Icon, Index, and Symbol Classification Explained

International Phenomenological Society
Icon, Index, and Symbol Author(s): Arthur W. Burks Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Jun., 1949), pp. 673-689 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103298 . Accessed: 06/12/2013 18:17
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ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL Thispaperis divided intotwosections. The first makesa critical examination ofPeirce'sclassification ofsignsintoicon,index, and symbol. The secondoffers an analysis ofthenature ofindexical signswhich goes whatPeirce considerably beyond has said on thesubject.
I. Peirce's Classification ofSigns intoIcon, Index, and Symbol
S. Peirce'sdivision ofsigns intoicon,index, Charles and symbol is the ofhismany classifications ofsigns, andis,moreover, simplest themost imofthemall, forit contains theessence portant ofeventhemostcomplicated of themwithout theirrepetitive and unwieldy sharing character. themorecomplicated classifications Historically, as expansions developed ofthe simpler of distinctions thatcan and shouldbe one,in recognition in a way which made. Peircemade thesedistinctions, is too however, hissystem ofcategories hisphilosophy, bound to be ofuse outside up with novelto hisoriginal and without adding anything trichotomy.' In thissection, we shallattempt to provide a critical then, exposition of andmost earliest basicclassification. Let us begin Pierce's with a prelimiofthethree kinds ofsigns, thesymbol, nary explanation theindex, andthe inthatorder. We canbestdo this to be taken interms ofthefollowicon, ing examples:(1) the word'red',as used in the English sentence, 'The usedto callattention tosome bookis red';(2) an act ofpointing, particular usedto communicate toa machinist object, e.g.,a tree;(3) a scaledrawing, All ofthese in thegeneral ofa pieceofmachinery. aresigns thestructure in which thisterm is usedby Peirce:eachsatisfies hisdefinition sense ofa which orsignifies an object to some as something sign' represents interpretant the objectsare: the color (1.346,2.228,4.531).Y In theabove examples and thestructure ofthemachine, theinterprered,thetree, respectively; thesign. But there tantsare,in each case,theminds are understanding
' For a brief discussion of the entire hierarchyof Peirce's classifications, see "Peirce's Sixty-SixSigns," by Paul Weiss and ArthurBurks, The Journalof Vol. XLII (1945),pp. 383-388. Philosophy, of 'sign', 'icon', 'index', and 'symbol' here and 2 The use of Peirce's definitions to implythat the authorregards the restof thissectionis not intended throughout we find Peirce's definition ofsigns. In particular, forthetheory as satisfactory them 8, 14, and 18) and so of reasons(see footnotes of an indexinadequatefora number replaceit in the secondsectionwitha new analysisof indices. 3 These and thefollowing are to theCollected references PapersofCharles numerical and Paul Weiss. SandersPeirce,editedby Charles Hartshorne 673
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in the way in whichthesesignssignify someimportant differences or represent theirobjects,and it is on the basis of these differences that the clasis made. A sign represents sification its object to its interpretant symor ironicallyaccordingto whether bolically,indexically, it does so (1) by beingassociatedwithits objectby a conventional ruleused by the interpretant (as in the case of 'red'); (2) by being in existentialrelationwith its its object object (as in the case ofthe act ofpointing);or (3) by exhibiting (as in the case ofthe diagram). Let us examine further the application of these criteriato our three examples. Consider firstthe word 'red'. The word 'red' is a symbol because it standsforthe qualityred to an interpretant4 who interprets it in virtueof the conventional rule of Englishestablishing linguistic the meaning of this word. Thus any word is a symbol,includingwords that are indexical (e.g., 'this') and words that are iconic (e.g., an onomatopoetic word). Considernextthe act of pointing. Its object is whateveris pointedto, that is, whateveris in a certainphysicalrelationto the sign. Here the tree is selectedor indicatedby virtue of its being in the directionof the pointedfinger, onlya fewyardsaway from it, etc. Hence the act ofpointing is an index,i.e., a sign whichdetermines its object on the basis of an connection. The symbol'this' is also an index,because (apart existential fromthe conventional elementby virtueof whichit is a symbol) it may function verymuchthe same as the act ofpointing; i.e., insteadofpointing to a treeone may use the phrase'thistree'. The object ofa specific occurrence or token of 'this' is determined or selectedby virtueof its being in relationto the occurrence of the signitself. some existential the diagram. The diagramis an icon because it repreConsider, finally, sentsthe structure of the machineby exemplifying or exhibiting the same in somerespects. The draftsman communicates to themachinist structure the fact that one wheel of the machinehas twice the diameterof another thefirst wheelwithtwicethe diameter ofthe second,and so on. by drawing word when used orallyis an icon (as In the same way, an onomatopoetic well as a symbol)because the sound of the word suggestsor exhibitsthe writings Peirce givesus an exampleofa written sense. In his unpublished that he analogue of onomatopoetic words,a kind of iconic handwriting calls art chirography. He wroteout Poe's "The Raven" in such a hand as to conveythe poetic ideas by means of the handwriting as well as the words. This concludesour preliminary explanationof icons, indices,and sym4 In the interest of brevitythis reference to an interpretant will not usually be made explicithereafter.
