million ha/year 6 . This figure represents a dramatic increase from previous years, which was already shocking for the international community. In 2000, forest maps showed that for the 12-year period ending in 1997, Indonesia had lost on average 1.7 million ha per year, which was nearly twice the deforestation rate that most people had estimated in the early 1990s (World Bank 2001). Deforestation has placed the greatest pressure on the countrys lowland forests, which correspond to the most biodiverse habitats. The World Bank estimated that non-swampy lowland forests outside protected areas would be highly degraded in Sumatra by 2005 and in Kalimantan by 2010 (Holmes 2000). 7 Further, although timber,

It is important to note that there is not consensus on this figure since data remain unreliable. Estimates range from the World Banks 2.4 million hectares/year to the Ministry of Forestrys 3.6 million hectares/year.

This often cited prediction requires the following contextualization: In that report, Holmes (2000) notes that the reminants of non-swampy lowland forests in Sumatra in 2005 and in Kalimantan in 2010 will not be viable as timber resources or as habitats for biodiversity (Holmes 2000: ii). Further, this prediction is based upon the comparison of forest cover maps produced by the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops c. 1997 with the c. 1985 forest cover maps produced by the Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration (REPPProT). The c. 1997 maps are satellite images and were produced as part of an attempt to obtain a rapid overview of the change in forest cover. The scale of these maps is 1:500,000. There was no ground truthing. The methods and scale of the c. 1997 mapping exercise were intended to provide information on forest cover

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rattan, fisheries, swiftlet nests and other biological resources are major contributors to the national economy, they are exploited at unsustainable rates. The significant increase in forest degradation is attributed to a range of often interrelated problems intimately related to immense social, economic and political changes, which began in 1997 and continue to the present, thereby exacerbating illegal logging and a gap between wood-based industry capacity and a legal, sustainable supply of timber. The economic crisis, dramatic political transition, ad hoc devolution of authority to provincial and district (kabupaten) levels, lack of law enforcement and poor governance have led to increased pressures on forests throughout the country. Accelerated illegal logging and land encroachment are often sponsored by powerful political figures and institutions, and continue to be encouraged in the name of economic recovery and development. Although the rate of forest loss was already high and accelerating in the mid-1990s, in 1997-1998 this escalated as a consequence of the devastating fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra, which burned nearly 5 million ha and imposed approximately USD 8 billion in economic losses on Indonesias citizens and businesses (World Bank 2001). These fires were unprecedented in number and geographic scope, and international attention was drawn to the massive scale of environmental damage occurring in Indonesia (Barber and Schweithelm 2000). Indisputable evidence demonstrated that these fires were by and large caused by oil palm plantation companies that converted forest using fire (Barber and Schweithelm 2000, World Bank 2001). Further, during the economic crisis of 1997-1998, Indonesia saw the loss of 80% of the value of the rupiah and the flight of working capital. This led to the collapse of Javas

only, i.e., natural forest that could be recognized as such on satellite images (Holmes 2000: i). Holmes (2000: 1) notes that the data must be regarded as provisional.

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industrial sector, and as a result, Indonesians, including policymakers, looked to their traditional economic base in natural resources to power the countrys economic recovery (World Bank 2001, Sunderlin et al. 2000). Moreover, with the fall of the 32-year centralistic Suharto government in May 1998, the call for political reform (reformasi) by various segments of society and the enactment of a set of decentralization laws in 1999, the central governments control over regional affairs, including natural resource extraction, was vastly reduced. Regional governments, unable to develop during the New Order 8 , are to a large extent ill equipped to cope with these new responsibilities. Also, civil society greatly suppressed during the New Order -- has yet to fully mobilize to monitor the government in attempts to keep it accountable and transparent. Thus, one result of this transition towards decentralization has been the manifestation and expansion in the regions of the system of corruption, collusion and nepotism that characterized the New Order regime. Overcapacity in the wood-processing industry, which consumes at least six times the officially annual allowable harvest (6.3 million m3 for 2003), is a key factor driving overexploitation of the forests and illegal logging. While wood-based exports were led by plywood through the 1980s and 1990s, pulp and paper exports have gradually replaced plywood as the primary export product. Indonesias pulp capacity rose from 606,000 metric tons in 1988 to 4.9 million metric tons in 2000. Paper production capacity rose from 1.2 million to 4.3 million metric tons during the same period. Operating at current capacity, Indonesias pulp and paper mills alone would consume some 24 million cubic meters of timber, more than four times the current Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) (Barr 2001).
New Order or Orde Baru is the term coined by Suharto to refer to his regime and to mark a break with the previous Sukarno regime.
8

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Annual round wood consumption by the wood-processing industry is generally regarded to be around 60 million m3 (Bennett and Walton 2003). With the AAC from Indonesias forest in 2002 at 12 million m3, this means that legal, authorized consumption was only one fifth of actual demand. As the AAC has been reduced in recent years to 6.3 million m3 in 2003 and further to 5.7 million m3 in 2004, there has not been a noticeable decline in wood processing activity and industrial timber demand, meaning a greater share is coming from illegal and unsustainable sources. Official statistics indicate that wood supply comes from a variety of sources, including timber concessions (HPHs) and forest clearcutting for plantations and industrial timber plantations (HTIs). Overcapacity is a consequence of more than a decade of government policy incentives to develop local value-added industries, as well as below-market stumpage fees and log prices and a lack of care by banks in their evaluation of new wood-processing investments. Of the USD 51.5 billion in private debt owed to the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), USD 4.1 billion is in loans to the forest industry, of which USD 2.7 billion are classified as non-performing (World Bank 2001, Simangunsong and Setiono 2003). The wealth of forest resources, both products and environmental services, also results in extensive conflict over control of these resources. These are reflected in horizontal conflicts between local communities and timber concession holders, as well as vertical conflicts between different levels of government (Bennett and Walton 2003). Moreover, years of built-up resentment from forest dependent communities and the political changes in the reformasi era have fomented another set of challenges for Indonesias forests. Specifically, the New Order denied communities access to their customary natural resource

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base, thereby exacerbating poverty for many rural households. Now, communities that believe they have claims against GOI or logging or plantation companies for compensation or return of land use rights perceive a sense of power and are willing to act. In many places, they have created new local pressures on forests that have exacerbated the strains imposed by large-scale operators (World Bank 2001). Hence the factors driving deforestation are not only multiple, but also are the legacy of the New Order. B. Summary of International Donors, Activities and Trends 9 In this section, I provide a brief overview of international donor involvement in the forestry sector in Indonesia, primarily focusing on the bilateral and multilateral donor community. This overview does not attempt to be comprehensive, but rather illustrative or indicative of international aid assistance in the Indonesian forestry sector. The following discussion does not include the numerous international NGOs, such as The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International, and other international organizations, such as CIFOR and ICRAF, that are active in the Indonesian forestry sector as implementing and/or re-granting agencies. The overview focuses on the bilateral and multilateral donor community because this group of institutions has formally committed to coordinating and collaborating with each other and GOI through the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF) and is also a focal point or platform for other institutions to engage in the Indonesian forestry sector at an international level. Before discussing the international donor community and its activities, it is important to note that GOI has also formally committed to resolving the crisis in the forestry sector, which includes bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. For example, GOI has ratified or been

This section draws heavily on and is in part a summary of Rhee et al.s (2004) assessment of biodiversity and tropical forests in Indonesia.

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party to most international conservation treaties, albeit implementation of these agreements has been lacking (see Table 1). Table 1: Indonesias Membership in International Conservation Treaties
TREATY
Signatory to CITES 10 Signatory to Ramsar Wetlands Convention 11 Signatory to Convention on Biological Diversity 12 Signatory to other international treaties designed to protect or manage biological resources 12/28/1978 8/8/1992 8/23/1994 Party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: Desertification, Marine Life Conservation

DATE (m/d/yr)

Source: http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/~sustain/h90/Indonesia.htm

In addition to these treaties, more recently GOI has engaged in a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements in attempts to address the national and international dimensions of illegal logging, which is perhaps the most significant symptom of Indonesias multi-faceted forest crisis and a stated key priority for the Ministry of Forestry (see Table 2). These agreements also represent part of the international communitys formal or public commitment to addressing the forestry crisis and awareness of its transnational dimensions.

CITES: Formulated in 1973, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora is an international agreement between governments that aims to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. Today, CITES accords varying degrees of protection to more than 30,000 species of animals and plants, whether they are traded as live specimens, fur coats, or dried herbs. For more information see www.cites.org. Ramsar Convention on Wetlands: Formulated in Ramsar, Iran in 1971, this convention is an intergovernmental treaty which provides the framework for national action and international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources. For more information see www.ramsar.org The Convention on Biological Diversity was agreed to in 1992 in Rio by the vast majority of the worlds governments and sets out commitments for maintaining the worlds ecological underpinnings as economic development continues. The CBD establishes three main goals: the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits from the use of genetic resources. For more information see www.biodiv.org.
12 11

10

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Table 2: Indonesias MOUs/Agreements to Curb Illegal Logging

Agreement East Asian Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG). 9/1/01 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). 5/1/03 Asia Forest Partnership (AFP). 2002 Indonesia-UK. 4/1/02 Description Ministerial Declaration agreed at the end of East Asian FLEG conference in Bali. Includes indicative list of actions for the implementation of the declaration www.worldbank.or.id/flegeap EC measures set out in this plan include support for improved governance in wood-producing countries, voluntary partnerships with producing countries to ensure only legally harvested timber enters the EU market, and efforts to develop international collaboration to combat the trade in illegally harvested timber. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/flegt/workshop/forest.htm Asia Pacific forest partnership (AFP) promotes sustainable forest management in Asia through addressing the following 5 urgent issues: Good governance and forest law enforcement; Developing capacity for effective forest management; Control of illegal logging; and Control of forest fires. http://www.asiaforests.org MOU on co-operation to improve forest law enforcement and governance and to combat illegal logging and the international trade in illegally logged timber and wood products. It aims to establish a system of legality identification and verification in Indonesia (with capacity-building assistance from the UK), and to move towards excluding products not so identified from the UK/EU market. http://illegallogging.info/dfid/DFID%20FLEG%20web%20output1.htm MOU would see the EU ban the entry of illegal logs from Indonesia into their countries. To aid this, Indonesia will supply both governments with a list of companies that are licensed to export logs, and will audit local timber companies to ensure that their logs come from sustainable sources. http://www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=837&area=home LoI to cooperate to improve forest law making and law enforcement to combat illegal logging. http://illegal-logging.info/dfid/DFID%20FLEG%20web%20output1.htm Malaysian government bans the importation of logs from Indonesia. On 6/1/03, Malaysia banned the importation of squared logs from Indonesia. http://www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=693 MOU concerning co-operation in combating illegal trade of forest products contains a list of objectives and areas of cooperation, including identification of illegal timber, data collection and exchange of information. http://dte.gn.apc.org/53MoU.htm MOU to cooperate over their opposition to illegal logging and trade in illegal forest products by building on existing bilateral schemes and multilateral frameworks. Contains a list of objectives for the partnership and areas that the partnership will focus on. http://www.illegallogging.info/textonly/documents.php?sortByMode=title MOU to cooperate in some projects including trees planting, investment in ecotourism, human resources training, illegal logging and forest fires fighting. http://forests.org/archive/indomalay/siforagr.htm

Indonesia-EU. End 2003 (expected) IndonesiaNorway. 8/30/02 IndonesiaMalaysia. 6/25/02 Indonesia-China. 12/18/02 Indonesia-Japan. 6/24/03

Indonesia-Korea. 7/12/01

Source: Rhee et al. (2004)

These bilateral and multilateral agreements are one aspect of a broader commitment from the international donor community to assist GOI in resolving problems plaguing the forestry sector. International aid in the form of bilateral or multilateral projects focusing on technical and policy assistance has been a key manifestation of this international

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commitment. The following discussion provides a brief summary of the history of international aid to the forestry sector and current bilateral and multilateral projects and funding. International assistance to the forestry sector in Indonesia was initiated in the 1970s, and at that time focused on the development of forest transmigration sites and watershed management. In the 1980s, donor assistance focused on reforestation for watershed management, a national forest inventory, protected area management, and training and research. From the 1980s to the 1990s, donor assistance also moved towards supporting the management of natural forests. Moreover, starting in the mid-1980s up to the present, forest co-management with rural communities became a central focus for donor assistance. Examples include the Ford Foundations support of social forestry in Java and the Outer Islands and GTZs decade-long community-based logging project in West Kalimantan. Other examples of donor focus on communities include DFIDs Multistakeholder Forestry Programme initiated in 1998 and a series of USAID-supported Natural Resource Management (NRM) projects that began in 1991 with assistance for protected area and concession management and later moved to a more decentralized approaches and community-based initiatives (Bennett and Walton 2003). At the time research was conducted (2002-4), many donors were active in the forestry sector, primarily through grants and not loans. The three largest are the European Union (EU), the United Kingdoms DFID, and Japan through JICA. Also active with substantial funding levels are USAID, Germanys GTZ, Denmarks DANIDA, Canadas CIDA, the

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ITTO and the Netherlands through Tropenbos and universities. Although not a bilateral or multilateral agency, the Ford Foundation remains a key donor in the forestry sector 13 . The EU funds multiple projects in the forest sector (USD 112.6 million in grants from 1995 though 2005) that cover biodiversity conservation, illegal logging and concession management. The EUs flagship forest and biodiversity project is its long-term (1995-2004) investment in the management of Gunung Leuser National Park in Aceh and North Sumatra. The EU has also funded projects to support forest concession management in South Kalimantan and East Kalimantan, as well as forest fire management in South Sumatra that complements institutional strengthening at the MOF level. It also supports an illegal logging response center based at MOF in Jakarta and the Forest Liaison Bureau (FLB) based in MOF to link its own projects and provide technical assistance and coordination to MOF. The UK (USD 42.7 million) through DFID funds the Multistakeholder Forestry Program (MFP), the largest single donor project in the forestry sector (USD 41.3 million for 2001-5). The MFP is active across Indonesia, supports participatory processes for decentralized forest resource management and provides substantial grants for NGOs. An additional USD 1.4 million supports a Cambridge University primate research project in Central Kalimantan and supports a seconded staff member at the World Bank to work on forestry dialogue and governance issues. Japan through JICA (USD 21.5 million) funds multiple projects in the forestry sector, including those concerned with carbon-fixing (2001-6), forest tree improvement (1992-2002) and the propagation of native species for rehabilitation and reforestation in Java, Kalimantan and Sumatra (2003-6). Additionally, assistance on biodiversity conservation is provided to

The following discussion of donor projects adapted from Rhee et al. (2004) is based on Bennett and Walton (2003) and the EU Forest Liaison Bureau database of forestry projects.

13

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Way Kambas National Park in Lampung, Sumatra (2000-4) and Halimun National Park in West Java (1998-2003). Other projects include a mangrove information center in N. Sulawesi (2001-4), a forest fire prevention project in Jambi, Sumatra (2002-6), and a forest sector development project based in MOF (2001-3). Japan also through Komatsu Ltd. (USD 600,000) conducts research and development on Dipterocarp species. Several other bilateral donors have played a significant role in providing assistance to the Indonesian forestry sector. Germany through GTZ (USD 18.8 million) funded an integrated forest fire management project (1994-2004), as well as a project based at MOF that focuses on strengthening management capacities of Ministry officials and working with MOF on the National Forestry Program (1997-2005). Denmark through DANIDA (USD 10.3 million) funds a forest seed project that focuses on training, technical assistance, institutional strengthening and provision of equipment to the Ministry and to six regional tree seed centers throughout the country. USAIDs assistance program of approximately USD 10 million funds the NRM program (USD 8 million for 2002-4) and the GreenCOM Environmental Education and Communication Project (2002-5). The NRM project focuses on participative and decentralized natural resource management and good governance, with particular geographic focus on East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. Multilateral donors have also supported activities that affect the forestry sector, through both policy reform efforts and land management efforts. The World Bank has been active in biodiversity conservation and protected area management but absent from the forestry sector until the economic crisis in 1997. After the economic crisis, the World Bank helped to include forest policy reform conditions in both the IMF loan package and the Banks own structural adjustment loans in 1998 and 1999. Further since then, the World

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Bank has been involved in forest policy dialogue with GOI and served as the coordinator of the DFF. ADB support in forestry has emphasized watershed management, including reforestation initiatives that incorporate community-based approaches to agroforestry in upper catchment areas. For example, ADB funds a watershed management project in central Java that includes reforestation and community forestry components. Although they address forestry issues, many ADB funded projects are not directly linked to MOF, as other donor funded projects are. For example, ADB poverty alleviation initiatives have bearing on forest lands and rehabilitation. The Poor Farmers Income Improvement through Innovation Project (USD 56 million) started in Central Sulawesi, NTT, and Lombok where it builds on a GTZ fruit tree lease initiative. ADB also has several large flood control projects, such as the South Java Flood Control Project (USD 88 million), which includes nursery development and tree seedlings for farmers. The ADB also has a number of large projects in development that have direct bearing on forestry, land rehabilitation and watershed management. The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) (USD 6.2 million) supports 15 forestry projects ranging from about US$ 0.05 to 1 million. The largest of these is the Sustainable Forest Management and Human Resources Development Project (US$ 1.1 million, 2001-2003), which include guidelines for illegal logging control, breeding, plantation management, community-based forest management, wood-based industry development and strategy and forest certification. One other international donor is important to mention. The Ford Foundation began working in Indonesia in 1953 and has provided over USD 125 million in grants in selected fields. Although it is a non-governmental organization, it is also an important donor agency

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because of its substantial grants program. Ford has focused on environment, forestry and natural resource issues in Indonesia since the 1980s. Ford grants (about USD 3 million per year) to government and NGOs have been instrumental in evaluating, testing, and promoting community-based forestry and natural resource management approaches, including social forestry, in Indonesia. In recent years, Ford has expanded support to cover good governance of natural resources in general. The table below summarizes the preceding discussion and other bilateral and multilateral aid commitments to the Indonesian forestry sector. Table 3: Summary of Funding for Donor Projects in the Forestry Sector 14
Country/Donor European Union/EC United Kingdom/DfID ADB (loans and grants) Japan/JICA Germany/GTZ Ford Denmark/DANIDA U.S.A./USAID Canada/CIDA I.T.T.O. The Netherlands/ Tropenbos Korea/KOICA WB/Alliance Grand Total Life of Project Commitment 15 (USD) 112,600,000 42,700,000 40,000,000 22,246,496 20,000,000 18,000,000 10,349,153 10,000,000 9,220,000 6,294,794 6,080,655 1,485,000 1,160,662 300,136,761 % total 37.5% 14.2% 13.3% 7.4% 6.7% 6.0% 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 2.1% 2.0% 0.5% 0.4% 100.0% Ave. Annual Spending (USD) 17,287,937 10,605,000 8,000,000 5,174,400 2,786,667 3,000,000 2,733,192 4,666,667 3,289,333 3,527,963 1,520,164 495,000 656,705 63,743,027 % total 27.1% 16.6% 12.6% 8.1% 4.4% 4.7% 4.3% 7.3% 5.2% 5.5% 2.4% 0.8% 1.0% 100.0%

Source: Rhee et al. (2004)

Much of the data to construct this table are from the Forest Liaison Bureau (FLB), which intermittently collects data on funding of donor projects in the forestry sector. The FLB data do not include all projects and funding agencies that impact forestry, and indeed their data is limited to bilateral and multilateral donors that fund projects with direct linkages to the Ministry. ADB and Ford Foundation funding were added to the data collected by FLB for a sense of completeness. That said, funds from organizations such as CIFOR and conservation NGOs such as TNC are not included in this table. Moreover, funding from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which provides millions in funding for conservation projects, is not included. The table is illustrative and not comprehensive. Life of project commitment is an approximation of the most recent 5-7 year period. Durations of projects vary, and projects begin and end at different times.
15

14

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The approximately USD 300 million refers to the sum of all life of project funding commitments. While it is a useful benchmark, it does not provide a full picture of current or annual funding available because projects vary in duration and begin and end at different times. With that caveat, the table provides an analysis of average annual spending based on project years of funding. Funding levels are ranked by size, and percentages are calculated for ease of comparison. Perhaps the most important insight from this table is that although total donor project funding is in the hundreds of millions of dollars, annual funding for the most recent 5-7 year period is closer to USD 60 million. To place this figure in perspective, it is useful to note that Indonesias GDP attributable to forestry and processed wood products in 2000 was nearly USD 4 billion and export earnings were about USD 3.5 billion, excluding pulp and paper, which were worth another USD 2.2 billion. Further, in 2000, GOI earned USD 275 million from forest sector revenues and reforestation funds, not including corporate taxes. IV. Malinau and Decentralization The Malinau District of East Kalimantan and CIFORs applied research initiatives there are indicative of the aforementioned broader political economic dynamics and related issues in the forestry sector, as well international concern over Indonesias forests. As discussed in detail below, ad hoc decentralization processes, valuable forests (from both commercial and conservation perspectives), opportunistic logging, and social conflict are all at play and interrelated in Malinau. Moreover, CIFOR has brought international attention to Malinau since 1996, when CIFOR started its applied research initiatives in the area. Thus, CIFOR in Malinau provides an extremely robust case study to ground and localize the broader political-economic dynamics.

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The CIFOR and Malinau case is also informative because of CIFORs focus on research and knowledge production versus a more straightforward development project intervention, which often puts less explicit emphasis on evidence and scientific rigor. Moreover, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, CIFORs applied research in Malinau is linked to the broader landscape of forestry related institutions in multiple ways. Given CIFORs position as an international applied research institute, its mission is to provide knowledge to other forest-related institutions, and thus examining knowledge flows are important. Indeed, for CIFOR not only are knowledge production and dissemination institutional priorities, but so is the applicability of context-specific research to other regions. Further, CIFORs research priorities of improved local livelihoods, local peoples control and access to forest resources and improved forest management all articulate with at least at the level of public discourse -- the priorities and concerns of other forestry related institutions in Indonesia, including the Ministry of Forestry. Lastly, CIFOR has worked in Malinau consistently for over ten years -- both during and after the Suharto regime, which gives it a deeper history and perhaps a deeper understanding of relevant dynamics in Indonesia vis-vis other international forest related institutions. A. Brief Description of people and place Located in the northern interior of the province of East Kalimantan, the district of Malinau was established in October 1999 through the division of the then Bulungan district. The Malinau district covers approximately 42,000 km2 an area the size of the Netherlands and the largest of East Kalimantans districts. The district is distinguished by its large expanse of Dipterocarp forest, noted as one of the largest remaining contiguous forests in Southeast Asia, which is primarily due to rugged terrain that has ensured that many areas

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remain inaccessible to commercial logging, even though most of the catchment was officially allocated to timber concessions (Campbell et al. 2003, Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a], Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]). Ninety-five percent of the district is classified as state forest land (Kawasan Hutan) by the Indonesian government (Barr et al. 2001), and indeed Malinaus forests are relatively intact compared with other forest lands in East Kalimantan, which have been heavily logged since the early 1970s. Approximately three-fourths of Indonesia's second largest national park, Kayan Mentarang (1 million ha), is located within the regency's boundaries (Barr et al. 2001). However, most accessible lowland forest, e.g., along the lower reaches of the Malinau River, is fragmented and degraded due to logging and extensive swidden cultivation (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]). Like much of Borneo, this district is traversed by a dendritic system of rivers; the primary waterway being the Malinau River. The Malinau joins the Mentarang River near the river town of Malinau to form the larger Sesayap River by which one can travel eastward to the larger trade town of Tarakan, which commercially connects northeastern East Kalimantan with the rest of the province. Although air service has improved over the last few years and the district government is expanding the airports capacity, the river route from Tarakan to Malinau remains the primary avenue of transport for people and goods from the coast to the interior. The district is sparsely populated with a total of approximately 40,000 16 inhabitants (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a], District Government of Malinau 2003). Malinaus inhabitants self-identify into more than 20 ethnic groups, most of which fall under the

16

Estimated from 2003 election census.

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category of Dayak 17 , and include the largest population of Punan in Borneo 18 (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]). The vast majority of Malinaus inhabitants are rural upland Dayaks living in villages, more than half of which are poor by national standards in terms of housing, clothing and number of daily meals (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]). They practice swidden agriculture and hunting and gathering from forests, directly depending on forests for income and subsistence needs (Levang 2002, cited in Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]) 19 . Approximately 20% of the population lives in the district capital, the town of Malinau, which is located in the basin of the Malinau River catchment (District Government of Malinau 2003). This more urban population is highly mixed, with a strong representation of local and non-local Muslim traders and migrants, Tidung and Bugis (South Sulawesi), respectively, as well as Dayak and Punan. Additionally, a small number of individuals from Java, Flores and other islands and regions of Kalimantan have settled in town, with a few settling in upland villages. Most of CIFORs research initiatives in Malinau district, particularly activities related to the Adaptive Collaborative Management project (ACM) and the ones that I most closely attended to in this analysis, are focused on the Malinau watershed (See Figure 3), which is

Dayak is an umbrella and exogenous term referring to the upland, indigenous groups of Borneo, who are now primarily Christian. Punan sometimes fall under this term. See for example King (1993).
18

17

See Sellato (2001) for a historical overview of the upper Malinau River during the last 150 years.

Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note that these Dayak groups have been involved in international trade networks for centuries. Prior the arrival of the Dutch in the late 19th century and as in many parts of Kalimantan, the Malinau watershed was characterized by trade relationships between upland Dayak groups and coastal sultanates and petty kingdoms, who in turm traded non-timber forest products (NTFPs) with seafaring merchants, viz., the Taosug and Bugis (Peluso 1983, Warren 1981). Trade in NTFPs with China is recorded in Chinese archives dating to c. 1000 AD (Sellato 2001). In the late 19th century the Dutch colonial administration began a systematic program to control economic and political activities in inland East Kalimantan, spurred on in part by increased demand for NTFPs in Europe and West Asia (birds nests and gaharu), as well as the threat of British expansion into Dutch controlled Borneo (Peluso 1983, Linblad 1988, Black 1985). Gaharu is the resinous heartwood that results from a fungal infection (Cytosphaera mangifera) in some species of Aquilaria. The resulting aromatic heartwood is exported and used in perfumes and incense.

19

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the most densely populated and most developed area of the district (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]). Approximately 6,673 20 people live in 27 villages distributed in 21 settlements in the 500,000 ha watershed (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]) 21 . Village populations range from 15 to 997 individuals each (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]).

20

Based on voting census data in April 2003.

Villages (desa) are defined administratively, and several villages maybe located physically together in one area due to government resettlement programs. Each of these villages have desa status administratively, i.e., each has a government document noting its village status, and are not administratively hamlets (dusun).

21

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Figure 4. Map of Ethnic Groups in the Malinau Watershed 22

22

This map was produced in 1999 by Asung Uluk, who was a member of the CIFOR ACM team in Malinau.

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At least eleven Dayak ethnic groups live in the watershed, but the situation is complicated by the fact that within a particular Dayak ethnic category, e.g., Kenyah, villagers further differentiate themselves by identifying a specific river of origin or other historically significant indicator, e.g., Kenyah Lepo Ke or Kenyah Oma Lung. Each of these subgroups speaks a distinct dialect or language, which may or may not be intelligible to individuals from another sub-group. For example, Kenyah Oma Lung can understand Kenyah Lepo Ke, but generally Kenyah Lepo Ke do not understand Kenyah Oma Lung. The Punan are often noted by villagers of various ethnic groups as being the most linguistically accomplished, often able to speak multiple languages, which is unsurprising given their historically marginalized position in trade relations and thus the need for them to learn how to communicate with more dominant groups. In addition to Dayak groups, individuals from Sulawesi, Flores, Java and Sumatra or elsewhere in Kalimantan have settled in the area, often having significant influence locally due to their education and broader experiences (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004). The history of settlement, migration, and government interventions has strongly influenced the current ethnic diversity in the Malinau watershed and inter-ethnic relations 23 . Since migrating to the Malinau in the mid-nineteenth century from the Bahau, the Merap have claimed most of the watershed as theirs, which is recognized by other ethnic groups who, when migrating to the Malinau watershed, requested permission from the Merap Chief Customary Leader (Ketua Adat Besar) 24 . The Merap claim the Malinau watershed 25 ,
23

See Sellato (2001) for a detailed discussion of these issues. See Sellato (2001) and Kaskija (1999, 2000) for historical and anthropological studies of the Merap.

24

Territorial claims should be interpreted loosely here since it is debated whether the Merap or other Dayak groups, including Punan, had fixed or firm ideas about territory or boundaries beyond the level of individual ownership.

25

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particularly the middle and upper portions, as their customary land (tanah adat), and are recognized by other Dayak groups as indigenous (asli), which in the current era of decentralization confers substantial political leverage (see following section). The Kenyah 26 groups, however, have the largest population in the watershed and the most political control of any single Dayak ethnic group. The Kenyah groups migrated en masse to the Malinau from the Bahau-Pujungan watersheds starting in the 1960s to be closer to markets and schools and have succeeded both economically and politically due to several factors, inter alia, intact hierarchical social structure and expert skills as swidden cultivators (see Sellato 2001). It is important to underscore that they intentionally moved to the Malinau for economic purposes and were not forcibly resettled, although their migration might have been influenced by government resettlement programs. When migrating to the Malinau, the Kenyah requested permission from the Merap Chief Customary Leader to settle in the region, and subsequently received legal recognition from the sub-district government. The Punan are traditionally hunter-gathers, but for the most part have now settled in permanent villages, although it is not uncommon for Punan to be absent from their villages for long stretches of time due to hunting and/or foraging expeditions. They continue to be the most marginalized politically, which is indicative of their historical role as clients, or often slaves 27 , of swiddening groups such as the Merap and Kenyah (Sellato 2001). Government resettlement programs from the 1960s to 1980s and one in 1999 strongly influenced current settlement locations and their ethnic make-up, most deleteriously affecting the Punan 28 . Through various promises, mostly unfulfilled to date, these programs

26

For studies of Kenyah social stratification see, for example, Whittier (1973) and Rousseau (1990). Sellato (2001) uses the term slave. Please see his text for an explanation.

27

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encouraged Dayak groups from more remote areas to resettle in areas closer to the district capital of Malinau. One of the consequences of these programs was to have two to four ethnically homogenous villages 29 located in one area, such that one area consists of multiple villages and ethnic groups. For example, Long Loreh is one large area consisting of four ethnically distinct villages the Kenyah village of Long Loreh proper, the Merap village of Sengayan, the Punan Tubu village of Bila Bekayuk and the Punan Malinau village of Pelancau. In 2003 there were nine such locations or settlements in the watershed. The Punan incurred the most negative consequences of these programs because the promises of homes and agricultural land were unfulfilled, and hence many currently continue to maintain settlements in their original locations upstream, spending part of their time in those upstream areas. Each village has a village head (kepala desa) who is elected by villagers after candidates for the position have been vetted by the sub-district government. The village head is part of the official government structure and paid Rp. 750,000 (approximately USD 80) per month by the district government. Most of the individuals who serve as village heads are also customary leaders in the village, a position that was not recognized during the New Order. Current village locations reflect the history of migration and settlement patterns of different ethnic groups arriving in the area at different times. Indeed, a reading of the landscape of villages demonstrates alternating sequences of older and newer villages (Limberg [forthcoming]). This history of migration and settlement in the context of current increased pressures on, and incentives to claim, land and resources has engendered and exacerbated inter-village conflicts with respect to territorial claims and justifications, which
For ethnographic studies of the Punan see, for example, Sellato (2001, 1994), Hoffman (1986, 1988), Kaskija (1999, 2000), and Puri (1997). 29 I use the term village here in its administrative and legal sense (desa).
28

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is discussed in detail later in this chapter. The district government has attempted to change the administrative status of clusters of villages into single villages through district government decree (District Decree No. 3/2001) and declared that villages can only claim land they are living on, but implementation of these directives has not occurred. The inter-ethnic tensions and struggles over forest and land resources in the Malinau watershed are indicative of alliances and tensions in the district more broadly. Ethnic affiliations, economic interdependencies, strategic kin relations and historical relationships form the fabric of current alliances and tensions. In recent years, Kenyah, Lundaye and Tidung groups have been the most politically active and dominate the district government. Together with the Merap, these groups have worked the most aggressively to consolidate claims to forest and land. The Punan, on the other hand, are only minimally represented in the district government, lack strong documentation of their territorial claims, and must struggle against a history of marginalization by these other groups 30 . B. Decentralization Processes in Indonesia related to forestry and community management After the passing of the decentralization laws in 1999, district governments, particularly in regions with rich forest resources, took advantage of the decentralization laws and more broadly the reformasi 31 ethos and quickly issued permits for small scale timber concessions ranging from 100 ha to 5,000 ha per permit that were valid from a few months up to two years. The most common ones in East Kalimantan were Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan (HPHH) or Forest Product Harvest Concession and Izin Pemungutan dan
30

The Punan historically lack the strong social cohesion of groups such as the Kenyah and lack effective institutions to represent their interests. Only in the mid-1990s did the Punan in Malinau organize the appointment of a Punan customary leader (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b])
31

Reformasi refers to the transformation and dismantling of the policies, practices, and institutional structures through which the New Order leadership and a handful of well-connected conglomerates controlled the political and economic life of the country prior to Suhartos resignation in May 1998 (Barr et al. 2001: v).

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Pemanfaatan Kayu (IPPK) or Timber Extraction and Utilization Permits. HPHH permits allow the extraction of timber and/or non-timber forest products in areas of 100 ha that are located within the government controlled Forestry Estate (Kawasan Hutan) (Barr et al. 2001: 56). IPPK permits are small scale forest conversion licenses, ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 per permit, for areas designated as social forest (Hutan Rakyat) or privately-owned forest (Hutan Milik) (Barr et al. 2001: 13). It is important to note here that while these types of permits seem to carry the signature of clear legal justification and certainty, precisely the opposite is true their issuance and implementation are indicative of ambiguous, contentious and ad hoc decentralization processes. Due to loopholes in legislation, these permits did not require central government approval prior to their issuance. For example, the areas covered by these permits often overlapped with those of forest concessionaires who had received permits from the central government during the New Order, as has been the case in Malinau (Barr et al. 2001, Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]). Even the legal genealogy of IPPKs issued by Malinaus district government is in fact, rather sketchy, not citing the proper legal decisions and regulations, mistakenly citing the wrong ones, and/or erroneously referring to the wrong types of permits, e.g., referring to IPPKs as Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu (IPKs) or Timber Clearance Permit, which can only be issued by the Ministry of Forestry (Barr et al. 2001: 43). Indeed, indicative of the legal confusion over these permits and the general lack of concern over legal accuracy during this period, district government officials, villagers and industry actors in Malinau referred to IPPKs as IPKs (Barr et al. 2001) 32 .

This general lack of concern regarding the legal accuracy of permits reflects more an opportunism of district governments taking advantage of legal loopholes in the post-Suharto era than it does an intentional confusing of permits and regulations. For example, in the case of Malinau, the district government had nothing to gain by referring to IPPKs and IPKs the district government was authorized to issue IPPKs and not IPKs.

32

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In Malinau, which is indicative of the situation in forest rich districts, the district government issued 46 IPPK permits to timber concessionaires (1000 to 5000 hectares per permit) between April 2000 and April 2001 and thus opened up approximately 60,000 ha of forest for unsustainable harvesting (Wollenberg et al [forthcoming a]). These entrepreneurial concessionaires secured agreements with villages that claimed the surrounding forest through negotiations with village leaders 33 . In exchange for agreeing to allow the concessionaire to harvest timber, villages were promised a fee per cubic meter of timber harvested, which in the worst case was not defined and in the best case was 50,000 rupiah (approximately USD 6) per cubic (Limberg [forthcoming]). Further, villages also sometimes negotiated in-kind benefits, such as roads, public buildings and public facilities such as generators, rice hullers and water pumps to the villages (Wollenberg et al [forthcoming a]: 10). The cash benefits alone were much more than what villages had received previously. For example, in the seven villages studied in the Malinau watershed that entered into IPPK agreements, cash benefits from three years of IPPK fees averaged about USD 1,000 per householdcompared to prior benefits from large scale logging companies or government of only about USD 1,500 annually per village, plus minor community development projects (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]: 10, italics in original). That said, Wollenberg et al. (forthcoming a: 11) estimate that villagers received only 1.4% of the gross value of the timber harvested, based on timber prices in Malinau town. Additionally, the issuance of permits and operations of IPPKs in a weak institutional environment created a host of problems and conflicts for villagers. For example, common
33

To apply for an IPPK permit, logging companies were required to secure a timber harvest agreement with the village that claimed the forested region that was to be exploited (Barr et al. 2001)

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villagers benefited less compared to village leaders, who sometimes received an individual fee of about 10,000 rupiah per m3 beyond what was paid to the village, in addition to less transparent payments, which has generated conflict (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]: 11). Additionally, the fulfillment of contractual obligations has been minimal. Nineteen of the 22 villages in Malinau that had agreed to IPPKs mentioned that they had encountered problems with the broker because of unfulfilled promises (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]: 11). There were few, if any, attempts by the district government at monitoring and enforcement of IPPKs, which in theory should have paid various taxes and levies to the district government that it had not received previously from large-scale concessionaires (Barr et al. 2001). It seems, however, that many IPPKs were negligent in paying these taxes and levies, yet were allowed to operate, which indicates the payment of bribes to certain officials by these companies (Barr et al. 2001). Indeed, Barr et al. (2001: 19) note that several of their informants involved in securing IPPK permits indicated that informal payments were routinely required at each step of the permit approval process where a signature is needed. Timber brokers interviewed in September 2000 indicated that they had paid as much as Rp. 50 million (or roughly US$7,500 at an exchange rate of Rp. 6,700/US$) for individual signatures. Further, the lack of proper institutional mechanisms in district government and the new possibilities of cash compensation provided by timber entrepreneurs exacerbated conflicts between villages that compete with each other to claim forests, based on justifications of indigeneity and/or historical agreements. IPPKs also fueled intra-village conflicts due to inequitable distribution of benefits among villagers.

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In issuing logging permits, district governments, including Malinau, effectively bypassed the central governments Ministry of Forestry, which during the Suharto regime was one of the most powerful ministries, claiming authority over two-thirds of Indonesias landmass which was classified as state forest. During the New Order the vast majority of government revenue from forest resources fell into the coffers of the Ministry of Forestry, with resource rich districts receiving little benefit. Decentralization processes have shifted logging revenues from central to district governments and have also officially weakened the Ministry of Forestrys authority. This is strongly resented and resisted by the Ministry, and indeed the Ministry has attempted to re-assert its authority and re-centralize forestry based on the justification that district governments are acting irresponsibly and creating autonomous fiefdoms. As part of this justification, the Ministry to a large extent blames the current deforestation rate in Indonesia of 2.4 million ha per year on decentralization processes and the lack of district regulatory mechanisms, enforcement and monitoring. The Ministry points out that district governments have issued a multitude of logging permits, e.g., IPPKs, that are not in accordance with permit issuing protocol, that are not regulated in the least, and that often overlap with existing permits. Moreover, according to the Ministry, with the loss of central government authority and the lack of law enforcement in the regions, illegal logging operations have been able to increase in number and also work more openly and intensively. According to the Ministry, regionalized or localized systems of corruption, collusion and nepotism have facilitated rampant illegal logging. As part of its attempt to re-centralize control, in June 2002 the Ministry passed a regulation stipulating that all logging permits must be issued by the central government and

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that district governments no longer had the right to issue permits 34 . This regulation was both drafted and passed by the central government without consultation with provincial or district governments and civil society groups, and because of that and its ethos of re-centralization, other actors strongly contest this regulation and have called for a judicial review. That said, district governments, including Malinau, have stopped issuing small scale logging permits such as IPPKs due to directives from the central government that make them illegal. These directives have leverage in part due to the continued heavy dependence of district governments on the central government for their operating budgets. In the case of Malinau, over 95% of the district governments annual budget comes from the central government; the district is as yet unable to generate significant revenue locally. V. CIFOR in Malinau: institutional arrangements and plans A. Formal Institutional Relationships As part of the host country agreement with the Government of Indonesia (GOI), CIFOR was provided privileged access 35 to a large forested area to conduct long-term applied research on forest related issues (Sayer and Campbell 2004). The research forest was part of GOIs bid to have CIFOR headquartered in Indonesia, when CIFOR was created in 1993. Initially, there was debate within CIFOR regarding the location and nature of the research forest, which was a reflection of attitudes of people [at CIFOR] with different perspectives on the role of science in natural resource management (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 146). Several scientists advocated an area of forest that could be a controlled
34

Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 34 Tahun 2002 tentang Tata Hutan dan Penyusunan Rencana Pengelolaan Hutan, Pemanfaatan Hutan, dan Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan.

By privileged access I mean that CIFOR scientists do not need to apply for research permits to conduct research in Malinau, and CIFOR is guaranteed long-term access to the region. That said, CIFORs access to this area is not exclusive other actors such as logging companies may operate in the region as well.

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experimental environment, while others preferred an ill-defined area where the interactions among different stakeholder groups could be studied (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 146). In consultation with GOI, CIFOR chose a forested region in the then Bulungan district (now Malinau district), East Kalimantan where logging had not yet taken place, but was scheduled in the medium term, and where local communities were living. The area was also adjacent to a large national park, Kayan Mentarang, and it was assumed that the research forest would act as a buffer zone for the protected area and that requiring access to extensive pristine forests could make use of the part (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 146). Further, WWF had been active in Kayan Mentarang for quite some time and by having CIFORs research forest next to the national park, it was hoped that there would be close collaboration between the two institutions. It transpired, however, that the area would not be logged as soon as anticipated, and as research initiatives unfolded, it proved expedient to locate more and more of the work outside in areas outside, but adjacent to the designated research forest where a timber concessionaire actively operated (Inhutani II) and many local communities lived (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 146). With time, researchers were active in various parts of the district and in fact more work was going on in the inhabited areas outside the forest than in the forest itself (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 146). The forest itself was formally known as the Bulungan Research Forest and was recognized through Ministerial Decree 36 . In 2003 Bulungan Research Forest was changed to Malinau Research Forest to reflect the change in the name of the district.37 Formally, the Malinau
36

This decree from the Minister of Forestry, signed on January 23, 1996, is entitled Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan No. 35/Kpts-II/1996: Pemberian Izin Kegiatan Penelitian Kepada Center for International Forestry Research In late 1999, the Bulungan district was divided in three districts: Malinau, Bulungan and Nunukan. The region of forest where CIFOR had privileged access was entirely in the district of Malinau, and thus CIFOR felt that the name of the research forest should reflect this.
37

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Research Forest is 302,900 ha, but has never been gazetted, and when people refer to the Malinau Research Forest they mean the general region of Malinau where CIFOR is active. With decentralization, district-level governments previously rubber stamps of the central government gained a broad range of decision-making authority, and thus in 2002 CIFOR initiated and signed an MOU with the district government 38 . The official agreements between CIFOR, GOI and the Malinau district government signify, at least in public discourse, a recognition and willingness to engage in collaborative research on a host of forest-related issues and to apply research results. The extent to which this assumption has been borne out is questionable. As I discuss in Chapter 4, much of CIFORs applied research activities has not been adopted by district government whether in policy or practice. It is unsurprising that the MOUs between CIFOR, the central government and district government have not engendered the types of collaborations that one would anticipate. They are general enough to allow all parties to interact with each other without compromising any of their respective positions. A brief examination of these MOUs shows they are policy fictions and vehicles of articulation or platforms for negotiation more than anything else (see for example Mosse 2004 and Rossi 2004). In the agreement signed between the GOI and CIFOR on May 15, 1993 that legally recognizes the relationship between CIFOR and GOI, it is noted that the agreement shall be interpreted in light of the primary objective of enabling the Center.to discharge fully, efficiently and effectively its responsibilities and fulfill

It should be noted here that the Ministry of Forestry initially opposed the MOU between CIFOR and the Malinau district government because the Ministry perceived this as inadvertently undermining its authority. CIFOR already had a MOU with GOI via the Ministry, and since Malinau is part of the Republic of Indonesia, a separate MOU is thought to be unnecessary and implies that the MOU with the Ministry is somehow insufficient. The resistance from the Ministry is related to the ongoing tensions between central and district governments in the context of ad hoc decentralization.

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its purposes and functions as described in its Constitution, without jeopardizing, with regard to the Centers programme in Indonesia, the Governments policy on national development and prevailing laws and regulations (Article 2). 39 With respect to CIFORs work in Indonesia specifically, the agreement states that the Government recognizes the right of the Center to freely conduct research in lands mutually agreed, and publish and disseminate research results and information internationally and within the Republic of Indonesia in pursuit of objectives set out in the Centers Constitution (Article 3, 3a). Both of these statements express common ground for CIFOR and GOI to engage with each other through an articulation of the freedom of each party, as well as the limits of that freedom the agreement provides an ill-defined yet bounded arena for CIFOR and GOI to engage and negotiate with each other. With respect to the Malinau Research Forest, the Ministerial decree notes that although there are research activities conducted by CIFOR, activities of forest concessionaires and/or other approved activities that have been there before continue to operate under the legal regulations that apply (8) 40 . Additionally, research activities conducted by CIFOR should be based on planned activities that are agreed upon together by

This agreement in both Indonesian and English is entitled Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Center for International Forestry Research regarding the Headquarters Seat of the Center and was signed on May 15, 1993 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of CIFOR, Bo Bengtsson. It was approved by the President of Indonesia Suharto on August 4, 1993 through Presidential Decree No. 71 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 71 tentang Pengesahan Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Center for International Forestry Research regarding the Headquarters seat of the Center). This is a translation of the original agreement in Indonesian, which reads walaupun ada kegiatan penelitian dilakukan oleh CIFOR, tetapi kegiatan pengusahaan hutan dan atau kegiatan sah lainnya yang telah ada sebelumnya tetap berjalan sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku (8)
40

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CIFOR and the Ministry of Forestry (4) 41 . Thus, as in the original agreement between CIFOR and GOI, the Ministerial decree provides CIFOR and the Ministry of Forestry ample room to negotiate and compromise with each other the decree recognizes CIFORs freedom, yet places vague limits on it by not providing exclusive access to the forest and requiring some form of agreement of planned activities. The broad swathe of authority gained by district governments with the ad hoc implementation of decentralization laws in conjunction with concerns from the district government of Malinau that CIFOR was bypassing them led to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CIFOR and the district government of Malinau, signed on May 13, 2002 by the Director General of CIFOR, David Kaimowitz, and the Regent of Malinau, Marthin Billa. 42 This MOU articulates the shared interests in identifying and improving ways to improve the sustainability of forestry and land benefits in the district of Malinauthrough research, capacity building and community empowerment (1). The MOU calls for consultation and cooperation in identifying research issues, in implementing research activities addressing these problems, and in communicating the results of such research (Article 1, 1) and that the aim of cooperation is to produce integrated natural resource management models, scientific knowledge and appropriate technologies and to transfer them for practical application.both in Malinau and elsewhere (Article 1, 2).
41

kegiatan penelitian yang dilaksanakan oleh CIFOR berdasarkan rencana kegiatan yang disetujui bersama oleh CIFOR dan Departemen Kehutanan (4). This agreement is in both Indonesian and English and is entitled Nota Kesepahaman Antara Kabupaten Malinau, Kalimantan Timur, Indonesia dan Center for International Forestry Research tentang Kerja Sama Ilmiah dan Teknis or Memorandum of Understanding Between the District of Malinau, East Kalimantan, Indonesia and the Center for International Forestry Research for Scientific and Technical Co-operation.

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The types of cooperation anticipated will include but not be limited to exchange of scientific information, exchange visits of scientists and other experts as well as planning and implementing cooperative research activities designed to produce new information or new or improved technologies (Article 1, 3), with the open ended possibility that the scale and nature of cooperative activitiescan be revised form time to time based on a joint evaluation of the cooperation activities (Article 1, 5). As in the other agreements, this MOU provides a broad, ill-defined platform for engagement that addresses the interests of both parties, while obfuscating possible political tensions between them. The MOU is about possibilities without mentioning limits, which provides for greater opportunities of articulation without threatening the authority of either party. This MOU, however, is somewhat more specific than the others, noting the following agreement about research agendas: Research in the district will be focused on forestry and forest science including but not limited to research on the biophysical aspects of forests and forest management technologies, values of forest, peoples dependency on income of the forest and impact of peoples activities on the forest, the development of informal and formal land use planning processes involving communities and coordinated by BAPPEDA 43 at both Kabupaten and desa levels; clarification and development of processes to legitimize community claims to forest land resources; the identification of effective mechanisms for inter-community communication and coordination; impact of

43

BAPPEDA is an Indonesian acronym for the regional, in this case district level, development planning agency, Badan Perencanaan PembangunanDaerah.

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decentralization and improvement of civil and state governance structures to improve negotiation by communities with other stakeholders (Article 1, 6.1). As I discuss in detail in Chapter 4, the district government has demonstrated little interest in these items and has made minimal progress in policy and/or practice on these issues. This raises the issue of whether these agreements have any authority beyond formally legitimizing the relationship between CIFOR, the central government and district government. In Chapter 4 I demonstrate that they indeed do not. For example, the limited authority of and interest in these agreements is demonstrated by the fact that most of CIFORs activities to date have taken place outside of the area originally demarcated as CIFORs research forest in the Ministerial Decree, and none of the actors, including CIFOR, seem too concerned about this. B. CIFOR Activities in Malinau, particularly Adaptive Collaborative Management In this section of the chapter, I provide a brief overview of CIFORs activities in Malinau, which began in 1996, and then move to a summary of the CIFOR project I was most closely associated with as both participant and observer, viz., the Adaptive Collaborative Management project (ACM)). It is important to note here that although CIFOR has conducted and continues to conduct numerous activities led by various CIFOR scientists with different disciplinary backgrounds that fall under different projects, government officials and villagers refer to CIFOR without necessarily being aware of, distinguishing between or taking into consideration all of CIFORs activities. Indeed, their references to CIFOR are usually from the partial perspective gained through involvement in particular activities or with particular individuals. A global understanding of CIFORs activities in Malinau is uncommon not only among villagers and government officials, but also among

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CIFOR scientists themselves (Sayer and Campbell 2004). In other words, CIFOR scientists working in Malinau often do not have a strong understanding of other CIFOR research initiatives in Malinau beyond the one(s) they are directly involved in an overarching research coordination or harmonization mechanism does not exist. With that caveat, I briefly summarize the different types of major activities CIFOR has initiated in Malinau. Under the general mandate to improve the sustainability of forests and to help alleviate poverty, CIFOR has conducted a broad suite of applied research activities in Malinau funded by various donors and led by various CIFOR scientists with different disciplinary backgrounds that taken as a collective embrace a multi-disciplinary or integrated approach and that have evolved through time (Sayer and Campbell 2004; Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]). Most of CIFORs activities have been focused on the Malinau watershed (approximately 500,000 ha) of the district of Malinau. One of the earlier research activities was Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) in conjunction with the parastatal timber company Inhutani II in Inhutanis 48,300 ha concession in Malinau. The purpose was to compare RIL with conventional logging from ecological and economic perspectives. With the implementation of decentralization and the subsequent issuance of IPPKs and loss of authority of Inhutani II, this activity had much less relevance than initially anticipated because Inhutani has been forced to stop its operations and IPPKs have no interest in RIL (Sayer and Campbell 2004). Another major CIFOR activity in the Malinau watershed has been the Multidisciplinary Landuse Assessment (MLA) led by a forest ecologist. Initiated in 1999, MLA has focused on researching and developing tools to assess biodiversity value from the perspective of remote and marginalized forest communities, in this case villagers in the

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Malinau watershed (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/mla/_ref/philosophy/index.htm). Data collection for MLA has ended, but the CIFOR MLA team continues to work in Malinau on disseminating research results to villagers and district government officials through popular media such as posters, playing cards, and videos. Since 2000, another CIFOR research team led by an anthropologist and agronomist has focused on understanding and analyzing the livelihood activities, forest dependence and health of Punan in the entire Malinau district, ranging from those still living the uppermost reaches of watersheds to those living in Malinau town. In addition to researching these issues, this team has presented research results to both villagers and district government officials, and convinced an international medical NGO, Medicin du Monde, to assist Punan villagers in the region with health related concerns. The other major CIFOR research activity in Malinau is Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM), which focuses on the 27 villages in the Malinau watershed, with certain villages being sites of more intensive activities than others. I was most closely affiliated with this applied research initiative, and it is a key focus of my analysis in Chapter 4. Initiated in 1998, ACM in Malinau seeks to empower local communities to increase their access and control over forest benefits and decisions (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 21). To this end, the ACM team employs an action research approach 44 in which they act as researchers, facilitators and information resources. Through this approach, the objectives of ACM have been to facilitate communities to work with other stakeholders to learn to: Increase awareness about their opportunities Know and confidently express their needs and opinions

The logic of action research or participatory action research is to plan and implement activities with relevant actors, documenting the process and then reflecting on the results and planning next steps often with those actors. The expectation is that this learning cycle will contribute to improved communication among groups and more inclusive planning and management.

