Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CORPORATION LAW
FINALS 09
A. By-laws
1. Definitin f by-laws
These are regulations, ordinances, rules or laws adopted by an association or
corporation or the like for its internal governance. By laws define the rights and
obligations of various officers, persons or groups within the corporate structure and
provide rules for routine matters such as calling meetings.
Every corporation under this code shall have the power and capacity: (! to adopt by"
laws not contrary to law, morals, or public policy, and to amend or repeal the same in
accordance with this code (#ec $%!
!. W"en t a#$t %y-laws &Se'tin ()*
Every corporation formed under this code must within & month after receipt of official
notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the #E' adopt a code of
by"laws for its government not inconsistent with this code. (#ec (%!
)ay be adopted and filed prior to incorporation, in such case, shall be approved and
signed by all incorporators submitted to #E' together with A* (#ec (%!
+oyola ,rand -illas .omeowners Ass v. 'A
The #upreme 'ourt held that although the 'orporation 'ode re/uires the filing of by"
laws within one month after the issuance of the 'ertificate of *ncorporation, it does
not e0pressly provide for the conse/uences of non"filing within the said period.
*t should be noted, however, that under #ection % of 12 345"A, the #E' can revoke
the certificate of registration of corporations for failure to file the by"laws within the
re/uired period but only after proper notice or hearing.
There is no automatic dissolution for failure to file by"laws within the re/uired period.
6leischer v. Botica 7olasco
The by"laws of the 'orporation which effectively gives the corporation preferential
right of the shares in /uestion is in direct conflict with the 'orporation +aw. The owner of
the shares, which are personal property, has the uncontrollable right to alienate them
which attaches to the ownership of any other species of property.
The right to impose restrictions on transfer of shares must be conferred upon the
corporation by a governing statute or by the A8*. *t cannot be done by a by"law without
statutory or charter authority.
,ov9t of 1hils. -. El .ogar
The by"laws provision which empowers the board to cancel shares and return to the
owner the balance resulting from the li/uidation by a vote of absolute ma:ority of the
members is an AB#8+;TE 7;++*T<. This is in direct conflict with the 'orporation +aw
HLP2009-3B Page 2
which declares that the board shall not have the powers to force the surrender and
withdrawal of unmatured stock e0cept in case of li/uidation or forfeiture of stock.
The practice of the directorate filling"up the vacancies by the action of the directors
themselves is valid.
The 'orporation +aw does not undertake to prescribe the rate of compensation for
the directors of the corporation. The power to fi0 compensation is left to the corporation
itself to be determined in the by"laws. .ence, the distribution to directors of El .ogar of
= net profit in proportion to their attendance at board meetings is valid.
*f a mistake has been made or the rule adopted in the by"laws has been found to
work harmful results, the remedy is in the hands of the #.s who have the power at any
lawful meeting to change the rule.
The provisions in the by"laws which re/uire that the persons elected to the board be
holders of shares with paid"up value of 1> and that directors who loan from the
association waive their rights as #.s are -A+*2. The 'ode specifically gives the power
to the corporation to provide in its by"laws for the /ualifications of directors, and the
re/uirement of security from them for the proper discharge of the duties of their office is
highly prudent and in conformity with good practice. The 'ode also has safeguards on
directors from making loans to themselves, designed to prevent the possibility of looting
of the corporation.
+. ,w file#
)ust be approved by the affirmative vote of the #tockholders representing the
ma:ority of the outstanding capital stock or ma:ority of members (#ec (%!
)ust be signed by the stockholders or members voting for it (#ec (%!
)ust be filed with the #E' certified by the ma:ority of directors?trustees and
countersigned by the secretary of the corporation which shall be attached to original
A* (#ec (%!
(. W"e-e .e$t
)ust be kept in the principal office of the corporation@ sub:ect to inspection of
stockholder or member during office hours (#ec (%!
/. 0ffe'ti1ity f %y-laws
Effective only from the issuance of #E' of certification that bylaw are not inconsistent
with the 'ode (#ec (%!
'annot bind stockholders ? corporation pending approval
By laws, like A* are contracts of adhesion. They will bind the corporation and
stockholders including those who vote against as well as those who became
members after approval
'ontracts entered into without strict compliance with by"laws may be binding on the
corporation due to long ac/uiescence and usage
By laws are mere internal rules among stockholders and cannot affect or pre:udice $
rd
persons who deal with the corporation unless they have knowledge of the same
HLP2009-3B Page 3
). Cntents &Se'tin (2*
#ub:ect to the provisions of the 'onstitution, this 'ode, other special laws, and the
articles of incorporation, a private corporation may provide in its by"laws for:
a! The time, place and manner of calling and conducting regular or special
meetings of the directors or trustees@
b! The time and manner of calling and conducting regular or special meetings of the
stockholders or members@
c! The re/uired /uorum in meetings of stockholders or members and the manner of
voting therein@
d! The form for pro0ies of stockholders and members and the manner of voting
them@
e! The /ualifications, duties and compensation of directors or trustees, officers and
employees@
f! The time for holding the annual election of directors of trustees and the mode or
manner of giving notice thereof@
g! The manner of election or appointment and the term of office of all officers other
than directors or trustees@
h! The penalties for violation of the by"laws@
i! *n the case of stock corporations, the manner of issuing stock certificates@ and
:! #uch other matters as may be necessary for the proper or convenient transaction
of its corporate business and affairs.
2. P-'e#3-e f- a4en#4ent f %y-laws &Se'tin (5*
-oting Ae/uirement: board of directors or trustees by a ma:ority vote and the
owners of at least a ma:ority of the outstanding capital stock, or ma:ority of the
members of a non"stock corporation, at a regular or special meeting duly called for
the purpose, may amend or repeal any by"laws or adopt new by"laws
2elegation of power to amend to the B82: The owners of two"thirds (5?$! of the
outstanding capital stock or two"thirds (5?$! of the members in a non"stock
corporation may delegate to the board of directors or trustees the power to amend or
repeal any by"laws or adopt new by"laws
Aevocation of the delegation of power to amend: Any power delegated to the board
of directors or trustees to amend or repeal any by"laws or adopt new by"laws shall be
considered as revoked whenever stockholders owning or representing a ma:ority of
the outstanding capital stock or a ma:ority of the members in non"stock corporations,
shall so vote at a regular or special meeting
Bhenever any amendment or new by"laws are adopted, such amendment or new by"
laws shall be attached to the original by"laws in the office of the corporation, and a
copy thereof, duly certified under oath by the corporate secretary and a ma:ority of
the directors or trustees, shall be filed with the #ecurities and E0change 'ommission
the same to be attached to the original articles of incorporation and original by"laws.
HLP2009-3B Page 4
The amended or new by"laws shall only be effective upon the issuance by the
#ecurities and E0change 'ommission of a certification that the same are not
inconsistent with this 'ode.
B. Nn-3se f C"a-te- 6 Cntin33s In$e-atin
&. 7on"user for 5 years (non"use of charter!" when the corporation does not formally
organiCe and commence the transaction of its business or the construction of its
works within 5 years from the date of its incorporation. *ts corporate powers cease
and the corporation shall be deemed dissolved (automatic!
6ormal organiCation D 7ot only means adoption of by"laws but also the organiCation
of the Board. This may consist in the election of new board of directors or trustees
and corporate officer
The A8* names the initial members of the Board who are to act until the &
st
set of
directors are duly elected and /ualified. This interim board can perform the functions
of a regular board until the date of the election of directors. 8nce elected, the
directors must complete the organiCation of the corporation by electing the officers.
'ommencement of business D This is after the approval of the by"laws and the
election of directors and officers elected. This may take the form of contracting for
lease or sale of properties to be used as business site of the corporation and other
preparatory acts geared towards fulfillment of the purpose for which the corporation
was established
5. 7on"user for years (continuous inoperation!" when the corporation has commenced
the transaction of its business but subse/uently becomes continuously inoperative for
a period of at least years. The same shall be a ground for the suspension or
revocation of its corporate franchise or 'ertificate of *ncorporation (not automatic!.
7otice and hearing is re/uired.
$. E0ception: cause or non"use or operation was due to causes beyond the control of
the corporation as determined by #E' (e0. )ineral lands to be developed by the
corporation as per its purpose are the ob:ect of court litigation and a court in:unction
against the corporate activities has been issued!
POW0RS OF CORPORATIONS
P-i4a-y R3le7 All corporate powers shall be e0ercised and all corporate businesses shall be
conducted by the board of directors of the corporation (#ec. 5$!
08'e$tin7 #pecific instances when the 'ode re/uires the consent and ratification of the #.s,
particularly where the underlying contractual relationship between the parties: The corporation,
the #.s?members, and the #tate is being amended or alterd
How is consent expressed by the parties?
Corporation: Through the Board
State: Through act of the regulatory body (SEC)
SHs: Through a!ority or "#$ %ote where applicable (&ote: 'issenting SHs in
certain instances are gi%en the option to withdraw fro the relationship through the
exercise of appraisal right)
HLP2009-3B Page 5
A. In 9ene-al (#ection $%!
&. To sue and be sued in its corporate name@
5. #uccession by its corporate name for the period of time stated in the articles of
incorporation and the certificate of incorporation@
$. To adopt and use a corporate seal@
(. To amend its articles of incorporation in accordance with the provisions of this 'ode@
. To adopt by"laws, not contrary to law, morals, or public policy, and to amend or
repeal the same in accordance with this 'ode@
%. *n case of stock corporations, to issue or sell stocks to subscribers and to sell stocks
to subscribers and to sell treasury stocks in accordance with the provisions of this
'ode@ and to admit members to the corporation if it be a non"stock corporation@
E. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and
otherwise deal with such real and personal property, including securities and bonds
of other corporations, as the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may
reasonably and necessarily re/uire, sub:ect to the limitations prescribed by law and
the 'onstitution@
F. To enter into merger or consolidation with other corporations as provided in this
'ode@
3. To make reasonable donations, including those for the public welfare or for hospital,
charitable, cultural, scientific, civic, or similar purposes: 1rovided, That no
corporation, domestic or foreign, shall give donations in aid of any political party or
candidate or for purposes of partisan political activity@
&4. To establish pension, retirement, and other plans for the benefit of its directors,
trustees, officers and employees@ and
&&. To e0ercise such other powers as may be essential or necessary to carry out its
purpose or purposes as stated in the articles of incorporation. (in the purpose
clause!
#ources of power
o #ection $%
o 1urpose clause (#ec. FF"7on stock 'orporations!: charitable, religious,
educational, professional, cultural, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civic
service, or similar purposes like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers or
any combination thereof. GAecreationalH is omitted.
#ec $F par && grants such power as are essential or necessary to carry out its
purpose or purposes as stated in the A*. A corporation is presumed to act within its
powers and when a contract is not on its face necessarily beyond its authority, it will
in the absence of proof to the contrary presumed valid
5 general restrictions on the power of the corporation to ac/uire and hold properties:
o that the property must be reasonably and necessarily re/uired by the
transactions of its lawful business
o that the power shall be sub:ect to the limitations prescribed by other special laws
and the constitution (corporation may not ac/uire more than $4= of voting stocks
of a bank@ corporations are restricted from ac/uiring public lands e0cept by lease
of not more than &444 hectares!
HLP2009-3B Page 6
B. S$e'ifi' Pwe-s
E0tend or shorten the corporate term
*ncrease or decrease capital stock
*ncur, create or increase bonded indebtedness
2eny preemptive right
#ell or otherwise dispose of substantially all its assets
Ac/uire its own shares
*nvest in another corporation or business
2eclare dividends
Enter into management contracts
'. T e8ten# - s"-ten '-$-ate te-4 (#ection $E!
&. Approval and -oting and 7otice Ae/uirement:
a! Approved by a ma:ority vote of the board of directors or trustees and
b! Aatified at a meeting by the stockholders representing at least two"thirds (5?$! of
the outstanding capital stock or by at least two"thirds (5?$! of the members in
case of non"stock corporations.
c! Britten notice of the proposed action and of the time and place of the meeting
shall be addressed to each stockholder or member at his place of residence as
shown on the books of the corporation and deposited to the addressee in the
post office with postage prepaid, or served personally.
5. Appraisal right D *n case of e0tension of corporate term, any dissenting stockholder
may e0ercise his appraisal right under the conditions provided in this code.
2. T in'-ease - #e'-ease 'a$ital st'.: T in'3-; '-eate; in'-ease; %n#e#
in#e%te#ness (#ection $F!
&. Approval and -oting and 7otice Ae/uirement:
a! Approved by a ma:ority vote of the board of directors
b! Two"thirds (5?$! of the outstanding capital stock shall favor the increase or
diminution of the capital stock, or the incurring, creating or increasing of any
bonded indebtedness in a meeting duly called for the purpose
c! Britten notice of the proposed increase or diminution of the capital stock or of the
incurring, creating, or increasing of any bonded indebtedness and of the time and
place of the stockholderIs meeting at which the proposed increase or diminution
of the capital stock or the incurring or increasing of any bonded indebtedness is
to be considered, must be addressed to each stockholder at his place of
residence as shown on the books of the corporation and deposited to the
addressee in the post office with postage prepaid, or served personally
5. 'ertificate of 6iling: A certificate in duplicate must be signed by a ma:ority of the
directors of the corporation and countersigned by the chairman and the secretary of
the stockholdersI meeting, setting forth:
a! That the re/uirements of this section have been complied with@
b! The amount of the increase or diminution of the capital stock@
HLP2009-3B Page 7
c! *f an increase of the capital stock, the amount of capital stock or number of
shares of no"par stock thereof actually subscribed, the names, nationalities and
residences of the persons subscribing, the amount of capital stock or number of
no"par stock subscribed by each, and the amount paid by each on his
subscription in cash or property, or the amount of capital stock or number of
shares of no"par stock allotted to each stock"holder if such increase is for the
purpose of making effective stock dividend therefor authoriCed@
d! Any bonded indebtedness to be incurred, created or increased@
e! The actual indebtedness of the corporation on the day of the meeting@
f! The amount of stock represented at the meeting@ and
g! The vote authoriCing the increase or diminution of the capital stock, or the
incurring, creating or increasing of any bonded indebtedness.
$. Approval of #E': Any increase or decrease in the capital stock or the incurring,
creating or increasing of any bonded indebtedness shall re/uire prior approval of the
#ecurities and E0change 'ommission.
8ne of the duplicate certificates shall be kept on file in the office of the corporation
and the other shall be filed with the #ecurities and E0change 'ommission and
attached to the original articles of incorporation.
(. Effectivity: 6rom and after approval by the #ecurities and E0change 'ommission
and the issuance by the 'ommission of its certificate of filing, the capital stock shall
stand increased or decreased and the incurring, creating or increasing of any bonded
indebtedness authoriCed, as the certificate of filing may declare
. Treasurer Affidavit: 1rovided, That the #ecurities and E0change 'ommission shall
not accept for filing any certificate of increase of capital stock unless accompanied by
the sworn statement of the treasurer of the corporation lawfully holding office at the
time of the filing of the certificate, showing that at least twenty"five (5=! percent of
such increased capital stock has been subscribed and that at least twenty"five (5=!
percent of the amount subscribed has been paid either in actual cash to the
corporation or that there has been transferred to the corporation property the
valuation of which is e/ual to twenty"five (5=! percent of the subscription
2ecrease of capital stock: 7o decrease of the capital stock shall be approved by the
'ommission if its effect shall pre:udice the rights of corporate creditors
7on"stock corporations: )ay incur or create bonded indebtedness, or increase the
same, with the approval by a ma:ority vote of the board of trustees and of at least
two"thirds (5?$! of the members in a meeting duly called for the purpose.
Aegistration of bonds" Bonds issued by a corporation shall be registered with the
#ecurities and E0change 'ommission, which shall have the authority to determine
the sufficiency of the terms thereof.
7o appraisal right here, a dissenting #. can simply sell his shares. A grant of
appraisal right would defeat the purpose which is to raise funds.
HLP2009-3B Page 8
E. T #eny $-e-e4$ti1e -i9"ts (#ection $3!
&. 2efinition of pre(epti%e rights D All stockholders of a stock corporation shall en:oy
pre"emptive right to subscribe to all issues or disposition of shares of any class, in
proportion to their respective shareholdings, unless such right is denied by the
articles of incorporation or an amendment thereto
This is to prevent dilution in shareholding
*f you increase common stock and some of the stockholders do not want to
subscribe, get from them a waiver of pre"emptive right (There are authorities saying
that the right is applicable when there is reduction of shares!
Basis of right@ common law rule
1reemptive right: option privilege of an e0isting #. to subscribe to a proportionate
part of shares subse/uently issued by the corporation before the same can be
disposed in favor of others
'ommon"law right granted to #.s of a corporation to be granted the first option to
subscribe to any opening of the unissued capital stock, or to any increase from the
authoriCed capital stock
JEconomic aspect: right to invest capitalJthe right becomes valuable when the
enterprise has demonstrated that it will earn a higher rate of return on the capital than
the #. could get were he to invest it in the open market
J+imited to shares issued in pursuance of an increase in the authoriCed capital
stock@ does not apply to additional issues of originally authoriCed shares forming part
of the e0isting capital stock
JAn original subscriber is deemed to have taken his shares knowing that they form a
definite proportionate part of the whole number of authoriCed shares
JBhen unsubscribed shares are later reoffered, the #. cannot claim that his
interest would be diluted
J1reemptive rights are not statutory rights, but common law rights
J1reemptive rights are personal rights of the #.
7eed not be stipulated in the A8* or by"laws
)ay be removed, denied, or altered only through specific provisions in the A8* or
amendment thereto
#E': vote by ma:ority of #.s to waive the right is 7;++ and -8*2@ such waiver must
be given individually by the #.s concerned
But unanimous vote of all will bind them
)n close corporations: Balance of power in close corporations may be disturbed by an
indiscriminate issuance of new shares without regard to preemptive right of #.s. *n a
close corp, e0ceptions in #ec $3 are not applicable
5. +imitation to e0ercise of pre"emptive right:
a! #uch pre"emptive right shall not e0tend to shares to be issued in compliance with
laws re/uiring stock offerings or minimum stock ownership by the public@
b! 7ot e0tend to shares to be issued in good faith with the approval of the
stockholders representing two"thirds (5?$! of the outstanding capital stock, in
HLP2009-3B Page 9
e0change for property needed for corporate purposes or in payment of a
previously contracted debt
c! #hall not take effect if denied in the Articles of *ncorporation or an amendment
thereto.
1reemptive right D option privilege of an e0isting stockholder to subscribe to a
proportionate part of shares subse/uently issued by the corp before same can be
disposed of in favor of the others@ includes all issues and disposition of shares of any
class
*ncludes not only new shares in pursuance of an increase of capital stock but would
cover the issue of previously unissued shares which form part of the e0isting capital
stock as well as treasury shares (#ec. 3 used the phrase, Gdisposition of shares of
any classH, furthermore since the funds used in reac/uiring T?# come from surplus
profits which could have been declared instead as dividends, it is desirable policy to
recogniCe the pre"emptive rights of #.s!
Bhere the shares are issued in e0change for property needed for corporate purposes
or for debt previously granted, #. cannot demand his pre"emptive right for right may
pre:udice corporate interest
*n :oint ventures, you can e0pand pre"emptive rights even in instances under #ec $3
$. Aemedies in case of unwarranted denial:
a! *n:unction
b! )andamus
in any case, the suit should be individual and not derivative because the wrong done
is to the stockholders individually
Aight of 6irst Aefusal refers to the offering of the shares first to the other stockholders
before it is sold?transferred to outsiders. As distinguished to A*,.T 86 6*A#T
AE6;#A+, the latter is contractual, while 1AE"E)1T*-E A*,.T e0ists even if not
stated in A8*, that9s why there is a need to e0pressly deny it. 6urthermore, the right
must be e0ercised within $4 days, hence not indefinite. Bhile e0ercise of pre"emptive
right is usually fi0ed by a resolution.
6. T sell - #is$se f '-$-ate assets (#ection (4!
&. Aestrictions: #ub:ect to the provisions of e0isting laws on illegal combinations and
monopolies
5. #cope of power: To sell, lease, e0change, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of
all or substantially all of its property and assets, including its goodwill, upon such
terms and conditions and for such consideration, which may be money, stocks,
bonds or other instruments for the payment of money or other property or
consideration, as its board of directors or trustees may deem e0pedient
)eaning of disposition of substantially all of the corporate property and assets" if
thereby the corporation would be rendered incapable of continuing the business or
accomplishing the purpose for which it was incorporated.
HLP2009-3B Page 10
$. Approval, voting and notice re/uirement:
a! )a:ority vote of its board of directors or trustees,
b! AuthoriCed by the vote of the stockholders representing at least two"thirds (5?$!
of the outstanding capital stock, or in case of non"stock corporation, by the vote
of at least to two"thirds (5?$! of the members, in a stockholderIs or memberIs
meeting duly called for the purpose.
c! Britten notice of the proposed action and of the time and place of the meeting
shall be addressed to each stockholder or member at his place of residence as
shown on the books of the corporation and deposited to the addressee in the
post office with postage prepaid, or served personally
Bhen #. approval not necessary " *f disposition is necessary in the usual and regular course of
business of said corporation or if the proceeds of the sale or other disposition of such property and
assets be appropriated for the conduct of its remaining business.
*n non"stock corporations where there are no members with voting rights " the vote
of at least a ma:ority of the trustees in office will be sufficient authoriCation for the
corporation to enter into any transaction authoriCed by this section.
(. Appraisal right: That any dissenting stockholder may e0ercise his appraisal right
under the conditions provided in this 'ode
. Abandonment of the sale, leaseK " After such authoriCation or approval by the
stockholders or members, the board of directors or trustees may, nevertheless, in its
discretion, abandon such sale, lease, e0change, mortgage, pledge or other
disposition of property and assets, sub:ect to the rights of third parties under any
contract relating thereto, without further action or approval by the stockholders or
members.
