Modality, Weights, and

Inconsistent Premise Sets

Alex Silk
a.silk,bham.ac.uk
Draf of May io1
Abstract
It is a commonplace that some of our desires are stronger than others;
that certain values, norms, and rules are more important than others; and
that states of aairs can be more likely or typical than others. Some authors
have claimed that standard analyses of modals cannot capture how the truth
conditions of modal sentences can be sensitive to such dierences in strength
and priority. I develop an interpretation of a standard premise semantics for
modals that captures various ways in which weights and priorities can fgure
in the interpretation of modal sentences. I then extend the proposed analyses
in considering certain inference patterns involving modals and comparatives,
and modals and conditionals. Te resulting framework provides an attractive
account of the relation between the conventional meanings of modals and the
logic of weights and priorities.

Tanks to Fabrizio Cariani, Kai von Fintel, Irene Heim, Ezra Keshet, Dan Lassiter, Bob Stalnaker,
Eric Swanson, and participants at SALT ii for helpful discussion, and to two anonymous reviewers
for DEONio1 for their valuable comments. Apreliminary version of the ideas in this paper can be
found in Anca Chereches (Ed.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Teory (SALT) ::, o, .
Introduction
It is a commonplace that some of our desires are stronger than others; that certain
values, norms, and rules are more important than others; and that states of aairs
can be more likely or typical than others. Tese dierences in strength and prior-
ity can aect which modal claims are true. Suppose you promised Alice that you
would meet her for lunch, but you also promised your ailing mother that you would
drive her to the hospital for a critical operation. You realize that you cant keep both
promises, but it is much more important that you keep your promise to your mother.
Suppose also that there are no other normatively relevant factors. Intuitively, (1) is
true and (i) is false. (Here and throughout, assume that the modals are given a
uniform type of normative reading.)
(1) You must keep your promise to your mother.
(i) You must keep your promise to Alice.
Call this case wiicu1iu vvomisis.
Cases like wiicu1iuvvomisis raise a prima facie challenge for the classic premise
semantic framework for modals. Modals are treated as receiving their reading or in-
terpretation from a contextually supplied set of premises.
1
Since modals can them-
selves occur in intensional contexts, it is standard to index premise sets to a world of
evaluation(written: P
w
). To a frst approximation, givena consistent set of premises
P
w
, Must says that the prejacent follows from P
w
. Making room for non-trivial
interpretations of modal claims given inconsistent premise sets, Must says that
follows from every maximally consistent subset of P
w
. Slightly less roughly, given
a premise set F
w
(a modal base) that describes some set of relevant background
facts in w, and given a further premise set G
w
(an ordering source) that represents
the content of some ideal (morality, your goals, etc.) in w, Must says that fol-
lows from every maximally consistent subset of F
w
G
w
that includes F
w
or, in
terms of the simplifying notation in Defnition 1, that follows from every set in
m.x(F
w
, G
w
).
i
1
Equivalently, a preorder (Liwis 181). See especially Kv.1ziv 1,,, 181a, 11; also
v. Fv..ssi 1,, Liwis 1,, Vii1m. 1,o.
i
Kv.1ziv 181a, 11; cf. Gonii io1: i8oi81. Tis premise semantic implementation is
equivalent to the perhaps more familiar implementation in Kv.1ziv 181a, 11 which uses the
ordering source to induce a preorder on the worlds compatible with the modal base (Liwis 181).
For simplicity I make the limit assumption (Liwis 1,: 1io) and assume that ordering the con-
sistent subsets of F
w
G
w
(that include F
w
as a subset) by set inclusion yields a set of subsets that
are -maximal. For semantics without the limit assumption, see Liwis 1,, Kv.1ziv 181a, 11,
1
Denition . m.x(F
w
, G
w
) = {P cons(P) P

[P P

F
w
G
w
cons(P

)]
F
w
P F
w
G
w
}, where, for a set of propositions S, cons(S) i S
Denition . Must is true at w i P m.x(F
w
, G
w
) P
What premise sets are called for in a case like wiicu1iu vvomisis: As David Lewis
counsels us, We must be selective inthe choice of premisesBy judicious selection,
we can accomplish the same sort of discrimination as would result from unequal
treatment of premises (181: iioii1; cf. Kv.1ziv 181b: i1o). Te question is
whether we can do so in a way that captures the full range of data and refects our
intuitive views about the norms that are relevant in the context.
Te musts in (1)(i) are interpreted with respect to the relevant norms. Te
normative force of your promise to Alice should be represented, even if this promise
is ultimately outweighed by the promise to your mother. Intuitively, the norms that
fgure in the interpretation of must in (1)(i) are the same as the norms that fgure
in the interpretation of have to in ().
() If you didnt visit your mother, you would have to meet Alice for lunch.
So, we might treat wiicu1iu vvomisis as calling for premise sets like the ones in
() that describe the relevant circumstances and the contents of the relevant prac-
tical norms, where l is the proposition that you meet Alice for lunch, and h is the
proposition that you take your mother to the hospital.

