C A S E H I S T O R Y

Case Study of an Aerosol Explosion and a Method to Determine

Explosion Temperatures
Michael Fox Richard Hastings Scott Lovald
Juan Heinrich
Submitted: 24 February 2007 / in revised form: 4 May 2007 / Published online: 26 June 2007
ASM International 2007
Abstract A failure analysis case study is presented for a
two-piece aerosol containing tetrauoroethane, commonly
referred to as Refrigerant 134a. A gentleman was preparing
to recharge the air conditioning system of an automobile
when the bottom exploded off the aerosol container, pro-
pelling the body of the aerosol container like a rocket,
which hit the man in the eye and blinded him in that eye.
The aerosol was never connected to the air conditioner,
therefore backpressure from the air conditioner (AC)
compressor was ruled out as a cause for the explosion. The
objective of the study was to determine why the aerosol
exploded. Several recently developed test methods were
used, including two types of heat-to-burst tests and a
puncture chamber to measure the pressure-versus-temper-
ature behavior of aerosols. More common test methods
were also used, such as water bath pressure tests, hydro
pressure burst tests, pneumatic pressure burst tests, hard-
ness measurements, weight measurements, metallography,
scanning electron microscopy (SEM), energy-dispersive
spectroscopy (EDS), and an accident scenario recreation. A
semi-empirical correlation between the hardness and
weights of the container bottoms was used to determine the
explosion temperature and/or pressure. This semi-empirical
correlation agrees in principle with an analysis of the
explosion pressures using nite-element analysis (FEA).
The root cause for the explosion was determined to be a
lack of strength of the bottom of the two-piece aerosol
coupled with heating the aerosol to temperatures signi-
cantly above room temperature.
Keywords Aerosol container Burst pressure
Failure analysis FEA Predictive method
Introduction
A middle-aged man purchased a kit to recharge the air
conditioning (AC) units on several vehicles he owned. The
kit was a do-it-yourself package consisting of three 425-
gram, two-piece aerosol containers of Refrigerant 134a
(tetrauoroethane) and several adaptors plus a connection
hose with a built-in pressure gage. From here forward the
aerosol being used will be referred to as R134a. After
successfully recharging one vehicle, he moved to a second
auto. Using the connectors that came with the R134a kit, he
attached one of the kit adaptors to what he believed to be
the correct air conditioning tting to determine the ll
requirement per the instructions, and then restarted the
engine. It turned out to be the wrong air conditioning t-
ting, so he stopped the engine at that point after it had run
for a period of time. That was the last time the engine ran.
The aerosol container of R134a was never connected to the
tting but was placed lying on its side on top of the engine
valve cover with the hose-gage assembly attached to the
R134a container.
After stopping the engine, he continued to inspect the
engine compartment for several minutes and tried to nd
the correct combination of ttings and connections. He was
M. Fox (&)
Chemical Accident Reconstruction Services, Inc., 9121 E.
Tanque Verde Rd. #105, Tucson, AZ 85749, USA
e-mail: mikefox@mikefox.com
R. Hastings
Materials Science Department, University of Arizona, Tucson,
AZ 85719, USA
S. Lovald J. Heinrich
Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
1 3
J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174
DOI 10.1007/s11668-007-9029-1
just about to go get the manual for the vehicle when there
was an explosion. The bottom exploded off the two-piece
container and the body of the container was propelled like a
rocket. The rocketing container hit him with a glancing
blow in the eye. He was blinded in that one eye.
In Figure 1, A is the hood dent from the hose, B
the hood dent from the bottom of the aerosol, C is the
location where the hose was found after the explosion, D
is where the bottom of the aerosol was found after the
explosion, and E is where the aerosol R134a was located
just prior to the explosion.
The person who came to pick up the pieces and survey
the accident after the injured man was taken to the hospital
photographed and documented where each piece was
found. The body of the aerosol was found approximately
22.3 m (73 ft) away from the drivers side of the vehicle,
which is where the injured man was standing next to the
engine. It was apparent that after hitting the man in the eye
the body of the aerosol continued to be propelled in this
same general direction. The bottom of the container and the
hose assembly that were attached to the aerosol at the time
it exploded were found between the engine and the radia-
tor. The engine hood was the type that lifted toward the
front of the vehicle, as seen in Figure 1.
From the position of the bottom of the aerosol plus a
dent visible in the hood (see B in Figure 1), it appeared
that the bottom was propelled into the hood, thereby
making a small dent in the hood, and then ricocheted
downward and landed between the engine and the radiator.
