PERRY V.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE

LEIGHTON LEE PERRY
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, JP
MORGAN CHASE BANK NA,
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE
CORP,
Defendants and Respondents.
Court of Appeal No. A139655

(Super. Ct. No. MSC10-02914)


Appeal From a Judgment
Of The Superior Court, County of CONTRA COSTA
Hon. Laurel S. Brady, Judge
_________________________________________
APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING
_________________________________________
Leighton Lee Perry
XXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXX

Appellant / Real Party, pro se



PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al

PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1
INTRODUCTION 1
DISCUSSION 1
I.

Rehearing is Required Because The Opinion Misinterprets Appellants
Argument and Misstates and Disregards Relevant Material Facts; And
As a Result, Reached a Flawed Conclusion. ........................................... 1

A. Appellants Position Is that By Taking Events Out
of Chronological Order The Trial Court Shifted the
Focus From the States Right of Entitlement to
Real Property To a Wrongful Foreclosure Action. 2
B. The Opinions Presentation of Material Facts
Misstated and Avoided Facts Prejudicial to
Respondents. 2
C. The Courts Presentation of a Focus of
Hypothetical Agency Was Not Advanced By Any
Respondent In Pleadings Or Oral Argument. 5
D. The Courts Presentation of an Issue of Tender
Ignored the Multiple Considerations of the Issue by
the Trial Court. 8
II.

Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the The Trial Court Denial
of Due Process Preventing Appellants Discovery of Corroborating
Business Records by Electively Abdicating Judicial Powers to a
Discovery Facilitator. ............................................................................ 8

III.

Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the Opinions
Interpretation of the Relevant Statutes..................................................... 9

A. Rehearing Should be Granted to Reconsider the
Interpretationof Gomes vis--vis Civil Code 2924. 9
B. Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the
Interpretation of Calvo v HSBC Bank (2011) 199
CA4th 118, 130 CR 3d 815 / Stockwell In Light of
the Apparent Bid-Rigging Actions Taken by
Respondents. 10
IV.

Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the Opinions Ruling on
Federal Preemption of 2943 and Contract Language. ......................... 11

A. The Court Failed to Consider the Express
Exceptions to HOLA and RESPA for Contract
Torts and Real Estate Law (Estate Entitlement). 11

PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
B. The Court Failed to Show How The Contract
Language Waiver Was Preempted by Federal Law. 14
CONCLUSION 14
CERTIFICATION OF LENGTH 1

PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Calvo v HSBC Bank (2011) 199 CA4th 118, 130 CR 3d 815..................... 10
Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L L C (2009), 557 U.S. 519.......... 13
Garcia v Industrial Acc. Com (1953) 41 Cal.2d 689, 694 ............................ 6
In re Jessup (1889) 81 Cal. 408, 471 ............................................................ 1
Jelsing v. MIT Lending (S.D.Cal., July 9, 2010, No. 10cv416.................... 12
Lopez v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 729.......... 13
McCauley v. Home Loan Investment Bank, F.S. (2013) U.S. Court of
Appeal 4
th
Circuit #12-1181 .................................................................. 12
People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4
th
1184, 1205 .............................................. 1
San Francisco v. Pacific Bank (1891) 89 Cal. 232, 25 ................................. 1
Stockwell v. Barnum, (1908) 7Cal.App.413,416-17 ................................... 10
Rules
Rule 8.268(a) ................................................................................................. 1
Rule 8.500(c)(2) ............................................................................................ 1
Statutes
12 U.S.C. 2605(k)(1)(C)........................................................................... 12
12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1)(A)............................................................................ 13
Cal Civ Code 2923.55(b)(1)(B)(i)............................................................. 13
Cal Civ Code 2924(a)(6) ............................................................................. 6
Cal Civ Code 2932.5 ................................................................................. 10
Civ. Code 2924............................................................................................ 9

