You are on page 1of 9

CITIZENS CRIME COALITION

MEMORANDUM

To: Mayor Anthony Williams and Members of the Council

Subject: Summit 2006

Date: October 5, 2006

Introduction
1


On July 19
th
, members of the Council received the Enhanced Crime
Prevention and Abatement Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (Bill 16-877) and
two days later they enacted it into law without benefit of any community input.

On September 18
th
, members of the Citizens Crime Coalition
2
convened
Summit 2006 at the Wilson Building to examine the need for the emergency
legislation and the measures it authorized and to develop their own
programmatic proposals for the District crime problem. This Memorandum
summarizes those deliberations and the Summits recommendations.

There was no crime emergency.
3


Requesting the Council to convene in special session to consider the
emergency bill, the Mayor cited a sharp increase in criminal activity that
included 15 murders since July 1
st
.
4
Mayoral spokesperson Sharon Gang called
it a crime wave that includes an 11 percent increase in robberies in the past 30
days and an 82 percent increase in arrests of juveniles for robberies in the first
six months of this year.
5


The premise for the declaration of a crime emergency was several high
profile crimes: an awful robbery-assault-homicide in Georgetown and several
robberies on the National Mall. However, a more careful look at the data reveals
a different picture: The homicide rate, including the spate of murders in July, was
down before the declaration of the emergency, and crime on the Mall is a small
fraction of the citys crime problem, less than one percent.


1
This summary of the proceedings of Summit 2006 was prepared by staff of the ACLU of the
National Capital Area, 1400 20
th
Street, NW, #119, Washington, DC 20036 (tel. 202/457-0800).
Please address questions and comments to Johnny Barnes, Executive Director.
2
Participants in the Citizens Crime Coalition are listed at the end of this memorandum.
3
Based on the presentation of Jason Ziedenburg, Co-founder, Justice Policy Institute.
4
The Washington Post, July 18, 2006, B1.
5
Ibid at B2.
2
Juvenile crime, particularly robberies, is not driving crime trends in the
District. MPD data for 2006 show that 94 percent of all persons arrested are
adults, and adults comprise 82 percent of all persons arrested for violent crimes.
Of those arrested for robbery, 60 percent were adults. The 82 percent increase
in arrests of juveniles for robberies in the first six months of this year represents
60 more arrests than the comparable period last year. But the number of juvenile
robbery arrests for the first six months of 2006 is consistent with the number of
such arrests for the last six months of 2005. And to put this into context, there
are 30,000 crimes annually reported in the District.

This picture does not warrant the declaration of a crime emergency. The
Georgetown murder and robberies on the Mall were exploited on the eve of the
September 12 primary election to obtain Council sanction for police measures
not previously authorized. The Summit considered three of them: neighborhood
surveillance cameras, the 10 p.m. juvenile curfew, and disclosure of juvenile
arrest records.

Surveillance cameras dont stop crime.
6


The District of Columbia should not waste money on surveillance
cameras. The truth about CCTV is already well known: cameras dont stop
crime.

In August 2002 the British Home Office published a Meta Study
reviewing the research on the effect of CCTV on crime rates.
7
The bottom line is
that in the areas where the police department has placed cameras center city
and residential areas, CCTV offers no value as a crime fighting tool.

This year the non-partisan Constitution Project published its Guidelines for
Public Video Surveillance. Among the Core Principles Governing the Creation
and Design of Public Video Surveillance Systems is the requirement that they be
capable of effectively achieving their articulated purposes.
8
The Guidelines
summarized the most recent research on the effectiveness of CCTV as follows:
9


The rapid expansion of public video surveillance has sparked a fierce
debate over the efficacy of the systems in fighting crime. A 2003 review by
the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta,
Canada found the consensus amongst empirical studies to be that video
surveillance has little effect on violent crime, and only a small positive
effect on property crime. This positive effect on property crime, moreover,

6
Based on the presentations of Melissa Ngo, Staff Counsel and Director of the Identification and
Surveillance Project at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and Jay Stanley, Public
Education Director of the Technology and Liberty Program of the ACLU.
7
The Meta Study is available on line at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hors252.pdf.
8
Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance at xii.
9
Guidelines at 7.