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bols. We are now ready to take up in greaterdetail the two whichhave morenovel aspects, the icon and the index; what Peirce has to say about withthese. the symbolwe can best treatin connection A study of Peirce's theoryof sighs is difficult not only because of the on this subject but also characterof his writings unusuallyfragmentary and confusions. In because of the presence of certain inconsistencies are only apparent,resulting many instancesthese discrepancies fromthe fact that Peirce triedto workout his views in different ways, and witha at different times. In otherinstancesthe inconsistvaryingterminology, fromhis tendencyto lump things are real, resulting encies and confusions in his eagernessto discover togetherand overlookimportantdifferences the basis fora comprehensive philosophicsystem. In treating examinecertainof the icon and the index,then,we will first on each, clarify Peirce's basic statements them,and decide whichare conof 'sign', 'icon', 'index', and 'symbol'. Followsistentwithhis definitions ing that we will take up his views concerning the importance of each kind of sign. ofan icon states that it is a signwhichexhibits or exempliOur definition its object (cf.2.282, 3.556, 4.448, 4.531). Peirce,however,oftensays fies toits object (1.558,2.247, 2.255,2.276, 2.314). Now that an icon is similar the firstcriterion impliesthat the object of an icon is a general quality (universal) or relation,whereasthe second impliesthat it is a particular thingor groupofthings. We have spokenofthe diagramas an icon ofthe ofthe machine;the secondcriterion makes the diagraman icon of structure the machineitself. Of course the diagramis similarto the machineonly in certainabstract respects;namely,its two-dimensional structure correstructureof the machine. But in the sponds to the three-dimensional the diagramis an icon of only same way, accordingto the first criterion, certainones of the qualities or relationsit exhibits,not of all. Though to avoid confusion either way of looking at the matter is permissible, themand adopted one or the other. (The Peirceshouldhave distinguished the former and has framedthe definition presentwriterprefers of 'icon' accordingly.) ifit possessesor Peircesometimes impliesthat a symbolis an icon merely exhibitsthe quality or relationit signifies (2.247, 2.255, 2.314). On this in black ink is iconiceven thoughthe criterion any tokenof 'black' printed reader(interpretant) is unawareofthe factthat it is displaying the quality it represents, i.e., that it is autological. Such a criterion, contrahowever, of an icon as a signwhichexhibits dictsthe originaldefinition its object to an interpretant; forthe definition impliesthat a signis not iconicunlessthe
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of the machine, of whichthe structure but not an icon of the material is made. The interpretant machine knows thatthisis thecasebecauseof is not only hencethe diagram theconvention associated withdiagrams; with its objectby is associated an iconbutis also a symbol (a signwhich ruleemployed More explicit use of a conventional bytheinterpretant). is madeon thediagram in stating thescale ofthedrawing itself symbols to recognize thatsinceanysign to themachine, etc. Peircehimself failed or exhibits a number and relations, somesymbolic embodies of qualities is required to communicate boththefactthata signis an iconand means inwhich it is iconic, to see thatthere can be therespect and so alsofailed iconsthings which led himto includeamong no pureicons. This failure 2.276). arenotreally signs, e.g.,a color, orinfactanyquality(2.254, the importance oficonic Let us turnnowto Peirce'sviewsconcerning certain for representing signs. Such signsare, of course,convenient thantheequivalent a scaledrawing ofa structure is much simpler things: to attached greater importance considerably Peirce, however, description. kinds of inconnection hisbroader thesis thatall three thanthis, with them for a satisfactory arerequired language.6By sucha general-purpose signs
5 Morestrictly, theinterpretant must knowtherespect(s)in whichan icon claims of error, its object, forthereis always the possibility to represent e.g., one part of the drawing may not be drawnto the properscale. 6 Peirceneverexplicitly expressesthisgeneralthesis; but that thisis his position that branch of.the speculative grammar, is obvious fromhis remarksconcerning signs (1.559,2.229,2.341,3.430), and also fromthe theoryof signs whichclassifies is a special case of his threecategories. fact that the icon-index-symbol trichotomy a classification of the of First,Second,and Third,whichare supposedto constitute makesno attemptat writer ofthe universe. The present essential,generalfeatures withwhat of this generalthesis,since we are not hereconcerned a fullformulation a satisfactory, constitutes all-purposelanguage,but only withwhat kinds of languages requireicons and indices.
