Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2009 Leach 221 9

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DOI: 10.1177/0146167208327001
2009 35: 221 Pers Soc Psychol Bull
Frederick R. Leach and Jason E. Plaks
Abstraction
Regret for Errors of Commission and Omission in the Distant Term Versus Near Term: The Role of Level of
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221
Regret for Errors of Commission and
Omission in the Distant Term Versus Near
Term: The Role of Level of Abstraction
Frederick R. Leach
Stanford University
Jason E. Plaks
University of Toronto
involves the possibility of making an error of commis-
sion (incorrectly acting) or an error of omission (incor-
rectly refraining from acting). A question of both
theoretical and practical importance is whether one type
of error tends to evoke greater regret. Two English
idioms suggest contrasting views: Better safe than
sorry implies that an error of commission is graver
than an error of omission, but Nothing ventured,
nothing gained implies the opposite.
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) investigated this
question by providing participants with a scenario
involving switching versus not switching stocks that
either declined or did not decline in value. They
obtained striking results: 92% of their participants
reported that a person making an error of commission
would feel worse than a person making an error of
omission, ceteris parabis (cited in Gilovich & Medvec,
1995). Subsequent studies, including those by Landman
(1987) and Gleicher et al. (1990), found similar pat-
terns. According to Kahneman and Miller (1986),
action produces more intense regret than inaction
because action is less common and thus more salient.
Authors Note: Authors are listed alphabetically. Each contributed
equally to this work. Please address correspondence to Jason E. Plaks,
4003 Sidney Smith Hall, Department of Psychology, University of
Toronto, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3; e-mail:
plaks@psych.utoronto.ca.
PSPB, Vol. 35 No. 2, February 2009 221-229
DOI: 10.1177/0146167208327001
2009 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
Why are errors of omission regretted more than errors
of commission in the distant past, whereas the reverse is
true for the near past? The authors hypothesized that
abstract versus concrete representation is a significant
contributor to this effect. In Study 1, the authors
assessed participants regret for errors of commission
versus omission occurring in the distant versus near past
while measuring the level of abstraction at which par-
ticipants spontaneously described the dilemma. As pre-
dicted, participants greater regret for errors of omission
(vs. commission) in the distant term (vs. near term) was
mediated by level of abstraction. In Study 2, temporal
distance, level of abstraction, and error type were all
independently manipulated. As expected, participants
reported more regret for an error of omission in the dis-
tant past when it was represented abstractly versus con-
cretely. The authors discuss the role of mental
abstraction in the phenomenology of binary decisions
and error-related regret.
Keywords: regret; errors of commission and omission; level
of abstraction
D
ecisions between the alternatives of action and
inaction are pervasive in life, appearing in a wide
range of decision-making contexts. Examples include
financial decisions (e.g., should I buy the promising, but
risky, new stock?), medical decisions (e.g., should I try
the new, but unproven, treatment?), and interpersonal
dilemmas (e.g., should I ask that attractive stranger out
on a date?). Despite the widely differing content of such
decisions, they share a common structure in that each
at Alexandru Ioan Cuza on April 10, 2014 psp.sagepub.com Downloaded from
THE TEMPORAL PATTERN OF REGRET
Later studies, however, uncovered a more complex
phenomenon. When Gilovich and Medvec (1994) asked
participants to name the single mistake they regretted
the most in their lives, participants reported errors of
omission more frequently (see also Hattiangadi,
Medvec, & Gilovich, 1995). Gilovich and Medvec rea-
soned that (a) when asked to name their greatest regret,
people tend to recall events in the distant past, and (b) in
the distant past, errors of omission are more regrettable
than errors of commission (see also Gilovich & Medvec,
1995). In other studies, Gilovich and Medvec (1994,
Studies 3 and 4) directly compared the near term versus
distant term by asking participants to indicate whether
an actor or a nonactor who both obtained the same neg-
ative outcome would experience more regret immedi-
ately versus in the long run. A strong majority (76%)
indicated that the actor would experience greater regret
in the short term, but a solid majority (63%) felt that
the nonactor would experience greater regret in the long
term (for similar findings, see Feldman, Miyamoto, &
Loftus, 1999).
1
Additional studies examined mediating mechanisms.