Page 1 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
MOTION TO REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 8.268(a), Appellant Leighton Lee Perry petitions this Court for
rehearing of the basis of the Opinion filed June 10, 2014 (Opinion). Rehearing is
required because the Opinion relies on erroneous hypothetical and factual premise
concerning Appellants argument and misstates the nature of a case of property title with
that of wrongful foreclosure. Moreover, rehearing is warranted to reconsider the
Opinions resolution of statutory construction and application of relevant Supreme Court
precedent.
Petition for rehearing are permitted for the purpose of correcting any error which the
Court may have made in its opinion, or of enabling counsel to direct the attention of the
Court to matters presented at the argument which may have been overlooked in the
decision. (San Francisco v. Pacific Bank (1891) 89 Cal. 232, 25.)
A rehearing may be granted owing to any mistake of law or misunderstanding of
facts (In re Jessup (1889) 81 Cal. 408, 471.) As set forth below, the Opinion contains
several material errors that affect the outcome of the case. The Supreme Court will not
review issues not decided the by the Court of Appeal and accepts as true misstatements of
issues or of fact if no timely petition for rehearing has been filed. (People v. Peevy (1998)
17 Cal.4
th
1184, 1205; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.500(c)(2).) As set forth below,
rehearing is appropriate here.

DISCUSSION
I. Rehearing is Required Because The Opinion Misinterprets Appellants
Argument and Misstates and Disregards Relevant Material Facts; And As a
Result, Reached a Flawed Conclusion.



Page 2 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
A. Appellants Position Is that By Taking Events Out of Chronological
Order The Trial Court Shifted the Focus From the States Right of
Entitlement to Real Property To a Wrongful Foreclosure Action.

Appellant opened oral arguments with a synopsis reminding the Court that even IF
Respondents are owed this money, their dirty hands from misleading Appellant that they
were the beneficiary by failing to conform to the terms of the deed of trust to supply the
beneficiary statement when lawfully requested makes them either tortfeasors, or
criminals, subject to actual, punitive, and exemplary damages, as well as criminal
penalties. For this reason Appellant requested leave to amend his complaint under unfair
practices under Californias UCL in the event federal preemption was determined by this
Court
1
.
B. The Opinions Presentation of Material Facts Misstated and Avoided
Facts Prejudicial to Respondents.

The following material facts were misstated in the Opinion:
That the original promissory note was presented to Appellant at his
disposition [Opinion Fn 3] when it was actually introduced
2
as I am going to
show you what is called an Adjustable Rate Note. Substituting a for the
and dropping the word original from the Opinion would result in a shift of
consideration from an actual to a hypothetical (a promissory note) on the part
of the deposed party. Furthermore, it calls into question the overruling of the
objection of foundation
3
by Appellant on the trial courts part since
Respondents had failed to produce the original document to the trial court or

1
Appellant is unsure whether this point was presented at oral argument as only uncertified copies
of the audio are available from the court for transcription.
2
[Chavez Declaration ISO MSJ: Exh 1 Pg 16][Pltf Stmt Objections to MSJ App Apndx Pg 326
ln22]
3
[App Apndx Pg 326 et seq]

Page 3 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
explain how a document unavailable in paper format inexplicably
materialized for the deposition.
That Appellant admitted to having signed both [Fn 3] the documents
presented at the deposition when actually
4
:
1. This statement was made by Appellant in the deposition It really doesnt
show pressure points of someone that made a handwritten signature, so
yeah, with that objection ;
2. Appellants admission was to this question: Mr. Perry, youve admitted
that you did sign a deed of trust and you signed an adjustable rate note and
a promissory note back in 1988.
The Opinion states Plaintiff presented no evidence that he did not sign any
of these documents in an inappropriate display of bias for Respondents when
the facts are:
1. It is an irrelevant conclusion since these documents apparently referred to
copies of hypothetical loan documents;
2. Appellant was denied access to the alleged documents when attempting to
arrange for a forensic document analyst to accompany him to authenticate
the document.
5
;
3. the trial court denied Appellant discovery to the common business records
that would depict the transformation of the original paper document that
became unavailable in paper format and then materialized out of thin

4
[Chavez Declaration ISO MSJ: App Apndx Pg 189]
5
This technologically challenged court should note the President of the United States uses an
AutoPen that uses a scanned image of his signature to direct the motion of the pen on a piece
of paper when he is out of the office. See http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/autopen-
barack-obama-10-facts-85720.html for an example.

