I PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:

1
AN INTERPRETIVE ANALYSI S OF PERSONNEL
' SYSTEMS
Robert Folger and Jerald Greenberg
INTRODUCTION
I The concept o f justice i s prevalent i n personnel research and practice. Pervasive
attention t o matters o f justice i s evidenced by the importance placed on maki ng
"fair" employee selection decisions (Arvey. 1979). settling l a h r disputes "justly"
(Wal ton & McKersie, 1965). and negotiating "equitable" wage settlements
(Mahoney. 1975). t o name just a f ew areas i nvol vi ng human resources man-
agement. Empi ri cal and theoretical wor k wi t hi n the broader psychological l i t -
erature has also had much t o say about justice.
q
Most of what we know about justice i n organizations concerns what is referred '
to as distributive justice (Ho~nans, 1961); that is, the manner i n whi ch organi-
zational resources are distributed among personnel ( f or a review, see Freedman
& Montanari. 1980). and on employees' reactions to those resource distributions
(for a review, see Greenberg, 1982). Research inspired by equity theory (Adams,-
1963. 1965)-mostly popular i n the 1960s ( f or reviews. see Goodman & Fried-
i
man, 197 1; Pritchard. 1969), although st i l l currently i n evidence (e.g., Greenberg
& Ornslein, I983)--as wel l as more recent conceptualizations o f justice i n
I organizations (e.g.. Bies. 1983; Dal ton & Ttdor, 1985, ftruses pri mari l y on
!
Rmr ch in Personnel a d Human Resources Manapment. Volume 3. paw141483.
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ROBERT FOI-GER and JliRA1.D GREENIII:Rc,
In contrast to Thibaut and Walker's orientation toward prcxcdural justice as
a consideration i n the dispute-resolution process, 1-eventha1 (1976. 1080) con-
ceive.(\ of prtxedural justice (what he has called "prcx-edural faimess") as a
neglected aspect of reward al l trati on. Initially described i n 1976. LeventhalTs
of procedural justice is more fully developed i n t wo subsequent
publications (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal. Kanrza. & Fry, 1980).
he essence elf [evcnthal's conceptualization is that various procedural ele-
nients are used to form evaluations of fairness. Specifically, seven different
r c~cdur al e!_cm_en_ts are identified. each representing a pr t ~edur al aspect con- _
I-'--.
sidcrcd ;evaluating the fairness of alltxations. These elements arc as follows:
I. selection (4 agenrs-procedures for determining who makes al l wati on
decisions; I
7. set tin^ ground rules-prclcedures for determining and evaluating pt cr l t i al
I
rewards, and the behaviors necessary to attain them;
3. ~ur her i ng infurmurion-procedures for obtaining and using information
about reward recipients;
4. ~l eci si on struc.ture-procedures for defining the structure of the allocative
decision process (c.g.. the successive ordering of individual and group
I
decisions);
5 . trpp'~~(rIs-procedures for seeking redress against unsatisfactory decisions;
6. .~cl/r~rtc~rd.~-procedures for ensuring that the decision-making ht dy does
not abuse its power; and
7. &r n~e me~l umi . ~m. r - - pr t ~~d~~s enabling allocation practices to he altered.
Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry (1980) postulated that the @@mati on gathered 7
about each of these seven prtlcedural elements (when available) is .. used ~ . ~~ to evaluate
the fairness of the procedure itself. The fairness of the prc~edures may he
-
evaluated according to each of six proredurn1 rult-s. These rules arc as follows: -
I
I . conri rnncy ride-allocation procedures should be consistent across persons I
and over time;
2. bias supprcs..~ion rule--personal self-interest in the allocation process should
1
be prevented;
3. accuracy rule--decisions must be based on accurate information;
!
I
4. correctahilil?, rrtle--opportunities must exist to enable decisions to he
mcdilied;
5, rppresenrutiveness rrtle-the allocation process must represent the concerns
of all recipients; and
6. erh;culiQ rule-allocations must k based on prevailing moral and ethical
standards.
'The weighting of t h c ~ v:irious nllcs i n dct cr ~~~i ni ng fi~irnsss is ;111othc.~ c.ctnce1.n
of Lrvcnthal's. Hc as.~l~lllle(I Itlilt i n c l i ~ i ~ l ~ ~ ; ~ l s ;~pl)ly t l i c r~rl cs sclcctivcly, gi vi ng
certain ones different weights ;it various tirnes. Spci hr predictions ahout the
wcighrinp of these procctl~lr:ll nllcs. howcvcr, ;lrc not offcrcd. Thcrc i s solne
from f ~l l ow- up resei~rch hv Fry ant1 I,cventh;ll (1079) th;~t inconsis-
tency i n the setting of ground n~l es is given the greatest weight i n JuLlping the
u n f ; ~ i r n ~ ~ ~ of prt ~edures. Ilowcver. i n thc ahuencc of any addition;~l c ~ ~ ~ p i r i ~ ; ~ I
investigations into Levcnthal's conccptuali7ation. t h~s finding must h consitlcred
tentative. Despite the pallcity of empirical valitl;~tion of Levcnthal's framework,
we wi l l show i t to provide many uscl'ul insights into personnel mnnagenlcnt
procctlures i n the sccontl half of this pirpcr
Recause Leventhal's approach is aiorc structural. an<l Thihatct and Walker's
approach is more process-oricntctl, dircct comparisons ht wccn them are di f l i cl ~l t
to make. There are, however. a few impnrtant issues about which the theorists
agree. as wel l as some apparent disagrcemcnts.
-
One especially important area of tlisagrc.ement concerns the relationship be-
tween procedural and distrihutive justice. Lcventhal (1976) argued that "pro-
:
cedural fairness i s a necessary precondition for the establishment and maintenance
!
of distrihutive fairness" (p. 2.10). Furlhcrmorc, he added, "Unless procedural
faimess exists, distrihutive fairness is sure to he violated" (Levcnthal, 1976, p.
230). I n contrast, Thihaut and Walker (1975) asserted that procedural justice
and distributive justice can he independent. I n this regard they claimed that,
"Although procedural justice may often lead to and prtwluce distributive justice,
it is possible for distrihutive justice to he achieved without the application of
any special procedure" (p. 3).
