International relations scholars need to be as carefu l abou t is s ues of empirical tes ting and theoretical rigor when s tu d ying a s ian international relations. A mitav a charya agrees with both of thes e claims while als o critiqu ing my es s ay in arguing that s hared norms and ins
International relations scholars need to be as carefu l abou t is s ues of empirical tes ting and theoretical rigor when s tu d ying a s ian international relations. A mitav a charya agrees with both of thes e claims while als o critiqu ing my es s ay in arguing that s hared norms and ins
International relations scholars need to be as carefu l abou t is s ues of empirical tes ting and theoretical rigor when s tu d ying a s ian international relations. A mitav a charya agrees with both of thes e claims while als o critiqu ing my es s ay in arguing that s hared norms and ins
Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations
Author(s): David C. Kang
Source: International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003/2004), pp. 165-180 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137481 . Accessed: 20/05/2014 17:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les in A s ian International Relations David C. Kang In my article entitled "Getting A s ia Wrong," I make two major argu ments .' Firs t, Eu ropean-d erived theories in general and realis t theories in particu lar frequ ently have d ifficu lty explaining A s ian international relations . Second , international relations s chol- ars need to be as carefu l abou t is s u es of empirical tes ting and theoretical rigor when s tu d ying A s ia as they are when s tu d ying Eu rope. In a reply to my arti- cle, A mitav A charya agrees with both of thes e claims while als o critiqu ing my es s ay in argu ing that s hared norms and ins titu tional linkages mitigate rivalry in A s ia and that I am a his torical d eterminis t. A charya, however, has mis u n- d ers tood both international relations theory and the role of his tory. His re- s pons e to my article provid es me with an opportu nity to clarify and briefly expand on the major themes in "Getting A s ia Wrong." A s A charya's reply exemplifies , mos t s cholars not only d is mis s the notion that the A s ian experience might force a rethinking or mod ification of Eu ro- pean-d erived theories , bu t they als o pay little attention to the his torical A s ian international s ys tem. A charya writes , "Contrary to Kang's argu ment, A s ia's fu tu re will not res emble its pas t" (p. 150). A charya, however, has mis u nd er- s tood my argu ment: To s tu d y the role of his tory is hard ly to pred ict that it will replicate its elf in the fu tu re. My main point is that there are good reas ons to think that A s ian s tates may not fu nction like Eu ropean s tates and that the s tu d y of A s ia mu s t begin with a d is cu s s ion of s ome of A s ia's empirical anoma- lies and what might explain them. A charya s eems to argu e that the only goal to which s cholars who s tu d y A s ia can as pire is to u nqu es tioningly apply exis t- ing theory. In contras t, my goal is to expand international relations theory s o that s cholars can better id entify factors that help to explain regional and tem- poral d ifferences in how s tates think abou t and achieve s ecu rity and how they cond u ct their international relations . David C. Kang is A s s ociate P rofes s or of Government and A d ju nct A s s ociate P rofes s or at the Tu ck School of Bu s ines s , Dartmou th College. For their comments and s u gges tions , the au thor thanks A mitav A charya, Thomas Chris tens en, Stephan Haggard , Victoria Hu i, P eter Katz ens tein, Jennifer Lind , Richard Little, Rand all Schweller, A llan Stam, and William Wohlforth. 1. David C. Kang, "Getting A s ia Wrong: The Need for New A nalytic Frameworks ," International Secu rity, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Su mmer 2003), pp. 57-85. International Secu rity, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 165-180 @ 2004 by the P res id ent and Fellows of Harvard College and the Mas s achu s etts Ins titu te of Technology. 165 This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 166 In this reply I make three points . Firs t, I s how that A charya's as s ertion that I am claiming an exceptional role for A s ia is u nfou nd ed ; I als o s how that rigor- ou s s ocial s cience d emand s that s cholars be open to the pos s ibility that evi- d ence may force theoretical mod ifications . Second , I d emons trate that the s tu d y of hierarchy is a well-d eveloped branch of international relations theory, and I explain why balancing s hou ld not be the d efau lt hypothes is in interna- tional relations . Third , I examine A s ia's empirical record to illu s trate the im- portance of an increas ed focu s on A s ian his tory for the field of international relations ; in ad d ition, I enu merate s everal cu rrent empirical anomalies that s cholars need to ad d res s given the challenge that thes e pos e to conventional theoretical explanations of A s ian international relations . Theory Bu ild ing and Theory Tes ting acros s Regions International relations s cholars mu s t take s eriou s ly the pos s ibility that d iffer- ent regions of the world might ind eed be d ifferent. Related ly, critiqu es of this claim as s omehow fu nd amentally exceptionalis t mis u nd ers tand the natu re of s cholarly inqu iry. It is good s ocial s cience to be open to the pos s ibility that evid ence may not fit a theory, ju s t as it is pos s ible to note d ifference withou t res orting to caricatu re-a trap into which A charya falls when criticiz ing s ome of my as s ertions as having an "exceptionalis t ring" (p. 162). A n example of how progres s ive res earch might occu r is perhaps bes t d emons trated throu gh a comparis on of s cholars hip on A s ian d evelopment with s cholars hip on A s ian international relations . A ccord ing to a nu mber of criteria-theoretical s ophis ti- cation, attention to the empirical record , and impact on the wid er field of s ocial s cience-the s tu d y of A s ian international relations lags far behind . A brief re- view of the intellectu al his tory of A s ia confirms this obs ervation. Beginning in the late 1970s , s cholars of A s ian d evelopment challenged their colleagu es in the field s of economics , political s cience, and s ociology to move beyond the long-s tand ing d ichotomy between a neoclas s ical free market and a centrally planned economy in their s tu d y of economic d evelopment. Chalmers Johns on, for example, was particu larly forcefu