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To manage conflict and negotiate for their demands more effectively To understand how to use and influence political decision making in relation to their interactions with local government, local companies and other villages or ethnic groups. (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 21) Research and facilitation activities fall under the following components, which were

built up over time, with each serving as a layer that augmented previous components: (1) village surveys and monitoring to understanding local concerns and conditions (2) participatory mapping and inter-village agreements (3) community and district government legal awareness and policy dialogue (4) community participation in district land use planning (5) community participation in village economic development and land use (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 21-22) 45 . The ACM team remains active in all components in various extents. Since 2003, the team has also worked with the district government to develop indicators to gauge poverty and the impacts government programs have on poverty and also to prepare tools that help local governments develop, implement and evaluate programs to improve the well-being of poor, forest-dependent people (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/research/poverty/). At the time of writing, the core ACM research team included an international social scientist (the team leader) with nearly 10 years of research experience in Kalimantan and a US-trained Indonesian policy analyst, both of whom are based in Bogor, and a two-person field team based in Malinau, one of whom is a local Dayak Kenyah villager and the other who is a Dutchman who has settled down and worked in East Kalimantan for over 15 years.
45

See this paper for a detailed discussion of each of these components.

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Additionally, three other individuals, two local Dayaks and one Balinese with extensive experience in this region of East Kalimantan, have been part of the Malinau field team in the past. Collaborators on various aspects of activities have included representatives from the 27 villages in the watershed, government agencies, Indonesian NGOs, and Indonesian and foreign universities (Wollenberg et al [forthcoming b]). As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the ACM project and CIFORs other applied research activities, to lesser extents, employ a research approach that invites various actors participation in research, convenes or bridges various groups, and provides information with the expectation of better managed forests and improved local livelihoods. The overriding logic of CIFORs applied research in Malinau is that engagement by various actors will lead to more informed and equitable decision making regarding control and access to forest resources and benefits derived from forests. CIFOR has become an effective means of obtaining information for villagers, yet the actual tangible effects or benefits associated with ACM and other CIFOR activities have not been fully realized. At the district and village levels, CIFOR generally is in a less powerful or authoritative position than one would perhaps assume because its points of leverage are limited. For example, CIFOR does not bring to villagers or to local government the financial and other material resources of traditional development projects, but rather provides information and opportunities for dialogue, which would not exist otherwise. To a large extent, CIFOR relies on the self-interest of villagers and local government to engage in its project objectives and activities, and thus the extent of these actors involvement in the project is determined by the extent of overlap of their respective interests and CIFORs interests. As I detail in Chapter 4, shared interests among these actors are only partial, and hence many of CIFORs activities

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have had only partial expected results. In that chapter, I also expand upon the relationships between CIFOR, villagers and local government in Malinau in the context of decentralization to provide a deeper understanding of the constraints that CIFOR and ACM face.

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CHAPTER 4 LOCATING CIFOR LOCALLY: RELATIONSHIPS AND PERCEPTIONS OF VILLAGERS, DISTRICT

GOVERNMENT AND CIFOR IN MALINAU

I. Introduction In this chapter, I describe and examine the relationships and perceptions of villagers, district government and CIFOR vis--vis each other. In doing so, I try to understand the activities, influence and power of CIFOR, an international applied forestry research institute, in the context of a politically contentious forest landscape, viz., in the context of Indonesias ad hoc decentralization processes. Moreover, I analyze the perceived expectations and benefits of the actors that CIFOR engages in Malinau why they are interested in working with CIFOR and the extent to which these expectations are borne out. Further, I examine at the local level of intervention the role of a publicly funded, international research organization that ostensibly should have global influence. II. Decentralization processes and dynamics of village-government relations A. Villagers perceptions of their relations with district government 1. Patron-client Prior to decentralization and to a large extent now in the decentralization transition, the relationship between local government and communities is one perhaps best characterized as patron-client, to a great extent lacking formal institutional mechanisms of downward accountability and transparency. Moreover, the authoritarian Suharto regime successfully stunted meaningful participation of Indonesian citizens in political processes. Hence, decentralization and its attendant transfer of governing authority to district governments have

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taken place in a context of ill-prepared district government officials, weak civil society groups, and extremely limited experience with participatory, democratic political processes among all actors. Villagers themselves often perceive their relationship with the district government as patron-client. For example, several villagers noted that they often bring meat or forest fruit to government officials, which according to them makes it much easier to secure an appointment. Indeed, the way that villagers talk about the district government and their relationship to the district government indicates the prevalence and persistence of this perception. For example one villager noted to me the hierarchy where the district government is above villagers. 1 Another noted that villagers are extremely dependent on the district government for aid and assistance.2 Villagers often comment that local officials abuse their positions in government for personal benefit, but that there is little that local people can do to hold them accountable. Indeed, some villagers articulate district government decisions and affairs as something disconnected from what villagers can influence, referring to government affairs as urusan dalam or internal issues, implying that villagers were outside the realm of influence. Another villager lamented that the district government has yet to visit their village and that villagers are tired of attempting to speak with district government officials because it has proven ineffective. 3 Other villagers go further and note that district officials prioritize personal interests at the expense of villagers interests. For example, one villager noted that the attitude and behavior
1

di atas ada pemda. masyarakat sangat tergantung pada pemda. pemda belum turun ke lapangan, desakita malas bicaranga ada artinya.

2
3

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of the district government now was like the authoritarian control of the state-owned timber concessionaire, Inhutani II, operating in Malinau during the Suharto regime. 4 Similarly, another villager observed that district government officials deceive communities because they use their positions for personal gain. He gave the example of district forestry and other agency officials coming to his village on behalf of companies using the mask of government to scare villagers into accepting, in this particular case, a proposed pulp and paper plantation, and thus were acting similarly to IPKs 5 6 . Indeed, another villager succinctly observed that the district government keeps community rights hidden and has as yet no approach with communities. 7 Some villagers perceive an actively antagonistic relationship between themselves and the district government, such as the villager who rhetorically asked if the district government controls all [of the forest resources], where will the communities go? 8 Another villager commented flatly that the district government was in conflict with custom. 9 2. Social structures in which relationship is embedded This patron-client relationship is embedded in several important social structures and institutions. First, the notion that the government develops or guides (membina) villagers, which reflects the doctrine of the 32-year authoritarian regime of Suharto, remains

seperti dulu dikuasai Inhutani II.

IPK is the colloquial acronym for short-term timber concessionaires (IPPKs) that had to secure village agreement through the village head before receiving a timber extraction permit from the district government. These companies rarely fulfilled the promises and agreements they made with villages. pemda main-main masyarakatada kepentingan pribadikehutanan dan pejabat lain kesini mewakili perusahaansama dengan IPKpemda pakai topengpemda takutkan masyarakat. hak masyarakat sangat ditutupi pemdabelum ada pendekatan pemda dengan masyarakat. kalau garap pemda semua, masyarakat kemana? pemda betertentangan dengan adat.

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a strong influence in the terms of engagement between villagers and local officials. Some villagers lament that the local government has left them behind, not developing them and not providing development assistance. Indeed, villagers very much want development (see Li 1999b). For many villagers the notion of development (pembangunan or pembinaan) translates into government provision of schools, health care facilities, infrastructure, income generating opportunities and projects such as building village meeting halls and cementing walkways. Many villagers vision of development and how it should be delivered is not different from the New Order ideals or modernist notions of development. This is unsurprising. Many Dayaks, particularly the Kenyah, migrated to the Malinau region to be closer to development, e.g., markets and roads and speak of their original upland settlements in terms of hardship and scarcity. Also, many Dayaks have endured a long history of sociocultural and political-economic discrimination and marginalization by the government and other actors, who have impressed upon Dayaks that their cultural and livelihood practices are backwards and primitive (Dove 1983). Thus, the imperative that they need to develop, a perception that many Dayaks have of themselves, is in part a consequence of this disenfranchisement. Further, Dayak visions of development are greatly informed by what they have seen and experienced as development, which by and large have been extractive industries such as logging, mining and plantations. Although recognizing that this form of development has negative effects, many villagers view the trade-off as worth it, albeit with extreme consternation, believing that it is not realistic or feasible to have the benefits of development without incurring the costs. As a senior Punan customary leader flatly put it with respect to

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IPPKs, you get a fee [from the timber company] but drink muddy water (dapat fee tapi minum air keruh). It has only been since the fall of the New Order and implementation of decentralization that Dayaks have had the possibility of benefiting from development. Previously, they were by and large spectators of development, which took the form of rapacious extraction of landscapes that Dayaks depended upon and managed for their livelihoods. Another important social institution is the history of interethnic relationships between Dayaks and non-Dayaks and between Dayak groups themselves, discussed in Chapter 3 10 . The history of relationships between ethnic groups plays a critical factor in articulating claims to forest areas and gaining access to government officials. For example, certain Dayak groups, viz., the Merap and Tidung, assert that they are the original or indigenous (asli) inhabitants of the Malinau watershed and hence have legitimate claim to it, whereas migrants or newcomers (pendatang) do not. Other more recently arrived Dayak groups, who are far more numerous, viz., the Kenyah, argue that it is not fair or just that the small number of original inhabitants can lay claim to such a vast area, particularly considering that these original inhabitants also moved to the Malinau watershed from another region. The conflicts between ethnic groups also play out within the district government, and villagers often approach government officials based on ethnic affiliations. That said, many villagers are disappointed with and cynical about having orang kita (literally, our people), or in this case local Dayak, in district government. At the onset of decentralization in 2000, villagers expected that having orang kita in government would benefit them
For a detailed discussion of the cultural politics in Malinau and the history of inter-ethnic relationships that inform them, see Rhees chapter The Cultural Politics of Collaboration to Control and Access to Forest Resources in Malinau, East Kalimantan in the book by Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming c], Riding the Rapids of Malinau: Local Governance, Forests and Conflicts in Indonesian Borneo. See Sellato (2001) for a detailed treatment of the history of migration and inter-ethnic relationships in Malinau.
10

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because these individuals knew villagers and their situation intimately. Many had grown up in similar environments and attended school together and thus had first hand experience with the difficulties Dayak villagers face. Hence, villagers expected these officials to by more supportive of and concerned with increasing local prosperity. After four years, most villagers do not believe their expectations have been met and thus are disappointed and jaded. Indeed, several villagers noted that once these individuals entered office, their attitudes towards villagers changed, becoming less accessible and more formal and stiff in their interactions. Several villagers in Long Loreh noted this about the sub-district head of south Malinau, whom they had grown up with and who lived in Long Loreh. Moreover, two villagers I discussed this with commented that it would be better to have outsiders in district government instead of local people because outsiders dont know villagers weaknesses and thus are hesitant, whereas government officials who are local know villagers weaknesses and exploit them 11 . They ended the discussion by noting that communities were bitter about this. 12 Third, traditional intra-village social structures such as the role of elders, aristocrats and kinship continue to play an important role in decision-making, settling disputes, as well as whether/how officials are contacted or approached. Individuals elected as village heads (kepala desa), who are the villagers most proximate representative in government, are often either customary leaders (tokoh adat) themselves or descended from them, which sometimes implies that they are from the aristocracy, at least for some of the swiddening Dayak

11

lebih bagus hubungi orang luar dari pada orang dalamorang luar masih ragu-ragu karna nga tahu kelemahanorang dalammereka sudah tahu kelemahan kita. masyarakat pahit sekarang.

12

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groups 13 . As Wollenberg and Uluk (2004: 6) observe regarding representation and representativeness of villagers in Malinau, representation of peoples interests in a village and beyond revolved around the village head and his inner circle of powerful, often aristocratic individuals whom villagers called the tokoh masyakarat (village elders 14 , leaders). Additionally, as mentioned earlier, although they make up a substantial percentage of the districts population, the Punan continue to be the most politically marginalized group in Malinau, in part because of their historically weak position vis--vis other groups, i.e., as clients in patron-client relationships (Kaskija 1999, Sellato 2001). The above institutions overlap to form the basis for how villagers perceive district government and make sense of the ways in which they can access government officials and government services. The role of the district government in the broader government framework of Indonesia is uncertain, and the rights and responsibilities of the district government vis--vis villagers -- its ostensible constituents -- are ambiguous. Hence, villagers make sense of this relationship through these existing reference points. That said, one phenomenon that does not have historical or cultural precedent, but is now commonplace among villagers in the era of decentralization, is to demonstrate or protest, e.g., in the form of road blockades or seizing heavy equipment, until the government addresses their grievances. Indeed, the number of conflicts within and between villages, as well as between villages,

13

Wollenberg and Uluk elaborate that (2004: 6) although customary leaders were unrecognized by the Soeharto New Order, the practice was for the customary (adat) leader to become the village head and for local people to still refer to them as adat leaders. They thus carried both customary and government authority. Many of the older village heads today are descendents or relatives of these adat leaders.

14

The tokoh masyarakat are not necessarily old, but they are considered the people most capable of making decisions on behalf of the community.

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companies and government has increased extraordinarily since decentralization (see Yasmi et al. 2004, Sudana [forthcoming]). B. District Governments Relationship with and Perceptions of Villagers 1. Unconcerned with villagers aspirations Similarly, district officials to a great extent perceive their relationship with villagers in a reciprocal manner, viz., as villagers patrons. Generally, district officials do not know, do not want to know, and/or are unconcerned with the desires and aspirations of villagers as expressed by villagers public consultations are not only superficial, but rare. 15 For example, in 2002 the district government commissioned the drafting of a district-level land use plan (tata ruang kabupaten) that ostensibly includes consultations with local people, yet in late 2002 just prior to a presentation of the draft plan, none of the villagers interviewed by myself and a CIFOR researcher had heard of a land use plan, although they were interested and considered it important. None were invited to nor attended the presentation held in the district capital in November 2002. This is not at all uncommon in Malinau -- invitations to hearings were usually circulated only the day before the event (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 8). Among a sample of six meetings, two had only one or no village representative, three had 10-30, and the district heads accountability speech had the highest attendance with about 50 (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004). The reasons for this on the part of district officials are multiple, including a lack of incentives and confidence in meaningfully engaging villagers; ingrained

In the 2001 elections of the district head and the 2004 elections of the district legislature, villagers voted for political party and not candidate. The winning party then decided on who would fill the positions the party had won. When the district of Malinau was created in late 1999, a provisional district legislature and district head were appointed by the provincial government. This system has not been conducive to downward accountability. In the 2006 both the district head (bupati) and members of the district legislature (DPRD) will be chosen through direct elections.

15

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habits and attitudes from the New Order; and concern of being confronted by villagers, who are now more confident in asserting themselves (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004). Moreover, officials tend to perceive villagers as ignorant and incapable of making informed decisions, which is in part demonstrated by officials not wanting CIFOR to distribute legal literacy literature to villagers because the government was sure villagers would misunderstand or misinterpret the information. As another example, several district officials noted to me that the Punan think like monkeys (Punanpikiran monyet), only thinking for today and not tomorrow and that generally communities in Malinau lacked analytical abilities. 16 Moreover, government officials emphasize the lack of human resource development in the district. 17 2. Government knows better Government officials feel that they are more knowledgeable than villagers and know what is best for villagers. For some officials, this perception is based on fact that they are in office, which means that villagers have put their faith in them, and hence there is no need for villagers to provide input to the government. Another reason that officials rarely meet with villagers is, of course, to avoid villagers complaints and demands, which have become more aggressive and common with decentralization (Sudana [forthcoming], Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a], Yasmi et al. 2004). As mentioned earlier, the district governments attitude toward villagers is embedded in an institutional structure that does not reward downward accountability. Further, district officials have little previous experience with this mechanism and other democratic processes.
16

masyarakat kitapikiran kurang. sumber daya manusia kurang.

17

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Most of their experience as civil servants has been being upwardly accountable during the Suharto regime. To a great extent the institutional structure of district government has not changed with the transition to decentralization. It was only recently, with decentralization, that district officials had any power, whereas previously they were rubber stamps and awaiting orders from the central government. One dramatic change with decentralization has been the inclusion of Dayaks in positions of authority in the district government such as the Kenyah district head (Bupati), the Tidung vice-district head (Wakil Bupati), the Lundaye district secretary (Sekretaris Daerah), and Merap head of the district legislature (Ketua DPRD). Yet, these Dayaks embrace several identities that are often conflicting. For example, when government officials speak casually or outside of their official capacity, their rationale and statements are not different from villagers themselves, e.g., they note that swidden cultivation is appropriate for the area, yet once they put on their uniforms, they are transformed into bureaucrats who are still strongly influenced by the Suharto regimes notions of development. Moreover, ethnic affiliation has in no way ensured that officials and other representatives are accountable to their constituencies 18 . One of the key dynamics in Malinau is that one ethnic group does not dominate politically 19 . Further, the collective identity of Dayak has not been a cohesive force in Malinau, and indeed there are struggles for power within the district government, as there are between villages of different Dayak groups. The district head (Bupati) has crafted a tenuous balance in the district government to not exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. Based on ethnic

See Rhee on the cultural politics of Malinau in the forthcoming book by Wollenberg et al. (forthcoming c). See also Wollenberg et al. (forthcoming a).
19

18

Ibid.

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alliances, government officials marshal villagers for support, yet at the same time the district government has consolidated and thickened the bureaucracy to keep people at a distance. Civil servants are still relatively accessible for the people of Malinau, yet meeting with government officials who actually have decision-making authority is much more difficult. 3. Visions of development: revenue, infrastructure, and payment for environmental services Although the Malinau district government is far from monolithic, government officials visions of development the future of Malinau tend to be consistent. The three official development priorities for the district are improving infrastructure, human resources (such as education), and agriculture, broadly defined to include plantations such as oil palm and acacia. The district governments key focus is generating revenue ostensibly to improve the prosperity of communities 20 , and in this regard the comparative advantage of Malinau noted by government officials is the districts natural resources, especially its forest and mineral resources. To date the district government has operationalized this vision through timber extraction and mining, as well as luring investors interested in oil palm and pulp and paper plantations, e.g., Acacia mangium plantations. Even though CIFOR has conducted research demonstrating the biophysical unsuitability of oil palm in Malinau and communicated this to district government, the district government has moved forward with providing Sabah Forest Industries an oil palm concession (Business Times Malaysia 3/19/2005). When I asked the Head of the District Forestry Service about this, he remarked that the oil palm company would not come to Malinau if it was unsuitable.

20

meningkatkan kesejahteraan masyarakat..

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The district government also initiated a program in which it expects 70% of the villages to be economically self-sufficient by 2010 (Gerakan Pembangunan Desa Mandiri 21 ). The district government also hopes to take advantage of its international borders with Sabah and Sarawak to increase investment and trade. As one government official in the district planning office noted, development (pembangunan) is the primary priority of the district, and the district wants to invite investors so that the communities of Malinau improve their economy like other areas. 22 In many ways the district governments vision of development is a continuation of classic New Order policies and practices. This is particularly evident in the types of development occurring in Malinau, viz., large infrastructure projects such as road improvement and construction, telecommunications and electricity, as well as its geographic focus, viz., in the town of Malinau, with minimal development in the rural uplands. Also similar to the New Order are the multitude of public works and reforestation projects that have failed to achieve their ostensible goals, yet are ripe for graft (Barr et al. 2001). Conservation, sustainable forest management, and community rights to forests resources and land are not district government priorities. Conservation of forests only enters the district governments purview if monetary compensation is tied to it. Lungs of the Earth (paruparu dunia), conservation district (kabupaten konservasi), environmental services (jasa linkungan), and medicinal plants (tanaman obat) are frequently invoked by district government officials, but they are always couched in terms of compensation. Several senior district officials noted that Malinau is the headwaters for six major rivers in East Kalimantan,

21

This is also referred to by its acronym Gerbangdema.

22

mengundang investor-investor supaya masyarakat Malinau meningkatkan perekonomianseperti daerah lain.

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that Malinaus forests produce oxygen for the world, and that Dayaks have conserved the regions forests. They go on to note that it has been unfair that the district and its people have not accrued financial gains from the environmental services provided to the province, nation and the world. Essentially, the argument is articulated in terms of villagers wanting and having a right to develop and that the only existing means for this development to occur is for the district government to allow and promote the exploitation of natural resources. In this argument, district government officials articulate the welfare of villagers and the conservation of natural resources as mutually exclusive because the only development that these officials believe as tangible is one that relies on extraction. The idea that forest dependent villagers want to remain forest dependent is not within the purview. When speaking of forest conservation, district officials noted that villagers did not want to be primitive (tidak mau primitif) and that not providing them road access for the sake of conservation was tantamount to keeping them as Tarzan (Tarzan terus), the popular representation of primitive man. The Head of District Planning commented that there are 10 villages around the national park of Kayan Mentarang that were there before the national park existed. He rhetorically asked whether it was fair for them to continue to live in the middle of the forest. 23 Another official was quite frank in noting that increasing access and opening up the districts isolation was part of the primary priority of development and that it was in conflict with conservation. 24 One official noted that the ideal development for Malinau would be eco-tourism that catered to executives that involved chartering helicopters and airplanes and

Sepuluh masyarakat di sekitar taman nasional Kayan Mentarang. Adil kalau tetap tinggal di hutan? Mereka ada sebelum ada TNKM.
24

23

mau buka isolasiaksesbebenturan dengan konservasi.

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executives hunting with traditional weapons, practicing blow pipes and enjoying traditional dances. The worst case scenario, in this individuals opinion, is that the forest would be cut down because that is all that Malinau has to offer to generate revenue and that the consequences downstream would be severe. These accounts demonstrate that district officials articulate development and conservation as mutually exclusive, noting the extraction of natural resources as the most likely means to development because that is the only option they have (dengan pilihan yang ada). The justification for development is that villagers want it and it is a right that they should not be denied it is the officials rhetoric of villagers prosperity that justifies development through extractive industries. Thus, in this context, conservation is only feasible if there is financial compensation for the district and villagers, otherwise, according to district government, it has no other option to develop other than through natural resource exploitation. C. Summary of Background, Context and Village-Government Relationships To summarize, ad hoc decentralization processes and post-Suharto euphoria of reform (reformasi) have transformed Malinau into a dynamic and rapidly evolving frontier in which culture, history and politics at the district-level and below strongly influence decisions, their implementation, and who gains and who doesnt. It is a frontier in which formal regulations are often not known, not implemented, and/or violated with impunity. Further, Malinau and Indonesia more generally are currently mired in an ambiguous policy environment that is indicative of the inchoate and weak governance mechanisms in the post-Suharto decentralization transition. Malinau is also characterized by the richness of its natural resources, which has the potential to generate substantial revenue to improve the livelihoods

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of its inhabitants and which holds extraordinary value for conservationists and environmentalists if they were to remain minimally exploited. The relationship between the recently-formed district government and villagers is by and large patron-client, albeit villagers now feel more confident in explicitly expressing their discontent with government decisions, and district officials are more aware of -- and attempt to avoid -- these expressions of unhappiness. The current patron-client relationship takes its precedent from the New Order, which is unsurprising given that most district officials were trained as civil servants during that period, and villagers experience with government and development were defined by that era. The ethnic diversity of Malinau and the economic opportunities made available through ad hoc decentralization have put a premium on the cultural politics at the district level and below. Mired in a weak institutional environment, inter-ethnic disputes over forest and land claims are much more common and heated among Dayak groups -- often with only temporary resolution compared to authoritarian New Order regime. Further, the difficulty of keeping village elite somewhat accountable to their constituencies and minimally corrupted by the ample opportunities afforded to them as official representatives of villages has significantly disrupted village life and intra-village social cohesion. It is in this context that CIFOR conducts its applied research initiatives that attempt to improve the sustainability of forests and alleviate poverty. It is important to recall, however, that CIFOR started its research activities in Malinau in an extremely different politicaleconomic and institutional context, viz., during the New Order. At that time, district governments did not have the authority to make decisions independent of the central government; villagers generally and Dayak swidden cultivators particularly were politically

146

disenfranchised; and the destinies of forests and forest dependent people lay in the hands of Suharto, his New Order apparatus particularly the military -- and a small number of massive forest industry conglomerates. No one could foresee or predict how the post-Suharto period would play out, or the effects it would have on forests and forest-dependent people. CIFORs research evolved and adapted to the situation. CIFORs early research on Reduced Impact Logging with the parastatal timber company Inhutani II became even less relevant in the post-New Order period as Inhutanis authority waned and the institutional context became entirely unsupportive of RIL, and thus CIFOR minimized its focus on this topic. CIFORs ACM project initially focused on action research with villagers vis--vis central government laws and regulations and central-government sanctioned extraction companies, and then evolved into an emphasis on local-level (district and below) politics -- articulated in terms of culture, history and decentralization -- in an ambiguous institutional environment. Reformasi and decentralization have allowed CIFORs research to have a more explicit focus on forest-related politics than could not have been imagined during the New Order, while also confronting CIFOR and other actors with a much more complex, uncertain and rapidly evolving institutional landscape. In the next section of the chapter, I discuss this landscape in detail in terms of the relationships and perceptions of district officials and villagers regarding CIFOR and its activities in the context of the ostensible transition to decentralization. III. Perceptions and relationships between CIFOR, villagers and local government A. District governments perceptions and relationship with CIFOR: fragile, tenuous, and constrained. The district government perceives CIFOR as a primary interlocutor between it and villagers and between it and the international community. But the relationship between

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CIFOR and the district government, and hence the meaning of being an interlocutor, is fragile, shifting, negotiated and constrained. Although the collaboration between CIFOR and the district government is officially recognized through a MOU, the MOU provides a vast expanse of ambiguity and play for the agreement to be operationalized. It is also important to note that since CIFOR was already working in the region for several years prior to the district government being formed and becoming a powerful political player, the relationship between the two was forged out of historical coincidence and accommodation, making the best of existing resources, instead of a preliminary assessment of agreed upon priorities and tasks. 1. District Government does not use CIFORs Research The district government has to a great extent neither used nor adopted CIFORs research results and recommendations in policy or practice. For example, as mentioned earlier, CIFOR has conducted biophysical research demonstrating that oil palm would not be suitable to the region due to poor soils and steep topography (Sheil and Basuki, Jakarta Post, 3/30/05) and informed the district government of this, yet the district government has dismissed this and issued an oil palm plantation permit to a company from Malaysia, Sabah Forest Industry (Business Times Malaysia 3/19/05). Moreover, the district government informed CIFOR not to distribute policy briefs, including one on oil palm plantations, to villagers due to the ostensible concern from district government that villagers would misunderstand the policy briefs. Also, in 2001 CIFOR provided input to the district government to formulate district regulations (peraturan daerah) regarding village governance, customary institutions (lembaga adat), forest exploitation and establishing and merging villages, but none of these inputs were used in the drafting of district regulations.

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The mapping of village territories is another example of the district government not adopting and/or following-up a CIFOR-initiated activity. In this case, the district officials had made it explicit to CIFOR that they would continue with the community mapping exercise and even charged the coordination of the task to BAPPEDA, the District Planning Agency. This is not to say, however, that the district government finds the entirety of CIFORs activities useless (the instances where the district government finds CIFOR useful are discussed below), but rather to highlight that CIFOR in no way holds direct power or authority over the district government. 2. District government is heterogeneous, which affects the relationship with CIFOR District officials are in varying degrees supportive of, critical of and indifferent to CIFOR, depending on the issue, context and government official. As with communities, the district government is not homogenous, and indeed the multiple political, ethnic and economic interests play themselves out in local government. For example, the District Forestry Service, ostensibly a key government partner for CIFOR and an agency that CIFOR has repeatedly attempted to engage, has shown minimal interest in working with CIFOR. Indeed, CIFOR researchers themselves have noted this, as well as noting that CIFOR is sometimes perceived as a threat by the District Forest Service specifically and the district government generally (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming b]). In an interview with me, the head of the District Forest Service noted that he didnt know why [CIFOR] was in Malinau 25 and that if CIFOR left [Malinau], it would not be a problem. 26 Moreover, he noted that some of CIFORs activities such as informing villagers that the Malinau area was not suitable

25

nga tahu kenapa disini kalau pulang nga masalah.

26

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to oil palm plantations were anti-investment and provoking communities to oppose government plans (Widjono AMZ 2004). On the other end of the spectrum of relations with district government is the districts Village Empowerment Service, Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarkat Desa (PMD). Staff from PMD have joined CIFOR researchers in monitoring visits to villages and other activities related to poverty alleviation, which is a common priority for both institutions. The head of PMD noted that the working partnership is good, 27 that there is a match of interests, 28 that CIFOR has expertise that should be used by the district government, 29 and the district government should be more active in applying CIFORs research, not blaming CIFOR for the lack of application. 30 Indeed, he even noted that CIFOR is an angel (CIFOR adalah malakat). One key reason for the two polarized views of CIFOR is that the forestry sector generates revenue, and some of CIFORs activities question certain revenue generating schemes such as oil palm, whereas the Village Empowerment Service is charged with leading poverty alleviation strategies, which at the time in Malinau was not a revenue generating sector. The multiplicity of perceptions and attitudes toward CIFOR means that a fixed, stable relationship between CIFOR and the district government as an entity does not exist, but rather CIFOR is faced with the challenge of articulating and negotiating common ground with multiple district government players.

27

mitra kerja cukup bagus. CIFOR PMD nyambung. CIFOR punya alihan, kenapa tidak tangkapbodoh kalau nga pakai.

28

29

CIFOR adalah penelitianjangan salahkan CIFORkita harus tahu tugas pokokpemda harus aktifapplikasi.

30

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3. Role of CIFOR is fragile and constrained While perceptions within the district government can vary with respect to the perceived usefulness of CIFORs presence and research in the district, there are several consistent themes articulated by district government officials about the role of CIFOR and the relationship between CIFOR and district government that locate CIFOR in a fragile, tenuous and limited position. a. CIFOR is not a powerful actor, not integral and has different priorities Perhaps most significant is that district officials do not consider CIFOR to be a powerful actor or in a position of influence. In a conversation about the role of CIFOR, the District Secretary (Sekretaris Daerah), the second most powerful government official in the district, noted to me that CIFOR is not on equal footing with the government, that CIFOR is a sub-unit of the global system, and that CIFOR does not influence government policy. 31 Making explicit that the district government has decision making power, he further noted that the issues that CIFOR deals with are strong [important], but CIFORs influence is limited since it is not their [CIFORs] right. 32 He went on to comment that CIFOR acts as if it has bargaining power with district government, but actually does not. 33 Fundamentally, he perceived CIFORs presence or absence as unessential, noting that CIFOR was not a handicap [to the district] whether CIFOR was present or not. 34 Another government official

31

selama ini CIFOR nga seimbang pemerintah.CIFOR dalam system globalsub-subCIFOR nga mempengaruhi kebijakan pemerintah. CIFORisu kuat tetapi sejauh mana bisa pengaruhibukan haknya dia. CIFOR seolah-olah punya bargaining position dengan pemerintah daerah. CIFOR tidak menjadi handicap kalau ada, tidak ada.

32

33

34

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who had previously worked for CIFOR in Malinau from 1998 through 2001 acknowledged that CIFOR was not in a strong position vis--vis district government. 35 District officials make explicit that CIFOR is not integral to the governing and administration of the district since CIFOR is outside their institutional system and mired in its own, separate institutional world. In speaking of institutional incentives, the District Secretary cynically noted about CIFOR and others that international institutions look for projects 36 and that CIFOR has its own priorities to maintain its existence and create [research] products. 37 The Head of the District Planning Agency echoed this point about international organizations and NGOs existing in a different institutional landscape, commenting that all international bodies take up community issues, make proposals, and look for funding with that issue. 38 On a related note, with respect to whether CIFOR understands the issues being faced by district government, the District Secretary explained that it wasnt that CIFOR doesnt understand the issues but rather that CIFOR cannot be involved in the governments issues and problems and thus cannot provide an appropriate or accurate response. 39 On an issue related to different institutional incentives, many district officials explain that often CIFORs priorities and research are not in harmony with the needs of the district government, and often they fail to connect. 40 One former CIFOR researcher who is now a

35

CIFOR tidak kuat.. lembaga internasional cari proyek CIFORkepentingan sendiriexistensi dan produk. semua badan internasional ambil isu masyarakat, buat proposal, cari uang dengan isu. bukan dia tidak memahamitapi tidak masuk persoalan kitatidak bisa memberi respons yg tepat.

36

37

38

39

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civil servant in the district governments planning agency noted that CIFOR researchers do not understand the district government bureaucracy and that CIFOR researchers only think of their own needs, not considering that the district government has programs of its own in place. 41 He noted further that CIFOR thinks it has a partnership with the district government but in actuality it has yet to meet its partner [or in other words to achieve a partnership]. 42 He explained that although there is a MOU between CIFOR and district government, CIFOR doesnt allocate a budget for research collaboration initiated by CIFOR and hence doesnt recognize that these activities are a burden to district government 43 . Further, he commented that the district government complains that CIFOR is not transparent, for example, with its project budget and that CIFOR researchers receive large salaries. 44 He did, however, acknowledge that the priorities of CIFOR and the district government do not connect [in part] due to the rapid [socio-political] changes in Malinau and the difficultly of research agendas adapting to these changes because research requires time [or a relatively long time frame]. 45 That said, he emphasized that the working relationship is hindered by the lack of a shared budget. 46 Further, he noted that on both sides there are strong personalities and that CIFOR researchers often think of themselves as smartest. 47

40 41

nga nyambung. orang CIFOR kurang paham birokrasi. Orang CIFOR pola pikir sendiripemerintah daerah udah punya program sendiri. Orang CIFOR pikir mitra tapi belum ketemu mitra.

42

43

kerjasama CIFOR dan pemda dalam risetCIFOR nga pikir beban pada orang pemda yang ikut riset [CIFOR]. Walaupun ada duit [pemda], nga dibudget [to be part of CIFORs research].harus membahas budget. CIFOR tidak tranparen, misalnya, anggarangaji besar orang CIFOR. prioritas pemda dan prioritas CIFOR nga nyambung karna Malinau berubah terusriset perlu waktu. CIFOR tidak tahu betul recana pemda dan sebaliknyawalaupun ada MOU, nga ada budget sendiri.

44

45

46

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He noted that ultimately even though there is a MOU, if the process is not integrated [harmonized], the research will not be used. 48 That said, this same individual noted that CIFOR was needed in the district because of its research abilities, 49 and that an adaptive, action-oriented approach was needed, 50 but that pure or basic research was inappropriate. 51 Indeed, as analyzed later in this paper, many district officials take this position of criticizing CIFORs work and constraining CIFORs position, yet leave space for the relationship to continue. b. Example of constraining: Mapping and evolution of district governments perceptions This type of attitude toward CIFOR is indicative of the fragile, tenuous and constrained position that CIFOR is located in by district officials. Perhaps the most illuminating example is the community mapping activity initiated by CIFOR in 1999-2000. Started just prior to decentralization and the formation of the district of Malinau, this activity was initiated by CIFOR at the request of the 27 villages in the Malinau watershed. The idea was to train three representatives from each of the 27 villages in mapping technologies and skills such as using a GPS unit and compass so that villagers could map territories they claimed, including forests, and use these maps as bargaining tools with government and companies operating in the area. CIFORs training and facilitation were expected to assist in the resolution of boundary disputes between villages and between villages and companies/government.

47 48

sama ego kuat.CIFOR pikir paling pintar. walaupun ada MOU, kalau proses nga terpadu, nga pakai penelitian. CIFOR perlu disini karena riset.

49

50

kalau mau riset [perlu] aksiwalaupun melangar risetharus dipadukancocok riset ACM [adaptive, action oriented]. jangan penelitian murni.

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As the mapping exercise progressed in 1999 and 2000, the new district was formed, and the newly formed district government licensed small-scale timber concessionaires (IPPKs) with short time horizons (1-2 years) to operate in the area, provided that the village claiming the said forest area contractually agreed. The lack of clear village territorial rights to forests preceding and during the move toward decentralization, as well as an ambiguous and weak institutional environment, led to increased boundary disputes, increased inter and intra community conflict, and villagers protesting and/or complaining to district government. A key justification of villages claims to forested areas was the maps created with the facilitation of CIFOR (see Harwell 2000 for a discussion concerning villagers appropriation of mapping technologies). It should be noted that CIFOR made explicit that these maps were not legal or authoritative and that they were temporary, but villages used and were allowed to use them as tools of legitimizing claims anyway. District government officials reactions to and perceptions of this mapping activity illuminate their shifting perceptions of CIFOR and CIFORs tenuous and constrained position. When the district was formed in October 1999, an interim district government was put into place with the current District Head holding the second most powerful position in district government, District Secretary (Sekretaris Daerah). According to one CIFOR researcher who is now and civil servant and was intimately involved in the community mapping activity from beginning to end, when CIFOR informed the interim district government of the plan to conduct community mapping, the current District Head (then District Secretary) supported CIFORs efforts and hoped that CIFOR could help settle boundary disputes between villages. The interim District Head told CIFOR to proceed with the mapping and report results back to him. In December 2000, CIFOR reported the results

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of the mapping activity at an annual meeting of villagers and district government initiated by CIFOR. According to this same CIFOR researcher, at this meeting he [the current District Head] lauded the activity and was prepared to inaugurate the results. 52 , 53 . Earlier, in August 2000, when the initial round of mapping of village boundaries had been completed, the interim district government noted that it would carry forth the boundary mapping activity, charging coordination to the district planning agency, and even requested that CIFOR continue the mapping, although according to one CIFOR researcher the district governments actual commitment to this was unclear. For this reason and the limited resources and programmatic boundaries of CIFOR, CIFOR did not continue with the mapping, but moved on to another applied research activity, viz., village land use planning and local resource regulations in three villages. Regardless of the district governments commitment, what is clear is that at that point in time a time when several IPPK permits had already been issued -- district government officials were not disapproving of the mapping activity, and indeed there may have even been a few key supporters within district government. To date, however, none of the village territory maps have been recognized by district government, and the district government has not followed up on the CIFOR-initiated mapping activity, as it had noted to CIFOR previously, and CIFOR itself has not re-initiated the mapping activity. At a meeting in October 2001 in which CIFOR was requested to present its research results to all senior district officials, the district government reprimanded CIFOR for the village territory mapping activity which CIFOR had effectively ceased in August 2000 noting that the district government had to deal with the fallout of CIFORs
52

dia salutmau kukuhkan hasil. The district government by this point had issued IPPK permits, the first one being issued in July 2000.

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activity and that CIFORs mapping related activities had fueled community conflicts and villagers protests against companies and the government. Further, according to one CIFOR researcher present at the meeting, the Head of the District Forestry Service asked rhetorically with respect to CIFORs mapping activity what CIFORs authority was and that it was actually the authority of the government to conduct mapping and not CIFOR or the communities. 54 This was a significant change in the district governments attitude toward CIFOR and the mapping activity. In July 2000, the district government started issuing IPPKs and as their numbers grew, so did boundary conflicts between villages. Moreover, the IPPKs often would not pay the agreed compensation to villages, and villagers by this time felt confident enough to protest against government and companies. According to one CIFOR researcher, the district government needed a scapegoat, and thus they blamed CIFOR and the village territory mapping activity 55 . Prior to this meeting, the district government had never expressed unhappiness with the mapping activity. Indeed, although certain villages were using the temporary maps as justification for claiming large swathes of forest areas to broker deals with IPPKs, it was the district government that was issuing the IPPK permits -- the district government could have as easily not issued the permits. At this same meeting, the district government criticized CIFOR for working closely with the central government in Jakarta and villagers in Malinau, yet not engaging the district government enough. As a result of this meeting in October 2001, CIFOR was told to stop field activities and data collection temporarily because the district government needed to decide on how CIFOR
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mana hak kita? Wewenang pemerintah.

That the mapping activity itself did not cause conflicts is evinced by the escalation in conflicts over natural resources involving communities throughout the country, many of whom lacked maps of any sort (see Yasmi et al. (2004) for documentation of the escalation of conflicts).

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should proceed. In February 2002, the District Head informed CIFOR that it should no longer focus on community mapping, rights and tenure issues, and thus CIFOR necessarily shifted its research focus to improving villagers economic options. This was a shift in the district governments attitude and perception of CIFOR, and destabilized CIFORs position in Malinau, as well as limiting the scope of acceptable research activities conducted by CIFOR. The shift in the district governments attitude toward CIFOR and mapping was also a way of displacing blame for conflicts within and between villages, as well as between villages and companies and government. Additionally, the district governments criticizing and reprimanding CIFOR constraining CIFOR -- was not based on CIFORs violating a previous agreement between CIFOR and the district government, and indeed from prior interactions, it seems that the district government had not taken issue with the activity at all. c. Constraining and destabilizing continue to be factors The district governments constraining and destabilizing of CIFORs role in the district and relationship with the district government continue to be an everyday condition of CIFORs work that CIFOR researchers must negotiate at an interpersonal level. In a conversation I had with the Head of District Planning in July 2004, he made a series of statements delimiting the space of CIFOR. He noted first that sometimes there is a difference of perception between CIFOR and the district government such that CIFOR activities conflict with the governments authority and laws and regulations. 56 For example, he noted that CIFORs activity of village level spatial planning was the district

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kadang-kadang ada ketidaksamaan persepsi antara pemerintah kabupaten dan CIFORpekerjaan CIFOR tumpang tindih.kebijakan daerah dan undang-undang.

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governments authority and could not be carried out by another party. 57 Implied in his statement is that CIFOR is overstepping its proper role, and thus he is instantiating or delineating what that proper role should and should not be. As a further example, with respect to the village territory mapping, he noted that it was a waste of time (buang waktu) since after the mapping there were community conflicts over forests and that after CIFOR left that activity, the district government had to deal with it. 58 Through a retelling of events that implies a causal linkage between the mapping activity, community conflicts and a further burden on district government, the Head of District Planning is making a prescriptive statement about what CIFOR should and should not be doing. Further reprimanding CIFOR, he commented that the application of CIFORs research was to date not evident 59 and that there had been no concrete action from CIFOR. 60 He also noted that while CIFOR does produce research results, its mostly for CIFOR itself, implying that its not applicable or appropriate. 61 In a similar vein, another government official noted that providing people research results in no way ensured that people would use them and that CIFOR should instruct people on how to apply research results and recommendations. Further, the district official who worked for several years as a member of CIFORs field team noted that indeed the expectation from CIFOR had been that its research results would be adopted or used by the district government, but that the idea that good

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misalnya membuat tataruang desaitu pemerintah kabupaten, tidak boleh orang lain. setelah pemetaan, berselisih asset hutan. Saling mengkalim. Setelah CIFOR pergi, harus selesai oleh pemerintah daerah.. applikasi penelitian belum kelihatan. sampai sekarang belum ada tinkdakan konkret. hasil penelitian CIFOR ada tapi sebagian besar untuk mereka sendiri.

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research would sell itself proved to be a poor assumption since there were many other political-economic factors involved in the district governments decision making. With respect to the type of research that CIFOR should be conducting, the Head of the District Planning Agency was emphatic about valuation studies of Malinaus forest resources such as carbon stock and payment for environment services. He also made several prescriptive comments about what CIFOR should not do, thereby circumscribing CIFORs position and role dont make problems with communities, 62 implying that CIFOR should avoid activities such as mapping, which according to him created conflict at the village level; dont follow issues handled by the district government 63 ; there must be a solution, dont just criticize 64 ; and dont just be interested in pre-determined or pre-mandated research, 65 implying that CIFOR selected research priorities without consulting local actors. d. District government constrains but maintains engagement Although the Head of District Planning Agency is limiting the scope of CIFORs role and relationship with villagers and the district government, he is not implying that there is not a role or place for CIFOR. Indeed, he noted that if CIFOR were to leave Malinau it would be a [negative] effect because CIFOR activities can be used [by the district government]. 66 Moreover, he noted that CIFOR has made certain contributions such as collecting and disseminating a list of plant species [in Malinau] and assessing the value of forests for

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jangan membuat masalah terhadap masyarakat. jangan ikut isu yang ditangani pemda. harus punya solusi. Jangan kritik aja. jangan hanya diasyik dengan penelitian di-order. kalau CIFOR pulang dampak ada. Kegiatan CIFOR bisa pakai.

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communities. 67 Further, he made several suggestions as to future CIFOR activities, thereby implying that he sees a role for CIFOR. The repertoire of statements made by the Head of the District Planning Agency is indicative of other officials perceptions of CIFOR and captures the attempts at constraining or circumscribing CIFORs activities. For example, the Head of the District Forestry Service criticized CIFOR for informing villagers that oil palm plantations are not suitable to Malinau and that they will have negative effects. He noted that CIFOR did not consider the economic benefits that the district and villages would gain, and that CIFOR seems to be anti-investor (Widjono AMZ 2003: 13). In a further reprimand of CIFORs activities, the District Secretary, in reflecting on the period of IPPKs, noted that at that time CIFOR was acting as an Indonesian NGO, fighting for the rights of communities and acting like a provocateur when they should have been consulting with the district government. 68 Thus, the district government attempts to limit CIFOR from engaging in activities that could lead to criticism of local government policies and practices, create accountability demands from communities onto local government, and/or strengthen villagers position vis--vis district government. Conversely, the district government wants CIFOR to support its position and policies vis--vis villagers. According to district government, this is justified because CIFOR is a guest of the Indonesian government and the purpose of CIFOR in Malinau is to assist and serve through its technical expertise. Implicit in this constraining, however, is that district officials by and large still engage CIFOR, maintaining a connection and thus possibilities. The question, however, is why.

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penyebaran jenis-jenis tumbuhan. Menghimpun nilai hutan untuk masyarakat. begerak sebagai LSMperjuangan hak masyarakatseharusnya CIFOR konsultasi pemerintah daerahsepterti provocateur waktu itu.

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Why do district government officials engage CIFOR, albeit in varied and limited fashion? What are the perceived benefits of CIFORs presence for district government officials? Although it would be difficult for the district government to expel CIFOR from Malinau due to the MOU between CIFOR and the Government of Indonesia, the district government could decide to disengage entirely, but it does not. Indeed, the District Secretary referred to CIFOR as the districts asset and hopes that CIFOR will continue to be in Malinau and involved in various processes. 69 That said, he noted that if CIFOR were to leave [Malinau], the asset would be lost but [the district] would not be handicapped. 70 CIFORs access to senior district government officials is indicative of the power dynamics of the relationship. Since 2001, CIFORs field team, all of whom have an intimate understanding of the history of the region and people and politics, has made an extensive and intensive commitment to establish rapport with the local government. Their personal and professional interactions with district government officials are frequent and cordial. That said, although CIFOR does have access to district officials, it is not preferential access. For example, CIFOR researchers must often wait for hours to meet senior officials, and sometimes hours of waiting do not result in a meeting. Moreover, the attendance of officials, particularly senior ones, at CIFOR initiated meetings to which they are invited is never a certainty, which is indicative of the lack of commitment of the district government to CIFOR and villagers. The question of perceived benefits is even more intriguing given that CIFOR does not offer large-scale projects or project funding to the district government. There are several answers to the question of why district officials continue to engage CIFOR. In addition to not
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CIFOR assetberharap tetap existterlibat proses Malinau. Kalau CIFOR pulang, asset hilang tapi bukan handicapped.

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tasking the coffers of district government, CIFOR fulfills certain social service functions that the district government should carry out, e.g., villagers participation and involvement in governance issues through such forums as the annual CIFOR initiated inter-village workshops and community-government workshops, as well as through legal literacy and conflict resolution initiatives not only for villagers but also for government officials. Additionally, CIFOR has provided technical trainings such as GIS for the district officials who have access to and are responsible for using the technology, yet lack the technical skills. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, both district officials and villagers perceive CIFOR as the main interlocutor between them. As one district government official in the legal affairs division noted, CIFOR is close to communities in the forestthe district government has yet to be. 71 He also noted that CIFOR has helped the district government sufficiently, providing legal drafting training and helping to familiarize district regulations to communities. 72 He went on further to note how understaffed his division was and how CIFORs legal literacy and legal drafting activities were needed at the village level for the districts village autonomy program (Gerbangdema) and that it would help the development of district authority 73 . It is clear from this officials statements that CIFOR is filling a gap in the functioning of district government. This lower level government official, who has a NGO background, has a much more positive perspective on the benefits of citizen involvement in governance than certain more powerful government officials, such as the District Secretary, who in commenting on

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Moses: CIFOR dekat masyarakat sekitar hutanpemda belum. CIFOR cukup bantu pemerintah daerahlegal draftingbantu sosialisasi ke masyarakat.

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bagian hukum hanya delapan orangtidak cukuplegal drafting perlu di tingkat desa kalau mau desa otonomi.

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CIFORs activities with villagers noted that CIFORs mission was okay, but the tools [or methods] needed to be adjusted to the local situation.74 As an example of how CIFOR had erred, he explained how CIFORs community mapping activity, although good in its community approach, provided villagers an exaggerated sense of their tenure rights that was not in accordance with the district government. 75 The District Secretarys notion of community participation or empowerment -- one devoid of negative political consequences for district government reinforces the idea that the district government perceives benefit from CIFORs de facto government functions, as long as they remain within acceptable boundaries. District officials also perceive CIFOR as a vehicle to the potential national and international largesse of conservation a primary interlocutor between the district and those with national and international conservation interests. CIFOR provides status and legitimacy to the district government regarding, and allows the district government to tap into, the global discourse of sustainable forestry, conservation and payments for environmental services. Indeed, as discussed in an earlier section, many government officials, such as the District Secretary, the Head of the District Forestry Service and Head of the District Planning Agency, often speak of Malinaus forest resources as the lungs of the earth (Malinau paru paru dunia), and its geographic position as the heart (jantung) of Kalimantan. Consistently, district government officials emphasized to me that Malinau is home to the headwaters of East Kalimantans six major river systems and that Malinaus forests protect the region from extreme flooding. Indeed, 95% of the 42,000 km2 district is demarcated by

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misi CIFOR oke.alat harus disesuaikan. masyarakat diberi pemahaman terlalu jauh untuk saat inipemetaan desabagus karna pendekatan tapi nga sesual dengan pemerintah daerah.

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the government as forest, and CIFOR has noted that Malinau is home to one of the largest expanses of intact tropical forest in the world (Barr et al. 2001). District officials continue, noting that it is unfair that Malinau receives no compensation for the environmental services it provides, and that villagers remain forest dependant without access to the benefits of development. The district government expects monetary compensation for the services Malinaus forests provide the outside world, whether it is clean water to other districts in the province or oxygen to the world. Conservation notions such as payment for environment services, virgin forests and carbon trading are a common part of district officials discourse. And it is here that the district government perceives the potential benefit of CIFORs presence in the district, viz., that CIFOR should validate the importance of Malinaus forest resources for the outside world, justify payments for these environmental services to Malinau, and identify external parties to make such payments 76 . Indeed, CIFOR has already brought significant attention to Malinaus forest resources. In addition to the mere presence of CIFOR in Malinau, which confers a global importance to Malinau, CIFOR brings a consistent flow of national and international scientists and policymakers to the district. Also, through CIFORs efforts a village in the district won the National Environmental Award (Kalpataru), which brought national recognition to the district. Further, CIFOR has raised international awareness of the importance of Malinaus forests and district-level efforts to conserve its forests through such initiatives as nominating a village in the district in the World Water Councils Water Action Contest in 2003, which focused on initiatives to resolve world water issues. The village was subsequently selected as one of the 150 global
CIFOR was indeed in the process of conducting research on this topic during my fieldwork period, as well as research on international donor interest in paying for these services. An article entitled When donors get cold feet: The community conservation concession in Setulang (Kalimantan, Indonesia) that never happened by Wunder et al. is an example of the results of this research and will be a chapter in a book to be published by Earthscan.
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finalists (out of 870) to attend and present at the World Water Forum in Kyoto, Japan. Thus, the district government is well aware of the articulating and interlocuting ability of CIFOR. The Head of the District Forestry Service noted that CIFOR is the districts channel and voice to the outside. 77 Another official noted that one of the governments expectations was that CIFOR could connect them with international donors. 78 That said, the recognition made possible by CIFOR has not translated into financial compensation for the district, and thus district government officials emphasize that CIFOR has not done enough and should assist in this endeavor to sell Malinau to the outside world (jual ke dunia luar) so that the district can receive compensation for the environmental services it provides. It is the possibility that CIFOR can serve as interlocutor, broker, and legitimizer for the district government in the imagined world of conservation-related payments -- in part evinced by CIFORs successful efforts at drawing national and international attention to Malinau that keeps the district government interested in CIFOR itself. 4. Summary of District Government Perceptions and Relationship with CIFOR I have attempted to describe and analyze the relationship between CIFOR and the Malinau district government. In doing so, I have demonstrated the fragile, negotiated and compromised position of CIFOR vis--vis the district government. Further, I attempted to show that for the district government CIFOR is a primary interlocutor between the government and villagers, on the one hand, and government and extra-local conservation community, on the other. I also examined the conditions and practices of CIFOR being an interlocutor and demonstrated that CIFOR does not have direct power or authority over the
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CIFOR suara guang di luar. hubungan dengan international donor.