,. T a'<3i-e wn s"a-es (#ection (&!
A stock corporation shall have the power to purchase or ac/uire its own shares for a
legitimate corporate purpose or purposes (treasury shares! provided, that the
corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books to cover the shares to be
purchased or ac/uired
Trust *und doctrine D the re/uirement of unrestricted retained earnings is because
subscription to the capital of a corporation constitute a fund to which creditors have a
right to look for the satisfaction of their claims
+egitimate purpose includes:
a! To eliminate fractional shares arising out of stock dividends@
b! To collect or compromise an indebtedness to the corporation, arising out of
unpaid subscription, in a delin/uency sale, and to purchase delin/uent shares
sold during said sale@ and
c! To pay dissenting or withdrawing stockholders entitled to payment for their
shares under the provisions of this 'ode.
HLP2009-3B Page 11
A corporation must have unrestricted retained earnings in ac/uiring own shares
e0cept:
a! shares are ac/uired in the redemption of redeemable shares
b! shares are re"ac/uired to effect a decrease in capital stock approved by the #E'
c! shares are reac/uired by a close corporation pursuant to the order of the #E'
acting to arbitrate a deadlock
.. T in1est '-$-ate f3n#s in ant"e- '-$-atin - %3siness (#ection (5!
&. #ub:ect to the provisions of this 'ode, a private corporation may invest its funds in
any other corporation or business or for any purpose other than the primary purpose
for which it was organiCed
5. Approval, voting and notice re/uirement
a! )a:ority of the board of directors or trustees and
b! ratified by the stockholders representing at least two"thirds (5?$! of the
outstanding capital stock, or by at least two thirds (5?$! of the members in the
case of non"stock corporations, at a stockholderIs or memberIs meeting duly
called for the purpose.
c! Britten notice of the proposed investment and the time and place of the meeting
shall be addressed to each stockholder or member at his place of residence as
shown on the books of the corporation and deposited to the addressee in the
post office with postage prepaid, or served personally
$. Appraisal right " any dissenting stockholder shall have appraisal right as provided in
this 'ode
(. Bhen #. approval not necessary" where the investment by the corporation is
reasonably necessary to accomplish its primary purpose as stated in the articles of
incorporation
To avoid #. approval, include other business undertakings in the secondary
purpose
. Aules in case a corporation will invest its funds in another corporation
a! *f it is the same purpose or incidental or related to its primary purpose, the board
can invest the corporate fund without the consent of the stockholders. Bhat is
re/uired is only the vote of the ma:ority of the B82. 7o appraisal right
b! *f the investment is in another corporation of different business or purpose, the
affirmative vote of ma:ority of the board consented by 5?$ 8# capital stock is
re/uired
T %3y t"e s"a-es f ant"e- '-$-atin &+)* $-1i#e#7
a. Aeasonably necessary for its lawful business
b. The other corporation must be engaged in an allied business or not alien to the
purposes of the purchasing corporation ((5!
This means a corporation can enter into a :oint venture with another person,
partnership or another corporation
HLP2009-3B Page 12
But a corporation cannot enter into a partnership contract
Pwe- t ente- int a $a-tne-s"i$
,A: corporation cannot enter into partnerships with other corporations or with
individuals
E0ception: e0pressly allowed by statute or charter
o Loint ventures
o +imited partnerships (;# +aw!
*. T #e'la-e #i1i#en#s (#ection ($!
The board of directors of a stock corporation may declare dividends out of the
unrestricted retained earnings which shall be payable in cash, in property, or in stock
to all stockholders on the basis of outstanding stock held by them.
Any cash dividends due on delin/uent stock shall first be applied to the unpaid
balance on the subscription plus costs and e0penses, while stock dividends shall be
withheld from the delin/uent stockholder until his unpaid subscription is fully paid
Approval M voting re/uirement:
a! Approval of B82
b! *n case of stock dividend: *t shall be not be issued without the approval of
stockholders representing not less than two"thirds (5?$! of the outstanding capital
stock at a regular or special meeting duly called for the purpose.
+imitation on retention of surplus profits" #tock corporations are prohibited from
retaining surplus profits in e0cess of one hundred (&44=! percent of their paid"in
capital stock, e0cept:
a! when :ustified by definite corporate e0pansion pro:ects or programs approved by
the board of directors@ or
b! when the corporation is prohibited under any loan agreement with any financial
institution or creditor, whether local or foreign, from declaring dividends without
its?his consent, and such consent has not yet been secured@ or
c! when it can be clearly shown that such retention is necessary under special
circumstances obtaining in the corporation, such as when there is need for
special reserve for probable contingencies.
Stoc+ di%idends: distribution to stockholders of company9s own stock. 'orporate
profits or earnings are transferred to capital stock and shares of stock representing
the increase in capitaliCation are distributed. )ay be issued out of premium surplus.
o +imitation on the issue of stock dividends:
there must be unissued shares of the corporation
there must be unrestricted retained earnings
cannot be issued to non"stockholders even for services rendered
Bhether or not there should be a distribution of dividends in whatever form, such
matters are always sub:ect to the business :udgment of the B82 and the courts
will not interfere with the former9s discretion e0cept:
o when tainted with bad faith
o when tainted with fraud
o when tainted with gross negligence
HLP2009-3B Page 13
o when profits accumulated are in e0cess of &44= of the corporations paid"in
capital stock unless e0empted
Bhen right to 2ividends -ests:
o ,eneral rule: as soon as the same have been lawfully declared by the B82,
becomes a debt owing to the #.. 7o revocation can be made
o Exceptions:
not yet announced or communicated to the public, revocable before
announcement to shareholders
when stock dividends are declared since these are not distributions but
merely represent changes in the capital structure, may be revoked prior to
actual issuance
Aights of transferee to dividends D Aight to dividends vests upon declaration so
whoever owns the stock at time or stockholders of record also owns the dividend.
#ubse/uent transfer of stock would not carry with it right to dividends
Aecord date D The date on which a stockholder must be registered on a corporation9s
stock and transfer book in order to be entitled to a dividend or voting rights.
L. T ente- int 4ana9e4ent 'nt-a't (#ection ((!
Approval and -oting Ae/uirement:
o Approval by the board of directors, and
o Approval by stockholders owning at least the ma:ority of the outstanding capital
stock, or by at least a ma:ority of the members of both the managing and the
managed corporation
7ote: if managing other corporations is the primary purpose, ratificatory vote is
not re/uired
o 5?$ vote re/uired when: (#1E'*A+ A;+E!
a. where a stockholder or stockholders representing the same interest of both the
managing and the managed corporations own or control more than one"third
(&?$! of the total outstanding capital stock entitled to vote of the managing
corporation@ or
b. where a ma:ority of the members of the board of directors of the managing
corporation also constitute a ma:ority of the members of the board of directors of
the managed corporation
-ationale for special rule: entering into a anageent contract is a de%iation
fro the ,eneral -ule that the board anages the corporation and that the board of
the anaging copany should de%ote its affairs to its own corporation
Term of management contract: 7o management contract shall be entered into for a
period longer than five years for any one term.
These provisions shall apply to any contract whereby a corporation undertakes to
manage or operate all or substantially all of the business of another corporation,
whether such contracts are called service contracts, operating agreements or
otherwise
#ervice contracts or operating agreements which relate to the e0ploration,
development, e0ploitation or utiliCation of natural resources may be entered into for
such periods as may be provided by the pertinent laws or regulations.
HLP2009-3B Page 14
)anagement contract D any contract whereby a corporation undertake to manage or
operate all or substantially all of the business of another corporation
*f managing a partnership or individual not a corporation, not covered
>. =lt-a1i-es a'ts (#ection (!
2efinition of ultra%ires acts D These are acts which a corporation is not empowered to
do or perform because they are not based on the powers conferred by its A8* or by
the 'orporation 'ode on corporations in general, or because they are not necessary
or incidental to the e0ercise of the powers so conferred.
Aule on ;ltravires acts of corporations D 7o 'orporation under this 'ode shall
possess or e0ercise any corporate powers e0cept those conferred by this 'ode or by
its articles of incorporation and e0cept such as are necessary or incidental to the
e0ercise of the powers so conferred.
J Based on two (5! principles:
&. 'orporation is a creature of law and has only such powers and privileges as are
granted by the #tate
&
5. The doctrine upholds the duty of trust and obedience owed by the corporation9s
directors and officers to the #.s
a. 2efense of ultra vires rests on the violation of trust or duty towards #.s, and
should not be entertained where its allowance will do greater wrong to innocent $rd
parties
There are $ types of ;+TAA"-*AE# acts:
a. Acts beyond the powers of the corporation as stipulated in law or A8*
b. Acts or contracts entered in behalf of the corporation by persons w?o corporate
authority
,A: *n the absence of an authority from the board, no person , not even the
officers can validly bind the corporation
E0ception: 2octrine of apparent Authority@ *n dealing with corporations, the public
at large is bound to rely upon outward appearances, and relying on such, if it be
found that the directors permitted the agent to hold himself out as having
1
Corporations are now more of a product of the agreement of the incorporating parties
rather than a mere creature of the State:
Sec 10 allows 5 or more persons to form a private corporation for any lawful
purpose/s
Sec 3 par 11 allows every corporation the power to e!ercise such other powers
as may "e essential or necessary to carry out the purpose/s in the #$%
&he corporation's powers depends on its purpose in the #$%
Since parties are entirely free to insert any num"er of purposes in its #$%(
it follows that the e!tent of the corporation's powers depends largely on
their agreement( and not merely on a direct grant from the State( unless of
course the purposes are illegal)
%nstances where an act can or cannot "e reasona"ly implied from the purposes
due to poor draftsmanship or lac* of foresight of the drafters( the purpose
clause may "e reasona"ly stretched to accommodate the new and une!pected
situations( otherwise( a proper amendment of the #$% would "e necessary)
HLP2009-3B Page 15
authority to bind or ac/uiesced in the contract and accepted the benefits
therefrom, the corporation will be bound. (AamireC v. 8rientalist!
c. Acts or contracts which are per se illegal.
i. This cannot be gi%en legal effect and are %oid
B;T in .arden v. Benguet, #' upheld a patently void contract as between
the contracting parties. #' said that public policy is controlling in the grant of
mining rights. The violation of the prohibition against mining corporations
from owning stock of another corporation though illegal did not in any way
affect the contract. This violation can only be proceeded upon by way of a
criminal prosecution or by /uo warranto which can be maintained only by the
#tate. *nsofar as the parties are concerned, no civil wrong had been
committed between them, and if public wrong had been committed, then the
directors of both Balatoc and .arden were the active inducers of that wrong.
Thus, since the contract has been performed on both sides and there is no
possibility of undoing what has been done, and though the corporate
contracts are illegal per se, when only the public or government policy or
interests are at stake and no private wrong is committed, the courts will leave
the parties as they are, in accordance with their original contractual
stipulations.
ii. /ltra( 0ires 1cts which are not per se illegal are erely %oidable hence can be
ratified by SHs. (2iro%ano case)
*n the case of 1irovano v. 2ela Aama, which involves the issue of
whether or not the donation by the corporation of the proceeds of the
insurance is an ultra"vires act, #' held that such donation is not ultra"vires.
#' said that it comes within the broad power under the A8* that the
'orporation may invest and GdealH with moneys of the company not
immediately re/uired. The word GdealH is broad enough to include any
manner of disposition.
6urthermore, assuming that it was ultra"vires, there was ratification by
the #.s. 6inally, the donation was already consummated. The defense of
ultra"vires cannot be set"up against completed or consummated transactions.
6orm of Aatification:
a. E0press act of #.(if act is by the Board! or Board(if act is by the
officers!
b. *mplied through acceptance of benefits
c. Through estoppel on the part of Board or the officers
Effect?s of Aatification:
'ures the infirmity and makes it perfectly valid and enforceable,
1A8-*2E2 that it pre:udices no creditors and if it has been partially
e0ecuted and not merely e0ecutory
HLP2009-3B Page 16
Atrium v. 'A
Atrium )anagement 'orporation filed with AT' action for collection of the (
postdated checks issued by the .i"cement 'orporation, though its signatories de
+eon, treasurer, and de las Alas, chairman of the corporation to a certain ET .enry
and 'o which the latter endorsed to Atrium for rediscounting.
The act of issuing was well within the ambit of a valid corporate act, for it was for
securing a loan to finance the activities of the corporation, hence, not an ultravires
act.
An ultravires act is distinguished from illegal act, the former being voidable which
may be enforced by performance, ratification, or estoppel, while the latter is void and
cannot be validated. #' however, held de +eon negligent.
Aepublic of the 1hilippines vs. Aco:e )ining 'o.
The company is estopped from denying liability on the ground that the board
resolution is ultravires. Assuming arguendo that the resolution is an ultra vires act,
the same is not void for it was approved not in contravention of law, customs, public
order and public policy. N*n this case, even if the setting up of a post office in the
mining camp is outside the e0press powers, it is necessary to promote the interest
and welfare of the corporationO
The term ultravires should be distinguished from an illegal act for the former is merely
voidable which may be enforced while the latter is void and cannot be validated.
,eneral conse/uences of ultravires acts are as follows:
a! 'orporation may be dissolved under a /uo warranto proceeding but in most
cases, the court merely en:oins the corporation from commission of the ultra
vires acts
b! 'ertificate of Aegistration may be suspended or revoked by #E'
c! 1arties to the ultravires contract if e0ecutory on both sides neither party can ask
for specific performance. Bill be left as they are if the contract has been fully
e0ecuted on both sides. *f one party has performed his part, the contract will be
enforced provided it is not illegal
d! 'ontract proceeding from an ultra"vires act is voidable
e! Any stockholder may bring either an individual or derivative suit to en:oin a
threatened ultravires act or contract. *f act or contract has already been
performed, a derivative suit for damages may be filed against the directors, but
their liability will depend on whether they acted in good faith and with reasonable
diligence in entering into contracts. Bhen based on tort, cannot set"up the
defense of ultravires against in:ured party who had no knowledge that such was
ultravires
f! )ay become binding by the ratification of all stockholders unless third parties are
pre:udice thereby or unless the acts is illegal
Le9al Cnse<3en'es f =lt-a->i-es A'ts &Classifie#*
&. 8n the 'orporation
*f the act is *++E,A+, involuntary dissolution under a /uo warranto proceeding
by the #ol,en
HLP2009-3B Page 17
Aevocation or suspension of the certificate of registration by #E'
5. 8n the parties to the ultra"vires contract
1arties are left as they are and no rescission would lie
Bhere there has been partial performance by one party and the other has not,
the latter having benefited from the performance, is estopped from claiming ultra"
vires
$. 8n the rights of #tockholders
A #. can file an individual or derivative suit to en:oin a threatened ultra vires
act or contract or a derivative suit for damages if the contract has been
performed
+iability would depend on whether the contracting parties acted in ,6 and with
reasonable diligence@ an honest mistake would not give rise to liability
*f action is based on tort, the #.s cannot set up the defense of ultra vires
against the in:ured party who had no knowledge that the corporation was
engaging in an act not included e0pressly or impliedly in its purpose clause
7apocor v. -era
The issue in this case is whether or not the act of 71' in taking over #ea
+ion9s stevedoring services is an ultra"vires act.
#' held that it is not ultra"vires. 71' is empowered by its charter to undertake
such services, it being reasonably necessary to the operation and maintenance
of the power plant. The ruling in Aco:e )ining was upheld, where the company is
not restricted by its e0press powers as long as the act will promote the interests
and welfare of the corporation.
,overnment of 1.*. v. El .ogar
1. B?7 el .ogar is illegally owning and holding a business lot in e0cess of the reasonable
re/uirements and in contravention of the 'orpo law that every corporation has the power
to purchase hold lease real property as reasonable and necessary re/uired for the
transaction of the lawful business
.: The law e0pressly declares that corporations may ac/uire such real estate as is
reasonably necessary to enable them to carry out the purposes for which they were
created@ and we are of the opinion that the owning of a business lot upon which to
construct and maintain its offices is reasonably necessary to a building and loan
association such as the respondent was at the time this property was ac/uired. A
different ruling on this point would compel important enterprises to conduct their business
e0clusively in leased offices J a result which could serve no useful end but would retard
industrial growth and be inimical to the best interests of society. Be are furthermore of
the opinion that, inasmuch as the lot referred to was lawfully ac/uired by the respondent,
it is entitled to the full beneficial use thereof. 7o legitimate principle can discovered which
would deny to one owner the right to en:oy his (or its! property to the same e0tent that is
conceded to any other owner.
!. B?7 el .ogar has engaged in activities foreign to the purposes for which the
corporation was created and not reasonably necessary to its legitimate ends, specifically:
(&! the administration of the offices in the El .ogar building not used by the respondent
itself and the renting of such offices to the public@ (5! the administration and management
of properties belonging to delin/uent shareholders of the association@ ($! the
management of some parcels of improved real estate situated in )anila not under
mortgage to it, but owned by shareholders, and has held itself out by advertisement as
prepared to do so
.: (&! The activities here criticiCed clearly fall within the legitimate powers of the
respondent, as shown in what we have said above relative to the second cause of action.
This matter will therefore no longer detain us. *f the respondent had the power to ac/uire
HLP2009-3B Page 18
the lot, construct the edifice and hold it beneficially, as there decided, the beneficial
administration by it of such parts of the building as are let to others must necessarily be
lawful.
(5! The case for the government supposes that the only remedy which the respondent
has in case of default on the part of its shareholders is to proceed to enforce collection of
the whole loan in the manner contemplated in section &F of the 'orporation +aw. *t will
be noted, however, that, according to said section, the association may treat the whole
indebtedness as due, Pat the option of the board of directors,P and this remedy is not
made e0clusive. Be see no reason to doubt the validity of the clause giving the
association the right to take over the property which constitutes the security for the
delin/uent debt and to manage it with a view to the satisfaction of the obligations due to
the debtor than the immediate enforcement of the entire obligation, and the validity of the
clause allowing this course to be taken appears to us to be not open to doubt.
($! The practice described in the passage above /uoted from the agreed facts is in our
opinion unauthoriCed by law. The administration of property in the manner described is
more befitting to the business of a real estate agent or trust company than to the
business of a building and loan association. The practice to which this criticism is directed
relates of course solely to the management and administration of properties which are
not mortgaged to the association. The circumstance that the owner of the property may
have been re/uired to subscribe to one or more shares of the association with a view to
/ualifying him to receive this service is of no significance. *t is a general rule of law that
corporations possess only such e0press powers. The management and administration of
the property of the shareholders of the corporation is not e0pressly authoriCed by law,
and we are unable to see that, upon any fair construction of the law, these activities are
necessary to the e0ercise of any of the granted powers. The corporation, upon the point
now under the criticism, has clearly e0tended itself beyond the legitimate range of its
powers. But it does not result that the dissolution of the corporation is in order, and it will
merely be en:oined from further activities of this sort.
+. B?7 the royalty paid to the founder of el .ogar, Antonio )elian, as compensation for
his services rendered by him during the early stages of the organiCation of the
corporation, is unconscionable, e0cessive, and thus necessitates dissolution
.: 7o possible doubt e0ists as to the power of a corporation to contract for services
rendered and to be rendered by a promoter in connection with organiCing and
maintaining the corporation. *t is true that contracts with promoters must be characteriCed
by good faith@ but could it be said with certainty, in the light of facts e0isting at the time
this contract was made, that the compensation therein provided was e0cessiveQ *f the
amount of the compensation now appears to be a sub:ect of legitimate criticism, this must
be due to the e0traordinary development of the association in recent years. *f the )elian
contract had been clearly ultra vires J which is not charged and is certainly untrue J its
continued performance might conceivably be en:oined in such a proceeding as this@ but if
the defect from which it suffers is mere matter for an action because )elian is not a party.
*t is rudimentary in law that an action to annul a contract cannot be maintained without
:oining both the contracting parties as defendants. )oreover, the proper party to bring
such an action is either the corporation itself, or some shareholder who has an interest to
protect.
(. B?7 el .ogar had abused its franchise in issuing special shares, which is alleged to be
illegal and inconsistent with the plan and purposes of building and loan associations,and
that these are held by well"to"do people purely for investment purposes and not by wage"
earners for savings
.: The ground for supposing the issuance of the PspecialP shares to be unlawful is that
special shares are not mentioned in the 'orporation +aw as one of the forms of security
which may be issued by the association. ;pon e0amination of the nature of the special
shares in the light of American usage, it will be found that said shares are precisely the
same kind of shares that, in some American :urisdictions, are generally known as
HLP2009-3B Page 19
advance payment shares@ in if close attention be paid to the language used in the last
sentence of section &EF of the 'orporation +aw, it will be found that special shares where
evidently created for the purpose of meeting the condition cause by the prepayment of
dues that is there permitted. The language of this provision is as follow Ppayment of dues
or interest may be made in advance, but the corporation shall not allow interest on such
advance payment at a greater rate than si0 per centum per annum nor for a longer period
than one year.P *n one sort of special shares the dues are prepaid to the e0tent of 1&%4
per share@ in the other sort prepayment is made in the amount of 1&4 per share, and the
subscribers assume the obligation to pay 1&4 monthly until 1&%4 shall have been paid.
*t will escape notice that the provision /uoted say that interest shall not be allowed on the
advance payments at a greater rate than si0 per centum per annum nor for a longer
period than one year. The word Pinterest P as there used must be taken in its true sense
of compensation for the used of money loaned, and it not must not be confused with the
dues upon which it is contemplated that the interest may be paid. 7ow, in the absence of
any showing to the contrary, we infer that no interest is ever paid by the association in
any amount for the advance payments made on these shares@ and the reason is to be
found in the fact that the participation of the special shares in the earnings of the
corporation, in accordance with section &FF of the 'orporation +aw, sufficiently
compensates the shareholder for the advance payments made by him@ and no other
incentive is necessary to induce inventors to purchase the stock.