l when argu ing that Japan's eco- nomic growth fit into neither category.2 A nd as Stephan Haggard has written, "Spearhead ed by s cholars ou ts id e the mains tream of North A merican econom- ics , this work began by u nd erlining empirical anomalies : the myriad ways in 2. Chalmers Johns on, MITI and the Japanes e Miracle: The Growth of Ind u s trial P olicy, 1925-1975 (Stan- ford , Calif.: Stanford Univers ity P res s , 1982). This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les 167 which the Eas t A s ian cas es failed to conform to the neoclas s ical view."3 In the 1980s , as Japan's economic ris e continu ed , and Sou th Korea and Taiwan be- came s u cces s fu l d evelopers (i.e., newly ind u s trializ ed cou ntries , or NICs ), the d ebate over the explanation for their s u cces s intens ified . The d epend ent variable in all three cas es was s tartlingly clear: Each was ex- periencing economic d evelopment that was his torically u npreced ented by world s tand ard s in both its pace and its d epth.4 The is s u e was how to explain this growth. The d ebate began by focu s ing on whether s tate intervention was central to the NICs ' economic s u cces s -the "s tate vers u s the market" d ebate.5 In s u rpris ingly little time, it became obviou s that the common variable was ex- tens ive government intervention into the market. This find ing mad e clear the need to recas t the s tand ard d ebate between the virtu es of a neoclas s ical free market vers u s a centrally planned economy. Twenty years later, the s tu d y of A s ian d evelopment and the high theoretical s tand ard s that this s cholars hip has es tablis hed have forced s cholars to face a myriad of new id eas and is s u es . The concept of a "d evelopmental s tate" has become part of the canon in political economy.6 New d evelopments in micro- economics , s ociology, and anthropology have u nd ers cored the role of ins titu - tions in Eas t A s ia's economic performance. Scholars no longer view markets as the frictionles s inters ection of s u pply and d emand cu rves . Ins tead markets are being reinterpreted as complexes of principal-agent relations hips in which problems of imperfect and as ymmetric information, contracting, and cred ibil- 3. For an overview of the intellectu al d evelopment of the field , s ee Stephan Haggard , "Ins titu tions and Growth in Eas t A s ia," Stu d ies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Spring 2004), p. 4. For empirical as s es s ments , s ee Richard Lu ed d e-Neu rath, Import Controls and Export- Oriented Development: A Reas s es s ment of the Sou th Korean Cas e (Bou ld er, Colo.: Wes tview, 1986); and Ru s s ell Mard on, "The State and the Effective Control of Foreign Capital: The Cas e of Sou th Ko- rea," World P olitics , Vol. 43, No. 1 (October 1990), pp. 111-138. 4. Robert Wad e, "Eas t A s ia's Economic Su cces s : Conflicting P ers pectives , P artial Ins ights , Shaky Evid ence," World P olitics , Vol. 44, No. 2 (Janu ary 1992), pp. 270-320. 5. For economic pers pectives , s ee A lwyn You ng, "The Tyranny of Nu mbers : Confronting the Sta- tis tical Realities of the Eas t A s ian Growth Experience," Qu arterly Jou rnal of Economics , Vol. 110, No. 3 (A u gu s t 1995), pp. 641-680; P au l Kru gman, "The Myth of A s ia's Miracle," Foreign A ffairs , Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 62-79; and Helen Hu ghes , ed ., A chieving Ind u s trializ ation in A s ia (Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity P res s , 1988). For d is cu s s ions of s tatis ts , s ee Robert Wad e, Governing the Market (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univers ity P res s , 1990); A lice H. A ms d en, A s ia's Next Giant: Sou th Korea and Late Ind u s trializ ation (Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity P res s , 1989); and Stephan Haggard , P athways from the P eriphery: The P olitics of Growth in the Newly Ind u s trializ ing States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univers ity P res s , 1990). 6. Mered ith Woo-Cu mings , ed ., The Developmental State (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univers ity P res s , 1999); and David C. Kang, "Bad Loans to Good Friend s : Money P olitics and the Developmental State in Korea," International Organiz ation, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 177-207. This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 168 ity are u biqu itou s .7 The s mooth fu nctioning of markets requ ires more than get- ting policies , incentives , and prices right. A ls o need ed are pu blic and private ins titu tions that facilitate market exchange-from the legal s ys tem and a clear d elineation of property rights , to the pu blic provis ion of information, to infor- mal ins titu tions that bu ild tru s t." Scholars continu e to probe the relations hip between d evelopment and politics , corru ption, the international s ys tem, and the role of his tory.' A s Haggard writes , "In the 1990s , intellectu al d evelop- ments ... provid ed earlier ins ights on government intervention with micro- fou nd ations that mad e them legitimate to the economics profes s ion."'" The continu ing d ebate over A s ian d evelopment has generated more than its s hare of controvers y." A lmos t nowhere in this d ebate, however, d o argu ments abou t whether or not A s ia is "exceptional" play a role, and mos t s cholars take A s ia's empirical realities on their own terms . They pay clos e attention to mea- s u ring the ind epend ent and d epend ent variables , and they are open to the po- tential ramifications of their find ings for s ocial s cience theory. Exploring how ins titu tions affect markets , and in particu lar the impact of A s ian governments and the organiz ation of A s ian bu s ines s on economic growth, is an ongoing proces s that involves carefu l attention to both theory and evid ence. By com- paris on, the s tu d y of A s ian international relations is s till in its initial s tages . Bu t if s cholars in the field of political economy can d o it, s o too can s cholars in the field of international relations . 7. Dani Rod rik, "Getting Interventions Right: How Sou th Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic P olicy, No. 20 (A pril 1995), pp. 141-193; Mas ahiko A oki, Information, Incentives , and Bargaining in the Japanes e Economy (New York: Cambrid ge Univers ity P res s , 1988); Jos eph E. Stiglitz and Marylou Uy, "Financial Markets , P u blic P olicy, and the Eas t A s ian Miracle," World Bank Res earch Obs erver, Vol. 11, No. 2 (November 1996), pp. 249-276; and World Bank, The Eas t A s ian Miracle: Economic Growth and P u blic P olicy (New York: Oxford Univers ity P res s , 1993). 