Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (Taylor & Francis Group)

Altruism or Egoism? That Is (Still) the Question

Author(s): Robert B. Cialdini
Source: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1991), pp. 124-126
Published by: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (Taylor & Francis Group)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449244
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124 COMMENTARIES
Summarizingin the theoreticaltermsof Batsonand Shaw,
we maintain that persons high in empathy have multiple
ultimate goals, both altruistic and egoistic, that generally
promotehelping. In controlledcircumstancesBatsonandhis
colleagues have demonstratedthat the altruistic goals are
morepowerfulwhen subjectsareforcedto choose. However,
they readily concede that outside the laboratorythese goals
are often satisfied by the same behavior,helping. Given the
conflicting evidence concerningthe interactionbetween al-
truisticand egoistic motives in helping situations(cf. Archer
et al., 1981; Cialdini et al., 1987; Fultz et al., 1986), more
researchon dispositionalempathy and helping is needed to
decide our claim.
If both motives do drive highly empathic people, then
Batson and Shaw's elegant and parsimoniousEden in which
a single ultimate goal predominatesis definitely lost to us.
But then we never really had it to lose.
Note
RichardL. Archer,Departmentof Psychology,Southwest
Texas State University, San Marcos, TX 78666-4616.
Altruism or Egoism? That Is (Still) the Question
RobertB. Cialdini
Arizona State University
Like Batson and Shaw, I find myself intrigued by the
question of why we help. And, like these authors, I am
especially interestedin the questionas it applies to an effect
thatis undeniableyet altogetherremarkableto me. It is that,
as a species, we have evolved both biologically and so-
cioculturally so that, when we pay attention to another's
suffering,we hurtin a way thatfrequentlyleads to helping. It
strikesme that the most importantquestion in the scientific
study of helping action today is "Whatis the natureof that
hurt?"
There are a couple of things we know for sure:The hurtis
vicarious and it is emotional. That is, it is not the direct,
somatic experience of pain that the sufferer often experi-
ences; instead, it is a second-order, affective response to
another's pain. Thus, to try to understandthe conceptual
natureof this discomfort, it makes sense to look to the liter-
ature on the relationshipbetween vicarious emotional re-
sponses and the tendency to help.
Along with colleagues such as Jim Fultz and Mark
Schaller,I have examinedandcontributedto this literaturein
recent years. The consequence has been the emergence of
certain points of agreementand disagreementwith Batson
and Shaw's analysis. Beginning with the points of agree-
ment, we sharethe view thatprosocialactionis susceptibleto
a pluralityof motives. And specifically within the realm of
vicarious, unpleasantemotion and helping, we seem to be
readingthe literaturesimilarly,in thatwe have identifiedthe
same major candidates for explaining why exposure to a
sufferingotherfrequentlyleads to helping. The languagewe
References
Archer, R. L. (1984). The farmerand the cowman should be friends:An
attempt at reconciliation with Batson, Coke, and Pych. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 709-711.
Archer, R. L., Diaz-Loving, R., Gollwitzer, P. M., Davis, M. H., &
Foushee, H. C. (1981). The role of dispositionalempathyand social
evaluationin the empathicmediationof helping. JournalofPersonality
and Social Psychology, 40, 786-796.
Archer, R. L., Foushee, H. C., Davis, M. H., & Aderman, D.
(1979). Emotionalempathyin a courtroomsimulation:A person-sit-
uationinteraction.Journalof AppliedSocial Psychology, 9, 275-291.
Cialdini, R. B., Schaller,M., Houlihan,D., Arps, K., Fultz,J., & Beaman,
A. A. (1987). Empathy-basedhelping:Is it selflessly or selfishly mo-
tivated?Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 52, 749-758.
Coke, J. S., Batson, C. D., & McDavis, K. (1978). Empathicmediationof
helping: A two-stage model. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 36, 752-766.
Foushee, H. C., Davis, M. H., & Archer, R. L. (1979). Empathy,mas-
culinity, and femininity.JSAS Catalog of Selected Documentsin Psy-
chology, 9, 85. (Ms. No. 1974)
Fultz, J., Batson, C. D., Fortenbach,V. A., McCarthy,P. M., & Varey, L.
L. (1986). Social evaluation and the empathy-altruismhypothesis.
Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 50, 761-769.
Heider, F. (1958). A psychology of interpersonal relations. New York:
Wiley.
use to label these vicarious emotional states differs some-
what, however. Accordingly, for clarity's sake it would be
worth a brief descriptionof each.