Leventhal (1980) also argued that distrihutive outcomes are seen as a more - I
important determinant of fairness than the procedures used to determine them,
primarily because procedures are usually well-established routines and are gen-
erally not fully understorxl hy recipients. Onl y when a new distributive system
'
is being developed or an existing one is being changed. or when an influential--
recipient is dissatisfied, are procedural systems likely to become perceptually
figural. One thrust apparent i n Thihaut and Walker's (1975) work, however, has
been their desire to emphasize the key role that procedures can often play i n
-
individuals' assessments of distributive Justice. That is. although these authors '
insist on the conceptual independence o f distributive and procedural justice i n
principle (as noted above, where we distinguished between their stance and
Leventhal's postulation of the conceptual necessity of procedural justice as a
Prerequisite for distrihutive justice), they also asserted that i n actual situations
there can be a significant form of pc.rc.eptuul overlap regarding these t wo forms
ofjustice. This perceptual overlap can he conceptualized as a t y p of halo effect
ROBERT FO1,GER and J1'RAI.D GREENBERG
i n whi ch evaluations of pr t r cdur al justice influence ev;lluations o f distrihulivc-
iusticc-the fairer the procedure used t o detcnnine outcomes. the tnorc psycho. ,
l ogi cal l y ncceptahlc those olltcomes are l i kcl y t o hc ti.e.. the nl orc they are
l i kel y t o k evaluated as k i n g distrihutively just). l ' h ~ s , r i ~t hei than supp)rting
Lrventhi rl ' s p s i t i o n that distributive concerns have a predominant impact on
ovcral l evaluations of a situation and that procedural conccrns are salicnt only
I
tinder special circulnstanccs. Thihaut and Walker' s approach i s more Con~pat i hl ~
wi t h predictions that horh procedural and distributive concerns wi l l ordi nari l y
!.
he mmi f est cd. Moreover, the evidence gathered hy Thihaut and Wal ker (t o he
1
revi ewcd bel ow) actually suggests that i n a sense procedural matters are more
l i gural than distributive. Specifically, thcy consistently found mai n effects of-
prcxredural factors on ratings o f di stri buti ve justice (along wi t h mai n effects of
distributive factors on those ratings), hut they di d not fi nd corresponding effect,
ol' distributive factors (i.e.. the fairness o f received outcomes) on ratings (11
procedural justice (although procedural factors di d significantly influence such
ratings).
i
Despite these differences, both conceptualizations share a common concern.^
for i dent i f yi ng control over procedures (dispute-resolution procedures i n Thihaut _
and Walker' s case and resource-distribution procedures i n Leventhal' s casc) as
a central aspect o f procedural justice. Indeed, each o f Leventhal' s pr t ~edur al
elements may be vi ewed as defi ni ng more precisely specific aspects o f process
;
control described by Thibaut and Walker. Bot h perspectives agree, then. that
procedures provi di ng the i nvol ved parties (be they litigants i n a courtrtwm, or
reward recipients i n an organization) some control over the procedures affecting
their outcomes are essential t o procedural justice. The importance o f procedural
control i n b t h allocation procedures and dispute-resolution procedures has been
the focus of a considerable amount of research that we wi l l revi ew i n the ncxt
section o f this paper.
LESSONS FROM PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
RESEARCH
As we have noted. Thihaut and Wal ker (1975) and Leventhal (1976, 1980) have
,
expressed dissenting opi ni ons ahout the interrelationship between the fairness of
decision outcomes and the procedures used i n determining those out come5
However, they also both have stressed the importance of gi vi ng affected persons
control over the decision-making procedures affecting them, although they do
so wi t h respect t o di fferent decision domains. Each o f these issues-the in&-
I
pendence o f procedures and outcomes, and the importance of process control-
I
has generated a considerable amount o f w e n t r er ar c h that wi l l he revi ewed '
here. We do not mean t o i mpl y that these represent the onl y f oci o f procedural
justice research (although they certainly appear t o be the most popul ar concerns).
hut that they are both most representative of exi sti ng lines o f investigation and
The I ncl t . pcndcnt I nl pi ~<. t o f I ' r o c c d ~ ~ r r s and Outconles
~ h c question of whctllcr pr t ~ct l ur es c;111 h;~vc an 1111pi1ct on perccivc(i f:lirncs5i,
th;lt i s indcpendcnt of c)utcon~cs has hccn of' ron\idcrahle intcrcst to pl i t i c r r I
scicn!ist~. Kefcrring t o a focus on pr c~cdur cs ;IS "process politics" (Optr~ll.;,--
1977), pol i ti cal scientists have cn~phasi zctl that i n the cases o f such cheriqhcd
nlcchanis~lls as the jrltlicial prwcss i ~ n d the procedures for conducting clcctions,
the prcwcdurcs thclnselves contrihute t o citi7ens' perceptions o f faimcss Inore
than the outcomes of thcsc prtwcdurcs (I'dclman. 1964; Scheingold, 1974).
Tyl er and Fol gcr (1980) conductetl ;I survey study that examined the rel:~.
tionship hetween outcomes and pr c~cdur cs i n the context o f police-citizen en-
counters. Questioning citizens who c;~llcd the police themselves and those who
were stopped by the pol i cc for an alleged dri vi ng violation, they found that the
outcome of the encounter (i.e.. whether or not the problem was satisfactorily
resolved and whether or not the citizen was cited for a viol;ltion) di d not influence
judgments regarding the overall fairness o f treatment. Instead, how fai rl y subjects
helieved they werc treated by thc police officer depended on the officer's pro-
cedural behaviors duri ng the cncountcr. Citizens are satisfied wi t h police officers
who fol l ow appropriate procedures, such as fi l l i ng out a thorough report of a
crime, even i f doi ng so fails t o uncover evidence leading t o the arrest of 3 suspect
(Parks, 1976). Apparently, the procedures followed, and not the outcomes, are<'
more l i kel y t o influence overall judgments o f fairness.
-
I n a series o f studies. Tyl er and Cainc (1981) extcnded examination o f this
issue t o the domai n of leadership endorsen~cnt. Specifically, they sought t o
determine whether satisfaction wi t h leaders was hased on the procedures used
to allocate outcomes. independently o f thc outcome levels themselves. I n their
first study, undergraduate student subjects rcad and suhsequently evaluated sccn-
arios depicting a student enrolled i n a course i n whi ch the grades were awarded
following a fai r or an unfai r procedure, and i n whi ch the grade received was
either less than. greater than. or equal t o the grade the student actually deserved.