respector respectsin whichit does so.5 The diagram is an icon of the
in the semiotic makeconscious use of the factthatthe reference, must, ofthescaledrawitsobject. Thisis thecase in theexample signexhibits is (thisinformation is iconic knows thatthediagram ing, for themachinist use makes to himbyiconic signs-seebelow)andhence notcommunicated itis drawn onereads thesentence that when toscale. Similarly, ofthefact whatpica typeis by 'This lineis set in pica' set in pica type,he learns by the sentence. making use of the factthat it is exhibited consciously to understand onemustbe aware preceeding sentence theauthor's Again, ofexhibiting between (token) of a sentence an instance oftheconvention in order marks to makea sign(name)forthatsentence. quotation must know thatit for a sign to be au icontheinterpretant Thusin order its object. In addition, mustknowthe exact the interpretant exhibits
that it is such. In otherwords,the interpretant interpretant recognizes
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language he means a system of signs capable of efficiently describing featuresof the universeand of formuboth the genericand the specific oftheempirical and results latingtheprocedures sciences, mathematics, etc. Icons, he held, are requiredformathematicalor deductivereasoning;for is based on the observation such reasoning ofmentalimages,whichexhibit reasoned about and the relations hence are icons (3.363, 3.556, 3.560, being Peirce's of mathematical 3.619, 5.148, 5.162). theory reasoningis thus and in variantofKant's views.I an intuitionistic one, is, fact,an interesting We may concludethen that Peirce's assertionthat icons are requiredfor mathematicalreasoning (and hence for a satisfactorygeneral-purpose language) restsupon his intuitionistic theoryof mathematics, and so need not be accepted by one who does not hold to such a theory. ofan indexis to refer to or call attention Peirceheld that the function to in or the of the interpretant. immediateenvironment some feature object
If, forexample,a man remarks, "Why, it is raining!" it is only by some as thathe is nowstanding herelooking out at a window as suchcircumstances he speaks, whichwould serve as an Index. . that he is speakingof this we can be assured that he cannotbe speaking place at this time,whereby centuries of the weatheron the satelliteof Procyon,fifty ago. (4.544)
The indexicalelementof this remarkis impliedin the speaker'suse of the both of whichgive the presenttense,as well as in his bodily orientation, the 'It here and sentence is uttered meaning now; raining' underthese cirin to the 'It is is sentence hereand cumstances equivalent meaning raining and references as time Such now'. place 'here', 'now', 'there','then','yesterday', 'tomorrow', etc., are all indexical symbols. The pronouns 'I', 'you', 'he', 'this', 'that', etc., and such expressionsas 'this city', 'that bridge',are also indexicalsymbols. The following quotationexplainswhy Peirceanmanner: are indicesin a typically pronouns
a pronoun as a wordused in place ofa noun. That define Moderngrammars which,explodedearlyin the thirteenth disis an ancientdoctrine century, the grammars forseveralhundred appearedfrom years. But thesubstitute was not veryclear; and whena barbarousrage againstmedieval employed There is no reason forsaying brokeout, it was swept away.... thought that I, thou,that,this,stand in place of nouns; theyindicatethingsin the A pronounis an index. A noun,on the other directest possibleway.... hand, does not indicatethe object it denotes; and whena noun is used to
I For a detaileddiscussionof Peirce's theory of mathematical reasoning, see the author's"The Logical Foundationsof the Philosophyof Charles SandersPeirce," of Michigan,1941. Chs. II and III, PhD Dissertation,University Peircethought in deductive reasoning, iconsas so fundamental Becauseheregarded or language. His logical symbolism theycould be made the basis of an improved graphswas an attemptto workout such a language (4.368). systemof existential
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of the heareris reliedupon showwhat one is talkingabout, the experience does at ofthenounfordoingwhatthepronoun to makeup fortheincapacity substitutefora pronoun.... A proonce. Thus, a noun is an imperfect the towhich which as a word mayindicateanything noun oughtto be defined havesuitablereal connections, bycallingtheattention and secondpersons first toit. (2.287n) ofthesecondperson
of an index, In these assertions about indices,as well as in his definition ofindices(the case where function out a littlerecognized Peirce is pointing he overthoughin his enthusiasm an index indicatesits object directly), of these signs (the case wherean function recognized looks the commonly to anothersign that names the obindex indicatesits object by referring case occurin the sentence'I am goingintothis ject). Examples ofthe first house', utteredby a person as he turnsinto a driveway;here 'I' refers 'I') and 'this house' to the speaker ('I' means thepersonuttering directly pointedto. An exampleof the second indicatesa physicalobject directly to the personnamed in the case occurswhen 'he' is used in a book to refer but indiprevioussentence;here 'he' does not indicatean object directly, in rectly,via a sign in the precedingsentence. To put the difference relatedto its object in thefirst case the indexis existentially Peirce's terms, while (its object is the thingpointedout in the immediateenvironment); relatedto a sign of its object in the second case the index is existentially phrase (its object is the thingnamed by the propername or descriptive foundin the preceding sentence). criticisms we can make the following of On the basis of this distinction of the index. First, to cover both cases his definition Peirce's treatment ofan indexwouldhave to be revisedto read: an indexis a signwhichsignito this object or to a sign connection an existential fiesits object through that the commondefiniofthis'object.8 Second,it oughtto be recognized well. In speechand writtion of a pronoundoes fitthe second case fairly to ideas, persons, back (or forward) are used to refer ing,indexicalsymbols places, times,etc., whichhave been denoted or named by previoussigns. In this case indices do serve as substitutesforpreviouslyused linguistic that a noun or descriptive expressions. Third,it shouldalso be recognized fora pronounonlywhenthe object to be indiphrase is a poor substitute is unnecessary)or when the object cated is present(so that a description has already bees named or described(so that the pronouncan do the job the role of the noun and moreconveniently). In reversing more directly Peirce was trying to heighten and the pronounin the commondefinition, the contrastbetweenhis own positionand the usual one. Aside fromthese signswhichare clearlyindexicalby Pierce's definition,
8 Thoughthis definition of an would amendone inadequacyof Peirce's definition 14 and 18. see footnotes index,it is still unsatisfactory;