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district government, nor is the relationship between CIFOR and the district government a seamless given, a stable fact. Indeed precisely the opposite characterizes the relationship. It is the district government that maintains a position of power vis--vis CIFOR and attempts to constrain or circumscribe CIFORs role and position in the district such that CIFORs work in no way sparks criticism of the district governments policies and practices. Moreover, the relationship between CIFOR and the district government is not stable and must constantly be negotiated by CIFOR through interpersonal engagements to find a perceived common ground with district officials and their multiple and unpredictable interests. As I discussed, there are several factors that militate against CIFOR having a more embedded relationship with the district government factors that district government officials are well aware of. First, CIFOR does not hold institutional leverage vis--vis district government indeed, CIFOR is a guest of the Indonesian government. Moreover, although CIFOR conducts applied research through the paradigm of participatory action research, the actions of CIFORs initiatives are limited since ultimately CIFOR is a research center and not, for example, an advocacy NGO. Thus, in many ways CIFORs influence is limited to reports of research results, recommendations and provision of information. Second, CIFOR and the district government are each mired in their own institutional bureaucracies and incentives although CIFOR maintains a certain amount of flexibility in its research agendas, it is not at the beck and call of the district government. This difference in institutional incentives has translated into a significant lack of interest on the part of the district government regarding CIFORs research topics, use of CIFORs research and collaboration with CIFOR. In other words, CIFOR to a great extent is conducting applied

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research in an unsupportive institutional environment there is little to indicate that the district government shares CIFORs concern with research-informed policy, equitable natural resource management, and villagers rights to participate as full citizens. This inhospitable institutional environment goes beyond the district government, and includes the multiple uncertainties that ad hoc decentralization has engendered. However, the district government continues to engage CIFOR. That CIFOR does have access to senior district officials and that at times these officials make commitments to support or partner with CIFOR demonstrate that the district government perceives a certain level of shared interest with and/or need for CIFOR. For example, CIFOR works closely with the District Village Empowerment Service on poverty alleviation issues, and the Head of this agency strongly applauds CIFOR and the collaborative arrangement. Other government officials have commented positively about CIFOR assisting the district in gaining national and international environmental recognition, as well as the trainings and facilitation CIFOR has provided for villagers and district government officials. The district governments perceived benefits from CIFORs presence are related to shared institutional incentives and district officials personal ones. For example, very little evidence indicates that the district government is committed, now or in the past, to sustainable forest management or to improving the livelihoods of forest dependent communities, however there are strong institutional and personal incentives to diminish community conflict and ease villagers dissatisfaction with the district government, particularly as it concerns basic livelihood issues. These are issues that CIFOR has and does directly address, and hence, the district government uses CIFOR to fulfill these social services that the district government is incapable or unwilling to take on. Moreover, CIFOR does not task the coffers of the district

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government. Further, the district government has used CIFOR as a scapegoat in dealing with community protests of IPPKs and government policies. Lastly, another personal and institutional incentive for the district government to work with CIFOR is that through CIFOR the district government taps into/accesses state and international power. The metaphor of tropical forest, specifically Borneo/Kalimantan, being the Lungs of the Earth is recognized and deployed by district officials. CIFOR brings national and international attention some wanted and some unwanted -- to Malinau, and it is the potential national and international largesse that in part motivates the district governments collaboration with CIFOR. B. Villagers perceptions and relationship with CIFOR: a key interlocutor of whom much is expected but who has been unable to deliver. In this section of the chapter, I discuss villagers perceptions of and relationship with CIFOR to understand their expectations regarding CIFOR, the extent to which those expectations have been borne out, and explanations for unmet expectations. Fundamentally, I examine why villagers are interested in working with CIFOR and how they perceive CIFOR. Villagers perceive CIFOR to be a key interlocutor, confidant and bridge to the outside world, even though many villagers expectations for CIFORs presence in Malinau have not been met, and thus led to a sense of disappointment among some villagers. That said, villagers continue to engage CIFOR, and the relationship is maintained through the hope and possibility engendered by the collaborations more minor achievements. 1. CIFOR as Interlocutor: Bridge, Information Source, Confidant, Advocate Villagers perceive CIFOR as one of their most trustworthy interlocutors with and about the outside world. Particularly important for villagers is CIFORs interlocuting role between them and the district government. Indeed, villagers frequently refer to CIFOR as the

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bridge (jembatan) between villagers and government, which is consistent with how CIFOR institutionally represents itself to villagers and district government. CIFOR justifies this by framing itself and its bridging role as neutral, as merely being a vehicle for information and communication. CIFORs role as a bridge or interlocutor for villagers has several dimensions in everyday practice. Villagers perceive CIFOR as one of their primary means of obtaining information about district government policies and practices, as well as broader issues that affect villagers lives such as national decentralization policies. Indeed, many villagers note that it is through CIFOR that they find out about district government regulations and decrees, and that the district government itself rarely provides this type of information. While CIFOR has conducted discrete participatory action research activities with villagers such as mapping of village territories, through which villagers gain information, CIFOR also carries out a more regular repertoire of information and bridging activities. Since 2000, CIFOR has regularly provided villagers newsletters, policy briefs and other written material regarding locally relevant issues such as different types of timber concessions, oil palm plantations, and district government regulations affecting village governance and administration. Further, since 1999 CIFOR has organized three-day annual workshops of the 27 villages in the Malinau watershed. The agendas of these annual workshops are based upon prior input from villagers. As part of or immediately following these workshops, CIFOR also organizes dialogues between district government officials and villagers, topics and questions for which are prepared during the inter-village workshop. These workshops and dialogues are one of the few occasions where villagers from all villages gather to discuss and communicate, and one of the very few events where villagers can speak directly with government officials in an

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open forum. Government officials sometime attend these workshops, although they are frequently absent and their participation is limited. Since 2000 the field team has also conducted monitoring visits of all the villages in the Malinau watershed. These monitoring visits are conducted every six months and normally are one day and one night per village. The face-to-face interactions are an extremely productive way for villagers and CIFOR to exchange information. Another means by which CIFOR provides information to villagers is by conducting visits to other regions of Indonesia and meeting with villagers who have experienced situations pertinent to villagers from Malinau, e.g., rubber gardens in the district of West Kutai and oil palm plantations in the district Paser, both of which are in East Kalimantan. Villagers comments reflect the value they attribute to CIFOR as an information source and bridge. One villager noted that a key benefit of CIFOR is that communities can [now] know about a range of issues such as government policies. 79 Another commented that the use of CIFOR is the information [CIFOR provides] because the district government rarely provides information. 80 Taking this one step further, another villager commented that communities benefit from CIFORs informing them of various policies and practices, which sometimes lead to villager protests of companies and/or government . 81 With respect to being a bridge, one villager rhetorically asked, If not CIFOR, who can we rely on? and observed that CIFOR has a link to the district government, but is not the same as the government. 82 Another noted that CIFOR was a convener between
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kebaikan CIFORmasyarakat bisa tahu. guna CIFORinformasijarang ada informasi dari pemda. ada manfaat untuk masyarakatCIFOR kasihtahu ini-ini pada masyarakat jadi demo.

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communities and government 83 and that CIFORs plans and activities were appropriate. 84 Also, the visits to other regions were noted by villagers as extremely helpful, 85 as were the inter-village workshops, particularly since the different Dayak ethnic groups themselves were unable or unwilling to be close [to each other]. 86 During the 2003 inter-village workshop a CIFOR staff member who is not involved in the ACM project asked the 52 participants to evaluate the benefits or use of CIFOR. 87 Participants responses emphasized the information and bridge building aspects, viz., expanding their thinking, information and experience; providing input to communities through advice and explanations; improving relationships among villages; helping to bridge communities and government; and improving awareness about forest conservation (Wollenberg et al. 2004). Another critical element of villagers perceptions of CIFOR as interlocutor is CIFORs role as villagers confidant and advocate, and not merely a neutral party. In this regard, one villager observed that CIFOR protects us [villagers] and that if CIFOR had not come [to Malinau], logging would be uncontrolled. 88 Indeed, CIFORs field team over the years has built such strong rapport and trust with villagers that villagers frequently seek out members of CIFORs field team to inform them or ask for information. One village head who has been

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kalau nga cifor, harap pada siapa? CIFOR ada kaitan sama pemdanga sama pemerintah. penggabung masyarakat dan pemda. rencana betul-betul. studi banding bantu betul. suku-suku sendiri nga bisa begitu akrab. I was a participant-observer at this workshop and was present during this evaluation. CIFOR untuk melindungi kitakalau CIFOR nga masuk, tebang sesuka-suka.

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involved in CIFOR activities for several years noted that although he is disappointed with the lack of concrete results from CIFOR activities, he an other villagers continue to participate in CIFOR activities because of close relations with the field team who he considers as local people (anggap orang sini). CIFOR as villagers confidant is also demonstrated by the quality and quantity of sensitive and personal information that villagers provide to the field team, ranging from the history of inter- and intra-village conflicts to individual payments from timber concessionaires. Villagers also provide critical feedback directly to CIFORs field team, which is significant in light of the political-economic, power and status differences between CIFOR and villagers. Villagers perceive CIFOR as a key means to access, inter alia, state power. That villagers to a great extent feel comfortable with providing critical feedback to CIFOR indicates that this hierarchical aspect of the relationship is muted -- villagers are not concerned that CIFOR will leave them because they are critical of CIFOR. Moreover, during a field visit conducted by myself and a CIFOR field team member in November 2002, one village head instructed us to write down that his village had not received any development or assistance projects from the district government. His instruction for us to write down that item demonstrates his understanding that CIFOR is an interlocutor and confidant, indicating that he feels enough equity in the relationship between himself and CIFOR that he can make that request. Villagers do not tell those they perceive as higher authorities, e.g., government officials, to write things down. Related to the issue of writing, several villagers noted that CIFORs documentation of local knowledge and practices support villagers. One older,

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illiterate villager noted the importance of CIFOR documenting so that others such as children could see and read about local knowledge, since otherwise it could be forgotten.89 Another example of villagers trust in CIFOR is that several have requested CIFOR to settle territorial boundary disputes between villages. One village head informed me that CIFOR should not be hesitant about determining villagers rights [regarding boundaries]. 90 In regards to the CIFOR-initiated mapping exercise, another noted that although there were boundaries previously, they were not clear and that if CIFOR had not been there, it would be chaotic [now]. 91 Villagers also want the district government to settle these disputes, but many feel closer to CIFOR. As discussed in an earlier section, many villagers have little faith in the district government, noting that the district government is hopeless 92 and that they wouldnt imagine relying on the government, 93 and thus thank CIFOR for their efforts. 94 Also, CIFOR asks villagers what they want, the government rarely does. Even though CIFOR has repeatedly informed villagers that it does not have the authority to settle these disputes and that villagers must first come to an agreement among themselves, which villagers acknowledge as correct, they continue to request this. On a related point, villagers are not singling out CIFOR to take on this task, but rather they are making a broader request for resolution and enforcement of agreements, institutions for which are lacking.

89

mendata semuabisa lihat dan bacaanak-anak bisa tahukalau tidak, bisa lupa. jangan ragu-ragu untuk menentu hak masyarakat. batassebelum ada tapi belum hitam di atas putihkalau CIFOR nga ada, ada kekacauan. pemda tidak ada harapan. kalau mengharap pemda, nga mungkin. terima kasih pada CIFOR.

90

91

92

93

94

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The trust villagers place in CIFOR is even more remarkable given that many villagers are often unclear about the overall objective (tujuan) of CIFORs work. In my asking about what he thought CIFORs objective was, one villager turned the question around asking what is [CIFORs] research for? What is the objective? 95 , but then noted with certainty that the objective was good and that CIFOR helps communities even though there had not been any assistance yet. 96 CIFOR has been able to establish this high level of trust through various means: In addition to CIFORs long term presence in Malinau and in the villages, CIFORs field team consists of individuals who are extremely familiar with and have an intimate knowledge of local people and practices there is a personal connection between the field team and villagers. Indeed, one of the members of the field team is a local villager. Moreover, members of the field team have cultivated a comfortable and casual relationship with villagers they often visit villages and stay overnight, and the team always welcomes villagers to visit the field office. Further, from the perspective of villagers, CIFOR is one of the few organizations or actors that demonstrates an explicit interest in their lives and welfare, and thus their options are limited. 2. Villagers disappointment with CIFOR: lack of tangible impacts While the relationship between villagers and CIFOR is positive, and villagers perceive CIFOR as an ally, many of these same villagers express one consistent disappointment regarding CIFOR and CIFOR activities, viz., that there have been no concrete results from CIFORs research and related activities. This was not only expressed in interviews I conducted independently of CIFOR in mid-2004, but also in interviews conducted by a

95

Penelitian untuk apa? Tujuan? tujuan bagusbantu masyakarakatbelum ada bantuan.

96

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CIFOR field team member and myself in late 2002. Villagers were quite frank about this disappointment, and some villager leaders noted growing frustration among villagers. Statements such as the following were indicative of the disappointment or criticism expressed by villagers: One villager commented that there is no changeno realization [of CIFORs research] that can be seen by communities. 97 Another noted, communities havent felt the results, benefits from CIFORs research. 98 With respect to CIFORs research informing policy, one villager commented, until now there has yet to be a policy that can be felt by communities. 99 With respect to CIFOR being a bridge and information source, one village head asked rhetorically, how is the result? Until now theres nothing. 100 On a related point, while villagers appreciate the information that CIFOR provides in reports, newsletter and policy briefs, the use is limited because villagers note it is not their hobby to read, 101 as farmers they dont have the opportunity to study [reports], 102 or they are illiterate. This is problematic because CIFOR relies heavily on text to disseminate information, particularly since the field team, ranging from two to four people, is limited in how frequently they meet face-to-face with people from the 27 villages in the watershed. Also, although villagers comment positively on the annual workshops, many agree with the comment from one villager that the workshop is not enough, theres not follow up. 103

97

tidak ada perubahannga pernah ada realisasi dilihat masyarakat. masyarakat belum merasa hasil, manfaat dari penelitian CIFOR sampai saat ini belum ada keibijakan dirasakan. bagaimana realisasi? Sampai sekarang belum. nga hobi baca. petani nga sempat belajar.

98

99

100

101

102

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For example, in the 2004 inter-village workshop, CIFOR invited the provincial forestry research agency (BPPK) to demonstrate producing gaharu or eaglewood by inoculating an uninfected tree with the fungi responsible for the aromatic, resinous heartwood. One village head who attended noted that there was no follow up to the gaharu training. 104 Similarly, another village head commented that the problem with the gaharu training was that villagers were just informed about it, shown a demonstration, but no extension or follow up. 105 Another village head captured the general disappointment with CIFOR sentiment quite well, explaining that he was not satisfied with the results of CIFORs research, and that our [villagers] desires are results that can change villagers livelihoods.from impoverished to a certain standard[and that] the workshop was not satisfyingwe have yet to see the resultthere has yet to be change based on results. 106 He continued slightly indignant that CIFORs reports are good for CIFOR, they make a report [and] are happytheyre finishedbut there has not yet been change. 107 3. Expectations unmet: Unfounded assumptions and unsupportive institutional environment Indeed, from one vantage point, CIFORs participatory action research has not achieved much for villagers. For example, boundary disputes between villages persist, village territories have not been recognized by the district government, the district government has not adopted recommendations based on research conducted collaboratively between CIFOR
103

lokakarya tidak cukupnga ada tindaklanjut. tindaklanjut pelatihan [gaharu] kurang. masalah dengan pelatihan gaharu...contoh, kasihtahu ajagimana?

104

105

106

keinginan kitahasil yang bisa mengubah kehidupan masyarakatdari miskin sampai standar tertentulokakarya nga puashasil belum kita lihathasil perubahan belum ada. mereka buat laporansenangsudah selesaiuntuk berubah belum.

107

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and villagers, and villagers proposals to district government regarding income generating activities based on research with CIFOR have not been approved. From a research perspective, participatory action research is considered beneficial because it is less extractive and more inclusive than traditional research and also allows for documentation and analysis of particular interventions. Yet, from a development intervention perspective and from the perspective of villagers, ACM specifically and CIFOR more generally seem only partially committed since the extent of and follow-up to the intervention are limited by the fact that ultimately CIFOR is a research institution and not a development one. That said, villagers continue to participate in CIFORs activities and comment positively about certain aspects of CIFORs work. As one villager noted regarding CIFOR, there hasnt been anything we can feel, not yet any benefit from CIFORs activities[but] its impossible that good people would just look at us, definitely they have the good objective to help. 108 As this comment suggests, it is the promise of change, of hope and possibility, cultivated through CIFORs building strong rapport and constantly engaging villagers that keeps villagers coming back. This individuals comments are also illuminating with respect to villagers expectations of CIFOR and CIFOR activities and the extent to which these expectations are borne out. Putting together villagers disappointment and praise in one analytical frame reveals a broader frustration and understanding regarding how villagers expect CIFORs role to play out and how it actually has to date. Villagers expectations of impact or change from CIFORs research are due to the following assumptions: (1) CIFOR and district government have a MOU agreeing to collaborate, (2) CIFOR is an international
108

belum ada yang kita rasa, belum ada manfaat dari kegiatan CIFOR...nga mungkin orang baik lihat kita percuma-cuma, pasti dia punya tujuan bantu baik.

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organization and thus has influence over district government policies, (3) CIFOR has conducted sound research based on community aspirations and thus would ostensibly inform policy, and (4) participating in CIFOR activities through the action research approach should lead to change. Indeed, as discussed earlier, these assumptions were not only held by villagers, but were initially broad operating principles for CIFOR as well. These assumptions came across in comments made during my conversations with villagers regarding what they expected CIFORs leverage to be and what actually transpired. For example, one village head noted that CIFOR should have leverage since CIFOR is supported, protected by multiple countries and protected by law. 109 Another noted that CIFOR should have a powerful position since CIFOR has the character of international research, representing the world. 110 And indeed villagers have been frustrated by the fact that the suggestions based on collaborative research between CIFOR and villagers have not been taken into account in district policies. One village head noted with exasperation that policies are not in accordance with villagers aspirations and asked why are [these policies] different from the research carried out by CIFOR and communities. 111 As the relationship between villagers, district government and CIFOR has played out, it has become clear that these assumptions were unfounded. As one villager observed, CIFOR appears strong but is not, 112 indicating an awareness of CIFORs lack of political power vis--vis the district government. One of the key reasons for this is that in Malinau, as well as in Indonesia and internationally, CIFOR operates in an institutional environment that is often
109

berupa lembaga penelitian didukung, lindungi beberapa negaradilindungi oleh hukum. CIFOR bersifat penelitian internasional, mewakili dunia. kebijakan tidak sesuai dengan aspirasi, kenapa beda dengan penelitian sama masyarakat. kelihatan kuat tapi tidak.

110

111

112

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unsupportive of and sometimes antagonistic toward many of the assumptions and values that CIFOR was ostensibly founded upon. As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, the relationship between CIFOR and the district government is anything but given, and CIFORs influence on district government has been limited. On this point, one villager noted that CIFOR inspires communities to demand [their rights] from district government[but the relationship] with the district government is not clear. 113 Similarly, with respect to why the mapping of village territories had not led to the legal recognition villagers had expected, this same individual observed that the district government is unsupportive. The district government and CIFOR do not collaborate closely, [and] the obstacle is the district government. CIFOR cannot scold [or protest] directly, the communities are the ones that scold directly, but the government has not responded although theyve been scolded. 114 Thus, while expressing disappointment that CIFORs activities have not met their expectations and manifested the changes hoped for, villagers are very much aware of the unsupportive institutional environment and do not solely, or even mostly, blame CIFOR. The unsupportive institutional environment within which CIFORs applied research activities take place in Malinau is not limited to government, but rather extends to intra and inter village relations among Dayak groups. Dayak villagers in Malinau often comment on the prevalence of Dayak eating Dayak (Dayak makan Dayak) since decentralization, referring to a lack of social cohesion or collaboration among Dayaks as well as sub-ethnic groups. Analyzing territorial boundary conflicts between villages illuminates the various dimensions of village-level institutional constraints to meeting villagers expectations for
113

CIFOR membangkit masyarakat supaya bisa menuntut pemdadengan pemda belum jelas.

114

pemda kurang mendukungpemda dan cifor tidak begitu kerjasamahalangan pemda.cifor nga bisa menggonggong langsung, masyarakat yang menggonggong tapi pemerintah belum respon walaupun digonggong.

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CIFOR related activities. With the implementation of ad hoc decentralization processes since mid 2000, villagers have for the first time the possibility of gaining significant profit from land and/or forested regions that they can claim. Opportunities for villagers to profit from territorial claims, e.g., IPPKs, have exacerbated previous boundary disputes and sparked new ones between villages, which often translate into conflicts between Dayak ethnic groups. Although boundary disputes between villages existed prior to decentralization, the onset of decentralization ratcheted up the possible profits and conflicts. Indeed, at least six villages (Limberg [forthcoming]) used the temporary maps produced through the CIFOR activity to justify claims to and negotiate with IPPKs. As one villager head noted, maps were negotiation tools with companies (alat negosiasi dengan perushaan) and used to bargain with companies (tawar-menawar sama perusahaan). While scholars debate the

extent to which Dayak communities traditionally demarcated and recognized territorial boundaries (see for example Sellato 2001, Sirait et al. 1994, Fox 2002), it is clear that boundaries in terms fixed territorial boundaries -- have come to play a more important role and figure prominently in the minds of Dayak villagers as their access to the value of territories, forested and otherwise, has increased. Prior to gaining access to the value of territory, Dayak villagers placed limited importance on boundaries. This is analogous to precolonial kingdoms of Southeast Asia, where labor and not land was the scarce resource, and hence territorial boundaries overlapped and shaded into each other. This helps explain villagers comments about why there are boundary conflicts now and not before. As one villager commented, before there were boundaries but they were not that clear. 115 This comment also implies that while there might have been boundaries, the rules

115

batas sebelumnya adanga begitu jelas

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and institutions governing them were at least flexible and/or overlapping. Another villager echoed the earlier comment noting that there were boundaries before but not black and white [or in other words clearly demarcated and fixed]. 116 Thus, the increased value of territory for villagers has heightened the importance of boundaries, and conflicts and negotiations over them, because boundaries of territory now translate into boundaries of economic gain. Conversely, these comments imply a shift in the concept of the boundary, from something flexible and less absolute to something fixed territorially. Because of the different migration and settlement histories of Dayak ethnic groups into the Malinau watershed, village territorial disputes are articulated as ethnic ones. More specifically, with the increased value of territory, the dichotomy of indigenous (asli) versus migrant or newcomer (pendatang) has become the core tension and lightning rod between Dayak groups with respect to claims to territory, particularly forested regions. The Merap and Tidung 117 consider themselves to be the indigenous inhabitants of the mid/upper and lower portions of the Malinau watershed, respectively. Thus, they claim the forested areas and other territories as customarily theirs, using phrases such traditional forest (hutan adat) and/or traditional land (tanah adat). Their ostensible indigeneity is the justification for their claims, and equally as important the justification for delegitimizing the claims of other Dayak groups who migrated to the region more recently and who they say have their traditional lands (tanah adat) in their original villages.

116

batas sebelum ada tapi belum hitam di atas putih.

117

While the Merap are upland people who fall under the rubric of Dayak, the Tidung are Muslim coastal dwellers, who with decentralization and the increased political power of the Dayak identity now self-identify as a group as belonging to the Dayak category. Indeed, in 2003 the Tidung attended the meeting of the East Kalimantan Dayak Association (Persekutuan Dayak Kalimantan Timur), which is now a much more politically powerful group and chaired by the District Head of Malinau, Marthin Billa, who is Kenyah Dayak.

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In the Malinau watershed this most significantly affects the Kenyah who migrated east to Malinau in the 1960s from the neighboring Bahau and Pujungan watersheds. The Kenyah are extremely sensitive to this point of being referred to as migrants or newcomers (pendatang) and having their claims to territory in the Malinau watershed challenged. Their sensitivity to this issue is in part due to what they recognize as the political power of claiming indigeneity. Indeed, when they migrated to the Malinau, the Kenyah recognized the Malinau as being controlled by the Merap and requested permission from the Merap Chief Customary Leader (Ketua Adat Besar) to settle in the Malinau. Conversely, due to this recognition the Kenyah now incur the negative ramifications of being labeled migrants, viz., potentially being dispossessed of territorial claims. Kenyah are particularly concerned about this because of their large numbers in the Malinau watershed and their dependence on making large swiddens for their livelihood. Complicating this situation further is that the villages along the Malinau watershed alternate between older and newer villages, thereby exacerbating territorial conflicts between indigenous and migrant, or long-settled and recently-settled, groups (Limberg [forthcoming]. Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s the New Orders resettlement programme resulted in Punan, some of whom are indigenous to the Malinau, moving from settlements in the upper watersheds to the middle and lower reaches in villages already inhabited by others. Thus, while some Punan can claim indigeneity and traditional territory in the Malinau watershed, it is often much farther upstream from where they are settled currently 118 . Thus, according the to Merap and Tidung, the Kenyah and to a lesser extent the Punan have no

118

Further, Punan claims to any territory are questioned by some Dayak in Malinau since they are traditionally hunter and gathers placing little if any importance on boundaries and defined territories. Indeed, some scholars have commented that Punan traditionally oriented themselves in the landscape according to hill ridges since these were their walking paths (Kaskija 2000).

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legitimate claim to forested regions in the Malinau and can only rightfully claim swidden fields they have worked since their arrival, some of which are also contested as being on borrowed land. In other words, the Merap and Tidung are attempting to exclude the Kenyah and Punan from claiming any tracts of forest that could possibly be commercially valuable and of commercial scale. A Dayak Kenyah villager from Long Loreh lost rights to his two hectare cacao and fruit garden he had cultivated for ten years because according to the Merap in Langap, the village where the Chief Customary Leader of Malinau (Ketua Adat Besar) resides, the land was only borrowed by him and was owned by a Merap villager. The Kenyah villagers cacao and fruit garden were destroyed, and the land was allocated by the original owner to a Merap villager to use temporarily for swiddens. The real motivation for re-claiming that patch of land, however, was that there was coal underneath, and a mining company had plans to excavate in that region, which would mean substantial compensation for the owner of the land. This Dayak Kenyah villager had no avenue of recourse. At the village level, the predominantly Kenyah village of Gong Solok did not receive any compensation from an IPPK operating in small watershed where the village is located because, according to the Tidung, it was Tidung territory. The justification for the region belonging to the Tidung was that certain Tidung had a long history of owning birds nest caves in the area, which according to the Tidung, justified claims to surrounding forest. The inter-ethnic tensions between Dayak groups is due to the deployment of an indigenous versus migrant discourse by powerful actors, and not due to actual length of residence in the region. For example, one long standing village, Paya Seturan, has had its territorial claims squeezed by the two neighboring villagers of Langap and Tanjung Nanga,

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the former claiming indigeneity and being the home of the Chief Customary Leader of the watershed and the latter being a relatively recently settled village but of significant size and home to a member of the district parliament. Conflicts among Dayaks, however, are not limited to disputes between ethnic groups, but intra-ethnic and intra-village disputes have also been common (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]). For example, the Merap village of Laban Nyarit in mid-2004 prepared to seize the heavy equipment of a timber concessionaire with whom they had brokered a deal because the timber concessionaire had not fulfilled any of its promises during the six months it had operated in the forested region claimed by Laban Nyarit. The timber company was owned by Merap from the neighboring village of Langap. As the village head of Laban Nyarit commented to me, this was a case of Merap eating Merap (Merap makan Merap). Indeed, the lack of institutional arrangements and attendant social cohesion within and between Dayak groups severely limits the effectiveness of CIFORs applied research initiative, and some villagers are aware of this. As one villager commented, if communities could agree, all the villages would have an areaCIFOR facilitated communities to make maps and gave input about the implementation of forest management. 119 Related to this last comment regarding villagers awareness that conflicts among them work against their collective best interests is villagers awareness of their own sense of agency with respect to whether, or to what extent, CIFOR related research activities are used or adopted. In our conversations, villagers made explicit to me that they themselves had a role in the lack of fulfillment of the expectations regarding CIFOR activities. With respect to

119

Kalau masyarakat bisa sepakat, semua desa sudah punya wilayah desaCIFOR mendampingi masyarakat buat peta and berikan masukan tentang pelaksanaan pengelolaan hutan.

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why CIFORs suggestions had not been implemented, one villager noted that it is our weakness, 120 and another noted that CIFOR does not have a responsibility to us, the communities [we] have responsibility to ourselves. 121 More generally, villagers are aware that their actions are not necessarily in their best interests. For example, in relating to me why villagers did not use CIFORs research, which he considered useful and important, one village head noted that it was like using electrical current to catch fish, which is prevalent in Malinau everyone is aware that it is destructive and shouldnt use that method, but they do because its easier. He continued with another analogy about Dayaks agreeing to broker agreements to timber concessionaires to log their forests, even though they are fully aware of their dependence on the forest. Thus, villagers do not merely displace blame onto others, but also take some responsibility for the situation they find themselves in and the extent to which the situation can change. CIFORs participatory action research approach is, however, ambiguous and confusing to villagers, particularly in an extremely politicized forested landscape such as Malinau. Many villagers in Malinau have difficulty understanding the limits and boundaries of CIFORs work. The boundaries between action and research are not clear for many villagers, which leads to comments such as being left in the middle of the road 122 by CIFOR. Yet, even with these misgivings and disappointments with CIFOR related activities, villagers still engage CIFOR and participate in activities. It is the hope, trust and possibility that maintain the relationship and collaboration between CIFOR and villagers. As one village
120

kekurangan kita CIFOR bukan bertanggung jawab pada kita, masyarakat bertanggung jawab pada kita. ditengah jalan

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head who was quite disappointed with the lack of results from CIFOR activities answered when I asked him why he continues to join CIFOR activities, who knows, maybe it will succeed later. 123 4. Case Study of Articulation and Alienation: Setulang, Setarap, Sentaban and CIFOR The relationship between three neighboring villages in the lower reaches of the Malinau watershed Setulang, Sentaban and Setarap and CIFOR raises an interesting case study of CIFORs interests articulating with those of a village and generating benefits for both, yet at the same time partially alienating neighboring villages and exacerbating intervillage tensions, thereby unintentionally working against CIFORs broader objectives. Among all the villages that CIFOR works with in the Malinau watershed, Setulang figures prominently because of the strong articulation between the village and CIFOR. An analysis of this articulation and the broader context succinctly reveal the inter-village, inter-ethnic and village-government relations within which CIFOR is embroiled. Moreover, this case study illustrates the actualization of expectations that villagers in Malinau have for CIFOR an actualization that helps keep villagers interested in CIFOR as well as the unintended consequences that it engenders due to the politically charged landscape. A village of 860 people (208 households), Setulang is ethnically homogenous, consisting of Kenyah Oma Lung who migrated voluntarily in 1968 from their previous longterm settlement of Long Saan, located in the upper reaches of the Pujungan River where it meets the Bahau River, to their current location in the lower reaches of the Malinau River. They migrated to the Malinau primarily to have better access to schools for their children and to markets, where basic goods such as salt and sugar could be easily purchased. In 1974, a

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siapa tahu nanti berhasil.

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written decree by the Regent of Bulungan (Bupati Bulungan) officially acknowledged Setulang as a village (Iwan 2004). Setulang also claims approximately 5,300 ha of intact, old-growth lowland Dipterocarp forest, which was not part of the 1974 decree 124 . Setulang is the only village on the Malinau that was approached by a small scale timber concessionaire (IPPK) that never agreed to partner with a timber company indeed eight times. The largest offer made to Setulang was USD 300,000, which Setulang villagers consider an enormous sum, but still rejected (Iwan 2003). There are multiple reasons that Setulang never agreed to a timber concession deal, including what was perceived as relatively low profits from logging compared to the loss of goods and services from the forest such as clean water, the multitude of forest products for building materials and consumption, and wild game. Setulang is also a relatively prosperous village, commonly having a surplus of rice to sell in the market. Moreover, many of the men have worked in Malaysia for timber companies and plantations. Additionally, in the 1970s two logging companies operated around Setulang, and villagers became aware of the deleterious effects logging had on the Setulang River, their source of fresh water, and the damage caused to the forest (Iwan 2004). One important catalyst in declining offers from IPPKs was a Setulang villager who had started working as local CIFOR staff in January 2000, Ramses Iwan. Ramses has been a key individual in village debates about whether to accept a timber concessionaire villagers were divided on the issue. Indeed, some influential villagers, including the village head, were inclined to accept various offers of the timber companies. Yet, there remained a stronger, more numerous contingent of villagers who did not want to accept offers (Iwan 2004).
124

This is not surprising given that during the New Order all forests were classified as state forests.

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Ramses was one of the villagers not enticed by IPPK offers and engaged in village discussions, invoking CIFOR to leverage the position to not accept offers. He was integral in fostering a mutually productive relationship between CIFOR and the village of Setulang. Since the inception of this relationship in 2000, Setulang through CIFOR has gained national and international acclaim for conserving the forested area it claims, which has included taking direct action in some cases seizing heavy equipment -- against three separate timber companies that were perceived by Setulang villagers as encroaching on their territory. In 2003 Setulang received the Kalpataru, the Indonesian National Environmental Award, conferred by the President of Indonesia and the National Ministry of Environment. Setulang was also one of 150 global finalists (out of 870 nominees) selected in the World Water Councils Water Action Contest in 2003, which focused on initiatives to resolve world water issues and which led to a representative from Setulang attending and presenting at the World Water Forum in Kyoto, Japan. Neither of these would have been possible without CIFOR -- it was CIFOR that nominated Setulang for both awards. CIFOR has also brought much national and international media attention to Setulangs efforts to conserve the forest area they claim. Setulang has been the focus of two Indonesian network news television programs (TVRI and RCTI), as well as a German radio news story and numerous national and international print media stories (Iwan 2004). The most recent international print media story about Setulangs efforts was reported by AFP in a May 1, 2005 article entitled In the heart of Borneo, a village that said no to the chainsaws (http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20050501/sc_afp/indonesiaenvironment_0 50501210059).

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Moreover, through the link with CIFOR, the case of Setulang as forest protectors has been presented in international conservation and development fora, at such events as the 10th Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property in Oaxaca, Mexico and two community forestry conferences in the United States in 2004. Further, Setulangs efforts have been elaborated in an issue of IUCNs journal Policy Matters (Iwan 2003) and also a chapter the forthcoming book Riding the Rapids of Malinau: Local Governance, Forests and Conflict in Indonesian Borneo (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming c]), which is geared toward both practitioners and academics. The presenter at these events and author of these articles is Ramses, the Kenyah Oma Lung villager of Setulang who is CIFOR staff. Also, since 2001, a steady stream of CIFOR-related national and international guests has visited Setulang. The duration of their visits range from a few days to weeks, and the purposes of these visits vary from conducting research and holding workshops to appreciating Setulangs cultural performances and forest area. Regardless of the purposes however, they all convey status, recognition and pride to Setulang villagers, particularly since guests normally lodge and eat in villagers homes. In addition to the symbolic resources that Setulang accrues through CIFOR, villagers have also gained both materially and technically from the articulation with CIFOR. For example, CIFOR pays villagers for hosting guests and for the rental of outboard motors. Additionally, CIFOR donated a computer to the village, used by those involved in Forest Management Body 125 , and provided funding and training for villagers to conduct a forest inventory.

The Forest Management Body or Badan Pengelola Hutan Taneq Olen Desa Setulang consists of a group of villagers from Setulang who are committed to organizing activities related to the forest that Setulang claims.

125

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The most recent symbolic and material recognition that Setulang has received with CIFORs assistance is a one-year grant from the IUCN for Euro 17,200 (USD 21,734) to implement conservation activities in the forested area they claim and resolve tenurial disputes with neighboring villages (the latter is discussed below). This grant has a strong possibility of being extended for two more years with additional funding. CIFOR researchers both identified the grant mechanism and wrote the proposal with Setulangs agreement 126 . From CIFORs perspective, Setulang deserves recognition and support for its efforts in conserving the forest area claimed, perhaps at the expense of, or backgrounding of, other dynamics that at least some CIFOR researchers were aware of, such as inter-village tenurial conflict (see following discussion) 127 . CIFORs support of Setulangs efforts highlights the shared values of CIFOR and Setulang, as well as the mutual benefit. For CIFOR, Setulang embodies the exact constellation of village mobilization, community well-being and forest conservation that the institution aspires to foster through its applied research. Indeed, Setulang is a showcase village for CIFOR and is one of the few clear examples in Malinau where CIFORs research and institutional priorities have gained traction. However, the relationship between CIFOR and Setulang is similar to those between CIFOR and other villages with respect to the lack of immediate tangible results from CIFORs research and lack of fulfillment of villagers expectations vis--vis CIFORs ostensible support. The clearest example of this is the ongoing discussion between CIFOR and Setulang regarding environment service payments, initiated by CIFOR in 2001. At that
126

CIFOR does not receive any of the funding and contributes in-kind in the form of covering CIFOR scientists time and expenses.

127

Not all CIFOR researchers supported Setulangs nominations for the National Environmental Award or the World Water Councils Water Action Contest. Moreover, some CIFOR researchers felt that the emphasis on Setulangs conservation efforts obfuscated certain actions by Setulang villagers that were inconsistent with the conservation representations. CIFOR as an institution, however, allowed these nominations to be made, and thus I refer to CIFOR here institutionally with the aforementioned qualification.

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time, the then Director General of CIFOR and other senior CIFOR staff visited Setulang and raised the possibility of environmental service payments from international donors for Setulangs conservation efforts. The idea was that international donors might be interested in compensating Setulang an amount comparable to what they would gain from an IPPK. Villagers listened intently at the time and expectations grew, but as time passed and meetings continued, villagers began to grow politely frustrated and pessimistic at the lack of realization. Villagers, however, never disengaged from CIFOR for this reason, and indeed accrued many other benefits. The closest approximation to the actualization of the environmental service payments was the grant from IUCN, which was proposed initially by CIFOR as an environmental service payment scheme. IUCN, however, required a reframing of the original proposal due to, inter alia, tenurial conflicts between Setulang and neighboring villages. The two neighboring villages of Setulang Sentaban downstream and Setarap upstream perceive Setulang to be quite different from, and indeed contradictory to, the praise and recognition Setulang has received through CIFORs assistance. Villagers from Sentaban and Setarap note that they do not understand why Setulang received the National Environmental Award since Setulang opens large swidden fields, cutting down primary forest in the process and crossing over agreed upon boundaries with Sentaban and Setarap. According to these two neighboring villages, even though Setulang villagers do not damage the forest they claim as theirs, they are definitively not conservationists, evidence for which is their massive swiddens. 128 Indeed, Setulang villagers themselves do not claim to be conservationists beyond the area they claim as theirs. Many have experience working for logging companies in Malaysia
128

Setarap did enter into an agreement with an IPPK.

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(Iwan 2003, 2004), and in 2002 a group of 11 men from Setulang agreed to work as loggers for a Malaysian timber company in Guyana, South America. They signed two-year contracts and received net salaries of USD 300 per month. The Malaysian timber company Samling specifically sought out Setulang men to work for them in Guyana because of their hard work ethic when logging for the company in Malaysia. In discussing this with one Setulang villager, he noted with a chuckle that we conserve our [forests] and destroy [forests] belonging to others (kita selamatkan yg kita punya, kasih hancur orang lain punya)! More fundamentally, the two neighboring villages argue that Setulang has no rightful claim to the forest they claim as theirs since they are Dayak Kenyah migrants who arrived to the Malinau only in the late 1960s. Setarap consists of mostly of Dayak Merap and Punan, and Sentaban consists of Dayak Merap, Punan and Abai all of whom claim much longer residence, indeed indigeneity, in the Malinau watershed. According to Sentaban and Setarap, the forest that Setulang claims belongs to Sentaban since the original boundary agreement over forest area was between Sentaban and Setarap. Moreover, according to these two villages there was originally no discussion or agreement of the boundary of forest area when Setulang moved to the Malinau. Villagers in Sentaban note that Setulangs settlement not forest area claimed -- in the Malinau was agreed to by the Chief Customary Leader as well as villagers of Sentaban. Further, Sentaban and Setarap note that Setulangs traditional forest is in their original settlement in Long Saan on the Pujungan River. According to Sentaban and Setarap, the main reason that Setulang has been able to maintain its claim to the forest is that Setulang villagers are aggressive and threaten them. In their retelling of attempts at negotiating boundaries with Setulang (starting in 1999 before CIFORs involvement), Sentaban villagers invoke images of Setulang villagers threatening to

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take heads, intimidating them during meetings by arriving en masse, and showing aggression toward Sentaban villagers. Indeed, many villagers in the Malinau watershed recognize the strong social cohesion and collective identity of Setulang, which is characteristic of Dayak Kenyah generally (Sellato 2001). To date the conflict between Setulang and Sentaban persists, and officially the status of the forested region that Setulang claims is ambiguous. Similar to all of the villages in Malinau, Setulang has received no official documentation of its ownership or rights over the forested area claimed, even though Setulang has received substantial recognition for its conservation efforts, including the national environmental award, which was further legitimized by the Malinau Regent and other senior district officials attendance and speeches at a reception in Setulang to honor receiving the award. Indeed, as in other cases, the district government is unwilling to resolve this conflict and make a decision with respect to the status of the forested area claimed by Setulang. At best, the district government has arbitrated negotiations between the two villages, but is reluctant to take a decision due to the potential political ramifications. The praise and recognition accorded to Setulang through CIFORs assistance in the context of these inter-village conflicts is unfair according to villagers in Setarap and Sentaban and has also exacerbated social envy between the villages. From the perspective of all three villages, CIFOR has played a role in these inter-ethnic and inter-village tensions. CIFORs support of Setulang has helped Setulang legitimize their claim to the forested area, warranted or not. CIFOR has brought symbolic and material resources to Setulang in the form of national and international praise, recognition and funding. And it is precisely these resources that have in part, albeit unintentionally, heightened tensions and jealousy between

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villages, as well as engendered some ill feelings towards CIFOR from some villagers in Setarap and Sentaban. Indeed, one Setulang villager informed me that after receiving the National Environmental Award, problems and conflicts with neighboring villages only grew worse. The three villages and CIFOR recognize this problem, and it is hoped that the grant from IUCN discussed earlier will assist in the resolution of these conflicts. Interestingly, villagers from both Setarap and Sentaban noted that they would like to be nominated for the National Environmental Award and that it would help ease tensions between villages and also assuage ill feelings toward CIFOR. C. Summary of Analysis of perceptions and relationships regarding CIFOR In the preceding sections, I examined the role at the local level of CIFOR, a publicly funded, international applied research organization that ostensibly should have local and global influence. To this end, I described and analyzed the perceptions and relationships between villagers, district officials and CIFOR in Malinau in the context of CIFORs applied research activities that ostensibly attempt to improve sustainability of forests to help alleviate poverty. My analysis demonstrates that these relationships and the role of CIFORs research are anything but straightforward, and require continuous negotiation and compromise. Further, the results of these negotiations and compromises are contingent upon a broad set of factors beyond the formal institutional relationship between CIFOR, the district government and villagers, and infrequently meet the expectations of various actors. The significance and role of CIFORs research are embedded in the tenuous, negotiated articulation of perceived interests and possibilities. It is clear that CIFORs influence, at least at the local level of intervention, is more limited than CIFOR and villagers had hoped.

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This is perhaps surprising given that CIFOR is one of the 16 CGIAR Centers. Past CGIAR activities such as the controversial and -- according to some scholars -- often impoverishing Green Revolution implemented by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) delegitimized long-standing, local knowledge and techniques of resource management through a strict focus on modernization of agriculture and the articulation of agriculture as a strictly technical process (Dove 1993; Dove and Kammen 1997; Lansing 1991; Marglin 1996; Yapa 1993, 1996). That said, CIFORs presence and activities do provide a vehicle of articulation and potential leverage to the actors the institution attempts to engage at the district level. As this chapter has demonstrated, these articulations are established in a mire of contingencies, and thus their formations and consequences are unpredictable. Indeed, the process of articulation or collaboration is a fragile one. One question remains unanswered, however: What does CIFOR do with the messy reality of its activities in Malinau, with the constant need to compromise, negotiate and maintain? CIFOR is a global applied research institute, which means that its research should have much broader application and influence than at the local level. A report by Spilsbury and Bose (2004) -- research staff in CIFORs Research Evaluation and Impact Unit entitled Influencing the Global Forest Policy Agenda: An Evaluation of CIFOR Research 129 expresses the high level of importance that CIFOR places on extra-local influence. Spilsbury and Bose (2004: 1) write that CIFOR research projects attempt to achieve impact by

129

The report that I cite from is an internal, extended version of the report that will appear as an article in either Unasylva or Forest Policy and Economics. The journal article is a truncated version, excluding CIFOR specific sections.

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promoting the uptake of research findings across differing impact pathways 130 and that one of the key pathways for CIFOR is to shape forest-related policies. They continue noting that an important strategy has been to inform policy audiences across the globe with impartial, high quality science-based information and analysis in an attempt to influence international, national and local debates, decisions and policy processes related to forests (Spilsbury and Bose 2004: 1). To this end manyresearch outputs are intended to be of international relevance and are often widely disseminated (Spilsbury and Bose 2004: 1). With this context, Spilsbury and Boses article (2004: 1) summarizes literature on the influence of research on policy, highlights key organizations that act to shape the international forest agenda and explores the nature and significance of citations, and other bibliographic information as evidence of research influence. They then move to an examination of CIFOR contributions to international forestrelated agenda through its influence on policy documents through an analysis of research influence on organizations responsible for major financial flows to forest-related development assistance and research influence on the key organizations that help shape the global forest agenda (Spilsbury and Bose 2004: 1). Through a bibliographic analysis (citations, acknowledgements and author contributions), Spilsbury and Bose (2004: 23) conclude, inter alia, the following about CIFORs influence:

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Impact pathway a series of causal linkages between the production research outputs and changes in metrics related to mission-level goals. Often a pathway includes: production of a research output, uptake of the output, local adaptation/integration of the output, distribution of the locally adapted output derivative(s), implementation of the output derivative(s), generation of benefits due to implementation, and facilitated changes in mission-level metrics due to benefit generation (Spilsbury and Bose [forthcoming]: 1).

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Use and acknowledgement of CIFOR research findings was widespread among a class of documents that influence both national and international polices and financial flows to forestry initiatives. We examined 193 significant and secondary policy documents with bibliographies from influential organizations and found a total of 405 CIFOR citations spanning a wide range of topics. The highest frequency of CIFOR citations was found in documents produced by the World Bank, FAO, WRI, ITTO, CBD and GEF suggesting that CIFOR helped to shape and support their opinions, policies and, presumably, subsequent actions. These same organizations play a major role in creating and sustaining policy narratives and are prominent in shaping the global forest agenda. Given the importance that CIFOR places on the influence of its research on global forest policy and the high level of influence it seems to have to date, it is important to examine how CIFOR addresses the messy social reality of Malinau when CIFOR writes about its research in Malinau to this global audience. I address this in the next chapter (Chapter 5).

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CHAPTER 5 LOCATING CIFOR GLOBALLY: HOW CIFOR ATTEMPTS TO HAVE GLOBAL INFLUENCE AND
ADDRESS ITS ROLE IN MALINAU

I. Introduction In this chapter, I examine the type of global influence that CIFOR attempts to have based on its local level applied research in Malinau, and in doing so ethnographically ground global-local linkages of knowledge. Further, I attempt to demonstrate that although CIFOR has limited influence at the local or field level, the retelling or reporting of their local level research experience provides compelling, persuasive (policy) narratives and prescriptions to influence, in particular ways, the global community concerned with tropical forests and forest-dependent people. CIFORs field research in Malinau and CIFOR researchers critical reflections on their experiences are essential legitimizing vehicles to influence CIFORs interpretive community (Mosse 2004) 1 or epistemic community (Haas 1990) 2 of practitioners and academics. This may indirectly lead to CIFOR having more influence at the local level through a refraction of CIFORs interests via international actors who can influence institutional and governance mechanisms that affect Malinaus forests and forestdependent people, e.g., international donor priorities and global finance institutions.

Mosse (2004: 646) notes that development projects need interpretive communities; they have to enroll a range of supporting actors with reasons to participate in the established order as if its representations were reality (Sayer, 1994: 374, cited in Li, 1999: 374).
2

According to Haas (1990: 55), an epistemic community is a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect-relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values. As well as sharing an acceptance of a common body of facts, its members share a common interpretive framework, or consensual knowledge, from which they convert such facts, or observations, to policy-relevant conclusionsPresented with incomplete or ambiguous evidence, members of an epistemic community would draw similar interpretations and make similar policy conclusions...An epistemic community's power resource, domestically and internationally, is its authoritative claim to knowledge.

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To understand ethnographically these global-local linkages of knowledge, I discuss how CIFOR addresses and represents the political-economic aspects of the institutions relationships in Malinau in their publications, which are geared toward the aforementioned global epistemic or interpretive community. I then argue that it is through this particular retelling that CIFOR articulates and legitimizes calls for change among those institutions interested in international conservation and development. In doing so, my purpose is to analyze how CIFOR addresses the unintended consequences of its applied research activities and to demonstrate how CIFOR employs these unintended consequences to its benefit to advance a particular agenda in the epistemic or interpretive community within which it is located. II. CIFOR writes about the politics of relationships and critically reflects on its role A. CIFOR writes about power relations in Malinau CIFOR has not shied way from addressing power relations between actors in Malinau, nor the challenges or difficulties that researchers have faced in implementing their applied research agenda in the context of this politically contentious environment. Indeed, CIFOR researchers involved in Malinau have published or are in the process of publishing a number of articles and books that are not only detailed analyses of the cultural politics in Malinau, but also critical reflections of their applied research activities. Many of these insights and reflections are quite similar to what I found in my conversations and interviews with villagers and district officials (see Chapter 4). For example, a forthcoming book authored by CIFOR researchers explicitly addresses power, ethnicity and governance issues related to control of and access to forest resources in Malinau (see Wollenberg et al.

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[forthcoming c]) 3 . This book and articles such as a forthcoming Between State and Society: Local Governance, Conflict and Forests in Malinau, Indonesia (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]) to be published in the peer-reviewed journal Forestry Policy and Economics deal explicitly with the political-economy and cultural politics of the struggle between local government and villagers regarding control and access to forest resources. A quote from the journal article, which is a truncated version of key aspects of the book, illuminates the types of issues addressed: In this article we use the case of Malinau, East Kalimantan Indonesia to show how decentralization has affected forest management and marginalized groups. We specifically ask the question: how have these changes led to emerging new political orders?We document how new political alliances have emerged to make use of these small-scale timber systems and discuss the resulting benefits from forests their distribution and the types of conflicts that have emerged (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming a]: 2). B. CIFOR writes self-critical reflections of it experience in Malinau 1. CIFOR writes about the political role of research and the institution in Malinau Other publications directly address the obstacles faced by CIFOR in Malinau -CIFOR researchers do not obfuscate the difficulties faced in their relationships with villagers and government officials. For example, in Muddling Toward Cooperation: A CIFOR case study of shared learning in Malinau District, Indonesia (Wollenberg et al. 2004) published in the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) journal Currents 4 5 , CIFOR

I am one of several authors of the book, provisionally entitled Riding the Rapids of Malinau: Local Governance, Forests and Conflicts in Indonesian Borneo.