() F
w
= {(h l)}
G
w
= {h, l}
P = F
w
G
w
= {(h l), h, l}
But this wont do. P is inconsistent. Holding fxed the relevant circumstance that you
cant keep both promises, P has maximally consistent subsets P
1
= {(h l), h} and
P
i
= {(h l), l}. Since neither h nor l follows from both P
1
and P
i
, this incorrectly
predicts that each of (1) and (i) is false (though it correctly predicts that You must
keep your promise to Alice or your mother is true). Te problemis that there seems
Sw.so io11. I assume that the prejacents of modals and the elements of premise sets are proposi-
tions, conceived as sets of possible worlds. For expository purposes I focus only on strong necessity
modals, like must and have to; weak necessity modals, like ought and should, raise complications
orthogonal to our discussion here (see Siix io1 for my preferred account).

I will use as an abbreviation for

= V/, and as an abbreviation for

=
V/. I will ofen use unitalicized capital letters or w in referring to worlds, italicized lowercase
(English or Greek) letters in referring to propositions, and italicized capital letters in referring to sets
of propositions.
i
to be no room for representing how your promise to your mother is stronger than
your promise to Alice, or how the premise h has priority to the premise l. Tere
seems to be no mechanism for breaking the tie between the maximally consistent
subsets of P.
It is rare to fnd explicit articulations of the premises that fgure in the inter-
pretations of modals. Not unsurprisingly, problems concerning weights and prior-
ities among premises have received little attention in the formal semantics litera-
ture. Daniel Lassiter (io11) is one of the few to address these issues; his assessment
is not optimistic: Te problem is fundamentally that the theory makes no room
for one [premises] being stronger than another; instead any confict of [premises]
leads to incomparability; the theory doesnt leave any roomfor [one premises] be-
ing stronger or weaker than another [Premises] are all-or-nothing (io11: o1oi,
oo; see also 1,1, 1,).

Considering an essentially equivalent semantics to

the one in Defnition i, Lou Goble comes to a similar conclusion: it fails to take
the relative weight or signifcance of [premises] into account (io1: i8,i88).
Tere are various ways we might respond to the problem posed by cases like
wiicu1iu vvomisis. Tere are rich literatures in deontic logic on capturing pri-
orities among default rules and the logic of prima facie obligations. One response
would be to revise the classic semantics by importing additional apparatus from
these theories into our semantics for modals.
,
Tere may be reasons in the end for
doing so. However, I will argue that with a more nuanced characterization of the
premises that fgure in the interpretation of modals, we can capture a wide range of
linguistic data concerning weights and priorities within the classic premise seman-
tic framework. Roadmap: First, I develop an interpretation of a standard premise

In context Lassiter is considering the implications of this alleged failure to represent weights for
Kratzers account of (epistemic and deontic) comparatives.
,
For instance, abstracting away from details of implementation, we might introduce a ranking

Gw
on the propositions in a given premise set G
w
. We could then introduce a function G
w
that
takes F
w
and
Gw
as argument and returns a preorder on the elements of m.x(F
w
, G
w
). Making an
analogue of the limit assumption, we could then say that Must is true i follows from every set
in m.x(F
w
, G
w
) that ranks among the highest in the preorder G
w
(F
w
,
Gw
). In wiicu1iu vvomisis,
G
w
and
Gw
would privilege the maximally consistent subset P
1
over P
i
; it would only be P
1
from
which the modals prejacent would be said to follow. Tis would correctly predict that (1) is true but
(i) is false. Tis is essentially the route taken by Goble (io1: i8,i), following work by H.si
(iooo) and Hov1v (ioo,, io1i); cf., e.g., Asuiv & Boiv.c 1o, Bvow 1o, Biiziv & Loiwiv
1,, v. uiv Tovvi & T. 18, H.sso ioo1. See K.1z i1 .i. io1i for a related account that
represents cascades of priorities via an operation of ordered merging of ordering sources that mirrors
the lexicographical product for posets. Tis account canbe seenas developing Kratzers (181b, 18,
iooi) strategy of lumping propositions into additional premises to capture the relative importance
of facts in the interpretation of counterfactuals.

semantics that captures various ways in which weights and priorities can fgure in
the interpretation of modal sentences (i). I then extend the proposed analysis
to the case of graded modal expressions in considering certain inference patterns
involving modals and comparatives (). Te resulting framework provides an at-
tractive account of the relation between the conventional meanings of modals and
the logic of weights and priorities (,).
Weights, priorities, and applicability conditions
We need a more nuanced enough understanding of the considerations that fgure
in the interpretation of modals. Norms like values, goals, desires, etc. typically
dont come in the form of blunt categorical imperatives or commands. Tey arent
usually of the form ^o matter what, !. Rather they ofen come with what I will call
applicability conditions (ACs), or conditions under which they apply. If I want to go
for a run, my desire neednt be that I go for a run, come what may. More plausibly, it
is that I go for a run given that its nice outside, among other things. Our preferences
are ofen conditional, preferences for certain circumstances. Similarly with moral
norms. A norm against lying neednt take the form of a categorical prohibition. It
might be something to the eect that you dont lie unless not lying would lead to an
innocent persons death, or would put your family in grave danger, or . Norms
can thus be understood on the model of conditional imperatives, imperatives that
enjoin an action or state of aairs given that certain circumstances obtain. Tis
captures the intuitive idea that depending on the circumstances i.e., depending
on which applicability conditions are satisfed only certain norms may apply, or
be in force. Fixing terminology, call the content of a conditional norm, goal, etc. a
consideration. Given a consideration If C, , let C be the considerations applicability
condition, and be the considerations premise, or what the consideration enjoins
given C. (Categorical considerations can be treated as conditional on the tautology.)
Tere are a number of ways applicability conditions might be integrated into the
semantics. One option, suggested by the few explicit remarks that there are on the
contents of ordering sources in concrete examples, would be to build them into the
propositions that are the elements of ordering sources. Te elements of ordering
sources would be identifed with considerations, construed as material conditionals
C .
o
Simplifying quite a bit, the relevant deontic premise set in wiicu1iu co.is
o
For example: one should take the propositions that make up the relevant deontic background
context l(w) to consist just of such conditional propositions, like that If someone owns a car and is
not handicapped, he must pay taxes (Fv.x 1o: ,; see also ,1,i, 18o181, Pov1iv ioo: 8,