*t will be observed that the final 54 per centum of the par value of each special share is
not paid for by the shareholder with funds out of the pocket. The amount is satisfied by
applying a portion of the shareholderIs participation in the annual earnings. But as the
right of every shareholder to such participation in the earnings is undeniable, the portion
thus annually applied is as much the property of the shareholder as if it were in fact taken
out of his pocket. *t follows that the mission of the special shares does not involve any
violation of the principle that the shares must be sold at par.
6rom what has been said it will be seen that there is e0press authority, even in the very
letter of the law, for the emission of advance"payment or PspecialP shares, and the
argument that these shares are invalid is seen to be baseless. *n addition to this it is
satisfactorily demonstrated in #everino vs. El .ogar 6ilipino, supra, that even assuming
that the statute has not e0pressly authoriCed such shares, yet the association has implied
authority to issue them. The complaint conse/uently fails also as regards the stated in
the ninth cause of action.
/. B?n El .ogar is pursuing illegally a policy of depreciating, at an e0cessive rate at the
discretion of its Board, the value of real properties ac/uired by it at its sales, thereby
frustrating the right of #.s to participate annually and e/ually in the earnings.
.: This count for the complaint proceeds, in our opinion, upon an erroneous notion as to
what a court may do in determining the internal policy of a business corporation. *f the
criticism contained in the brief of the Attorney",eneral upon the practice of the
respondent association with respect to depreciation be well founded, the +egislature
should supply the remedy by defining the e0tent to which depreciation may be allowed by
building and loan associations. 'ertainly this court cannot undertake to control the
discretion of the board of directors of the association about an administrative matter as to
which they have legitimate power of action. The tenth cause of action is therefore not well
founded.
). B?n el .ogar9s charter should be revoked because it illegally maintains e0cessive
reserve funds and because it pursues a policy, allegedly unlawful, of paying a straight
annual dividend of &4= regardless of losses suffered and profits made by the corporation
and in violation of the re/uirement s of the corpo code.
HLP2009-3B Page 20
.: *t is insisted in the brief of the Attorney",eneral that the maintenance of reserve funds
is unnecessary in the case of building and loan associations, and at any rate the keeping
of reserves is inconsistent with section &FF of the 'orporation +aw. ;pon careful
consideration of the /uestions involved we find no reason to doubt the right of the
respondent to maintain these reserves. *t is true that the corporation law does not
e0pressly grant this power, but we think it is to be implied. *t is a fact of common
observation that all commercial enterprises encounter periods when earnings fall below
the average, and the prudent manager makes provision for such contingencies. To
regard all surplus as profit is to neglect one of the primary canons of good business
practice. Building and loan associations, though among the most solid of financial
institutions, are nevertheless sub:ect to vicissitudes. 6luctuations in the dividend rate are
highly detrimental to any fiscal institutions, while uniformity in the payments of dividends,
continued over long periods, supplies the surest foundations of public confidence.
)oreover, it is said that the practice of the association in declaring regularly a &4 per cent
dividend is in effect a guaranty by the association of a fi0ed dividend which is contrary to
the intention of the statute. The government insists upon an interpretation of section &FF
of the 'orporation +aw that is altogether too strict and literal. 6rom the fact that the
statute provides that profits and losses shall be annually apportioned among the
shareholders it is argued that all earnings should be distributed without carrying anything
to the reserve. But it will be noted that it is provided in the same section that the profits
and losses shall be determined by the board of directors: and this means that they shall
e0ercise the usual discretion of good businessmen in allocating a portion of the annual
profits to purposes needful to the welfare of the association. The law contemplates the
distribution of earnings and losses after other legitimate obligations have been met. 8ur
conclusion is that the respondent has the power to maintain the reserves criticiCed in the
eleventh and twelfth counts of the complaint@ and at any rate, if it be supposed that the
reserves referred to have become e0cessive, the remedy is in the hands of the
+egislature. *t is no proper function of the court to arrogate to itself the control of
administrative matters which have been confided to the discretion of the board of
directors. The causes of action under discussion must be pronounced to be without merit.
2. B?n el .ogar illegally departed from its charter because it has made loans which were
intended to be used by the borrowers for other purposes than the building of homes.
There is no statute here e0pressly declaring that loans may be made by these
associations solely for the purpose of building homes. 8n the contrary, the building of
homes is mentioned in section &E& of the 'orporation +aw as only one among several
ends which building and loan associations are designed to promote. 6urthermore, section
&F& of the 'orporation +aw e0pressly authorities the Board of directors of the association
from time to time to fi0 the premium to be charged. *n the brief of the plaintiff a number of
e0cerpts from te0tbooks and decisions have been collated in which the idea is developed
that the primary design of building and loan associations should be to help poor people to
procure homes of their own. This beneficent end is undoubtedly served by these
associations, and it is not to be denied that they have been generally fostered with this
end in view. But in this :urisdiction at least the lawmaker has taken care not to limit the
activities of building and loan associations in an e0clusive manner, and the e0ercise of
the broader powers must in the end approve itself to the business community.
5. B?n the el .ogar charter may be revoked because various loans now outstanding
have been made by the respondent to corporations and partnerships, and that these
entities have in some instances subscribed to shares in the respondent for the sole
purpose of obtaining such loans, and that some of these :uridical entities became
shareholders merely for the purpose of /ualifying themselves to take loans from the
association.
.: the 'orporation +aw declares that Pany personP may become a stockholder in building
and loan associations. The word PpersonP appears to be here used in its general sense,
HLP2009-3B Page 21
and there is nothing in the conte0t to indicate that the e0pression is used in the restricted
sense of both natural and artificial persons, as indicated in section 5 of the Administrative
'ode. Be would not say that the word PpersonP or persons,P is to be taken in this broad
sense in every part of the 'orporation +aw. 6or instance, it would seem reasonable to
say that the incorporators of a corporation ought to be natural persons, although in
section % it is said that five or more PpersonsP, although in section % it is said that five or
more Ppersons,P not e0ceeding fifteen, may form a private corporation. But the conte0t
there, as well as the common sense of the situation, suggests that natural persons are
meant. Bhen it is said, however, in section &E$, that Pany personP may become a
stockholder in a building and loan association, no reason is seen why the phrase may not
be taken in its proper broad sense of either a natural or artificial person. At any rate the
/uestion whether these loans and the attendant subscriptions were properly made
involves a consideration of the power of the subscribing corporations and partnerships to
own the stock and take the loans@ and it is not alleged in the complaint that they were
without power in the premises. 8f course the mere motive with which subscriptions are
made, whether to /ualify the stockholders to take a loan or for some other reason, is of
no moment in determining whether the subscribers were competent to make the
contracts. The result is that we find nothing in the allegations of the si0teenth cause of
action, or in the facts developed in connection therewith, that would :ustify us in granting
the relief.
9. B?n el .ogar, in disposing of real estate purchased in the collection of defaulted loans,
on credit at first and then sold and mortgaged to el .ogar to secure payment of the
purchase price, had incurred several outstanding loans, and that that the persons and
entities to which said properties are sold under the condition charged are not members or
shareholders nor are they made members or shareholders of the defendant.
.: This part of the complaint is based upon a mere technicality of bookkeeping. The
central idea involved in the discussion is the provision of the 'orporation +aw re/uiring
loans to be stockholders only and on the security of real estate and shares in the
corporation, or of shares alone. *t seems to be supposed that, when the respondent sells
property ac/uired at its own foreclosure sales and takes a mortgage to secure the
deferred payments, the obligation of the purchaser is a true loan, and hence prohibited.
But in re/uiring the respondent to sell real estate which it ac/uires in connection with the
collection of its loans within five years after receiving title to the same, the law does not
prescribe that the property must be sold for cash or that the purchaser shall be a
shareholder in the corporation. #uch sales can of course be made upon terms and
conditions approved by the parties@ and when the association takes a mortgage to secure
the deferred payments, the obligation of the purchaser cannot be fairly described as
arising out of a loan. 7or does the fact that it is carried as a loan on the books of the
respondent make it a loan on the books of the respondent make it a loan in law. The
contention of the ,overnment under this head is untenable.
I4$lie# - Ne'essa-y Pwe-s
,A: all acts other than those specified in #ec $%"(( and in other special provisions would be ultra
vires
08'e$tin: those which are:
necessary or in'i#ental to the e8e-'ise f t"e $we-s so conferred ((!, or
essential or ne'essa-y to carry out its $3-$se or $3-$ses as stated in the A8*.
($F!
1resumption that a corporation can act within its powers and when a contract is not on its face
necessarily beyond its authority, it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presumed to be
valid.
HLP2009-3B Page 22
#ec $%(&&!: corporations have the power and capacity to e0ercise such other powers
as may be essential or necessary to carry out its purpose(s! as provided for in the
A8*
o Aestated: the management of a corporation has discretionary authority, in the
absence of e0plicit restrictions, to enter into contracts or transactions deemed
reasonably necessary or incidental to its business purposes.
In'i#ental6In"e-ent Pwe-s
#ec 5: powers, attributes, and properties e0pressly authoriCed by law or in'i#ent
t its e8isten'e
*ncidental powers: those that attach to a corporation at the moment of its creation
without regard to its e0press powers or particular primary purpose, and is
inherent in it as a legal entity
E0amples:
i. To sue and be sued
ii. To grant and receive in the corporate name
iii. To purchase hold and convey real and personal property for its purposes
iv. To have a corporate seal
v. To adopt and amend by"laws for its government
vi. To disenfranchise or remove members
1owers that go into the very nature and e0tent of a corporation9s :uridical entity
cannot be presumed to be incidental or inherent powers
CONTROL AND ?ANA@0?0NT
T"-ee le1els f 'nt-l7
(&! board of directors or trusteesR formulate the corporate policies
(5! corporate officersR e0ecute the policies
($! stockholders or membersR have residual powers over fundamental corporate changes
Ratinale f 'ent-aliAe# 4ana9e4ent
one of the advantageous features of the corporationJacting through centraliCed
management
the congruence of authority and responsibility in the same person, committee, or board
always promote efficiency
W" e8e-'ises '-$-ate $we-sB
1. %a-# f #i-e't-s (for stock corporations! or t-3stees (for non"stock corporations!
governing body
sole authority to determine the policy and conduct the ordinary business of the corporation
within the scope of the charter
so long as the board acts honestly, in ,6, and not in defraud of creditors or abusive of the
rights of minority #.s
,A: in the absence of an authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the
officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation
E0ception: with respect to $
rd
persons, actions of the corporation even without formal board
approval may still bindS (e0. 1roof of usage, ac/uiescence of the board despite knowledge of
the act, receipt of benefits, implied ratification, estoppel
P-i4a-y %Ce'ti1e f t"e Ba-#
HLP2009-3B Page 23
primary obligation of directors is to seek the ma0imum amount of profits for the corporation,
and characteriCed the position as a position of trust
o in case director9s interest conflict with those of the corporation, he cannot sacrifice the
latter to his own advantage and benefit
o fiduciary or trust relationship is not a matter of statutory or technical law, but springs from
the control and guidance of corporate affairs and property and hence the property interest
of the #.s
BOARD OF DIR0CTORS
A. A3t"-ity: Re$sit-y f '-$-ate $we-s (#ection 5$!
The board of directors or trustees are responsible for corporate policies and general
management of the business affairs of the corporation
;nless otherwise provided in the 'orporation 'ode, the Board of 2irectors control
and e0ercise:
o the corporate powers of corporation
o all business conducted,
o all property of such corporation
The board e0ercises almost all corporate powers, lays down all business policies and
is responsible for the efficiency of management. The stockholders have no right to
interfere with the board9s e0ercise of its powers and functions e0cept where the law
e0pressly gives them the final say, like in cases of removal of a director, amendment
of articles of incorporation, and other ma:or changes. Their resolutions on matters
other than the e0ceptions are legally not effective nor binding and may be treated as
merely advisory or may be totally disregarded.
G;nless 8therwise 1rovidedH D may pertain to instances where a management
contract is entered hence corporate posers are e0ercised by the managing company
and not the board
The directors or trustees shall not act individually nor separately but as a body in a
lawful meeting. 'ontracts entered into without a formal board resolution does not
bind the corporation e0cept when ma:ority of the board has knowledge of the contract
and the contract benefited the corporation.
2irectors owe their duties to corporation as a whole rather than to individual
shareholders of classes of shareholders
Ra4i-eA 1 O-ientalist C D Fe-nan#eA
8rientalist 'o engaged in the theater business, desired to be the e0clusive agent of AamireC,
who is based in 1aris, for two film outfitsJTclair 6ilms and )ilano films. Through the active
involvement and negotiations of Aamon GEl 1residenteH 6ernandeC, a director of 8rientalist and
also its treasurer, with AamireC, 8rientalist was able to secure an offer, the terms of which were
acceptable to the Board as well as to the stockholders. *t appears that this acceptance of the
terms of the offer was decided during an informal meeting of the board, and conveyed to AamireC
in two letters signed only by 6ernandeC, both in his individual and his capacity as treasurer of
HLP2009-3B Page 24
8rientalist. *t turns out that the company was not financially capable to comply with the
obligations set forth in the agency contract, and about this time films had already been delivered
to the company. Two stockholders meetings were organiCed, the first adopted a resolution
approving the action of the board on the offer, the second raising the contingency of the lack of
funds and the proviso that the four officers involved, including 6ernandeC would continue
importing the films using their own funds. AamireC sues 8rientalist and 6ernandeC for what is due
on the contract. T' ruled 8riental as the principal debtor while 6ernandeC is subsidiarily liable.
.: (&! it was incumbent upon the corporation if it desired to /uestion the authority of 6ernandeC to
bind it, to deny the due e0ecution of the contract made by him. *n pleading lack of authority of an
officer of a corporation to bind the latter through a contract e0ecuted by the former is a special
defense which should be specially pleaded and the answer setting up this defense must be
verified under oath. The denial shall be specific, and a mere attack on the instrument in general
terms is insufficient, even though under oath. *n dealing with corporations the public at large is
bound to rely to a large e0tent upon outward appearances. *f a man is found acting for a
corporation with the e0ternal indicia of authority, any person not having notice of want of
authority, may usually rely upon those appearances, and if it be found that the directors had
permitted the agent to e0ercise that authority and thereby held him out as a competent person to
bind the corporation, or had ac/uiesced in a contract and retained the benefit supposed to have
conferred by it, the corporation will be bound, notwithstanding the actual authority may never
have been granted. The public is not supposed nor re/uired to know the transactions which
happen around the table where the corporate board of directors or the stockholders are from time
to time convoked. *t is therefore reasonable, in a case where an officer of a corporation has made
a contract in its name, that the corporation should be re/uired, is it denies his authority, to state
such defense in his answer. This failure of 8rientalist to make any issue in its answer with regard
to the authority of Aamon 6ernandeC to bind it and its failure to deny specifically under oath the
genuineness of the due e0ecution of the contracts sued upon, have the effect of eliminating the
/uestion of his authority from the case.
(5! 6ernandeC had no authority to bind the corporation. 'orporate powers is e0ercised by the
board of directors, and is recogniCed in the bylaws of 8rientalist. The fact that the power to make
contracts is thus vested in the borad does not always signify that a formal vote of the board must
always be taken before contractual liability can be fi0ed@ the board can create liability, like an
individual, by other means than by formal e0pression of its will. *t may be established without
reference to official records of the proceedings of the board, by proof of the usage to which the
company had permitted to grow up in the business, and of the ac/uiescence of the board
charged with the duty of supervising and controlling the company9s business. 6ernandeC was the
most active in the effort to secure the films. The negotiations were conducted by him with the
knowledge and consent of the other members of the board. The board, before the financial
inability of the corporation was revealed, had already recogniCed the contracts as being in
e0istence and had proceeded to take the steps necessary to utiliCe the films, particularly the
publication of announcements in the papers. *n light of this, the contracts in /uestion were thus
inferentially approved by the board and that the company is bound unless the subse/uent failure
of the stockholders to approve the same had the effect of abrogating the liability created.
HLP2009-3B Page 25
($! the action of the stockholders, whatever its character, must be ignored. #tockholders or
members resolutions dealing with matters other than the e0ceptions are not legally effective nor
binding on the board, and may be treated as merely advisory or may even be completely
disregarded. The functions of the stockholders of a corporation are, of a limited nature. The
theory is that the stockholders may have all the profits but shall turn over the complete
management of the enterprise to their representatives or agents, called the directors, making by"
laws, and e0ercising special powers defined by law. Thus contracts between a corporation and
third persons must be made by the directors and not by the stockholders. The corporation is
represented by the directors and not the stockholders. Third persons can have little or no
information as to what occurs in corporate meetings, and must necessarily rely on e0ternal
manifestations of corporate consent. The integrity of commercial transactions can only be
maintained by holding the corporation strictly to the liability fi0ed upon in by its agents in
accordance with law. *f a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers or any other person to
do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and thus hold him out to the public as
possessing the power to do these acts, the corporation will be estopped from denying such
authority as against anyone who has dealt with the corporation in ,6.
08$e-t-a1el D T3-s 1 CA an# E-ean Ai-lines.
6: >orean Airlines, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a 'omplaint against E0pertravel with the AT'
for the collection of the principal amount of 15%4,&4.44, plus attorney9s fees and e0emplary
damages. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of >A+ and
had caused the preparation of the complaint. E0pertravel filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authoriCed to e0ecute the verification and certificate of
non"forum shopping as re/uired by the Aules of 'ourt. >A+ opposed the motion, contending that
Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such with the #ecurities and
E0change 'ommission (#E'! as re/uired by the 'orpo'ode, and was further alleged that Atty.
Aguinaldo was also the corporate secretary of >A+. Atty. Aguinaldo also claimed that he had
been authoriCed to file the complaint through a resolution of the >A+ Board of 2irectors approved
during a special meeting held on Lune 5, &333, wherein the board of directors conducted a
special teleconference on Lune 5, &333, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. *t was also
averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authoriCing
Atty. Aguinaldo to e0ecute the certificate of non"forum shopping and to file the complaint. #uk
>yoo >im also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid
resolution. T' denies )T2, 'A affirms.
.: *t is settled that the re/uirement to file a certificate of non"forum shopping is mandatory and
that the failure to comply with this re/uirement cannot be e0cused. The certification is a peculiar
and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that
there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action. .ence, the certification must be accomplished by the party himself because he has actual
knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or
tribunals. Even his counsel may be unaware of such facts. .ence, the re/uisite certification
e0ecuted by the plaintiff9s counsel will not suffice.
*n a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on
behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authoriCed person, including its retained counsel,
who has personal knowledge of the facts re/uired to be established by the documents. The
corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers e0cept those e0pressly conferred on it by the
'orporation 'ode and those that are implied by or are incidental to its e0istence. *n turn, a
corporation e0ercises said powers through its board of directors and?or its duly"authoriCed officers
and agents. 1hysical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
HLP2009-3B Page 26
persons duly"authoriCed for the purpose by corporate by"laws or by specific act of the board of
directors.
The respondent9s allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on Lune 5,
&333 and approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance! is incredible, given the
additional fact that no such allegation was made in the complaint. *f the resolution had indeed
been approved on Lune 5, &333, long before the complaint was filed, the respondent should
have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed
to do so. *t was only on Lanuary 5F, 5444 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that
there was such a meeting of the Board of 2irectors held on Lune 5, &333@ it even represented to
the 'ourt that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in >orea, only to allege later that no
written copy e0isted. *t was only on )arch %, 5444 that the respondent alleged, for the first time,
that the meeting of the Board of 2irectors where the resolution was approved was held %ia
teleconference.
Borse still, it appears that as early as 3anuary 456 4777, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a
#ecretary9s?Aesident Agent9s 'ertificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference
on 3une "86 4777. 7o such certificate was appended to the complaint, which was filed on
#eptember %, &333. )ore importantly, the respondent did not e0plain why the said certificate was
signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as Lanuary 3, &333, and yet was notariCed one year later (on
Lanuary &4, 5444!@ it also did not e0plain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint,
as well as to its 'ompliance dated )arch %, 5444. *t was only on Lanuary 5%, 544& when the
respondent filed its comment in the 'A that it submitted the #ecretary9s?Aesident Agent9s
'ertificateN$4O dated Lanuary &4, 5444.
The 'ourt is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on Lune 5, &333
never took place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent9s Board of
2irectors during the said teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the AT',
the 'A and this 'ourt, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
Citi%an. NA 1 C"3a.
