SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156187. November 11, 2004]

JIMMY T. GO, petitioner, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, ANGELO V.
MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD
MARTIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 31 July 2002
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62625, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders dated June 7, 2000, August 9,
2000 and November 8, 2000 are SET ASIDE.
Respondent judge is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 67878 on the ground of improper
venue.[3]
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark International,
Noahs Ark Sugar Carriers, Noahs Ark Sugar Truckers, Noahs Ark Sugar Repacker, Noahs
Ark Sugar Insurers, Noahs Ark Sugar Terminal, Noahs Ark Sugar Building, and Noahs Ark
Sugar Refinery.[4]
Sometime in August 1996, petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko applied for an
Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the
amount of Nine Hundred Million (P900,000,000) Pesos,[5] and was favorably acted upon by the
latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 64070, located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837 square
meters, and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also located at
Mandaluyong City with an area of 14,271 square meters, registered in the name of Noahs Ark
Sugar Refinery.
On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was
subsequently cancelled[6] by respondent UCPB. As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go
demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by
Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the same and proceeded to have
the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the
registration thereof before the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City on 02 September 1997.
On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage[7] covered by
TCT No. 64070, for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result, the
public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate
Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, against respondent bank and its officers, namely, Angelo V. Manahan, Francisco C.
Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty. Edward E. Martin, together with Ex-Officio Sheriff Lydia G.
San Juan and Sheriff IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
266, docketed as Civil Case No. 67878. The complaint was subsequently amended[8] on 22 May
2000. The amended complaint alleged, among other things, the following: that petitioner Jimmy
T. Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT No. 64070, although the title is registered
only in the name of Looyuko; that respondent bank was aware that he is a co-owner as he was
asked to sign two deeds of real estate mortgage covering the subject property; that the approved
omnibus credit line applied for by him and Looyuko did not materialize and was cancelled by
respondent bank on 21 July 1997, so that the pre-signed real estate mortgages were likewise
cancelled; that he demanded from respondent bank that TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be
returned to him, but respondent bank refused to do so; that despite the cancellation of the
omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had the two deeds of real estate mortgage
dated and notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
constituted on TCT No. 64070; that the auction sale scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May
2000 be enjoined; that the two real estate mortgages be cancelled and TCTs No. 64070 and No.
3325 be returned to him; and that respondent bank and its officers be ordered to pay him moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On 07 June 2000, respondent bank, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss[9]
based on the following grounds: 1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to
nonpayment of the proper filing and docket fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong
venue; 3) an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore, the
complaint states no cause of action; 4) that the complaint was improperly verified; and 5) that
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient and false certification of non-
forum shopping.
On 07 June 2000, the trial court issued an order[10] granting petitioners application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the auction sale, scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03
May 2000, was enjoined.
On 09 August 2000, the trial court denied[11] respondent banks motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 67878. A motion for reconsideration[12] was filed, but the same was likewise denied in an
Order[13] dated 08 November 2000.
Respondent bank questioned said orders before the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari[14] dated 03 January 2001, alleging that the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order denying the motion to dismiss
and the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On 31 July 2002, the Court of Appeals[15] set aside the Orders dated 07 June 2000, 09 August
2000 and 08 November 2000 issued by the trial court and directed the trial court to dismiss Civil
Case No. 67878 on the ground of improper venue.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner,[16] which was denied in an order dated 14
November 2002.[17]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.[18]
On 16 June 2003, the Court gave due course to the petition, and required[19] the parties to file
their respective memoranda. Respondents filed their Joint Memorandum on 27 August 2003,
while petitioner filed his on 25 September 2003 upon prior leave of court for extension. With
leave of this Court, private respondents filed their reply to petitioners memorandum.
In his memorandum, petitioner raised a lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER BY ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS FINDING THAT THE CASE A QUO IS A REAL
ACTION.
Simply put, the issue to be resolved in this case is whether petitioners complaint for cancellation
of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section 1,
Rule 4,[20] a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property. The venue for real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial
courts -- the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any
part thereof lies.[21]
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person or property.[22] The venue for personal actions is likewise
the same for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.[23]
It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue for cases of the above nature
is the primary objective for which said cases are filed. Thus:
1. In Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[24] this Court ruled that an
action to redeem by the mortgage debtor affects his title to the foreclosed property. If the action
is seasonably made, it seeks to erase from the title of the judgment or mortgage debtor the lien
created by registration of the mortgage and sale. If not made seasonably, it may seek to recover
ownership to the land since the purchasers inchoate title to the property becomes consolidated
after [the] expiration of the redemption period. Either way, redemption involves the title to the
foreclosed property. It is a real action.
2. In Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc., v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court quoting the decision of
the Court of Appeals ruled that since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a
conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the
foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a
real action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part
thereof lies.
3. In Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana,[26] this court ruled that while it is true that petitioner
does not directly seek the recovery . . . of the property in question, his action for annulment of
sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is
petitioners primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime
objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real
action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of
improper venue which was timely raised.
4. In Ruiz v. J. M. Tuason Co., Inc., et al.,[27] the court ruled that although [a] complaint is
entitled to be one for specific performance, yet the fact that [complainant] asked that a deed of
sale of a parcel of land . . . be issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate of title covering
said land be issued to him, shows that the primary objective and nature of the action is to recover
the parcel of land itself because to execute in favor of complainant the conveyance requested
there is need to make a finding that he is the owner of the land which in the last analysis resolves
itself into an issue of ownership. Hence, the action must be commenced in the province where
the property is situated . . . ."
5. In Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Inc. v. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag,[28] this Court ruled that an
action praying that defendant be ordered `to accept the payment being made by plaintiff for the
lot which the latter contracted to buy on installment basis from the former, to pay plaintiff
compensatory damages and attorneys fees and to enjoin defendant and his agents from
repossessing the lot in question, is one that affects title to the land under Section 3 of Rule 5, of
the Rules of Court, and shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any
part thereof lies, because, although the immediate remedy is to compel the defendant to accept
the tender of payment allegedly made, it is obvious that this relief is merely the first step to
establish plaintiffs title to [the] real property.
6. In Land Tenure Administration, et al. v. The Honorable Higinio B. Macadaeg and Alejandro T.
Lim,[29] this Court ruled that where the lessee seeks to establish an interest in an hacienda that
runs with the land and one that must be respected by the purchaser of the land even if the latter is
not a party to the original lease contract, the question of whether or not the standing crop is
immovable property become[s] irrelevant, for venue is determined by the nature of the principal
claim. Since the lessee is primarily interested in establishing his right to recover possession of
the land for the purpose of enabling him to gather his share of the crops, his action is real and
must be brought in the locality where the land is situated.
7. In Espineli & Mojica v. Hon. Santiago and Vda. de Ramirez,[30] the court ruled that although
the main relief sought in the case at bar was the delivery of the certificate of title, said relief, in
turn, entirely depended upon who, between the parties, has a better right to the lot in
question. As it is not possible for the court to decide the main relief, without passing upon the
claim of the parties with respect to the title to and possession of the lot in question, the claim
shall be determined x x x in the province where [the] said property or any part thereof lies.
The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals,[31] is more particularly instructive. There, we held
that an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged
property is a real action that affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is
before the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which is the
Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal action and
since he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by
alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena.[32]
Petitioners reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena[33] is
misplaced. Firstly, said case was primarily an action to compel the mortgagee bank to accept
payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That action, which is not expressly
included in the enumeration found in Section 2(a) of Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and now
under Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the
mortgaged lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed
the mortgage. The plaintiffs title is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged
lots. Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs personal action is the place where the defendant or any
of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estate
mortgage filed by herein petitioner was primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to
return to him the properties covered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had
already initiated foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation by the said respondent bank
of the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997. The prime objective is to recover said real
properties. Secondly, Carandang distinctly articulated that the ruling in Hernandez does not
apply where the mortgaged property had already been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed
out by the appellate court, respondent bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, and were it not for the timely issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner
Go in the lower court, the same would have already been sold at a public auction.
In a relatively recent case, Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,[34] it was succinctly
stated that the prayer for the nullification of the mortgage is a prayer affecting real property,
hence, is a real action.
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real
action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself.[35] An
action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the
property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong
City, the place where the subject property lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated
31 July 2002 and the Order dated 14 November 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration are
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairman), and Callejo, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
Tinga, J., on leave.