Interestingly, i t was found that subjects rated the teacher more positively along
a number of dimensions when the teacher fol l owed fair as opposed t o unfair
Procedures. O f even greater importance was the fi ndi ng that the actual grade
given by the teacher di d not significantly influence ratings o f overall fairness.
although the grading procedures di d. Extending these findings t o a naturalistic
Setting, the authors also conducted a questionnaire study t o determine the extent
to which actual teacher evaluations are influenced by outcomes and procedures.
This study found that students' perceptions o f the fairness o f the grading pro-
cedures of courses they recently took accounted for more variance i n their teacher
evaluations and ratings o f teacher fairness than the grades they received. I n fact,
ROBERT FOLGER and 1ERAI.D C R E E N R E ~ ~
1
rl R. l . , i l l r ~ l /~tst;ie
emulate legal conditions (Brett, 1973-74). i t provides US with an interesting and
reliable set of findings about the inllucnces of prcress control.
Several studies have shown that s:itisfaction wi th the adversary prcedurc . .--:
1s j
greater than satisfaction wi th the inquisitorial procedure. One of the f i rst expcr- ,
iments to find this result was cond~~ct ed by Walker. LaTour, Li nd, and .rhibaut~-
(1974). Their subjects played the role of either litigants in, or observers of, a
t ri al i n which either an adversary procedure or an inquisitorial procedure was
used. I n the adversary procedure condition. subjects were ahle t o select attorneys
10 represent their sides; i n the inquisitorial prtredure condition. a single repre-
sentative was expected to represent both sides. Not surprisingly, fiivomble out-
comes (i.e.. innocent verdicts) were preferred to unfavorable outcomes (i.e.,
guilty verdicts). However, an independent effect of procedures was found that
was particularly interesting: both trial participants and observers preferred the
adversary procedure. Compared to subjects who either experienced or observed
the inquisitorial procedure. those i n the adversary procedure condition were more
satisfied with the procedures and believed them t o be fairer. These effects were
subsequently replicated by Lind. Kurtz. Musante. Walker, and Thihaut (1980).
who found that adversary procedures were preferred to nonadversary procedures.
m e former process was considered t o be more satisfying, accurate, and unbiased.
Corroborating evidence has also been reported by Lind. Lissak, and Conlon
(1983). and by Walker. Lind. and Thibaut (1979).
I t i s tempting to explain these results i n terms of a cultural bias that the subject$-1
i n these investigations might have had i n favor of the adversary procedure. That-
is, having grown up wi th the adversary procedure, American students are cer-
tainly more accustomed to, and familiar with. the adversary procedure than the
inquisitorial procedure, and may be expected t o favor it. This explanation, how-
ever, is inconsistent wi th evidence gathered by Lind, Erickson. Friedland, and
Dickensberger (1978). who compared preferences for various legal systems among
groups of students i n the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Ger-
many. Although the inquisitorial procedure is used i n France and West Germany.
subjects i n these countries reported disliking the inquisitorial systems as much
as those from the United States and Great Britain, who were less familiar with_-
i t . The adversary system was preferred by subjects from al l nations. suggesting '
that a preference for procedures offering process control is not the result of -
cultural bias (see also Lind, 1982a). -
11 is important to note that the trial and procedures employed also influenced !
perceptions of the resulting verdicts. Not only were adversary procedures PE-
ferred to nonadversary ones, but they also appeared to encourage greater satic*
faction with the verdicts and the belief that these verdicts were fair (LaTour.
1978; Walker et al.. 1974). I t makes sense to interpret these results as further
evidence of the positive reaction to control-giving, adversary procedures. Con-
sider. i n this regard, that the greater satisfaction wi th the outcomes of advercaq
prtredures occurred even when the litigants believed their case was favored by
nonadvers;~ry prwetlures (L.intl et al.. IOXO). Morcc,ver, the prcfcrcncr I;)r
procedures (e.g., more positivc attituclcs tow;hrO I;~wycrs, prc;lter si l t -
isfaction with thc evijcnce prcsentetl) was cvcn found hc./hrc the vcrtlict w;is
anno~~n~ed.
The iniportancc o!' prnccss control illso h:~s heell dcnlonstrated recently i n
of dispute-resoliltion procedures i n nonlegal settings. I n one such inves-
.oation, Lind. LissaL. ant1 Conlon ( 1983) exnmincd the effects of process control
(1,
in the context of an organizational hearing i n which the outcomes were either
binding or nonhindirig. Regardless of whether or not the outcomes were believed--'
hinding, prtrcdures that afforded tlisputants greater prcress control were
prceived to be fairer than those i n which less prtxcss control was available.
similarly, Musank, Gilbert, ancl Thi ba~~t (IYX3) f o ~ ~ ~ i d that decision makers i n .-;
hr;lring evalu;~tzd the outconics ;~nd the prt~(.tlures more favorably when they i
were given an op~) r t uni t y to chcu)sc the ;~pplicahlc decision rule than when they
'
could not do so. /.
To summarize. the research on dispute-resolution procedures, whether i n legal
or nonlegal settings, clearly indicates that proceclures giving disputing parties
over the resolution process are preferrctl to those that do not offer any
such process contrc~l. Greater satisfi~ction with the prwcdures, as well as with
thc resulting outcomes, is protluccd hy process control-giving proceclures.
Partly because interest i n procedural issues has a long and cherished tr;ldition
in dispute-resolution contexts (Hazard. 1Y63), ;~ntl kc;luse interest i n reward
distribution has been guided primarily by the tradition of equity thcory ( I xv-
enthal. 1976), i t is not surprising that theoretical intercst i n proceclural justice
emerged i n the area of dispute resolution before i t di d i n the area of reward
allocation. Nevertheless, parallels between the dispute-resolution context and
the reward-distribution context have led to sevcr;~l stutlies explicitly exnniining
wedur al effects i n the latter.
