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Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations

Author(s): David C. Kang


Source: International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003/2004), pp. 165-180
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137481 .
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les
in A s ian International
Relations
David C.
Kang
In
my
article entitled
"Getting
A s ia
Wrong,"
I make two
major argu ments .'
Firs t,
Eu ropean-d erived
theories in
general
and realis t theories in
particu lar frequ ently
have
d ifficu lty
explaining
A s ian international relations .
Second ,
international relations s chol-
ars need to be as carefu l abou t is s u es of
empirical tes ting
and theoretical
rigor
when
s tu d ying
A s ia as
they
are when
s tu d ying Eu rope.
In a
reply
to
my
arti-
cle,
A mitav
A charya agrees
with both of thes e claims while als o
critiqu ing my
es s ay
in
argu ing
that s hared norms and ins titu tional
linkages mitigate rivalry
in A s ia and that I am a his torical d eterminis t.
A charya,
however,
has mis u n-
d ers tood both international relations
theory
and the role of
his tory.
His re-
s pons e
to
my
article
provid es
me with an
opportu nity
to
clarify
and
briefly
expand
on the
major
themes in
"Getting
A s ia
Wrong."
A s
A charya's reply exemplifies ,
mos t s cholars not
only
d is mis s the notion
that the A s ian
experience might
force a
rethinking
or mod ification of Eu ro-
pean-d erived
theories ,
bu t
they
als o
pay
little attention to the his torical A s ian
international
s ys tem. A charya
writes ,
"Contrary
to
Kang's argu ment,
A s ia's
fu tu re will not res emble its
pas t" (p.
150).
A charya,
however,
has mis u nd er-
s tood
my argu ment:
To
s tu d y
the role of
his tory
is
hard ly
to
pred ict
that it will
replicate
its elf in the fu tu re.
My
main
point
is that there are
good
reas ons to
think that A s ian s tates
may
not fu nction like
Eu ropean
s tates and that the
s tu d y
of A s ia mu s t
begin
with a d is cu s s ion of s ome of A s ia's
empirical
anoma-
lies and what
might explain
them.
A charya
s eems to
argu e
that the
only goal
to which s cholars who
s tu d y
A s ia can
as pire
is to
u nqu es tioningly apply
exis t-
ing theory.
In
contras t,
my goal
is to
expand
international relations
theory
s o
that s cholars can better
id entify
factors that
help
to
explain regional
and tem-
poral
d ifferences in how s tates think abou t and achieve
s ecu rity
and how
they
cond u ct their international relations .
David C.
Kang
is A s s ociate
P rofes s or of
Government and
A d ju nct
A s s ociate
P rofes s or
at the Tu ck School
of
Bu s ines s ,
Dartmou th
College.
For their comments and
s u gges tions ,
the au thor thanks A mitav
A charya,
Thomas
Chris tens en,
Stephan Haggard ,
Victoria
Hu i,
P eter
Katz ens tein, Jennifer Lind ,
Richard
Little,
Rand all
Schweller,
A llan
Stam,
and William Wohlforth.
1. David C.
Kang, "Getting
A s ia
Wrong:
The Need for New
A nalytic
Frameworks ,"
International
Secu rity,
Vol.
27,
No. 4
(Su mmer 2003),
pp.
57-85.
International
Secu rity,
Vol.
28,
No. 3 (Winter 2003/04),
pp.
165-180
@ 2004
by
the P res id ent and Fellows of Harvard
College
and the Mas s achu s etts Ins titu te of
Technology.
165
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International
Secu rity
28:3 166
In this
reply
I make three
points .
Firs t,
I s how that
A charya's
as s ertion that I
am
claiming
an
exceptional
role for A s ia is
u nfou nd ed ;
I als o s how that
rigor-
ou s s ocial s cience d emand s that s cholars be
open
to the
pos s ibility
that evi-
d ence
may
force theoretical mod ifications .
Second ,
I d emons trate that the
s tu d y
of
hierarchy
is a
well-d eveloped
branch of international relations
theory,
and I
explain why balancing
s hou ld not be the d efau lt
hypothes is
in interna-
tional relations .
Third ,
I examine A s ia's
empirical
record to illu s trate the im-
portance
of an increas ed focu s on A s ian
his tory
for the field of international
relations ;
in
ad d ition,
I enu merate s everal cu rrent
empirical
anomalies that
s cholars need to ad d res s
given
the
challenge
that thes e
pos e
to conventional
theoretical
explanations
of A s ian international relations .
Theory Bu ild ing
and
Theory Tes ting
acros s
Regions
International relations s cholars mu s t take
s eriou s ly
the
pos s ibility
that d iffer-
ent
regions
of the world
might
ind eed be d ifferent.
Related ly, critiqu es
of this
claim as s omehow
fu nd amentally exceptionalis t
mis u nd ers tand the natu re of
s cholarly inqu iry.
It is
good
s ocial s cience to be
open
to the
pos s ibility
that
evid ence
may
not fit a
theory, ju s t
as it is
pos s ible
to note d ifference withou t
res orting
to caricatu re-a
trap
into which
A charya
falls when
criticiz ing
s ome
of
my
as s ertions as
having
an
"exceptionalis t ring" (p.
162).
A n
example
of
how
progres s ive
res earch
might
occu r is
perhaps
bes t d emons trated
throu gh
a
comparis on
of
s cholars hip
on A s ian
d evelopment
with
s cholars hip
on A s ian
international relations .
A ccord ing
to a nu mber of criteria-theoretical
s ophis ti-
cation,
attention to the
empirical
record ,
and
impact
on the wid er field of s ocial
s cience-the
s tu d y
of A s ian international relations
lags
far behind . A brief re-
view of the intellectu al
his tory
of A s ia confirms this obs ervation.
Beginning
in the late
1970s ,
s cholars of A s ian
d evelopment challenged
their
colleagu es
in the field s of
economics ,
political
s cience,
and
s ociology
to move
beyond
the
long-s tand ing d ichotomy
between a neoclas s ical free market and a
centrally planned economy
in their
s tu d y
of economic
d evelopment.
Chalmers
Johns on,
for
example,
was
particu larly
forcefu l when
argu ing
that
Japan's
eco-
nomic
growth
fit into neither
category.2
A nd as
Stephan Haggard
has
written,
"Spearhead ed by
s cholars ou ts id e the mains tream of North A merican econom-
ics , this work
began by u nd erlining empirical
anomalies : the
myriad ways
in
2. Chalmers
Johns on,
MITI and the
Japanes e
Miracle: The Growth
of
Ind u s trial
P olicy,
1925-1975 (Stan-
ford ,
Calif.: Stanford
Univers ity
P res s , 1982).
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les 167
which the Eas t A s ian cas es failed to conform to the neoclas s ical view."3 In the
1980s ,
as
Japan's
economic ris e
continu ed ,
and Sou th Korea and Taiwan be-
came s u cces s fu l
d evelopers
(i.e.,
newly
ind u s trializ ed
cou ntries ,
or
NICs ),
the
d ebate over the
explanation
for their s u cces s intens ified .
The
d epend ent
variable in all three cas es was
s tartlingly
clear: Each was ex-
periencing
economic
d evelopment
that was
his torically u npreced ented by
world s tand ard s in both its
pace
and its
d epth.4
The is s u e was how to
explain
this
growth.