-eleC deposited his unfunded personal checks with his current account with the petitioner. But
prior to depositing said checks, he would present his personal checks to a bank officer asking the
latter to have his personal checks immediately credited as if it were a cash deposit and at the
same time assuring the bank officer that his personal checks were fully funded. .aving already
gained the trust and confidence of the officers of the bank because of his past transactions, the
bankIs officer would always accommodate his re/uest. After his re/uests are granted which is
done by way of the bank officer affi0ing his signature on the personal checks, private respondent
'resencio -eleC would then deposit his priorly approved personal checks to his current account
and at the same time withdraw sums of money from said current account by way of petitioner
bankIs managerIs check. 1rivate respondent would then deposit petitioner bankIs managerIs
check to his various current accounts in other commercial banks to cover his previously deposited
unfunded personal checks with petitioner bank. 7aturally, petitioner bank and its officers never
discovered that his personal check deposits were unfunded. 8n the contrary, it gave the
petitioner bank the false impression that private respondentIs construction business was doing
very well and that he was one big client who could be trusted. This deceptive and criminal
scheme he did every banking day without fail from #eptember (, &3F up to )arch &&, &3F%. The
amounts that he was depositing and withdrawing during this period (#eptember (, &3F to )arch
&&, &3F%! progressively became bigger. *t started at 1(%,444.44 on #eptember (, &3F and on
)arch &&, &3F% the amount of deposit and withdrawal already reached over 1$,444,444.44. At
this point in time ()arch &&, &3F%!, the private respondent 'resencio -eleC presumably already
feeling that sooner or later he would be caught and that he already wanted to cash in on his evil
scheme, decided to run away with petitionerIs money. 8n )arch &&, &3F%, he deposited various
unfunded personal checks totaling 1$,43,444.44 and re/uested a bank officer that the same be
credited as cash and after securing the approval of said bank officer, deposited his various
personal checks in the amount of 1$,43,444.44 with his current account and at the same time
withdrew the sum of 1$,5((,444.44 in the form of petitionerIs managerIs check. *nstead of using
HLP2009-3B Page 27
the proceeds of his withdrawals to cover his unfunded personal checks, he ran away with
petitioner bankIs money. Thus, private respondent 'resencio -eleCIs personal checks deposited
with petitioner bank on )arch &&, &3F% in the total aggregate amount of 1$,43,444.44 bounced.
The checks bounced after said personal checks were made the substantial basis of his
withdrawing the sum of 1$,5((,444.44 from his current account with petitioner bank. 'itibank
sues on the grounds of violation of B1 55. Before pre"trial conference, and in pursuance of the
authority granted to him by petitioner bankIs by"laws, its E0ecuting 8fficer appointed Billiam B.
6erguson, a resident alien, as its Attorney"in"6act empowering the latter, among other things, to
represent 'itibank in court cases such as the present case. *n turn, Billiam B. 6erguson
e0ecuted a power of attorney in favor of L.1. ,arcia M Associates (petitioner bankIs counsel! to
represent petitioner bank in the pre"trial conference before the lower court.
*: There are thus two issues in this case. 6irst, whether a resolution of the board of directors of a
corporation is always necessary for granting authority to an agent to represent the corporation in
court cases.
.: *n the corporate hierarchy, there are three levels of control: (&! the board of directors, which is
responsible for corporate policies and the general management of the business affairs of the
corporation@ (5! the officers, who in theory e0ecute the policies laid down by the board, but in
practice often have wide latitude in determining the course of business operations@ and ($! the
stockholders who have the residual power over fundamental corporate changes, like
amendments of the articles of incorporation. .owever, :ust as a natural person may authoriCe
another to do certain acts in his behalf, so may the board of directors of a corporation validly
delegate some of its functions to individual officers or agents appointed by it.
*t is clear that corporate powers may be directly conferred upon corporate officers or agents by
statute, the articles of incorporation, the by"laws or by resolution or other act of the board of
directors. *n addition, an officer who is not a director may also appoint other agents when so
authoriCed by the by"laws or by the board of directors. #uch are referred to as e0press powers.
There are also powers incidental to e0press powers conferred. *t is a fundamental principle in the
law of agency that every delegation of authority, whether general or special, carries with it, unless
the contrary be e0press, implied authority to do all of those acts, naturally and ordinarily done in
such cases, which are reasonably necessary and proper to be done in order to carry into effect
the main authority conferred.
#ince the by"laws are a source of authority for corporate officers and agents of the corporation, a
resolution of the Board of 2irectors of 'itibank appointing an attorney in fact to represent and
bind it during the pre"trial conference of the case at bar is not necessary because its by"laws
allow its officers, the E0ecuting 8fficer and the #ecretary 1ro"Tem, F to e0ecute a power of
attorney to a designated bank officer, Billiam B. 6erguson in this case, clothing him with
authority to direct and manage corporate affairs.
#ince paragraph UU* (of the by"laws! specifically allows 6erguson to delegate his powers in
whole or in part, there can be no doubt that the special power of attorney in favor, first, of L.1.
,arcia M Associates and later, of the bankIs employees, constitutes a valid delegation of
6ergusonIs e0press power (under paragraph U-** above! to represent petitioner bank in the pre"
trial conference in the lower court.
*: The second issue is whether the by"laws of the petitioner foreign corporation which has
previously been granted a license to do business in the 1hilippines, are effective in this
:urisdiction. *f the by"laws are valid and a board resolution is not necessary as petitioner bank
claims, then the declaration of default would have no basis.
.: A careful reading of the #ec (% of 'orpo 'ode would show that a corporation can submit its
by"laws, prior to incorporation, or within one month after receipt of official notice of the issuance
of its certificate of incorporation by the #E'. Bhen the third paragraph of the above provision
mentions Pin all casesP, it can only refer to these two options@ i.e., whether adopted prior to
HLP2009-3B Page 28
incorporation or within one month after incorporation, the by"laws shall be effective only upon the
approval of the #E'. But even more important, said provision starts with the phrase PEvery
corporation formed under this 'odeP, which can only refer to corporations incorporated in the
1hilippines. .ence, #ection (%, in so far as it refers to the effectivity of corporate by"laws, applies
only to domestic corporations and not to foreign corporations. 8n the other hand, #ection &5 of
the same 'ode re/uires that a foreign corporation applying for a license to transact business in
the 1hilippines must submit, among other documents, to the #E', a copy of its articles of
incorporation and by(laws, certified in accordance with law. ;nless these documents are
submitted, the application cannot be acted upon by the #E'. #ince under #ec &5% of 'orpo 'ode
the #E' will grant a license only when the foreign corporation has complied with all the
re/uirements of law, it follows that when it decides to issue such license, it is satisfied that the
applicantIs by"laws, among the other documents, meet the legal re/uirements. This, in effect, is
an approval of the foreign corporationIs by"laws. *t may not have been made in e0press terms,
still it is clearly an approval. Therefore, petitioner bankIs by"laws, though originating from a foreign
:urisdiction, are valid and effective in the 1hilippines.
Bye--R8as 1 CA. (.idden -alley Apocalypse 7ow case!.
The corporation, .eirs of Eugenia Ao0as *nc, was established to engage in agriculture to develop
the properties inherited from Eugenia Ao0as and Eufroncio Ao0as, which includes the land upon
which the .idden -alley #prings Aesort was put up, including various improvements thereon,
using corporate funds (used as site for filming Apocalypse 7ow!. The A8* of .eirs *nc was
amended for this purpose. .eirs *nc claims that Boyer"Ao0as and ,uillermo Ao0as had been in
possession of the various properties and improvements in the resort and only upon the tolerance
of the corporation. *t was alleged that they committed acts that impeded the corporation9s
e0pansion and normal operation of the resort. They also did not comply with court and regulatory
orders, and thus the corporation adopted a resolution authoriCing the e:ectment of the
defendants. T' grants. 'A affirms. Boyer and Ao0as contend that, being #.s, their possession of
the properties of the corporation must be respected in view of their ownership of an ali/uot
portion of all properties of the corporation.
.: Aegarding properties owned by the corporation, the #. of ,uanCon case says that Gproperties
registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from
its members. Bhile shares of stock constitute personal property, they do not represent property of
the corporation. A share of stock only typifies an ali/uot part of the corporation9s property, or the
right to share in its proceeds to that e0tent when distributed according to law and e/uity, but its
holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation, nor is he entitled to the
possession of any definite portion of its property or assets. The #. is not a co"owner or tenant in
common of the corporate property.
The corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its members and transacts business
only through its officers or agents. Bhatever authority these officers or agents may have derived
from the board or other governing body, unless conferred by the charter of the corporation itself.
*n this case the elder Ao0as who then controlled the management of the corporation, being the
ma:ority #., consented to the petitioner9s use and stay within the properties. The Board did not
ob:ect and were allowed to stay until it adopted a resolution to the effect of authoriCing moves to
e:ect them. #ince their stay was merely by tolerance, in deference to the wishes of the ma:ority
#. who controlled the corporation, when Ao0as died his actions cannot bind the company
forever. There is no provision in the by"laws or any other resolution authoriCing their continued
stay.
Pe'3lia- A9en'y Rle f t"e %a-#
HLP2009-3B Page 29
in a manner of speaking, the board acts as an agent of the corporation, and is bound by the
rules applying to agency relationship
o although the board is an agent of the corporation, since the principal is a mere :uridical
concept, it realistically is not in a position to countermand the decisions of its agent
o unlike in an ordinary principal"agent relationship, the corporate principal does not really
have its own mind to allow it to decide matters for itself
o the board stands both as an agent of the corporation, and the very personification of the
corporation in the commercial and legal world
board has sole power to decide whether a corporation could sue, purchase or sell property,
enter into a contract, or perform any other act
#. resolutions on matters other than the e0ceptionsR not legally effective nor binding on the
board@ may be treated as merely advisory (AamireC case!
,A: to the #. go the profits, to the board goes the management
for educational institutions:
B. Re<3i-e4ents
Vualifying share (#ection 5$!" Every director must own at least one (&! share of the
capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director, which share shall stand in
his name on the books of the corporation. Any director who ceases to be the owner
of at least one (&! share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a
director shall thereby cease to be a director.
Lee 1 CA
#ummons was served upon +ee and +acdao, president and vice president of A+6A
The two, however contended that they are no longer corporate officers of the
corporation because of the voting trust agreement e0ecuted to 2B1 hence not
authoriCed to receive summons. #ummons must be served upon 2B1
2B1 however refused to receive the alias summons claiming it was not authoriCed
because it has not yet taken over A+6A
)otion for 2eclaration of proper service of summons filed by #acoba
-oting trust results from the separation of voting rights of a stockholder from his other
rights such as rights to receive dividends or inspect books of corporation
'riteria for a valid voting trust:
o -oting rights of the stock separate from other attributes of ownership
o -oting rights granted are intended to be irrevocable for a definite period of time
o 1rincipal purpose is to ac/uire voting control of the corporation
E0ecution of a voting trust creates a dichotomy between e/uitable or
beneficial ownership of the corporate shares of a stock holder and legal title
thereto
The change from the old code to the new code with respect to /ualifying shares of
directors is the omission of the phrase Gin his own rightH pertaining to beneficial
ownership of shares.
*n the new corpo code, persons may be directors if they are stockholders although
not Gin their own rightH hence includes trustees
HLP2009-3B Page 30
There is clear indication that to be a director, what is material is legal title and not
beneficial ownership
Bith the e0ecution of the voting trust agreement, +ee and +acdao were divested of
their legal title to their shares hence can no longer be directors and are no longer
corporate officers.
Because of this, they are not authoriCed to receive summons
Ae/uirements?2is/ualifications:
o Aesidence (#ection 5$! " a ma:ority of the directors or trustees of all corporations
organiCed under this 'ode must be residents of the 1hilippines
o 7ationality no re/uirement for citiCenship of a director or trustee so even an alien
may be elected as such e0cepts in business activities totally closed to aliens
o 2is/ualification of directors, trustees or officers (#ection 5E!:
'onvicted by final :udgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment for a
period e0ceeding si0 (%! years, or
-iolation of this 'ode committed within five (! years prior to the date of his
election or appointment
By laws may provide for additional /ualifications?dis/ualifications as long as
such additional /ualifications?dis/ualifications shall not modify re/uirements
as prescribed in the corporation code or be in conflict with such prescribed
re/uirements
Term:
o 2irectors D shall hold office for & year. .owever, incumbent directors shall
continue to be directors?trustees as long as their successors have not been
elected and /ualified (#ection 5$!
C. ,w ele'te# (#ection 5(!
)anner of election:
o There must be present in person or by representative ma:ority of the outstanding
capital stock ? member
o *n any form@ or must be by ballot when re/uested by any voting stock holder or
member
o -oting may be in person or by pro0y
At all elections of directors or trustees, there must be present owners of a ma:ority of
the outstanding capital stock, or if there be no capital stock, a ma:ority of the
members entitled to vote.
Every stockholder entitled to vote shall have the right to vote the number of shares of
stock standing, at the time fi0ed in the by"laws, in his own name on the stock books
of the corporation, or where the by"laws are silent, at the time of the election
Time to determine voting right
o As per share standing in one9s name at the time fi0ed by the By"+aws
o Bhere By"laws silent, at time of election
HLP2009-3B Page 31
'umulative voting D A system of voting designed to increase he voting power of
minority stockholders in the election of corporate directors when more than one
director is to be elected.
o A stockholder shall have as many votes as he has number of shares times the number of
directors up for election
o 'umulative voting is allowed for election of members of the Board in a stock corporation.
)embers of the Board in a 7on"stock 'orporation shall not be voted cumulatively unless
specifically provided for in the By"laws.
o The total number of votes cast by a stockholder shall not e0ceed the number of
shares owned by him as shown in the books of the corporation multiplied by the
whole number of directors to be elected
o ,ives the minority an opportunity to elect a representative to the board of
directors. 'annot itself give the minority control of corporate affairs but may
affect and limit the e0tent of ma:ority9s control
o By"laws cannot provide against cumulative voting since this right is mandated in
#ec 5(
o 7o delin/uent stock shall be voted
7on"stock corporation:
o ;nless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or in the by"laws,
members of corporations which have no capital stock may cast as many votes as
there are trustees to be elected but may not cast more than one vote for one
candidate.
o 'andidates receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared elected.
o Any meeting of the stockholders or members called for an election may ad:ourn
from day to day or from time to time but not sine die or indefinitely if:
6or any reason, no election is held, or
*f there not present or represented by pro0y, at the meeting, the owners of a
ma:ority of the outstanding capital stock, or if there be no capital stock, a
ma:ority of the member entitled to vote.
o #ince the provision re/uires presence, meeting of stockholders is re/uired
D. ,w -e41e# (#ection 5F!
Any director or trustee of a corporation may be removed from office by a vote of the
stockholders holding or representing 5?$ of the outstanding capital stock, or if the
corporation be a 7on"stock 'orporation, by a vote of 5?$ of the members entitled to
vote (with or without cause!.
7ote: #uch removal shall take place either at a regular meeting or at a special
meeting call for the purpose of removal of 2irectors or Trustees, with previous notice
of the time and place of such meeting, as well as the intention to propose such
removal. *f the officers refuse to call a meeting to consider the removal of the
2irector, it may be called at the instance of any stockholder or member, but with due
notice.
A director elected because of the vote of minority stockholders who united in
cumulative voting cannot be removed without cause
HLP2009-3B Page 32
The board cannot remove a director or trustee as member of the board
0. ,w 1a'an'y fille# (#ection 53!
Any vacancy occurring in the Board of 2irectors or Trustees other than by removal by
the stockholders or members or by e0piration of terms may be filled:
o *f still constituting /uorum, by the vote of at least a ma:ority of the remaining
directors or trustees
o 8therwise, said vacancies must be filled by the stockholders in a regular or
special meeting called for that purpose. A director or trustee so elected to fill a
vacancy shall be elected only for the une0pired term of his predecessor in office.
F. Re$-t f ele'tin f #i-e't-s; t-3stees; D ffi'e-s (#ection 5%!
Bithin $4 days after the election of the directors, trustees, and officers of the
corporation@ the #ecretary or any other officer of the corporation shall submit to the
#E', the names, nationalities, and residences of the directors, trustees, and officers
elected.
#hould a director, trustee, or officer die, resign, or in any manner cease to hold office,
his heirs in case of his death, the secretary or any other officer of the corporation, or
the director, trustee, or officer himself, shall immediately report such fact to the #E'.
@. ,w '4$ensate# (#ection $4!
*n the absence of any provision in the By"laws fi0ing their compensation, the directors
shall not receive any compensation, e0cept for reasonable per diems.
Any such compensation (other than per diems! may be granted to the directors by
the vote of the stockholders representing at least a ma:ority of the outstanding capital
stock at a regular or special stockholder9s meeting.
+imit: *n no case shall the total yearly compensation of directors, as such directors,
e0ceed &4= of the net income before income ta0 of the corporation during the
preceding year.
Ba--ett 1 La P-e1is-a Fili$ina. 6: #uit by the resigned directors of a building and loan
association to recover &= of the profits to each complainant in accordance with
an amendment to the by"laws, which stipulate that they are entitled to a lifetime
annuity from the profits of the corporation.
.: The amended by"laws does create any obligation to pay to the persons name therein such a
life gratuity or pension out of the profits. A by"law of this nature must be clearly
regarded as beyond the lawful powers of a mutual building and loan association
and is thus ultra vires. As it were, the by"law cannot be held to establish a
contractual relation between the parties.
HLP2009-3B Page 33
The authority conferred upon corporations in the code refers to providing compensation for future
services of directors, officers, and employees after the adoption of the by"law and
cannot in any sense be held to authoriCe the giving of continuous compensation
to particular directors after their employment has terminated for past services
rendered gratuitously by the them to the corporation. To permit the transaction
would be to create an obligation unknown to the law, and to countenance a
misapplication of funds of the building and loan association to the pre:udice of
#.s.
'ontracts between a corporation and third persons must be made by or under authority of its
board and not by the #.s. The action of the #.s is only advisory and is not
binding on the corporation.
Weste-n Instit3te f Te'"nl9y 1 Salas
*n a meeting of the Board of Trustees of Bestern *nstitute of Technology, Aesolution
was passed granting monthly compensation to officers respondents who are
members of the Board D validQ
Aespondents are entitled to compensation because they are not :ust directors but
officers as well. The prohibition under #ec $4 does not apply to them
,. ?atte-s -e<3i-in9 Ba-# f Di-e't-sG a'tin (vote by ma:ority of the board!
&. Amendment of A*
5. E0tending and #hortening 'orporate Term
$. *ncreasing ? 2ecreasing capital stock ? bonded indebtedness
(. #ale or disposition of all, substantially all of corporate assets
. *nvestment of corporate funds in another corporation or for a purpose other than main
purpose
%. *ssuance of stock dividends
E. 'orporate mergers or consolidation
F. -oluntary dissolution of the corporation whether or not creditors are pre:udiced
3. Approval of management contract
&4. Amendment to by"laws, repeal of by"laws, adoption of new by"laws
&&. 2eclare cash dividends
I. Lia%ility f Ba-# f Di-e't-s
&. *n ,eneral (#ection $&!
2irectors or trustees shall be liable solidarily for all damages resulting therefrom
suffered by the corporation, its stockholders, or members and other persons when:
o They willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation.
o They ac/uire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such
directors or trustees.
HLP2009-3B Page 34
Three fold duty of directors to the corporation:
o 2iligence
o +oyalty
o 8bedience
Bhat are re/uired and e0pected of directors:
o To posses at least ordinary knowledge and skill to enable them to make sound
business decision
o To attend directors meetings with reasonable regularity
o To e0ercise reasonable care in the management of the corporation
o To keep themselves sufficiently informed about the general condition of the
business
'auses of director9s liability:
o >nowing authoriCation of wrongful acts
o 7egligence
o 'onflict of interest
E0tent of +iability: All damages resulting from knowing authoriCation of wrongful acts,
negligence and conflict of interest suffered by the corporation, its stockholders, and
other persons
The degree of care and diligence re/uired is usually that which men prompted by
self"interest, generally e0ercise in their own affairs. *n determining whether
reasonable diligence has been e0ercised, the particular circumstances of each case
must be considered. The nature of the business is an important factor.
5. Business !udgent rule
Board of 2irectors has authority to modify the proposed terms of the contracts of the
corporation for the purpose of making the terms more acceptable to the other
contracting partiesKThe test to be applied is whether the act in /uestion is the direct
and immediate furtherance of the corporation9s business, fairly incidental to the
e0press powers and reasonably necessary to their e0ercise. *f so, the corporation
has the power to do it@ otherwise not. N)ontelibano v. Bacolod )urcia )illing 'o.O
$. #elf"dealing director (#ection $5!
A contract of the corporation with one or more of its directors or trustees or officers is
voidable, at the option of such corporation, unless all the following conditions are
present:
o That the presence of such director or trustee in the board meeting in which the
contract was approved was not necessary to constitute a /uorum for such
meeting@
o That the vote of such director or trustee was nor necessary for the approval of
the contract@
o That the contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances@ and
HLP2009-3B Page 35
o That in case of an officer, the contract has been previously authoriCed by the
board of directors.
Bhere any of the first two conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph is absent,
in the case of a contract with a director or trustee, such contract may be ratified by
the vote of the stockholders representing at least two"thirds (5?$! of the outstanding
capital stock or of at least two"thirds (5?$! of the members in a meeting called for the
purpose
6ull disclosure of the adverse interest of the directors or trustees involved must be
made at such meeting
The contract is voidable whether the corporation suffered damages or not
The burden of proving fairness is on the director
P-i4e W"ite Ce4ent 1 IAC.
1rime Bhite 'ement entered into a dealership agreement with one of its directors, Ale:andro Te,
for the latter to be the e0clusive distributor of 54,444 bags of 1rime Bhite cement per month W
13.E4 per bag for the entire )indanao area for years, and that a letter of credit be opened to
secure payment. Te advertised his dealership and was able to obtain possible clients, and
entered into agreements with several hardware stores for the purchase of the cement. Te then
informed 1rime Bhite of the orders, but the latter imposed additional conditions, which effectively
delayed the delivery of the cement, lowered the number of bags to be delivered, and increased
the price per bag. *t also made the prices sub:ect to change unilaterally and additional conditions
on the manner of payment. Te refused to comply and 1rime Bhite cancelled the dealership
agreement. Te sued for specific performance and damages. T' ruled ifo Te.
*: B?7 the dealership agreement is a valid and enforceable contract binding on the 'orporation.