8. David C. Kang, "Trans action Cos ts and Crony Capitalis m in Eas t A s ia," Comparative P olitics , Vol. 35, No. 4 (Ju ly 2003), pp. 439-459; A nd rew MacIntyre, "Ins titu tions and Inves tors : The P olitics of the Economic Cris is in Sou theas t A s ia," International Organiz ation, Vol. 55, No. I (Winter 2001), pp. 81-122; and Michael Ros s , "Ind ones ia's P u z z ling Cris is ," Univers ity of California at Los A n- geles , 2003. 9. David C. Kang, Crony Capitalis m: Corru ption and Development in Sou th Korea and the P hilippines (Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity P res s , 2002); Richard Doner, Bryan Ritchie, and Daniel Slater, "Sys tem Vu lnerability and the Origins of Developmental States : Northeas t and Sou theas t A s ia in Comparative P ers pective," Emory Univers ity, 2003; and Mu s htaq H. Khan and K.S. Jomo, Rents , Rent-s eeking, and Economic Development: Theory and Evid ence in A s ia (New York: Cambrid ge Univer- s ity P res s , 2000). 10. Haggard , "Ins titu tions and Growth in Eas t A s ia," p. 14. 11. One s u ch controvers y is over total factory prod u ctivity. See Kru gman, "The Myth of A s ia's Miracle"; and Dani Rod rik, "Coord ination Failu res and Government P olicy: A Mod el with A ppli- cations to Eas t A s ia and Eas tern Eu rope," Jou rnal of International Economics , Vol. 40, Nos . 1-2 (Feb- ru ary 1996), pp. 1-22. This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les 169 Hierarchy and Balancing in International Relations In my article, I qu es tion whether A s ian international relations will be hierar- chic or whether a regional balance of power is more likely. In ad d ition, I criti- ciz e s cholars who au tomatically as s u me that balancing will res u lt. Scholars have no reas on to think that balancing behavior is homogeneou s ly d is tribu ted acros s regions , and that becau s e it occu rred in Eu rope, it will in A s ia as well. The is s u e for A s ian international relations is not a theoretical one abou t whether hierarchy cou ld exis t, bu t rather an empirical one: Does the evid ence s how balancing or band wagoning behavior in A s ia? A charya writes that "Kang's notion of hierarchy is not grou nd ed in the available theoretical literatu re" (p. 154). In making this claim, however, A charya overlooks at leas t two well-es tablis hed s chools that examine variou s forms of hierarchy and band wagoning.'2 The hegemonic s tability s chool, which emphas iz es the beneficial impact that a d ominant power can have on les s powerfu l s tates , is a prime example. A nother is the prepond erance of power s chool, which argu es that an u nequ al d is tribu tion of power in the inter- national s ys tem is more s table than an equ al d is tribu tion of power." In ad d i- tion, s ome s cholars have explored ways in which the United States can res train its own overweening power to "mitigate fears of d omination and aband on- ment" among s econd ary s tates in the s ys tem.14 In contras t, A charya falls into the trap of as s u ming that balancing is the d efau lt hypothes is in international 12. Rand all L. Schweller, "Band wagoning for P rofit: Bringing the Revis ionis t State Back In," Inter- national Secu rity, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Su mmer 1994), pp. 72-107; Robert P owell, In the Shad ow of P ower: States and Strategies in International P olitics (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univers ity P res s , 1999); and Charles L. Glas er, "The Secu rity Dilemma Revis ited ," World P olitics , Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-210. 13. On hegemonic s tability, s ee Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World P olitics (Cambrid ge: Cam- brid ge Univers ity P res s , 1981); Robert O. Keohane, A fter Hegemony: Cooperation and Dis cord in the World P olitical Economy (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univers ity P res s , 1984); and David A . Lake, P ower, P rotection, and Free Trad e: International Sou rces of United States Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univers ity P res s , 1988). On prepond erance of power, s ee A .EK. Organs ki and Jacek Ku gler, The War Led ger (Chicago: Univers ity of Chicago P res s , 1980); Dou glas Lemke, Regions of War and P eace (Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity P res s , 2002); Henk Hou weling and Jan Siccama, "P ower Trans itions as a Cau s e of War," Jou rnal of Conflict Res olu tion, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March 1988), pp. 87-102; and Dou glas Lemke and Su z anne Werner, "P ower P arity, Commitment to Change, and War," International Stu d ies Qu arterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Ju ne 1996), pp. 235-260. 14. G. John Ikenberry, A fter Victory: Ins titu tions , Strategic Res traint, and the Rebu ild ing of Ord er after Major Wars (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univers ity P res s , 2001), p. 5; William C. Wohlforth, "The Sta- bility of a Unipolar World ," International Secu rity, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Su mmer 1999), pp. 5-42; and Jo- s eph S. Nye, Bou nd to Lead : The Changing Natu re of A merican P ower (New York: Bas ic Books , 1990). This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 1170 relations theory. However, as Robert P owell conclu d es , "Whether s tates bal- ance, band wagon, or s tand as id e while others fight d epend s in a complicated way on many d ifferent factors .... when thes e factors are taken into accou nt, s tates u s u ally band wagon."'5 The balancing propos ition that grows ou t of this literatu re-Kenneth Waltz 's confid ent as s ertion that "hegemony lead s to balance" and has d one s o "throu gh all of the centu ries we can contemplate"'6--is alive and well. A nd as Stu art Kau fman and William Wohlforth note, "Criticis m of Waltz concerns mainly his theoretical explanation for recu rrent balances , not the phenomenon its elf."" This es s ay is too s hort for a fu ll theoretical elaboration of hierarchy and how it exis ted in the his torical A s ian context. Ins tead , the remaind er of this s ection aims to s how that the theoretical ed ifice cons tru cted by Waltz is bad ly in need of repair. In Theory of International P olitics , Waltz claims that anarchic and hierarchic ord ers are two end s of a s pectru m and that international relations is anarchic. Hence, Waltz d efines hierarchy as the oppos ite of anarchy; in this world , hier- archy