The d ebate
began by focu s ing
on whether s tate intervention was
central to the NICs ' economic s u cces s -the "s tate vers u s the market" d ebate.5
In
s u rpris ingly
little
time,
it became obviou s that the common variable was ex-
tens ive
government
intervention into the market. This
find ing
mad e clear the
need to recas t the s tand ard d ebate between the virtu es of a neoclas s ical free
market vers u s a
centrally planned economy.
Twenty years
later,
the
s tu d y
of A s ian
d evelopment
and the
high
theoretical
s tand ard s that this
s cholars hip
has es tablis hed have forced s cholars to face a
myriad
of new id eas and is s u es . The
concept
of a
"d evelopmental
s tate" has
become
part
of the canon in
political economy.6
New
d evelopments
in micro-
economics ,
s ociology,
and
anthropology
have u nd ers cored the role of ins titu -
tions in Eas t A s ia's economic
performance.
Scholars no
longer
view markets as
the frictionles s inters ection of
s u pply
and d emand cu rves . Ins tead markets are
being reinterpreted
as
complexes
of
principal-agent relations hips
in which
problems
of
imperfect
and
as ymmetric
information,
contracting,
and cred ibil-
3. For an overview of the intellectu al
d evelopment
of the
field ,
s ee
Stephan Haggard ,
"Ins titu tions
and Growth in Eas t
A s ia,"
Stu d ies in
Comparative
International
Development,
Vol.
38,
No. 4
(Spring
2004),
p.
4. For
empirical
as s es s ments ,
s ee Richard
Lu ed d e-Neu rath,
Import
Controls and
Export-
Oriented
Development:
A Reas s es s ment
of
the Sou th Korean Cas e
(Bou ld er, Colo.: Wes tview, 1986);
and
Ru s s ell
Mard on,
"The State and the Effective Control of
Foreign Capital:
The Cas e of Sou th Ko-
rea,"
World
P olitics ,
Vol.
43,
No. 1 (October 1990),
pp.
111-138.
4. Robert
Wad e,
"Eas t A s ia's Economic Su cces s :
Conflicting P ers pectives ,
P artial
Ins ights , Shaky
Evid ence,"
World
P olitics ,
Vol.
44,
No. 2
(Janu ary
1992),
pp.
270-320.
5. For economic
pers pectives ,
s ee
A lwyn You ng,
"The
Tyranny
of Nu mbers :
Confronting
the Sta-
tis tical Realities of the Eas t A s ian Growth
Experience," Qu arterly Jou rnal of
Economics , Vol.
110,
No.
3
(A u gu s t
1995),
pp.
641-680;
P au l
Kru gman,
"The
Myth
of A s ia's
Miracle,"
Foreign A ffairs ,
Vol.
73,
No. 6 (November/December 1994),
pp.
62-79;
and Helen
Hu ghes ,
ed .,
A chieving
Ind u s trializ ation in
A s ia
(Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity
P res s , 1988). For d is cu s s ions of
s tatis ts ,
s ee Robert
Wad e,
Governing
the Market
(P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton
Univers ity
P res s , 1990);
A lice H.
A ms d en,
A s ia's
Next Giant: Sou th Korea and Late Ind u s trializ ation
(Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity
P res s , 1989);
and
Stephan Haggard , P athways from
the
P eriphery:
The P olitics
of
Growth in the
Newly Ind u s trializ ing
States
(Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell
Univers ity
P res s , 1990).
6. Mered ith
Woo-Cu mings ,
ed .,
The
Developmental
State
(Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell
Univers ity
P res s ,
1999);
and David C.
Kang,
"Bad Loans to Good Friend s :
Money
P olitics and the
Developmental
State in
Korea,"
International
Organiz ation,
Vol.
56,
No. 1
(Winter 2002),
pp.
177-207.
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International
Secu rity
28:3 168
ity
are
u biqu itou s .7
The s mooth
fu nctioning
of markets
requ ires
more than
get-
ting policies ,
incentives ,
and
prices right.
A ls o need ed are
pu blic
and
private
ins titu tions that facilitate market
exchange-from
the
legal s ys tem
and a clear
d elineation of
property rights ,
to the
pu blic provis ion
of
information,
to infor-
mal ins titu tions that bu ild tru s t." Scholars continu e to
probe
the
relations hip
between
d evelopment
and
politics , corru ption,
the international
s ys tem,
and
the role of
his tory.'
A s
Haggard
writes ,
"In the
1990s ,
intellectu al
d evelop-
ments ...
provid ed
earlier
ins ights
on
government
intervention with micro-
fou nd ations that mad e them
legitimate
to the economics
profes s ion."'"
The
continu ing
d ebate over A s ian
d evelopment
has
generated
more than its
s hare of
controvers y."
A lmos t nowhere in this
d ebate, however,
d o
argu ments
abou t whether or not A s ia is
"exceptional" play
a
role,
and mos t s cholars take
A s ia's
empirical
realities on their own terms .
They pay
clos e attention to mea-
s u ring
the
ind epend ent
and
d epend ent
variables ,
and
they
are
open
to the
po-
tential ramifications of their
find ings
for s ocial s cience
theory. Exploring
how
ins titu tions affect
markets ,
and in
particu lar
the
impact
of A s ian
governments
and the
organiz ation
of A s ian bu s ines s on economic
growth,
is an
ongoing
proces s
that involves carefu l attention to both
theory
and evid ence.
By
com-
paris on,
the
s tu d y
of A s ian international relations is s till in its initial
s tages .
Bu t if s cholars in the field of
political economy
can d o
it,
s o too can s cholars in
the field of international relations .
7. Dani
Rod rik,
"Getting
Interventions
Right:
How Sou th Korea and Taiwan Grew
Rich,"
Economic
P olicy,
No. 20
(A pril
1995),
pp.
141-193;
Mas ahiko
A oki,
Information,
Incentives ,
and
Bargaining
in the
Japanes e Economy
(New York:
Cambrid ge Univers ity
P res s , 1988);
Jos eph
E.
Stiglitz
and
Marylou
Uy,
"Financial
Markets ,
P u blic
P olicy,
and the Eas t A s ian
Miracle,"
World Bank Res earch
Obs erver,
Vol.
11,
No. 2 (November 1996),
pp.
249-276;
and World
Bank,
The Eas t A s ian Miracle: Economic
Growth and P u blic
P olicy
(New York: Oxford
Univers ity
P res s , 1993).
8. David C.
Kang,
"Trans action Cos ts and
Crony Capitalis m
in Eas t
A s ia,"
Comparative
P olitics ,
Vol.
35,
No. 4
(Ju ly
2003),
pp.
439-459;
A nd rew
MacIntyre,
"Ins titu tions and Inves tors : The P olitics
of the Economic Cris is in Sou theas t
A s ia,"
International
Organiz ation,
Vol.
55,
No. I
(Winter 2001),
pp.
81-122;
and Michael
Ros s ,
"Ind ones ia's
P u z z ling
Cris is ,"
Univers ity
of California at Los A n-
geles ,
2003.
9. David C.
Kang, Crony Capitalis m: Corru ption
and
Development
in Sou th Korea and the
P hilippines
(Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity
P res s , 2002);
Richard
Doner,
Bryan
Ritchie,
and Daniel
Slater,
"Sys tem Vu lnerability
and the
Origins
of
Developmental
States : Northeas t and Sou theas t A s ia in
Comparative P ers pective," Emory Univers ity,
2003;
and
Mu s htaq
H. Khan and
K.S. Jomo, Rents ,
Rent-s eeking,
and Economic
Development: Theory
and Evid ence in A s ia (New York:
Cambrid ge
Univer-
s ity
P res s , 2000).
