Running Head: A TOWN COVERED IN COAL ASH

A Town Covered in Coal Ash: An Analysis of Tennessee Valley Authoritys Response to the Kingston Fossil Plant Coal Ash Spill

Case Study Submitted to the 2014 Arthur W. Page Society Case Study Competition

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Table of Contents
Overview...3 Overview of TVA Kingston Coal Ash Spill...3 History of TVA....4 TVA Kingston Fossil Plant Coal Ash Spill...5 Chronological Report of TVAs Responses..7 Crisis Communication and Risk Communication.....10 Legal Action..12 Reform. .....14 Conclusion.....15 References.16

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A Town Covered in Coal Ash: An Analysis of Tennessee Valley Authoritys Response to the Kingston Fossil Plant Coal Ash Spill

Overview In 2008, a coal ash barrier ruptured at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Kingston Fossil Plant in Roane County, Tennessee, releasing millions of cubic yards of ash into the community. This spill made the TVA responsible for the largest fly ash spill in United States history. The TVA, a United States government-owned organization that provides electricity to millions of people in the Southeast, was embroiled in a crisis that had environmental implications for thousands of residents. This paper will cover the strategic and crisis communication tactics used by TVA and the lasting impact they have made in community and national policy.

Overview of TVA Kingston Coal Ash Spill The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) (2013) is a United States government-owned organization that provides electricity to millions of people in the Southeast. Receiving no taxpayer money, the TVAs vision is to help lead the Tennessee Valley region and the nation toward a cleaner and more secure energy future, relying more on nuclear power and energy efficiency and relying less on coal. On December 22, 2008, a coal ash barrier ruptured at the TVA Kingston Fossil Plant in Roane County, Tennessee. Coal ash, a fine particulate pollutant produced by the combustion of coal, was being contained in an 84-acre unlined ash fill. This powder is collected then mixed with water so it can be pumped into a retaining pond. Coal ash carries many toxic substances such as mercury, arsenic and lead. The TVA Kingston Fossil Plant spill consisted of 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash spilled from an on-site landfill, covering more than 300 acres of surrounding land and water (Department of Environment and Conservation, 2013). This spill was the largest fly ash release in the
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history of the United States and recorded more damage and spill than the BP oil spill which

occurred a couple years later in 2010.

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According to Appalachian Voices (2012), a nonprofit organization dedicated to reducing coal dependency in Southern Appalachia, this spill was so large that it could have filled 1,500 Olympic swimming pools. The mix of fly ash and water, known as slurry, traveled across the Emory River, Clinch River and other tributaries to the Tennessee River, destroying land, homes, and ecosystems. Some areas recorded having six feet of slurry sludge. No one died in the immediate wake of this event; however, as time went on the ash spill had large effects on local citizens and the physical and natural environment (Department of Environment and Conservation, 2013). Citizens in the surrounding areas began to get ill from the large amounts of coal, breathing in the harsh fumes emitted by the coal. According to the Department of Environment and Conservation (2013), the community saw a quick decrease in the number of fish in the polluted rivers and lakes. The public as well as government agencies took immediate action to bring awareness to the coal fly ash spill as well as cleanup efforts that are still in effect today.

History of TVA TVA is a United States Government owned company that provides electricity to over 9 million people and is the largest public power provider (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013). The TVA does not receive appropriated tax money, and its sales revenues exceed $11 billion annually. In addition to supplying electricity, the TVA provides flood control, navigation and land management for the Tennessee River system. Their mission is to have affordable electricity, economic and agricultural development, environmental stewardship, integrated river system management, and technological innovation (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013). TVA claims that in order to improve all of these aspects of their mission, they have changed with the times and improved their systems. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt established the TVA on May 18, 1933 in response to the Great Depression. President Roosevelt asked Congress to create a corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013). In the beginning, TVA created a problem-solving approach to achieving its mission through integrated resource management. No matter the issue TVA faced, whether it was power production, navigation, or flood control, TVA said it would study the situation and help control the problem. The most dramatic change in the Depression came from