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thereare a numberofentities whichhe classifies as indicesbut whicheither are not signs at all or are signs but not indices. In each instancehe is led to do thisbecause ofsome basic confusion. To beginwith,Peirce confuses the cause-effect relationwiththe semiotic relation. Thus he says that "a low barometer with a moist air is an index of rain.... A weathercock is an indexof the direction ofthe wind..." (2.286). It is true that the word 'sign' is oftenused to cover such cases (e. g., in 'Clouds are a sign of rain'), but a weathercock is not a sign in the sense ofPeirce's definition-theinterpretant does not use the weathercock to represent or denote the directionof the wind. What the interpretantdoes is to inferthe directionof the wind fromthe weathercock's position,on the basis of his knowledgethat this positionis the effect of the wind. Secondly,Peirce confuses the conceptof indexwiththat of grammatical subject. Some grammaticalsubjects include indexical signs (e. g., 'this book' in 'This book is red'), but others are composedexclusively ofsymbols (e. g., 'the numberfour' in 'The numberfouris even'). In both cases the subject denotes or names an object (a book and the numberfour, but onlyin the first respectively), case does it do so on the basis of an existentialconnection. Thus in sayingthat everysubject is an index (1.372, 2.262, 2.296, 2.357, 3.419, 4.58) Peirce is confusing the namingor denoting function of a subject withthe particular is accomplished way thisfunction in cases wherethe subject is an index. Thirdly,Peirce confusesthe existentialrelationinvolved in an indexical sign with that involved in the ostensiveor operationaldefinition of a symbol. A symbolis ostensively to an interpretant defined by putting the interpretant in existential connection with (i. e., pointing to) instances and counter-instances of the concept signifiedby that symbol. Thus 'red' may be defined ostensively by pointingout various red and non-red things. This means that an index (the act of pointing)is requiredfor the ostensivedefinition of a symbol,but it does not make the symbolso definedan index. Peirce does not recognizethis distinction, and as a consequence wronglyclassifiescertain signs as indices. For example, he classifies 'meter'as indexicalon the groundthat a meteris defined by reference to a standarddenotedby indices(2.305, 4.544). Again,he holds that 'existence' and 'imaginary'are indexical. His argumentamounts to sayingthat these are names of basic categoriesand hence must be definedostensively: existenceis not a predicate,he argues,and so the distinctionbetween the "real world of existence" and the "ideal world of mathematics"must be shownby means of indices (2.295, 2.305, 2.337, 3.363, 4.544). Let us now considerPeirce's views on the importanceof indices. He
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held, as in the case of icons, that indices are requiredfora satisfactory forthis thesisbreak general-purpose language; but most of his arguments we have just discussed are eliminated. For down when the confusions example,he arguesthat indicesare requiredin everylanguagesince every subjects (2.295, as grammatical languagemust includesignsthat function 2.369, 3.363). Again,he states that indicesare requiredformathematics, bothbecause mathematical propositions have subjects (3.392, 3.399,6.471) the factthat mathand because indices, are needed to establishostensively ematical propositions referto an "ideal, abstract world" and not to the "real world of existence" (2.305, 2.337, 3.363). Peirce does say that a date or position cannot be described (and so indices are required) and the location of two of that to use a map we must know independently explain why descripits pointsin nature (3.419). He does not, however, tions and diagrams (symbolsand icons) cannot do the work of indices. We will attemptto supply this explanationin our analysis of the utility of the indexin the nextsection. II. An Analysis of Indexical-Meaning In carrying out our analysis of the nature of indexicalsigns it will be convenientto introducesome new terms, such as 'indexical-meaning', in quite specificsenses. and to use some old ones, such as 'information', When each such termis presentedforthe firsttime it will be italicized, it will be used onlyin the sense defined. and thereafter It will develop that the fundamental kind of indexical sign is the inthe concept dexicalsymbol(ratherthan the pure index),and in presenting we will need to analyze the distinctionbetween of indexical-meaning of this dissymbols. A clear formulation indexical and non-indexical distinction tinctionrequiresthe use of Peirce's type-token (4.537). Consider a non-indexical symbol,e. g., 'red'. There are many occurrences of a writtenor printedpatternof a certain of this word,each consisting pattern of sound. Whenever such a pattern shape or a characteristic it is taken by the interpretant to signify context9 occursin an appropriate of a patternof 'red' whichis reacted to the color red. Each occurrence in this way is called a tokenof 'red'. A token of a by an interpretant non-indexical symbolis thus an event of a certaincharacter(i.-e., having
or spokentokenofthe 9The contextmustbe taken into accountwhena written all but one of whichare elimiwordby itselfhas two or morealternative meanings nated by the context. Thus, in the sentences,'He ran fast', 'He was stuck fast', even thoughthe and 'He has startedto fast', 'fast' has threedifferent meanings, 'meet' and 'meat' sight and sound patternsare the same in each case. Similarly, and 'mete' when spoken sound the same, yet they have different meanings. We shall use 'ambiguous'in a special sense to apply to such words.
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of the word), and so has a location a sound or sightpatterncharacteristic in space and time. The class of all tokens of a given word' is called a tokens when a speaker uses 'red' in two type. There are two different sentences,and two more when 'red' occurs once in a printed different sentencebut is read twice; and all of these tokens belong to the same type. A type will, of course,be withoutspatiotemporallocation. The distinction may be appliedin thesame way to indexicalsymbols. type-token of the word 'now' is a token,and the class of all tokens Each occurrence of 'now' is a type. location of a token of a non-indexNote, now, that the spatiotemporal ical symbol is irrelevantto its meaning:" 'red' means the same thing times and places, each token signifying the same when used at different symbol is color. Moreover,the meaning of a token of a non-indexical always the same as the meaning of the type to which it belongs. The forthe spatiotemporal withan indexicalsymbol,however, case is different location of a given token of such a symbolis relevantto the meaningof that token: 'now' means two different thingswhen it is utteredon two ofthetypeto whichanysymbolbelongs different days.'2 Since themeaning (whetherindexical or non-indexical)is always the same, it followsthat from themeaning themeaningofa tokenofan indexicalsymbolis different of the type to whichit belongs. Yet even in the case of the indexicalsymbol,the meaningof the token clearly has somethingin common with the meaning of its type. For at least in part the meaningof a token of any kind of symbolis specified by a general linguisticrule applicable to all tokens of the type. We shall referto the common elementin the,meaning of a token and the of the token or type. It meaning of its type as the symbolic-meaning is obvious that the completemeaningof a type (eitherindexical or nonthe completemeaning indexical) is its symbolic-meaning.Furthermore,
10Or rather, ofa givenwordin one ofitsmeanings. Thereare three different types 'fast' cited in the last footnote. in the threesentencesinvolving 11We are assuming that ambiguity has been eliminated. This hereand hereafter forif a non-indexical is necessary, restriction symbolis ambiguousits meaningis signs and hence in some sense depends on its spatiospecified by its neighboring 12. location. Cf. footnote temporal as a kind of ambiguity, 12 This phenomenon i.e., we could say mightbe regarded of the ambiguous the meaning word'now'. context that the spatiotemporal specifies not to use the word'ambiguity'forthis kind of phenomenon, However,we prefer but to reserveit forthosesituationswherethe meaningof a sign is specified by its 9. This being our usage of 'amneighboring signs,as in the examplesof footnote eliminable; biguity',we can say that the ambiguityof a symbolis theoretically ifthe otherusage wereadopted,we couldnotsay that ambiguity is eliminawhereas ble (for,as we shall show, indexicalsymbolsare indispensable).