10.
Haggard ,
"Ins titu tions and Growth in Eas t
A s ia,"
p.
14.
11. One s u ch
controvers y
is over total
factory prod u ctivity.
See
Kru gman,
"The
Myth
of A s ia's
Miracle";
and Dani
Rod rik,
"Coord ination Failu res and Government
P olicy:
A Mod el with
A ppli-
cations to Eas t A s ia and Eas tern
Eu rope," Jou rnal of
International
Economics ,
Vol.
40,
Nos . 1-2
(Feb-
ru ary
1996),
pp.
1-22.
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les 169
Hierarchy
and
Balancing
in International Relations
In
my
article,
I
qu es tion
whether A s ian international relations will be hierar-
chic or whether a
regional
balance of
power
is more
likely.
In
ad d ition,
I criti-
ciz e s cholars who
au tomatically
as s u me that
balancing
will res u lt. Scholars
have no reas on to think that
balancing
behavior is
homogeneou s ly
d is tribu ted
acros s
regions ,
and that becau s e it occu rred in
Eu rope,
it will in A s ia as well.
The is s u e for A s ian international relations is not a theoretical one abou t
whether
hierarchy
cou ld
exis t,
bu t rather an
empirical
one: Does the evid ence
s how
balancing
or
band wagoning
behavior in A s ia?
A charya
writes that
"Kang's
notion of
hierarchy
is not
grou nd ed
in the
available theoretical literatu re"
(p.
154).
In
making
this
claim, however,
A charya
overlooks at leas t two well-es tablis hed s chools that examine variou s
forms of
hierarchy
and
band wagoning.'2
The
hegemonic s tability
s chool,
which
emphas iz es
the beneficial
impact
that a d ominant
power
can have on
les s
powerfu l
s tates ,
is a
prime example.
A nother is the
prepond erance
of
power
s chool,
which
argu es
that an
u nequ al
d is tribu tion of
power
in the inter-
national
s ys tem
is more s table than an
equ al
d is tribu tion of
power."
In
ad d i-
tion,
s ome s cholars have
explored ways
in which the United States can res train
its own
overweening power
to
"mitigate
fears of d omination and aband on-
ment"
among s econd ary
s tates in the
s ys tem.14
In
contras t,
A charya
falls into
the
trap
of
as s u ming
that
balancing
is the d efau lt
hypothes is
in international
12. Rand all L.
Schweller,
"Band wagoning
for P rofit:
Bringing
the Revis ionis t State Back
In,"
Inter-
national
Secu rity,
Vol.
19,
No.
1 (Su mmer 1994),
pp.
72-107;
Robert
P owell,
In the Shad ow
of
P ower:
States and
Strategies
in International
P olitics (P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton
Univers ity
P res s , 1999);
and
Charles L.
Glas er,
"The
Secu rity
Dilemma
Revis ited ,"
World
P olitics ,
Vol.
50,
No.
1 (October 1997),
pp.
171-210.
13. On
hegemonic s tability,
s ee Robert
Gilpin,
War and
Change
in World P olitics
(Cambrid ge:
Cam-
brid ge Univers ity
P res s , 1981);
Robert
O.
Keohane,
A fter Hegemony: Cooperation
and Dis cord in the
World P olitical
Economy
(P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton
Univers ity
P res s , 1984);
and David A .
Lake,
P ower, P rotection,
and Free Trad e: International Sou rces
of
United States Commercial
Strategy,
1887-1939
(Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell
Univers ity
P res s , 1988).
On
prepond erance
of
power,
s ee
A .EK. Organs ki
and
Jacek Ku gler,
The War
Led ger (Chicago: Univers ity
of
Chicago
P res s , 1980);
Dou glas
Lemke,
Regions
of
War and P eace
(Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity
P res s , 2002);
Henk
Hou weling
and
Jan
Siccama,
"P ower Trans itions as a Cau s e of
War," Jou rnal of Conflict
Res olu tion,
Vol.
32,
No.
1 (March
1988),
pp.
87-102;
and
Dou glas
Lemke and Su z anne
Werner,
"P ower
P arity,
Commitment to
Change,
and
War,"
International Stu d ies
Qu arterly,
Vol.
40,
No. 2
(Ju ne 1996),
pp.
235-260.
14. G.
John Ikenberry, A fter Victory:
Ins titu tions ,
Strategic
Res traint,
and the
Rebu ild ing of
Ord er
after
Major
Wars
(P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton
Univers ity
P res s , 2001),
p.
5;
William C.
Wohlforth,
"The Sta-
bility
of a
Unipolar
World ,"
International
Secu rity,
Vol.
24,
No.
1 (Su mmer 1999),
pp.
5-42;
and
Jo-
s eph
S.
Nye,
Bou nd to Lead : The
Changing
Natu re
of
A merican P ower (New York: Bas ic
Books , 1990).
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International
Secu rity
28:3
1170
relations
theory.
However,
as Robert P owell
conclu d es ,
"Whether s tates bal-
ance,
band wagon,
or s tand as id e while others
fight d epend s
in a
complicated
way
on
many
d ifferent factors
....
when thes e factors are taken into
accou nt,
s tates
u s u ally band wagon."'5
The
balancing propos ition
that
grows
ou t of this literatu re-Kenneth Waltz 's
confid ent as s ertion that
"hegemony
lead s to balance" and has d one s o
"throu gh
all of the centu ries we can
contemplate"'6--is
alive and well. A nd as
Stu art Kau fman and William Wohlforth
note,
"Criticis m of Waltz concerns
mainly
his theoretical
explanation
for recu rrent
balances ,
not the
phenomenon
its elf."" This
es s ay
is too s hort for a fu ll theoretical elaboration of
hierarchy
and how it exis ted in the his torical A s ian context.
Ins tead ,
the remaind er of
this s ection aims to s how that the theoretical ed ifice cons tru cted
by
Waltz is
bad ly
in need of
repair.
In
Theory of
International
P olitics ,
Waltz claims that anarchic and hierarchic
ord ers are two end s of a
s pectru m
and that international relations is anarchic.
Hence,
Waltz d efines
hierarchy
as the
oppos ite
of
anarchy;
in this
world ,
hier-
archy
and
anarchy
cannot coexis t. The d ominant
pred iction
that aris es from
this formu lation is that balances occu r.
Fu rther,
Waltz res tricts his locu s of in-
qu iry
to the
great powers , d efining away
the tremend ou s
d ivers ity
that exis ts
within the international
s ys tem
and thu s
making
his
theory
fit his evid ence.
In recent
years ,
however,
s ome international relations s cholars have increas -
ingly begu n
to
challenge
the
balancing hypothes is .
If
twenty years ago
the con-
ventional wis d om was that
balancing
was a u nivers al law of international
relations ,
there is now cons id erable evid ence from ou ts id e the
Eu ropean
con-
text-inclu d ing
ancient
A s s yria,
med ieval
A s ia, Ind ia,
and Latin
A merica-
that in
s ys tems cons is ting
of one
major power,
the
s econd ary
s tates often d o
not balance
agains t
it. In one recent
project,
for
example,
s cholars fou nd that
s table hierarchies are at leas t as common as
balancing
or
empire.'"