Rewards are equitably distributed when the relationship between (a) the amount
of rewards a person receives and (b) the extent o f a prson' s qualilications on
wine appropriate entitlement dimension (e.g.. amount of work performed) is
the same across people-that is, i n Adanis's ( 1965) terms, when the outcome1
input ratio is equivalent. An equitable outcome i n a reward-distribution context
1s analogous to the outcome an innocent defendant receives i n a trial when a
verdict of "innocent" is handed down. Just as such a defendant is likely to be
about that verdict regardless of the courtrtwni prcrcdure used, so-i t is
masonable to expect that satisfaction wi th eqi~iluhlc outcomes i n a reward-dis-
hhution context wi l l not vary greatly as a f u~~ct i on of p r ( ~ e d ~ ~ r ; ~ l differences
(i.e.. a ceiling effect could easily preclutlc evitlence of pr t ~edur al impact). On
lhe other hand, there is evidence that an innocent person found guilty wi l l react
ROBERT FOLGER and JFRA1.D CREENRER~
quite differently depending on the perceived fairness of the procetlure responsible
for that vertlict (I*nTour. 1978). For this reason. we wi l l f ~ c u s on re;lctions
ir~cqrtirtrhle outcomes i n reviewing reward-distribution studies.
Folger ( 1977) condi~cted an early laboratory investigation of procedural cffecls
i n a reward-distribution context. Male subjects ("workers") performed a t;,,k
during I 0 work peri tds and were notified of their earnings on I 0 COITcsp,nding
"pay peri t d" c~casions. These earnings were allegedly determined by a
who received money from the experimenter (the amount received being the sanlc
for each pay period), and who was responsible for deciding each time how much
o f that amount to keep for himself and how much to give to the worker (in
actuality, the announced division was controlled by the experimenter). The sit-
uation had been described i n a manner encouraging the workers to believe that
an equal share between worker and decision maker would be equitable, and the
predominant response of workers-when asked i n advance to indicate on a card
what their "fair" share per pay period should be-was an endorsement of equal
shares (the few exceptions deviating only slight1 y from equality).
Several sets of experimental conditions were examined i n this study, and one
of these yielded an effect that has come t o be the most common finding i n reward-
distribution contexts. I n this set of conditions (labeled "inequitable-constant"),
workers learned on each of the first two pay periods that the decision maker had
purportedly elected t o keep two-thirds for himself and t o give the worker only
one-third of the arnount available. The procedure manipulation was introduced
at this p i n t , when the experimenter met briefly wi th each worker after the
second pay period announcement. I n the "mute" procedure condition, the worker
was given no opportunity t o influence the decision maker, and the supposed
purpose of the experimenter's visit was only to see i f there were any questions
about the task. By contrast, workers i n the "voice" procedure condition exercised
an opportunity to influence the decision maker: after asking for questions, the
experimenter took the worker's "Fair Payment Card" and said i t would be
shown to the decision maker. (The term voice was coined by Hirschman. 1970,
as a generic description for oppdrtunities t o influence decision making; i t is thus
analogous to process control i n dispute-resolution contexts. but without the
connotations of "control" inherent i n the latter term.)
Regardless of procedure, the workers' payments remained constant thereafter;
that is, the decision maker continued t o keep two-thirds of the available amount
on each of the subsequent pay periods, so that the cumulative amounts for worker
and decision maker were highly inequitable at the end of the 10 pay periods. I n
response to a questionnaire item asking about the perceived fairness of those
totals, however, "voice" workers reacted significantly more favorably than their
"mute" counterparts. This type o f result has been referred to as a "fair process
effect" (e.g., Greenberg & Folger, 1983). Such an effect involves a situation
i n which the same outcome is produced by either of t wo procedures that differ
in ,,prceived fairness. with the orltcorllc itselt' k i n g pcrccivctl ; I S faircl (nlc,rc '
satisfyir~g, acceptable, etc.) when as ~c ~i i ~t c t l with IIIC I;~i rcr prcwcdirrc.
Ancjthcr set of conditions ("rncqt~il;~hlc-i~~iprovc") i n t1lC l.olger ( 10.77) ex-
Frilllent fount! evidence for ;In opp)site type of rcsult, which has heen cnllcd
a .sfnls~ra~ic)n effect. " I n these conditions, the workcr ;~~nounts for the first two
pay peritds wcre even Irlore highly incqtlit;lhlc thiln in the conditions dcscr i kd
above (i.e.. ;~pproxinlattly only 10 percent of what was available). Again the
mu t e - v e r s ~ ~ - ~ o i c ~ manipulation was introducctl after the second pay pericd. I n
contrast to the schedult- (?f paynients used for the inequitable-constant conditions,
however, the subsequent worker amounts i n these inequitable-improve conditions
increased. 'The cuni ~l i ~t i vc amounts i ~f t cr I0 pay periods were -identical
across conditions (viz,. the workcr reccivctl one-third of the total. and the decision
Ill;~kcr t wo- t hi r dst yct within the inequitable-improve conditions, the fairness7
ratings regarding these amounts wcre significantly higher from "mute" workers
than f r o ~ ~ i "voice" wwkers. Several possible explanations of this effect have
k e n proposed (e.g.. see decarufel & Schopler. 1979). some of which we w i l l
touch upon later. For the moment, however, we simply note that although similar
results can bc fount! i n some earlier studies (e.g., Thibaut. 1950; Thibaut.
Friedland, 8i Walker. 1973). subsequent research (e.g., Folgcr. Rosenfield,
Grove, & Corkran. 1979) hassuggested that the frustration of having influenced-'
a decision maker "coo late" (the experience of the voice-improve workers&
such that the restc~ration of equity is only partial-is likely to he manifested onl y
under a reslriclrrl set of circ~~mstanccs (see Greenberg & Folger, 1983).
A series of recent studies by Tylcr. Rasinski. and Spdi ck ( 1985) have followed
up on Folger's studies of the voice-induced fair process effect. I n their one
experimental study, these investigators created scenarios i n which leaders allo-
cated resoilrces, nianipulating the degree of process control and decision control.
It was found that even when decisions could not he controlled directly, procedures
giving people a voice were perceived as bcing more prtwredurally fair and led
to more positive evaluations of the al l t ~at i ng decision niakers than were pro-
cedures i n which voice could not be exercised. Analogous findings were obtained
In their two questionnaire studies correlating procedural justice judgments and
leadership endorsement wi th prcei ved degree of process control+jne studying
defendants' reactions to legal cases and one studying students' reactions to grades
they received. I n both surveys, greater degrees of prcei ved control over t h f
Prtress were associated wi th heightened feelings of procedural justice and more '
positive attitudes toward the reward allocator (the judge or the instructor).