Page 4 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
air for the deposition as an adjustable rate note ;
4. Declarations were based on belief and knowledge, but failed to identify
which documents were on personal knowledge
6
, and thereby, admissable.
The phrase 'authenticity of the documents' should read 'authenticity of some
documents' [Opinion FN 4].
Clearly there was no tie to the original documents and those presented at the
deposition to which Appellant could admit to signing.
The following material facts were not mentioned in the Opinion:
That neither a copy of the Subject Note nor a beneficiary statement
7
was
delivered to Appellant until after a Notice of Default was recorded;
That Respondents sent a letter to Appellant stating the document requested
(copy of the Subject Note) was not available in paper, microfiche, or image
format before the notice of default was recorded;
The special endorsement to Federal Home Loan Bank San Francisco
8
, is
indicative of the lack of beneficiary interest in the Subject Loan by Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and their alleged successors in that
interest. No endorsement from FHLB-SF exists.
Corroborating business records seem to indicate the promissory note was
not delivered to Fannie Maes vault system as either the actual note or a bailee
letter, rendering the recorded assignment of 1991 an authentic act of perjury to
which Appellant objected on the grounds of foundation under Herrerra.

6
[Sierra Declaration ISO MSJ: App Apndx Pg 197] except for those facts expressed on
information and belief, I have personal knowledge
7
The term beneficiary statement is used in 2943, and is equivalent to the Statement of
Obligation used in the language of the deed of trust.
8
[App Apndx Pg. 205; Stmt Facts in Opposition to MSJ]

Page 5 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
The trial court prejudiced Appellants right to due process by denying his
motions to compel the business records depicting the transfer of either the
Subject Note or a bailee letter among Respondents.
Although the Court addressed the request for a statement of decision of the
amount paid by any party as form, not substance
The following material facts were disallowed from consideration in the Opinion:
Had this Court actually read the portion of the deposition found in the Chavez
Declaration
9
they would have seen why Appellant attempted to notice the third party
payment arranged by Attorney General Kamala Harris from JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA
(JPM) to the mortgage backed securities held by CalPERS that make any remaining
balance on the Subject Loan allegedly held by JPM, as alleged successor to Washington
Mutual, indeterminate absent a production of a beneficiary statement
10
reflecting third
party payments. A beneficiary statement reflects receipt of payments from either a
servicer or a borrower, where a statement from the servicer only depicts fees charged and
payments from the borrower and to the beneficiary. In other words, with a servicer there
are two sets of books. There are sources of credits to a loan available to the beneficiary,
such as foreclosure insurance payouts, or a legal agreement with a government body that
provides recoupment of losses of funds as a result of (unadmitted criminal) conduct, that
are unknown to the servicer.
C. The Courts Presentation of a Focus of Hypothetical Agency Was Not
Advanced By Any Respondent In Pleadings Or Oral Argument.

9
[App Apndx: Pg 190]
10
A beneficiary statement reflects receipt of payments from either the servicer or the borrower,
where a statement from the servicer only depicts payments from the borrower and to the
beneficiary. With a lender / servicer there are two sets of books, and there are sources of credits
to a loan available to the beneficiary that are unknown to the servicer, such as a legal agreement
with a government body that provides recoupment of losses of funds by replacing cash flow from
defaulted loan payments.

Page 6 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
Where the evidence necessary to establish a fact that is essential to a claim
lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties,
that party has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue
even though it is not the party asserting the claim. [Garcia v Industrial
Acc. Com (1953) 41 Cal.2d 689, 694; Wigmore Evidence 2d ed. 1940 Sec
2486; Witkin Cal. Evidence (1958) Sec 56(b).]