Gilovich, Medvec, and Chen (1995), for example,
found that people exhibited more cognitive dissonance
reduction for actions than for inactions while at the
same time engaging in more counterproductive rumina-
tion over inactions compared to actions (see also
Savitsky, Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997). In a related vein,
Kahneman (1995) argued that regret for near-term
events is qualitatively different from regret for distant-
term events in that the former is hotter and the latter
more wistful. According to this logic, differences in
regret between errors of commission versus omission
occur because errors of commission are more typically
linked to hot regret while errors of omission are more
typically linked to wistful regret (Gilovich, Medvec, &
Kahneman, 1998).
THE TEMPORAL PATTERN OF ABSTRACTION
As helpful as these insights have been, we suggest
that there is a critical aspect of the psychology of regret
that has been largely overlooked: namely, how
abstractly versus concretely errors are represented in the
distant versus near term. We argue that this difference
in mental representation plays a key role in the psy-
chology of distant-term versus near-term regret.
Trope and Liberman (2003) proposed construal level
theory (CLT), which asserts that mental representations
of distant events (future and past) are more abstract
than those of near events (Liberman & Trope, 1998;
Trope & Liberman, 2000). Abstract representation typ-
ically refers to thinking of not only the act itself but its
purpose and/or consequences (Bar-Anan, Liberman, &
Trope, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2003). To illustrate
what differences in abstraction denote, consider a
person ringing a doorbell. This persons behavior can be
described either abstractly as calling on a friend or
concretely as pushing a button. Vallacher and
Wegners (1989) Behavioral Identification Form is used
to measure chronic individual differences in the ten-
dency to invoke high-level versus low-level repre-
sentations. Construal level may also be experimentally
manipulated in a variety of ways, including asking par-
ticipants to describe how an event occurred versus why
it occurred (e.g., Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004).
Much of this research has found that when people
think about the distant term, they tend to select higher
level descriptions (e.g., calling on a friend), but when
they consider the same event in the near term, they pre-
fer lower level descriptions (e.g., pushing a button) (e.g.,
Trope & Liberman, 2000). According to recent
accounts (e.g., Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006; Trope &
Liberman, 2003), details about distant future events are
often knowable only as the time draws closer. Thus, it is
sensible that people would come to associate distant
future events with abstract concepts (e.g., superordinate
goals, broad summaries of the situation) and only turn
to concrete considerations (e.g., subordinate goals,
specifics of the situation) when the events imminence
focuses attention on successful execution. This associa-
tion between distant events and abstract representation
versus near-term events and concrete representation
has been shown to affect cognition and motivation in
a host of everyday domains, including choice behav-
ior (Liberman & Trope, 1998), gambling preferences
(Sagristano, Trope, & Liberman, 2002), self-control
(Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006), and judgments of similarity
(Day & Bartels, 2004, 2006).
2
However, no studies, to
our knowledge, have examined the effect of construal
level on error-related regret.
DO ERRORS OF COMMISSION AND
OMISSION DIFFER IN ABSTRACTION?
Several studies lend indirect evidence that errors of
omission are mentally represented more abstractly than
errors of commission. In one study, Gilovich and
Medvec (1995) asked participants to rate how different
their lives would be if they could change their greatest
error of omission and error of commission. Participants
222 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
indicated that undoing the error of omission would have
a greater impact than undoing the error of commission.
This broader reach of errors of omission suggests more
abstract representation. In another study, Ngbala and
Branscombe (1997) recorded the counterfactuals partic-
ipants generated following negative outcomes. The
counterfactuals generated for actions tended to be sub-
ordinate (63.2%) rather than superordinate (15.8%),
but the counterfactuals generated for inactions tended to
be superordinate (85%) rather than subordinate (15%).
(For a related finding, see Hetts, Boninger, Armor,
Gleicher, and Nathanson, 2000, Study 2.)
These findings begin to document that compared to
errors of commission, errors of omission are generally
associated with abstract representation. Why might this
be the case? An error of omission tends to be subjec-
tively perceived as open or unfinished business
(Savitsky et al., 1997). Events that are construed in such
a manner typically call to mind a higher number of
imaginable outcomes. That is, failing to act leads people
to imagine the many ways they could have acted and the
many consequences of these potential courses of action
(Savitsky et al., 1997). This perceived wider range of
consequences is one of the hallmarks of abstract repre-
sentation (Bar-Anan et al., 2006; Trope & Liberman,
2003). In contrast, committing to a single course of
action has the subjective effect of closing off all other
options. This sense of narrowing the field is one of
the hallmarks of concrete representation (Trope &
Liberman, 2003).