3
was substantially less than the effect of improved lighting. Also unclear is
the effect of other simultaneous public-safety enhancementssuch as
improved street lightingand the extent to which criminal activity was
simply displaced to non-surveilled areas. Finally, given the cost of
deploying, maintaining, and operating such systems, no data exists to
demonstrate that video surveillance is a more effective use of public
resources than traditional law enforcement.

A number of American cities have abandoned their surveillance camera
systems as ineffectual: Detroit, Miami Beach, New York (Times Square),
Hoboken, N.J., and Mt. Vernon, N.Y. For three years, the Oakland, California
police department advocated the use of surveillance cameras in public places. In
a report to the City Council, Chief of Police Joseph Samuels, Jr., stated that his
department had hoped to be . . . among the pioneers in the field of taped video
camera surveillance but ultimately found that . . . there is no conclusive way to
establish that the presence of video surveillance cameras resulted in the
prevention or reduction of crime.

Simply put, there is no evidence that links publicly operated surveillance
cameras to a decrease in crime rates. At best, studies have been inconclusive
on the efficacy issue; at worst, they clearly show surveillance cameras to be
completely ineffective. But none have found the dramatic effects that proponents
claim follow the installation of cameras.

The $2.3 million appropriated for neighborhood surveillance cameras
could have been better spent hiring 46 additional police officers. The
presentation on community policing made clear that successful law enforcement
depends on the relationship between the individual police officer and the
individual resident. No such relationship is possible between a resident and a
camera on a pole.

Recommendation: Discontinue the use of surveillance cameras except to
monitor the perimeters of fixed locations such as public monuments that are
likely targets for terrorist attack.

The youth curfew does not protect young people or deter youth crime.
10


As noted above, most crime is not committed by young people. Research
from California shows that places that made more strict use of youth curfews
actually had a harder time reducing crime than counties that used curfews more
sparingly. In the years that the District did not have a curfew in place, juvenile
crime actually fell faster than when a midnight curfew was brought into place.

Recommendation: Repeal the youth curfew.


10
Based on the presentation of Jason Ziedenberg.
4
Notification of student arrests reverses the presumption of innocence.
11


Whenever a student is charged with a serious reportable crime, the
emergency crime act requires the police department to notify the Superintendent
of Public Schools of the students arrest and charges. This is a major breach of
the principle of confidentiality on which the juvenile justice system is based.
Even though there has been no finding of guilt, this notification can only be
prejudicial to the juvenile.

For their part, the school authorities are uncertain about the utility of
receiving this information. Other than being aware of the information, there is
nothing that the school may do with it.

And it must be noted that this requirement of notification applies only to
the public school system and not to charter, private or parochial schools.

Recommendation: Repeal this breach of the confidentiality of the juvenile
justice system.
* * * * * *
The Enhanced Crime Prevention and Abatement Emergency Amendment
Act of 2006 contains many other problematic provisions such as the denial of bail
to persons accused of certain crimes. Because of time constraints, these
provisions were not on the agenda for the Summit.

There is a need for a real crime prevention, opportunities, and law enforcement
strategy for the District.

Summit participants were pleased to learn from Associate Judge Anita
Josey-Herring, presiding officer of the Family Court, how the juvenile drug court
and the alternative initiative for juvenile detention were making a difference in the
lives of at-risk youth. Associate Judge Lynn Leibovitz who hears adult criminal
cases also emphasized the destructiveness of drugs.