might be something like in (,), where p

a
is the proposition that you promise to meet
Alice for lunch; p
m
is the proposition that you promise to take your mother to the
hospital; l is the proposition that you meet Alice for lunch; and h is the proposition
that you take your mother to the hospital.
(,) G
w
= {(p
a
p
m
) l, p
m
h}
One might worry that this approach will require the elements of ordering sources to
be extraordinarily complex. In our simplistic example there were only two promises
at play. But in more realistic cases there may be many competing norms, and there
may be no simple way to describe their interaction and the conditions under which
they apply.
,
Even given the sorts of idealizations common in semantics, it is hard
to see contexts as supplying such bodies of premises. A more serious problem with
this way of capturing the role of applicability conditions is that it makes incorrect
predictions. It treats all normative considerations as categorical commands of con-
ditionals rather than as conditional commands (and all bouletic considerations as
preferences that a conditional be satisfed rather than as conditional preferences,
and so on). Tis raises problems familiar from discussions of material conditional
analyses of conditionals.
Suppose Little Timmy has some free time afer school, followed by a piano recital
and a basketball game. Timmys Momand Dad both tell himto fnish his homework
when he gets home from school before he does anything else. Finishing his home-
work frst is most important. Timmys Momtells him to practice piano too if he fn-
ishes his homework in time, but Timmys Dad tells him to practice his free throws if
he fnishes his homework in time. Even if he fnishes his homework, Timmy wont
be able to practice both piano and basketball before needing to leave. When Timmy
gets home from school, his parents are out, unable to be contacted, and they wont
be returning until they have to leave for the recital and game. Given the current
way of capturing applicability conditions, this case would seem to call for a deontic
premise set like in (o) that describes Timmys parents commands, where h is the
proposition that Timmy fnishes his homework, p is the proposition that he prac-
tices piano, and b is the proposition that he practices basketball. Tis yields the ele-
ments of m.x(F
w
, G
w
) the maximally consistent subsets of F
w
G
w
that include
F
w
in (,) (see n. ).
vo Fi1ii io1i: i,io (following unpublished notes by Kratzer on information-sensitivity), Siix
io1i: o,, ,o).
,
Cf. H.v1 1o1/1: 1i,1i; Ai-Hinvi 18o: 8o; Nicxii 18i: i,,; H.ssoio1: iioii,;
also the qualifcation problem in AI (McC.v1uv & H.vis 1o, McC.v1uv 1,,).
,
(o) F
w
= {(b p)}
G
w
= {h, h b, h p}
(,) P
1
= {(b p), h, h b}
P
i
= {(b p), h, h p}
P

= {(b p), h b, h p}
Intuitively, in light of his parents commands, Timmy must work on his home-
work frst. However, since h is compatible with P

, the deontic premise set in (o)

incorrectly predicts that the sentences in (8) are true, assuming that may and is
permissible are duals of must.
Denition . May is true at w i P m.x(F
w
, G
w
) (P {})
(8) a. Its permissible for Timmy not to work on his homework frst.
b. Timmy may refrain from working on his homework frst.
c. Timmy doesnt have to work on his homework frst.
If Timmy doesnt do his homework frst when he gets home, he cant defend him-
self by saying that he complied with his parents conditional norms by making their
antecedents false. Little Timmy would never be so crafy.
Te case of Little Timmy highlights that we must only consider considerations
whose applicability conditions are satisfed when evaluating modal claims. I noted
above that it is standard in linguistic semantics to index premise sets to a world of
evaluation. Tis feature of the classic semantics makes available an alternative way
of distinguishing considerations whose applicability conditions are satisfed.
8
Which premise sets are relevant for the evaluation of a given modal sentence
can depend on howthings happen to be in the actual world, or on howthings could
be but arent, or could have been but werent. What Little Timmys parents com-
mand might change from one world to the next. Tey could have told Timmy to
practice piano frst thing afer school. Tus the meaning of a phrase like what Little
8
Another strategy would be to revise the classic semantic framework by treating ordering sources
not as sets of propositions, but as sets of pairs of applicability conditions (propositions) and premises
(propositions). (See the input/output logic of M.xiso & v. uiv Tovvi iooo, ioo1 for related
representations of conditional norms.) AconsiderationIf C, wouldbe representedby a premise set
that includes the pair C, . Only those considerations whose applicability conditions are entailed
by the relevant background facts would fgure in the interpretation of the modal: Must could be
treated as saying that follows from every set in m.x(F
w
, G