.: 7o. it is not valid and enforceable. All corporate powers are e0ercised by the Board. *t may
also delegate specific powers to its 1resident or other officers. *n the absence of e0press
delegation, a contract entered into by the 1resident in behalf of the corporation, may still bind the
latter if the board should ratify e0pressly or impliedly. *n the absence of e0press or implied
ratification, the 1resident may as a general rule bind the corporation through a contract in the
ordinary course of business, provided the same is reasonable under the circumstances. These
rules are applicable where the 1resident or other officer acting for the corporation is dealing with
a third person.
The situation is different where a director or officer is dealing with his own corporation. Te was not
an ordinary stockholder@ he was a member of the Board and Auditor of the corporation. .e is
what is often called a Gself"dealingH director. As a director, he holds a position of trust and owes a
duty of loyalty to his corporation. *n case his interests conflict with those of the corporation, he
cannot sacrifice the latter to his own advantage and benefit. The trust relationship springs from
the control and guidance of the corporate affairs and property interests of the stockholders. A
director9s contract with his corporation is not in all instances void or voidable. *f the contract is fair
and reasonable under the circumstances, it may be ratified by the stockholders provided a full
disclosure of his adverse interest is made. The contract in this case is neither fair nor reasonable.
At the time of the contract, the corporation had not yet even started producing the cement. 1rices
of cement, :ust like any other commodity, are not stable and e0pected to rise. Bithin a period of
si0 years from the date of dealership agreement the prices were certain to rise, and yet the
contract pegged the rate to 13.E4 per bag. This according to the 'ourt was not fair and
reasonable at all, and unduly pre:udiced the corporation. The contracts he entered into after the
dealership agreement were such as to completely shield him from any increase in the price of
cement. The contracts were only for two years at a time, even if the dealership was good for .
.e was attempting to enrich himself at the e0pense of the corporation. There is no showing that
the stockholders ratified the dealership agreement. Thus the same was not valid and he cannot
be allowed to reap the fruits of his disloyalty.
HLP2009-3B Page 36
(. 'ontracts between the corporations with interlocking directors (#ection $$!
A contract between two or more corporations having interlocking directors shall not
be invalidated on that ground alone, e0cept cases of fraud.
The contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
*f the interest of the interlocking director in one corporation is substantial and his
interest in the other corporation or corporations is merely nominal, he shall be sub:ect
to the provisions of the preceding section insofar as the latter corporation or
corporations are concerned.
#tockholdings e0ceeding twenty (54=! percent of the outstanding capital stock shall
be considered substantial for purposes of interlocking directors.
Ae/uisites of a valid contract between the corporation and one or more of its
directors, trustees or officers:
o That the presence of such director or trustee in the Board meeting in which the
contract was approved was not necessary to constitute a /uorum for such
meeting
o That the vote of such director or trustee was not necessary for the approval of the
contract
o That the contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances
o That in case of an officer, the contract with the officer has been previously
authoriCed by the Board of 2irectors
. 2isloyalty (#ection $(!
Bhere a director, by virtue of his office, ac/uires for himself a business opportunity
which should belong to the corporation, thereby obtaining profits to the pre:udice of
such corporation, he must account to the latter for all such profits by refunding the
same
;7+E## his act has been ratified by a vote of the stockholders owning or representing
at least two"thirds (5?$! of the outstanding capital stock.
This provision shall be applicable, notwithstanding the fact that the director risked his
own funds in the venture.
2octrine of corporate opportunity " Bhen a director, trustee or officer attempts to
ac/uire or ac/uires, in violation of his duty, any interest adverse to the corporation in
respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence, as to which
e/uity imposes a liability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be liable as a
trustee for the corporation and must account for the profits which otherwise would
have accrued to the corporation.
The last paragraph of #ection $& and #ection $( contain the doctrine of corporate
opportunity. *n case of such conflict of interests, and the director acts against the
good of the corporation, he shall be accountable for the profits he obtained, even if
he had risked his own funds.
%. ;se of inside information
HLP2009-3B Page 37
The fiduciary position of insiders, directors, and officers prohibits them from using
confidential information relating to the business of the corporation to benefit
themselves or any competitor corporation in which they may have a mere substantial
interest.
The liability of a director or officer guilty of using inside information is to the
corporation and not to any individual stockholder
#ince loss and pre:udice to the corporation is not a re/uirement for liability, the
corporation has a cause of action as long as there is unfair use of inside information
*t is inside information if it is not generally available to others and is ac/uired because
of the close relationship of the director or officer of the corporation
,eneral rule: ()a:ority view! 2irectors owe no fiduciary duty to stockholders but they
may deal with them at arm9s length. 7o duty to disclose facts known to the director
or officer
#pecial facts doctrine D 'onceding the absence of a fiduciary relationship in the
ordinary case, courts nevertheless hold that where special circumstances or facts are
present which make it ine/uitable for the director to withhold information from the
stockholder, the duty to disclose arises and concealment is fraud.
@.n9wei 1 S0C .
This involves two actions in the #E' filed by Lohn ,okongwei, a #an )iguel 'orporation
stockholder by himself and through the ;A' and '6', who sued the ma:ority of the #)' Bo2
(#oriano, Xobel, Ao0as, 8rtigas, 1rieto et al! and #)' itself to declare null and void the amended
by"laws and a cancellation of the certificate of filing the amended by"laws. .e alleges the
following:
#)'B82 acted without authority in amending the by"laws without the prescribed 5?$
vote of stockholders holding subscribed and paid"up capital stock
#ome members of the #)'B82 amended the by"laws which state that in
determining whether or not a person is engaged in competitive business, the Board
may look into factors such as competitive business and family relationship, thus
purposely providing for ,okongwei9s dis/ualification as director, and effectively
dis/ualified him from being elected as director
,okongwei also files an action in the #E' to compel #)' to allow him to inspect the records of
the corporation, including the minutes of the last stockholders meeting, copy of the management
contract with A7#'8A, latest financial statements among others, including the authority of the
stockholders to invest corporate funds in #an )iguel *nternational *nc.
The #orianos counter by alleging that ,okongwei as president and ma:ority stockholder of ;A'
and '6', conducted bad publicity against the #)' to generate support from the stockholders in
his effort to secure a seat in the board. They add the fact ,okongwei was re:ected by the
stockholders because he was engaged in competitive business and securing a seat would have
sub:ected #)' to grave disadvantages. #E' grants ,okongwei motion but denies the motion to
inspect the financial statements and records of #an )iguel *nternational as he is not a
stockholder thereof. #E' also allowed him to run as director but cannot sit as long as the validity
of the by"laws has been settled. )eanwhile the #)'B82 submitted the amended by"laws to the
stockholders, who ratified the same.
*: were the aended by(laws %alid and reasonable
HLP2009-3B Page 38
.: *n the case at bar, there are facts which cannot be denied, viC.: that the amended by"laws
were adopted by the Board of 2irectors of the #an )iguel 'orporation in the e0ercise of the
power delegated by the stockholders ostensibly pursuant to section 55 of the 'orporation +aw@
that in a special meeting on 6ebruary &4, &3EE held specially for that purpose, the amended by"
laws were ratified by more than F4= of the stockholders of record@ that the foreign investment in
the .ongkong Brewery and 2istellery, a beer manufacturing company in .ongkong, was made by
the #an )iguel 'orporation in &3(F@ and that in the stockholdersI annual meeting held in &3E5
and &3EE, all foreign investments and operations of #an )iguel 'orporation were ratified by the
stockholders.
*: 9hether or not the aended by(laws of S:C of dis;ualifying a copetitor fro noination or
election to the Board of 'irectors of S:C are %alid and reasonable
.: ,okongwei claims that the amended by"laws are invalid and unreasonable because they were
tailored to suppress the minority and prevent them from having representation in the Board, at the
same time depriving petitioner of his Pvested rightP to be voted for and to vote for a person of his
choice as director. ;pon the other hand, respondents Andres ). #oriano, Lr., Lose ). #oriano
and #an )iguel 'orporation content that the e0clusion of a competitor from the Board is
legitimate corporate purpose, considering that being a competitor, petitioner cannot devote an
unselfish and undivided +oyalty to the corporation@ that it is essentially a preventive measure to
assure stockholders of #an )iguel 'orporation of reasonable protective from the unrestrained
self"interest of those charged with the promotion of the corporate enterprise.
;nder ;# corporate law, corporations have the power to make by"laws declaring a person
employed in the service of a rival company to be ineligible for the corporationIs Board of
2irectors. ... NAOn amendment which renders ineligible, or if elected, sub:ects to removal, a
director if he be also a director in a corporation whose business is in competition with or is
antagonistic to the other corporation is valid.P This is based upon the principle that where the
director is so employed in the service of a rival company, he cannot serve both, but must betray
one or the other. #uch an amendment Padvances the benefit of the corporation and is good.P *n
the 1hilippines, section 5& of the 'orporation +aw e0pressly provides that a corporation may
make by"laws for the /ualifications of directors. Thus, it has been held that an officer of a
corporation cannot engage in a business in direct competition with that of the corporation where
he is a director by utiliCing information he has received as such officer, under Pthe established law
that a director or officer of a corporation may not enter into a competing enterprise which cripples
or in:ures the business of the corporation of which he is an officer or director.H
*t is also well established that corporate officers Pare not permitted to use their position of trust
and confidence to further their private interests.P *n a case where directors of a corporation
cancelled a contract of the corporation for e0clusive sale of a foreign firmIs products, and after
establishing a rival business, the directors entered into a new contract themselves with the
foreign firm for e0clusive sale of its products, the court held that e/uity would regard the new
contract as an offshoot of the old contract and, therefore, for the benefit of the corporation, as a
Pfaultless fiduciary may not reap the fruits of his misconduct to the e0clusion of his principal.H
*: 9#& ,o+ongwei6 as SH of S:C6 has a %ested right to be %oted as director in the corporation.
.: *t is further argued by #)' that there is no %ested right of any stoc+holder under 2hilippine
<aw to be %oted as director of a corporation. 1ursuant to section &F of the 'orporation +aw, any
corporation ay aend its articles of incorporation by a %ote or written assent of the stoc+holders
representing at least two(thirds of the subscribed capital stoc+ of the corporation )f the
aendent changes6 diinishes or restricts the rights of the existing shareholders then the
dissenting inority has only one right6 %i=.: Pto ob:ect thereto in writing and demand payment for
his share.P ;nder section 55 of the same law, the owners of the ma:ority of the subscribed capital
stock may amend or repeal any by"law or adopt new by"laws. *t cannot be said, therefore, that
petitioner has a vested right to be elected director, in the face of the fact that the law at the time
HLP2009-3B Page 39
such right as stockholder was ac/uired contained the prescription that the corporate charter and
the by"law shall be sub:ect to amendment, alteration and modification.
Although in the strict and technical sense, directors of a private corporation are not regarded as
trustees, there cannot be any doubt that their character is that of a fiduciary insofar as the
corporation and the stockholders as a body are concerned. As agents entrusted with the
management of the corporation for the collective benefit of the stockholders, Pthey occupy a
fiduciary relation, and in this sense the relation is one of trust.P GThe ordinary trust relationship of
directors of a corporation and stockholdersP, according to 1shaan %. :iller6P is not a matter of
statutory or technical law. *t springs from the fact that directors have the control and guidance of
corporate affairs and property and hence of the property interests of the stockholders. E/uity
recogniCes that stockholders are the proprietors of the corporate interests and are ultimately the
only beneficiaries thereof.
*: 9hether or not respondent San :iguel Corporation could6 as a easure of self( protection6
dis;ualify a copetitor fro noination and election to its Board of 'irectors.
.: *t is alleged that petitioner, as of )ay %, &3EF, has e0ercised, personally or thru two
corporations owned or controlled by him, control over the following shareholdings in #an )iguel
'orporation. According to respondent #)', in &3E%, the areas of competition affecting #)'
involved product sales of over 1(44 million or more than 54= of the 15 billion total product sales
of #)'. The '6'"Aobina group was in direct competition on product lines which, for #)',
represented sales amounting to more than 1(EF million.
*n this :urisdiction, under section 5& of the 'orporation +aw, a corporation may prescribe in its by"
laws Pthe /ualifications, duties and compensation of directors, officers and employees ... P This
must necessarily refer to a /ualification in addition to that specified by section $4 of the
'orporation +aw, which provides that Pevery director must own in his right at least one share of
the capital stock of the stock corporation of which he is a director ... P Any person Pwho buys stock
in a corporation does so with the knowledge that its affairs are doinated by a a!ority of the
stockholders and that he ipliedly contracts that the will of the ma:ority shall govern in all matters
within the limits of the act of incorporation and lawfully enacted by"laws and not forbidden by law.P
To this e0tent, therefore, the stockholder may be considered to have Pparted with his personal
right or privilege to regulate the disposition of his property which he has invested in the capital
stock of the corporation, and surrendered it to the will of the ma:ority of his fellow incorporators. ...
*t cannot therefore be :ustly said that the contract, e0press or implied, between the corporation
and the stockholders is infringed ... by any act of the former which is authoriCed by a ma:ority...P
*t is not denied that a member of the Board of 2irectors of the #an )iguel 'orporation has access
to sensitive and highly confidential information, such as: (a! marketing strategies and pricing
structure@ (b! budget for e0pansion and diversification@ (c! research and development@ and (d!
sources of funding, availability of personnel, proposals of mergers or tie"ups with other firms.
*t is obviously to prevent the creation of an opportunity for an officer or director of #an )iguel
'orporation, who is also the officer or owner of a competing corporation, from taking advantage
of the information which he ac/uires as director to promote his individual or corporate interests to
the pre:udice of #an )iguel 'orporation and its stockholders, that the /uestioned amendment of
the by"laws was made. 'ertainly, where two corporations are competitive in a substantial sense,
it would seem improbable, if not impossible, for the director, if he were to discharge effectively his
duty, to satisfy his loyalty to both corporations and place the performance of his corporation
duties above his personal concerns.
#ound principles of corporate management counsel against sharing sensitive information with a
director whose fiduciary duty of loyalty may well re/uire that he disclose this information to a
competitive arrival. These dangers are enhanced considerably where the common director such
as the petitioner is a controlling stockholder of two of the competing corporations. *t would seem
HLP2009-3B Page 40
manifest that in such situations, the director has an economic incentive to appropriate for the
benefit of his own corporation the corporate plans and policies of the corporation where he sits as
director.
*ndeed, access by a competitor to confidential information regarding marketing strategies and
pricing policies of #an )iguel 'orporation would sub:ect the latter to a competitive disadvantage
and un:ustly enrich the competitor, for advance knowledge by the competitor of the strategies for
the development of e0isting or new markets of e0isting or new products could enable said
competitor to utiliCe such knowledge to his advantage.
@l%e Wlen C 1 =ti'a @as D 0le't-i'. 6: ,lobe Boolen needed electric power to run its
mills. *ts president and ma:ority #., )aynard, was able to get a contract with the electric
company ;tica ,as which was ratified by the e0ecutive committee of ,lobe9s board. )aynard
was a nominal #. in the electric company also, and did not vote in the meeting. ,lobe desires to
enforce the contract.
.: 'ontracts are voidable at the instance of ;tica ,as. ,lobe argues that by refusing to vote,
)aynard shifted responsibility to his associates, and may reap a profit from their errors. 8ne does
not divest oneself so readily of one9s duties as trustee. The refusal to vote, has indeed this
importance: it gives to the transaction the form and presumption of propriety, and re/uires one
who would invalidate it to prove beneath the surface. The trustee or director holds a duty of
constant and un/ualified fidelity. .e cannot rid himself of the duty to warn and to denounce, if
there is improvidence or oppression, either apparent on the surface, or lurking beneath it.
There was an influence in this case which was e0erted by )r )aynard the president of ,lobe
Boolen. 6rom beginning to end he dealt with a subordinate, who was alert to serve at his
pleasure. The unfairness in the contract is startling and the conse/uences could be disastrous.
7o matter how large the business, or how great the increase in prices of labor or fuel, or there be
e0tensions to the plant, the electric company had pledged that for &4 years there will be saving of
Y%44?month, Y$44 for each mill, YE544?year. As a result of that pledge it has supplied the plaintiff
with electric current for practically nothing, and even owes it some money thereafter. )r )aynard
knew the unfairness of the contract, and he cannot have failed to know that he held a one"sided
contract which left the defendant at his mercy. Thus his refusal to vote does not nullify, as of
course an influence and predominance e0erted without a vote. A constant duty rests on a trustee
to seek no harsh advantage to the detriment of his trust, but rather to protect and renounce he
gains what is unfair.
D3ty f DILI@0NC0 CAS0S
Ben93et 0le't-i' C$e-ati1e 1 NLRC. 'osalan, ,) of the Benguet Electric 'ooperative, was
informed by '8A that cash advances received by officers and employees of Benguet Electric had
been virtually written off the books, that per diems and allowances showed substantial
inconsistencies with the directives of the 7ational Electricifcation Administration, and that several
irregularities in the utiliCation of funds released by 7EA to Benguet. 'osalan then implemented
the remedial measures recommended by '8A. Board members of Benguet responded by
abolishing the housing allowance of 'osalan, reduced his salary, representation and other
allowances, and directed him to hold in abeyance all disciplinary actions, and struck his name out
as principal signatory of Benguet Electric. The Board adopted another series of resolutions which
resulted in te ouster of 'osalan as ,). 'osalan nonetheless continued to work as ,),
contending that only the 7EA can suspend and remove him. The Board then refused to act on
'osalan re/uest to release compensation due him. 'osalan files a complaint with the 7+A'
against the Board of Benguet Electric, and impleaded Benguet Electric itself as well as the
individual members of the board in their official and private capacities. +abor Arbitrer rules ifo
'osalan, holding both the company and the board solidarily liable to 'osalan. 7+A' modifies
award to 'osalan by declaring Bengeut alone, and not the Board members, was liable to
'osalan. Benguet appeals.
HLP2009-3B Page 41
.: the Board members and officers of a corporation who purport to act for and in behalf of the
corporation, keep within the lawful scope of their authority in so acting, and act in ,6, do no
become liable, civilly or otherwise, for the conse/uences of their acts. Those acts are properly
attributed to the corporation alone and no personal liability is incurred. *n this case, the board
members obviously wanted to get rid of 'osalan and acted with indecent haste in removing him
from his ,) position. This shows strong indications that the members of the board had illegally
suspended and dismissed him precisely because he was trying the rectify the financial
irregularities.
The Board members are also liable for damages under #ec $& of the 'orpo 'ode, which by
virtue of #ec ( thereof, makes it applicable in a supplementary manner to all corporations,
including those with special or individual charters so long as these are not inconsistent therewith.
The Board members are also guilty of gross negligence and B6 in directing the affairs of the
corporation in enacting the said resolutions, and in doing so, acted beyond the scope of their
authority.
Otis D C. 1 Pennsyl1ania Rail-a# C. 6: 8tis M 'o is a #. in and among the wholly"owned
subsidiaries of the 1ennsylvania Aailroad 'o (1AA!, which included 1ennsylvania 8hio E 2etroit
Aailroads (182!. 8ne of its subsidiaries had an outstanding bond issuance of Y5F.(). The
parent then negotiated with a third party, >uhn, +oeb and 'o, to refinance the bonds. The
directors of 182 approved a resolution authoriCing the sale of the new #eries 2 bonds at a best
obtainable price. Bonds were then sold to >uhn and +oeb. Another buyer was willing to purchase
the bonds at a better price but the directors declined. The *nterstate 'ommerce 'ommission
found that the corporation was not able to get the best price for the sale and that other options
were not e0plored, that negotiations were only with one investment house and were at Garms"
length dealingH, and that it was possible to have greater savings.
*: B?7 the directors are liable for failing to e0ercise ordinary care and :udgment in the issuance
and sale of Y5F) in bonds, which resulted in alleged losses suffered by the corporation.
.: Business :udgment rule: courts will not interfere in matters of business :udgment, in which it is
presumed that :udgmentJreasonable diligenceJhas in fact been e0ercised. A director cannot
close his eyes to what is going on about him in the conduct of business :udgment. 'ourts have
given directors wide latitude in the management of the affairs of the corporation provided that the
:udgment is unbiased, honest and reasonably e0ercised. 7egligence must be determined as of
the time of transaction. )istakes or errors in the e0ercise of honest business :udgment do not
sub:ect the officers and directors to liability for negligence in the discharge of their appointed
duties. 2irectors are entrusted with the management of the affairs of the corporation. *f in the
course of management they arrive at a decision for which there is a reasonable basis, and they
acted in ,6 as the result of their independent :udgment, and uninfluenced by any other
consideration than what they honestly felt was in the best interests of the corporation. *n the
present case, the #' found that the officers and directors of the corporations acted honestly in
,6 and sought to e0ercise their best :udgment for the best interests of their corporation. 7o fraud
was present, but only a faint suggestion of B6. The directors had the right to negotiate privately
with >uhn and +oeb. *n contracting with the latter, the directors were not contracting with another
firm in which they were interested, nor did the directorship or officership positions interlock. There
is no contention that fraud e0isted and fraudulent acts will not be presumed.
?nteli%an et al 1. Ba'l#-?3-'ia ?illin9 C In'. )ontelibano et al are sugar planters
adhered to the )illing 'ompany9s sugar central mill under identical contracts. The contracts
would be in force for $4 years and provide that the resulting product should be divided in the ratio
of (= for the mill and = for the planters. *t was proposed to e0ecute the milling contracts,
increasing the planter9s shares to %4= of the manufactured sugar and molasses and e0tending
HLP2009-3B Page 42
the period from $4 to ( years. The Board of the )illing company then adopted a resolution
granting further concessions to the planters over and above the amended contract. &E years later,
)ontelibano sues the )illing company, contending that the $ sugar centrals with a total annual
production e0ceeding &?$ of the production of all sugar millis in 7egros, had already granted
%5.= participation to their planters, and in accordance with 1ara 3 of the resolution, it had
become obligated to grant similar concessions to them.