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researchers critically reflect upon their action-research and facilitation in their ACM project in Malinau, noting that they sought to empower local communities to increase their access and control over forest benefits and decisions (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 21). This CIFOR research team writes explicitly about their political agenda and awareness of the political landscape in Malinau: This case examines how a CIFOR research team used informal, shared learning to support more socially just decisions among groups that shared and often contested claims to forest resources and responsibility for their management (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 20). They write further about the politically contentious landscape of Malinau. They note that local government is at ease with the rhetoric of civil society participation, but suspicious and unsure of exactly how to do it and that the roles of district government and local people in the forest remain as opaque as ever and struggles for control of the forest continue (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 20). Not only is there explicit recognition of the political contentiousness and disparity in power between villagers and the government, but also explicit recognition of the political role of CIFOR researchers themselves, writing that there is a need to engage peoples values and politics in the facilitation process (Wollenberg et al: 23). Moreover, they acknowledge the political ramifications of their research, writing [i]n response to the difficulties faced in mapping and participation reforms, we modified our strategy and platform to be less threatening to local government yet still contribute directly to economic priorities of local
4

According to Currents, the journal is intended for a readership interested in rural development in developing countries.

A more elaborate version of this article will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming book provisionally titled Adaptive Collaborative Management of Forests in Asia edited by R. J. Fisher et al.

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communities and the district (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 22, italics added). Indeed, with respect to the mapping activity, the ACM team makes explicit that they purposefully worked with communities rather than government or industry to empower villagers as a group and build trust (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 21). Lastly, these CIFOR researchers comment on their political position as facilitators/researchers, which significantly differs from formal and positivist notions of facilitation and research: Our goal has been not to facilitate collaboration so much as to create an enabling environment for accommodating interest and their coordination, especially of weaker groups. This is a messy, muddling process (Lindblom 1983). But it is also a reality of political change (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 23). As another example, in the article Do communities need to be good mapmakers? (Anau et al. 2003), which was published by CIFOR and circulated by information clearinghouses such as Participatory Avenues (IAPAD) 6 , CIFOR researchers critically reflect on their experience facilitating participatory mapping. In this piece, CIFOR researchers note how their expectations of villagers -- who were eager to conduct mapping -- based on existing participatory mapping literature were unfilled, viz., we had hoped that villagers could become self-sufficient in mapping (Anau et al. 2003: 2), and we were also disappointed by the low proportion of community involved in decisions about mapping (2). Further, in analyzing why these expectations were unmet, these CIFOR researchers address explicitly the difficulties in the relationship between villagers and CIFOR in this activity. For example, they note that communities may not have the time, interest or capacity to develop the requisite mapping skills [and] [a]s in Malinau, they may prefer outsiders play a strong

See the following websites: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/acm/download/pub/Do_Communities_Need.pdf and www.iapad.org/publications/ppgis/ Do_communities_need_to_be_good_mapmakers.pdf

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facilitating role (Anau et al. 2003: 2). They also address the intra-community conflicts that affected the CIFOR initiated activity: There was a general lack of adequate representation and accountability of leaders to their constituencies. Internal conflict in the community was common where a few select village leaders conducted negotiations in non-transparent ways (Anau et al. 2003: 2). Additionally, CIFOR researchers not only address inter-community conflicts in this article, but also acknowledge that they did not attend adequately to institutional issues beyond the level of communities thereby allowing participatory maps to fuel intercommunity conflicts: as we learned, not seeking more participation from other stakeholders has its costsIn Malinau, most communities treated the maps as an end in themselves (despite efforts by CIFOR and local government to the contrary) without seeking formal legal status from government or cooperation from neighbors or logging companies. They then used the maps as evidence of their ownership and control over the territories. Conflicts between older and newer villages became entrenched because of a lack of clear policy from government authoritiesboundary agreements turned out to be highly fluid as there was no authority to approve or enforce agreements.Our experience in Malinau made us more aware that we spent too much time on facilitating community participation in technical aspects and less on the more unwieldy aspects that ensured accountability and ownership by the necessary stakeholders (Anau et al. 2003: 3-4).

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Another example of how CIFOR addresses the politics of relationships in Malinau and critically reflect on their role is Wollenberg and Uluks (2004) paper Representation: Who speaks for whom in citizen-driven research, which was presented at the 10th Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property in August 2004 in Mexico 7 . In this paper, Wollenberg and Uluk (2004) examine how the dual functions of representativeness [standing in for] and representation [on behalf of] occur in practice using examples from CIFORs work in Malinau (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 1). They reflect critically on the CIFOR ACMs team role as facilitators in bringing western scientific, participatory development and democratic assumptions into these processes (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 1). In their critical reflections, Wollenberg and Uluk (2004) note that the ACM team always tried to stay aware of the implications of who participated and the degree of responsible representation that occurred (10), yet illustrate through examples that they found themselves erring toward representativeness rather than representation among different groups (11), even though they explicitly promoted representation with villagers (11). Indeed, they are quite transparent about the normative aspect of their research, commenting that facilitating representation was not just a matter of reinforcing existing norms.but rather making normative choices (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 14). Further, they not only write about the difficulties of promoting representation through their activities, but also comment on how villagers statements to CIFOR and actions in villages demonstrated the pitfalls of development theater: It was fascinatingto see villagers expressing criteria for good representation.[but] despite the explicit discussion of such criteria, no villagers seems to carry these principles home and apply them (Wollenberg

Eva Wollenberg initiated the ACM project in Malinau and is CIFORs lead scientist on the project, and Asung Uluk worked as an ACM team member for several years in Malinau.

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and Uluk 2004: 12). They are also explicit about CIFORs difficult political relationship with the district government as well as other power-brokers and how they negotiated these: For example, they note that given the necessity of working thorough existing village and government authoritieswe needed sometimes to make difficult diplomatic trade-offs between prioritizing our relationship with these more powerful actors or taking actions that enhanced the influence of disadvantaged groups (Wollenberg and Uluk 20004: 13). They go further in explaining their strategy: Our approach to this dilemma was to secure the long-term support of controlling authorities, yet create the space to work with different entities within that authority and independently in the short-term. To create this space, over time we learned to work with a lower profile, often facilitating disadvantaged groups in independent activities apart from more powerful groups (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 13). They are also explicit about their awareness of the power relationship between external actors such as CIFOR and villagers. In their discussion regarding the most recent inter-village community workshop that CIFOR organized in 2004, Wollenberg and Uluk (2004) note that this workshop was remarkable because it was the first one where villagers themselves facilitated the workshop, with coaching from CIFOR, yet some villagers noted that they were not ready to be self-sufficient and requested that CIFOR continue to assist villagers in organizing and conducting these meetings. In reflecting upon these statements, Wollenberg and Uluk (2004: 15-16) comment that these requests may reflect an interest in CIFORs resources, an (unreasonable) belief in the superiority of CIFORs knowledge, or a

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(reasonable) distrust in the villages coordinating activities, or more generally to be dependent on a patron. They continue their reflexive mode, noting their concern that outside groups such as CIFOR at some level facilitate or drive projects with their own research or social development agenda. A power divide normally exists between the outsiders and local people, with the former taking the identity of the authority and expert, whose knowledge local people see initially as superior (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 16). 2. CIFOR writes about intra-institutional issues CIFOR does not limit the discussion of the political-economic aspects of its applied research agenda to relationships with government and villagers. CIFOR also critical reflects on and writes about institutional obstacles in the international aid regime within which they are embedded and that significantly debilitate the ability of applied research to be adaptive and useful. For example, Wollenberg and Uluk (2004: 9) make explicit that their commitment to research that benefited disadvantaged local groups and was driven primarily by local, rather than scientific or donor priorities was in part compromised by needing to fulfill CIFOR and donor mandates. In their book The Science of Sustainable Development: Local Livelihoods and the Global Environment published by Cambridge University Press in 2004, Jeff Sayer, the former Director General of CIFOR, and Bruce Campbell, the Director of CIFORs Forest and Livelihoods Programme, devote a chapter to relating and reflecting on CIFORs history and experiences conducting applied research in Malinau, eschewing a celebratory recounting of CIFORs successes over its seven-year presence in Malinau. For example, Sayer and Campbell (2004: 145) write about the debates among CIFOR scientists, with different

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perspectives and attendant disciplinary biases, regarding the nature and location of CIFORs research in Malinau, and by implication the disparate assumptions of CIFOR scientists regarding the role of science in natural resource management, e.g., controlled experimental environments versus a heterogeneous, ill-defined area where stakeholder interactions could be studied. They also discuss the difficulties and disadvantages of scientists working as an interdisciplinary research team in Malinau. Interdisciplinarity was initially hoped for, but they found working in a multi-disciplinary mode more expedient (159). They note that this is in part because it is often impossible to formulate a single big problem or large-scale hypothesis that an interdisciplinary team could reasonably tackle (159). Equally as significantly, they recognize that their expectation that it would be possible for scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds to work together to formulate hypotheses and design data collection and analysis in an integrated, holistic way (158) was misplaced since scientists ultimately have to focus on the specific component problems that their own disciplinary backgrounds enabled them to address (159). Further, they are aware that researchers will attempt to collect and manage data to fit the analytical models with which they are familiar (156), thereby acknowledging the subjective and partial nature of any single discipline. Sayer and Campbell (2004) also turn a critical lens on the donors that funded CIFORs research in Malinau, noting how donor demands and attendant institutional constraints limited collaboration among scientists, as well as the possible relevance and usefulness that the research could have had. They write,

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A major problem emerged, however, as an increasingly large proportion of the research budget began to be targeted to priorities of individual donors. Scientists were subject to pressures to deliver component products to meet specific donor targets and time frames. Donors did not want to buy into a large complex programme; they wanted to be able to identify with a defined product. This made it difficult for the different scientists to collaborate optimallyit was simply not efficient for different groups to work together and to meet donor expectations (152). III. CIFOR advocates and articulates changes based on and legitimized by Malinau field experience and through the vehicle of self-critique It is clear from the publications discussed above that CIFOR reflects critically on its role in Malinau and its position within multiple landscapes, explicitly addressing the political-economic, cultural politics and institutional factors that have affected the organizations applied research activities in Malinau. Moreover, CIFOR also discusses how various research initiatives have navigated these landscapes and attendant constraints. The question then is why? What does this retelling achieve? In this section, I discuss how CIFORs critical reflections on its work in Malinau act as vehicles to articulate and advocate significant and particular changes in global institutions and mechanisms related to international conservation and development. More specifically, CIFOR researchers weave into the critical reflections of their own work calls for and articulations of particular changes in how research is conducted, how international aid is distributed and accounted for and how the global community concerned with sustainable forest management and improved local livelihoods should engage those actors more proximate to the forest. These calls for change are legitimized by CIFORs long-term field

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presence in Malinau, as well as the institutions credibility as a seminal international applied research institute on issues related to tropical forests (see for example Fairhead and Leach 2003). It is important to note here that the persuasiveness of their prescriptions is closely related to the narrative style in which the retelling is done, viz., self-critical reflection that employs a testimonial or confessional mode to arrive at prescriptions or recommendations. This mode of lessons learned is much more palatable to the practitioner community than the overtly critical stance taken by academics, which often engenders defensiveness among practitioners, who are then prone to dismiss these critiques. None of the publications by CIFOR researchers discussed above are limited to critique, but rather instrumentally use those critiques to put forward a set of prescriptions or recommendations on how conservation and development interventions -- research or otherwise -- should be conceptualized, institutionalized and operationalized. The book The Science of Sustainable Development by Sayer and Campbell, which contains a chapter on critical reflections of CIFORs work in Malinau, articulates the most-broad reaching critique and calls for change in international conservation and development. In the preface and introduction of the book, Sayer and Campbell (2004) detail the dysfunctionality of the current institutional arrangements and paradigms of the science and development of natural resource management in developing countries. They argue that conventional agricultural research and the dominant paradigm of a deterministic, rational approach to rural development that is founded on the belief in science and administrative intervention are inadequate to provide sustainable livelihoods for people living in rural tropical landscapes, while ensuring the global environmental benefits they provide (26). Moreover, they demonstrate in exacting detail how this dominant development paradigm and attendant

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delivery mechanism of the development project, or development pathology (16), are incapable of dealing with the complexities of natural resource systems: it [the development project] allows development to be reduced to bite-sized components for which donors can assume responsibilityHowever, the problem with natural resources is that they are components of large complex landscapes. Diverse interests impinge on themMany development projects are trying to shoehorn the complex and dynamic realities of a natural resource system into the constraints of a time-bound, tightly planned, highly predictable system. This does not usually work (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 11-12) They note that this same dominant discourse has impeded natural resource research: We acknowledge that much natural resources research has not been very useful, but we attribute this to the way in which research has been funded and managed. Funding constraints have forced researchers to operate within a deterministic, rational vision of development. Research was expected to produce technologies ready for widespread disseminationThe entire discourse about the role of technology in development has, in our opinion, missed the point that technologies have to respond to needs: they have to fit within the context of local development trends (Sayer and Campbell 2004: xiv). In place of this high-modernist notion of science and development (Scott 1998), Sayer and Campbell (2004) argue for a paradigmatic shift, indeed a Khunian revolution (26), in the thinking and practice of natural resource research and development. They argue for a science-based approach to the integrated management of natural resource systems (26). This entails not only research that both mobilizes existing knowledge and generates new

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knowledge and that treats all management as experimental and that deals with real-life situations, but also action researchat a much larger scale than that usually practiced (xiii). They also advocate closer partnerships between scientists and resource managers, asserting that research must be a shared learning experience for scientists, local farmers, fishermen, forest managers and the staff of government resource management agencies (xiii). This is not to imply, however, that Sayer and Campbell eschew the political dimensions of these relationships. Indeed, in a lead-up article to the book entitled Research to Integrate Productivity Enhancement, Environmental Protection and Human Development published in the journal Conservation Ecology in 2001, Sayer and Campbell (2001: 32) note that the approach they advocate must be based upon continuous dialogue and deliberation among stakeholders and that this incorporates adaptive management as well as political processes related to conflict among stakeholders. In essence, Sayer and Campbell (2004) are calling for new ways of organizing science in support of sustainable development in rural tropics as well as redefin[ing] roles for government agencies, development assistance programmes and science (xiii). They emphasize that scientists must not be detached observers from outside the system, but rather, actors themselves (xiii) and that this will require research organizations to reflect on their modus operandi and scientific culture and rise to the challenge of reorganizing for maximum effectiveness (26). A crucial component of this reorganization, according to Sayer and Campbell (2004), is linking modern science to traditional knowledge and practice (27) since formal scientific knowledge and local knowledge must be combined in an adaptive framework (28). To emphasize the break with the dominant paradigm, Sayer

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and Campbell speak of marriage guidance counseling as the model we need for the new complex science (2004: 19), and declare that natural resource management is like jazz; it requires constant improvisation (2001: 32). Essential to Sayer and Campbells line of critique and argument is their ability to substantiate their assertions. For this, the retelling of CIFORs long-term applied research in Malinau is absolutely critical. While they marshal existing literature to support their arguments, the self-critique of CIFORs seven years of research experience in Malinau, as well as similar case studies about the rangelands of southern Africa and Andean hillside agriculture, has the effect of lending an extraordinary amount of credibility, legitimacy and indisputability to their argument, regardless of whether CIFORs applied research is successful or not. There is a slippage here by virtue of being an applied research institute, even if the application of their research does not result in the in intended outcome, e.g., improved local livelihoods or secure tenure does not result, CIFORs research is still successful because they can write about the lessons learned. By being an applied research institute, CIFOR can toggle between being scientists and practitioners and hence elide failure of applied research interventions through the idiom of science. CIFORs Malinau experience provides Sayer and Campbell essential ingredients to craft a persuasive scientific narrative, viz., an abundance of primary data in the form of seven years of continuous fieldwork to make an inductive argument couched in a balanced, critical examination of CIFORs activities, which deflect suspicions of spin, or overly celebratory self-assessments of CIFORs achievements. For example, in the introduction of their book where they detail dysfunctional development assistance projects (11), Sayer and Campbell (2004:12) invoke CIFORs Malinau experience as first-hand evidence of the consequences

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of the application of strict project management in a research and development programme, concluding that meeting donor needs for quickly attaining specific milestones came to dominate over a participatory process of learning and experimentation (12). Moreover, they make explicit that the three case studies, of which Malinau is one, illustrate different approaches, elements of best practice, components of success and the problems inherent in trying to use science to improve development and conservation outcomes (20-1). And to further dismiss any doubts about the authenticity of their experiences, observations and analyses, they inscribe the three case studies under the rubric of Realities on the Ground in the table of contents (Sayer and Campbell 2004: v, italics added). As mentioned earlier, the Malinau chapter of the Sayer and Campbell book critically reflects upon CIFORs experience implementing applied research in the district, detailing both the evolution of CIFORs research activities, as well as the attendant institutional issues, and the effects of the dramatic political changes in the district due to the fall of Suharto and decentralization. Perhaps most compelling about the chapter are the reflections on the unintended benefits of not following the conventional wisdom of international conservation and development projects, viz., CIFOR had scientists dispersed in Malinau and lacked a predetermined integrated research platform. Both resulted in a pluralism of views, an adaptive framework and a better understanding of local or tacit knowledge (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 152-3). Sayer and Campbell (2004: 152) note that although the initial intention had been to build a single permanent field station, CIFOR opted for a number of more temporary field locations because of the diversity of research interests and needs of CIFOR scientists. This decision, according to Sayer and Campbell (2004), had two significant unintended benefits:

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First, scientists were dispersed throughout the region and thus observed the full complexity of the system much more than if we had all operated out of a single location (152). Second, since scientists worked with and lived closely to villagers and logging company employees, they became much more sensitive to local perspectives than would have been the case if a large monolithic residential research facility had been the focus of all the work (152). CIFOR also lacked a mechanism for integrating these multiple perspectives and knowledges and was criticized by visitors as inefficient since there was only a weak shared knowledge base (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 153). Sayer and Campbell (2004: 153) argue that this actually benefited CIFORs work because the collective knowledge that we now have for the area is much richer and more pluralistic than it would have been if a uniformity of vision had been more actively sought at an early stage in the process. This, according to Sayer and Campbell (2004), was beneficial because it meant that collectively we had a pluralism of view about the problems and the role of research in finding solutions (153). 8 To highlight further the benefits and usefulness of these two non-conventional approaches, Sayer and Campbell (2004) bring attention to the negative consequences of the

Interestingly, Sayer and Campbell (2004) preface their discussion of the unintended benefits of neither having a permanent field station nor having a mechanism for integration with the rhetorical device of in hindsight, which has the effect of relating a sense of honesty, vulnerability, and experimentation, making their prescriptions even more compelling because they are not founded upon an implication of intentional planning of these benefits, which would convey dissembling at best and disingenuousness at worst. Indeed, the effectiveness of this technique for Sayer and Campbell (2004) is captured in a review of the book by a World Bank scientist: Although clearly demonstrating the benefits of this evolution in research approach, the case studies provide a refreshingly frank self-critique, proving the truth of one of the authors main messages: we are only at the beginning of the road to finding solutions to the complex challenges of NRM in the real world (Kiss 2005: 10, italics added).

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status quo of detailed planning and centralized facilities. For example, they note that during a later period in Malinau when CIFOR sought out more targeted donor funding, donor requirements for rigid logframes led to greater efficiency and ease of understanding to outsiders but to a programme that provided fewer insights and innovations (153). With respect to single permanent field facilities, which is the norm for large international projects, Sayer and Campbell (2004) note that they required heavy up-front investments in fixed infrastructure and in doing so obliged their scientists and technicians to work in the same locality, which they argue precluded much of the flexibility that subsequently proved of great value to CIFOR researchers (153). They argue that with the fall of Suharto, decentralization and all the attendant uncertainties, other large international conservation and development projects in Indonesia, which invested heavily in facilities and planned in great detail, ran into serious difficulties because they operated outside the system and they were unprepared for and unable to adapt to the changes that occurredthey all found themselves pursuing visions for their areas that were at variance with those of important local stakeholders (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 168-9). Indeed, several internationally-funded field stations in Indonesia that fit Sayer and Campbells description did incur difficulties in the post-Suharto period. The German-funded, GTZ led community forestry project in West Kalimantan was effectively terminated in 1999 because of conflicts with certain actors in the region. Also, the USAID funded, Harvard University led community forestry project outside of Gunung Palung National Park in West Kalimantan was also terminated for similar reasons. In both projects, well-equipped field

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stations that had operated in bubbles, isolated from the surrounding social-political realities, were unable to adapt to the political-economic transitions in the post-Suharto period. Sayer and Campbell (2004) assert that their adaptive, flexible and pluralistic approach enabled CIFOR to deal with the full range of perspectives on the complex issues generated by decentralization such as IPPKs (162). The chapter ends with a set of prescriptions phrased as key lessons based on CIFORs experience in Malinau and that are grounded articulations of the conceptual shifts they call for in natural resource management research and development more generally. While readily acknowledging that CIFOR has not solved either the conservation or the development problems of the area, Sayer and Campbell (2004) suggest that scientists confronted by similar situations consider the following: begin research in an open explanatory manner, initial work must focus on learning and listening, the main benefit from research may be to reduce uncertainties and inform choices, a continuing process of learning and adaptation needs to be a feature of programmes, and major unanticipated changes may be common (169). These somewhat non-conventional recommendations are based on Sayer and Campbells retelling of CIFORs Malinau story, the first-hand, ethnographic flavor of which imbues their prescriptions with a sense of realness and irrefutability. The objective and potential impact of their story is not lost on them. Sayer and Campbell (2004: 164) make explicit that we have developed these arguments at some length because they are central to making decisions on the allocation of resources for research and development on natural resource systems. Although a slight aside, it is important to note the relatively dramatic departure from conventional CGIAR thinking that Sayer and Campbell (2004) are advocating. In the past,

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the dominant paradigm informing most CGIAR centers research focused on improving germplasm to increase productivity and efficiency it was reductionist science and an assumed linear relationship between research and adoption characteristic of high modernist thinking (Scott 1998). That said, there are indications that the CGIAR itself realizes the problematic nature of this dominant paradigm. Sayer and Campbells book itself is based upon the work of a task force that was established by the CGIAR to implement the recommendations of Maurice Strongs review of the CGIAR in the late 1990s, which advocated an emphasis on integrated natural resource management (Sayer and Campbell 2004: xiii). Also, Sayer and Campbells 2001 lead up article to the book published in Conservation Ecology subsequently received the 2002 CGIAR Science award for an outstanding scientific article. Lastly, in 2004, the interim Science Council of the CGIAR published the book Research Towards Integrated Natural Resource Management, which includes seven case studies, each from a different CG Center, similar to the Malinau case study in the Sayer and Campbell book, albeit in a less dense and less self-critical fashion. For example, the Malinau case study in the CGIAR book highlights the successes and achievements of a flexible, adaptive and pluralistic approach, while de-emphasizing the institutional constraints such as donor requirements and intraCIFOR debates 9 . Although the extent to which the calls for a shift in how research is

The Malinau case study in Research Towards Integrated Natural Resource Management published by the CGIAR has a slightly different emphasis or focus than the Malinau case study in Sayer and Campbells book, published by Cambridge University Press, for several reasons. First, the CGIAR book is geared more toward practitioners and leans slightly more toward a promotion of CGIAR institutes and integrated natural resource management in them. Also, it is important to recall that for Sayer and Campbell changes in the institutional landscape, e.g., donor requirements, are central to their argument, whereas it is not for the CGIAR book. Moreover, the CGIAR book was published by the Interim Science Council of the CGIAR, which remains deeply embedded in a traditional CGIAR paradigm of science, technology and improved effectiveness and efficiency.

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conceptualized and practiced will be implemented or institutionalized remain uncertain, the publications themselves perhaps indicate an institutional shift. Publications by other CIFOR scientists have also used a strategy similar to that of the Sayer and Campbell book, viz., to reflect self-critically on their work in Malinau as a vehicle to articulate and advocate for changes in how research is conducted, how international aid is distributed and accounted for, and how the global community concerned with sustainable forest management and improved local livelihoods should engage those actors more proximate to the forest. For example, in the article Muddling Through Cooperation discussed earlier, Wollenberg et al. (2004) conclude the CIFOR ACM teams self-critical reflection of their work in Malinau with a qualified countervailing of conventional wisdom followed by a set of qualified prescriptions. Wollenberg et al. (2004: 20) write, our experience leads us to question the desirability of creating formalized multistakeholder learning mechanisms and common strategies on single platforms, and instead to stress the value of informal interactions and working strategically with different groups. They continue, noting the difference between their approach and others: In contrast to other participatory action research with communities and resourceswe have developed a more multi-pronged, informal and multi-scaled approach to learning (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 24). They then go on to articulate a set of prescriptions in the practitioner vernacular of our major lessons:

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(1) working at multiple levels enables linking the needs of villagers and policymakers [and] trade-offs associated with working with one partner versus trying to maintain a neutral positionneed to be weighed carefully (2) facilitation strategies need to be flexible enough to respond to changing opportunities[and] it is helpful to create a learning culture among facilitators (3) informality allowed us to be flexible to capture opportunities and adapt our strategies to fluid conditions[and] having a continuous presence through our resident field team made this opportunism possible (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 23-4). These prescriptions, however, are qualified; Wollenberg et al. (2004: 24) note that they are not blueprint prescriptions and that the selection of methods in any site is itself an iterative and adaptive muddling process. That said, they do make explicit what they believe the normative element or political purpose of research should be, and thus why their research approach is significant: these sorts of approaches contribute to a more democratic and feasible way of facilitating change. We believe these are the foundation of a civil science that can use information to strengthen society (24). The implication here is that the values of democracy and civil science are at the heart of what research is about, which is in itself a call for a shift in what research is and how its conducted. Further, Wollenberg et al. (2004) articulate a shift away from the notion that research, researchers and facilitators are or can be neutral towards one where each is an integral component of a politically-charged, value-laden system. Wollenberg and Uluks (2004) paper Representation: Who speaks for whom in citizen-driven research? is another example of CIFOR self-critically reflecting on their work

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in Malinau to articulate and advocate for changes in how institutions plan and implement. For example, in discussing how villagers facilitated the most recent inter-village meeting yet expressed a desire for CIFOR to continue to assist them in these meeting, Wollenberg and Uluk (2004: 16) caution their audience at the Common Property Conference, which is a mix of academics and practitioners concerned with common property issues, that extreme sensitivity, explicitness about power relations and self-criticism is necessaryto promote good governance in appropriate ways as an outsider or noncitizen. They go on to reject that the principles of participation, representation and transparency are everywhere applicable in their western form. Indeed, while supporting the goals of democratic governance and liberating social agendas, they find the simplistic, formulaic, and hegemonic promotion problematic (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 16). In its place, they suggest working from an understanding of the existing governance system and towards an improved awareness among facilitators and representatives about how power and knowledge intersect (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004). They close their critical self-reflection with a set of tentative prescriptions to help promote better representation, which reads like an anthropologists checklist for fieldwork and includes the following (Wollenberg and Uluk 2004: 17-18): 1. Collect and analyze information about how representation works formally and informally 2. Use a scale of work or units of analysis that have existing or potential constituencies and representatives.

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3. Use representativeness of different interest groups as a basis for representation. Be clear about the categories across which representativeness is required, and identify which ones have existing mechanisms of representation and which do not. 4. Promote improved representation in knowledge-producing activities 5. Share choice of participants with existing representatives or authorities, such that participants are accountable to them rather than the facilitator. 6. Acknowledge and actively work against the biases that promote elites or experts over citizens knowledge 7. Critically question and debate different conceptions of desirable representation IV. Analysis of how CIFORs articulation of change works Thus far in this chapter, I have argued that CIFOR researchers critical reflections advocate and articulate to the epistemic or interpretive community that CIFOR is part of a particular way of conducting applied research and implementing conservation and development interventions that shifts the paradigm of mainstream applied research and intervention practice. It is perhaps here, in these critical reflections and suggestions for moving forward, published for an international audience ostensibly concerned with sustainable and socially just forest and natural resource management that CIFOR has more influence and power compared to its presence locally in Malinau. In the following discussion, I demonstrate how it is that CIFOR and its calls for change in those self-critical reflections 10 articulate with and have influence among the international conservation and

The self-critical reflections are publications that seem very much geared toward the international community of academics and practitioners engaged in conservation and development. They are published in English and in presses and journals associated with this community.

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development practitioner community, or what Fairhead and Leach (2003) refer to as Tropical Forest International. 11 A. CIFORs position and leverage in the international community There are several articulative elements (Tsing 1999b) between CIFOR and international conservation and development community and that make CIFORs prescriptions compelling or convincing to this community. Perhaps first and foremost is that within this community, CIFOR ipso facto has substantial legitimacy and cachet it is part of the CGIAR, was created to be one of the seminal knowledge institutes on tropical forests and related livelihood issues, and epitomizes science and neutrality within this community (Fairhead and Leach 2003). CIFORs work is used and cited by not only most major international organizations such as the World Bank (Spilsbury and Bose 2004), but also by the scientific community via peer reviewed journals (Angelsen and Aryal [forthcoming]). Further, by virtue of being within the ambit of mainstream international organizations concerned with sustainable development, CIFORs critiques and calls for change are relatively more palatable or acceptable for this community than if they were coming from a perceived outsider, inter alia, academia. Indeed, much academic scholarship already exists that provides similar critiques and recommendations, yet is often dismissed as academic, theoretical, or overly critical by practitioners. Because of the niche that CIFOR occupies, the institution acts as a boundary object (Fujimura 1992) to help massage certain messages into the mainstream practitioner community.

Fairhead and Leach (2003: 26-27) use the term Tropical Forest International to refer to the increasingly de-centered, de-territorialized form of global governance related to the forests and biodiversity and the nexus of international conventions, the United Nations and other international organizations, multilateral and bilateral donors, trans-national corporations, international NGOs, international research centers and the research community more widely.

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B. CIFORs use and refashioning of mainstream discourse: boundary objects CIFOR translates or articulates critiques of conventional wisdom and practice and calls for change in a vernacular that the practitioner community is comfortable with. Indeed, from the earlier analysis of CIFOR publications that are critical self-reflections, it is apparent that CIFOR researchers use terms that are part and parcel of the conventional wisdom of this community and then redefine and tailor those terms to countervail conventional wisdom. For example, Sayer and Campbell (2004) critique the collection of integrated natural resource management approaches in their book, and in doing so refashion the concept to imbue it with the shift in thinking and practice they advocate. Importantly, they do not dismiss or discard the idea or the term/jargon, but rather use integrated natural resource management as a boundary object 12 . In initiating their critique of existing approaches, Sayer and Campbell (2004) appeal to the collective sense of wanting to do good, as well as the collective sense of disappointment and frustration felt within this community. These are important entry points because they do not attribute blame or malicious intent and also foster a sense of inclusiveness and collective identity, but at the same time convey the failure of these approaches, which is critical for their own agenda. They write, Huge amounts of money have been invested in various approaches to achieving integration in natural resource managementMany attempts to integrate complex sets of knowledge and the interests of diverse sets of actors into a common framework have yielded disappointing results. The desire to achieve integration persists but our seeming inability to translate theories of integration into practical
Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites.The have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable (Star and Griesmer 1989: 393). Boundary objects can be ideas, things, people or processes.
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achievements on the ground is leading to widespread disillusion. In frustration, we abandon one set of integrative buzzwords and replace them with others. What is surprising is not the improvement of integrative methods over the past 40 years rather it is their fundamental similarity. The words have changed but the paradigm remains the same (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 4). Once they convey the sense of failure and crisis in a palatable fashion, they make possible the refashioning of the concept to include their calls for a shift in the way research and development are thought about and practiced: The lack of progress in achieving integration has led many to question its usefulness. Many have argued that the idea of integration is conceptually appealing but is impossible to achieve in practiceAnother view, and the one we will explore in this book, is that the processes, tools and concepts that could underpin a new integrative science are not widely understood and not fully embraced, and that fundamental aspects of the way development science is organized are creating obstacles to change (Sayer and Campbell 2004: 5). In Muddling Through, Wollenberg et al. (2004 and [forthcoming b]) effect a similar partial countervailing of conventional wisdom and refashioning of accepted jargon with respect to adaptive collaborative management. Through a retelling of their experience in Malinau, Wollenberg et al. (2004) indirectly critique formal models of adaptive collaborative management such as formal multistakeholder forums by demonstrating their inappropriateness in the Malinau context. At the same time, Wollenberg et al. (2004) maintain the use of the term adaptive collaborative management indeed, in the name of the project itself and imbue it with an informal, embedded approach focused on

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incremental strengthening of communities (Wollenberg et al. 2004: 20). In essence, adaptive collaborative management is the quintessential boundary object (Fujimura 1992) - there is enough play in the concept and enough common ground in the way Wollenberg et al. (2004) articulate their version to allow what Wollenberg et al. (2004) call for to remain within the acceptable boundaries of the mainstream practitioner concept of adaptive comanagement. Indeed, this is captured succinctly in a chapter of a forthcoming book on ACM, which is an expanded version of the Wollenberg et al. (2004) article. In that chapter, Wollenberg et al. (forthcoming b) locate their approach as part of, but significantly different from, other ACM approaches. They write, The authors of this report were part of a larger program at CIFOR called Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM), hence we refer to ourselves as the ACMMalinau team. Our activities in Malinau pre-dated the other studies in this volume and so were organized with different purposes and questions than these other studies. We nevertheless shared concepts and methods in Bogor, and developed fruitful synergies (Wollenberg et al. [forthcoming]: 3) 13 C. CIFORs long-term presence in Malinau: The cachet of being there CIFORs long-term field experience in Malinau and other locations is an essential element in CIFORs prescriptions coming across as convincing and expert to the international conservation and development community. CIFORs long-term fieldwork being there -- in part legitimizes critiques of conventional wisdom and the positions advocated by CIFOR researchers. For example, as mentioned earlier, Wollenberg et al.
With respect to different purposes and questions, Wollenberg et al. (forthcoming b: 5) write the following: Different from other cases in this book, we did not seek to test ACM approaches to understand their effectiveness. We also did not develop indicators and monitoring systems with different stakeholders, nor promote collaborative management per se.
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(2004) critique formal ACM processes through a retelling of their long-term fieldwork experience in Malinau. The first-hand, long-term field experience also conveys a sense of mastery or expertise, which is critical for the reputation of CIFOR and CIFOR researchers, and conversely, for the acceptability/palatability of CIFOR researchers prescriptions. The sense of expertise and power that being there conveys is captured succinctly in a review of Sayer and Campbells (2004) book. The book reviewer, A. Kiss of the Social and Environmental Unit of the World Bank, writes in the first sentence, Jeffery Sayer and Bruce Campbell bring literally a world of experience from the front lines (Kiss 2005: 9, italics added). Further, the indisputability or legitimacy of the case studies in the book is emphasized when she notes that they are grounded in three complex ecological settings in which the authors have extensive personal experience (Kiss 2005: 9, italics added). V. Summary of Analysis and Conclusion In this chapter, I analyzed the type of global influence that CIFOR attempts to have based on its local-level applied research, ethnographically grounding the idea of global-local linkages of knowledge. To this end, I discussed how CIFOR represents its experience in Malinau to a broader audience, viz., how it addresses these disconnects or challenges in publications geared toward its interpretive (Mosse 2004) or epistemic (Haas 1990) communities and what those particular representations of its experience attempts to achieve among the community of practitioners and academics involved in international conservation and development. CIFOR researchers retelling and reporting in publications of their local-level research experience in Malinau and articulating these experiences through a particular selfreflexive mode provide compelling, persuasive (policy) narratives and prescriptions to their

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global epistemic or interpretive communities. Essential to the traction of these narratives and prescriptions is the telling of the difficulties, challenges and constraints that CIFOR has encountered in Malinau. CIFOR researchers first-hand experience of being there also lends further legitimacy to its prescriptive comments and suggestions. In employing this self-reflexive mode, CIFOR attempts to carve out a different space for international aid, research, science culture, and conservation and development policies and practices that underscores the need for the broader practitioner community to account for and accommodate local variation. The emphasis on the need to be adaptive and flexible is unusual for a CGIAR institute (see for example Marglin 1996), and yet by virtue of being a CGIAR institute CIFOR has the legitimacy and authority to advocate for these changes in the mainstream conservation and development community. These publications indicate not only an awareness of the non-linear and political relationship between research and practice, but also a call to embrace these dynamics in the practice of research and development intervention. The extent to which these prescriptions will be institutionalized at CIFOR or elsewhere depends greatly on whether significant institutional and inter-institutional changes can take place. There is potentially a performative aspect to these lessons learned in which there are many nods of understanding and agreement, yet little institutional change occurs to enable the application of these prescriptions -- the history of aid in the forestry sector in Indonesia could be considered a case in point 14 . Further, some scholars argue that even if the necessary institutional changes occurred, the practice of these prescriptions or policies would be significantly different than what CIFOR researchers would intend from the prescriptions because the things that make for good policy [prescriptions in this case], -- policy which
14

See Chapter 6 and Chpater 7 for a detailed discussion regarding forests and international aid in Indonesia.

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legitimizes and mobilizes political support in reality make it rather unimplementable within its chosen institutions and regions (Mosse 2004: 1). I address these issues in the following two chapters (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).

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PREFACE TO CHAPTER 6 AND CHAPTER 7 In this chapter (Chapter 6) and the next (Chapter 7), I describe and analyze the relationships between, and incentives and logics of, aid-related forestry institutions at the national level in Indonesia, as well as the relationship and dynamics between aid-related forestry institutions and central government agencies including, but not limited to, the Ministry of Forestry. To understand these institutional relationships, incentives and logics, I examine the origin and evolution of (1) forestry as an agenda item at the annual Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) meetings, which are the annual diplomatic meetings between the international donor community and the Indonesian government, and (2) the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF), which was created by the CGI in 2000, and its relationship with other forestry-related institutions. Conceptually, in Chapters 6 and 7 I examine the tension between, on the one hand, the order (Mosse 2004, 2005) that maintains international attention and aid in the Indonesian forestry sector in the face of inaction and the lack of progress, and on the other, the disjuncture (Mosse 2004, 2005) of knowledge, policy and practice both within and between forest-related institutions, which in turn perpetuates the lack of progress on reforms agreed upon by international donors and the Indonesian government. More specifically, I examine how the order or master metaphor (Mosse 2004, 2005) of forestry reform agreeable to both the international community and Indonesian government at the highest levels of diplomatic relations was crafted and maintained to justify aid-interventions. I also analyze how this master metaphor evolved through the active refashioning by both donors and government to address the reality that the commitments agreed upon in the master metaphor of forest reform were not being met. Further, I examine the structural and

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institutional dynamics that explain the lack of progress on the agreed upon commitments and the ineffectiveness of aid-related forestry interventions in Indonesia, and consequently the disjuncture or disconnect between knowledge, policy and practice, as well as how these disjunctures are maintained. It is important to locate CIFOR in the broader landscape of institutions or interpretive community within which it operates in Indonesia. CIFOR does not work in isolation, and integral to understanding the factors that influence the use of CIFORs research-based recommendations and prescriptions in Indonesia or lack thereof is the broader institutional landscape within which the institution operates. In other words, understanding the relationships, incentives and logics of aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia and their engagement with other actors such as government reveal whether and/or the extent to which CIFOR influences and is influenced by (informs and is informed by) these other institutions. An unfounded assumption is the linear knowledge-to-policy-to-practice model, e.g., the assumption that if CIFOR makes an evidence-based recommendation regarding forest policy and practice in Indonesia, it will be implemented by the Indonesian authorities and supported by the larger community of aid-related forestry institutions. As previous chapters have demonstrated and the following chapters will, this is clearly not the case, and hence in Chapters 6 and 7 I explain the basis for how CIFOR engages with aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia, as well as its global interpretive community, discussed in Chapter 5 and further elaborated in Chapter 8. The extent to which CIFORs prescriptions will be institutionalized at CIFOR or elsewhere heavily depends on whether significant institutional and inter-institutional changes can take place.

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More specifically, my contention is that the bureaucratic logic of each aid-related forestry institution and the actors they engage takes precedence over the publicly agreed upon commitment to collaborate and coordinate. At the same time, these institutions maintain a public discourse or appearance of striving or trying that is sufficient to keep aid flowing. Evidence of this is the approximately USD 60 million/year for the past five to seven years that Indonesia has received through bilateral and multilateral grants, while the forestry sector continues to generate revenue of over USD 4 billion through practices that violate the commitments made by government with respect to reform in the forestry sector. Related to the disparity between the revenue generated by the sector and international aid to forestry, this dissertation generally and Chapters 6 and 7 specifically examine the reasons for the Indonesian governments involvement in aid-related forestry interventions, particularly considering that they potentially threaten a USD 4 billion industry.

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CHAPTER 6 FORESTRY AND THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INDONESIA (CGI): CRAFTING AND
MAINTAINING THE MASTER METAPHOR OF FORESTRY REFORM IN INDONESIA

I. Introduction In this chapter (Chapter 6), I discuss and analyze how and why forestry was elevated to the highest levels of diplomatic negotiations between the international donor community and the government of Indonesia, viz., the annual CGI meetings, and how an agreed upon master metaphor (Mosse 2004) of forest reform was fashioned by the donor community and government. Further, I examine how this master metaphor evolved over time and was actively refashioned by both donors and the Indonesian government, as well has how the master metaphor incorporated the concomitant lack of progress on the agreed upon commitments. To this end, I discuss and analyze the official donor and government statements made at annual and mid-term CGI meetings from 2000, when forestry first became a CGI agenda item, through 2003, at which time the deforestation rate was significantly higher than it had been in 2000 and the general situation in forestry was undeniably worse. In short, I show how the master metaphor of the Indonesian forestry sectors problems and solutions is created, maintained and refashioned among international donors and the government, while the situation in the forest indicates a trajectory diametrically opposed to the aims of forestry reform agreed upon. My analysis demonstrates that there is a significant performative element to CGIrelated evaluations and assessments of the forestry sector reform in Indonesia, as well as calls for reform and coordination among donor and government agencies and between donors and

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the government. Indeed, in the last portion of this section of the chapter, I discuss and analyze an evaluation of the Indonesian forestry sector that preceded forestry becoming a CGI agenda item. In doing so, I demonstrate how the inaction that resulted from forestry reform being a CGI agenda time was not only predictable, but also how very similar assessments and recommendations had been made in the past to no avail. Assessments and evaluations, as well as their attendant recommendations, are not instruments to achieve their ostensible goals of improved sustainable and equitable forest management, but rather vehicles to recruit for and maintain master metaphors. They help maintain attention on Indonesias forests in the global and national arena and are an important aspect of the narrative that supports aid-related forestry in Indonesia. II. The CGI and Forestry as a CGI agenda item A. The CGI and its importance Forestry issues in Indonesia first appeared on the CGI agenda in the July 1999 meeting in Paris, at the urging of international donors. One senior donor representative noted that according to colleagues who were in attendance at the CGI the only topic that received more attention was the terrible situation in East Timor (Walton nd). That said, for the government of Indonesia forestry was not a priority issue. According to the World Bank Indonesia missions environment specialist, government representatives could not understand why the donors were so upset about the forest destruction but agreed, in order to move on to other agenda items, a high-level seminar on forestry to be held with donors and officials (Walton nd). Thus at its inception, forestry was a donor driven agenda item the values regarding Indonesias forests dramatically differed between the international donor

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community and the government. The government, however, could not ignore the issue since it had drawn the attention of the CGI, which is significant. The CGI is the group of bilateral and multilateral donors that provides foreign assistance to the Indonesian government in the form of grants, loans and projects. According to Vikram Nehru (2000), at that time the Lead Economist of the World Bank office in Jakarta, the CGI consults with government and each other on Indonesias development priorities and the external financing the country needs to meet those priorities. According to Nehru (2000), the CGIs key objective is to better understand Indonesias development policies and programs, and to improve coordination between donors and government, and among donors themselves, so that external aid is used as effectively as possible and in the nations best interests. Each CGI member pledges according to the government of Indonesias requests and their respective nations policies. At the October 2000 CGI, Japan, ADB and the World Bank accounted for almost 90% of the pledges (Nehru 2000). The annual CGI meetings represent the literal and symbolic face-to-face discussion of what the donor community and Indonesian government have mutually determined as important for the development of Indonesia, an accounting of what has and has not been achieved, followed by a pledging of future funding in the form of grants and loans, conditionalities and achievements. In addition to the formal annual meeting, which is scheduled so that CGI pledges can inform parliament when finalizing Indonesias annual budget, mid-term review meetings are also held to report on progress. The first CGI meeting was held in Paris in 1992 at the request of the Indonesian government. There was a predecessor to the CGI, referred to as the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which had been the Indonesian donor forum since 1967. The

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Indonesian government dissolved the IGGI in March 1992 because it could not accept the Dutch government, which Jakarta saw as using development assistance to intervene in the internal affairs of Indonesia. Jakarta was upset with Dutch pressure and criticism of human rights violations in East Timor (Bahagijo 2004). 1 The only difference between the CGI and IGGI is the exclusion of the Dutch government. Prior to 2000, the CGI meetings were exclusive affairs between international donors and senior Indonesian government officials and always took place outside of Indonesia. The World Bank has traditionally organized and chaired the CGI forum, as well as being one the largest providers of loans, together with Japan and ADB 2 . Unsurprisingly, the Bank also has more leverage and influence than bilateral donors and UN agencies operating in Indonesia (Bahagijo 2004). Since 2000, the organization of the CGI meetings has changed significantly such that they are now held in Indonesia, invite a number of NGOs as observers and have working groups (Bahagijo 2004) 3 . CGI meetings are typically two day events, with much press coverage in Indonesia both before and after the event. The first day is formally referred to as the Pre-CGI meeting and is devoted to gathering inputs and reports, both from government and donors, including working groups (Bahagijo 2004). At the December 2003 Pre-CGI, there were six working groups: Forestry, Decentralization, Overseas
On November 12, 1991 the Santa Cruz Massacre occurred. Indonesian troops fired on a peaceful memorial procession to the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili that turned into a pro-independence demonstration. Over 270 East Timorese were killed in the massacre, which was filmed by two international journalists and sparked the international solidarity movement for East Timor (http://www.etan.org/timor/SntaCRUZ.htm). The January 2005 CGI meeting in Jakarta was the first to be chaired by the Indonesian government. This came after the presentation at the December 2003 CGI of a study by Bappenas (National Development Planning Body) (2003) drawing attention to the donor driven process in terms of the topics being discussed at the CGI and recommending that the CGI meetings should be led by GOI instead of the World Bank (Bahagijo 2004).
3 2 1

It is not entirely clear why 2000 was a turning point for the organization of CGI meetings, but mostly likely the decision was influenced by the post-Suharto reformasi ethos of transparency, accountability and inclusion of civil society organizations in governance affairs.

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Development Assistance (ODA) Effectiveness, Supreme Court Reform, Poverty Reduction and Health. The second day is the official CGI Meeting, which is chaired by the vicepresident of the World Bank and co-chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (Bahagijo 2004). This meeting discusses the official statement and official reply, and comments from Indonesian government delegates[and] agrees on the amount pledged by donors, based on requests by [the] government of Indonesia (Bahagijo 2004). Opinions vary with respect to the extent to which donors or the government drives the agenda at the annual meeting between the CGI and the government of Indonesia. According to Nehru (2000), a World Bank official, the CGI meeting does not impose any conditions on the Indonesian Government. But the purpose of the CGI meeting is for donors to assess whether the governments policies are conducive for development and thus warrant international financial support. So there is undoubted pressure on the Indonesian Government to meet these expectations While the CGI meeting itself does not impose conditions on the Indonesian Government, individual lenders or grantors may very well link their financial support to certain government actions. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, for example, regularly link their project aid to effective implementation, and require key policy reforms before disbursing their adjustment loans. These conditions are negotiated in advance and are designed to ensure that the funds are used to meet the development priorities of the country. Others, unsurprisingly, look more critically at the donor communitys motives and intentions. For example, Bahagijo (2004), who is a representative from the International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INFID), notes that the World Bank, as the lead agency or chair

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of the CGI, basically controls the process and the decision making. Bahagijo (2004) continues noting that the Bank can choose which analysis is supported and which issues are deemed important and that the CGI is a forum on what type of economic analysis and economic policy is being supported and opposed. Thus, for Bahagijo and others, the CGI has been strongly donor driven, particularly by the World Bank and IMF, and has not allowed discussion of issues such as debt relief. Thus, for Bahagijo and others the voice and influence of both the Indonesian government and people must be increased in the CGI (Bahagijo 2004). Indeed, a number of Indonesian NGOs have called for the dissolution of the CGI altogether (see for example Joint Statement by NGOs on pre-CGI meeting in Indonesia, April 23-24, 2001 4 ). B. Forestry as a top tier issue at the CGI Regardless of ones analysis of the CGI and its relationship to the government, the CGI is undeniably important for Indonesia, and for forestry to have become an agenda item is to elevate the perceived problems related to forestry to the highest levels of intergovernmental political dialogue. Moreover, since the CGI addresses at most five agenda items at its annual meetings, forestry as a CGI agenda item means that it was given priority over a host of other internationally significant issues in Indonesia. Several converging factors seem to explain why the international donor community raised forestry as a particularly important issue at the 1999 CGI in Paris 5 . Perhaps most critically, the fall of Suharto in May

According to this joint statement, Indonesian NGOs want to dissolve the CGI for several reasons: First, although providing aid to the forestry sector, CGI member countries have encouraged and facilitated large-scale deforestation by supporting pulp and paper industries (which by and large rely on illegally source materials) through export credit agencies, e.g., Europe, Japan and the US. Second, the CGI has neither investigated nor taken action regarding the clear and multiple cases of corruption where government officials misappropriated international aid (grants and loans). Lastly, the CGIs policies such as market liberalization will only worsen poverty in Indonesia and not alleviate it, while also further indebting the country. . The first CGI in the post-Suharto period was in Paris on July 29-30th, 1998.

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1998 and the ensuing era of reformasi allowed both international and national critics of Indonesias forestry practices to voice their concerns publicly. Further, during 1997-1998 forest fires ravaged over five million hectares of Sumatra and Kalimantan. The haze created an international incident between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and firmly situated Indonesias forests in crisis in the international gaze. Moreover, with the use of GPS/GIS technologies, it was clear that many of those responsible for the fires were large plantation companies, but none were prosecuted or penalized. Moreover, in early 1999 the Germanfunded Social Forestry Development Project (SFDP) in West Kalimantan, which had been operating since 1990, was effectively terminated because certain local level actors did not feel they were benefiting from the project and thus burned down the field station and chased out staff. At that time, Germany held the presidency of the European Commission and thus raised forestry as an issue at the 1999 Paris CGI. Additionally, recently released forest maps showed that for the 12-year period ending in 1997 Indonesia had lost on average 1.7 million hectares per year, which was nearly twice the deforestation rate that most people had estimated in the early 1990s (Walton nd). A key institutional instrument for donors to raise forestry in the CGI meeting was the inclusion of forestry policy reforms as conditionalities in the January 1998 IMF loan package to Indonesia. These conditionalities, one of which was the production of more accurate forest maps, set the precedent for and leveraged the position of the donor community to engage the government on forestry issues. The full set of IMF conditionalities related to forestry is as follows: Removal of restrictions on foreign investment in palm oil plantations Removal of the ban on palm oil product exports and replacement with an export tax

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Reduction of export taxes on logs and rattan to a maximum of 20% ad valorem Creation of new taxes on activities involving exploitation of timber resources Increase of timber royalties charged to forest concessions, implementation of an auction system to allocate new concessions, and allow transferability of forestry concessions and de-link their owners from processing for new concessions.

Elimination of the Indonesian Plywood Association (APKINDO)s monopoly over plywood exports.

Transfer of control over all government-owned commercial forestry companies from the Ministry of Forestry to the Ministry of Finance

Incorporation of the reforestation fund into the national budget and use money in the fund only for reforestation purposes.