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the electricity generated by TVA dams. TVAs electricity output made the region a more productive place to work and live. This surplus of electricity drew industries into the region, providing desperately needed jobs. Following World War II, TVA started a project building a 650-mile long navigation channel, providing the worlds largest amount of electricity. This channel covered the length of the Tennessee River. In 1959, the legislation deemed TVA a self-financing power system. This brought economic growth to its highest point in the history of the Tennessee Valley area. Electric price rates were within the nations lowest and stayed low as TVA brought larger, more efficient generating units into service (Almanac of Policy Issues, 2013). Knowing the future electrical power needs, TVA decided to build nuclear plants as a new source of economic power. In 2000, TVA introduced the first green power program in the Southeast by launching the Green Power Switch Program on Earth Day in 2000 (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013). Eight years later a retaining wall failed at the plant in Kingston where millions of pounds of coal fly ash were released into Tennessee River tributaries. According to TVA, plans were put into action to restore and improve the affected area and eliminate wet storage of ash at TVA fossil plants; however many complaints were filed stating that TVAs lack of urgency in releasing information and taking action created long term issues in the community and surrounding areas. (Almanac of Policy Issues, 2013).

TVA Kingston Fossil Plant Coal Ash Spill The coal ash slide began just before 1 a.m. on Dec. 22, 2008, when an earthen dike, the only thing separating millions of cubic yards of ash from the river, gave way, releasing a glossy sea of muck, four to six feet thick, dotted with icebergs of ash across the landscape (Paine & Sledge, 2008). The large wave of ash damaged over 15 homes, knocked down power lines, ruptured gas lines and covered roads. TVA originally reported that only 1.7 million cubic yards of slurry escaped the storage facility. They also said the retention area only held 2.6 million cubic yards of sludge; however, four days later an aerial survey confirmed that 5.4 million cubic yards of sludge, the equivalent to 1.09 billion gallons, was released into the surrounding areas. The spill covered more
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than 400 acres with deposits over 6 feet deep. According to Source Watch, this spill was 100

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times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, which released 10.9 million gallons of crude oil. The morning after the spill a small plane flew over to look at the clean-up efforts put into place by TVA, which showed some cleanup activity, but no evidence of promised skimmers or barricades on the water to prevent the ash from sliding downstream (Dewan, 2008). Although TVA apologized for the break in the retention wall, no concrete information was given about the potential risks coal ash would have on the environment, human health and water quality. According to a New York Times article published two days after the event there had been no official warning of the dangers of coal ash. The executive director of the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Stephen A. Smith said it was mind-boggling that officials had not warned nearby residents of the dangers. The fact that they have not warned people, I think, is disastrous and potentially harmful to the residents. There are people walking around, checking it out (Dewan, 2008). This was a common response by environmentalists and the public due to the study the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did a year before finding that coal ash contains high amounts of carcinogens as well as retains heavy metals from the coal. Another common fear was the danger of the coal ash drying out and becoming airborne and breathable (Dewan, 2008). The EPA immediately began testing air and water after the spill. They took samples from the drinking water, privately-owned wells and surface water as well as tested the air quality, ash and soil. After the samples were collected, TVA sent them for analysis to the Tennessee Department of Health to check for any potential health effects. On January 1, 2009, the results found seven metals above the maximum contaminant levels, including arsenic at 149 times the drinking water limit (Earthjustice, 2009). Following the spill, the EPA conducted hundreds of tests that all concluded there were substantial contaminants in the water, air and soil. TVA dredged more than 3.5 million cubic yards of coal ash from the river; however, as of 2012, millions of yards of toxic sludge remained (Allyn, 2012). TVA had to purchase 180 properties around the spill in addition to settling more than 200 other claims due to the damage the spill caused. TVA paid $43 million to the Roane County Economic Development Foundation for restoration efforts.
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After an 18-month investigation on the coal ash spill, the EPA concluded there were leachable coal ash contaminants (LCACs), particularly arsenic, selenium, boron, strontium, and barium in the water. All of these contaminants have different effects on the quality of impacted environments (Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). Along with the EPA, many other organizations were influential in uncovering the impacts this spill had on the area. Earthjustice, local residents, and the Sierra Club formally informed the TVA of their intent to sue the TVA for violations of the Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act. This spill ignited a debate over whether the United States federal government should regulate coal ash as a hazardous material.