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of a token of a non-indexical symbolis also its symbolic-meaning.But the symbolic-meaning of a token of an indexical symbol is only part ofitsfullmeaning:we shallrefer to itsfullmeaning as its indexical-meaning. For example,everytokenofthetype'now' has thesame symbolic-meaning: 'now) means thetimeat which'now' is uttered. But in orderto know the of a token of the type 'now', one must know not only indexical-meaning its symbolic-meaning but its temporallocation as well. To summarize the distinction betweenindexicaland non-indexical symbols: Any two tokensof a given type of symbolhave the same symbolicmeaning,but two tokens of a given type of indexical symbolmay have do have) different (and generally indexical-meanings. A consideration of the theoreticaland practical functionof indexical signs will help to clarifythe nature of indexical-meaning.In this connection,it is desirable to treat separatelythe two kinds of indices distinguishedin the precedingsection of the paper: those which indicate and those whichindicatetheirobjects by referring theirobjects directly, to signs whichname these objects. The latterkind of index servesas a substitutefor the name or descriptivephrase it refersto-it functions as a variable abbreviation;and its utilityderivesfromthe fact that it is shorterthan the name for which it is an abbreviation. Clearly, this kind of index can be dispensedwith in a language,forit is theoretically possible to repeat names and descriptivephrases as often as need' be. The modusoperandiof the second kind of index is evidentand needs no confineour attention to the first furtheranalysis. We will therefore kind of index (which indicates its object directly)in the remainderof the section. sees a book on a table and wishes to assert Suppose an interpretant that it is red. He can do so quite simplyby pointingto the book and token sentence:(A) 'This book is red'. This senthe following uttering tence contains indices and hence could not be expressedin a language composed exclusivelyof non-indexical symbols. The question we want in connection with (A) is: Could we expressin a language to examinefirst whichwould,theoretically, limitedto non-indexical symbolssome sentence for(A)? This will be possibleif the object indicated serveas a substitute withoutthe use of indices. An by 'this book' can be named or identified circumstances under whichindices can be disanalysis of the theoretical pensed with in denotingparticularexistentobjects has been made by C. H. Langfordin connectionwith the identityof indiscernibles.'3We of 'index' and 'symbol'. will present his analysis in the terminology
Mind, Vol. XXXIX N.S. (1930),pp. 454-461. 13"Otherness and Dissimilarity,"
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Considera universewhichconsistsof two parts,one located so as to be a construction mirror-image ofthe other,each part havingthe same internal as the other. Considerfurther a particularobject, e. g., a cubical yellow box with a door on it, and its mirror-image counterpart. The intrinsic qualities of these would be identical-both would be cubical, hollow, of exactlythe same shade ofyellow,ofexactlythe same size, etc. Moreover, certainof theirrelationalproperties would also be identical-if one box would be near a greenchair,etc. were near a greenchair its counterpart in relational properties On the other hand, these objects would differ sort. If an observerpointedto one greenchair it would of the following be true of one yellowbox that it was near thisgreenchair,and it would to an observerthe door be false of the otheryellow box. Furthermore, of one box would be a left-hand door, while the door of the otherwould is indexical;and rightand door. Now the act of pointing be a right-hand and leftleftare also indexical (2.290), foras Kant showed of the rightdescriptively, hand gloves of a perfect pair, they cannot be distinguished symbols. Hence it is clear that the rei. e., by means of non-indexical on whichthesetwo objects agree can be named bynonlational properties indexicalsymbols, and thatthe ones on whichtheydisagreecan be specified and indexsymbolic-properties onlyby indices. Let us call theseproperties ical-properties, 'respectively. is ordinarily stated Leibniz's principleof the identityof indiscernibles whichhave exactly as follows: theredo not existin the universetwo things the same specificproperties. So stated the principleis vague, for it is are to be included. not made clear whetheror not indexical-properties ofthe identity Let us assume that theyare not,in whichcase the principle of indiscernibles becomes: there do not exist in the universetwo things When stated which have exactly the same specificsymbolic-properties. is clearlyfalseofthe dual universewhichwe have in thisway the principle been describing. There are two cubical yellowboxes whichhave exactly and differ only as to indexical-properties. the same symbolic-properties It follows, particularobjects then, that indices are requiredfor denoting is false: since one in a universein which the identityof indiscernibles as its mirror-image counteryellowbox has the same symbolic-properties part,it can be denotedor named onlyby means of an index. (Of course, are identicalthereis not much of interest since theirsymbolic-properties to say of one box that cannot also be said of the other.) On the other as stated above is true and there hand, if the identityof indiscernibles is no suchdual universe, any objectwillhave at least one symbolic-property be named or identified not sharedby any otherobject. It can therefore and hence withoutthe use of indices. Our by means of this property, a possible to formulate question,then, as to whetherit is theoretically
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PHILOSOPHY