Increase the proportion of market value of land and buildings assessable for tax purposes to 40% for plantations and forest. (World Bank 2000)

While it is debatable whether the IMF conditionalities related to forestry issues actually incentivized reform toward sustainable and equitable forest management (Barr 2001), they did allow the international donor community, particularly the World Bank, which had been absent from the forestry in Indonesia since 1994, to involve itself in the political-economic elements of forestry in Indonesia in a way that was not possible during the Suharto regime. Indeed, the way that the definitive 2001 World Bank report on Indonesias forests describes how forestry went from a IMF conditionality to a CGI agenda item is telling of how the donor community had implicated itself in post-Suharto forestry politics: There was, nevertheless, a sense that change was neither moving fast enough nor reaching deep enough to stem the destruction of the forests. Reports of illegal logging in

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national parks were confirmed. The bill that became the new Law on Forestry (Law No. 41/1999) was rushed into hearings in the DPR (National Assembly) despite complaints from NGOs, donors, and even MoFECs [Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops] own Komite Reformasi [Reform Committee] that the agreed-on prior consultation with stakeholders had not occurred. In light of these concerns, the World Bank placed forestry on the agenda of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) for the first time ever 6 , at its annual meeting in Paris in July 1999. A memorandum on the sector, prepared jointly by the European Commission, Germany and the United Kingdom, was tabled at the meeting, and it prompted extensive discussion by the donors. The outcome was a proposal by the Head of the Indonesian delegation for a high level seminar on forestry, with a report to be submitted to the next CGI meeting, in 2000. (World Bank 2001: 6) III. Analysis of CGI statements and their evolution A. Coalescing the master metaphor: The Removing the Constraints seminar After the international community raised forestry as a critical issue at the 1999 CGI in Paris, and the Indonesian government was persuaded of its importance, an agreement was reached to bring together representatives from government, donors and other stakeholder groups at a high level event. This manifested in the January 2000 seminar in Jakarta Removing the Constraints: Post-consultative group meeting on Indonesia Seminar on Indonesian Forestry, the results of which were presented at the February 2000 CGI in Jakarta. 7 The seminar was organized by the World Bank and BAPPENAS and opened by Mark Baird, who was then the World Bank Country Director for Indonesia, and Kwik Kian
6

Placing forestry on the CGI agenda had not been attempted before.

The seminar was originally planned to take place in October 1999, but it was postponed because the Indonesian presidential election was unexpectedly moved up to October 1999, and it made more sense to conduct the seminar with the new government.

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Gie, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs at that time. Also, the then Minister of Forestry Nur Mahmudi Ismail gave the keynote. Participants included senior government, NGO, and donor representatives, as well as senior university researchers. Indeed, this was a high profile event, which focused on a series of short, impactful illustrations of the problems in the forestry sector, delivered by acknowledged Indonesian experts, that received extensive advance publicity in international and national media, and almost 200 people attended (World Bank 2001: 6) 8 . Indicative of the post-Suharto reformasi (reform) ethos, the presentations at this seminar did not shy away from the political-economic dimensions of the forestry sector in Indonesia. They addressed topics that would have been extremely sensitive to present and discuss publicly during the Suharto regime. The first half of the full-day seminar focused on illustrations of the problems plaguing the forestry sector. For example, a representative from the MOFEC 9 showed that recent maps indicated a much higher deforestation rate over the past decade than originally estimated, and the then head of WWF Indonesia, Agus Purnomo, presented on the corporate debt held by companies in the forestry sector, which was part of an entire sub-session on overcapacity and debt in the forestry sector. The second half of the seminar focused on possible solutions or promising new directions in forest management. Forest management by communities and traditional user groups figured prominently, with separate presentations on forest boundary mapping by local communities, sustainable forest management under adat, the government sanctioned community forestry program

In addition to the World Bank funding the event, CIFOR, ICRAF, GTZ, EU, DFID, WWF Indonesia and the Ford Foundation helped identify speakers, prepare presentations and covered the cost of their travel to Jakarta.

Since the fall of Suharto, the Ministry of Forestry (MOF) has moved through various reorganizations, each with an attendant name change, which has included being called the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (MOFEC). It has reverted to the Ministry of Forestry (MOF).

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known as HKM, the social forestry development project in West Kalimantan led by GTZ, and natural forest management in S. Kayan, E. Kalimantan. In addition to the topics of the presentations being progressive, the public framing of the event also demonstrated a shift away from the technical aspects of forestry, which had been the dominant paradigm of forestry aid in Indonesia, toward one that emphasized the institutional, governance and political-economic reforms needed in the forestry sector. For example, the World Bank Country Director for Indonesia Mark Baird noted in his opening remarks that the forestry sector is a microcosm of the challenges that Indonesias people, government, and economy face today. Technical issues of natural resource management need to be tackled, for sure, but the more fundamental concerns that affect many sectors must be tackled on the way to any solution in this one (Baird 2000). The World Bank Country Director also commented on the problems plaguing the forestry sector, being quite specific in framing those problems as institutional and politicaleconomic (Baird 2000, emphases added): Corruption is evident in illegal logging and was well-known in the nontransparent way in which access to forest resources was awarded in the past. Improved governance and judicial reform are critically needed if sustainable forest management is ever to be achieved Those involved in banking reforms and corporate restructuring will have to concern themselves with forestry.

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Andthere are important concerns of social equity of the role of local communities in forest management, and of the rights of those communities to share in forest benefits that link with efforts to alleviate poverty and raise the standard of living of all Indonesians.

Further, as a lead-up article to the seminar, on January 14, 2000, Thomas Walton, then senior environmental specialist at the Bank mission in Jakarta, wrote an op-ed piece for the International Herald Tribune entitled Is There a Future for Indonesias Forests? that not only highlighted the seminar internationally, but also called for a radical departure from business as usual, which according to Walton required significant changes in the institutional and political-economic dimensions of forestry in Indonesia. For example, with respect to the causes of the crisis in the Indonesian forestry sector, Walton notes the following: The list of causes is longforest fires in 1997-8many of incendiaries [sic] were large companiesbut none received more than a slap on the wrist from the Soeharto governmentpermits to convert forest for mine, plantations and settlements, have not respected the official forest boundaries.logging incentives have not been strictly regulated.perverse incentives existillegal logging has been rampantand authorities look the other way.the illegal logging is directly related to expansion of the countrys wood-processing industriesdecisions affecting access to the forest have largely excluded two groups of stakeholders rural communities and traditional forest dwellers that might be inclined to manage forests well if they could realize a secure flow of benefits from doing so

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With respect to addressing these causes, Walton delineates eight elements of a National Forest Program for the government to formulate and that emphasize institutional and governance reform particularly within the government itself (IHT, emphases added): 1. an interagency, multistakeholder body responsible for forest policy 2. a freeze on conversion of natural forest for any purpose until the national forest program is in place and a transparent mechanism for forest use decisions is functioning. 3. a system to broaden and guarantee access to forest benefits for forest-dwellers and local communities, through ownership or secure, long-term rights of use 4. environmental education and public awareness programs to build a local and national constituency for forest conservation and sustainable management 5. incentives and penalties to improve concession management, including some form of performance bonding and independent inspection 6. rigorous and consistent enforcement of the laws concerning illegal logging, burning, and encroachment. 7. renewed commitment to conserving Indonesias world class biodiversity heritage through establishment of a national network of parks and protected areas that can be effectively managed in partnership with local communities and other stakeholders 8. aggressive replanting programs to return damaged forest land to productive use and relieve industry pressure on natural forest, at the same time generating rural employment and income. The emphasis on institutional, governance and political-economic reforms to resolve Indonesias forestry problems was indeed the explicit framing of seminar. The background document to the seminar that contextualizes the event notes: The Indonesian forestry sector

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is currently subject to a thorough reform process. This process is driven by a new sociopolitical context in which civil society plays a more important role than in the past (World Bank 2000). After a brief account of the importance of Indonesias forests, the achievements in reform to date and the persisting problems, the document articulates the solutions to these problems primarily in terms quite similar to Bairds opening remarks and Waltons recommendations (World Bank 2000, emphases added): Major donor agencies recommend that the following elements be taken into account in the approach to achieve structural improvements in the Indonesian forestry sector. Building up a transparent, participatory and consistent decision making process regarding land use planning and dispute settlement Promotion of rehabilitation and reforestation activities on degraded lands Rendering management sustainable in all permanent production forests Promotion of a consultative process on policy reforms Making use of experiences from donor projects Reorganization and strengthening of the main function of the forest administration Setting of incentives and removal of disincentives for sustainable management at macro-economic levels. B. The master metaphor materializes and evolves 1. The Platform of the master metaphor Following the January 2000 high-level seminar on forestry, at the February 2000 CGI in Jakarta, Untung Iskandar, the Director of Research Development in the Ministry of Forestry, articulated the government and Ministrys position on the forest sector in Indonesia. He affirmed the governments commitment toward pursuance of sustainable forest

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management, acknowledged that Indonesias tropical forests constitute the lifelungs [sic] of the world, and further assured the international community that it is our long term commitments to put our forest resources back to their functions, ie [sic] as a life supporting system (Iskandar 2000). After noting that Indonesias forests have been under heavy pressures to support the nation development [sic] and reviewing the main issues discussed at the January 2000 seminar, Iskandar re-affirmed the governments commitment noted in the Letter of Intent with the IMF that an Interdepartmental Committee to address Forestry issues (IDCF) would be established and that the National Forest Program (NFP) would be elevated to a new interministerial level. The purpose of the IDCF was to coordinate multisectoral actions to return the forests to sustainable management (World Bank 2001: 27). The IDCF was charged with two key tasks: to ensure the complete development of the NFP, and to coordinate and support the immediate actions that the MoFEC agrees need to be taken to address urgent issues raised at the Post-CGI Seminar [on forestry in January 2000] (World Bank 2001: 27). The intention of the NFP was to be an Indonesia-specific policy, strategy, and action plan to achieve sustainable use of forest resources, formulated in a transparent manner and in consultation with all stakeholders (World Bank 2001: 27). Given that many forest related issues fall outside of the authority or responsibility of the MoFEC, both donors and the Ministry recognized that preparing the NFP required the involvement of many other government agencies and non-government actors. Thus, the government proposed that the NFP would go forward under a temporary statutory body to be established within 60 days by Presidential Decree (KepPres), and that this body would involve representatives of all stakeholders at district, provincial and national levels (World Bank 2001: 27).

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In addition to the IDCF and NFP commitments, the Ministry agreed to take immediate action on the following eight points based on the January 2000 forestry seminar (Iskandar 2000, emphases added), all of which were confirmed by the Minister of Economic Affairs in his capacity as the head of the Indonesian delegation: 1. To invite cooperation and coordination of other ministries to impose strong measure against illegal loggers especially those operating within national parks, and closure of illegal sawmill 2. To speed up forest resource assessment as basis for NFP formulation 3. To evaluate the policy in conversion forest and put moratorium on all forest conversion until NFP agreed 4. To downsize and restructure wood based industry to balance between supply and demand of raw material and most importantly is to increase competitiveness 5. To close heavily-indebted wood industries under control of IBRA and linking proposed debt write off to capacity reduction 6. To connect reforestation program with the existing forest industries and those under construction 7. To recalculate real value of timber 8. To use decentralization process as a tool to enhance sustainable forest management These eight points of immediate action plus the IDCF and NFP commitments map onto and reaffirm the recommendations made during the high profile January 2000 forestry seminar, as well as those made by the international donor community, indicated by Baird and Waltons respective comments discussed earlier. Indeed, the Ministrys statement at the

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February 2000 CGI gives a definitive, tangible form to the master metaphor (Mosse 2004, 2005) or standardized package (Fujimura 1992) of forest reform, particularly since it is the governments formal articulation of its agenda, thereby bringing together the ostensible commitments of both the government and donor community. In short, both the government and donor community have been recruited to buy into this master metaphor. Bairds broad concerns discussed earlier perhaps best capture the key themes of the master metaphor that would carry and maintain forestry as a key issue at ensuing CGI meetings, viz., corruption, governance and judicial reform, banking reforms and corporate restructuring, and social equity (Baird 2000). These four elements formed the broad contours of the master metaphor that the international community and GOI publicly agreed upon through the Ministrys statement at the February 2000 CGI. Moreover, this master metaphor or standardized package not only has an institutional history in IMF and World Bank structural adjustment conditionalities, but also was legitimized by and negotiated in a high-level, multistakeholder seminar in the spirit of reformasi. Although the Ministrys statement is the moment where the master metaphor of forest reform in the CGI materializes having at that point recruited both international donors and the Indonesian government -- at the onset there was concern among the donor community of whether and/or how the master metaphor would be translated into practice. Thus, to allay this concern, the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF) was created: The donors asked the Government to attach some target dates to the key actions. They proposed (and GOI accepted) to have a small group of donor agencies establish a forum to assist GOI in carrying out its proposed actions and monitoring progress

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leading up to the next CGI meeting. Accordingly, the CGI Donor Forum on Forestry has been established (World Bank 2001:27). 2. An analysis of the evolution of the master metaphor In this section, I analyze the formal statements made by the donor community and Indonesian government at CGI meetings with respect to progress, or lack thereof, in the forestry sector. I should note here that these formal statements are not responses to each other; in other words, the donor statement is not necessarily a rejoinder to the Ministry of Forestry statement and vice versa. Based on my experience with the preparations for the December 2003 CGI, the DFF and Ministry exchange drafts of formal statements prior to the CGI. In the following analysis, I examine how the substance of the statements evolved on the donor side as well as the governments side. Perhaps the most consistent theme in both donor and government statements at the CGI with respect to the forest situation in Indonesia is the lack of progress, results and achievements in meeting commitments expressed by the government, which could potentially destabilize the master metaphor. How the donor community and government incorporate this perceived failure or lack of progress into the master metaphor is instructive with respect how each side attempts to maintain recruitment and stabilize the master metaphor. a. Donors and the lack of progress At the October 2000 CGI, after reviewing the history of forestry in the CGI and the governments commitments, the donors noted that progress is generally slow and there are few concrete results to date [since the February 2000 CGI] and that the DFF and the international community as a whole remains concerned over the large gap that exists between

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stated aims and actual achievements (Donor Statement October 2000). The document goes on to specify that the IDCF has neither been truly active or operational since its establishment, that the process of drafting the NFP is delayed and the composition of the special working groups falls far short of the promised stakeholder representation, and that the level of illegal logging appears to be increasing (Donor Statement October 2000). As a concrete step to remedy this lack of progress, the donor statement calls upon GOI to present a plan of action within one month of the [October 2000] Tokyo CGI meeting (Donor Statement October 2000). Thus, in this statement, which came eight months after GOIs declaration of commitments to reform in the forest sector, the donors clearly articulate the lack of progress on GOIs commitments, while also providing an avenue of recourse for the government. In the April 2001 mid-term review CGI meeting, the progress report jointly carried out by the government and donors notes that the action plan was drafted by the IDCF and made public, yet it did not incorporate an instrument to objectively measure achievements on these commitments (Donor Statement April 2001). The joint statement continues with a comment from the donors similar to their October 2000 statement: progress from the donors viewpointin terms of results in the forest.[is] there have been no tangible improvementsdonors are of the opinionvery few tangible results have been achieved (Donor Statement April 2001). Again similar to the October 2000 statement, the donors make recommendations: donors believe that the indicators [to the action plan] will be a useful tool to assess in terms agreed by all parties and law enforcement has to be endorsed from the highest political level (Donor Statement April 2001). Perhaps most revealing about these recommendations

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and the ones from October 2000 is that they lack any repercussions if they are not fulfilled. In short, donor statements do not have teeth. Although the IDCF created an action plan, it lacked indicators, making it action-less. Yet, the donors did not reprimand or penalize GOI for this or any of the other multiple instances of the lack of progress on commitments. Indeed, this begs the question of what instruments the donor community possesses and/or is willing to employ to reprimand GOI for non-compliance. The answer is very few if any at all, as I elaborate in the rest of the chapter. The donor statement at the November 2001 CGI meeting differs little in substance from former ones, primarily noting the worsening situation in both the natural and institutional environments: the lack of recognition of land rights, access and tenureinequitable distribution of those [sic] revenuesthere is unfortunately little on the ground evidence of having made an impact at resolving itillegal logging has increased, forest based industry restructuring has not started, and policy initiatives towards sustainable forest managementhave yet to be implemented (Donor Statement November 2001). Notable about this donor statement is how these comments are incorporated into the master metaphor. While acknowledging the worsening situation, this donor statement, like previous ones, attempts to maintain recruitment and stabilize the standardized package of forest reform by explicitly locating the lack of progress away from the Ministry of Forestry and onto other government institutions, which it does not specify. The statement notes that the problems in the forest sector are complex, as they do not fall under the authority of one institution, and thus

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it is unsurprising that the efforts the MOF has made.over the past two yearssuccess has been very limited because this institution simply does not have the authority and resources to address them single-handedly (Donor Statement November 2001). The donor statement once again provides impotent recommendations, which are to consider the revitalization of the IDCF (Donor Statement November 2001). And once again there are no concrete reprimands or penalties, only the proclamation that what is needed is a processdriven, multistakeholder approach supported by strong leadership and political will at the highest level (Donor Statement November 2001). At the June 2002 CGI mid-term review meeting, the donor statement only reiterates what was noted at the November 2001 meeting: With respect to reform in the forest sector, revitalizing the IDCF was considered a necessary part of this process. This statement still standsthe donors would like to bring emphatically to the attention of the Government that the IDCF has never been fully operational since its establishment, and we again strongly recommend that this situation be corrected (Donor Statement June 2002). The only difference in the June 2002 donor statement from previous ones is noting new threats to forest management, viz., the debt restructuring policies of IBRA with respect to heavily indebted forest industries and strip mining in protection forests. On the issue of debt restructuring, the donor community sent the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs -copied to several other high level government agencies including IBRA -- a donor forum position paper entitled Issues involved in restructuring the forest industry and forest sector debt with a cover letter from the World Bank signed by the Acting Country Director at the

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time, Vikram Nehru. It seems that the letter and recommendations were ignored. IBRA sold the debt owed by these industries at extreme low rates and mostly to the government itself, thereby not only bailing out these industries but also re-incurring the debt. The substance of the donor statement at the January 2003 CGI meeting strays very little from previous statements, although the tone is stronger and comments more specific. After reiterating the need for a multistakeholder, process-driven approach to resolving the problems in the forestry sector, the donor statement asserts that today, there appears to be little change other than an increase in the amount of illegal logging that is taking place, despite the high profile forestry has been given in the CGI (Donor Statement 2003). The assumption here is that the attention of the CGI should in itself motivate reform. Indeed, the international donor community and government have ostensibly agreed on an agenda with respect to forest reforms. Yet the commitment of the government to reform is suspect, and international pressure and conditionalities are evidently insufficient to foment change. The January 2003 donor statement again praises the Ministry of Forestry, highlighting the Ministrys sole efforts that should be congratulated, while blaming other agencies for their lack of support, which detracted from some of the valuable initiatives that have been undertaken by the Ministry of Forestry (Donor Statement January 2003). In particular, the donor statement notes that the lack of consideration of timber supply in IBRAs ongoing debt restructuring and asset sales directly counteracts the Ministrys efforts (Donor Statement January 2003). The donor statement continues commenting on the lack of interest and apathy within other agencies, and at worst, as calculated and counterproductive moves within government and associated institutions (Donor Statement January 2003). To substantiate these claims, the donor community appended a list of MOF initiatives and the

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obstacles incurred in moving them forward. Further, after noting that the lack of an active, interagency forum is regarded as one the principal reasons why there would appear to be little change in the business as usual scenario, the donor statement attempts to focus responsibility on the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, who chairs the IDCF. The statement asks the Coordinating Minister to clarify his position with respect to the IDCF and the measures that he will be taking to ensure that there will be an interagency forum (Donor Statement January 2003) 10 . The donor community bitingly answers its own question in the closing of the statement, noting that it is perhaps appropriate in summing up, by reflecting on the comment made by the President of Indonesia, at the Johannesburg Summit [in 2002], The lack of political will is the root cause of continued environmental degradation (Donor Statement January 2003). 11 The donor statement at the June 2003 CGI mid-term review meeting only reiterates the statement from January 2003, noting again that the need for effective interagency dialogue has been the main theme.for the CGI over the past one and a half years and the current situation would endorse maintaining this position (Donor Statement June 2003). The only unique aspect of this statement is to confirm that the best opportunity to manage debt in the forest sector in a manner that would contribute to achieve sustainable forest management has been lost by IBRAs selling Rp. 19 trillion of the Rp. 22 trillion in forest industry debt it held (Donor Statement June 2003).
10

To the best of my knowledge, there was no response to this question from the Coordinating Minister. Although it seems improbable that one person could rectify the lack of progress in the forestry sector, the position of the Coordinating Minister did figure prominently in the plans for reform, particularly since this position was charged with the chairing the IDCF. It was after the January 2003 CGI that Indonesian NGO/Civil Society Groups called for a review and evaluation of the work of the DFF.
11

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Moreover, half of the debt sold was to state-owned Bank Mandiri, which effectively means that the government has bought debt twice for no real apparent, economic, social or forest management advantage (Donor Statement June 2003). The December 2003 CGI donor statement on forestry reiterates previous statements. Indeed, it even acknowledges this: DFF statements since 2001 have discussed key issues in the forestry sector in the context of GOIs stated priorities and commitments to the CGI. Today, the issues remain the same, and this years statement emphasizes the same point as was made in the previous years: support from other sectors concerned is essential to promote progress (Donor Statement December 2003). The closing of the donor statement succinctly captures the experience to date: There has not been meaningful progress for Indonesias forests since it became a CGI issue three years ago. The priorities and commitments and pledges so far have had a limited impact on the reality in the field. An analysis of the evolution of the donor statements at CGI meetings with respect to forestry brings out several key points. Although every donor statement clearly expresses frustration and disappointment with the lack of progress, the donor community incorporates the frustration and disappointment into the master metaphor, and thus maintains recruitment for it. Maintaining recruitment for the master metaphor in forestry was important for donor community for multiple reasons and motivations. First, forestry vis--vis other priority items at the CGI meetings became a relatively lower priority, and hence the donor community was unwilling to risk improved collaborative efforts with the government in other sectors for the sake of forestry. With respect to agenda

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items, it is important to recall that the period between 1999 and 2004 was full of transition for Indonesia: Gus Dur was elected president and then ousted, replaced by Megawati; East Timor seceded, and violence instigated by the Indonesian armed forces ensued; a civil war was raging in Aceh; and ad hoc decentralization processes created extreme tensions between central and regional governments. Further, in the Ministry of Forestry itself there were four ministers during this period, each with his select group of senior Ministry officials, as well as the change from the Ministry of Forestry to the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops and then back again. Moreover, there was a massive personnel shift from central government forestry offices to regional ones and the liquidation of the Regional Ministry of Forestry Offices (KanWil). Second, it is not entirely clear what the donor community could do to leverage its position beyond stating its disappointment. Indeed, international aid projects in the forestry sector could have been halted, but as one expatriate technical expert noted to me, stopping a project is not easy. In short, it is in no ones interest to stop a project. Further, international aid projects in the forest sector are grants, not loans, and thus the Ministry in no way depends or relies on them. Third, the commitment of donors themselves to reforming Indonesias forest sector is suspect vis--vis other political and economic ties between donor nations and Indonesia, e.g., broader industry and trade relations, as well as geo-political concerns. For example, although Germany pulled out technical assistance from the forestry sector in Indonesia in 2002 because of their disappointment with the lack of commitment after 10 years of technical assistance, Germany in no way changed broader trade relations with Indonesia, which would

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have been a much more significant indicator that Germany took seriously Indonesias forest crisis. Returning to the donor statements, they also consistently emphasize that a crosssectoral approach and interagency forum are critical, neither of which actually came to fruition in a functional manner. Interestingly, starting with the November 2001 statement, donors not only displaced responsibility from the Ministry of Forestry onto other government agencies, but also lauded the Ministry for the activities it had initiated. Moreover, donor statements since November 2001 progressively specify the government elements outside of the Ministry that are either not supporting or actively contravening forest reform efforts, e.g., IBRA and Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. Even given these quite specific calls for accountability, at the end of the day business does indeed go on as usual. b. GOI and the lack of progress The ways in which the government addresses the undeniable lack of progress on agreed upon reforms in the forest sector are instructive with respect to how it attempts to recruit for and stabilize the master metaphor, while addressing and/or incorporating this fact. At the October 2000 CGI meeting, the Minister of Forestry (2000) in his formal speech expressed awareness that the errors of past experience must not continue in the future and noted the establishment of the IDCF, but admitted that we are not satisfied with the progress to date. It has been difficult to generate high level coordination. He ended his speech with a list of proclamations of what would be done, thereby maintaining engagement in and stabilizing the master metaphor. At the April 2001 CGI meeting, the Ministry in the joint review carried out by the government and donors noted that the action plan requested at the October 2000 CGI was

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completed, thereby demonstrating that the government had achieved something concrete, albeit only on paper: the action plan was drafted by the end of November and formally made public by the IDCF in December (Donor Statement April 2001). This statement reiterates the commitment of the government, noting that the coordinating ministerresolved to work on the four of the most urgent issues: illegal logging, forest fires, restructuring industry, forest inventory/mapping (Donor Statement April 2001). At the November 2001 CGI meeting, by which point Megawati had taken the office of the Presidency and installed a new cabinet, including a new Minister of Forestry, the government 12 articulated its efforts in terms of decrees and agreements, as well as some actions taken against government officials and companies found involved in illegal logging and forest fires, respectively. Moreover, the government statement mentions the drafting of a national forest statement, which was to be the precursor to the NFP. The statement also recognizes that there is clear need [sic] for a multi-sector approach to overcome forestry problems, [and] therefore IDCF needs to be revived, which resonates with the statements of the donor community (Government Statement November 2001). There is, however, no mention of how this is to be operationalized, only a statement of the obvious: The IDCF needs to further improve its existing action planAll relevant government ministries and relevant stakeholders.must commit themselves to implementing these agreed upon actions, which should be clearly supported in the annual program budget (Government Statement November 2001).

At this CGI meeting, there was not a statement specifically from the Minister or Ministry of Forestry. Comments on forestry were part of a more general government statement entitled The Government of Indonesia: Position Paper on the Justice Reform, Fighting Corruption and Forest Management Reform.

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In short, this statement from the government conveys to the donor community once again -that the government is in agreement with the donors on the problems and solutions, and that although progress has not been sufficient, concrete actions have been taken. At the June 2002 mid-term review of the CGI, the Minister of Forestry Muhammad Prakosa added another dimension to and reinterpreted the master metaphor of forestry reform. He displaced blame and responsibility from the Indonesian government to the international community, particularly developed countries. This tactic was similar to that of former Prime Minister Mahatir of Malaysia, who similarly displaced blame onto developed countries and Northern NGOs in rebuttal to the heavy criticism of Malaysias logging practices and disregard for the livelihoods of forest dependent communities during the 1980s (Dove 1998). Although refashioning the master metaphor, Prakosa remained firmly within its boundaries. After reiterating the governments five priorities with respect to forests, Prakosa commented that the problems and constraints of forest-based industries are complicated, requiring a comprehensive assessment of timber based industries and a joint effort between MOF, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade and IBRA (Minister Statement June 2002). On a related point, he noted that the IDCF had not been effective, but that he was committed to working with other ministries to make it so. Most importantly, he reinterpreted the global concern over illegal logging and illegal log trade of Indonesias forests, which until that point laid blame and found root cause in Indonesia and Indonesias corruption and poor governance. Prakosa articulated Indonesias illegal logging and illegal log trade problem as being partially caused by the complicity of developed, consuming countries. He noted the need for and urged international cooperation

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to curb illegal logging and illegal log trade, citing a recently signed MOU on the issue between the UK and GOI, as well as the Asia Forestry Partnership, which is a dialogue forum that came out of World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002. Prakosa closed his speech with a backhanded reprimand of donor countries that they were contributing to and complicit in Indonesias illegal logging problem, while also reminding donors of the multiple and often incommensurable incentives of their own governments and bureaucracies: we would welcome additional bilateral and multilateral agreements to control illegal timber trade like the one just signed with the UK. And just as I am trying to work with my colleague the Minister of Industry and Trade to ensure that new investment in forest industry is not considered without regard to availability of sustainable timber supply, I would request CGI donors to do the same. Please establish good communications between the agencies of your governments that are concerned with sustainable development and those that issue export credit and promoted investment in industrial expansion. (Minister Statement June 2002) At the January 2003 CGI meeting, the Minister once again noted the ineffectiveness of the IDCF, but described other joint initiatives similar to those he mentioned at the June 2002 CGI. As a further concrete action, the Minister noted the MOFs soft landing policy, in which the level of timber production has been step-wisely reduced to 6.89 million m3 by 2003 (Minister Statement January 2003). At the same time, he noted that there had been no progress with respect to restructuring forest-based industries, and specifically implicated IBRA as non-cooperative and counterproductive: Restructuring the wood-based industrieshas been hindered by IBRAs debt restructuring and asset sales, which has

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been undertaken without considering timber sources as essential elements (Minister Statement January 2003). Analogous to his June 2002 statement, but much stronger in tone, the Minister not only implicated the CGI member countries as contributing to and being complicit in Indonesias forest crisis, but also rhetorically asked to what extent donor administrations were willing to take actions: both timber producing and importing countries must have the same vision and standard to curb the illegal logging and associated trade. Strong actions by both.are all we needI request (or perhaps I should demand instead of request) to all representatives from CGI member countries that are present here to make statement publicly at the end of this CGI meeting saying that all CGI member countries will not receive or import illegally cut timber and associated products. I believe, if materialized, this statement will definitely have tremendous impacts to help us combat the forest crimes. Otherwise, we all here are doing business as usual (Minister Statement January 2003). In articulating Indonesias forest crisis in these terms, the Minister is not only implicating the global community, but is also stabilizing the master metaphor of forest reform by demonstrating that the obstacles to forest reform do not solely lie with the government of Indonesia and that action needs to be taken at the global level before actors stop supporting this metaphor. In essence, the Minister is buying not only time, but also an avenue of recourse for the government should the donor community no longer buy into master metaphor of forest reform, it cannot be blamed solely on the government of Indonesia, but rather it is the responsibility of the global community as well.

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The June 2003 statement from the Ministry of Forestry also incorporated a new stabilizing element in the master metaphor of forest reform. Instead of merely noting the lack of interagency cooperation or the need for it as previous statements had, this statement makes explicit that difference in perception, vision and mission about illegal logging among related institutions and also existing laws and regulations are constraints that should be solved (Ministry Statement June 2003). The statement goes further in specifying the different perceptions of relevant government agencies with respect to forest industry restructuring: some related institutions need to solve the problem namely Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Industry and Trade, State Minister of State-owned Enterprises cq. IBRA under coordination of the Coordinating Minister of Industry, Finance, and Economic. Each related institution has their own different visions: a. the Ministry of Forestry concern is to preserve forest resources b. the Ministry of Industry and Trade concern is to improve productivity and export of forest products. c. IBRA concern is to maximize debt recovery that is restructured into the banking system (Ministry Statement June 2003). This was the first statement in which the Ministry made explicit and public differences and struggles between government agencies, as well as how those differences were obstacles to cooperation. Although in the past the Ministry or Minister noted the lack of interagency cooperation, this was the first time that the lack of cooperation was attributed to intragovernmental struggles and different priorities and incentives of relevant government agencies.

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The December 2003 CGI statement from the Ministry further elaborated on interagency differences and indeed even portrayed the Ministry as being victimized for trying to carry out its duty: Declining government income from forestry sector due to the implementation of soft landing policy is still considered as if Ministry of Forestry is not committed to national economic growth (Ministry Statement December 2003). This statement also explicitly notes that after reflecting on the obstacles to reform in the forest sector, governance issue become [sic] one important issue in forestry development (Ministry Statement December 2003). Besides this, however, the December statement strays very little from previous ones. An analysis of the evolution of government statements at CGI meetings with respect to forestry brings out several key points. First, all of the statements acknowledge that progress and/or fulfillment of commitments does not meet the expectations agreed upon. One of the key reasons consistently sited in these government statements is the lack of interagency coordination and cooperation. Moreover, the Ministrys statement become progressively more specific in laying blame and responsibility onto other agencies such as IBRA and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, while emphasizing the sole efforts of the Ministry of Forestry itself to meet the reform commitments. The other key aspect of the governments statements is the move from focusing on its own shortcomings and attempts to articulating the donor community as complicit and/or contributing to Indonesias forest crisis, which Minister Prakosa first articulated at the June 2002 CGI meeting. Indeed, by articulating the obstacles to Indonesias forest reforms as in part international, Prakosa remained within the master metaphor of forest reform in

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Indonesia, while also refashioning the underlying causes and solutions as being in part beyond the control of Indonesia and in the control of donor countries. It is through the articulation of responsibility for the lack of forest reforms in Indonesia in terms of agencies beyond the Ministry of Forestry and indeed in terms of nation-states beyond Indonesia that the Ministry is able to maintain the master metaphor of forest reform. The Ministry deflects the element of failure or lack of progress through this discursive tactic of emphasizing those elements outside of the Ministry that are inextricably linked to Indonesias forest crisis and hence reform, and thus maintaining interest in, or recruitment for, the master metaphor in the face of business as usual. c. Overall analysis of donor and government statements Examining both donor and government statements made at CGI meetings since forestry became a priority agenda item at the 1999 CGI brings out several key analytical points. First, evident from these CGI meeting statements is the active maintenance of the master metaphor of forest reform commitments agreed to by both the government and the international community at the February 2000 CGI. This active maintenance is articulated not only in terms of the recounting of agreed upon priorities and tallying off achievements, but also providing legitimate and authoritative reasons for not achieving the commitments. In doing so, both sides safeguard against the destabilizing of the master metaphor that both parties have agreed to. It is perhaps the recruitment for the master metaphor that begins to destabilize it (Mosse 2004, 2005). For example, as both the Ministry and donor community maintain the master metaphor by broadening the scope of the causes to other agencies, they must also recruit these other agencies to support the master metaphor of forest reform. It is here that

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support breaks down, and it is here that neither the donor community nor the Ministry of Forestry can coerce or leverage support for the master metaphor of forest reform from these other agencies. For example, both the donor community and Ministry of Forestry implicate the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs in the lack of progress on forest reform, and consequently attempts to recruit him into supporting the master metaphor. The Coordinating Minster, however, has little to gain from buying into the master metaphor of forest reform other issues are of much higher priority and interest. As Mosse ( 2005: 9) notes, common narratives or commanding interpretations are supported for different reasons and serve a diversity of perhaps contradictory interests.the problem is that this diversity and multiplicity of interests (and needs to be met) itself destabilizes and militates against coherence. This is precisely what we see when the donor community and Ministry refashion the metaphor to emphasize other agencies within the Indonesian government, as well as the political economies of timber consuming nations the master metaphor of forest reform is safeguarded because the obstacles are broader than and/or beyond that originally anticipated in the master metaphor, and thus the master metaphor is refashioned. That said, recruitment among these other agencies and institutions has not been forthcoming, thereby working against coherence of and support for the metaphor (Mosse 2005). The broader analytical point of this discussion of the evolution of the master metaphor is that there is a significant performative element to CGI-related evaluations and assessments of the forestry sector reform in Indonesia, as well as calls for reform and coordination among donor and government agencies and between donors and the government. Moreover, both the donor community and Ministry of Forestry have been able to incorporate potentially destabilizing

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elements into the master metaphor itself through recruitment of other actors and factors. The performance then is in the maintenance of the appearance of order in light of the messy social reality or disjuncture. IV. Evaluations and Assessments: An analysis of the 1998 IMF forestry conditionalities, the relationship to the CGI experience and institutional amnesia In this section of the chapter, I discuss and analyze an evaluation of the Indonesian forestry sector that preceded forestry becoming a CGI agenda item. I pay particular attention to Seymour and Kartodihardjos (2000) evaluation of the implementation of 1998 IMF and World Bank conditionalities related to forestry reform. In doing so, I demonstrate how the inaction that resulted from forestry reform being a CGI agenda time was not only predictable, but also how similar assessments and recommendations had been made in the past to no avail and evidently not taken into consideration when forestry became a CGI agenda item. As this analysis shows, assessments and evaluations, as well as their attendant recommendations, are vehicles to recruit for master metaphors that provide an authoritative framework of interpretation and are produced by engaging with a series of other logics, forces, chemistries (Mitchell 2002: 51, cited in Lewis and Mosse 2006: 4). Assessments and evaluations help maintain attention on Indonesias forests in the global and national arena through the order they create with respect to elements of social reality that could potentially fail or not support previously articulated master metaphors or policies. In other words, assessments and evaluations are narrative tools to (re)translate master metaphors so as to incorporate or account for elements of an unwieldy social reality. It is through the (re)translating or (re)composing achieved through, for example, evaluations that different

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institutional logics of various actors and of policy versus project can co-exist and protect the autonomy of policy and practice (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 5). Seymour and Kartodihardjos analysis of the January 1998 IMF conditionalities related to forestry is relevant to the preceding discussion of forestry issues in the CGI in several ways. These conditionalities and their implementation (or lack thereof) were the basis for forestry being raised as a key agenda item at the 1999 CGI meeting (Sheng and Cannon 2004; World Bank 2001; Seymour and Kartodihardjo 2000). Perhaps more importantly, the lack of enforcement of forest sector conditionalities in the January 1998 Letter of Intent (LOI), which was negotiated with the IMF as part of the IMFs bailout package, is extremely instructive for understanding the CGI experience with forestry discussed earlier. Seymour and Kartodihardjo (2000) provide an excellent analysis of how the World Bank, in collaboration with the IMF, attempted to address some of the structural issues in the forest sector through adjustment lending mobilized in the wake of the financial crisis that devastated Indonesia starting in 1997 (83). First, in their analysis of the history of the World Banks involvement in the Indonesian forestry sector, which started with lending in 1989 13 , Seymour and Kartodihardjo (2000) note that the Ministry of Forestry terminated lending in 1994 because the World Bank and the Ministry had reached an impasse on policy reforms being promoted by the World Bank, particularly those that would harm the interests of politically powerful concession holdersIn particular, Mohammed Bob Hassan,

13

Bank initiated lending in the forestry sector in 1989 focused on inventory, research plans and development of the forest sector via improved timber concession management and plantation development. The Ministry terminated lending just prior to the implementation of improved concession management systems, including mechanisms for inspection and audit and royalty collection (Seymour and Kartodihardjo 2000: 86).

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Indonesias most prominent timber tycoon and a close associate of President Suharto, is said to have blocked reform of concession management (86). This effectively meant that when the IMF requested the World Bank to prepare structural reform conditionalities for the January 1998 LOI, the Bank had been absent from the Indonesian forestry sector for over three years. Further, Seymour and Kartodihardjo note that [a]ccording to participants interviewed for this [their] study, the IMF team invited World Bank staff to contributeon extremely short notice, precluding the possibility of conducting any new analysis or consultation with concerned stakeholders. Indeed, when asked why stopping a notorious million-hectare rice project that threatened swamp forests in Kalimantan was not included among the conditions, a World Bank official confessed, I didnt have a file on it that day. Forest sector elements added to the package were selected from among those already on the shelf from the sector review completed by World Bank staff in 1995 (91). 14 Regardless of how spontaneous, irrational and/or nonsensical the process of formulating the conditionalities was, it mattered very little, since by late 1998, many of these conditions remained unfulfilled (92). Indeed, Seymour and Kartodihardjo (2000) note that early on, there were signs that reform would be more apparent than real, as limitations on the governments political will and capacity to meet IMF conditions emerged (93) and that the Ministry of Forestry appeared to focus on fulfilling the letter of the IMF agreement rather than the spirit of the objectives (93). With regards to this latter point, some officials in the Ministry felt that the Bank and IMF had erred in focusing on specific measures instead of

In addition to the IMF-GOI LOI, the World Bank refined and reinforced forest-related conditionalities through two structural adjustment loans (91).

14

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clarifying objectives to be reached and leaving the means by which to meet them more flexible (95). Taking this point into consideration, the World Bank provided the Ministry flexibility in implementing reforms, which may have inadvertently signaled to the Ministry that the conditionality was being relaxed. At minimum, it was difficult for observers to distinguish between the World Banks encouragement of conscientiousness and its tolerance for foot dragging (95). Seymour and Kartodihardjo (2000) further analyze the reformation without any changes that occurred in the forestry sector after the downfall of Suharto in May 1998. They note that the Ministry had established a Development Reformation Committee composed of representatives from the Ministry itself, NGOs, universities and businesses whose mandate was to make recommendations to the Minister regarding the Ministrys vision, mission and organization, as well as with regard to key legislative and regulatory frameworks (96). Yet, recommendations of the Reformation Committee were somehow removed from the regulations and draft legislation that emerged from the Ministrys internal decision making processes (97). Further, Seymour and Kartodihardjo (2000) note that compliance with the letter of commitments was undermined by deviations from the spirit of the commitment (98). In addition to attempting to work with the Ministry, the World Bank also initiated dialogue with a broader group of stakeholders on a more comprehensive reform agenda realizing that a consensus on a forestry policy reform agenda among relevant stakeholders was necessary (98). In doing so, the World Bank attempted to address social justice concerns and preconditions for reform such as filling gaps in data and developing performance criteria in their sectoral adjustment loan after the fall of Suharto. While the Bank acknowledged and

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attempted to operationalize the connection between forest sector reform and improved governance, the World Banks success in promoting compliance with these commitments [with the Ministry] was mixed (99). In sum, Seymour and Kartodihardjo (2000) conclude that the slow and uneven pace of reform can be traced to many factors, some of which were under the control of the World Bank and the IMF (105). They note the following factors (Seymour and Kartodihardjo 2000: 106): First, the initial package was inconsistent and incompletethe World Bank had not been substantively engaged in the forestry sector for the four years prior to the crisis.Second, the original forest policy conditions contained in the January LOI were articulated in terms of specific measures rather than desired outcomes, were associated with unrealistic deadlines, and in some cases reflected a lack of understanding of the Indonesian policymaking process.the articulation of conditions in terms of specific measures allowed the Ministry of Forestry to comply with the letter of the conditions while undermining the spiritThird, the initial focus of the WB and the IMF on efficiency-oriented reform, without explicit attention to the social justice aspects.compromised the initial ownership of the reform program.Fourth.the WBs attention to governance issues in the reform itselfis essential to empower domestic constituencies for reform. Seymour and Kartodihardjo (2000: 106) sum up their analysis of the Indonesia case as follows: the Indonesia case demonstrates the limitations of the adjustment instrument to promote change in the forest sector. In 1995, the World Banks own assessment of its

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experience with project lending in the forest sector in Indonesia concluded that the need to deal comprehensively with institutional constraints is a major lesson which arises from experience with this project (World Bank 1996, p. iv). Four years later, it is clear that institutional constraints continue to be the major obstacle to reform, despite the significant political and economic changes that have occurred in the interim. I have discussed and summarized Seymour and Kartodihardjos analysis at length because for the most part it preceded the CGI forestry experience (the final draft being published in 2000), yet it seems that very little of their analysis and recommendations was incorporated into the strategies of, or even considered by, donors in engaging the government on forestry issues in the context of the CGI starting in 1999. In short, the institutional constraints noted in the 1995 World Bank assessment that Seymour and Kartodihardjo highlight as a major obstacle to reform in their analysis of implementing structural adjustment instruments in 1998 persist throughout the donor experience with forestry reform in the context of the CGI. That nearly 10 years later quite similar obstacles or institutional constraints are being articulated in the CGI is evidence for the intrinsic gap between policy and practice that Mosse (2004, 2005) notes is due to the disparate institutional worlds and logics that policy and practice inhabit. For example, Seymour and Kartodihardjos analysis makes clear that powerful individuals and institutions related to government did not consider forest sector reform important, and thus the actual reform achievements were limited, although government representatives were adept at maintaining the discourse of reform. The preceding analysis of CGI meeting statements on forestry makes it abundantly clear that virtually the same dynamics are at play as discussed in Seymour and Kartodihardjos (2000)

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analysis. That during a 10-year period policy prescriptions and recommendations did not substantively affect practice and that social reality did not substantively affect policy implies a co-existence, yet autonomy, between the two (Lewis and Mosse 2006). V. Conclusion In this chapter, I analyzed how forestry became a top-tier priority for both international donors and the Indonesian government and examined how the order or master metaphor (Mosse 2004, 2005) of forest reform was mutually crafted and articulated in official documents. I also analyzed how this master metaphor evolved through time as the lack of progress on commitments became impossible to ignore. In doing so, I attempted to show how the master metaphor was maintained by both donors and the government and incorporated the concomitant lack of progress on agreed upon commitments. In attempting to stabilize the master metaphor of forest reform in the face of a potentially destabilizing element, viz., the indisputable lack of progress on agreed upon reforms, both international donors and the Indonesian government over time refashioned the master metaphor to include other actors and factors, which had the effect keeping the master metaphor viable and justifying continued engagement in trying to achieve reforms. That said, the inclusion of other actors and interests and attempts to recruit them to support the master metaphor had the opposite effect of further destabilizing the master metaphor. In other words, as causes of and responsibility for Indonesias forest crisis and lack of progress on reforms were located in the multiple policies of multiple ministries of multiple countries, support for this interpretation became more difficult to recruit for because it required the buy-in from so many diverse interests and actors. As Mosse (2005: 10) notes, the coherence and order of a successful project is always vulnerable; interpretations can fail.

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CHAPTER 7 THE DONOR FORUM ON FORESTRYS ROLE AS BROKER: INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS,

INCENTIVES AND LOGICS THAT EXPLAIN THE DISJUNCTURE IN INDONESIAN FORESTRY REFORM.

I. Introduction In Chapter 6, I discussed and analyzed how and why forestry was elevated to the highest levels of diplomatic negotiations, viz., the annual CGI meetings, and how an agreed upon master metaphor (Mosse 2004) of forest crisis and reform was fashioned by the donor community and GOI. Further, I examined how this master metaphor evolved over time and was actively refashioned by both donors and the Indonesian government, as well has how the master metaphor incorporated the concomitant lack of progress on-the-ground. In this chapter, I discuss and analyze the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF), which was created by the CGI in 2000 to assist GOI in carrying out its proposed actions and monitor progress and is responsible for drafting the donor statement for the annual CGI meetings, i.e., the donors articulation of the master metaphor. I examine the DFFs history and evolution, relationships between members of the DFF, and how the DFF relates to other forest-related institutions such as government agencies, international organizations, and Indonesian NGOs. In doing so, I try to understand the institutional relationships, incentives and logics that explain the disjuncture 1 in Indonesian forestry reform. The DFF is an

Lewis and Mosse (2006) explain that order can be understood as the ideal worlds that development actors aim to bring about[and] disjuncture comes from the gap between these ideal worlds and the social reality they have to relate to (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 2).

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intensive case study and a window through which to examine the broader landscape of forestry institutions. 2 More specifically, in light of the DFFs crucial role in the co-production of the master metaphor for the annual CGI meetings, I examine the DFFs position as a broker or translator (Mosse 2005) in these institutional relationships. Mosse (20005: 9) clarifies the following about the relationship between master metaphors and brokers or translators: common narratives or commanding interpretations are supported for different reasons and serve a diversity of perhaps contradictory interests.This is possible because of the productive ambiguity that characterizes development policys master metaphors. But it also requires the constant work of translation (of policy goals into practical interests; practical interests back into policy goals), which is the task of skilled brokers (managers, consultants, fieldworkers, community leaders) who read the meaning of a project into the different institutional languages of its stakeholder supporters, constantly creating interest and making real. According to Mosse (2005: 125), brokering requires the fostering of close and trusting relationships between key individuals in different parts of the system, and to this end the broker must have certain qualities: an ability to exploit ambiguous insider/outsider positions to create space and give actors in organizations a room for maneuver that is formally denied. The broker/mediator is a person of constantly shifting size and institutional position (Mosse 2005: 125).

The data for this chapter comes from documents and interviews (over 50) conducted during the fieldwork period (2002-2004). I conducted interviews with bilateral/multilateral project staff, representatives of donor agencies posted in Indonesia, senior central government officials and NGO representatives.

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In addition to these protean qualities, Mosse importantly notes that the influence or power of the broker cannot be assumed brokers at institutional interfaces are as vulnerable as they are necessary in aid projects (Mosse 2005: 188). As I demonstrate in this chapter, DFF plays precisely this role vis--vis other institutions and possesses these attributes, viz., shifting in size and institutional position, speaking in everyones name, or no ones (Latour 1996: 44-5, cited in Mosse 2005: 125), and necessary, yet vulnerable. As noted earlier, the DFF was created in the context of the CGI 3 : At the February 2000 CGI meeting, donors were concerned about the whether/how the government would operationalize its commitment to forestry reform and thus proposed (and GOI accepted) to have a small group of donor agencies established as a forum to assist GOI in carrying out its proposed actions and monitoring progress leading up to the next CGI meeting. Accordingly, the CGI Donor Forum on Forestry has been established (World Bank 2001: 27). The DFF itself describes its history and function as follows: The DFF (Donor Forum on Forestry) was created in 2000 within the context of the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia) as a dialog partner for the Government of Indonesia in implementing commitments on the Forestry sector. It has, so far, been very successful in that it has enabled common donor agreements and monitoring
3

The closest predecessor to the DFF was the Consultative Group on Indonesian Forestry (CGIF). The CGIF was active from 1993 to 1999. It began as a government initiated donor-government dialogue and donor coordination initiative. Several factors contributed to its demise. First, the issue of forestry was raised to the level of international donors (the Paris Club) in 1999, thereby moving government interest away from the CGIF to the Paris Club and CGI. Second, with the creation of the DFF, donors involved in the forestry sector now had another forum to focus its energies. Third, GTZ has been involved in CGIF for several years, and a leadership change in the GTZ project most closely associated with the CGIF affected GTZs interest and role in the CGIF. GTZ began to play a more prominent role in the CGIF and, unconsciously or not, projectized the CGIF to make it more inclusive, bringing Indonesian NGOs into the dialogue. However, NGO and GoI interpretations of dialogue substantially differed to the point of NGO disengagement and GoI persistence of its established agenda. In making CGIF more of a project, GTZ created a set of outputs and objectives to be met by the CGIF that the active members of the CGIF did not necessarily consider as top priorities of the CGIF. Additionally this projectizing took partial authority of the CGIF from MoF, thereby losing MoFs sense of ownership.

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procedures to be agreed to prepare for donor inputs at CGI meetings. DFF meetings have also been used as a forum to discuss forest policy related topics beyond the confines of the CGI. The paper on Forest Finance is a case in point. This has led some to believe that the DFF could gradually be expanded to encompass a wider donor coordination mandate. The latter expectation has not materialized (DFF Terms of Reference 2003). As a dialog partner for GoI, the status and legality of DFF as an entity is unclear there is no governmental decree acknowledging its legal existence, and the forum itself does not have a charter or by-laws. Moreover, in examining the minutes from the first DFF meeting on March 8, 2000, vagueness of the DFFs role and position prevail. The meeting minutes note the following functions of the DFF: facilitating consultation and dialogue, encouraging GOI through the IDCF to address the urgent, intersectoral issues affecting the forests, elevating the National Forest Program process to the interministerial level, supporting those in and outside [at the then named] MoFEC that are working for forestry reform, educating IDCF members about what each of us4 is already doing to assist with the [then] eight urgent actions identified in the MoFECs presentation at CGI in February 2000, providing technical assistance, normally through our various existing programs, on questions on which the IDCF or MoFEC would like assistance.

Although not explicit, us and our in these minutes seem to refer to donors engaged in the CGI process, thus excluding donors such as Ford and NGOs that provide funding in the forestry sector such as TNC, CI, WWF, etc.