Why might the greater abstraction of errors of omis-
sion translate into greater regret over time? The answer
may involve basic properties of human memory. The
higher number of imagined consequences associated
with errors of omission leads to more retrieval routes to
reactivate memory for the event (i.e., a form of a fan
effect; Anderson & Reder, 1999). Thus, over time, the
greater breadth of an error of omission leads people to
stumble upon more reminders of the error, thereby con-
tinually reopening the wound. Consistent with this
idea, Rajagopal, Raju, and Unnava (2006) showed that
over time, errors of omission become more accessible in
memory than errors of commission.
In the present research, we suggest that although
errors of omission are (compared to errors of commis-
sion) generally associated with abstract representation,
there is nevertheless a high degree of variability in how
abstractly people may represent an error of omission.
We posit that to the extent that people represent an
error of omission abstractly, regret will increase over
time. As noted, abstract representation is likely to
include the context and implications of the event. Thus,
abstract representation of a distant-term omission
should constitute a subjective expansion of the error,
causing it to be experienced as a chronic fixture in ones
mental life. However, to the extent that people activate
a concrete representation for an error of omission they
should succeed in compartmentalizing it and preventing
its implications from seeming widespread and chronic.
Thus, for those who happen to represent the omission
concretely, the temporal effect of regret should be less
pronounced or even eliminated.
To summarize, in the present studies we test a model
that systematically combines the links among temporal
distance, level of abstraction, and errors of commission
versus omission. We hypothesized that if it is the case that
(a) near and distant past events differ in level of abstrac-
tion, and (b) errors of commission and omission likewise
differ in level of abstraction, then (c) level of abstraction
mediates the differential regret observed for errors of
omission versus commission in the distant versus near
past. These three facets, taken together, may help to
explain the differential imprint that errors of omission
(vs. commission) leave in the distant past (vs. near past).
Previous accounts have emphasized the different emo-
tional qualities or cognitive dissonance reduction
processes associated with errors of omission and commis-
sion and the distant and near past (Gilovich et al., 1998;
Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). We submit that such warm
mechanisms, though helpful, may benefit from being sup-
plemented by colder concerns such as mental represen-
tation. Note that our approach is not mutually exclusive
with accounts that evoke emotional or motivational
processes. We do suggest, however, that insight into how
errors are mentally represented contributes crucial detail
to the emerging picture of the psychology of regret.
STUDY 1
The goal of Study 1 was to measure the degree of
abstraction participants spontaneously associated with
near-term and distant-term errors to determine whether
this would influence the differential effect of distance on
regret for errors of omission versus commission.
Method
Participants. Participants were 129 undergraduates
(82 females) enrolled in an introductory psychology
course who received extra course credit for completing
the experiment.
Procedure. Participants read one of four scenarios
representing a 2 (error type: commission vs. omission)
2 (temporal distance: near term vs. distant term)
between-subjects design. The scenario is presented in
the following with language used in the distant and
inaction conditions in bold:
Leach, Plaks / ERRORS OF COMMISSION VS. OMISSION 223
On the popular TV game show Deal or No Deal con-
testants are often faced with a particular scenario at the
end of the game. The contestant has a suitcase contain-
ing one of two amounts of money and there is another
suitcase held by the host that contains the other amount
of money. The contestant is faced with a decision of
whether or not to switch his/her case before being
allowed to view the contents. The scenario below was
encountered by a contestant when it was aired [last
week/five years ago].
Markus was a college student. Markuss case con-
tained either $300,000 or $5. He chose [to switch/not
to switch] his case, and when the host revealed the con-
tents of the [new case/his case], it contained $5.
Participants completed the following item: Looking
back on the decision Markus made [last week/five years
ago], how regretful do you think Markus feels?
Ratings were made on a 5-point scale that ranged from
not at all to extremely. Next, participants were asked to
explain as best you can in your own words the
thoughts you had about the situation that led you to
your rating.