There were also bers on the aerosol bottom that were later
conrmed via SEM and EDS to be consistent with the hood
insulation. This is discussed in more detail later.
The hose-gage assembly was also found between the
radiator and the engine (see C in Figure 1). There was
also hood damage (see A in Figure 1) indicating that the
hose-gage assembly hit the hood, thereby being deected
downward between the radiator and the engine. If the
injured mans description of what happened was true, this
meant that the hose-gage assembly would have had to
immediately, upon explosion, tear apart from the aerosol to
which it was attached. An unconned heat-to-burst test
(Pancake Griddle Test), discussed later, conrmed that
the hose-gage assembly does instantly separate from the
aerosol when the bottom explodes off the aerosol.
The objective of the investigation was to determine why
the R134a exploded. Was it overheated by sitting on the
engine, or was it in some way defective, or did something
else happen? Because the R134a was never connected to
the AC unit, reverse pressurizing the aerosol container via
the AC compressor was not considered possible.
The Product
The product at issue was a do-it-yourself kit for recharging
automobile AC units. Each kit contained three 425-gram
aerosols of Refrigerant 134a or tetrauoroethane, referred
to in this paper as R134a. The R134a also contained
lubricants and sealants and hence was not pure tetra-
uoroethane. The aerosol container was a two-piece steel
construction. The body and top are one piece formed by
impact forging. The bottom is attached to the body via a
double seam as seen in Figure 2.
The kit also contained various ttings and a hose-gage
assembly. The aerosol container was labeled as a Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) 2Q designation. The al-
lowed pressures and burst pressures of aerosol containers
are regulated by the DOT [1]. Two DOT requirements
of importance in this investigation were the maximum
Fig. 1 Schematic preceding the explosion incident as viewed through
the windshield
Fig. 2 Cross-sectional metallography of a bottom double seam of a
two-piece DOT 2Q container. Thickness of metal bottom at double
arrows is 0.0356 cm (0.014 in.). This is an exemplar double seam, not
the evidence
166 J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174
1 3
54.4 C (130 F) vapor pressure of the contents and the
minimum burst pressure of the container. Those parameters
are presented in Table 1.
The Experimental Methodology
The rst step after examining the physical evidence from
the explosion was to determine the pressure-versus-
temperature behavior of the contents of R134a. Following
that, a simulation was performed using the automobile that
was involved in the explosion incident. The purpose of the
simulation was to determine the maximum temperature to
which that specic vehicle could heat a container of R134a.
Next, various forms of burst testing were performed to
determine the burst characteristics of exemplar R134a
aerosols. The burst methods included hydrostatic (water),
pneumatic (nitrogen gas), and heat-to-burst testing. Scan-
ning electron microscopy and EDS were used to examine
bers from the hood and from the aerosol bottom along
with grease found on the body of the aerosol and the engine
belts. After heat-to-burst testing, the aerosol bottoms were
cleaned and weighed and hardness measurements were
made. Finally, nite element model calculations were made
to compare against the experimental and empirical ndings.
Each phase of the experimental and theoretical methods is
discussed in the following sections of this paper.
Pressure vs. Temperature
In an investigation of an exploding aerosol it is advisable to
measure the temperature-versus-pressure behavior of the
contents of the aerosol. This was accomplished by two
separate methods. The rst was to submerge the R134a into
a water bath at approximately 60 C (140 F) and monitor
the pressure as the water bath cooled. This is readily
accomplished with R134a because the container is de-
signed to accommodate a screw-type puncture valve as
seen in Figure 3, which is looking down on a container of
R134a submerged in water and taped to two bricks. In turn,
that valve can be connected to a hose leading to a cali-
brated pressure gage. Two surface thermocouples were
attached to the sidewall of the R134a container, one near
the top and one near the bottom. The measurement of
aerosol pressures (Figure 3) by the water bath method was
conducted inside a strong metal cage. The objective of the
water bath pressure test is to measure the pressure of the
contents at 54.4 C (130 F) and lower. As shown in Fig-
ure 3, the 54.4 C (130 F) pressure of the contents was
measured to be 1.38 MPa (200 psig), which is 0.14 MPa
(20 psig) higher than allowed in a DOT 2Q container (see
Table 1). The water bath is maintained at a temperature of
54.4 C (130 F) for a period of time to ensure thermal
equilibrium with the R134a contents.