Chronological Report of TVAs Responses December 22, 2008.The coal ash spill was first reported by a man trapped in his home when he called 911. TVA police were then notified of the dike failure (Liska, Petrun, Sellnow & Seeger, 2012). December 23, 2008. TVA referred to the disaster as an ash slide in the media and on their website. They reported an estimated 1.7 million cubic yards of coal ash was spilled. Meanwhile, TVA CEO, Tom Kilgore, called the disaster an inconvenience (Button, 2013). According to Liska et al. (2012) the initial response of the TVA was to make sure the people in the immediate vicinity of the ash spill were safe. TVA rented around 30 hotel rooms for displaced residents. Those affected were also provided with gift cards for food and clothing, water and cell phones (Copeland, 2009). According to the TVA there was no evidence that led them to believe the community was in immediate danger. Youre not going to be endangered by touching the ash material, said Barbara Matocci, a spokeswoman for the TVA (as cited in Dewan, 2008). December 25, 2008. Two days after the TVA estimated the amount of spilled coal ash as 1.7 million cubic yards they revised their estimate to 5.4 million cubic yards of spilled coal ash (Earthjustice, 2009). December 26, 2008. John Moulton, a spokesman for TVA, claims that while levels of lead and thallium exceed drinking water safety standards, the metals are filtered out by water treatment processes. He also claims the mercury and arsenic are barely detectable in water testing samples (Earthjustice, 2009). December 27, 2008. A list of precautions was issued to residents by the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013).

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December 28, 2008. An inventory of the plants byproducts, including arsenic, lead, barium, chromium, and manganese, was released by TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013). December 30, 2008. An announcement was made by TVA revealing that they were requesting the assistance of the Army Corps of Engineers to dredge the ash-filled Emory River in order to restore navigation (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013). January 1, 2009. The TVA announced that they would spray seed, straw and mulch on top of the coal ash to combat dust and erosion. This plan replaced the previous course of action that they would clear away all of the spilled coal ash (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2013). January 9, 2009. In Alabama, at TVAs Widows Creek Power Plant, 10,000 gallons of fly ash and gypsum sludge are released from a pond. TVA admits that among 10 other substances, arsenic and aluminum increased in the water downstream (Earthjustice, 2009). January 13, 2009. A local news channel aired a one hour special on the coal ash spill. A resident who lost his home in the ash spill asked Ron Hall, Kingston Plant manager, if he had any specific cleanup plans for the two coves that were affected. In response to the question, Hall said our focus right now has really been outreach, monitoring the water and the air, containment of the debris that is outside of the dredge cell and the recovery operations. When asked about the outlook for the water sport season in and around Kingston in the summer of 2009, Hall responded, the state and Coast Guard and the EPA are going to be very conservative about when they say its safe to start that water based recreation again. Hall was then asked if the situation could have been avoided had TVA taken a different course, he said Im not here to speculate on what the reason for this failure was. We had absolutely no indication of this failure before it occurred (WATE, 2009).
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January 23, 2009. A memo created by

TVAs 50-member public relations staff was inadvertently sent to the Associated Press, who then published the document. Edits to the memo reveal TVAs intentions to change catastrophic to sudden, accidental release, as well as the removal of risk to public health and risk to the environment. TVA also removed a reference to the potential of an acute threat to fish. The memo was also changed to describing the coal ash as consisting of inert material not harmful to the environment (Earthjustice, 2009).

