Momens Srudir., In,. Forum, Vol. 5, No. 314. pp. 341-348.

1982 0277 5395:X2/030341 063 IWO

Ptinted in Great Brllam.
Pergamon Press Ltd
ON BEAUTIFUL SOULS, J UST WARRIORS AND FEMINIST
CONSCIOUSNESS
J EAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01002, U.S.A.
Synopsis-The author sketches, evaluates, and aims to disenthrall feminist thinkers from the grip of
two powerfully and deeply held archetypes, the Beautiful Soul and the Just Warrior. Both these
positions, with their many historic variants, operate to forestall consideration of possible alternatives
on matters of war and peace, for feminists and non-feminists alike. The postures gear thinking a
certain direction on the question of war itself and on the problem of male and female involvement in
war.
After criticizing these received notions, and explaining why each is inadequate to our current
historic needs, the author develops a perspective, maternal thinking, which, transformed by and
infused with a particular mode of feminist consciousness can, she argues, help to place contemporary
feminists in a powerful theoretical posture from which to challenge the militarist state and militaristic
policies and thinking.
I propose to disenthrall us from the grip of two images-the Beautiful Soul and the Just
Warrior-which now permeate much of our thinking on matters of women, men, and war.
These archetypes embody certain powerful, received notions about the roles men and women
have, and should, play in time of war. There are variations on the basic theme, which I shall
discuss, but the images continue to operate both as deep background and as explicit
justification in war and peace argumentation. I shall contend that for us to remain tied to
these images we shall have made an implicit pact til death do us part, either in a nuclear
holocaust or in the lingering twilight of the American experiment, already deeply damaged
by the corruption of the Vietnam War and its aftermath. I shall propose an alternative: the
transformation of maternal thinking in and through feminist consciousness.
The Beautiful Soul-the term comes from Hegels Phenomenology ofMind-was Hegels
way of conveying the mode of consciousness of those human beings he dubbed the beautiful
souls, beings frequently of great individual goodness and purity, yet beings cut-off and
abstracted from the world of which they were a part (Hegel, 1979; pp. 383409). Beautiful
Souls often condemn all or most of social reality even as they celebrate their own rarified
sensibilities. Their fellow men and women become either villains or saints rather than
imperfect and complex human beings, for the Beautiful Soul evaluates others from a
standpoint that immunizes him or her from the stubborn reality of others and from the wider
community. Non-beautiful souls, the vast majority, may go about their business largely as if
the Beautiful Soul, in his or her perfectionism, did not exist. Occasionally a Beautiful Soul ofa
particular kind may bear witness in such a way that the world, for one brief moment, must
take notice before the waters close over and business-as-usual, including the business of war,
goes on.
The world has long been able to accommodate and contain Beautiful Souls, including
those whose total pacifism involved a counsel of passivity and withdrawal. Politics has been
able to render impotent and ineffectual in any wider social sense the counsels of spiritual
341
342 J EAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
perfectionism. Two features of the Beautiful Soul as an anti-war, anti-violence stances must
be stressed. First, women historically, though neither uniformly nor exclusively, have been
cast as societys beautiful souls. That is, they have served as the collective projection of a pure,
rarified, self-sacrificing, otherworldly and pacific Other. There is a contrast model of the
woman as Beautiful Soul in the image of man as the incorrigible beast. Elizabeth Cady
Stanton enunciated this view when she condemned the male element in civilization as a
destructive force, stern selfish, aggrandizing, loving war, violence, conquest, acquisition,
breeding in the material and moral world alike discord, disorder, disease and death (Stanton,
1882; pp 351-352). Within contemporary feminist thought, the Beautiful Soul position has
been celebrated as an ontological vision of pure female Be-ing, with women conceived as
beings of an altogether different and superior sort from males who, in turn, are defined as
brute-like and brutal. In the world of the Beautiful Soul, people are frequently judged by what
they are, not by what they do.