.: Bhen a resolution is passed in ,6 by the board, it is valid and binding, and whether or not it
will cause losses or decrease the profits of the central, the court has no authority to review them.
Vuestions of policy or management are left solely to the honest decision of officers and directors
of a corporation, and the court is without authority to substitute its :udgment for that of the board@
the board is the business manager of the corporation and so long as it acts in ,6 its orders are
not reviewable by the courts
Litwin 1 Allen et al. .: The officers are liable for the transaction because the entire arrangement
was so improvident, risky, and unusual and contrary to fundamental concepts of prudent banking
practice. A bank director when appointed takes oath that he will diligently and honestly administer
the affairs of the bank or trust company. .onesty alone would not suffice@ there must be more
than honestyJthere must be diligence, and that means care and prudence as well. Bhat sound
reason is there for a bank, desiring to make an investment, to buy securities under an
arrangement whereby any appreciation will insure to the benefit of the seller and any loss will be
borne by the bank. There is here more than a /uestion of business :udgment. The directors
plainly failed to bestow the care which the situation demanded.
A director, however, is not liable for loss or damage other than what was pro0imately caused by
his own acts or omissions in breach of his duty. The directors in this case are liable only for the
loss attributable to the improper transaction itself, and not after the option on the improper
transaction had e0pired.
Wal.e- 1 ?an et al. 6?.: 'orporation was engaged in real estate and advanced a loan to a third
person taking as security his 17. The loan was not authoriCed by the board and was not for the
benefit of the corporation nor was it in aid of its business. 7o effort was done to collect on the
loan, which became due and demandable. The corporation went bankrupt, and the receiver sues
the directors to collect on the amount due the insolvent corporation and for damages. 'ourt held
that the director was negligent.
Stein%e-9 1 >elas'. 6: The board of the corporation authoriCed the purchase of $$4 shares of
capital stock of the corporation and the declaration of dividends at a time when the corporation
was indebted and in such a bad financial condition. The directors relied on the face value on the
books of its A?A, which had little or no value. 6urthermore it appears that two of the directors were
permitted to resign so that they could sell their stock to the corporation. The corporation became
insolvent, and the receiver #teinberg sues the directors.
.: The corporation did not have a bona fide surplus with which dividends could be declared and
paid out. The directors did not act in ,6 and were grossly ignorant of their duties. 2irectors were
held personally liable for causing the corporation to purchase their own shares and declaring
dividends, which because of such failure to take into consideration of worthless receivables,
worked to the detriment of the creditors. The directors did not act with diligence in taking the word
of their chairman and not making an informed decision based on the facts then available to them
and on not relying on other documents available to them.
'reditors have the right to assume that so long as there are outstanding debts and liabilities, the
board will not use the corporate assets to purchase its own stock, and that it will not declare
dividends to #.s when the corporation is insolvent
Ba-nes 1 An#-ews. 6: 'orporation manufactures starters for 6ord motor vehicles and airplanes.
HLP2009-3B Page 43
2irector Andrews, the largest #., who was induced by the 1resident to become director, held
only 5 board meetings. 2uring his term, the company business was mismanaged. Barnes was
then appointed receiver after the corporation had gone under, and was found that the company
had no funds. .e alleged that Andrews failed to give ade/uate attention to the affairs of the
company, which had been conducted incompetently and without regard to the wastage in
salaries. Bork had languished from incompetence and e0travagance and /uarrels between the
factory manager and the other personnel affected production.
.: 6irst liability must rest upon the director9s general inattention to his duties. .e cannot be
charged with neglect in attending director meetings, since there had been only 5. But his liability
must depend upon his failure in general to keep advised of the conduct of the corporate affairs.
Bhile directors are collectively managers of the company, they are not e0pected to interfere
individually in the actual conduct of its affairs. To do so would disturb the authority of the officers
and destroy their individual responsibility, without which no proper discipline is possible. .aving
accepted a post of confidence, Andrews was charged with an active duty to learn whether the
company was moving to production, and why it was not, and to consider what could be done to
avoid the conflicts among personnel or correct their incompetence, which was slowly bleeding the
business to death. .e must go further to show that he should have been more active, as the
cause of action against him by the receiver rests upon a tort of omission as though it had rested
on a positive act on his part.
Bhen a business fails from general mismanagement or business incapacity, could the blame be
placed upon a single director and could he have saved the company if he had triedQ A director
could have least fulfilled his duties to the company and to the #.s to have made the company
prosper, or at least to show that he had done his duty enough to have broken the fall of the
company. This Andrews failed to do. 0
True, Andrews was not well"suited by e0perience for the :ob he had undertaken. 2irectors are not
specialists, but they must have good sense, and must have ac/uainted themselves with the
corporate affairs, but they need not have any technical talent. They are the general advisers of
the business, and if they faithfully give such ability as they have, it would not be lawful to hold
them liable. )ust a director guarantee that his :udgment is goodQ 'an #.s call him to account for
deficiencies which their votes assured him did not dis/ualify him for officeQ
Bates 1 D-esse-. 6: Bank employee was able to embeCCle cash from the branch operations for a
considerable period of time, unbeknown to the bank officers, who relied to heavily and trusted the
employee. .e was able to swindle money by concealing his withdrawals through entries in the
records of the bank, and matched it with the correct statements which were relied upon by the
cashier.
.: ;nder the circumstances of this case, the directors did not neglect their duty in accepting the
statement of the cashier and failing to inspect the depositor9s ledger. They should not be held
answerable for taking the cashier9s statement to be as correct as the statement of assets always
was. The statement of assets were always correct. A committee was appointed to e0amine the
operations of the bank. The bank itself was in sound financial condition. Their confidence seemed
warranted by the semi"annual e0aminations by the government e0aminer and they were
encouraged in their belief that all was well by the president. They were not bound by virtue of the
office gratuitously assumed by them to call in the passbooks and compare them with the ledger,
and until the event showed the possibility they hardly could have seen that their failure to look at
the ledger opened a way to fraud.
The position of the president, however, is different. 1ractically he was the master of the situation.
.e was at the bank daily for hours, had the ledger in his hands at time. .e had hints and
warnings of the une0plained shortages and rapid decline in deposits. .e knew the errant
employee had been living at a fast pace and had been dabbling in stocks. .e had been put on his
guard, and had they been heeded by the 1resident, it would have led to an e0amination of the
HLP2009-3B Page 44
ledger9s and would have prevented future thefts. *n accepting the presidency 2resser must be
taken to have contemplated responsibility for losses to the bank.
S0IHIN@ CORPORAT0 OPPORT=NITI CAS0S
Sin9e- et al 1 Ca-lisle. 6: #inger et al are #.s of the ;nited 'orporation which owns all capital
stock of its subsidiary, 7< ;nited 'orp, both of which are engaged in the business of underwriting
securities. 'arlisle et al are directors of the two corporations. 8ther defendants are investment
houses L1 )organ, 2re0el M 'o, and )organ #tanley. ;nited 'orp ac/uired substantial voting
stock of various holding and operating companies?utilities, which were all publicly listed and
obtained their funds through the public sale of their securities. L1 )organ et al were able to
obtain large profits from the underwriting of such securities to the e0clusion of ;nited and 7<
;nited. 1laintiff #inger charge that the defendant bankers and investment houses and the
directors of the two corporations fraudulently caused the latter corporations to use their influence
and control over the subsidiaries in order to induce them to award the underwriting business to
the defendant bankers. .aving eliminated ;nited 'orp and 7< ;nited as their competitors for the
underwriting business of the subsidiaries, the defendants allegedly proceeded to utiliCe their
control and influence to obtain the business for themselves. #inger et al also claimed that the
directors of the corporation, as fiduciaries, eliminated their cestui as a competitor in the
underwriting profits.
.: ;nited and 7< ;nited were also engaged in underwriting as do the defendant banks. *t was
the duty of their directors and officers to make every effort consonant with good, honest :udgment
to obtain for those corporations as much of the underwriting business as possible, and to make
this business as profitable as possible. This does not mean, however, that the directors and
controlling #.s of ;nited and 7< ;nited were re/uired to do anything detrimental to the affairs of
other corporations of which they were officers and directors, and to the affairs of ;nited and 7<
;nited. 8ne in control of a ma:ority of the stock and of the board of a corporation occupies a
fiduciary relation towards the minority, and is charged with the duty of e0ercising a high degree of
,6, care, and diligence for the protection of the same. Every act in its own interest to the
detriment of the minority interests becomes a breach of duty and of trust, and entitled them to
plenary relied. #o strict is the rule of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary that the mere fact that a
trustee has an interest inconsistent with the interest of his cestui, casts upon him that burden of
:ustification. Bhere this duty e0ists, the duty of the trustee is to manage the property and affairs of
the corporation with an eye single to the advantage of the corporation itself. *t is not proper for the
fiduciary to take those opportunities unto itself, while at the same time it stayed the processes of
its subsidiary directed towards the same business ends. *t is not only a case of a fiduciary seiCing
business opportunities of the cestui. The trustee at the same time kept its dominant hand over the
cestui, suppressing any attempt by the cestui to go out and compete with the trustee.
Bhere a fiduciary is engaged in a business in competition with his corporation, he cannot actively
use his position and power over his corporation so as to prevent the corporation from seeking
certain businesses in competition with himself. *t is charged that the directors here not only failed
and refused any attempt to obtain certain business for their own corporation, but that they
affirmatively prevent the corporation from competing with them for that business. This they may
not do. 2irectorship in two competing corporation does not in and of itself constitute a wrong. *t is
only when a business opportunity arises which places the director in a position of serving two
masters, and when dominated by one, he neglects his duty to the other, that a wrong has been
done.
I-1in9 T-3st C 1 De3ts'" et al. 6: *rving is the trustee of the insolvent company #onora
Acoustic. Acoustic desired the patents of the 2e 6orest company and wanted gain at least
minority stake to have a voice in the management of its patents and products, which goes to
Acoustic9s corporate purpose. Aeynolds M 'o, receiver of the insolvent 2e 6orest, offered to give
HLP2009-3B Page 45
Acoustic &?$ participation in the purchase of %44,444 shares of 2e 6orest stock. *t also stipulated
that Acoustic9s nominees should hold ( of 3 seats in the board and that it should have the right to
enter into a contract to handle the managing and selling of 2e 6orest products. This offer was
presented to the board of Acoustic and a resolution was passed authoriCing its president,
2eutsch, to obtain sufficient funds to enable Acoustic to carry out its obligations in case it accepts
the offer. 7o funds were obtained but Biddle and 2eutsch et al, agreed to put up the money and
accept the certificates of 2e 6orest stock issued when date of payment came under the offer.
Aeynolds agreed and issued the certificates. The deal was consummated on the purchase of 2e
6orest stock. *t was then traded in the e0change and Biddle, 2eutsch et al were able to reap huge
profits in selling their shares. Acoustic declares bankruptcy and sues the Biddle group, three of
whom were directors of 2e 6orest, appropriated to themselves Acoustic9s right under its contract,
when as fiduciaries they were obligated to preserve those rights for Acoustic and were forbidden
to take position where personal interest would conflict with the interest of their principal.
.: The theory of the suit is that a fiduciary may make no profit for himself out of a violation of duty
of the cestui, even though he risked his own funds in the venture, and that any one who assists in
the fiduciary9s dereliction is likewise liable to account for the profit so made. *t is clear that there is
no contract between Acoustic and Aeynolds because the offer did not run to Acoustic but to the
Biddle group as individuals. The management contract, once entered into, would enable access
to the patents, stock ownership in 2e 6orest as a going concern after receivership was lifted, and
were all concededly legitimate corporate purposes. Thus the proposed purchase is not ultra
vires.
The facts of the present case militate strongly against the directors since in this case, they
absolutely bound Acoustic by contract to make payments to Aeynolds and e0posing it to risk of a
suit for damages for nonperformance, without committing themselves to it to relieve it of this
obligation if necessary when time for payment arrives. 2irectors of a solvent corporation are
forbidden to take over for their own profit a corporate contract on the plea of the corporation9s
financial inability to perform. *f the directors are uncertain whether the corporation can make the
necessary outlays, they need not embark upon the venture. *f they do, they cannot substitute
themselves for the corporation any place along the line and divert possible benefits into their own
pockets.
Litwin 1 Allen et al. 6: L1 )organ, in disposing of &,54,444 shares of '# of Alleghany
corporation, offered 44,444 to ,uaranty 'orporation to be sold on a commission at Y5(?share.
Before the public offering, )organ also offered the other E4,444 to friends at Y54. Among those
receiving the shares were some directors of ,uaranty 'orp, who received (4,444 shares. The
market opened at a premium and the directors were able to dispose of their stock at a substantial
profit.
.: A director of a corporation is in a position of fiduciary. .e will not be permitted to improperly
profit at the e0pense of the corporation. ;ndivided loyalty will ever be insisted upon. 1ersonal
gain will be denied to a director when it comes because he has taken a position adverse to or in
conflict with the best interests of the corporation. The fiduciary relationship imposes a duty to act
in accordance with the highest standard. There is thus no basis for holding that in ac/uiring stock
through L1 )organ at Y54, any of the defendants were guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty. The
'# purchased did not represent in any case a business opportunity for the ,uaranty 'orporation.
.aving fulfilled their duty to the corporation in accordance to their best :udgment, the directors
were not precluded from a transaction for their own account and risk.
*n order to constitute a corporate opportunity that was deprived by the directors, it was necessary
to prove the ff:
The shares purchase were in contemplation of e/uity offered to the cestui
That the cestui had some legitimate right or e0pectancy in these shares
HLP2009-3B Page 46
The /uestion to ask is, have the directors profited at the e0pense of their corporation@ have they
gained because of disloyalty to its interest and welfareQ *n this case, the GopportunityH was a
routine piece of business wholly lacking in the uni/ue and special /uality which distinguished
other corporate opportunity cases. The interest of the directors in the stock was purely
speculative, and they even incurred a definite risk which at the time was totally eliminated from
the cestui9s position in the same stock. *n other words, the profit of the cestui was assured@ that of
the directors were still at haCard.
D3ty f Cnt-llin9 Inte-ests
Ins3-ans"a-es C-$-atin 1 N-t"e-n Fis'al C-$. 6: The )anagement group (composed of
1hiladelphia banks! transferred control over the *nsuranshares 'orporation, an investment trust
specialiCing in shares of small life insurance companies, to the Boston ,roup, none of whom ever
had any interest of any in it. Bith the control went plenary power under the by"laws to sell or
transfer all the securities in the company9s portfolio. #uch ac/uisition of control was the first step
of a grand scheme, planned by the Boston ,roup with the connivance of brokers, to strip the
corporation of its valuable assets, leaving a mere shell to the remaining #.s.
.: This case involves more than :ust a /uestion of liability in the sale of corporate stock: it is the
sale of control by a minorityJbut controllingJinterest.
Those who control a corporation either by the ma:ority or minority stock ownership owe some
duty to the corporation in respect of the transfer of the control to outsiders. 8wners of control in a
corporation are under a duty not to transfer ownership to outsiders if the circumstances
surrounding the proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on his
guard. *n this case the evidence shows that the Boston group were ac/uiring control over the
corporation by improper means and for an improper purpose.
E. *ssuance of watered stock (#ection %!
+iability of directors for watered stocks: #hall be solidarily liable with the stockholder
concerned to the corporation and its creditors for the difference between the fair
value received at the time of issuance of the stock and the par or issued value of the
same.
F. #eiCing corporate opportunity
A director has a duty to refrain from usurping a business opportunity rightly belonging
to the corporation. *n case of breach of this obligation, he has a duty to account to
the corporation all profits received by him (#ection $(!
;7+E##, his act has been ratified by a vote of the stockholders owning or
representing at least 5?$ of the outstanding capital stock
8fficers can be held liable under (#ection $&!
J. Re4e#ies in 'ase f 4is4ana9e4ent
Aeceivership
*n:unction if the act has not been done
2issolution if the abuse amounts to a ground for /uo warranto but the #olicitor
,eneral refuses to act
2erivative suit a complaint filed with the #E'
;ichico, et al. vs. 7+A':
HLP2009-3B Page 47
The petitioners, who are officers and directors of 'rispa, *nc., assailed the decision of
the 7+A' holding them solidarily liable with 'rispa for the payment of separation pay
and backwages to the private respondents. *t was the contention of the petitioners
that the award of separation pay and backwages is a corporate obligation and must
therefore be assumed by 'rispa alone.
Bhile the general rule is that obligations incurred by a corporation, acting through its
directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities, there are times when solidary
liabilities may be incurred such as in this case where it is undisputed that petitioners
had a direct hand in the illegal dismissal of respondent employees. They were the
ones, who as high"ranking officers and directors of 'rispa, signed he Board
resolution retrenching the private respondents on the feigned ground of serious
business losses that had no basis apart from an unsigned and unaudited profit and
loss statement which had no evidentiary value whatsoever. This is indicative of bad
faith on the part of petitioners for which they can be held :ointly and severally liable
with 'rispa for all the money claims of the illegally terminated respondent employees.
Tramat )ercantile, *nc. vs. 'A:
1ersonal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not
necessarily! with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when:
.e assents (a! to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or (b! for bad faith or
gross negligence in directing its affairs, or (c! for conflict of interest, resulting in
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons@
.e consents to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof,
does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written ob:ection thereto@
.e agrees to hold himself personally and soidarily liable with the corporation@ or
.e is made, by a specific provision of law, to personally answer for his corporate
action.
E. 08e'3ti1e '44ittee (#ection $!
The by"laws of a corporation may create an e0ecutive committee, composed of not
less than three members of the board, to be appointed by the board.
#aid committee may act, by ma:ority vote of all its members, on such specific matters
within the competence of the board, as may be delegated to it in the by"laws or on a
ma:ority vote of the board, e0cept with respect to:
o approval of any action for which shareholdersI approval is also re/uired@
o the filing of vacancies in the board@
o the amendment or repeal of by"laws or the adoption of new by"laws@
o the amendment or repeal of any resolution of the board which by its e0press
terms is not so amendable or repealable@ and
o a distribution of cash dividends to the shareholders.
'annot go as far as to render the bond powerless and free from all responsibilities
imposed on it by law
)ust be provided in the by laws, composed of not less than $ members of the board
Essential the e0ecutive committee acts by ma:ority vote of all the members
HLP2009-3B Page 48
OFFIC0RS
A. C-$-ate ffi'e-s
The officers e0ecute the polices laid down by the board but in practice have wide
latitude in determining the course of business operations
&. )inimum set of officers and Vualification (#ection 5!
*mmediately after their election, the directors of a corporation must formally organiCe
the election of:
a. A president, who shall be a director
b. A treasurer who may or may not be a director
c. A secretary who shall be a resident and citiCen of the 1hilippines, and
d. #uch other officers as may be provided for in the By"laws
Any two (5! or more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, e0cept
that no one shall act as president and secretary or as president and treasurer at the
same time.
5. 2is/ualifications (#ection 5E!
7o person convicted by final :udgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment for
a period e0ceeding si0 (%! years, or a violation of this 'ode committed within five (!
years prior to the date of his election or appointment, shall /ualify as a director,
trustee or officer of any corporation.
$. +iability in general (#ection $&!
Bhen a director, trustee or officer attempts to ac/uire or ac/uires, in violation of his
duty, any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been
reposed in him in confidence, as to which e/uity imposes a disability upon him to
deal in his own behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for the corporation and must
account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the corporation.
(. 2ealings with corporation (#ection $5!
A contract of the corporation with one or more of its directors or trustees or officers is
voidable, at the option of such corporation, unless all the following conditions are
present:
o That the presence of such director or trustee in the board meeting in which the
contract was approved was not necessary to constitute a /uorum for such
meeting@
o That the vote of such director or trustee was nor necessary for the approval of
the contract@
o That the contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances@ and
HLP2009-3B Page 49
o That in case of an officer, the contract has been previously authoriCed by the
board of directors.
Bhere any of the first two conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph is absent,
in the case of a contract with a director or trustee, such contract may be ratified by
the vote of the stockholders representing at least two"thirds (5?$! of the outstanding
capital stock or of at least two"thirds (5?$! of the members in a meeting called for the
purpose
1rovided, That full disclosure of the adverse interest of the directors or trustees
involved is made at such meeting: 1rovided, however, That the contract is fair and
reasonable under the circumstances.
B. C1e-a9e f '-$-ate ffi'e-
8ngkingco v. 7+A' " Gwhere the By"laws of the condominium corporation specifically
includes the position of G#uperintendent?AdministratorH in a roster of corporate
officers, then such position is clearly a corporate officer position and issues of
reinstatement would be within the :urisdiction of the #E' and not the 7+A'.H
Tabaug v. 7+A' " GBhen the By"laws of the corporation provide that one of the
powers of the BoTrustees is Gto appoint a )edical 2irector,
'omptroller?Administration, 'hief of #ervices, and such other officers as it may deem
necessary and prescribe their powers and dutiesH then such specifically designated
positions should be considered Gcorporate officersH positionsK.H
C. A3t"-ity f '-$-ate ffi'e-s
The authority of corporate officers to bind the corporation is usually not considered
inherent in their office but is derived from law, the corporate by"laws or by delegation
from the board either e0pressly or impliedly by habit, custom, or ac/uiescence in the
general course of business
,en rule: A person dealing with a corporate officer is put on in/uiry as to the scope of
the latter9s authority but an innocent person cannot be pre:udiced if he had the right
to presume under the circumstances the authority of the acting officers.