A nd as
Wohlforth and Kau fman
point
ou t,
"Core
propos itions
from
many
theories
concerning
balance and
hierarchy
fall flat when confronted with evid ence from
15.
P owell,
In the Shad ow
of
P ower,
pp.
6,
201.
16. Kenneth N.
Waltz ,
"The
Emerging
Stru ctu re of International
P olitics ,"
International
Secu rity,
Vol.
18,
No. 2 (Fall 1993),
p.
77.
17. William C. Wohlforth and Stu art
Kau fman,
"Hierarchy
and Balance in International
Sys tems ,"
paper prepared
for the conference
"Hierarchy
and Balance in A ncient
Sys tems ,"
Dartmou th Col-
lege,
Hanover,
New
Hamps hire,
October
19-21, 2003,
p.
2.
18.
"Hierarchy
and Balance in A ncient
Sys tems ,"
conference held at Dartmou th
College,
October
19-21,
2003.
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les 171
s ys tems
other than thos e
compris ed
of the
Eu ropean
s tates and their contem-
porary d es cend ents .""1
Scholars are
beginning
to
explore
the theoretical u nd er-
pinnings
of international
s ys tems
mu ch more
broad ly
than before.21
In
d eveloping
the balance of
power
thes is ,
Waltz
u nd ers tand ably
focu s ed on
"a
few
big things ,"
and in
particu lar
on the
bipolar
confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union and the
potential
for nu clear holocau s t. A t
the
time,
Waltz
argu ed ,
"The
theory
of international
politics
is written in terms
of the
great powers
of an era. It wou ld be ... rid icu lou s to cons tru ct a
theory
of
international
politics
bas ed on
Malays ia
and Cos ta Rica.... A
general theory
of
international
politics
is
neces s arily
bas ed on the
great powers ."21
Even within a
Waltz ian
world , however,
s mall and med iu m
powers
d o exis t. This is not to ar-
gu e
for inclu s ion into his
theory
of variables s u ch as
id eology,
nons tate
actors ,
or international
ins titu tions ,
bu t rather to
acknowled ge
that in
accepting
the
nation-s tate as the u nit of
analys is ,
one mu s t allow for the role of s mall nation-
s tates . For
Waltz ,
the
great powers
are all that
matter,
s o
again
he has chos en a
s et of cas es that fit his
theory.
In
explaining
his
d epend ent variable--Cold
War
s tability
between two nu -
clear
s u perpowers -Waltz
was correct to res trict his focu s to the
great powers .
Small
powers
d id not matter in the
global s tru ggle
between the United States
and the Soviet Union. A
theory d es igned
to
explain
the Cold
War, however,
may
not
explain why
A s ian s tates are not
neces s arily balancing
China in the
s ame
way
that the United States balanced the Soviet Union. Becau s e the world
is no
longer
mad e
u p
of two
s u perpowers
and all the
res t,
s cholars who want
to
explore
other international
s ys tems
or alternative reas ons for s tate behavior
need to move
away
from
Waltz 's
tru ncated d efinition of which cou ntries mat-
ter and how
anarchy
interacts with
hierarchy.
If Thailand can s tart a
global
eco-
19. Wohlforth and
Kau fman,
"Hierarchy
and Balance in International
Sys tems ," p.
11.
20. See William C.
Wohlforth,
"Hierarchy,
Statu s ,
and
War,"
paper prepared
for the annu al meet-
ing
of the A merican P olitical Science
A s s ociation, Bos ton, Mas s achu s etts ,
A u gu s t 29-September
1,
2002;
David A .
Lake,
"A narchy, Hierarchy,
and the
Variety
of International
Relations ,"
International
Organiz ation,
Vol.
50,
No.
1 (Winter 1996),
pp.
1-33;
and
Katja
Weber,
Hierarchy
amid s t
A narchy:
Trans action Cos ts and Ins titu tional Choice
(A lbany:
State
Univers ity
of New York
P res s , 2000). The
Britis h School has been mos t active in
exploring
alternative forms of
organiz ation.
See A d am Wat-
s on,
The Evolu tion
of
International
Society:
A
Comparative
His torical
A nalys is
(New York:
Rou tled ge,
1992);
Evan
Lu ard ,
Conflict
and P eace in the Mod ern International
Sys tem:
A
Stu d y of
the
P rinciples of
International Ord er
(A lbany:
State
Univers ity
of New York
P res s , 1988);
and
Barry
Bu z an and Rich-
ard
Little,
"The Id ea of 'International
Sys tem': Theory
Meets
His tory,"
International P olitical Science
Review,
Vol. 15
(Ju ly
1994),
pp.
231-255.
21. Kenneth N.
Waltz ,
Theory of
International P olitics
(Read ing,
Mas s .:
A d d is on-Wes ley,
1979),
p.
73.
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International
Secu rity
28:3 172
nomic
cris is ,
and if war in
A fghanis tan
or Taiwan cou ld have a d irect
impact
on the United
States ,
perhaps
we s hou ld cons id er
incorporating
s u ch cou ntries
and s itu ations into ou r theories .
Ind eed ,
even Waltz allows for the
pos s ibility
that
balancing may
not
occu r,
althou gh
he
merely
as s erts
this ,
rather than
provid ing
a
theory
to
help explain
it. In
Theory of
International
P olitics ,
Waltz 's
es cape
clau s e was to
argu e
that
"s econd ary
s tates ,
if
they
are free to
choos e,
flock to the weaker s id e."22
Bu t
this ad mis s ion is
hard ly
s u fficient. Nor is his
implicit
d is mis s al of
hierarchy
ac-
ceptable.
Is Waltz
s u gges ting
that in a
s ys tem
with one d ominant
s tate,
s econd -
ary
s tates withou t a
balancing option
have no choice bu t to
acqu ies ce
and
accommod ate? Is this not
hierarchy?
Sometimes s tates
band wagon.
The is s u e is not nation-s tates
thems elves ,
bu t
rather the international d is tribu tion of
power
and
capabilities . A lread y
s chol-
ars know that s mall
powers
d o not
neces s arily
balance. If there is one d omi-
nant
power,
even other
great powers may
not
balance,
s eeing
it in their
interes ts to accommod ate the s tatu s
qu o.23 Band wagoning-or
at leas t
acqu ies -
cence to the s tatu s
qu o-by s econd ary
s tates is a central featu re of
hierarchy.24
In contras t to realis t
pred ictions
that
s econd ary
s tates will be fearfu l of and bal-
ance
agains t
the d ominant
s tate,
in
hierarchy
the
s econd ary
s tates flock to its
s id e with a view toward
gaining
benefits .2s
This behavior is cons is tent with
Rand all Schweller's d is tinction between
balancing
for
s ecu rity
and band -
wagoning
for
profit.2'
One
res pons e
from realis ts is that d ifferential
power
d oes not cons titu te a hi-
erarchy
and that the exis tence of
balancing
or
band wagoning
behavior
proves
nothing.27 They argu e
that
ju s t
becau s e s ome s tates are weaker d oes not mean
that
they
will not s trive to maintain their
ind epend ence,
which the
great pow-
22.
Ibid .,
p.
127.
23.
Wohlforth,
"The
Stability
of a
Unipolar
World ."
24. A
challenge
for international relations s cholars is to d efine more
clearly
ou r bas ic theoretical
concepts ,
s u ch as
band wagoning, balancing, engagement,
containment,
hegemony,
accommod a-
tion, hid ing,
and
hed ging.