The hard truth for feminists seeking to construct a theory of women and war is this: despite
the paeons to the day when the Beautiful Souls all get together to curb and defeat the
primitive beasts and to usher in the reign of harmony and peace, no sane person really
believes in this outcome. It does seem rather late in the day for facile romanticism. We
recognize that a rather nasty historic bargain has been struck here: Beautiful Souls may stay
as sweet as they are while the boys will be boys. This demeaning and destructive pact must
be broken. It offers only the deadly still of silence for the Beautiful Souls and the beasts, by
definition, cannot speak to one another. A genuine dialogue might break the trance. Neither
the Beautiful Souls, who do not want their presumptive purity and position of perfectionism
threatened, nor the ugly beasts, who would prefer to continue to see their bestiality as
inevitable, want the deal broken. Yet it must be if we are to break through to some
alternative.
A second feature of the Beautiful Soul vision is that in the long history of struggle around
questions of war and peace, Beautiful Souls who pre-judged all war as immoral have asked
for and frequently received the protection of government in exchange for political passivity
(Niebanck, 1972; p. 48). No feminist who seeks to participate in peace-making as a social and
cultural activity of the greatest urgency, indeed as the end of collective human existence and
the means through which that existence is conducted, can endorse such withdrawal. While
this judgement is not meant to disallow entirely absolute pacifism as a way for some
Christians to bear witness to the peace of the kingdom of God, it is very much a judgement
against a passivity that simply plays into the hands of the powers-that-be. A counsel of
spiritual perfectionism abstracted from particular situations and demands places this
position beyond the reach of all but a few: it easily becomes smug and solipsistic. It separates
the Beautiful Souls from the rest of us-though all women, cast from time-to-time in the
image of the Beautiful Souls, have been given the historic task of perpetuating the cult of
denial and true knowledge of self and other the Beautiful Soul position requires.
The second image which no longer offers a genuine alternative if we are serious about
stemming the tides of war is that of the Just Warrior. As a response to the perils of war and
possible nuclear destruction, the Just Warrior and that just war doctrine with which he is
linked, is an inadequate frame for a compelling feminist anti-war alternative. The Just
Warrior, interestingly, requires the female second line of defense--women as buddies and
support troops who help to provide the material conditions and the spiritual sustenance
which enables the Just Warrior to fight on. Within this historic image, somewhat at odds with
that of the Beautiful Soul though womens war-time activitism never tarnished her image of
On Beautiful Souls, Just Warriors and Feminist Consciousness 343
the Beautiful Soul in ideology, myth, and legend, women kept the home fires burning, the
farms and factories producing, the bandages, blankets and food stuffs flowing and the dead
mourned.
The Just Warrior himself is regarded as a human being engaged in the regrettable but
sometimes necessary task of collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong. Just
war theory is a complex body of ethical and political teaching that served vital purposes
historically in limiting, questioning, and chastening violence. Its origins lay in the fact that
early Christianity had to come to terms with a world that was power mad and evil to
Christian eyes, yet to remain true, simultaneously, to the message of peace and love
propounded by their God, the Prince of Peace. St Augustines discussion of war in his fourth
century masterwork, The City of God (1972), marks the beginning of this long history of
inquiry. Augustine opens his account of the just war by posing the unjust war as a contrast
model. The paradigmatic case of the unjust war, for Augustine, was a war of imperialist
conquest carried out by Rome. Consider the scale of those wars, with all that slaughter of
human beings, all the human blood that was shed!, he cries (Augustine, 1972; p. 861). The
just war, on the other hand, which Augustine does not celebrate but which he defends with
regret, involves the use of force in defense of the common good (Murphy, 1980; p. 243). War
is evil: this dictum has presumptive force. In order for it to be overriden a number of
conditions must be met. Only certain situations are sufficient to justify a resort to war. Then,
during the war, justice must prevail in its waging which is to be carried out in accordance with
certain standards. (This means, for example, that not every particular warrior in a just war is
a just warrior, for he may violate the rules of war.) War is conceived as a rule-governed
activity with non-combatant immunity the most important of all rules (Walzer, 1977; p. 21).