For higher temperatures that may approach the bursting
pressure of the aerosol container, a device referred to as the
Puncture Chamber was developed. A diagram and photo of
the Puncture Chamber are seen in Figure 4.
The Puncture Chamber is capable of withstanding much
higher pressures than aerosol cans. It is designed and built
to t tightly around the aerosol container. Once sealed, but
prior to testing, the air gaps between the Puncture Chamber
walls and the aerosol are ushed with propellant from a
sister aerosol. The spring-loaded and self-sealing puncture
device on the top of the container is impacted against the
bottom of the aerosol inside the chamber. This produces a
large hole in the bottom of the aerosol that allows the
Table 1 Two DOT Requirements for 2Q Aerosol Containers
Requirement Metric Units English Units
Maximum 54.4 C (130 F) vapor
pressure of contents
1.24 MPa 180 psig
Minimum burst pressure 1.86 MPa 270 psig
Minimum wall thickness 0.0203 cm 0.008 in.
Fig. 3 Water bath method for measuring pressure at 54.4 C
(130 F) and below
J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174 167
1 3
propellant to escape into the small free volume of the
chamber. The chamber is then ushed three times briey
with the contents of the punctured aerosol. After that, the
Puncture Chamber is slowly heated and the pressure and
temperature are monitored with a calibrated pressure gage
and thermocouple. The pressure and temperature data are
continuously recorded during heating and cooling.
The Puncture Chamber method has been validated against
aerosols containing pure propellants, such as isobutane
and pure tetrauoroethane. The pressure-versus-temperature
behaviors of those aerosols, as obtained via the Puncture
Chamber, were in excellent agreement with the scientic
literature for those propellants. Therefore, the Puncture
Chamber is considered to be reliable and accurate.
Figure 5 presents the pressure-versus-temperature
results of R134a using the water bath, which are in good
agreement with data from the Puncture Chamber. Also
presented are data points from DuPont [2] for pure tetra-
uoroethane showing that the results are in good agreement
with DuPont, a manufacturer of tetrauoroethane. This
agreement is to be expected because the other ingredients
in R134a are sealants and lubricants, which are not ex-
pected to alter the vapor pressure of pure tetrauoroethane
to any signicant degree.
Figure 5 also shows that any R134a that explodes below
65.5 C (150 F) would not meet the minimum burst
requirement for a DOT 2Q container, which is 1.86 MPa
(270 psig).
Automobile Simulation
Within a few months of the actual incident, an accident
recreation simulation was conducted based on an interview
with the man who lost his eye. The identical vehicle was
used at the same location where the explosion occurred.
The goal of the simulation was to measure the maximum
temperatures reached when R134a is positioned on a
running engine in the same manner as on the day of the
explosion.
Two thermocouples were attached to the container of
R134a on opposing sides of the body of the container,
approximately in the center. The R134a was positioned on
the engine as it was positioned on the day of the explosion,
as shown schematically in Figure 1.
Fig. 4 The Puncture Chamber is designed to obtain temperature vs.
pressure behavior of aerosol at high temperatures and pressures
Fig. 5 Experimentally measured pressure-versus-temperature data of
134a. Data from DuPont [2] are also presented for comparison
168 J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174
1 3
One thermocouple was mounted on the R134a sidewall
next to the engine and the other thermocouple was mounted
on the R134a sidewall facing the sky. Wire mesh was
placed over the entire engine compartment for safety, but
the hood was kept open as it was on the day of the
explosion. The engine (cold) was started and the temper-
atures were monitored. The engine was turned off after
40 min. Figure 6 presents the temperature results graphi-
cally with time.
The maximum temperature reached during the above
experiment was 65.9 C (150.7 F) on the underside of the
R134a facing the engine, while the topside maximum
temperature was approximately 58.9 C (138 F). The
average temperature (topside + underside) at that time was
61 C (141.8 F). The maximum temperature happened
14 min after the engine was turned off, which would be
expected because water-cooled automobile engines gener-
ally get hotter when they are turned off. Also, with no
engine fan running, there is no longer any air owing past
the R134a keeping it cool. The oscillations of temperature
on the thermocouple pointing toward the sky were caused
by clouds that would come and go during the simulation.
This observation illustrates the variability that can occur in
the overall canister temperature during such a simulation.