w
), where G

w
is the set of premises
such that there is a pair C, in G
w
such that F
w
C. Since my aim here is to capture the role of
weights and priorities within the classic semantic framework, I wont pursue this approach. We can
capture the intuitions driving it utilizing resources already present in the classic semantics.
o
Timmys parents command that determines the intended reading of must in ()
can be treated as a function that assigns to every possible world the set of proposi-
tions describing the house rules in that world.
() Inlight of what Little Timmys parents command, he must do his homework
frst.
Similar remarks hold for the meanings of phrases like in view of the relevant cir-
cumstances, according to U.S. law, and so on. It is these functions that context
supplies for the interpretation of modals. Call these functions unsaturated premise
sets (written S). Call the value of an unsaturated premise set given a world of eval-
uation a saturated premise set, or simply a premise set (written S
w
).
We can capture the role of applicability conditions in terms of variability in the
values of unsaturated premise sets at dierent worlds. Suppose we have a consid-
eration If C, which enjoins given that conditions C obtain. We can represent
the content of this consideration with an unsaturated premise set S that assigns to
every relevant C-world a premise set that includes . For example, the import of
your desire to go for a run, mentioned above, would be refected in Ss assigning a
premise set that includes the proposition that you go for a run to worlds in which the
weather is nice (among other things). Te premises in a saturated premise set thus
refect what follows from a body of considerations what is enjoined by a body of
conditional norms, what is preferred in light of a body of conditional preferences,
what is expected in light of a body of evidential relations, etc. given the circum-
stances that obtain in the evaluation world.

Objection. Te characterization of applicability conditions will be problemati-

cally circular in certain cases. For example, the applicability condition for the norm
enjoining you to keep your promise to Alice in wiicu1iu vvomisi wont just be
that you havent promised to take your mother to the hospital. It will presumably
be some more general condition, like that you havent made any more important
promises that are incompatible with your keeping your promise to Alice. But this
makes reference to weights and the relative importance of various norms, which is
precisely what needs to be explained.
1o

Translated to Kratzers terminology, my unsaturated premise sets correspond to conversa-

tional backgrounds, and saturated premise sets correspond to modal base and ordering source.
I invoke new terminology because of occasional variation in how terms like modal base, ordering
source, and conversational background are used in the literature e.g., whether they refer to sets of
propositions, sets of worlds, functions from worlds to sets of propositions, or functions from worlds
to sets of worlds (which is not to say that Kratzer herself was unclear about this).
1o
Tanks to Dan Lassiter and Paul Portner for pressing me on this issue.
,
Reply. We as theorists might use modal notions and talk of weights and priori-
ties in describing the intuitively relevant considerations in a given circumstance, and
in explaining what makes it the case about a concrete situation that such-and-such
premises are enjoined. But it is the ways things are in the world of evaluation the
features of the world on which the facts about priorities and applicability conditions
supervene that determines what premises are enjoined. Information about appli-
cability conditions, weights, and priorities is encoded in, but not itself recoverable
from, an unsaturated premise set. It is not explicitly delineated in the semantics. An
intuitive body of considerations and relative priorities determines an unsaturated
premise set, but not vice versa. (More on this in ,.)
Capturing the role of applicability conditions in this way may also stave o the
complexity worry above with treating the elements of premise sets as material con-
ditionals. Te complexities in the material conditional antecedents are refected in
the current framework in terms of howcertain distinctions among worlds aect the
value of an unsaturated premise set at those worlds. Descriptions of the elements
of premise sets need only be as complex as the descriptions of what the relevant
considerations enjoin.
Applications
In this section I will apply this interpretation of the classic premise semantic frame-
work to several examples.
. Little Timmy
Start with the case of Little Timmy. Little Timmys parents, recall, both required
him to work on his homework frst thing afer school. His Mom told him to prac-
tice piano next if (and only if) he fnishes his homework, whereas his Dad told him
to practice basketball. For simplicity, assume that Timmy will in fact either work on
his homework, practice basketball, or practice piano. As before, let h be the proposi-
tion that Timmy works on his homework frst, p be the proposition that he practices
piano, and b be the proposition that he practices basketball. Let w
C
be a world in
which Timmy completes his homework with time to spare before needing to leave
for the game and recital, and let w
C
be a world in which Timmy doesnt complete his
homework. (Tese can be treated as representatives of suitable equivalence classes
of worlds.) To a frst approximation (see below), we can capture the relevant cir-
cumstances and Timmys parents commands with unsaturated premise sets with
8
the following properties:
(1o) F
w
C
= F
w
C
= {(b p), h b p}
G
w
C
= {h, b, p}
G
w
C
= {h, (b p)}
Tis correctly predicts that (11) is true and (1i) is false both at w
C
and at w
C
.
(11) Timmy must work on his homework frst.
(1i) Timmy may refrain from working on his homework frst.
Even if it isnt settled whether Timmy will complete his homework before needing to
leave even if w
C
and w
C
are both live possibilities it can be known that he must
work on his homework.
11
. Weights and contrary-to-duty imperatives
Return to wiicu1iu vvomisis. What we need to capture is that (1) is true and (i)
is false; your promise to your mother is more important than your promise to Alice.
(1) You must keep your promise to your mother.
(i) You must keep your promise to Alice.
Consider the following worlds, AM, AM, AM, AM, characterized with respect to
whether or not you promise to meet Alice and whether or not you promise to help
your Mother in them. We can capture the normative import of your promises as
follows, again where h is the proposition that you take your mother to the hospital
and l is the proposition that you meet Alice for lunch.
(1) G
AM
= {h}
G
AM
= {l}
11
What matters for present purposes is simply that we capture how Timmy must work on his
homework before practicing piano or basketball. What one says about Timmys obligations with
respect to practicing piano and practicing basketball if he does complete his homework will depend
on ones views about the possibility of irresolvable practical dilemmas. I leave open this issue here,
since the aim in this paper is to examine cases where the relevant norms are comparable to one
another, and so the apparent dilemmas can be resolved. See my io1 for discussion of how the
framework developed in this paper can be applied to data involving irresolvable dilemmas expressed
with weak vs. strong necessity modals.