[1] Rollo, pp. 9-37.
[2] Records, pp. 704-714; penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Acting Presiding Justice
Cancio C. Garcia and Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, concurring.
[3] Rollo, p. 714.
[4] Records, pp.177-179, Agreement dated 10 October 1986.
[5] Rollo, p. 19.
[6] Records, p. 161.
[7] Records, pp. 101-109.
[8] Records, pp. 110-122.
[9] Records, pp. 189-208.
[10] Records, pp. 82-84.
[11] Records, pp. 76-80.
[12] Records, pp. 426-451.
[13] Records, p. 81.
[14] Records, pp. 2-75.
[15] Records, pp. 704-714.
[16] Records, pp. 721-731.
[17] Records, p. 746.
[18] Rollo, pp. 9-37.
[19] Rollo, p. 440.
[20] 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
[21] Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129184, 28
February 2001, 353 SCRA 89.
[22] Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Edition, p. 456, citing Hernandez v. Development Bank
of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-31095, 18 June 1976, 71 SCRA 290.
[23] 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
[24] G.R. No. 125008, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 439, 450.
[25] G.R. No. 76431, 16 October 1989, 178 SCRA 564, 568-569.
[26] G.R. No. L-55729, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 331, 336.
[27] G.R. No. L-18692, 31 January 1963, 7 SCRA 202, cited in Torres v. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-19668, 22 October 1964, 12 SCRA 174, 177.
[28] G.R. No. L-17699, 30 March 1962, 4 SCRA 746.
[29] 107 Phil 83 (1960).
[30] 107 Phil 830 (1960).
[31] G.R. No. L-44932, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 266.
[32] G.R. No. L-29791, 10 January 1978, 81 SCRA 75.
[33] Ibid.
[34] G.R. No. 81024, 03 February 2000, 324 SCRA 533.
[35] Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, G.R. No. 141930, 10 September 2001, 364
SCRA 812.