and anarchy cannot coexis t. The d ominant pred iction that aris es from this formu lation is that balances occu r. Fu rther, Waltz res tricts his locu s of in- qu iry to the great powers , d efining away the tremend ou s d ivers ity that exis ts within the international s ys tem and thu s making his theory fit his evid ence. In recent years , however, s ome international relations s cholars have increas - ingly begu n to challenge the balancing hypothes is . If twenty years ago the con- ventional wis d om was that balancing was a u nivers al law of international relations , there is now cons id erable evid ence from ou ts id e the Eu ropean con- text-inclu d ing ancient A s s yria, med ieval A s ia, Ind ia, and Latin A merica- that in s ys tems cons is ting of one major power, the s econd ary s tates often d o not balance agains t it. In one recent project, for example, s cholars fou nd that s table hierarchies are at leas t as common as balancing or empire.'" A nd as Wohlforth and Kau fman point ou t, "Core propos itions from many theories concerning balance and hierarchy fall flat when confronted with evid ence from 15. P owell, In the Shad ow of P ower, pp. 6, 201. 16. Kenneth N. Waltz , "The Emerging Stru ctu re of International P olitics ," International Secu rity, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 77. 17. William C. Wohlforth and Stu art Kau fman, "Hierarchy and Balance in International Sys tems ," paper prepared for the conference "Hierarchy and Balance in A ncient Sys tems ," Dartmou th Col- lege, Hanover, New Hamps hire, October 19-21, 2003, p. 2. 18. "Hierarchy and Balance in A ncient Sys tems ," conference held at Dartmou th College, October 19-21, 2003. This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les 171 s ys tems other than thos e compris ed of the Eu ropean s tates and their contem- porary d es cend ents .""1 Scholars are beginning to explore the theoretical u nd er- pinnings of international s ys tems mu ch more broad ly than before.21 In d eveloping the balance of power thes is , Waltz u nd ers tand ably focu s ed on "a few big things ," and in particu lar on the bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and the potential for nu clear holocau s t. A t the time, Waltz argu ed , "The theory of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era. It wou ld be ... rid icu lou s to cons tru ct a theory of international politics bas ed on Malays ia and Cos ta Rica.... A general theory of international politics is neces s arily bas ed on the great powers ."21 Even within a Waltz ian world , however, s mall and med iu m powers d o exis t. This is not to ar- gu e for inclu s ion into his theory of variables s u ch as id eology, nons tate actors , or international ins titu tions , bu t rather to acknowled ge that in accepting the nation-s tate as the u nit of analys is , one mu s t allow for the role of s mall nation- s tates . For Waltz , the great powers are all that matter, s o again he has chos en a s et of cas es that fit his theory. In explaining his d epend ent variable--Cold War s tability between two nu - clear s u perpowers -Waltz was correct to res trict his focu s to the great powers . Small powers d id not matter in the global s tru ggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. A theory d es igned to explain the Cold War, however, may not explain why A s ian s tates are not neces s arily balancing China in the s ame way that the United States balanced the Soviet Union. Becau s e the world is no longer mad e u p of two s u perpowers and all the res t, s cholars who want to explore other international s ys tems or alternative reas ons for s tate behavior need to move away from Waltz 's tru ncated d efinition of which cou ntries mat- ter and how anarchy interacts with hierarchy. If Thailand can s tart a global eco- 19. Wohlforth and Kau fman, "Hierarchy and Balance in International Sys tems ," p. 11. 20. See William C. Wohlforth, "Hierarchy, Statu s , and War," paper prepared for the annu al meet- ing of the A merican P olitical Science A s s ociation, Bos ton, Mas s achu s etts , A u gu s t 29-September 1, 2002; David A . Lake, "A narchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations ," International Organiz ation, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-33; and Katja Weber, Hierarchy amid s t A narchy: Trans action Cos ts and Ins titu tional Choice (A lbany: State Univers ity of New York P res s , 2000). The Britis h School has been mos t active in exploring alternative forms of organiz ation. See A d am Wat- s on, The Evolu tion of International Society: A Comparative His torical A nalys is (New York: Rou tled ge, 1992); Evan Lu ard , Conflict and P eace in the Mod ern International Sys tem: A Stu d y of the P rinciples of International Ord er (A lbany: State Univers ity of New York P res s , 1988); and Barry Bu z an and Rich- ard Little, "The Id ea of 'International Sys tem': Theory Meets His tory," International P olitical Science Review, Vol. 15 (Ju ly 1994), pp. 231-255. 21. Kenneth N. Waltz , Theory of International P olitics (Read ing, Mas s .: A d d is on-Wes ley, 1979), p. 73. This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 172 nomic cris is , and if war in A fghanis tan or Taiwan cou ld have a d irect impact on the United States , perhaps we s hou ld cons id er incorporating s u ch cou ntries and s itu ations into ou r theories . Ind eed , even Waltz allows for the pos s ibility that balancing may not occu r, althou gh he merely as s erts this , rather than provid ing a theory to help explain it. In Theory of International P olitics , Waltz 's es cape clau s e was to argu e that "s econd ary s tates , if they are free to choos e, flock to the weaker s id e."22 Bu t this ad mis s ion is hard ly s u fficient. Nor is his implicit d is mis s al of hierarchy ac- ceptable. Is Waltz s u gges ting that in a s ys tem with one d ominant s tate, s econd - ary s tates withou t a balancing option have no choice bu t to acqu ies ce and accommod ate? Is this not hierarchy? Sometimes s tates band wagon. The is s u e is not nation-s tates thems elves , bu t rather the international d is tribu tion of power and capabilities . A lread y s chol- ars know that s mall powers d o not neces s arily balance. If there is one d omi- nant power, even other great powers may not balance, s eeing it in their interes ts to accommod ate the s tatu s qu o.23 Band wagoning-or at leas t acqu ies - cence to the s tatu s qu o-by s econd ary s tates is a central featu re of hierarchy.24 In contras t to realis t pred ictions that s econd ary s tates will be fearfu l of and bal- ance agains t the d ominant s tate, in hierarchy the s econd ary s tates flock to its s id e with a view toward gaining benefits .2s This behavior is cons is tent with Rand all Schweller's d is tinction between balancing for s ecu rity and band - wagoning for profit.2' One res pons e from realis ts is that d ifferential power d oes not cons titu te a hi- erarchy and that the exis tence of balancing or band wagoning behavior proves nothing.27 They argu e that ju s t becau s e s ome s tates are weaker d oes not mean that they will not s trive to maintain their ind epend ence, which the great pow- 22. Ibid ., p. 127. 23. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World ." 24. A challenge for international relations s cholars is to d efine more clearly ou r bas ic theoretical concepts , s u ch as band wagoning, balancing, engagement, containment, hegemony, accommod a- tion, hid ing, and hed ging. 25. On balancing, s ee Waltz , Theory of International P olitics ; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of A lliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univers ity P res s , 1987); and Eric Labs , "Do Weak States Band wagon?" Secu - rity Stu d ies , Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 41-61. 26. Schweller, "Band wagoning for P rofit." 27. A ccord ing to Waltz , "State actions are not d etermined by s tru ctu re.... Becau s e s tates coexis t in a s elf-help s ys tem, they are free to d o any fool thing they care to, bu t they are likely to be re- ward ed for behavior that is res pons ive to s tru ctu ral pres s u res and pu nis hed for behavior that is not." Waltz , "Evalu ating Theories ," A merican P olitical Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 915. This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les 173 ers are largely able to achieve. If realis m cannot pred ict s tate behavior, then realis ts ou ght to ad mit as mu ch. Ins tead , they continu e to pred ict over- whelmingly that s tates will balance in the face of pred ominant power. On the other hand , if balancing and band wagoning are not pred ictions that d erive from a Waltz ian approach, then that only bu ttres s es my point that s cholars need to be more carefu l in explaining A s ian s tate behavior. Scholars hip that ignores A s ian s tates ' his tory and the role of preferences in favor of a pu rely s tru ctu ral formu lation of international relations als o ignores many of the theoretical ad vances of the pas t d ecad e by ind ivid u als s u ch as Robert P owell and James Fearon, among others .28 The mos t s ophis ticated theo- retical treatments of d eterrence, s piral mod els , and power trans itions contend that u nd ers tand ing preferences is vital for d rawing any conclu s ions abou t s tate behavior. A s Haggard notes , "In the abs ence of information on actors ' preferences or a clear s ens e of the natu re of the s trategic interaction in qu es - tion, we are u nlikely to generate d efens ible expectations abou t s tate behavior or the propens ity for conflict."29 In s u m, the notion of hierarchy is well es tablis hed in the international relations literatu re, and balancing s hou ld not be the d efau lt hypothes is in in- ternational relations theory. Balancing is the expected ou tcome u nd er certain cond itions (i.e., when there is a s mall nu mber of great powers ). Hierarchy and band wagoning are the expected ou tcomes when one s tate is d ominant in the s ys tem. The qu es tion then is , What is happening in A s ia? Empirical A nomalies and His torical A s ia In ad d ition to opening theoretical s pace for cons id eration of alternative expla- nations of A s ian international relations , s cholars s hou ld cons id er more care- fu lly the empirical record of A s ian s tates , inclu d ing both the his torical origins of the A s ian international s ys tem and pres ent-d ay empirical anomalies .30 One can lis t d oz ens of books in the political s cience mains tream literatu re that d eal 28. P owell, In the Shad ow of P ower; James D. Fearon, "Domes tic P olitics , Foreign P olicy, and The- ories of International Relations ," A nnu al Review of P olitical Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1998), pp. 289- 314; and Bru ce Bu eno d e Mes qu ita and David Lalman, War and Reas on: Domes tic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univers ity P res s , 1992). 29. Stephan Haggard , "The Balance of P ower, Globaliz ation, and Democracy in Northeas t A s ia: Reflections on Long-Ru n Forces ," paper pres ented at the conference "P eace, Development, and Regionaliz ation in Eas t A s ia," Seou l, Sou th Korea, September 2-3, 2003, p. 60. 30. This s ection is d rawn from David C. Kang, "Hierarchy in A s ian International Relations : 1300- 1900," paper prepared for the conference "Hierarchy and Balancing in A ncient Sys tems ." This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 174 with pre-1945 Eu rope.3' In contras t, there are only two wid ely read works of political s cience that d eal with pre-1945 A s ia.32 The field of international relations tend s to treat the contemporary A s ian s ys tem as if it emerged fu lly formed from nothingnes s in the pos t-World War II, pos tcolonial era. Bu t many A s ian cou ntries have been geographically d efined , centrally ad minis tered s tates for far longer than thos e in Eu rope. To ignore the evolu tion of thes e s tates is at bes t an overs ight; at wors t, it reveals an u nwillingnes s to engage A s ia d irectly. This is es pecially pu z z ling given the hu ge amou nt of attention that international relations s cholars have paid to the his torical roots of the Eu ropean s ys tem. If s u ch s cholars were d is mis s ive of all his tory, at leas t that wou ld be cons is tent. Bu t ignoring A s ian his tory while s tu d ying Eu ropean his tory in es s ence bias es their conclu s ions in favor of the Eu ropean experience. A charya's article critiqu es my brief overview of A s ian his tory in "Getting A s ia Wrong," yet his d is cu s s ion of A s ia's his torical record relies almos t exclu - s ively on a 1968 volu me ed ited by John Fairbank.33 There has been a tremen- d ou s amou nt of his torical s cholars hip in the intervening thirty-five years ." Below I briefly expand my argu ment to cons id er (1) whether other s tates ac- commod ated to China in the pas t, and (2) the exis tence of hierarchy in A s ian international relations his torically. Firs t, accommod ation of China was the norm in Eas t A s ia d u ring the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) eras . This d id