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February 9, 2009. TVA CEO Tom Kilgore was set to earn potentially more than $3.27 million a year after his October 20 percent pay raise. He publicly apologized about this pay raise, and days later the TVA board cut his pay to around $1 million (Earthjustice, 2009). February 12, 2009. According to TVA, officials the final cost of cleanup was estimated between $525 million and $825 million, but could potentially exceed $825 million depending on fines and litigation costs (Earthjustice, 2009). February 12, 2009. We recognize the impacts that the economic slowdown is having on power sales and are evaluating ways we can reduce our costs and continue to provide reliable, affordable power to the consumers in the Tennessee Valley, said TVA Chief Financial Officer Kim Greene. While we expect our sales to continue to be affected throughout the fiscal year, we are confident that the region will recover as the nations economy recovers (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2009). March 3, 2009. In a news release, TVA announced the submission of its Corrective Action Plan to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. The Corrective Action Plan focused on four main objectives: maintaining the health and safety of the public and those working on the project, involving the public, affected property owners, and other agencies in the formulation of recovery activities, restoring impacted natural and public resources expeditiously, and making things good, if not better, than they were before. TVA Senior Vice President of Environment and Research Anda Ray said, We have committed to making things right for the people in the area, and thats what we will do (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2009). March 5, 2009. TVA police arrested United Mountain Defense volunteer Matt Landon for trespass by motor vehicle and violation of restricted access. According to Earthjustice, Landon was driving a local resident, 65-year old Eva Hewitt, back to her home (Earthjustice, 2009). March 20, 2009. TVA began dredging operations to remove ash from the navigation channel of the Emory River (Earthjustice, 2009). A news release from TVA quoted TVAs Environmental Executive Anda Ray as saying TVA appreciates the continued patience of the local community with our cleanup and recovery operations (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2009). March 23, 2009. The charges TVA brought against United Mountain Defense volunteer, Matt Landon, on March 5, 2009, were dismissed by the judge (Earthjustice, 2009). April 1, 2009. TVA decided to use an independent university research group for the health monitoring of residents and to verify cleanup of the coal ash spill (Earthjustice, 2009). April 17, 2009. TVA asked federal court to dismiss all lawsuits resulting from the coal ash spill (Earthjustice, 2009).

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July 2, 2009. TVAs plan to dispose of millions of tons of coal as in Alabama is approved by the government (Earthjustice, 2009). July 24, 2009. According to Newsweek Magazine, the Kingston spill ranks among the worlds worst man-man environmental disasters (Earthjustice, 2009). July 25, 2009. The Root Cause Analysis Summaries was released by TVA. This analysis reveals engineering data about why the spill occurred (Earthjustice, 2009). August 1, 2009. TVA reported a third-quarter loss of $167 million, which they partly blame on the cleanup. The cleanup estimate was raised to $1.2 billion (Earthjustice, 2009). November 13, 2009. TVA planned to discharge water from the Kingston Power plant into the Clinch River (Earthjustice, 2009). June 14, 2010. The recovery work has progressed around-the-clock for more than 17 months since the event occurred, and the progress is on schedule. The time-critical phase of removing the ash from the river is complete, as scheduled. Nearly three-fifths of the spilled ash has been recovered, said Anda Ray, TVA Senior Vice President of Environment and Technology in a statement regarding the order from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (PR Newswire, 2010). August 23, 2012. A federal judge found TVA liable for the failure of a storage cell which led to the coal ash spill. TVA lawyers admitted that the agency had problems, but argued that the collapse was triggered by a rare, undetectable and unpreventable geologic eventthe failure of an unstable soil layer under the foundation of the ash cell (Knoxville News Sentinel, 2012).

Crisis Communication and Risk Communication In this crisis, it was important to address peoples perceptions as well as the reality of the disaster. TVA had to make sure all audiences were informed with details relating to the coal ash spill. They had to communicate effectively and identify their biggest concerns as quickly as possible. Their publics include local citizens, governmental regulators, stockholders, employees, environmental and pressure groups, and politicians. In a report by the Environmental Integrity Project (EIP), it was determined that TVAs crisis management when handling this disaster was inconsistent and lacked transparency because of its constant changes in updates to the public (Mitchell, 2009). Their communication during the crisis falls under the Image Restoration Theory. There are five aspects of the Image Restoration Theory, including denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. Denial was the first way that TVA responded to the crisis, claiming that there were no harmful effects of coal ash on the environment and public health. According to Dewan (2008), this is untrue. In fact, coal ash