25. On
balancing,
s ee
Waltz ,
Theory of
International
P olitics ;
Stephen
M.
Walt,
The
Origins of
A lliances
(Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell
Univers ity
P res s , 1987);
and Eric
Labs ,
"Do Weak States
Band wagon?"
Secu -
rity
Stu d ies ,
Vol.
1,
No. 3
(Spring
1992),
pp.
41-61.
26.
Schweller,
"Band wagoning
for P rofit."
27.
A ccord ing
to
Waltz ,
"State actions are not d etermined
by
s tru ctu re.... Becau s e s tates coexis t
in a
s elf-help s ys tem, they
are free to d o
any
fool
thing they
care
to,
bu t
they
are
likely
to be re-
ward ed for behavior that is
res pons ive
to s tru ctu ral
pres s u res
and
pu nis hed
for behavior that is
not."
Waltz ,
"Evalu ating
Theories ,"
A merican P olitical Science
Review,
Vol.
91,
No. 4 (December
1997),
p.
915.
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les 173
ers are
largely
able to achieve. If realis m cannot
pred ict
s tate
behavior,
then
realis ts
ou ght
to ad mit as mu ch.
Ins tead ,
they
continu e to
pred ict
over-
whelmingly
that s tates will balance in the face of
pred ominant power.
On the
other
hand ,
if
balancing
and
band wagoning
are not
pred ictions
that d erive
from a Waltz ian
approach,
then that
only
bu ttres s es
my point
that s cholars
need to be more carefu l in
explaining
A s ian s tate behavior.
Scholars hip
that
ignores
A s ian s tates '
his tory
and the role of
preferences
in
favor of a
pu rely
s tru ctu ral formu lation of international relations als o
ignores
many
of the theoretical ad vances of the
pas t
d ecad e
by
ind ivid u als s u ch as
Robert P owell and
James Fearon,
among
others .28 The mos t
s ophis ticated
theo-
retical treatments of
d eterrence,
s piral
mod els ,
and
power
trans itions contend
that
u nd ers tand ing preferences
is vital for
d rawing any
conclu s ions abou t
s tate behavior. A s
Haggard
notes ,
"In the abs ence of information on
actors '
preferences
or a clear s ens e of the natu re of the
s trategic
interaction in
qu es -
tion,
we are
u nlikely
to
generate
d efens ible
expectations
abou t s tate behavior
or the
propens ity
for conflict."29
In
s u m,
the notion of
hierarchy
is well es tablis hed in the international
relations
literatu re,
and
balancing
s hou ld not be the d efau lt
hypothes is
in in-
ternational relations
theory. Balancing
is the
expected
ou tcome u nd er certain
cond itions
(i.e.,
when there is a s mall nu mber of
great powers ). Hierarchy
and
band wagoning
are the
expected
ou tcomes when one s tate is d ominant in the
s ys tem.
The
qu es tion
then
is ,
What is
happening
in A s ia?
Empirical
A nomalies and His torical A s ia
In ad d ition to
opening
theoretical
s pace
for cons id eration of alternative
expla-
nations of A s ian international
relations ,
s cholars s hou ld cons id er more care-
fu lly
the
empirical
record of A s ian
s tates ,
inclu d ing
both the his torical
origins
of the A s ian international
s ys tem
and
pres ent-d ay empirical
anomalies .30
One
can lis t d oz ens of books in the
political
s cience mains tream literatu re that d eal
28.
P owell,
In the Shad ow
of
P ower; James
D.
Fearon,
"Domes tic
P olitics ,
Foreign P olicy,
and The-
ories of International
Relations ,"
A nnu al Review
of
P olitical
Science,
Vol.
1,
No.
1
(Fall 1998),
pp.
289-
314;
and Bru ce Bu eno d e
Mes qu ita
and David
Lalman,
War and Reas on: Domes tic and International
Imperatives
(New Haven,
Conn.: Yale
Univers ity
P res s , 1992).
29.
Stephan Haggard ,
"The Balance of
P ower, Globaliz ation,
and
Democracy
in Northeas t A s ia:
Reflections on
Long-Ru n
Forces ,"
paper pres ented
at the conference
"P eace,
Development,
and
Regionaliz ation
in Eas t
A s ia," Seou l,
Sou th
Korea,
September
2-3, 2003,
p.
60.
30. This s ection is d rawn from David C.
Kang, "Hierarchy
in A s ian International Relations : 1300-
1900," paper prepared
for the conference
"Hierarchy
and
Balancing
in A ncient
Sys tems ."
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International
Secu rity
28:3 174
with
pre-1945 Eu rope.3'
In
contras t,
there are
only
two
wid ely
read works of
political
s cience that d eal with
pre-1945
A s ia.32
The field of international relations tend s to treat the
contemporary
A s ian
s ys tem
as if it
emerged fu lly
formed from
nothingnes s
in the
pos t-World
War
II,
pos tcolonial
era. Bu t
many
A s ian cou ntries have been
geographically
d efined ,
centrally
ad minis tered s tates for far
longer
than thos e in
Eu rope.
To
ignore
the evolu tion of thes e s tates is at bes t an
overs ight;
at
wors t,
it reveals
an
u nwillingnes s
to
engage
A s ia
d irectly.
This is
es pecially pu z z ling given
the
hu ge
amou nt of attention that international relations s cholars have
paid
to the
his torical roots of the
Eu ropean s ys tem.
If s u ch s cholars were d is mis s ive of all
his tory,
at leas t that wou ld be cons is tent. Bu t
ignoring
A s ian
his tory
while
s tu d ying Eu ropean his tory
in es s ence bias es their conclu s ions in favor of the
Eu ropean experience.
A charya's
article
critiqu es my
brief overview of A s ian
his tory
in
"Getting
A s ia
Wrong," yet
his d is cu s s ion of A s ia's his torical record relies almos t exclu -
s ively
on a 1968 volu me ed ited
by
John
Fairbank.33 There has been a tremen-
d ou s amou nt of his torical
s cholars hip
in the
intervening thirty-five years ."
Below I
briefly expand my argu ment
to cons id er
(1)
whether other s tates ac-
commod ated to China in the
pas t,
and
(2)
the exis tence of
hierarchy
in A s ian
international relations
his torically.
Firs t,
accommod ation of China was the norm in Eas t A s ia
d u ring
the
Ming
(1368-1644)
and
Qing
(1644-1911)
eras . This d id
not, however,
involve a
s ignificant
los s of national
ind epend ence,
as
nearby
s tates were
largely
free to
cond u ct their d omes tic and
foreign policy ind epend ent
of China.
Regard ing
the Vietnames e Le
d ynas ty
(1427-1787),
for
example,
David Marr
writes ,
"This
31.
A mong many
books on his torical
Eu ropean
international
relations ,
s ee Henrik
Spru yt,
The Sov-
ereign
State and Its
Competitors :
A n
A nalys is of Sys tems
(P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton
Univers ity
P res s ,
1994);
Charles
Tilly,
ed .,
The Formation
of
National States in Wes tern
Eu rope
(P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton
Univers ity
P res s , 1974);
Hans
J. Morgenthau ,
P olitics
among
Nations : The
Stru ggle for
P ower and
P eace,
3d ed . (New York: A lfred A .
Knopf,
1960);
E.H.