symbols depends substitute sentencefor(A) solelyinterms ofnon-indexical of the principleof the identityof indiscernibles. upon the truth-status is true. It is theoretically possibleonlyif the identityof indiscernibles possibleto identify Let us assumeforthe moment that it is theoretically an object in the universewithoutthe use of indices,and considerwhether it is practicalto do so. An interpretant, in orderto knowthathe is naming an object by means of a symbolic-property unique to it, must have some way of knowingthat this property is, in fact,unique to the object he is designating. This Would require a knowledge of the entire universe, which is, of course,a practical impossibility. It may seem that the incould overcome his difficulty up a coordinatesystem terpretant by setting his objectnotby its unique property, and naming but by its spatiotemporal system. But settingup a colocation x, y, z, and t in this reference ordinate systemwithoutthe use of indices is subject to the same diffiuniquely culty,for the interpretant must now know how to characterize From a prachis originand axes solelyin termsof symbolic-properties. tical pointofview,then,we cannotdispensewithindices:we can formulate no practicalsubstitute sentencefor(A) withoutthe use ofindices. But it is of interestto considera sentence (B) which does make use of a reference systeminvolving indices,and whichis in some sense a substitute for (A). Let the interpretant adopt some commonly-accepted, indexical coordinatesystem (e. g., standard units of measure, standard and thestandard reference pointssuchas theequatorand a primemeridian, calendar), findthe location of the book in this system,and then assert the tokensentence:(B) 'The book at x, y, z, and t is red'. Two questions the relationof (B) to (A). First,what is the practical arise concerning convenienceof replacing (A) with (B)? We answer by noting that it to have a fixedreference systemwhen the inis usually more convenient wishesto refer to an object outsidehis immediate environment, terpretant or when he wishes to referto a number of objects conjointly. On the wishes other hand, (A) is more useful than (B) when the interpretant to referto an object withinhis immediateenvironment. In using an index as in (A), he can carryhis reference point with him and denote a nearby object withouta knowledgeof the relation of this object to the rest of the universe. Since a person frequently does not know his or own location in a reference system (he may be lost geographically, he may have forgotten the date), he can utilizesentenceslike (A) in many cases wherehe cannot utilize sentenceslike (B). Second, in preciselywhat sense is (B) a substitutefor (A)? Clearly, in meaning: (A) containsthe symbolicexpression these two tokensdiffer 'this book' and (B) the symbolicexpression'the book at x, y, z, and t', in symbolic-meaning.Furthermore, different and these differ procedures
685
is present forverifying when(A) are required (A) and (B). If a person is uttered he can verify it by direct observation, whereas he wouldhave his location to verify to determine (B). Yet though thesesentences do in onesenseof'information' in meaning, bothconvey differ they thesame for to thesameobjectand predicate thesame information, they bothrefer that(B) is a substitute property ofit. We can say,then, for(A) in the butitis notan exactsubstitute thesameinformation; sense thatit conveys in indexicaland symbolic-meaning. for(A) in thesensethatit differs of different This situation, wheretwo sentences meaning conveythe sameinformation, is notuniqueto sentences involving indices, ofcourse, two proper namesforthe same objectare subforit occurswhenever in the same propositional function.But in the case of indices stituted of different underwhichsentences the circumstances meaning are used are ofinterest.Supposea man located to convey thesame information in AnnArbor, Michigan, sayson May 12, 1947,'It is raining herenow'. on thefollowing thesameinformation He cannot convey dayby asserting tokenof 'It is a tokenwiththe same symbolic-meaning (i. e., another will sucha token havea different raining here now'),for indexical-meaning. with a different ofa sentence a token he asserts Rather, symbolic-meaning: after 'It rained hereyesterday'.In fact, May 12, 1947,no sentence can of course one can be referred everbe uttered has the (though to) which token sentence ofthetype as thefirst samemeaning above;for anytoken after in indexherenow'occurring 'It is raining May 12, 1947,willdiffer uttered on thatdate. Thisfactconstitutes from thetoken ical-meaning on one's abilityto communicate of course, no limitation -information, out the same information is communicated foras we have just pointed a different with at a later datebya sentence meaning. of indexical-meaning, we have It may be objectedthat,in speaking in an odd sense. The essential factabout an inbeenusing'meaning' is a genuine that its indexical-meaning mode dexicalsignis, however, thispointwitha number Peirceconfused of and although of meaning; ofthepaper)he displayed section real others (as we saw in theprevious is whatever it. The meaning of a sentence must in recognizing insight and to decide to be able to verify thatsentence, in order be understood herenow' one mustknow ofany tokenof 'It is raining thetruth-status For if but also its indexical-meaning. not only its symbolic-meaning he does not knowwhatspecific information one knows onlythe former, ofthattoken. to thetruth-status is relevant formeaning the criterion Employing givenabove,we can makea deThat is, usingthe tailedanalysisof the natureof indexical-meaning. is whatmustbe of a sign,or groupof signs, thatthemeaning criterion
686
PHILOSOPHY