A thoughtful reading of the notice of default
11
implies an agency relationship with the
By: before LSI Titles name, and QLS is identified AS AGENT FOR
BENEFICIARY. The unintelligible issue presented by the court does not address why
the author of the notice neglected to identify JPM as an agent in the same manner as was
QLS. Furthermore, the Opinion presents false facts in stating JPMorgan in turn referred
the matter to QLS to file the notice of default and Although the notice does not identify
the beneficiary explicitly, it does refer inquiries to JP Morgan. The opinion does not
explain why JPM, as an agent of the beneficiary, would be contacted at the offices of
QLS, especially since their subsidiary, Chase Home Loans, Inc., was the servicer at the
time.
The relevant statute, 2924(a)(6) states
No entity shall record or cause a notice of default to be recorded or
otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is the holder of the
beneficial interest under the mortgage or deed of trust, the original trustee
or the substituted trustee under the deed of trust, or the designated agent of
the holder of the beneficial interest.

Here, there is a question of the beneficiary interest, no original trustee mentioned, and no
designation evidenced among multiple possible agents of the alleged beneficiary.
What is more troubling in this inappropriate issue that was not raised by any party,
besides the obvious bias by the Court for the party presenting a MSJ, is that the Court has
no problem with a title-related document where NONE of the parties mentioned were

11
[App Apndx Pg 259]

Page 7 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
parties to the original contract or to recorded title documents. When questioned why
Respondents would contrive such a Rube Goldberg document instead of just doing the
assignment first, thereby avoiding the apparent bid-rigging that would result from a
clouded title at the time of the notice, the Court had no answer, and Respondents did not
support the Courts hypothesis of agency at oral argument. The Court couldnt even point
to responses to forms interrogatory showing JPM or FNMA considered JPM an agent.
The referral to QLS
12
stated FNMA was the investor and JPM was the beneficiary. The
title insurance company said FNMA was the investor and JPM was the beneficiary
13
; QLS
stated FNMA was the investor and JPM was the holder of the note
14
; the trial judge
stated JPM was the beneficiary (for who else would know the terms of the default). The
sole basis of this hypothetical issue was one of 2 Powers of Attorney naming JPM and
McCarthy & Holthus, which were evidenced by QLS and Appellant, respectively, to
show the perjury on the forms interrogatories regarding agency produced by JPM and
FNMA who stated no such agency. The Opinion does not state why JPM was the agent
of the beneficiary instead of McCarthy & Holthus.
The Appellate Court was so confused by their agency issue they could not proffer a
motive for the multiple beneficiary identities when asked why Respondents would
contrive such a situation (indicating to the public a clouded title at the time of the notice
of default) when they could have just made the correcting assignment before issuing the
notice. However, by foisting this issue on the parties at oral argument, the underlying
problem with the subsequent assignment and substitution was denied the time for
exploration.

12
[App Apndx Pg 297 see 8(a)]; A copy of the referral by Lender Processing Services to QLS
was inadvertently copied as blank pages by Appellant in his Appendix.
13
[App Apndx Pg 345]
14
[App Apndx Pg 348 ln 7]

Page 8 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
D. The Courts Presentation of an Issue of Tender Ignored the Multiple
Considerations of the Issue by the Trial Court.

The issue of tender was exhaustively litigated and reviewed by the trial court in
motions for temporary restraining order (which included supplemental briefs requested
by the trial court), a later motion to review terms of the TRO, and the motions for
summary judgment (MSJ)
15
. The presumption for a MSJ is given to the opponent of the
motion, in this case the Appellant, who questioned an amount owing after Respondents
refused to identify themselves as the beneficiary as a result of their illegal actions and
breach of contract. There are no material facts evidenced by common business records
that either FNMA or JPM purchased and or sold the Subject Loan, which makes sense in
light of the special endorsement to Federal Home Loan Bank SF on the back of the
copy of the note sent to Appellant in August, 2010.
Without benefit of having common business records from the alleged investor that
shows any balance remaining (no beneficiary statement was ever produced), the servicer
portrayed a balance of less than $70k on a home with no other liens that sell for $400k
and up. Apparently the justices of this Opinion think it is just to require Appellant to sell
his home in order to tender the amount owing to an stranger claiming note holder in
order to bring an action to save his home from being sold at auction.
16

II. Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the The Trial Court Denial of
Due Process Preventing Appellants Discovery of Corroborating Business
Records by Electively Abdicating Judicial Powers to a Discovery Facilitator.