The chief elements ofjust war theory--those conditions and situations that justify waging
it and indicate how it is to be waged-were cast in Martin Luthers sixteenth century
rendering as follows: (1) War must be the last resort to be used only after all other means
have been exhausted; (2) war must clearly involve an act of redress of rights actually violated
or a defense against unjust demands backed by the threat of force; (3) war must be openly
and legally declared by a properly constituted government; (4) there must be a reasonable
prospect for victory; (5) means must be proportionate to the ends; (6) war must be waged in
such a way as to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants; (7) the victorious
nation must not require the utter humiliation of the vanquished (Niebanck, 1972; pp. 29-3 1).
The great and continuing strength of just war theory is that it sees politics and ethics as
inseparable. Yet the Just Warrior cannot survive the nuclear age; neither can his mate, the
Beautiful Soul.
Why can the warrior no longer be just and the soul no longer beautiful? My arguments
make specific reference to an American context. So long as we, as Americans, stay within the
language and presumptions ofjust and unjust war notions, so long as we remain locked into
these terms of discourse and a search for justification for American involvement in a war must
occur, our current political reality is such that justification can and always will be found by
the policy elite who will commit this country to a war should one occur. The just war posture
too easily falls into a rationalization: any war American fights, by definition, must be just
because we are a country that believes it must justify itself.
My point is this: the way matters of war and peace decision-making are now set up, the
just war conditions will always be found to pertain. The citizen is placed in a wholly re-active
position. By the time the matter of whether a war is just or not gets debated-and this is the
story of the Vietnam War-we will already be in it. Just war doctrine, properly applied,
344 J EAN BETHKE ELSH I AI N
requires debate of a particular, substantive kind. That debate will never take place in time
under present political conditions, but every attempt will be made to convince concerned
citizens, without the luxury of a debate which we cannot afford if we are to move quickly in
a perilous situation, that the conditions and limitations required by the just war ethos have
all been found and met in the judgement of those whose business it is to make such
judgements. The inadquacies of just war doctrine, then, are forced upon us by the nature of
the modern state combined with the nature of modern total war. .I (Z&n, 1979; p. 251).
Thinkers still struggling within the boundaries ofjust war doctrine as a way to eliminate or
to curb war have stretched those boundaries to the breaking point. Such thinkers, including
the last four popes, have come very close to the position that no modern war could ever be
just. Pope John XXIII noted: . it is hardly possible to imagine that in the atomic era, war
could be used as an instrument ofjustice (Murphy, 1980; p. 244). Pope Paul VI condemned
the arms race as an utterly treacherous trap for humanity, a danger, an injustice, a theft from
the poor and a folly (Hehir, 1980; p. 676). John Paul II at the United Nations cried: The
ancients said, Si vis pacem, para bellum. But can our age really believe that the breath-taking
spiral of armaments is at the service of world peace? In alleging the threat of a potential
enemy, is it really not rather the intention to keep for oneself a means of threat in order to get
the upper hand with the aid of ones own arsenal of destruction? Here too it is the human
dimension of peace that tends to vanish in favor of ever new possible forms of imperialism
(John Paul II, 1979; p. 266). Contemporary just war thinkers have condemned total war and
nuclear weapons: have called for arms control and disarmament; and have insisted that the
content of a nations strategic doctrine, which is filled with implicit moral as well as political
premises, be scrupulously scrutinized and judged given the qualitative increase in destructive
capacity introduced by nuclear weapons (Hehir, 1980; p. 676).
Just war doctrine-and Just Warriors-along with beautiful but passive souls, or women
as homefront helpmeets, despite their lingering strengths and attractions, must make way for
some alternative. If the heart of just war doctrine, as well as the Beautiful Soul image, is the
proscription and repudiation of violence and destruction, the feminist thinker casting about
for a new form for her thinking on war and peace can and should absorb the truths and
strengths from these previous postures, positions, and images. It is to one alternative to the
grip of these powerful images, that taps their strengths, that I now turn. It involves the
transformation of what Sara Ruddick has called maternal thinking through the prism of a
particular feminist consciousness.