or known understood. by the interpretant in order to be able to findor recognize theobjectofthatsign, we can makeouranalysis by listing the different piecesof information thatan interpretant mustknowabout a ofan indexical token symbol in order to locatetheobjectit indicates. (1) The spatial, temporal, orspatiotemporal location ofthetoken must to determine be known the objectit indicates: e. g., to findthe timea tokenof 'now' indicates one mustknowwhenthe tokenwas uttered; the booka tokenof 'thisbook' indicates to find one mustknowwhere thattoken and when was used;etc. (2) The objectindicated mustbe specified.A tokenis in existential relation to everyother existent thing, and henceit mustbe understood whichone of theseis beingreferred to. The description of the object maybe conveyed by a nounaccompanying a 'this'or 'that' (as in 'this book','thiscolor','thiscity','thisstar',etc.) or it may be incorporated inthesign itself (as in 'now', which indicates a time, 'here', which indicates a place,etc.). In either case theobjectis signified on thebasisofa rule of linguistic usage,and hencethisinformation is part of the symbolicofthetoken. meaning (3) Finally, theinterpretant 'needs to knowa set ofdirections relating to theobjectit indicates. For there thetoken are usually manyobjects of the sortdescribed by (2) existentially relatedto the token.14,Thus there maybe manybooksin theneighborhood ofa tokenof 'thisbook', and the one indicated of a pointed is foundby observing the direction hand or the bodily orientation of the speaker. Thereare two cases to here: (3a) The set of directions be considered may be associatedwith i. e., on thebasisofa linguistic thesignsymbolically, rule. Thusa token of 'I' that one finds the objectindicated symbolic-meaning by a token ofthistypeby proceeding from thetoken to thespeaker. Similarly, the theobject ofthetoken, location objectindicated by 'now'is thetemporal by 'today'is the day on whichthe tokenis uttered, and the indicated thetoken occurs. (3b) objectindicated by 'thiscity'is thecityin which a bodilyoriThe set of directions maybe shown by an act of pointing, etc. Examplesare 'this book', 'that tree',accompanied entation, by appropriate gestures. in whatmustbe known We can now summarize by an interpretant to find the objectindicated by a tokenof an indexical type,i. e., order. its indexical-meaning: whatfactors constitute ofthetoken. (1) The spatiotemporal location
Iin existentialrelation This analysis reveals the inadequacy of the expression of the index. Since a token is in existentialrelationto to' in Peirce's definition mustbe limitedby factors(2) and (3). everyotherexistent thing,the possibilities
14
in otherwords,it is part of the of 'I' means thepersonuttering thattoken;
687
oftheobject indicated. (2) A description the tokento its object (a) conveyed relating (3) A set of directions act of pointing.Factors by a physical or (b) conveyed symbolically, thesymofthetypeand henceconstitute (2) and (3a) are characteristic of the type and its tokens. (1) and (3b) dependupon bolic-meaning ofthetoken, and hence, whenadded to thesymbolic-meaning thetoken by the tokenis the The object indicated give its indexical-meaning. from to the (1) according by proceeding by (2) reached objectdescribed of (3). directions in someindices('now','thisbook'),it is (2) is present Thoughfactor in all ('this','that',an act of pointing). But unless(2) is not present obor implicitly, a definite the signcannotindicate present, explicitly related is existentially to ject.15A tokenof 'this',or an act ofpointing, and so when to manyobjects, unaccompanied by a descriptive and points one of them."6For example, elementcannotindicateany particular to a bookthereference objects: ifoneis pointing maybe to anyofvarious
thiscolor this leather binding, thisbook,thiscopyof a book,thisred cover,
the descriptive element maynot be made explicit (red),etc. Of course, if two peopleare disThus contributed the context. but may be by a and to book says 'This is interesting', booksand one points cussing The factthat an book is for 'This is interesting'. whathe says short or indexical-meaning onlywhen well-defined complete indexical signhas a conclusions worth or to several is leads explicitly implicitly, (2) present, cannot have a act of complete a index pointing) (an noting. First, pure kindof indexical the fundamental sign and therefore indexical-meaning, of section.'7 the this (Of as was stated at beginning symbol, is theindexical 'this' and are like a index e. some indexical 'that', pure symbols, g., course, Second,the in that theydo not have a complete indexical-meaning.) B' 'This A is a B'. is 'This is but reference not a of indexical form general and failto well-defined have a indexical-meaning yet a Finally, signmay
"Some 15 This factwas notedby C. H. Langford paperentitled in a mimeographed to Professor p. 4. The authoris indebted PointsAboutthe Use ofLanguage," 1940, to this paper. to make reference forpermission Langford by precannot be accomplished 16 It is forthis reason that ostensivedefinition a singleinstanceofthe conceptto be defined. See theauthor's"Empiricism senting Vol. XLIII (1946),p. 478. and Vagueness," The Journalof Philosophy, 17 Note that we reachedthe same conclusion in the case of the icon: a symbolis object. The symbolis therefore a definite requiredalong with an icon to signify theindexis morefundathantheiconor theindex. Furthermore, morefundamental mentalthan the icon, for,as we saw, indices cannot be dispensedwith,whereas, that Peirce accepted, reasoning ofmathematical unlesswe acceptthe kindoftheory in regarding icon,index,and symbol iconsare dispensable. Hence Peircewas wrong kindsof signs. and independent as equally fundamental
688
PHILOSOPHY