The effects of voice-giving procedures has also been demonstrated i n a series
of studies by Lissak ( 1983) i n a variety of allocation settings. Lissak's first study
was a laboratory simulation study i n the tradition of Thibaut and Walker's
paradigm. Subjects played the role of adveriising exccutivcs involved i n com-
Petition for a contract from a sponsor and had prepared a hid i n an attempt to
156
ROBERT FOLGER and JERALD GR E E N B E R ~
secure that contract. The manipulation of how much input. or voice, the subjects
had i n presenting information ahout their ideas (i n an atten~pt to secure
contracl) was very influential in determining their reactions l o the pr()cedure.
Those who were able t o present information on their hehalf were more satisfied--;
wi t h the procedure and k l i ev ed i t t o be fairer than those who onl y had a limited
voice i n influencing the sponsor's decision. I t i s interesting l o nole that subjects
who had a voice i n the decision rated the procedures more positively than thoseL
who had no such voice. even before the sponsor's decision was made. These
findings are analogous t o those o f Lind et al. (19801, who found the same thing
wi t h respect t o the presentation o f evidence i n a legal setting.
Addi ti onal 'studies by Lissak (1983) demonstrated similar effects i n the ques-
tionnaire responses of actual organizational employees-specifically, members
o f the Canadian Forces. One o f the field studies compared the enlisted menas
reactions t o t wo personnel evaluation procedures: one i n whi ch they had "no
i nput concerning the behaviors and activities that they were rated on." and one
i n whi ch they were permitted t o "provide a written statement on their duties
and noteworthy accomplishments" (p. 5 1 ). Consistent wi t h the previously noted
findings, respondents who were gi ven the opportunity t o provide i nput i nt o their 1
evaluations reacted to the performance appraisal procedure more positively. A)
second field study found analogous results when the procedural manipulation of
interest was input i nto the procedure by whi ch transfers to different bases were
made. Once again, those who had i nput i nt o the (personnel) allocation procedures.
expressed greater satisfaction wi t h them.
T o ~ p ma r i z ? , studies o f reward allocation procedures have clearly demon?
strated the prevalence of enhanced outcome-acceptance effects and greater per-
ceived procedural fairness associated wi t h procedures that gi ve people process
control i n the f or m of "voice." These tindings lend support to both Thibaut and I
Walker' s ( 1975) and Leventhal's ( 1976, 1980) conceptualizations o f procedural
justice.
Now that we have reviewed the conceptual background o f procedural justice
and the research findings bearing on i t, the stage is set for our attempts t o apply
this work t o various personnel procedures. Specifically, we wi l l focus on four
varieties o f personnel systems-performance evaluation systems, compensation
systems, participatory decision-making systems, and dispute-resolution sys-
t er ns- each o f whi ch contains procedures analyzable i n terms of ~r cr edur al
justice.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEMS
We believe that performance appraisal situations represent an especially fertile
fi el d in whi ch to examine the implications of research and theory on procedural
justice. I n fact. t wo studies by Landy and his associates deal di rectl y wi t h the
fairness o f performance appraisal procedures, although they do hot couch their
work i n pr t ~edur al justice terms. I n the fiisl_mcly. I.andy. Harncs, and Murphy
(1978) questionecl over 700 rll;~nagcrial ;111d prolsstoo;rl cr ~~pl oyccs o f a large
,,lanufacturing company ahout the ni ~t urc 01' tlrcir pcrlor11l;rnc.e cv;~luations and
,heir reactions to t he~l l . I2;!ntly et ;I!. hound th;~t e111ployccs' pcrccptiolrs o f the-;
f;limcss of cv;~luation systcr~ls was signifir;lntly pohitivcly re1;ucd to " pr c~ess
vnriahles," srlch as the freq!rcncy of evaluations, the rater's familiarity wi t h the'
ratees, and the opportunity 10 cxpress feelings. l' hcse findings were successfully
cross-validiited. and thcy were replicated i n ;In identical follow-up-study hy
Landy, Barnes-Farrcll, ant! Cleveland (1980). Furthermore, this fol l ow-up i n- -
vestigation found that percrptions of fairness were not related to the respondents' !
own performance ratings, therchy discounting the possibility that the outcomes
of the rating prtress inll\rcnced the fairness ratings. These findings are perfectly
consistent wi t h those of Tyl er and Caine (19HI) ohtaincd i n educational and--
pc)litical settings. showing that perceived fairness is more strongly rclatcd to the
process by whi ch the ouicolnes are ohtaincd than t o the outcomes themselves..
They are a150 consistent wi t h the organizationally based findings o f Alexander
1
and Rudernlan (1983) showing the dominance o f pr t ~cdur al justice over dis:
tributive justice and their statistically independent impact.
Having established that reactions to performance evaluations depend more on
the procedures by whi ch they%are conducted than on what the evaluation outcomes
may be, we have set the stage for a more tlctailed examination o f reactions to
spci f i c procedures that may form the hasis of these reactions. Four aspects of
performance evaluation procedures wi l l be analyzed: procedures al l owi ng worker
input i nto the evaluation; self-appraisal procedures; appraisal interview pr t r e-
dures; and rccord-kecpi~tg prcredurcs (see (;rcenhcrg. i n press).
I n p u t In Eval uat i on Procedures
As part o f his dissertation, Robi n Lissak (1983. Field Study I ) examined the
impact o f input i nto performance evaluation prmcdurcs i n the Can:ldian Forces
on enlisted men's reactions to these procedures. Distinguishing between eval-
uation prtredures i n whi ch the soldiers coul d and could not explain their per-
formance to their supervisory raters ( i n the form o f written narra~ives). Lissak
found significantly more Fivorable reactions ' to high-input procedures than t<
low-input procedures. Specifically. suhjects who had input i nto their evaluation:
procedure rated that procedure higher on a pr c~edur al Fairness index (composed
of highly intercorrelated items assessing satisfaction with. fi~irncss of. and trust
and acceptance of the evaluation system) than those who had no such input.