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contains high concentrations of heavy metals as well as significant levels of carcinogens. An EPA study found that the concentrations of arsenic to which people might be exposed through drinking water contaminated by fly ash could increase cancer risks several hundredfold (Dewan, 2008). TVA blamed the retention wall failure on rain that fell 10 days prior to the event and unstable soil under the ash cell. In an attempt to appear less accountable, TVA claimed there were no indications of any issues with the retention wall. Ten years prior to the spill, TVAs Enterprise Risk Management plan was created; however, they did not see ash management or ash ponds as a risk and instead treated them as dams (Moore, 2010). The first stage in a crisis is detection, which includes identifying the warning signs. Several prodromes, or warnings, surfaced in the years leading up to the spill, indicating the need for safety modifications to ash ponds at their Kingston facility (Moore). Although they expressed sympathy, TVA downplayed the extent of the damage, attempting to minimize the negative feelings community members and environmental groups had regarding the spill. An example of this was the memo leaked on January 23 to the Associated Press where they replaced the term catastrophic with sudden, accidental release, and removed the phrase risk to public health and risk to the environment and a reference to the potential of an acute threat to fish. The memo also described the coal ash as consisting of inert material not harmful to the environment (Earthjustice, 2009). Corrective action finally came into play when the EPA and other agencies came to help and started making a visual difference in the area. Four years later, TVA was held responsible for the coal ash spill in federal court. In crisis communications, it is vital that the company responds effectively. Important organizational factors are credibility, trust, reputation, resources and history (Fearn-Banks, 2011). These components allow the company to engage their publics and effectively inform them. TVA responded quickly to the crisis, but some of their actions were premature and resulted in inaccurate, inconsistent information. Subsequently, public criticism resulted in reputational harm. Another issue TVA faced was its failure to communicate the claims policy and decisions in a timely manner, increasing settlement expectations for affected residents. According to the Inspector General of Tennessee, Richard W. Moore, TVA management handled the root cause analysis in a manner that avoided transparency and accountability in favor of preserving a litigation strategy (Moore, 2010). In addition, TVA also elected not to publicly release their management practices that may have contributed to the Kingston spill (Moore, 2010). This report claimed TVA had not implemented the National Incident Management System required by national Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (Moore). All of these problems with TVAs

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communication process delayed important emergency response actions. The public became hostile and outraged towards the agency, adding to the lack of faith in TVA (Moore). When any large company is faced with a crisis that impacts human health as well as environmental safety issues, reacting with accurate and solid evidence is vital in conveying that the organization is doing its best to keep the publics and the environment safe. In addition to the importance of a TVA Kingston representative being informative and proactive, the involvement of other activist groups and governmental agencies are critical. The EPA headed the cleanup of the spill. According to the EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, they provided resources and expertise in accordance to federal law as well as partner with the State of Tennessee in coming up with a comprehensive plan to ensure the cleanup of the site is up to environmental standards (Appalachian Voices, 2012). This plan was put in place to make sure the cleanup site was up to scientific and ecological principles that protect human health and safety, while also looking at the long term ecological effects (Appalachian Voices, 2012).

Legal Action In the aftermath of an environmental catastrophe, such as the Kingston, Tennessee ash spill, one of the most important and difficult tasks is determining fault and carrying out legal action to guilty parties. A full, objective investigation of the conditions leading up to the crisis and the magnitude of the crisis itself is crucial in allocating those affected the proper compensation. TVA conducted their own investigation into the cause and level of damage of the Kingston disaster, but when third party organizations like the Environmental Integrity Project analyzed the event, several discrepancies were found between the agencys official account and the facts surrounding the Emory River spill. A report issued by the EIP in 2009 evaluated TVAs own investigation of the crisis over the past year and concluded that it was deliberately designed to limit its scope, minimize the companys own liability, and avoid anything that might call into question
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the safety of the nearly 3,000 acres of coal waste ponds still in use at other TVA coal

plants (Mitchell, 2009). The report also referred to the fact that TVAs own Inspector General, based on a review by an independent engineering firm, found that TVA negligence contributed to