Carr,
The
Twenty
Years '
Cris is ,
1919-1939: A n
Introd u ction to the
Stu d y of
International Relations (Lond on: Macmillan, 1951);
and Eliz abeth
Kier,
Imagining
War: French and Britis h
Military
Doctrine between the Wars
(P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton Uni-
vers ity
P res s , 1997).
32. Thes e are lain A las tair
Johns ton,
Cu ltu ral Realis m:
Strategic
Cu ltu re and Grand
Strategy
in Chines e
His tory
(P rinceton, N.J.:
P rinceton
Univers ity
P res s , 1994),
and
John
King
Fairbank, ed .,
The Chines e
World Ord er: Trad itional China's
Foreign
Relations
(Cambrid ge,
Mas s .: Harvard
Univers ity
P res s ,
1968). A third will be Victoria
Hu i,
War and State Formation in A ncient China and
Early
Mod ern Eu -
rope
(New York:
Cambrid ge Univers ity
P res s ,
forthcoming).
33.
Fairbank,
The Chines e World Ord er.
34. Mu ch of this literatu re is cited in
my book-length manu s cript.
David C.
Kang, "Hierarchy,
A lli-
ances ,
and
Stability
in
A s ia,"
Dartmou th
College,
2003.
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les 175
reality
[China's
overwhelming
s iz e],
together
with s incere cu ltu ral
ad miration,
led Vietnam's ru lers to
accept
the
tribu tary s ys tem. P rovid ing
China d id not
med d le in Vietnam's internal affairs .... Vietnames e monarchs were
qu ite
will-
ing
to d eclare thems elves vas s als of the Celes tial
Emperor.
The
s u btlety
of this
relations hip
was evid ent from the
way
in which Vietnames e monarchs
s tyled
thems elves
'king' (vu ong)
when
commu nicating
with China's
ru lers ,
bu t
'em-
peror' (hoang
d e)
when
ad d res s ing
their own
s u bjects
or
s end ing mes s ages
to
other Sou theas t A s ian ru lers ."35
Japan
als o worked within the Chines e-d ominated international
s ys tem.
To
eliminate the
ins ecu rity
cau s ed
by
fear of a Chines e
invas ion,
the
A s hikaga
Shogu nate
(1333-1573)
s ou ght
inves titu re
by
the
Ming emperor.
Kawaz oe
Shoji
writes ,
"Japan
had to become
part
of the
Ming
tribu te
s ys tem
and thu s
ceas e to be the
'orphan'
of Eas t A s ia. For centu ries the
Japanes e
had feared at-
tack
by
the Silla
(Korea),
and the
Mongol
invas ions had
provid ed
real
grou nd s
for
fearing
a
Ming
attack.""3 Even the
Toku gawa s hogu nate (1600-1868)
recog-
niz ed China's
centrality
and
Japanes e-Korean
relations as
equ al. A ccord ing
to
Key-hu ik
Kim,
"The
Toku gawa
ru lers
tacitly acknowled ged
Chines e
s u prem-
acy
and cu ltu ral
lead ers hip
in the Eas t A s ian world ....
thou gh Toku gawa
Ja-
pan
maintained no formal ties with China ... for all intents and
pu rpos es
it
was as mu ch a
part
of the Chines e world as
A s hikaga Japan
had
been."37
Thu s ,
A s ian s tates of
varying
s iz e and
technological capability
exis ted in an
international
s ys tem
bas ed on ru les and norms that revolved arou nd China.
From
Japan
to
Siam,
and for more than s ix
centu ries ,
this
s ys tem
fu nctioned in
es s entially
the s ame manner.
Second ,
althou gh
economic relations in his torical A s ia were as vibrant as
thos e in
Eu rope,
conflict was
notably
rare. Centu ries
s eparated major
inters tate
conflict in
A s ia,
which tend ed to occu r when ord er within the central
power
had
begu n
to break d own. A s Chines e
d ynas ties began
to
d ecay,
conflict
along
and
among
the
peripheral
s tates wou ld flare
u p,
as the central
power
tu rned
its attention inward . Thu s in 1274 and
1281,
as the
Su ng
and Chin
d ynas ties
were
cru mbling,
the
Mongols
u nd er Ku blai Khan tried
u ns u cces s fu lly
to con-
qu er
Korea and
Japan.38
Centu ries
later,
as the
Ming d ynas ty began
to
weaken,
35. David
Marr,
"Sino-Vietnames e
Relations ,"
A u s tralian
Jou rnal of
Chines e
A ffairs ,
Vol.
10,
No. 6
(Ju ly
1981),
p.
49.
36. Kawaz oe
Shoji, "Japan
and Eas t
A s ia,"
in Koz o
Yamamu ra, ed ,
The
Cambrid ge His tory of Japan,
Vol. 3: Med ieval
Japan,
3d ed .
(Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity
P res s , 1990),
p.
437.
37.
Key-hiu k
Kim,
The Las t P has e
of
the Eas t A s ian World Ord er:
Korea,
Japan,
and the Chines e
Empire
(Berkeley: Univers ity
of California
P res s , 1980),
pp.
21,
23.
38. See
Jeremiah Cu rtin,
The
Mongols :
A
His tory (Wes tport,
Conn.:
Greenwood , 1972).
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International
Secu rity
28:3 176
the
Japanes e general Hid eyos hi
twice
attempted
to invad e China
throu gh
Ko-
rea
(in
1592 and 1598).
With the res toration of ord er in
China, however,
conflict
among
the
peripheral
s tates
ceas ed ,
and
intraregional
relations remained rela-
tively peacefu l
for s everal hu nd red
years .
The d ominant
power
had no need to
fight,
and the
s econd ary powers
had no d es ire to
fight.
This is not to
s ay
that conflict in A s ia was
totally
abs ent,
bu t rather that
inters tate war was mu ch les s common than it was in
Eu rope.
P irates ,
no-
mad s ,
and other nons tate actors exis ted in the his torical A s ian
s ys tem, ju s t
as
Barbary
Coas t
pirates
and
s imilarly powerfu l
actors cou ld be fou nd in
Eu rope.
The
Chines e,
for
ins tance,
engaged
in
long-ru nning
bord er battles with the
Mongols
to the
north,
at times
employing
as
many
as
500,000
troops
in an
effort to s ecu re this front.39
That A s ian international relations d o not conform to the clas s ical
Eu ropean
balancing
mod el has been
empirically
valid ated
by
res earch that examines the
origins
of war over the
pas t
150
years .
Scott Bennett and A llan
Stam
s u bjected
the
Eu ropean
mod el to
empirical tes ting
acros s
regions
and time and fou nd
that
althou gh
it works well in
Eu rope, "s ignificant
d ifferences in
preferences
for conflict exis t acros s
regions ." They
als o fou nd "no
s u pport
for the
argu -
ment that
[A s ian]
behavior will
converge
on that of
Eu rope.
In
fact,
all of the
regions
ou ts id e of
Eu rope appear
to
d iverge
from the
Eu ropean pattern
[of
clas s ical balance of
power]."'"
There are at leas t s ix
empirical
anomalies in
contemporary
A s ian interna-
tional relations that realis t
interpretations
cannot
explain.
