Godels first incompleteness theorem

1. Proof sketch of Gdels first incompleteness theorem

Gdels 1st incompleteness theorem (syntactic version): any -consistent, primitive recursive (abb. p.r.) axiomatized theory which contains the language of arithmetic and is p.r. adequate is negation-incomplete. (Rosser 1936 has shown that this also holds for the weaker assumption of consistency rather than -consistency)

Defining the terms

A theory T is -inconsistent if there is some open wff (x) such that T can prove ( n) for each number n and T can prove . Otherwise T is -consistent. A theory T is p.r. axiomatized iff the numerical property of being the Gdel number of a T-sentence/T-axiom/proof in T is p.r. (See Smith p. 161) A theory T with language L contains the language of arithmetic, LA, iff all the sentences of LA are sentences of L and these have the same interpretation (i.e. standard) as in L A. A theory T is p.r. adequate iff T can represent all p.r. numerical properties and relations A theory T is negation-incomplete iff there is a sentence A such that .

Useful notations and definitions; PA

We take for granted the theory PA presented in first-order logic with identity with its intended interpretation. The term n which is part of our formalized language is shorthand for the term denoting the numeral n. Thus 2 is shorthand for SS0. Where is a wff with n variables free, the expression [ n1,n2,,nn] stands for replacing every occurrence of x1, x2, , xn with n1, n2, , nn, respectively. The expression x> is shorthand for x1, x2, xn. The wff expresses the relation (or property when n=1) R iff [ n1, n2, ..., nn] is true whenever Rn1n2,,nn holds. The wff represents the relation (or property when n=1) R iff PA Rn1n2,,nn and PA [n1, n2, ..., nn] whenever Rn1n2,,nn. [n1, n2, ..., nn] whenever

Preliminary remarks and proofs needed

In a full proof of Gdels incompleteness theorem one needs to prove that PA can express and represent all p.r. functions and properties. Briefly: to show that PA can express all p.r. functions, we show that PA expresses the initial functions (successor, zero and projection functions), functions defined from p.r. functions by composition and functions defined by primitive recursion from p.r. functions. With the exception of the last case which requires using Gdels -function, these are all easy to show. The proof that PA can represent all p.r. functions uses essentially the same strategy.

0-, 1- and 1-sentences (leave out)

, abbreviated . A 0-wff is a wff with no occurrences of unbounded quantifiers A 1-wff is a 0-wff with an added unbounded existential quantifier as its main connective. The 0-wff must not contain negation as its main connective, however. A 1-wff is a 0-wff with an added unbounded universal quantifier as its main connective. The 0-wff must not contain negation as its main connective, however.

A quantifier is said to be bounded just in case it has the form

PA is 0- and 1-wff complete, i.e. it proves every such wff or its negation. This can be show using a proof by induction on the complexity of sentences, where complexity is measured by number of connectives and quantifiers.

Primitive recursive (p.r.) functions (leave out)

The initial functions are p.r. They are as follows: the successor function S(x)=y, the zero function Z(x)=0, and all the projection functions Functions defined by composition from p.r. functions. Functions defined by primitive recursion, i.e. any function f such that f(x>,0) = g(x>) and f(x>,Sy)= h(x>,y,f(x>,y)) where g and h are p.r.

The primitive recursive functions are as follows:

- PA can express and represent all p.r. functions (leave out)

To show that PA can express all p.r. functions, we show that PA expresses the initial functions, functions defined from p.r. functions by composition and functions defined by primitive recursion from p.r. functions. With the exception of the last case which requires using Gdels -function, these are all easy to show. The proof that PA can represent all p.r. functions uses a similar strategy; we cant simply use 1-completeness and the fact that all p.r. functions can be expressed by 1-sentences as we want a constructive proof which shows, given any p.r. function, how to construct a sentence which will represent this function.

- Arithmetization of syntax and Gdel numbering

First we arithmetize our language by giving a unique assignment of numbers to every symbol of our language. What is important is that our Gdel numbering is unique and effective: we want to be able to mechanically produce the g.n. of any expression and mechanically produce any expression given its Gdel number. Expressions of the language are assigned Gdel numbers (abb. g.n., <> reading the Gdel number of the symbol/expression/sequence of expressions ) as follows. The g.n. of an expression = s1s2sn where the si are symbols is: <> = 2<s1>3<s2>pn<sn> where 2,3,,pn are in order the first primes. When is a sequence of expressions each si is instead an expression.

- Constructing a Gdel sentence

The relation Prf(m,n) holds between numbers m and n when m is the g.n. of a proof of n. It can be shown that Prf(m,n) is a relation whose characteristic function is p.r., and so is p.r. (this step of our proof utilizes the fact that our theory T is p.r. axiomatized). We now define the diagonalisation of an open wff Diag(n) is a p.r. function (this needs to be proved) which takes us from the g.n. n of a wff to its diagonalisation. The relation between numbers Gdl(m,n) holds just in case m is the g.n. of a proof of the diagonalisation of the wff whose g.n. is n (i.e. a proof of ). Since Gdl(m,n) is defined by composition from Prf(m,n) and Diag(n) (as Prf(m,diag(n)) ) and these are p.r., Gdl(m,n) is p.r. Since PA can represent all p.r. functions, PA represents Gdl(m,n). Let the formula expressing Gdl(m,n) be Gdl(x1,x2). We now construct the sentence U =def . The property U expressed by U holds of a number n iff it is the g.n. of a wff whose diagonalisation is not provable in Q. Take the diagonalisation of U, call it G =def )

G is equivalent to which is true just in case the diagonalisation of U is not derivable in PA. But G is the diagonalisation of U, so G is true iff G is not derivable in PA.

- Showing that PA is negation-incomplete

We first define the notion of -incompleteness. A theory T is -incomplete iff there is some open wff (x) such that T can prove (n) for each number n but cannot prove . Otherwise T is -complete. We now show that PA is -incomplete and incomplete given the assumption of -consistency. Suppose that and that PA is consistent. This implies that some m is the g.n. of the derivation of G. This in turn implies that some m is the g.n. of the derivation of the diagonalisation of U. This implies that Gdl(m,<U>) holds. This implies that , as PA represents Gdl. This implies that . But G is equivalent, by definition, to . Contradiction. So . . However, PA represents Gdl(m,n) and thus proves , for each number m, since no such number is the g.n. of a proof of the diagonalisation U which is G. So PA is -incomplete. To show that we assume that PA is -consistent. Since PA is consistent if consistent, [ ] for each m. Suppose . Then . So PA is -inconsistent. Contradiction. Putting our results together, assuming that PA is -consistent, we get the conclusion that PA is negation incomplete since and . Q.E.D.