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These functions assume a certain authority of the DFF and a productive working relationship between the DFF and various Indonesian government agencies, but as discussed in the analysis of annual CGI statements, the relationship is anything but that. These relationships and the de facto authority of the DFF or lack thereof -- will be elaborated upon in this chapter. The minutes of the meeting also note that the group will be called the CGI Donor Forum on Forestry, which links the DFF to the CGI, but does not distinguish between the DFF and the CGI Working Group on Forestry. The CGI Working Group on Forestry (CGIWG), on paper at least, is a multistakeholder group that discusses forestry issues at the annual CGI meetings and is chaired by the EU, whereas the DFF is chaired by the World Bank. The Working Group is also supposed to include the Ministry of Forestry and civil society organizations, but as will be explained later the Working Group does not really exist. The minutes continue with an important remark: The Forum does not seek to become a permanent body and sees the months between now and the Tokyo CGI meeting (in 2000) as the time in which its work will be most important. Its first priority is to have the IDCF established and operating, since that is strategically important to both the NFP and the eight urgent actions. In 2004, the DFF still very much existed albeit in an ad hoc fashion. It is clear from the minutes of this first DFF meeting that the key functions of the DFF gravitated around supporting the IDCF, moving the NFP and priority points forward, and framed itself in terms of the CGI. What was unclear then and continues to be unclear are the legality of the DFF, the institutional muscle or instruments by which the DFF engages and monitors GOI, the

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criteria for membership, and DFFs relationship with the CGI-WG on forestry. Moreover the minutes assume a certain importance or authority of the IDCF, NFP and CGI that are not well founded. As I discuss in this chapter, the ambiguity in the status and position of the DFF is precisely what gives DFF its potential influence and makes DFF a resource to those actors it attempts to engage, albeit in a fragile and tenuous fashion. Within a particular institutional landscape, the DFF, by virtue of its ambiguity, can be different things to different actors, which helps recruit for the master metaphor of forest reform. In its day to day functioning and work, the DFF consists not of embassy staff or diplomatic corps of donor countries, but rather primarily of technical assistance experts, a self referential term, as well as an official descriptor of their capacity or function. They are expatriates that are paid through bilateral or multilateral projects or agencies that have international cooperative agreements with the Government of Indonesia through the Ministry of Forestry. Their official function is to provide technical assistance or expertise to the Ministry to carry out the said project. Given their ambiguous insider/outsider status, these individuals are particularly well placed to act as the brokers or translators in the master metaphor of forestry reform (Mosse 2005). The regular members of the DFF consist of the following individuals: (1) Environment specialist of the World Bank Indonesia office (2) Coordinator of DFIDs MFP (3) Forest Economist of DFIDs MFP (4) Technical Assistant for Forestry Sector Development Strategy, JICA (5) Director of EU funded Forest Liaison Bureau (6) Deputy Director of EU funded Forest Liaison Bureau

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(7) Chief of Party of the USAID funded NRM project (8) Deputy Chief of Party of the USAID funded NRM project (9) Chief Adviser, GTZ Strengthening the Management Capacities in the Ministry of Forestry The DFID, EU, GTZ, and JICA projects have direct cooperative agreements with the Ministry of Forestry and thus these projects are ostensibly in part accountable to the Ministry. The USAID funded NRM project has its direct cooperative agreement with the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), with the Ministry of Forestry as a formal partner; thus NRM reports to BAPPENAS and not the Ministry of Forestry, which individuals at NRM noted as significant. The World Bank had been absent from the forestry sector from 1994 until the IMF bailout loans and WB structural adjustment loans starting in 1998. In addition to this core group, representatives from embassies or bilateral aid agencies intermittently attend DFF meetings, particularly as the annual CGI meetings approach. For lack of a better name and acknowledging that they themselves are by and large not representatives of donor agencies, this core group refers to themselves half jokingly as the usual suspects or the sixth floor club. The sixth floor club refers to the fact that the majority of them have offices on the sixth floor of a particular building in the Ministry of Forestry (Block 7), which is where the Ministry places the offices for all of the international aid projects. Indeed, the elevator directory in this building refers to the sixth floor as the EXPERT floor. That this core group is uncomfortable referring to itself as donors is indicative of their ambiguous identities. While the status and position of these usual suspects as members of the DFF are ambiguous, it is important to distinguish how they are ambiguous, or in other words, to

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understand the various identities the usual suspects can assume. Eybens (2003) ethnography of the donor community in Bolivia is helpful in this regard. According to Eyben (2003: 7), in the world of international relations and development practice, we can think of three types of communities the international community, the development community and the donor community. 5 She notes that while the boundaries of the international community are fuzzy and disputed.firmly and undisputedlywithin those boundaries is a subcommunity that describes itself as the donor community (Eyben 2003: 7-8). The donor community, according to Eyben (2003: 8) is composed of donor professionals, employed by government departmentsinternational organizations such as the World Bank andUNDP and international NGOs such as CARE and Oxfam.[they] distinguish themselves from their fellow bureaucrats working as diplomats (who are part of the wider international community). With respect to the development community, Eyben (2003: 8) notes that it is more inclusive and heterogeneous than the donor community [and] extends to all development NGOs, global advocacy organizations and academics studying development. More specifically, Eyben (2003: 9) carves out the following space for the donor community: One way of considering the donor community and its capacity to influence, is in terms of Lathams description of social sovereignty (2000, cited in Eyben 2003). Social sovereignty is more restricted in its powers than hegemony and, unlike hegemony, does not necessarily entail the formation of an integrated political or

Eyben (2003: 7) uses community to mean an association in which membership is characterized as being exclusive, of long duration and with members united by sentiment with shared values, norms and practices.

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social order.we may see the donor community possessing social sovereignty over the domain of development practice, that is practice which is viewed by themselves and others as pertaining to development as a concept. Thus donors establish the rules for other actors, state and non-state, who engage with donors in development. While distinguishing between the international, donor and development communities, Eyben (2003: 9) makes explicit that all three are inter-locking communities that operate at the local (country) level and trans-nationally. Moreover, for any given member of the donor community at the country level, Eyben (2003: 11-12) explains that this individual is placed at the nexus of three overlapping circles or sets of relationships, norms and practices that influencer her action and, through her mediation, impact upon each othersuch a person [is] in a highly ambiguous situation, standing at the cognitive, cultural and political boundaries of three different structures and histories[viz..] the global donor communitythe local recipient space where we resided[and] back home. Eybens lucid description of the landscape of international development provides an institutional context within which to place the DFF and better understand the various spaces that members of the DFF can be perceived to occupy. It is important to note, however, that the role of the members of the DFF does not precisely map onto the role of Eybens donor, whose identity is established and maintained through giving, that is making gifts to others (Eyben 2003: 10). The core group of the DFF the usual suspects self-identify first and foremost as experts tied to bilateral or multilateral projects, although at times they are perceived by others as donors. This core group, however, is part of all three communities Eyben describes.

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II. Perceptions of the DFF by the usual suspects 6 A. The usual suspects perception of the DFF The core group the usual suspects -- agrees that the DFF was created in the context of the CGI meeting in 2000 to monitor the achievement of the then eight commitments in the forestry sector made by MOF, as well as to coordinate among donors to assist MOF in achieving these commitments. The core group also agrees that the DFF has been unable to fulfill its mandate for various reasons. One of the core members noted that the DFF was created to monitor commitments under CGI [priorities] and that it became a forum for major donors and projects to coordinate[and] develop a position paper. With respect to donor coordination, another core member noted that he and others saw it as vital since separately we cannot possibly have a strong impact with the little money, resources[we] want to effect leveragetherefore a relationship withthose with more power[and] influencing other bodies is important. And indeed, several of the core members noted improved collaboration and coordination among donor projects. One core member who had worked for an international forestry project in Indonesia for nearly a decade recalled that as late as 1997, there was little communication among projects and between projects and diplomats and that before [there was] vicious competition for meetings [with government]. With the DFF, he noted, there was more communication and some narrowing of statements to MOF. He highlighted in particular a joint analysis conducted by the core group and others in 2002 on Indonesian
6

The World Bank representative, who chaired the DFF and was considered a key figure in organizing DFF meetings by other DFF members, left Indonesia in mid-2003 for another post and was not replaced until mid2004, which meant there was effectively a one year gap in World Bank participation in the DFF. During this period the DFF was co-chaired by the EU-FLB and JICA with intermittent involvement of Bank officials.

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forest industry restructuring, overcapacity of forest industries, and related finance and debt issues, all of which led to a position paper and set of recommendations to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and IBRA. Another core member also noted that donor statements and commitments were more harmonized and that there had been a few areas of co-funding that were small, convenient, [and] within the realm of what we can do on our own10,000 to 50,000 USD. He referred to this as technical coordination [that] happens between the cracks [of individual bilateral projects]. That said, he also noted that he cannot say all donors coordinate for [the then] eight priorities. Moreover, he noted that the DFF doesnt have full coordination because no [involvement] of Ford, CIFOR [and others] and that real coordination requires a broader group. While recognizing the gains made through the DFF, the core group was of the opinion that the DFF had by and large failed to fulfill its mandate. One core member observed that although the DFF was supposed to help the donor community identify donor conditionalities within the CGI, we could not do thatforestry doesnt carry enough weight among donors. While he acknowledged that the DFF increased awareness, it did not lead to impact; he gave the example of the DFF analysis in 2002 demonstrating that IBRA should not sell the debt owed by forest industries in Indonesia because it would bail out companies that sourced their raw materials unsustainably and illegally. IBRA ignored the DFF analysis and recommendations and sold the vast majority of the debt to the government itself. According to another member of the core group, the purpose of the DFF in many ways was set up to create the paper [for the] CGI and that the DFF was supposed to monitor what is happening, but is not.

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In reflecting on the origin and evolution of the DFF, another of the core group noted the following: donors raised the issue and then they disappeared[the issue was ] left to the experts[in the] 1999 and 2000 CGIthe political momentum was there at the CGIdonors [were] strong and the CGI committedthen we the donors and experts failed to make use of the momentum[we] should have sat together and separate and with GOI for support programsbut did not[we] sat on existing projectswe did not unite. Experts were left alone and not prepared for the political job[there was] little participation from the embassiesembassies should have brought in political experts. From these comments we can glean that the perceived failure of the DFF is very much a failure to maintain recruitment of the other actors involved, e.g., GOI and the donor community. Mosse (2005: 184) notes that failure is produced by the cascading effect of individuals disconnecting the fate of their ambitions from the fate of a project. And indeed, this is precisely what the core member of the DFF means when he says donors raised the issue and then they disappeared. In that individuals comments, as well as others, we also see that the core members refer to themselves as experts and distinguish themselves from donors. As discussed earlier, the position and status of the core members of the DFF is ambiguous and multiple, and in this context, they draw attention to the fact that although they acted as brokers between institutions, they lacked the political power of donors to influence the practices of GOI at an intergovernmental level. In commenting on how the DFF functions, a member of the core group noted that the DFFs activity is linked to the CGI meetings, which are held twice a year the annual and

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mid-term meetings. He noted that its a peak and crash of activity every six months and that afterwards everyone forgets what the issues are and [there is no] follow-up. Then six months later the DFF starts sweating again. Another concurred noting that the DFF is like a spring [coil] that tenses up toward the CGI. 7 With respect to who attends DFF meetings, one of the core members noted that the donors are not really there[and when they do come] donors are there for political reasons. He reiterated that regular participation in the DFF consists of the sixth floor club with others coming in and out and that it is not a donor forum[but rather] project guys with energy that do the writing [of the CGI statements]. Further, he noted that the informality of the DFF and meeting procedures is problematic: the DFF is a forumno one [is] in charge, no institutional structure, bylaws[there are] huge process violations. As an example, he noted that for the June 2003 CGI meeting, the donor statement was changed after the event because MOF found certain language unacceptable. Further, he noted in preparing a DFF statement for another CGI meeting, one of the core members who had been involved in the drafting of the statement was informed at an extreme late juncture by his agencys home office not to sign the statement and indeed to denounce it due to heavy lobbying by an environmental NGO based in that country. In the end, this led to last minute changes in the statement to the disgruntlement of the other core members. The core member who related these incidents to me summed up his experience in the DFF observing that in the end, each donor is left to their own devices and that a failure of the DFF was not to follow procedures internally more

In her ethnography of the donor community in Bolivia, Eyben (2003: 15) notes a similar situation: Before the annual Consultative Group meetings between donors and government, the like-mindeds would prepare intensively to achieve a common position at the meeting.

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rigorously. This individuals comments indicate the negative aspects or vulnerabilities (Mosse 2005) of the broker role of the DFF and its flexible and informal organization. The informal and consensus based nature of the DFF led another long-term core member to note that the DFF was settling for mediocrity and that nothing is hard hitting in the donor statements. In commenting on the reasons for this, this individual asked rhetorically, Is it realistic for donor representatives to make a position paper? Reflecting on the decision making processes of the DFF, he noted that foreign policy differs in each country.therefore a unified position is often weak. He further explained that the paper starts as a solid first draft, [and then] the negotiation waters it down to something that is mediocre (cf. Riles 1998). He noted that the end result is not really a DFF position paper and ends up being a debate between the usual suspects. Indeed, another concurred adding that each donor flies its own flag[it is] difficult to make everyone happy without diluting down the statement. This is unsurprising given that the donor paper presented at the CGI meetings is the donors articulation of the master metaphor of forest crisis and reform in Indonesia and thus is necessarily vague, general and ambiguous (Mosse 2005). Similar to other core members regarding the origins of the DFF, the individual who mentioned that the DFF was settling for mediocrity noted that it was set up to make progress and highlight issues [that] feed into donors and the CGI and that initially it seemed a way to address the issue of how could technical people in donor projects work with MOF and other sectors? He commented that in the beginning there was an assumption that the CGI process [was] so significant that it would make [forest] issues look important. Indeed, his initial assumption of the DFF was that it can reach beyond MoF[that] diplomatic people can take forestry to the next level, [that] they are interlocutors to the broader

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landscape [of institutions]. His experience with the DFF, however, led him to conclude that since 2001, weve been kidding ourselves that the CGI is a place for forestry reform. In reflecting on the ad hoc evolution of the DFF he noted that in the beginning [the DFF was] not seen as permanent[but now] perceived as a permanent institutional process, and that its purpose and benefit were not clear. He noted that if the purpose of the DFF was to work with MOF to resolve problems, it was unnecessary since projects dont need DFF[there is] no reason to use DFF to work with MOF. Further, he noted that if the DFF [is] about the CGI process and forestry, the CGI cannot accomplish [that] since it is more of a ceremonial event. In sum, it is clear that this core group of the DFF perceive the DFF as not having achieved its original mandate beyond minor improved donor communication and marginal international project collaboration. The reasons for this perception implied in their comments are intimately related to the DFFs relationship with, on the one hand, (1) the CGI and donor agencies of respective members and, (2) on the other, the Ministry of Forestry. The following portion of the chapter focuses on these two sets of relationships. B. The usual suspects perceptions of the CGI and their relationship with their respective donor agencies 1. A case of dual identities In the core groups comments regarding the reasons for the DFFs perceived failure, the relationship between this core group and their respective donor agencies in the context of the CGI figures prominently. More specifically, many of the core members of the DFF perceive their institutional position in the DFF, and consequently their drafting of the DFF statement for the CGI, as debilitating the DFF as well as their own project work. It is

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important to recall one core members comment regarding how the DFF evolved after the initial political commitment from the donors at the 2000 CGI meeting: Experts were left alone and not prepared for the political job[there was] little participation from the embassies. In other words, according to this individual and other core members, the usual suspects or technical experts de facto became the DFF because the diplomatic corps or embassy representatives of donor countries did not actively engage in the DFF once it was established. This presents an interesting variation on Mosses (2004) notion of brokers. The core members of the DFF are well-positioned to act as brokers because of the ambiguous identities, yet were reluctant to be brokers and were failed by other actors in part because of the lack of clarity of their identities. According to many of the core members their being the DFF de facto is problematic because they are officially seconded or linked to the Ministry of Forestry. Moreover, they do not have the diplomatic status to be a donor representative. For example, one noted that if you look at the organizational chart[I am] part of the secretary general [of the Ministry], not the government [of my donor institution].but at the CGI, [I am] on the side of [my government]. On a related issue of their position vis--vis the Ministry and donor governments, another core member noted that we [technical experts] dont have the mandate, authority, or experience to engage in high level policy such as the CGI. And thus, according to another, the problem is we [technical experts] get lost[it is] difficult for us to wear two hats. The two hats he refers to is, on the one hand, officially being technical experts seconded to the Ministry via international government-to-government agreements and, on the other, de facto acting as a proxy for donor countries via their participation in the DFF and

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drafting of the DFF statement for the CGI annual meetings. Similarly, another core member noted that in the double role of individuals there are ambiguities, constraints, conflicts. He continued noting that the double role of donor and projects are two distinct positions the donor exercises persuasion, leverage, as a project cannot since in a project the individual is assigned to the loyalty to a master [viz., the Ministry of Forestry]. Echoing this point, another core member in assessing this awkward double role noted that MOF is rightyou [the technical experts] come to help us and you turn around and criticize us [in the DFF statements]therefore DFF has negative influence. He concluded that we [the technical experts] overstepped our welcome, therefore we were pushed back. Moreover, several of the core members noted that their participation and work in the DFF is either not within or a low priority in their individual Terms of Reference (ToR) or job description, which focuses much more on the implementation of their respective bilateral projects. One noted that the DFF is beyond everyones job description and it needed more active diplomatic participation. Another noted that his participation in the DFF was outside his ToR, while three others noted that their ToRs made general reference to supporting the CGI, and not specific reference to preparing the DFF statement. Two others who are contractors to the same aid agency noted that their ToRs do not explicitly mention DFF or pay 20% attention to the DFF. The core members remarked negatively on the lack of participation of the diplomatic corps of their respective donor countries in the DFF and in the CGI Forestry Working Group at the CGI meetings. One asked rhetorically who are the donors? What do we mean by donor forum? He continued explaining that diplomats represent governmenttechnical people [are] running the programsone problem [is that] diplomats dont come to [DFF]

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meetings. In distinguishing between technical people and diplomats, this individual implies that technical people are somehow divorced from government and politics and do not have leverage in those arenas, which is not the case. As Eyben (2003: 28) observes, the donor community used development discourses that allow its members to dress up the moral, the value-laden and the ideological as technical. Another core member flatly noted that the diplomatic group needs to increase participation. Yet another concurred, commenting that the role of diplomats in the Working Group is not clear and that the Working Group doesnt work because the only meetings of the Working Group are for the CGI statement. This individual also rhetorically asked can we get buy in from the embassy in the CGI Working Group on Forestry? No! [And that] raises the question of whether the CGI Working Group should exist at all. A World Bank consultant who was responsible for organizing the December 2003 CGI observed that the group of donors at embassies are not engaged [there are] no leaders, champions. The frustration of this core group with respect to their ambiguous institutional role in the DFF and the lack of participation from the diplomatic corps was conveyed in a core members comment that the usual suspects are not invited to [the CGI]although they prepare the paperthe usual suspects are not officially the same as the DFF. Another noted that although a commitment had been made at the December 2003 CGI to follow up on forestry issues, and he had contacted many institutions including the IMF and World Bank, the CGI was not followed up, which was frustrating. Indeed, the World Bank consultant who was a key organizer of the December 2003 CGI noted that embassy staff de facto defer to contractors [the technical experts] and that although this is good for information sharing

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among technical experts and that [brought] technical experts closer to dialogue[it] does not take the dialogue where it needs to go. One of the core members noted that the director of natural resource issues at his donors international aid office in Indonesia entrusted him and the other expatriate involved in the bilateral project as representatives at DFF meetings, but with the understanding that they are technical and not diplomatic representatives, and thus did not have decision making authority. This DFF core member also rhetorically asked who is the DFF? noting that it is not clear. Another commented that there are always questions of who are members of DFF. The reality of the institutional arrangements and functioning of the DFF is in stark contrast to what the name the Donor Forum on Forestry implies and indeed what other actors, such as the Indonesian government and NGOs, assume that the DFF should be. This only adds to the perceived failure of the DFF to fulfill its mandate. As one core member noted, the CGI has inflated the DFF, therefore many think that the DFF can do more that it does.[but actually] its a lot of hype in many cases. Another noted that because of the assumption that donors are unified, that donors learn and that the CGI process is effective, the DFFs image is bigger than life, and this perception held by the Indonesian government and NGOs only led the DFF into a position that the DFF was bigger, stronger [than it actually was]therefore [it] failed miserably. 2. Institutional incentives of donors While the ambiguous position of the usual suspects, or the core members of the DFF, in some ways strengthens the DFFs brokering role, in other ways this lack of clarity works against brokering, particularly in light of the incentives and practices of the diplomatic corps and other official representatives of donor countries, who ultimately failed the DFF

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(Mosse 2004), or in other words prioritized other issues over the DFF and forest reform in Indonesia. In examining the comments from the core group regarding institutional incentives, practices and relationships of donors calling for reform and participating in the CGI, there seems to be marginal institutional incentive and interest among the diplomatic corps and other official donor representatives to engage in processes related to forest reform such as the DFF. This has contributed to the disjuncture between, on the one hand, the institutional logic and practices of international aid-funded projects and, on the other, fulfilling the mandate of the DFF. In reflecting on the history of forestry issues in the CGI and its origins in the IMF and World Bank conditionalities, one core member of the DFF noted that the CGI became a conditionality thing [that] the IMF never enforcedtherefore the framework failed. He concluded that the CGI is formal pronouncementnot a confrontational forum. Commenting on the lack of donor commitment to forest reforms, this individual rhetorically asked given that international export-import banks make loanshow serious are donors? Another individual agreed that conditionalities dont work, while at the same time he thought that the CGI and conditionality process was the reason they, the members of the core group, were systematically excluded from the policy process [of the Ministry]. When asked about their own institutional incentives to participate in the DFF as well as their respective donor institutions incentives, the core members comments highlighted that often other incentives and other institutional practices take precedence over donor coordination and collaboration and fulfillment of DFF functions. Besides the DFF being by and large outside of their individual job descriptions, the core members commented on institutional incentives and practices that were not necessarily supportive of the DFF

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mandate. For example, when asked why donors do not penalize the government of Indonesia for not complying to their commitments through, for example, halting disbursement of funds, one core member noted that to stop a bad project is not easy[there is a] chain effect. In this case, this individual worked for a EU-funded project and he noted that a sanction by one country of the EU is all of the EU. Another noted that with respect to donor coordination, projects take one year to design and assess, and thus coordinating project activities among different donors was institutionally difficult, whereas coordinating statements was much easier. He noted that all projects have a scope of work and that all donors have these constraints, and thus it was a question of whose job is thisto coordinate across sectors. Further, this individual noted that within any given aid agency, there is no institutional incentive to coordinate, collaborate and that it falls between the cracks. He gave an example of the donor institution he was working for funding not only a sustainable natural resource management project, but also IBRA, which ultimately wrote off the debt of many of the forest industries that were sourcing raw materials unsustainably or illegally. Asked whether these institutional incentives and practices experienced at the project or field level by core members of DFF could be fed into donor policies and practices to improve them, he flatly noted members of DFF do not influence ministries of foreign affairs [or other government departments] and that in the case of his project the influence was nil. With respect to incentives for coordination within a donor agency, another core member noted that the Indonesian mission of that donor country included not only an international aid representative in charge of the natural resource portfolio, but also an embassy staffer representing the department of foreign affairs on science, technology and

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environment issues whose responsibility was to brief the home office. There was no institutional link to ensure communication between these two individuals since each came from a different government department, even though their offices were both within the embassy complex. It was also pointed out that with respect to institutional incentives, the head of the aid mission in Indonesia was accountable and responsive to directives from the metropole and not necessarily the realities in Indonesia, and thus if the two were not in accordance, the implementation of the metropoles directives took precedence -- in short the aid directors tenure is measured by indicators of success [mandated by the metropole]. On a related topic regarding the metropoles influence on field projects, a core member of the DFF in charge of a bilateral project noted that with the change in administration in his home country, the management of the international aid agency also changed and therefore, [now] less money, more emphasis on results. He continued noting that previously there was less emphasis on monitoring, outputsnow [the emphasis is on] number of hectares effected, number of people trained and that money [was] tighter and requirements on work tighter with a demand for specific activities replicated. It was a turn back to traditional indicators, and the current indicators, which emphasized outputs and products, did not help what his project was attempting to achieve. Mosse (2005: 188) describes a similar situation in the rural development project in India when DFID changed its global policy: DFID construed the complex effects of a change in the relationship between donor patron and project client as operational failure. But in reality, project operations and field practices what project staff actually did changed little in the shift from success to failure.

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These core members of the DFF also commented that often the institutional incentives and practices related to international aid-projects were not conducive to achieving the mandate of the DFF. For example, one observed that in his agency internationally posted personnel changed every two to three years and that a three year project is not enough timeneed 5-10 years to establish an effective policy dialogue mechanism. In her ethnography of the donor community in Bolivia a community in which she was an active participant Eyben (2003: 28) concludes something similar: It is difficult to learn and to assume a long-term vision in a local donor community. Each individual is operating in a short-time frame related to an average residence of three years in any country and she want to see herself as having made a difference. In many instances she is also under pressure to disburse. An example of the debilitating effect of personnel change is the one year gap between the departure of the previous environment specialist at the World Bank in Indonesia, which chairs the DFF, and his successor. Compounding this problem, during the interim the World Bank did not defer chairmanship to another organization, but rather intermittently and inconsistently chaired DFF meetings and appointed individuals whose understanding of the forestry situation in Indonesia was limited. C. The usual suspects perceptions of their relationship with MOF The core group generally agrees that the relationship between members of the DFF and the Ministry of Forestry is not productive. That said, some view this relationship as having been better or worse in the past. This difference of opinion depends on individual members perception of the ideal working relationship between them and the Ministry, e.g., whether their mandate is to work with the Ministry as the Ministry sees fit, or to work

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towards the goals stipulated in their project mandate, regardless of whether this may conflict with the interests of the Ministry. As one core member caricatured it within the DFF, [there are] bilaterals that work like NGOs and others who pat the feathers of important people. Indeed, some members of the core group commented that we were not sensitive enough as advisors [to MoF] and thus MOF blames experts. Others, however, see the Ministry and government as more responsible for the lack of progress. One member rhetorically asked, how does the international community express frustration that the government made commitments and got billions and did not follow through? He continued remarking that donor supportconfirms the status quo...[it] confirms pusats [the central governments] belief in its own importance. In the context of the multiple, rapid, and dramatic political economic changes in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto in 1998, it is perhaps not surprising that the members of this core group have significantly different opinions on how international aid-related forest related projects should engage with the Ministry. It also important to recall that for the Ministry the post-Suharto period has been one of constant transition there have been six Ministers of Forestry during the period between 1998 and 2004, and with each Minister there has been change in senior level personnel in the Ministry. Indeed, one core member noted that during this period it has been difficult to find a person in the Ministry to consistently meet with. Another noted that in 2001, he didnt even know who to go to for a meeting and that in mid 2002 there was absolute paralysis in the Ministry of Forestry. That said, the core members agree that the Ministry has not been active in engaging the DFF in coordinating international aid projects in the forestry sector. Donor coordination should be done by the Government of Indonesia, remarked one core member. Another noted

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that the Ministrys department of international cooperation (Kerjasama Luar Negri) should say here is our program but does not. Yet another observed that in the Ministry capacity and willingness [are] lacking. Indeed, the core members agree that since forestry became an agenda item at the CGI in 2000, the Ministry has engaged members of the DFF in a limited fashion. One core member reflected that after a joint action plan was drawn up in 2000 based on national level workshops, there was no partner, no implementation and that the DFF should report to the CGI that nothing is happening and that it [the CGI] should pressure the government of Indonesia by implementing conditionalities, but instead it has only raised the pitch of rhetoric. The inaction of the Ministry specifically and government generally on the National Forest Plan (NFP) that the government committed to at the 2000 CGI is indicative of this perceived lack of engagement. On this issue, one core member noted that there is no country led coordination and that if it is talked about, it comes from donors. He continued noting that the NFP should be the overarching framework, but that the chair of the IDCF (the committee that oversees and is responsible for the NFP), the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs, is not interested and that the Ministry of Forestry had no interest in the NFP even though it was mandated by Presidential Decree (KepPres 80/2000). Indeed, the MOF counterpart to the bilateral project assisting the NFP process never came to the project office, and the NFP working group was never active because of the lack of interest. In addition to this perceived inaction, core members of the DFF also perceive the Ministry as periodically defensive and opposing reform. For example, in June 2003 the Ministry halted the DFID funded Multi-stakeholder Forestry Program (MFP) for more than

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six months and called for a joint review of the program because the Ministry perceived MFPs activities to not be in accordance with priorities of the Ministry or the bilateral agreement between DFID and the Ministry. The Ministry felt that MFP was advocating for and supporting Indonesian NGOs promoting land tenure reform in the forestry sector so that the rights of forest dependent communities to forest resources would be recognized. While it was acknowledged that MFP could have been more sensitive to the Ministrys position, particularly given the bilateral agreement between MOF and DFID, according to one member of the core group of the DFF, DFID did not realize how strongly pusat [the Ministry] would oppose MFP working directly in the regions[that] the attitude toward otda [decentralization] was negative[and] blamed local governments. According to this individual, the senior levels of the Ministry perceive the crisis is such in forestry that there is no time for democracytherefore recentralize and then go to decentralization more slowly and that the Ministrys vision proclaims only the top can manage forests properly. He further remarked that donors have achieved nothing with MOFMOF even set up a parallel process for restructuring industry. After the Ministry mandated review, MFP became a traditional bilateral project with government staff at MFP to approve proposals for grants to Indonesian NGOs. In short, it was noted that MFP evolved from a free independent operator to more traditional business, project and that MFP has not had impact on the bureaucracy. 8 The USAID-funded Natural Resource Management (NRM) project also incurred a defensive response from the Ministry. This project, which has its bilateral agreement with

DFID signed a bilateral agreement with the Ministry to implement MFP because DFID previously had a strong network in MOF, and it was believed by some that DFID could create change in MOF from within. The review was perceived less as an actual assessment and more as diplomatic vehicle to increase MOFs role in the remainder of the project, which runs through 2006.

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BAPPENAS, supports decentralized sustainable natural resource management. To this end, it worked with the district government of Kutai Barat in East Kalimantan on multistakeholder strategic forest planning by providing training, facilitation and a framework for the strategic plan. The district government then developed and approved a district forest regulation that the Ministry considered in violation of the Basic Forestry Law (UU 41/1999). The Ministry criticized the NRM project for supporting this illegal activity, even though NRM did not create the plan or write the regulation. Moreover, according to NRM staff, over the 18-month period of training and facilitation in Kutai Barat, Ministry personnel visited the district two to three times; it was a transparent process. Further, even though the district forest regulation was approved in November 2002, the Ministry only made an issue of this in March 2003, which was approximately the same time that the Ministry fell under heavy scrutiny over a regulation (PP 34/2002) it had passed that many perceived as an attempt to recentralize control over logging and other permits. Indeed, at that time Indonesian NGOs and others had petitioned for and were granted a judicial review of the regulation. In the end, the NRM project did not concede to the Ministrys accusation and did not request the district government to retract the district regulation, but it did agree to facilitate better communication and cross visits between the district government and Ministry. These two examples, as well as the inertia of the NFP, demonstrate how the core members of the DFF became implicated in the power struggles between the central and district governments, as well as power struggles between various central government agencies. Moreover, from the perspective of this core group the Ministry has minimal interest and/or ability to move forward the reforms in the forestry sector that the government had committed to at the 2000 CGI. At the same time, the core group also perceives the

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commitment of their respective donor agencies as less than optimal due to the institutional incentives, logics and practices of these bureaucracies. In sum, the DFF was failed by both donor and GOI agencies, and the ambiguous, informal institutional reality of the DFF was a liability instead of an asset with respect to brokering between institutions. III. Perceptions of the DFF by central government agencies 9 A. The Ministry of Forestrys perceptions of DFF Senior officials at the Ministry of Forestry have high expectations for what the DFF should do and how the relationship between the Ministry and DFF should be, while also being dissatisfied by the day-to-day membership of the DFF and generally disappointed by the reality of the DFF. With respect to expectations of the DFF, senior MOF officials want the DFF to be the MOFs voice (swara) in the international community, defending and explaining the position of the MOF and GOI to the international community. As one senior MOF official noted, the DFF should represent the institution above them.[they] communicate the limits of MOF to [for example] the World Bank, embassies. This official also noted that if a person can understand us, please give us inputwe want to be understood. Indeed, for MOF specifically and GOI generally international aid and donor engagement in the forestry sector are vehicles to leverage credibility and legitimacy internationally.

The following section of the chapter is based on interviews (approximately 10) conducted with senior central government officials who rank either just below or two levels below the Minister in the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Environment, the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, and the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), all of which ostensibly participate in the Interdepartmental Committee on Forestry (IDCF), which all of these agencies concur failed miserably. The failure of the IDCF was in large part due to these various central government agencies having differing institutional incentives with respect to forests. See Chapter 6.

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From the perspective of senior officials at the MOF, however, the DFF has not achieved what the MOF expects of it. On an operational, day-to-day basis the MOF sees that the DFF consists of expatriates who work for bilateral projects and are ostensibly technical assistance experts seconded to the MOF. From the perspective of senior MOF officials, it is not clear how this technical staff, lower in the hierarchy than they are, can also represent the donors. In other words, with respect to the Ministrys hierarchy, how can those that serve the Ministry, viz., ranking below the Director General level, also be the Ministrys international counterpart, i.e., donor representatives? These comments from the senior Ministry officials reveal both the positive and negative elements of the ambiguous and informal reality of the DFF. That the DFF consists of seconded technical expert expatriates is beneficial with respect to brokering and translating between institutions because they understand the practices, logics and culture of the Ministry better than most of the international community. At the same time, when the DFF does not achieve what Ministry officials expect, Ministry officials blame the ambiguity of the membership of the DFF for the lack of progress. One senior official noted with respect to the CGI and the unclear role of technical project people and diplomatic staff, the technical level [and] policy level in the CGI [are] mixed and uncleardo technical people inform embassy people as well? In the CGI, the embassy people represent and support their own countries. This official continued commenting that there is a problem of technical people and decision makers communication and that the diplomatic corps tend to speak in terms of feathery words or fluff (kata bersayap). He recommended that there needs to be increased informal discussions between embassies and the government to brief about the situation[it] provides understanding and communication [that] cannot happen at the CGI.

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Senior MOF officials were also critical of the positions of some of the individuals who made up the core group of the DFF, i.e., the bilateral project expatriates. Specifically, these senior government officials were critical of those members of the DFF who were policy as opposed to technical oriented. One senior official noted that the weakness of DFF is that in the DFF there are two levels technical and policy and that communication between MOF and DFF was not smooth (nga lancar) because of this, or more specifically because technical people were good with us (baik sama kita) and the policy people had different thoughts (pikiran lain) and thus did not connect (jadi nga nyambung). The distinction between technical and policy is informative because it is really a distinction between those that accommodate the wishes of Ministry and those that the Ministry feels has created problems for them. The distinction has much less to do with the actual different in functions of technical versus policy staff, which none of the Ministry officials or project people could articulate, and much more to do with supportive versus critical from the perspective of the Ministry. This resonates with Eybens comment that those we [international donors and development community] encounter in the local community may actually encourage us to stay in the realm of technical discourse as a means of managing a relationship where they can keep a certain distance from us (Eyben 2003: 28). Related to this last point, those individuals attached to bilateral projects that focused on the forestry sector through a framework of good governance, poverty alleviation and decentralized management were considered by senior Ministry officials as policy and thus had different thoughts. Indeed, one senior MOF official mapped onto the distinction between technical and policy staff the distinction between knowledge and ignorance of forests and ecosystems. She noted that those promoting tenure reform and rationalization of

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forests lacked an understanding of the forest (kurang pemhamanan hutan). This individual noted that in these discussions of tenure sustainable forest management is not considered and that the government releasing authority over Indonesias forests would not alleviate poverty. As this official noted, in Indonesia, if [we] give forest to community, [they] will sell. According to this official, the DFF members who advocate this type of tenure reform lack a background regarding ecosystem functions. And indeed with respect to the national social forestry program, those members of DFF who raised issues regarding tenure, according to this official, were those who did not have a natural resource background. In doing so, this senior official calls into question the knowledge and expertise of any individual who raises policy or tenure issues. An important analytical point from these comments from senior government officials is the unstated assumption that if DFF members understood the Ministry better, then there would be no difference of opinion between the Ministry and the DFF. Conversely, another assumption is that if DFF members do not agree with MOF, the reason is that that DFF member does not understand the Ministry and/or forestry. The fundamental assumption from officials comments is that if an individual understands, then undoubtedly he/she will have the same position as the Ministry. This is what Ministry officials expect will be communicated to the international community by the DFF, viz., the Ministrys position, which is not to be questioned. Senior MOF officials noted the lack of understanding in highlighting their disappointment concerning two incidents where bilateral projects were involved in or supportive of demands perceived by MOF as not in accordance with the Forestry Law and other related MOF policies. They referred specifically to the DFID funded Multistakeholder

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Forestry Programme (MFP) and the USAID funded Natural Resource Management (NRM) project, both of which were discussed in an earlier section of the chapter. With respect to MFP, senior MOF officials perceived MFP as inappropriately advocating for tenure reform, and hence the Ministry called for a joint review of MFP after a conflict occurred between a senior Ministry official and Indonesian NGO representatives at the 2003 national MFP meeting funded by MFP. According to the senior MOF official, the national meeting showed that after two years of implementation real multistakeholder processes were not in place, evinced by the hostile interaction between the Ministry and Indonesian NGOs. From the perspective of this official, Indonesian NGOs funded by MFP -- were calling for ownership over forests without considering the necessary pre-conditions and also the fact that there was no local reform. With respect to the USAID-funded NRM project and its facilitation of forest policy development in the district of Kutai Barat in East Kalimantan, from the perspective of senior Ministry officials, USAID facilitated the process by their design (design dia) and was in conflict with the Basic Forestry law, and therefore the Ministry admonished the project about its activities. Indeed, one senior official referred to USAIDs involvement as manipulation to push for US priorities and position on decentralization. He also noted that all donors are similar in this regard, and thus the DFF needs to be sensitive because this kind of thing creates instability. In addition, senior officials commented negatively that these projects went directly to the local level forgetting the upper levels [with whom they have official relationships] and thus were confused or out of order (galau).

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B. MOFs negative perception of the international aid agenda The perception of senior MOF officials regarding the conflicts between the Ministry and the two bilateral projects is indicative of a broader awareness and critical understanding of MOF officials towards international aid-funded forestry initiatives. Comments made during interviews regarding donors and international aid clearly indicated this. One senior official noted that donors often have an agenda (sering mereka punya agenda), that the DFF often blames the government instead of building the country (DFF sering salahkan GOI dari pada membangun negara) and that priorities in donor countries are different than the government of Indonesia since donors have their own constituencies. He continued noting that MOF feels that projects are [for] their [the donors] needs. Moreover, he mentioned that at the CGI meetings the Indonesian contingent is particularly disturbed by the way diplomats comment on matters.most diplomats jump to conclusions and emphasize the negative side[and] forget that this is hard in their own country. He noted this attitude is particularly difficult to take from donor countries that are critical but do not provide aid to the forestry sector. He further commented that therefore many Indonesians say forget it. Another concurred, commenting that members of the DFF had a personal agenda that was part of their institutions foreign policy agenda. He continued noting that the differing foreign policy agendas of respective donors created competition within DFF and made it such that MOF could not coordinate the DFF. For example, he noted that many donors insisted on East Kalimantan as a location for projects because of politics in home countries (insist KalTimkarena politik disana). Additionally, he commented that sometimes foreign experts who came with projects were not qualified and that it would be better to use local

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experts. In a slightly more conspiratorial tone, he added that some donors use Indonesia to experiment with Western notions such as poverty. Thus, the possibility of multiple objectives, ulterior motives and/or hidden agendas among donors constitutes an important element of how Ministry officials understand the international aid community. In addition to this critical understanding of donor motives and incentives, senior MOF officials also commented on other disincentives or barriers in the implementation of bilateral projects. One senior official noted that the disparities in salary and benefits between expatriate experts and their Indonesian government counterparts were not conducive to productive collaborations. 10 These disparities are particularly difficult for Indonesian government counterparts when the counterpart is thought to end up carrying out most of the work because the expert lacks the skills or knowledge to do so. In addition to these benefit and salary disparities, this same senior MOF official acknowledged that segregating the bilateral project expatriates onto one floor separate from the rest of the Ministry was a barrier to coordination and collaboration. C. Other central government agencies perceptions of the DFF Thus far, the discussion has focused exclusively on the perceptions of senior MOF officials regarding the DFF. Senior officials from other central government agencies with connections to forestry through the IDCF also have particular expectations and perceptions of the DFF, which are inextricably linked to those agencies relationship, or lack thereof, with the Ministry of Forestry. Although they may only be familiar with the DFF in name and may not understand its role, other central government agencies have high expectations of the DFF with respect to coordination. One reason for this, according to one senior government

Somewhat ironically, it was BAPPENAS that established the compensation scales for civil servants involved in international aid funded projects.

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official, is because [there is] no hope for the government. Indeed, perhaps the most instructive aspect of conversations with non-MOF officials regarding the DFF was their remarks regarding the government and inter-agency relationships, both of which were primarily negative and critical. These inter-agency struggles and conflicts contributed to government departments failing, or not supporting, the DFF. For example, one senior official at BAPPENAS when asked about the role of the DFF noted that the problem of coordination should actually be addressed by BAPPENAS, but that BAPPENAS had lost that authority, as well as other inter-agency decision making powers and control over annual budget allocations11 . Senior government officials did not limit their comments to noting the loss of authority in their own agencies, but instructively, they commented quite critically about other agencies and were forthcoming about conflicts between agencies. For example, one senior non-MOF official noted that Minister of Forestry felt defensive or cornered (dipojokan) because he did not have allies in the Ministry (nga ada kawan didalam). He continued noting that corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN 12 ) was still strong within the MOF (KKN didalam dephut.kuat) and that for the Minster there were many enemies within the Ministry[and that it was] still rotten inside MOF (banyak musuh didalam selimutmasih busuk didalam MOF). Another senior non-MOF official noted that the reasons for the lack of progress in forestry was that problem solving at MOF
He noted that with reforms in government since the fall of Suharto in mid 1998, BAPPENAS and other executive branch agencies had lost substantial control of budgetary decisions to the legislature (DPR). He further commented that with this shift in authority it was unclear what agency should be responsible for coordination and that consultation between agencies was minimal. He added that BAPPENAS loss of authority and power was not merely due to changing regulations and indeed there is no official regulation decreasing the control, power [of BAPPENAS], but [at the] political levelrealities. In short, BAPPENAS loss of power over the past few years has very much to do with that agencys prominent role during the Suharto regime and centralized governance. In the era of reformasi and decentralization, it was politically unacceptable for BAPPENAS to maintain a position of authority. Indeed, this BAPPENAS official noted that now BAPPENAS could not involve itself in the middle of projects (ngak boleh ikut campur didalam proyek).
12 11

KKN is the Indonesian acronym for korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme or corruption, collusion and nepotism.

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was lacking and MOF internal politics was hindering the process (problem solving kurang di MOFMOF internal politics). The critique of MOF was also extended to the agencys institutional incentives. For example, one senior non-MOF official noted that projects from the government such as a national forest inventory are of no interest to MOF because MOF prefers to issue concession permits. Further, he noted that MOF has no interest in annual budget allocations because the vast majority of their operating budget comes from the reforestation fund which is outside the national budget. His comments emphasize how independently MOF operates and the lack of institutional incentive in MOF to coordinate with other agencies. Indeed, he flatly noted [there is] no one in MOF who is coordinating with other sectors and that the Ministrys attempts at decreasing the amount of wood consumption through a gradual decrease in harvesting quotas, or soft landing, was only talk since reducing the capacity of industry was really the only way to address the problem. The multi-sectoral problem of overcapacity in the forest product processing industry in Indonesia and the inability, inertia and/or unwillingness of the IDCF to address the problem raise another important factor with respect to the relationship between central government institutions. In Chapter 6, I discussed the origin of the IDCF and the persistent failure of the IDCF due to the lack of interest in it by, and conflicting institutional incentives of, various government agencies. As one official flatly stated, The Ministry of Industry and Trade does not want a regulation on illegal logging (Memperinag nga mau SK illegal logging).The lack of commitment to the IDCF and the inharmonious relationship between government agencies are apparent in the structure of the IDCF. The Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs officially chairs the IDCF, but he has delegated the responsibility to someone one at the Director General Level (Echelon I), who in turn has delegated it to one of

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her staff members, who is at the rank of Echelon II. Within the Coordinating Ministry, the Director General in charge of the IDCF was relatively new and lacked an understanding of it beyond the fact that it was inactive. Indeed, she even asked a senior Indonesian NGO executive, who also participated in the interview, what she should do and how the IDCF could be activated. She noted that she inherited the IDCF from her predecessor, absolving herself of responsibility for it. When asked why she delegated responsibility of the IDCF to someone whose rank was Echelon II, she noted that staff and funding were limited, and the individual who was coordinating the IDCF was the only individual available. From the perspective of senior officials in the Ministry of Forestry, who are at the Director General level (Echelon I), this inter-institutional relationship was problematic. In essence, the person in charge of the IDCF from the Coordinating Ministry was hierarchically at a lower level than those officials at the Ministry of Forestry that he was calling to meetings. For the Director Generals at the Ministry of Forestry this was unacceptable someone lower in rank should not be calling meetings or calling them on the phone. These are not trivial matters for Indonesian government officials and reflect the differing levels of commitment of various government agencies.

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IV. Perceptions of the DFF by the diplomatic corps 13 A. Donors skeptical and cautious engagement with forestry issues Although international donors have committed themselves to helping to resolve problems in the Indonesian forestry sector since 2000, in the context of other internationally funded priorities, forestry ranks relatively low. Moreover, due to the lack of progress in forestry issues, many donors are hesitant to continue or to initiate engagement in the sector. Donors failed the DFF in that they did not support and validate its significance for various reasons (Mosse 2004), except when they needed a donor position paper for the annual CGI meetings. One senior representative from an international aid agency flatly noted that the DFF is broken because forestry is off the agenda at the CGI[there is] no respect from GOI and that at the December 2003 CGI the forestry dialogue was depressing because the governments tone was flippant, challenging, [and] cynical. In short, there was no meaningful discussion regarding forestry issues. This aid representative was equally as critical of the donor community, noting that the DFF has dissolved into squabbling with very few active members, [and] contractors, which reflects that donors are not doing their jobs regarding management....[and] collaboration. Indeed, this official noted that not only is there silence at the top, but also that there is tremendous pressure for the agency she works for to pull funding from forestry based on diplomatic level discussions that have

In this section of the chapter, I discuss the perceptions of donors with respect to the DFF and the relationship between aid agencies, central government agencies and other actors engaged in the forestry sector. This section is based on interviews with embassy and international aid organization representatives who are posted in Indonesia and who are knowledgeable of and/or engaged in the forestry sector in Indonesia, but are not actively involved in the DFF, although they might attend intermittently. In other words, they are not members of the core group of the DFF, either because (1) they defer to their contractors and/or technical experts who are core members and/or (2) the amount of time and energy they commit to the DFF is limited because forestry is only one component of their portfolios.