G
AM
= {h}
G
AM
=
Te normative import of your promise to Alice is refected in Gs assigning a premise
set that includes l to some world in which you make this promise, namely AM. Te
normative import of your promise to your mother is refected in Gs assigning a
premise set that includes h to some world in which you make this promise, e.g.
AM (or AM). And the priority of keeping your promise to your mother over your
promise to Alice is refected in Gs assigning a premise set that includes h to some
world in which you make both promises, namely AM. (Had your promises been of
equal importance, this would be refected in a premise set that contains the disjunc-
tion h l.) Tis unsaturated premise set G correctly predicts that (1) is true and
(i) is false in the given context, i.e. at AM: h, but not l, follows from every set in
m.x(F
AM
, G
AM
).
(1) m.x(F
AM
, G
AM
) = {{(h l), h}}
Prima facie conficts among norms neednt lead to incomparabilities.
One might worry that this treatment of wiicu1iu vvomisis makes incorrect
predictions concerning contrary-to-duty imperatives. Consider (1,)(1o).
1i
(1,) You have to take your mother to the hospital.
(1o) If you dont take your mother to the hospital, you have to meet Alice for
lunch.
Assuming a standard Kratzerian (11) treatment of conditionals (Defnition ),
the antecedent of (1o) adds the proposition h to F
AM
, and the modal have to is
interpreted with respect to this updated modal base F
+
AM
= F
AM
{h}. Given the
proposed premise sets for F
AM
and G
AM
, this seems to incorrectly predict that (1o)
is false, as refected in (1,)(18):
Denition . If , is true at w i P m.x(F
+
w
, G
w
) P , where F
+
w
=
F
w
{}
(1,) F
+
AM
= {(h l), h}
G
AM
= {h}
1i
I use have to instead of must to avoid potential complications fromthe entailingness of must.
(I.e., many speakers fnd Must , but and Must , but might to be marked, even for deontic
readings of must. For such speakers, accepting Must has the potential to violate the presupposi-
tion of conditionals If that is a live possibility.)
1o
m.x(F
+
AM
, G
AM
) = {F
+
AM
}
(18) (1o) is true at AM i
P m.x(F
+
AM
, G
AM
) P l i
{(h l), h} l
Tere are subtle issues concerning time, andwhat informationis takenfor granted,
which may complicate the interpretation of pairs of claims like (1,)(1o). Intu-
itively, in interpreting the modal in (1,) one assumes that the acts of keeping your
promise to your mother and keeping your promise to Alice are both available to you.
In interpreting the modal in the consequent of the conditional in (1o), by contrast,
one assumes that the act of keeping your promise to your mother is no longer an
option. One way of capturing this is to refne our indices of evaluation. Te norms
encoded in G must be conditional not only what promises you have made but also
on what acts are available to you. Let AM1 be a circumstance in which the option
of keeping your promise to your mother and the option of keeping your promise
to Alice are both available, and let AMi be a circumstance in which only the op-
tion of keeping your promise to Alice is available.
1
A more fne-grained deontic
unsaturated premise set G

can be given as follows:

(1) G

AM1
= {h}
G

AMi
= {l}

Assuming that (1,) is evaluated at a circumstance like AM1 at which keeping your
promise to your mother is still available, we continue to predict that (1,) is true.
Adopting a double modal analysis of deontic conditionals delivers the correct inter-
pretation for (1o).
1
Roughly, on such an analysis, in interpreting a deontic condi-
tional one checks whether the modalized consequent clause is verifed at all relevant
(circumstantially accessible, epistemically accessible, closest) worlds in which the
antecedent holds. Tis delivers the following simplifed truth conditions for (1o):
(io) (1o) is true at wifor all relevant h-worlds w