The critical task that confronts the anti-war feminist is to determine how her feminist
consciousness can be brought to bear on a world that holds human life very cheaply indeed, a
world in peril of destruction. If feminists fail in this task or if, in the name of feminism, women
succumb to the militarist mentality, including the notion that sex equality must be bought
1 I t might be argued that every epoch rationalizes its war activities as just; that no society has ever been set up in
which conditions to justify a war could not be found. This may well be true but it is somewhat beside the point, for
there were previous eras when wars were flatly condemned as unjust and some peace-keeping was compelled. This
was the function of the medieval church when it functioned true to its own mission. With the advent of the modern
state, however, instruments and methods of manipulation, circumvention and cooptation have been enormously
enhanced, thus rendering even more problematic the actual implementation of just war doctrine in practice.
On Beautiful Souls, Just Warriors and Feminist Consciousness 345
or earned through participation in militarized citizenship, another generation of mothers
may well muse sadly and Murmur/Your doings as boys, as Thomas Hardy wrote in his
powerful anti-war poem, The Souls of the Slain, only the next time round the lament could
well be for daughters as well as sons. Why have women been willing to sacrifice their male
children to the gods of war? Or, why have women been impotent to prevent this sacrifice?
How can the evil be stopped?
I shall move towards answering this question from the perspective of maternal thinking.
The Beautiful Soul, remember, proposes to make each individual a beacon of light in the
surrounding darkness and to draw others in on a life of spiritual perfectionism, or to
repudiate them if they fail. But such counsel rarely percolates upward or outward; moreover,
the Beautiful Soul position includes no notion of structural constraints-economic, political,
ideological-under which people labor. The Just Warrior, on the other hand, does involve
the real world, does place individuals under a set of political obligations. But under present
circumstances, the individual must undertake those obligations from a position which he or
she confronts as the passive recipient of afuit accompli with reference to war and peace policy-
making. An alternative must take account of these realities without falling into its own naive
perfectionism, or into an overly legalistic and circumscribed, hard-boiled realism.
Maternal thinking contains no neat programmatic outputs and it eschews tidy definitions
of either personal or political realities. It involves human beings, particularly women who
mother, in a way ofknowing. This way of knowing flows from living in the world and engaging
in certain practices. It demands that one reflect critically on those practices and on that way
of living. It links the individual with the social whole and ties the particular to the larger
structural context in which it exists. Because maternal thinking involves a way of knowing
from which ways of acting flow, and because this knowing is tied to interests, values, and
imperatives that are not presumed to be absolute, final, and total, this alternative involves
politics as human speech and action towards shared ends and purposes. Maternal thinking
forges links between the big questions of war and peace and the nature of the political
community with the world of everyday, ordinary reality.
What, then, is maternal thinking? I owe the notion to Sara Ruddick, who argues that
maternal thinking grows out of the experience of mothering or of having been mothered: it is
not some innate given of female nature (Ruddick, 1980; passim). Certainly not all modes of
feminist thought are cast within the frame of maternal thinking. This mode of feminism
recalls an earlier form of feminist thought linked with such activists and thinkers as Jane
Addams and known as social feminism. Such feminism is rather dramatically at odds with
what might be called absolute rights feminism. Rights feminists stress womens rights to
individualistic achievement, opportunity, and power in the world as it is presently (and
hierarchically) structured, including the right to achievement on the battle field. Where rights
feminists stress individualism, social feminists, including maternal thinkers, press social
responsibilities, duties to and for a wider communal framework.
For example: in an amicus curiae brief filed before the Supreme Court in its hearing on a case involving the
constitutionality of an all-male draft, the National Organization for Women (NOW) ties compulsory universal
military service to the concept of citizenship in a democracy, apparently not recognizing that the notion of
militarized citizenship originates not with the theory and practice of democracy but with Machiavelli. There are, of
course, women who argue that proving themselves in combat is part of equal opportunity for women. The point here
is that by succumbing to received notions, such feminists simply draw women in on the ventures to which men
historically have been subjected or which men historically have undertaken rather than attempting to find some
alternative for men and women alike.