Results
Level of abstraction. Two coders who were blind to
the hypotheses coded participants free descriptions on
a scale based on Semin and Fiedlers (1988) coding sys-
tem, indicating the extent to which the response was
abstract versus concrete (0 to 2 scale). According to this
system, more physically invariant behaviors are classi-
fied at a lower level and less invariant behaviors at a
higher level. For example, ringing a doorbell can only
be accomplished in a limited number of ways and is
thus low level or concrete, whereas calling on a friend
may be accomplished in a wide variety of ways and is
thus high level or abstract. Intercoder agreement was
82%, and the mean rating was used when coders dis-
agreed. A total of 5 participants were excluded from
further analysis because their responses indicated that
they did not complete the experiment faithfully.
A 2 (error) 2 (temporal distance) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) conducted on these abstraction ratings
revealed a significant Error Temporal Distance interac-
tion, F(1, 125) = 5.53, p < .05. Examination of the means
revealed that both error types were represented equiva-
lently abstractly in the near term (M
omission
= 0.85 vs.
M
commission
= 0.79, ns), but in the distant term, errors of
omission were represented more abstractly than errors of
commission (M
omission
= 1.21 vs. M
commission
= 0.73), F(1,
125) = 6.02, p < .05. Put differently, only errors of omis-
sion increased in abstractness when moving from near
term to distant term, F(1, 125) = 5.86, p < .05.
Ratings of regret. Next, a 2 (error) 2 (temporal dis-
tance) ANOVA conducted on ratings of regret revealed
a main effect for distance, F(1, 125) = 6.40, p < .02,
indicating that the distant-term scenario produced more
regret overall (M = 4.00 vs. M = 3.53). In addition, this
analysis found the predicted Error Temporal Distance
interaction, F(1, 125) = 7.19, p < .01, indicating that
errors of commission were regretted more in the near
term (M
commission
= 3.82 vs. M
omission
= 3.24) while errors
of omission were regretted more in the distant term
(M
omission
= 4.25 vs. M
commission
= 3.79). Put differently,
errors of omission, but not errors of commission,
elicited more regret over time. This interaction, which
replicates previous findings (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec,
1994), is depicted in Figure 1.
In order to test whether level of abstraction mediated
the effect of the interaction between error type and psy-
chological distance on regret, separate mediation analy-
ses were conducted for each temporal distance
condition. As shown in Figure 2, whereas in the near-
term condition there was no relationship between error
type and regret (and thus no mediation by level of
abstraction), B = .288, p > .134, t(59) = 1.521, in the
distant-term condition, level of abstraction did signifi-
cantly mediate the effect of error type on regret (Sobel
z = 2.20, p < .05). Thus, as predicted, including level of
abstraction in the analysis accounted for a significant
portion of the effect of distance and error type on
regret.
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
Near Term Far Term
Commission
Omission
Figure 1 Regret for errors of commission and omission in the near
term and distant term.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 demonstrate that (a) errors of
commission and omission differ in how abstractly they
are spontaneously represented in the distant term and
(b) this difference in abstraction accounts for the differ-
ences in regret associated with distant-term errors of
omission versus commission. It is noteworthy that we
did not find any difference in level of abstraction
between errors of commission versus omission in the
near-term condition. It appears that a minimum amount
of temporal distance may be required to draw out the
difference in abstraction between omissions and com-
missions. Consistent with this idea, we observed that in
the distant-term condition, errors of omission were
regretted more than errors of commission and that
moreover, level of abstraction significantly mediated
this difference.
Because a key element of the Study 1 data was not
manipulated (participants spontaneous descriptions),
in Study 2 we sought to provide additional, converging
evidence for our hypothesis by manipulating all three
independent variables, including level of abstraction. In
so doing, we tested the following hypothesis: If abstract
representation is critical to the elevated regret associ-
ated with distant-term errors of omission, then when
participants are forced to represent distant-term errors
of omission concretely, regret should diminish. If so,
this would indicate that level of abstraction is not
merely correlated with regret for distant-term omis-
sions, but in fact plays a causal role. In addition, we
tested whether the effect would generalize beyond the
simplified variant of the Monty Hall problem pre-
sented in Study 1 by framing the dilemma in a different,
real-world context.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants. Participants were 158 undergraduates
(111 females) who received course credit for participation.