P m.x(F
w
, G
w
) P l
1
As before, AM1 and AMi can be treated as representatives of suitable equivalence classes of
worlds. Te sensitivity to time or available acts may also be captured by treating indices as world-
time pairs or situations. I remain neutral on these alternative implementations. For discussion of
timeless contrary-to-duty cases, see, e.g., Pv.xxi & Sivco1 1o, 1,.
1
See Fv.x 1o, GiUv1s ioo, vo Fi1ii & I.1viuoU ioo,, Lisiii ioo, Sw.so io1o,
Siix io1o. I leave open what kind of reading the posited higher necessity modal is to be given.
11
Tis correctly predicts that (1o) is true at AM1, andthus consistent with(1,): roughly,
(1o) is true at AM1 iyou have to meet Alice is true at AMi i{(hl), h, l} l.
. Outweighing and undercutting
Wiicu1iu vvomisis was a case where one consideration was outweighed by an-
other conficting consideration. Now consider a case where the applicability of one
premise undercuts, or excludes, the applicability of another premise.
1,
Suppose Betty
is a cadet, and her Captain orders her to clean the barracks. Ordinarily, this would
imply that Betty has to clean the barracks. But the Major, who outranks them both,
orders Betty to ignore the Captains command. Intuitively, (i1) is true.
(i1) Betty doesnt have to clean the barracks.
Te Majors command, it is ofen claimed, isnt an ordinary, weightier frst-order
reason; rather, it undercuts the consideration about the Captains command from
bearing on Bettys deliberation.
Let b be the proposition that Betty cleans the barracks, c be the proposition that
the Captain ordered Betty to clean the barracks, and m be the proposition that the
Major ordered Betty to ignore the Captains command. Let CM be the world as it
is described by the case, and CM be an otherwise similar world in which the Major
doesnt order Betty to ignore the Captain. We cancapture the contents of the relevant
norms at play with an unsaturated premise set with the following properties:
(ii) G
CM
=
G
CM
= {b}
Te normative import of the Captains commandis refectedinGs assigning a premise
set that includes b to (c m)-worlds in which the Major doesnt interfere. Te un-
dercutting role of the Majors command is refected in Gs assigning a premise set
that fails to include b to (c m)-worlds. Tis correctly predicts that (i1) is true in
the given context (i.e., at CM): {c, m} b.
Tat the Captains command is undercut, and not outweighed, is refected in the
fact that the Major neednt forbid Betty from cleaning the barracks or order her to
performsome alternative action. He might just want to undermine the Captains au-
1,
Compare the distinction between rebutting defeat and undercutting defeat in the litera-
ture on epistemic reasons (Poiiocx 1,o, 1,), and the notions of exclusionary reasons (R.z
1,,/1o, G.s 18o, Pivvv 18) and overridden requirements (Cuisuoim 1o, 1,) in
ethics.
1i
thority. Te undercutting role of the Majors command can be further reinforced by
considering a minor extension of the case. Adapting an example fromHov1v (io1i:
111), suppose that the situation is as before, but Betty also received an order
from her Lieutenant to do drills. Since the Captain outranks the Lieutenant, ordi-
narily Betty would have to obey the Captains command and not do drills (assuming
she cant both clean the barracks and do drills). But given the Majors command to
ignore the Captain, there is nownothing excluding the Lieutenants command from
applying. Te contents of the relevant norms can be refected as follows, where d is
the proposition that Betty does drills, l is the proposition that the Lieutenant ordered
Betty to do drills, and Lxx is an l-world.
(i) G
LCM
= {d}
G
LCM
= {b}
G
LCM
=
Tis correctly predicts that (i1) and (i) are true in the revised context (i.e., at
LCM): {c, m, l, (b d), d} entails d but doesnt entail b.
(i) Betty must do drills.
More generally, the contrasting ways in which considerations can be undercut
and outweighed is represented in terms of what premise sets are assigned at certain
minimally dierent worlds. Let a and b be relevant conditions, AB be a relevant
(a b)-world, and AB be a relevant (a b)-world. (For simplicity, suppose that
G
AB
and G
AB
are each consistent, and bracket the role of F.) Suppose that G
AB
,
refecting that given a and absent some defeating condition b, is necessary. Te
premise that , with applicability condition a, is outweighed if there is a premise
with applicability condition b, where = , such that G
AB
and G
AB
.
By contrast, the premise that is undercut by a background condition b simply if
G
AB
.
. Epistemic readings
So far we have been focusing on root modals. Te proposals for capturing priorities
among premises, and for distinguishing outweighing from undercutting, apply to
epistemic readings of modals as well. First, consider a familiar epistemic analog of
wiicu1iu vvomisis. Suppose you are looking at a ball. It seems red to you, but a
peer tells you that the ball isnt actually red. Your sense perception is general reli-
able; typically, the fact that an object seems red is good evidence that the object is
1
red. But your peer is eminently trustworthy and might have access to information
that you dont for example, perhaps there are unusual lighting conditions. Te re-
liability of your peer, lets suppose, is even greater than that of your sense perception.
Intuitively, this outweighs your reason for thinking that the ball is red indeed, it
gives you reason for thinking the ball is not red. Suppose that there is no other rele-
vant possible evidence that may bear on the color of the ball. (i,) seems true in this
scenario.
(i,) Te ball must not be red.
We can capture this as follows. Let l be the proposition that the ball looks red; r be
the proposition that the ball is red; and t be the proposition that your peer told you
that the ball isnt red. Consider the worlds LT and LT, characterized in the expected
way as above. We can capture the priorities among the relevant evidential norms
with an unsaturated premise set with the following properties.
(io) G
LT
= {r}
G
LT
= {r}
Te evidential import of the objects looking redis refectedinGs assigning a premise
set that includes r to t-worlds where the ball looks red. Te priority of your peers
testimony is refected in Gs assigning a premise set that includes r to t-worlds. Tis
predicts that (i,) is true in the given context (i.e., at LT): {l, t, r} r.
Nowconsider a case of epistemic undercutting. Suppose that rather thanhearing
fromyour peer that the object is not red, you realize that you have taken a drug that
makes everything look red. Intuitively, this undercuts your reason for concluding
that the ball is red. (i,) is false in this scenario.
(i,) Te ball must be red.
Let d be the proposition that you took the drug, and consider the worlds LD and
LD, characterized in the expected way. We can capture the probabilistic information
encoded in the relevant epistemic norms with an unsaturated premise set with the
following properties:
(i8) G
LD
=
G
LD
= {r}
Te evidential import of the objects looking redis refectedinGs assigning a premise
set that includes r to d-worlds in which the ball looks red. Te undercutting role of
1
taking the drug is refected in Gs assigning the empty set to d-worlds. Tis predicts
that (i,) is false in the given context (i.e., at LD): {l, d} r.
Modals and comparatives
An adequate general treatment of priorities must extend to the case of comparatives,
like (i).
(i) It is better for me to keep my promise to my mother than for me to keep
my promise to Alice.
Indeed, in the passages fromL.ssi1iv io11 cited in 1, Lassiters central criticismof
the implementation in Kv.1ziv 181a, 11, io1i is that its proliferation of incon-
sistencies in premise sets leaves it unable to capture the truth of such comparatives.
Te primary aim of this paper has been to capture how intuitions about priorities
among considerations can aect the truth conditions of modal sentences. Te pro-
posed strategy is compatible with various views on the semantics of comparatives
like (i) and the semantic relation between modals and comparatives. Neverthe-
less I would like to briefy mention one way of extending the account fromi to
capture certain data involving comparatives.
I suggest that comparatives like (i) have a kind of counterfactual element to
their meaning: in considering whether an option is better than another option ,
one looks at relevant possibilities in which or is necessary (in the relevant sense),
and assesses whether is necessary in those possibilities. Informally, (i) seems to
mean something like If I had to keep my promise to my mother or to Alice and
conditions were otherwise normal, expected, or as desired I would have to keep
my promise to my mother. Roughly, is better than is true at w i for all closest
(maximally similar) relevant worlds w