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concluded very little progress has been achieved. This individual continued that the director of their aid mission was certain that no real reform would occur until the Indonesian armed forces were fully funded through the national budget and no longer involved in business ventures such as logging. In short, this aid representative observed that a reaffirmation at the level of heads of missions and heads of agencies to give support for a coordinated approach were needed, but not forthcoming. Many other aid agency representatives articulated similar concerns. The head of one agency commented that donors are discouraged and that there is no way to work, assist where there are no results. He noted that in the beginning there was wide attendance at the DFF of both technical and diplomatic staff, but the diplomatic [staff is] now disengaged and that nobody has time for the DFF. He remarked that at this point [he was] very skeptical and that there were feelings of deception that certain elements in the government had no interest in forestry reform. He gave an example of a proposed road in North Sumatra supported by the military that many, including himself, noted was merely an excuse to extract timber from Leuser National Park. He noted that it was military supported, that the military will be the contractor, and that the design of the road is not useful. In short, the Leuser National Park was seen as a liability. While locating most of the blame and responsibility on the Indonesian government, this individual also noted that donor programs, including his own agencys, lacked the necessary flexibility to address forestry issues in Indonesia. This diplomats version of the history of the DFF succinctly captures donors failing the DFF, or losing support in and validation of the DFF. While there is deep skepticism and frustration among donors regarding the possibility of progress on forestry reforms agreed to by the Indonesian government and donor

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community, several donor representatives noted that their agencies are not necessarily writing off the forestry sector all together. Several donors indicated that should there be positive indications of political will on the part of the government and substantive changes on the ground, their agencies would (re) engage. One noted that their agency would like to increase lending, but [currently forestry was considered] high risk. The head of an extremely influential aid agency noted that while acknowledging that forestry is the leading case of failure with respect to his agencys work in Indonesia, the agency was willing to play any role that is helpful and that he was looking for a fresh startfor big ideas.[in the] analysis of forestry issues and mechanisms appropriate for certain issues. Another donor representative, whose government had been actively engaged as a bilateral donor in the forestry sector but pulled out in 2001 due to a perceived lack of commitment from the Indonesian government, noted that if [there is] a signal from Indonesia, [the agency] wants to come back but at present a clear Indonesian commitment [is] lacking and that donors could not establish a mechanism without this. The interest yet skepticism of most donors with respect to the forestry sector was expressed succinctly by one donor representative when he noted that unless there is revision in the legal and institutional landscape, forestry is not a fertile ground for [aid] investment. In elaborating on this point, this individual noted that the problems in the Indonesian forestry sector are complex, involving multiple ministries, and while the Ministry of Forestry wants to be part of the solution, [it is] structurally part of the problem. This skeptical and cautious attitude of the donor community with respect to engagement in forestry issues in Indonesia is apparent in the DFF, viz., in the lack of diplomatic level engagement in the DFF and the dependence on contractors and technical

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experts as proxies for donor representatives. This in turns maintains the appearance that donors are engaged in the forestry sector, whereas the reality is that they are increasingly less so. One diplomat noted that she was amazed by the work in forestry, by the network of information, by so much going on, and so many actors and consultations and that people are really engaged, yet at the same time nothing [was being] done from political aspects, which differed from other sectors where there was much more political discussion with diplomats. This individual concluded that forestry must ultimately be a low priority for donor countries. This individual further noted that the technical experts and/or contractors that constitute the DFF on a daily basis are not in a position to conduct a political dialogue, and the lack of political dialogue suggested either poor communication between the core group and their respective diplomats or indifference on the part of the donor community. Others reiterated the point that the lack of diplomatic participation in the DFF was a serious obstacle to moving the forestry agenda forward from the donor side. One aid agency representative who intermittently attended DFF meetings noted that while forestry experts know whats going on, bringing the issues to a political level requires the involvement of diplomats, and currently in the DFF there are hardly any diplomats to bring [these issues] to GOI. In short, he noted an ambassador can talk to a minister, whereas technical or project staff were not in a position to do so. This individual also commented that the lack of donor and government interest in the forestry sector was evident in the lack of follow up regarding forestry issues after the December 2003 CGI when follow up was agreed upon by both sides. As he noted, everyone says forestry is important but only discussed once, no follow up. Another aid agency representative concurred, stating that you cant have someone who is technical and also a national delegate[it] doesnt work. Another bilateral aid agency

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representative added another concern that in the DFF the core group, which consists of technical and project staff, end up talking more about political coordination mechanisms, which they are not necessarily qualified to do and which confuses the primary focus of the group. This analysis of the DFF based on the perceptions of donor agency representatives reveals that the donor communitys commitment to and engagement in the reforms of the Indonesian forest sector are not nearly as straightforward as might be assumed from the proclamations articulated in formal CGI statements. The reasons for this are multiple, ranging from a lack of perceived commitment from the government of Indonesia to changing priorities and incentives of donor agencies. The reality of the DFF reflects this lack of commitment the donor community failed the DFF in not supporting or validating it. Without donors support or validation, the ambiguous and flexible position of the core members of the DFF became an excuse or reason for failure instead of an attribute to broker institutional relationships. B. Institutional arrangements that work against a concerted effort by donors Since the 2000 CGI when forestry was first introduced as an agenda item, in addition to the DFF, there has, at least on paper, also existed the CGI Working Group on Forestry (CGI FWG). The CGI FWG takes the CGI as its focus and ostensibly includes donors, the government and perhaps other actors such as NGOs this has never been clarified. The CGI FWG has never been functional and has only added to the confusion of institutional arrangements that the donor community is involved in. Indeed, the relationship between the DFF and the CGI FWG is entirely unclear, particularly since the minutes of the first DFF meeting refers to the DFF as the CGI Donor Forum on Forestry. One aid agency

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representative confessed that it took him one and a half years to understand that the DFF is not the [CGI] working group. When asked about the relationship between the DFF and CGI FWG, another aid agency representative flatly answered that the forestry working group was useless. Although perhaps useless, the CGI FWG does formally exist and is officially chaired by the European Commission (EC), which differs from the DFF, which is chaired by the World Bank. The logic of this was that different donors would chair different working groups so that the World Bank was not perceived as dominating the CGI. Several representatives of the donor community noted that the chair of the CGI FWG had not been active and indeed a senior official at the EC mission in Jakarta noted that this had been problematic but would not comment further. Another aid agency representative took a much more critical perspective on the institutional ineffectiveness of the CGI FWG and its relationship with the DFF. This individual noted that the pretense of the CGI FWG in the context of its inaction was detrimental since the FWG pretends to take a niche of dialogue with the Ministry of Forestrybut the conversation does not exist. This individual continued noting that the relationship of the DFF, CGI FWG and CGI is ineffective and does harm because of the pretense of doing something. It is also important to mention that the donors involved in the CGI process and the Indonesian forestry sector are not all of the donors or granting institutions involved in forestry issues in Indonesia, e.g., the Ford Foundation, Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, CIFOR, etc. Indeed criteria for membership in the DFF and the CGI FWG are ad hoc, historically contingent and not straightforward. One donor representative who intermittently attends DFF meetings and who works for a private foundation noted that

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invitations are sporadic and arbitrary since it depends on who sends the email. At the same time, this private foundation is a regular member of the CGI poverty alleviation working group. Indeed, this individual noted that the Donor Forum on Forestry (DFF) was a misnomer and that more accurately the group referred to as the DFF was actually the bilateral CGI statement group. More pointedly, this individual further highlighted that the problem of the DFF and CGI FWG was that operationally they were the same and that membership was by and large limited to project oriented technical advisors who had no say in policy while their respective diplomats do not know the issues. Further, he rhetorically asked what is the value-added of limiting the DFF to bilaterals? explicitly noting that there are trade offs in government-to-government agreements. Additionally, some donors heavily involved in other sectors such as poverty alleviation, are unaware of the linkages and/or similarities between forestry and other sectors. While the linkages between the problems and solutions in the forestry sector and other sectors are multiple, substantial and evident to those heavily involved in the forestry sector, the communication of these linkages to donors in other sectors in a way that speaks to their institutional interests and demonstrates the value-added of taking an integrated perspective is lacking. One donor agency representative heavily involved in poverty alleviation noted that the main problem [of forestry is] getting forestry out of the sector and that people working in forestryneed to change language and make it relevant to others. In short, forestry is not mainstreamed and for example, there is no connection between the PRSP [poverty reduction strategy paper] and forestry. And while this individual questioned the value of the PRSP, the point was that links with other sectors were needed. Indeed, another individual

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heavily involved in the PRSP process noted that none of the PRSP task forces was addressing forestry. Interestingly, the two individuals who made these comments work for a bilateral aid agency that currently funds and implements a multi-year project in cooperation with the Ministry of Forestry. This raises a broader issue of intra-institutional communication or lack thereof that several donors frankly commented on. Several donors noted this as a real obstacle. One noted that while their agency supports efforts to mitigate illegal logging in Indonesia, one of their poverty alleviation projects focuses on supporting small and medium size enterprises in the furniture sector, which it turns out in part sources their timber from illegal sources and that the price difference between legal and illegal wood was 40%. In relating this, this individual asked how do we deal with this? V. Perceptions of DFF by Indonesian NGOs 14 Most NGO representatives assume that the DFF consists of donors engaged in the forestry sector in Indonesia and also assume that the international donor community has substantial influence over the Indonesian governments policies and practices that affect forestry issues. Further, most NGOs do not differentiate between the technical experts who constitute the core group of the DFF and the diplomatic corps that ostensibly participate in the DFF. This is unsurprising given that many Indonesian NGOs are often grantees or subcontractors of international aid projects, and thus these projects are donors from the perspective of Indonesian NGOs.
In this section of the chapter, I discuss the perceptions of Indonesian NGOs based in Jakarta with respect to the DFF as well as their perceptions of the broader relationship between the donor community and the Indonesian government both within and beyond the context of the CGI. This section is based on individual and group interviews, as well as minutes of meetings. Indonesian NGO representatives are not members of the DFF, but intermittently engage the DFF, normally at the request of the DFF as part of the preparation for the annual CGI meeting statements. Members of the core group of the DFF interact and/or work with NGO representatives in the capacity of their respective bilateral projects, e.g., as partners or sub-contractors. Since 2000, a delegation of NGO representatives has been invited to attend CGI meetings as observers.
14

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Many NGOs have high expectations towards donors and the DFF, while also highlighting their disappointment and frustration at the lack of progress. These sentiments were expressed at an October 2003 meeting organized by the DFF with primarily Indonesian NGOs to discuss forestry issues in advance of the [December 2003] CGI meeting and to conduct an informal discussion of issues of common concern in the forestry sector (DFF NGO October 2003). With respect to expectations of the DFF, one Indonesian NGO representative asked how can DFF pressure the central government to be a better facilitator to bring regional governments into better practice (DFF NGO October 2003). Another flatly stated that the DFF needs to pressure the GOI (DFF NGO October 2003), while a different individual hoped that donors can push for better data and more transparency from GOI (DFF NGO October 2003). Yet another explained that because international donors are important, NGOs want donors to respond loudly and consistently and that external pressure seems to mean more to GOI (DFF NGO October 2003). Related to this last point, NGO representatives assume that donors and the DFF have closer relations with the government than they do. Indeed, one individual commented that donors have better access (DFF NGO October 2003). While their expectations for donors and the DFF are high, NGO representatives are equally frustrated and disappointed by the lack of donor influence. Indeed, one individual noted that every year we talk about the same things (DFF NGO October 2003). Another expressed his disappointment with the DFF and donors commenting that in practice, [CGI] statements are disappointingnot so strong, or they are contradicted by other statements or policies that are implemented later (DFF NGO October 2003). More concretely, this NGO

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representative explained that none of the governments commitments [to forest sector reform] has been achieved, but no strong response from donors (DFF NGO October 2003). NGO expectations for and disappointments with the DFF and donors were succinctly expressed by one individual who noted that donors should conduct a real review of the indicators of what the GOI has committed to already since this review should create a huge pressure for GOI to do what it said it would and that up to now, the DFF has not done this (DFF NGO October 2003). Another individual observed that theres a gap in expectationsNGOs hope for a lot, but donors cant deliver it (DFF NGO October 2003). Indeed, the disappointment and frustrations of NGOs with donors carried over even with respect to this meeting itself. One Indonesian NGO representative commented that the DFF has sought consultations in the past [and] sometimes the final result after these consultations is far from what was hoped for and this is disappointing[I] would like to see more NGO impact on the final statement [for the CGI] (DFF NGO October 2003). Indonesian NGOs disappointment with the DFF juxtaposed to the continual hopes they have for it is revealing. It indicates that for Indonesian NGOs the symbolic capital of the DFF is such that they are willing to overlook the continual inability of the DFF to meet their expectations. Annually, Indonesian NGOs suspend judgment of the DFF and its track record and accept DFF meeting invitations with at least some hope that the DFF will somehow be different. The hope of these Indonesian NGOs is similar to the hope that Mosse discusses when speaks of development as hope, which is hope [that] involved the redefinition of the past and present in terms of an imagined future (Mosse 2004: 240). While the brunt of Indonesian NGO representatives disappointment with the DFF and donors was aimed at the perceived lack of donor influence, others were also critical of

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donors who funded contradictory initiatives. For example, one individual rhetorically asked what is the relation of the donor mission in Indonesia with the overall foreign policy? and Are donors engagement in the CGI consistent with their actual practices and actions? He continued noting that several donor governments are investing in pulp mills in South Kalimantan, even though that is part of the [forest industry] overcapacity problem.this foreign policy objective is inconsistent with the policy objectives expressed by the DFF (DFF NGO October 2003). That said, by and large most Indonesian NGO representatives and aid-related project staff noted that there is a strong convergence of interests between donors and NGOs in forestry policy reform (DFF NGO October 2003). An Indonesian NGO representative commented that we [NGOs and donors] have the same objectives and hence are natural allies (DFF NGO October 2003). There is indeed shared interest with respect to priority issues for forestry reform, e.g., corruption, law enforcement, decentralization, industry overcapacity, and tenurial rights. The shared understanding of priority issues perhaps exacerbates the frustration of Indonesian NGOs since it is not a matter of donors having a different understanding of the issues, but rather disjunctures in the institutional relationships between donors, the government and NGOs. In other words, the influence of one set of institutions over another is limited, which differs from what these inter-institutional relationships appear to be, viz., the order of forest reform. One experienced Indonesian NGO representative related his skepticism toward donors and their influence over government remarking on the following: Do we need the DFF? No answer because they [the donors] formed it themselves. He continued noting that there had been hope that the DFF and donors could play the role of an

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external pressure group, but it turned out they could not, so we [Indonesians] do not need themIndonesia has not changedthe substance of the problems are not dealt with by donors. He noted that fundamentally each donor has its own set of self-interests (kepentingan masing-masing). One veteran Indonesian NGO representative who has also worked for international aid projects shed further light on the perceptions of Indonesian NGOs with respect to the DFF and donors by explaining the history of inter-institutional relationships. This individual noted that Indonesian nationals, activists[are] really mad and really excited[and] disappointed and that it is difficult to maintain trust since the effort to include NGOsis not quite true and thus NGOs have a hard time believing. He explained that the reasons for this are multiple. He noted that to a great extent donors tend to be accommodating to the wishes of MOF rather than what is written in laws. He gave examples of two bilateral projects, i.e., the USAID funded NRM project and DFID funded MFP project, being reprimanded by MOF because their initiatives were perceived as threatening by MOF. He noted that often donors [are] too soft [particularly with respect to tenure issues]seen from the perspective of partners on the ground, who see lots of room for improving long term security, benefit. He further explained that Indonesian NGOs were disappointed with donors because of the conflicting agendas put on the table by donors and their lack of coordination and concerted effort. He mentioned that in 2000 when forestry became a high priority issue at the CGI and donors pressured the government to change, one government donor announced out of the blue a grant to support the Ministry of Forestry before a high-profile meeting between the government and donors, which resulted in pressure being 100% lost. He also

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noted that in 2000 and 2001 when there was both international and national pressure on the government over the forestry crisis, certain donors were praising the Indonesian government regarding forestry, which worked against a concerted effort. He gave another example of a bilaterally-funded project that worked with Indonesian NGOs to campaign against illegal logging in Indonesia and how that project lost legitimacy with its Indonesian NGO partners because the donor did not support publicizing a case involving two officials from the MOF because the donor did not want to damage its working relationship with MOF. This section of the chapter has focused on Indonesian NGO representatives perceptions of the DFF and the relationship between donors and the government. As far as international NGOs, their representatives were more aware of the reality of the DFF, viz., that on a day to day basis the DFF consisted of expatriate technical experts attached to aid projects and that it wasnt nearly as influential as the forums name would imply. Moreover, for Indonesian NGOs the core members of the DFF were actually past and potential funders since international projects often contracted work to or provided grants to Indonesian organizations. International NGOs, however, by and large seek funding in donor metropoles, e.g., USAID in Washington D.C. (and not the USAID-funded project implemented in Indonesia). Further, international NGO representatives had a strong understanding of the history of the relationship between the Indonesian government and international donor community with respect to forestry issues, and thus understood the limitations of donor influence on the government, whether it be due to the lack of political will on the part of the government or inconsistent, contradictory initiatives within donor agencies themselves. Also, international NGO representatives in Indonesia were occupied with their own set of issues in dealing with

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the Indonesian government and home offices of international donors from which they secured funding. Further, the arbitrary criteria by which organizations could or could not participate in the DFF did nothing to ingratiate members of the DFF with the international NGO community in Indonesia. That said, recognizing the potential influence that the DFF could have, a number of international NGO representatives did engage with the DFF when thet were asked, e.g. analyzing forest industry debt in Indonesia. Moreover, international NGOs frequently worked with individual members of the core group of the DFF in the capacity of their respective projects. VI. Summary of Analysis of Perceptions and Conclusions In this section, I summarize the analytical points that come out of the preceding discussions of the perceptions of various actors who engage and/or are involved in the DFF. In doing so, I highlight the role of the DFF as a broker or translator between various institutions involved in aid-related forestry interventions and the master metaphor of forest reform in Indonesia. While created by the international donor community in the context of the February 2000 CGI, the DFF in its day-to-day functioning does not consist of donor representatives, but rather technical experts tied to bilateral or multilateral projects. The DFF has no legal standing, charter or by-laws, and is essentially an informal forum. The ambiguity in the status and position of the DFF is potentially what gives it influence and makes the DFF a resource to those actors it attempts to engage, albeit in a fragile and tenuous fashion. Further, the core members of the DFF are well placed to play the role of brokers since they have a strong understanding of the institutional logic and practices of both GOI agencies and donor agencies and are in varying degrees part of both sets of institutions. Indeed, the core members of the DFF craft the annual CGI meeting donor statement -- the donors articulation

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of the master metaphor of forestry reform in part through consultations and negotiations with government and donor agencies. The core members of the DFF and the DFF itself possess the protean qualities important to brokering between institutions, viz., an ability to exploit an ambiguous insider/outsider position and speak to, or resonate with, actors with disparate interests (Mosse 2005). Mosse (2005: 123-124) notes the following about brokering in the context of the rural development project he participated in and analyzes: managing relations across boundaries of organizational culture required skillful mediators, multilingual in the discourse of village, project office, corporate bureaucracy and donor policy and able to translate between different rationalities and expectations. Success as a manager-broker meant having the type of personality.to be a blade of grass blowing in the wind listening to what the powerful forces want and delivering. Although the DFF and its core members were partially successful in its brokering role, particularly in the context of the annual CGI statements, the DFF was unable to cultivate trust between key individuals in different parts of the system (Mosse 2005: 125) and ultimately could not deliver as brokers. Thus, the DFF was to a great extent failed by the donor community and central government agencies, and the ambiguous position of the DFF became a liability, instead of being an asset to its functioning as a broker. Although maintaining forestry on the CGI agenda and master metaphor of forest reform in Indonesia, the usual suspects or core group of the DFF agree that the DFF has not fulfilled its mandate to monitor the achievement of agreed upon commitments and to coordinate among donors to assist MOF. The cause of this they note is a lack of commitment from both the donor community and government. Indeed, because of the lack of participation

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on the part of the diplomatic corps and the fact that DFF related work is secondary to their job descriptions, members of the core group note that their dual identities as technical experts and de facto donor representatives has debilitated the work of both the DFF and their respective projects. Other institutional incentives and practices of the core groups donor organizations also work against fulfilling the DFF mandate, e.g., donors are accountable and responsive to their respective institutions and not the DFF, donors do not penalize GOI for not achieving commitments, coordination of various donor projects comes after individual projects have been created, and intra-agency coordination is often lacking. The core group also perceive a lack of commitment from the government generally and MOF particularly, noting the lack of inter-agency cooperation within the government as well as inaction and defensiveness. Indeed, aid projects are implicated in the power struggles between central government agencies as well as between the central and local governments. Central government officials themselves acknowledge that the government agencies are presently incapable of and/or unwilling to coordinate among themselves as well as aidfunded projects. While acknowledging the lack of inter-agency cooperation, the MOF

in particular has been disappointed by and critical of the DFF because of its inability to be MOFs voice (swara) to the international community, or in other words, explaining to the international community that MOF should not be blamed for the forestry crisis in Indonesia. Since the DFF did not fulfill this expectation, senior MOF officials failed to support or validate the DFF. In the context of the post-Suharto differentiation of the state, the DFFs inability to support MOFs voice or position resulted in MOF not supporting the DFF and indeed being critical of it. Senior MOF officials observed that expatriate technical experts who are seconded to the Ministry are de facto donor representatives in the DFF, thereby

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making the institutional position of these technical experts unclear. Additionally, from the perspective of senior MOF officials, several technical experts have dramatically overstepped their authority by promoting initiatives that these Ministry officials perceive as explicitly undermining the Ministry. From the perspective of these officials, technical experts should be understanding of and assisting the Ministry and by implication not critical of the Ministry. Donor representatives have also by and large failed to support the DFF. They are hesitant to continue or initiate engagement in the forestry sector because of a perceived lack of progress and lack of commitment from GOI. They are aware that the lack of diplomatic participation in the DFF is problematic and an obstacle to its effectiveness, yet are unwilling to commit further then they already have. Further, the core members of the DFF have been unable to convince them otherwise. The lack of donor participation in the DFF is indicative of a broader set of institutional arrangements that work against a more concerted effort. Specifically, the DFF does not include all donors involved in forestry; donors engaged in forestry do not sufficiently communicate intersectoral aspects to other donors; and intraagency communication is often lacking. The institutional reality of the DFF and incentives and practices of donors frustrate Indonesian NGOs, who perceive the DFF as consisting of donors and who assume that donors have significant influence over the policies and practices of GOI. Thus, they are critical of and disappointed with the DFF, particularly since they perceive a shared understanding of problems and solutions in the forestry sector. That said, it is precisely because of the assumed influence of donors and the DFF that Indonesian NGOs continue to engage them.

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CHAPTER 8 CIFOR RESEARCHERS EXPERIENCES PRACTICING SCIENCE

I. Introduction In this chapter, I return to CIFOR to discuss and analyze the experiences and practices of CIFOR managers and researchers with respect to operationalizing fundamental elements of the institutions mandate, viz., (1) to conduct impact oriented science, (2) to establish and implement research priorities and (3) to work in partnership with other institutions and build their capacity. I discuss how scientists talk about the difference between the real and ideal world of CIFOR, including the landscape of institutions that CIFOR is part of, and how they negotiate or manage these differences 1 . In doing so, I examine the institutional culture and structure that frame CIFORs researchers and managers engagement with the broader political-economic dynamics and institutional landscape related to forestry and forest dependent people in Indonesia and elsewhere. In this chapter, I switch vantage points to understand from an intra-institutional perspective the logics, practices and relationships discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 specifically and in other chapters generally. I place this chapter after the ones that examine the political-economic dynamics and institutional landscape of aid because that context is necessary to make sense of CIFOR scientists everyday practices.
1

CIFOR scientists and management are not of one voice and do not constitute a monolithic entity. CIFOR is replete with factions, alliances, cultural differences, personal histories, personalities, and power differences. These dynamics are included in the following discussion to the extent that they are explanatory. In noting the diversity of views and positions within CIFOR, I would like to emphasize that generalizations about how CIFOR scientists and management talk about and perceive the various elements of CIFORs mandate discussed in this chapter should not be taken as the CIFOR position. The issues discussed in this chapter emerged out of a clustering of comments made by CIFOR scientists and management and are ongoing debates within the organization. They are common substantive issues that CIFOR scientists and management raised in conversations with me and are focal points of debate within the institution.

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II. Description and Analysis of CIFOR Researchers Experiences A. Impact-oriented Science In this section of the chapter I discuss how CIFOR scientists talk about putting into practice the mandate to carry out impact-oriented science. In doing so, I explain how impact-oriented science has been discussed at the institutional level and how CIFOR scientists have attempted to implement this mandate, highlighting how their experiences differ from the ideal or theory. 1. Evolution of the idea of impact-oriented science at CIFOR In conceiving of a CGIAR Center with the dual mandate to conserve tropical forests and improve local livelihoods, CIFORs creators had a particular vision of what would make the institution unique and justifiable, viz., international public goods. CIFORs creators believed that in tropical forestry, there were many international public goods (that is, research which provides very substantial benefits overall, but which would not be worthwhile from the viewpoint of a single country or organization that had to pay all the costs, but received only a fraction of the international benefits); these need and deserve international funding. (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/different.htm, emphases added). In theory, these international public goods were to operate in the classic CGIAR paradigm of increasing germplasm productivity through research: Like other CGIAR Centers, CIFORs focus will be on strategic and applied research. In the context of CIFORs global mission, strategic research aims to produce a better

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understanding of natural and social processes related to internationally significant problems of forest use, development or degradation.The problem-solving nature of CIFORs research approach makes it inherently appliedIt will be important to clearly distinguish strategic and applied research from both basic and adaptive approaches. Adaptive research aims to modify human approaches and prototype technologies to solve specific problems of people at specific locations. Adaptive research is a major focus of CIFORs partners in the forest research institutes of tropical developing countries. CIFOR itself does not have a comparative advantage in this areaEffective research partnerships will be the principal means through which the policy and technology outputs of strategic research will be locally adapted and evaluated (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/different.htm). The IPG paradigm articulated in these two quotations assumes a linear model in which research is the basis to formulate policy, which then is operationalized in practice. The quintessential example of this paradigm is the Green Revolution, in which High-Yield Varieties (HYVs) of rice were developed and promoted by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) during the 1960s and 1970s. IRRI, one of earliest CGIAR centers, worked with developing country governments and their National Agricultural Research Centers to conduct research on and disseminate a package of technologies, including seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, to farmers in developing countries. The IPGs in this case were the products and technologies developed by IRRI in collaboration with their developing country partners. In CIFORs case, the IPG paradigm was expected to be articulated through CIFORs collaboration with national level institutions such as Forestry Departments in multiple countries to design and implement a research protocol to address a common problem. CIFOR

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would supervise the implementation of this protocol by national or local level partners, who would ostensibly gain capacity in this relationship. The added value or comparative advantage of CIFOR would be producing a global level synthesis or comparison, from which recommendations would be derived, and then adopted by national/local level institutions CIFORs global level, synthetic research would be the IPG. The IPG paradigm also assumes that CIFORs global, synthetic research and recommendations would be applicable to those institutions or countries that did not participate in CIFOR-led research. The assumption is that good research will sell itself. CIFOR scientists note that the international level and global agenda foci are the only things that justify CIFORs expensive existence. CIFOR scientists are in consensus that CIFOR should not be doing what regional, national and local institutions do, since CIFOR would be duplicating efforts at much higher costs. As this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate however, the reality of the relationship between research, policy and practice is dramatically different from that envisioned in the IPG paradigm. As I have examined and elaborated on in previous chapters of this dissertation, the relationship between knowledge, policy and practice is not straightforward in the least, particularly when research results advocate for changes in relations of power. In this dissertation, I have attempted to demonstrate that rigorous, high quality research on forestry related issues in Indonesia has not been adopted and blatantly ignored by those in decision-making positions because those individuals stand to lose out should policies based on this research be developed and implemented. In the case of the Green Revolution, IRRI worked closely with developing country governments, and their research products and technologies benefited and profited these governments and relevant private sector industries. It is in part because Green Revolution technologies did not threaten

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existing relations of power that the IPG paradigm played out so smoothly in practice. Much of what CIFORs research concludes, however, threatens those in power. In the early years of CIFOR, the issue of IPGs as the vehicle for impact was assumed as unproblematic and not prioritized in discussions, since the organization was focused on conducting research to establish its scientific credibility as a global authority on tropical forests. These were relatively halcyon days of strong core funding, which meant that research was not necessarily demand-driven, and impact was a non-issue since CIFOR was at its inception. The idea of good research will sell itself figured prominently in CIFOR, and while there was talk of impact, it was considered by and large the responsibility of other institutions. In the words of one CIFOR scientist, it was left to organizations like WWF. That said, research impact was on the agenda early on at CIFOR and an impact assessment specialist was hired in 1995/6. This individual, realizing there was no research yet to assess, focused on CIFOR scientists thinking about impact pathways in their research. According to one CIFOR scientist, however, there was freedom to ignore it due to the abundance of unrestricted funds and the focus on establishing CIFORs scientific credibility. As a 12-year old institution in 2005, CIFOR felt pressure from its donors to demonstrate impact and influence, and thus CIFOR management required more explicitly that its researchers demonstrate that their research has had or will have impact or influence. Although by some scientists accounts CIFOR was moving toward a more impact-orientation as the organization matured, the consensus is that when the current Director General took office in 2001 impact was pushed to the top of researchers list of priorities. The DGs prioritization of impact was sparked by several factors: his realization that donors were much less familiar with CIFOR than expected, the percentage of unrestricted funds had decreased,

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and after nearly 10 years of work CIFOR should be able to demonstrate impact to its donors, in other words to show that CIFOR was a good investment. The prioritization of impact has stirred increased debate within CIFOR related to whom CIFOR is trying to influence, the mechanisms for research to have influence, and, more broadly, the location of, and links between, CIFOR in the landscape of institutions from village to global levels affecting forests and people living in/around them. Indeed, in 2002 CIFOR devoted its annual science seminar to Getting Impact-oriented Science during which CIFOR scientists discussed these issues. The prioritization of impact-oriented science has brought out divergent views within CIFOR regarding CIFORs purpose and how the institution should achieve that purpose. The differing perceptions of how CIFOR can have influence and the debates regarding impact-oriented science are embedded in several factors: First, the institution does not have a standardized protocol or guideline on how to conduct impact-oriented research there has not been an institutionalized paradigm to replace the former one that assumed that good research would sell itself. Second the explicit calls for impact have not been accompanied by attendant institutional changes required for this orientation. Third, and perhaps most significantly, this prioritization has required CIFOR scientists to think more explicitly about and reflect on their institutional position, the ways that research can have influence, and the broader landscape within which CIFOR operates, which turns out to be significantly different from the world assumed in the IPG paradigm discussed above. Indeed, that several CIFOR scientists noted that either before coming to CIFOR or before the explicit push toward impact-oriented science, they did not think explicitly about impact implies that they considered the application of research as unproblematic. The assumption among these

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individuals seems to have been that as long as the research was rigorous and relevant, it would be used or adopted. 2. Researchers experiences and thoughts on implementing impact-oriented science This portion of the section details the reflections and perceptions of CIFOR scientists with respect to the impact-oriented science mandate based on how they have experienced attempting to put that mandate into practice. a. Nature, Timing and Timeframes of Research In reflecting on the practice of impact-oriented science, some scientists noted that the nature, timing and time frame of research differ from and/or works against influencing donors and development agencies. With respect to the nature of research, a few scientists observed that research should have a certain degree of uncertainty in terms of answers (otherwise theres no point in conducting the research), whereas impacts are more likely where research results have a degree of certainty. One scientist commented with respect to the link between research and impact that if you know the answer its not research, yet if you dont know the answer, you cant strategize about follow-up extension [or in other words, impact]. CIFOR scientists are highlighting a perceived tension between research and impact. The perceived tension between producing versus applying knowledge centering around certainty is connected to another perceived dilemma, viz., management versus science. For some CIFOR scientists the explicit push for impact has translated in practice into overly bureaucratic managing, planning and strategizing in CIFOR that, in the words of one scientist, blunts creativity that is part of what makes research exciting in the first place. This scientist commented that the most exciting research is the riskiest, but [acknowledges it is] difficult to manage. Similarly, another scientist evoked the notion of craft when talking

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about research, emphasizing curiosity and passion and that managing for impact can at times work against that. Several scientists also noted that research requires a relatively long period (5-10 years), unless the research is directly tied to monitoring and evaluation of an intervention, and that donor, conservation and development agencies interests and priorities shift within a faster cycle than that of research. One scientist commented that the process of finding a research topic, securing a donor to fund it, and producing an output takes a decade. Another CIFOR scientist gave the following example: After the El Nino related fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan in 1998, donors were eager to fund research on these fires fire was hot. Yet, the results of these studies were only published in 2003 and in 2003 no one talks about fires. There was little interest in the results, little interest in applying them, and little interest in funding further research on the topic. According to this individual and corroborated by others, development and donor lifecycles are much faster than the research cycle. The non-research world moves on and is no longer as interested as they were when they funded the project. Another example of asynchronous institutional cycles is a book that was to be written and published to cap off 10 years of CIFOR scientists research on the underlying causes of deforestation in the tropics. Although many publications were produced during those 10 years, the compendium was never completed or published because the CIFOR scientists involved in the book read a shift in the donor world in 2001 towards poverty alleviation and felt that it was necessary for CIFOR to more explicitly engage that shift to access and influence donor funds. Around this period there was a stronger, more concerted commitment to poverty alleviation among donors due in part to critiques of the World Bank and IMF. The

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increased focus on poverty alleviation meant raising the efficiency of existing marginal funds, which caused environmental issues to be merged with others and a decline in donor attention on forests per se. Thus, the tradeoff was that the book on the underlying causes of deforestation was never completed because, according to one scientist, the opportunity cost of the book was too high in the context of the gains for CIFOR and rural communitiesby raising the profile to attention to livelihoods. b. Simplification and Translation: Media, Donors and Credibility 1. Audiences Another set of debates related to practicing impact-oriented science at CIFOR has focused on audiences for CIFORs research and the appropriate means to communicate to those audiences. These debates regarding audience and communication are a subset of the broader question of how to apply and disseminate research, to make it useful for more direct agents of change. Many CIFOR scientists have become skeptical of global processes such as the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) as agents of change due to the lack of tangible benefits since the Rio Summit in 1992. With respect to international processes related to forestry, one scientist commented that the evolution of the IPF to IFF to UNFF 2 was the same as a patient alive to patient lying down to patient comatose. In this scientists assessment, UN related processes achieved very little. The expected leverage of these global forums has not been brought to bear, which has called into question one of the CIFORs assumed audiences and required reflection among CIFOR scientists about mechanisms of change and the institutional landscape they operate in. Indeed, according to one scientist, a sense of shared institutional audience is lacking at CIFOR. This is not to say, however, that
IPF to IFF to UNFF refers to the evolution of UN coordinated initiatives related to forestry that grew out of the 1992 Rio Summit. IPF refers to the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, which was the basis of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF). The UNFF refers to the United Nations Forum on Forestry.
2

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CIFOR has extricated itself from global processes, agendas and meetings. Indeed, CIFOR representatives frequently participate in these global level forums, but it is equally, if not more, about maintaining credibility among CIFORs peer institutions, rather than the belief that these global processes can actually effect change. Within this ongoing debate as to whom CIFOR tries to influence and how, CIFOR scientists by and large agree on two audiences: the donor and scientific communities. With respect to the donor community, some CIFOR scientists believe that CIFOR can influence donor agendas and funding priorities. CIFOR also places a high level of importance on being accountable to its donors, and conversely, wants to be recognized by donors for past achievements and future funding possibilities. That said, CIFOR scientists and management are of the opinion that donors generally read little beyond executive summaries of lengthy reports and rarely read journal articles in peer-reviewed publications. Indeed, one CIFOR staff member presented on this precise issue at the 2002 CIFOR Science Seminar, marshaling testimonials from donor representatives such as Ive occasionally read a whole reportan executive summary and conclusion is a safer bet we rely a lot on what the Post [newspaper] and contractors tell us. With respect to research, this donor noted, definitely not! Too hard to readmaybe skim some graphs. In this same presentation, another donor representative was quoted as saying research may be intellectually interesting, but it is of little relevance to donors and that donors want complex issues reduced to a few core messages, followed by a brief description of the solution and some easily grasped steps on how to achieve that solution. One CIFOR scientist noted that donors send mixed messages. They want to see bang for the buck and want something tangible, but if they are presented with a choice between

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a scientific paper demonstrating results based on donor funded research and a volume of vignettes packaged in an aesthetically pleasing way donors will reach for the latter [that] will be the one the donor will pick up, but its not sciencedonors go for the easy stuffthey dont read. On a related point, another CIFOR scientist noted that donors do not read impact assessments based on the CGIAR standard of econometric surplus models, which determine return on investment, but rather donors prefer adoption studies narrating, for example, who uses or cites CIFOR work. According to this scientist, adoption studies are compelling, important for donors and corresponding constituencies.econometric models are rigorous but late. An example of this type of CIFOR adoption study is Spilsbury and Boses (2004) analysis of CIFOR contributions to international forest-related agenda through its influence on policy documents of organizations responsible for major financial flows and key organizations that help shape the global forest agenda (Spilsbury and Bose 2004: 1) 3 . These observations about donors are unsurprising in light of the discussions in earlier chapters of this dissertation, particularly Chapters 6 and 7 that in part demonstrated that they logics, incentives and practices of donors are driven less by science and research and more by political-economic expediency. Recognizing that scientific publications are insufficient to have the desired influence on the priorities and policies of donors, CIFOR attempts to work within these institutional realities without losing key research messages. For example, CIFOR regularly sends key research messages and reports to an assembled list of 500 or so individuals with decisionmaking power at key institutions that work on issues related to forests and poverty
Through a bibliographic analysis (citations, acknowledgements and author contributions), Spilsbury and Bose (2004: 23) conclude, inter alia, that use and acknowledgement of CIFOR research findings was widespread among a class of documents that influence both national and international polices and financial flows to forestry initiatives. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.
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alleviation. Additionally, CIFOR scientists and management spend significant time and energy on face-to-face meetings with donors, influential government agencies and NGOs to present and discuss priority issues and research for CIFOR. Further, in 1997 the current DG, then CIFOR scientist, established the POLEX message, which is a concise summary of recent research that has a bearing on forest policy (CIFOR 2004: 43). The current DG writes the messages, and since 1997 over 150 POLEX messages have been posted on CIFORs website and mailed to an ever-increasing subscription list. Almost 17,000 individuals, including many leading policymakers now receive POLEX (CIFOR 2004: 43). Messages are published in English, French, Indonesian, Spanish and Japanese. Besides the donor community, the other agreed upon audience by CIFOR scientists and management is the scientific community that contributes to and reads peer-reviewed journals. The scientific community and peer-reviewed journals give CIFOR its credibility and authority as a seminal applied research institute on tropical forests and related livelihood issues. Peer-reviewed journal articles are a proxy for the scientific communitys approval and legitimacy of CIFOR as impartial, objective, scientific, knowledgeable and authoritative. That this communitys judgment is taken extremely seriously by CIFOR is evinced, for example, by the primacy of publishing peer-reviewed journal articles in the performance contracts of CIFOR scientists. Further, as recently as 2004, CIFOR conducted an analysis of citations of CIFOR publications to examine the details of, for example, where CIFORs work is being published, what percentage is in peer-reviewed publications, who is citing CIFORs work and where, etc. (see Angelsen and Aryal [forthcoming]) 4 . This type of

Angelsen is affiliated with both CIFOR and the Agricultural University of Norway. According to their study, in which they used the ISI Web of Science database, referred articles make up 24% of all CIFOR publications, and together with referred books and book chapters, refereed publications constitute 1/3 of all CIFOR publications, which in total is 1,437 (Angelsen and Aryal [forthcoming])..

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analytical stocktaking demonstrates in part the importance of the scientific community to CIFOR. Further, as discussed in Chapter 5, CIFORs hybrid identity as both a research institute and a member of the international conservation and development practitioner community allows it to calls for certain changes, based on research, in the practitioner community that is more acceptable than if they came from a perceived outsider, e.g., an academic institution not directly involved in conservation and development. While recognizing the importance of the scientific community and peer-reviewed publications, CIFOR scientists do not consider this community as very capable of influencing relevant policies and practices. For this reason, some CIFOR scientists grudgingly acknowledge this shared audience, feeling that peer reviewed journal articles and the scientific community are the farthest removed from impact, and thus contradictory to the mandate for impact-oriented science. Beyond this, there is little if any consensus among CIFOR scientists regarding the laundry list of other actors as audiences, although each one of the following was mentioned by one CIFOR scientist or another: local communities, local governments, national governments, NGOs, and private sector. The lack of consensus on these other possible audiences reflects ongoing debates at CIFOR regarding the institutions purposes, positions and locations in the institutional landscape. While CIFOR scientists recognize there is no blueprint for research to have influence, this realization has done little to clarify the situation. 2. Communication: Simplification and Credibility The second issue at core of the research impact, application and dissemination debate is the forms of communication that CIFOR scientists this are appropriate and effective vehicles to convey CIFORs research to its intended audiences. CIFOR scientists recognize

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that research results need to be translated, tailored and packaged specifically to the audiences that CIFOR would like to influence and that this translation by and large means simplification of research results. The tension for CIFOR scientists is simplifying research results to communicate them effectively without compromising their integrity. This has proven difficult for CIFOR. Commenting on the disjuncture between the audiences that CIFOR tries to reach, one CIFOR scientist noted scientists love complexity, politicians hate it. Another scientist commented that policymakers ask how much does it cost? and scientists answer its complicated. These remarks reflect the tension between the need to simplify to communicate effectively without distorting and potentially calling into question CIFORs credibility. Figuring prominently in this debate is the increased use of mass media (international and national newspapers, magazines and to a lesser extent television) to increase the exposure and influence of CIFORs research results and recommendations. Under the leadership of the current Director General, CIFOR has dramatically increased its use of and presence in mass media. For example, the explicit focus on communications and mass media resulted in over 530 news articles and feature stories [that] referred to CIFORs research in 2004, which exceeded 370 in 2003 and 171 in 2002 (CIFOR 2004). Of the 503 in 2004, online media accounted for 221 stories, newspapers for 182, radio for 59, wire services for 28 and television for 20 (CIFOR 2004: 42). Approximately 40 per cent of the media coverage for 2004 appeared in Indonesian media, which is unsurprising given CIFORs headquarters is in Indonesia (CIFOR 2004: 42). In addition to national media outlets, e.g., Kompas and Tempo in Indonesia, CIFORs international media coverage has included the International Herald Tribune, the Asian Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, the Economist,

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and Time Magazine. For example, in the first quarter of 2006, there were 134 stories about CIFORs research, with major topics including China and the global market, forests and floods, and a model forest workshop in Cameroon. Of these 134 stories 31 appeared in international media, including the BBC, the Wall Street Journal, Associated Press (AP), Agence France Presse (AFP), Time magazine and the Economist. Nationally media coverage included Indonesia, Cameroon, the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia and China 5 . In addition to increasing awareness of the institution, the rationale for increasing media exposure of its research is to influence efficiently decision-makers, who are more like to read the International Herald Tribune than Science, as well as sway public opinion, which can potentially influence the priorities and agendas of governments. According to CIFOR, A small organization like CIFOR has to get its messages across to policy makers, opinion leaders and others without spending large amounts of money on dissemination. If its research is to have an impact, then it must catch the attention of the institutions and people who really matter. That means getting its publications into the right places in the right format.Besides publishing books, occasional papers and monographs, CIFOR seeks to get a wider audience for its research findings by using the international and national media. (CIFOR 2004: 37) With respect to how CIFOR engages the mass media, CIFOR (2004: 43) notes the following: CIFORs strategy is to identify good stories and approach the media directly, explains CIFOR communications specialist Greg Clough. Once we have gained their interest we send them the background information they need to pursue the story. Clough believes that CIFORs media success stems from the fact that it has developed a reputation for providing interesting news, without being dogmatic. We
5

The figures for 2006 come from an email from CIFORs communications specialist.

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have also made an effort to win trust by providing accurate information and helping journalists identify other sources when we can help, he says (43). One of the most effective and frequently noted examples of impact through mass media at CIFOR is Chris Barrs research on the financial necessity of two of Indonesias largest pulp and paper conglomerates at the time carrying USD 15 billion in outstanding debt -- to clear natural forests due to a shortfall in supply of plantation fiber, which is illegal in Indonesia. After strategizing with individuals at CIFOR and journalists, in November 2000 Barr placed a story on the Bloomberg Financial Newswire, and within three days the share price of Asia Pulp and Paper fell 20% on the New York Stock Exchange. In March 2001, Asia Pulp and Paper defaulted and was delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. At a broader level, Barrs work was pioneering in that it made financial analysts aware of the natural resource base as a risk factor to consider when investing in these types of companies. (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/publications/newsonline/31/major_awards.htm) The Barr case, however, as most at CIFOR acknowledge, is unique and perhaps a best case scenario, but even in this case, some CIFOR researchers question its effectiveness and appropriateness. For some at CIFOR, this media release was too confrontational for CIFOR, and they would have preferred CIFORs working with those companies instead of exposing them in the media. This difference of opinion reveals a difference in how CIFOR should work and CIFOR location in the landscape of forestry institutions. One CIFOR scientist noted that the Barr article negatively affects CIFOR with respect to working with the private sector, in Indonesia at least. 6 Others question the

CIFOR does not have strong history of working with the private sector, but in recent years collaborations between CIFOR and certain companies has increased.

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appropriateness of the media release coming from CIFOR; these scientists perceived it as advocacy work beyond the scope of CIFOR. These differing opinions about one of CIFORs most effective media events reflect a more general debate among CIFOR scientists regarding the effectiveness of mass media in conveying research, and tradeoffs entailed. Even a strong proponent of the use of media for CIFORs research noted you get in bed with the devil. CIFOR scientists recognize that engaging mass media involves trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency, on the one hand, and simplification and distortion, on the other. Perceptions vary among CIFOR scientists with respect to whether these tradeoffs are worth it, which seems to imply a need for more systematic analysis of the sociology of media and discussion of that within CIFOR. As one CIFOR scientist noted, what does it [media] mean for impact? No one knows. Some CIFOR scientists are skeptical of mass medias effectiveness, viz., its ability to influence agendas and sway public opinion. For example, one CIFOR scientist rhetorically asked whether I remembered anything I read in the newspaper yesterday, implying that mass media is transient and ephemeral. The same individual noted that the only thing you can say is theres a lot of media coverage. Another noted that media is important, but not to convey scientific results[it is] to reassure the taxpayer that money is not spent in vainassure people youre doing a good job. Some CIFOR scientists are also concerned that mass media can simplify and distort research to such an extent that it calls into question the researchers credibility. Caution and careful were noted by several scientists. On a related point, one CIFOR scientist noted that media articles involving CIFOR have angered the Ministry of Forestry in Indonesia, calling into question CIFORs credibility from the Ministrys perspective. This person, as

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well as others, felt that CIFOR should release media articles with the Ministry or other partners. Others, however, perceive the cost-efficiency, wide-distribution and attention gathering of media as trumping concerns about simplification and credibility. In reflecting on whether media exposure was worth the tradeoff of complexity being lost, one scientist noted yes, because donors and officials are framed by the newsits one of many impact pathways. With respect to angering powerful actors such as the Ministry, this individual noted that backlashes are no problem[they] deepen discussion. On a related point, another CIFOR scientist noted that it is the hubris and elitism of researchers to think their research cannot be presented in a mass media format. In a conceding manner, another researcher noted that for too long, too many institutes had this attitude of the mandarin we know, we know whats best. This attitude is no longer possible. These individuals consider using mass media an obligation of publicly funded researchers. A concrete example of how opinions vary with respect to CIFOR and its mass media strategy is the 10-page CIFOR report Hamburger Connection Fuels Amazon Destruction and mass media articles based on the report. The report was timed for release when the Brazilian government announced the annual deforestation figures in April 2004, but it was unclear precisely when the Brazilian government would release the figure or what the figure would be exactly. A team of CIFOR researchers estimated that the figure would be high and that timing the report with the release of the figure would be an opportunity to explain the link between the frightening increase in deforestation and the growth in international demand for Brazilian beef (Kaimowitz et al. 2004: 1). It also called on the international community to provide urgent assistance (Kaimowitz et al. 2004: 1). According to one

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CIFOR scientist, this report had a particular agenda, viz., to call attention to international demand and have the international community decrease consumption of Brazilian beef, and thus media articles de-emphasized certain other factors such as increased consumption by the growing middle class in Brazil and the growing demand in former Soviet counties. Given the time constraints and uncertainties with respect to what the deforestation rate would be and when it would be released, some of the report results were not fully verified. The report itself generated some controversy in Brazil, but the real controversy came when the Economist published an article based on the report in November 2004. The Brazilian government reacted negatively to CIFOR, and released a rebuttal disputing claims in the Economist article. Within CIFOR, the hamburger report, as CIFOR scientists commonly referred to the report and associated events, raised questions regarding the purpose, position and location of CIFOR in the institutional landscape. Among CIFOR scientists, opinions varied regarding the hamburger reports effectiveness and whether/how it would affect CIFORS credibility. Some noted that hundreds of articles 7 were generated at minimal cost, attention was drawn and thus it was a huge success, and the simplification was worth it. Others noted that it was a media hit, but there was no lasting effect. Some were concerned about the lack of scientific rigor of the report, which calls into question CIFORs credibility. This discussion of how CIFOR researchers have attempted to practice impactoriented research, and the issues and debates raised in the process, indicate that CIFOR researchers are dealing on a daily basis with how to make their knowledge authoritative to have their research have impact -- in a context that is far removed from the linear IPG model in which policy and practice are build on good research. In the original formulation of
7

Indeed, over 120 media outlets gave the report extensive coverage (CIFOR 2004).

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CIFOR and its comparative advantage, viz., IPGs, CIFORs knowledge was assumed authoritative. The idea that CIFOR would have to actively attempt beyond conducting the research itself to make its knowledge authoritative was not taken into consideration. The world within which CIFOR operates, however, requires that CIFOR make vigorous attempts to make its research and knowledge authoritative because much of what CIFORs research demonstrates and thus promotes in recommendations runs counter to the interests of political-economic elites. Thus, for CIFORs research to be authoritative, being rigorous or scientific are necessary but insufficient. CIFORs research must also resonate with and persuade and compel decision-makers, their constituents and others through media and other vehicles. Making CIFORs research authoritative is a political campaign because, as Mosse notes (2004: 646), authoritative interpretations have to be made and sustained socially. B. Priority Setting In this section of the chapter, I examine how CIFOR scientists and management talk about and perceive individual, programme and institutional setting of research priorities, as well the evolution of these research priorities. Two contextual factors at CIFOR are important to highlight with respect to CIFORs structure, culture and priorities. First, when CIFORs leadership changed in 2001, the current Director General 8 initiated changes in the institutional structure of CIFOR. Previously, CIFOR was divided along six projects, with a senior scientist leading each project; this person was responsible for the management of the project and supervised and conducted research. When the current DG came into office, the six project structure was transformed into a three programme structure: (1) Forest Governance, (2) Forests and Livelihoods and (3) Environmental Services and Sustainable
8

In CIFORs history there have been two Director Generals (DGs), Jeffrey Sayer and David Kaimowitz.

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Use of Forests. CIFOR scientists self-selected into programmes. Each programme is led by a Programme Director, whose responsibilities include coordinating the programme, acting as key interlocutor between the programme and the external world, and leading fund raising. The terms of reference for the Programme Directors were not much clearer than this. In March 2003, three Programme Directors and an Assistant Director General were hired, only one among them had worked for CIFOR previously. The rationale for this change, as well as other structural changes in the institution, was to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of CIFORs research, as well as clarify for both internal and external purposes the similarities, differences and integration of CIFORs multiple research initiatives. According the current DG, it was an act of streamlining and strengthening the organization in light of scarcer resources and increasing demand from external stakeholders for impact. There was buy-in from CIFOR staff, and CIFORs Board of Trustees agreed upon these changes. Second, when the current DG took office, he perceived a potentially serious funding crisis. This was due to several factors. He was concerned that the strengthening of the Euro compared to the US dollar would negatively affect CIFORs fiscal health since most of CIFORs funding is in US dollars. Also, there was a significant decrease in unrestricted or core funding, which is not tied to a specific project, from CIFORs donors, and thus there was a need to raise funds from donors through specific projects (restricted money). Further, in the aftermath of the tragedy on September 11, 2001, it was anticipated that funding for international forestry related issues would be negatively effected. The financial crisis did not occur, and quite the opposite has happened. CIFORs annual budget grew from USD 12.5 million in 2001 to almost USD 15 million in 2004, most

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of this growth occurring through project-specific (or restricted) funding. CIFOR also maintained a critical mass of scientists in its headquarters, while also increasing its presence in three regional offices in Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Brazil. According to the current DG, it is this type of growth that has allowed CIFOR to maintain its comparative advantage. That said, CIFOR scientists setting research priorities in this context has highlighted a series of issues or debates within the institution regarding CIFORs relationship with donors, the balance of scientific disciplines in the institution, and the usefulness of priority setting exercises. 1. Donor-Driven Donors figure prominently in discussions about setting research priorities at CIFOR, whether at the individual, programme or center-wide level, and have become only more so since the perceived financial crisis, the decrease in unrestricted or core funding 9 , and the need for scientists to raise their own salaries through securing funding through projects 10 . The single most frequently heard phrase from CIFOR scientists about the CIFOR-donorpriority setting relationship was donor-driven. This was noted as a pejorative. Analogous comments made by CIFOR scientists included CIFOR is not setting the agenda, we are prostituting ourselves because goodwill funding ran out, [we are in] danger of being opportunistic, and donors are in the drivers seat. It was curious that donor-driven was so pejorative, considering that donors created and sustained CIFOR. For these CIFOR scientists, the current CIFOR-donor relationship in the context of CIFORs research priorities has been qualitatively different since the perceived financial crisis and push for donor-funded

Approximately 50% of CIFORs current annual budget is unrestricted, but previously this proportion was higher. The extent that scientists must raise their own salaries varies for every scientist.

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projects. For example, many CIFOR scientists noted that CIFOR is in fire-fighting mode when it comes to submitting project proposals, that there is crazy pressure to write proposals, that CIFOR is chasing small amounts of money and short-term priorities, and that there is a funding frenzy with no strategic thinking. These perceptions were in part corroborated in an in-house analysis of CIFORs 2003 funding raising efforts. This analysis noted that 45% of the proposals submitted by one of CIFORs three programmes had budgets less than USD 100,000, and that for the two other programmes the percentage was greater than 60%, which suggests that CIFOR scientists were expending much effort on smallbudget projects (CIFOR PDU 2003). On a day-to-day and visceral level, the push to secure funding has meant CIFOR scientists spending much of their time, often at last minutes notice, to write and submit funding proposals; this has happened without a decrease in other workload responsibilities. Some CIFOR scientists commented that the securing of project funds compromised the quality of research since there is a shortage of CIFOR scientists who can take on the existing workload, and thus CIFOR must hire consultants, who this person noted rehash their own work. You dont get better work out of them. They just get it in on time. The comments about opportunism and no strategic thinking get at the core reasons why the CIFOR-donor relationship is perceived negatively. CIFOR scientists perceive this crisis mode of submitting proposals and securing funding, which has been ongoing since 2001, as coming at the expense of the integrity of the institution. There a sense that CIFOR is willing to secure funding for things donors prioritize, but they as individual scientists and as an institution may not. For example, one scientist noted that CIFORs emphasizing the potential of forests to alleviate poverty is forced, while another noted that

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the discussion on poverty alleviation was too donor driven. Indeed, many noted that CIFOR should say no more often to donors, and one individual previously at a donor organization noted that donors respect institutions that say no. This raises the issue of the mission and values of CIFOR as an institution, which is not as straightforward as previously perceived by CIFOR scientists. One senior scientist noted that it is no longer clear what the shared mission values are or that they are shared. Further, CIFOR scientists had expected the Programme Directors to handle most of the fund raising; indeed, this is in part how CIFOR scientists were convinced of the three programme structure, according to one senior scientist. CIFOR scientists feel that this expectation has not been met over a year after they were hired, and thus this added to frustrations. Additionally, there is a sense among these strong, pejorative comments made by CIFOR scientists that CIFOR should be influencing donor agendas, but definitively is not. Yet, on the topic of CIFOR influencing donors agendas, there is a variety of views on whether this is actually something that CIFOR was created to do. Several scientists, one of whom was involved in the creation of CIFOR, noted that CIFOR was not established to influence donor agendas, and that the CGIAR, which created CIFOR and provides 85% of its funding annually, does not take direction from CG centersCG centers [like CIFOR] work with NARS [National Agricultural Research Institutes] to change national mandates. In a similar vein, another scientist noted that the CG already knew, set priorities. Further, others noted a more dialogic, negotiated exchange between CIFOR and its donors. One noted that CIFOR has always been donor driven[and that CIFOR] needs to accommodatebut we are using donor money in a clever way. Not selling our soul. For example, one CIFOR scientist acknowledged that an unlikely donor funded a particular project he was working on

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because the proposal was more technical than the reality of the project, thereby meeting this donors requirements, and thus both sides got what they wanted, since the donor needed to disburse funds. Another scientist noted that CIFOR is donor driven and influencing donorsboth are true without contracting each other[reading] corresponding signals. From a slightly different perspective, another scientist mentioned that it is not clear whether CIFOR or donors are the driving force, or who wants the next project, considering donors must disburse their funds according to an annual budget. It seems that this dialogic, mediated, negotiated interaction between donors and CIFOR and the domestication or translation of various projects by individual researchers seems under-recognized by scientists who suggest CIFOR is more donor-driven than not, at least not donor-driven enough for scientists to quit because of some perceived breach of individual or institutional integrity. That said, there is a strong perception among scientists that CIFORs direction, integration and integrity are unclear and that this is debilitating. Additionally, much of the frustration about being donor-driven and funding frenzy seems to be due to the large time investments and frequent last-minute nature of preparing and submitting proposals, often at the direction of a Programme Director or DG. Although the reasons for this sense of hurriedness are not entirely clear, in part it seems that individuals at CIFOR became aware of certain opportunities only as deadlines approached, and staff were requested to shift time and effort to these fund raising efforts. Moreover, CIFOR has cast its fund raising net more widely, and thus more funding opportunities are available. CIFORs growth has been primarily through project funding, which has meant an increased number of projects in any given scientists work portfolio. Further, at the time of fieldwork, the division at CIFOR responsible for leading funding

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raising efforts, the Programme Development Unit, was not fully in place, and thus fund raising efforts at the level of the institution were less systematic and organized. There are two others factors that help explain the negative view of the CIFOR-donor relationship with respect to CIFORs priority setting. First, much of the fund raising that CIFOR scientists are required to take on seems to be outside of the programme strategy planning document that is discussed annually and ostensibly guides each programme. Second, since 2001, there has been a shift in focus institutionally at CIFOR towards poverty alleviation and away from a perceived, more balanced mixture of conservation and improved livelihoods, which makes some scientists uncomfortable. Moreover, this shift has been led by the current DG and is perceived by scientists as a top-down decision. In reading donor trends, the current DG among others at CIFOR saw a donor shift away from forests specifically and the environment generally and towards poverty alleviation, and decided to capitalize on that shift. The understanding among these scientists was that the environment and deforestation was the fashion for many donors in the 1990s, but there had been little tangible progress on the forest and environment issues. Further, there was stronger, more concerted commitment among donors to poverty alleviation due in part to critiques of the World Bank and IMF. Thus, the increased focus on poverty alleviation meant raising the efficiency of existing marginal funds, which caused environmental issues to be merged with others. Although no one at CIFOR seems to disagree with the importance of poverty alleviation, some are skeptical of the link between forests and poverty alleviation and/or that CIFORs applied research can contribute to alleviating poverty. Others see it as a top-down management decision that has come at the expense of other pertinent issues related

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to forests and people, and by association important research disciplines and approaches relevant to forests and people. 2. Natural and Social Sciences Closely tied to the perceived shift in institutional emphasis to poverty alleviation, many CIFOR scientists are concerned with a perceived change in the prioritization of research agendas and scientific disciplines since the current DG came into office and the increased demand for scientists to raise funds for both projects and their salaries. Grossly, there is a perception among CIFOR staff that CIFOR is now dominated by social science at the expense of the natural sciences. At the 2004 annual CIFOR meeting, it was noted that two-thirds of CIFOR research staff had natural science backgrounds, but several CIFOR scientists considered this an obfuscation of the reality at CFIOR. They noted that although these individuals have natural science backgrounds, most currently conduct socio-economic research. Further, there was skepticism among CIFOR scientists that those individuals with natural science backgrounds were in decision-making positions and/or were senior scientists. Even those CIFOR scientists who believe that the problems related to tropical forests and improving livelihoods of forest dependent people are primarily political-economic feel that conservation and production elements have been marginalized. Many scientists perceive a loss in institutional balance between research on conservation, production and social science aspects of forests, and in its place CIFOR research has shifted towards economicallyoriented research that targets policy change. Many perceive that institutionally conservation is much less of a priority at CIFOR and that forest production is virtually non-existent. This, of course, implies a perceived past of balance among these three elements that constitute CIFOR research, which is unclear.