Firs t,
the main em-
pirical anomaly,
and the main
problem
with a theoretical view bas ed on
realis m,
is the focu s of attention on the mos t
powerfu l
cou ntries . For
A s ia,
the
bigges t
threats aris e not from the mos t
powerfu l cou ntry
(the United
States )
or
even the s econd mos t
powerfu l cou ntry (Japan),
bu t rather from the
region's
s malles t and weakes t s tates
(Taiwan
and North
Korea,
res pectively).'4
This
anomaly
cannot be
explained
withou t firs t
u nd ers tand ing
thes e s tates ' inter-
es ts and the natu re of their interactions with other cou ntries .42
Writing
abou t
d ifferent behavior acros s
regions ,
Bennett and
Stam
note "It is not that the
39.
Johns ton,
Cu ltu ral
Realis m,
p.
234. See als o Hans
J.
van d e
Ven,
"War and the
Making
of Mod -
ern
China,"
Mod ern A s ian
Stu d ies ,
Vol.
30,
No. 4
(October 1996),
p.
737.
40. D. Scott Bennett and A llan
Stam,
The Behavioral
Origins of
War (A nn A rbor:
Univers ity
of Mich-
igan
P res s , 2003),
pp.
191-195.
41. Thomas
J. Chris tens en, "China,
the
U.S.-Japan
A lliance,
and the
Secu rity
Dilemma in Eas t
A s ia,"
International
Secu rity,
Vol. 23 No. 4
(Spring
1999),
pp.
49-79.
42.
Jack
L.
Snyd er
and Robert
Jervis , ed s .,
Coping
with
Complexity
in the International
Sys tem
(Bou l-
d er, Colo.: Wes tview, 1993).
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les 177
actors are not
rational,
even
thou gh
a u nivers al mod el
may
fail.
Rather,
they
s imply
are not
playing
the s ame
game
with the s ame
preferences ."43
A s econd
empirical anomaly
concerns the
thorny
is s u e of Taiwanes e s over-
eignty.44
Taiwan is
not
recogniz ed
as a
s overeign
s tate,
yet many
international
relations s cholars treat it like one becau s e it acts like one. This not
only
d oes
the field of international relations a
d is s ervice,
bu t it is als o
logically
incons is -
tent with the
Wes tphalian
view that formal
recognition
is
paramou nt.
A l-
thou gh A charya argu es
that China u s es
Wes tphalian concepts ,
Chines e
s cholars
point
ou t that when
d is cu s s ing
Taiwan,
Chines e know
exactly
when
they
want to u s e
Englis h
word s and
meanings
and when
they
want to u s e Chi-
nes e word s and
meanings ,
and s o d o the
Taiwanes e.45
Scholars need to con-
front s u ch
realities ,
es pecially
becau s e of their s u ch ramifications for both
China and
Taiwan."4
A third
anomaly
is the remarkable
s taying power
of A s ia's three Leninis t
s tates :
China, Vietnam,
and North Korea have s u rvived
d es pite
the
collaps e
of
the
Eu ropean
commu nis t bloc more than a d ecad e
ago. A lthou gh
China and
Vietnam
(and ,
to a les s er
extent,
North
Korea)
have
engaged
in s ome economic
reforms ,
they
remain au thoritarian
political regimes .47
It
als o bears mention
that all three are
prod u cts
of
anti-Wes tern,
anticolonial movements . North Ko-
rea,
in
particu lar,
has s u rvived mu ch
longer
than almos t
anyone pred icted .48
A lthou gh
minu s cu le
compared
with
any
of its
neighbors ,
North Korea is the
cou ntry
mos t
likely
to be at the center of conflict in Northeas t
A s ia.4j
43. Bennett and
Stam,
The Behavioral
Origins of
War,
p.
174.
44. A ihwa
Ong,
"The Chines e A xis :
Zoning Technologies
and the
Logic
of
Exception
in
Variegated
Sovereignty," paper prepared
for the conference
"P eace,
Development,
and
Regionaliz ation
in Eas t
A s ia";
and A nd reas
Os iand er,
"Sovereignty,
International
Relations ,
and the
Wes tphalian Myth,"
International
Organiz ation,
Vol.
55,
No. 2 (Winter 2001),
pp.
251-287.
45. P ers onal commu nication from P eter
Katz ens tein,
September
29,
2003. See als o Yu n-han
Chu ,
"Taiwan's
Secu rity
Dilemma:
Military Rivalry,
Economic
Depend ence,
and the
Stru ggle
over Na-
tional
Id entity," paper prepared
for the conference
"P eace,
Development,
and
Regionaliz ation
in
Eas t A s ia."
46.
Shelley Rigger, "Competing Conceptions
of Taiwan's
Id entity,"
in
Su is heng
Zhao, ed .,
A cros s
the Taiwan Strait: Mainland
China, Taiwan,
and the 1995-1996 Cris is (New York:
Rou tled ge,
1997);
Chris topher Hu ghes ,
Taiwan and Chines e Nationalis m: National
Id entity
and Statu s in International So-
ciety
(New
York:
Rou tled ge,
1997);
and
Gary
Klintworth,
New
Taiwan,
New China:
Taiwan's
Changing
Role in the
A s ia-P acific Region
(New York: St.
Martin's , 1995).
47. On North Korean economic
reforms ,
s ee David C.
Kang,
"The A void able Cris is in North Ko-
rea," Orbis ,
Vol.
47,
No. 3 (Su mmer 2003),
pp.
495-510.
48. Several
years ago,
I
pred icted
that North Korea wou ld s u rvive into the fores eeable fu tu re. Da-
vid C.
Kang, "Rolling
with the P u nches : North Korea and Cu ba
d u ring
the
1980s ," Jou rnal of
Eas t
A s ian
A ffairs ,
Vol.
8,
No. 1
(Winter 1994),
pp.
18-55.
49. Victor D. Cha and David C.
Kang,
Nu clear North Korea: A Debate on
Engagement Strategies
(New
York: Colu mbia
Univers ity
P res s , 2003).
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International
Secu rity
28:3 178
A fou rth
anomaly
concerns the attitu d e of Sou th Korea and
Japan
to the Tai-
wan-China conflict. A realis t wou ld
argu e
that both cou ntries s hou ld have
mu ch to fear from an
aggres s ive
China,
and hence
they
s hou ld be
eager
to
help
the United States and Taiwan contain
it,
either
throu gh
more active meas u res
tod ay
or
throu gh promis es
to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a Chines e at-
tack. A liberal wou ld as s ert
that,
as
d emocracies ,
Sou th Korea and
Japan
s hou ld be
eager
to d efend d emocratic Taiwan
agains t
au thoritarian China. Yet
becau s e of their
perception
of the Taiwan-China is s u e as more of an internal
than an international
matter,
both cou ntries have s hown a relu ctance to
get
involved .
A fifth
anomaly
involves the
ejection
of U.S. bas es from the
P hilippines
after
the Cold War. Given the tremend ou s
s ecu rity
benefits that the
P hilippines
en-
joys
as a member of the U.S. alliance
s ys tem
in
A s ia,
why
wou ld it take s u ch a
s eemingly s elf-d efeating
action?s "
The s tand ard realis t
explanation
is that it
reflected a
s u rge
in
Filipino
nationalis m-an
explanation
that s eems rather
exceptionalis t.
A s Yu en
Foong Khong
writes ,
"By
1989 it became obviou s that
the
negotiations
had become
entangled
with a fierce d omes tic
political
d ebate
within the
P hilippines .
The
s u rge
in
Filipino
nationalis m d erailed the
negotia-
tions .""' Realis ts , however,
cannot s o
eas ily
attribu te the ou s ter of the U.S.
bas es to d omes tic
politics .