to w at which Must is true, Must

is true. More formally:
Denition . is a better possibility than is true at w (written:
w
) i for all
closest relevant worlds w

to w such that P m.x(F

w
, G
w
) P , its the
case that P m.x(F
w
, G
w
) P
For simplicity, I will treat is at least as good as as true when its not the case that
.
1o
1o
Tere may be reasons for strengthening Defnition o to require not simply that
w
, but
rather than for all closest relevant w

to w at which Must is true, Must is false. Tis

1,
Denition . is at least as good a possibility as is true at w (written:
w
) i

w

Tese defnitions correctly predict that (i) is true. Reconsider the proposedpremise
sets for wiicu1iu vvomisis at world AMin which you both promise to meet Alice
and promise to help your mother:
(1) m.x(F
AM
, G
AM
) = {{(h l), h}}
Te closest world to the evaluation world AM at which Must h l is true is AM
itself, given Weak Centering for the similarity relation among worlds (i.e., given that
if u is a -world, u is the closest -world to u). Assuming AM is among the closest
relevant such worlds, the truth of the comparative (i) follows straightaway: Must
h is true at AM.
Seth Yalcin (io1o) and Daniel Lassiter (io1o, io11) have argued that the follow-
ing problematic inference is validated on Kratzers (181a, 11, io1i) semantics
for comparative modals.
(o) Disjunctive Inference:
a. p is at least as likely as q
b. p is at least as likely as r
c. p is at least as likely as q r
Te semantics in Defnition ,o avoids validating this inference. Here is a model:
Suppose (i) the closest relevant worlds i at which Must p q is true are such that
m.x(F
i
, G
i
) = {{s t u, p}}; (ii) the closest worlds j at which Must p r is
true are such that m.x(F
j
, G
j
) = {{s t u, p}}; and (iii) the closest worlds k at
which Must p q r is true are such that m.x(F
k
, G
k
) = {{s t u, q r}}. Ten
(oa) and (ob) are true, but (oc) is false. For instance, let p be the proposition that
x wins the tournament; q be the proposition that y wins the tournament; r be the
proposition that z wins the tournament; s be the proposition that teams x and y play
in the fnals; t be the proposition that teams x and z play in the fnals; and u be the
proposition that teams y and z play in the fnals.
Lassiter has also objected to Kratzers semantics on the grounds that it fails to
capture certain apparent entailment relations among modals and comparatives. For
would followon the assumption that all the worlds w