During the simulation, there was no bottom bulging and
the exemplar R134a did not explode. An important fact that
should not be overlooked is that no point on the R134a
used in the simulation got above a surface temperature of
65.9 C (150.7 F), even though in this simulation the
engine ran longer than it did on the day of the explosion.
The fact that the engine ran for a shorter period of time on
the day of the explosion suggests that the R134a was most
likely heated to some temperature below 65.9 C
(150.7 F) on the day of the explosion.
The simulation resulted in the need for more research.
On one hand, the temperature did not exceed 65.9 C
(150.7 F), thus an R134a should not explode because the
minimum DOT burst pressure is 1.86 MPa (270 psig).
However, this simulation was made because an R134a
exploded and injured the man under conditions similar
(temperature wise) to those encountered on the day of the
explosion. A plausible explanation is that not all R134a
containers are alike and the one that exploded had a lower
burst pressure than the exemplar used in the simulation.
Examination of the Container Bottom
Fibers were found on the inside surface of the bottom of the
aerosol container, as seen in Figure 7. Recall that the
bottom was found between the radiator and the engine and
that there was a dent in the hood suggesting that the bottom
rocketed against the hood and was deected downward.
Scanning electron microscopy and EDS conrmed that
the bers on the bottom of the R134a container were
consistent with bers taken directly from the hood.
Therefore, the scenario in which the bottom hit the hood
and was deected downward appeared consistent with the
testimony of the injured man.
Black marks were also present on the R134a container
body and it was hypothesized (by others) that those were
evidence that the R134a had been crushed by moving en-
gine belts. All attempts to get a container of R134a into an
engine belt such that it could be crushed were unsuccessful.
Additionally, it seemed inconceivable that the body of the
R134a could be both crushed inside an engine belt and then
travel 22.3 m (73 ft) away from the vehicle. It was also
observed that the engine belts and pulleys did not exhibit
any evidence of physical damage. Nevertheless, SEM/EDS
Fig. 6 Simulation testing temperature vs. time data. The hotter curve
is for the thermocouple facing down toward the engine
Fig. 7 SEM micrograph of bers found on the inside surface of the
R134a container bottom
J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174 169
1 3
of the black marks were consistent with engine grease.
Scanning electron microscopy and EDS were also per-
formed on the belts removed from the engine of the
vehicle, as shown in Figure 8b. The belts contained a high
amount of chlorine, whereas the black marks on the R134a
contained no chlorine. These results showed that the black
marks were not from belt crushing, but were consistent
with engine grease that could have been picked up either
before or during the explosion.
Burst Testing
Three different forms of burst testing were performed to
determine the burst characteristics of exemplar R134a. The
burst methods included hydrostatic (water), pneumatic
(nitrogen gas), and heat-to-burst testing. A detailed dis-
cussion and comparison of the three methods has already
been published [3]. This paper focuses on the heat-to-burst
testing, which provides the most conservative estimates of
burst pressure and best represents the conditions on the day
of the explosion. The testing reported here conrmed the
previous published results [3] and showed that hydro
testing led to high burst pressures while heat-to-burst
testing led to low burst pressures. It should be noted that
either test may be used to demonstrate compliance with
present day DOT requirements.
Due to the energy that can be released in a heat-to-burst
test, a device that provides a level of safety during testing is
shown in Figure 9. This devise is affectionately called the
Rocket Launcher. The heat-to-burst apparatus consists
of a 7.6 cm (3 in.) diameter steel tube approximately
46 cm (18 in.) long with one end-cap. Heating tape is
wrapped around the steel tube and aluminum bubble
insulation is wrapped over the heating tape. A shop rag is
placed between the aerosol and the end cap for added
insulation. A shop rag is also loosely placed at the opening
of the pipe to prevent air currents and thermal uxuations
inside the pipe. The rate of heating is regulated by a heating
controller that takes its signal from a thermocouple at-
tached to the outer or inner surface of the pipe wall. At
least two thermocouples are attached to the R134a con-
tainer with at least one thermocouple attached to the con-
tainer bottom and at least one thermocouple attached to the
container body. Temperatures are continuously monitored
and recorded. Depending on the rate of heating, there is a
Fig. 8 (a) Black residue from
R134a container body. (b)
Surface SEM/EDS of engine
belt
170 J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174
1 3
slight temperature difference (5.58.3 C, or 1015 F)
between the bottom and the body, with the body being
warmer.
Heat-to-burst tests on R134a always result in explosions.