Reflexive distressrefersto a kind of self-oriented,highly-
aversive, arousal-basedaffective state that results from ex-
posure to cues of pain or suffering from a victim. Upon
recognizingthe victim's distress, an observeris said to expe-
rience unpleasantarousaland to seek avenues for reduction
of thatarousal.In the most clearly articulatedhelping model
based on this motivational construct (Piliavin, Dovidio,
Gaertner,& Clark, 1981), the observeris seen as possessing
a cost-benefit orientationand, accordingly,as looking for
the least costly means for arousalreduction. When helping
the victim (and, thus, terminatinghis or hersuffering)affords
the least costly means, it should be the behaviorof choice in
the situation. A large body of work exists to supportthe
causal influence of reflexive distresson helping, both in the
realmof bystanderinterventionresearch(see Piliavinet al.,
1981, for a summary)and in the arenaof nonemergencyaid
(see Batson, 1987, for a review).
A second relevant researchdomain documents the rela-
tionshipbetween what can be termednormativedistress and
helping. Normative distress refers to an unpleasantfeeling
arising from the violation of social or personalstandardsof
conduct. For 30 years, social scientists have theorized and
documentedthe existence of certainsocial normsthatcoun-
sel in favor of helping action (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964;
Gouldner, 1960). According to one such norm-that of so-
cial responsibility-helping-giving in the presence of a
 COMMENTARIES
needy other is positively regardedin our culture, whereas
failing to help is negatively regarded(see Berkowitz, 1972,
for a review of supportiveevidence). The desire to manage
social approvaland disapproval,then, can be one mediator
of the decision to help. In additionto social norms, Schwartz
(1973) and his co-workershave investigatedthe concept of
personalnorms-the privatemoral standardsthatone holds
for one's own conduct-and the impact of these personal
norms on helping decisions. It is arguedthat helping often
occurs in an attempt to avoid the self-sanctions and self-
esteem damage that would attendthe violation of these pri-
vate standards.In a variety of studies by Schwartzand oth-
ers, measuresof personalnorms, along with moderatorsof
these norms(such as denial of responsibility)have been pre-
dictive of helping (see Schwartz, 1977, for a review). With
respectto either social normsor personalnorms, normative
distressoccurs when the perceptionof another'sneed makes
salient one or anotherhelping norm and the potentialhelper
entertainsthe possibility of violating the norm to avoid the
costs that helping might entail.
Sadness is a third vicarious emotional response to an-
other's sufferingthat has been shown to affect helping. To-
getherwith a set of talentedco-workers,I have undertakena
programof researchto determinethe circumstancesunder
which a feeling of temporarysadness or sorrow leads to
enhanced aid. That research suggests that attention (es-
pecially empathicattention)to the plightof a needy othercan
result in the negative affective state of sadness and that,
because the act of helping has acquireda gratifyingmood-
elevating characterin most normallysocialized adults, help
can be used to dispel the sadness of the adult observer of
suffering. As with persons experiencingreflexive and nor-
mative distress, an individualexperiencingtemporarysad-
ness is thoughtto possess a cost-benefit orientationto reduc-
ing the disagreeable affective state. That is, a saddened
personis hypothesizedto engage in helpingactiononly to the
extent that it, among the various behavioraloptions, is per-
ceived to resultin the most desirable(i.e., sadnessreducing)
combination of personal rewards and costs (see Cialdini,
Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982, for a summaryof supportive
research).
The final vicariousemotionalresponseto another'ssuffer-
ing that emerges from a longstandingprogramof research
into the determinantsof helping is empathy.Because in the
target article Batson and Shaw spend the majorityof their
time detailing its workings, it is not necessaryto describe it
furtherin this commentary-except to note how similarit is
in crucial respects to the three other vicarious emotional
responses I have discussed. I have observed Batson's con-
ceptionof empathy(as it is associatedwith the opportunityto
help a victim) develop over the years so that not only is it
conceived as a vicarious emotional response but-like the
otherthree-it is deemedto be aversiveto possess andmere-
ly one motivationalfactor taken into accountby a potential
helper who is doing hedonic calculus (a cost-benefit analy-
sis) to decide whetherto renderaid. BatsonandShawremind
us, however, that a central difference remains: The moti-
vational natureof empathyis said to be altruistic(i.e., ulti-
mately orientedto the interestsof another)ratherthan ego-
istic (i.e., ultimatelyorientedto self-interest).