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the Kingston disaster, and that TVA avoided full transparency to limit litigation following the spill (Mitchell). The Inspector General also stated that the TVA bypassed air emission controls at the Cumberland, Widows Creek and Bull Run coal plants, resulting in well over a thousand tons of illegal emissions. According to the IG reports, TVA delayed fixing the problem or reporting the emissions to regulatory authorities (Mitchell). This wasnt the end of TVAs attempts to avoid legal liability. In a lawsuit that would determine if TVA was responsible for fly ash damages, it was uncovered that the agencys engineers left out data collected from de-watering well points because they believed it might confuse data from piezometers, which measure water conditions below the surface (Mitchell, 2009). Jamie Dotson, a TVA engineer, testified in court and explained why this data was tampered with. According to Dotson, "there was a fear that if someone in upper management read the spreadsheet and didn't take time to read the fine print they might misunderstand the spreadsheet" (Mitchell, 2009). These testimonies found TVA officials deliberately tampered with data to avoid legal liabilities, increasing the amount of damage to the Emory River environment and Swan Pond community members when the Kingston dyke eventually failed in 2008. It was only until the case was brought to a federal court on August 23, 2012, that TVA was officially held responsible for the Kingston crisis and obligated to pay those affected. According to U.S. District Judge Thomas Varlan of the Eastern District of Tennessee, had the TVA acted appropriately, the underlying failure of the north dike "would have been investigated, addressed, and potentially remedied before the catastrophic failure" (Allyn, 2012). Varlan contributed to the federal decision almost four years after the initial spill that held TVA fully responsible for the faulty dike at their Kingston facility. As for property damage and settlements to the Swan Pond community members, the agency was forced to pay over $11 million in legal costs alone (Allyn). Heimann and Bernstein, a legal firm based in Nashville, represented more than 500 property owners who sought damages from the disaster (Allyn). Not every complaint filed was settled, though. Two years after the spill, about 90 lawsuits had been dismissed, leaving over 50 still to be heard in the Knoxville U.S. District Court (Sohn, 2010). Part of the reason why TVA fought for so long was because they had been living under the protection the government since their creation and had used their status to escaping legal and financial ramifications for misconduct in the past (Mitchell, 2009). Environmental Integrity Project Director Eric Schaeffer, when releasing the report on TVA and the Kingston Ash Spill, called attention to the fact that the TVA has been exempt from federal punishment due to its status as a government agency (Mitchell, 2009). Any other utility that spilled a billion gallons of coal ash into a river, Schaeffer said, would face certain federal prosecution, but the Justice

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Department won't file a case against TVA(Mitchell). This cloak of immunity led to TVA being complacent in dealing with its coal ash waste deposits in the years leading up to the Kingston crisis. The EIP report supports this claim, discussing how TVA intended to transition its coal waste ponds from wet-to-dry systems over 20 years ago, a move that could have averted the coal ash disasters at both Kingston and Widows Creek and curb TVA's harmful water discharges (Mitchell). Nothing was done, however, because they weren't required by law to do so, and the rest is history. Reform After it was determined that TVA was responsible for the ash spill in Kingston, several steps were taken by the agency to reform and rebuild the affected parties. In February 2012, contractors began repairing and rebuilding the retention wall that failed four years prior (Sohn, 2010). The plan is to move the remaining ash from the spill back into the fill and seal it (Sohn). TVAs current goal is to have the safest and most thoroughly inspected impoundments in the industry (Sohn). Last year, TVAs board approved to spend $2 billion to convert all of its ash and gypsum ponds from wet storage to dry storage within 8
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to 10 years (Sohn). The EPA also played a major role in

proposing reform for the coal industry after the Kingston spill. On May 4, 2010, EPA announced that they would create new and more effective national guidelines for the storage of toxic coal ash (Walker-Journey, 2010). In the past, sludge from power plants that burn coal wasn't labeled as hazardous, making the material exempt from government regulation. After the 2008 spill in Kingston, however, the EPA determined that the environmental risks associated with toxic coal ash material are severe enough to establish guidelines for regulating the storage of coal ash (Walker-Journey). Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the EPA proposed two ways to regulate the toxin. First, the wet storage technique being used in TVA plants is to be eliminated and replaced with a dry storage system so the toxins can be transported to landfills (Walker-Journey, 2010). The other proposal would require the coal ash ponds used by industrial plants to be lined in order to prevent any toxic materials from seeping into groundwater (Walker-Journey).