There were no leaks or partial failures or even step-wise
failures. The explosions were all one-step events that oc-
curred without warning when the bottom buckles. When
the bottom exploded off, the R134a bodies would be pro-
pelled approximately 61 m (200 ft) in the direction the
apparatus was pointing. The heat-to-burst tests produce the
temperatures at which R134as will explode. The temper-
ature at which each explosion occurs can be measured
accurately and reproducibly using surface thermocouples,
heating controllers, and data loggers. The pressure-versus-
temperature data (Figure 5) is then used to determine the
explosion pressure.
The initial motive for the heat-to-burst test was to
determine if a thermally exploded R134a could travel at
least 22.3 m (73 ft), as it was reported to have done on the
day of the accident. In other words, could a thermally ex-
ploded R134a with an unobstructed ight path travel the
required distance? Because the R134as traveled further
than 22.3 m (73 ft), this observation was consistent with
the testimony of the injured man and the physical evidence.
A travel distance shorter than 61 m (200 ft) can be ex-
plained by either the R134a hitting the man in the eye or
the arc of ight. The heat-to-burst tests were always con-
ducted with a 30 elevation from horizontal and ight paths
were always unobstructed.
What was surprising and led to further heat-to-burst
testing was that the rst R134a exploded at a much lower
than expected temperature, approximately 49 to 54 C
(120135 F). Further testing revealed a range of explosion
temperatures that made the automobile-heating scenario
plausible. Of six heat-to-burst tests, at least four were be-
low 1.86 MPa (270 psig). The R134a that was used in the
automobile simulation (Fig. 1 and 6) exploded in the heat-
to-burst test just a few degrees higher than was achieved
during the simulation, thus explaining why that specic
R134a did not explode during the automobile simulation.
Another, unconned form of heat-to-burst test, referred
to as a Pancake Griddle Test, was designed to answer
questions that arose out of nding both the bottom of the
R134a and the hose-gage assembly between the radiator
and engine. It made sense that the bottom of the R134a hit
the hood and was deected downward between the radiator
and the engine, but should the hose-gage assembly also
have ended up there, or should it have traveled some
distance away from the vehicle with the rocketing body of
the R134a?
A single R134a with its hose-gage assembly attached
was placed on an electric pancake griddle in the middle of
a eld. The purpose of the test was to determine what
happens when an R134a with its hose-gage assembly at-
tached explodes and it is not constrained. To ensure the
lack of constraint no thermocouples were attached to the
R134a itself. It was a concern that an attachment of any
kind, even a thermocouple, might alter the ight path of the
pieces once the R134a exploded. The griddle was turned to
100% heat from the very start of the test.
In the R134a Pancake Griddle Test, the bottom pointed
west and the top east. When the R134a exploded, the top of
the container was damaged in a manner very similar to the
evidence R134a. The hose-gage assembly ended up 4.9 m
(16 ft) directly to the south of the pancake griddle. Hence,
the hose-gage assembly was torn away from the R134a
instantly upon explosion and did not travel with the R134a
body even a few inches. The bottom of the can ended up
approximately 45.1 m (148 ft) to the south. The body of
the can ended up approximately 74.4 m (244 ft) northeast.
Therefore, the result of the Pancake Griddle Test was
consistent with the physical evidence from the day of the
explosion.
Semi-Empirical Correlation
As it is in most failure analyses, each new piece of infor-
mation led to further questions. The obvious question was:
Why, in the heat-to-burst tests, were there such dramatic
variations in R134a explosion temperatures (and hence
pressures)?
In an effort to answer that question, each R134a bottom
used in the heat-to-burst testing was thoroughly cleaned in
ultrasonic acetone and methanol baths and then dried and
weighed. There appeared to be a correlation between the
weights of the bottoms and the explosion temperatures
(with heavier bottoms exploding at higher temperatures),
but the correlation was qualitative and had at least one
signicant outlier. The idea that heavier bottoms exploded
at higher temperatures and pressures was logical if the
Fig. 9 Heat-to-burst test apparatus
J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174 171
1 3
heavier weight was due to thicker material. Thicker bot-
toms would be expected to have greater stiffness and be
less prone to buckling than thinner bottoms.
Next, the Rockwell 15T supercial hardness of each
bottom was measured at multiple locations and a new
parameter, which was the multiplication product of the
bottom mass in grams times its minimum Rockwell 15T
hardness, was created. A fully automated digital readout
hardness tester was used. The idea was that hardness is
related to strength and weight to stiffness. When this new
parameter was plotted against the explosion temperatures,
as seen in Figure 10, the correlation factor (calculated via
Microsoft Excel) was greater than 0.9. This made sense.