Procedure. Participants read one of eight scenarios that
reflected a 2 (error: commission vs. omission) 2 (tempo-
ral distance: near term vs. distant term) 2 (abstraction:
abstract vs. concrete) between-subjects design (presented
in the following). The temporal distance manipulation is
presented in the first set of brackets (distant term in bold).
The construal level manipulation is in the second set of
brackets (high-level, abstract representation in bold). The
error type manipulationcomprising the type of decision
(action vs. inaction) and the outcomeis presented in the
third set of brackets (error of omission in bold).
Imagine the following scenario happened to you [sev-
eral years ago/several days ago]. In thinking about the
scenario, [try to analyze why you might have acted the
way you did. Try to put your behavior into the larger
context of your general goals in life./try to vividly imag-
ine the situation in all its rich detail. Imagine exactly
what the experience and feelings would be like.]
You have applied for two summer jobs. You receive
a call from your potential boss at one of the companies.
He says that they want to hire you, but they havent
decided which position to put you in: a high-ranking,
high-paying position or a low-ranking, low-paying posi-
tion. They will not tell you which position you were
assigned to until next week. The only catch is you have
to let him know by the end of today if you will accept
or decline the offer. A few minutes later, you get a call
from the second company. The second boss says the
same thing: They want to hire you, but they havent
decided which position to put you in: a high-ranking,
high-paying position or a low-ranking, low-paying posi-
tion. They will not tell you which position you were
assigned to until next week. You are faced with a deci-
sion: Do you accept the first offer or pass on the first
offer and take a chance on the second offer? Because
you need the money, you do not have the option of
going without a job.
Near Term
Distant Term
n = 62
Error Type
(1 = Commission;
1 = Omission)
Regret
Level of Abstraction
.032, ns
.029, ns
.228, ns (.227, ns)
n = 67
Error Type
(1 = Commission;
1 = Omission)
Regret
Level of Abstraction
.239*
.599*
.291* (.147, ns)
* Sobel z = 2.20, p < .05
Figure 2 Tests of mediation in the near-term condition (top panel)
and distant-term condition (bottom panel).
[Decision: You decide to accept the first offer and
pass on the second offer./You decide to pass on the first
offer and accept the second offer. Result: The next
week, a representative from the company that made the
first offer calls and tells you were assigned to the low-
paying position./The next week, the company who
made the second offer calls and tells you were assigned
to the low-paying position.]
On a separate page of the packet, participants were
asked to indicate how regretful they felt about the deci-
sion right now on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged
from not at all to extremely. (The inclusion of the
phrase right now was meant to ensure that participants
considered the event from their present near-term or dis-
tant-term vantage point rather than considering how
they felt at the time.) Participants were also asked to
rate how responsible they felt when looking back on
this decision (on a 5-point scale).
Next, participants were asked to complete three
manipulation check items without turning back to the
previous page. First, they were asked to indicate
whether they considered their error an error of commis-
sion or omission by checking one of two boxes. Second,
as a check of the temporal distance manipulation, they
were asked to fill in a blank asking when the event
occurred. Third, as a check of the construal level manip-
ulation, they were asked to complete the blank asking
them to describe the instructions we (the experimenters)
gave them for how to think about the event.
Results
Manipulation checks. A total of 11 participants
(evenly distributed across the conditions) failed at least
one manipulation check item. Inclusion or exclusion of
these participants data did not significantly affect the
results. The results reported in the following include
these participants.
Ratings of regret. A 2 (error type) 2 (temporal dis-
tance) 2 (level of abstraction) analysis of variance con-
ducted on the ratings of regret revealed significant main
effects for level of abstraction and error (both Fs >
14.80, both ps < .001), indicating that overall, partici-
pants expressed more regret when the error was repre-
sented abstractly (M = 3.73) than concretely (M = 3.28)
and more regret when it was an omission (M = 3.88)
than a commission (M = 3.22). These main effects were
qualified by all of the possible two-way interactions (all
Fs > 4.33, all ps < .05) and the predicted three-way
Error Temporal Distance Level of Abstraction inter-
action, F(1, 150) = 4.01, p < .05.