J I MMY T . GO,

petitioner,
vs.
UNI TED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, ANGELO V.
MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD
MARTIN,

respondents.
Doctrine:
The cancellation of the real estate mortgage is a real action, considering that a real estate
mortgage is areal right and a real property by itself; and an action for cancellation of real estate
mortgage is necessarily an actionaffecting the title to the property.
Facts:
Petitioner Go and Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark International, Noahs Ark
Sugar Carriers, etc. Their application for an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in theamount of P900, 000, 000 was approved.- The
transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land located at Mandaluyong
City
and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and another property also located at Mandaluyong
City, registered in thename of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.- UCPB subsequently cancelled the
approved Omnibus Line accommodation; so,
Go demanded from UCPB thereturn
of the two TCTS (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by Real Estate Mortgages.
UCPB however refused
toreturn the same and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate
Mortgages notarized and caused theregistration thereof before the Registry of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City.- UCPB f i l ed t he wi t h t he Of f i ce of t he Cl er k of Cour t and
Ex- Of f i ci o Sher i f f of Mandal uyong Ci t y
anextrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged land
that was registered in the name of Looyuko , for nonpayment of t he obl i gat i on s ecur ed
by s ai d mor t gage. Publ i c auct i on s al e was s et . Hence,
Go f i l ed a compl ai nt f or Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages,
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against
respondent bank and its officers
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Thecomplaint was later amended.- Respondent bank, instead of filing an answer,
filed a motion to dismiss
based on the several grounds. Amongwhich is that the complaint was filed in the
wrong venue.
Trial Court: issued an order granting petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Correspondingly,t he auct i on s al e was enj oi ned. The t r i al cour t deni ed
r es pondent bank s mot i on t o di s mi s s . A mot i on f or reconsideration was likewise
denied. UCPB filed a petition for certiorari.CA: set aside orders issued by the trial court and
directed the trial court to dismiss case on the ground of improper venue. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner, which was denied. Hence, this
petition for review oncertiorari.
Petitioner argues: that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal action and since he
resides at Pasig City,venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by alluding to the
case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. RuralBank of Lucena.
Issue:
WON petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or
real action for the purpose of determining venue. [It is a real action which should be
commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property lies.]
Held/Ratio:
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property
, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule4, a real action
is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein.
These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property
. The venue for real actions is the samefor regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the
court which has territorial jurisdiction over the areawhere the real property or any part
thereof lies.
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damagesfor the commission of an injury to the person or property. The
venue for personal actions
is likewise the same for