The bottom of an aerosol container receives much of its
strength from its domelike geometry. The failure mecha-
nism of an aerosol bottom is buckling. Once the bottom
buckling initiates, the bottom loses almost half of its
strength and the bottom can no longer resist the pressure
inside the container. At that instant the bottom vigorously
buckles outward with enough force and kinetic energy to
unravel the bottom double seam. To the unaided eye this
appears as a one-step explosion.
With the (hardness weight) parameter available, the
explosion temperature of the evidence R134a was deter-
mined via extrapolation of Figure 10 to be 37.8 C
(100 F), which was consistent with the description from
the injured man of what happened on the day of the
explosion. This 37.8 C (100 F) was determined using an
average hardness for the entire evidence bottom.
From the automobile simulation data presented in Fig-
ure 6, a temperature of 37.8 C (100 F) would require
only a relatively short heating time, which was consistent
with the description from the injured man of what hap-
pened on the day of the explosion. It is worthwhile to note
that the evidence bottom was the lightest of all the bottoms
(16.5 g) and also had the lowest supercial hardness
(HR15T:77.6) compared to all the exemplars.
The empirical correlation seen in Figure 10 made it
possible to conclude that the R134a not only exploded
below 37.8 C (150 F), but also that the specic reason
for the explosion was the low weight/stiffness of the
bottom.
Per DOT Regulations, all aerosols are required to go
through a hot water bath such that they are heated to their
55 C (131 F) equilibrium pressure. One might question
then, why the evidence R134a did not explode when it
went through the manufacturers hot water bath. After all,
55 C (131 F) is greater than 37.8 C (100 F). It is
suggested that the residence time and temperature of the
manufacturers water bath was insufcient for the contents
to be heated to their 55 C (131 F) temperature. Had the
water bath been operated at higher temperature and/or the
aerosols had a longer residence time in the water bath, this
R134a may have been rejected before reaching any con-
sumer.
Finite-Element Analyses
While straightforward stress-strain calculations are appli-
cable for simple problems, nite-element analysis (FEA) is
a common numerical method for more complicated prob-
lems with irregular geometry and loadings. A rst attempt
to model the aerosol container bottom behavior was pub-
lished earlier [4].
In FEA, a geometrical domain is broken into a nite
number of elements, or subdivisions of that domain. The
elements are quadrilateral or triangular shaped in the case
of a 2D problem or shaped as a brick or tetrahedral in the
case of a 3D problem. The elements are connected at a
specied number of intersecting points, called nodes. As
the mathematical equations are solved for one element, the
displacements at that elements nodes are transferred to
other elements connected at common nodes. Eventually, as
the equilibrium equations for each element are satised, the
displacement, strain, and stress elds throughout the entire
physical body are known. Understanding these elds al-
lows the estimation of the functional failure of a device.
The nite element software package ANSYS/LS-DYNA
was used to simulate the 2-piece aerosol problem, because
the software package has been a leading FEA program for
almost thirty years [5]. The software packages are mature
and reliable structure analysis tools available with the
capabilities to handle highly nonlinear contact problems
[6].
For the problem considered here, ANSYS/LS-DYNA
with element PLANE162 is used for large-deformations
dynamic analysis and the collapse of the container in axi-
symmetric geometry. To model contact between surfaces,
the 2D automatic single surface (ASS2D) model is used [7].
Fig. 10 Explosion temperature vs. (hardness grams) of R134a
bottoms. The linear trendline is drawn by Microsoft Excel
172 J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174
1 3
Figure 11 presents a schematic of the dimensions used in
the FEA model.
Nine separate analyses were completed, varying three
levels of two parameters for the R134a bottom, yield
strength and thickness.
Other than the thickness of the bottom (t
B
), all geo-
metrical parameters from Figure 11 are held constant as:
D = 6.4 cm (2.52 in.), H
S
= 0.323 cm (0.127 in.), t
W
=
0.254 cm (0.01 in.), H
W
= 2.54 cm (1.0 in.), H
A
=
0.889 cm (0.35 in.), r
S
= 0.20 cm (0.08 in.), and r
A
=
6.104 cm (2.403 in.).