not, however, involve a s ignificant los s of national ind epend ence, as nearby s tates were largely free to cond u ct their d omes tic and foreign policy ind epend ent of China. Regard ing the Vietnames e Le d ynas ty (1427-1787), for example, David Marr writes , "This 31. A mong many books on his torical Eu ropean international relations , s ee Henrik Spru yt, The Sov- ereign State and Its Competitors : A n A nalys is of Sys tems (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univers ity P res s , 1994); Charles Tilly, ed ., The Formation of National States in Wes tern Eu rope (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univers ity P res s , 1974); Hans J. Morgenthau , P olitics among Nations : The Stru ggle for P ower and P eace, 3d ed . (New York: A lfred A . Knopf, 1960); E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years ' Cris is , 1919-1939: A n Introd u ction to the Stu d y of International Relations (Lond on: Macmillan, 1951); and Eliz abeth Kier, Imagining War: French and Britis h Military Doctrine between the Wars (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Uni- vers ity P res s , 1997). 32. Thes e are lain A las tair Johns ton, Cu ltu ral Realis m: Strategic Cu ltu re and Grand Strategy in Chines e His tory (P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univers ity P res s , 1994), and John King Fairbank, ed ., The Chines e World Ord er: Trad itional China's Foreign Relations (Cambrid ge, Mas s .: Harvard Univers ity P res s , 1968). A third will be Victoria Hu i, War and State Formation in A ncient China and Early Mod ern Eu - rope (New York: Cambrid ge Univers ity P res s , forthcoming). 33. Fairbank, The Chines e World Ord er. 34. Mu ch of this literatu re is cited in my book-length manu s cript. David C. Kang, "Hierarchy, A lli- ances , and Stability in A s ia," Dartmou th College, 2003. This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les 175 reality [China's overwhelming s iz e], together with s incere cu ltu ral ad miration, led Vietnam's ru lers to accept the tribu tary s ys tem. P rovid ing China d id not med d le in Vietnam's internal affairs .... Vietnames e monarchs were qu ite will- ing to d eclare thems elves vas s als of the Celes tial Emperor. The s u btlety of this relations hip was evid ent from the way in which Vietnames e monarchs s tyled thems elves 'king' (vu ong) when commu nicating with China's ru lers , bu t 'em- peror' (hoang d e) when ad d res s ing their own s u bjects or s end ing mes s ages to other Sou theas t A s ian ru lers ."35 Japan als o worked within the Chines e-d ominated international s ys tem. To eliminate the ins ecu rity cau s ed by fear of a Chines e invas ion, the A s hikaga Shogu nate (1333-1573) s ou ght inves titu re by the Ming emperor. Kawaz oe Shoji writes , "Japan had to become part of the Ming tribu te s ys tem and thu s ceas e to be the 'orphan' of Eas t A s ia. For centu ries the Japanes e had feared at- tack by the Silla (Korea), and the Mongol invas ions had provid ed real grou nd s for fearing a Ming attack.""3 Even the Toku gawa s hogu nate (1600-1868) recog- niz ed China's centrality and Japanes e-Korean relations as equ al. A ccord ing to Key-hu ik Kim, "The Toku gawa ru lers tacitly acknowled ged Chines e s u prem- acy and cu ltu ral lead ers hip in the Eas t A s ian world .... thou gh Toku gawa Ja- pan maintained no formal ties with China ... for all intents and pu rpos es it was as mu ch a part of the Chines e world as A s hikaga Japan had been."37 Thu s , A s ian s tates of varying s iz e and technological capability exis ted in an international s ys tem bas ed on ru les and norms that revolved arou nd China. From Japan to Siam, and for more than s ix centu ries , this s ys tem fu nctioned in es s entially the s ame manner. Second , althou gh economic relations in his torical A s ia were as vibrant as thos e in Eu rope, conflict was notably rare. Centu ries s eparated major inters tate conflict in A s ia, which tend ed to occu r when ord er within the central power had begu n to break d own. A s Chines e d ynas ties began to d ecay, conflict along and among the peripheral s tates wou ld flare u p, as the central power tu rned its attention inward . Thu s in 1274 and 1281, as the Su ng and Chin d ynas ties were cru mbling, the Mongols u nd er Ku blai Khan tried u ns u cces s fu lly to con- qu er Korea and Japan.38 Centu ries later, as the Ming d ynas ty began to weaken, 35. David Marr, "Sino-Vietnames e Relations ," A u s tralian Jou rnal of Chines e A ffairs , Vol. 10, No. 6 (Ju ly 1981), p. 49. 36. Kawaz oe Shoji, "Japan and Eas t A s ia," in Koz o Yamamu ra, ed , The Cambrid ge His tory of Japan, Vol. 3: Med ieval Japan, 3d ed . (Cambrid ge: Cambrid ge Univers ity P res s , 1990), p. 437. 37. Key-hiu k Kim, The Las t P has e of the Eas t A s ian World Ord er: Korea, Japan, and the Chines e Empire (Berkeley: Univers ity of California P res s , 1980), pp. 21, 23. 38. See Jeremiah Cu rtin, The Mongols : A His tory (Wes tport, Conn.: Greenwood , 1972). This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 176 the Japanes e general Hid eyos hi twice attempted to invad e China throu gh Ko- rea (in 1592 and 1598). With the res toration of ord er in China, however, conflict among the peripheral s tates ceas ed , and intraregional relations remained rela- tively peacefu l for s everal hu nd red years . The d ominant power had no need to fight, and the s econd ary powers had no d es ire to fight. This is not to s ay that conflict in A s ia was totally abs ent, bu t rather that inters tate war was mu ch les s common than it was in Eu rope. P irates , no- mad s , and other nons tate actors exis ted in the his torical A s ian s ys tem, ju s t as Barbary Coas t pirates and s imilarly powerfu l actors cou ld be fou nd in Eu rope. The Chines e, for ins tance, engaged in long-ru nning bord er battles with the Mongols to the north, at times employing as many as 500,000 troops in an effort to s ecu re this front.39 That A s ian international relations d o not conform to the clas s ical Eu ropean balancing mod el has been empirically valid ated by res earch that examines the origins of war over the pas t 150 years . Scott Bennett and A llan Stam s u bjected the Eu ropean mod el to empirical tes ting acros s regions and time and fou nd that althou gh it works well in Eu rope, "s ignificant d ifferences in preferences for conflict exis t acros s regions ." They als o fou nd "no s u pport for the argu - ment that [A s ian] behavior will converge on that of Eu rope. In fact, all of the regions ou ts id e of Eu rope appear to d iverge