Similar results have been reported i n ;I field study by Diphoye and de Pontbraind
(198 1 ). Thcse investig;ltors fcouncl that clnployccs' opinions o f their ;~ppraisal
system were more favorable to the extent that thcy helicved they had an oppor-
tunity to express their own viewpoints.
In addition to this work, a recent experiment hy Kanfer, Sawyer, Early, and
Li nd (1083) further supported the role of input i n the performance evaluntion
process as a deterniinant of prtwredural justice. Undergradu;~te stuclcnts serving
; I S subjects i n this laboratory investigation perk)nned a task for which they were
evaluated by a supervisor. Manipulated were (a) subjects' opportunities to offer
information ahout their performance to their supervisor and (b) the presence or
ahsence of information provided by the supervisor regarding the evaluation cri-
teria. Kanfer et al. found that subjects performed at the highest level when high
input opportunities were combined with an explicit statement about prf orni ance
criteria. Additionally. high input into the appraisal led suhjects to perceive the
appraisal procedure as k i n g fairer than when opportunities for input were denied.
The high-input procedures also were found to enhance satisfaction wi th per-
formance outcomes as wel l as satisfaction wi th the supervisors. These laboratory
results are consistent wi th the findings of held questionnaires ( Ll i pbye & de
Ponthraind, 1981; Lissak, 1983). which also reported favorable re;rctions t o the
feedback from evaluation procedures that provided opportunities for input hy
thc evaluated worker.
These findings not only invite comparison wi th Folger's (1977; Folgcr et al.,
1979) studies of "voice," but can be explained i n terms of the same mechanisms.
Indeed, they reveal further instances of the "fair process effect" (e.g., Greenberg
& Folger. 1983) described earlier i n this paper (i.e.. the tendency for greater
outcome satisfaction to result from voice-giving procedures than from mute
procedures). A likely expl;~nation for the effect, particularly i n the context of
perfomlance appraisals. is that voice-giving (high-input) procedures allow par-
ticipants to ensure that the evaluator has more complete, accurate i nforn~ati on
to consider i n making his or her evaluations than mute (low-input) procedures
(cf. Folger el al.. 1979; Thibaut & Walker, 1978). This notion is consistent wi th
Leventhal's ( 1980) procedural elements of "setting ground rules'' and "gathering
information," ones subsequently shown to c;rrry the greatest weight i n judg~iients
of fairness (Fry & Cheney, 1981; Fry & Leventhal. 1979).
At the same time. however. we must emphasize that the effects of procedures
are twofold, and that predictions regarding the impact of procedures must take
their dual nature into account. Specifically, while procedures are inevitably;
instrumental i n character (i.e.. they constitute the means for accomplishing someJ
end result. such as when performance appraisal procedures are used to generate
evaluations upon which such outcomes as salary increases. bonuses, and pro-
motions are based), reactions to a given procedure may also at times reflect an-.?
assessment of that procedure as an md-in-ifself. Part of the favorable reaction .:,
to voice and enhanced process-control procedures, as suggested above. is prob-
ably due to their being perceived as an efficient-a_nd accurate -- -. means .. - for accu-
mulating the information most relevant to a decision or judgment. o n t h e other
-- -
hand, another part o f such reactions may stem from aspects of these p c e d u r s
-
considered to be desirahle. regardless of the particular decision they yield on a
given occasion. An important aspect of the contrast between mute and voice --
procedures, for exanlplc. ni;ly bc th;~t the I;~ttcr rcllcctc nlorc th:ln thc fonllcr ;I
dcgrec of trust in. and rc.g;~rd for (rc5pct vi s- i vi \ the opinions ot). those who
;Ire given voice. This i ~nl di ci t recognition 01- sonic potcntiill value i n the voice-
rccipicnt's views may constitute a psychologically signilicant "outcollle" i n
itself. and thc positive al'fcct thcrcby asstri;lted with k i n g given a voice may
gcnerali7e to wh;~tevcr other outcolncs ;Ire obtaincd from the evaluation.
I n light o f this dual nature of procedures, i t is important to note that two -
different kinds of favorable reactions involving perfomlance appraisal systems
have been obtaincd i n the studies rcviewcd hove, and that these reactions
correspond to t wo different types of me;lsllres i~sstwriated with prc~edural justice
research i n general. reaction is to the performance app~i . yl system itself
1
(high-input -- systems k i n g evaluated more f;~vor;lbly thi "l ow-i nput systems).
and the obtained effect is comparhl e to the strong preference for adversary
rather than inquisitori;rl legal systems that has been so thoroughly docunlented
by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and their associates. The second -- .. type of reaction r.
involves f+gs_~hout the feedba.ck_received from performance appraisals. and
the findings reported to date (Dipboye & de Pontbraind, 1981; Lissak, 1983;
Kanfcr et al., 1983) are consistent with the fair process effect i n reward-distri-
bution studies. Nevertheless, given the occasional presence of a frustration effect
i n the latter context, we would car~tion that reactions to the outcome of a per-
fonnance appraisal n ~ y - b .g~fun-ti!)-n~jf-twth the appraisal system used (e.g., <,
high versus l ow input) and the actual appraisal received (c.g., its relationship
to the appraisal that was expected or considered to k deserved).
Although conducted i n a reward-distribution context, the Folger (1977) ex-
periment can be used to illustrate the distinction between reactions to a pro-
cedure and reactions to i ts consequences, as wel l as to i l l ustrate the
circumstances under which frustration effects might arise. Subjects i n that ex-
periment provided t p t y p e s of questionnaire responses: ratings of prtwredural
fairness a@ ratings of outcome fairness. I n the inequitable-constant condi-
tions. voice workers gave more positive ratings to both items than di d mute
workers. I n the inequitable-improve conditions, however, the pattern of re-
sponses differed hetween the two items. As noted earlier, the voice workers i n
these latter conditions gave more nexafir,e ratings of outcome fairness than di d
the mute workers (the frustration effect). Nevertheless, the voice conditions
produced more posirive ratings of prtredural fairness than di d the mute con-
ditions. Together, these results show that positive reactions regarding a pro-?
cedure do not_a_l eys spill over to reactions regarding the outcomes ohtained i
as a consequence of that procedure.