Instead of addressing this issue the Opinion merely infers that Appellant produced
no evidence, even in light of the extreme action of Appellant to request a statement of
decision to illustrate the violation of his rights to discovery of relevant documents.

15
[App Apndx Pg 402]
16
Imagine the results if this were the justices Candidates Statement in their bid for affirmation
before the voters

Page 9 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
The Opinion states Appellant made no showing that the court abused its discretion
despite the inclusion in the appendix
17
of Appellants [unopposed] motion for
reconsideration of motions to compel discovery that was pending before the court and
conveniently dismissed as a part of the order on the MSJ by the trial court. An example of
the denial of due process can be found in the trial court ruling That the failure of
Fannie Mae to provide a timely verification to the responses is the result of mistake,
inadvertence or excusable neglect, with no accompanying description of the
circumstances the ruling was based upon. So which was it? Plaintiff was prejudiced by
the untimely verification due to the draconian discovery rules denying further discovery
that would result if he did not proceed immediately with a motion to compel. This
discovery request included the common business records depicting the transfer of the
promissory note by physical location or bailment, and the common business records
showing the purchase and or sale of the Subject Loan among Respondents. This affects a
partys right to equitable relief as a point of law if no loss can be shown by that party.
III. Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the Opinions Interpretation of
the Relevant Statutes.

A. Rehearing Should be Granted to Reconsider the Interpretationof Gomes
vis--vis Civil Code 2924.

Cal. Civil Code 2924 has been deemed all inclusive by case law, and because it
neither states nor denies a homeowners right to question the identity of the Party Entitled
To Enforce (PETE), case law has issued to dismiss cases pleading a standing cause of
action such as the instant case. 2924 neither states nor denies provisions for assignment
after a notice of default, but it does state provisions for substitution of trustee after such
notice. Separate statutes govern assignments and substitutions outside of 2924. Why is

17
[App Apndx: Pg 390 et seq]

Page 10 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
the limitation applied against homeowners defending property title when the same
limitation should be applied against assignments executed after the notice of default, as in
this case, using the same legal basis of logic?
If the substitution of trustee after the notice of default was made by the assignee of an
assignment made after the notice, what is the status of the alleged trustee? And if that
trustee files a notice of trustee sale, is that not slander of title?
18

B. Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the Interpretation of Calvo
v HSBC Bank (2011) 199 CA4th 118, 130 CR 3d 815 / Stockwell In Light of
the Apparent Bid-Rigging Actions Taken by Respondents.

The circumstances shown in this case were unforeseen by the Stockwell
19
court upon
which Calvo
20
was based, and with the demise of Cal Civ Code 2932.5 for deed of trust
loans, the law now condones the acts of a stranger beneficiary to the contract or recorded
title documents to substitute the trustee for any deed of trust loan, thus making the status
of title uncertain to the subsequent purchaser and public, thereby denying finality
between parties in contradiction to the stated intent of the Legislature.
The existence and details of unrecorded assignments of a note endorsed in blank are
now only found in private and corporate records, unavailable to the public. The assignees
of the hidden assignments have the power to substitute trustees, making it possible that at
any time a stranger can record a substitution of trustee. The federal TILA provision
21
that
such assignees are required to notify the borrower of such assignments (including contact
information for an agent having authority to act on behalf of the assignee) provides a 1
year statute of limitations to bring a cause of action. This case amply demonstrates such a

18
This question was partially raised at oral arguments, but interrupted by a question from a judge
about the hypothetical agency issue raised by the Court.
19
Stockwell v. Barnum, (1908) 7Cal.App.413,416-17
20
Calvo v HSBC Bank (2011) 199 CA4th 118, 130 CR 3d 815
21
15 USC 1641(g)

Page 11 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
violation in the alleged assignment from FNMA to JPM where no TILA notice is found
in the record, either of assignment or of agency. Since such notices remain in private
records of the borrower and assignee, title insurance companies are unable to determine a
complete chain of title, which impacts the warrantee they can provide for title insurance.
The wording of 2932.5 includes or other encumbrancers, and recent decisions in
California courts still state the loan was encumbered by a deed of trust. A conflict now
exists with 2924(c) in stating:
A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale shall
constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and
conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and
encumbrancers for value and without notice. [emphasis added]

If a deed of trust is not an encumbrance, how can the mortgagor of a deed of trust be
an encumbrancer for value?
IV. Rehearing Should Be Granted to Reconsider the Opinions Ruling on Federal
Preemption of 2943 and Contract Language.