To determine the nature of the three-way interaction,
we examined each temporal distance condition sepa-
rately. These analyses revealed a significant Error
Level of Abstraction interaction in the distant-term con-
dition, F(1, 150) = 11.64, p < .01, but not in the near-
term condition, F(1, 150) = 0.18. Decomposing the
two-way interaction in the distant-term condition,
simple effects tests revealed that as predicted, an error
of omission was regretted more when represented
abstractly (M = 4.81) than concretely (M = 3.44), F(1,
150) = 24.74, p < .001. In addition, in the distant term,
an abstract omission was regretted significantly more
than an abstract commission (M = 3.25, p < .01). In
contrast, in the near term, the effect of abstract con-
strual on regret for an omission (M = 3.80) versus com-
mission (M = 3.36) was only marginally significant, F(1,
150) = 3.60, p = .06. Finally, a distant-term/abstract
omission was regretted more than a near-term/abstract
omission (M = 3.80), F(1, 150) = 5.00, p < .05. In short,
an abstract representation was necessary for a distant-
term omission to elicit a high level of regret. These
results are consistent with those of Study 1. These
means are presented in Figure 3 (distant-term condition
on top, near-term condition on bottom).
This pattern indicates that abstract construal is a crit-
ical component of regret for temporally distant errors of
omission. It appears that the combination of a significant
length of time and abstract construal broadens and inten-
sifies the regret resulting from not having acted when one
should have acted. When abstract representation is
absent, however, regret remains constant over time.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
With the goal of better understanding the temporal
pattern of regret, in Study 1 we examined (a) whether
errors of commission and omission differ in how
abstractly they tend to be spontaneously represented in
the distant term and (b) whether this difference medi-
ates the effect of temporal distance on regret. Consistent
with our hypotheses, the data indicated that the answer
to both of these questions was yes. In Study 2, we inde-
pendently manipulated all three variables and found a
similar pattern; distant-term omissions were regretted
more than other types of errors only when they were
represented abstractly (vs. concretely).
An idea that has promise in explaining this phenom-
enon relies on our fundamental assumptions about
cause and effect. From the earliest stages of life, actions
seem inherently more causal than inactions. There is
often a strong and concrete subjective link between an
action and its effects, whereas the effect of an inaction
often requires delving into less salient, behind-the-
scenes causes. For this reason, detecting the effect of
an inaction typically requires more abstract processing
than detecting the effect of an action. For example, the
infant who bangs her spoon on the table will likely per-
ceive an effect of her action, especially when she is in a
restaurant with easily embarrassed parents. In contrast,
the infant who leaves her spoon on the table is less likely
to perceive that her parents appreciative glances were
caused by this nonaction. Detecting the relationship
between her nonaction and her parents glances would
require a broader representation of the situation, one
that included, for example, the parents expectations of
the childs behavior. It is reasonable to conclude that
over time, because understanding inactions as causes
generally requires abstract processing, inactions would
tend to readily activate an abstract perspective.
Although the effects of inactions may require a more
abstract perspective to discern, there is evidence that
errors resulting from inactions become more memo-
rable than actions over time (Rajagopal et al., 2006).
Why might that be? Typically, errors of omission,
through their lack of action, are subjectively perceived
as leaving open a range of imaginable outcomes
(Savitsky et al., 1997). In contrast, for errors of com-
mission, the action and its consequences are perceived
as known and this outcome has eliminated all other
possible outcomes. Thus, errors of omission, with their
perceived higher number of dangling possibilities,
should have more retrieval routes available to trigger
memory for the event (Rajagopal et al., 2006).
3
In the
long run, the continual reminderscoming from a
range of sourceswould reinforce the subjective sense
of globalizing the error across many aspects of ones life.
In addition, the tendency to ruminate more over the
unfinished business of errors of omissiona form of
a Zeigarnik effectshould further increase the memo-
rability of errors of omission (Savitsky et al., 1997).
Over time, as memory for particular details of both
errors of commission and errors of omission degrade,
this effect should only increase.