346 J EAN BFIHKE ELSHIAIN
Who is the maternal thinker? She is very much in and of the world. She is no Beautiful Soul.
A powerful perspective on individual and social reality emerges from those features of
maternal practice that are nearly unchanging. That is, all who mother or were mothered in a
good enough fashion have had these experiences or engaged in these practices, hence
known them on some level. (Though, to be sure, the woman who is mothering or has herself
mothered has what might be called easier access to maternal knowledge.) Ruddick describes
maternal practices by the interests mothers have in the preservation, the growth, and the
acceptability of their children.
There are tensions between and among these imperatives for the third, acceptability, is
always framed with reference to the judgements of the wider social world as every mother
wants her child to become the sort of human being others can appreciate and accept.
Preseruation and growth, however, are tied to and affirm the primacy of the particular, the
concrete reality of each and every child. The perspective which flows from mothering
practices, as these revolve around preservation and growth, asserts the primacy of keeping
over acquiring, conserving the fragile over conquering, holding on to and protecting the
vulnerable over controlling and coercing. Within this frame, what counts as failure is the
death, injury or damage of a child through carelessness or neglect or the shunting and
shaming of a child through over-control and domination.
With her statement of the elemental features of maternal thinking, Ruddick has framed an
implicit critique of those social policies modern war inevitably brings in its wake and
requires. Control is the key term. War begins with the acquisition of human bodies and the
silencing of human souls (for the Greeks logistikon, the soul, meant the power to speak and in
war-time those powers are eviscerated). Conscription is the direct control of human beings
and is unacceptable, not because we are all selfish individualists who refuse to accept any
demands placed upon us in the name of the larger community and the public good, but
because conscription dictates to the very heart and soul of the human being the most frightful
thing of all: to kill. What counts as a failure within the maternal perspective overcontrol
and death-is located in the heart of the war-making powers of the modern state, including
its right to declare wars, to compel some to fight, to mobilize others to support the war effort
with their labor and their loyalty. Modern war fails under the terms of the maternal
perspective because it leads to the creation of a state of emergency that is a threat to
democracy. In a time of war, the state not only commits itself against an external enemy; it
moves internally to quash enemies within, to force silence and obedience. Writes Ruddick:

. I have identified four characteristics of maternal practice which I believe incompatable

with the military mind . . These are mothers preservative love, female-maternal
sexuality, female-maternal cognitive holism, and a maternal-pacifist philosophy of
conflict (Ruddick, 1981; p. 16).
Yet mothers in the past have not been a consistent, coherent force set in opposition to state
war-making powers, despite the fact that they, presumably, have had access to maternal
thinking as Ruddick, and I, have sketched it. Why? The tensions within maternal thinking
help US to understand this. Women engaged in maternal practices frequently feel compelled
to override preservation and growth in favor of the social value of acceptability. They train
their sons for obedience; their daughters to be Beautiful Souls or helpmeets, good girls who
do not complain or who suffer in silence. To assert the primacy of acceptability, as one
dimension of maternal thinking, slides into support at present either for a just war posture or,
On Beautiful Souls, Just Warriors and Feminist Consciousness
347
most unhappily of all, should women suppress entirely the values of preservation and growth,
towards full acquiesence in militarism and statism.
What can be done about the bind that the social world puts on maternal practices and
imbeds within the imperatives that flow from these practices? The answer lies in the
transformation of acceptability into a value not at odds with the injunctions to preserve the
concrete integrity of each and every child. This means acceptability must become a felt
interest within a world that allows the mothers interest in her childs preservation and
growth to flourish. To achieve such a world, women must concern themselves with the nature
of public reality, with that social context in which maternal practices occur, rather than
limiting their concerns to the smaller world. They must participate in the project of social
justice, human dignity, and freedom, for so long as maternal practices and thinking take place
within relations of dominance, in a society governed increasingly by a technocratic politics
and an unaccountable professional managerial class with sophisticated methods of
surveillance and control at their disposal, mothers will continue to feel they must stress
acceptability, teaching their children to grow up to accept authority, to obey, and to be
good.