1resident D no inherent powers by virtue of his office but acts done in the ordinary
course of business is presumably within the scope of his authority unless the contrary
is proven. *n many instances, he is impliedly vested with corporate powers through
long ac/uiescence. .is acts may be subse/uently ratified and the corporation may
be bound. .e cannot be secretary and treasurer at the same time
-ice 1resident D no inherent power. Takes over when the president is absent
#ecretary D duties are ministerial. 'annot bind the corporation unless authoriCed or
named manager
Treasurer D entrusted with authority to receive and keep funds and to disburse them
as he may be authoriCed. 1owers are limited@ cannot bind the corporation unless
authoriCed.
,eneral manager D takes care of the day to day affairs of the corporation. 1owers
are limited to implementing the policies laid down by the board and perform such
acts and enter into such contracts which are within the usual course of business
HLP2009-3B Page 50
unless the board has given a broader authority. Even if act is not within the usual
course of business, if the board hd ac/uiesced in the past to similar acts, his
subse/uent acts must be deemed within his implied authority. A third person has the
right to presume that ,) had authority to perform acts in ordinary course of business
8ther agent D the corporation may employ such other persons as may be necessary
to carry on the business
I3 C"3'. 1 En9 Li P. >ong +i 1o is a corporation engaged in the publication of a 'hinese
newspaper. *ts A8* provide for a president who shall sign all contracts and other instruments of
writing, but does not provide for a business or general manager. '' 'hen or T' 'hen was
appointed general business manager of the paper. .e then entered into an agreement with <u
'huck for the printing of the newspaper for 1F4 per month. <u 'huck worked for a year until
they were discharged by the new manager Tan Tian .ong because '' 'hen had left for 'hina.
<u 'huck sues the paper, claiming the the contract was for a period of $ years, and that
discharge without :ust cause before the e0piration of this term entitles them to receive full pay for
the remainder of the term. >ong +i 1o counters that '' 'hen was not authoriCed to enter into the
contract with <u 'huck. T' ruled ifo of <u 'huck, concluding that the contract had been impliedly
ratified by >ong +i 1o and that although he had no e0press authority to enter into the contract,
since he was general business manager in charge of the printing of the paper and thus had
implied authority to employ the petitioners
*: B?7 '' 'hen had the power to bind the corporation through the contract mentioned.
.: ,A: The power to bind a corporation by contract lies with its board of directors or trustees, but
this power may either be e0pressly or impliedly delegated to other officers or agents of the
corporation. EU'E1T*87: An officer or agent who has general control and management of the
corporation9s business or a specific part thereof, may bind the corporation by the employment of
such agents and employees as are usual and necessary in the conduct of such business.
E0ception to e0ception: Bhere the authority is vested e0pressly in the B82.
As to the term of employment, a manager has authority to hire an employee for such a period as
is customary or proper under the circumstances, but unless he is e0pressly authoriCed or held out
to have such authority, he cannot make a contract of employment for a long future period, such
as for $ years. There can be no doubt that '' 'hen as general manager of the >ong +i 1o, had
implied authority to bind the defendant corporation by a reasonable and usual contract of
employment with the plaintiffs. But the term of employment is unusually long, and the conditions
are otherwise so onerous to the defendant corporation that the possibility of the corporation being
thrown into insolvency thereby is e0pressly contemplated in the same contract.
The corporation also did not impliedly ratify the contract, :ust because the president of >ong +i 1o
saw the plaintiffs work as printers in the office one day. Before a contract can be ratified,
knowledge of its e0istence must, of course, be brought home to the parties who have authority to
ratify it or circumstances must be shown from which such knowledge may be presumed. 7o such
knowledge or circumstances indicating knowledge is shown or proven in the case. )oreover, a
ratification by him would have been to no avail@ in order to validate a contract, a ratification by the
B82 was necessary. The fact that the president was authoriCed by the by"laws to sign
documents evidencing contracts doesn9t mean that he had power to make the contracts.
W#'"il# ,l#in9s In' 1 R8as 0le't-i' an# Cnst-3'tin C. The respondent posits that
Ao0as was not so authoriCed under the )ay &E, &33& Aesolution of its Board of 2irectors to
impose a burden or to grant a right of way in favor of the petitioner on +ot 7o. (3&"A"$"B"&, much
less convey a portion thereof to the petitioner. .ence, the respondent was not bound by such
provisions contained in the deed of absolute sale.
.: ,enerally, the acts of the corporate officers within the scope of their authority are binding on
the corporation. .owever, under Article &3&4 of the 7ew 'ivil 'ode, acts done by such officers
HLP2009-3B Page 51
beyond the scope of their authority cannot bind the corporation unless it has ratified such acts
e0pressly or tacitly, or is estopped from denying them. Thus, contracts entered into by corporate
officers beyond the scope of authority are unenforceable against the corporation unless ratified by
the corporation.
Evidently, Ao0as was not specifically authoriCed under the said resolution to grant a right of way
in favor of the petitioner on a portion of +ot 7o. (3&"A"$"B"& or to agree to sell to the petitioner a
portion thereof. The authority of Ao0as, under the resolution, to sell +ot 7o. (3&"A"$"B"5 covered
by T'T 7o. EF4F% did not include the authority to sell a portion of the ad:acent lot, +ot 7o. (3&"A"
$"B"&, or to create or convey real rights thereon. 7either may such authority be implied from the
authority granted to Ao0as to sell +ot 7o. (3&"A"$"B"5 to the petitioner Gon such terms and
conditions which he deems most reasonable and advantageous.H The general rule is that the
power of attorney must be pursued within legal strictures, and the agent can neither go beyond it@
nor beside it. The act done must be legally identical with that authoriCed to be done. *n sum,
then, the consent of the respondent to the assailed provisions in the deed of absolute sale was
not obtained@ hence, the assailed provisions are not binding on it.
*t bears stressing that apparent authority is based on estoppel and can arise from two instances:
first, the principal may knowingly permit the agent to so hold himself out as having such authority,
and in this way, the principal becomes estopped to claim that the agent does not have such
authority@ second, the principal may so clothe the agent with the indicia of authority as to lead a
reasonably prudent person to believe that he actually has such authority. There can be no
apparent authority of an agent without acts or conduct on the part of the principal and such acts
or conduct of the principal must have been known and relied upon in good faith and as a result of
the e0ercise of reasonable prudence by a third person as claimant and such must have produced
a change of position to its detriment. The apparent power of an agent is to be determined by the
acts of the principal and not by the acts of the agent.
*t bears stressing that the respondent sold +ot 7o. (3&"A"$"B"5 to the petitioner, and the latter
had taken possession of the property. As such, the respondent had the right to retain the
1,444,444, the purchase price of the property it had sold to the petitioner. 6or an act of the
principal to be considered as an implied ratification of an unauthoriCed act of an agent, such act
must be inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that he approved and intended to adopt what
had been done in his name. Aatification is based on waiver D the intentional relin/uishment of a
known right. Aatification cannot be inferred from acts that a principal has a right to do
independently of the unauthoriCed act of the agent. )oreover, if a writing is re/uired to grant an
authority to do a particular act, ratification of that act must also be in writing. #ince the respondent
had not ratified the unauthoriCed acts of Ao0as, the same are unenforceable. .ence, by the
respondent9s retention of the amount, it cannot thereby be implied that it had ratified the
unauthoriCed acts of its agent, Aoberto Ao0as.
Ba-# f Li<3i#at-s 1 Ealaw. )a0imo >alaw is chairman of the board and general manager of
the 7ational 'oconut 'orporation (7A'8'8!, a non"profit ,8'' empowered by its charter to
buy sell barter e0port andK deal in coconut, copra, and dessicated coconut. Bocar, ,arcia and
)oll were directors. *t entered into contracts for the trading and delivery of copra. 7ature
intervenedJ( typhoons devastated agriculture and copra production. 7A'8'8 was on the verge
of sustaining losses and could not be able to make good on the contracts. #ensing this, >alaw
submitted the contracts to the board for approval and made a full disclosure of the situation. 7o
action was taken, and no vote was taken on the matter. 8n 54 Lan &3(E the board met again with
>alaw, Bocar, ,arcia, and )oll in attendance, and approved the contracts. 7A'8'8 however
only partially performed the contracts. 8ne of the contracts concerns the +ouis 2rayfus M 'o.,
which sued 7A'8'8. 7A'8'8 settled out"of"court and paid 2rayfus 1%E,45(.5 representing
E4= of total claims. The total settlements sum up to 1&.$). 7A'8'8 sues >alaw, and his
directors Bocar, )oll and ,arcia to recover this sum, alleging negligence and B6 and breach of
trust in approving the contracts, by not having them approved by the board. T' dismisses
complaint. 7A'8'8 claims that the by"laws provide that prior Board approval is re/uired before
HLP2009-3B Page 52
the ,) can perform or e0ecute in behalf of 7A'8'8 all contracts necessary to accomplish its
purpose.
*: B?7 the >alaw contracts are valid despite its lack of prior board approval as re/uired by the
7A'8'8 by"laws
.: The contracts in /uestion are Gforward salesH contractsJa sales agreement entered into, even
though the goods are not yet in the hands of the seller. ,iven the peculiar nature of copra trading,
ie copra must be disposed of asap else it would lose weight and would decrease its value, it
necessitates a /uick turnover and e0ecution of the contract on short notice (w?in 5( hours!. *t
would be difficult if not impractical to call a formal meeting of the board each time a contract is to
be e0ecuted.
7A'8'8 board met the difficulties attendant to forward sales by leaving the adoption of the
means to the sound discretion of >alaw. +ong before the contracts came into being, >alaw
already contract by himself alone some %4 such contracts, and 7A'8'8 reaped a gross profit.
These contracts were contracted without prior authority from the Board and were known to all the
members, but nothing was said by them. Also contracts entered into by >alaw had been
submitted to the board after e0ecution, not before as re/uired by the by"laws. The Board has
knowledge of this and did not ob:ect to the same. Thus the practice of the corporation has been to
allow its ,) to negotiate and e0ecute contracts in behalf of 7A'8'8 without prior Board
approval, and by its acts and through ac/uiescence practically laid aside the re/uirement in the
by"law. The contracts are therefore valid.
Aatification by a corporation of an unauthoriCed act or contract by its officers relates back to the
time of the act or contract ratified and is e/uivalent to original authority. The theory of corporate
ratfication is predicated upon the right of a corporation to contract, and any ratification or adoption
is e/uivalent to a grant of prior authority. Aatification Gcleanses the contract from all its defects
from the moment it was constituted. By corporate confirmation of the contracts in dispute on 54
Lan, the >alaw contracts are thus purged of whatever vice or defects they may have. Thus even
in the face of an e0press by"law re/uirement of prior approval, the law on corporations is not to
be held so rigid and infle0ible as to fail to recogniCe e/uitable considerations.
There was no B6 or breach of trust on the part of >alaw. The board knew, and >alaw had so
informed it, that the contracts would cause heavy losses. The 'ourt found no trace of any
dishonest purpose or moral obli/uity or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud which would
consitute B6 on the part of >alaw. The Board did not eventhink of raising their voice in protest
against past contracts which brought enormous profits to 7A'8'8. The ratification was an act of
simple :ustice and fairness to the ,) and to the best interest of the corporation whose prestige
would have been seriously impaired by a re:ection of the board of those contracts which proved
disadvantageous.
?00TIN@S OF STOCE,OLD0RS AND DIR0CTORS
A. Ein#s (#ection (3!
)eetings of directors, trustees, stockholders, or members may be
o regular
o special
HLP2009-3B Page 53
B. W"en an# w"e-e "el#B (#ections 4, &, and $!
)eetings of #tockholders (#ection 4!
o #tockholders action is needed in ma:or changes in the corporation which would
affect their contract with the corporation and although such action is usually
initiated by the board, it is not sufficient to give them effect. #tockholders or
members approval e0pressed in a meeting duly called and held for the purpose
is still necessary. E0ceptions:
#ec &% any corporation may amend its A* by ma:ority vote of B82 or written
assent of 5?$ of the stockholders
'orporations may be bound by unanimous agreement of its stockholders
although e0pressed elsewhere than at a meeting
o Aegular meetings of stockholders or members shall be held annually on a date
fi0ed in the by"laws, or if not so fi0ed, on any date in April of every year as
determined by the board of directors or trustees
o Bhen there is no person authoriCed to call a meeting, the #ecretaries and
E0change 'ommission, upon petition of a stockholder or member on a showing
of good cause therefor, may issue an order to the petitioning stockholder or
member directing him to call a meeting of the corporation by giving proper notice
re/uired by this 'ode or by the by"laws.
o The petitioning stockholder or member shall preside thereat until at least a
ma:ority of the stockholders or members present have been chosen one of their
number as presiding officer.
o 1lace and time of meetings of stockholders of members " #tockholderIs or
memberIs meetings, whether regular or special, shall be held in the city or
municipality where the principal office of the corporation is located, and if
practicable in the principal office of the corporation: 1rovided, That )etro )anila
shall, for purposes of this section, be considered a city or municipality.
o )embers of non"stock corporations may provide in by"laws that meetings may be
held any place even outside the place where the principal office is located
provided proper notice is sent and that it is within the 1hilippines
o All proceedings had and any business transacted at any meeting of the
stockholders or members, if within the powers or authority of the corporation,
shall be valid even if the meeting be improperly held or called, provided all the
stockholders or members of the corporation are present or duly represented at
the meeting. (#ec &!
)eetings of 2irectors or trustees (#ection &!
o Aegular meetings of directors or trustees shall be held monthly, unless the by"
laws provide otherwise.
o #pecial meetings of the board of directors or trustees may be held at any time
upon the call of the president or as provided in the by"laws.
o )eetings of directors or trustees of corporations may be held anywhere in or
outside of the 1hilippines, unless the by"laws provide otherwise.
o Ae/uisites of board meetings
)eeting of the Board duly assembled
HLP2009-3B Page 54
E0istence of /uorum (ma:ority of the board members! and
2ecision of the ma:ority of the /uorum duly assembled
o 7ote: 2irectors in Board meetings cannot be represented or voted by pro0ies.
C. Nti'e# -e<3i-e# (#ection 4 and $!
)eetings of #tockholders?)embers
o Britten notice of regular meetings shall be sent to all stockholders or members of
record at least two (5! weeks prior to the meeting, unless a different period is
re/uired by the by"laws
o Britten notice of special meetings shall be sent at least one (&! week prior to the
meeting, unless otherwise provided in the by"laws.
o 7otice of any meeting may be waived, e0pressly or impliedly, by any stockholder
or member
o 6ailure to give notice would render a meeting voidable.
o Attendance to a meeting despite want of notice will be deemed implied waiver
)eetings of 2irectors or trustees (#ection &!
o 7otice of regular or special meetings stating the date, time and place of the
meeting must be sent to every director or trustee at least one (&! day prior to the
scheduled meeting, unless otherwise provided by the by"laws.
o A director or trustee may waive this re/uirement, either e0pressly or impliedly
D. K3-34 -e<3i-e# (#ection 5 and 5!
)eeting of directors or trustees and officers (#ection 5!
o ;nless the articles of incorporation or the by"laws provide for a greater ma:ority,
a ma:ority of the number of directors or trustees as fi0ed in the articles of
incorporation shall constitute a /uorum for the transaction of corporate business,
and every decision of at least a ma:ority of the directors or trustees present at a
meeting at which there is a /uorum shall be valid as a corporate act, e0cept for
the election of officers which shall re/uire the vote of a ma:ority of all the
members of the board.
)eeting of stockholders (#ection 5!
o ;nless otherwise provided for in this 'ode or in the by"laws, a /uorum shall
consist of the stockholders representing a ma:ority of the outstanding capital
stock or a ma:ority of the members in the case of non"stock corporations.
o Bylaws may provide for a greater or lesser /uorum
o Bhere /uorum is present at the start of a lawful meeting, stockholders present
cannot without :ustifiable cause break the /uorum by walking out from said
meeting so as to defeat the validity of any act proposed and approved by the
ma:ority
0. W" $-esi#es (#ection (!
HLP2009-3B Page 55
The president shall preside at all meetings of the directors or trustee as well as of the
stockholders or members, unless the by"laws provide otherwise.
Bhen there is no person authoriCed to call a meeting, the #ecretaries and E0change
'ommission, upon petition of a stockholder or member on a showing of good cause
therefor, may issue an order to the petitioning stockholder or member directing him to
call a meeting of the corporation by giving proper notice re/uired by this 'ode or by
the by"laws.
The petitioning stockholder or member shall preside thereat until at least a ma:ority of
the stockholders or members present have been chosen one of their number as
presiding officer.
F. W" '3l# atten# an# 1teB (#ection 5 and F!
#tockholder in person
1ro0ies:
o #tockholders and members may vote in person or by pro0y in all meetings of
stockholders or members.
o 1ro0ies shall in writing, signed by the stockholder or member and filed before the
scheduled meeting with the corporate secretary. ;nless otherwise provided in
the pro0y, it shall be valid only for the meeting for which it is intended. 7o pro0y
shall be valid and effective for a period longer than five (! years at any one time.
o 2irectors or trustees cannot attend or vote by pro0y at board meetings.
@. Re<3i-e# atten#an'e at 4eetin9 f- ele'tin
#tock corporation " ma:ority of outstanding capital stock
7on"stock corporation " ma:ority of members entitled to vote
J"nstn 1 J"nstn. +ogan, *rene, and 6elisa Lohnston, and +ouis and Aosario Lohnston, and
EliCabeth Araneta are the ma:ority shareholders of a family stock corporation known as Lohnston
+umber 'o *nc. A stockholders meeting was scheduled to elect a new set of directors who would
in turn choose the new officers of the corporation. +ogan presented a pro0y by his mother, 6elisa,
and another pro0y by his wife, *rene, which all"in"all represented &,5(5 of the 5,(%5 shares of the
corporation. .e also re/uested that the duly endorsed shares of LB #olis be listed in the books
for voting purposes. )inority #. +ouis Lohnston, as 'hairman of the board, denied the re/uest.
+ogan /uickly sent for the original owners so that they could vote in his favor. +ouis also
disallowed +ogan from voting the $4E shares of the elder Lohnston which he had been voting in
his capacity as administrator of the estate because the estate proceedings were already
terminated. Thereafter, and before the e0istence of a /uorum could be declared, +ogan et al
walked out of the #. meeting and refused to recogniCe the validity of the meeting. +ouis9 group,
the minority carried on and elected themselves directors and officers. Another #. meeting was
called by +ouis at the instance of +ogan, which will cover matters not taken up or not finished
during the regular #. meeting. 2uring the meeting +ogan moved for the election of a new board,
claiming that there was no /uorum in the last meeting and thus was not validly held. +ouis denied
the motion. +ogan, who represented ma:ority of the stocks, then nominated his own set of
directors, and his group cast their votes in favor of the nominees, which were elected the new
members of the board. This action was overruled again by +ouis as 'hair. +ogan *rene and 6elisa
filed a /uo warranto suit alleging that they were the duly elected members of the B82 of
Lohnston +umber 'o, and were also elected as the corporate officers thereof and praying for the
ouster of +ouis, Araneta and Aosario Lohnston.
HLP2009-3B Page 56
*: (&! Bhich of the two factions, the +ogan group or the +ouis group, was validly elected as
directors and officers of the corporation
.: The #.s who remained after the group representing the ma:ority walked out without a /uorum
being declared represented the minority and did no constitute a /uorum, and it is clear that they
could not have validly transacted further business much less have elected a new set of directors.
*t follows that if the election of the directors after the withdrawal of +ogan was null and void, then
the subse/uent meeting of the board at which the +ouis group was elected was likewise null and
void.
*f the purpose in bolting the meeting was to deliberately defeat the e0istence of a /uorum, the
absence of a /uorum, then it would produce the effect of nullifying the proceedings that follows. *t
is to be noted that a #. can, for :ustifiable reasons, break the /uorum by w?drawing from the
meeting. +ogan walked out because +ouis persistently and with reason overruled +ogan on his
re/uests to vote the shares of the #ilos family, which he validly purchased. That +ogan did
everything possible to register the stocks in order to vote them was substantial compliance with
the charter and the by"laws. The denial by +ouis to vote the shares of the minor children of Albert
Lohnston was likewise unreasonable. The withdrawal of +ogan, although it actually defeated the
e0istence of a /uorum, was neither unreasonable nor un:ustifiable.
The second meeting of #. was properly convened. All parties were present. The roll was called
and a /uorum was declared. The contention of +ouis that the 5nd meeting did not amount to an
election cannot be sustained. *t must be remembered that the +ogan group held the ma:ority of
stocks when they cast their votes ifo the nominees. The inaction of the +ouis faction, did not have
the effect of defeating or invalidating the election. *t is the essence of all elections that the will of
the ma:ority, properly e0pressed, shall govern. A ma:ority of votes cast will decide, although some
#.s who are present may refuse to vote, and thus the ma:ority of the votes cast may be less than
a ma:ority of the persons or stocks present or represented.
7either may the second election be assailed on the ground that notice did not specifically include
the election of the new board on the agenda. The notice provided that matters not taken up or
finished during the first meeting will be part of the agenda, therefore the #.s knew that +ogan
would press for the new board and they were prepared for it, having attended the first meeting.
6urthermore, all #.s were present either in person or by pro0y during the &st meeting and
whatever defect in the notice was cured b their presence and ac/uiescence.