--
The caveat suggested hy the possibility of a frustration effect is that i n pro-
viding the opportunity for expression of one's opinions, voice procedures may
also raise one's hopes and expectations ahout the prospects of influence. Indeed.
whereas mute-improve workers were no tloubt plc;~santly surprised by the upward
turn i n their fortunes, voice-improve workers prcsu~nably thought their gradually
lfrl
ROGER FOLGER AND JERALD GREENHERc,
(tlistributive justice) as contributors to pay satisfaction. I n a somewhat strongcr
I
vein, Mahoney and Weit7,el (1978) suggest that impersonal referents. such as
the compnsati on system itself, rather than personal referents, such as interper-
sonal wage comparisons, provide the basis of satisfaction.
Both the findings from studies of open pay systems and the above conjectures
are consistent wi th leventhal' s (1980) analysis of the elements of prwedural
justice. Specifically. open pay systems assure those covered hy them that pro-
cedures are i n place for ensuring against i~buses o f power by decision-making
bodies-leventhal's (1980) procedural element, "safeguards." Indeed, the very
transparency of the system discourages abuse and favoritism, thereby promoting
procedural fairness based on "consistency" and "bias suppression." Thus,
although open pay systems do not provide assurances o f procedural justice based
on the opportunity to exert direct control over the payment process, opportunitir\
to openly monitor that process's operation are likely to make workers feel con-
fident that the procedures wi l l not be abused, thereby resulting i n consistent and
unbiased (i.e., procedurally fair) decisions.
Before concluding this section, we would l i ke to comment on a law that has.
since September 2. 1974, acted to ensure procedural justice i n the area of fringe
benefit administration, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
The intent of this law was to set up procedures ensuring that participants i n
benefit plans know what they are entitled to and to guarantee that they get i t.
The law distinguishes among (a) information regarding benefit programs that
must be communicated to workers, (h) information that must be provided by the
employer upon request by the worker, and (c) information that the employer
must make available for examination (see Fleming. 1975). We believe ERISA' s
stipulations help ensure that procedural justice wi l l be accomplished i n niuch
the same way as open pay systems. That is, by assuring access to inforn~ation.
the l aw protects employees from procedures that might deny them an opportunity
to receive the benefits coming to them.
Cafeteria-Style Benefi t Pl ans
Cafeteria-style benefit plans, also referred to as flexible benefit plans, represent
another type of compensation system analyzable from the perspective of pm-
cedural justice. These plans allow employees to "determine the relative mi x of
their fringe benefits and wage package" (Werther, 1976, pp. 41-42). Social
-
conditions leading to changing demographics of the work force (Mi l kovi ch &
Delaney, 1975) and changes i n American income tax regulations (Treacy &
Tane. 1982) have contributed to the growing popularity of cafeteria-style benefit
plans (Lawson, 1982). leading one industry analyst to refer to them as the
"buzzword o f the 'NOS" ("Social Changes." 1981). Although such plans have
met wi t h economic success i n many of the companies using them, such as
American Can Company. TRW, and the Educational Testing Service ("Em-
,,li)yees Satisfied." IOH3). and have hcc~i ;~ssociatrd with [he satisfaction of tllcir
t.rllployees, sonie prohlcriis h;~vc k c n reportrd with rvspcct to unforscen ex-
pnditures (Dlitzer, I OHI ). di f f i c~~l t i cs i n adr~iini\tration she;^, IYXI), and en,-
ployces' not making their decisiol~s rcspt~nsihly (Schlacht~neyer & Bog;lrt, 1970)
Still, because flexihlc benefit plans have k e n seen as a virtual condition of
empIoy~ncnt i n some cases (Harris. 1975) and as a motivational t(n,I (Cole,
108.3). interest i n such plans has remained high enough to encourage personnel
administrator^ to devise ci ~ref ul systclns designed to avoid the sllortcomings
(Werther. 1976).
Th:~t cafeteria-style benefit plans are so well-received by employees is not
particularly surprising from the sti~ndpoint of pr t ~edur al justice. Using Thibaut
;~nd Walker's (1978) terminology. such pl;~ns give employees decision cont r o~.
( i . ~ . , the opportunity to make decisions concerning their outcomes). I n writing
earlier on this topic (Greenberg & Folger, 1983). wc have identified such direct
decisions as those involving "choice." to distinguish them from those more
indirect decisions involving "voice" (or process control). According to o u r ,
analysis, there i s nothing particularly surprising about the increased satisfaction
resulting from choice-giving procedures, such as cafeteria-style benefit plans. J
After all, allowing people to chtwse what benefits they want increases their
chances of receiving highly desired outcomcs, relative to a system ill which the
employer makes the choice for all elnployccs.
We helieve. however. that the psychological mechanisms underlying the ben--~
eficial effects of choice lie beyond this s~~pcrf i ci al simplicity. The crucial question
concerning the effects of choice is whether individuals are happier wi th the
outcomes they have selected than with the same outcomes selected for them.
Several experiments suggest that the act of making a choice is i n itself incre-
mentally responsible for outcomc satisfnction. Greenkrg (1983). for example,
had subjects i n a marketing-prefercnce study sample desirable-tasting or unde-
sirable-tasting breakfast cereals that they were either given a choice. or had no
choice, i n selecting. I t was fount1 that the chosen cereal was nrore liked by^;
subjects than the nonchosen one. whether or not i t was desirable tasting. Sim-
ilarly, i n an experiment mentioned earlier. Musante, Gilbert, and Thibaut (1983)
found that subjects i n a hearing were niore sati.ficd with outcomes when they
chose the decision rule that governcd the outcomes of the hearing than when no
choice was available. Unfortunately, no comparable studies have been conducted
regarding choice of fringe benefits. Indeed. i t would be very difficult to find
matched pairs of subjects containing one member who selected his or her own
benefits and another for whom the same benefit package was chosen by another.
Generalizing from the experiments conducted i n other contexts, however, we2
suggest that the satisfaction resulting from choice-giving procedures goes beyond
simply assuring that the choosers get what they want.