indicate an object.'8 For it is possible to make a mistake and describe, under (2), an object when in fact thereis no such object. Thus a person may say 'The chairin the next roomis made of oak' whenin fact thereis no chair in the next room. There is even the possibilityof perceptual errorin regardto objects in the perceptualfieldof the interpretant. It mightbe proposed that we should not use an indexical sign unless we are sure it indicates. But how certainmustwe be beforeusingan index? If we insistupon Cartesian suretywe are limitedto using indexicalsigns which indicate private sense-data of the present moment: e. g., 'This to subjectivetime) it seems is red', 'Now (referring circularsense-datum to be raining',etc. This means that certaintyis attained at the price private. It is clearly necessaryin a public of making communication to fail to indexical-meanings language to allow signs with well-defined The possibilitythat an index may fail to indicate raises the problem of 'This A is B', that is, the problem of how to analyze the contradictory a sentencewhich is equivalent to 'It is not the case that this of finding A is B' but which is more nearly in standard form(i. e., which has the inside,just as 'It is not the case that all A is B' translates negationbrought into the standardform'Some A is not B'). It mightappear that 'This A is non-B' is such a sentence. However, 'This A is non-B' and 'It is not the case that this A is B' are not equivalent,forif 'this A' does not is false whilethe second is true. In otherwords,'This indicate,the first for but contraries, A is B' and 'This A is non-B' are not contradictories conboth will be false if 'this A' does not indicate.20 Thus thereare two
18 This pointis also made by Langford; not allowed Ibid, p. 5. It is a possibility of an index. for in Peirce's definition indexicalexthe fact that a well-formed 19 The conclusion mightbe drawnfrom are meaningless exceptin context; maynotindicatethatall suchexpressions pression descriptions in his theory that definite thisline of argument Russell seemsto follow does not followhas been pointedout are incomplete symbols. That this conclusion as need not be construed description whoshowedthat a definite by AlonzoChurch, symbolsince it can have a sense (Frege's 'Sinn') even if it lacks a an incomplete Logic,Vol. V (1940), denotation(Frege's 'Bedeutung'); see The JournalofSymbolic and VII (1942),p. 47. We have been arguingthe same pointbut with pp. 162-163 indices, thoseinvolving namely, descriptions, class of definite regardto a restricted such as 'the chairin the nextroom'. between the controversy 20 Langford, op. cit.,p. 10. See also in this connection Vol. XXXVII (1928), pp. 73-81, [MindN.S. Vol. XXXVI (1927),pp. 342-346, Langford and J. A. Chadwick[Ibid., Vol. XXXVI and, Vol. XXXVIII (1929), pp. 219-2251 on the contradictories of and Vol. XXXVII (1928),pp. 471-4841 (1927),pp. 347-353 of this discussionby E. J. and a recentcontinuation certainsingularpropositions; A. Pap [Ibid.,Vol. LVI (1947),pp. 72-761, Nelson [Ibid.,Vol. LV (1946),pp. 319-3271, Logic,Vol. XUI (1947),pp. 52-551. AndW. V. Quine [The Journalof Symbolic
indicate.'9
689
ditionsunder which 'This A is B' is false: (1) 'this A' does not indicate, and (2) 'this A' does indicate but the A indicatedis not a B, i. e., 'This A is non-B' is true. By disjoining thesetwo conditions we getthe sentence thatwe are looking for, but it mustbe recognized thatsincetheseconditions includea statement of the relationof a signto its object,it is not possible to formulate the sentencein the language containing'this A'; rather,it is necessaryto formulate it in the metalanguageof that language. The desiredcontradictory of "This A is B" is therefore "Either 'this A' does not indicate or this A is non-B." It is interesting to note that as a consequence "This A is B" is equivalent to "'This A' indicatesand it is not "This A is non-B" is equivalent the case that thisA is non-B." Similarly, to "'This A' indicatesand it is not the case that thisA is B," and "Either 'thisA' does not indicateor thisA is B" is its contradictory. ARTHUR
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
W. BURKS.
EXTRACTO En la primeraparte el autor examina criticamente la tricotomia ba'sica de los signosde Peirce. El simbolo('rojo') represents su objeto mediante una reglaconventional; el indice (el acto de sefialar)lo represents mediante una relationexistential, y un icono (un diagrama) mediantela exhibici6n de su objeto. Peirce confundela relaci6nindicative o de indice con la con la funci6n relaci6nde causa-efecto, denotativede los sujetos y con la definicicion ostensive. En la segundaparte,analiza el autorla naturalezade los indices,llevando el anatlisis may's alla' del punto a donde llego Peirce. La indicaci6n 'este libro' tiene un sentidoindicative o de Indice que se componedel sentido simb6licocaracteristico la informaci6n tnica relativa a la del tipo, may's indicaci6n,a saber: su situationespacio-temporal y el acto de seflalardel que esta hablando. Un signo con sentidoindicativebien definido puede no indicarbienun objeto,de tal suerteque 'Este A es B' y 'Este A es no-B' de no sean contradictorios. Se hace un analisis de los contradictorios ambos.

Icon, Index, and Symbol Classification Explained

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International Phenomenological Society

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL

RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

respector respectsin whichit does so.5 The diagram is an icon of the

that it is such. In otherwords,the interpretant interpretant recognizes

ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL

RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

ICON, INDEX, ANR SYMBOL

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

in otherwords,it is part of the of 'I' means thepersonuttering thattoken;

ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL

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