The transformation of maternal thinking in and through feminist consciousness aims to
bring maternal thinking to bear upon the social world, rather than to repudiate maternal
practices and to treat maternal thinking as unliberated and unworthy from a feminist rights
perspective. If maternal thought can reach out and enter the wider world, can challenge and
critique it, that world will be transformed slowly, over time, if it is to be transformed at all.
This feminist project requires time. One of the most hideous things about war is that it
destroys time; it breaks into and crushes the integrity of the human life cycle; it stymies that
dialectical transformation of consciousness that only a public dialogue and open debate, over
time, can bring about. Any political system that holds human speech in contempt, and any
political movement, including those modes of feminism which hold mothering in contempt,
are at odds with maternal thinking as a form of feminist consciousness.
American feminists are in a bind. A feminist politics and theory that goes beyond narrow,
self-interested reaction towards one that incorporates a vision of social justice and resolute
compassion into its conceptual heart could begin to pave the way for a dialogue with that
potential constituency that has thus far been alienated from feminism along lines of class,
race, religion and traditional beliefs. To this end, feminists must not junk all received notions
of traditional feminity and motherhood-this is something maternal thinking tells us-
instead they must appropriate and transform these images. This means American feminists
must begin to look with greater suspicion upon the state. By looking to government as the
new Mr Right to protect them, guarantee their equality, and clean up their messes, many
American feminists locked themselves into a position from which it has become difficult to
reject equality through the state, even if that includes military service. Such statist feminism
has insulated itself from radically new modes of social change both here and abroad-modes
that often draw upon deeply held religious values about community life that are rejected by
many U.S. feminists, and that regard the state with suspicion, out of hard-won knowledge
that all governments, unless checked, sooner or later resort to armies and police to advance
their goals . . (Close, 1980; p. 373).
Maternal thinking may provide the grounds for a rapprochement between feminists and
non-feminist women, a meeting of minds that can best take place in and through a feminist
transformed maternal perspective. For any woman who mothers or has mothered in the
direct sense and, with greater difficulty, any person who has been mothered, is capable, in
348
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
principle, through empathy and reflection, of entering into this mode of consciousness, of
understanding what the political and moral generalization of what Ruddick calls attentive
love to all children is about (Ruddick, 1980; p. 29). To teach communities how to value
childrens lives, to treat children as ends-in-themselves, the perspective immanent within
maternal practices must be boldly developed and rendered political without losing sight of
the concrete reality of each mother and child with which it begins.
What I am proposing is that feminists must be about their mothers business; that we must
come to understand the perspective and way of knowing that flows from mothering and the
action intrinsically linked to this knowing. This could lead to some interesting new political
alliances: between mothers and sons, for example, and against militarist fathers. Maternal
thinking as an alternative to Beautiful Souls and Just Warriors can do the following for us: it
can answer the realist recognition that the world is tough and we must not be naive about it in
a way Beautiful Souls cannot. For against Beautiful Souls the maternal thinker knows we
cannot opt out of the world, nor remain pure within it. Every mother recognizes the world as
a perilous place. With the Beautiful Souls, however, maternal thinkers recognize that human
reality is about matters of the spirit, not just about power or material conditions. It
incorporates idealist truths even as it remains aware of harsh realities. A politically
transformed maternal thinking ties feminism into the larger frame of a communitarian theory
of politics. It anticipates the possibility that we might come to experience deeply moving
patriotic ties as our links to a way of life that does not have to coerce devotion. It embraces
the dignity of each and every human being, for each and every human being was once a child
who needed attentive love.
The daunting challenge which confronts feminist reflections on war and peace is that
should we fail this time, there will be no one left: no Beautiful Souls, no Just Warriors, not
even the cry of the suffering mother. We must, with Albert Camus, stake everything on the
formidable gamble: that words are more powerful than munitions, words that were first
taught us, that first entered our hearts and formed our identifies in and through what we call
the Mother Tongue (Camus, 1972; p. 55).
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