A likely explanation for the increased satisfaction resulting froni choice i s ?
that. according to cognitive dissonance theory (e .g., Insko, Worchel. Folgcr. Kr _/
170
ROBERT FO1,GER and JERALD GREENBERG
than whcn the lack o f support f or a suggestion is unaninlous. I n terms of our
social influcncc explanation o f the fair prcxcssefl2ct (Gwenhcrg & I;olgcr, 1 9 ~ 3 ) ~
unanimously rcjccted suggestions are analogous t o the voice-constant condition
of 1:olger's (1977) experiment (i n whi ch a fai r process cffect was obtained). That
is, aftcr the suggestion has k c n submittcd (a voiced request). subsequent acticJns
show that t he val i di ty o f the suggestion has heen denied (outcomes remain
unchanged). I n the Folger ( 1977) experiment. the prsuasivencss of those actions
(the cxtcnt to whi ch the sincerity of the decision maker was "augmented" by
his havi ng so emphatically denied the request) may have k e n enhanced hecause
the worker had no source o f social support for hi s own viewpoint. as woul d he
the case i n the unanimous committee rejection. Other research is consistent i n
showi ng the strong social influence o f a unanimous majority (e.g., Asch. 1952)
and the tendency toward accepting a decision when social support for a dissentinF
opi ni on i s absent (Folger et al.. 1979; Michener & Lyons. 1972; Mi chener &
Tausig. 1971 ). On the other hand, a spl i l opi ni on i n the suggestion con~mi t t ec
offers partial support for the validity of the suggestion, a condition that leads to
less acceptance o f decisions (Folger et al., 1979) and to the reduced influence
o f majorities (Asch, 1952).
Thc situation is also particularly problematic when several employees submit
the same g d suggestion at the samc time and some hybri d suggestion is enacted
(Sandell, 1979). Possible problems may result f rom workers' bel i evi ng that their
credit (recognition and monetary reward) was unfai rl y diluted by another's seem-
i ngl y i nferi or suggestion, or perhaps the fear that the ideas was stolen by another
(Reuter. 1977). One proposed;olution t o this problem is that bonuses be dis-
tributed on a companywide basis rather than on an i ndi vi dual basis (Olsen, 1976).
~ l t h o u g h i t woul d be inappropriate herc for us t o debate the merits of shared
versus i ndi vi dual incentive systems, we should note that shared incentivcs for
suggestions may he expected to alleviate some o f the dissatisfaction expected to
result f r om partial acceptance o f one's decisions.
Fair Administration of thc Plnn
.
A second reason why the benefits o f suggestion systems may not be realized '
i s that they may lack appropriate procedurally fai r elements. Indeed. several -
recommendations f or the implementation and administration of suggestion sys-
tems coincide wi t h the procedural elements identified by Leventhal (1980). For
example. i t has been recommended that the suggestion committee, whi ch eval-
uates suggestions and sets policies concerning the system's operation, be corn-
posed o f representatives of the various departments of an organization (Gunter
& George, 1975). Thi s advice i s congruent wi t h Leventhal's hypothesis that the --
selection o f appropriately representative decision-making agents contributes to
procedural fairness. Another recommendation i s that suggestion systems be based .
on "clear. publicized politics." thereby avoiding dissatisfaction resulting f n ~ m _
S,,spctcd parti;~litv (Rcutrr. 1977. p. 8x1. .l'hill i\. tilt .'tirscihron htnrct~lre,"
1 c,,enlhal's tcm?inology, nccds to he dcli~~c.tl.
Probably the nlost ilnpc~rtnnt rcc.o~nn~cnd;~tion. I~C'~;IIISC i t htlS the preatc,,
,-,,,tentiili for callsing probiellls. i s ti1:11 "A11 v f ' ~c c t i ~e CL)SI S Y S ~ C ~ ~ , llllIs~
avilil --
able as a prr~rr(llll.rilf I() .fair ~r@rrllrrllion upon which to h;rsc tin: v;,lue of a,l
award" (Reuter. 1977. p. 8H. emphasis i ~ d d ~ d ) . Thi s advice is in keeping wi t \ l
~ ~ ~ ~ n t h a l ' ~ (l')XO) i dc; ~ of "scltin&! ~r oi r ncl rules" (i.e., creating prtx.cdurcs
cl etem~i ni ng and cv:~lu;llinl: potential rcw;irtls and the hhavi ors lleressary I,,
att;lin them). The advice is prc)hicnri~tic, howcvcr, i n that (a) there are oftcl,
a n l b i g u i t i ~~ inhcrcnl i n the ;~ccourlling systcms used to dctcnninc an illca\
linancial worl h l o the company (hence the s~~ggcstcr' s share) and ( h) the saving5
rcsuiting from inlplcmenting the plan aftcr thc first year are 1y1iic;~lly not con-
~i dcr ed whcn the amount of an individual award is dctcrmincd, despite the
company's continued benefits (Olscn. 1976). As a result, drtennining awards
i n a procedurally fair manncr miry bc tliflicult to accomplish. I n view of the
[rustrating effects l i kel y to result f r o n ~ thc irnplc~ncntation o f unfair p r t ~e d u ~e s .
our analysis furthcr undcrscorcs the reco~~~rncndat i ons noted here.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
If we were to idcntiSy any onc area o f personnel work as traditionally being most
concerned wi t h procedures. i t w o ~ ~ l d have to be the area o f organizational disputc
resolution. Because many organizational dispute-resolution procedures may hc
viewed as private, intraorganizational lcpal systems. i t should not he surprising
that they share an interest i n prcretlural matters wi th the external legal systems
within which they are based (Evan. 1962). By setting up their own dispute-
resolution systems, organizations h o p to avoid the acrimony and costs o f formal
litigation through the legal system (Coulson, 1978). Our analysis o f the proce-
dures used i n these systems wi l l distinguish between traditional organizational
due process systems and some much morc rccent approaches that have been
advanced.
Tr adi t i onal D u e Process Procedures
The term "organizational due process" procedures refers to procedures ex--i
isling wi t hi n organizations that attcnlpt to provide an opportunity for employer- :
employee di spu~es t o be resolved internally, without relying on formal litigation
through the court system ( Ar am & Salipante, 1981). Fueled by a widening -.
recognition o f the need t o extend the application o f constitutional rights t o
employees on the j ob (Ewing, 1977a), sevcral types o f due process mechanisms
have become popular. Specifically, survey studies (e.g., Ewing, 1977b; Scott
"r
1965) have reported thc existence of due process procedures ranging from ex-
ecutive open door policies to appeals systcms. corporate ombudsmen, and man- :