Speaker after speaker and community participants expressed their
dissatisfaction and frustration with the Districts response to its crime problem,
especially the emergency legislation. Most considered it more sound bite than
sound policy. The pervasiveness of crime in certain neighborhoods is not a new
phenomenon. It is an unacceptable violation of the rights of residents to safety; it
is constant and ruins lives everyday. The causes of crime are interconnected:
the failure of families and schools, drugs, and joblessness, to cite the most
obvious. We do know what makes a difference in reducing crime but are just not
putting adequate resources into those programs. Simply increasing the number
of police officers and instituting harsher punishments does not work.


11
Based on the presentation of Iris Toyer, Director of the School Partnership Project of the
Washington Lawyers Committee.
5
The Summit identified several key areas where the District must do a
better job:

Institute real community policing.
12


The professional and academic literature is replete with prescriptions for
community policing. In short, it requires police officers to know the residents of
the neighborhoods they patrol and to work intimately and cooperatively with
them in preventing and solving crime. To do so, police officers must be problem
solvers for a broad range of community problems and not just crime. In that way
they will earn the trust of residents who will cooperate when crime does occur.

Community police officers can do their job only if they get out of their
squad cars. Beats should be covered with 16 hour foot patrols. Police officers
must become part of their neighborhoods and not be seen as a hostile, outside
occupying force. Simply increasing police presence without this major change in
attitude on the part of both police officers and residents will not be effective.

Recommendation: Institute real community policing by educating both
officers and residents. Officers unwilling or unable to perform as community
police officers should be terminated. Attached is A Commitment to Community
Policing Reform within the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, DC by
Tom Blagburn, which identifies specific issues requiring further review to institute
real community policing.

Support the health needs of families and children.
13


Health problems play a major role in crime. Here are some numbers: At
least half of all incarcerated youth have a mental disorder. One in nine District
residents is addicted to drugs. More than half of juveniles arrested last year
tested positive for drugs. Eighty percent of child abuse or neglect cases involve
parental drug use. Thirty percent of children live in poverty; 50 percent in ward 8.
And there is an established link between lead poisoning and later violent
behavior.

Recommendations:
Establish a childrens mental health system with clinical and family
support;
Increase substance abuse residential treatment beds for women
(presently there are only 20 beds);

12
Based on the presentations of Ron Hampton, Executive Director, National Black Police
Association, and Tom Blagburn, formerly Community Relations Director, Executive Assistant to
Chief of Police and Chief of the Program Review and Resource Management Division for the
Metropolitan Police Department.
13
Based on the presentations of Suzanne E. Cambria, Deputy Director for Public Policy of D.C.
Action for Children, and Frankeena Wright, Senior Health Policy Analyst.
6
Invest in substance abuse prevention programs for adolescents;
and
Expand mental health programs in schools (at present less than
1/3 of public schools have such programs).

Provide hope and opportunity to youth.
14


The July crime surge revealed an acute lack of summertime crime
prevention planning by the District government. Indifferent city residents who
failed to hold their elected officials accountable also are culpable. Every summer
large numbers of youth seek jobs and recreational opportunities in vain. Most
reside in wards 7 and 8. Summer after summer we seem destined to fail our
children, to rescue them from the despicable conditions that too many of them
endure. Gangs fill this void by providing the recognition and support that young
people crave. To break this cycle, the District government must assist parents
and communities meet their responsibilities.


14
Based on the presentation of Tom Blagburn.
7

A Commitment to Community Policing Reform within the
Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, DC
Prepared by Tom Blagburn
An Overview

Community Policing has become the most discussed and overly used buzzword
in the vernacular of law enforcement. It often carries multiple explanations and
definitions. Foremost, community policing is an organizational philosophy and
style of law enforcement practice that addresses the following: placing greater
emphasis and resources on the prevention of every specific category of crime;
focusing on collaborative problem solving to ameliorate the systemic dimensions
of crime; and constructing neighborhood service-delivery infrastructures to
effectively keep young people out of the juvenile justice process and lessen
recidivism. Additionally, the community policing philosophy must ensure that
there is a well-balanced programming repertoire of prevention/intervention and
arrest/incarceration to carry out the law enforcement mission.