D0>IC0S AFF0CTIN@ CONTROL
1. P-8ies
two meanings of pro0y:
o person duly authoriCed by the stockholder to vote in his behalf at a stockholder9s meeting
is actually an agent for a special purpose
rules on agency apply to the relationship
o the actual document evidencing this authority
types of pro0y:
o general pro0yJgives the power to vote for directors and on all ordinary matters which
may be properly be taken in an #. meeting
does not include the power to vote for an amendment to the A8* or other unusual
transactions
o limited pro0yJrestricts the authority to vote to specified matters only and may direct the
vote to be case in a certain way
7ature of pro0y: a special form of agency governed by the laws on agency
o #trictly fiduciary relation, and therefore as a ,A, revocable in nature despite contrary
stipulations
HLP2009-3B Page 57
o E0ception: coupled with an interest
*ncludes where the pro0y has parted with the value or incurred liability at the #.s
re/uestK
K which would mean to it is 78T the giving of onerous consideration that makes
a pro0y one that is coupled with an interest, but that the pro0y is an integral part
of the security by which a loan is to be paid
re/uisites for valid pro0y (F!
o in writing
o signed by #. or member
o filed before the scheduled meeting
term of pro0y:
o pro0y may fi0 the period it may be used, but cannot e0ceed years, renewable for not
more than years per renewal
o no period specified: e0pires after the meeting for which it was given and cannot be used
for another meeting unless it is renewed
who may be appointed pro0yQ
o #tock: no limitation, and B+ restrictions on #. right to appoint a pro0y will be -8*2
o 7on"stock: F3: A8* or B+ may restrict right to appoint pro0y
revocability:
o ,A revocable even before the period has e0pired and even if it e0pressly provides for
irrevocability
o E0ception: coupled with an interest
*rrevocable for the period fi0ed
;pon e0piry, pro0y automatically ceases to be effective unless renewed
Bhat constitutes sufficient interestQ 2epends from case to case
1rocedure?practice:
o management usually sends a pro0y form with notice of the annual stockholders meeting
o persons suggested as pro0ies have been selected by the incumbent directors and are
sometimes referred to as the pro0y committee
o the e0isting management who may own only a small portion of the corporation9s shares
can retain its control over corporate affairs for as long as they can obtain the necessary
number of pro0ies from absentee stockholders
o pro0ies may not be appointed orally and the written pro0y should be filed with the
corporate secretary before the meeting
failure to comply will render the pro0y void and ineffective
vote or presence counted on the basis of a void pro0y may result in the
invalidation of any action, unless the number of shares re/uired for /uorum or
voting is present
o when a group of #. feel dissatisfied with management, they may seek control to correct
such mismanagement by soliciting pro0ies for the ne0t election of directors
o each block of #. will seek pro0ies of absentee #.s
o since management has the right to defend its present policies, it can as a rule, use
corporate funds and facilities in solicitation, as long as:
it acts in ,6,
the e0penses are reasonable under the circumstances and
the pro0y war is not a personal one
,A: when the right to vote by pro0y is given by statute, a stockholder cannot be deprived of it
by any by"law
E0ception: non"stock corpsJ'ode allows for a waiver of the right provided this is made in the
A8* or by"laws
By"laws may also impose reasonable conditions as to the form and manner of voting by pro0y
In -e @iant P-tlan# Ce4ent. .: #tock transferred on the books of the corporation within 54 days prior to a
stockholders meeting, for the election of directors, is temporarily disenfranchised, and cannot be voted either
by the transferor or by the transferee. The persons on whose pro0ies the #. meeting were the #. of record
within the provision of the statute, although they were not real beneficial or e/uitable owners of the stock.
The right to vote shares of corporate stock, having voting powers, has always been incident to its legal
ownership. Bhatever the rights of the mere unrecorded assignee of the stock certificate might be in the
absence of a by"law or other contract provision re/uiring all transfers of shares to be recorded on the books
of the corporation, it is not contended that such a provision is not authoriCed or is not binding as between
HLP2009-3B Page 58
#.s and the corporation. As between the transferor and the unrecorded transferee to the stock certificate,
the legal title passes to the latter. A very different rule applies between the corporation and the mere
unrecorded assignee of the certificate of stock. That is because limited contract restrictions relating to stock
transfers, are for the benefit of the corporation, and to enable it to ascertain from its records who its
members of #.s are. #o far as the corporation is concerned, until such a by"law is complied with, the
record owner must therefore be regarded as the real owner of the stock, with the conse/uent general right to
vote it by pro0y or otherwise. Bhen considered from a legal standpoint, there is no privity of contract
between the mere holder of the certificate and the corporation, and he is not a real member of that
organiCation until the transfer is recorded. ;ntil that time, the possible legal rights of the holder of the
certificate are of an inchoate nature. *n other words, a real novation, whereby a new contract between the
mere holder of the certificate and the corporation is substituted for the prior contract of the record owner, can
only be brought about by complying with the corporate regulation relating to transfers of stock. The record
owner may, therefore, be the mere nominal owner, or technically a trustee for the holder of the certificate,
but legally he is still a stockholder in the corporation, and so far as the corporation is concerned, like the
usual trustee, ordinarily has the right to vote the stock standing in his name. *n cases of this nature, when
nothing more than a mere dry trust is involved the owners of the certificates can usually protect their rights
by recording the transfers and having the new certificates issued@ but even though that could not be done in
this case because the corporate transfer books were closed at the time of the assignments, they could have
compelled the record owners to give them pro0ies to vote the stock standing in their names. A mere nominal
owner naturally owes some duties to the real beneficial owner or e/uitable owner of the stock, and even if
the right to demand a pro0y is not e0ercised, if the vendor e0ercises his legal right to vote in such a manner
as to materially and in:uriously affect the rights of the vendee, he is perhaps answerable in damages in
some cases. *t can hardly be contended that the actual consent of the holder of the certificate is ordinarily
essential to the right of the record owners to vote stock standing in their names.
Bhen the right and power of a mere record owner to vote is /uestioned, some ultra vires, negligent, or
improper willful act or omission on the part of the corporation or its agents is relied upon and must appear. *n
some cases the court may also re:ect votes cast by the record owners, which are regarded as improper,
solely because of some peculiar ine/uitable circumstances affecting the relation between such apparent
owners and the transferee of the certificates. 'onceding that as between a transferor who has parted will all
the beneficial interest in stock and his transferee, the board e/uities are all in favor of the latter in the matter
of its voting.
State e8 -el 01e-ett T-3st 1 Pa'ifi' Wa8. *: B?7 the pro0y to vote the stock owned by 1aine")itchell and
Lordan was revocable
.: The rules against perpetuities is usually stated as prohibiting the creation of future interest or estates,
which by possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in being and 5& yearsK the rule however
applies only to the vesting of future estates and does not apply to vested estates. The option agreement did
not create a future estate or interest to become vested at some future time. *t was a promise by an owner of
stock in a corporation that if at any time during the ne0t 54 years he desired to sell his stock he would give
the promissee the first opportunity for a period of & days to purchase it a such price and upon such terms
and conditions as the promisor offered. *t was in effect a promise to give an option in the even the promisor
desired to sell his stock.
,A: a pro0y given by a #. to vote his corporate stock at a meeting of the #.s of a corporation is revocable
by him even though the pro0y by its terms is e0pressly made irrevocable.
E0ceptions:
(&! where authority or power is coupled with an interestJa power coupled with an interest is a power or
authority to do an act, accompanied by or connected with an interest in the sub:ect or thing itself upon which
the power is to be e0ercised, the power and interest being united in the same person. The interest is not
limited to the thing itself upon which the power is to be e0ercised, but is also included the sub:ect upon
which the power is to be e0ercised. *t is however sufficient that the pro0y holder have an interest in the
sub:ect matter upon which the power is to be e0ercised. The Gthing itselfH may refer to tangible shares or
certificates of stock, but the sub:ect matter may refer to the intangible voting right and the incidental control
of the corporation.
(5! where authority is given as part of a security or is necessary to effectuate a securityJin such a case the
interest of an agent is something more than an interest in being permitted to e0ercise the power, yet
something less than an estate in the sub:ect matter or thing upon which the power is to be e0ercised.
*t is clear from the pro0y agreement that the parties agreed that 1aine )itchell stock should be used in
con:unction with the stock owned by Engle so that the policies of the respondent should be thus controlled.
*n this situation Engle was more than a mere agent. *n voting stock he served purposes of his own in
HLP2009-3B Page 59
maintaining control of the corporation by his choice of directors and the determination of policies and
business affairs of the corporation. This voting of the stock for these purposes was the sub:ect matter of the
agency. Engle ac/uired an interest in the sub:ect matter of the power given to him and this interest was
coupled with such power. The power to vote the stock was necessary in order to make Engle9s control of the
corporation secure. The mutual agreement as a whole created something like a community of interest in the
stockholdings of the parties having for its purpose the use of their stock as a unit and the effect of which was
to give both parties an interest in the voting of the stock, although the power to vote was to be e0ercised by
Engle after the death of Lordan or by 1aine")itchell after the death of Engle. This power was couple with an
interest and by the entire agreement between the parties the power was intended to be and became a
security to effectuate the main purpose of the agency. The parties did no more than promise to give each
other an option to purchase in the even either had a proposal to buy his or its stock@ but the option
agreement must be considered with the pro0y agreement in determining the intention of the parties and
whether Engle had an irrevocable pro0y. The conclusion is that Engle had a power coupled with an interest
and that the authority was given to him as part of a security and was necessary to effectuate such security
and therefore the pro0y was not revocable by the appellant.
1 proxy in fa%or of the pledgee of the shares sub!ect of the proxy is sufficient interest to render the proxy
irre%ocable
!. 1tin9 t-3st a9-ee4ent
2ef9n: a trust agreement whereby a stockholder transfers his shares to a trustee who will e0ercise
his voting rights. ;nder this arrangement, the stockholder remains the beneficial or e/uitable owner
of the shares, but legal ownership is transferred to the trustee.
Essence of voting trust: real ownership is separated from the voting rights
*nvolves the complete surrender by the #. of his voting rights to a trustee or trustees
-oting trustee is only a share owner vested with colorable and fictitious title for the sole purpose of
voting upon stocks that he does not own
Transferring #. ceases to become #. of record but retains the right of inspection of corporate
books
2uring the period of the agreement, it is irrevocable for as long as the trustee has not violated the
trust by his misconduct or fraud.
'onditions for the use of voting trustsJ#ec 3:
Ae/uisites of a valid voting trust: (3!
o *n writing and notariCed
o 'ertified copy filed with the corporation and the #E'
o 1eriod not longer than years, but renewable each time for not more than years
E0ception: where the voting trust is a condition of a loan agreement, in which case it may
be for a longer period but not beyond the time when the loan is fully paid
o 'ertificates of stock is to be cancelled, and new ones issued to the trustee stating that it is issued in
pursuance of a voting trust agreement
o Transfer must be entered in the corporate books
o Trustee should issue voting trust certificates in favor of transferring #.s
o 7ot for an illegal purpose, or for the benefit only of the trustee without any obligation to perform any
useful service for the protection of the stockholders or creditors of the corporation
it must have a legitimate business purpose to promote the best interest of the corporation
or even to protect the legitimate interests of others in the corporation
creation of voting trust:
o transferring #.s receive transferable voting trust certificates as evidence of their rights
rights other than voting rights may also be transferred to the trustee
o but the #. ceases to be a #. and his rights are now against the trustee in accordance with the
agreement
o #. has the e0press right to inspect corporate books and records
o Trustee is also /ualified to become a director, since he is the registered owner of the shares and
fulfills the /ualifications of the 'ode that at least one share is owned to become /ualified as director
o 7o voting trust agreement may be kept secret among the parties thereto@ it must be open to
e0amination
HLP2009-3B Page 60
o 7o voting trust agreement may be e0clusive, since the law gives a #. the right to transfer his
shares to the trustee upon the same terms and conditions in the agreement
01e-ett 1 Asia Ban.in9. Teal M 'ompany is indebted to .B 1eabody M 'o. for 1$44> for tractors, plows,
and parts delivered, of which it has paid 1&4>. Asia Banking 'orp held drafts accepted by Teal under the
.B 1eabody9s guarantee. Tractors were returned to .B 1eabody due to its being unsellable due to
financial and agricultural depression in the A1. Teal ordered another lot of tractors from #mith >irkpatrick,
but shipment was delayed until the rescission of the credit of Teal with Asia Bank. <et #mith still delivered
the order, and Teal at the re/uest and advice of the Bank accepted the drafts and stored the same. Asia
bank persuaded Teal, 1eabody, and #mith >irkpatrick to enter into a Gcreditors agreementH wherein it was
mutually agreed that neither of the parties should take action to collect its debts from Teal for 5 years. Teal
soon became indebted to Asia Bank for 1E4,444, secured by mortgage. The Bank then suggested that, for
the mutual protection of Teal and itself, it was advisable that the Bank should temporarily obtain control of
the management and affairs of the company. To this end, it was necessary for the #.s to place their shares
in a voting trust to be held by the Bank, then the Bank would finance Teal under its own supervision. The
Teal #.s were thus induced to enter into the -oting Trust Agreement, with the purpose that the agreement
will be intended for the protection of all parties from outside creditors. #hortly after the e0ecution and
delivery of the voting trust and the )8A, )ullen as ,) of the Bank, caused the displacement and removal
#. representatives in the Board and the substitution in their place of the Bank9s employees or
representatives. The new Board, who have not purchased any share of stock of Teal, proceeded to remove
the 'orp #ecretary, discharge all the old managers and displace them with creatures of their own choosing
whose interest consisted wholly in pleasing themselves and the Bank, and who were wholly foreign to the
stockholders.
Aight of transferring #.s to set aside the trust agreement when their rights are trampled upon by the
trustee. 'orpo 'ode now provides that no -TA will be used for purposes of fraud.
?a'.in 1 Ni'llete ,tel. 2i0on was the owner of a leasehold interest in a tract of land in )inneapolis upon
which stood what was known as the 7icollet .otel. 7icollet .otel *nc was organiCed for the purpose of
adding to the hotel accommodation of that city. Arrangements were made to have 2i0on take 544 shares
for his lease and to erect an new 7icollet .otel upon this property. 'ost was Y$), to be raised by the sale of
Y&) mortgage bonds and Y&.5) of preferred stock. The )innesota +oan and Trust 'o approved the loan
application of 7icollet for Y&.F) secured by the said mortgaged bond. The loan agreement stipulates that a
voting trust agreement is entered covering the common stock of 7icollet. The #tate #ecurities 'ommission
approved 7icollet9s application for the license to sell its preferred stock, provided that the common stock is to
be trusted with three trustees for &4 years for the protection of preferred #.s. Thereafter a voting trust
agreement was entered with 2i0on et al as voting trustees. )ackin is the owner of a trust certificate
representing F4 shares of common stock, alleging that the voting trust is void and that the trustees and
directors appointed have mismanaged the company and have caused large losses. The agreement also
allegedly denied them the right to inspect the books, and they ask the court to declare the same null and
void and appoint a receiver until the beneficial owners can elect a new set of directors.
*: B?7 the voting trust is valid
.: -oting trusts are not illegal per se. *n the instances where the voting trust has been held void, there
e0isted invalidating circumstances such as want of consideration, voting power not coupled with an interest,
fraud, illegal purpose, and so on. *n this case there was no charge of illegality or fraud, nor of any
invalidating circumstance. The voting power of the three trustees is coupled with an interest because of one
of the trustees is a substantial owner of the common stock, and all are charged with the duty of protecting
and conserving property for the benefit of those who became purchasers of preferred stock and bonds. The
whole purpose of the agreement is legitimate and wholesome. *t was a matter of civic pride and to make this
possible, it involved the invitation of combinations of capital in substantial amounts, which could only be
secured by having those who invested their money assured of the fact that there would be a continuity of
management during a period of years until such time that the new enterprise would have an opportunity to
:ustify a successful financial future. *t would be a manifest in:ustice to the large number of holders of bonds
and preferred stocks, not to the parties to the suit, to ad:udge and hold illegal a trust agreement upon the
strength of which they had invested their money in the enterprise. *t also appears that )ackin purchase the
certificates of trust after the creation of the trust agreement and are presumed to have full knowledge of the
limitation of their rights.
NIDC 1 A<3in. Bat:ak, a manufacturer of coco oil and copra cake for e0port, is on the brink of bankruptcy.
*t entered in to a 6inancial Agreement with 17B for additional operating capital for its $ processing mills and
to pay its other debts to other banks. ;nder the agreement with 17B, 7*2', a wholly"owned subsidiary of
HLP2009-3B Page 61
17B, would invest 1%.E) worth of preferred shares convertible within years into common stock to pay off
the other debts and the balance to pay off its own due with 17B. 17B also granted various credit
accommodations. Bat:ak as part of the deal, mortgaged all its properties in the province. A "year voting
trust agreement was e0ecuted ifo 7*2' by the #.s representing %4= outstanding stock of Bat:ak. <ears
later, 17B instituted foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties due to Bat:ak9s insolvency,
and soon became owner of the properties. Bat:ak failed to e0ercise its right to redeem within the period
allowed and 17B transferred ownership of the 5 oil mills to 7*2'. $ years later, Bat:ak represented by
ma:ority #.s, in/uired with 7*2' if it was still interested in negotiating the renewal of the voting trust
agreement. 7*2' replied that its was no longer interested and re/uested turn"over of all Bat:ak assets and
properties. Bat:ak demanded an accounting of all assets and properties and operations but 7*2' refused to
comply. Bat:ak then filed an action for mandamus. '6* Ludge A/uino issued a TA8 prohibiting 7*2' from
removing any record, report, or document or disposing all of the properties of Bat:ak, and allowed Bat:ak to
inspect the same. Bat:ak then moved for the appointment of a receiver. 7*2' and 17B opposes, but
overruled by '6*. )As denied.
.: Bat:ak premises its right to possession through the receivership of the $ oil mills in the voting trust
agreement, claiming that under said agreement, 7*2' was constituted as trustee of the assets,
management, and operations of Bat:ak, and that due to e0piration of the agreement, 7*2' should turn over
the assets to Bat:ak. Bhat was assigned to 7*2' was the power to vote the shares of stock representing
%4= of #.s, who are signatories to the agreement. 7owhere in the agreement is mention made of any
transfer or assignment to 7*2' of Bat:ak9s assets operations and management. 7*2' was constituted as
trustee only of the voting rights of %4= of outstanding shares. Bhat was to be returned by 7*2' as trustee
to Bat:ak9s #.s upon termination of the agreement, was the certificates of stock, not the properties or assets
which were never delivered to 7*2' in the first place. The ac/uisition of 17B and 7*2' of the properties
was not in its capacity as trustee but as a creditor in accordance with the financing agreement.
#' failed to appreciate the fact that the voting trust was obtained from the #.s of the borrowing
corporation precisely to allow 17B"7*2' to have management and undertake control in the operations
of the borrowing corporation
*n this case, the -TA was part and parcel of the loan arrangement, and should have been considered
by the 'ourt as a means by which the lending institution obtains control over the management or
operation of the borrowing corporation, and not merely as a transfer only of voting or other rights
pertaining to the shares
>TA as $a-t f Lan A9-ee4ent
-TA as part of loan agreement can e0ceed years as an e0ception to the rule that -TAs cannot be for
more than years
-TA as part of loan agreement ensures that the lending institution would have a controlling interest in
corporate votes
'onstitutes further security to the lending institution
*n reality, the lending institution would have very little interest in the operations of the corporation as to
re/uire a voting trust
+. $lin9 an# 1tin9 a9-ee4ents
2efinition: an agreement between two or more #.s to vote their shares the same way.
Through this kind of agreement, #.s who individually own only a minority of the shares but
together represent the ma:ority, can obtain control of the management of the corporation.
;sually relates to the election of directors, which may either specify the name of the nominees to
be voted for, or the number shares to be voted as a unit
*n case of disagreement: arbitration
#ince pooling agreements personal obligations to do, then although valid it cannot be enforced by
action for specific performance
These agreements have been upheld as valid provided they do not limit the discretion of the board
or work fraud against the other #.s
o E0. An agreement that directors once elected must vote for certain persons as officers would
be void, since the choice of officers is vested in law in the board
-oting agreement vs. voting trust: -A does not involve a transfer of stocks but is merely a private
agreement between and among #.s to vote the same way. Breach would therefore give rise to
liability for damages.
*n close corporations: #ec &44:
HLP2009-3B Page 62
(. '343lati1e 1tin9
the system of cumulative voting gives the minority an opportunity to elect a representative to the
board
it is vital to both the ma:ority and the minority to cumulate their votes so that they can get as many
seats as possible
/. 'lassifi'atin f s"a-es &Sec 6)
device of classification of shares can be used to achieve the allocation of control desired by the
parties
if shares are classified into common voting and preferred non"voting shares, the management of
corporate affairs will be controlled by whoever owns the ma:ority of the common voting, even
though it may only be a minority of the total number of shares (voting and non"voting!
control would depend not on the amount of investment, but on the number of voting shares
ac/uired
if non"voting shares are non"redeemable, the prospect that the investor may get back his
investment at some future time before dissolution would be a compensating factor
#E': to prevent abuses, it re/uires where no dividends are declared for $ consecutive years
despite available profits, that preferred stocks be given the right to vote for directors until dividends
are declared
*n a close corporation, it is allowed to classify its directors into one or more classes, each of whom may
be voted for and elected solely by a particular class of stock
). -est-i'tin n t-ansfe- f s"a-es (#ec. 3F!
common e0ample: a restriction which gives a first option to other #.s and?or the corporation to ac/uire
the shares of a #. who wishes to sell
o peculiar to close corps
2. $-es'-i%in9 <3alifi'atins f- #i-e't-s: &Se'. (2 $a-./* f3n#e-sG s"a-es &Se'. 2*
definition of the /ualifications of directors or trustees may be provided in the by"laws
e0amples:
o a by"law provision that only #.s with a stated minimum number of shares fully paid up may be
elected as directors is valid (,ovt v El .ogar!
o a by"law that dis/ualify a #. who is competing with the corporation, as the corporation has the right
to protect itself from persons who may use inside information to its pre:udice (,okongwei v #E'!
o a by"law that only holders of Gfounders sharesH may /ualify for directorship (#ec E!
e0ception to #ec % that non"voting shares shall be limited to preferred and redeemable
shares
year period non"e0tendible
#E' approval