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These perceptions are also closely linked to personnel changes within the institution, particularly in CIFOR headquarters, where the majority of international scientists are based. From 2001 to 2004, CIFOR lost three expatriate dirt foresters for various reasons without their being replaced. One CIFOR scientist, however, noted that this imbalance is a misperception because it is a headquarters-centric view, and that his programme had recently hired three natural scientists in CIFORs regional offices in Africa. Further, the strong institutional emphasis on poverty alleviation does not sit comfortably with several CIFOR scientists who feel that there has been an attendant marginalization of the non-economic values of forests, e.g., the cultural and spiritual aspects. One CIFOR scientist also noted discomfort with the poverty alleviation emphasis because it frames the people who are ostensibly the ultimate beneficiaries of CIFORs work in terms of what they dont have. These concerns about the loss of balance between the social and natural sciences and the loss of balance between production, conservation and social science elements of forests are revealing in several ways. First, these concerns are revealing in terms of what CIFOR scientists think an international applied forestry research institute should be doing and how it should be doing it: It should address problems related to forests and forest dependent people in a multidisciplinary fashion, a balance of natural and social sciences. It should address in an integrated fashion the conservation, production and social science elements of these problems. In essence, this ideal of what CIFOR should do reflected in the comments made by CIFOR scientists is intimately tied to an imaginary and unproblematized world of sustainable development, where a balance is not only attainable, but effective, and assumes a linear model of research informing policy and practice.

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As discussed in the previous section on impact-oriented science this world of sustainable development is mythical, and only obfuscates the real challenges facing forests, forests dependent people, and forestry institutions, such as CIFOR. These notions of what CIFOR should do further imply that some CIFOR scientists, to a certain extent, believe that the organization should be one step removed from the external world there should be a buffer to their everyday practice that allows for and fosters the balance in research approaches, disciplines and topics, which in the end will lead to sustainable forest management and improved livelihoods. There seems to be an underlying faith in this largely mythical world among those concerned that the balance is off at CIFOR. Interestingly, one CIFOR scientist commented that CIFOR needs more forestry and need to help foresters, but that we dont believe in it, which implies a loss of faith in this balance between disciplines, particularly among those who favor the institutional emphasis on political-economic factors. Second, the concern among CIFOR scientists that the balance of research approaches and disciplines has shifted too far to the social sciences, economics in particular, is also in part due to a perceived credibility issue. One CIFOR scientist noted that CIFOR has credibility among mainstream forestry institutions, and hence CIFOR was an acceptable interlocutor to bring non-traditional ideas into these traditional forestry institutions, e.g., ideas about community forestry. This individuals concern about the balance in research disciplines and agendas was partially founded on the concern about the loss of credibility in the eyes of these traditional institutions, now that CIFOR placed less emphasis on conservation and production. Indeed, one CIFOR scientists comment that CIFOR is a forestry institution [and] should produce forest science [but there is] not much these days captures the concern about

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the institutions possible loss of credibility. Another scientist noted that CIFOR is near the edge of what we could afford to lose with respect to natural scientists. This issue of credibility is intimately tied to an historical trajectory of forestry as a profession: The profession and discipline was first dominated by the natural sciences that denied the importance, or sometimes even the existence, of the people that lived in and around them and that focused on production and yield (see Scott 1998). With time, institutions involved in forestry came to accept conservation aspects, and at later date, social science aspects. It was, however, production that was the basis of a forestry institution. There is an origin story about forestry institutions and the arc of their development that is implied in some of the perceived concerns of CIFOR scientists. The implication seems to be if an institution does not have a practicing silviculturalist who can manage forests for production, conservation and ecosystem services, then it cannot credibly call itself a forestry institution. Implied in this is that the social sciences should play a supporting role in a forestry institution, and yet they seem to have taken over. While this maybe the perception among some CIFOR scientists, according to others multiple disciplines have always been a priority at CIFOR. According some scientists, the previous DG, trained as a conservation biologist, recognized the importance of social sciences and policy research to forests conservation and use and the livelihoods of forest dependent people. Thus, he hired scientists from multiple disciplines, although was least keen on anthropologists and the soft social sciences. That said, about one-third or halfway through his tenure as DG from 1993 to 2001, he went from dismissing an adaptive collaborative approach to forest management where forest dependent people figured centrally to embracing it and holding it up as one of the key approaches to forest management.

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This concern about research agendas and disciplines in CIFOR reveals a tension between the natural and social sciences in forestry institutions. From the perspective of social scientists its a success story about natural scientists and foresters coming around to the importance of social science in forest related issues, yet at the same time many scientists, including social scientists, are concerned with the prospect of social sciences dominating due to the possible loss of credibility in less progressive forestry institutions. 3. Programme Strategies and their Implications In this section, I describe and analyze how CIFOR scientists and management talk about and perceive the programme strategy process and documents, and how those are linked or not to CIFORs broader center-wide strategy. Another key element in discussions at CIFOR about determining research priorities are programme specific strategy meetings, processes and documents and their links to CIFORs center-wide strategy. Annually, each of CIFORs three programmes goes through a process of designing or revising a programme strategy that ostensibly should guide the programmes direction for 3-5 years and is linked to the broader center-wide mid-term plan (MTP) that is a designed as a rolling three year plan. The participative processes that produce these documents are, in theory, management tools that guide the programme, assist in planning and communicate to external audiences of the current and future directions the specific programme and CIFOR. Since the three programme directors have only been in place since March 2003 and the programmes themselves since 2001/2, at the programme level these processes and documents are relatively recent. Interestingly, analogous processes and documents existed previously, and CIFOR scientists and management were involved in those as well.

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CIFOR scientists have little faith in the ability of these documents to actually guide the programme and individual researchers work. Many scientists seem these processes and documents as administrative exercises that have never worked at CIFOR. As one scientist put it they are ritual and cycles of ritual. Another noted that institutionally priority setting is pathetic. Yet another senior scientist had the question of how do we set priorities for the institution and noted that in their tenure at CIFOR, which started with the previous DG, now and then [it has been] seat of the pants funding. From both the perspectives of Programme Directors and CIFOR scientists, the best that they hope for are changes at the margins, since many research initiatives are ongoing, in different periods in the project lifecycle and whose budgets are strictly regulated. One scientist added that since the scientists write various portions of the strategy documents, they end up reflecting more what the scientists are already doing than future directions for the programme. In an in-house analysis of information flows within CIFOR, a CFIOR research fellow clearly demonstrated that the link between (1) research projects and their impacts and (2) programme strategy documents was entirely unclear. According to this individual, programme strategies had not translated into research projects, and research projects impacts had not informed programme strategies. There seems to be a strong disconnect between policy and practice. Indeed the perceived lack of usefulness or real implications of these documents was confirmed by several CIFOR scientists comments that they give priority to their own research interests over the programmes. However, some scientists did note the usefulness of the process of building and/or revising a programme strategy to foster a sense of coherence and integrity in the programme.

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It is clear from these comments that the actual guiding ability of these documents have been marginal, and most scientists who have experienced these processes perceive them as a necessary evil or as perfunctory, administrative burdens that are part of the price of being a member of the CGIAR and an institution as large as CIFOR. Moreover, given the reality of fund raising noted by CIFOR scientists in the earlier part of this section, the leverage of the documents seem extremely limited. They may become even less so as CIFOR becomes more dependent upon donor funding for specific projects (restricted funding), which means having to accommodate donor priorities and demands to a greater extent, and thus greater probability of neglecting these documents. One scientist flatly noted that believing that strategies make a difference is self-deception. Another set of reasons that these processes and documents are perceived as not useful is institutional. As noted earlier, they are disconnected from projects on the ground, which really means they are disconnected from institutional reality and institutional history. The reason for this is, in part, they are public discourse and management documents documents that represent CIFOR and each programme as coherent and progressing rationally from and into a particular direction. To portray the messy reality of securing funding, implementing projects, and institutional learning (or lack thereof) would not speak well of CIFOR management to donors and other external stakeholders. Thus, there is very little learning that is possible from these processes and documents at the individual, programme and center levels. At least to a few CIFOR scientists recognize these documents require ex post facto rationalizations and historical revisions necessary for public consumption/discourse. But for these scientists the problem arises if we begin to believe these rationalizations [since] we

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lose our sense of history and lose our possibilities to learn, implying that the formulation of these documents and related processes are not opportunities to really learn. These programme strategies are quintessential examples of Mosses notion of policy, and thus it is unsurprising that they lack any actual guiding ability for future programmatic direction. Mosse (2004) notes that policys primary functions are to legitimize rather than orientate practice. (648) and that good policy is policy which legitimizes and mobilizes practical support and is not a good guide to action (663). The role of policy is to provide an authoritative framework of interpretation, or a second order rationalization of politically and economically ordered work routines (Heyman 1995: 265, cited in Lewis and Mosse 2006: 4). In light of these insights, the disconnect between programme strategy documents and research project impacts noted earlier is to be expected. This disconnect is precisely the inherent disjuncture between policy and practice that Mosse and others discuss (Mosse 2004, 2005; Rossi 2004). These insights also shed light on why scientists participate in these processes. One reason is that since these documents have historically little institutional leverage, i.e., not abiding by them does not lead to punishment or reprimand, but not participating in the process does. Also, it is important to note that scientists feel ownership of the institution and programme and thus do expend time and energy in these processes. Another related reason that CIFOR scientists actively participate is perhaps connected to institutional change at CIFOR and a perception that management the Programme Directors, the Assistant Director General and Director General has become more hierarchical and more bureaucratic. Scientists are concerned with the possible implementation of top-down, non-process decision making, and hence, scientists participate in these processes to ensure that should these

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documents be enforced, their interests will not be excluded. In light of the perceived increased hierarchical, top-down structure of CIFOR, the earlier comment about the dangers of believing our own fictions is a concern that the combination of institutional hierarchy and management tools such as strategy documents could have negative consequences for scientists, e.g., increased regulation and control of their activities justified through these documents. C. Partnerships and Capacity Building 1. Theory of Partnerships and Capacity Building in CIFOR In theory, partnerships and capacity building have figured prominently in CIFORs modus operandi from its inception. Increasing national forestry research capacity is one of four main objectives in CIFORs constitution (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/mission.htm), and one of CIFORs unique traits is its commitment to working in collaborative partnerships and in the process enhancing the capacity of national institutions and researchers to address their own research needs and to set their own agenda and effectively pursue their own scientific programmes (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/different.htm). Partnerships are the way that CIFOR operationalizes its unique character as a Center without Walls, a modus operandi that is not business as usual (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/partnership.htm). In theory, partnerships and capacity building are glossed over as part of a single process to achieve impact: CIFORs comparative advantageis derived from its appeal to partnersfostering research capacity in developing countries

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(http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/comparative.htm). Further, in operationalizing a partnership, in theory, the conception, execution and delivery of research must include all partners and should not follow only the agenda set by CIFOR HQ, and joint decision making in a partnership maybe less efficient than direct control by one party, but we recognize that not only efficiency but eventual empowerment of these partners is central to this strategy (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/partnership.htm). And indeed, in the ideal world of CIFOR true partnership comes through collaboration on mutually agreed tasks for mutual benefit (http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/aboutcifor/strategy/capacity_building.htm). 2. Reality of Partnerships and Capacity Building The reality of partnerships and capacity building at CIFOR articulated through the experiences of its scientists differs substantially from the ideal, while also varying across individual researchers and context. Consistent across individuals and contexts, however, is the perception that CIFOR is not very good at it and more often than not pays lip service rather than supporting and encouraging it. Further, partnerships and capacity building are not as straightforward as presented in the ideal in the context of scientists incentive to produce high quality research products. One instructive example is the partnership and capacity building relationship between CIFOR and the Indonesian Ministry of Forestrys Division of Forestry Research and Development (FORDA), which is ostensibly a key CIFOR partner. One senior Indonesian scientist who was involved in discussions at the time of Indonesias bid to host CIFOR mentioned that the Ministry had wanted to host CIFOR not only for the political

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encouragement and legitimacy, but also for career, partnership and capacity building purposes. The Ministry anticipated a relationship analogous to IRRI in the Philippines where, according to this Indonesian scientist, at least 60% of staff were Filipinos. Thus, the Ministry saw CIFOR not only as a vehicle for legitimacy, but also as an opportunity for Indonesian foresters and scientists. And, indeed on paper it would seem to be a natural pairing. The practice has been considerably different, with the partnership often non-existent or strained in practice. One CIFOR researcher noted FORDA is a weight around our necks. Further, with the increased focus on political-economic issues at CIFOR, senior officials in the Ministry note that CIFOR opposes the Ministry, not contributing to the Republic. And indeed, on several occasions the Ministry has not only expressed its unhappiness with CIFOR, but also reprimanded CIFOR. According to senior officials in the Ministry and FORDA, CIFORs research should not be critical of the Ministry, particularly in public. For FORDA what is considered acceptable research is research that backstops or justifies the policies of the Ministry. Hence, research that challenges the Ministrys position and policies is referred to as advocacy, which for the Ministry is mutually exclusive from research. FORDA and CIFOR also have different notions of what research is and the boundaries of research. For example, FORDA finds action research unacceptable; from FORDAs perspective it is not research, it is extension. Further, CIFOR and FORDA are both mired in their own bureaucratic procedures, which makes institutional partnering difficult, and indeed both parties acknowledge the lack of incentives to institutionalize the partnership. At one meeting between CIFOR and FORDA in January 2003 regarding improved collaboration, a senior FORDA researcher openly stated that they had these precise meetings annually, and progress was never made. He noted that, for example, FORDA had promised CIFOR a list of

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FORDA publications several years ago, but did not even deliver on that. This researcher was retiring the next day. One CIFOR scientist who de facto became the interlocutor between CIFOR and FORDA noted that indeed the partnership is mostly on paper because, inter alia, a framework for collaboration did not exist. Further, he noted that the massive difference in salary 10 to 1 according to him between CIFOR expatriate scientists and Indonesian civil servants did little to incentivize FORDA scientists to work in partnership with CIFOR. A few CIFOR scientists, however, are recognized by CIFOR and FORDA as having established meaningful research partnerships. One CIFOR scientist in particular noted that she initiated the relationship with FORDA over a two year period, presenting research at annual FORDA meetings. After introducing herself and her research to FORDA, she built relationships before any specific proposal was on the horizon. When a possible research proposal opportunity presented itself, she worked with specific individuals at FORDA to develop the proposal and to navigate the bureaucratic maze of FORDA to ensure the individuals at FORDA she had worked with received permission to work on the project from their superiors. She noted that the CIFOR person must be patientthe transaction cost is high[we] must go to FORDAwe must make timepeople at CIFOR tend not to make the time[and] CIFOR should be more sensitive regarding issues that the government, NGOs and communities are dealing with. The FORDA-CIFOR partnership illustrates the multiple constraints that partnerships and capacity building place upon CIFOR researchers and their partners, and also exemplifies how those constraints are navigated. There several key analytical points. First, much works

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against institutional partnerships or capacity building because of the ideological, epistemological and bureaucratic differences. However, given little choice but to work in partnership because of its mandate, CIFOR as an institution tends to these institutional partnerships in an ad hoc basis, limiting investments, whether time, energy or funds. Second, at the level of the individual, much also works against forming meaningful partnerships due to the high transaction costs perceived by CIFOR scientists, and thus many are only willing to invest small amounts of time and energy, since often the payoff is not worth the time and energy, and also because at the institutional level partnerships are not as rewarded or recognized as other accomplishments. Indeed many CIFOR scientists noted that often partnerships are really sub-contracting, which translates into contracting out specific tasks without any pretenses of capacity building. At the institutional level this is not reprimanded since it often means more efficient delivery of research products, which is highly recognized and rewarded. Thus, in the case of the CIFOR scientist who has established a good partnership with FORDA, this individual perceives she is working against certain strong professional incentives valued by CIFOR. Third, partnerships and capacity building often require technical skills, as well as soft skills and the willingness to use them, such as cultural understanding, patience, process activities and frequent face-to-face meetings that often do not have immediate payoff. Although some CIFOR scientists have and/or are willing to use one or both sets of skills, some do not and/or are not willing to prioritize them because other institutional priorities take precedence. Indeed, several CIFOR scientists noted that the institutional incentives are quite the opposite, although there is institutional incentive to call something a partnership or capacity building.

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Comments made by CIFOR scientists, beyond the CIFOR-FORDA example, support these analytical points. Most CIFOR researchers have clear understandings of what partnerships and capacity building entail, but there are many serious doubts about whether this is or should be one of CIFORs main objectives. Most scientists agree that partnerships and capacity building require substantial time investments and some financial investments since they are about building relationships, finding common interests on multiple fronts, meeting with people face-to-face, cross cultural understanding and working intensively with a relatively small group of people. According to one scientist, it is about embedding each other in each others problems. There is also agreement that particularly the time investments are difficult for CIFOR scientists. CIFOR scientists also differentiate between partners and those that require or want capacity building in terms of power or status, or the resources that each contributes. Several noted that with capacity building there is a power relationship where CIFOR is the bearer of resources, whereas with partners its more of an equitable relationship in which both parties bring resources, and there can be lateral capacity building. Further, several considered that capacity building as a goal as patronizing and irrational since it assumes that CIFOR is the bearer of expertise that its partners need. Scientists question CIFORs role in capacity building. Several noted that it was not CIFORs main line of business, that is was a footnote, and/or that that CIFOR did not have the skills or appropriate people to conduct it. On this latter point, many scientists noted they were not hired based on their capacity building skills, but rather their publications. On a related point, many scientists commented that what is called partnerships is more often sub-contracting where CIFOR is a broker to conduct or coordinate research as

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efficiently as possible, and much of what is called capacity building is at best a byproduct of research and at worst in the eye of the beholder, who is tempted to call all things capacity building that are not. For one senior scientist, this disconnect between theory and reality is unsurprising given that at the time CIFORs key objectives or goals were established, they were not discussed and thought about with respect to weighing or role of each relative to each other. That said, capacity building is still one of CIFORs main objectives, but it is the one most frequently sidelined and allowed to be sidelined by the institution. As one scientist noted about partnerships and capacity building, they are a little stone we have in our shoe.a democratic sword hanging over our headsmoral obligations to have it in our basket. 3. Perception of Tradeoffs and Institutional Incentives CIFOR scientists often perceive partnerships and capacity building as a tradeoff with producing high quality research and efficiency, both of which are stronger institutional priorities at CIFOR. Repeatedly, CIFOR scientists stressed that it was publications that counted, although a few who have had significant media coverage did not feel the pressure of having to produce scientific publications. Thus, partnerships in general and capacity building specifically are consistently lower priorities. For example, one scientist noted that going out and discussing possible projects with possible partners means time not writing scientific publications, which from an institutional incentive perspective and the perspective of a scientists career has higher priority. Moreover this individual noted that there is often not a budget to initiate and explore these possible partnerships, which is an additional incentive not to do so, at least until there is a project tangibly in hand, which then often translates into finding partners hastily and not

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having a sense of ownership of the project on their part. It is a logic that works against partnerships in the ideal sense. Another scientist related that for one project he was involved in, the key criteria for choosing partners was to minimize the cost of case studies and thus partners with the most data and/or most expertise were chosen. Capacity building was not a specific objective of the project. In this case as in others, capacity building and high quality research were perceived as mutually exclusive due to the institutional incentive of efficiency. An example came from one senior scientist who, on the subject of partners and capacity building, noted that an article submitted by CIFOR researchers and 30 of their national level partners to a high profile peer-reviewed journal was rejected, in part, because the article required so many compromises to make it acceptable to all the authors. Whether it would have changed the fate of the article or not is questionable, but he noted that if authorship had been limited to the two principal CIFOR researchers, it would have been stronger. Also, it would have been better tailored to the audience of journal since many national level partners have much less interest and incentive in publishing peer-reviewed journal articles. With respect to transaction costs, he also noted that to even obtain the signature of the 30 authors, which the journal required, took three to four months. Moreover, from the perspective of several scientists, capacity building is a high risk investment because of the uncertainties surrounding the recipients of capacity building activities it can be hit or miss because capacity building assumes a certain statis or trajectory of the recipient. One scientist noted that although she invests a lot on capacity building of local government partners in Indonesia, she is uncertain whether it will have any impact due to the likely changes in positions of government officials. And although capacity

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building should ostensibly be at the institutional level to ensure that even if an individual leaves an office, the position will still have strengthened capacity, in reality this is not the case because of the difficult institutional changes it requires. The requirement that CIFOR scientists produce high quality scientific products maintains higher priority. As one scientist noted, and many other scientists comments corroborate, if you want to do well you can drop capacity building in terms of ones career at CIFOR or in other research-oriented organizations. Another scientist noted that [you are] not punished for not doing it [and] it doesnt count if you do do it. This further substantiates the perception among scientists that they and CIFOR are ultimately judged on science. Yet there is an understanding and perhaps even struggle that the dissonance between the real and ideal and how CIFOR scientists must navigate it is problematic, particularly with respect to the institutional incentive to be efficient. One senior scientist commented, if we talk cost-effective, we stop talking Africa this is not the point [of CIFOR], meaning that efficiency should not be the sole the metric for CIFOR to determine whether they should work on a certain issue or certain region. Similarly, another scientist acknowledged that in the longer run, capacity building is the most meaningful. The issue of the longer run seems important here because as far as incentives and investments, most are seen in a shorter time horizon. CIFOR scientists noted that fundamental changes in institutional incentives are required if partnerships and capacity building are to be taken seriously. For example, there needs to time and budget allocation for researchers to carry out partnerships and capacity building, and perhaps even a separate capacity building unit, since many researchers

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acknowledge the do not have the skills 11 . CIFOR scientists noted that in their hiring interviews, capacity building was not a criteria. Capacity building needs to be institutionalized, e.g., integrated and weighed heavily in the annual performance contracts of researchers. The institutional incentives that work against partnerships and capacity building in CIFOR are, of course, part of a much broader constellation of institutions and incentives. In other words, the problems and solutions regarding partnerships and capacity building are not bounded within the confines of CIFOR, but rather require systemic change in the broader landscape of institutions. CIFORs mixed messages, contradictory incentives and hidden transcripts only reflect the mixed messages, contradictory incentives and hidden transcripts of the broader system of which it is a part. Further, it is not merely about whether funds are available or not since, for example, several scientists could point to large tranches of funding specifically for capacity building. An illuminating example was provided by one expatriate CIFOR scientist who noted that the donor for a particular project involving national partners in three countries locked in both his billing cost and time on a given project because that donor agency had strict policy about minimizing the expatriate time on a project but locking them into particular billing costs. The consequence in this case was that his allocated time on the project had almost expired during the first year of a three-year project. The prospects of fostering partnerships and carrying out capacity building activities look bleak for this project. In a critique of international forestry aid published by CIFOR Persson (2003) notes the following:

Other CGIAR Centers such as ICRAF do have separate capacity building units, but these Centers tend to be much larger.

11

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most donors do not have an administration that is suited to assistance in forestryIn spite of all the talk about ownership and partnership, projects are still very often donor driven. The bureaucratic systems of most donors are very complicated (x) and that it is quite easy to strengthen the capacity of individuals, but building institutional capacity is a different issue.need strong commitments from governments and real ownership of the process (80). In a similar vein, Black (2003: 117) notes the following: The results oriented, bureaucratic imperatives of many government and donor agencies effectively nullify the long-term, participatory, and process-oriented approach to capacity building that is promoted in the discourse. UNICEF notes that many interventions categorized as capacity building are in fact implementation support measures, which aim simply to improve an organizations service-delivery function to better achieve the donors mandate (IFCB nd, accessed 2000). III. Conclusion In this chapter, I discussed and analyzed the experiences and practices of CIFOR managers and researchers with respect to operationalizing fundamental elements of the institutions mandate, viz., (1) to conduct impact oriented science, (2) to establish and implement research priorities and (3) to work in partnership with other institutions and build their capacity. I discussed how scientists talk about the difference between the real and ideal world of CIFOR, including the landscape of institutions that CIFOR is part of, and how they negotiated or managed these differences. In doing so, I examined the institutional culture and structure that frame CIFORs researchers and managers engagement with the broader political-economic dynamics and institutional landscape related to forestry and forest

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dependent people in Indonesia and elsewhere. This discussion of how CIFOR researchers have attempted to practice impact-oriented research, and the issues and debates raised in the process, indicate that CIFOR researchers are dealing on a daily basis with how to make their knowledge authoritative to have their research have impact -- in a context that is far removed from the linear IPG model in which policy and practice are build on good research. The discussion of priority setting at CIFOR reveals a dialogic, mediated and negotiated interaction between CIFOR and its donors, as well as translation between project proposal, implementation and reporting. However, the current donor emphasis on poverty alleviation and CIFORs attempts to connect to that agenda have raised concerns within the institution with respect to the extent to which CIFOR can speak to that agenda item without compromising the integrity of CIFOR scientists interests and practices. Lastly, the discussion regarding partnerships and capacity building reveals a tension not only between the incentives of CIFOR and its partners, but also with respect to the incentives of CIFOR researchers to produce high quality research products versus build the capacity of local partners.

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CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS I. Summary This dissertation examined the nexus of research, policy and practice from village to global levels with respect to forest management and local communities control over forest resources and improved local livelihoods in Indonesia. I investigated how problems and solutions are articulated; how these articulations are transformed in practice; how practices are translated into knowledge or policy; and how certain interpretations become authoritative. In doing so, I examined the institutional culture of and relationships between forestry institutions in Indonesia, highlighting the role of brokers of authority, i.e., how certain actors become brokers and the social processes involved in brokering across institutions to recruit support for certain interpretations to become authoritative. In this dissertation, CIFOR and the DFF were the key interlocutors studied. With respect to CIFOR, I examined in one analytical frame (1) project plans and intentions, (2) the context within which activities take place and the relationships between the different actors engaged in CIFORs activities on the ground, and (3) how CIFOR addresses or represents the difference between plan and outcome to a broader public. In doing so, I show that although the coherence of design unravels in the practical unfolding of a project (Mosse 2004: 664), CIFORs reporting and publishing of unintended outcomes incorporate this unraveling into an authoritative narrative of prescriptions for CIFORs interpretive community. CIFORs articulation of these prescriptions -- which promote an approach to international conservation and development that is adaptive, flexible and accommodating to local variation -- through the vehicle of self-critical reflections is essential to legitimizing and

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mobilizing support for them and CIFOR since that rhetorical mode is more palatable to CIFORs interpretive community involved in policy and practice. I also studied the tension between order and disjuncture in the landscape of aidrelated forestry institutions in Indonesia. More specifically, I examined how the order or master metaphor (Mosse 2004, 2005) of reform agreeable to both the international community and Indonesian government was crafted and maintained by the DFF in its brokering role. I investigated how this master metaphor evolved through the active refashioning by both donors and government to incorporate the lack of progress on commitments. Moreover, I examined the structural dynamics that explain this lack of progress and the ineffectiveness of aid in Indonesia. In doing so, I revealed the disconnect between knowledge, policy and practice, as well as how these disjunctures are maintained. I expanded the use of Mosses framework beyond any one given development project and into the realm of multiple projects, multiple interests and multiple actors, all of whom were recruited by the DFF to support the master narrative of forest reform. After contextualizing this study in Chapters 2 and 3, in Chapter 4 I examined CIFORs role in Malinau, and in doing so analyzed CIFORs role as an interlocutor or broker between villagers and the district government. I analyzed the perceptions and relationships between villagers, district officials and CIFOR in the context of CIFORs applied research. My analysis demonstrates that these relationships and the role of CIFORs research are not straightforward, and require continuous negotiation and compromise. Further, the results of these negotiations are contingent upon a broad set of factors beyond the formal institutional relationship between CIFOR, the district government and villagers, and rarely meet actors expectations. The significance and role of CIFORs research are embedded in the tenuous,

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negotiated articulation of perceived interests and possibilities. It is clear that CIFORs influence, at least at the local level, is more limited than CIFOR and villagers had hoped. CIFORs presence and activities do, however, provide a vehicle of articulation and potential leverage for the actors the institution engages. These articulations, however, are established in a mire of contingencies, and thus their formations and consequences are unpredictable. Indeed, the process of articulation is a fragile one. Given the importance that CIFOR places on the influence of its research on global forest policy and the substantial influence it seems to have to date, it is important to examine how CIFOR addresses the social reality of Malinau when CIFOR writes about its research to this global audience, which was the focus of Chapter 5. In that chapter, I discussed how CIFOR represents its experience in Malinau to a broader audience, viz., how it addresses the disconnects or challenges in publications geared toward its global interpretive communities and what those representations attempt to achieve among the practitioners and academics involved in international conservation and development. CIFOR researchers reporting of their local-level research experience in Malinau and articulating these experiences through a particular self-reflexive mode provide compelling, persuasive (policy) narratives and prescriptions to their global interpretive community. Essential to the traction of these narratives and prescriptions is the telling of the challenges and constraints that CIFOR encountered in Malinau. CIFOR researchers first-hand experience of being there lends further legitimacy to its prescriptive comments and suggestions. In employing this self-reflexive mode, CIFOR attempts to carve out a space for aid, research, science culture, and conservation and development that underscores the need for the broader practitioner community to account for and accommodate local variation. The

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emphasis on the need to be adaptive and flexible is unusual for a CGIAR institute (see for example Marglin 1996), and yet by virtue of being a CGIAR center CIFOR has the legitimacy and authority to advocate for these changes in the mainstream development community. CIFORs Malinau based publications indicate not only an awareness of the nonlinear and political relationship between research and practice, but also a call to embrace these dynamics in research and development. The extent to which these prescriptions will be institutionalized at CIFOR or elsewhere depends greatly on whether significant institutional changes can take place. There is potentially a performative aspect to these lessons learned in which there are nods of agreement but the necessary institutional changes are not made. To examine these issues more closely, in Chapters 6 and 7 I investigated the broader landscape of aid-related forestry institutions in Indonesia. In Chapter 6, I analyzed how forestry became a top priority for both international donors and the Indonesian government and examined how the order or master metaphor (Mosse 2004, 2005) of forest reform was mutually crafted and articulated in official documents. I also analyzed how this master metaphor evolved through time as the lack of progress on commitments became impossible to ignore. In doing so, I attempted to show how the master metaphor was maintained by both donors and the government and incorporated the lack of progress. In attempting to stabilize the master metaphor in the face of a potentially destabilizing element, viz., the indisputable lack of progress, both donors and the government refashioned it to include other actors and factors, which had the effect of keeping the master metaphor viable and justifying continued engagement. However, the inclusion of other actors and interests to support the master metaphor also had the opposite effect of further destabilizing it. In other words, as

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responsibility for Indonesias forest crisis and lack of progress on reforms were located in the multiple policies of multiple ministries of multiple countries, support for this interpretation became more difficult to recruit because it required buy-in from too many diverse interests and actors. In chapter 7, I analyzed the relationships and perceptions of actors who engage and/or are involved in the DFF. I highlighted the role of the DFF as a broker between institutions involved in aid-related forestry and the master metaphor of forest reform in Indonesia. While created by the donors, the DFF in its everyday functioning does not consist of donor representatives, but rather technical experts tied to bilateral or multilateral projects. The DFF has no legal standing, charter or by-laws, and is essentially an informal forum. DFFs ambiguity in status and position is potentially what gives it influence and makes it a resource for those actors it attempts to engage, albeit in a fragile and tenuous fashion. The core members of the DFF are well placed to play the role of brokers since they have a strong understanding of the institutional logic and practices of both government and donor agencies and are in varying degrees part of both institutions. Indeed, the core members of the DFF draft the annual CGI meeting donor statement -- the donors articulation of the master metaphor in part through consultations and negotiations with government and donor agencies. The core members of the DFF and the DFF itself possess the protean qualities important to brokering between institutions, viz., an ability to exploit an ambiguous insider/outsider position and resonate with actors with disparate interests (Mosse 2005). Although the DFF was partially successful in its brokering role, particularly in the context of the annual CGI statements, it was unable to continue cultivate trust between key individuals in different parts of the system (Mosse 2005: 125) because as more actors were

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recruited to support the master metaphor of reform, the DFF could not accommodate the multiple and disparate interests of these actors. By the December 2003 CGI, the master metaphor of forest reform had lost the support of many actors; the DFF could no longer broker the multiple and disparate interests, and hence the master metaphor was not only destabilized, but also broke down. The DFF was unable to continue to deliver as brokers and thus was no longer useful to donor and government agencies, which subsequently failed the DFF resulting in its dissolution in 2004. The DFF became obsolete, and the DFFs ambiguous position became a liability instead of an asset to its functioning as a broker. Although a lack of progress and failure to achieve commitments had previously become part of the master metaphor of reform, they were necessarily accompanied by a sense of striving -- of hope -- which maintained support for the master metaphor. As it evolved and more actors and interests were recruited to support the master metaphor, it reached a point where the disparate interests of the multiple actors could no longer be accommodated and brokered -- at least by the DFF. The sense of failure and lack of progress came to greatly outweigh a sense of hope, which is fundamental to the master metaphor since hope involves the redefinition of the past and present in terms of an imagined future (Mosse 2005: 240, emphases added). Brokering multiple interests and institutions to cultivate a master metaphor provides this sense of hope and translates reality into an imagined future. The DFF had been a successful broker until it could no longer articulate a compelling sense of hope and vision for the future that resonated with all of the actors and their interests. With this detailed understanding of the institutional landscape, in Chapter 8, I switched vantage points to an intra-institutional one to analyze the experiences of CIFOR managers and researchers with respect to (1) the conduct of impact oriented science, (2) the

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establishment and implementation of research priorities, and (3) partnerships with other institutions and capacity building. In doing so, I examined the institutional culture and structure that frame CIFOR scientists engagement with the broader political-economic dynamics and institutional landscape in Indonesia and elsewhere. The discussion of CIFOR researchers practicing impact-oriented research indicates that they deal on a daily basis with how to make their knowledge authoritative to have their research have impact -- in a context far removed from the linear model in which policy and practice are built on good research. The discussion of priority setting reveals a dialogic and negotiated interaction between CIFOR and its donors, as well as translation between project proposal, implementation and reporting. However, donor emphasis on poverty alleviation and CIFORs attempts to connect to that agenda have raised concerns with respect to the extent to which CIFOR can speak to that agenda without compromising CIFOR scientists interests and practices. I placed this intra-institutional chapter after the analysis of the institutional landscape (Chapters 6 and 7) so that CIFORs logic and practices, as well as brokering with institutions in Indonesia and its global interpretive community would make more sense. For example, although CIFOR engages the DFF and CGI through strategic collaborations and targeted articles in national newspapers such as Kompas, it does so in a limited fashion because CIFOR realizes that they are largely impotent institutions that have been unable to effect the change CIFOR advocates. As I discussed in Chapters 5 and 8, CIFOR places more emphasis on articulating with its global interpretive community at the level of donor metropoles, e.g., USAID in Washington DC instead of the USAID Indonesia Mission, which from CIFORs perspective has greater likelihood of affecting relevant political-economic dynamics in

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Indonesia. As discussed in Chapter 8, part of CIFORs communication strategy is to articulate its research findings and recommendations in ways and in media palatable to its global interpretive community, e.g., articles in the International Herald Tribune and Economist to influence politicians and their constituencies, as well as in-person meetings with Ministers of Trade and Industry in Japan and the US that speak to the interests of those actors. II. Conclusions The findings of this dissertation contribute to and expand upon multiple debates in the academic literature regarding the culture and political economy of knowledge producing institutions, and the effects of that knowledge at global, national and local levels. Although the need was articulated over thirty years ago (Nader 1972), institutional ethnographies generally and ones that deal with international conservation and development specifically are not yet commonplace 1 (Dove 1999b). As I have attempted to demonstrate in this dissertation, studying up yields robust insights and complements existing social science literature that brings the local and global into one analytical frame. Much of the existing literature does not illuminate the inner workings of these institutions. More specifically, analyses of international conservation and development institutions by and large lack a detailed examination of the agency within and between these institutions they lack an ethnographic thickness that investigates the actors, logics, motivations and relationships within an institution. As Cooper and Packard (1997: 28) note, [i]t is not hard to deconstruct the modes of discursive power. It is much harder to discover how discourse operates within institutions.

Notable exceptions are recent ethnographies by Goldman (2005) and Mosse (2005).

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Carrying out this institutional ethnography allowed me to understand the everyday social practices and processes by which narratives are fashioned within institutions, how certain narratives becomes privileged over others, and how they are translated and brokered to recruit support for them by other actors. In studying up I attempted to pry open the black box of institutional policy and practice (Mosse 2004) and documented what Tsing (2005: 1) refers to as friction, or the sticky materiality of practical encounters. In doing so, I discovered how unintended consequences and failure can be articulated to strengthen narratives of hope and of development, and moreover, that failure and can be integral to these master metaphors. In other words, I traced the process by which order is crafted out of a social reality that is inherently disconnected from, yet related to, these orderings (Lewis and Mosse 2006). For example, I analyzed how CIFOR articulated the unintended consequences of its applied research initiatives in Malinau into data, which were then transformed into lessons learned and recommendations for its global interpretive community. Moreover, I argued that CIFORs being there in Malinau was integral to its establishing legitimacy for its recommendations it provided CIFOR with an authenticity and expertness. CIFORs selfcritical testimonial mode of being there cultivated an authoritativeness to justify its recommendations, which runs counter to much of international development conventional wisdom. My analysis of the evolution of the master metaphor of forest reform at the CGI meetings by the DFF and Indonesian government demonstrated how failure, or a lack of progress on agreed upon commitments, can be articulated in terms of hope. The master

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metaphor was expanded to include the recruitment of other actors and interests to stabilize it and maintain a sense of possibility that reform was attainable. With respect to the linkage of local and global realities, my analysis of CIFOR in Malinau demonstrated that an international institution not only has less local influence than the political ecology literature (e.g., Ferguson 1994) would suggest, but also that the position of these institutions is fragile, negotiated and constrained. I do, however, argue that CIFOR attempts to engender discursive authority, but that this authority is attempted at the level of CIFORs global interpretive community. My analysis of how CIFOR attempts to have global influence complements the literature on transformations and articulations of interventions at the local level (e.g., Tsing 1999a, Li 2000) in that it details how an institution transforms field realities into institutional prescriptions. My analysis attempted to integrate an investigation of the interplay between village, district government and CIFORs institutional realities with how CIFOR addresses and represents the differences between plan and practice to its interpretive community. With respect to the methodological issues and implications related to studying up, this dissertation offers several insights, the most basic of which is that ethnographic methods, particularly participant observation, are indeed well suited to addressing how transnational institutions link with aspects of society such as the state and household, as other scholars have argued (see Markowitz 2001). Conducting this type of ethnographic research is, however, challenging for several reasons, perhaps the most pragmatic being that powerful groups do not appreciate being studied (Dove 1999b, Markowitz 2001, Pierce 1995). This in part explains the relative lack of ethnographies that study up. Scholars who have written about the experience of studying up such as Pierce

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(1995) have emphasized the ethnographers positionality as a key methodological tool as well as theoretical issue. Being aware of, articulating and shifting ones positionality is critical to studying up since the relations of power are unclear (Pierce 1995). In carrying out this dissertation project, I also came to understand the fragile and uncertain qualities in the articulations of my positionality and research. Since the beginning of my research in 1999, the extent that I would be able to study up and the extent that the practitioner community would be comfortable with it were entirely unpredictable. My confidence as a researcher to carry out this project and the comfort of the practitioner community with it have interacted over the years in such an erratic and shifting fashion that I almost came to expect an element of unpredictability in the quality of my interactions. This unpredictability was closely related to the multiple, shifting identities I assumed during my fieldwork, which were absolutely critical for me to be able to translate across, indeed broker, multiple institutions and interests. Interestingly, navigating my multiple positions was the most difficult at CIFOR because the institutional worldview of CIFOR scientists was too close to my own to be able to accurately and consistently draw boundaries and gauge to what extent CIFOR would be comfortable with my studying it. Moreover, not only did my research agenda and representation of it shift over time, but so did CIFORs understanding of it. One of the key methodological elements of studying up is for the ethnographer to cultivate an insider/outsider position. With respect to being an insider, my collaborating with CIFOR and engaging other aid-related institutions over the years provided the necessary access and institutional intimacy. In his institutional ethnography of DFID, Mosse also discusses how insider status allowed him access, particularly since in these institutions

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information is a private good rather than a public asset (Mosse 2005: 11). Critical to cultivating an insider identity is to be useful to the institution since it is virtually impossible to sustain long-term participant observation in the absence of making a practical contribution (Mosse 2005:12). On a related point, Mosse (2005: 12) notes something that I experienced, viz., that development institutions are less tolerant of research that falls outside design frameworks, that does not appear to be of practical relevance. Insider status in itself, however, is insufficient in studying up since it limits interpretive possibilities (Mosse 2005: 12). A hybrid position, however, allows the researcher to engage in participant destruction, wresting ones thinking free from prevailing models and means-ends rationality in order to offer critical insight (Mosse 2005: 13). The discussion of multiple positions and a hybrid insider/outsider status raise issues for current debates regarding the nature of ethnographic research and its audiences. Given that I was at various times and capacities a member of CIFOR and other practitioner institutions, I cannot and do not claim my analysis to be objective in the sense of suppressing subjectivity since I was part of the world described (Mosse 2004: 666). Indeed, this dissertation, similar to Mosses institutional ethnography, is an interested interpretation whose objectivitycomes from maximizing the capacity of actors to object to what is said about them (to raise concerns, insert questions and interpretations) (Latour 2000) (Mosse 2005: 14). Assuming that the number institutional ethnographies will increase, it seems important to revisit discussion about who is reading our work or what the effects of the circulation of our representations are, both of which have received much less attention that issues of ethnographic authority (Dove 199b).

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With respect to the field of science studies, in examining CIFOR, its applied research initiatives in Malinau and how it represents those experiences as authoritative knowledge, I found that the boundary between what does and does not constitutes data and science for CIFOR is much less clear than laboratory or bench sciences, where science and data are constituted within the confines of a laboratory. In CIFORs case, the boundaries of its lab and science are emergent properties that are defined through dialogue and negotiation with both the subjects of its research, e.g., villagers and government officials in Malinau, and CIFORs interpretive community, e.g., international conservation and development organizations concerned with tropical forests and forest dependent communities. The shift from laboratory to field sciences is significant because of the great complexity in contextual factors that exists in field conditions, which is relatively absent in the laboratory. Hence, an important contribution of this study is an examination of how a science producing institution elides or addresses that complexity. To this end, my analysis of CIFOR demonstrates that this variability is addressed by transforming it into data itself. While variability in a lab or bench science would perhaps be discarded as noise, in the case of CIFORs field science, it is precisely the variability that is embraced as signal. Pushing the comparison between lab and field sciences further, I would also surmise that field sciences such as CIFORs require a particular type of work or effort of recruitment to make its knowledge authoritative and have traction that lab sciences may not. As my analysis of both CIFOR and the broader landscape of institutions attempted to demonstrate, brokering and translating interpretations between various actors is not only critical in making knowledge authoritative, but also must be continuous so that these interpretations can adapt to changing contexts and speak to different audiences.

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In my analysis of CIFORs work in Malinau, an interesting similarity between field and lab sciences was found in the case of CIFORs articulation with the village of Setulang, which was the one village that did not sell felling rights to its forests and which became the focus of much of CIFORs work. In a sense, Setulang became a model village for CIFOR in that it contained the elements of forest dependence, village empowerment and community forest management that are at the heart of CIFORs applied research interests. There was then a laboratization of Setulang through CIFORs activities there and through that process non-project community forestry and indeed broader society and forest use are being imagined as if they were actual or potential projects, and thus depoliticized (Fairhead and Leach 2003: 48). In other words, through CIFORs articulation with Setulang and CIFORs attention to it through publications and media, Setulang became an ideal type community forestry village from which lessons can be learned by other, less ideal villages. CIFORs laboratorization of Setulang transforms the village into something that science can control and manage, which complements the scholarship on articulations and coproduction between actors and the appropriation of dominant discourses (see for example Tsing (1999a,1999b, 2000a, 2000b); Moore (2000); Li (1999a, 2000); and Brosius 1997, Conklin 1997) (see Chapter 2). Much of this literature focuses on how articulations are crafted in the necessary room to maneuver that provides an ambiguity that can be read into by the actors involved. For example, Tsing (1999a) shows how the existence of a "green" international development project creates a "field of attraction" that provides local Meratus Dayak the conceptual space to tap into the globally circulating discourse of the "ecologically noble savage" (Redford 1990) as a means to assert territorial claims. Tsings study as well as

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others to a great extent focuses on a marginalized groups ability to appropriate a dominant stereotype or discourse to their benefit. CIFORs laboratorization of Setulang provides a detailed perspective from the other end of the articulation, viz., the development institution, demonstrating what and why the development agency found compelling about a particular village and its inhabitants. In the case of CIFOR and Setulang, it was not the exoticism of the ecological noble savage that interested CIFOR, but rather Setulangs resonance with the mundane and everyday of CIFORs work, e.g., community forest management, and the willingness of Setulang to become not only a subject of scientific study but also an ideal type or model village, all of which CIFOR articulates to its global interpretive community. Setulangs role as a model village for CIFOR is informative with respect to how the intimations of pilot projects, demonstration plots and unproblematic scaling up continue to pervade international conservation and development thinking, albeit in a landscape of ideas and concepts more heterogeneous than previously. Through these insights, this dissertation hopes to contribute to the anthropological and sociological studies of science by examining the nexus of science and management, and moving from the laboratory sciences, which have been most examined, to the field sciences and their application, which has been least studied (Franklin 1995). This dissertation also attempted to expand the use of Mosses framework beyond any one given development project and into the realm of multiple projects, multiple interests and multiple actors, all of who have formally bought into a particular master narrative of forest reform in Indonesia that maintains aid and attention. In doing so, I demonstrated that while the basic principles of his framework of order and disjuncture pertain, the work of brokering and translating interpretations across multiple actors is more fragile and vulnerable to being

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failed due to the increased disparate interests of those that brokers attempt to recruit. Indeed, in the case of the master metaphor of forestry reform, the recruitment of the Indonesian government to support it was extremely tenuous, particularly considering that the amount of aid made available through support of reform was marginal compared to the revenue that the forestry sector generated through its pre-reform practices. It was only through international political pressure that the government came to support the master metaphor of reform. Moreover, the recruitment of government was only maintained by through a particular evolution of the master metaphor that ensured that the revenue generated by the Indonesias forest industry would not be affected. The government refashioned the master metaphor to displace attention away from the practices and policies related to forestry in Indonesia itself and towards the consumption of Indonesias timber by the global community, as well as towards broader governance issues in Indonesia. For example, the Ministry of Forestry placed blame on the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of Trade responded by emphasizing the employment and income from forest industries for Indonesian citizens who already face economic difficulties. This analysis has highlighted the tension between recruiting as many supporters as possible to maintain a master metaphor and its breaking down due to the multiple, disparate interests of those who were recruited to support it. The tension between recruiting supporters and the breakdown of support due to disparate interests intimates the robustness or durability of the master metaphor. With respect to brokering, this dissertation raises the question of whether actors who become brokers are aware of their role as brokers, or whether an actors role as a broker is an emergent property of the system they are in. In other words, is an actors role as a broker planned or is their role an emergent function of the system? With respect to the DFF, the

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individuals who came to represent the DFF in everyday practice the usual suspects assumed the role of brokers because of institutional expediency and historical contingency. When the DFF was created, many of its members were actual donors, i.e., they were part of the diplomatic corps and could speak on behalf of their governments, as opposed to a contractor or consultant on an aid project. As the DFF and the CGI social system (e.g., actors, functions, frequency, locations and topics of meetings, etc.) began to gel, the diplomatic corps began to disengage from the DFFs everyday functioning, and the core group or usual suspects came to assume the role of the DFF, as well as the role of brokers. This was not planned. Indeed, according to the minutes of the first DFF meeting in March 2000, the DFF itself was envisioned to be temporary, lasting only a year. Moreover, if DFF membership had consisted only of the donor diplomatic corps, the DFF would not have been a broker it is precisely because of the ambiguous identity of the usual suspects and their ability to cross institutional boundaries that the DFF was able to become a broker. The usual suspects becoming the DFF and taking on the role of broker was part of the self-organization of the system and outside the cognizance of the actors involved. CIFOR, on the other hand, actively fashioned itself as a broker brokering across multiple institutions and disparate interests to establish authoritative interpretations articulated as science and policy recommendations. From its inception CIFOR was established with the potential to play the role of the broker, particularly since in it was part of the CGIAR. The organization is located at the interface of multiple institutional realities and languages, e.g., government and non-government, villagers in need of expertise and the experts, field and office, research and application, social sciences and natural sciences, and academic and practitioner. CIFORs protean qualities made it an ideal candidate to broker

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authority among the institutions involved in and impacting forest management and the livelihoods of forest dependent people, and under the leadership of its second Director General, David Kaimowitz, this role became more central and expanded. Moreover, the institutions cognizance of its role as a broker or translator became much more heightening under the leadership of Kaimowitz, who advanced an institutional agenda to communicate research-based policy recommendations to a broader audience and in multiple media so that CIFORs research would have more impact. Thus, at its inception CIFOR already possessed the potential to be a broker, although the awareness of this role among CIFOR scientists and management was most likely limited at that stage since the institutional focus was on establishing its legitimacy as a seminal applied research institute. It was under the directorship of the second Director General that the institution and staff became more aware of and actively played a brokering role.

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