In the District of Columbias Metropolitan Police Department, community policing
has become the illusive imperative. Policing, as it is now carried out, is too
reactive and less prevention-directed. However, there is clear evidence of
community policing efforts by some patrol officers to be more focused on the
prevention of crime; to develop problem solving partnerships with residents as
well as involving other government agencies and non-profit organizations in the
process of keeping youth away from incarceration and assisting with juvenile
offender reentry. But this action is not the widespread policing norm. Principally,
it is intermittent and has not been adopted as an operational priority throughout
the agency

It appears that the Metropolitan Police Department does not have a standardized
and unifying definition of community policing. Concomitantly, the District of
Columbia Government does not view itself as a community-oriented
bureaucracy. Both are required to make community policing a workable model.
Critics of community policing inside and outside of the Metropolitan Police
Department often misinterpret community policing as being too soft on crime.
Yet, nothing could be further from the truth.
A critical challenge is creating an institutional framework to support collaboration
among police, schools, recreation, job training and employment, and Mental
Health services. The resources and services provided to residents as an
outcome of this interdependency is the true work of community policing.

The community policing philosophy can be just as dominant among those officers
comprising a gang strike force as those officers assigned to neighborhood foot
patrols. The key is that each cadre of officers operates in a symbiotic
partnership. One will not be optimally effective in sustaining crime reductions
without the participation of the other.
8
Today, spikes in crime are frequent occurrences in specific quadrants of the city
and MPD must become the lead agency in coordinating government services
and prevention resources into hotspot areas to transform these locations into
neighborhood peace zones.
Some Patrol Service Areas [PSAs] are too large and the geographical
boundaries must be compressed. The Districts high volume of 911 calls for
service workload is causing officers to be chained to their scout cars. Calls for
service are not being managed in the best manner to give officers blocks of
uncommitted patrol time to engage residents. Police repeat calls for service to
the same locations that are in high volume should be reviewed and analyzed.
Clearly, there are locations across the cities that are consuming large quantities
of officer patrol time. This makes it extremely difficult for officers to participate in
regular neighborhood foot patrols and to be more proactive. Also, neighborhood
risks and hazards to police caused by increasing incidents of interpersonal
violence are high along with the availability of firearms. Consequently, there are
few single officer scout cars [1099 units] available. The issue of low police
visibility and resident contact should be addressed quickly, beginning with PSA
beat officers. Part of the community policing philosophy is to foster a bottoms-up
approach by gathering officer(s) insights and innovations. This approach will
contribute to building trust among residents and recast police officers as
enforcement engineers.

Training in the protocols of problem solving must be upgraded and expanded for
all members from dispatchers and officers to supervisors and managers. More
importantly, problem solving should be defined as a unit of work and must
become a workload measure to evaluate officer performance and community
policing efficacy. It can become the foundation for professional development
officer and integrated into annual performance review. Problem solving should
carry a higher performance index than the execution of an arrest. Performing
community policing will create an operational model that will improve
investigations, ensure greater case closure rates and strengthen the connection
to residents.

Issues requiring further review

Analyze all calls for service to the same location.

Conduct an inventory of all existing youth violence prevention programs by
Ward.

Survey officers and Sergeants from each police district about work issues,
organizational support and available problem-solving resources.

Review and evaluate Departments organizational structure. MPD appears top
heavy and a complete realignment may be necessary.

9
Evaluate utilization of personnel in tactical vice units.

Examine the tensions and strained relationships of residents toward police.
Trust between police and residents has deteriorated. Bold initiatives to rebuild
confidence and trust between residents, adults and juveniles, must be developed
as soon as possible, neighborhood by neighborhood.

Recommendations for action and reforms in community policing must be shared
with residents in every Ward of the city, allowing for their input.

You might also like