As a simplified example, consider the difference
between asking a person out on a date and being rejected
(an error of commission) versus never asking the person
out and being haunted by what could have been (an
error of omission). In the latter case, both options (being
accepted and being rejected) are likely to be perceived
as still-open possibilities. In the former case, getting
rejected becomes the known quantity and in turn, the
only outcome remaining. Thus, for errors of omission,
both thoughts about being rejected and thoughts about
being accepted should activate memory for the decision,
whereas for errors of commission only thoughts about
being rejected should trigger the memory.
4
Consistent with this account, Rajagopal et al. (2006)
found that over time, the accessibility (as measured by
response time and response order) of errors of omission
increased. This was not the case for errors of commis-
sion. Rajagopal et al. found that this difference in acces-
sibility between errors of omission and commission was
related in part to the greater subjective breadth of
errors of omission. Breadth was operationalized as the
number of areas of participants lives affected by the
error and thus corresponds to a key aspect of abstract
representation. Although no studies, to our knowledge,
have directly tested the interrelations among level of
abstraction, memory, and regret for errors of omission
and commission over time, the accumulated evidence is
highly suggestive that the effect of level of abstraction
on regret is due in large measure to (a) greater memora-
bility for the event and (b) increased focus on the
broader implications of the event.
Figure 3 Regret for abstractly versus concretely represented errors
of commission and omission in the distant term (top
panel) and the near term (bottom panel).
Near Term
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
Commission Omission
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
commission omission
Concrete Abstract
Concrete Abstract
Distant Term
It is worth noting that in Study 1, in the near-term
condition, there was no difference in level of abstraction
between errors of commission and omission. (As noted,
this pattern is consistent with construal level theory,
which does not necessarily predict a crossover interac-
tion.) From these data it appears that in the near term,
the difference in regret between errors of commission
and omission that has been previously found in the lit-
erature may not hinge on level of abstraction. Instead,
the warmer mechanisms described in previous research
(Gilovich et al., 1998) may be more applicable to near-
term regret. In the distant term, however, level of
abstraction exerted a clear effect in both of the present
studies. Taken together, it is plausible that warmer and
colder mechanisms play leading roles at different points
in the temporal sequence. Future research is needed to
illuminate at what point in time the warmer processes
cede ground to the colder processes.
In summary, the two studies reported here indicate
that how events are mentally represented play a signifi-
cant, heretofore underexamined role in the experience
of regret for errors that occurred in the distant past. As
noted, this is not to deny that emotional and motiva-
tional processes play important roles as well, as there is
clear evidence that they do (e.g., Gilovich et al., 1995,
1998). Nevertheless, the present studies underscore the
ways in which initial mental representation may set the
tone for how emotional and motivational processes play
out. Future researchers may do well to explore the inter-
play between warmer and colder processes in the expe-
rience of regret by examining how emotional and
motivational aspects influenceand in turn are influ-
enced byhow an error is mentally framed.
NOTES
1. Byrne and McEleneys (2000) attempts to replicate Gilovich and
Medvecs (1994, Studies 3 and 4) findings using a scenario similar to
that used by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) were unsuccessful.
However, Byrne and McEleneys studies were fundamentally different
in that they manipulated the temporal distance between the decision
and outcome rather than the temporal distance of the outcome itself.
2. It is important to note that construal level theory does not nec-
essarily imply a crossover pattern whereby concrete features are more
salient in the near term and abstract features are more salient in the
distant term. Rather, in the near term abstract and concrete features
are likely to be similarly salient with the potential for concrete fea-
tures to be more salient than abstract features, but as distance
increases, the concrete features become less salient, resulting in
abstract features being more salient than concrete features.
3. Note that this is in accord with one of the ways that Semin and
Fiedler (1988) operationalized abstractness: An end that can be
accomplished by more means (e.g., killing John) is more abstract
than one that can be accomplished by fewer means (e.g., pulling the
trigger).
4. Note that in the present studies, for the sake of creating equiv-
alence among the experimental conditions, we gave the error of omis-
sion in our scenarios a single known outcome. In everyday life,
however, the majority of errors of omission are likely to be associated
with greater uncertainty and a greater number of plausible outcomes
(as in the example of failing to ask the person out). Thus, even in cases
when the error of omission does have a high degree of certainty and
finality, it is reasonable to assume that the processing typically associ-
ated with errors of omission would be activated.
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Received March 18, 2008
Revision accepted August 23, 2008

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