Whether Respondents violated federal law, or state law, or the language of the
contract, it remains a fact that Appellant was mislead as to the identity of the beneficiary
interest, and the effect is the same. Appellant was obligated by his signature to protect the
clear title to the Subject Property, and thus was forced to stop making payments in order
not to affirm an illegitimate debt. That is the substance of the law, regardless of the form.
And in most courts across this land, lawbreakers are not afforded equitable relief as a
reward for criminal actions.
A. The Court Failed to Consider the Express Exceptions to HOLA and
RESPA for Contract Torts and Real Estate Law (Estate Entitlement).

The Jelsing
22
interpretation of disclosure is inappropriately broad as the disclosure

22
Jelsing v. MIT Lending (S.D.Cal., July 9, 2010, No. 10cv416 BTM (NLS)) 2010 U.S.Dist.
Lexis 68515, pp. *6-7

Page 12 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
referenced only relates to the presentation of documents necessary to originate (or
modify) a loan as part of the lending process. Furthermore, it was based on non-binding
federal case law that over-expanded the cited definitions of servicing and disclosure.
The Jelsing court got away with this travesty because it was uncontested by the
homeowner. Appellant cited
23
cases finding that HOLA did not preempt UCL claim based
on misrepresentation but dismissing claim for failure to allege injury, which come under
the tort exception
24
(see McCauley v. Home Loan Investment Bank, F.S. (2013) U.S.
Court of Appeal 4
th
Circuit #12-1181; holding state tort claim for fraud only incidentally
affected lending, it was not preempted by HOLA or its implementing regulation.).
Appellants QWR was originally presented in January, 2010, with a follow-up request
in June, 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in July 2010, amended certain provisions in
RESPA and added subsections (k)-(m). Section 2605(k)(1)(C) requires the servicer to
take timely action to respond to a borrowers requests to correct errors relating to
allocation of payments, final balances for purposes of paying off the loan, or avoiding
foreclosure, or other standard servicers duties. 12 U.S.C. 2605(k)(1)(C).
2605(k)(1)(D) requires the servicer to respond within 10 business days to a request from
a borrower to provide the identity, address, and other relevant contact information about
the owner or assignee of the loan. 12 U.S.C. 2605(k)(1)(D). A copy of the promissory
note was presented to Appellant in August, 2010
25
. Thus it could be argued that
Respondents came under the Dodd-Frank provisions when they honored Appellants

23
DeLeon v.Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C10-01390 LHK, 2011 WL 311376, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2011)
24
12 CFR 560.2(c)(4)
25
[App Apndx: Pg 199 #14]

Page 13 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
QWR
26
. On July 10, 2013, the Consumer Finance Protection Board (CFPB) issued
mortgage rules under Regulation Z and Regulation X pursuant to its authority under the
Dodd-Frank Act. The CFPB further amended the mortgage rules on September 15, 2013
and October 1, 2013. The DoddFrank Acts revisions to RESPA were not in effect as of
the time when Appellant submitted his QWRs to Respondents in 2010. Thus, the deadline
to acknowledge receipt of plaintiffs QWRs was 20 days, as provided in 12 U.S.C.
2605(e)(1)(A), rather than 10 days as provided in 12 U.S.C. 2605(k).
The recent Homeowner Bill of Rights passed in California contains language that
similarly provides for a request for a copy of the note [Cal Civ Code
2923.55(b)(1)(B)(i)]. Also, Cal Civ Code 2943 was set to expire at the end of 2013 and
was restored by the Legislature this year. So apparently the California Legislature is at
odds with the Court (likely due to this Courts ruling on Lopez
27
) and perhaps thinks the
ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cuomo
28
is binding on California courts going
forward with greater protections for homeowner. Neither Lopez nor Jelsing considered
the Cuomo ruling which stated:
Evidently realizing that exclusion of state enforcement of all state laws
against national banks is too extreme to be contemplated, the Comptroller
sought to limit the sweep of its regulation by the following passage set forth
in the agencys statement of basis and purpose in the Federal Register:

What the case law does recognize is that states retain some power to
regulate national banks in areas such as contracts, debt collection,
acquisition and transfer of property, and taxation, zoning, criminal, and tort

26
The issue of preemption did not come up until Respondents filed their MSJs, during the period
the trial court was withholding its decision regarding discovery compulsion motions which,
when issued, left Appellant 2 days to respond to 2 MSJs. The trial court had already denied
Appellants request to set out the trial date, so Appellant did not consider a motion to amend the
FAC to add RESPA violations given the urgency to oppose the 2 MSJs within 2 days.
27
Lopez v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 729
28
Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L L C (2009), 557 U.S. 519

Page 14 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
law. [citing a Ninth Circuit case.] Application of these laws to national
banks and their implementation by state authorities typically does not affect
the content or extent of the Federally-authorized business of banking . . .
but rather establishes the legal infrastructure that surrounds and supports
the ability of national banks . . . to do business. 69 Fed. Reg. 1896 (2004)
(footnote omitted).

B. The Court Failed to Show How The Contract Language Waiver Was
Preempted by Federal Law.

To some extent the Opinion was correct that the notice of default was voidable
because it did not provide the language in 19 of the deed of trust regarding the required
statement that the borrower has the right to bring a court action to assert the non-
existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale
29
. The
language in 25 for furnishing the statement of obligation as provided by Section
2943 of the Civil Code of California
29
on a form presented by Respondents evidences the
waiver of preemption on their part, to which the Opinion remained silent.
CONCLUSION
The wordsmithing displayed in this Opinion marks it well suited as a product of the
office of Court Shysters in its unabashed and inappropriate bias for Respondents when
the presumption should have been weighted in Appellants favor as opponent to the
summary judgment.
Clearly this Court is attempting to rationalize, and make binding, case law that that a
homeowner has no right to question the beneficiary interest of complete strangers
claiming a balance remaining, whether a debt exists or not, as long as the stranger is
protected by federal bank charter laws. Further, it is a reprehensible position to take in
light of the monetary and civil beneficial interest of clear title and the ability of the public
to readily discover, with some certainty, the chain of estate of real property.

29
[App Apndx: Pg 210]

Page 15 of 15
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
For the reasons presented above Appellant requests a rehearing and opinion that
reflects the actual material facts and issues of property title of this case.
Respectfully submitted June 16, 2014,

________________________/s/
Leighton Lee Perry,
Appellant pro se



PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al


PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
Certification of Length

I, Leighton Lee Perry, Appellant, hereby certify pursuant to the Cal. RC
that the work count for this document is 4,724 words, excluding tables, this
certificate, and any attachment permitted under RC 14(d). This document
was prepared in Microsoft Word, and this is the word count generated by
the program for this document. I declare under penalty of perjury under the
laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: June 16, 2014
________________________/s/
Leighton Lee Perry,
Appellant pro se




PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
PROOF OF SERVICE APPELLANT ROA
PROOF OF SERVICE BY TrueFiling
I declare that I am a citizen of the United States and over the age of 18. My email
address is LL_Perry@att.net, and my phone number is: (925) 949-8377.
On the date shown below, I served the attached per Local Rule Court 16:
APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING;

With service indicated for the following parties or entities named by:
X Transmitting by internet from my computer using my TrueFiling login a true copy
thereof, to the email recipients addressed as follows:

John C. Cox, Esq.
Keesal, Young & Logan
Charles Bell, Esq
McCarthy & Holthus LLP
450 Pacific Avenue 1770 Fourth Ave
San Francisco, California
94133
San Diego, CA 92101
John.Cox@kyl.com cbell@mccarthyholthus.com

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
on June 16, 2014, at Martinez, California


_______________________/s/
Leighton Lee Perry, Appellant