being considered agree in what is possible and

necessary (permitted and required) perhaps understood as a sort of comparability assumption
between and . Te two defnitions would collapse given conditional excluded middle (Liwis
1,: ,81). I assume that the relevant sense of closeness is the same (context-dependent) sense
used in interpreting subjunctive conditionals, however it is ultimately to be cashed out.
1o
instance, it fails to validate inferences like the following (see, e.g., his io11: 81;
there he focuses specifcally on epistemic readings, but the points extend to deontic
readings as well).
(1) a. Must
b.
c. Must
Te semantics proposed here also doesnt validate this inference (though slight vari-
ants would do so). However, contrary to Lassiter, I take this to be a feature, not a bug.
I am doubtful about whether we should treat the inference in (1) as semantically
valid. First, it is intuitively invalid for deontic readings. It excludes the possibility of
supererogatory acts acts that go beyond the call of duty, acts that are permitted
but not required and better than what is minimally required as refected in (i).
(i) a. I must give 1o of my income to charity.
b. Its better for me to give 1, of my income to charity than for me to
give 1o of my income to charity.
c. I must give 1, of my income to charity.
Even if there are no supererogatory acts, this should be determined on the basis of
substantive normative theory, not logic or semantics.
Second, the inference pattern in (1) is arguably invalid even in the case of epis-
temic readings. Epistemic must sentences make claims about what follows from a
relevant body of evidence. Considered in this light, there may seemsomething puz-
zling about the constraint on bodies of evidence semantically required by (1): why
should we expect the fact that is at least as likely as to imply that, necessarily,
any body of evidence that entails must also entail : Tis is abstract; consider a
concrete example. Suppose you are inside and see a bunch of people coming in with
wet umbrellas. You infer, plausibly enough, that it must be raining; you accept ().
() It must be raining.
You also accept ().
() Its at least as likely to be cloudy as it is to be raining.
Afer all, its nearly always cloudy when it rains. Nevertheless, you are inside with
no access to windows. Your evidence doesnt itself say anything about whether it is
cloudy. For all your evidence suggests, there is a sun shower. It is hard to see why
1,
it would be incoherent, or a refection of semantic incompetence, for you to think
that it might not be cloudy and fail to accept (,).
(,) It must be cloudy.
My aim in this section has been modest. My claim is simply that we can extend
the premise semantic treatment of priorities from i to give a preliminary anal-
ysis of certain expressions of graded modality. Tis analysis avoids problems facing
previous attempts. However, there may ultimately be reasons for giving expressions
of comparative possibility an overtly probabilistic semantics. More thorough inves-
tigation of (e.g.) inferences involving modals and comparatives, similarities and dif-
ferences between epistemic readings and deontic readings, and the relation between
expressions of comparative possibility and overt probabilistic language is required.
1,
Such additional investigations must be lef for future work.
Concluding reections
On a standard premise semantics for modals, modals are interpreted with respect to
a contextually supplied function fromworlds to premise sets. Tis function what
I have called an unsaturated premise set determines the intended reading for
the modal. Inthis paper I have oeredaninterpretationof these unsaturatedpremise
sets as encoding the content of a body of conditional norms, values, preferences,
expectations, etc. (considerations). Te value of an unsaturated premise set at
a world of evaluation w represents what follows from such a body of considera-
tions given the circumstances that obtain in w. Tis way of thinking about premise
sets makes empirically correct predictions about various ways in which weights and
priorities can aect the truth conditions of modal sentences. Te project has not
been to argue that no other theory can get the data concerning weights and priori-
ties right. It has been to motivate one way of doing so that is empirically adequate,
methodologically conservative, and theoretically attractive.
In this spirit I would like to close by briefy returning to an alternative strategy
for capturing the role of weights and priorities raised in 1. Consider a prioritized
default theory in the style of, say, Hov1v (ioo,, io1i), consisting of a set of back-
ground facts F, a set of default rules representing defeasible norms or generaliza-
tions, and an ordering relation < on the set of default rules refecting their relative
priority. Following Hortys terminology, say that a default rule A B whose an-
1,
See, e.g., Pov1iv ioo, L.ssi1iv io1o, io11, Kv.1ziv io1i.
18
tecedent is entailed by F is triggered, and that a triggered default is defeated if there is
some other triggered default that is given higher priority according to <. To a very
rough frst approximation, we could then say that Must is true i every maxi-
mally consistent set of conclusions of non-defeated triggered defaults entails (cf.
nn. ,, 8). For example, in wiicu1iu vvomisis, let p
m
h be the default rule d
1
that you help your mother given that you promised to do so; let p
a
l be the default
rule d
i
that you meet Alice for lunch given that you promised to do so; and suppose
d
1
< d
i
, refecting that your promise to your mother has priority over your promise
to Alice. Since both defaults are triggered, but d
i
is defeated by d
1
, the set of conclu-
sions of non-defeated triggered defaults is {h}. Tus, You must help your mother
is true, and You must meet Alice for lunch is false.
Te premise semantics in i simply utilizes a function from worlds to premise
sets, where the premises in a premise set represent what is ultimately enjoined given
the circumstances that obtain in the evaluation world. Information about the ap-
plicability conditions of particular norms and about the priority relations among
norms is encoded in, but not recoverable from, a deontic unsaturated premise set.
Te above kind of default-theoretic analysis, by contrast, explicitly represents a fac-
tual condition for each conclusion and a priority relation among defaults. And it
makes explicit how the set of conclusions of non-defeated triggered defaults is gen-
erated. Given the independent motivation for introducing this sort of extra struc-
ture into a logic of practical and theoretical reasoning, why not introduce it into our
semantics for modals:
Tere may ultimately be empirical reasons for incorporating the above sort of
apparatus into our semantics for modals. Te strategy taken up in may not gen-
eralize to more complex cases. But if it does, we should be cautious about building
the extra structure into the conventional meanings of modals. At least for the exam-
ples considered in this paper, it has been sucient to utilize unsaturated premise
sets that encode the contents of considerations (conditional norms, etc.) in terms of
what premise sets are returned at certain worlds, given the relevant circumstances
in those worlds. For the purposes of capturing the intuitively correct truth condi-
tions we have been able to bracket the substantive normative and logical questions
of how to generate unsaturated premise sets from intuitive bodies of considerations
and weights, and how to derive premise sets from sets of background conditions
and considerations. Tis is not simply a point about theoretical economy. By being
neutral on these issues, we can avoid building controversial logical and normative
views into the conventional meanings of modals e.g., concerning the proper logi-
cal representations of certain cases, the proper order in which to apply defaults, and
1
consequence (non)monotonicity.
18
If this is right, our best logical theories can be
seen as providing an explicit account of something that is taken as given by the com-
positional semantics: howunsaturated premise sets are generated fromthe intuitive
considerations and priorities relevant in concrete discourse contexts. Tis suggests
an attractive way of situating the respective work in deontic logic and the semantics
of modals in an overall theory of modality and modal language.
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