A more
likely explanation
is that the
P hilippines
d oes not view China as the threat that realis ts believe it s hou ld .
Sixth,
d es pite s eemingly every
reas on to be
fu lly incorporated
into the U.S.
alliance
s ys tem,
Sou th Korea
clearly
has a d ifferent
pers pective
on the role of
the United States in Northeas t
A s ia.52
The id ea that Seou l
might
not want to
continu e its clos e alliance with
Was hington
was u nthinkable even two
years
ago.
Bu t a
res u rgent
Left in Sou th
Korea,
combined with worries that the
United States -not North Korea-is the
d es tabiliz ing
force in the the
region
has led
many
in Sou th Korea to view the U.S.
pres ence
with s ome alarm. This
50. Daniel Okimoto
writes , "[The U.S. alliances in A s ia have] withs tood the tes t of
time,
las ting
for
longer
than a
half-centu ry; they
have als o fu nctioned
effectively
to d eter
blackmail, coercion,
conflict,
and war."
Okimoto,
"KA SA and
JA SA :
Twin P illars of A s ia's
Secu rity
A rchitectu re,"
paper
pres ented
at the conference
"P eace,
Development,
and
Regionaliz ation
in Eas t A s ia."
51.
Khong
is not a
realis t,
thou gh
here he d oes offer the s tand ard realis t
explanation
for Manila's
d ecis ion. Yu en
Foong Khong, "Coping
with
Strategic Uncertainty:
The Role of Ins titu tions and Soft
Balancing
in Sou theas t A s ia's P os t-Cold War
Strategy,"
in
J.J. Su h,
P eter
J. Katz ens tein,
and A llen
Carls on
ed s .,
Rethinking Secu rity
in Eas t A s ia:
Id entity,
P ower,
and
Efficiency
(Stanford ,
Calif.: Stan-
ford
Univers ity
P res s ,
forthcoming).
52. CSIS
Working Grou p
on U.S.-R.O.K.
Relations ,
"Strengthening
the U.S.-R.O.K. A lliance: A
Blu eprint
for the 21s t
Centu ry" (Was hington,
D.C.: Center for
Strategic
and International
Stu d ies ,
2003).
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Hierarchy, Balancing,
and
Empirical
P u z z les 179
has cau s ed mu ch cons ternation in
Was hington,
which is
beginning
to take the
threat to the alliance more
s eriou s ly. Chu ng-min
Lee
writes ,
"For the firs t time
s ince the bilateral alliance
[with
the United
States ]
was
forged
more than a
half-centu ry ago,
more Koreans are at leas t
entertaining
the
s pecter
of clos er
political, s ecu rity,
and economic ties with
China.""53
There are
d eep
d ivis ions in
Sou th Korea
concerning
the
u tility
of a continu ed alliance with the United
States ,
U.S.
policy
toward North
Korea,
and Sou th Korea's relations with the
other
powers
in the
region.54 A lthou gh
d ifferences over how to d eal with
North Korea are
nothing
new,
in the
pas t
thes e d ifferences were often
tactical,
res olved in
large part
becau s e of the common
perception
that North Korea
rep-
res ented a s eriou s
s ecu rity
threat. In recent
years ,
however,
Sou th Korean and
U.S.
s ecu rity perceptions
have
begu n
to
s ignificantly d iverge.
Ins tead of
ad d res s ing
s u ch
anomalies ,
A charya
chos e to
emphas iz e
two
other
argu ments :
firs t,
that Ind ia is a
s ignificant
actor in A s ian international re-
lations
and , s econd ,
that norms matter in
explaining
thes e relations . Neither
argu ment
is s u s tainable.
A lthou gh
Ind ia
certainly
is an
important
actor in
Sou th
A s ia,
the fact that China extend s into two
regions
d oes not mean that
the two
regions
are the s ame. This wou ld be s imilar to
argu ing
that becau s e the
United States is involved in A s ia and
Eu rope,
both of thos e
regions
are the
s ame. Ind ia
may
matter to Sou th
A s ia,
bu t it d oes not
figu re
in Eas t A s ian s ecu -
rity
is s u es s u ch as North Korea and
Taiwan,
or even in
P hilippine s ecu rity
d ecis ionmaking.
In
ad d ition,
the norms and ins titu tions
argu ment
has little
empirical valid ity.
One recu rrent
find ing
is the
d is parity
in attitu d es and beliefs on thes e
s u bjects
within Sou th
Korea,
Japan,
Thailand ,
the
P hilippines ,
and Ind ones ia. Thes e
cou ntries are
certainly
mod ern,
bu t a common d es ire for a
s ecu rity commu nity
is far from a
reality.
Norms that
might
influ ence A s ian s tate behavior are s tar-
tlingly
abs ent,
and here A aron
Fried berg's original argu ment
is tru e: Given
their vas t
d is parities
in
wealth,
political d evelopment, ethnicity, religion,
and
langu age,
s tates in Eas t A s ia d o not s hare a common
bond ,
beyond
the d es ire
to be
wealthy
and s ecu re."5 Ins titu tions s u ch as the A s s ociation of Sou theas t
53.
Chu ng-min
Lee,
"Between A lliance and
A u tonomy: Reconceptu aliz ing
Sou th Korea's
Strategic
Choices and A ttend ant
Cons equ ences ," paper pres ented
at the conference
"P eace,
Development,
and
Regionaliz ation
in Eas t
A s ia,"
p.
162.
54.
Chu ng-in
Moon,
"Between Banmi and
Su ngmi: Changing Images
of the United States in Sou th
Korea,"
lectu re
pres ented
at
Georgetown Univers ity, A u gu s t
20,
2003.
55. A aron L.
Fried berg, "Ripe
for
Rivalry: P ros pects
for P eace in a
Mu ltipolar
World ,"
International
Secu rity,
Vol.
18,
No. 3 (Winter 1993/94),
pp.
5-33.
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International
Secu rity
28:3 180
A s ian Nations and the A SEA N
Regional
Foru m remain
peripheral
to the con-
d u ct of A s ian international relations . That thes e A s ian s tates
may
have mod ern
as pirations
is one
thing;
to
argu e
that
they
s hare
d eeply
held norms and a d e-
s ire for more
regional
ins titu tions is another.
Conclu s ion
A mitav
A charya
has mad e a nu mber of
important points regard ing
the
s tu d y
of A s ian international relations . In ad d ition to
focu s ing
on s tand ard realis t con-
cerns s u ch as material
capabilities ,
international relations s cholars need to
give
greater
cons id eration to the role of
ins titu tions , id eas ,
and
his tory
in
A s ia,
as
well as to d efinitions of the A s ian
region
and its
s u bs ys tems .
The
key qu es tion
is whether
balancing
or
band wagoning
bes t characteriz es
contemporary
A s ian
relations . The
evid ence,
althou gh
mixed ,
s hows that A s ian nations d o not feel
particu larly
threatened
by any cou ntry
and hence are not
balancing
China.
Clos e examination of mains tream realis t theoretical
approaches
to A s ian inter-
national relations reveals a nu mber of
pu z z les ,
and s cholars of A s ian interna-
tional relations need to
pay
more attention to the
empirical
record ,
both
his torical and mod ern.
My goal
is not to
replace
one s et of
u nqu es tioned
as s er-
tions with
another,
bu t rather to
open u p
the field for continu ed
progres s .
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