Of course, Batson and Shaw do far more than assertthat
empathicmotivationis, at base, altruistic.They review the
findings of an extensive programof empirical work that is
125
consistent with the assertion and is inconsistent with the
notion that the helping found in critical conditions of those
studieswas causedby one of the egoistic motivators.Instruc-
tive, though, is the recognitionof how BatsonandShaw deal
with and dispatch each of the egoistic alternatives.It is in
one-at-a-timeorder, because that is how the empirical re-
search was done. To eliminate the possibility that reflexive
distressmay accountfor helping underempathicconditions,
a set of studies was done to partialout the presenceof such
aversivearousal,andit was foundthatenhancedhelpingstill
occurred.To eliminatethe possibilitythatnormativedistress
may accountfor helping underempathicconditions, a sepa-
rateset of studieswas conductedto partialoutthe presenceof
this sort of distress, and it was found that enhancedhelping
still occurredagain. To eliminatethe possibility thatsadness
may accountfor helping underempathicconditions, a set of
studieswas done to partialout the presenceof sadness, andit
was found that enhanced helping still occurredyet again.
So, what we have is evidence of a helping residuumthat,
presumably,is altruisticallymediatedbecause when we par-
tial out (one at a time) the explanatorypower of each of the
major egoistic alternatives, helping remains elevated. Al-
though the conceptual and proceduralquality of the work
itself is remarkable,for me, the weaknessof this approachis
thatthe empathy-altruismhypothesisis supportedindirectly,
by default. This is of special concerngiven the one-at-a-time
patternof assault on egoistic alternatives.That is, it is con-
ceivable that, if reflexive distresswas eliminatedas a causal
factor in enhanced helping in one set of experimentalpro-
ceduresthat a differentegoistic alternative,such as sadness,
may have still been causal there. Similarly, if the likely
causal influence of sadness was reducedin a differentset of
experimentalprocedures,it is conceivable that anotherego-
istic alternative,such as concernfor social approvalor self-
regard,may havebeen active. And so on for each of the other
combinationsof egoistic motives. The point is that to offer
the strongestevidence for the altruisticmediationof helping
undera certainset of conditions, it seems necessaryto con-
duct studies with designs thateliminate, simultaneously,the
explanatorypower of each of the egoistic alternatives.This
strikes me as an experimentaltask that has not yet been
accomplished.
It is perhapsfor this reasonthat Batson and Shaw suggest
that,on the basis of the workof Batsonandhis associates,the
empathy-altruismhypothesis can be offered as "tentatively
true." Whatever the reason, I agree with them that in-
terpretivecaution remains appropriatein these mattersand
thatmuch more is likely to be discoveredand writtenon this
vital issue of humannature.
Note
Robert B. Cialdini, Departmentof Psychology, Arizona
State University,Tempe, AZ 85287-1104.
References
Batson, C. D. (1987). Prosocialmotivation:Is it ever trulyaltruistic?In L.
Berkowitz(Ed.), Advancesin experimentalsocialpsychology (Vol. 20,
pp. 65-122). New York:Academic.
Berkowitz, L. (1972). Social punishments,feelings, and other factorsaf-
126 COMMENTARIES
fecting helping and altruism. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in ex-
perimental social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 63-108). New York:
Academic.
Berkowitz, L., & Daniels, L. R. (1964). Affecting the salience of the
social responsibilitynorm. Journalof Abnormaland Social Psycholo-
gy, 68, 275-281.
Cialdini, R. B., Kenrick,D. T., &Baumann,D.J. (1982). Effectsof mood
on prosocialbehaviorin childrenandadults.In N. Eisenberg(Ed.), The
development of prosocial behavior (pp. 339-359). New York:
Academic.
The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis: Paradigm and Promise
John F. Dovidio
Colgate University
Batson and Shaw provide an eloquent summary of the
empathy-altruismhypothesis that reflects earlier formula-
tions of the framework(e.g., Batson, 1987; Batson & Coke,
1981) plus new ideas and developments.The version of the
empathy-altruismhypothesispresentedby Batson and Shaw
has, at its core, the centralassertionof all the previousver-
sions-that "empathyevokes altruisticmotivation,"which
has "the ultimate goal of increasing another'swelfare." In
essence, the authorsproposethataltruisticbehavioris funda-
mentallydifferentfrom othertypes of intentionalbehaviors.