Each simulation was performed by incrementally
increasing the loading pressure inside the R134a by Dp,
which is proportional to a pseudo time step, and nding a
static solution before advancing the calculation to the next
step. The nine analyses performed are listed in Table 2.
The failure criterion was selected as the pressure at
which there are through-thickness yield stresses in the
bottom and the bottom loses its domelike geometry. The
reason this failure criterion was chosen is due to the
experimental observation that a one-step explosion takes
place the instant there is a disturbance of the geometry of
the bottom. It is acknowledged that the failure criterion is
rather exible at this point in the development of the FEA
model and that further research, both experimental and
theoretical, is warranted. However, it is a very reasonable
criterion based on the information and data available
(Figure 12).
Table 2 shows that increasing bottom thickness and/or
bottom strength will improve the resistance to failure. It
also shows that some combinations of thickness and
strength predict failures at pressures below 1.86 MPa (270
psig), while other combinations predict failures above
1.86 MPa (270 psig). This is consistent with experimental
observations. The failure pressures calculated by FEA can
be converted to failure temperatures by using Figure 5. A
graphical presentation of Table 2 is presented in Figure 13.
Summary and Conclusions
A failure analysis case study is presented for an aerosol
container. The aerosol container came out of a do-it-yourself
Fig. 11 Schematic of dimensions used in FEA model
Table 2 Matrix of Yield Strengths and Bottom Thickness and Results of FEA Model
YS Ksi Thickness, in. Internal Psig at Failure Deg F at Failure YS MPa Thickness, cm Deg C at Failure MPa cm
50 0.013 209 134 0.34 0.033 56.67 0.011
50 0.014 241 145 0.34 0.036 62.78 0.012
50 0.015 281 157 0.34 0.038 69.44 0.013
60 0.013 232 142 0.41 0.033 61.11 0.014
60 0.014 267 153 0.41 0.036 67.22 0.015
60 0.015 307 162 0.41 0.038 72.22 0.016
70 0.013 245 146 0.48 0.033 63.33 0.016
70 0.014 285 157 0.48 0.036 69.44 0.017
70 0.015 325 165 0.48 0.038 73.89 0.018
Fig. 12 Graphic representation of failure stress in FEA model. Yield
strength of bottom illustrated is 34.7 MPa (50 Ksi) and thickness
0.036 cm (0.014 in.)
J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174 173
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automobile AC recharging kit containing three DOT 2Q,
two-piece aerosol containers of tetrauoroethane, com-
monly referred to as Refrigerant 134a. A gentleman was
preparing to recharge the ACsystemof his automobile when
the bottomexploded off the aerosol container, propelling the
body of the aerosol container like a rocket, which in turn hit
the man in the eye and blinded him in that eye.
An empirical correlation using measured hardness and
weights of the container bottoms and the experimentally
determined burst pressures allowed the calculation of the
explosion temperature and pressure on the day of the
incident. This empirical correlation agrees qualitatively
with a theoretical analysis of the failure pressures using
FEA.
Several factors were experimentally measured that most
likely contributed to the unexpected explosion of the
R134a. The 54.4 C (130 F) pressure of the contents was
0.14 MPa (20 psig) higher than allowed by DOT regula-
tions for the 2Q container. The strength (hardness) and/or
thickness (weight) of the container bottom were insuf-
cient to provide the necessary resistance to buckling, thus
when the container was heated, the bottom buckled and the
aerosol exploded.
References
1. Code of Federal Regulations, Transportation, 49 CFR Sections
173.306, 178.33 and 178.33a, October, 2003.
2. DuPont Product Information Bulletin for Suva 134a, February
2003.
3. M. Fox, R. Hastings J. of Failure Anal. Prevent. 6(2), 5056
(2006).
4. M. Fox, P. Zhao and J. C. Heinrich: Computer Stress Analysis of
Self-Pressurized Container Bottom, Invited Paper, On-Line
Packaging Conference, www.industryids.com, February 2005.
5. S. Moaveni: Finite Element Analysis, Theory and Application with
ANSYS, Pearson Education, New Jersey, 2
nd
Ed. 2003.
6. ANSYS 7.0: Online Documentation (included with the software).
7. Explicit Dynamics with ANSYS LS-DYNA, Training Manual,
Release 7.1, 2
nd
edition, 2003.
Fig. 13 Graphical presentation of FEA model calculations. The
linear trendline is drawn by Microsoft Excel
174 J Fail. Anal. and Preven. (2007) 7:165174
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