from the Eu ropean pattern [of clas s ical balance of power]."'" There are at leas t s ix empirical anomalies in contemporary A s ian interna- tional relations that realis t interpretations cannot explain. Firs t, the main em- pirical anomaly, and the main problem with a theoretical view bas ed on realis m, is the focu s of attention on the mos t powerfu l cou ntries . For A s ia, the bigges t threats aris e not from the mos t powerfu l cou ntry (the United States ) or even the s econd mos t powerfu l cou ntry (Japan), bu t rather from the region's s malles t and weakes t s tates (Taiwan and North Korea, res pectively).'4 This anomaly cannot be explained withou t firs t u nd ers tand ing thes e s tates ' inter- es ts and the natu re of their interactions with other cou ntries .42 Writing abou t d ifferent behavior acros s regions , Bennett and Stam note "It is not that the 39. Johns ton, Cu ltu ral Realis m, p. 234. See als o Hans J. van d e Ven, "War and the Making of Mod - ern China," Mod ern A s ian Stu d ies , Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1996), p. 737. 40. D. Scott Bennett and A llan Stam, The Behavioral Origins of War (A nn A rbor: Univers ity of Mich- igan P res s , 2003), pp. 191-195. 41. Thomas J. Chris tens en, "China, the U.S.-Japan A lliance, and the Secu rity Dilemma in Eas t A s ia," International Secu rity, Vol. 23 No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-79. 42. Jack L. Snyd er and Robert Jervis , ed s ., Coping with Complexity in the International Sys tem (Bou l- d er, Colo.: Wes tview, 1993). This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les 177 actors are not rational, even thou gh a u nivers al mod el may fail. Rather, they s imply are not playing the s ame game with the s ame preferences ."43 A s econd empirical anomaly concerns the thorny is s u e of Taiwanes e s over- eignty.44 Taiwan is not recogniz ed as a s overeign s tate, yet many international relations s cholars treat it like one becau s e it acts like one. This not only d oes the field of international relations a d is s ervice, bu t it is als o logically incons is - tent with the Wes tphalian view that formal recognition is paramou nt. A l- thou gh A charya argu es that China u s es Wes tphalian concepts , Chines e s cholars point ou t that when d is cu s s ing Taiwan, Chines e know exactly when they want to u s e Englis h word s and meanings and when they want to u s e Chi- nes e word s and meanings , and s o d o the Taiwanes e.45 Scholars need to con- front s u ch realities , es pecially becau s e of their s u ch ramifications for both China and Taiwan."4 A third anomaly is the remarkable s taying power of A s ia's three Leninis t s tates : China, Vietnam, and North Korea have s u rvived d es pite the collaps e of the Eu ropean commu nis t bloc more than a d ecad e ago. A lthou gh China and Vietnam (and , to a les s er extent, North Korea) have engaged in s ome economic reforms , they remain au thoritarian political regimes .47 It als o bears mention that all three are prod u cts of anti-Wes tern, anticolonial movements . North Ko- rea, in particu lar, has s u rvived mu ch longer than almos t anyone pred icted .48 A lthou gh minu s cu le compared with any of its neighbors , North Korea is the cou ntry mos t likely to be at the center of conflict in Northeas t A s ia.4j 43. Bennett and Stam, The Behavioral Origins of War, p. 174. 44. A ihwa Ong, "The Chines e A xis : Zoning Technologies and the Logic of Exception in Variegated Sovereignty," paper prepared for the conference "P eace, Development, and Regionaliz ation in Eas t A s ia"; and A nd reas Os iand er, "Sovereignty, International Relations , and the Wes tphalian Myth," International Organiz ation, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 251-287. 45. P ers onal commu nication from P eter Katz ens tein, September 29, 2003. See als o Yu n-han Chu , "Taiwan's Secu rity Dilemma: Military Rivalry, Economic Depend ence, and the Stru ggle over Na- tional Id entity," paper prepared for the conference "P eace, Development, and Regionaliz ation in Eas t A s ia." 46. Shelley Rigger, "Competing Conceptions of Taiwan's Id entity," in Su is heng Zhao, ed ., A cros s the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Cris is (New York: Rou tled ge, 1997); Chris topher Hu ghes , Taiwan and Chines e Nationalis m: National Id entity and Statu s in International So- ciety (New York: Rou tled ge, 1997); and Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the A s ia-P acific Region (New York: St. Martin's , 1995). 47. On North Korean economic reforms , s ee David C. Kang, "The A void able Cris is in North Ko- rea," Orbis , Vol. 47, No. 3 (Su mmer 2003), pp. 495-510. 48. Several years ago, I pred icted that North Korea wou ld s u rvive into the fores eeable fu tu re. Da- vid C. Kang, "Rolling with the P u nches : North Korea and Cu ba d u ring the 1980s ," Jou rnal of Eas t A s ian A ffairs , Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 18-55. 49. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nu clear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Colu mbia Univers ity P res s , 2003). This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 178 A fou rth anomaly concerns the attitu d e of Sou th Korea and Japan to the Tai- wan-China conflict. A realis t wou ld argu e that both cou ntries s hou ld have mu ch to fear from an aggres s ive China, and hence they s hou ld be eager to help the United States and Taiwan contain it, either throu gh more active meas u res tod ay or throu gh promis es to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a Chines e at- tack. A liberal wou ld as s ert that, as d emocracies , Sou th Korea and Japan s hou ld be eager to d efend d emocratic Taiwan agains t au thoritarian China. Yet becau s e of their perception of the Taiwan-China is s u e as more of an internal than an international matter, both cou ntries have s hown a relu ctance to get involved . A fifth anomaly involves the ejection of U.S. bas es from the P hilippines after the Cold War. Given the tremend ou s s ecu rity benefits that the P hilippines en- joys as a member of the U.S. alliance s ys tem in A s ia, why wou ld it take s u ch a s eemingly s elf-d efeating action?s " The s tand ard realis t explanation is that it reflected a s u rge in Filipino nationalis m-an explanation that s eems rather exceptionalis t. A s Yu en Foong Khong writes , "By 1989 it became obviou s that the negotiations had become entangled with a fierce d omes tic political d ebate within the P hilippines . The s u rge in Filipino nationalis m d erailed the