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TVA has stated that they are willing to comply with the EPAs reforms and have suggested a proposal of their own. Specifically, they want to create a public recreation area that would restore land impacted by the spill and make it available for public use (Walker-Journey, 2010). Under the proposition, about 140 acres of damaged property under the ownership of TVA would be converted into a ball field, wetland restoration area, and even a bird-watching area (Walker-Journey, 2010).

Conclusion On November 8, 2012 both federal and state environmental authorities signed off on TVA final plan of clean up. TVAs next course of action is to simply let nature take its course. This type of plan is known as Monitored Natural Recovery and will require TVA to monitor the remaining ash in more than 200 acres of the rivers over the next 30 years, at an estimated price tag of $10 million (Blackerby, 2012). The EPA remedial project manager Craig Zeller stated that it is the mother of all eco- studies and it will entail a culmination of a two-year, $40 million study that includes the taking of more than 16,000 samples and the completion of 400,000 analyses (Blackerby, 2012). An alternative option to the Monitored Natural Recovery plan would be dredging. This approach would cost over $200 million dollars and potentially cause more environmental issues. According to (AFFILIATION REMOVED FOR ANONYMITY OF CASE STUDY SUBMISSION) Professor Joanna Weintraub (personal interview, March 2013) one of the main concerns with the cleanup efforts from the ash spill was the radioactivity embedded in the river floor. Because of this, dredging of the valley floor and removal of spill contaminants could only go so far. For TVA and the surrounding areas it would have been far worse to dig into the cesium layers and bring radioactivity back to the surface. The TVA coal ash spill was a great example of how industrial waste management practices and communication strategies can impact the response in an environmental/human health crisis of this magnitude. The disaster following the break in the retention wall paved the way for new regulations towards coal ash waste as well as an increased awareness on the impact of coal the nation's dependency on it. This crisis highlighted the importance of active citizenry in ensuring that industries are held accountable for their actions.

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References Allyn, B. (2012, August 23). TVA held responsible for massive coal ash spill. USA Today. Retrieved April 24, 2013, from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-0823/tva-coal-ash-spill/57246824/1

Almanac of Policy Issues. History of the Tennessee Valley Authority. (2013). Retrieved April 14, 2013, from http://www.policyalmanac.org/economic/archive/tva_history.shtml

Appalachian Voices. TVA Kingston coal ash spill. (2012, December 21). Retrieved April 16, 2013, from http://appvoices.org/tag/tva-kingston-coal-ash-spill/

Department of Environment and Conservation. (2013). Ash slide at TVA Kingston Fossil Plant. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.tn.gov/environment/kingston/

Blackerby, M. (2012, November 8). Natural conclusion: TVA, environmentalists make pitch to those affected by coal ash spill. Knoxville News Sentinel. Retrieved April 10, 2013, from http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/nov/08/natural-conclusion-tva-environmentalists-make-to/

Button, G. (2013). The TVA ash spill one year later: Lessons learned. Counterpunch. Retrieved April 21, 2013, from http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/12/16/the-tva-ash-spill-one-year-laterlessons-learned/

Copeland, L. (2009, January 1). Tenn. residents fear impact of sludge ash pill. USA Today. Retrieved April 24, 2013 from www.usatoday.com

Dewan, S. (2008, December 24). Coal ash spill revives issue of its hazards. The New York Times. Retrieved April 24, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/25/us/25sludge.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Dewan, S. (2008, December 27). Tennessee ash flood larger than initial estimate. The New York Times. Retrieved April 22, 2013 from www.nytimes.com

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Earthjustice. (2009, December 23). Kingston coal ash disaster: The first year. Earthjustice. Retrieved April 22, 2013, from http://earthjustice.org/features/campaigns/kingston-coal-ashdisaster-the-first-year

Environmental Protection Agency, (2013). TVA Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant release site. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from http://www.epakingstontva.com/default.aspx

EPA to oversee cleanup of TVA Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant release. (2009, May 11). Environmental Protection Agency. Retrieved April 20, 2013, from http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/2ac652c59703a4738525735900400c2c/7e39c49bea407 817852575b30064e666!Open

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