The key concepts are defined with precision and the philo-
sophical and theoretical assumptions are refreshingly ex-
plicit. These areessential steps in areasinvolvingtheoretical
controversy(see Tetlock& Levi, 1982). Comparedto earlier
expositions of the framework,Batson and Shaw elaborate
more on the natureof empathyand its antecedents.In addi-
tion, they are more explicit about the potential for a "plu-
ralism" of motives, which relates to the proposition that
"both altruistic and egoistic motives can exist simul-
taneously within a single organism."In this commentary,I
focus not on the details of the argumentsand evidence that
Batson and Shaw present, but ratheron what this approach
has contributedmore generally and how it may shape re-
search in the future.
Scientific knowledge is cumulative. New theories, which
generate new "facts" and knowledge, are rarely (if ever)
entirely new. They frequentlyevolve from or are developed
in oppositionto old theories. Batson and Shaw pay homage
to the philosophic traditionsthat relate to altruismand con-
sider alternativepsychological perspectives on empathy.A
brief reviewhere of the recenthistoryof researchon helping,
however, also provides a context for understandingwhat the
empathy-altruismhypothesisis andwhat it contributesto the
field.
The study of altruismand helping has undergonea series
of shifts and driftsin both focus and paradigmsover the past
25 years. Stimulatedby the infamous Kitty Genovese inci-
dent (in which 38 bystanderswitnessedthe stabbingdeathof
a woman and did not intervene)and the subsequentwork of
LataneandDarley(Darley& Latane, 1968;Latane& Darley,
1970), researchon helping from the late 1960s throughthe
mid-1970s focused on situationaland social factorsthatpro-
mote or, more often, inhibit bystanderintervention.In the
Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity:A preliminarystate-
ment. AmericanSociological Review, 25, 161-179.
Piliavin, J. A., Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Clark, R. D.,
III. (1981). Emergencyintervention.New York:Academic.
Schwartz, S. H. (1973). Normative explanationsof helping behavior:A
critique, proposal, and empiricaltest. Journal of ExperimentalSocial
Psychology, 9, 349-364.
Schwartz, S. H. (1977). Normative influences on altruism. In L.
Berkowitz(Ed.), Advancesin experimentalsocial psychology(Vol. 10,
pp. 221-279). New York:Academic.
mid-1970s, however, questions concerningwhen people do
not help sharedthe empiricalstage with emergingtheoriesof
why people do help.
Many of the original studies and ideas of the 1970s con-
cerning prosocial motives (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent,
1973; J. A. Piliavin& I. M. Piliavin, 1973; Schwartz, 1974)
evolved into relatively elaboratetheoretical models by the
early 1980s (Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; J. A.
Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; Schwartz &
Howard, 1981). Although these models posited different
mechanisms(e.g., negative-staterelief, aversive-arousalre-
duction), one common theme was that apparentlyselfless
behavior(helping) may be selfishly (egoistically) motivated.
Cialdini and his colleagues discussed "altruism as
hedonism";J. A. Piliavin and her colleagues hypothesized
that "observationof an emergencyarousesa bystander"and
that this arousal "becomes more unpleasantas it increases
and the bystanderis thereforemotivatedto reduce it" (J. A.
Piliavinet al., 1981, p. 22). Otherresearchersproposedthat
the processes involved in egoistically motivatedhelpingmay
haveevolutionaryroots. Forexample, Hoffman(1981) stated
that empathic arousal, arousal arising from the distress of
others, "appearsto be a universalhumanresponsefor which
there is a constitutionalbasis" (p. 128).
It was in this context that nascent forms of the empathy-
altruism hypothesis appeared. Batson and Coke (1981)
observed:
The ideathatempathicemotionproducesgenuinely
altruisticmotivationcontradicts
theegoisticassump-
tion of most, if not all, currenttheoriesof motivation.
Becauseegoismis a widelyheld andbasicassump-
tion,it is prudent
to requirethattheevidencesupport-
ing altruismbe strongbeforeit is accepted.(p. 184)
In the context of prevailingtheories of egoism, the historic
challenge of the empathy-altruismhypothesiswas to demon-
stratethat empathypromoteshelping in ways thatcannotbe
accountedfor by self-interest. Over the past decade, Batson
and his colleagues have crafteda numberof innovativestud-
ies (summarizedby Batson and Shaw) that attemptto sys-
tematicallyrule out alternativeegoistic explanationsinvolv-
ing (a) aversive-arousal reduction, (b) empathy-specific