negotia- tions .""' Realis ts , however, cannot s o eas ily attribu te the ou s ter of the U.S. bas es to d omes tic politics . A more likely explanation is that the P hilippines d oes not view China as the threat that realis ts believe it s hou ld . Sixth, d es pite s eemingly every reas on to be fu lly incorporated into the U.S. alliance s ys tem, Sou th Korea clearly has a d ifferent pers pective on the role of the United States in Northeas t A s ia.52 The id ea that Seou l might not want to continu e its clos e alliance with Was hington was u nthinkable even two years ago. Bu t a res u rgent Left in Sou th Korea, combined with worries that the United States -not North Korea-is the d es tabiliz ing force in the the region has led many in Sou th Korea to view the U.S. pres ence with s ome alarm. This 50. Daniel Okimoto writes , "[The U.S. alliances in A s ia have] withs tood the tes t of time, las ting for longer than a half-centu ry; they have als o fu nctioned effectively to d eter blackmail, coercion, conflict, and war." Okimoto, "KA SA and JA SA : Twin P illars of A s ia's Secu rity A rchitectu re," paper pres ented at the conference "P eace, Development, and Regionaliz ation in Eas t A s ia." 51. Khong is not a realis t, thou gh here he d oes offer the s tand ard realis t explanation for Manila's d ecis ion. Yu en Foong Khong, "Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Ins titu tions and Soft Balancing in Sou theas t A s ia's P os t-Cold War Strategy," in J.J. Su h, P eter J. Katz ens tein, and A llen Carls on ed s ., Rethinking Secu rity in Eas t A s ia: Id entity, P ower, and Efficiency (Stanford , Calif.: Stan- ford Univers ity P res s , forthcoming). 52. CSIS Working Grou p on U.S.-R.O.K. Relations , "Strengthening the U.S.-R.O.K. A lliance: A Blu eprint for the 21s t Centu ry" (Was hington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Stu d ies , 2003). This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical P u z z les 179 has cau s ed mu ch cons ternation in Was hington, which is beginning to take the threat to the alliance more s eriou s ly. Chu ng-min Lee writes , "For the firs t time s ince the bilateral alliance [with the United States ] was forged more than a half-centu ry ago, more Koreans are at leas t entertaining the s pecter of clos er political, s ecu rity, and economic ties with China.""53 There are d eep d ivis ions in Sou th Korea concerning the u tility of a continu ed alliance with the United States , U.S. policy toward North Korea, and Sou th Korea's relations with the other powers in the region.54 A lthou gh d ifferences over how to d eal with North Korea are nothing new, in the pas t thes e d ifferences were often tactical, res olved in large part becau s e of the common perception that North Korea rep- res ented a s eriou s s ecu rity threat. In recent years , however, Sou th Korean and U.S. s ecu rity perceptions have begu n to s ignificantly d iverge. Ins tead of ad d res s ing s u ch anomalies , A charya chos e to emphas iz e two other argu ments : firs t, that Ind ia is a s ignificant actor in A s ian international re- lations and , s econd , that norms matter in explaining thes e relations . Neither argu ment is s u s tainable. A lthou gh Ind ia certainly is an important actor in Sou th A s ia, the fact that China extend s into two regions d oes not mean that the two regions are the s ame. This wou ld be s imilar to argu ing that becau s e the United States is involved in A s ia and Eu rope, both of thos e regions are the s ame. Ind ia may matter to Sou th A s ia, bu t it d oes not figu re in Eas t A s ian s ecu - rity is s u es s u ch as North Korea and Taiwan, or even in P hilippine s ecu rity d ecis ionmaking. In ad d ition, the norms and ins titu tions argu ment has little empirical valid ity. One recu rrent find ing is the d is parity in attitu d es and beliefs on thes e s u bjects within Sou th Korea, Japan, Thailand , the P hilippines , and Ind ones ia. Thes e cou ntries are certainly mod ern, bu t a common d es ire for a s ecu rity commu nity is far from a reality. Norms that might influ ence A s ian s tate behavior are s tar- tlingly abs ent, and here A aron Fried berg's original argu ment is tru e: Given their vas t d is parities in wealth, political d evelopment, ethnicity, religion, and langu age, s tates in Eas t A s ia d o not s hare a common bond , beyond the d es ire to be wealthy and s ecu re."5 Ins titu tions s u ch as the A s s ociation of Sou theas t 53. Chu ng-min Lee, "Between A lliance and A u tonomy: Reconceptu aliz ing Sou th Korea's Strategic Choices and A ttend ant Cons equ ences ," paper pres ented at the conference "P eace, Development, and Regionaliz ation in Eas t A s ia," p. 162. 54. Chu ng-in Moon, "Between Banmi and Su ngmi: Changing Images of the United States in Sou th Korea," lectu re pres ented at Georgetown Univers ity, A u gu s t 20, 2003. 55. A aron L. Fried berg, "Ripe for Rivalry: P ros pects for P eace in a Mu ltipolar World ," International Secu rity, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33. This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Secu rity 28:3 180 A s ian Nations and the A SEA N Regional Foru m remain peripheral to the con- d u ct of A s ian international relations . That thes e A s ian s tates may have mod ern as pirations is one thing; to argu e that they s hare d eeply held norms and a d e- s ire for more regional ins titu tions is another. Conclu s ion A mitav A charya has mad e a nu mber of important points regard ing the s tu d y of A s ian international relations . In ad d ition to focu s ing on s tand ard realis t con- cerns s u ch as material capabilities , international relations s cholars need to give greater cons id eration to the role of ins titu tions , id eas , and his tory in A s ia, as well as to d efinitions of the A s ian region and its s u bs ys tems . The key qu es tion is whether balancing or band wagoning bes t characteriz es contemporary A s ian relations . The evid ence, althou gh mixed , s hows that A s ian nations d o not feel particu larly threatened by any cou ntry and hence are not balancing China. Clos e examination of mains tream realis t theoretical approaches to A s ian inter- national relations reveals a nu mber of pu z z les , and s cholars of A s ian interna- tional relations need to pay more attention to the empirical record , both his torical and mod ern. My goal is not to replace one s et of u nqu es tioned as s er- tions with another, bu t rather to open u p the field for continu ed progres s . This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions