HILTON v. GUYOT, 159 U.S.

113 (1895)
159 U.S. 113
HILTON et al.
v.
GUYOT et al. (two cases).
Nos. 130 an 3!.
"#ne 3, 1895. $159 U.S. 113, 11!% T&e '()st o' t&ese two cases was an act(on at law, *)o#+&t
,ece-*e) 18, 1885, (n t&e c()c#(t co#)t o' t&e Un(te States 'o) t&e So#t&e)n (st)(ct o' New
Yo)., */ G#stave 0e)t(n G#/ot, as o''(c(al l(1#(ato) o' t&e '()- o' 2&a)les 3o)t(n 4 2o., an
*/ t&e s#)v(v(n+ -e-*e)s o' t&at '()-, all al(ens an c(t(5ens o' t&e )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance,
a+a(nst Hen)/ H(lton an 7(ll(a- L(**e/, c(t(5ens o' t&e Un(te States an o' t&e state o'
New Yo)., an t)a(n+ as co6a)tne)s, (n t&e c(t(es o' New Yo). an 8a)(s, an elsew&e)e,
#ne) t&e '()- na-e o' 9. T. Stewa)t 4 2o. T&e act(on was #6on a :#+-ent )ecove)e (n a
3)enc& co#)t at 8a)(s, (n t&e )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance, */ t&e '()- o' 2&a)les 3o)t(n 4 2o., all o'
w&ose -e-*e)s we)e 3)enc& c(t(5ens, a+a(nst H(lton 4 L(**e/, t)a(n+ as co6a)tne)s, as
a'o)esa(, an c(t(5ens o' t&e Un(te States an o' t&e state o' New Yo)..
T&e co-6la(nt alle+e t&at (n 188;, an s(nce, #)(n+ t&e t(-e o' all t&e t)ansact(ons
(ncl#e (n t&e :#+-ent s#e on, H(lton an L(**e/, as s#ccesso)s to 9le<ane) T.
Stewa)t an L(**e/, #ne) t&e '()- na-e o' 9. T. Stewa)t 4 2o., ca))(e on a +ene)al
*#s(ness as -e)c&ants (n t&e c(t(es o' New Yo). an 8a)(s, an elsew&e)e, an -a(nta(ne
a )e+#la) sto)e an 6lace o' *#s(ness at 8a)(s= t&at #)(n+ t&e sa-e t(-e 2&a)les 3o)t(n 4
2o. ca))(e on t&e -an#'act#)e an sale o' +loves at 8a)(s, an t&e two '()-s &a t&e)e
la)+e eal(n+s (n t&at *#s(ness, an cont)ove)s(es a)ose (n t&e a:#st-ent o' acco#nts
*etween t&e-.
T&e co-6la(nt '#)t&e) alle+e t&at *etween >a)c& 1, 18?9, an ,ece-*e) 1, 188@, '(ve s#(ts
we)e *)o#+&t */ 3o)t(n 4 2o. a+a(nst Stewa)t 4 2o. 'o) s#-s alle+e to *e #e, an t&)ee
s#(ts */ Stewa)t 4 2o. a+a(nst 3o)t(n 4 2o., (n t&e t)(*#nal o' co--e)ce o' t&e e6a)t-ent
o' t&e Se(ne, a :#(c(al t)(*#nal o) co#)t, o)+an(5e an e<(st(n+ #ne) t&e laws o' 3)ance,
s(tt(n+ at 8a)(s, an &av(n+ :#)(s(ct(on o' s#(ts an cont)ove)s(es *etween -e)c&ants o)
t)ae)s +)ow(n+ $159 U.S. 113, 115% o#t o' co--e)c(al eal(n+s *etween t&e-= t&at Stewa)t
4 2o. a66ea)e */ t&e() a#t&o)(5e atto)ne/s (n all t&ose s#(ts= an t&at, a'te) '#ll &ea)(n+
*e'o)e an a)*(t)ato) a66o(nte */ t&at co#)t, an *e'o)e t&e co#)t (tsel', an a'te) all t&e
s#(ts &a *een consol(ate */ t&e co#)t, '(nal :#+-ent was )ene)e on "an#a)/ @0,
1883, t&at 3o)t(n 4 2o. )ecove) o' Stewa)t 4 2o. va)(o#s s#-s, a)(s(n+ o#t o' t&e eal(n+s
*etween t&e-, a-o#nt(n+ to ;;0,8!? ')ancs, w(t& (nte)est, an (s-(sse 6a)t o' 3o)t(n 4
2o.As cla(-.
T&e co-6la(nt '#)t&e) alle+e t&at a66eals we)e ta.en */ *ot& 6a)t(es ')o- t&at :#+-ent
to t&e co#)t o' a66eals o' 8a)(s, T&() sect(on, an a66ellate co#)t o' )eco), o)+an(5e an
e<(st(n+ #ne) t&e laws o' t&e )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance, an &av(n+ :#)(s(ct(on o' a66eals ')o-
t&e '(nal :#+-ents o' t&e t)(*#nal o' co--e)ce o' t&e e6a)t-ent o' t&e Se(ne, w&e)e t&e
a-o#nt (n (s6#te e<ceee t&e s#- o' 1,500 ')ancs= an t&at t&e sa( co#)t o' a66eal, */ a
'(nal :#+-ent, )ene)e >a)c& 19, 188!, an )e-a(n(n+ o' )eco) (n t&e o''(ce o' (ts cle).
at 8a)(s, a'te) &ea)(n+ t&e seve)al 6a)t(es */ t&e() co#nsel, an #6on '#ll cons(e)at(on o'
t&e -e)(ts, (s-(sse t&e a66eal o' t&e e'enants, con'()-e t&e :#+-ent o' t&e lowe)
co#)t (n 'avo) o' t&e 6la(nt(''s, an o)e)e, #6on t&e 6la(nt(''sA a66eal, t&at t&e/ )ecove)
t&e a(t(onal s#- o' 15@,5@8 ')ancs, w(t& 18@,8!9 ')ancs 'o) (nte)est on all t&e cla(-s
allowe, an 1@,559 ')ancs 'o) costs an e<6enses.
T&e co-6la(nt '#)t&e) alle+e t&at G#/ot &a *een #l/ a66o(nte */ t&e t)(*#nal o'
co--e)ce o' t&e e6a)t-ent o' t&e Se(ne o''(c(al l(1#(ato) o' t&e '()- o' 3o)t& 4 2o., w(t&
'#ll 6owe)s, acco)(n+ to law an co--e)c(al #sa+e, 'o) t&e ve)('(cat(on an )eal(5at(on o'
(ts 6)o6e)t/, *ot& )eal an 6e)sonal, an to collect an ca#se to *e e<ec#te t&e :#+-ents
a'o)esa(.
T&e co-6la(nt '#)t&e) alle+e t&at t&e :#+-ent o' t&e co#)t o' a66eals o' 8a)(s, an t&e
:#+-ent o' t&e t)(*#nal o' co--e)ce, as -o('(e */ t&e :#+-ent o' t&e a66ellate co#)t,
st(ll )e-a(n (n '#ll 'o)ce an e''ect= At&at t&e sa( co#)ts )es6ect(vel/ &a :#)(s(ct(on o' t&e
s#*:ectB-atte) o' t&e cont)ove)s(es so s#*-(tte to t&e-, an o' t&e 6a)t(es, t&e $159 U.S.
113, 11;% sa( e'enants &av(n+ (nte)vene, */ t&e() atto)ne/s an co#nsel, an a66l(e
'o) a''()-at(ve )el(e' (n *ot& co#)ts= t&at t&e 6la(nt(''s &ave &(t&e)to *een #na*le to collect
t&e sa( :#+-ents o) an/ 6a)t t&e)eo', */ )eason o' t&e a*sence o' t&e sa( e'enants,
t&e/ &av(n+ +(ven #6 t&e() *#s(ness (n 8a)(s 6)(o) to t&e )ecove)/ o' t&e sa( :#+-ent on
a66eal, an &av(n+ le't no 6)o6e)t/ w(t&(n t&e :#)(s(ct(on o' t&e )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance o#t o'
w&(c& t&e sa( :#+-ents -(+&t *e -ae=A an t&at t&e)e a)e st(ll :#stl/ #e an ow(n+
')o- t&e e'enants to t&e 6la(nt(''s #6on t&ose sa( :#+-ents ce)ta(n s#-s, s6ec('(e (n
t&e co-6la(nt, an a-o#nt(n+ (n all to 1,008,?83 ')ancs (n t&e c#))enc/ o' t&e )e6#*l(c o'
3)ance, e1#(valent to C195,1@@.!?.
T&e e'enants, (n t&e() answe), set 'o)t& (n eta(l t&e o)(+(nal cont)acts an t)ansact(ons
(n 3)ance *etween t&e 6a)t(es, an t&e s#*se1#ent eal(n+s *etween t&e-, -o('/(n+ t&ose
cont)acts, an alle+e t&at t&e 6la(nt(''s &a no :#st cla(- a+a(nst t&e e'enants, *#t t&at,
no t&e cont)a)/, t&e e'enants, #6on a :#st settle-ent o' t&e acco#nts, we)e ent(tle to
)ecove) la)+e s#-s ')o- t&e 6la(nt(''s.
T&e answe) a-(tte t&e 6)ocee(n+s an :#+-ents (n t&e 3)enc& co#)ts, an t&at t&e
e'enants +ave #6 t&e() *#s(ness (n 3)ance *e'o)e t&e :#+-ent on a66eal, an &a no
6)o6e)t/ w(t&(n t&e :#)(s(ct(on o' 3)ance o#t o' w&(c& t&at :#+-ent co#l *e collecte.
T&e answe) '#)t&e) alle+e t&at t&e t)(*#nal o' co--e)ce o' t&e e6a)t-ent o' t&e Se(ne
was a t)(*#nal w&ose :#+es we)e -e)c&ants, s&(6 ca6ta(ns, stoc.*)o.e)s, an 6e)sons
en+a+e (n co--e)c(al 6#)s#(ts, an o' w&(c& 2&a)les 3o)t(n &a *een a -e-*e) #nt(l
s&o)tl/ *e'o)e t&e co--ence-ent o' t&e l(t(+at(on.
T&e answe) '#)t&e) alle+e t&at, (n t&e o)(+(nal s#(ts *)o#+&t a+a(nst t&e e'enants */
3o)t(n 4 2o., t&e c(tat(ons we)e le't at t&e() sto)e&o#se (n 8a)(s= t&at t&e/ we)e t&en
)es(ents an c(t(5ens o' t&e state o' New Yo)., an ne(t&e) o' t&e- at t&at t(-e, o) w(t&(n
'o#) /ea)s *e'o)e, &a *een w(t&(n, o) )es(ent o) o-(c(le w(t&(n, t&e :#)(s(ct(on o' t&at
t)(*#nal, o) owe an/ alle+(ance to 3)ance= *#t t&at $159 U.S. 113, 11?% t&e/ we)e t&e
owne)s o' 6)o6e)t/ s(t#ate (n t&at co#nt)/, w&(c& wo#l */ t&e law o' 3)ance &ave *een
l(a*le to se(5#)e (' t&e/ ( not a66ea) (n t&at t)(*#nal= an t&at t&e/ #nw(ll(n+l/, an solel/
'o) t&e 6#)6ose o' 6)otect(n+ t&at 6)o6e)t/, a#t&o)(5e an ca#se an a+ent to a66ea) 'o)
t&e- (n t&ose 6)ocee(n+s= an t&at t&e s#(ts *)o#+&t */ t&e- a+a(nst 3o)t(n 4 2o. we)e
*)o#+&t 'o) t&e sa-e 6#)6ose, an (n o)e) to -a.e a 6)o6e) e'ense, an to esta*l(s&
co#nte)cla(-s a)(s(n+ o#t o' t&e t)ansact(ons *etween t&e 6a)t(es, an to co-6el t&e
6)o#ct(on an (ns6ect(on o' 3o)t(n 4 2o.As *oo.s, an t&at t&e/ so#+&t no ot&e)
a''()-at(ve )el(e' (n t&at t)(*#nal.
T&e answe) '#)t&e) alle+e t&at 6en(n+ t&at l(t(+at(on t&e e'enants (scove)e +)oss
')a#s (n t&e acco#nts o' 3o#)t(n 4 2o., t&at t&e a)*(t)ato) an t&e t)(*#nal ecl(ne to
co-6el 3o)t(n 4 2o. to 6)o#ce t&e() *oo.s an 6a6e)s 'o) (ns6ect(on, an t&at, (' t&e/ &a
*een 6)o#ce, t&e :#+-ent wo#l not &ave *een o*ta(ne a+a(nst t&e e'enants.
T&e answe) '#)t&e) alle+e t&at, w(t&o#t an/ 'a#lt o) ne+l(+ence on t&e 6a)t o' t&e
e'enants, t&e)e was not a '#ll an 'a() t)(al o' t&e cont)ove)s(es *e'o)e t&e a)*(t)ato), (n
t&at no w(tness was swo)n o) a''()-e= (n t&at 2&a)les 3o)t(n was 6e)-(tte to -a.e, an
( -a.e, state-ents not #ne) oat&, conta(n(n+ -an/ 'alse&oos= (n t&at t&e 6)(v(le+e o'
c)ossBe<a-(nat(on o' 3o)t(n an ot&e) 6e)sons, w&o -ae state-ents *e'o)e t&e
a)*(t)ato), was en(e to t&e e'enants= an (n t&at e<t)acts ')o- 6)(nte news6a6e)s,
t&e .nowle+e o' w&(c& was not *)o#+&t &o-e to t&e e'enants, an lette)s an ot&e)
co--#n(cat(ons (n w)(t(n+ *etween 3o)t(n 4 2o. an t&() 6e)sons, to w&(c& t&e
e'enants we)e ne(t&e) 6)(v/ no) 6a)t/, we)e )ece(ve */ t&e a)*(t)ato)= t&at w(t&o#t s#c&
(-6)o6e) ev(ence t&e :#+-ent wo#l not &ave *een o*ta(ne= an t&at t&e a)*(t)ato)
was ece(ve an -(sle */ t&e 'alse an ')a##lent acco#nts (nt)o#ce */ 3o)t(n 4 2o.,
an */ t&e &ea)sa/ test(-on/ +(ven, w(t&o#t t&e sole-n(t/ o' an oat&, an w(t&o#t c)ossB
e<a-(nat(on, an */ t&e ')a##lent s#66)ess(on o' t&e *oo.s an 6a6e)s.
T&e answe) '#)t&e) alle+e t&at 3o)t(n 4 2o. -ae #6 t&e() state-ents an acco#nts 'alsel/
an ')a##lentl/, an w(t& $159 U.S. 113, 118% (ntent to ece(ve t&e e'enants an t&e
a)*(t)ato) an t&e sa( co#)ts o' 3)ance, an t&ose co#)ts we)e ece(ve an -(sle
t&e)e*/= t&at, ow(n+ to t&e ')a##lent s#66)ess(on o' t&e *oo.s an 6a6e)s o' 3o)t(n 4 2o.
#6on t&e t)(al, an t&e 'alse state-ents o' 3o)t(n )e+a)(n+ -atte)s (nvolve (n t&e
cont)ove)s/, t&e a)*(t)ato) an t&e co#)ts o' 3)ance Awe)e ece(ve an -(sle (n )e+a) to
t&e -e)(ts o' t&e cont)ove)s(es 6en(n+ *e'o)e t&e-, an w)on+'#ll/ ec(e a+a(nst sa(
Stewa)t 4 2o., as &e)e(n*e'o)e state= t&at sa( :#+-ent, &e)e(n*e'o)e -ent(one, (s
')a##lent, an *ase #6on 'alse an ')a##lent acco#nts an state-ents, an (s
e))o)neo#s (n 'act an (n law, an (s vo(= t&at t&e t)(al &e)e(n*e'o)e -ent(one was not
con#cte acco)(n+ to t&e #sa+es an 6)act(ce o' t&e co--on law, an t&e alle+at(ons an
6)oo's +(ven */ sa( 3o)t(n 4 2o., #6on w&(c& sa( :#+-ent (s 'o#ne, wo#l not *e
co-6etent o) a-(ss(*le (n an/ co#)t o) t)(*#nal o' t&e Un(te States, (n an/ s#(t *etween
t&e sa-e 6a)t(es, (nvolv(n+ t&e sa-e s#*:ectB-atte), an (t (s cont)a)/ to nat#)al :#st(ce
an 6#*l(c 6ol(c/ t&at t&e sa( :#+-ent s&o#l *e en'o)ce a+a(nst a c(t(5en o' t&e Un(te
States= an t&at, (' t&e)e &a *een a '#ll an 'a() t)(al #6on t&e -e)(ts o' t&e cont)ove)s(es
so 6en(n+ *e'o)e sa( t)(*#nals, no :#+-ent wo#l &ave *een o*ta(ne a+a(nst sa(
Stewa)t 4 2o.
A,e'enants, '#)t&e) answe)(n+, alle+e t&at (t (s cont)a)/ to nat#)al :#st(ce t&at t&e
:#+-ent &e)e(n*e'o)e -ent(one s&o#l *e en'o)ce w(t&o#t an e<a-(nat(on o' t&e
-e)(ts t&e)eo'= t&at */ t&e laws o' t&e )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance, to w(t, a)t(cle 181 $159 U.S. 113,
1@1% o' t&e )o/al o)(nance o' "#ne 15, 1;@9, (t (s 6)ov(e na-el/D A"#+-ents )ene)e,
cont)acts o) o*l(+at(ons )eco+n(5e, (n 'o)e(+n .(n+o-s an sove)e(+nt(es, 'o) an/ ca#se
w&ateve), s&all +(ve )(se to no l(en o) e<ec#t(on (n o#) .(n+o-. T&#s t&e cont)acts s&all
stan 'o) s(-6le 6)o-(ses, an, notw(t&stan(n+ s#c& :#+-ents, o#) s#*:ects a+a(nst
w&o- t&e/ &ave *een )ene)e -a/ contest t&e() )(+&ts anew *e'o)e o#) own :#+es.A
A9n (t (s '#)t&e) 6)ov(e */ t&e laws o' 3)ance, */ a)t(cle 5!; o' t&e 2oe e 8)oce#)e
2(v(le, as 'ollowsD A"#+-ents )ene)e */ 'o)e(+n t)(*#nals s&all *e ca6a*le o' e<ec#B$159
U.S. 113, 119% t(on (n 3)ance, onl/ (n t&e -anne) an (n t&e cases set 'o)t& */ a)t(cles @1@3
an @1@8 o' t&e 2(v(l 2oe.A
A9n (t (s '#)t&e) 6)ov(e */ t&e laws o' 3)ance, */ a)t(cle @1@8 $ @1@3% o' t&e 2oe e
8)oce#)e 2(v(le $2(v(l 2oe%D A9 l(en cannot, (n l(.e -anne), a)(se ')o- :#+-ents
)ene)e (n an/ 'o)e(+n co#nt)/, save onl/ as t&e/ &ave *een ecla)e (n 'o)ce */ a 3)enc&
t)(*#nal, w(t&o#t 6)e:#(ce, &oweve), to 6)ov(s(ons to t&e cont)a)/, conta(ne (n 6#*l(c
laws an t)eat(es.A $9n */ a)t(cle @1@8 o' t&at 2oeD A2ont)acts ente)e (nto (n a 'o)e(+n
co#nt)/ cannot +(ve a l(en #6on 6)o6e)t/ (n 3)ance, (' t&e)e a)e no 6)ov(s(ons cont)a)/ to
t&(s 6)(nc(6le (n 6#*l(c laws o) (n t)eat(es.A%
AT&at t&e const)#ct(on +(ven to sa( stat#tes */ t&e :#(c(al t)(*#nals o' 3)ance (s s#c& t&at
no co-(t/ (s (s6la/e towa)s t&e :#+-ents o' t)(*#nals o' 'o)e(+n co#nt)(es a+a(nst t&e
c(t(5ens o' 3)ance, w&en s#e #6on (n sa( co#)ts o' 3)ance, an t&e -e)(ts o' t&e
cont)ove)s(es #6on w&(c& t&e sa( :#+-ents a)e *ase a)e e<a-(ne anew, #nless a t)eat/
to t&e cont)a)/ e''ect e<(sts *etween t&e sa( )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance an t&e co#nt)/ (n w&(c&
s#c& :#+-ent (s o*ta(ne. T&at no t)eat/ e<(sts *etween t&e sa( )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance an
t&e Un(te States, */ t&e te)-s o) e''ect o' w&(c& t&e :#+-ents o' e(t&e) co#nt)/ a)e
6)evente ')o- *e(n+ e<a-(ne anew #6on t&e -e)(ts, w&en s#e #6on (n t&e co#)ts o' t&e
co#nt)/ ot&e) t&an t&at (n w&(c& (t (s o*ta(ne. T&at t&e t)(*#nals o' t&e )e6#*l(c o' 3)ance
+(ve no 'o)ce an e''ect, w(t&(n t&e :#)(s(ct(on o' t&e sa( co#nt)/, to t&e #l/ )ene)e
:#+-ents o' co#)ts o' co-6etent :#)(s(ct(on o' t&e Un(te States a+a(nst c(t(5ens o'
3)ance, a'te) 6)o6e) 6e)sonal se)v(ce o' t&e 6)ocess o' sa( co#)ts (s -ae t&e)eon (n t&(s
co#nt)/.A
T&e answe) '#)t&e) set #6, */ wa/ o' co#nte)cla(-, an (n eta(l, va)(o#s -atte)s a)(s(n+
o#t o' t&e eal(n+s *etween t&e 6a)t(es, an alle+e t&at none o' t&e 6la(nt(''s &a s(nce
1881 *een )es(ents o' t&e state o' New Yo)., o) w(t&(n t&e :#)(s(ct(on o' t&at state, *#t t&e
e'enants we)e, an alwa/s &a *een, )es(ents o' t&at state.
T&e answe) concl#e */ e-an(n+ t&at t&e 6la(nt(''sA $159 U.S. 113, 1@0% co-6la(nt *e
(s-(sse, an t&at t&e e'enants &ave :#+-ent a+a(nst t&e- #6on t&e co#nte)cla(-s,
a-o#nt(n+ to C10@,9!@.91.
T&e 6la(nt(''s '(le a )e6l(cat(on to so -#c& o' t&e answe) as -ae co#nte)cla(-s, en/(n+
(ts alle+at(ons, an sett(n+ #6 (n *a) t&e)eo' t&e :#+-ent s#e on.
T&e e'enants, on "#ne @@, 1888, '(le a *(ll (n e1#(t/ a+a(nst t&e 6la(nt(''s, sett(n+ 'o)t&
t&e sa-e -atte)s as (n t&e() answe) to t&e act(on at law, an 6)a/(n+ 'o) a (scove)/, an
'o) an (n:#nct(on a+a(nst t&e 6)osec#t(on o' t&e act(on. To t&at *(ll a 6lea was '(le, sett(n+
#6 t&e 3)enc& :#+-ents, an #6on a &ea)(n+ t&e *(ll was (s-(sse. !@ 3e. @!9. 3)o- t&e
ec)ee (s-(ss(n+ t&e *(ll an a66eal was ta.en, w&(c& (s t&e secon case now *e'o)e t&(s
co#)t.
T&e act(on at law a'te)wa)s ca-e on 'o) t)(al */ a :#)/, an t&e 6la(nt(''s 6#t (n t&e
)eco)s o' t&e 6)ocee(n+s an :#+-ents (n t&e 3)enc& co#)ts, an ev(ence t&at t&e
:#)(s(ct(on o' t&ose co#)ts was as alle+e (n t&e co-6la(nt, an t&at t&e 6)act(ce 'ollowe,
an t&e -et&o o' e<a-(n(n+ t&e w(tnesses, we)e acco)(n+ to t&e 3)enc& law= an also
6)ove t&e t(tle o' G#/ot as l(1#(ato).
It was a-(tte */ *ot& 6a)t(es t&at 'o) seve)al /ea)s 6)(o) to 18?; t&e '()- o' 9le<ane) T.
Stewa)t 4 2o., co-6ose o' Stewa)t an L(**e/, con#cte t&e() *#s(ness as -e)c&ants (n
t&e c(t/ o' New Yo)., w(t& *)anc&es (n ot&e) c(t(es o' 9-e)(ca an E#)o6e= t&at *ot&
6a)tne)s we)e c(t(5ens an )es(ents o' t&e c(t/ an state o' New Yo). #)(n+ t&e ent()e
6e)(o -ent(one (n t&e co-6la(nt= an t&at (n 96)(l, 18?;, Stewa)t (e, an H(lton an
L(**e/ 'o)-e a 6a)tne)s&(6 to cont(n#e t&e *#s(ness #ne) t&e sa-e '()- na-e, an
*eca-e t&e owne)s o' all t&e 6)o6e)t/ an )(+&ts o' t&e ol '()-.
T&e e'enants -ae n#-e)o#s o''e)s o' ev(ence (n s#66o)t o' all t&e s6ec('(c alle+at(ons
o' 'act (n t&e() answe), (ncl#(n+ t&e alle+at(ons as to t&e law an co-(t/ o' 3)ance. T&e
6la(nt(''s, (n t&e() *)(e' '(le (n t&(s co#)t, a-(tte t&at -ost o' t&ese o''e)s Aw&e)e o''e)s
to 6)ove -atte)s (n s#66o)t o' t&e e'enses an co#nte)cla(-s set #6 */ t&e e'enants (n
t&e cases t)(e *e'o)e t&e 3)enc& co#)ts, an w&(c&, o) -ost $159 U.S. 113, 1@1% o' w&(c&,
wo#l &ave *een )elevant an co-6etent (' t&e 6la(nt(''s (n e))o) a)e not concl#e */ t&e
)es#lt o' t&ose l(t(+at(ons, an &ave now t&e )(+&t to t)/ t&ose (ss#es, e(t&e) on t&e +)o#n
t&at t&e 3)enc& :#+-ents a)e onl/ 6)(-a 'ac(e ev(ence o' t&e co))ectness o' t&ose
:#+-ents, o) on t&e +)o#n t&at t&e case (s w(t&(n t&e e<ce6t(on o' a :#+-ent o*ta(ne
*/ ')a#.A
T&e e'enants, (n o)e) to s&ow t&at t&e/ s&o#l not *e concl#e */ &av(n+ a66ea)e
an l(t(+ate (n t&e s#(ts *)o#+&t a+a(nst t&e- */ t&e 6la(nt(''s (n t&e 3)enc& co#)ts,
o''e)e to 6)ove t&at t&e/ we)e )es(ents an c(t(5ens o' t&e state o' New Yo)., an ne(t&e)
o' t&e- &a *een, w(t&(n 'o#) /ea)s 6)(o) to t&e co--ence-ent o' t&ose s#(ts, o-(c(le
o) )es(ent w(t&(n t&e :#)(s(ct(on o' t&ose co#)ts= t&at t&e/ &a a 6#)c&as(n+ a+ent an a
sto)e&o#se (n 8a)(s, *#t onl/ as a -eans o) 'ac(l(t/ to a( (n t&e t)ansact(on o' t&e()
6)(nc(6al *#s(ness, w&(c& was (n New Yo)., an t&e/ we)e neve) ot&e)w(se en+a+e (n
*#s(ness (n 3)ance= t&at ne(t&e) o' t&e- owe alle+(ance to 3)ance, *#t t&e/ we)e t&e
owne)s o' 6)o6e)t/ t&e)e, w&(c& wo#l, acco)(n+ to t&e laws o' 3)ance, &ave *een l(a*le to
se(5#)e (' t&e/ &a not a66ea)e to answe) (n t&ose s#(ts= t&at t&e/ #nw(ll(n+l/, an solel/
'o) t&e 6#)6ose o' 6)otect(n+ t&e() 6)o6e)t/ w(t&(n t&e :#)(s(ct(on o' t&e 3)enc& t)(*#nal,
a#t&o)(5e an a+ent to a66ea), an &e ( a66ea) (n t&e 6)ocee(n+s *e'o)e (t= an t&at
t&e() -ot(on to co-6el an (ns6ect(on o' t&e 6la(nt(''sA *oo.s, as well as t&e s#(ts *)o#+&t */
t&e e'enants (n 3)ance, we)e necessa)/ */ wa/ o' e'ense o) co#nte)cla(- to t&e s#(ts
t&e)e *)o#+&t */ t&e 6la(nt(''s a+a(nst t&e-.
9-on+ t&e -atte)s w&(c& t&e e'enants alle+e an o''e)e to 6)ove (n o)e) to s&ow t&at
t&e 3)enc& :#+-ents we)e 6)oc#)e */ ')a# we)e t&at 3o)t(n 4 2o., w(t& (ntent to
ece(ve an e')a# t&e e'enants, an t&e a)*(t)ato) an t&e co#)ts o' 3)ance, ente)e (n
t&e() *oo.s, an 6)esente to t&e e'enants, an to t&e 3)enc& co#)ts, acco#nts *ea)(n+
#6on t&e t)ansact(ons (n cont)ove)s/ w&(c& we)e 'alse an ')a##lent, an conta(ne
e<cess(ve an ')a##lent c&a)+es a+a(nst t&e e'enants (n va)(o#s 6a)t(c#la)s, s6ec('(e=
t&at t&e $159 U.S. 113, 1@@% e'enants -ae #e a66l(cat(on to t&e t)(*#nal o' co--e)ce
to co-6el 3o)t(n 4 2o. to allow t&e() acco#nt *oo.s an lette) *oo.s to *e (ns6ecte */ t&e
e'enants, an t&e a66l(cat(on was o66ose */ 3o)t(n 4 2o., an en(e */ t&e t)(*#nal=
t&at t&e (scove)/ an (ns6ect(on o' t&ose *oo.s we)e necessa)/ to ete)-(ne t&e t)#t& o'
t&e cont)ove)s(es *etween t&e 6a)t(es= t&at *e'o)e t&e t)(*#nal o' co--e)ce 2&a)les 3o)t(n
was 6e)-(tte to an ( +(ve (n ev(ence state-ents not #ne) oat&, )elat(n+ to t&e -e)(ts
o' t&e cont)ove)s(es t&e)e 6en(n+, an 'alsel/ )e6)esente t&at a ce)ta(n w)(tten cont)act,
-ae (n 18?3, *etween Stewa)t 4 2o. an 3o)t(n 4 2o., conce)n(n+ t&e() eal(n+s, was not
(ntene */ t&e 6a)t(es to *e o6e)at(ve acco)(n+ to (ts te)-s= an (n s#66o)t o' t&at 'alse
)e6)esentat(on -ae state-ents as to a-(ss(ons */ Stewa)t (n a 6)(vate conve)sat(on w(t&
&(-= an t&at t&e e'enants co#l not en/ t&ose state-ents, *eca#se Stewa)t was ea,
an t&e/ we)e not 6)otecte ')o- t&e e''ect o' 3o)t(nAs state-ents */ t&e 6)(v(le+e o' c)ossB
e<a-(n(n+ &(- #ne) oat&= an t&at t&e 3)enc& :#+-ents we)e *ase #6on 'alse an
')a##lent acco#nts 6)esente an state-ents -ae */ 3o)t(n 4 2o. *e'o)e t&e t)(*#nal o'
co--e)ce #)(n+ t&e t)(al *e'o)e (t.
T&e )eco)s o' t&e :#+-ents o' t&e 3)enc& co#)ts, 6#t (n ev(ence */ t&e 6la(nt(''s,
s&owe t&at all t&e -atte)s now )el(e on to s&ow ')a# we)e conteste (n an cons(e)e
*/ t&ose co#)ts.
T&e 6la(nt(''s o*:ecte to all t&e ev(ence o''e)e */ t&e e'enants, on t&e +)o#ns t&at
t&e -atte)s o''e)e to *e 6)ove we)e ())elevant, (--ate)(al, an (nco-6etent= t&at (n
)es6ect to t&e- t&e e'enants we)e concl#e */ t&e :#+-ent s#e on an +(ven (n
ev(ence= an t&at none o' t&ose -atte)s, (' 6)ove, wo#l *e a e'ense to t&(s act(on #6on
t&at :#+-ent.
T&e co#)t ecl(ne to a-(t an/ o' t&e ev(ence so o''e)e */ t&e e'enants, an ()ecte
a ve)(ct 'o) t&e 6la(nt(''s (n t&e s#- o' C@??, ??5.!!, *e(n+ t&e a-o#nt o' t&e 3)enc&
:#+-ent an (nte)est. T&e e'enants, &av(n+ #l/ e<ce6te to t&e )#l(n+s an ()ect(on
o' t&e co#)t, s#e o#t a w)(t o' e))o).
TB $159 U.S. 113, 1@3% T&e w)(t o' e))o) (n t&e act(on at law an t&e a66eal (n t&e s#(t (n
e1#(t/ we)e a)+#e to+et&e) (n t&(s co#)t (n "an#a)/, 189!, an, */ ()ect(on o' t&e co#)t,
we)e )ea)+#e (n 96)(l, 189!
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ICEN!E PALANCA, a"#$%$&'ra'or o( 'h) )&'a') o( E%*rac$o Pa+a%ca !a%,-$%.)%*, defendant-
appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
S!REE!, J./
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "l !anco spanol-"ilipino" to foreclose a
#ort$a$e upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The #ort$a$e in
%uestion is dated &une 1', 190', and was e(ecuted by the ori$inal defendant herein, n$racio
)alanca Tan%uinyen$ y *i#%uin$co, as security for a debt owin$ by hi# to the ban+. ,pon March
31, 190', the debt a#ounted to )-18,-9..10 and was drawin$ interest at the rate of 8 per centu#
per annu#, payable at the end of each %uarter. /t appears that the parties to this #ort$a$e at that
ti#e esti#ated the value of the property in %uestion at )-9-,008, which was about )10,000 in
e(cess of the indebtedness. 2fter the e(ecution of this instru#ent by the #ort$a$or, he returned to
3hina which appears to have been his native country4 and he there died, upon &anuary -9, 1810,
without a$ain returnin$ to the )hilippine /slands.
2s the defendant was a nonresident at the ti#e of the institution of the present action, it was
necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedin$ to $ive notice to the defendant by publication
pursuant to section 399 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure. 2n order for publication was accordin$ly
obtained fro# the court, and publication was #ade in due for# in a newspaper of the city of Manila.
2t the sa#e ti#e that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a sta#ped envelope a
copy of the su##ons and co#plaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit,
the city of 2#oy, in the #pire of 3hina. This order was #ade pursuant to the followin$ provision
contained in section 399 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure5
/n case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is +nown,
the 6ud$e #ust direct a copy of the su##ons and co#plaint to be forthwith deposited by the
cler+ in the post-office, posta$e prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place of
residence
7hether the cler+ co#plied with this order does not affir#atively appear. There is, however, a#on$
the papers pertainin$ to this case, an affidavit, dated 2pril ., 1908, si$ned by !ernardo 3han y
8arcia, an e#ployee of the attorneys of the ban+, showin$ that upon that date he had deposited in
the Manila post-office a re$istered letter, addressed to n$racio )alanca Tan%uinyen$, at Manila,
containin$ copies of the co#plaint, the plaintiff9s affidavit, the su##ons, and the order of the court
directin$ publication as aforesaid. /t appears fro# the post#aster9s receipt that !ernardo probably
used an envelope obtained fro# the cler+9s office, as the receipt purports to show that the letter
e#anated fro# the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance4 and the defendant not havin$
appeared, 6ud$#ent was, upon &uly -, 1908, ta+en a$ainst hi# by default. ,pon &uly 3, 1908, a
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. /n this decision it was recited that publication had been
properly #ade in a periodical, but nothin$ was said about this notice havin$ been $iven #ail. The
court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant a#ounted to )-.9,300. 3-,
with interest fro# March 31, 1908. 2ccordin$ly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or
before &uly ', 1908, deliver said a#ount to the cler+ of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of
the 6ud$#ent, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the 6ud$#ent
within such period, the #ort$a$e property located in the city of Manila should be e(posed to public
sale. The pay#ent conte#plated in said order was never #ade4 and upon &uly 8, 1908, the court
ordered the sale of the property. The sale too+ place upon &uly 30, 1908, and the property was
bou$ht in by the ban+ for the su# of )110,-00. ,pon 2u$ust 1, 1908, this sale was confir#ed by the
court.
2bout seven years after the confir#ation of this sale, or to the precise, upon &une -0, 1910, a #otion
was #ade in this cause by :icente )alanca, as ad#inistrator of the estate of the ori$inal defendant,
n$racio )alanca Tan%uinyen$ y *i#%uin$co, wherein the applicant re%uested the court to set aside
the order of default of &uly -, 1908, and the 6ud$#ent rendered upon &uly 3, 1908, and to vacate all
the proceedin$s subse%uent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the #otion itself,
was that the order of default and the 6ud$#ent rendered thereon were void because the court had
never ac%uired 6urisdiction over the defendant or over the sub6ect of the action.
2t the hearin$ in the court below the application to vacate the 6ud$#ent was denied, and fro# this
action of the court :icente )lanca, as ad#inistrator of the estate of the ori$inal defendant, has
appealed. ;o other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to the action
of the court upon said #otion.
The case presents several %uestions of i#portance, which will be discussed in what appears to be
the se%uence of #ost convenient develop#ent. /n the first part of this opinion we shall, for the
purpose of ar$u#ent, assu#e that the cler+ of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance did not obey the order of
the court in the #atter of #ailin$ the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in
2#oy4 and in this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court ac%uired the necessary
6urisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the #ort$a$e and, secondly, whether those
proceedin$s were conducted in such #anner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "6urisdiction," as applied to the faculty of e(ercisin$ 6udicial power, is used in several
different, thou$h related, senses since it #ay have reference <1= to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular +ind of action or to ad#inister a particular +ind of relief, or it #ay refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or <-= over the property which is the sub6ect to the liti$ation.
The soverei$n authority which or$ani>es a court deter#ines the nature and e(tent of its powers in
$eneral and thus fi(es its co#petency or 6urisdiction with reference to the actions which it #ay
entertain and the relief it #ay $rant.
&urisdiction over the person is ac%uired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
sub#ission to its authority, or it is ac%uired by the coercive power of le$al process e(erted over the
person.
&urisdiction over the property which is the sub6ect of the liti$ation #ay result either fro# a sei>ure of
the property under le$al process, whereby it is brou$ht into the actual custody of the law, or it #ay
result fro# the institution of le$al proceedin$s wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of
the court over the property is reco$ni>ed and #ade effective. /n the latter case the property, thou$h
at all ti#es within the potential power of the court, #ay never be ta+en into actual custody at all. 2n
illustration of the 6urisdiction ac%uired by actual sei>ure is found in attach#ent proceedin$s, where
the property is sei>ed at the be$innin$ of the action, or so#e subse%uent sta$e of its pro$ress, and
held to abide the final event of the liti$ation. 2n illustration of what we ter# potential 6urisdiction over
the res, is found in the proceedin$ to re$ister the title of land under our syste# for the re$istration of
land. ?ere the court, without ta+in$ actual physical control over the property assu#es, at the
instance of so#e person clai#in$ to be owner, to e(ercise a 6urisdiction in re# over the property and
to ad6udicate the title in favor of the petitioner a$ainst all the world.
/n the ter#inolo$y of 2#erican law the action to foreclose a #ort$a$e is said to be a proceedin$
%uasi in re#, by which is e(pressed the idea that while it is not strictly spea+in$ an action in rem yet
it parta+es of that nature and is substantially such. The e(pression "action in re#" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain proceedin$s in courts of ad#iralty wherein the
property alone is treated as responsible for the clai# or obli$ation upon which the proceedin$s are
based. The action %uasi re# differs fro# the true action in re# in the circu#stance that in the for#er
an individual is na#ed as defendant, and the purpose of the proceedin$ is to sub6ect his interest
therein to the obli$ation or lien burdenin$ the property. 2ll proceedin$s havin$ for their sole ob6ect
the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attach#ent, foreclosure, or
other for# of re#edy, are in a $eneral way thus desi$nated. The 6ud$#ent entered in these
proceedin$s is conclusive only between the parties.
/n spea+in$ of the proceedin$ to foreclose a #ort$a$e the author of a well +nown treaties, has said5
Thou$h no#inally a$ainst person, such suits are to vindicate liens4 they proceed upon
sei>ure4 they treat property as pri#arily indebted4 and, with the %ualification above-
#entioned, they are substantially property actions. /n the civil law, they are styled
hypothecary actions, and their sole ob6ect is the enforce#ent of the lien a$ainst the res4 in
the co##on law, they would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional
conveyance as a #ere hypothecation, and the creditor9s ri$ht ass an e%uitable lien4 so, in
both, the suit is real action so far as it is a$ainst property, and see+s the 6udicial reco$nition
of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. <7aples, )roceedin$s /n @e#. sec.
'01.=
/t is true that in proceedin$s of this character, if the defendant for who# publication is #ade appears,
the action beco#es as to hi# a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not
affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem4 and it
should therefore be considered with reference to the principles $overnin$ actions in rem.
There is an instructive analo$y between the foreclosure proceedin$ and an action of attach#ent,
concernin$ which the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates has used the followin$ lan$ua$e5
/f the defendant appears, the cause beco#es #ainly a suit in personam, with the added
incident, that the property attached re#ains liable, under the control of the court, to answer
to any de#and which #ay be established a$ainst the defendant by the final 6ud$#ent of the
court. !ut, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of process on hi#, the
case beco#es, in its essential nature, a proceedin$ in rem, the only effect of which is to
sub6ect the property attached to the pay#ent of the defendant which the court #ay find to be
due to the plaintiff. <3ooper vs. @eynolds, 10 7all., 308.=
/n an ordinary attach#ent proceedin$, if the defendant is not personally served, the preli#inary
sei>ure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer 6urisdiction upon the court. /n this case the
lien on the property is ac%uired by the sei>ure4 and the purpose of the proceedin$s is to sub6ect the
property to that lien. /f a lien already e(ists, whether created by #ort$a$e, contract, or statute, the
preli#inary sei>ure is not necessary4 and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the #anner
provided by law precisely as thou$h the property had been sei>ed upon attach#ent. <@oller vs.
?olly, 11' ,. A., 398, .004 .. *. ed., 0-0.= /t results that the #ere circu#stance that in an
attach#ent the property #ay be sei>ed at the inception of the proceedin$s, while in the foreclosure
suit it is not ta+en into le$al custody until the ti#e co#es for the sale, does not #aterially affect the
funda#ental principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here e(ercisin$ a 6urisdiction
over the property in a proceedin$ directed essentially in re#.
)assin$ now to a consideration of the 6urisdiction of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance in a #ort$a$e
foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action pri#arily fro# the
statutes or$ani>in$ the court. The 6urisdiction of the court, in this #ost $eneral sense, over the cause
of action is obvious and re%uires no co##ent. &urisdiction over the person of the defendant, if
ac%uired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary sub#ission of the defendant or by the
personal service of process upon hi# within the territory where the process is valid. /f, however, the
defendant is a nonresident and, re#ainin$ beyond the ran$e of the personal process of the court,
refuses to co#e in voluntarily, the court never ac%uires 6urisdiction over the person at all. ?ere the
property itself is in fact the sole thin$ which is i#pleaded and is the responsible ob6ect which is the
sub6ect of the e(ercise of 6udicial power. /t follows that the 6urisdiction of the court in such case is
based e(clusively on the power which, under the law, it possesses over the property4 and any
discussion relative to the 6urisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart
fro# the case. The 6urisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the e(clusive ob6ect of
such action, is evidently based upon the followin$ conditions and considerations, na#ely5 <1= that the
property is located within the district4 <-= that the purpose of the liti$ation is to sub6ect the property by
sale to an obli$ation fi(ed upon it by the #ort$a$e4 and <3= that the court at a proper sta$e of the
proceedin$s ta+es the property into custody, if necessary, and e(pose it to sale for the purpose of
satisfyin$ the #ort$a$e debt. 2n obvious corollary is that no other relief can be $ranted in this
proceedin$ than such as can be enforced a$ainst the property.
7e #ay then, fro# what has been stated, for#ulated the followin$ proposition relative to the
foreclosure proceedin$ a$ainst the property of a nonresident #ort$a$or who fails to co#e in and
sub#it hi#self personally to the 6urisdiction of the court5 </= That the 6urisdiction of the court is
derived fro# the power which it possesses over the property4 <//= that 6urisdiction over the person is
not ac%uired and is nonessential4 <///= that the relief $ranted by the court #ust be li#ited to such as
can be enforced a$ainst the property itself.
/t is i#portant that the bearin$ of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are #any
e(pressions in the 2#erican reports fro# which it #i$ht be inferred that the court ac%uires personal
6urisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice4 but such is not the case. /n
truth the proposition that 6urisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be ac%uired by
publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the 2#erican courts until after the
decision had been rendered by the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates in the leadin$ case of
)ennoyer vs. ;eff <90 ,. A. 11.4 -. *. ed., 0'0=. /n the li$ht of that decision, and of other decisions
which have subse%uently been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that 6urisdiction
over the person cannot be thus ac%uired by publication and notice is no lon$er open to %uestion4 and
it is now fully established that a personal 6ud$#ent upon constructive or substituted service a$ainst a
nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all +inds of constructive
or substituted process, includin$ service by publication and personal service outside of the
6urisdiction in which the 6ud$#ent is rendered4 and the only e(ception see#s to be found in the case
where the nonresident defendant has e(pressly or i#pliedly consented to the #ode of service. <;ote
to @aher vs. @aher, 30 *. @. 2. B;. A. C, -9-4 see also 00 * .@. 2., 0804 30 *. @. 2. B;. A.C, 31-
The idea upon which the decision in )ennoyer vs. ;eff <supra= proceeds is that the process fro# the
tribunals of one Atate cannot run into other Atates or countries and that due process of law re%uires
that the defendant shall be brou$ht under the power of the court by service of process within the
Atate, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authori>e the court to pass upon the %uestion of
his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates on this
point, bein$ based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is bindin$ upon the
courts of the )hilippine /slands. /nvolved in this decision is the principle that in proceedin$s in re# or
%uasi in re# a$ainst a nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not
appear, the relief #ust be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal
6ud$#ent a$ainst hi#. <Dewey vs. Des Moines, 113 ,. A., 1934 .3 *. ed., ''04 ?eidritter vs.
li>abeth Eil 3loth 3o., 11- ,. A., -9.4 -8 *. ed., 1-9.= Therefore in an action to foreclose a
#ort$a$e a$ainst a nonresident, upon who# service has been effected e(clusively by publication,
no personal 6ud$#ent for the deficiency can be entered. <*atta vs. Tutton, 1-- 3al., -194 !lu#ber$
vs. !irch, 99 3al., .1'.=
/t is su$$ested in the brief of the appellant that the 6ud$#ent entered in the court below offends
a$ainst the principle 6ust stated and that this 6ud$#ent is void because the court in fact entered a
personal 6ud$#ent a$ainst the absent debtor for the full a#ount of the indebtedness secured by the
#ort$a$e. 7e do not so interpret the 6ud$#ent.
/n a foreclosure proceedin$ a$ainst a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases
of foreclosure, to ascertain the a#ount due, as prescribed in section -0' of the 3ode of 3ivil
)rocedure, and to #a+e an order re%uirin$ the defendant to pay the #oney into court. This step is a
necessary precursor of the order of sale. /n the present case the 6ud$#ent which was entered
contains the followin$ words5
!ecause it is declared that the said defendant n$racio )alanca Tan%uinyen$ y *i#%uin$co,
is indebted in the a#ount of )-.9,300.3-, plus the interest, to the 9!anco spanol-"ilipino9 . .
. therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above a#ount etc., etc.
This is not the lan$ua$e of a personal 6ud$#ent. /nstead it is clearly intended #erely as a
co#pliance with the re%uire#ent that the a#ount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence of
this it #ay be observed that accordin$ to the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure a personal 6ud$#ent a$ainst
the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold and the
proceeds applied to the #ort$a$e debt. <sec. -'0=.
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever #ay be the effect in other respects of
the failure of the cler+ of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance to #ail the proper papers to the defendant in
2#oy, 3hina, such irre$ularity could in no wise i#pair or defeat the 6urisdiction of the court, for in our
opinion that 6urisdiction rest upon a basis #uch #ore secure than would be supplied by any for# of
notice that could be $iven to a resident of a forei$n country.
!efore leavin$ this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that #any
reported cases can be cited in which it is assu#ed that the %uestion of the sufficiency of publication
or notice in a case of this +ind is a %uestion affectin$ the 6urisdiction of the court, and the court is
so#eti#es said to ac%uire 6urisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseolo$y was undoubtedly
ori$inally adopted by the court because of the analo$y between service by the publication and
personal service of process upon the defendant4 and, as has already been su$$ested, prior to the
decision of )ennoyer vs. ;eff <supra= the difference between the le$al effects of the two for#s of
service was obscure. /t is accordin$ly not surprisin$ that the #odes of e(pression which had already
been #olded into le$al tradition before that case was decided have been brou$ht down to the
present day. !ut it is clear that the le$al principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar
lan$ua$e in which the courts have e(pounded their ideas.
7e now proceed to a discussion of the %uestion whether the supposed irre$ularity in the
proceedin$s was of such $ravity as to a#ount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was
secured by the 2ct of 3on$ress in force in these /slands at the ti#e this #ort$a$e was foreclosed.
<2ct of &uly 1, 190-, sec. 0.= /n dealin$ with %uestions involvin$ the application of the constitutional
provisions relatin$ to due process of law the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates has refrained fro#
atte#ptin$ to define with precision the #eanin$ of that e(pression, the reason bein$ that the idea
e(pressed therein is applicable under so #any diverse conditions as to #a+e any atte#pt ay precise
definition ha>ardous and unprofitable. 2s applied to a 6udicial proceedin$, however, it #ay be laid
down with certainty that the re%uire#ent of due process is satisfied if the followin$ conditions are
present, na#ely4 <1= There #ust be a court or tribunal clothed with 6udicial power to hear and
deter#ine the #atter before it4 <-= 6urisdiction #ust be lawfully ac%uired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the sub6ect of the proceedin$4 <3= the defendant #ust be
$iven an opportunity to be heard4 and <.= 6ud$#ent #ust be rendered upon lawful hearin$.
)assin$ at once to the re%uisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case so#e notification of the proceedin$s to the nonresident owner,
prescribin$ the ti#e within which appearance #ust be #ade, is everywhere reco$ni>ed as essential.
To answer this necessity the statutes $enerally provide for publication, and usually in addition
thereto, for the #ailin$ of notice to the defendant, if his residence is +nown. Thou$h co##only
called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. /t is #erely a #eans
provided by law whereby the owner #ay be ad#onished that his property is the sub6ect of 6udicial
proceedin$s and that it is incu#bent upon hi# to ta+e such steps as he sees fit to protect it. /n
spea+in$ of notice of this character a distin$uish #aster of constitutional law has used the followin$
lan$ua$e5
. . . if the owners are na#ed in the proceedin$s, and personal notice is provided for, it is
rather fro# tenderness to their interests, and in order to #a+e sure that the opportunity for a
hearin$ shall not be lost to the#, than fro# any necessity that the case shall assu#e that
for#. <3ooley on Ta(ation B-d. ed.C, 0-1, %uoted in *ei$h vs. 8reen, 193 ,. A., 19, 80.=
/t will be observed that this #ode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containin$ the publication #ay
never in fact co#e to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice #ay often be
very sli$ht. ven where notice is sent by #ail the probability of his receivin$ it, thou$h #uch
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon
the re$ularity and security of the #ail service. /t will be noted, further#ore, that the provision of our
law relative to the #ailin$ of notice does not absolutely re%uire the #ailin$ of notice unconditionally
and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant9s residence is +nown. /n the li$ht of all
these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this +ind is not, under the law,
to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in reco$ni>in$ the efficacy of a #eans of notification which
#ay fall short of actual notice is apparently this5 )roperty is always assu#ed to be in the possession
of its owner, in person or by a$ent4 and he #ay be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with +nowled$e that proceedin$s have been instituted for its conde#nation and sale.
/t is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to ta+e #easures that in so#e
way he shall be represented when his property is called into re%uisition, and if he fails to do
this, and fails to $et notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been re%uired in
such cases, it is his #isfortune, and he #ust abide the conse%uences. <' @. 3. *., sec. ..0
Bp. .00C=.
/t has been well said by an 2#erican court5
/f property of a nonresident cannot be reached by le$al process upon the constructive notice,
then our statutes were passed in vain, and are #ere e#pty le$islative declarations, without
either force, or #eanin$4 for if the person is not within the 6urisdiction of the court, no
personal 6ud$#ent can be rendered, and if the 6ud$#ent cannot operate upon the property,
then no effective 6ud$#ent at all can be rendered, so that the result would be that the courts
would be powerless to assist a citi>en a$ainst a nonresident. Auch a result would be a
deplorable one. <Fuarl vs. 2bbett, 10- /nd., -334 0- 2#. @ep., ''-, ''1.=
/t is, of course universally reco$ni>ed that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other
for# of notice a$ainst a nonresident owner should be co#plied with4 and in respect to the publication
of notice in the newspaper it #ay be stated that strict co#pliance with the re%uire#ents of the law
has been held to be essential. /n 8uaranty Trust etc. 3o. vs. 8reen 3ove etc., @ailroad 3o. <139 ,.
A., 131, 138=, it was held that where newspaper publication was #ade for 19 wee+s, when the
statute re%uired -0, the publication was insufficient.
7ith respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sendin$ of notice by #ail, the
re%uire#ent is that the 6ud$e shall direct that the notice be deposited in the #ail by the cler+ of the
court, and it is not in ter#s declared that the notice #ust be deposited in the #ail. 7e consider this
to be of so#e si$nificance4 and it see#s to us that, havin$ due re$ard to the principles upon which
the $ivin$ of such notice is re%uired, the absent owner of the #ort$a$ed property #ust, so far as the
due process of law is concerned, ta+e the ris+ incident to the possible failure of the cler+ to perfor#
his duty, so#ewhat as he ta+es the ris+ that the #ail cler+ or the #ail carrier #i$ht possibly lose or
destroy the parcel or envelope containin$ the notice before it should reach its destination and be
delivered to hi#. This idea see#s to be stren$thened by the consideration that placin$ upon the
cler+ the duty of sendin$ notice by #ail, the perfor#ance of that act is put effectually beyond the
control of the plaintiff in the liti$ation. 2t any rate it is obvious that so #uch of section 399 of the
3ode of 3ivil )rocedure as relates to the sendin$ of notice by #ail was co#plied with when the court
#ade the order. The %uestion as to what #ay be the conse%uences of the failure of the record to
show the proof of co#pliance with that re%uire#ent will be discussed by us further on.
The observations which have 6ust been #ade lead to the conclusion that the failure of the cler+ to
#ail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irre$ularity, as a#ounts to a denial of
due process of law4 and hence in our opinion that irre$ularity, if proved, would not avoid the
6ud$#ent in this case. ;otice was $iven by publication in a newspaper and this is the only for# of
notice which the law unconditionally re%uires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary
to sustain the proceedin$s.
/t will be observed that in considerin$ the effect of this irre$ularity, it #a+es a difference whether it be
viewed as a %uestion involvin$ 6urisdiction or as a %uestion involvin$ due process of law. /n the
#atter of 6urisdiction there can be no distinction between the #uch and the little. The court either has
6urisdiction or it has not4 and if the re%uire#ent as to the #ailin$ of notice should be considered as a
step antecedent to the ac%uirin$ of 6urisdiction, there could be no escape fro# the conclusion that
the failure to ta+e that step was fatal to the validity of the 6ud$#ent. /n the application of the idea of
due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so ri$orous. The 6urisdiction
bein$ once established, all that due process of law thereafter re%uires is an opportunity for the
defendant to be heard4 and as publication was duly #ade in the newspaper, it would see# hi$hly
unreasonable to hold that failure to #ail the notice was fatal. 7e thin+ that in applyin$ the
re%uire#ent of due process of law, it is per#issible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision
which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlyin$ the e(ercise of 6udicial power
in these proceedin$s. &ud$e in the li$ht of these conceptions, we thin+ that the provision of 2ct of
3on$ress declarin$ that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has
not been infrin$ed.
/n the pro$ress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions4 <1= that the failure of the cler+
to send the notice to the defendant by #ail did not destroy the 6urisdiction of the court and <-= that
such irre$ularity did not infrin$e the re%uire#ent of due process of law. 2s a conse%uence of these
conclusions the irre$ularity in %uestion is in so#e #easure shorn of its potency. /t is still necessary,
however, to consider its effect considered as a si#ple irre$ularity of procedure4 and it would be idle
to pretend that even in this aspect the irre$ularity is not $rave enou$h. "ro# this point of view,
however, it is obvious that any #otion to vacate the 6ud$#ent on the $round of the irre$ularity in
%uestion #ust fail unless it shows that the defendant was pre6udiced by that irre$ularity. The least,
therefore, that can be re%uired of the proponent of such a #otion is to show that he had a $ood
defense a$ainst the action to foreclose the #ort$a$e. ;othin$ of the +ind is, however, shown either
in the #otion or in the affidavit which acco#panies the #otion.
2n application to open or vacate a 6ud$#ent because of an irre$ularity or defect in the proceedin$s
is usually re%uired to be supported by an affidavit showin$ the $rounds on which the relief is sou$ht,
and in addition to this showin$ also a #eritorious defense to the action. /t is held that a $eneral
state#ent that a party has a $ood defense to the action is insufficient. The necessary facts #ust be
averred. Ef course if a 6ud$#ent is void upon its face a showin$ of the e(istence of a #eritorious
defense is not necessary. <10 @. 3. *., 118.=
The lapse of ti#e is also a circu#stance deeply affectin$ this aspect of the case. /n this connection
we %uote the followin$ passa$e fro# the encyclopedic treatise now in course of publication5
7here, however, the 6ud$#ent is not void on its face, and #ay therefore be enforced if
per#itted to stand on the record, courts in #any instances refuse to e(ercise their %uasi
e%uitable powers to vacate a 6ud$e#ent after the lapse of the ter# ay which it was entered,
e(cept in clear cases, to pro#ote the ends of 6ustice, and where it appears that the party
#a+in$ the application is hi#self without fault and has acted in $ood faith and with ordinary
dili$ence. *aches on the part of the applicant, if une(plained, is dee#ed sufficient $round for
refusin$ the relief to which he #i$ht otherwise be entitled. Ao#ethin$ is due to the finality of
6ud$#ents, and ac%uiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to #otions of this character,
since courts are always reluctant to interfere with 6ud$#ents, and especially where they have
been e(ecuted or satisfied. The #ovin$ party has the burden of showin$ dili$ence, and
unless it is shown affir#atively the court will not ordinarily e(ercise its discretion in his favor.
<10 @. 3. *., '9., '90.=
/t is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, n$racio )alanca Tan%uinyen$ y *i#%uin$co, died
&anuary -9, 1910. The #ort$a$e under which the property was sold was e(ecuted far bac+ in 190'4
and the proceedin$s in the foreclosure were closed by the order of court confir#in$ the sale dated
2u$ust 1, 1908. /t passes the rational bounds of hu#an credulity to suppose that a #an who had
placed a #ort$a$e upon property worth nearly )300,000 and had then $one away fro# the scene of
his life activities to end his days in the city of 2#oy, 3hina, should have lon$ re#ained in i$norance
of the fact that the #ort$a$e had been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposin$ that he had
no +nowled$e of those proceedin$s while they were bein$ conducted. /t is #ore in +eepin$ with the
ordinary course of thin$s that he should have ac%uired infor#ation as to what was transpirin$ in his
affairs at Manila4 and upon the basis of this rational assu#ption we are authori>ed, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, to presu#e that he did have, or soon ac%uired, infor#ation as to the sale of his
property.
The 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure, indeed, e(pressly declares that there is a presu#ption that thin$s have
happened accordin$ to the ordinary habits of life <sec. 33. B-'C=4 and we cannot conceive of a
situation #ore appropriate than this for applyin$ the presu#ption thus defined by the law$iver. /n
support of this presu#ption, as applied to the present case, it is per#issible to consider the
probability that the defendant #ay have received actual notice of these proceedin$s fro# the
unofficial notice addressed to hi# in Manila which was #ailed by an e#ployee of the ban+9s
attorneys. 2doptin$ al#ost the e(act words used by the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates in
8rannis vs. Erdeans <-3. ,. A., 3804 08 *. ed., 13'3=, we #ay say that in view of the well-+nown
s+ill of postal officials and e#ployees in #a+in$ proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we
thin+ the presu#ption is clear and stron$ that this notice reached the defendant, there bein$ no proof
that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. 2nd if it was delivered in Manila,
instead of bein$ forwarded to 2#oy, 3hina, there is a probability that the recipient was a person
sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or co##unicate its contents to hi#.
Ef course if the 6urisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon the
#ailin$ of the notice by the cler+, the reflections in which we are now indul$in$ would be idle and
frivolous4 but the considerations #entioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of applyin$
to this situation the le$al presu#ption to which allusion has been #ade. ,pon that presu#ption,
supported by the circu#stances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the
defendant voluntarily abandoned all thou$ht of savin$ his property fro# the obli$ation which he had
placed upon it4 that +nowled$e of the proceedin$s should be i#puted to hi#4 and that he ac%uiesced
in the conse%uences of those proceedin$s after they had been acco#plished. ,nder these
circu#stances it is clear that the #erit of this #otion is, as we have already stated, adversely
affected in a hi$h de$ree by the delay in as+in$ for relief. ;or is it an ade%uate reply to say that the
proponent of this #otion is an ad#inistrator who only %ualified a few #onths before this #otion was
#ade. ;o disability on the part of the defendant hi#self e(isted fro# the ti#e when the foreclosure
was effected until his death4 and we believe that the delay in the appoint#ent of the ad#inistrator
and institution of this action is a circu#stance which is i#putable to the parties in interest whoever
they #ay have been. Ef course if the #inor heirs had instituted an action in their own ri$ht to recover
the property, it would have been different.
/t is, however, ar$ued that the defendant has suffered pre6udice by reason of the fact that the ban+
beca#e the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price $reatly below that which had
been a$reed upon in the #ort$a$e as the upset price of the property. /n this connection, it appears
that in article nine of the #ort$a$e which was the sub6ect of this foreclosure, as a#ended by the
notarial docu#ent of &uly 19, 190', the parties to this #ort$a$e #ade a stipulation to the effect that
the value therein placed upon the #ort$a$ed properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the
debt should re#ain unpaid and the ban+ should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in
that stipulation for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was )-8',000. /t is said in behalf of the
appellant that when the ban+ bou$ht in the property for the su# of )110,-00 it violated that
stipulation.
/t has been held by this court that a clause in a #ort$a$e providin$ for a tipo, or upset price, does
not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale #ade in the foreclosure proceedin$s.
<Gan$co vs. 3ru> ?errera and 7y )iaco, 11 )hil. @ep., .0-4 !anco-spaHol "ilipino vs. Donaldson,
Ai# and 3o., 0 )hil. @ep., .18.= /n both the cases here cited the property was purchased at the
foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or #ort$a$ee, but by a third party. 7hether the sa#e rule
should be applied in a case where the #ort$a$ee hi#self beco#es the purchaser has apparently not
been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this %uestion need not here be considered,
since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the ban+ by purchasin$ for a price below that
fi(ed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived fro# the contract of #ort$a$e4 and
as we have already de#onstrated such a liability could not be the sub6ect of ad6udication in an action
where the court had no 6urisdiction over the person of the defendant. /f the plaintiff ban+ beca#e
liable to account for the difference between the upset price and the price at which in bou$ht in the
property, that liability re#ains unaffected by the disposition which the court #ade of this case4 and
the fact that the ban+ #ay have violated such an obli$ation can in no wise affect the validity of the
6ud$#ent entered in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance.
/n connection with the entire failure of the #otion to show either a #eritorious defense to the action
or that the defendant had suffered any pre6udice of which the law can ta+e notice, we #ay be
per#itted to add that in our opinion a #otion of this +ind, which proposes to unsettle 6udicial
proceedin$s lon$ a$o closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon $rounds which
appeal to the conscience of the court. )ublic policy re%uires that 6udicial proceedin$s be upheld. The
#a(i#u# here applicable is non %uieta #overe. 2s was once said by &ud$e !rewer, afterwards a
#e#ber of the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates5
)ublic policy re%uires that 6udicial proceedin$s be upheld, and that titles obtained in those
proceedin$s be safe fro# the ruthless hand of collateral attac+. /f technical defects are
ad6ud$ed potent to destroy such titles, a 6udicial sale will never reali>e that value of the
property, for no prudent #an will ris+ his #oney in biddin$ for and buyin$ that title which he
has reason to fear #ay years thereafter be swept away throu$h so#e occult and not readily
discoverable defect. <Martin vs. )ond, 30 "ed., 10.=
/n the case where that lan$ua$e was used an atte#pt was #ade to annul certain foreclosure
proceedin$s on the $round that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based
erroneously stated that the Atate of Iansas, when he was in fact residin$ in another Atate. /t was
held that this #ista+e did not affect the validity of the proceedin$s.
/n the precedin$ discussion we have assu#ed that the cler+ failed to send the notice by post as
re%uired by the order of the court. 7e now proceed to consider whether this is a proper assu#ption4
and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a le$al presu#ption that the cler+
perfor#ed his duty as the #inisterial officer of the court, which presu#ption is not overco#e by any
other facts appearin$ in the cause.
/n subsection 1. of section 33. of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure it is declared that there is a
presu#ption "that official duty has been re$ularly perfor#ed4" and in subsection 18 it is declared that
there is a presu#ption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed." These
presu#ptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they e(press ideas which have always been
reco$ni>ed. E#nia presu#untur rite et sole#niter esse acta donec probetur in contrariu#. There is
therefore clearly a le$al presu#ption that the cler+ perfor#ed his duty about #ailin$ this notice4 and
we thin+ that stron$ considerations of policy re%uire that this presu#ption should be allowed to
operate with full force under the circu#stances of this case. 2 party to an action has no control over
the cler+ of the court4 and has no ri$ht to #eddle unduly with the business of the cler+ in the
perfor#ance of his duties. ?avin$ no control over this officer, the liti$ant #ust depend upon the court
to see that the duties i#posed on the cler+ are perfor#ed.
Ether considerations no less potent contribute to stren$then the conclusion 6ust stated. There is no
principle of law better settled than that after 6urisdiction has once been re%uired, every act of a court
of $eneral 6urisdiction shall be presu#ed to have been ri$htly done. This rule is applied to every
6ud$#ent or decree rendered in the various sta$es of the proceedin$s fro# their initiation to their
co#pletion <:oorhees vs. ,nited Atates !an+, 10 )et., 31.4 30 ,. A., ..9=4 and if the record is silent
with respect to any fact which #ust have been established before the court could have ri$htly acted,
it will be presu#ed that such fact was properly brou$ht to its +nowled$e. <The *essee of 8ri$non vs.
2stor, - ?ow., 3194 11 *. ed., -83.=
/n #a+in$ the order of sale Bof the real state of a decedentC the court are presu#ed to have
ad6ud$ed every %uestion necessary to 6ustify such order or decree, vi>5 The death of the
owners4 that the petitioners were his ad#inistrators4 that the personal estate was insufficient
to pay the debts of the deceased4 that the private acts of 2sse#bly, as to the #anner of sale,
were within the constitutional power of the *e$islature, and that all the provisions of the law
as to notices which are directory to the ad#inistrators have been co#plied with. . . . The
court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on which any fact was decided.
<"lorentine vs. !arton, - 7all., -104 11 *. ed., 180.= specially does all this apply after lon$
lapse of ti#e.
2pple$ate vs. *e(in$ton and 3arter 3ounty Minin$ 3o. <111 ,. A., -00= contains an instructive
discussion in a case analo$ous to that which is now before us. /t there appeared that in order to
foreclose a #ort$a$e in the Atate of Ientuc+y a$ainst a nonresident debtor it was necessary that
publication should be #ade in a newspaper for a specified period of ti#e, also be posted at the front
door of the court house and be published on so#e Aunday, i##ediately after divine service, in such
church as the court should direct. /n a certain action 6ud$#ent had been entered a$ainst a
nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the
proceedin$s was called in %uestion in another action. /t was proved fro# the files of an ancient
periodical that publication had been #ade in its colu#ns as re%uired by law4 but no proof was
offered to show the publication of the order at the church, or the postin$ of it at the front door of the
court-house. /t was insisted by one of the parties that the 6ud$#ent of the court was void for lac+ of
6urisdiction. !ut the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates said5
The court which #ade the decree . . . was a court of $eneral 6urisdiction. Therefore every
presu#ption not inconsistent with the record is to be indul$ed in favor of its 6urisdiction. . . . /t
is to be presu#ed that the court before #a+in$ its decree too+ care of to see that its order for
constructive service, on which its ri$ht to #a+e the decree depended, had been obeyed.
/t is true that in this case the for#er 6ud$#ent was the sub6ect of collateral , or indirect attac+, while
in the case at bar the #otion to vacate the 6ud$#ent is direct proceedin$ for relief a$ainst it. The
sa#e $eneral presu#ption, however, is indul$ed in favor of the 6ud$#ent of a court of $eneral
6urisdiction, whether it is the sub6ect of direct or indirect attac+ the only difference bein$ that in case
of indirect attac+ the 6ud$#ent is conclusively presu#ed to be valid unless the record affir#atively
shows it to be void, while in case of direct attac+ the presu#ption in favor of its validity #ay in certain
cases be overco#e by proof e(trinsic to the record.
The presu#ption that the cler+ perfor#ed his duty and that the court #ade its decree with the
+nowled$e that the re%uire#ents of law had been co#plied with appear to be a#ply sufficient to
support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the cler+ as re%uired by the order. /t is true that
there ou$ht to be found a#on$ the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as re%uired by section
.00 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure, showin$ that the order was in fact so sent by the cler+4 and no
such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ou$ht to spea+. !ut the very purpose of
the law in reco$ni>in$ these presu#ptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior 6ud$#ent in the
face of such an o#ission. /f we were to hold that the 6ud$#ent in this case is void because the
proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call the record, the result would be that in
the future every title in the /slands restin$ upon a 6ud$#ent li+e that now before us would depend, for
its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit a#on$ the papers and would be liable at
any #o#ent to be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. 7e thin+ that no court,
with a proper re$ard for the security of 6udicial proceedin$s and for the interests which have by law
been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a conclusion. /n our opinion the proper
course in a case of this +ind is to hold that the le$al presu#ption that the cler+ perfor#ed his duty
still #aintains notwithstandin$ the absence fro# the record of the proper proof of that fact.
/n this connection it is i#portant to bear in #ind that under the practice prevailin$ in the )hilippine
/slands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicatin$ the collective #ass of
papers which contain the history of all the successive steps ta+en in a case and which are finally
deposited in the archives of the cler+9s office as a #e#orial of the liti$ation. /t is a #atter of $eneral
infor#ation that no 6ud$#ent roll, or boo+ of final record, is co##only +ept in our courts for the
purpose of recordin$ the pleadin$s and principal proceedin$s in actions which have been
ter#inated4 and in particular, no such record is +ept in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of the city of
Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure which directs that such a boo+ of
final record shall be +ept4 but this provision has, as a #atter of co##on +nowled$e, been $enerally
i$nored. The result is that in the present case we do not have the assistance of the recitals of such a
record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this 6ud$#ent and as already stated the %uestion
#ust be deter#ined by e(a#inin$ the papers contained in the entire file.
!ut it is insisted by counsel for this #otion that the affidavit of !ernardo 3han y 8arcia showin$ that
upon 2pril ., 1908, he sent a notification throu$h the #ail addressed to the defendant at Manila,
)hilippine /slands, should be accepted as affir#ative proof that the cler+ of the court failed in his duty
and that, instead of hi#self sendin$ the re%uisite notice throu$h the #ail, he relied upon !ernardo to
send it for hi#. 7e do not thin+ that this is by any #eans a necessary inference. Ef course if it had
affir#atively appeared that the cler+ hi#self had atte#pted to co#ply with this order and had
directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed it to 2#oy, this would be conclusive
that he had failed to co#ply with the e(act ter#s of the order4 but such is not this case. That the
cler+ of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the defendant at a #ista+en
address affords in our opinion very sli$ht basis for supposin$ that the cler+ #ay not have sent notice
to the ri$ht address.
There is undoubtedly $ood authority to support the position that when the record states the evidence
or #a+es an aver#ent with reference to a 6urisdictional fact, it will not be presu#ed that there was
other or different evidence respectin$ the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than stated. /f, to $ive
an illustration, it appears fro# the return of the officer that the su##ons was served at a particular
place or in a particular #anner, it will not be presu#ed that service was also #ade at another place
or in a different #anner4 or if it appears that service was #ade upon a person other than the
defendant, it will not be presu#ed, in the silence of the record, that it was #ade upon the defendant
also <8alpin vs. )a$e, 18 7all., 300, 3''4 Aettle#ier vs. Aullivan, 91 ,. A., ..., ..9=. 7hile we
believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case where the person #a+in$
the return is the officer who is by law re%uired to #a+e the return, we do not thin+ that it is properly
applicable where, as in the present case, the affidavit was #ade by a person who, so far as the
provisions of law are concerned, was a #ere inter#eddler.
The last %uestion of i#portance which we propose to consider is whether a #otion in the cause is
ad#issible as a proceedin$ to obtain relief in such a case as this. /f the #otion prevails the 6ud$#ent
of &uly -, 1908, and all subse%uent proceedin$s will be set aside, and the liti$ation will be renewed,
proceedin$ a$ain fro# the date #entioned as if the pro$ress of the action had not been interrupted.
The proponent of the #otion does not as+ the favor of bein$ per#itted to interpose a defense. ?is
purpose is #erely to annul the effective 6ud$#ent of the court, to the end that the liti$ation #ay a$ain
resu#e its re$ular course.
There is only one section of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure which e(pressly reco$ni>es the authority of
a 3ourt of "irst /nstance to set aside a final 6ud$#ent and per#it a renewal of the liti$ation in the
sa#e cause. This is as follows5
A3. 113. ,pon such ter#s as #ay be 6ust the court #ay relieve a party or le$al
representative fro# the 6ud$#ent, order, or other proceedin$ ta+en a$ainst hi# throu$h his
#ista+e, inadvertence, surprise, or e(cusable ne$lect4 )rovided, That application thereof be
#ade within a reasonable ti#e, but in no case e(ceedin$ si( #onths after such 6ud$#ent,
order, or proceedin$ was ta+en.
2n additional re#edy by petition to the Aupre#e 3ourt is supplied by section 013 of the sa#e 3ode.
The first para$raph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows5
7hen a 6ud$#ent is rendered by a 3ourt of "irst /nstance upon default, and a party thereto
is un6ustly deprived of a hearin$ by fraud, accident, #ista+e or e(cusable ne$li$ence, and
the 3ourt of "irst /nstance which rendered the 6ud$#ent has finally ad6ourned so that no
ade%uate re#edy e(ists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearin$ #ay present his
petition to the Aupre#e 3ourt within si(ty days after he first learns of the rendition of such
6ud$#ent, and not thereafter, settin$ forth the facts and prayin$ to have 6ud$#ent set aside. .
. .
/t is evident that the proceedin$ conte#plated in this section is intended to supple#ent the re#edy
provided by section 1134 and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other #eans
reco$ni>ed by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceedin$ in the sa#e cause, procure a
6ud$#ent to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the liti$ation.
The 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure purports to be a co#plete syste# of practice in civil causes, and it
contains provisions describin$ with #uch fullness the various steps to be ta+en in the conduct of
such proceedin$s. To this end it defines with precision the #ethod of be$innin$, conductin$, and
concludin$ the civil action of whatever species4 and by section 190 of the sa#e 3ode it is declared
that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this 3ode. 7e are
therefore of the opinion that the re#edies prescribed in sections 113 and 013 are e(clusive of all
others, so far as relates to the openin$ and continuation of a liti$ation which has been once
concluded.
The #otion in the present case does not confor# to the re%uire#ents of either of these provisions4
and the conse%uence is that in our opinion the action of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance in dis#issin$ the
#otion was proper.
/f the %uestion were ad#ittedly one relatin$ #erely to an irre$ularity of procedure, we cannot
suppose that this proceedin$ would have ta+en the for# of a #otion in the cause, since it is clear
that, if based on such an error, the ca#e to late for relief in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance. !ut as we
have already seen, the #otion attac+s the 6ud$#ent of the court as void for want of 6urisdiction over
the defendant. The idea underlyin$ the #otion therefore is that inas#uch as the 6ud$#ent is a nullity
it can be attac+ed in any way and at any ti#e. /f the 6ud$#ent were in fact void upon its face, that is,
if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there #i$ht possibly be so#ethin$ in this.
7here a 6ud$#ent or 6udicial order is void in this sense it #ay be said to be a lawless thin$, which
can be treated as an outlaw and slain at si$ht, or i$nored wherever and whenever it e(hibits its
head.
!ut the 6ud$#ent in %uestion is not void in any such sense. /t is entirely re$ular in for#, and the
alle$ed defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. /t follows that even if the 6ud$#ent could
be shown to be void for want of 6urisdiction, or for lac+ of due process of law, the party a$$rieved
thereby is bound to resort to so#e appropriate proceedin$ to obtain relief. ,nder accepted principles
of law and practice, lon$ reco$ni>ed in 2#erican courts, a proper re#edy in such case, after the
ti#e for appeal or review has passed, is for the a$$rieved party to brin$ an action to en6oin the
6ud$#ent, if not already carried into effect4 or if the property has already been disposed of he #ay
institute suit to recover it. /n every situation of this character an appropriate re#edy is at hand4 and if
property has been ta+en without due process, the law concedes due process to recover it. 7e
accordin$ly old that, assu#in$ the 6ud$#ent to have been void as alle$ed by the proponent of this
#otion, the proper re#edy was by an ori$inal proceedin$ and not by #otion in the cause. 2s we
have already seen our 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure defines the conditions under which relief a$ainst a
6ud$#ent #ay be productive of conclusion for this court to reco$ni>e such a proceedin$ as proper
under conditions different fro# those defined by law. ,pon the point of procedure here involved, we
refer to the case of )eople vs. ?arrison <8. 3al., '01= wherein it was held that a #otion will not lie to
vacate a 6ud$#ent after the lapse of the ti#e li#ited by statute if the 6ud$#ent is not void on its face4
and in all cases, after the lapse of the ti#e li#ited by statute if the 6ud$#ent is not void on its face4
and all cases, after the lapse of such ti#e, when an atte#pt is #ade to vacate the 6ud$#ent by a
proceedin$ in court for that purpose an action re$ularly brou$ht is preferable, and should be
re%uired. /t will be noted ta+en verbati# fro# the 3alifornia 3ode <sec. .13=.
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the 6ud$#ent appealed fro# is without error, and
the sa#e is accordin$ly affir#ed, with costs. Ao ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avancea, JJ., concur.
S)0ara') O0$%$o%&
MALCOLM, J., dissentin$5
/ dissent. /t will not #a+e #e lon$ to state #y reasons. 2n i##utable attribute J the funda#ental
idea J of due process of law is that no #an shall be conde#ned in his person or property without
notice and an opportunity of bein$ heard in his defense. )rotection of the parties de#ands a strict
and an e(act co#pliance with this constitutional provision in our or$anic law and of the statutory
provisions in a#plification. *iterally hundreds of precedents could be cited in support of these
a(io#atic principles. 7here as in the instant case the defendant received no notice and had no
opportunity to be heard, certainly we cannot say that there is due process of law. @esultantly, "2
6ud$#ent which is void upon its face, and which re%uires only an inspection of the 6ud$#ent roll to
de#onstrate its want of vitality is a dead li#b upon the 6udicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the
power so to do e(ists. /t can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant #enace to the defendant."
<Mills vs. Dic+ons, ' @ich BA. 3.C, .81.=
Au##ary of Shaffer v. Heitner, .33 ,.A. 18', 91 A. 3t. -0'9, 03 *. d. -d '83 <1911=.
Fac'&
8reyhound, a Delaware corporation, lost a lar$e antitrust 6ud$#ent and ?eitner <)= initiated a shareholder
derivative suit in Delaware a$ainst -8 officers and directors of the corporation <i.e. Ahaffer, D=. ?eitner
owned one share of 8reyhound stoc+ and was a nonresident of Delaware. ?eitner filed a #otion for
se%uestration of stoc+ owned by -1 of the defendants in order to obtain %uasi-in-re# 6urisdiction. The
le$al situs of the stoc+ was dee#ed to be in Delaware.
The Delaware se%uestration statute allowed property within the state to be sei>ed to allow the Delaware
court to obtain personal 6urisdiction over the owner. Ahaffer et al. #ade a special appearance to challen$e
the courtKs 6urisdiction on the $rounds that the statute was unconstitutional. Ahaffer also asserted that
there were insufficient contacts to confer 6urisdiction. The District 3ourt found that the statute was valid,
and did not address the #ini#u# contacts ar$u#ent due to the findin$ that the le$al presence of the
stoc+ in Delaware conferred %uasi-in re# 6urisdiction.
I&&-)&
1. 3an a state obtain personal 6urisdiction over a party based on that partyKs ownership of property
in the stateL
-. /s %uasi in re# 6urisdiction sub6ect to the constitutional re%uire#ents of #ini#u# contactsL
1o+"$%* a%" R-+) 2Mar&ha++3
1. ;o. 2 state cannot obtain 0)r&o%a+ 4-r$&"$c'$o% over a party based #erely on that partyKs
ownership of property in the state.
-. Ges. Fuasi in re# 6urisdiction is sub6ect to the constitutional re%uire#ents of #ini#u# contacts.
R-+)&
7hether or not a Atate can assert 6urisdiction over a nonresident #ust be evaluated accordin$ to the
#ini#u#-contacts standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
/n re# 6urisdiction5 due process under the "ourteenth 2#end#ent re%uires that the basis for 6urisdiction
#ust be sufficient to 6ustify e(ercisin$ 6urisdiction over the interests of persons in the thin$. The presence
of property in a Atate #ay allow 6urisdiction by providin$ contacts a#on$ the foru# Atate, the defendant,
and the liti$ation4 for e(a#ple, when clai#s to the property itself are the source of the underlyin$
controversy.
7here, as in this case, the property servin$ as the basis for 6urisdiction is co#pletely unrelated to the
plaintiffKs cause of action, the presence of the property alone, i.e., absent other ties a#on$ the defendant,
the Atate, and the liti$ation, would not support the AtateKs 6urisdiction.
DelawareKs assertion of 6urisdiction over appellants, based solely as it is on the statutory presence of
appellantsK property in Delaware, violates the Due )rocess 3lause, which does not conte#plate that a
state #ay #a+e bindin$ a 6ud$#ent a$ainst an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has
no contacts, ties, or relations. 2ppellantsK holdin$s in the corporation do not provide contacts with
Delaware sufficient to support 6urisdiction of that AtateKs courts over appellants.
Delaware state-court 6urisdiction is not supported by that AtateKs interest in supervisin$ the #ana$e#ent
of a Delaware corporation and definin$ the obli$ations of its officers and directors, since Delaware bases
6urisdiction, not on appellantsK status as corporate fiduciaries, but on the presence of their property in the
Atate.
Thou$h it #ay be appropriate for Delaware law to $overn the obli$ations of appellants to the corporation
and stoc+holders, this does not #ean that appellants have purposefully availed the#selves of the
privile$e of conductin$ activities within the foru# Atate. Aee Hanson v. Denckla. 2ppellants, who were
not re%uired to ac%uire interests in the corporation in order to hold their positions, did not by ac%uirin$
those interests surrender their ri$ht to be brou$ht to 6ud$#ent in the Atates in which they had #ini#u#
contacts.
5$&c-&&$o%
/n Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust we held certain "ourteenth 2#end#ent ri$hts attach
once an adverse 6ud$#ent in re# directly affects the property owner by divestin$ hi# of his ri$hts in the
property. /f 6urisdiction over property involves 6urisdiction over a personKs interests, the proper standard is
the #ini#u# contacts standard of /nternational Ahoe. This #a+es the assertion of 6urisdiction over the
property an assertion of 6urisdiction over the person. Thus, all assertions of 6urisdiction #ust be
deter#ined accordin$ to the standards of /nternational Ahoe and its pro$eny.
Delaware has a stron$ interest in supervisin$ the #ana$e#ent of corporations created within its borders.
The le$islature #ust assert that interest, however. Delaware is not a fair foru# for this liti$ation because
the officers and directors have never set foot in the state and have not purposefully availed the#selves of
the benefits and protections of the state.
5$&0o&$'$o%
@eversed.
Co%c-rr$%* 2Po6)++3
/ reserve 6ud$#ent as to whether ownership of real property in a 6urisdiction #ay provide the contacts
necessary for 6urisdiction. Fuasi in re# 6urisdiction should re#ain valid when real property is involved.
Co%c-rr$%* 2S')7)%&3
This holdin$ should not be read to invalidate in re# 6urisdiction.
Co%c-rr$%* $% Par' a%" 5$&&)%'$%* $% Par' 2Br)%%a%3
The use of #ini#u# contacts is #ore than 6ustified and it represents a sensible approach to the e(ercise
of state court 6urisdiction, however the #a6orityKs approach to #ini#u# contacts is wron$. To be proper,
Atate court 6urisdiction #ust have both notice and a lon$ ar# statute. ,nder this case there is no such
statute.
2s a $eneral rule, a state foru# has 6urisdiction to ad6udicate a shareholder derivative action centerin$ on
the conduct and policies of the directors and officers of a corporation incorporated in that Atate. /
therefore would not foreclose Delaware fro# assertin$ 6urisdiction over appellants were it persuaded to do
so on the basis of #ini#u# contacts. ?eitner however never pleaded or de#onstrated that the
defendants had #ini#u# contacts with the state.
8reyhoundKs choice of incorporation in Delaware is a pri#a facie showin$ of sub#ission to its 6urisdiction.
There was a voluntary association with the Atate of Delaware invo+in$ the benefits and protections of its
laws. The #a6ority opinion is purely advisory once it finds that the state statute is invalid.
IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.
GRN 47517, June 27, 1941
FATS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the C!" #anila against the $enguet
Consolidated #ining Company for the reco%ery of a sum consisting of di%idends &hich ha%e 'een
declared and made paya'le on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of &hich &as 'eing
&ithheld 'y the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares
to the e(clusion of all others) *he company alleged, 'y &ay of defense that the &ithholding of
plaintiff+s right to the disposal and control of the shares &as due to certain demands made &ith
respect to said shares 'y the petitioner !donah Perkins, and 'y one Engelhard)
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner, !donah Perkins,
and Engelhard) Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner !donah Perkins and ,) Engelhard 'e ad-udged
&ithout interest in the shares of stock in .uestion and e(cluded from any claim they assert thereon)
/ummons 'y pu'lication &ere ser%ed upon the nonresident defendants !donah Perkins and Engelhard)
Engelhard filed his ans&er) Petitioner filed her ans&er &ith a crosscomplaint in &hich she sets up a
-udgment allegedly o'tained 'y her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the /C of the /tate of
0e& 1ork, &herein it is declared that she is the sole legal o&ner and entitled to the possession and
control of the shares of stock in .uestion &ith all the cash di%idends declared thereon 'y the $enguet
Consolidated #ining Company)
!donah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that 2the court has no -urisdiction of the
su'-ect of the action,3 'ecause the alleged -udgment of the /C of the /tate of 0e& 1ork is res
-udicata) Petitioner+s demurrer &as o%erruled, thus this petition)
ISS!E:
450 in %ie& of the alleged -udgment entered in fa%or of the petitioner 'y the /C of 0e& 1ork and
&hich is claimed 'y her to 'e res -udicata on all .uestions raised 'y the respondent, Eugene Perkins,
the local court has -urisdiction o%er the su'-ect matter of the action)
R!LING:
$y -urisdiction o%er the su'-ect matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
sought, and this is conferred 'y the so%ereign authority &hich organi6es the court, and is to 'e sought
for in general nature of its po&ers, or in authority specially conferred) !n the present case, the
amended complaint filed 'y the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the ad-udication of title to
certain shares of stock of the $enguet Consolidated #ining Company and the granting of affirmati%e
reliefs, &hich fall &ithin the general -urisdiction of the C!" #anila) /imilarly C!" #anila is empo&ered
to ad-udicate the se%eral demands contained in petitioner+s crosscomplaint)
!donah Perkins in her crosscomplaint 'rought suit against Eugene Perkins and the $enguet
Consolidated #ining Company upon the alleged -udgment of the /C of the /tate of 0e& 1ork and
asked the court 'elo& to render -udgment enforcing that 0e& 1ork -udgment, and to issue e(ecution
thereon) *his is a form of action recogni6ed 'y section 379 of the Code of Ci%il Procedure 8no& section
9:, ;ule 39, ;ules of Court< and &hich falls &ithin the general -urisdiction of the C!" #anila, to
ad-udicate, settle and determine)
*he petitioner e(presses the fear that the respondent -udge may render -udgment 2annulling the final,
su'sisting, %alid -udgment rendered and entered in this petitioner+s fa%or 'y the courts of the /tate of
0e& 1ork, &hich decision is res -udicata on all the .uestions constituting the su'-ect matter of ci%il
case3 and argues on the assumption that the respondent -udge is &ithout -urisdiction to take
cogni6ance of the cause) 4hether or not the respondent -udge in the course of the proceedings &ill
gi%e %alidity and efficacy to the 0e& 1ork -udgment set up 'y the petitioner in her cross"complaint is a
.uestion that goes to the merits of the contro%ersy and relates to the rights of the parties as 'et&een
each other, and not to the -urisdiction or po&er of the court) *he test of -urisdiction is &hether or not
the tri'unal has po&er to enter upon the in.uiry, not &hether its conclusion in the course of it is right
or &rong) !f its decision is erroneous, its -udgment can 'e re%ersed on appeal= 'ut its determination of
the .uestion, &hich the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to pre%ent, is the e(ercise 'y that court
and the rightful e(ercise of its -urisdiction)
Petition denied)
Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll
Supreme Court of Alabama
97 Ala. 126 , 11 So. 803 (1892
!CC"#""A$, %.
&he pla'nt'ff, (. ). Carroll, '*, an+ ,a* at the t'me of enter'n- 'nto the *erv'.e of the
+efen+ant, the Alabama Great Southern Ra'lroa+ Compan/, an+ at the t'me of be'n-
'n0ure+ 'n that *erv'.e, a .'t'1en of Alabama. &he +efen+ant '* an Alabama
.orporat'on, operat'n- a ra'lroa+ e2ten+'n- from Chattanoo-a, 'n the *tate of
&enne**ee, throu-h Alabama to !er'+'an, 'n the *tate of !'**'**'pp'. At the t'me of
the .a*ualt/ .ompla'ne+ of pla'nt'ff ,a* 'n the *erv'.e of the +efen+ant 'n the .apa.'t/
of bra3eman on fre'-ht tra'n* runn'n- from 4'rm'n-ham, Ala., to !er'+'an, !'**.,
un+er a .ontra.t ,h'.h ,a* ma+e 'n the *tate of Alabama. &he 'n0ur/ ,a* .au*e+ b/
the brea3'n- of a l'n3 bet,een t,o .ar* 'n a fre'-ht tra'n ,h'.h ,a* pro.ee+'n- from
4'rm'n-ham to !er'+'an. &he po'nt at ,h'.h the l'n3 bro3e an+ the 'n0ur/ ,a*
*uffere+ ,a* 'n the *tate of !'**'**'pp'. &he ev'+en.e ten+e+ to *ho, that the l'n3
,h'.h bro3e ,a* a +efe.t've l'n3, an+ that 't ,a* 'n a +efe.t've .on+'t'on ,hen the
tra'n left 4'rm'n-ham. 555
&he ev'+en.e ,ent al*o to *ho, that the +efe.t 'n th'* l'n3 .on*'*te+ 'n or re*ulte+
from 't* hav'n- been bent ,h'le .ol+6 that th'* ten+e+ to ,ea3en the 'ron, an+ 'n th'*
'n*tan.e ha+ .ra.3e+ the l'n3 *ome,hat on the outer .urve of the ben+, an+ that the
l'n3 bro3e at the po'nt of th'* .ra.3. 7t ,a* *ho,n to be the +ut/ of .erta'n emplo/ee*
of +efen+ant *tat'one+ alon- 't* l'ne to 'n*pe.t the l'n3* atta.he+ to .ar* to be put 'n
tra'n*, or form'n- the .oupl'n-* bet,een .ar* 'n tra'n* at Chattanoo-a, 4'rm'n-ham,
an+ *ome po'nt* bet,een 4'rm'n-ham an+ the pla.e ,here th'* l'n3 bro3e, an+ al*o
that 't ,a* the +ut/ of the .on+u.tor of fre'-ht tra'n*, an+ the other tra'n men, to
ma'nta'n *u.h 'n*pe.t'on a* o..a*'on affor+e+ throu-hout the run* or tr'p* of *u.h
tra'n*6 an+ the ev'+en.e affor+* -roun+ for 'nferen.e that there ,a* a ne-l'-ent
om'**'on on the part of *u.h emplo/ee* to perform th'* +ut/, or, 'f performe+, the
fa'lure to +'*.over the +efe.t 'n, an+ to remove, th'* l'n3 ,a* the re*ult of ne-l'-en.e.
&he fore-o'n- *tatement of fa.t*, e'ther prove+ or f'n+'n- lo+-ment 'n the ten+en.'e*
of the ev'+en.e, to-ether ,'th the ev'+en.e of the la, of !'**'**'pp' a* to the ma*ter8*
l'ab'l't/ for 'n0ur'e* *u*ta'ne+ b/ an emplo/ee 'n h'* *erv'.e, ,'ll *uff'.e for the
.on*'+erat'on an+ +eterm'nat'on of the 9ue*t'on ,h'.h '* of .h'ef 'mportan.e 'n th'*
.a*e, namel/, ,hether the +efen+ant '* l'able at all, on the fa.t* pre*ente+ b/ th'*
re.or+, for an 'n0ur/ *u*ta'ne+ b/ the pla'nt'ff 'n the *tate of !'**'**'pp'.
555&he onl/ ne-l'-en.e 555 ,h'.h f'n+* *upport 555 'n an/ ten+en./ of the ev'+en.e,
'* that of per*on* ,ho*e +ut/ 't ,a* to 'n*pe.t the l'n3* of the tra'n, an+ remove *u.h
a* ,ere +efe.t've, an+ repla.e them ,'th other* ,h'.h ,ere not +efe.t've. &h'* ,a*
the ne-l'-en.e, not of the ma*ter, the +efen+ant, but of fello, *ervant* of the pla'nt'ff,
for ,h'.h at .ommon la, the +efen+ant '* not l'able. 555
7t '*, ho,ever, further .onten+e+ that the pla'nt'ff, 'f h'* ev'+en.e be bel'eve+, ha*
ma+e out a .a*e for the re.over/ *ou-ht un+er the emplo/er*8 l'ab'l't/ a.t of Alabama,
't be'n- .learl/ *ho,n that there '* no *u.h or *'m'lar la, of for.e 'n the *tate of
!'**'**'pp'. Con*'+er'n- th'* po*'t'on 'n the ab*tra.t,:that '*, +'**o.'ate+ from the
fa.t* of th'* part'.ular .a*e, ,h'.h are *uppo*e+ to e2ert an 'mportant 'nfluen.e upon
't,:there .annot be t,o op'n'on* a* to 't* be'n- un*oun+ an+ untenable. So loo3e+ at,
,e +o not un+er*tan+ appellee8* .oun*el even to +en/ e'ther the propo*'t'on or 't*
appl'.at'on to th'* .a*e,:that there .an be no re.over/ 'n one *tate for 'n0ur'e* to the
per*on *u*ta'ne+ 'n another, unle** the 'nfl'.t'on of the 'n0ur'e* '* a.t'onable un+er the
la, of the *tate 'n ,h'.h the/ ,ere re.e've+. Certa'nl/ th'* '* the ,ell:e*tabl'*he+ rule
of la,, *ub0e.t, 'n *ome 0ur'*+'.t'on*, to the 9ual'f'.at'on that the 'nfl'.t'on of the
'n0ur'e* ,oul+ al*o *upport an a.t'on 'n the *tate ,here the *u't '* brou-ht ha+ the/
been re.e've+ ,'th'n that *tate.555
4ut 't '* .la'me+ that the fa.t* of th'* .a*e ta3e 't out of the -eneral rule ,h'.h the
author't'e* .'te+ above abun+antl/ *upport, an+ author'1e the .ourt* of Alabama to
*ub0e.t the +efen+ant to the pa/ment of +ama-e* un+er *e.t'on 2;90 of the Co+e,
althou-h the 'n0ur'e* .ounte+ on ,ere *u*ta'ne+ 'n !'**'**'pp' un+er .'r.um*tan.e*
,h'.h 'nvolve+ no l'ab'l't/ on the +efen+ant b/ the la,* of that *tate. &h'* 'n*'*ten.e
'*, 'n the f'r*t 'n*tan.e, ba*e+ on that a*pe.t of the ev'+en.e ,h'.h -oe* to *ho, that
the ne-l'-en.e ,h'.h pro+u.e+ the .a*ualt/ tran*p're+ 'n Alabama, an+ the theor/
that, ,herever the .on*e9uen.e* of that ne-l'-en.e man'fe*te+ 't*elf, a re.over/ .an
be ha+ 'n Alabama. (e are referre+ to no author't/ 'n *upport of th'* propo*'t'on, an+
e2hau*t've 'nve*t'-at'on on our part ha* fa'le+ to +'*.lo*e an/.
5557t '* a+m'tte+, or at lea*t .annot be +en'e+, that ne-l'-en.e of +ut/ unpro+u.t've of
+amn'f/'n- re*ult* ,'ll not author'1e or *upport a re.over/. <p to the t'me th'* tra'n
pa**e+ out of Alabama no 'n0ur/ ha+ re*ulte+. =or all that o..urre+ 'n Alabama,
therefore, no .au*e of a.t'on ,hatever aro*e. &he fa.t ,h'.h .reate+ the r'-ht to *ue,:
the 'n0ur/,:,'thout ,h'.h .onfe**e+l/ no a.t'on ,oul+ l'e an/,here, tran*p're+ 'n the
*tate of !'**'**'pp'. 7t ,a* 'n that *tate, therefore, ne.e**ar'l/ that the .au*e of a.t'on,
'f an/, aro*e6 an+ ,hether a .au*e of a.t'on aro*e an+ e2'*te+ at all, or not, mu*t 'n all
rea*on be +eterm'ne+ b/ the la, ,h'.h obta'ne+ at the t'me an+ pla.e ,hen an+
,here the fa.t ,h'.h '* rel'e+ on to 0u*t'f/ a re.over/ tran*p're+. Se.t'on 2;90 of the
Co+e of Alabama ha+ no eff'.a./ be/on+ the l'ne* of Alabama. 7t .annot be allo,e+
to operate upon fa.t* o..urr'n- 'n another *tate, *o a* to evolve out of them r'-ht* an+
l'ab'l't'e* ,h'.h +o not e2'*t un+er the la, of that *tate, ,h'.h '* of .our*e paramount
'n the prem'*e*.
555Se.t'on 2;90 of the Co+e, 'n other ,or+*, '* to be 'nterprete+ 'n the l'-ht of
un'ver*all/ re.o-n'1e+ pr'n.'ple* of pr'vate, 'nternat'onal, or 'nter*tate la,, a* 'f 't*
operat'on ha+ been e2pre**l/ l'm'te+ to th'* *tate, an+ a* 'f 't* f'r*t l'ne rea+ a*
follo,*> ?(hen a per*onal 'n0ur/ '* re.e've+ 'n Alabama b/ a *ervant or emplo/ee,?
et.. &he ne-l'-ent 'nfl'.t'on of an 'n0ur/ here, un+er *tatutor/ .'r.um*tan.e*, .reate* a
r'-ht of a.t'on here, ,h'.h, be'n- tran*'tor/, ma/ be enfor.e+ 'n an/ other *tate or
.ountr/ the .om't/ of ,h'.h a+m't* of 't6 but for an 'n0ur/ 'nfl'.te+ el*e,here than 'n
Alabama our *tatute -'ve* no r'-ht of re.over/, an+ the a--r'eve+ part/ mu*t loo3 to
the lo.al la, to a*.erta'n ,hat h'* r'-ht* are. <n+er that la, th'* pla'nt'ff ha+ no .au*e
of a.t'on, a* ,e have *een, an+ hen.e he ha* no r'-ht* ,h'.h our .ourt* .an enfor.e.
555
Another .on*'+erat'on 555 't '* 'n*'*te+, ent'tle* th'* pla'nt'ff to re.over here un+er the
emplo/er*8 l'ab'l't/ a.t for an 'n0ur/ 'nfl'.te+ be/on+ the terr'tor'al operat'on of that
a.t. &h'* '* .la'me+ upon the fa.t that at the t'me pla'nt'ff ,a* 'n0ure+ he ,a* 'n the
+'*.har-e of +ut'e* ,h'.h re*te+ on h'm b/ the term* of a .ontra.t bet,een h'm an+
the +efen+ant, ,h'.h ha+ been entere+ 'nto 'n Alabama, an+ hen.e ,a* an Alabama
.ontra.t, 'n .onne.t'on ,'th the fa.t* that pla'nt'ff ,a* an+ '* a .'t'1en of th'* *tate,
an+ the +efen+ant '* an Alabama .orporat'on. &he*e latter fa.t*:of .'t'1en*h'p an+
+om'.'le, re*pe.t'vel/, of pla'nt'ff an+ +efen+ant:are of no 'mportan.e 'n th'*
.onne.t'on, 't *eem* to u*, further than th'*> the/ ma/ ten+ to *ho, that the .ontra.t
,a* ma+e here, ,h'.h '* not .ontroverte+ an+, 'f the pla'nt'ff ha* a .au*e of a.t'on at
all, he, b/ rea*on of them, ma/ pro*e.ute 't 'n our .ourt*. &he/ have no bear'n- on the
pr'mar/ 9ue*t'on of the e2'*ten.e of a .au*e of a.t'on, an+, a* that '* the 9ue*t'on
before u*, ,e nee+ not further a+vert to the fa.t of pla'nt'ff8* .'t'1en*h'p or +efen+ant8*
+om'.'le.5555
&he .ontra.t ,a* that pla'nt'ff *houl+ *erve the +efen+ant 'n the .apa.'t/ of a
bra3eman on 't* fre'-ht tra'n* bet,een 4'rm'n-ham, Ala., an+ !er'+'an, !'**., an+
*houl+ re.e've a* .ompen*at'on a *t'pulate+ *um for ea.h tr'p from 4'rm'n-ham to
!er'+'an an+ return. &he theor/ '* that the emplo/er*8 l'ab'l't/ a.t be.ame a part of
th'* .ontra.t 555 7f th'* ar-ument '* *oun+, an+ 't '* *oun+ 'f the +ut'e* an+ l'ab'l't'e*
pre*.r'be+ b/ the a.t .an be *a'+ to be .ontra.tual +ut'e* an+ obl'-at'on* at all, 't
,oul+ lea+ to .on.lu*'on*, the po**'b'l't/ of ,h'.h ha* not h'therto been *u--e*te+ b/
an/ .ourt or la, ,r'ter, an+ ,h'.h, to *a/ the lea*t, ,oul+ be a*toun+'n- to the
profe**'on.555
7t '* the purpo*e of the *tatute, an+ mu*t be the l'm't of 't* operat'on, to -overn
per*on* *tan+'n- 'n the relat'on of ma*ter an+ *ervant* to ea.h other, 'n re*pe.t of the'r
.on+u.t 'n .erta'n part'.ular* ,'th'n the *tate of Alabama. !'**'**'pp' ha* the *ame
r'-ht to e*tabl'*h -overnmental rule* for *u.h per*on* ,'th'n her bor+er* a* Alabama,
an+ *he ha* e*tabl'*he+ rule* ,h'.h are +'fferent from tho*e of our la,6 an+ the
.on+u.t of *u.h per*on* to,ar+* ea.h other '*, ,hen 't* le-al't/ '* brou-ht 'n 9ue*t'on,
to be a+0u+-e+ b/ the rule* of the one or the other *tate, a* 't fall* terr'tor'all/ ,'th'n
the one or the other. 555
=or the error 'n refu*'n- to 'n*tru.t the 0ur/ to f'n+ for the +efen+ant, 'f the/ bel'eve+
the ev'+en.e, the 0u+-ment '* rever*e+, an+ the .au*e ,'ll be reman+e+.
32D2*/; T 2* :A. )E2 T 2*

"IEN#ENIDO $. ADALIN, ROLANDO $. A$!L, DONATO ". E#ANGELISTA, %n& '(e )es' *+
1,7,7 NA$ED-O$PLAINANTS, '()u %n& ./ '(e0) A''*)ne/-0n-+%1', A''/. GERARDO A. DEL
$!NDOvs. PHILIPPINE O#ERSEAS E$PLO2$ENT AD$INISTRATION3S AD$INISTRATOR,
NLR, "RO4N 5 ROOT INTERNATIONAL, IN. AND6OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL "!ILDERS
ORPORATION
GRN 17477,, De1e8.e) 5,1994.
FATS:
*his is a consolidation of 3 cases of /PEC!>? C!@!? >C*!50/ in the /upreme Court for Certiorari)
5n June A, 1989, Cadalin, >mul and E%angelista, in their o&n 'ehalf and on 'ehalf of :B8 other 5C4s
instituted a class suit 'y filing an 2>mended Complaint3 &ith the P5E> for money claims arising from
their recruitment 'y >/!> !0*E;0>*!50>? $C!?DE;/ C5;P5;>*!50 8>!$C< and employment 'y
$;540 E ;55* !0*E;0>*!50>?, !0C 8$;!< &hich is a foreign corporation &ith head.uarters in
,ouston, *e(as, and is engaged in construction= &hile >!$C is a domestic corporation licensed as a
ser%ice contractor to recruit, mo'ili6e and deploy ilipino &orkers for o%erseas employment on 'ehalf
of its foreign principals)
*he amended complaint sought the payment of the une(pired portion of the employment contracts,
&hich &as terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the
*ra%el and ;eser%ed und= interest on all the unpaid 'enefits= area &age and salary differential pay=
fringe 'enefits= reim'ursement of /// and premium not remitted to the ///= refund of &ithholding
ta( not remitted to the $!;= penalties for committing prohi'ited practices= as &ell as the suspension of
the license of >!$C and the accreditation of $;!!
5n 5cto'er B, 1989, the P5E> >dministrator denied the 2#otion to /trike 5ut of the ;ecords3 filed 'y
>!$C 'ut re.uired the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out)
>!$ and $;!! kept on filing #otion for E(tension of *ime to file their ans&er) *he P5E> kept on
granting such motions)
5n 0o%em'er 19, 1989, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for e(tension of time and asked
that >!$C and $;!! declared in default for failure to file their ans&ers)
5n Decem'er B:, 1989, the P5E> >dministrator issued an order directing >!$C and $;!! to file their
ans&ers &ithin ten days from receipt of the order)
8at madami pang motions ang na"file, ne& complainants -oined the case, ang daming ina%ail na
remedies ng 'oth parties<
5n June 19, 198:, >!$C finally su'mitted its ans&er to the complaint) >t the same hearing, the
parties &ere gi%en a period of 15 days from said date &ithin &hich to su'mit their respecti%e position
papers) 5n e'ruary B9, 1988, >!$C and $;!! su'mitted position paper) 5n 5cto'er B:, 1988, >!$C
and $;!! filed a 2Consolidated ;eply,3 P5E> >dminitartor rendered his decision &hich a&arded the
amount of F8B9, A5B)99 in fa%or of only 3B9 complainants) Claimants su'mitted their 2>ppeal
#emorandum or Partial >ppeal3 from the decision of the P5E>) >!$C also filed its #; andGor appeal
in addition to the 20otice of >ppeal3 filed earlier)
0?;C promulgated its ;esolution, modifying the decision of the P5E>) *he resolution remo%ed some of
the 'enefits a&arded in fa%or of the claimants) 0?;C denied all the #;s) ,ence, these petitions filed
'y the claimants and 'y >l$C and $;!!)
*he case rooted from the ?a'or ?a& enacted 'y $ahrain &here most of the complainants &ere
deployed) ,is #a-esty !se $in /elman >l Haifa, >mir of $ahrain, issued his >miri Decree 0o) B3 on
June 1A, 11:A, other&ise kno&n re the ?a'our ?a& for the Pri%ate /ector) /ome of the pro%ision of
>miri Decree 0o) B3 that are rele%ant to the claims of the complainants"appellants are as follo&s:
2>rt) :9: ( ( ( > &orker shall recei%e payment for each e(tra hour e.ui%alent to his &age entitlement
increased 'y a minimum of t&enty"ri%e per centurn thereof for hours &orked during the day= and 'y a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours &orked during the night &hich shall 'e deemed to
'eing from se%en o+clock in the e%ening until se%en o+clock in the morning )3
>rt) 87: riday shall 'e deemed to 'e a &eekly day of rest on full pay)
!f employee &orked, 157I of his normal &age shall 'e paid to him ( ( ()3
>rt) 81= ( ( ( 4hen conditions of &ork re.uire the &orker to &ork on any official holiday, he shall 'e
paid an additional sum e.ui%alent to 157I of his normal &age)3
>rt) 89: E%ery &orker &ho has completed one year+s continuous ser%ice &ith his employer shall 'e
entitled to ?aos on full pay for a period of not less than B1 days for each year increased to a period
not less than B8 days after fi%e continuous years of ser%ice)3
> &orker shall 'e entitled to such lea%e upon a .uantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his
ser%ice in that year)3
>rt) 17:: > contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may 'e terminated 'y
either party thereto after gi%ing the other party prior notice 'efore such termination, in &riting, in
respect of monthly paid &orkers and fifteen days+ notice in respect of other &orkers) *he party
terminating a contract &ithout the re.uired notice shall pay to the other party compensation
e.ui%alent to the amount of &ages paya'le to the &orker for the period of such notice or the
une(pired portion thereof)3
>rt) !ll: ( ( ( the employer concerned shall pay to such &orker, upon termination of employment, a
lea%ing indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the 'asis of fifteen days+ &ages for
each year of the first three years of ser%ice and of one month+s &ages for each year of ser%ice
thereafter) /uch &orker shall 'e entitled to payment of lea%ing indemnity upon a .uantum meruit in
proportion to the period of his ser%ice completed &ithin a year)3
ISS!E:
1) 450 the foreign la& should go%ern or the contract of the parties)8450 the complainants &ho ha%e
&orked in $ahrain are entitled to the a'o%e"mentioned 'enefits pro%ided 'y >miri Decree 0o) B3 of
$ahrain<)
B) 450 the $ahrain ?a& should apply in the case) 8>ssuming it is applica'le 450 complainants+ claim
for the 'enefits pro%ided therein ha%e prescri'ed)<
3) 4hether or not the instant cases .ualify as= a class suit 8siningit ko nalang<
8the rest of the issues in the full te(t of the case refer to ?a'or ?a&<
R!LING:
1) 0?;C set aside /ection 1, ;ule 1B9 of the 1989 ;e%ised ;ules on E%idence go%erning the pleading
and proof of a foreign la& and admitted in e%idence a simple copy of the $ahrain+s >miri Decree 0o)
B3 of 19:A 8?a'our ?a& for the Pri%ate /ector<)
0?;C applied the >miri Deere, 0o) B3 of 19:A, &hich pro%ides for greater 'enefits than those
stipulated in the o%erseas"employment contracts of the claimants) !t &as of the 'elief that &here the
la&s of the host country are more fa%ora'le and 'eneficial to the &orkers, then the la&s of the host
country shall form part of the o%erseas employment contract) !t appro%ed the o'ser%ation of the P5E>
>dministrator that in la'or proceedings, all dou'ts in the implementation of the pro%isions of the ?a'or
Code and its implementing regulations shall 'e resol%ed in fa%or of la'or)
*he o%erseas"employment contracts, &hich &ere prepared 'y >!$C and $;!! themsel%es, pro%ided
that the la&s of the host country 'ecame applica'le to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions
more fa%ora'le than those stipulated therein) ,o&e%er there &as a part of the employment contract
&hich pro%ides that the compensation of the employee may 'e 2ad-usted do&n&ard so that the total
computation plus the non"&ai%a'le 'enefits shall 'e e.ui%alent to the compensation3 therein agree,+
another part of the same pro%ision categorically states 2that total remuneration and 'enefits do not
fall 'elo& that of the host country regulation and custom)3
>ny am'iguity in the o%erseas"employment contracts should 'e interpreted against >!$C and $;!!,
the parties that drafted it) >rticle 13:: of the Ci%il Code of the Philippines pro%ides:
J*he interpretation of o'scure &ords or stipulations in a contract shall not fa%or the party &ho caused
the o'scurity)3
/aid rule of interpretation is applica'le to contracts of adhesion &here there is already a prepared
form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely 2take it or
lea%e it)3 *he presumption is that there &as an imposition 'y one party against the other and that the
employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their 'argaining po&er)
4e read the o%erseas employment contracts in .uestion as adopting the pro%isions of the >miri
Decree 0o) B3 of 19:A as part and parcel thereof) *he parties to a contract may select the la& 'y
&hich it is to 'e go%erned) !n such a case, the foreign la& is adopted as a 2system3 to regulate the
relations of the parties, including .uestions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities
to 'e o'ser%ed 'y them, matters of performance, and so forth) !nstead of adopting the entire mass of
the foreign la&, the parties may -ust agree that specific pro%isions of a foreign statute shall 'e
deemed incorporated into their contract 2as a set of terms)3 $y such reference to the pro%isions of the
foreign la&, the contract does not 'ecome a foreign contract to 'e go%erned 'y the foreign la&) *he
said la& does not operate as a statute 'ut as a set of contractual terms deemed &ritten in the
contract)
> 'asic policy of contract is to protect the e(pectation of the parties) /uch party e(pectation is
protected 'y gi%ing effect to the parties+ o&n choice of the applica'le la&) *he choice of la& must,
ho&e%er, 'ear some relationship the parties or their transaction) *here is no .uestion that the
contracts sought to 'e enforced 'y claimants ha%e a direct connection &ith the $ahrain la& 'ecause
the ser%ices &ere rendered in that country)
B) 0?;C ruled that the prescripti%e period for the filing of the claims of the complainants &as 3 years,
as pro%ided in >rticle B91 of the ?a'or Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as pro%ided in >rticle
1199 of the Ci%il Code of the Philippines nor one year as pro%ided in the >miri Decree 0o) B3 of 19:A)
>rticle 15A of the >miri Decree 0o) B3 of 19:A pro%ides:
2> claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actiona'le after the lapse of one year from
the date of the e(piry of the Contract3)
>s a general rule, a foreign procedural la& &ill not 'e applied in the forum 8local court<, Procedural
matters, such as ser%ice of process, -oinder of actions, period and re.uisites for appeal, and so forth,
are go%erned 'y the la&s of the forum) *his is true e%en if the action is 'ased upon a foreign
su'stanti%e la&)
> la& on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of ?a&s in the sense that it may 'e %ie&ed
either as procedural or su'stanti%e, depending on the characteri6ation gi%en such a la&) !n $ournias
%) >tlantic #aritime Company 8BB7 ) Bd) 15B, Bd Cir) K1955L<, &here the issue &as the applica'ility
of the Panama ?a'or Code in a case filed in the /tate of 0e& 1ork for claims arising from said Code,
the claims &ould ha%e prescri'ed under the Panamanian ?a& 'ut not under the /tatute of ?imitations
of 0e& 1ork) *he C)/) Circuit Court of >ppeals held that the Panamanian ?a& &as procedural as it &as
not 2specifically intended to 'e su'stanti%e,3 hence, the prescripti%e period pro%ided in the la& of the
forum should apply) *he Court o'ser%ed: 2) ) ) &e are dealing &ith a statute of limitations of a foreign
country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose &as to limit the enforcea'ility,
outside as &ell as &ithin the foreign country concerned, of the su'stanti%e rights to &hich the statute
pertains) 4e think that as a yardstick for determining &hether that &as the purpose, this test is the
most satisfactory one)
*he Court further noted: 2>pplying that test here it appears to us that the li'ellant is entitled to
succeed, for the respondents ha%e failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in
.uestion &as specifically aimed against the particular rights &hich the li'ellant seeks to enforce) *he
Panama ?a'or Code is a statute ha%ing 'road o'-ecti%es)3 *he >merican court applied the statute of
limitations of 0e& 1ork, instead of the Panamanian la&, after finding that there &as no sho&ing that
the Panamanian la& on prescription &as intended to 'e su'stanti%e) $eing considered merely a
procedural la& e%en in Panama, it has to gi%e &ay to the la& of the forum 8local Court< on prescription
of actions)
,o&e%er the characteri6ation of a statute into a procedural or su'stanti%e la& 'ecomes irrele%ant
&hen the country of the forum 8local Court< has a 2'orro&ing statute)3 /aid statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of su'stance) > 2'orro&ing statute3 directs
the state of the forum 8local Court< to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims
'ased on a foreign la&) 4hile there are se%eral kinds of 2'orro&ing statutes,3 one form pro%ides that
an action 'arred 'y the la&s of the place &here it accrued &ill not 'e enforced in the forum e%en
though the local statute &as not run against it)
/ection 98 of Code of Ci%il Procedure is of this kind) !t pro%ides: 2!f 'y the la&s of the state or country
&here the cause of action arose, the action is 'arred, it is also 'arred in the Philippine !slands)3
/ection 98 has not 'een repealed or amended 'y the Ci%il Code of the Philippines) !n the light of the
198: Constitution, ho&e%er, /ection 98 cannot 'e enforced e( proprio %igore insofar as it ordains the
application in this -urisdiction of /ection 15A of the >miri Decree 0o) B3 of 19:A)
*he courts of the forum 8local Court< &ill not enforce any foreign claim o'no(ious to the forum+s pu'lic
policy) *o enforce the one"year prescripti%e period of the >miri Decree 0o) B3 of 19:A as regards the
claims in .uestion &ould contra%ene the pu'lic policy on the protection to la'or)
!n the Declaration of Principles and /tate Policies, the 198: Constitution emphasi6ed that:2*he state
shall promote social -ustice in all phases of national de%elopment3 8/ec) 17<)
J*he state affirms la'or as a primary social economic force) !t shall protect the rights of &orkers and
promote their &elfare3 8/ec) 18<)
!n >rticle M!!! on /ocial Justice and ,uman ;ights, the 198: Constitution pro%ides:
2/ec) 3) *he /tate shall afford full protection to la'or, local and o%erseas, organi6ed and unorgani6ed,
and promote full employment and e.uality of employment opportunities for all)3
*hus, the applica'le la& on prescription is the Philippine la&)
*he ne(t .uestion is &hether the prescripti%e period go%erning the filing of the claims is 3 years, as
pro%ided 'y the ?a'or Code or 17 years, as pro%ided 'y the Ci%il Code of the Philippines)
>rticle 1199 of the Ci%il Code of the Philippines pro%ides:
2*he follo&ing actions must 'e 'rought &ithin ten years from the time the right of action accross:
81< Cpon a &ritten contract= 8B< Cpon an o'ligation created 'y la&= 83< Cpon a -udgment3
!n this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the &ritten contracts 'et&een the
litigants, the ten"year prescripti%e period pro%ided 'y >rt) 11998l< of the 0e& Ci%il Code should
go%ern)
3) 05) > class suit is proper &here the su'-ect matter of the contro%ersy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impractica'le to 'ring them all 'efore the
court) 4hen all the claims are for 'enefits granted under the $ahrain la& many of the claimants
&orked outside $ahrain) /ome of the claimants &ere deployed in !ndonesia under different terms and
condition of employment)
!nasmuch as the irst re.uirement of a class suit is not present 8common or general interest 'ased on
the >miri Decree of the /tate of $ahrain<, it is only logical that only those &ho &orked in $ahrain shall
'e entitled to rile their claims in a class suit)
4hile there are common defendants 8>!$C and $;!!< and the nature of the claims is the same 8for
employee+s 'enefits<, there is no common .uestion of la& or fact) 4hile some claims are 'ased on the
>miri ?a& of $ahrain, many of the claimants ne%er &orked in that country, 'ut &ere deployed
else&here) *hus, each claimant is interested only in his o&n demand and not in the claims of the other
employees of defendants) > claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants
as sho&n 'y the fact, that hundreds of them ha%e a'andoned their co"claimants and ha%e entered into
separate compromise settlements of their respecti%e claims) *he claimants &ho &orked in $ahrain can
not 'e allo&ed to sue in a class suit in a -udicial proceeding)
4,E;E5;E, all the three petitioners are D!/#!//ED)
G.R. No. L-16899 :a%-ar. 31, 1963
IN !1E MA!!ER OF !1E !ES!A!E ES!A!E OF E5;AR5 E. C1RIS!ENSEN, 5ECEASE5.
A5OLFO C. A<NAR, E=)c-'or a%" L>C? C1RIS!ENSEN, 1)$r o( 'h) ")c)a&)", (ecutor and
?eir-appellees,
vs.
1ELEN C1RIS!ENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
!. ". Sotelo for e#ecutor and heir$appellees.
%eopoldo !. A&ellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor$appellant.
LABRA5OR, J.:
This is an appeal fro# a decision of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of Davao, ?on. :icente ;. 3usi, &r.,
presidin$, in Apecial )roceedin$ ;o. '-- of said court, dated Aepte#ber 1., 19.9, approvin$ a#on$
thin$s the final accounts of the e(ecutor, directin$ the e(ecutor to rei#burse Maria *ucy 3hristensen
the a#ount of )3,'00 paid by her to ?elen 3hristensen 8arcia as her le$acy, and declarin$ Maria
*ucy 3hristensen entitled to the residue of the property to be en6oyed durin$ her lifeti#e, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. 3arrie *ouise 3. !orton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator dward . 3hristensen. The will was
e(ecuted in Manila on March 0, 1901 and contains the followin$ provisions5
3. / declare ... that / have but E; <1= child, na#ed M2@/2 *,3G 3?@/AT;A; <now Mrs.
!ernard Daney=, who was born in the )hilippines about twenty-ei$ht years a$o, and who is
now residin$ at ;o. ''0 @od$er Goun$ :illa$e, *os 2n$eles, 3alifornia, ,.A.2.
.. / further declare that / now have no livin$ ascendants, and no descendants e(cept #y
above na#ed dau$hter, M2@/2 *,3G 3?@/AT;A; D2;G.
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
1. / $ive, devise and be%ueath unto M2@/2 ?*; 3?@/AT;A;, now #arried to
duardo 8arcia, about ei$hteen years of a$e and who, notwithstandin$ the fact that she was
bapti>ed 3hristensen, is not in any way related to #e, nor has she been at any ti#e adopted
by #e, and who, fro# all infor#ation / have now resides in $pit, Di$os, Davao, )hilippines,
the su# of T?@ T?E,A2;D A/M ?,;D@D )AEA <)3,'00.00=, )hilippine 3urrency
the sa#e to be deposited in trust for the said Maria ?elen 3hristensen with the Davao
!ranch of the )hilippine ;ational !an+, and paid to her at the rate of Ene ?undred )esos
<)100.00=, )hilippine 3urrency per #onth until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which #ay have accrued thereon, is e(hausted..
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
1-. / hereby $ive, devise and be%ueath, unto #y well-beloved dau$hter, the said M2@/2
*,3G 3?@/AT;A; D2;G <Mrs. !ernard Daney=, now residin$ as aforesaid at ;o. ''0
@od$er Goun$ :illa$e, *os 2n$eles, 3alifornia, ,.A.2., all the inco#e fro# the rest,
re#ainder, and residue of #y property and estate, real, personal andNor #i(ed, of
whatsoever +ind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which / #ay be possessed at #y
death and which #ay have co#e to #e fro# any source whatsoever, durin$ her lifeti#e5 ....
/t is in accordance with the above-%uoted provisions that the e(ecutor in his final account and pro6ect
of partition ratified the pay#ent of only )3,'00 to ?elen 3hristensen 8arcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his dau$hter, Maria *ucy 3hristensen.
Epposition to the approval of the pro6ect of partition was filed by ?elen 3hristensen 8arcia, insofar
as it deprives her <?elen= of her le$iti#e as an ac+nowled$ed natural child, she havin$ been
declared by ,s in 8.@. ;os. *-11.83-8. an ac+nowled$ed natural child of the deceased dward .
3hristensen. The le$al $rounds of opposition are <a= that the distribution should be $overned by the
laws of the )hilippines, and <b= that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
?elen 3hristensen, one of two ac+nowled$ed natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. /n a#plification of the above $rounds it was alle$ed that the law that should $overn the
estate of the deceased 3hristensen should not be the internal law of 3alifornia alone, but the entire
law thereof because several forei$n ele#ents are involved, that the foru# is the )hilippines and
even if the case were decided in 3alifornia, Aection 9.' of the 3alifornia 3ivil 3ode, which re%uires
that the do#icile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. /t was also alle$ed that Maria
?elen 3hristensen havin$ been declared an ac+nowled$ed natural child of the decedent, she is
dee#ed for all purposes le$iti#ate fro# the ti#e of her birth.
The court below ruled that as dward . 3hristensen was a citi>en of the ,nited Atates and of the
Atate of 3alifornia at the ti#e of his death, the successional ri$hts and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be $overned by the law of 3alifornia, in accordance with which a testator
has the ri$ht to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the ri$ht of absolute do#inion
over his property is sacred and inviolable </n re McDaniel9s state, 11 3al. 2ppl. -d 811, 11' ). -d
90-, and /n re Iauf#an, 111 3al. -8', .9 )ac. 19-, cited in pa$e 119, @ecord on 2ppeal=. Eppositor
Maria ?elen 3hristensen, throu$h counsel, filed various #otions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. ?ence, this appeal.
The #ost i#portant assi$n#ents of error are as follows5
/
T? *E7@ 3E,@T @@D /; /8;E@/;8 T? D3/A/E; E" T? ?E;E@2!* A,)@M
3E,@T T?2T ?*; /A T? 23I;E7*D8D ;2T,@2* 3?/*D E" D72@D .
3?@/AT;A; 2;D, 3E;AF,;T*G, /; D)@/:/;8 ?@ E" ?@ &,AT A?2@ /; T?
/;?@/T2;3.
//
T? *E7@ 3E,@T @@D /; ;T/@*G /8;E@/;8 2;DNE@ "2/*/;8 TE @3E8;/O T?
M/AT;3 E" A:@2* "23TE@A, *M;TA 2;D 3/@3,MAT2;3A 32**/;8 "E@ T?
2))*/32T/E; E" /;T@;2* *27.
///
T? *E7@ 3E,@T @@D /; "2/*/;8 TE @3E8;/O T?2T ,;D@ /;T@;2T/E;2*
*27, )2@T/3,*2@*G ,;D@ T? @;:E/ DE3T@/;, T? /;T@/;A/3 :2*/D/TG E" T?
TAT2M;T2@G D/A)EA/T/E; E" T? D/AT@/!,T/E; E" T? AT2T E" T? D32AD
D72@D . 3?@/AT;A; A?E,*D ! 8E:@;D !G T? *27A E" T? )?/*/))/;A.
/:
T? *E7@ 3E,@T @@D /; ;ET D3*2@/;8 T?2T T? A3?D,* E" D/AT@/!,T/E;
A,!M/TTD !G T? M3,TE@ /A 3E;T@2@G TE T? )?/*/))/; *27A.
:
T? *E7@ 3E,@T @@D /; ;ET D3*2@/;8 T?2T ,;D@ T? )?/*/))/; *27A
?*; 3?@/AT;A; 82@3/2 /A ;T/T*D TE E;-?2*" <1N-= E" T? AT2T /; ",**
E7;@A?/).
There is no %uestion that dward . 3hristensen was a citi>en of the ,nited Atates and of the Atate
of 3alifornia at the ti#e of his death. !ut there is also no %uestion that at the ti#e of his death he
was do#iciled in the )hilippines, as witness the followin$ facts ad#itted by the e(ecutor hi#self in
appellee9s brief5
/n the proceedin$s for ad#ission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased dward . 3hristensen was born on ;ove#ber -9, 1810 in ;ew Gor+ 3ity, ;.G.,
,.A.2.4 his first arrival in the )hilippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on &uly 1,
1901, on board the ,.A. 2r#y Transport "Aheridan" with )ort of #bar+ation as the 3ity of
Aan "rancisco, in the Atate of 3alifornia, ,.A.2. ?e stayed in the )hilippines until 190..
/n Dece#ber, 190., Mr. 3hristensen returned to the ,nited Atates and stayed there for the
followin$ nine years until 1913, durin$ which ti#e he resided in, and was teachin$ school in
Aacra#ento, 3alifornia.
Mr. 3hristensen9s ne(t arrival in the )hilippines was in &uly of the year 1913. ?owever, in
19-8, he a$ain departed the )hilippines for the ,nited Atates and ca#e bac+ here the
followin$ year, 19-9. Ao#e nine years later, in 1938, he a$ain returned to his own country,
and ca#e bac+ to the )hilippines the followin$ year, 1939.
7herefore, the parties respectfully pray that the fore$oin$ stipulation of facts be ad#itted
and approved by this ?onorable 3ourt, without pre6udice to the parties adducin$ other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. '()ph*'.+t
!ein$ an 2#erican citi>en, Mr. 3hristensen was interned by the &apanese Military "orces in
the )hilippines durin$ 7orld 7ar //. ,pon liberation, in 2pril 19.0, he left for the ,nited
Atates but returned to the )hilippines in Dece#ber, 19.0. 2ppellees 3ollective (hibits "'",
3"/ Davao, Ap. )roc. '--, as (hibits "22", "!!" and "33-Daney"4 (hs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM---Daney" and p. .13, t.s.n., &uly -1, 1903.=
/n 2pril, 1901, dward . 3hristensen returned once #ore to 3alifornia shortly after the
#a+in$ of his last will and testa#ent <now in %uestion herein= which he e(ecuted at his
lawyers9 offices in Manila on March 0, 1901. ?e died at the At. *u+e9s ?ospital in the 3ity of
Manila on 2pril 30, 1903. <pp. --3=
/n arrivin$ at the conclusion that the do#icile of the deceased is the )hilippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in ;ew Gor+, #i$rated to 3alifornia and resided there for nine years,
and since he ca#e to the )hilippines in 1913 he returned to 3alifornia very rarely and only for short
visits <perhaps to relatives=, and considerin$ that he appears never to have owned or ac%uired a
ho#e or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ulti#ately abandon the
)hilippines and #a+e ho#e in the Atate of 3alifornia.
Aec. 1'. @esidence is a ter# used with #any shades of #eanin$ fro# #ere te#porary
presence to the #ost per#anent abode. 8enerally, however, it is used to denote so#ethin$
#ore than #ere physical presence. <8oodrich on 3onflict of *aws, p. -9=
2s to his citi>enship, however, 7e find that the citi>enship that he ac%uired in 3alifornia when he
resided in Aacra#ento, 3alifornia fro# 190. to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the )hilippines,
for the latter was a territory of the ,nited Atates <not a state= until 19.' and the deceased appears to
have considered hi#self as a citi>en of 3alifornia by the fact that when he e(ecuted his will in 1901
he declared that he was a citi>en of that Atate4 so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his 3alifornia citi>enship by ac%uirin$ another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
followin$ principle e(pounded by 8oodrich in his 3onflict of *aws.
The ter#s "9residence" and "do#icile" #i$ht well be ta+en to #ean the sa#e thin$, a place of
per#anent abode. !ut do#icile, as has been shown, has ac%uired a technical #eanin$.
Thus one #ay be do#iciled in a place where he has never been. 2nd he #ay reside in a
place where he has no do#icile. The #an with two ho#es, between which he divides his
ti#e, certainly resides in each one, while livin$ in it. !ut if he went on business which would
re%uire his presence for several wee+s or #onths, he #i$ht properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. /t is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settle#ent as continuin$ only for the particular business in hand, not $ivin$ up his
for#er "ho#e," he could not be a do#iciled ;ew Gor+er. 2c%uisition of a do#icile of choice
re%uires the e(ercise of intention as well as physical presence. "@esidence si#ply re%uires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a $iven place, while do#icile re%uires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to #a+e it one9s do#icile." @esidence, however, is a ter#
used with #any shades of #eanin$, fro# the #erest te#porary presence to the #ost
per#anent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
<8oodrich, p. -9=
The law that $overns the validity of his testa#entary dispositions is defined in 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil
3ode of the )hilippines, which is as follows5
2@T. 1'. @eal property as well as personal property is sub6ect to the law of the country
where it is situated.
?owever, intestate and testa#entary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the a#ount of successional ri$hts and to the intrinsic validity of
testa#entary provisions, shall be re$ulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever #ay be the nature of the property and
re$ardless of the country where said property #ay be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar re%uires the deter#ination of the #eanin$ of the
ter# ,national la), is used therein.
There is no sin$le 2#erican law $overnin$ the validity of testa#entary provisions in the ,nited
Atates, each state of the ,nion havin$ its own private law applicable to its citi>ens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode above %uoted can
not, therefore, possibly #ean or apply to any $eneral 2#erican law. Ao it can refer to no other than
the private law of the Atate of 3alifornia.
The ne(t %uestion is5 7hat is the law in 3alifornia $overnin$ the disposition of personal propertyL
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the e(ecutor-appellee that under the
3alifornia )robate 3ode, a testator #ay dispose of his property by will in the for# and #anner he
desires, citin$ the case of state of McDaniel, 11 3al. 2ppl. -d 811, 11' ). -d 90-. !ut appellant
invo+es the provisions of 2rticle 9.' of the 3ivil 3ode of 3alifornia, which is as follows5
/f there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
dee#ed to follow the person of its owner, and is $overned by the law of his do#icile.
The e(istence of this provision is alle$ed in appellant9s opposition and is not denied. 7e have
chec+ed it in the 3alifornia 3ivil 3ode and it is there. 2ppellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. <Enly the case of Iauf#an is correctly cited.= /t is
ar$ued on e(ecutor9s behalf that as the deceased 3hristensen was a citi>en of the Atate of
3alifornia, the internal law thereof, which is that $iven in the abovecited case, should $overn the
deter#ination of the validity of the testa#entary provisions of 3hristensen9s will, such law bein$ in
force in the Atate of 3alifornia of which 3hristensen was a citi>en. 2ppellant, on the other hand,
insists that 2rticle 9.' should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and followin$ the doctrine
of therenvoi, the %uestion of the validity of the testa#entary provision in %uestion should be referred
bac+ to the law of the decedent9s do#icile, which is the )hilippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus5
The proble# has been stated in this way5 "7hen the 3onflict of *aws rule of the foru# refers
a 6ural #atter to a forei$n law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the forei$n syste#4 i.e., to the totality of the forei$n law #inus its 3onflict of *aws rulesL"
En lo$ic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michi$an court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the 3onflict of *aws rule of /llinois which referred the #atter bac+ to Michi$an law.
!ut once havin$ deter#ined the the 3onflict of *aws principle is the rule loo+ed to, it is
difficult to see why the reference bac+ should not have been to Michi$an 3onflict of *aws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
critici>ed be le$al writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have loo+ed #erely to the
internal law of /llinois, thus re6ectin$ the renvoi or the reference bac+. Get there see#s no
co#pellin$ lo$ical reason why the ori$inal reference should be the internal law rather than to
the 3onflict of *aws rule. /t is true that such a solution avoids $oin$ on a #erry-$o-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this ine#trica&ilis circulas by $ettin$ off at
the second reference and at that point applyin$ internal law. )erhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit #ore consistent for they loo+ always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Atran$ely enou$h, both the advocates for and the ob6ectors to the renvoi plead that $reater
unifor#ity will result fro# adoption of their respective views. 2nd still #ore stran$e is the fact
that the only way to achieve unifor#ity in this choice-of-law proble# is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws for# the le$al basis of the liti$ation disa$ree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. /f both re6ect, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
liti$ation will vary with the choice of the foru#. /n the case stated above, had the Michi$an
court re6ected the renvoi, 6ud$#ent would have been a$ainst the wo#an4 if the suit had been
brou$ht in the /llinois courts, and they too re6ected the renvoi, 6ud$#ent would be for the
wo#an. The sa#e result would happen, thou$h the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The @estate#ent accepts the renvoi theory in two instances5 where the title to land is in
%uestion, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challen$ed. /n these cases the
3onflict of *aws rule of the situs of the land, or the do#icile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the foru#, but any further reference $oes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person9s title to land, reco$ni>ed by the situs, will be reco$ni>ed by every court4 and every
divorce, valid by the do#icile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. <8oodrich, 3onflict of
*aws, Aec. 1, pp. 13-1..=
M, a citi>en of Massachusetts, dies intestate, do#iciled in "rance, leavin$ #ovable property
in Massachusetts, n$land, and "rance. The %uestion arises as to how this property is to be
distributed a#on$ M9s ne(t of +in.
2ssu#e <1= that this %uestion arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to #ovables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased9s last do#icile. Aince by hypothesis M9s last do#icile was "rance, the natural thin$
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to "rench statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in "rench law, and decree a distribution accordin$ly. 2n
e(a#ination of "rench law, however, would show that if a "rench court were called upon to
deter#ine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applyin$ the Massachusetts statute of distributions. Ao on
the surface of thin$s the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action5 <a=
either to apply the "rench law is to intestate succession, or <b= to resolve itself into a "rench
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assu#ption that this is
what a "rench court would do. /f it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applyin$ its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. 2 6ural #atter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
foru# refers to a forei$n law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the #atter bac+
a$ain to the law of the foru#. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The 8er#an ter# for this
6udicial process is 9@uc+verweisun$.9" <?arvard *aw @eview, :ol. 31, pp. 0-3-011.=
2fter a decision has been arrived at that a forei$n law is to be resorted to as $overnin$ a
particular case, the further %uestion #ay arise5 2re the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such forei$n law also to be resorted toL This is a %uestion which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the sub6ect of fre%uent
discussion by te(twriters and essayists4 and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
desi$nated by the# as the "@envoyer" to send bac+, or the "@uchversweisun$", or the
"7eiterverweisun$", since an affir#ative answer to the %uestion postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the forei$n law in toto would in #any cases result in returnin$ the #ain
controversy to be decided accordin$ to the law of the foru#. ... <1' 3.&.A. 81-.=
2nother theory, +nown as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the foru#, in deter#inin$ the %uestion before it, #ust
ta+e into account the whole law of the other 6urisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual %uestion which the rules of the other 6urisdiction
prescribe. This #ay be the law of the foru#. The doctrine of therenvoi has $enerally been
repudiated by the 2#erican authorities. <- 2#. &ur. -9'=
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country e(plained by )rof. *oren>en in an article in the Gale *aw &ournal, :ol. -1, 1911-1918, pp.
0-9-031. The pertinent parts of the article are %uoted herein below5
The reco$nition of the renvoi theory i#plies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporatin$ not only the ordinary or internal law of the forei$n state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. 2ccordin$ to this theory 9the law of a
country9 #eans the whole of its law.
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
:on !ar presented his views at the #eetin$ of the /nstitute of /nternational *aw, at
;euchatel, in 1900, in the for# of the followin$ theses5
<1= very court shall observe the law of its country as re$ards the application of forei$n laws.
<-= )rovided that no e(press provision to the contrary e(ists, the court shall respect5
<a= The provisions of a forei$n law which disclai#s the ri$ht to bind its nationals
abroad as re$ards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be deter#ined by the law of the do#icile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in %uestion occurred.
<b= The decision of two or #ore forei$n syste#s of law, provided it be certain that
one of the# is necessarily co#petent, which a$ree in attributin$ the deter#ination of
a %uestion to the sa#e syste# of law.
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
/f, for e(a#ple, the n$lish law directs its 6ud$e to distribute the personal estate of an
n$lish#an who has died do#iciled in !el$iu# in accordance with the law of his do#icile,
he #ust first in%uire whether the law of !el$iu# would distribute personal property upon
death in accordance with the law of do#icile, and if he finds that the !el$ian law would #a+e
the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality J that is the n$lish law J he #ust
accept this reference bac+ to his own law.
7e note that 2rticle 9.' of the 3alifornia 3ivil 3ode is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in /n re Iauf#an, Supra, its internal law. /f the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
3alifornia are to be enforced 6ointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited /n re Iauf#an should apply to citi>ens livin$ in the Atate, but 2rticle 9.' should apply to such
of its citi>ens as are not do#iciled in 3alifornia but in other 6urisdictions. The rule laid down of
resortin$ to the law of the do#icile in the deter#ination of #atters with forei$n ele#ent involved is in
accord with the $eneral principle of 2#erican law that the do#iciliary law should $overn in #ost
#atters or ri$hts which follow the person of the owner.
7hen a #an dies leavin$ personal property in one or #ore states, and leaves a will directin$
the #anner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was do#iciled at the
ti#e of his death will be loo+ed to in decidin$ le$al %uestions about the will, al#ost as
co#pletely as the law of situs is consulted in %uestions about the devise of land. /t is lo$ical
that, since the do#iciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the sa#e rules should deter#ine the validity of an atte#pted testa#entary
dispostion of the property. ?ere, also, it is not that the do#iciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the do#iciliary state. The rules of the do#icile are reco$ni>ed as controllin$ by
the 3onflict of *aws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the reco$nition as in the
case of intestate succession, is the $eneral convenience of the doctrine. The ;ew Gor+ court
has said on the point5 9The $eneral principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at
the do#icile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. /t had its
ori$in in that international co#ity which was one of the first fruits of civili>ation, and it this
a$e, when business intercourse and the process of accu#ulatin$ property ta+e but little
notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdo# and 6ustice of the rule is #ore apparent than
ever. <8oodrich, 3onflict of *aws, Aec. 1'., pp. ..--..3.=
2ppellees ar$ue that what 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines pointed out as the national
la) is the internal law of 3alifornia. !ut as above e(plained the laws of 3alifornia have prescribed
two sets of laws for its citi>ens, one for residents therein and another for those do#iciled in other
6urisdictions. @eason de#ands that 7e should enforce the 3alifornia internal law prescribed for its
citi>ens residin$ therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citi>ens do#iciled abroad. /f we
#ust enforce the law of 3alifornia as in co#ity we are bound to $o, as so declared in 2rticle 1' of
our 3ivil 3ode, then we #ust enforce the law of 3alifornia in accordance with the e(press #andate
thereof and as above e(plained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-
laws rule for those do#iciled abroad.
/t is ar$ued on appellees9 behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Aec. 9.' of the 3alifornia 3ivil 3ode refers to 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode
of the )hilippines and that the law to the contrary in the )hilippines is the provision in said 2rticle 1'
that the national la) of the deceased should $overn. This contention can not be sustained. 2s
e(plained in the various authorities cited above the national law #entioned in 2rticle 1' of our 3ivil
3ode is the law on conflict of laws in the 3alifornia 3ivil 3ode, i.e., 2rticle 9.', which authori>es the
reference or return of the %uestion to the law of the testator9s do#icile. The conflict of laws rule in
3alifornia, 2rticle 9.', 3ivil 3ode, precisely refers bac+ the case, when a decedent is not do#iciled
in 3alifornia, to the law of his do#icile, the )hilippines in the case at bar. The court of the do#icile
can not and should not refer the case bac+ to 3alifornia4 such action would leave the issue incapable
of deter#ination because the case will then be li+e a football, tossed bac+ and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citi>en and the country of his do#icile. The
)hilippine court #ust apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the %uestion has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
3alifornia provides no le$iti#e for children while the )hilippine law, 2rts. 881<.= and 89., 3ivil 3ode
of the )hilippines, #a+es natural children le$ally ac+nowled$ed forced heirs of the parent
reco$ni>in$ the#.
The )hilippine cases </n re state of &ohnson, 39 )hil. 10'4 @iera vs. )al#aroli, .0 )hil. 1004
Miciano vs. !ri#o, 00 )hil. 8'14 !abcoc+ Te#pleton vs. @ider !abcoc+, 0- )hil. 1304 and 8ibbs vs.
8overn#ent, 09 )hil. -93.= cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two i#portant reasons, i.e., the sub6ect in each case does not appear to be a citi>en
of a state in the ,nited Atates but with do#icile in the )hilippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there e(ists in the state of which the sub6ect is a citi>en, a law si#ilar to or identical with
2rt. 9.' of the 3alifornia 3ivil 3ode.
7e therefore find that as the do#icile of the deceased 3hristensen, a citi>en of 3alifornia, is the
)hilippines, the validity of the provisions of his will deprivin$ his ac+nowled$ed natural child, the
appellant, should be $overned by the )hilippine *aw, the do#icile, pursuant to 2rt. 9.' of the 3ivil
3ode of 3alifornia, not by the internal law of 3alifornia..
7?@"E@, the decision appealed fro# is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be #ade as the )hilippine law on succession provides.
&ud$#ent reversed, with costs a$ainst appellees.
G.R. No&. L-28860 a%" L-28896 March 29, 1989
P1ILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AN5 IN5>S!RIAL BAN@, A"#$%$&'ra'or o( 'h) !)&'a') E&'a') o(
Char+)& N)6'o% 1o"*)& 2S0. Proc. No. 1682 o( 'h) Co-r' o( F$r&' I%&'a%c) o( I+o$+o3, petitioner,
vs.
!1E 1ONORABLE ENICIO ESCOLIN, Pr)&$"$%* :-"*) o( 'h) Co-r' o( F$r&' I%&'a%c) o( I+o$+o,
Bra%ch II, a%" AELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. No&. L-28936 A L-28938 March 29, 1989
!ES!A!E ES!A!E OF !1E LA!E LINNIE :ANE 1O5GES 2S0. Proc. No. 13083. !ES!A!E ES!A!E
OF !1E LA!E C1ARLES NE;!ON 1O5GES 2S0. Proc. No. 16823. P1ILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AN5
IN5>S!RIAL BAN@, ad#inistrator-appellant,
vs.
LOREN<O CARLES, :OSE PABLICO, ALFRE5O CA!E5RAL, SALA5OR G><MAN, BELCESAR
CA>SING, FLORENIA BARRI5O, P>RIFICACION CORONA5O, GRACIANO L>CERO, ARI!EO
!1OMAS :AMIR, MELB>IA5ES BA!ISANAN, PEPI!O I?>LORES, ESPERI5ION PAR!ISALA,
;INIFRE5O ESPA5A, ROSARIO ALINGASA, A5ELFA PREMA?LON, SAN!IAGO PACAONSIS, a%"
AELINA A. MAGNO, 'h) +a&' a& A"#$%$&'ra'r$= $% S0. Proc. No. 1308, a00)++))&, ;ES!ERN
INS!I!>!E OF !EC1NOLOG?, INC., #ovant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, -on.ales and San Agustin for /hilippine Commercial and 0ndustrial 1ank.
!anglapus %a) 2ffice, Antonio %a) 2ffice and "i.al ". 3uimpo for private respondents and appellees
Avelina A. !agno, etc., et al.
BARRE5O, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preli#inary in6unction4 certiorari to Pdeclare all acts of the respondent court
in the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es <Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301 of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of /loilo=
subse%uent to the order of Dece#ber 1., 1901 as null and void for havin$ been issued without
6urisdictionQ4 prohibition to en6oin the respondent court fro# allowin$, toleratin$, sanctionin$, or abettin$
private respondent 2velina 2. Ma$no to perfor# or do any acts of ad#inistration, such as those
enu#erated in the petition, and fro# e(ercisin$ any authority or power as @e$ular 2d#inistratri( of
above-na#ed Testate state, by entertainin$ #anifestations, #otion and pleadin$s filed by her and actin$
on the#, and also to en6oin said court fro# allowin$ said private respondent to interfere, #eddle or ta+e
part in any #anner in the ad#inistration of the Testate state of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es <Ap. )roc. ;o.
1'1- of the sa#e court and branch=4 with prayer for preli#inary in6unction, which was issued by this 3ourt
on 2u$ust 8, 19'1 upon a bond of )0,0004 the petition bein$ particularly directed a$ainst the orders of the
respondent court of Ectober 1-, 19'' denyin$ petitionerKs #otion of 2pril --, 19'' and its order of &uly
18, 19'1 denyin$ the #otion for reconsideration of said order.
@elated to and involvin$ basically the sa#e #ain issue as the fore$oin$ petition, thirty-three <33= appeals
fro# different orders of the sa#e respondent court approvin$ or otherwise sanctionin$ the acts of
ad#inistration of the respondent Ma$no on behalf of the testate state of Mrs. ?od$es.
TH4 5ACTS
En May -3, 1901, *innie &ane ?od$es died in /loilo 3ity leavin$ a will e(ecuted on ;ove#ber --, 190-
pertinently providin$ as follows5
"/@AT5 / direct that all #y 6ust debts and funeral e(penses be first paid out of #y estate.
A3E;D5 / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated, or located, to #y beloved husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, to have and to
hold unto hi#, #y said husband, durin$ his natural lifeti#e.
T?/@D5 / desire, direct and provide that #y husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, shall have the ri$ht to
#ana$e, control, use and en6oy said estate durin$ his lifeti#e, and he is hereby $iven the ri$ht to #a+e
any chan$es in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he #ay thin+ best,
and the purchase of any other or additional property as he #ay thin+ best4 to e(ecute conveyances with
or without $eneral or special warranty, conveyin$ in fee si#ple or for any other ter# or ti#e, any property
which he #ay dee# proper to dispose of4 to lease any of the real property for oil, $as andNor other
#inerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee si#ple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he #ay elect to sell. 2ll rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e fro# said estate shall belon$
to hi#, and he is further authori>ed to use any part of the principal of said estate as he #ay need or
desire. /t is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the i#proved
property now owned by us located at, in or near the 3ity of *ubboc+, Te(as, but he shall have the full ri$ht
to lease, #ana$e and en6oy the sa#e durin$ his lifeti#e, above provided. ?e shall have the ri$ht to
subdivide any far# land and sell lots therein. and #ay sell uni#proved town lots.
"E,@T?5 2t the death of #y said husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of
the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
e%ually divided a#on$ #y brothers and sisters, share and share ali+e, na#ely5
sta ?i$don, ##a ?owell, *eonard ?i$don, @oy ?i$don, Aaddie @ascoe, ra @o#an and ;i#roy
?i$don.
"/"T?5 /n case of the death of any of #y brothers andNor sisters na#ed in ite# "ourth, above, prior to the
death of #y husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, then it is #y will and be%uest that the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall ta+e 6ointly the share which would have $one to such brother or sister had
she or he survived.
A/MT?5 / no#inate and appoint #y said husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, to be e(ecutor of this, #y last
will and testa#ent, and direct that no bond or other security be re%uired of hi# as such e(ecutor.
A:;T?5 /t is #y will and be%uest that no action be had in the probate court, in the ad#inistration of #y
estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and
appraise#ent of #y estate and list of clai#s. <)p. --., )etition.=
This will was subse%uently probated in afore#entioned Apecial )roceedin$s ;o. 1301 of respondent
court on &une -8, 1901, with the widower 3harles ;ewton ?od$es bein$ appointed as (ecutor, pursuant
to the provisions thereof.
)reviously, on May -1, 1901, the said widower <hereafter to be referred to as ?od$es= had been
appointed Apecial 2d#inistrator, in which capacity he filed a #otion on the sa#e date as follows5
6"-47T 48$/A"T4 !2T027 T2 A%%2W 2" A6TH2"094 /4T0T0274" T2 C27T0764 TH4
16S074SS 07 WH0CH H4 WAS 47-A-4D A7D T2 /4"52"! ACTS WH0CH H4 HAD 1447 D207-
WH0%4 D4C4AS4D WAS %0:07-
3o#e petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedin$s, thru his undersi$ned attorneys, to the ?on.
3ourt, #ost respectfully states5
1. J That *innie &ane ?od$es died leavin$ her last will and testa#ent, a copy of which is attached to the
petition for probate of the sa#e.
-. J That in said last will and testa#ent herein petitioner 3harles ;ewton ?od$es is directed to have the
ri$ht to #ana$e, control use and en6oy the estate of deceased *innie &ane ?od$es, in the sa#e way, a
provision was placed in para$raph two, the followin$5 P/ $ive, devise and be%ueath all of the rest, residue
and re#ainder of #y estate, to #y beloved husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, to have and <to= hold unto
hi#, #y said husband, durin$ his natural lifeti#e.Q
3. J That durin$ the lifeti#e of *innie &ane ?od$es, herein petitioner was en$a$ed in the business of
buyin$ and sellin$ personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner #ay thin+ best.
.. J That deceased *innie &ane ?od$es died leavin$ no descendants or ascendants, e(cept brothers
and sisters and herein petitioner as e(ecutor survivin$ spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.
0. J That the present #otion is sub#itted in order not to paraly>e the business of petitioner and the
deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That proper accountin$ will be had also in all
these transactions.
7?@"E@, it is #ost respectfully prayed that, petitioner 3. ;. ?od$es <3harles ;ewton ?od$es= be
allowed or authori>ed to continue the business in which he was en$a$ed and to perfor# acts which he
had been doin$ while deceased *innie &ane ?od$es was livin$.
3ity of /loilo, May -1, 1901. <2nne( PDQ, )etition.=
which the respondent court i##ediately $ranted in the followin$ order5
/t appearin$ in the ur$ent e#$parte #otion filed by petitioner 3. ;. ?od$es, that the business in which said
petitioner and the deceased were en$a$ed will be paraly>ed, unless and until the (ecutor is na#ed and
appointed by the 3ourt, the said petitioner is allowed or authori>ed to continue the business in which he
was en$a$ed and to perfor# acts which he had been doin$ while the deceased was livin$.
AE E@D@D.
3ity of /loilo May -1, 1901. <2nne( PQ, )etition.=
,nder date of Dece#ber 11, 1901, ?od$es filed as such (ecutor another #otion thus5
MET/E; TE 2))@E: 2** A2*A, 3E;:G2;3A, *2AA, ME@T828A T?2T T?
M3,TE@ ?2D M2D ",@T?@ 2;D A,!AF,;T T@2;A23T/E;A 7?/3? T? M3,TE@
M2G DE /; 233E@D2;3 7/T? T? *2AT 7/A? E" T? D32AD */;;/ &2; ?ED8A.
3o#es the (ecutor in the above-entitled proceedin$s, thru his undersi$ned attorney, to the ?on. 3ourt,
#ost respectfully states5
1. J That accordin$ to the last will and testa#ent of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es, the e(ecutor as
the survivin$ spouse and le$atee na#ed in the will of the deceased4 has the ri$ht to dispose of all the
properties left by the deceased, portion of which is %uoted as follows5
Aecond5 / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated, or located, to #y beloved husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, to have and to
hold unto hi#, #y said husband, durin$ his natural lifeti#e.
Third5 / desire, direct and provide that #y husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, shall have the ri$ht to
#ana$e, control, use and en6oy said estate durin$ his lifeti#e, and he is hereby $iven the ri$ht to #a+e
any chan$es in the physical properties of said estate, &; sale or any part thereof which he #ay thin+ best,
and the purchase of any other or additional property as he #ay thin+ best4 to e#ecute conve;ances with
or without $eneral or special warranty, conveyin$ in fee si#ple or for any other ter# or ti#e, any property
which he #ay dee# proper to dispose of4 to lease any of the real property for oil, $as andNor other
#inerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee si#ple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he #ay elect to sell. 2ll rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e fro# said estate shall &elong
to him, and he is further authori>ed to use any part of the principal of said estate as he #ay need or
desire. R
-. J That herein (ecutor, is not only part owner of the properties left as con6u$al, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es. That durin$ the lifeti#e of herein
(ecutor, as *e$atee has the ri$ht to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the )hilippines.
That inas#uch as 3.;. ?od$es was and is en$a$ed in the buy and sell of real and personal properties,
even before the death of *innie &ane ?od$es, a #otion to authori>e said 3.;. ?od$es was filed in 3ourt,
to allow hi# to continue in the business of buy and sell, which #otion was favorably $ranted by the
?onorable 3ourt.
3. J That since the death of *innie &ane ?od$es, Mr. 3.;. ?od$es had been buyin$ and sellin$ real and
personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late *innie &ane ?od$es.
.. J That the @e$ister of Deeds for /loilo, had re%uired of late the herein (ecutor to have all the sales,
leases, conveyances or #ort$a$es #ade by hi#, approved by the ?on. 3ourt.
0. J That it is respectfully re%uested, all the sales, conveyances leases and #ort$a$es e(ecuted by the
(ecutor, be approved by the ?on. 3ourt. and subse%uent sales conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es in
co#pliances with the wishes of the late *innie &ane ?od$es, and within the scope of the ter#s of the last
will and testa#ent, also be approved4
'. J That the (ecutor is under obli$ation to sub#it his yearly accounts, and the properties conveyed
can also be accounted for, especially the a#ounts received.
7?@"E@, it is #ost respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and #ort$a$es
e(ecuted by the (ecutor, be approved by the ?on. 3ourt, and also the subse%uent sales, conveyances,
leases, and #ort$a$es in consonance with the wishes of the deceased contained in her last will and
testa#ent, be with authori>ation and approval of the ?on. 3ourt.
3ity of /loilo, Dece#ber 11, 19'1.
<2nne( P8Q, )etition.=
which a$ain was pro#ptly $ranted by the respondent court on Dece#ber 1., 1901 as follows5
2 " D 4 "
2s prayed for by 2ttorney 8ellada, counsel for the (ecutor for the reasons stated in his #otion dated
Dece#ber 11, 1901, which the 3ourt considers well ta+en all the sales, conveyances, leases and
#ort$a$es of all properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es e(ecuted by the (ecutor 3harles ;.
?od$es are hereby 2))@E:D. The said (ecutor is further authori>ed to e(ecute subse%uent sales,
conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of the properties left by the said deceased *innie &ane ?od$es in
consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testa#ent of the latter.
Ao ordered.
/loilo 3ity. Dece#ber 1., 1901.
<2nne( P?Q, )etition.=
En 2pril 1., 1909, in sub#ittin$ his first state#ent of account as (ecutor for approval, ?od$es alle$ed5
)ursuant to the provisions of the @ules of 3ourt, herein e(ecutor of the deceased, renders the followin$
account of his ad#inistration coverin$ the period fro# &anuary 1, 1908 to Dece#ber 31, 1908, which
account #ay be found in detail in the individual inco#e ta( return filed for the estate of deceased *innie
&ane ?od$es, to wit5
That a certified public accountant has e(a#ined the state#ent of net worth of the estate of *innie &ane
?od$es, the assets and liabilities, as well as the inco#e and e(penses, copy of which is hereto attached
and #ade inte$ral part of this state#ent of account as 2nne( P2Q.
/; :/7 E" T? "E@8E/;8, it is #ost respectfully prayed that, the state#ent of net worth of the
estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, the assets and liabilities, inco#e and e(penses as shown in the individual
inco#e ta( return for the estate of the deceased and #ar+ed as 2nne( P2Q, be approved by the
?onorable 3ourt, as substantial co#pliance with the re%uire#ents of the @ules of 3ourt.
That no person interested in the )hilippines of the ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein accounts be
$iven notice, as herein e(ecutor is the only devisee or le$atee of the deceased, in accordance with the
last will and testa#ent already probated by the ?onorable court.
3ity of /loilo 2pril 1., 1909.
<2nne( P/Q, )etition.=
The respondent court approved this state#ent of account on 2pril -1, 1909 in its order worded thus5
,pon petition of 2tty. 8ellada, in representation of the (ecutor, the state#ent of net worth of the estate
of *innie &ane ?od$es, assets and liabilities, inco#e and e(penses as shown in the individual inco#e ta(
return for the estate of the deceased and #ar+ed as 2nne( P2Q is approved.
AE E@D@D.
3ity of /loilo 2pril -1, 1909.
<2nne( P&Q, )etition.=
?is accounts for the periods &anuary 1, 1909 to Dece#ber 31, 1909 and &anuary 1, 19'0 to Dece#ber
31, 19'0 were sub#itted li+ewise acco#panied by alle$ations identical mutatis mutandis to those of 2pril
1., 1909, %uoted above4 and the respective orders approvin$ the sa#e, dated &uly 30, 19'0 and May -,
19'1, were substantially identical to the above-%uoted order of 2pril -1, 1909. /n connection with the
state#ents of account 6ust #entioned, the followin$ assertions related thereto #ade by respondent-
appellee Ma$no in her brief do not appear fro# all indications discernible in the record to be disputable5
,nder date of 2pril 1., 1909, 3.;. ?od$es filed his first P2ccount by the (ecutorQ of the estate of *innie
&ane ?od$es. /n the PAtate#ent of ;etworth of Mr. 3.;. ?od$es and the state of *innie &ane ?od$esQ
as of Dece#ber 31, 1908 anne(ed thereto, 3.;. ?od$es reported that the co#bined con6u$al estate
earned a net inco#e of )3-8,.0-.'-, divided evenly between hi# and the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es.
)ursuant to this, he filed an Pindividual inco#e ta( returnQ for calendar year 1908 on the estate of *innie
&ane ?od$es reportin$, under oath, the said estate as havin$ earned inco#e of )1'.,-01.31, e(actly
one-half of the net inco#e of his co#bined personal assets and that of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es.
<p. 91, 2ppelleeKs !rief.=
((( ((( (((
,nder date of &uly -1, 19'0, 3.;. ?od$es filed his second P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccount by the
(ecutorQ of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. /n the PAtate#ent of ;etworth of Mr. 3.;. ?od$es and the
state of *innie &ane ?od$esQ as of Dece#ber 31, 1909 anne(ed thereto, 3.;. ?od$es reported that the
co#bined con6u$al estate earned a net inco#e of )-10,'-3.3-, divided evenly between hi# and the
estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. )ursuant to this, he filed an Pindividual inco#e ta( returnQ for calendar year
1909 on the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es reportin$, under oath, the said estate as havin$ earned inco#e
of )130,311.'', e(actly one-half of the net inco#e of his co#bined personal assets and that of the estate
of *innie &ane ?od$es. <pp. 91-9-. 2ppelleeKs !rief.=
((( ((( (((
,nder date of 2pril -0, 19'1, 3.;. ?od$es filed his third P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccount by the (ecutor
for the Gear 19'0S of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. /n the PAtate#ent of ;et 7orth of Mr. 3.;.
?od$es and the state of *innie &ane ?od$esQ as of Dece#ber 31, 19'0 anne(ed thereto, 3.;. ?od$es
reported that the co#bined con6u$al estate earned a net inco#e of )31.,801.9., divided evenly between
hi# and the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. )ursuant to this, he filed an Pindividual inco#e ta( returnQ for
calendar year 19'0 on the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es reportin$, under oath, the said estate as havin$
earned inco#e of )101,.-8.91, e(actly one-half of the net inco#e of his co#bined personal assets and
that of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. <)p. 9--93, 2ppelleeKs !rief.=
*i+ewise the followin$5
/n the petition for probate that he <?od$es= filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of *innie &ane as
her PheirsQ <see p. -, 8reen @E2=. The order of the court ad#ittin$ the will to probate unfortunately
o#itted one of the heirs, @oy ?i$don <see p. 1., 8reen @E2=. /##ediately, 3.;. ?od$es filed a verified
#otion to have @oy ?i$donKs na#e included as an heir, statin$ that he wanted to strai$hten the records
Pin order the heirs of deceased @oy ?i$don #ay not thin+ or believe they were o#itted, and that they
were really and are interested in the estate of deceased *innie &ane ?od$es. .
2s an e(ecutor, he was bound to file ta( returns for the estate he was ad#inisterin$ under 2#erican law.
?e did file such as estate ta( return on 2u$ust 8, 1908. /n Achedule PMQ of such return, he answered
PGesQ to the %uestion as to whether he was conte#platin$ Prenouncin$ the willQ. En the %uestion as to
what property interests passed to hi# as the survivin$ spouse, he answered5
P;one, e(cept for purposes of ad#inisterin$ the state, payin$ debts, ta(es and other le$al char$es. /t is
the intention of the survivin$ husband of deceased to distribute the re#ainin$ property and interests of the
deceased in their 3o##unity estate to the devisees and le$atees na#ed in the will when the debts,
liabilities, ta(es and e(penses of ad#inistration are finally deter#ined and paid.Q
2$ain, on 2u$ust 9, 19'-, barely four #onths before his death, he e(ecuted an PaffidavitQ wherein he
ratified and confir#ed all that he stated in Achedule PMQ of his estate ta( returns as to his havin$
renounced what was $iven hi# by his wifeKs will.
1
2s appointed e(ecutor, 3.;. ?od$es filed an P/nventoryQ dated May 1-, 1908. ?e listed all the assets of
his con6u$al partnership with *innie &ane ?od$es on a separate balance sheet and then stated e(pressly
that her estate which has co#e into his possession as e(ecutor was Pone-half of all the ite#sQ listed in
said balance sheet. <)p. 89-90, 2ppelleeKs !rief.=
)arenthetically, it #ay be stated, at this 6uncture, that 7e are ta+in$ pains to %uote wholly or at least,
e(tensively fro# so#e of the pleadin$s and orders whenever 7e feel that it is necessary to do so for a
#ore co#prehensive and clearer view of the i#portant and decisive issues raised by the parties and a
#ore accurate appraisal of their respective positions in re$ard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anythin$ else was done in the above-#entioned Apecial
)roceedin$s ;o. 1301 until Dece#ber -', 19'-, when on account of the death of ?od$es the day before,
the sa#e lawyer, 2tty. *eon ). 8ellada, who had been previously actin$ as counsel for ?od$es in his
capacity as (ecutor of his wifeKs estate, and as such had filed the afore%uoted #otions and
#anifestations, filed the followin$5
,@8;T 48$/A"T4 MET/E; "E@ T? 2))E/;TM;T E" 2
A)3/2* 2DM/;/AT@2T@/M
3EMA the undersi$ned attorney for the (ecutor in the above-entitled proceedin$s, to the ?onorable
3ourt, #ost respectfully states5
1. That in accordance with the *ast 7ill and Testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es <deceased=, her husband,
3harles ;ewton ?od$es was to act as (ecutor, and in fact, in an order issued by this ?on. 3ourt dated
&une -8, 1901, the said 3harles ;ewton ?od$es was appointed (ecutor and had perfor#ed the duties
as such.
-. That last Dece#ber --, 19'-, the said 3harles ;ewton ?od$es was stric+en ill, and brou$ht to the
/loilo Mission ?ospital for treat#ent, but unfortunately, he died on Dece#ber -0, 19'-, as shown by a
copy of the death certificate hereto attached and #ar+ed as 2nne( P2Q.
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es, whatever
real and personal properties that #ay re#ain at the death of her husband 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, the
said properties shall be e%ually divided a#on$ their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left
by 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, which need to be ad#inistered and ta+en care of.
.. That the estate of deceased *innie &ane ?od$es, as well as that of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, have not
as yet been deter#ined or ascertained, and there is necessity for the appoint#ent of a $eneral
ad#inistrator to li%uidate and distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and le$atees of both
spouses. That in accordance with the provisions of Aection - of @ule 10 of the @ules of 3ourt, the
con6u$al partnership of *innie &ane ?od$es and 3harles ;ewton ?od$es shall be li%uidated in the testate
proceedin$s of the wife.
0. That the undersi$ned counsel, has perfect personal +nowled$e of the e(istence of the last will and
testa#ent of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, with si#ilar provisions as that contained in the last will and
testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es. ?owever, said last will and testa#ent of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es is
+ept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will be presented in due ti#e before this honorable
3ourt.
'. That in the #eanti#e, it is i#perative and indispensable that, an 2d#inistratri( be appointed for the
estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and a Apecial 2d#inistratri( for the estate of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, to
perfor# the duties re%uired by law, to ad#inister, collect, and ta+e char$e of the $oods, chattels, ri$hts,
credits, and estate of both spouses, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es and *innie &ane ?od$es, as provided for in
Aection 1 and -, @ule 81 of the @ules of 3ourt.
1. That there is delay in $rantin$ letters testa#entary or of ad#inistration, because the last will and
testa#ent of deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, is still +ept in his safe or vault, and in the #eanti#e,
unless an ad#inistratri( <and,= at the sa#e ti#e, a Apecial 2d#inistratri( is appointed, the estate of both
spouses are in dan$er of bein$ lost, da#a$ed or $o to waste.
8. That the #ost trusted e#ployee of both spouses *innie &ane ?od$es and 3.;. ?od$es, who had been
e#ployed for around thirty <30= years, in the person of Miss 2velina Ma$no, <should= be appointed
2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and at the sa#e ti#e Apecial 2d#inistratri( of the
estate of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es. That the said Miss 2velina Ma$no is of le$al a$e, a resident of the
)hilippines, the #ost fit, co#petent, trustworthy and well-%ualified person to serve the duties of
2d#inistratri( and Apecial 2d#inistratri( and is willin$ to act as such.
9. That Miss 2velina Ma$no is also willin$ to file bond in such su# which the ?on. 3ourt believes
reasonable.
7?@"E@, in view of all the fore$oin$, it is #ost respectfully prayed that, Miss 2:*/;2 2. M28;E
be i##ediately appointed 2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and as Apecial
2d#inistratri( of the estate of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, with powers and duties provided for by law. That
the ?onorable 3ourt fi( the reasonable bond of )1,000.00 to be filed by 2velina 2. Ma$no.
<2nne( PEQ, )etition.=
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus5 .
"or the reasons alle$ed in the ,r$ent 4#$parte Motion filed by counsel for the (ecutor dated Dece#ber
-0, 19'-, which the 3ourt finds #eritorious, Miss 2:*/;2 2. M28;E, is hereby appointed
2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and as Apecial 2d#inistratri( of the estate of 3harles
;ewton ?od$es, in the latter case, because the last will of said 3harles ;ewton ?od$es is still +ept in his
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses #ay be lost, da#a$ed or $o to
waste, unless a Apecial 2d#inistratri( is appointed.
Miss 2velina 2. Ma$no is re%uired to file bond in the su# of "/: T?E,A2;D )AEA <)0,000.00=, and
after havin$ done so, let letters of 2d#inistration be issued to her.Q <2nne( P)Q, )etition.=
En Dece#ber -9, 19'-, however, upon ur$ent e#$parte petition of respondent Ma$no herself, thru 2tty.
8ellada, ?arold, @. Davies, Pa representative of the heirs of deceased 3harles ;ewton ?od$es <who had=
arrived fro# the ,nited Atates of 2#erica to help in the ad#inistration of the estate of said deceasedQ
was appointed as 3o-Apecial 2d#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es, <pp. -9-33, Gellow T @ecord on
2ppeal= only to be replaced as such co-special ad#inistrator on &anuary --, 19'3 by &oe ?od$es, who,
accordin$ to the #otion of the sa#e attorney, is Pthe nephew of the deceased <who had= arrived fro# the
,nited Atates with instructions fro# the other heirs of the deceased to ad#inister the properties or estate
of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es in the )hilippines, <)p. .1-00, id.=
Meanwhile, under date of &anuary 9, 19'3, the sa#e 2tty. 8ellada filed in Apecial )roceedin$s 1'1- a
petition for the probate of the will of ?od$es,
2
with a prayer for the issuance of letters of ad#inistration to
the sa#e &oe ?od$es, albeit the #otion was followed on "ebruary --, 19'3 by a separate one as+in$
that 2tty. "ernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-ad#inistrator. En the sa#e date this latter #otion was
filed, the court issued the correspondin$ order of probate and letters of ad#inistration to &oe ?od$es and
2tty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
2t this 6uncture, a$ain, it #ay also be e(plained that 6ust as, in her will, Mrs. ?od$es be%ueathed her
whole estate to her husband Pto have and to hold unto hi#, #y said husband, durin$ his natural lifeti#eQ,
she, at the sa#e ti#e or in li+e #anner, provided that Pat the death of #y said husband J / $ive devise
and be%ueath all of the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be e%ually divided a#on$ #y brothers and sisters, share and share ali+e JQ.
2ccordin$ly, it beca#e incu#bent upon ?od$es, as e(ecutor of his wifeKs will, to duly li%uidate the
con6u$al partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death,
Pthe rest, residue and re#ainderQ thereof could be deter#ined and correspondin$ly distributed or divided
a#on$ her brothers and sisters. 2nd it was precisely because no such li%uidation was done, further#ore,
there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be $overned by the laws of the
)hilippines or those of Te(as, of which Atate she was a national, and, what is #ore, as already stated,
?od$es #ade official and sworn state#ents or #anifestations indicatin$ that as far as he was concerned
no Pproperty interests passed to hi# as survivin$ spouse J Pe(cept for purposes of ad#inisterin$ the
estate, payin$ debts, ta(es and other le$al char$esQ and it was the intention of the survivin$ husband of
the deceased to distribute the re#ainin$ property and interests of the deceased in their 3o##unity
state to the devisees and le$atees na#ed in the will when the debts, liabilities, ta(es and e(penses of
ad#inistration are finally deter#ined and paidQ, that the incidents and controversies now before ,s for
resolution arose. 2s #ay be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of ?od$es beca#e rather
unusual and so, %uite understandably, the lower courtKs actuations presently under review are apparently
wantin$ in consistency and see#in$ly lac+ proper orientation.
Thus, 7e cannot discern clearly fro# the record before ,s the precise perspective fro# which the trial
court proceeded in issuin$ its %uestioned orders. 2nd, re$retably, none of the len$thy briefs sub#itted by
the parties is of valuable assistance in clearin$ up the #atter.
To be$in with, 7e $ather fro# the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed
cases, one with $reen cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of #odus
operandi had been a$reed upon by the parties under which the respective ad#inistrators of the two
estates were supposed to act con6ointly, but since no copy of the said a$ree#ent can be found in the
record before ,s, 7e have no way of +nowin$ when e(actly such a$ree#ent was entered into and under
what specific ter#s. 2nd while reference is #ade to said modus operandi in the order of Aepte#ber 11,
19'., on pa$es -00--0' of the 8reen @ecord on 2ppeal, readin$ thus5
The present incident is to hear the side of ad#inistratri(, Miss 2velina 2. Ma$no, in answer to the char$es
contained in the #otion filed by 2tty. 3esar Tirol on Aepte#ber 3, 19'.. /n answer to the said char$es,
Miss 2velina 2. Ma$no, throu$h her counsel, 2tty. @i>al Fui#po, filed a written #anifestation.
2fter readin$ the #anifestation here of 2tty. Fui#po, for and in behalf of the ad#inistratri(, Miss 2velina
2. Ma$no, the 3ourt finds that everythin$ that happened before Aepte#ber 3, 19'., which was resolved
on Aepte#ber 8, 19'., to the satisfaction of parties, was si#ply due to a #isunderstandin$ between the
representative of the )hilippine 3o##ercial and /ndustrial !an+ and Miss Ma$no and in order to restore
the har#onious relations between the parties, the 3ourt ordered the parties to re#ain in status quo as to
their #odus operandi before Aepte#ber 1, 19'., until after the 3ourt can have a #eetin$ with all the
parties and their counsels on Ectober 3, as for#erly a$reed upon between counsels, 2ttys. E>aeta,
8ibbs and E>aeta, 2ttys. Tirol and Tirol and 2tty. @i>al Fui#po.
/n the #eanti#e, the prayers of 2tty. Fui#po as stated in his #anifestation shall not be resolved by this
3ourt until Ectober 3, 19'..
AE E@D@D.
there is nothin$ in the record indicatin$ whatever happened to it afterwards, e(cept that a$ain, reference
thereto was #ade in the appealed order of Ectober -1, 19'0, on pa$es -9---90 of the 8reen @ecord on
2ppeal, as follows5
En record is an ur$ent #otion to allow )3/! to open all doors and loc+s in the ?od$es Effice at -0'--08
8uanco Atreet, /loilo 3ity, to ta+e i##ediate and e(clusive possession thereof and to place its own loc+s
and +eys for security purposes of the )3/! dated Ectober -1, 19'0 thru 2tty. 3esar Tirol. /t is alle$ed in
said ur$ent #otion that 2d#inistratri( Ma$no of the testate estate of *innie &ane ?od$es refused to open
the ?od$es Effice at -0'--08 8uanco Atreet, /loilo 3ity where )3/! holds office and therefore )3/! is
sufferin$ $reat #oral da#a$e and pre6udice as a result of said act. /t is prayed that an order be issued
authori>in$ it <)3/!= to open all doors and loc+s in the said office, to ta+e i##ediate and e(clusive
possession thereof and place thereon its own loc+s and +eys for security purposes4 instructin$ the cler+ of
court or any available deputy to witness and supervise the openin$ of all doors and loc+s and ta+in$
possession of the )3/!.
2 written opposition has been filed by 2d#inistratri( Ma$no of even date <Ect. -1= thru counsel @i>al
Fui#po statin$ therein that she was co#pelled to close the office for the reason that the )3/! failed to
co#ply with the order of this 3ourt si$ned by &ud$e 2nacleto /. !ellosillo dated Aepte#ber 11, 19'. to
the effect that both estates should re#ain in status quo to their modus operandi as of Aepte#ber 1, 19'..
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation of the office of both
estates, the 3ourt aside fro# the reasons stated in the ur$ent #otion and opposition heard the verbal
ar$u#ents of 2tty. 3esar Tirol for the )3/! and 2tty. @i>al Fui#po for 2d#inistrati( Ma$no.
2fter due consideration, the 3ourt hereby orders Ma$no to open all doors and loc+s in the ?od$es Effice
at -0'--08 8uanco Atreet, /loilo 3ity in the presence of the )3/! or its duly authori>ed representative and
deputy cler+ of court 2lbis of this branch not later than 1530 to#orrow #ornin$ Ectober -8, 19'0 in order
that the office of said estates could operate for business.
)ursuant to the order of this 3ourt thru &ud$e !ellosillo dated Aepte#ber 11, 19'., it is hereby ordered5
<a= That all cash collections should be deposited in the 6oint account of the estates of *innie &ane ?od$es
and estates of 3.;. ?od$es4
<b= That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should
be withdrawn and since then deposited in the 6oint account of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and the
estate of 3.;. ?od$es4
<c= That the )3/! should countersi$n the chec+ in the a#ount of )-00 in favor of 2d#inistratri( 2velina 2.
Ma$no as her co#pensation as ad#inistratri( of the *innie &ane ?od$es estate char$eable to the testate
estate of *innie &ane ?od$es only4
<d= That 2d#inistratri( Ma$no is hereby directed to allow the )3/! to inspect whatever records,
docu#ents and papers she #ay have in her possession in the sa#e #anner that 2d#inistrator )3/! is
also directed to allow 2d#inistratri( Ma$no to inspect whatever records, docu#ents and papers it #ay
have in its possession4
<e= That the accountant of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es shall have access to all records of the
transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es4 and in li+e #anner the
accountant or any authori>ed representative of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es shall have access to the
records of transactions of the *innie &ane ?od$es estate for the protection of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es.
Ence the estatesK office shall have been opened by 2d#inistratri( Ma$no in the presence of the )3/! or
its duly authori>ed representative and deputy cler+ 2lbis or his duly authori>ed representative, both
estates or any of the estates should not close it without previous consent and authority fro# this court.
AE E@D@D.
2s #ay be noted, in this order, the respondent court re%uired that all collections fro# the properties in the
na#e of ?od$es should be deposited in a 6oint account of the two estates, which indicates that see#in$ly
the so-called modus operandi was no lon$er operative, but a$ain there is nothin$ to show when this
situation started.
*i+ewise, in para$raph 3 of the petitionerKs #otion of Aepte#ber 1., 19'., on pa$es 188--01 of the
8reen @ecord on 2ppeal, <also found on pp. 83-91 of the Gellow @ecord on 2ppeal= it is alle$ed that5
3. En &anuary -., 19'. virtually all of the heirs of 3.;. ?od$es, &oe ?od$es and "ernando ). Mirasol
actin$ as the two co-ad#inistrators of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es, 2velina 2. Ma$no actin$ as the
ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and Messrs. 7illia# !rown and 2rdell Goun$ actin$ for
all of the ?i$don fa#ily who clai# to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and
various le$al counsel representin$ the afore#entioned parties entered into an a#icable a$ree#ent, which
was approved by this ?onorable 3ourt, wherein the parties thereto a$reed that certain su#s of #oney
were to be paid in settle#ent of different clai#s a$ainst the two estates and that the assets <to the e(tent
they e(isted= of both estates would be ad#inistered 6ointly by the )3/! as ad#inistrator of the estate of
3.;. ?od$es and 2velina 2. Ma$no as ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, sub6ect,
however, to the aforesaid Ectober 0, 19'3 Motion, na#ely, the )3/!Ks clai# to e(clusive possession and
ownership of one hundred percent <100U= <or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent <10U= of all assets
owned by 3.;. ?od$es or *innie &ane ?od$es situated in the )hilippines. En "ebruary 1, 19'. <pp. 93.-
930, 3"/ @ec., A.). ;o. 1'1-= this ?onorable 3ourt a#ended its order of &anuary -., 19'. but in no way
chan$ed its reco$nition of the afore-described basic de#and by the )3/! as ad#inistrator of the estate of
3.;. ?od$es to one hundred percent <100U= of the assets clai#ed by both estates.
but no copy of the #entioned a$ree#ent of 6oint ad#inistration of the two estates e(ists in the record, and
so, 7e are not infor#ed as to what e(actly are the ter#s of the sa#e which could be relevant in the
resolution of the issues herein.
En the other hand, the appealed order of ;ove#ber 3, 19'0, on pa$es 313-3-0 of the 8reen @ecord on
2ppeal, authori>ed pay#ent by respondent Ma$no of, inter alia, her own fees as ad#inistratri(, the
attorneyKs fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows5
2d#inistratri( Ma$no thru 2ttys. @aul A. Man$lapus and @i>al. @. Fui#po filed a Manifestation and
,r$ent Motion dated &une 10, 19'. as+in$ for the approval of the 2$ree#ent dated &une ', 19'. which
2$ree#ent is for the purpose of retainin$ their services to protect and defend the interest of the said
2d#inistratri( in these proceedin$s and the sa#e has been si$ned by and bears the e(press confor#ity
of the attorney-in-fact of the late *innie &ane ?od$es, Mr. &a#es *. Aullivan. /t is further prayed that the
2d#inistratri( of the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es be directed to pay the retailers fee of said
lawyers, said fees #ade char$eable as e(penses for the ad#inistration of the estate of *innie &ane
?od$es <pp. 1'.1-1'.-, :ol. :, Ap. 1301=.
2n opposition has been filed by the 2d#inistrator )3/! thru 2tty. ?er#inio E>aeta dated &uly 11, 19'.,
on the $round that pay#ent of the retainers fee of 2ttys. Man$lapus and Fui#po as prayed for in said
Manifestation and ,r$ent Motion is pre6udicial to the 100U clai# of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es4
e#ploy#ent of 2ttys. Man$lapus and Fui#po is pre#ature andNor unnecessary4 2ttys. Fui#po and
Man$lapus are representin$ conflictin$ interests and the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es should be closed
and ter#inated <pp. 1'19-1'8., :ol, :, Ap. 1301=.
2tty. *eon ). 8ellada filed a #e#orandu# dated &uly -8, 19'. as+in$ that the Manifestation and ,r$ent
Motion filed by 2ttys. Man$lapus and Fui#po be denied because no evidence has been presented in
support thereof. 2tty. Man$lapus filed a reply to the opposition of counsel for the 2d#inistrator of the 3.
;. ?od$es estate wherein it is clai#ed that e(penses of ad#inistration include reasonable counsel or
attorneyKs fees for services to the e(ecutor or ad#inistrator. 2s a #atter of fact the fee a$ree#ent dated
"ebruary -1, 19'. between the )3/! and the law fir# of E>aeta, 8ibbs V E>aeta as its counsel <)p.
1-80-1-8., :ol. :, Ap. 1301= which stipulates the fees for said law fir# has been approved by the 3ourt
in its order dated March 31, 19'.. /f pay#ent of the fees of the lawyers for the ad#inistratri( of the estate
of *innie &ane ?od$es will cause pre6udice to the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, in li+e #anner the very
a$ree#ent which provides for the pay#ent of attorneyKs fees to the counsel for the )3/! will also be
pre6udicial to the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es <pp. 1801-181., :ol. :, Ap. 1301=.
2tty. ?er#inio E>aeta filed a re6oinder dated 2u$ust 10, 19'. to the reply to the opposition to the
Manifestation and ,r$ent Motion alle$in$ principally that the estates of *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;.
?od$es are not si#ilarly situated for the reason that 3. ;. ?od$es is an heir of *innie &ane ?od$es
whereas the latter is not an heir of the for#er for the reason that *innie &ane ?od$es predeceased 3. ;.
?od$es <pp. 1839-18.8, :ol. :, Ap. 1301=4 that 2ttys. Man$lapus and Fui#po for#ally entered their
appearance in behalf of 2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es on &une 10, 19'. <pp. 1'39-
1'.0, :ol. :, Ap. 1301=.
2tty. Man$lapus filed a #anifestation dated Dece#ber 18, 19'. statin$ therein that &ud$e !ellosillo
issued an order re%uirin$ the parties to sub#it #e#orandu# in support of their respective contentions. /t
is prayed in this #anifestation that the Manifestation and ,r$ent Motion dated &une 10, 19'. be resolved
<pp. '.30-'.39, :ol. ://, Ap. 1301=.
2tty. @o#an Mabanta, &r. for the )3/! filed a counter- #anifestation dated &anuary 0, 19'0 as+in$ that
after the consideration by the court of all alle$ations and ar$u#ents and pleadin$s of the )3/! in
connection therewith <1= said #anifestation and ur$ent #otion of 2ttys. Man$lapus and Fui#po be denied
<pp. '..--'.03, :ol. ://, Ap. 1301=. &ud$e Fuerubin issued an order dated &anuary ., 19'0 approvin$
the #otion dated &une 10, 19'. of the attorneys for the ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es
and a$ree#ent anne(ed to said #otion. The said order further states5 PThe 2d#inistratri( of the estate of
*innie &ane ?od$es is authori>ed to issue or si$n whatever chec+ or chec+s #ay be necessary for the
above purpose and the ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es is ordered to countersi$n the sa#e.
<pp. '018-'0-3, :ol ://, Ap. 1301=.
2tty. @o#an Mabanta, &r. for the )3/! filed a #anifestation and #otion dated &anuary 13, 19'0 as+in$
that the order of &anuary ., 19'0 which was issued by &ud$e Fuerubin be declared null and void and to
en6oin the cler+ of court and the ad#inistratri( and ad#inistrator in these special proceedin$s fro# all
proceedin$s and action to enforce or co#ply with the provision of the aforesaid order of &anuary ., 19'0.
/n support of said #anifestation and #otion it is alle$ed that the order of &anuary ., 19'0 is null and void
because the said order was never delivered to the deputy cler+ 2lbis of !ranch : <the sala of &ud$e
Fuerubin= and the alle$ed order was found in the drawer of the late &ud$e Fuerubin in his office when
said drawer was opened on &anuary 13, 19'0 after the death of &ud$e Fuerubin by )erfecto Fuerubin,
&r., the son of the 6ud$e and in the presence of (ecutive &ud$e @ovira and deputy cler+ 2lbis <Aec. 1,
@ule 3', ;ew 3ivil 3ode= <)p. ''00-''0', :ol. :///, Ap. 1301=.
2tty. @o#an Mabanta, &r. for the )3/! filed a #otion for reconsideration dated "ebruary -3, 19'0 as+in$
that the order dated &anuary ., 19'. be reversed on the $round that5
1. 2ttorneys retained #ust render services to the estate not to the personal heir4
-. /f services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between the#4
3. 2ttorneys retained should not represent conflictin$ interests4 to the pre6udice of the other heirs not
represented by said attorneys4
.. "ees #ust be co##ensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate4
0. There #ust be assets in the estate to pay for said fees <)p. ''-0-''3', :ol. :///, Ap. 1301=.
2tty. Fui#po for 2d#inistratri( Ma$no of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es filed a #otion to sub#it dated
&uly 10, 19'0 as+in$ that the #anifestation and ur$ent #otion dated &une 10, 19'. filed by 2ttys.
Man$lapus and Fui#po and other incidents directly appertainin$ thereto be considered sub#itted for
consideration and approval <pp. '109-'1'0, :ol. :///, Ap. 1301=.
3onsiderin$ the ar$u#ents and reasons in support to the pleadin$s of both the 2d#inistratri( and the
)3/!, and of 2tty. 8ellada, hereinbefore #entioned, the 3ourt believes that the order of &anuary ., 19'0
is null and void for the reason that the said order has not been filed with deputy cler+ 2lbis of this court
<!ranch := durin$ the lifeti#e of &ud$e Fuerubin who si$ned the said order. ?owever, the said
#anifestation and ur$ent #otion dated &une 10, 19'. is bein$ treated and considered in this instant
order. /t is worthy to note that in the #otion dated &anuary -., 19'. <)p. 11.9- 11'3, :ol. :, Ap. 1301=
which has been filed by 2tty. 8ellada and his associates and 2tty. 8ibbs and other lawyers in addition to
the stipulated fees for actual services rendered. ?owever, the fee a$ree#ent dated "ebruary -1, 19'.,
between the 2d#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es and 2tty. 8ibbs which provides for retainer fee of
).,000 #onthly in addition to specific fees for actual appearances, rei#burse#ent for e(penditures and
contin$ent fees has also been approved by the 3ourt and said lawyers have already been paid. <pp.
1-13-1-19, :ol. :, Ap. )roc. 1301 pp. 131--1313, :ol. :, Ap. )roc. 1301=.
7?@"E@, the order dated &anuary ., 19'0 is hereby declared null and void.
The #anifestation and #otion dated &une 10, 19'. which was filed by the attorneys for the ad#inistratri(
of the testate estate of *innie &ane ?od$es is $ranted and the a$ree#ent anne(ed thereto is hereby
approved.
The ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es is hereby directed to be needed to i#ple#ent the
approval of the a$ree#ent anne(ed to the #otion and the ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es is
directed to countersi$n the said chec+ or chec+s as the case #ay be.
AE E@D@D.
thereby i#plyin$ so#ehow that the court assu#ed the e(istence of independent but si#ultaneous
ad#inistrations.
!e that as it #ay, a$ain, it appears that on 2u$ust ', 19'0, the court, actin$ on a #otion of petitioner for
the approval of deeds of sale e(ecuted by it as ad#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es, issued the followin$
order, also on appeal herein5
2ctin$ upon the #otion for approval of deeds of sale for re$istered land of the )3/!, 2d#inistrator of the
Testate state of 3. ;. ?od$es in Ap. )roc. 1'1- <:ol. ://, pp. --..---.0=, dated &uly 1', 19'0, filed by
2tty. 3esar T. Tirol in representation of the law fir#s of E>aeta, 8ibbs and E>aeta and Tirol and Tirol and
the opposition thereto of 2tty. @i>al @. Fui#po <:ol. :///, pp. '811-'813= dated &uly --, 19'0 and
considerin$ the alle$ations and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale should be
si$ned 6ointly by the )3/!, 2d#inistrator of the Testate state of 3. ;. ?od$es and 2velina 2. Ma$no,
2d#inistratri( of the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es and to this effect the )3/! should ta+e the
necessary steps so that 2d#inistratri( 2velina 2. Ma$no could si$n the deeds of sale.
AE E@D@D. <p. -.8, 8reen @ecord on 2ppeal.=
;otably this order re%uired that even the deeds e(ecuted by petitioner, as ad#inistrator of the state of
?od$es, involvin$ properties re$istered in his na#e, should be co-si$ned by respondent Ma$no.
3
2nd this
was not an isolated instance.
/n her brief as appellee, respondent Ma$no states5
2fter the lower court had authori>ed appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no to e(ecute final deeds of sale pursuant to
contracts to sell e(ecuted by 3. ;. ?od$es on "ebruary -0, 19'3 <pp. .0-.', 8reen @E2=, #otions for
the approval of final deeds of sale <si$ned by appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no and the ad#inistrator of the
estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, first &oe ?od$es, then 2tty. "ernando Mirasol and later the appellant= were
approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Ma$noKs counsel, 2tty. *eon ). 8ellada, on the
basis of section 8 of @ule 89 of the @evised @ules of 3ourt. Aubse%uently, the appellant, after it had ta+en
over the bul+ of the assets of the two estates, started presentin$ these #otions itself. The first such
atte#pt was a PMotion for 2pproval of Deeds of Aale for @e$istered *and and 3ancellations of
Mort$a$esQ dated &uly -1, 19'. filed by 2tty. 3esar T. Tirol, counsel for the appellant, thereto anne(in$
two <-= final deeds of sale and two <-= cancellations of #ort$a$es si$ned by appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no
and D. @. )aulino, 2ssistant :ice-)resident and Mana$er of the appellant <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o.
1301, :ol. :, pp. 1'9.-1101=. This #otion was approved by the lower court on &uly -1, 19'.. /t was
followed by another #otion dated 2u$ust ., 19'. for the approval of one final deed of sale a$ain si$ned
by appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no and D. @. )aulino <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301. :ol. :, pp. 18-0-
18-8=, which was a$ain approved by the lower court on 2u$ust 1, 19'.. The $ates havin$ been opened,
a flood ensued5 the appellant subse%uently filed si#ilar #otions for the approval of a #ultitude of deeds of
sales and cancellations of #ort$a$es si$ned by both the appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no and the appellant.
2 rando# chec+ of the records of Apecial )roceedin$ ;o. 1301 alone will show 2tty. 3esar T. Tirol as
havin$ presented for court approval deeds of sale of real properties si$ned by both appellee 2velina 2.
Ma$no and D. @. )aulino in the followin$ nu#bers5 <a= #otion dated Aepte#ber -1, 19'. J ' deeds of
sale4 <b= #otion dated ;ove#ber ., 19'. J 1 deed of sale4 <c= #otion dated Dece#ber 1, 19'. J .
deeds of sale4 <d= #otion dated "ebruary 3, 19'0 J 8 deeds of sale4 <f= #otion dated May 1, 19'0 J 9
deeds of sale. /n view of the very e(tensive landholdin$s of the ?od$es spouses and the #any #otions
filed concernin$ deeds of sale of real properties e(ecuted by 3. ;. ?od$es the lower court has had to
constitute special separate e(pedientes in Apecial )roceedin$s ;os. 1301 and 1'1- to include #ere
#otions for the approval of deeds of sale of the con6u$al properties of the ?od$es spouses.
2s an e(a#ple, fro# a#on$ the very #any, under date of "ebruary 3, 19'0, 2tty. 3esar T. Tirol, as
counsel for the appellant, filed PMotion for 2pproval of Deeds of Aale for @e$istered *and and
3ancellations of Mort$a$esQ <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, :ol. :///, pp. '010-'09'= the alle$ations of
which read5
P1. /n his lifeti#e, the late 3. ;. ?od$es e(ecuted P3ontracts to AellQ real property, and the prospective
buyers under said contracts have already paid the price and co#plied with the ter#s and conditions
thereof4
P-. /n the course of ad#inistration of both estates, #ort$a$e debtors have already paid their debts
secured by chattel #ort$a$es in favor of the late 3. ;. ?od$es, and are now entitled to release therefro#4
P3. There are attached hereto docu#ents e(ecuted 6ointly by the 2d#inistratri( in Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301 and
the 2d#inistrator in Ap. )roc. ;o. 1'1-, consistin$ of deeds of sale in favor J
"ernando 3ano, !acolod 3ity, Ecc. ;e$ros
"e Ma$banua, /loilo 3ity
)olicarpio M. )areno, *a )a>, /loilo 3ity
@osario T. *ibre, &aro, /loilo 3ity
"ederico !. Torres, /loilo 3ity
@eynaldo T. *ata%uin, *a )a>, /loilo 3ity
2natolio T. :iray, /loilo 3ity
!en6a#in @olando, &aro, /loilo 3ity
and cancellations of #ort$a$es in favor of J
)ablo Man>ano, Eton, /loilo
@icardo M. Diana, Dao, Aan &ose, 2nti%ue
Ai#plicio Tin$son, /loilo 3ity
2#ado Ma$banua, )ototan, /loilo
@oselia M. !aes, !olo, @o(as 3ity
7illia# !ayani, @i>al stan>uela, /loilo 3ity
lpidio :illarete, Molo, /loilo 3ity
;or#a T. @ui>, &aro, /loilo 3ity
P.. That the approval of the aforesaid docu#ents will not reduce the assets of the estates so as to prevent
any creditor fro# receivin$ his full debt or di#inish his dividend.Q
2nd the prayer of this #otion is indeed very revealin$5
P7?@"E@, it is respectfully prayed that, under @ule 89, Aection 8 of the @ules of 3ourt, this
honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of #ort$a$es.Q <)p. 113-111,
2ppelleeKs !rief.=
;one of these assertions is denied in )etitionerKs reply brief.
"urther indicatin$ lac+ of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and its
hesitancy to clear up #atters pro#ptly, in its other appealed order of ;ove#ber -3, 19'0, on pa$es 33.-
330 of the 8reen @ecord on 2ppeal, said respondent court allowed the #ovant @icardo Aalas, )resident
of appellee 7estern /nstitute of Technolo$y <successor of )anay ducational /nstitutions, /nc.=, one of the
parties with who# ?od$es had contracts that are in %uestion in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as
2d#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es andNor respondent Ma$no, as 2d#inistrator of the estate of Mrs.
?od$es, thus5
3onsiderin$ that in both cases there is as yet no 6udicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties
to who#soever are entitled thereto, the 3ourt believes that pay#ent to both the ad#inistrator of the
testate estate of 3. ;. ?od$es and the ad#inistratri( of the testate estate of *innie &ane ?od$es or to
either one of the two estates is proper and le$al.
7?@"E@, #ovant @icardo T. Aalas can pay to both estates or either of the#.
AE E@D@D.
<)p. 33.-330, 8reen @ecord on 2ppeal.=
En the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Ma$no was $iven authority to
act alone. "or instance, in the other appealed order of Dece#ber 19, 19'., on pa$e --1 of the 8reen
@ecord on 2ppeal, the respondent court approved pay#ents #ade by her of overti#e pay to so#e
e#ployees of the court who had helped in $atherin$ and preparin$ copies of parts of the records in both
estates as follows5
3onsiderin$ that the e(penses sub6ect of the #otion to approve pay#ent of overti#e pay dated
Dece#ber 10, 19'., are reasonable and are believed by this 3ourt to be a proper char$e of
ad#inistration char$eable to the testate estate of the late *innie &ane ?od$es, the said e(penses are
hereby 2))@E:D and to be char$ed a$ainst the testate estate of the late *innie &ane ?od$es. The
ad#inistrator of the testate estate of the late 3harles ;ewton ?od$es is hereby ordered to countersi$n
the chec+ or chec+s necessary to pay the said overti#e pay as shown by the bills #ar+ed 2nne( P2Q, P!Q
and P3Q of the #otion.
AE E@D@D.
<)p. --1----, 8reen @ecord on 2ppeal.=
*i+ewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no alone, as
2d#inistratri( of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, coverin$ properties in the na#e of ?od$es, pursuant to
Pcontracts to sellQ e(ecuted by ?od$es, irrespective of whether they were e(ecuted by hi# before or after
the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the followin$5
1. Erder of March 30, 19'', on p. 131 of the 8reen @ecord on 2ppeal, approvin$ the deed of sale
e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no in favor of appellee *oren>o 3arles on "ebruary -., 19'', pursuant to a
Pcontract to sellQ si$ned by ?od$es on &une 11, 1908, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
clai#s was cancelled by it for failure of 3arles to pay the install#ents due on &anuary 1, 19'0.
-. Erder of 2pril 0, 19'', on pp. 139-1.0, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no
in favor of appellee Aalvador 8u>#an on "ebruary -8, 19'' pursuant to a Pcontract to sellQ si$ned by
?od$es on Aepte#ber 13, 19'0, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner clai#s it cancelled
on March 3, 19'0 in view of failure of said appellee to pay the install#ents on ti#e.
3. Erder of 2pril -0, 19'', on pp. 1'1-1'8, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no
in favor of appellee )urificacion 3oronado on March -8, 19'' pursuant to a Pcontract to sellQ si$ned by
?od$es on 2u$ust 1., 19'1, after the death of his wife.
.. Erder of 2pril -0, 19'', on pp. 1'8-1'9, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no
in favor of appellee "lorenia !arrido on March -8, 19'', pursuant to a Pcontract to sellQ si$ned by ?od$es
on "ebruary -1, 1908, after the death of his wife.
0. Erder of &une 1, 19'', on pp. 18.-180, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no
in favor of appellee !elce>ar 3ausin$ on May -, 19'', pursuant to a Pcontract to sellQ si$ned by ?od$es
on "ebruary 10, 1909, after the death of his wife.
'. Erder of &une -1, 19'', on pp. -11--1-, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent
Ma$no in favor of appellee 2rtheo Tho#as &a#ir on &une 3, 19'', pursuant to a Pcontract to sellQ si$ned
by ?od$es on May -', 19'1, after the death of his wife.
1. Erder of &une -1, 19'', on pp. -1---13, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent
Ma$no in favor of appellees 8raciano *ucero and Mel%uiades !atisanan on &une ' and &une 3, 19'',
respectively, pursuant to Pcontracts to sellQ si$ned by ?od$es on &une 9, 1909 and ;ove#ber -1, 19'1,
respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Erder of Dece#ber -, 19'', on pp. 303-30., id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent
Ma$no in favor of appellees spiridion )artisala, 7inifredo spada and @osario 2lin$asa on Aepte#ber
', 19'', 2u$ust 11, 19'' and 2u$ust 3, 19'', respectively, pursuant to Pcontracts to sellQ si$ned by
?od$es on 2pril -0, 19'0, 2pril 18, 19'0 and 2u$ust -0, 1908, respectively, that is, after the death of his
wife.
9. Erder of 2pril 0, 19'', on pp. 131-138, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no
in favor of appellee 2lfredo 3atedral on March -, 19'', pursuant to a Pcontract to sellQ si$ned by ?od$es
on May -9, 190., before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner clai#s it had cancelled on
"ebruary 1', 19'' for failure of appellee 3atedral to pay the install#ents due on ti#e.
10. Erder of 2pril 0, 19'', on pp. 138-139, id., approvin$ the deed of sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no
in favor of appellee &ose )ablico on March 1, 19'', pursuant to a Pcontract to sellQ si$ned by ?od$es on
March 1, 1900, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner clai#s it had cancelled on &une -9,
19'0, for failure of appellee )ablico to pay the install#ents due on ti#e.
11. Erder of Dece#ber -, 19'', on pp. 303-30., id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale e(ecuted by
respondent Ma$no in favor of appellee )epito /yulores on Aepte#ber ', 19'', pursuant to a Pcontract to
sellQ si$ned by ?od$es on "ebruary 0, 1901, before the death of his wife.
1-. Erder of &anuary 3, 19'1, on pp. 330-33', id., approvin$ three deeds of sale e(ecuted by respondent
Ma$no, one in favor of appellees Aantia$o )acaonsis and two in favor of appellee 2delfa )re#aylon on
Dece#ber 0, 19'' and ;ove#ber 3, 19'', respectively, pursuant to separate Ppro#ises to sellQ si$ned
respectively by ?od$es on May -', 1900 and &anuary 30, 190., before the death of his wife, and Ectober
31, 1909, after her death.
/n li+e #anner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale e(ecuted by
petitioner alone and without the concurrence of respondent Ma$no, and such approvals have not been
the sub6ect of any appeal. ;o less than petitioner points this out on pa$es 1.9-100 of its brief as appellant
thus5
The points of fact and law pertainin$ to the two abovecited assi$n#ents of error have already been
discussed previously. /n the first abovecited error, the order alluded to was $eneral, and as already
e(plained before, it was, as ad#itted by the lower court itself, superseded by the particular orders
approvin$ specific final deeds of sale e(ecuted by the appellee, 2velina 2. Ma$no, which are sub6ect of
this appeal, as well as the particular orders approvin$ specific final deeds of sale e(ecuted by the
appellant, )hilippine 3o##ercial and /ndustrial !an+, which were never appealed by the appellee,
2velina 2. Ma$no, nor by any party for that #atter, and which are now therefore final.
;ow, si#ultaneously with the fore$oin$ incidents, others of #ore funda#ental and all e#bracin$
si$nificance developed. En Ectober 0, 19'3, over the si$nature of 2tty. 2llison &. 8ibbs in representation
of the law fir# of E>aeta, 8ibbs V E>aeta, as counsel for the co-ad#inistrators &oe ?od$es and
"ernando ). Mirasol, the followin$ self-e(planatory #otion was filed5
6"-47T !2T027 52" A7 ACC267T07- A7D D4%0:4"< T2 AD!070ST"AT027 25 TH4 4STAT4
25 C. 7. H2D-4S 25 A%% 25 TH4 ASS4TS 25 TH4 C27J6-A% /A"T74"SH0/ 25 TH4
D4C4AS4D %07704 JA74 H2D-4S A7D C 7. H2D-4S 480ST07- AS 25 !A< =>, '?@A /%6S A%%
TH4 "47TS, 4!2%6!47TS A7D 07C2!4 TH4"45"2!.
3EMA ;E7 the co-ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, &oe ?od$es, throu$h his undersi$ned
attorneys in the above-entitled proceedin$s, and to this ?onorable 3ourt respectfully alle$es5
<1= En May -3, 1901 *innie &ane ?od$es died in /loilo 3ity.
<-= En &une -8, 1901 this ?onorable 3ourt ad#itted to probate the *ast 7ill and Testa#ent of the
deceased *innie &ane ?od$es e(ecuted ;ove#ber --, 190- and appointed 3. ;. ?od$es as (ecutor of
the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es <pp. -.--0, @ec. Ap. )roc. 1301=.
<3= En &uly 1, 1901 this ?onorable 3ourt issued *etters Testa#entary to 3. ;. ?od$es in the state of
*innie &ane ?od$es <p. 30, @ec. Ap. )roc. 1301=.
<.= En Dece#ber 1., 1901 this ?onorable 3ourt, on the basis of the followin$ alle$ations in a Motion
dated Dece#ber 11, 1901 filed by *eon ). 8ellada as attorney for the e(ecutor 3. ;. ?od$es5
PThat herein (ecutor, <is= not only part owner of the properties left as con6u$al, but also, the successor to
all the properties left &; the deceased %innie Jane Hodges.Q
<p. .., @ec. Ap. )roc. 13014 e#phasis supplied.=
issued the followin$ order5
P2s prayed for by 2ttorney 8ellada, counsel for the (ecutory, for the reasons stated in his motion dated
Decem&er '', '?@A )hich the court considers )ell taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and
#ort$a$es of all properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es are hereby 2))@E:D. The said
e(ecutor is further authori>ed to e(ecute subse%uent sales, conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of the
properties left by the said deceased *innie &ane ?od$es in consonance )ith the )ishes contained in the
last )ill and testament of the latter.Q
<p. .', @ec. Ap. )roc. 13014 e#phasis supplied.=
<0= En 2pril -1, 1909 this ?onorable 3ourt approved the inventory and accountin$ sub#itted by 3. ;.
?od$es throu$h his counsel *eon ). 8ellada on 2pril 1., 1909 wherein he alle$ed a#on$ other thin$s
PThat no person interested in the )hilippines of the ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein account, be
$iven notice, as herein e#ecutor is the onl; devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance )ith the
last )ill and testament alread; pro&ated &; the Honora&le Court.Q
<pp. 11-18, @ec. Ap. )roc. 13014 e#phasis supplied.=.
<'= En &uly 30, 19'0 this ?onorable 3ourt approved the P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccountQ sub#itted by 3.
;. ?od$es throu$h his counsel *eon ). 8ellada on &uly -1, 19'0 wherein he alle$ed a#on$ other thin$s5
PThat no person interested in the )hilippines of the ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein account, be
$iven notice as herein e#ecutor is the onl; devisee or legatee of the deceased %innie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testa#ent of the deceased, already probated by this ?onorable 3ourt.Q
<pp. 81-8-. @ec. Ap. )roc. 13014 e#phasis supplied.=
<1= En May -, 19'1 this ?onorable court approved the P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccount !y The (ecutor for
the Gear 19'0S sub#itted throu$h *eon ). 8ellada on 2pril -0, 19'1 wherein he alle$ed5
That no person interested in the )hilippines be $iven notice, of the ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein
account, as herein 4#ecutor is the onl; devisee or legatee of the deceased %innie Jane Hodges, in
accordance )ith the last )ill and testament of the deceased, alread; pro&ated &; this Honora&le Court.
<pp. 90-91. @ec. Ap. )roc. 13014 e#phasis supplied.=
<8= En Dece#ber -0, 19'-, 3.;. ?od$es died.
<9= En Dece#ber -0, 19'-, on the ,r$ent 4#$parte Motion of *eon ). 8ellada filed only in Apecial
)roceedin$ ;o. 1301, this ?onorable 3ourt appointed 2velina 2. Ma$no
P2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and as Apecial 2d#inistratri( of the estate of 3harles
;ewton ?od$es, in the latter case, because the last will of said 3harles ;ewton ?od$es is still +ept in his
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses #ay be lost, da#a$ed or $o to
waste, unless a Apecial 2d#inistratri( is appointed.Q
<p. 100. @ec. Ap. )roc. 1301=
<10= En Dece#ber -', 19'- *etters of 2d#inistration were issued to 2velina Ma$no pursuant to this
?onorable 3ourtKs aforesaid Erder of Dece#ber -0, 19'-
P7ith full authority to ta+e possession of all the property of said deceased in any province or provinces in
which it #ay be situated and to perfor# all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, said
2d#inistratri( andNor Apecial 2d#inistratri( havin$ filed a bond satisfactory to the 3ourt.Q
<p. 10-, @ec. Ap. )roc. 1301=
<11= En &anuary --, 19'3 this ?onorable 3ourt on petition of *eon ). 8ellada of &anuary -1, 19'3 issued
*etters of 2d#inistration to5
<a= 2velina 2. Ma$no as 2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es4
<b= 2velina 2. Ma$no as Apecial 2d#inistratri( of the state of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es4 and
<c= &oe ?od$es as 3o-Apecial 2d#inistrator of the state of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es.
<p. .3, @ec. Ap. )roc. 1301=
<1-= En "ebruary -0, 19'3 this ?onorable 3ourt on the basis of a #otion filed by *eon ). 8ellada as le$al
counsel on "ebruary 1', 19'3 for 2velina 2. Ma$no actin$ as 2d#inistratri( of the state of 3harles
;ewton ?od$es <pp. 11.-11', Ap. )roc. 1301= issued the followin$ order5
PR se autori>a a a%uella <2velina 2. Ma$no= a fir#ar escrituras de venta definitiva de propiedades
cubiertas por contratos para vender, fir#ados, en vida, por el finado 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, cada ve>
%ue el precio estipulado en cada contrato este total#ente pa$ado. Ae autori>a i$ual#ente a la #is#a a
fir#ar escrituras de cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de bienes reales co#o personales cada ve> %ue la
consideracion de cada hipoteca este total#ente pa$ada.
P3ada una de dichas escrituras %ue se otor$uen debe ser so#etida para la aprobacion de este &u>$ado.Q
<p. 111, Ap. )roc. 1301=.
B)ar 1 <c=, @eply to Motion "or @e#oval of &oe ?od$esC
<13= En Aepte#ber l', 19'3 *eon ). 8ellada, actin$ as attorney for 2velina 2. Ma$no as 2d#inistratri( of
the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, alle$es5
3. J That since &anuary, 19'3, both estates of *innie &ane ?od$es and 3harles ;ewton ?od$es have
been receivin$ in full, pay#ents for those Pcontracts to sellQ entered into by 3. ;. ?od$es durin$ his
lifeti#e, and the purchasers have been de#andin$ the e(ecution of definite deeds of sale in their favor.
.. J That hereto attached are thirteen <13= copies deeds of sale e(ecuted by the 2d#inistratri( and by
the co-ad#inistrator <"ernando ). Mirasol= of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and 3harles ;ewton
?od$es respectively, in co#pliance with the ter#s and conditions of the respective Pcontracts to sellQ
e(ecuted by the parties thereto.Q
<1.= The properties involved in the aforesaid #otion of Aepte#ber 1', 19'3 are all re$istered in the na#e
of the deceased 3. ;. ?od$es.
<10= 2velina 2. Ma$no, it is alle$ed on infor#ation and belief, has been advertisin$ in the newspaper in
/loilo thusly5
"or Aale
Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es and 3harles ;ewton ?od$es.
2ll @eal state or )ersonal )roperty will be sold on "irst 3o#e "irst Aerved !asis.
2velina 2. Ma$no
2d#inistratri(
<1'= 2velina 2. Ma$no, it is alle$ed on infor#ation and belief, has paid and still is payin$ su#s of #oney
to sundry persons.
<11= &oe ?od$es throu$h the undersi$ned attorneys #anifested durin$ the hearin$s before this ?onorable
3ourt on Aepte#ber 0 and ', 19'3 that the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es was clai#in$ all of the assets
belon$in$ to the deceased spouses *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es situated in )hilippines
because of the aforesaid election by 3. ;. ?od$es wherein he clai#ed and too+ possession as sole
owner of all of said assets durin$ the ad#inistration of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es on the $round
that he was the sole devisee and le$atee under her *ast 7ill and Testa#ent.
<18= 2velina 2. Ma$no has sub#itted no inventory and accountin$ of her ad#inistration as 2d#inistratri(
of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and Apecial 2d#inistratri( of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es. ?owever,
fro# #anifestations #ade by 2velina 2. Ma$no and her le$al counsel, *eon ). 8ellada, there is no
%uestion she will clai# that at least fifty per cent <00U= of the con6u$al assets of the deceased spouses
and the rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e therefro# belon$ to the ?i$don fa#ily who are na#ed in
para$raphs "ourth and "ifth of the 7ill of *innie &ane ?od$es <p. 0, @ec. Ap. )roc. 1301=.
7?@"E@, pre#ises considered, #ovant respectfully prays that this ?onorable 3ourt, after due
hearin$, order5
<1= 2velina 2. Ma$no to sub#it an inventory and accountin$ of all of the funds, properties and assets of
any character belon$in$ to the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es which have co#e into
her possession, with full details of what she has done with the#4
<-= 2velina 2. Ma$no to turn over and deliver to the 2d#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es all of the
funds, properties and assets of any character re#ainin$ in her possession4
<3= )endin$ this ?onorable 3ourtKs ad6udication of the aforesaid issues, 2velina 2. Ma$no to stop, unless
she first secures the confor#ity of &oe ?od$es <or his duly authori>ed representative, such as the
undersi$ned attorneys= as the 3o-ad#inistrator and attorney-in-fact of a #a6ority of the beneficiaries of
the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es5
<a= 2dvertisin$ the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates5
<b= #ployin$ personnel and payin$ the# any co#pensation.
<.= Auch other relief as this ?onorable 3ourt #ay dee# 6ust and e%uitable in the pre#ises. <2nne( PTQ,
)etition.=
2l#ost a year thereafter, or on Aepte#ber 1., 19'., after the co-ad#inistrators &oe ?od$es and
"ernando ). Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner )hilippine 3o##ercial and /ndustrial !an+ as
sole ad#inistrator, pursuant to an a$ree#ent of all the heirs of ?od$es approved by the court, and
because the above #otion of Ectober 0, 19'3 had not yet been heard due to the absence fro# the
country of 2tty. 8ibbs, petitioner filed the followin$5
!A7054STAT027 A7D !2T027, 07C%6D07- !2T027 T2 S4T 52" H4A"07- A7D "4S2%:4
B6"-47T !2T027 52" A7 ACC267T07- A7D D4%0:4"< T2 AD!070ST"AT2"S 25 TH4 4STAT4
25 C. 7. H2D-4S 25 A%% TH4 ASS4TS 25 TH4 C27J6-A% /A"T74"SH0/ 25 TH4 D4C4AS4D
%07704 JA74 H2D-4S A7D C. 7. H2D-4S 480ST07- AS 25 !A< =>, '?@A /%6S A%% 25 TH4
"47TS, 4!2%6!47TS A7D 07C2!4 TH4"45"2! 25 2CT214" @, '?C>.
3EMA ;E7 )hilippine 3o##ercial and /ndustrial !an+ <hereinafter referred to as )3/!=, the
ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, deceased, in Apecial )roceedin$s ;o. 1'1-, throu$h its
undersi$ned counsel, and to this ?onorable 3ourt respectfully alle$es that5
1. En Ectober 0, 19'3, &oe ?od$es actin$ as the co-ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es filed,
throu$h the undersi$ned attorneys, an P,r$ent Motion "or 2n 2ccountin$ and Delivery To 2d#inistrator
of the state of 3. ;. ?od$es of all Ef The 2ssets Ef The 3on6u$al )artnership of The Deceased *innie
&ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es (istin$ as Ef May, -3, 1901 )lus 2ll Ef The @ents, #olu#ents and
/nco#e Therefro#Q <pp. 03'-0.-, 3"/ @ec. A. ). ;o. 1'1-=.
-. En &anuary -., 19'. this ?onorable 3ourt, on the basis of an a#icable a$ree#ent entered into on
&anuary -3, 19'. by the two co-ad#inistrators of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es and virtually all of the heirs
of 3. ;. ?od$es <p. 91-, 3"/ @ec., A. ). ;o. 1'1-=, resolved the dispute over who should act as
ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es by appointin$ the )3/! as ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;.
?od$es <pp. 900-90', 3"/ @ec. A. ). ;o. 1'1-= and issuin$ letters of ad#inistration to the )3/!.
3. En &anuary -., 19'. virtually all of the heirs of 3. ;. ?od$es, &oe ?od$es and "ernando ). Mirasol
actin$ as the two co-ad#inistrators of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, 2velina 2. Ma$no actin$ as the
ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, and Messrs. 7illia# !rown and 2rdel Goun$ 2ctin$ for
all of the ?i$don fa#ily who clai# to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and
various le$al counsel representin$ the aforena#ed parties entered into an a#icable a$ree#ent, which
was approved by this ?onorable 3ourt, wherein the parties thereto a$reed that certain su#s of #oney
were to be paid in settle#ent of different clai#s a$ainst the two estates and that the assets Dto the e#tent
the; e#istedEof &oth estates )ould &e administrated Fointl; &; the /C01 as administrator of the estate of
C. 7. Hodges and Avelina A. !agno as administratri# of the estate of %innie Jane Hodges, sub6ect,
however, to the aforesaid Ectober 0, 19'3 Motion, na#ely, the )3/!Ks clai# to e(clusive possession and
ownership of one-hundred percent <10011,= <or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent B10UC of all assets
owned by 3. ;. ?od$es or *innie &ane ?od$es situated in the )hilippines. En "ebruary 1, 19'. <pp. 93.-
930, 3"/ @ec., A. ). ;o. 1'1-= this ?onorable 3ourt a#ended its order of &anuary -., 19'. but in no way
chan$es its reco$nition of the aforedescribed basic de#and by the )3/! as ad#inistrator of the estate of
3. ;. ?od$es to one hundred percent <100U= of the assets clai#ed by both estates.
.. En "ebruary 10, 19'. the )3/! filed a PMotion to @esolveQ the aforesaid Motion of Ectober 0, 19'3.
This ?onorable 3ourt set for hearin$ on &une 11, 19'. the Motion of Ectober 0, 19'3.
0. En &une 11, 19'., because the undersi$ned 2llison &. 8ibbs was absent in the ,nited Atates, this
?onorable 3ourt ordered the indefinite postpone#ent of the hearin$ of the Motion of Ectober 0, 19'3.
'. Aince its appoint#ent as ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es the )3/! has not been able to
properly carry out its duties and obli$ations as ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es because of the
followin$ acts, a#on$ others, of 2velina 2. Ma$no and those who clai# to act for her as ad#inistratri( of
the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es5
<a= 2velina 2. Ma$no ille$ally acts as if she is in e(clusive control of all of the assets in the )hilippines of
both estates includin$ those clai#ed by the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es as evidenced in part by her loc+in$
the pre#ises at -0'--08 8uanco Atreet, /loilo 3ity on 2u$ust 31, 19'. and refusin$ to reopen sa#e until
ordered to do so by this ?onorable 3ourt on Aepte#ber 1, 19'..
<b= 2velina 2. Ma$no ille$ally acts as thou$h she alone #ay decide how the assets of the estate of 3.;.
?od$es should be ad#inistered, who the )3/! shall e#ploy and how #uch they #ay be paid as
evidenced in party by her refusal to si$n chec+s issued by the )3/! payable to the undersi$ned counsel
pursuant to their fee a$ree#ent approved by this ?onorable 3ourt in its order dated March 31, 19'..
<c= 2velina 2. Ma$no ille$ally $ives access to and turns over possession of the records and assets of the
estate of 3.;. ?od$es to the attorney-in-fact of the ?i$don "a#ily, Mr. &a#es *. Aullivan, as evidenced in
part by the cashin$ of his personal chec+s.
<d= 2velina 2. Ma$no ille$ally refuses to e(ecute chec+s prepared by the )3/! drawn to pay e(penses of
the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es as evidenced in part by the chec+ drawn to rei#burse the )3/!Ks advance of
).8,..0.00 to pay the 19'. inco#e ta(es reported due and payable by the estate of 3.;. ?od$es.
1. ,nder and pursuant to the orders of this ?onorable 3ourt, particularly those of &anuary -. and
"ebruary 1, 19'., and the #andate contained in its *etters of 2d#inistration issued on &anuary -., 19'.
to the )3/!, it has
Pfull authority to ta+e possession of all the property of the deceased 3. ;. ?od$es
Pand to perfor# all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property.Q <p. 91., 3"/ @ec., A.). ;o.
1'1-.=
8. 2s ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, the )3/! clai#s the ri$ht to the i##ediate e(clusive
possession and control of all of the properties, accounts receivables, court cases, ban+ accounts and
other assets, includin$ the docu#entary records evidencin$ sa#e, which e(isted in the )hilippines on the
date of 3. ;. ?od$esK death, Dece#ber -0, 19'-, and were in his possession and re$istered in his na#e
alone. The )3/! +nows of no assets in the )hilippines re$istered in the na#e of *innie &ane ?od$es, the
estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, or, 3. ;. ?od$es, (ecutor of the state of *innie &ane ?od$es on
Dece#ber -0, 19'-. 2ll of the assets of which the )3/! has +nowled$e are either re$istered in the na#e
of 3. ;. ?od$es, alone or were derived therefro# since his death on Dece#ber -0, 19'-.
9. The )3/! as the current ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, deceased, succeeded to all of the
ri$hts of the previously duly appointed ad#inistrators of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, to wit5
<a= En Dece#ber -0, 19'-, date of 3. ;. ?od$esK death, this ?onorable 3ourt appointed Miss 2velina 2.
Ma$no si#ultaneously as5
<i= 2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es <p. 10-, 3"/ @ec., A.). ;o. 1301= to replace the
deceased 3. ;. ?od$es who on May -8, 1901 was appointed Apecial 2d#inistrator <p. 13. 3"/ @ec. A.).
;o. 1301= and on &uly 1, 1901 (ecutor of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es <p. 30, 3"/ @ec., A. ). ;o.
1301=.
<ii= Special Administratri# of the estate of C. 7. Hodges <p. 10-, 3"/ @ec., A.). ;o. 1301=.
<b= En Dece#ber -9, 19'- this ?onorable 3ourt appointed ?arold I. Davies as co-special ad#inistrator
of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es alon$ with 2velina 2. Ma$no <pp. 108-111, 3"/ @ec., A. ). ;o. 1301=.
<c= En &anuary --, 19'3, with the confor#ity of 2velina 2. Ma$no, ?arold I. Davies resi$ned in favor of
&oe ?od$es <pp. 30-3', 3"/ @ec., A.). ;o. 1'1-= who thereupon was appointed on &anuary --, 19'3 by
this ?onorable 3ourt as special co-ad#inistrator of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es <pp. 38-.0 V .3, 3"/ @ec.
A.). ;o. 1'1-= alon$ with Miss Ma$no who at that ti#e was still actin$ as special co-ad#inistratri( of the
estate of 3. ;. ?od$es.
<d= En "ebruary --, 19'3, without ob6ection on the part of 2velina 2. Ma$no, this ?onorable 3ourt
appointed &oe ?od$es and "ernando ). Mirasol as co-ad#inistrators of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es <pp.
1'-18, 81 V 80, 3"/ @ec., A.). ;o. 1'1-=.
10. Miss 2velina 2. Ma$no, pursuant to the orders of this ?onorable 3ourt of Dece#ber -0, 19'-, too+
possession of all )hilippine 2ssets now clai#ed by the two estates. *e$ally, Miss Ma$no could ta+e
possession of the assets re$istered in the na#e of 3. ;. ?od$es alone only in her capacity as Apecial
2d#inistratri( of the state of 3.;. ?od$es. 7ith the appoint#ent by this ?onorable 3ourt on "ebruary
--, 19'3 of &oe ?od$es and "ernando ). Mirasol as the co-ad#inistrators of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es,
they le$ally were entitled to ta+e over fro# Miss Ma$no the full and e(clusive possession of all of the
assets of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es. 7ith the appoint#ent on &anuary -., 19'. of the )3/! as the sole
ad#inistrator of the estate of 3.;. ?od$es in substitution of &oe ?od$es and "ernando ). Mirasol, the
)3/! le$ally beca#e the only party entitled to the sole and e(clusive possession of all of the assets of the
estate of 3. ;. ?od$es.
11. The )3/!Ks predecessors sub#itted their accountin$ and this ?onorable 3ourt approved sa#e, to wit5
<a= The accountin$ of ?arold I. Davies dated &anuary 18, 19'3 <pp. 1'-33, 3"/ @ec. A.). ;o. 1'1-=4
which shows or its face the5
<i= 3onfor#ity of 2velina 2. Ma$no actin$ as P2d#inistratri( of the state of *innie &ane ?od$es and
Apecial 2d#inistratri( of the state of 3. ;. ?od$esQ4
<ii= 3onfor#ity of *eslie chols, a Te(as lawyer actin$ for the heirs of 3.;. ?od$es4 and
<iii= 3onfor#ity of 7illia# !rown, a Te(as lawyer actin$ for the ?i$don fa#ily who clai# to be the only
heirs of *innie &ane ?od$es <pp. 18, -0-33, 3"/ @ec., A. ). ;o. 1'1-=.
;ote5 This accountin$ was approved by this ?onorable 3ourt on &anuary --, 19'3 <p. 3., 3"/ @ec., A. ).
;o. 1'1-=.
<b= The accountin$ of &oe ?od$es and "ernando ). Mirasol as of &anuary -3, 19'., filed "ebruary -.,
19'. <pp. 990-1000, 3"/ @ec. A.). ;o. 1'1- and pp. 180'-18.8, 3"/ @ec. A.). ;o. 1301=.
;ote5 This accountin$ was approved by this ?onorable 3ourt on March 3, 19'..
<c= The )3/! and its undersi$ned lawyers are aware of no report or accountin$ sub#itted by 2velina 2.
Ma$no of her acts as ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es or special ad#inistratri( of the
estate of 3.;. ?od$es, unless it is the accountin$ of ?arold I. Davies as special co-ad#inistrator of the
estate of 3.;. ?od$es dated &anuary 18, 19'3 to which Miss Ma$no #anifested her confor#ity <supra=.
1-. /n the aforesaid a$ree#ent of &anuary -., 19'., Miss 2velina 2. Ma$no a$reed to receive
)10,000.00
Pfor her services as ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$esQ
and in addition she a$reed to be e#ployed, startin$ "ebruary 1, 19'., at
Pa #onthly salary of )000.00 for her services as an e#ployee of both estates.Q
-. e#s.
13. ,nder the aforesaid a$ree#ent of &anuary -., 19'. and the orders of this ?onorable 3ourt of sa#e
date, the )3/! as ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es is entitled to the e(clusive possession of all
records, properties and assets in the na#e of 3. ;. ?od$es as of the date of his death on Dece#ber -0,
19'- which were in the possession of the deceased 3. ;. ?od$es on that date and which then passed to
the possession of Miss Ma$no in her capacity as Apecial 3o-2d#inistratri( of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es
or the possession of &oe ?od$es or "ernando ). Mirasol as co-ad#inistrators of the estate of 3. ;.
?od$es.
1.. !ecause of Miss Ma$noKs refusal to co#ply with the reasonable re%uest of )3/! concernin$ the
assets of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, the )3/! dis#issed Miss Ma$no as an e#ployee of the estate of 3.
;. ?od$es effective 2u$ust 31, 19'.. En Aepte#ber 1, 19'. Miss Ma$no loc+ed the pre#ises at -0'-
-08 8uanco Atreet and denied the )3/! access thereto. ,pon the ,r$ent Motion of the )3/! dated
Aepte#ber 3, 19'., this ?onorable 3ourt on Aepte#ber 1, 19'. ordered Miss Ma$no to reopen the
aforesaid pre#ises at -0'--08 8uanco Atreet and per#it the )3/! access thereto no later than
Aepte#ber 8, 19'..
10. The )3/! pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this ?onorable 3ourt is a$ain in physical possession of
all of the assets of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es. ?owever, the )3/! is not in e(clusive control of the
aforesaid records, properties and assets because Miss Ma$no continues to assert the clai#s hereinabove
outlined in para$raph ', continues to use her own loc+s to the doors of the aforesaid pre#ises at -0'--08
8uanco Atreet, /loilo 3ity and continues to deny the )3/! its ri$ht to +now the co#binations to the doors
of the vault and safes situated within the pre#ises at -0'--08 8uanco Atreet despite the fact that said
co#binations were +nown to only 3. ;. ?od$es durin$ his lifeti#e.
1'. The )hilippine estate and inheritance ta(es assessed the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es were
assessed and paid on the basis that 3. ;. ?od$es is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of
*innie &ane ?od$es situated in the )hilippines. 2velina 2. Ma$no and her le$al counsel at no ti#e have
%uestioned the validity of the aforesaid assess#ent and the pay#ent of the correspondin$ )hilippine
death ta(es.
11. ;othin$ further re#ains to be done in the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es e(cept to resolve the
aforesaid Motion of Ectober 0, 19'3 and $rant the )3/! the e(clusive possession and control of all of the
records, properties and assets of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es.
18. Auch assets as #ay have e(isted of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es were ordered by this ?onorable
3ourt in special )roceedin$s ;o. 1301 to be turned over and delivered to 3. ;. ?od$es alone. ?e in fact
too+ possession of the# before his death and asserted and e(ercised the ri$ht of e(clusive ownership
over the said assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es.
7?@"E@, pre#ises considered, the )3/! respectfully petitions that this ?onorable court5
<1= Aet the Motion of Ectober 0, 19'3 for hearin$ at the earliest possible date with notice to all interested
parties4
<-= Erder 2velina 2. Ma$no to sub#it an inventory and accountin$ as 2d#inistratri( of the state of
*innie &ane ?od$es and 3o-2d#inistratri( of the state of 3. ;. ?od$es of all of the funds, properties
and assets of any character belon$in$ to the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es which
have co#e into her possession, with full details of what she has done with the#4
<3= Erder 2velina 2. Ma$no to turn over and deliver to the )3/! as ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;.
?od$es all of the funds, properties and assets of any character re#ainin$ in her possession4
<.= )endin$ this ?onorable 3ourtKs ad6udication of the aforesaid issues, order 2velina 2. Ma$no and her
representatives to stop interferrin$ with the ad#inistration of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es by the )3/! and
its duly authori>ed representatives4
<0= n6oin 2velina 2. Ma$no fro# wor+in$ in the pre#ises at -0'--08 8uanco Atreet, /loilo 3ity as an
e#ployee of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es and approve her dis#issal as such by the )3/! effective 2u$ust
31, 19'.4
<'= n6oin &a#es *. Aullivan, 2ttorneys Man$lapus and Fui#po and others alle$edly representin$ Miss
Ma$no fro# enterin$ the pre#ises at -0'--08 8uanco Atreet, /loilo 3ity or any other properties of 3. ;.
?od$es without the e(press per#ission of the )3/!4
<1= Erder such other relief as this ?onorable 3ourt finds 6ust and e%uitable in the pre#ises. <2nne( P,Q
)etition.=
En &anuary 8, 19'0, petitioner also filed a #otion for PEfficial Declaration of ?eirs of *innie &ane ?od$es
stateQ alle$in$5
3EMA ;E7 )hilippine 3o##ercial and /ndustrial !an+ <hereinafter referred to as )3/!=, as
ad#inistrator of the estate of the late 3. ;. ?od$es, throu$h the undersi$ned counsel, and to this
?onorable 3ourt respectfully alle$es that5
1. Durin$ their #arria$e, spouses 3harles ;ewton ?od$es and *innie &ane ?od$es, 2#erican citi>ens
ori$inally fro# the Atate of Te(as, ,.A.2., ac%uired and accu#ulated considerable assets and properties
in the )hilippines and in the Atates of Te(as and E+laho#a, ,nited Atates of 2#erica. 2ll said properties
constituted their con6u$al estate.
-. 2lthou$h Te(as was the do#icile of ori$in of the ?od$es spouses, this ?onorable 3ourt, in its orders
dated March 31 and Dece#ber 1-, 19'. <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, pp. J-4 Ap. )roc. ;o. 1'1-, p.
J-=, conclusively found and cate$orically ruled that said spouses had lived and wor+ed for #ore than 00
years in /loilo 3ity and had, therefore, ac%uired a do#icile of choice in said city, which they retained until
the ti#e of their respective deaths.
3. En ;ove#ber --, 190-, *innie &ane ?od$es e(ecuted in the 3ity of /loilo her *ast 7ill and Testa#ent,
a copy of which is hereto attached as Anne# BAG. The be%uests in said will pertinent to the present issue
are the second, third, and fourth provisions, which we %uote in full hereunder.
A3E;D5 / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated, or located, to #y husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, to have and to hold unto
hi#, #y said husband durin$ his natural lifeti#e.
T?/@D5 / desire, direct and provide that #y husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, shall have the ri$ht to
#ana$e, control, use and en6oy said estate durin$ his lifeti#e, and he is hereby $iven the ri$ht to #a+e
any chan$es in the physical properties of said estate by sale of any part thereof which he thin+ best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he #ay thin+ best4 to e(ecute conveyances with or
without $eneral or special warranty, conveyin$ in fee si#ple or for any other ter# or ti#e, any property
which he #ay dee# proper to dispose of4 to lease any of the real property for oil, $as andNor other
#inerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee si#ple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he #ay elect to sell. 2ll rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e fro# said estate shall belon$
to hi#, and he is further authori>ed to use any part of the principal of said estate as he #ay need or
desire. /t is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the i#proved
property now owned by us located at, in or near the 3ity of *ubboc+, Te(as, but he shall have the full ri$ht
to lease, #ana$e and en6oy the sa#e durin$ his lifeti#e, as above provided. ?e shall have the ri$ht to
sub-divide any far#land and sell lots therein, and #ay sell uni#proved town lots.
"E,@T?5 2t the death of #y said husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of
the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
e%ually divided a#on$ #y brothers and sisters, share and share ali+e, na#ely5
Psta ?i$don, ##a ?owell, *eonard ?i$don, @oy ?i$don, Aadie @ascoe, ra !o#an and ;i#ray
?i$don.Q
.. En ;ove#ber 1., 1903, 3. ;. ?od$es e(ecuted in the 3ity of /loilo his *ast 7ill and Testa#ent, a copy
of which is hereto attached as Anne# B1 B. /n said 7ill, 3. ;. ?od$es desi$nated his wife, *innie &ane
?od$es, as his beneficiary usin$ the identical lan$ua$e she used in the second and third provisos of her
7ill, supra.
0. En May -3, 1901 *innie &ane ?od$es died in /loilo 3ity, predeceasin$ her husband by #ore than five
<0= years. 2t the ti#e of her death, she had no forced or co#pulsory heir, e(cept her husband, 3. ;.
?od$es. Ahe was survived also by various brothers and sisters #entioned in her 7ill <supra=, which, for
convenience, we shall refer to as the ?/8DE;A.
'. En &une -8, 1901, this ?onorable 3ourt ad#itted to probate the *ast 7ill and Testa#ent of the
deceased *innie &ane ?od$es <2nne( P2Q=, and appointed 3. ;. ?od$es as e(ecutor of her estate without
bond. <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, pp. -.--0=. En &uly 1, 1901, this ?onorable 3ourt issued letters
testa#entary to 3. ;. ?od$es in the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, p.
30.=
1. The 7ill of *innie &ane ?od$es, with respect to the order of succession, the a#ount of successional
ri$hts, and the intrinsic of its testa#entary provisions, should be $overned by )hilippine laws because5
<a= The testatri(, *innie &ane ?od$es, intended )hilippine laws to $overn her 7ill4
<b= 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode provides that Pthe national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever #ay be the nature of the property and re$ardless of the country wherein said
property #ay be foundQ, shall prevail. ?owever, the 3onflict of *aw of Te(as, which is the Pnational lawQ of
the testatri(, *innie &ane ?od$es, provide that the do#iciliary law <)hilippine law J see para$raph
-, supra= should $overn the testa#entary dispositions and successional ri$hts over #ovables <personal
properties=, and the law of the situs of the property <also )hilippine law as to properties located in the
)hilippines= with re$ards i##ovable <real properties=. Thus applyin$ the P@envoi DoctrineQ, as approved
and applied by our Aupre#e 3ourt in the case of P/n The Matter Ef The Testate state of duard .
3hristensenQ, 8.@. ;o.
*-1'1.9, pro#ul$ated &anuary 31, 19'3, )hilippine law should apply to the 7ill of *innie &ane ?od$es
and to the successional ri$hts to her estate insofar as her mova&le and immova&le assets in the
)hilippines are concerned. 7e shall not, at this sta$e, discuss what law should $overn the assets of
*innie &ane ?od$es located in E+laho#a and Te(as, because the only assets in issue in this #otion are
those within the 6urisdiction of this #otion 3ourt in the two above-captioned Apecial )roceedin$s.
8. ,nder )hilippine and Te(as law, the con6u$al or co##unity estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution,
be divided e%ually between the#. Thus, upon the death of *innie &ane ?od$es on May -3, 1901, one-half
<1N-= of the entirety of the assets of the ?od$es spouses constitutin$ their con6u$al estate pertained
auto#atically to 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, not &; )a; of inheritance, &ut in his o)n right as partner in the
conFugal partnership. The other one-half <1N-= portion of the con6u$al estate constituted the estate of
*innie &ane ?od$es. This is the onl; portion of the conFugal estate capa&le of inheritance &; her heirs.
9. This one-half <1N-= portion of the con6u$al assets pertainin$ to *innie &ane ?od$es cannot, under a
clear and specific provision of her 7ill, be enhanced or increased by inco#e, earnin$s, rents, or
e#olu#ents accruin$ after her death on May -3, 1901. *innie &ane ?od$esK 7ill provides that Pall rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall &elong to him DC. 7. HodgesE and he is further authori.ed
to use an; part of the principal of said estate as he ma; need or desire.Q <)ara$raph 3, 2nne( P2Q.= Thus,
by specific provision of *innie &ane ?od$esK 7ill, Pall rents, e#olu#ents and inco#eQ #ust be credited to
the one-half <1N-= portion of the con6u$al estate pertainin$ to 3. ;. ?od$es. Clearl;, therefore, the estate
of %innie Jane Hodges, capa&le of inheritance &; her heirs, consisted e#clusivel; of no more than one$
half D'H=E of the conFugal estate, computed as of the time of her death on !a; =>, '?@A.
10. 2rticles 900, 990 and 1001 of the ;ew 3ivil 3ode provide that the survivin$ spouse of a deceased
leavin$ no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a #atter of ri$ht and by way of irrevocable le$iti#e,
to at least one-half <1N-= of the estate of the deceased, and no testa#entary disposition by the deceased
can le$ally and validly affect this ri$ht of the survivin$ spouse. /n fact, her husband is entitled to said one-
half <1N-= portion of her estate by way of le$iti#e. <2rticle 88', 3ivil 3ode.= 3learly, therefore, i##ediately
upon the death of *innie &ane ?od$es, 3. ;. ?od$es was the owner of at least three-fourths <3N.= or
seventy-five <10U= percent of all of the con6u$al assets of the spouses, <1N- or 00U by way of con6u$al
partnership share and 1N. or -0U by way of inheritance and le$iti#e= plus all Prents, e#olu#ents and
inco#eQ accruin$ to said con6u$al estate fro# the #o#ent of *innie &ane ?od$esK death <see para$raph
9, supra=.
11. The late *innie &ane ?od$es desi$nated her husband 3.;. ?od$es as her sole and e(clusive heir
with full authority to do what he pleased, as e(clusive heir and owner of all the assets constitutin$ her
estate, e(cept only with re$ards certain properties Powned by us, located at, in or near the 3ity of
*ubboc+, Te(asQ. Thus, even without relyin$ on our laws of succession and le$iti#e, which we have cited
above, C. 7. Hodges, &; specific testamentar; designation of his )ife, )as entitled to the entirel; to his
)ifeIs estate in the /hilippines.
1-. 2rticle 111 of the ;ew 3ivil 3ode provides that Pthe ri$hts of the successor are trans#itted fro# the
death of the decedentQ. Thus, title to the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es was trans#itted to 3. ;. ?od$es
i##ediately upon her death on May -3, 1901. "or the convenience of this ?onorable 3ourt, we attached
hereto as 2nne( P3Q a $raph of how the con6u$al estate of the spouses ?od$es should be divided in
accordance with )hilippine law and the 7ill of *innie &ane ?od$es.
13. /n his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es as above-stated, 3. ;.
?od$es, shortly after the death of *innie &ane ?od$es, appropriated to hi#self the entirety of her estate.
?e operated all the assets, en$a$ed in business and perfor#ed all acts in connection with the entirety of
the con6u$al estate, in his o)n name alone, 6ust as he had been operatin$, en$a$in$ and doin$ while the
late *innie &ane ?od$es was still alive. 6pon his death on Decem&er =@, '?C=, therefore, all said
conFugal assets )ere in his sole possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as
e#ecutor, &ut as e#clusive o)ner of all said assets.
1.. 2ll these acts of 3. ;. ?od$es were authori>ed and sanctioned e(pressly and i#pliedly by various
orders of this ?onorable 3ourt, as follows5
<a= /n an Erder dated May -1, 1901, this ?onorable 3ourt ruled that 3. ;. ?od$es Pis allowed or
authori>ed to continue the business in which he was en$a$ed, and to perfor# acts which he had been
doin$ while the deceased was livin$.Q <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, p. 11.=
<b= En Dece#ber 1., 1901, this ?onorable 3ourt, on the basis of the followin$ fact, alle$ed in the verified
Motion dated Dece#ber 11, 1901 filed by *eon ). 8ellada as attorney for the e(ecutor 3. ;. ?od$es5
That herein (ecutor, <is= not only part owner of the properties left as con6u$al, but also, the successor to
all the properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es.K <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, p. ..4
e#phasis supplied.=
issued the followin$ order5
P2s prayed for by 2ttorney 8ellada, counsel for the (ecutor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated
Decem&er '', '?@A, )hich the Court considers )ell taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and
#ort$a$es of all the properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es e(ecuted by the (ecutor,
3harles ;ewton ?od$es are hereby 2))@E:D. The said (ecutor is further authori>ed to e(ecute
subse%uent sales, conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of the properties left by the said deceased *innie
&ane ?od$es in consonance )ith the )ishes contained in the last )ill and testament of the latter.Q <3"/
@ecord. Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, p. .'4 e#phasis supplied.=
-. e#s
<c= En 2pril -1, 1909, this ?onorable 3ourt approved the verified inventory and accountin$ sub#itted by
3. ;. ?od$es throu$h his counsel *eon ). 8ellada on 2pril 1., 1909 wherein he alle$ed a#on$ other
thin$s,
PThat no person interested in the )hilippines of the ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein account, be
$iven notice, as herein e#ecutor is the onl; devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance )ith the
last )ill and testament alread; pro&ated &; the Honora&le Court.Q <3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, pp.
11-184 e#phasis supplied.=
<d= En &uly -0, 19'0, this ?onorable 3ourt approved the verified P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccountQ
sub#itted by 3. ;. ?od$es throu$h his counsel *eon ). 8ellada on &uly -1, 19'0 wherein he alle$ed,
a#on$ other thin$s.
PThat no person interested in the )hilippines of the ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein account, be
$iven notice as herein e#ecutor is the onl; devisee or legatee of the deceased %innie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testa#ent ofthe deceased, already probated by this ?onorable 3ourt.Q
<3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, pp. 81-8-4 e#phasis supplied.=
<e= En May -, 19'1, this ?onorable 3ourt approved the verified P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccount !y The
(ecutor "or the Gear 19'0S sub#itted throu$h *eon ). 8ellada on 2pril -0, 19'1 wherein he alle$ed5
PThat no person interested in the )hilippines be $iven notice, ofthe ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein
account, as herein e#ecutor is the onl; devisee or legatee of the deceased %innie Jane Hodges, in
accordance )ith the last )ill and testament ofthe deceased, alread; pro&ated &; this Honora&le Court .Q
<3"/ @ecord, Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, pp. 90-914 e#phasis supplied.=
10. Aince 3. ;. ?od$es was the sole and e(clusive heir of *innie &ane ?od$es, not only by law, but in
accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need to li%uidate the con6u$al estate of
the spouses. The entirely of said con6u$al estate pertained to hi# e(clusively, therefore this ?onorable
3ourt sanctioned and authori>ed, as above-stated, 3. ;. ?od$es to #ana$e, operate and control all the
con6u$al assets as owner.
1'. !y e(pressly authori>in$ 3. ;. ?od$es to act as he did in connection with the estate of his wife, this
?onorable 3ourt has <1= declared 3. ;. ?od$es as the sole heir of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, and
<-= delivered and distributed her estate to 3. ;. ?od$es as sole heir in accordance with the ter#s and
conditions of her 7ill. Thus, althou$h the Pestate of *innie &ane ?od$esQ still e(ists as a le$al and 6uridical
personality, it had no assets or properties located in the )hilippines re$istered in its na#e whatsoever at
the ti#e of the death of 3. ;. ?od$es on Dece#ber -0, 19'-.
11. The 7ill of *innie &ane ?od$es <2nne( P2Q=, fourth para$raph, provides as follows5
P2t the death of #y said husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of the rest,
residue and re#ainder of #y estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be e%ually
divided a#on$ #y brothers and sisters, share and share ali+e, na#ely5
Psta ?i$don, ##a ?owell, *eonard ?i$don, @oy ?i$don, Aadie @ascoe, ra !o#an and ;i#ray
?i$don.Q
!ecause of the facts hereinabove set out there is no Prest, residue and re#ainderQ, at least to the e(tent
of the )hilippine assets, which re#ains to vest in the ?/8DE;A, assu#in$ this proviso in *innie &ane
?od$esK 7ill is valid and bindin$ a$ainst the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es.
18. 2ny clai#s by the ?/8DE;A under the above-%uoted provision of *innie &ane ?od$esK 7ill is without
#erit because said provision is void and invalid at least as to the )hilippine assets. /t should not, in
anyway, affect the ri$hts of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es or his heirs to the properties, which 3. ;. ?od$es
ac%uired by way of inheritance fro# his wife *innie &ane ?od$es upon her death.
<a= /n spite of the above-#entioned provision in the 7ill of *innie &ane ?od$es, 3. ;. ?od$es ac%uired,
not #erely a usufructuary ri$ht, but absolute title and ownership to her estate. /n a recent case involvin$ a
very si#ilar testa#entary provision, the Aupre#e 3ourt held that the heir first desi$nated ac%uired full
ownership of the property be%ueathed by the will, not #ere usufructuary ri$hts. <3onsolacion "lorentino
de 3risolo$o, et al., vs. Manuel Ain$son, 8. @. ;o. *-1381', "ebruary -8, 19'-.=
<b= 2rticle 8'., 81- and 88' of the ;ew 3ivil 3ode clearly provide that no char$e, condition or substitution
whatsoever upon the le$iti#e can be i#posed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of 2rticles 900,
990 and 1001 of the ;ew 3ivil 3ode, the le$iti#e of a survivin$ spouse is 1N- of the estate of the
deceased spouse. 3onse%uently, the above-#entioned provision in the 7ill of *innie &ane ?od$es is
clearly invalid insofar as the le$iti#e of 3. ;. ?od$es was concerned, which consisted of 1N- of the 1N-
portion of the con6u$al estate, or 1N. of the entire con6u$al estate of the deceased.
<c= There are $enerally only two +inds of substitution provided for and authori>ed by our 3ivil 3ode
<2rticles 801-810=, na#ely, <1= simple or common substitution, so#eti#es referred to
as vulgar substitution <2rticle 809=, and <-= fideico##issary substitution <2rticle 8'3=. 2ll other
substitutions are #erely variations of these. The substitution provided for by para$raph four of the 7ill of
*innie &ane ?od$es is not fideico##issary substitution, because there is clearly no obli$ation on the part
of 3. ;. ?od$es as the first heir desi$nated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs.
<3onsolacion "lorentino de 3risolo$o et al. vs. Manuel Ain$son, 8. @. ;o.
*-1381'.= 2t #ost, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. ?owever, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions #ust be present, na#ely, that the
first desi$nated heir <1= should die before the testator4 or <-= should not wish to accept the inheritance4 or
<3= should be incapacitated to do so. ;one of these conditions apply to 3. ;. ?od$es, and, therefore, the
substitution provided for by the above-%uoted provision of the 7ill is not authori>ed by the 3ode, and,
therefore, it is void. Manresa, co##entin$ on these +isses of substitution, #eanin$fully stated that5 PR
cuando el testador instituyeun pri#er heredero, y por falleci#iento de este no#bra otro u otros, ha de
entenderse %ue estas se$undas desi$naciones solo han de lle$ar a tener efectividad en el caso de %ue el
pri#er instituido #uera antes %ue el testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. RQ. <' Manresa, 1
a ed., pa$. 110.= /n other words, )hen another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir,
the second designation can have effect onl; in case the first instituted heir dies &efore the testator,
)hether or not that )as the true intention of said testator. Aince 3. ;. ?od$es did not die before *innie
&ane ?od$es, the provision for substitution contained in *innie &ane ?od$esK 7illis void.
<d= /n view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the 7ill, 3. ;. ?od$esK inheritance to the
entirety of the *innie &ane ?od$es estate is irrevocable and final.
19. !e that as it #ay, at the ti#e of 3. ;. ?od$esK death, the entirety of the con6u$al estate appeared and
was re$istered in hi# e(clusively as owner. Thus, the presu#ption is that all said assets constituted his
estate. Therefore J
<a= /f the ?/8DE;A wish to enforce their dubious ri$hts as substituted heirs to 1N. of the con6u$al estate
<the other 1N. is covered by the le$iti#e of 3. ;. ?od$es which can not be affected by any testa#entary
disposition=, their re#edy, if any, is to file their clai# a$ainst the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, which should be
entitled at the present ti#e to full custody and control of all the con6u$al estate of the spouses.
<b= The present proceedin$s, in which two estates e(ist under separate ad#inistration, where the
ad#inistratri( of the *innie &ane ?od$es estate e(ercises an officious ri$ht to ob6ect and intervene in
#atters affectin$ e(clusively the 3. ;. ?od$es estate, is ano#alous.
7?@"E@, it is #ost respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, this ?onorable
3ourt declare5
1. That the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es was and is co#posed e(clusively of one-half <1N-= share in the
con6u$al estate of the spouses ?od$es, co#puted as of the date of her death on May -3, 19014
-. That the other half of the con6u$al estate pertained e(clusively to 3. ;. ?od$es as his share as partner
in the con6u$al partnership4
3. That all Prents, e#olu#ents and inco#eQ of the con6u$al estate accruin$ after *innie &ane ?od$esK
death pertains to 3. ;. ?od$es4
.. That 3. ;. ?od$es was the sole and e(clusive heir of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es4
0. That, therefore, the entire con6u$al estate of the spouses located in the )hilippines, plus all the Prents,
e#olu#ents and inco#eQ above-#entioned, now constitutes the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, capable of
distribution to his heirs upon ter#ination of Apecial )roceedin$s ;o. 1'1-4
'. That )3/!, as ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, is entitled to full and e(clusive custody,
control and #ana$e#ent of all said properties4 and
1. That 2velina 2. Ma$no, as ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, as well as the
?/8DE;A, has no ri$ht to intervene or participate in the ad#inistration of the 3. ;. ?od$es estate.
)3/! further prays for such and other relief as #ay be dee#ed 6ust and e%uitable in the pre#ises.Q
<@ecord, pp. -'0--11=
!efore all of these #otions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on Dece#ber -1, 19'0, private
respondent Ma$no filed her own PMotion for the Efficial Declaration of ?eirs of the state of *innie &ane
?od$esQ as follows5
3EMA ;E7 the 2d#inistratri( of the state of *innie &ane ?od$es and, throu$h undersi$ned counsel,
unto this ?onorable 3ourt #ost respectfully states and #anifests5
1. That the spouses 3harles ;ewton ?od$es and *innie &ane ?od$es were 2#erican citi>ens who died
at the 3ity of /loilo after havin$ a#assed and accu#ulated e(tensive properties in the )hilippines4
-. That on ;ove#ber --, 190-, *innie &ane ?od$es e(ecuted a last will and testa#ent <the ori$inal of this
will now for#s part of the records of these proceedin$s as (hibit P3Q and appears as Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301,
"olio /, pp. 11-18=4
3. That on May -3, 1901, *innie &ane ?od$es died at the 3ity of /loilo at the ti#e survived by her
husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and several relatives na#ed in her last will and testa#ent4
.. That on &une -8, 1901, a petition therefor havin$ been priorly filed and duly heard, this ?onorable
3ourt issued an order ad#ittin$ to probate the last will and testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es <Ap. )roc.
;o. 1301, "olio /, pp. -.--0, -'--8=4
0. That the re%uired notice to creditors and to all others who #ay have any clai#s a$ainst the decedent,
*innie &ane ?od$es has already been printed, published and posted <Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301, "olio /. pp. 3.-
.0= and the re$la#entary period for filin$ such clai#s has lon$ a$o lapsed and e(pired without any clai#s
havin$ been asserted a$ainst the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, approved by the
2d#inistratorN2d#inistratri( of the said estate, nor ratified by this ?onorable 3ourt4
'. That the last will and testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es already ad#itted to probate contains an
institution of heirs in the followin$ words5
PA3E;D5 / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated or located, to #y beloved husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es to have and to
hold unto hi#, #y said husband, durin$ his natural lifeti#e.
T?/@D5 / desire, direct and provide that #y husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, shall have the ri$ht to
#ana$e, control, use and en6oy said estate durin$ his lifeti#e, and, he is hereby $iven the ri$ht to #a+e
any chan$es in the physical properties of said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he #ay thin+ best,
and the purchase of any other or additional property as he #ay thin+ best4 to e(ecute conveyances with
or without $eneral or special warranty, conveyin$ in fee si#ple or for any other ter# or ti#e, any property
which he #ay dee# proper to dispose of4 to lease any of the real property for oil, $as andNor other
#inerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee si#ple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he elect to sell. 2ll rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e fro# said estate shall belon$ to
hi#, and he is further authori>ed to use any part of the principal of said estate as he #ay need or desire.
/t is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the i#proved property
now owned by us located at, in or near the 3ity of *ubboc+ Te(as, but he shall have the full ri$ht to lease,
#ana$e and en6oy the sa#e durin$ his lifeti#e, above provided. ?e shall have the ri$ht to subdivide any
far# land and sell lots therein, and #ay sell uni#proved town lots.
"E,@T?5 2t the death of #y said husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, / $ive, devise and be%ueath all of
the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
e%ually divided a#on$ #y brothers and sisters, share and share ali+e, na#ely5
sta ?i$don, ##a ?owell, *eonard ?i$don, @oy ?i$don, Aadie @ascoe, ra !o#an and ;i#roy
?i$don.
"/"T?5 /n case of the death of any of #y brothers andNor sisters na#ed in ite# "ourth, above, prior to the
death of #y husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, then it is #y will and be%uest that the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall ta+e 6ointly the share which would have $one to such brother or sister had
she or he survived.Q
1. That under the provisions of the last will and testa#ent already above-%uoted, *innie &ane ?od$es
$ave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and a vested
re#ainder-estate or the na+ed title over the sa#e estate to her relatives na#ed therein4
8. That after the death of *innie &ane ?od$es and after the ad#ission to probate of her last will and
testa#ent, but durin$ the lifeti#e of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, the said 3harles ;ewton ?od$es with full
and co#plete +nowled$e of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon hi# by the will since he was then
actin$ as 2d#inistrator of the estate and later as (ecutor of the will of *innie &ane ?od$es,
une%uivocably and clearly throu$h oral and written declarations and sworn public state#ents, renounced,
disclai#ed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es4
9. That, accordin$ly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es pursuant to her last
will and testa#ent, are her na#ed brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit5 sta ?i$don, ##a ?owell,
*eonard ?i$don, 2line ?i$don and David ?i$don, the latter two bein$ the wife and son respectively of the
deceased @oy ?i$don, Aadie @ascoe ra !o#an and ;i#roy ?i$don, all of le$al a$es, 2#erican
citi>ens, with residence at the Atate of Te(as, ,nited Atates of 2#erica4
10. That at the ti#e of the death of *innie &ane ?od$es on May -3, 1901, she was the co-owner <to$ether
with her husband 3harles ;ewton ?od$es= of an undivided one-half interest in their con6u$al properties
e(istin$ as of that date, May -3, 1901, which properties are now bein$ ad#inistered so#eti#es 6ointly
and so#eti#es separately by the 2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es andNor the
2d#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es but all of which are under the control and supervision of this
?onorable 3ourt4
11. That because there was no separation or se$re$ation of the interests of husband and wife in the
co#bined con6u$al estate, as there has been no such separation or se$re$ation up to the present, both
interests have continually earned e(actly the sa#e a#ount of Prents, e#olu#ents and inco#eQ, the entire
estate havin$ been continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were alive4
1-. That the one-half interest of *innie &ane ?od$es in the co#bined con6u$al estate was earnin$ Prents,
e#olu#ents and inco#eQ until her death on May -3, 1901, when it ceased to be saddled with any #ore
char$es or e(penditures which are purely personal to her in nature, and her estate +ept on earnin$ such
Prents, e#olu#ents and inco#eQ by virtue of their havin$ been e(pressly renounced, disclai#ed and
repudiated by 3harles ;ewton ?od$es to who# they were be%ueathed for life under the last will and
testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es4
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es in the co#bined con6u$al
estate e(istin$ as of May -3, 1901, while it #ay have earned e(actly the sa#e a#ount of Prents,
e#olu#ents and inco#eQ as that of the share pertainin$ to *innie &ane ?od$es, continued to be
burdened by char$es, e(penditures, and other dispositions which are purely personal to hi# in nature,
until the death of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es hi#self on Dece#ber -0, 19'-4
1.. That of all the assets of the co#bined con6u$al estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and 3harles ;ewton
?od$es as they e(ist today, the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es is clearly entitled to a portion #ore than fifty
percent <00U= as co#pared to the portion to which the estate of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es #ay be entitled,
which portions can be e(actly deter#ined by the followin$ #anner5
a. 2n inventory #ust be #ade of the assets of the co#bined con6u$al estate as they e(isted on the death
of *innie &ane ?od$es on May -3, 1901 J one-half of these assets belon$ to the estate of *innie &ane
?od$es4
b. 2n accountin$ #ust be #ade of the Prents, e#olu#ents and inco#eQ of all these assets J a$ain one-
half of these belon$ to the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es4
c. 2d6ust#ents #ust be #ade, after #a+in$ a deduction of char$es, disburse#ents and other dispositions
#ade by 3harles ;ewton ?od$es personally and for his own personal account fro# May -3, 1901 up to
Dece#ber -0, 19'-, as well as other char$es, disburse#ents and other dispositions #ade for hi# and in
his behalf since Dece#ber -0, 19'- up to the present4
10. That there re#ains no other #atter for disposition now insofar as the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es is
concerned but to co#plete the li%uidation of her estate, se$re$ate the# fro# the con6u$al estate, and
distribute the# to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testa#ent.
7?@"E@, pre#ises considered, it is #ost respectfully #oved and prayed that this ?onorable 3ourt,
after a hearin$ on the factual #atters raised by this #otion, issue an order5
a. Declarin$ the followin$ persons, to wit5 sta ?i$don, ##a ?owell, *eonard ?i$don, 2line ?i$don,
David ?i$don, Aadie @ascoe, ra !o#an and ;i#roy ?i$don, as the sole heirs under the last will and
testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es and as the only persons entitled to her estate4
b. Deter#inin$ the e(act value of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es in accordance with the syste#
enunciated in para$raph 1. of this #otion4
c. 2fter such deter#ination orderin$ its se$re$ation fro# the co#bined con6u$al estate and its delivery to
the 2d#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es for distribution to the heirs to who# they properly
belon$ and appertain.
<8reen @ecord on 2ppeal, pp. 38--391=
whereupon, instead of further pressin$ on its #otion of &anuary 8, 19'0 afore%uoted, as it had been doin$
before, petitioner withdrew the said #otion and in addition to opposin$ the above #otion of respondent
Ma$no, filed a #otion on 2pril --, 19'' alle$in$ in part that5
1. That it has received fro# the counsel for the ad#inistratri( of the supposed estate of *innie &ane
?od$es a notice to set her PMotion for Efficial Declaration of ?eirs of the state of *innie &ane ?od$esQ4
-. That before the aforesaid #otion could be heard, there are #atters pendin$ before this ?onorable
3ourt, such as5
a. The e(a#ination already ordered by this ?onorable 3ourt of docu#ents relatin$ to the alle$ation of
2velina Ma$no that 3harles ;ewton ?od$es Pthrou$h R written declarations and sworn public
state#ents, renounced, disclai#ed and repudiated life-estate and usufruct over the estate of *innie &ane
?od$esK4
b. That P,r$ent Motion for 2n 2ccountin$ and Delivery to the state of 3. ;. ?od$es of 2ll the 2ssets of
the 3on6u$al )artnership of the Deceased *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es (istin$ as of May -3,
1901 )lus 2ll the @ents, #olu#ents and /nco#e Therefro#Q4
c. :arious #otions to resolve the aforesaid #otion4
d. Manifestation of Aepte#ber 1., 19'., detailin$ acts of interference of 2velina Ma$no under color of title
as ad#inistratri( of the state of *innie &ane ?od$es4
which are all pre6udicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein bein$ #atters of
record, and therefore re%uire only the resolution of %uestions of law4
3. That whatever clai#s any alle$ed heirs or other persons #ay have could be very easily threshed out in
the Testate state of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es4
.. That the #aintenance of two separate estate proceedin$s and two ad#inistrators only results in
confusion and is unduly burdenso#e upon the Testate state of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, particularly
because the bond filed by 2velina Ma$no is $rossly insufficient to answer for the funds and property
which she has inofficiously collected and held, as well as those which she continues to inofficiously collect
and hold4
0. That it is a #atter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences not only the estate but
also third-parties dealin$ with it4Q <2nne( P:Q, )etition.=
and then, after further re#indin$ the court, by %uotin$ the#, of the relevant alle$ations of its earlier #otion
of Aepte#ber 1., 19'., 2nne( ,, prayed that5
1. /##ediately order 2velina Ma$no to account for and deliver to the ad#inistrator of the state of 3. ;.
?od$es all the assets of the con6u$al partnership of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es,
plus all the rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e therefro#4
-. )endin$ the consideration of this #otion, i##ediately order 2velina Ma$no to turn over all her
collections to the ad#inistrator )hilippine 3o##ercial V /ndustrial !an+4
3. Declare the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es <Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301= closed4
.. Defer the hearin$ and consideration of the #otion for declaration of heirs in the Testate state of *innie
&ane ?od$es until the #atters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
<)rayer, 2nne( P:Q of )etition.=
En Ectober 1-, 19'', as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied the
fore$oin$ #otion, holdin$ thus5
E @ D @
En record is a #otion <:ol. M, Ap. 1'1-, pp. .319-.390= dated 2pril --, 19'' of ad#inistrator )3/!
prayin$ that <1= /##ediately order 2velina Ma$no to account for and deliver to the ad#inistrator of the
estate of 3. ;. ?od$es all assets of the con6u$al partnership of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es and 3.
;. ?od$es, plus all the rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e therefro#4 <-= )endin$ the consideration of this
#otion, i##ediately order 2velina Ma$no to turn over all her collections to the ad#inistrator )3/!4 <3=
Declare the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es <Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301= closed4 and <.= Defer the hearin$
and consideration of the #otion for declaration of heirs in the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es until
the #atters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This #otion is predicated on the fact that there are #atters pendin$ before this court such as <a= the
e(a#ination already ordered by this ?onorable 3ourt of docu#ents relatin$ to the alle$ation of 2velina
Ma$no that 3harles ;ewton ?od$es thru written declaration and sworn public state#ents renounced,
disclai#ed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es <b= the
ur$ent #otion for accountin$ and delivery to the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es of all the assets of the con6u$al
partnership of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es e(istin$ as of May -3, 1901 plus all
the rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e therefro#4 <c= various #otions to resolve the aforesaid #otion4 and <d=
#anifestation of Aepte#ber 1., 19'., detailin$ acts of interference of 2velina Ma$no under color of title
as ad#inistratri( of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es.
These #atters, accordin$ to the instant #otion, are all pre-6udicial involvin$ no issues of facts and only
re%uire the resolution of %uestion of law4 that in the #otion of Ectober 0, 19'3 it is alle$ed that in a #otion
dated Dece#ber 11, 1901 filed by 2tty. *eon 8ellada as attorney for the e(ecutor 3. ;. ?od$es, the said
e(ecutor 3. ;. ?od$es is not only part owner of the properties left as con6u$al but also the successor to
all the properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es.
Aaid #otion of Dece#ber 11, 1901 was approved by the 3ourt in consonance with the wishes contained
in the last will and testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es.
That on 2pril -1, 1909 this 3ourt approved the inventory and accountin$ sub#itted by 3. ;. ?od$es thru
counsel 2tty. *eon 8ellada in a #otion filed on 2pril 1., 1909 statin$ therein that e(ecutor 3. ;. ?od$es
is the only devisee or le$atee of *innie &ane ?od$es in accordance with the last will and testa#ent
already probated by the 3ourt.
That on &uly 13, 19'0 the 3ourt approved the annual state#ent of accounts sub#itted by the e(ecutor 3.
;. ?od$es thru his counsel 2tty. 8ellada on &uly -1, 19'0 wherein it is stated that the e(ecutor, 3. ;.
?od$es is the only devisee or le$atee of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es4 that on May -, 19'1 the
3ourt approved the annual state#ent of accounts sub#itted by e(ecutor, 3. ;. ?od$es for the year 19'0
which was sub#itted by 2tty. 8ellada on 2pril -0, 19'1 wherein it is stated that e(ecutor ?od$es is the
only devisee or le$atee of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es4
That durin$ the hearin$ on Aepte#ber 0 and ', 19'3 the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es clai#ed all the assets
belon$in$ to the deceased spouses *innie &ane ?od$es and 3. ;. ?od$es situated in the )hilippines4
that ad#inistratri( Ma$no has e(ecuted ille$al acts to the pre6udice of the testate estate of 3. ;. ?od$es.
2n opposition <Ap. 1'1-, :ol. M, pp. ..10-..-1= dated 2pril -1, 19'' of ad#inistratri( Ma$no has been
filed as+in$ that the #otion be denied for lac+ of #erit and that the #otion for the official declaration of
heirs of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es be set for presentation and reception of evidence.
/t is alle$ed in the aforesaid opposition that the e(a#ination of docu#ents which are in the possession of
ad#inistratri( Ma$no can be #ade prior to the hearin$ of the #otion for the official declaration of heirs of
the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es, durin$ said hearin$.
That the #atters raised in the )3/!Ks #otion of Ectober 0, 19'3 <as well as the other #otion= dated
Aepte#ber 1., 19'. have been consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of evidence
with the hearin$ on the deter#ination of the heirs of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. /t is further alle$ed
in the opposition that the #otion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es is
the one that constitutes a pre6udicial %uestion to the #otions dated Ectober 0 and Aepte#ber 1., 19'.
because if said #otion is found #eritorious and $ranted by the 3ourt, the )3/!Ks #otions of Ectober 0,
19'3 and Aepte#ber 1., 19'. will beco#e #oot and acade#ic since they are pre#ised on the
assu#ption and clai# that the only heir of *innie &ane ?od$es was 3. ;. ?od$es.
That the )3/! and counsel are estopped fro# further %uestionin$ the deter#ination of heirs in the estate
of *innie &ane ?od$es at this sta$e since it was )3/! as early as &anuary 8, 19'0 which filed a #otion for
official declaration of heirs of *innie &ane ?od$es that the clai# of any heirs of *innie &ane ?od$es can
be deter#ined only in the ad#inistration proceedin$s over the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and not that
of 3. ;. ?od$es, since the heirs of *innie &ane ?od$es are clai#in$ her estate and not the estate of 3. ;.
?od$es.
2 reply <Ap. 1'1-, :ol. M, pp. ..3'-....= dated May 11, 19'' of the )3/! has been filed alle$in$ that the
#otion dated 2pril --, 19'' of the )3/! is not to see+ defer#ent of the hearin$ and consideration of the
#otion for official declaration of heirs of *innie &ane ?od$es but to declare the testate estate of *innie
&ane ?od$es closed and for ad#inistratri( Ma$no to account for and deliver to the )3/! all assets of the
con6u$al partnership of the deceased spouses which has co#e to her possession plus all rents and
inco#e.
2 re6oinder <Ap. 1'1-, :ol. M, pp. ..08-..'-= of ad#inistratri( Ma$no dated May 19, 19'' has been filed
alle$in$ that the #otion dated Dece#ber 11, 1901 only sou$ht the approval of all conveyances #ade by
3. ;. ?od$es and re%uested the 3ourt authority for all subse%uent conveyances that will be e(ecuted by
3. ;. ?od$es4 that the order dated Dece#ber 1., 1901 only approved the conveyances #ade by 3. ;.
?od$es4 that 3. ;. ?od$es represented by counsel never #ade any clai# in the estate of *innie &ane
?od$es and never filed a #otion to declare hi#self as the heir of the said *innie &ane ?od$es despite the
lapse of #ore than five <0= years after the death of *innie &ane ?od$es4 that it is further alle$ed in the
re6oinder that there can be no order of ad6udication of the estate unless there has been a prior e(press
declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es <Ap. 1301= has
been #ade.
3onsiderin$ the alle$ations and ar$u#ents in the #otion and of the )3/! as well as those in the
opposition and re6oinder of ad#inistratri( Ma$no, the 3ourt finds the opposition and re6oinder to be well
ta+en for the reason that so far there has been no official declaration of heirs in the testate estate of
*innie &ane ?od$es and therefore no disposition of her estate.
7?@"E@, the #otion of the )3/! dated 2pril --, 19'' is hereby D;/D.
<2nne( P7Q, )etition=
/n its #otion dated ;ove#ber -., 19'' for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alle$ed inter
alia that5
/t cannot be over-stressed that the #otion of Dece#ber 11, 1901 was based on the fact that5
a. ,nder the last will and testa#ent of the deceased, *innie &ane ?od$es, the late 3harles ;ewton
?od$es was the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties in the )hilippines are concerned4
b. Aaid last will and testa#ent vested upon the said late 3harles ;ewton ?od$es ri$hts over said
properties which, in su#, spell ownership, absolute and in fee si#ple4
c. Aaid late 3harles ;ewton ?od$es was, therefore, Pnot only part owner of the properties left as con6u$al,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es.
*i+ewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid #otion was $ranted by this ?onorable 3ourt Pfor
the reasons statedQ therein.
2$ain, the #otion of Dece#ber 11, 1901 prayed that not only Pall the sales, conveyances, leases, and
#ort$a$es e(ecuted byQ the late 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, but also all Pthe subse%uent sales,
conveyances, leases, and #ort$a$es RQ be approved and authori>ed. This ?onorable 3ourt, in its order
of Dece#ber 1., 1901, Pfor the reasons statedQ in the aforesaid #otion, $ranted the sa#e, and not only
approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of all properties left by the deceased *innie
&ane ?od$es e(ecuted by the late 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, but also authori>ed Pall subse%uent sales,
conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of the properties left by the said deceased *innie &ane ?od$es.
<2nne( PMQ, )etition=
and reiterated its funda#ental pose that the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es had already been
factually, althou$h not le$ally, closed with the virtual declaration of ?od$es and ad6udication to hi#, as
sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of Dece#ber 1., 1901, 2nne(
8. Atill unpersuaded, on &uly 18, 19'1, respondent court denied said #otion for reconsideration and held
that Pthe court believes that there is no 6ustification why the order of Ectober 1-, 19'' should be
considered or #odifiedQ, and, on &uly 19, 19'1, the #otion of respondent Ma$no Pfor official declaration of
heirs of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$esQ, already referred to above, was set for hearin$.
/n conse%uence of all these develop#ents, the present petition was filed on 2u$ust 1, 19'1 <albeit
petitioner had to pay another doc+etin$ fee on 2u$ust 9, 19'1, since the orders in %uestion were issued in
two separate testate estate proceedin$s, ;os. 1301 and 1'1-, in the court below=.
To$ether with such petition, there are now pendin$ before ,s for resolution herein, appeals fro# the
followin$5
1. The order of Dece#ber 19, 19'. authori>in$ pay#ent by respondent Ma$no of overti#e pay, <pp. --1,
8reen @ecord on 2ppeal= to$ether with the subse%uent orders of &anuary 9, 19'0, <pp. -31--3-, id.=
Ectober -1, 19'0, <pp. --1, id.= and "ebruary 10, 19'' <pp. .00-.0', id.= repeatedly denyin$ #otions for
reconsideration thereof.
-. The order of 2u$ust ', 19'0 <pp. -.8, id.= re%uirin$ that deeds e(ecuted by petitioner to be co-si$ned
by respondent Ma$no, as well as the order of Ectober -1, 19'0 <pp. -1'--11= denyin$ reconsideration.
3. The order of Ectober -1, 19'0 <pp. -9---90, id.= en6oinin$ the deposit of all collections in a 6oint
account and the sa#e order of "ebruary 10, 19'' #entioned in ;o. 1 above which included the denial of
the reconsideration of this order of Ectober -1, 19'0.
.. The order of ;ove#ber 3, 19'0 <pp. 313-3-0, id.= directin$ the pay#ent of attorneyKs fees, fees of the
respondent ad#inistratri(, etc. and the order of "ebruary 1', 19'' denyin$ reconsideration thereof.
0. The order of ;ove#ber -3, 19'0 <pp. 33.-330, id.= allowin$ appellee 7estern /nstitute of Technolo$y
to #a+e pay#ents to either one or both of the ad#inistrators of the two estates as well as the order of
March 1, 19'' <p. .'-, id.= denyin$ reconsideration.
'. The various orders hereinabove earlier enu#erated approvin$ deeds of sale e(ecuted by respondent
Ma$no in favor of appellees 3arles, 3atedral, )ablito, 8u>#an, 3oronado, !arrido, 3ausin$, &avier,
*ucero and !atisanan, <see pp. 30 to 31 of this opinion=, to$ether with the two separate orders both dated
Dece#ber -, 19'' <pp. 30'-308, and pp. 308-309, Gellow @ecord on 2ppeal= denyin$ reconsideration of
said approval.
1. The order of &anuary 3, 19'1, on pp. 330-33', Gellow @ecord on 2ppeal, approvin$ si#ilar deeds of
sale e(ecuted by respondent Ma$no, as those in ;o. ', in favor of appellees )acaonsis and )re#aylon,
as to which no #otion for reconsideration was filed.
8. *astly, the order of Dece#ber -, 19'', on pp. 300-30', Gellow @ecord on 2ppeal, directin$ petitioner to
surrender to appellees *ucero, !atisanan, &avier, )ablito, !arrido, 3atedral, 3ausin$, 8u>#an, and
3oronado, the certificates of title coverin$ the lands involved in the approved sales, as to which no #otion
for reconsideration was filed either.
Atrictly spea+in$, and considerin$ that the above orders deal with different #atters, 6ust as they affect
distinctly different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 1---0
thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three <33= appeals before ,s, for which reason, petitioner has to pay
also thirty-one <31= #ore doc+et fees.
/t is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals,
petitioner has assi$ned a total of seventy-ei$ht <*MM:///= alle$ed errors, the respective discussions and
ar$u#ents under all of the# coverin$ also the funda#ental issues raised in respect to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, thus #a+in$ it feasible and #ore practical for the 3ourt to dispose of all
these cases to$ether.
9
The assi$n#ents of error read thus5
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13-83, 2ppellantKs !rief.=
To co#plete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably e(tended narration of the factual settin$ of these
cases, it #ay also be #entioned that an atte#pt was #ade by the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es to have
respondent Ma$no re#oved as ad#inistratri(, with the proposed appoint#ent of !enito &. *ope> in her
place, and that respondent court did actually order such proposed replace#ent, but the 3ourt declared
the said order of respondent court violative of its in6unction of 2u$ust 8, 19'1, hence without force and
effect <see @esolution of Aepte#ber 8, 191- and "ebruary 1, 1913=. Aubse%uently, 2tty. frain !. Trenas,
one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no lon$er for the proposed ad#inistrator *ope> but for the
heirs the#selves, and in a #otion dated Ectober -', 191- infor#ed the 3ourt that a #otion had been
filed with respondent court for the re#oval of petitioner )3/! as ad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;.
?od$es in Apecial )roceedin$s 1'1-, which re#oval #otion alle$ed that --.9'81.9U of the share of 3.
;. ?od$es had already been ac%uired by the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es fro# certain heirs of her husband.
"urther, in this connection, in the answer of )3/! to the #otion of respondent Ma$no to have it declared
in conte#pt for disre$ardin$ the 3ourtKs resolution of Aepte#ber 8, 191- #odifyin$ the in6unction of
2u$ust 8, 19'1, said petitioner anne(ed thereto a 6oint #anifestation and #otion, appearin$ to have been
filed with respondent court, infor#in$ said court that in addition to the fact that --U of the share of 3. ;.
?od$es had already been bou$ht by the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es, as already stated, certain other heirs of
?od$es representin$ 11.3.3100U of his estate were 6oinin$ cause with the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es as
a$ainst )3/!, thereby #a+in$ so#ewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitionersK continuation as
ad#inistrator of the ?od$es estate.
@AE*,T/E; E" /AA,A /; T? C4"T02"A"0 2;D
)@E?/!/T/E; 32AA
/
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the /resent Appeals
The priority %uestion raised by respondent Ma$no relates to the alle$ed tardiness of all the
afore#entioned thirty-three appeals of )3/!. 3onsiderin$, however, that these appeals revolve around
practically the sa#e #ain issues and that it is ad#itted that so#e of the# have been ti#ely ta+en, and,
#oreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and e(plained #a+e it of no conse%uence whether
or not the orders concerned have beco#e final by the lapsin$ of the respective periods to appeal the#,
7e do not dee# it necessary to pass upon the ti#eliness of any of said appeals.
//
The /ropriet; Here of Certiorari and
/rohi&ition instead of Appeal
The other preli#inary point of the sa#e respondent is alle$ed i#propriety of the special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition in view of the e(istence of the re#edy of appeal which it clai#s is proven by
the very appeals now before ,s. Auch contention fails to ta+e into account that there is a co##on thread
a#on$ the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one sin$le
proceedin$, will inevitably cause the proliferation of #ore or less si#ilar or closely related incidents and
conse%uent eventual appeals. /f for this consideration alone, and without ta+in$ account any#ore of the
unnecessary additional effort, e(pense and ti#e which would be involved in as #any individual appeals
as the nu#ber of such incidents, it is lo$ical and proper to hold, as 7e do hold, that the re#edy of appeal
is not ade%uate in the present cases. /n deter#inin$ whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition #ay be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lac+ or e(cess of 6urisdiction or $rave
abuse of discretion is alle$ed, it is not enou$h that the re#edy of appeal e(ists or is possible. /t is
indispensable that ta+in$ all the relevant circu#stances of the $iven case, appeal would better serve the
interests of 6ustice. Ebviously, the lon$er delay, au$#ented e(pense and trouble and unnecessary
repetition of the sa#e wor+ attendant to the present #ultiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically
the sa#e basic issues that can be #ore e(peditiously resolved or deter#ined in a sin$le special civil
action, #a+e the re#edies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of
resolvin$ the co##on basic issues raised in all of the#, despite the conceded availability of appeal.
!esides, the settlin$ of such co##on funda#ental issues would naturally #ini#i>e the areas of conflict
between the parties and render #ore si#ple the deter#ination of the secondary issues in each of the#.
2ccordin$ly, respondent Ma$noKs ob6ection to the present re#edy of certiorari and prohibition #ust be
overruled.
7e co#e now to the errors assi$ned by petitioner-appellant, )hilippine 3o##ercial V /ndustrial !an+,
<)3/!, for short= in the petition as well as in its #ain brief as appellant.
///
2n Whether or 7ot There is Still An; /art of the Testate
4state !rs. Hodges that ma; &e AdFudicated to her &rothers
and sisters as her estate, of )hich respondent !agno is the
unquestioned Administratri# in special /roceedings '>JA.
/n the petition, it is the position of )3/! that the respondent court e(ceeded its 6urisdiction or $ravely
abused its discretion in further reco$ni>in$ after Dece#ber 1., 1901 the e(istence of the Testate state
of *innie &ane ?od$es and in sanctionin$ purported acts of ad#inistration therein of respondent Ma$no.
Main $round for such posture is that by the afore%uoted order of respondent court of said date, ?od$es
was already allowed to assert and e(ercise all his ri$hts as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the
provisions of her will, %uoted earlier, hence, nothin$ else re#ains to be done in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301
e(cept to for#ally close it. /n other words, the contention of )3/! is that in view of said order, nothin$
#ore than a for#al declaration of ?od$es as sole and e(clusive heir of his wife and the conse%uent
for#al un%ualified ad6udication to hi# of all her estate re#ain to be done to co#pletely close Apecial
)roceedin$s 1301, hence respondent Ma$no should be considered as havin$ ceased to be 2d#inistratri(
of the Testate state of Mrs. ?od$es since then.
2fter carefully $oin$ over the record, 7e feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently untenable
fro# whatever an$le it is e(a#ined.
To start with, 7e cannot find anywhere in respondent Erder of Dece#ber 1., 1901 the sense bein$ read
into it by )3/!. The tenor of said order bears no su$$estion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs
and distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its #ost i#portant function, and this
3ourt is not disposed to encoura$e 6ud$es of probate proceedin$s to be less than definite, plain and
specific in #a+in$ orders in such re$ard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, li+e the
heirs, the creditors, and #ost of all the $overn#ent, the devisees and le$atees, should +now with
certainty what are and when their respective ri$hts and obli$ations ensuin$ fro# the inheritance or in
relation thereto would be$in or cease, as the case #ay be, thereby avoidin$ precisely the le$al
co#plications and conse%uent liti$ations si#ilar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the
present cases. 7hile it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a
deceased person have already actually distributed a#on$ the#selves their respective shares therein to
the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no ri$hts of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it
would naturally be al#ost #inisterial for the court to issue the final order of declaration and distribution,
still it is inconceivable that the special proceedin$ instituted for the purpose #ay be considered
ter#inated, the respective ri$hts of all the parties concerned be dee#ed definitely settled, and the
e(ecutor or ad#inistrator thereof be re$arded as auto#atically dischar$ed and relieved already of all
functions and responsibilities without the correspondin$ definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
/ndeed, the law on the #atter is specific, cate$orical and une%uivocal. Aection 1 of @ule 90 provides5
A3T/E; 1. When order for distri&ution of residue made. J 7hen the debts, funeral char$es, and
e(penses of ad#inistration, the allowance to the widow and inheritance ta(, if any, char$eable to the
estate in accordance with law have been paid, the court, on the application of the e(ecutor or
ad#inistrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearin$ upon notice, shall assi$n the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the sa#e, na#in$ the# and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons #ay de#and and recover their respective shares fro# the
e(ecutor or ad#inistrator, or any other person havin$ the sa#e in his possession. /f there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
;o distribution shall be allowed until the pay#ent of the obli$ations above #entioned has been #ade or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of the# $ive a bond, in a su# to be fi(ed by the court,
conditioned for the pay#ent of said obli$ations within such ti#e as the court directs.
These provisions cannot #ean anythin$ less than that in order that a proceedin$ for the settle#ent of the
estate of a deceased #ay be dee#ed ready for final closure, <1= there should have been issued already
an order of distribution or assi$n#ent of the estate of the decedent a#on$ or to those entitled thereto by
will or by law, but <-= such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the Pdebts, funeral
e(penses, e(penses of ad#inistration, allowances, ta(es, etc. char$eable to the estateQ have been paid,
which is but lo$ical and proper. <3= !esides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific
application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court.
R it is only after, and not before, the pay#ent of all debts, funeral char$es, e(penses of ad#inistration,
allowance to the widow, and inheritance ta( shall have been effected that the court should #a+e a
declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the residue. <Moran, 3o##ents on the
@ules of 3ourt, -nd ed., :ol. //, p. 391, citin$ 3apistrano vs. ;adurata, .9 )hil., 1-'4 *ope> vs. *ope>, 31
Eff. 8a>., 3091.= <&/ME82-E; v. !*ME;T, 8. )hil. 0.0, 0.8= <p. 8', 2ppelleeKs !rief=
((( ((( (((
,nder Aection 103 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure, <correspondin$ to Aection 1, @ule 90= what brin$s an
intestate <or testate= proceedin$ to a close is the order of distribution directin$ delivery of the residue to
the persons entitled thereto after payin$ the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. <Aantiesteban vs.
Aantiesteban, '8 )hil. 3'1, 310.=
/n the cases at bar, 7e cannot discern fro# the volu#inous and varied facts, pleadin$s and orders before
,s that the above indispensable prere%uisites for the declaration of heirs and the ad6udication of the
estate of Mrs. ?od$es had already been co#plied with when the order of Dece#ber 1., 1901 was issued.
2s already stated, 7e are not persuaded that the proceedin$s leadin$ to the issuance of said order,
constitutin$ barely of the #otion of May -1, 1901, 2nne( D of the petition, the order of even date, 2nne(
, and the #otion of Dece#ber 11, 1901, 2nne( ?, all afore%uoted, are what the law conte#plates. 7e
cannot see in the order of Dece#ber 1., 1901, so #uch relied upon by the petitioner, anythin$ #ore than
an e(plicit approval of Pall the sales, conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of all the properties left by the
deceased *innie &ane ?od$es e(ecuted by the (ecutor 3harles ;. ?od$esQ <after the death of his wife
and prior to the date of the #otion=, plus a $eneral advance authori>ation to enable said P(ecutor J to
e(ecute subse%uent sales, conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of the properties left the said deceased
*innie &ane ?od$es in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will and testa#ent of the latterQ,
which, certainly, cannot a#ount to the order of ad6udication of the estate of the decedent to ?od$es
conte#plated in the law. /n fact, the #otion of Dece#ber 11, 1901 on which the court predicated the order
in %uestion did not pray for any such ad6udication at all. 7hat is #ore, althou$h said #otion did alle$e that
Pherein (ecutor <?od$es= is not only part owner of the properties left as con6u$al, but also, the successor
to all the properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$esQ, it si$nificantly added that Pherein (ecutor,
as *e$atee <sic=, has the ri$ht to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the )hilippines J
durin$ his lifeti#eQ, thereby indicatin$ that what said #otion conte#plated was nothin$ #ore than either
the en6oy#ent by ?od$es of his ri$hts under the particular portion of the dispositions of his wifeKs will
which were to be operative only durin$ his lifeti#e or the use of his own share of the con6u$al estate,
pendin$ the ter#ination of the proceedin$s. /n other words, the authority referred to in said #otions and
orders is in the nature of that conte#plated either in Aection - of @ule 109 which per#its, in appropriate
cases, advance or partial i#ple#entation of the ter#s of a duly probated will before final ad6udication or
distribution when the ri$hts of third parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in the established
practice of allowin$ the survivin$ spouse to dispose of his own share of he con6u$al estate, pendin$ its
final li%uidation, when it appears that no creditors of the con6u$al partnership would be pre6udiced thereby,
<see the @evised @ules of 3ourt by "rancisco, :ol. :-!, 1910 ed. p. 881= albeit, fro# the tenor of said
#otions, 7e are #ore inclined to believe that ?od$es #eant to refer to the for#er. /n any event, 7e are
fully persuaded that the %uoted alle$ations of said #otions read to$ether cannot be construed as a
repudiation of the ri$hts une%uivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. ?od$esK brothers and sisters
to whatever have not been disposed of by hi# up to his death.
/ndeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subse%uently acted upon the pre#ise
su$$ested by petitioner. En the contrary, on ;ove#ber -3, 19'0, when the court resolved the #otion of
appellee 7estern /nstitute of Technolo$y by its order 7e have %uoted earlier, it cate$orically held that as
of said date, ;ove#ber -3, 19'0, Pin both cases <Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 and 1'1-= there is as yet no
6udicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to who#soever are entitled thereto.Q /n this
connection, it #ay be stated further a$ainst petitioner, by way of so#e +ind of estoppel, that in its own
#otion of &anuary 8, 19'0, already %uoted in full on pa$es 0.-'1 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that
the court declare that P3. ;. ?od$es was the sole and e(clusive heir of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$esQ,
which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the order of Dece#ber 1., 1901 was already
the order of ad6udication and distribution of her estate. That said #otion was later withdrawn when Ma$no
filed her own #otion for deter#ination and ad6udication of what should correspond to the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. ?od$es does not alter the indubitable i#plication of the prayer of the withdrawn #otion.
/t #ust be borne in #ind that while it is true that Mrs. ?od$es be%ueathed her whole estate to her
husband and $ave hi# what a#ounts to full powers of do#inion over the sa#e durin$ his lifeti#e, she
i#posed at the sa#e ti#e the condition that whatever should re#ain thereof upon his death should $o to
her brothers and sisters. /n effect, therefore, what was absolutely $iven to ?od$es was only so #uch of
his wifeKs estate as he #i$ht possibly dispose of durin$ his lifeti#e4 hence, even assu#in$ that by the
alle$ations in his #otion, he did intend to ad6udicate the whole estate to hi#self, as su$$ested by
petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or di#inished in any de$ree or #anner the ri$ht of
his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would re#ain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can
ri$htly contend that the testa#entary provision in %uestion allowed hi# to so ad6udicate any part of the
estate to hi#self as to pre6udice the#. /n other words, irrespective of whatever #i$ht have been ?od$esK
intention in his #otions, as (ecutor, of May -1, 1901 and Dece#ber 11, 1901, the trial courtKs orders
$rantin$ said #otions, even in the ter#s in which they have been worded, could not have had the effect of
an absolute and unconditional ad6udication unto ?od$es of the whole estate of his wife. ;one of the#
could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their ri$hts under said will. 2nd it #ay be added
here that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the #otions in %uestion #ay only be attributed, firstly,
to the failure of ?od$es to send notices to any of the#, as ad#itted in the #otion itself, and, secondly, to
the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have ta+en said #otions to be for the final
distribution and ad6udication of the estate, but #erely for hi# to be able, pendin$ such final distribution
and ad6udication, to either e(ercise durin$ his lifeti#e ri$hts of do#inion over his wifeKs estate in
accordance with the be%uest in his favor, which, as already observed, #ay be allowed under the broad
ter#s of Aection - of @ule 109, or #a+e use of his own share of the con6u$al estate. /n any event, 7e do
not believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of
the clear lan$ua$e of the will but also because none of the interested parties had been duly notified of the
#otion and hearin$ thereof. Atated differently, if the orders of May -1, 1901 and Dece#ber ., 1901 were
really intended to be read in the sense contended by petitioner, 7e would have no hesitancy in declarin$
the# null and void.
)etitioner cites the case of Austria vs. :entenilla, 8. @. ;o. *-10018, Aepte#ber 19, 190', <unreported
but a partial di$est thereof appears in 99 )hil. 10'9= in support of its insistence that with the orders of May
-1 and Dece#ber 1., 1901, the closure of Mrs. ?od$esK estate has beco#e a #ere for#ality, inas#uch
as said orders a#ounted to the order of ad6udication and distribution ordained by Aection 1 of @ule 90.
!ut the parallel atte#pted to be drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the
trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and e(press order of ad6udication and distribution #ore than
twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed their #otion as+in$ that the ad#inistratri( be
re#oved, etc. 2s %uoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as follows5
n orden a la #ocion de la ad#inistradora, el 6u>$ado la encuentra procedente ba6o la condicion de %ue
no se hara entre$a ni ad6udicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de %ue estos presten la fian>a
correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el 2rt. 10. del 3odi$o de )rocedi#ientos5 pues, en
autos no aparece %ue hayan sido no#brados co#isionados de avaluo y recla#aciones. Dicha fian>a
podra ser por un valor i$ual al de los bienes %ue correspondan a cada heredero se$un el testa#ento.
3reo %ue no es obice para la ter#inacion del e(pediente el hecho de %ue la ad#inistradora no ha
presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes4 pues, se$un la ley, estan e(entos de esta for#alidad
os ad#inistradores %ue son le$atarios del residuo o re#anente de los bienes y hayan prestado fian>a
para responder de las $estiones de su car$o, y aparece en el testa#ento %ue la ad#inistradora 2le6andra
2ustria reune dicha condicion.
)E@ TEDE *E M),ATE, el 6u>$ado declara, 1.o5 no haber lu$ar a la #ocion de @a#on :entenilla y
otros4 -.o, declara asi#is#o %ue los unicos herederos del finado 2ntonio :entenilla son su esposa
2le6andra 2ustria, Maria :entenilla, her#ana del testador, y @a#on :entenilla, Maria :entenilla, @a#on
Aoriano, ulalio Aoriano, &ose Aoriano, 8abriela :entenilla, *oren>o :entenilla, "elicitas :entenilla,
u$enio :entenilla y 2le6andra :entenilla, en representacion de los difuntos &uan, To#as, 3atalino y
"roilan, her#anos del testador, declarando, ade#as %ue la heredera 2le6andra 2ustria tiene derecho al
re#anente de todos los bienes de6ados por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion %ue
corresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos, confor#e esta #andado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a,
11.a, 1-.a y 13.a del testa#ento4 3.o, se aprueba el pa$o hecho por la ad#inistradora de los $astos de la
ulti#a enfer#edad y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la scuela a
)ublica del Municipio de Man$atare#, y de las #isas en sufra$io del al#a del finado4 ..o, %ue una ve>
prestada la fian>a #encionada al principio de este auto, se ha$a la entre$a y ad6udicacion de los bienes,
confor#e se dispone en el testa#ento y se acaba de declarar en este auto4 0.o, y, final#ente, %ue
verificada la ad6udicacion, se dara por ter#inada la ad#inistracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la
ad#inistradora, y cancelando su fian>a.
2A/ A E@D;2.
,ndoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedin$s for the
settle#ent of the estate of a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.
/n the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not
appear e#$facie to be of the sa#e tenor and nature as the order 6ust %uoted, and, what is #ore, the
circu#stances attendant to its issuance do not su$$est that such was the intention of the court, for
nothin$ could have been #ore violative of the will of Mrs. ?od$es.
/ndeed, to infer fro# ?od$esK said #otions and fro# his state#ents of accounts for the years 1908, 1909
and 19'0, 2 2nne(es /, I and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly clai#ed that Pherein e(ecutor
<bein$= the only devisee or le$atee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testa#ent
already probated,Q there is Pno <other= person interested in the )hilippines of the ti#e and place of
e(a#inin$ herein account to be $iven noticeQ, an intent to ad6udicate unto hi#self the whole of his wifeKs
estate in an absolute #anner and without re$ard to the contin$ent interests of her brothers and sisters, is
to i#pute bad faith to hi#, an i#putation which is not le$ally per#issible, #uch less warranted by the
facts of record herein. ?od$es +new or ou$ht to have +nown that, le$ally spea+in$, the ter#s of his wifeKs
will did not $ive hi# such a ri$ht. "actually, there are enou$h circu#stances e(tant in the records of these
cases indicatin$ that he had no such intention to i$nore the ri$hts of his co-heirs. /n his very #otions in
%uestion, ?od$es alle$ed, thru counsel, that the Pdeceased *innie &ane ?od$es died leavin$ no
descendants and ascendants, e#cept &rothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to
inherit the properties of the decedentP, and even pro#ised that Pproper accountin$ will be had J in all
these transactionsQ which he had sub#itted for approval and authori>ation by the court, thereby i#plyin$
that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. 2s alle$ed by respondent Ma$no in her
brief as appellee5
,nder date of 2pril 1., 1909, 3. ;. ?od$es filed his first P2ccount by the (ecutorQ of the estate of *innie
&ane ?od$es. /n the PAtate#ent of ;etworth of Mr. 3. ;. ?od$es and the state of *innie &ane ?od$esQ
as of Dece#ber 31, 1908 anne(ed thereto, 3. ;. ?od$es reported that the co#bined con6u$al estate
earned a net inco#e of )3-8,.0-.'-, divided evenly between hi# and the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es.
)ursuant to this, he filed an Pindividual inco#e ta( returnQ for calendar year 1908 on the estate of *innie
&ane ?od$es reportin$, under oath, the said estate as havin$ earned inco#e of )1'.,-01.31, e(actly
one-half of the net inco#e of his co#bined personal assets and that of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es.
<p. 91, 2ppelleeKs !rief.=
,nder date of &uly -1, 19'0, 3. ;. ?od$es filed his second P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccount by the
(ecutorQ of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. /n the PAtate#ent of ;etworth of Mr. 3. ;. ?od$es and the
state of *innie &ane ?od$esQ as of Dece#ber 31, 1909 anne(ed thereto, 3. ;. ?od$es reported that the
co#bined con6u$al estate earned a net inco#e of )-10,'-3.3-, divided evenly between hi# and the
estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. )ursuant to this, he filed an Pindividual inco#e ta( returnQ for calendar year
1909 on the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es reportin$, under oath, the said estate as havin$ earned inco#e
of )130,311.'', e(actly one-half of the net inco#e of his co#bined personal assets and that of the estate
of *innie &ane ?od$es. <pp. 91-9-, id.=
,nder date of 2pril -0, 19'1, 3. ;. ?od$es filed his third P2nnual Atate#ent of 2ccount by the (ecutor
for the year 19'0S of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. /n the PAtate#ent of ;et 7orth of Mr. 3. ;.
?od$es and the state of *innie &ane ?od$esQ as of Dece#ber 31, 19'0 anne(ed thereto, 3. ;. ?od$es
reported that the co#bined con6u$al estate earned a net inco#e of )31.,801.9., divided of *innie &ane
?od$es. )ursuant to this, he filed an Pindividual evenly between hi# and the estate inco#e ta( returnQ for
calendar year 19'0 on the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es reportin$, under oath, the said estate as havin$
earned inco#e of )101,.-8.91, e(actly one-half of the net inco#e of his co#bined personal assets and
that of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es. <pp. 9--93, id.=
/n the petition for probate that he <?od$es= filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of *innie &ane as
her PheirsQ <see p. -, 8reen @E2=. The order of the court ad#ittin$ the will to probate unfortunately
o#itted one of the heirs, @oy ?i$don <see p. 1., 8reen @E2=. /##ediately, 3. ;. ?od$es filed a verified
#otion to have @oy ?i$donKs na#e included as an heir, statin$ that he wanted to strai$hten the records
Pin order <that= the heirs of deceased @oy ?i$don #ay not thin+ or believe they were o#itted, and that
they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased *innie &ane ?od$esQ.
Thus, he reco$ni>ed, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wifeKs estate fro# his own share of the
con6u$al partnership up to the ti#e of his death, #ore than five years after that of his wife. ?e never
considered the whole estate as a sin$le one belon$in$ e(clusively to hi#self. The only conclusion one
can $ather fro# this is that he could have been preparin$ the basis for the eventual trans#ission of his
wifeKs estate, or, at least, so #uch thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of durin$ his
lifeti#e, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her e(pressed desire, as inti#ated in his ta( return
in the ,nited Atates to be #ore e(tensively referred to anon. 2nd assu#in$ that he did pay the
correspondin$ estate and inheritance ta(es in the )hilippines on the basis of his bein$ sole heir, such
pay#ent is not necessarily inconsistent with his reco$nition of the ri$hts of his co-heirs. 7ithout
purportin$ to rule definitely on the #atter in these proceedin$s, 7e #i$ht say here that 7e are inclined to
the view that under the peculiar provisions of his wifeKs will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance
ta( laws, ?od$es had to be considered as her sole heir, pendin$ the actual trans#ission of the re#ainin$
portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever ad6ust#ent #i$ht
be warranted should there be any such re#ainder then is a #atter that could well be ta+en care of by the
internal revenue authorities in due ti#e.
/t is to be noted that the lawyer, 2tty. *eon ). 8ellada, who si$ned the #otions of May -1, 1901 and
Dece#ber 11, 1901 and the afore#entioned state#ents of account was the very sa#e one who also
subse%uently si$ned and filed the #otion of Dece#ber -', 19'- for the appoint#ent of respondent
Ma$no as P2d#inistratri( of the state of Mrs. *innie &ane ?od$esQ wherein it was alle$ed that Pin
accordance with the provisions of the last will and testa#ent of *innie &ane ?od$es, whatever real
properties that #ay re#ain at the death of her husband, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, the said properties
shall be e%ually divided a#on$ their heirs.Q 2nd it appearin$ that said attorney was ?od$esK lawyer as
(ecutor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understandin$ of the situation, i#plicit in his
alle$ations 6ust %uoted, could so#ehow be reflective of ?od$esK own understandin$ thereof.
2s a #atter of fact, the alle$ations in the #otion of the sa#e 2tty. 8ellada dated &uly 1, 1901, a P@e%uest
for /nclusion of the ;a#e of @oy ?i$don in the Erder of the 3ourt dated &uly 19, 1901, etc.Q, reference to
which is #ade in the above %uotation fro# respondent Ma$noKs brief, are over the oath of ?od$es
hi#self, who verified the #otion. Aaid alle$ations read5
1. J That the ?on. 3ourt issued orders dated &une -9, 1901, orderin$ the probate of the will.
-. J That in said order of the ?on. 3ourt, the relatives of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es were
enu#erated. ?owever, in the petition as well as in the testi#ony of (ecutor durin$ the hearin$, the na#e
@oy ?i$don was #entioned, but deceased. /t was unintentionally o#itted the heirs of said @oy ?i$don
who are his wife 2line ?i$don and son David ?i$don, all of a$e, and residents of Fuinlan, Te(as, ,.A.2.
3. J That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased "o; Higdon ma; not think or
&elieve the; )ere omitted, and that the; )ere reall; and are interested in the estate of deceased %innie
Jane Hodges, it is re%uested of the ?on. 3ourt to insert the na#es of 2line ?i$don and David ?i$don,
wife and son of deceased @oy ?i$don in the said order of the ?on. 3ourt dated &une -9, 1901. <pars. 1 to
3, 2nne( - of Ma$noKs 2nswer J @ecord, p. -'0=
2s can be seen, these italici>ed alle$ations indicate, #ore or less, the real attitude of ?od$es in re$ard to
the testa#entary dispositions of his wife.
/n connection with this point of ?od$esK intent, 7e note that there are docu#ents, copies of which are
anne(ed to respondent Ma$noKs answer, which purportedly contain ?od$esK own sole#n declarations
reco$ni>in$ the ri$ht of his co-heirs, such as the alle$ed ta( return he filed with the ,nited Atates Ta(ation
authorities, identified as Achedule M, <2nne( . of her answer= and his supposed affidavit of renunciation,
2nne( 0. /n said Achedule M, ?od$es appears to have answered the pertinent %uestion thus5
-a. ?ad the survivin$ spouse the ri$ht to declare an election between <1= the provisions #ade in his or
her favor by the will and <11= dower, curtesy or a statutory interestL <M= Ges < = ;o
-d. Does the survivin$ spouse conte#plate renouncin$ the will and electin$ to ta+e dower, curtesy, or a
statutory interestL <M= Ges < = ;o
3. 2ccordin$ to the infor#ation and belief of the person or persons filin$ the return, is any action
described under %uestion 1 desi$ned or conte#platedL < = Ges <M= ;o <2nne( ., 2nswer J @ecord, p.
-'3=
and to have further stated under the ite#, PDescription of property interests passin$ to survivin$ spouseQ
the followin$5
;one, e(cept for purposes of ad#inisterin$ the state, payin$ debts, ta(es and other le$al char$es. 0t is
the intention of the surviving hus&and of deceased to distri&ute the remaining propert; and interests of
the deceased in their Communit; 4state to the devisees and legatees named in the )ill )hen the de&ts,
lia&ilities, ta#es and e#penses of administration are finall; determined and paid. <2nne( ., 2nswer J
@ecord, p. -'3=
/n addition, in the supposed affidavit of ?od$es, 2nne( 0, it is stated5
/, 3. ;. ?od$es, bein$ duly sworn, on oath affir# that at the ti#e the ,nited Atates state Ta( @eturn was
filed in the state of *innie &ane ?od$es on 2u$ust 8, 1908, / renounced and disclai#ed any and all ri$ht
to receive the rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e fro# said estate, as shown by the state#ent contained in
Achedule M at pa$e -9 of said return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and #ade a
part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratif; and confirm, and 0 do here&; ratif; and confirm, the declaration
made in Schedule ! of said return and hereby for#ally disclai# and renounce any ri$ht on #y part to
receive any of the said rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e fro# the estate of #y deceased wife, *innie &ane
?od$es. This affidavit is #ade to absolve #e or #y estate fro# any liability for the pay#ent of inco#e
ta(es on inco#e which has accrued to the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es since the death of the said *innie
&ane ?od$es on May -3, 1901. <2nne( 0, 2nswer J @ecord, p. -'.=
2lthou$h it appears that said docu#ents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below, and 7e
cannot, therefore, rely on the# for the purpose of the present proceedin$s, still, 7e cannot close our eyes
to their e(istence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor 6ibes with Eur conclusion discussed above
fro# the circu#stances related to the orders of May -1 and Dece#ber 1., 1901. 0 Ao#ehow, these
docu#ents, considerin$ they are supposed to be copies of their ori$inals found in the official files of the
$overn#ents of the ,nited Atates and of the )hilippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension that
Eur conclusion fro# the other evidence of ?od$esK #anifest intent vis-a-vis the ri$hts of his co-heirs is
without basis in fact.
:erily, with such elo%uent #anifestations of his $ood intentions towards the other heirs of his wife, 7e
find it very hard to believe that ?od$es did as+ the court and that the latter a$reed that he be declared her
sole heir and that her whole estate be ad6udicated to hi# without so #uch as 6ust annotatin$ the
contin$ent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would re#ain thereof upon his de#ise. En the
contrary, it see#s to us #ore factual and fairer to assu#e that ?od$es was well aware of his position as
e(ecutor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in #ind the followin$ ad#onition #ade by the 3ourt
in /amittan vs. %asam, et al., '0 )hil., 908, at pp. 913-91.5
,pon the death of !ernarda in Aepte#ber, 1908, said lands continued to be con6u$al property in the
hands of the defendant *asa#. /t is provided in article 1.18 of the 3ivil 3ode that upon the dissolution of
the con6u$al partnership, an inventory shall i##ediately be #ade and this court in construin$ this
provision in connection with section '80 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure <prior to its a#end#ent by 2ct ;o.
311' of ;ove#ber -., 19-.= has repeatedly held that in the event of the death of the wife, the law
i#poses upon the husband the duty of li%uidatin$ the affairs of the partnership without delay <desde
lue$o= <2lfonso vs. ;atividad, ' )hil., -.04 )rado vs. *a$era, 1 )hil., 3904 De la @a#a vs. De la @a#a, 1
)hil., 1.04 nri%ue> vs. :ictoria, 10 )hil., 104 2#ancio vs. )ardo, 13 )hil., -914 @o6as vs. Ain$son
Ton$son, 11 )hil., .1'4 Aochaysen$ vs. Tru6illo, 31 )hil., 1034 Molera vs. Molera, .0 )hil., 0''4 ;able
&ose vs. ;able &ose, .1 )hil., 113.=
/n the last #entioned case this court %uoted with approval the case of %eather)ood vs. Arnold <'' Te(as,
.1., .1', .11=, in which that court discussed the powers of the survivin$ spouse in the ad#inistration of
the co##unity property. 2ttention was called to the fact that the survivin$ husband, in the #ana$e#ent of
the con6u$al property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of uni%ue character who is liable for any
fraud co##itted by hi# with relation to the property while he is char$ed with its ad#inistration. /n the
li%uidation of the con6u$al partnership, he had wide powers <as the law stood prior to 2ct ;o. 311'= and
the hi$h de$ree of trust reposed in hi# stands out #ore clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner
of a half interest in his own ri$ht of the con6u$al estate which he was char$ed to ad#inister. ?e could
therefore no #ore ac%uire a title by prescription a$ainst those for who# he was ad#inisterin$ the
con6u$al estate than could a $uardian a$ainst his ward or a 6udicial ad#inistrator a$ainst the heirs of
estate. Aection 38 of 3hapter /// of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure, with relation to prescription, provides that
Pthis chapter shall not apply R in the case of a continuin$ and subsistin$ trust.Q The survivin$ husband in
the ad#inistration and li%uidation of the con6u$al estate occupies the position of a trustee of the hi$hest
order and is not per#itted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for
whose benefit the law i#poses upon hi# the duty of ad#inistration and li%uidation. ;o li%uidation was
ever #ade by *asa# J hence, the con6u$al property which ca#e into his possession on the death of his
wife in Aepte#ber, 1908, still re#ains con6u$al property, a continuin$ and subsistin$ trust. ?e should
have #ade a li%uidation i##ediately <desde lue$o=. ?e cannot now be per#itted to ta+e advanta$e of his
own wron$. Ene of the conditions of title by prescription <section .1, 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure= is
possession Punder a clai# of title e(clusive of any other ri$htQ. "or a trustee to #a+e such a clai# would
be a #anifest fraud.
2nd +nowin$ thus his responsibilities in the pre#ises, 7e are not convinced that ?od$es arro$ated
everythin$ unto hi#self leavin$ nothin$ at all to be inherited by his wifeKs brothers and sisters.
)3/! insists, however, that to read the orders of May -1 and Dece#ber 1., 1901, not as ad6udicatory, but
#erely as approvin$ past and authori>in$ future dispositions #ade by ?od$es in a wholesale and $eneral
#anner, would necessarily render the said orders void for bein$ violative of the provisions of @ule 89
$overnin$ the #anner in which such dispositions #ay be #ade and how the authority therefor and
approval thereof by the probate court #ay be secured. /f 7e sustained such a view, the result would only
be that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way they are understood, considerin$ 7e
have already seen it is le$ally i#possible to consider the# as ad6udicatory. 2s a #atter of fact, however,
what sur$es i##ediately to the surface, relative to )3/!Ks observations based on @ule 89, is that fro#
such point of view, the supposed irre$ularity would involve no #ore than so#e non-6urisdictional
technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident funda#ental purpose the protection of parties
interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the $overn#ent on account of the
ta(es due it4 and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are ob6ectin$ to said orders or would
be pre6udiced by the unobservance by the trial court of the procedure pointed out by )3/!, 7e find no
le$al inconvenience in nor i#pedi#ent to Eur $ivin$ sanction to the blan+et approval and authority
contained in said orders. This solution is definitely preferable in law and in e%uity, for to view said orders
in the sense su$$ested by )3/! would result in the deprivation of substantive ri$hts to the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. ?od$es, whereas readin$ the# the other way will not cause any pre6udice to anyone, and,
withal, will $ive peace of #ind and stability of ri$hts to the innocent parties who relied on the# in $ood
faith, in the li$ht of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
;ow, the inventory sub#itted by ?od$es on May 1-, 1908 referred to the estate of his wife as consistin$
of PEne-half of all the ite#s desi$nated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and #ar+ed
as P2nne( 2Q.Q 2lthou$h, re$rettably, no copy of said 2nne( 2 appears in the records before ,s, 7e ta+e
6udicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the sa#e consists of considerable
real and other personal +inds of properties. 2nd since, accordin$ to her will, her husband was to be the
sole owner thereof durin$ his lifeti#e, with full power and authority to dispose of any of the#, provided
that should there be any re#ainder upon his death, such re#ainder would $o to her brothers and sisters,
and further#ore, there is no pretension, #uch less any proof that ?od$es had in fact disposed of all of
the#, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had +ept the# #ore or less
intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of ?od$es, there was no #ore estate of Mrs.
?od$es to spea+ of. /t is Eur conclusion, therefore, that properties do e(ist which constitute such estate,
hence Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 should not yet be closed.
;either is there basis for holdin$ that respondent Ma$no has ceased to be the 2d#inistratri( in said
proceedin$. There is no showin$ that she has ever been le$ally re#oved as such, the atte#pt to replace
her with Mr. !enito *ope> without authority fro# the 3ourt havin$ been e(pressly held ineffective by Eur
resolution of Aepte#ber 8, 191-. )arenthetically, on this last point, )3/! itself is very e#phatic in
stressin$ that it is not %uestionin$ said respondentKs status as such ad#inistratri(. /ndeed, it is not clear
that )3/! has any standin$ to raise any ob6ection thereto, considerin$ it is a co#plete stran$er insofar as
the estate of Mrs. ?od$es is concerned.
/t is the contention of )3/!, however, that as thin$s actually stood at the ti#e of ?od$esK death, their
con6u$al partnership had not yet been li%uidated and, inas#uch as the properties co#posin$ the sa#e
were thus co##in$led pro indiviso and, conse%uently, the properties pertainin$ to the estate of each of
the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is )3/! alone, as ad#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es, who should
ad#inister everythin$, and all that respondent Ma$no can do for the ti#e bein$ is to wait until the
properties constitutin$ the re#ainin$ estate of Mrs. ?od$es have been duly se$re$ated and delivered to
her for her own ad#inistration. Aee#in$ly, )3/! would li+en the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es to
a party havin$ a clai# of ownership to so#e properties included in the inventory of an ad#inistrator of the
estate of a decedent, <here that of ?od$es= and who nor#ally has no ri$ht to ta+e part in the proceedin$s
pendin$ the establish#ent of his ri$ht or title4 for which as a rule it is re%uired that an ordinary action
should be filed, since the probate court is without 6urisdiction to pass with finality on %uestions of title
between the estate of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an heir clai#in$
adversely a$ainst the estate, on the other.
7e do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. 2s 7e see it, the situation obtainin$ herein cannot
be co#pared with the clai# of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pendin$ probate proceedin$s.
/n the present cases what $ave rise to the clai# of )3/! of e(clusive ownership by the estate of ?od$es
over all the properties of the ?od$es spouses, includin$ the share of Mrs. ?od$es in the co##unity
properties, were the orders of the trial court issued in the course of the very settle#ent proceedin$s
the#selves, #ore specifically, the orders of May -1 and Dece#ber 1., 1901 so often #entioned above.
/n other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is so#ethin$ that the court itself has done
in the e(ercise of its probate 6urisdiction. 2nd since in the ulti#ate analysis, the %uestion of whether or not
all the properties herein involved pertain e(clusively to the estate of ?od$es depends on the le$al
#eanin$ and effect of said orders, the clai# that respondent court has no 6urisdiction to ta+e co$ni>ance
of and decide the said issue is incorrect. /f it was within the co#petence of the court to issue the root
orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their true si$nificance and intent, to the end that
the parties #ay +now whether or not the estate of Mrs. ?od$es had already been ad6udicated by the
court, upon the initiative of ?od$es, in his favor, to the e(clusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in
her willL
2t this point, it bears e#phasis a$ain that the #ain cause of all the present proble#s confrontin$ the
courts and the parties in these cases was the failure of ?od$es to secure, as e(ecutor of his wifeKs estate,
fro# May, 1901 up to the ti#e of his death in Dece#ber, 19'-, a period of #ore than five years, the final
ad6udication of her estate and the closure of the proceedin$s. The record is bare of any showin$ that he
ever e(erted any effort towards the early settle#ent of said estate. 7hile, on the one hand, there are
enou$h indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leavin$ intact her share of the con6u$al
properties so that it #ay pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other
hand, by not ter#inatin$ the proceedin$s, his interests in his own half of the con6u$al properties re#ained
co##in$led pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Ebviously, such a situation could not
be conducive to ready ascertain#ent of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs
upon his death. ?avin$ these considerations in #ind, it would be $ivin$ a pre#iu# for such
procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the ad#inistrator of his estate were to be $iven
e(clusive ad#inistration of all the properties in %uestion, which would necessarily include the function of
pro#ptly li%uidatin$ the con6u$al partnership, thereby identifyin$ and se$re$atin$ without unnecessary
loss of ti#e which properties should be considered as constitutin$ the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, the
re#ainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit e%ually a#on$ the#selves.
To be sure, an ad#inistrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts
are dee#ed to be ob6ectively for the protection of the ri$hts of everybody concerned with the estate of the
decedent, and fro# this point of view, it #aybe said that even if )3/! were to act alone, there should be
no fear of undue disadvanta$e to anyone. En the other hand, however, it is evidently i#plicit in section '
of @ule 18 fi(in$ the priority a#on$ those to who# letters of ad#inistration should be $ranted that the
criterion in the selection of the ad#inistrator is not his i#partiality alone but, #ore i#portantly, the e(tent
of his interest in the estate, so #uch so that the one assu#ed to have $reater interest is preferred to
another who has less. Ta+in$ both of these considerations into account, inas#uch as, accordin$ to
?od$esK own inventory sub#itted by hi# as (ecutor of the estate of his wife, practically all their
properties were con6u$al which #eans that the spouses have e%ual shares therein, it is but lo$ical that
both estates should be ad#inistered 6ointly by representatives of both, pendin$ their se$re$ation fro#
each other. )articularly is such an arran$e#ent warranted because the actuations so far of )3/! evince a
deter#ined, albeit $roundless, intent to e(clude the other heirs of Mrs. ?od$es fro# their inheritance.
!esides, to allow )3/!, the ad#inistrator of his estate, to perfor# now what ?od$es was duty bound to
do as e(ecutor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Aection - of @ule 18 which e(pressly provides that
PThe e(ecutor of an e(ecutor shall not, as such, ad#inister the estate of the first testator.Q /t $oes without
sayin$ that this provision refers also to the ad#inistrator of an e(ecutor li+e )3/! here.
7e are not un#indful of the fact that under Aection - of @ule 13, P7hen the #arria$e is dissolved by the
death of the husband or wife, the co##unity property shall be inventoried, ad#inistered, and li%uidated,
and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedin$s of the deceased spouse. /f both
spouses have died, the con6u$al partnership shall be li%uidated in the testate or intestate proceedin$s of
either.Q /ndeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or per#its the con6u$al partnership
of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or li%uidated in the testate or intestate proceedin$s of
either, but precisely because said sentence allows or per#its that the li%uidation be #ade in either
proceedin$, it is a #atter of sound 6udicial discretion in which one it should be #ade. 2fter all, the for#er
rule referrin$ to the ad#inistrator of the husbandKs estate in respect to such li%uidation was done away
with by 2ct 311', the pertinent provisions of which are now e#bodied in the rule 6ust cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the ti#e of the death of ?od$es, there was already the pendin$ 6udicial
settle#ent proceedin$ of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, and, #ore i#portantly, that the for#er was the
e(ecutor of the latterKs will who had, as such, failed for #ore than five years to see to it that the sa#e was
ter#inated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since fro# ou$ht that appears in the record, there were
no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not bein$ indebted and there bein$ no i##ediate heirs other
than ?od$es hi#self. Auch dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible pre6udice of his co-
heirs, whose ri$hts to inheritance depend entirely on the e(istence of any re#ainder of Mrs. ?od$esK
share in the co##unity properties, and who are now faced with the pose of )3/! that there is no such
re#ainder. ?ad ?od$es secured as early as possible the settle#ent of his wifeKs estate, this proble#
would not arisen. 2ll thin$s considered, 7e are fully convinced that the interests of 6ustice will be better
served by not per#ittin$ or allowin$ )3/! or any ad#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es e(clusive
ad#inistration of all the properties in %uestion. 7e are of the considered opinion and so hold that what
would be 6ust and proper is for both ad#inistrators of the two estates to act con6ointly until after said
estates have been se$re$ated fro# each other.
2t this 6uncture, it #ay be stated that we are not overloo+in$ the fact that it is )3/!Ks contention that,
viewed as a substitution, the testa#entary disposition in favor of Mrs. ?od$esK brothers and sisters #ay
not be $iven effect. To a certain e(tent, this contention is correct. /ndeed, le$ally spea+in$, Mrs. ?od$esK
will provides neither for a si#ple or vul$ar substitution under 2rticle 809 of the 3ivil 3ode nor for a
fideico##issary substitution under 2rticle 8'3 thereof. There is no vul$ar substitution therein because
there is no provision for either <1= predecease of the testator by the desi$nated heir or <-= refusal or <3=
incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as re%uired by 2rticle 8094 and neither is there a
fideico##issary substitution therein because no obli$ation is i#posed thereby upon ?od$es to preserve
the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. !ut fro# these pre#ises, it is not correct to 6u#p to the
conclusion, as )3/! does, that the testa#entary dispositions in %uestion are therefore inoperative and
invalid.
The error in )3/!Ks position lies si#ply in the fact that it views the said disposition e(clusively in the li$ht
of substitutions covered by the 3ivil 3ode section on that sub6ect, <Aection 3, 3hapter -, Title /:, !oo+ ///=
when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will Pso that he #ay
enter into inheritance in default of the heir ori$inally instituted,Q <2rticle 801, id.= and, in the present case,
no such possible default is conte#plated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es are not substitutes for
?od$es because, under her will, they are not to inherit what ?od$es cannot, would not or #ay not inherit,
but what he would not dispose of fro# his inheritance4 rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted
si#ultaneously with ?od$es, sub6ect, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
?od$es was concerned and correspondin$ly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law.
/t is partially resolutory, since it be%ueaths unto ?od$es the whole of her estate to be owned and en6oyed
by hi# as universal and sole heir with absolute do#inion over the#
6
only durin$ his lifeti#e, which #eans
that while he could co#pletely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other
than hi#self, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his ri$hts to what #i$ht re#ain upon his death
would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contin$ency, inas#uch as the ri$ht of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, althou$h vested already upon the death of Mrs. ?od$es, would
auto#atically beco#e operative upon the occurrence of the death of ?od$es in the event of actual
e(istence of any re#ainder of her estate then.
3ontrary to the view of respondent Ma$no, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as
conte#plated in 2rticle 8'9 of the 3ivil 3ode, that she be%ueathed to ?od$es durin$ his lifeti#e, but the
full ownership thereof, althou$h the sa#e was to last also durin$ his lifeti#e only, even as there was no
restriction whatsoever a$ainst his disposin$ or conveyin$ the whole or any portion thereof to anybody
other than hi#self. The 3ourt sees no le$al i#pedi#ent to this +ind of institution, in this 6urisdiction or
under )hilippine law, e(cept that it cannot apply to the le$iti#e of ?od$es as the survivin$ spouse,
consistin$ of one-half of the estate, considerin$ that Mrs. ?od$es had no survivin$ ascendants nor
descendants. <2rts. 81-, 900, and 90., ;ew 3ivil 3ode.=
!ut relative precisely to the %uestion of how #uch of Mrs. ?od$esK share of the con6u$al partnership
properties #ay be considered as her estate, the parties are in disa$ree#ent as to how 2rticle 1' of the
3ivil 3ode
8
should be applied. En the one hand, petitioner clai#s that inas#uch as Mrs. ?od$es was a
resident of the )hilippines at the ti#e of her death, under said 2rticle 1', construed in relation to the
pertinent laws of Te(as and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of
succession under the 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no #ore
than one-fourth of the said con6u$al properties, the other fourth bein$, as already e(plained, the le$iti#e
of her husband <2rt. 900, 3ivil 3ode= which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any
condition <2rt. 81-, 3ivil 3ode=. En the other hand, respondent Ma$no denies that Mrs. ?od$es died a
resident of the )hilippines, since alle$edly she never chan$ed nor intended to chan$e her ori$inal
residence of birth in Te(as, ,nited Atates of 2#erica, and contends that, anyway, re$ardless of the
%uestion of her residence, she bein$ indisputably a citi>en of Te(as, under said 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil
3ode, the distribution of her estate is sub6ect to the laws of said Atate which, accordin$ to her, do not
provide for any le$iti#e, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es are entitled to the re#ainder of
the whole of her share of the con6u$al partnership properties consistin$ of one-half thereof. @espondent
Ma$no further #aintains that, in any event, ?od$es had renounced his ri$hts under the will in favor of his
co-heirs, as alle$edly proven by the docu#ents touchin$ on the point already #entioned earlier, the
$enuineness and le$al si$nificance of which petitioner see#in$ly %uestions. !esides, the parties are
disa$reed as to what the pertinent laws of Te(as provide. /n the interest of settlin$ the estates herein
involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflictin$ clai#s of the parties were deter#ined in
these proceedin$s. The 3ourt re$rets, however, that it cannot do so, for the si#ple reason that neither the
evidence sub#itted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and
#e#oranda before ,s, of their respective contentions on the pertinent le$al issues, of $rave i#portance
as they are, appear to ,s to be ade%uate enou$h to enable ,s to render an intelli$ent co#prehensive
and 6ust resolution. "or one thin$, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly
applicable laws of Te(as are.
8
C Then also, the $enuineness of docu#ents relied upon by respondent
Ma$no is disputed. 2nd there are a nu#ber of still other conceivable related issues which the parties #ay
wish to raise but which it is not proper to #ention here. /n &ustice, therefore, to all the parties concerned,
these and all other relevant #atters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedin$s
hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertainin$ and ad6udicatin$ andNor distributin$ the estate
of Mrs. ?od$es to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
To be #ore e(plicit, all that 7e can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and
prohibition are5 <1= that re$ardless of which correspondin$ laws are applied, whether of the )hilippines or
of Te(as, and ta+in$ for $ranted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the
latter,
8
and re$ardless also of whether or not it can be proven by co#petent evidence that ?od$es
renounced his inheritance in any de$ree, it is easily and definitely discernible fro# the inventory sub#itted
by ?od$es hi#self, as (ecutor of his wifeKs estate, that there are properties which should constitute the
estate of Mrs. ?od$es and ou$ht to be disposed of or distributed a#on$ her heirs pursuant to her will in
said Apecial )roceedin$s 13014 <-= that, #ore specifically, inas#uch as the %uestion of what are the
pertinent laws of Te(as applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and, considerin$ that the
sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed
le$iti#e of ?od$es J it bein$ the stand of )3/! that ?od$es had such a le$iti#e whereas Ma$no clai#s
the ne$ative T it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of these proceedin$s that whatever be
the provisions actually of the laws of Te(as applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. ?od$es is at least, one-
fourth of the con6u$al estate of the spouses4 the e(istence and effects of forei$n laws bein$ %uestions of
fact, and it bein$ the position now of )3/! that the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, pursuant to the laws of Te(as,
should only be one-fourth of the con6u$al estate, such contention constitutes an ad#ission of fact, and
conse%uently, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedin$s in these cases to clai# that said estate
could be less, irrespective of what #i$ht be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable
laws of Te(as4 <3= that Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 for the settle#ent of the testate estate of Mrs. ?od$es
cannot be closed at this sta$e and should proceed to its lo$ical conclusion, there havin$ been no proper
and le$al ad6udication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved4 and <.= that respondent Ma$no
re#ains and continues to be the 2d#inistratri( therein. ?ence, nothin$ in the fore$oin$ opinion is
intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properly before the 3ourt now, na#ely,
<1= whether or not ?od$es had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance fro# Mrs. ?od$es,
in whole or in part, and <-= assu#in$ there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of
2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode, and in the li$ht of what #i$ht be the applicable laws of Te(as on the #atter,
the estate of Mrs. ?od$es is #ore than the one-fourth declared above. 2s a #atter of fact, even our
findin$ above about the e(istence of properties constitutin$ the estate of Mrs. ?od$es rests lar$ely on a
$eneral appraisal of the si>e and e(tent of the con6u$al partnership $athered fro# reference #ade thereto
by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadin$s included in the records on appeal, and it should
accordin$ly yield, as to which e(actly those properties are, to the #ore concrete and specific evidence
which the parties are supposed to present in support of their respective positions in re$ard to the
fore$oin$ #ain le$al and factual issues. /n the interest of 6ustice, the parties should be allowed to present
such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a 6oint hearin$ of the two probate proceedin$s
herein involved. 2fter all, the court a quo has not yet passed s%uarely on these issues, and it is best for all
concerned that it should do so in the first instance.
@elative to Eur holdin$ above that the estate of Mrs. ?od$es cannot be less than the re#ainder of one-
fourth of the con6u$al partnership properties, it #ay be #entioned here that durin$ the deliberations, the
point was raised as to whether or not said holdin$ #i$ht be inconsistent with Eur other rulin$ here also
that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Te(as, ,.A.2. Pwith respect
to the order of succession and to the a#ount of successional ri$htsQ that #ay be willed by a testator
which, under 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode, are controllin$ in the instant cases, in view of the undisputed
Te(an nationality of the deceased Mrs. ?od$es, these cases should be returned to the court a %uo, so
that the parties #ay prove what said law provides, it is pre#ature for ,s to #a+e any specific rulin$ now
on either the validity of the testa#entary dispositions herein involved or the a#ount of inheritance to
which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es are entitled. 2fter nature reflection, 7e are of the
considered view that, at this sta$e and in the state of the records before ,s, the feared inconsistency is
#ore apparent than real. 7ithal, it no lon$er lies in the lips of petitioner )3/! to #a+e any clai# that
under the laws of Te(as, the estate of Mrs. ?od$es could in any event be less than that 7e have fi(ed
above.
/t should be borne in #ind that as above-indicated, the %uestion of what are the laws of Te(as $overnin$
the #atters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. le#entary is the rule that forei$n
laws #ay not be ta+en 6udicial notice of and have to be proven li+e any other fact in dispute between the
parties in any proceedin$, with the rare e(ception in instances when the said laws are already within the
actual +nowled$e of the court, such as when they are well and $enerally +nown or they have been
actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not clai# otherwise. <0
Moran, 3o##ents on the @ules of 3ourt, p. .1, 1910 ed.= /n 5luemer vs. Hi#, 0. )hil. '10, it was held5
/t is the theory of the petitioner that the alle$ed will was e(ecuted in l+ins 7est :ir$inia, on ;ove#ber 3,
19-0, by ?i( who had his residence in that 6urisdiction, and that the laws of 7est :ir$inia $overn. To this
end, there was sub#itted a copy of section 38'8 of 2cts 188-, c. 8. as found in 7est :ir$inia 3ode,
2nnotated, by ?o$$ 3harles ., vol. -, 191., p. 19'0, and as certified to by the Director of the ;ational
*ibrary. !ut this was far fro# a co#pliance with the law. The laws of a forei$n 6urisdiction do not prove
the#selves in our courts. The courts of the )hilippine /slands are not authori>ed to ta+e 6udicial notice of
the laws of the various Atates of the 2#erican ,nion. Auch laws #ust be proved as facts. </n re state of
&ohnson B1918C, 39 )hil., 10'.= ?ere the re%uire#ents of the law were not #et. There was no showin$
that the boo+ fro# which an e(tract was ta+en was printed or published under the authority of the Atate of
7est :ir$inia, as provided in section 300 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure. ;or was the e(tract fro# the law
attested by the certificate of the officer havin$ char$e of the ori$inal, under the seal of the Atate of 7est
:ir$inia, as provided in section 301 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure. ;o evidence was introduced to show
that the e(tract fro# the laws of 7est :ir$inia was in force at the ti#e the alle$ed will was e(ecuted.Q
;o evidence of the nature thus su$$ested by the 3ourt #ay be found in the records of the cases at bar.
Fuite to the contrary, the parties herein have presented opposin$ versions in their respective pleadin$s
and #e#oranda re$ardin$ the #atter. 2nd even if 7e too+ into account that in A.nar vs. -arcia, the
3ourt did #a+e reference to certain provisions re$ardin$ succession in the laws of Te(as, the disparity in
the #aterial dates of that case and the present ones would not per#it ,s to indul$e in the ha>ardous
con6ecture that said provisions have not been a#ended or chan$ed in the #eanti#e.
En the other hand, in /n re state of &ohnson, 39 )hil. 10', 7e held5
,pon the other point J as to whether the will was e(ecuted in confor#ity with the statutes of the Atate of
/llinois J we note that it does not affir#atively appear fro# the transcription of the testi#ony adduced in
the trial court that any witness was e(a#ined with reference to the law of /llinois on the sub6ect of the
e(ecution of will. The trial 6ud$e no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly e(ecuted by e(a#inin$
section 181. of the @evised Atatutes of /llinois, as e(hibited in volu#e 3 of Atarr V 3urtisKs 2nnotated
/llinois Atatutes, -nd ed., p. .-'4 and he #ay have assu#ed that he could ta+e 6udicial notice of the laws
of /llinois under section -10 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure. /f so, he was in our opinion #ista+en. That
section authori>es the courts here to ta+e 6udicial notice, a#on$ other thin$s, of the acts of the le$islative
depart#ent of the ,nited Atates. These words clearly have reference to 2cts of the 3on$ress of the
,nited Atates4 and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, ta+e 6udicial notice
of the #ultifarious laws of the various 2#erican Atates. ;or do we thin+ that any such authority can be
derived fro# the broader lan$ua$e, used in the sa#e section, where it is said that our courts #ay ta+e
6udicial notice of #atters of public +nowled$e Psi#ilarQ to those therein enu#erated. The proper rule we
thin+ is to re%uire proof of the statutes of the Atates of the 2#erican ,nion whenever their provisions are
deter#inative of the issues in any action liti$ated in the )hilippine courts.
;evertheless, even supposin$ that the trial court #ay have erred in ta+in$ 6udicial notice of the law of
/llinois on the point in %uestion, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition
does not state any fact fro# which it would appear that the law of /llinois is different fro# what the court
found, and, secondly, because the assi$n#ent of error and ar$u#ent for the appellant in this court raises
no %uestion based on such supposed error. Thou$h the trial court #ay have acted upon pure con6ecture
as to the law prevailin$ in the Atate of /llinois, its 6ud$#ent could not be set aside, even upon application
#ade within si( #onths under section 113 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure, unless it should be #ade to
appear affir#atively that the con6ecture was wron$. The petitioner, it is true, states in $eneral ter#s that
the will in %uestion is invalid and inade%uate to pass real and personal property in the Atate of /llinois, but
this is #erely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is acco#panied contain no
reference to the sub6ect, and we are cited to no authority in the appellantKs brief which #i$ht tend to raise
a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. /t is very clear, therefore, that this point
cannot be ur$ed as of serious #o#ent.
/t is i#plicit in the above rulin$ that when, with respect to certain aspects of the forei$n laws concerned,
the parties in a $iven case do not have any controversy or are #ore or less in a$ree#ent, the 3ourt #ay
ta+e it for $ranted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual
a$ree#ent indicates, without the need of re%uirin$ the presentation of what otherwise would be the
co#petent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results fro# the respective
contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Te(as were +nown and to be applied, the
a#ount of the inheritance pertainin$ to the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es is as 7e have fi(ed above, the absence
of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no lon$er of
any conse%uence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be #ore. /n other words, since )3/!, the
petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode and the pertinent laws
of Te(as, the a#ount of the estate in controversy is 6ust as 7e have deter#ined it to be, and respondent-
appellee is only clai#in$, on her part, that it could be #ore, )3/! #ay not now or later pretend differently.
To be #ore concrete, on pa$es -0--1 of its petition herein, dated &uly 31, 19'1, )3/! states
cate$orically5
/nas#uch as 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode provides that Pintestate and testa#entary successions both with
respect to the order of succession and to the a#ount of successional ri$hts and to the intrinsic validity of
testa#entary provisions, shall be re$ulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever #ay be the nature of the property and re$ardless of the country wherein said
property #ay be foundQ, while the law of Te(as <the ?od$es spouses bein$ nationals of ,.A.2., Atate of
Te(as=, in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the do#iciliary law <in this case )hilippine law= $overns
the testa#entary dispositions and successional ri$hts over #ovables or personal properties, while the law
of the situs <in this case also )hilippine law with respect to all ?od$es properties located in the
)hilippines=, $overns with respect to i##ovable properties, and applyin$ therefore the Wrenvoi doctrineK as
enunciated and applied by this ?onorable 3ourt in the case of /n re state of 3hristensen <8.@. ;o. *-
1'1.9, &an. 31, 19'3=, there can be no %uestion that )hilippine law $overns the testa#entary dispositions
contained in the *ast 7ill and Testa#ent of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es, as well as the
successional ri$hts to her estate, both with respect to #ovables, as well as to i##ovables situated in the
)hilippines.
/n its #ain brief dated "ebruary -', 19'8, )3/! asserts5
The la) governing successional rights.
2s recited above, there is no %uestion that the deceased, *innie &ane ?od$es, was an 2#erican citi>en.
There is also no %uestion that she was a national of the Atate of Te(as, ,.A.2. 2$ain, there is li+ewise no
%uestion that she had her do#icile of choice in the 3ity of /loilo, )hilippines, as this has already been
pronounced by the above-cited orders of the lower court, pronounce#ents which are by now res
adFudicata <par. BaC, Aee. .9, @ule 39, @ules of 3ourt4 /n re state of &ohnson, 39 )hil. 10'=.
2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode provides5
P@eal property as well as personal property is sub6ect to the law of the country where it is situated.
?owever, intestate and testa#entary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
a#ount of successional ri$hts and to the intrinsic validity of testa#entary provisions, shall be re$ulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever #ay be the nature of
the property and re$ardless of the country wherein said property #ay be found.Q
Thus the aforecited provision of the 3ivil 3ode points towards the national law of the deceased, *innie
&ane ?od$es, which is the law of Te(as, as $overnin$ succession Pboth with respect to the order of
succession and to the a#ount of successional ri$hts and to the intrinsic validity of testa#entary provisions
RQ. !ut the law of Te(as, in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the do#iciliary law $overns the
testa#entary dispositions and successional ri$hts over #ovables or personal property, while the law of
the situs $overns with respect to i##ovable property. Auch that with respect to both #ovable property, as
well as i##ovable property situated in the )hilippines, the law of Te(as points to the law of the
)hilippines.
2pplyin$, therefore, the so-called Prenvoi doctrineQ, as enunciated and applied by this ?onorable 3ourt in
the case of P/n re 3hristensenQ <8.@. ;o. *-1'1.9, &an. 31, 19'3=, there can be no %uestion that
)hilippine law $overns the testa#entary provisions in the *ast 7ill and Testa#ent of the deceased *innie
&ane ?od$es, as well as the successional ri$hts to her estate, both with respect to #ovables, as well as
i##ovables situated in the )hilippines.
The sub6ect of successional ri$hts.
,nder )hilippine law, as it is under the law of Te(as, the con6u$al or co##unity property of the spouses,
3harles ;ewton ?od$es and *innie &ane ?od$es, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into two,
one-half pertainin$ to each of the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon the death of *innie
&ane ?od$es, one-half of the con6u$al partnership property i##ediately pertained to 3harles ;ewton
?od$es as his own share, and not by virtue of any successional ri$hts. There can be no %uestion about
this.
2$ain, )hilippine law, or #ore specifically, 2rticle 900 of the 3ivil 3ode provides5
/f the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate
of the deceased spouse, and the testator #ay freely dispose of the other half.
/f the #arria$e between the survivin$ spouse and the testator was sole#ni>ed in articulo mortis, and the
testator died within three #onths fro# the ti#e of the #arria$e, the le$iti#e of the survivin$ spouse as the
sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, e(cept when they have been livin$ as husband and
wife for #ore than five years. /n the latter case, the le$iti#e of the survivin$ spouse shall be that specified
in the precedin$ para$raph.
This le$iti#e of the survivin$ spouse cannot be burdened by a fideico##isary substitution <2rt. 8'., 3ivil
code=, nor by any char$e, condition, or substitution <2rt, 81-, 3ivil code=. /t is clear, therefore, that in
addition to one-half of the con6u$al partnership property as his own con6u$al share, 3harles ;ewton
?od$es was also i##ediately entitled to one-half of the half con6u$al share of the deceased, *innie &ane
?od$es, or one-fourth of the entire con6u$al property, as his le$iti#e.
Ene-fourth of the con6u$al property therefore re#ains at issue.
/n the su##ary of its ar$u#ents in its #e#orandu# dated 2pril 30, 19'8, the followin$ appears5
!riefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is5
a. That the ?od$es spouses were do#iciled le$ally in the )hilippines <pp. 19--0, petition=. This is now a
#atter of res ad6udicata <p. -0, petition=.
b. That under )hilippine law, Te(as law, and the renvoi doctrine, )hilippine law $overns the successional
ri$hts over the properties left by the deceased, *innie &ane ?od$es <pp. -0--1, petition=.
c. That under )hilippine as well as Te(as law, one-half of the ?od$es properties pertains to the
deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es <p. -1, petition=. This is not %uestioned by the respondents.
d. That under )hilippine law, the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, auto#atically inherited one-half of
the re#ainin$ one-half of the ?od$es properties as his le$iti#e <p. -1, petition=.
e. That the re#ainin$ -0U of the ?od$es properties was inherited by the deceased, 3harles ;ewton
?od$es, under the will of his deceased spouse <pp. ----3, petition=. ,pon the death of 3harles ;ewton
?od$es, the substitution Wprovision of the will of the deceased, *innie &ane ?od$es, did not operate
because the sa#e is void <pp. -3--0, petition=.
f. That the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, asserted his sole ownership of the ?od$es properties and
the probate court sanctioned such assertion <pp. -0--9, petition=. ?e in fact assu#ed such ownership and
such was the status of the properties as of the ti#e of his death <pp. -9-3., petition=.
Ef si#ilar tenor are the alle$ations of )3/! in so#e of its pleadin$s %uoted in the earlier part of this
option.
En her part, it is respondent-appellee Ma$noKs posture that under the laws of Te(as, there is no syste# of
le$iti#e, hence the estate of Mrs. ?od$es should be one-half of all the con6u$al properties.
/t is thus un%uestionable that as far as )3/! is concerned, the application to these cases of 2rticle 1' of
the 3ivil 3ode in relation to the correspondin$ laws of Te(as would result in that the )hilippine laws on
succession should control. En that basis, as 7e have already e(plained above, the estate of Mrs.
?od$es is the re#ainder of one-fourth of the con6u$al partnership properties, considerin$ that 7e have
found that there is no le$al i#pedi#ent to the +ind of disposition ordered by Mrs. ?od$es in her will in
favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of )3/! that the sa#e constitutes an
inoperative testa#entary substitution is untenable. 2s will be recalled, )3/!Ks position that there is no
such estate of Mrs. ?od$es is predicated e(clusively on two propositions, na#ely5 <1= that the provision in
%uestion in Mrs. ?od$esK testa#ent violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the 3ivil 3ode and <-=
that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May -1, and Dece#ber 1., 1901, the trial court had
already finally and irrevocably ad6udicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the
e(clusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, 7e have overruled. ;owhere in its pleadin$s,
briefs and #e#oranda does )3/! #aintain that the application of the laws of Te(as would result in the
other heirs of Mrs. ?od$es not inheritin$ anythin$ under her will. 2nd since )3/!Ks representations in
re$ard to the laws of Te(as virtually constitute ad#issions of fact which the other parties and the 3ourt
are bein$ #ade to rely and act upon, )3/! is Pnot per#itted to contradict the# or subse%uently ta+e a
position contradictory to or inconsistent with the#.Q <0 Moran, id, p. '0, citin$ 3unanan vs. 2#paro, 80
)hil. --14 Ata. 2na vs. Maliwat, *--30-3, 2u$. 31, 19'8, -. A3@2 1018=.
2ccordin$ly, the only %uestion that re#ains to be settled in the further proceedin$s hereby ordered to be
held in the court below is how #uch #ore than as fi(ed above is the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, and this
would depend on <1= whether or not the applicable laws of Te(as do provide in effect for #ore, such as,
when there is no le$iti#e provided therein, and <-= whether or not ?od$es has validly waived his whole
inheritance fro# Mrs. ?od$es.
/n the course of the deliberations, it was brou$ht out by so#e #e#bers of the 3ourt that to avoid or, at
least, #ini#i>e further protracted le$al controversies between the respective heirs of the ?od$es
spouses, it is i#perative to elucidate on the possible conse%uences of dispositions #ade by ?od$es after
the death of his wife fro# the #ass of the unpartitioned estates without any e(press indication in the
pertinent docu#ents as to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance fro# his wife or part
of his own share of the con6u$al estate as well as of those #ade by )3/! after the death of ?od$es. 2fter
a lon$ discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows5 <1= any such dispositions #ade gratuitousl; in
favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as
intended to be of properties constitutin$ part of ?od$esK inheritance fro# his wife, it appearin$ fro# the
tenor of his #otions of May -1 and Dece#ber 11, 1901 that in as+in$ for $eneral authority to #a+e sales
or other disposals of properties under the 6urisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the
con6u$al estate, he was not invo+in$ particularly his ri$ht over his own share, but rather his ri$ht to
dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife4 <-= as re$ards sales, e(chan$es or
other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties ta+en in by virtue of such
e(chan$es, shall be considered as #erely the products of Pphysical chan$esQ of the properties of her
estate which the will e(pressly authori>es ?od$es to #a+e, provided that whatever of said products
should re#ain with the estate at the ti#e of the death of ?od$es should $o to her brothers and sisters4 <3=
the dispositions #ade by )3/! after the death of ?od$es #ust naturally be dee#ed as coverin$ only the
properties belon$in$ to his estate considerin$ that bein$ only the ad#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es,
)3/! could not have disposed of properties belon$in$ to the estate of his wife. ;either could such
dispositions be considered as involvin$ con6u$al properties, for the si#ple reason that the con6u$al
partnership auto#atically ceased when Mrs. ?od$es died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under
discussion, the re#ainder of her share descended also auto#atically upon the death of ?od$es to her
brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of )3/!Ks ad#inistration. 2ccordin$ly, these construction
of the will of Mrs. ?od$es should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of ad6udication and
distribution andNor partition of the two estates in %uestion.
TH4 A//4A%S
2 cursory e(a#ination of the seventy-ei$ht assi$n#ents of error in appellant )3/!Ks brief would readily
reveal that all of the# are predicated #ainly on the contention that inas#uch as ?od$es had already
ad6udicated unto hi#self all the properties constitutin$ his wifeKs share of the con6u$al partnership,
alle$edly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of Dece#ber 1., 1901, there has been, since
said date, no lon$er any estate of Mrs. ?od$es of which appellee Ma$no could be ad#inistratri(, hence
the various assailed orders sanctionin$ her actuations as such are not in accordance with law. Auch
bein$ the case, with the fore$oin$ resolution holdin$ such posture to be untenable in fact and in law and
that it is in the best interest of 6ustice that for the ti#e bein$ the two estates should be ad#inistered
con6ointly by the respective ad#inistrators of the two estates, it should follow that said assi$n#ents of
error have lost their funda#ental reasons for bein$. There are certain #atters, however, relatin$
peculiarly to the respective orders in %uestion, if co##only a#on$ so#e of the#, which need further
clarification. "or instance, so#e of the# authori>ed respondent Ma$no to act alone or without
concurrence of )3/!. 2nd with respect to #any of said orders, )3/! further clai#s that either the #atters
involved were not properly within the probate 6urisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure followed
was not in accordance with the rules. ?ence, the necessity of dealin$ separately with the #erits of each
of the appeals.
/ndeed, inas#uch as the said two estates have until now re#ained co##in$led pro$indiviso, due to the
failure of ?od$es and the lower court to li%uidate the con6u$al partnership, to reco$ni>e appellee Ma$no
as 2d#inistratri( of the Testate state of Mrs. ?od$es which is still unse$re$ated fro# that of ?od$es is
not to say, without any %ualification, that she was therefore authori>ed to do and perfor# all her acts
co#plained of in these appeals, sanctioned thou$h they #i$ht have been by the trial court. 2s a #atter of
fact, it is such co##in$lin$ pro$indiviso of the two estates that should deprive appellee of freedo# to act
independently fro# )3/!, as ad#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es, 6ust as, for the sa#e reason, the latter
should not have authority to act independently fro# her. 2nd considerin$ that the lower court failed to
adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by allowin$ the two ad#inistrators to act independently of
each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the 3ourt has to loo+
into the attendant circu#stances of each of the appealed orders to be able to deter#ine whether any of
the# has to be set aside or they #ay all be le$ally #aintained notwithstandin$ the failure of the court a
quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that $raver in6ury to the substantive
ri$hts of the parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the sub6ect
proceedin$s #ay be forestalled. /n other words, 7e have to deter#ine, whether or not, in the li$ht of the
unusual circu#stances e(tant in the record, there is need to be #ore pra$#atic and to adopt a rather
unorthodo( approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in ri$hts already bein$ e(ercised by nu#erous
innocent third parties, even if to do so #ay not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the
applicable purely ad6ective rules.
/ncidentally, it #ay be #entioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that
#i$ht result later fro# )3/!Ks continuin$ to ad#inister all the co##unity properties, notwithstandin$ the
certainty of the e(istence of the separate estate of Mrs. ?od$es, and to enable both estates to function in
the #eanti#e with a relative de$ree of re$ularity, that the 3ourt ordered in the resolution of Aepte#ber 8,
191- the #odification of the in6unction issued pursuant to the resolutions of 2u$ust 8, Ectober . and
Dece#ber ', 19'1, by virtue of which respondent Ma$no was co#pletely barred fro# any participation in
the ad#inistration of the properties herein involved. /n the Aepte#ber 8 resolution, 7e ordered that,
pendin$ this decision, Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 and 1'1- should proceed 6ointly and that the respective
ad#inistrators therein Pact con6ointly J none of the# to act sin$ly and independently of each other for
any purpose.Q ,pon #ature deliberation, 7e felt that to allow )3/! to continue #ana$in$ or ad#inisterin$
all the said properties to the e(clusion of the ad#inistratri( of Mrs. ?od$esK estate #i$ht place the heirs of
?od$es at an unduly advanta$eous position which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, da#a$e
or in6ury to the other parties concerned. /t is indeed to be re$retted that apparently, up to this date, #ore
than a year after said resolution, the sa#e has not been $iven due re$ard, as #ay be $leaned fro# the
fact that recently, respondent Ma$no has filed in these proceedin$s a #otion to declare )3/! in conte#pt
for alle$ed failure to abide therewith, notwithstandin$ that its repeated #otions for reconsideration thereof
have all been denied soon after they were filed.
9
8oin$ bac+ to the appeals, it is perhaps best to be$in first with what appears to Eur #ind to be the
si#plest, and then proceed to the #ore co#plicated ones in that order, without re$ard to the nu#erical
se%uence of the assi$n#ents of error in appellantKs brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by
counsel.
Assignments of error num&ers
%8800, %88:00 and %88:000.
These assi$n#ents of error relate to <1= the order of the trial court of 2u$ust ', 19'0 providin$ that Pthe
deeds of sale <therein referred to involvin$ properties in the na#e of ?od$es= should be si$ned 6ointly by
the )3/!, as 2d#inistrator of Testate state of 3.;. ?od$es, and 2velina 2. Ma$no, as 2d#inistratri( of
the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es, and to this effect, the )3/! should ta+e the necessary steps so
that 2d#inistratri( 2velina 2. Ma$no could si$n the deeds of sale,Q <p. -.8, 8reen @ec. on 2ppeal= <-= the
order of Ectober -1, 19'0 denyin$ the #otion for reconsideration of the fore$oin$ order, <pp. -1'--11, id.=
<3= the other order also dated Ectober -1, 19'0 en6oinin$ inter alia, that P<a= all cash collections should be
deposited in the 6oint account of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and estate of 3. ;. ?od$es, <b= that
whatever cash collections <that= had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be
withdrawn and since then <sic= deposited in the 6oint account of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and the
estate of 3. ;. ?od$es4 R <d= <that= 2d#inistratri( Ma$no J allow the )3/! to inspect whatever records,
docu#ents and papers she #ay have in her possession, in the sa#e #anner that 2d#inistrator )3/! is
also directed to allow 2d#inistratri( Ma$no to inspect whatever records, docu#ents and papers it #ay
have in its possessionQ and P<e= that the accountant of the estate of *innie &ane ?od$es shall have
access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of *innie &ane
?od$es4 and in li+e #anner, the accountant or any authori>ed representative of the estate of 3. ;.
?od$es shall have access to the records of transactions of the *innie &ane ?od$es estate for the
protection of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$esQ, <pp. -9---90, id.= and <.= the order of "ebruary 10, 19'',
denyin$, a#on$ others, the #otion for reconsideration of the order of Ectober -1, 19'0 last referred to.
<pp. .00-.0', id.=
2s #ay be readily seen, the thrust of all these four i#pu$ned orders is in line with the 3ourtKs above-
#entioned resolution of Aepte#ber 8, 191- #odifyin$ the in6unction previously issued on 2u$ust 8, 19'1,
and, #ore i#portantly, with what 7e have said the trial court should have always done pendin$ the
li%uidation of the con6u$al partnership of the ?od$es spouses. /n fact, as already stated, that is the
arran$e#ent 7e are orderin$, by this decision, to be followed. Atated differently, since the %uestioned
orders provide for 6oint action by the two ad#inistrators, and that is precisely what 7e are holdin$ out to
have been done and should be done until the two estates are separated fro# each other, the said orders
#ust be affir#ed. 2ccordin$ly the fore$oin$ assi$n#ents of error #ust be, as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error 7um&ers %8:000
to %880 and %88000 to %88:0.
The orders co#plained of under these assi$n#ents of error co##only deal with e(penditures #ade by
appellee Ma$no, as 2d#inistratri( of the state of Mrs. ?od$es, in connection with her ad#inistration
thereof, albeit additionally, assi$n#ents of error ;u#bers *M/M to *MM/ put into %uestion the pay#ent of
attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constitutin$, in effect, pre#ature advances
to the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es.
More specifically, assi$n#ent ;u#ber *MM/// refers to rei#burse#ent of overti#e pay paid to si(
e#ployees of the court and three other persons for services in copyin$ the court records to enable the
lawyers of the ad#inistration to be fully infor#ed of all the incidents in the proceedin$s. The
rei#burse#ent was approved as proper le$al e(penses of ad#inistration per the order of Dece#ber 19,
19'., <pp. --1----, id.= and repeated #otions for reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of
&anuary 9, 19'0, <pp. -31--3-, id.= Ectober -1, 19'0, <p. -11, id.= and "ebruary 10, 19''. <pp. .00-
.0', id.= En the other hand, 2ssi$n#ents ;u#bers *M:/// to *MM/, *MM/: and *MM: %uestion the trial
courtKs order of ;ove#ber 3, 19'0 approvin$ the a$ree#ent of &une ', 19'. between 2d#inistratri(
Ma$no and &a#es *. Aullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es, as )arties of the "irst )art,
and 2ttorneys @aul Man$lapus and @i>al @. Fui#po, as )arties of the Aecond )art, re$ardin$ attorneys
fees for said counsel who had a$reed Pto prosecute and defend their interests <of the )arties of the "irst
)art= in certain cases now pendin$ liti$ation in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of /loilo J, #ore specifically in
Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 and 1'1- JQ <pp. 1-'-1-9, id.= and directin$ 2d#inistratri( Ma$no Pto issue
and si$n whatever chec+ or chec+s #aybe needed to i#ple#ent the approval of the a$ree#ent anne(ed
to the #otionQ as well as the Pad#inistrator of the estate of 3. ;. ?od$es J to countersi$n the said chec+
or chec+s as the case #aybe.Q <pp. 313-3-0, id.=, reconsideration of which order of approval was denied
in the order of "ebruary 1', 19'', <p. .0', id.= 2ssi$n#ent ;u#ber *MM:/ i#putes error to the lower
courtKs order of Ectober -1, 19'0, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that P)3/! should
counter si$n the chec+ in the a#ount of )-00 in favor of 2d#inistratri( 2velina 2. Ma$no as her
co#pensation as ad#inistratri( of *innie &ane ?od$es estate char$eable to the Testate state of *innie
&ane ?od$es only.Q <p. -9., id.=
Main contention a$ain of appellant )3/! in re$ard to these ei$ht assi$ned errors is that there is no such
estate as the estate of Mrs. ?od$es for which the %uestioned e(penditures were #ade, hence what were
authori>ed were in effect e(penditures fro# the estate of ?od$es. 2s 7e have already de#onstrated in
Eur resolution above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. /ndeed, in
whichever way the re#ainin$ issues between the parties in these cases are ulti#ately resolved,
10
the final
result will surely be that there are properties constitutin$ the estate of Mrs. ?od$es of which Ma$no is the
current ad#inistratri(. /t follows, therefore, that said appellee had the ri$ht, as such ad#inistratri(, to hire
the persons who# she paid overti#e pay and to be paid for her own services as ad#inistratri(. That she
has not yet collected and is not collectin$ a#ounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant )3/! is
to her credit.
Ef course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter into
contracts for attorneyKs fees in the #anner she had done in the a$ree#ent of &une ', 19'.. 2nd as
re$ards to the reasonableness of the a#ount therein stipulated, 7e see no reason to disturb the
discretion e(ercised by the probate court in deter#inin$ the sa#e. 7e have $one over the a$ree#ent,
and considerin$ the obvious si>e of the estate in %uestion and the nature of the issues between the
parties as well as the professional standin$ of counsel, 7e cannot say that the fees a$reed upon re%uire
the e(ercise by the 3ourt of its inherent power to reduce it.
)3/! insists, however, that said a$ree#ent of &une ', 19'. is not for le$al services to the estate but to
the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es, or, at #ost, to both of the#, and such bein$ the case, any pay#ent under it,
insofar as counselsK services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of
advances to such heirs and a pre#ature distribution of the estate. 2$ain, 7e hold that such posture
cannot prevail.
,pon the pre#ise 7e have found plausible that there is an e(istin$ estate of Mrs. ?od$es, it results that
6uridically and factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and different fro# those involved in
her estate of ?od$es and vice versa. /nsofar as the #atters related e(clusively to the estate of Mrs.
?od$es, )3/!, as ad#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es, is a co#plete stran$er and it is without
personality to %uestion the actuations of the ad#inistratri( thereof re$ardin$ #atters not affectin$ the
estate of ?od$es. 2ctually, considerin$ the obviously considerable si>e of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, 7e
see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates are se$re$ated fro# each other, the
a#ount of attorneyKs fees stipulated in the a$ree#ent in %uestion will pre6udice any portion that would
correspond to ?od$esK estate.
2nd as re$ards the other heirs of Mrs. ?od$es who ou$ht to be the ones who should have a say on the
attorneyKs fees and other e(penses of ad#inistration assailed by )3/!, suffice it to say that they appear
to have been duly represented in the a$ree#ent itself by their attorney-in-fact, &a#es *. Aullivan and
have not otherwise interposed any ob6ection to any of the e(penses incurred by Ma$no %uestioned by
)3/! in these appeals. 2s a #atter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the e(penses in %uestion,
includin$ the attorneyKs fees, #ay be paid without awaitin$ the deter#ination and se$re$ation of the
estate of Mrs. ?od$es.
7ithal, the wei$htiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this sta$e of
the controversy a#on$ the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the e(istence or non-e(istence of the
estate of Mrs. ?od$es. /n this respect, the interest of respondent Ma$no, as the appointed ad#inistratri(
of the said estate, is to #aintain that it e(ists, which is naturally co##on and identical with and
inseparable fro# the interest of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es. Thus, it should not be wondered
why both Ma$no and these heirs have see#in$ly a$reed to retain but one counsel. /n fact, such an
arran$e#ent should be #ore convenient and econo#ical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest
between Ma$no and the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es would be, at this sta$e, %uite re#ote and, in any event,
rather insubstantial. !esides, should any substantial conflict of interest between the# arise in the future,
the sa#e would be a #atter that the probate court can very well ta+e care of in the course of the
independent proceedin$s in 3ase ;o. 1301 after the correspondin$ se$re$ation of the two sub6ect
estates. 7e cannot perceive any co$ent reason why, at this sta$e, the estate and the heirs of Mrs.
?od$es cannot be represented by a co##on counsel.
;ow, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in %uestion that should correspond to the heirs
constitutes pre#ature partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es is also a #atter in which neither
)3/! nor the heirs of ?od$es have any interest. /n any event, since, as far as the records show, the
estate has no creditors and the correspondin$ estate and inheritance ta(es, e(cept those of the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es, have already been paid,
11
no pre6udice can caused to anyone by the
co#paratively s#all a#ount of attorneyKs fees in %uestion. 2nd in this connection, it #ay be added that,
althou$h strictly spea+in$, the attorneyKs fees of the counsel of an ad#inistrator is in the first instance his
personal responsibility, rei#bursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the situation
on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has $iven his confor#ity thereto, it would be idle effort to in%uire
whether or not the sanction $iven to said fees by the probate court is proper.
"or the fore$oin$ reasons, 2ssi$n#ents of rror *M:/// to *MM/ and *MM/// to *MM:/ should be as they
are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error 0 to 0:,
8000 to 8:, 8800 to 88:, 888:
to 888 :0, 8%0 to 8%000 and %.
These assi$n#ents of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real
properties re$istered in the na#e of ?od$es but e(ecuted by appellee Ma$no, as 2d#inistratri( of the
state of Mrs. ?od$es, purportedly in i#ple#entation of correspondin$ supposed written P3ontracts to
AellQ previously e(ecuted by ?od$es durin$ the interi# between May -3, 1901, when his wife died, and
Dece#ber -0, 19'-, the day he died. 2s stated on pp. 118-1-0 of appellantKs #ain brief, PThese are5 the,
contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, )epito 8. /yulores
e(ecuted on "ebruary 0, 19'14 the contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and
the appellant speridion )artisala, e(ecuted on 2pril -0, 19'04 the contract to sell between the deceased,
3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, 7inifredo 3. spada, e(ecuted on 2pril 18, 19'04 the contract
to sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, @osario 2lin$asa, e(ecuted on
2u$ust -0, 19084 the contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee,
*oren>o 3arles, e(ecuted on &une 11, 19084 the contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton
?od$es, and the appellee, Aalvador A. 8u>#an, e(ecuted on Aepte#ber 13, 19'04 the contract to sell
between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, "lorenia !arrido, e(ecuted on
"ebruary -1, 19084 the contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee,
)urificacion 3oronado, e(ecuted on 2u$ust 1., 19'14 the contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles
;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, 8raciano *ucero, e(ecuted on ;ove#ber -1, 19'14 the contract to sell
between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, 2riteo Tho#as &a#ir, e(ecuted on
May -', 19'14 the contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee,
Mel%uiades !atisanan, e(ecuted on &une 9, 19094 the contract to sell between the deceased, 3harles
;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, !elce>ar 3ausin$, e(ecuted on "ebruary 10, 1909 and the contract to
sell between the deceased, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, and the appellee, 2delfa )re#aylon, e(ecuted on
Ectober 31, 1909, re Title ;o. 13810.Q
@elative to these sales, it is the position of appellant )3/! that, inas#uch as pursuant to the will of Mrs.
?od$es, her husband was to have do#inion over all her estate durin$ his lifeti#e, it was as absolute
owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales that he e(ecuted the afore#entioned contracts
to sell, and conse%uently, upon his death, the i#ple#entation of said contracts #ay be underta+en only
by the ad#inistrator of his estate and not by the ad#inistratri( of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es. !asically, the
sa#e theory is invo+ed with particular reference to five other sales, in which the respective Pcontracts to
sellQ in favor of these appellees were e(ecuted by ?od$es before the death of his wife, na#ely, those in
favor of appellee Aantia$o )acaonsis, 2lfredo 3atedral, &ose )ablico, 7estern /nstitute of Technolo$y
and 2delfa )re#aylon.
2nent those deeds of sale based on pro#ises or contracts to sell e(ecuted by ?od$es after the death of
his wife, those enu#erated in the %uotation in the i##ediately precedin$ para$raph, it is %uite obvious
that )3/!Ks contention cannot be sustained. 2s already e(plained earlier, 1
1
C all proceeds of re#unerative
transfers or dispositions #ade by ?od$es after the death of his wife should be dee#ed as continuin$ to
be parts of her estate and, therefore, sub6ect to the ter#s of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in
the sense that should there be no showin$ that such proceeds, whether in cash or property have been
subse%uently conveyed or assi$ned subse%uently by ?od$es to any third party by acts inter vivos with the
result that they could not thereby belon$ to hi# any#ore at the ti#e of his death, they auto#atically
beca#e part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in %uestion involve
transactions which are e(actly of this nature. 3onse%uently, the pay#ents #ade by the appellees should
be considered as pay#ents to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es which is to be distributed and partitioned a#on$
her heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell e(ecuted ?od$es durin$ the lifeti#e of his wife,
present a different situation. 2t first blush, it would appear that as to the#, )3/!Ks position has so#e
de$ree of plausibility. 3onsiderin$, however, that the adoption of )3/!Ks theory would necessarily have
tre#endous repercussions and would brin$ about considerable disturbance of property ri$hts that have
so#ehow accrued already in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforena#ed, the 3ourt is
inclined to ta+e a pra$#atic and practical view of the le$al situation involvin$ the# by overloo+in$ the
possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which would not, after all, detract #aterially fro#
what should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be i$nored. 1ona fide third parties are involved4 as #uch as
possible, they should not be #ade to suffer any pre6udice on account of 6udicial controversies not of their
own #a+in$. 7hat is #ore, the transactions they rely on were sub#itted by the# to the probate court for
approval, and fro# already +nown and recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe
that it had authority to act on their #otions, since appellee Ma$no had, fro# ti#e to ti#e prior to their
transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as ad#inistratri( of one of the sub6ect estates
either alone or con6ointly with )3/!. 2ll the sales in %uestion were e(ecuted by Ma$no in 19'' already,
but before that, the court had previously authori>ed or otherwise sanctioned e(pressly #any of her act as
ad#inistratri( involvin$ e(penditures fro# the estate #ade by her either con6ointly with or independently
fro# )3/!, as 2d#inistrator of the state of ?od$es. Thus, it #ay be said that said buyers-appellees
#erely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. 2ccordin$ly, unless the i#pu$ned orders
approvin$ those sales indubitably suffer fro# so#e clearly fatal infir#ity the 3ourt would rather affir#
the#.
/t is %uite apparent fro# the record that the properties covered by said sales are e%uivalent only to a
fraction of what should constitute the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, even if it is assu#ed that the sa#e would
finally be held to be only one-fourth of the con6u$al properties of the spouses as of the ti#e of her death
or, to be #ore e(act, one-half of her estate as per the inventory sub#itted by ?od$es as e(ecutor, on
May 1-, 1908. /n none of its nu#erous, varied and volu#inous pleadin$s, #otions and #anifestations has
)3/! clai#ed any possibility otherwise. Auch bein$ the case, to avoid any conflict with the heirs of
?od$es, the said properties covered by the %uestioned deeds of sale e(ecuted by appellee Ma$no #ay
be treated as a#on$ those correspondin$ to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, which would have been actually
under her control and ad#inistration had ?od$es co#plied with his duty to li%uidate the con6u$al
partnership. :iewin$ the situation in that #anner, the only ones who could stand to be pre6udiced by the
appealed orders referred to in the assi$n#ent of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have
the re%uisite interest to %uestion the# would be only the heirs of Mrs. ?od$es, definitely not )3/!.
/t is of no #o#ent in what capacity ?od$es #ade the Pcontracts to sellK after the death of his wife. ven if
he had acted as e(ecutor of the will of his wife, he did not have to sub#it those contracts to the court nor
follow the provisions of the rules, <Aections -, ., 0, ', 8 and 9 of @ule 89 %uoted by appellant on pp. 1-0
to 1-1 of its brief= for the si#ple reason that by the very orders, #uch relied upon by appellant for other
purposes, of May -1, 1901 and Dece#ber 1., 1901, ?od$es was Pallowed or authori>edQ by the trial court
Pto continue the business in which he was en$a$ed and to perfor# acts which he had been doin$ while
the deceased was livin$Q, <Erder of May -1= which accordin$ to the #otion on which the court acted was
Pof buyin$ and sellin$ personal and real propertiesQ, and Pto e(ecute subse%uent sales, conveyances,
leases and #ort$a$es of the properties left by the said deceased *innie &ane ?od$es in consonance with
the wishes conveyed in the last will and testa#ent of the latter.Q <Erder of Dece#ber 1.= /n other words, if
?od$es acted then as e(ecutor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these blan+et
orders, and )3/! does not %uestion the le$ality of such $rant of authority4 on the contrary, it is relyin$ on
the ter#s of the order itself for its #ain contention in these cases. En the other hand, if, as )3/!
contends, he acted as heir-ad6udicatee, the authority $iven to hi# by the afore#entioned orders would
still suffice.
2s can be seen, therefore, it is of no #o#ent whether the Pcontracts to sellQ upon which the deeds in
%uestion were based were e(ecuted by ?od$es before or after the death of his wife. /n a word, 7e hold,
for the reasons already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds bein$ assailed pertain or should
be dee#ed as pertainin$ to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es4 hence, any supposed irre$ularity attendin$ the
actuations of the trial court #ay be invo+ed only by her heirs, not by )3/!, and since the said heirs are
not ob6ectin$, and the defects pointed out not bein$ strictly 6urisdictional in nature, all thin$s considered,
particularly the unnecessary disturbance of ri$hts already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is
best that the i#pu$ned orders are not disturbed.
/n view of these considerations, 7e do not find sufficient #erit in the assi$n#ents of error under
discussion.
Assignments of error : to :000,
8:0 to 8:000, 88:0 to 8808, 888:00
to 888:000, 8%0: to 8%:0 and %0.
2ll these assi$n#ents of error co##only deal with alle$ed non-fulfill#ent by the respective vendees,
appellees herein, of the ter#s and conditions e#bodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the
assi$n#ents of error 6ust discussed. /t is clai#ed that so#e of the# never #ade full pay#ents in
accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others, li+e *oren>o 3arles,
&ose )ablico, 2lfredo 3atedral and Aalvador A. 8u>#an, the contracts with the# had already been
unilaterally cancelled by )3/! pursuant to auto#atic rescission clauses contained in the#, in view of the
failure of said buyers to pay arreara$es lon$ overdue. !ut )3/!Ks posture is a$ain pre#ised on its
assu#ption that the properties covered by the deeds in %uestion could not pertain to the estate of Mrs.
?od$es. 7e have already held above that, it bein$ evident that a considerable portion of the con6u$al
properties, #uch #ore than the properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate
of Mrs. ?od$es, to avoid unnecessary le$al co#plications, it can be assu#ed that said properties for#
part of such estate. "ro# this point of view, it is apparent a$ain that the %uestions, whether or not it was
proper for appellee Ma$no to have disre$arded the cancellations #ade by )3/!, thereby revivin$ the
ri$hts of the respective buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the rules $overnin$ new dispositions of
properties of the estate were strictly followed, #ay not be raised by )3/! but only by the heirs of Mrs.
?od$es as the persons desi$nated to inherit the sa#e, or perhaps the $overn#ent because of the still
unpaid inheritance ta(es. !ut, a$ain, since there is no pretense that any ob6ections were raised by said
parties or that they would necessarily be pre6udiced, the contentions of )3/! under the instant
assi$n#ents of error hardly #erit any consideration.
Assignments of error 08 to 800, 808
to 880, 888 to 880:, 88808 to 8%,
8%:00 to 8%08, %00 and %000 to %80.
)3/! raises under these assi$n#ents of error two issues which accordin$ to it are funda#ental, na#ely5
<1= that in approvin$ the deeds e(ecuted by Ma$no pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in
the perfor#ance of its functions as ad#inistrator of the estate of ?od$es, the trial court deprived the said
estate of the ri$ht to invo+e such cancellations it <)3/!= had #ade and <-= that in so actin$, the court
Parro$ated unto itself, while actin$ as a probate court, the power to deter#ine the contendin$ clai#s of
third parties a$ainst the estate of ?od$es over real property,Q since it has in effect deter#ined whether or
not all the ter#s and conditions of the respective contracts to sell e(ecuted by ?od$es in favor of the
buyers-appellees concerned were co#plied with by the latter. 7hat is worse, in the view of )3/!, is that
the court has ta+en the word of the appellee Ma$no, Pa total stran$er to his estate as deter#inative of the
issueQ.
2ctually, contrary to the stand of )3/!, it is this last point re$ardin$ appellee Ma$noKs havin$ a$reed to
i$nore the cancellations #ade by )3/! and allowed the buyers-appellees to consu##ate the sales in
their favor that is decisive. Aince 7e have already held that the properties covered by the contracts in
%uestion should be dee#ed to be portions of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es and not that of ?od$es, it is )3/!
that is a co#plete stran$er in these incidents. 3onsiderin$, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. ?od$es and
her heirs who are the real parties in interest havin$ the ri$ht to oppose the consu##ation of the
i#pu$ned sales are not ob6ectin$, and that they are the ones who are precisely ur$in$ that said sales be
sanctioned, the assi$n#ents of error under discussion have no basis and #ust accordin$ly be as they are
hereby overruled.
7ith particular reference to assi$n#ents */// to *M/, assailin$ the orders of the trial court re%uirin$ )3/! to
surrender the respective ownerKs duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in
%uestion and otherwise directin$ the @e$ister of Deeds of /loilo to cancel said certificates and to issue
new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the li$ht of the
above discussion, the trial court was within its ri$hts to so re%uire and direct, )3/! havin$ refused to $ive
way, by withholdin$ said ownersK duplicate certificates, of the correspondin$ re$istration of the transfers
duly and le$ally approved by the court.
Assignments of error %800 to %8:00
2ll these assi$n#ents of error co##only deal with the appeal a$ainst orders favorin$ appellee 7estern
/nstitute of Technolo$y. 2s will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a
contract to sell e(ecuted by ?od$es prior to the death of his wife. 2s of Ectober, 19'0, it was in arrears in
the total a#ount of )9-,'91.00 in the pay#ent of its install#ents on account of its purchase, hence it
received under date of Ectober ., 19'0 and Ectober -0, 19'0, letters of collection, separately and
respectively, fro# )3/! and appellee Ma$no, in their respective capacities as ad#inistrators of the
distinct estates of the ?od$es spouses, albeit, while in the case of )3/! it #ade +nown that Pno other
arran$e#ent can be accepted e(cept by payin$ all your past due accountQ, on the other hand, Ma$no
#erely said she would Pappreciate very #uch if you can #a+e so#e re#ittance to brin$ this account up-
to-date and to reduce the a#ount of the obli$ation.Q <Aee pp. -90-311, 8reen @. on 2.= En ;ove#ber 3,
19'0, the /nstitute filed a #otion which, after alle$in$ that it was ready and willin$ to pay )-0,000 on
account of its overdue install#ents but uncertain whether it should pay )3/! or Ma$no, it prayed that it be
Pallowed to deposit the aforesaid a#ount with the court pendin$ resolution of the conflictin$ clai#s of the
ad#inistrators.Q 2ctin$ on this #otion, on ;ove#ber -3, 19'0, the trial court issued an order, already
%uoted in the narration of facts in this opinion, holdin$ that pay#ent to both or either of the two
ad#inistrators is Pproper and le$alQ, and so P#ovant J can pay to both estates or either of the#Q,
considerin$ that Pin both cases <Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 and 1'1-= there is as yet no 6udicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to who#soever are entitled thereto.Q
The ar$u#ents under the instant assi$n#ents of error revolve around said order. "ro# the procedural
standpoint, it is clai#ed that )3/! was not served with a copy of the /nstituteKs #otion, that said #otion
was heard, considered and resolved on ;ove#ber -3, 19'0, whereas the date set for its hearin$ was
;ove#ber -0, 19'0, and that what the order $rants is different fro# what is prayed for in the #otion. 2s
to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the #atter treated in the #otion is beyond the 6urisdiction of
the probate court and that the order authori>ed pay#ent to a person other than the ad#inistrator of the
estate of ?od$es with who# the /nstitute had contracted.
The procedural points ur$ed by appellant deserve scant consideration. 7e #ust assu#e, absent any
clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had acted re$ularly by seein$ to it that appellant was duly
notified. En the other hand, there is nothin$ irre$ular in the courtKs havin$ resolved the #otion three days
after the date set for hearin$ the sa#e. Moreover, the record reveals that appellantsK #otion for
reconsideration wherein it raised the sa#e points was denied by the trial court on March 1, 19'' <p. .'-,
8reen @. on 2.= 7ithal, 7e are not convinced that the relief $ranted is not within the $eneral intent of the
/nstituteKs #otion.
/nsofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are #ere
reiterations of contentions 7e have already resolved above adversely to appellantsK position. /ncidentally,
7e #ay add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbin$ the lower courtKs orders
sanctionin$ the sales %uestioned in all these appeal s by )3/!, that it is only when one of the parties to a
contract to convey property e(ecuted by a deceased person raises substantial ob6ections to its bein$
i#ple#ented by the e(ecutor or ad#inistrator of the decedentKs estate that Aection 8 of @ule 89 #ay not
apply and, conse%uently, the #atter has, to be ta+en up in a separate action outside of the probate court4
but where, as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in a$ree#ent that the
conveyance be #ade, it is properly within the 6urisdiction of the probate court to $ive its sanction thereto
pursuant to the provisions of the rule 6ust #entioned. 2nd with respect to the supposed auto#atic
rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell e(ecuted by ?od$es in favor of herein appellees, the
effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the said contracts, despite the no#enclature
appearin$ therein, which is not controllin$, for if they a#ount to actual contracts of sale instead of bein$
#ere unilateral accepted Ppro#ises to sellQ, <2rt. 1.19, 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines, -nd para$raph=
the pactum commissorium or the auto#atic rescission provision would not operate, as a #atter of public
policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or 6udicial de#and by the seller <10 Manresa -'3, -nd
ed.= neither of which have been shown to have been #ade in connection with the transactions herein
involved.
3onse%uently, 7e find no #erit in the assi$n#ents of error
;u#ber *M// to *M://.
S 6 ! ! A " <
3onsiderin$ the fact that this decision is unusually e(tensive and that the issues herein ta+en up and
resolved are rather nu#erous and varied, what with appellant #a+in$ seventy-ei$ht assi$n#ents of error
affectin$ no less than thirty separate orders of the court a %uo, if only to facilitate proper understandin$ of
the i#port and e(tent of our rulin$s herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restate#ent of the
whole situation be #ade to$ether with our conclusions in re$ard to its various factual and le$al aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late 3harles ;ewton ?od$es as well as that of his wife,
*innie &ane ?od$es, who predeceased hi# by about five years and a half. /n their respective wills which
were e(ecuted on different occasions, each one of the# provided #utually as follows5 P/ $ive, devise and
be%ueath all of the rest, residue and re#ainder <after funeral and ad#inistration e(penses, ta(es and
debts= of #y estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to #y beloved <spouse= to have
and to hold unto <hi#Nher= J durin$ <hisNher= natural lifeti#eQ, sub6ect to the condition that upon the death
of whoever of the# survived the other, the re#ainder of what he or she would inherit fro# the other is
P$ive<n=, devise<d= and be%ueath<ed=Q to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. ?od$es died first, on May -3, 1901. "our days later, on May -1, ?od$es was appointed special
ad#inistrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the sa#e date, he was Pallowed or authori>ed to
continue the business in which he was en$a$ed, <buyin$ and sellin$ personal and real properties= and to
perfor# acts which he had been doin$ while the deceased was livin$.Q Aubse%uently, on Dece#ber 1.,
1901, after Mrs. ?od$esK will had been probated and ?od$es had been appointed and had %ualified as
(ecutor thereof, upon his #otion in which he asserted that he was Pnot only part owner of the properties
left as con6u$al, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased *innie &ane ?od$esQ,
the trial court ordered that Pfor the reasons stated in his #otion dated Dece#ber 11, 1901, which the
3ourt considers well ta+en, R all the sales, conveyances, leases and #ort$a$es of all properties left by
the deceased *innie &ane ?od$es e(ecuted by the (ecutor, 3harles ;ewton ?od$es are hereby
2))@E:D. The said (ecutor is further authori>ed to e(ecute subse%uent sales, conveyances, leases
and #ort$a$es of the properties left by the said deceased *innie &ane ?od$es in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testa#ent of the latter.Q
2nnually thereafter, ?od$es sub#itted to the court the correspondin$ state#ents of account of his
ad#inistration, with the particularity that in all his #otions, he always #ade it point to ur$e the that Pno
person interested in the )hilippines of the ti#e and place of e(a#inin$ the herein accounts be $iven
notice as herein e(ecutor is the only devisee or le$atee of the deceased in accordance with the last will
and testa#ent already probated by the ?onorable 3ourt.Q 2ll said accounts approved as prayed for.
;othin$ else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or ?od$es until Dece#ber -0, 19'-.
/#portantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs. ?od$es that her share of the con6u$al partnership was to
be inherited by her husband Pto have and to hold unto hi#, #y said husband, durin$ his natural lifeti#eQ
and that Pat the death of #y said husband, / $ive, devise and be%ueath all the rest, residue and re#ainder
of #y estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be e%ually divided a#on$ #y
brothers and sisters, share and share ali+eQ, which provision naturally #ade it i#perative that the con6u$al
partnership be pro#ptly li%uidated, in order that the Prest, residue and re#ainderQ of his wifeKs share
thereof, as of the ti#e of ?od$esK own death, #ay be readily +nown and identified, no such li%uidation
was ever underta+en. The record $ives no indication of the reason for such o#ission, althou$h relatedly,
it appears therein5
1. That in his annual state#ent sub#itted to the court of the net worth of 3. ;. ?od$es and the state of
*innie &ane ?od$es, ?od$es repeatedly and consistently reported the co#bined inco#e of the con6u$al
partnership and then #erely divided the sa#e e%ually between hi#self and the estate of the deceased
wife, and, #ore i#portantly, he also, as consistently, filed correspondin$ separate inco#e ta( returns for
each calendar year for each resultin$ half of such co#bined inco#e, thus reportin$ that the estate of Mrs.
?od$es had its own inco#e distinct fro# his own.
-. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently o#it in its order probatin$ the will of Mrs. ?od$es,
the na#e of one of her brothers, @oy ?i$don then already deceased, ?od$es lost no ti#e in as+in$ for
the proper correction Pin order that the heirs of deceased @oy ?i$don #ay not thin+ or believe they were
o#itted, and that they were really interested in the estate of the deceased *innie &ane ?od$esQ.
3. That in his afore#entioned #otion of Dece#ber 11, 1901, he e(pressly stated that Pdeceased *innie
&ane ?od$es died leavin$ no descendants or ascendants e(cept brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner as the survivin$ spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedentQ, thereby indicatin$ that he
was not e(cludin$ his wifeKs brothers and sisters fro# the inheritance.
.. That ?od$es alle$edly #ade state#ents and #anifestations to the ,nited Atates inheritance ta(
authorities indicatin$ that he had renounced his inheritance fro# his wife in favor of her other heirs, which
attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alle$ed affidavit subscribed and sworn to here
in the )hilippines and in which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclai#in$ and
renouncin$ his ri$hts under his wifeKs will was to Pabsolve <hi#= or <his= estate fro# any liability for the
pay#ent of inco#e ta(es on inco#e which has accrued to the estate of *innie &ane ?od$esQ, his wife,
since her death.
En said date, Dece#ber -0, 19'-, ?od$es died. The very ne(t day, upon #otion of herein respondent
and appellee, 2velina 2. Ma$no, she was appointed by the trial court as 2d#inistratri( of the Testate
state of *innie &ane ?od$es, in Apecial )roceedin$s ;o. 1301 and as Apecial 2d#inistratri( of the
estate of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, Pin the latter case, because the last will of said 3harles ;ewton
?od$es is still +ept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses #ay
be lost, da#a$ed or $o to waste, unless Apecial 2d#inistratri( is appointed,Q <Erder of Dece#ber -',
19'-, p. -1, Gellow @. on 2.= althou$h, soon enou$h, on Dece#ber -9, 19'-, a certain ?arold I. Davies
was appointed as her 3o-Apecial 2d#inistrator, and when Apecial )roceedin$s ;o. 1'1-, Testate state
of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, was opened, &oe ?od$es, as ne(t of +in of the deceased, was in due ti#e
appointed as 3o-2d#inistrator of said estate to$ether with 2tty. "ernando ). Mirasol, to replace Ma$no
and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner )3/! alone.
2t the outset, the two probate proceedin$s appear to have been proceedin$ 6ointly, with each
ad#inistrator actin$ to$ether with the other, under a sort of #odus operandi. )3/! used to secure at the
be$innin$ the confor#ity to and si$nature of Ma$no in transactions it wanted to enter into and sub#itted
the sa#e to the court for approval as their 6oint acts. Ao did Ma$no do li+ewise. Ao#ehow, however,
differences see# to have arisen, for which reason, each of the# be$an actin$ later on separately and
independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, )3/! had its own lawyers
who# it contracted and paid handso#ely, conducted the business of the estate independently of Ma$no
and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearin$ in the na#e of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es belon$ed
solely and only to his estate, to the e(clusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es, without
considerin$ whether or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the con6u$al
partnership pertainin$ to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es. En the other hand, Ma$no #ade her own
e(penditures, hired her own lawyers, on the pre#ise that there is such an estate of Mrs. ?od$es, and
dealth with so#e of the properties, appearin$ in the na#e of ?od$es, on the assu#ption that they
actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es. 2ll of these independent and separate actuations of the
two ad#inistrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon sub#ission. ventually, the
differences reached a point wherein Ma$no, who was #ore co$ni>ant than anyone else about the ins and
outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her lon$ and inti#ate
association with the#, #ade it difficult for )3/! to perfor# nor#ally its functions as ad#inistrator
separately fro# her. Thus, le$al co#plications arose and the present 6udicial controversies ca#e about.
)redicatin$ its position on the tenor of the orders of May -1 and Dece#ber 1., 1901 as well as the
approval by the court a quo of the annual state#ents of account of ?od$es, )3/! holds to the view that
the estate of Mrs. ?od$es has already been in effect closed with the virtual ad6udication in the #entioned
orders of her whole estate to ?od$es, and that, therefore, Ma$no had already ceased since then to have
any estate to ad#inister and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es have no interests whatsoever in the
estate left by ?od$es. Mainly upon such theory, )3/! has co#e to this 3ourt with a petition
for certiorari and prohibition prayin$ that the lower courtKs orders allowin$ respondent Ma$no to continue
actin$ as ad#inistratri( of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 in the #anner she has
been doin$, as detailed earlier above, be set aside. 2dditionally, )3/! #aintains that the provision in Mrs.
?od$esK will institutin$ her brothers and sisters in the #anner therein specified is in the nature of a
testa#entary substitution, but inas#uch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of the 3ivil 3ode, it is ineffective and #ay not be enforced. /t is further
contended that, in any event, inas#uch as the ?od$es spouses were both residents of the )hilippines,
followin$ the decision of this 3ourt in 2>nar vs. 8arcia, or the case of 3hristensen, 1 A3@2 90, the estate
left by Mrs. ?od$es could not be #ore than one-half of her share of the con6u$al partnership,
notwithstandin$ the fact that she was citi>en of Te(as, ,.A.2., in accordance with 2rticle 1' in relation to
2rticles 900 and 81- of the 3ivil 3ode. /nitially, 7e issued a preli#inary in6unction a$ainst Ma$no and
allowed )3/! to act alone.
2t the sa#e ti#e )3/! has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approvin$ individual acts of
appellee Ma$no in her capacity as ad#inistratri( of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, such as, hirin$ of lawyers
for specified fees and incurrin$ e(penses of ad#inistration for different purposes and e(ecutin$ deeds of
sale in favor of her co-appellees coverin$ properties which are still re$istered in the na#e of ?od$es,
purportedly pursuant to correspondin$ Pcontracts to sellQ e(ecuted by ?od$es. The said orders are bein$
%uestioned on 6urisdictional and procedural $rounds directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory
of appellant that all the properties of the two estates belon$ already to the estate of ?od$es e(clusively.
En the other hand, respondent-appellee Ma$no denies that the trial courtKs orders of May -1 and
Dece#ber 1., 1901 were #eant to be finally ad6udicatory of the hereditary ri$hts of ?od$es and contends
that they were no #ore than the courtKs $eneral sanction of past and future acts of ?od$es as e(ecutor of
the will of his wife in due course of ad#inistration. 2s to the point re$ardin$ substitution, her position is
that what was $iven by Mrs. ?od$es to her husband under the provision in %uestion was a lifeti#e
usufruct of her share of the con6u$al partnership, with the na+ed ownership passin$ directly to her
brothers and sisters. 2nent the application of 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode, she clai#s that the applicable
law to the will of Mrs. ?od$es is that of Te(as under which, she alle$es, there is no syste# of le$iti#e,
hence, the estate of Mrs. ?od$es cannot be less than her share or one-half of the con6u$al partnership
properties. Ahe further #aintains that, in any event, ?od$es had as a #atter of fact and of law renounced
his inheritance fro# his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters
effective at the latest upon the death of ?od$es.
/n this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues 6ust su##ari>ed, 7e overrule
)3/!Ks contention that the orders of May -1, 1901 and Dece#ber 1., 1901 a#ount to an ad6udication to
?od$es of the estate of his wife, and 7e reco$ni>e the present e(istence of the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, as
consistin$ of properties, which, while re$istered in that na#e of ?od$es, do actually correspond to the
re#ainder of the share of Mrs. ?od$es in the con6u$al partnership, it appearin$ that pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of said share still e(istin$ and undisposed of by her husband at
the ti#e of his death should $o to her brothers and sisters share and share ali+e. "actually, 7e find that
the proven circu#stances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court intended
to #a+e thereby such alle$ed final ad6udication. *e$ally, 7e hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no
basis for such a conclusion, and what is #ore, at the ti#e said orders were issued, the proceedin$s had
not yet reached the point when a final distribution and ad6udication could be #ade. Moreover, the
interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would be done. 2t best,
therefore, said orders #erely allowed ?od$es to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance of final
ad6udication, which is i#plicitly per#itted under Aection - of @ule 109, there bein$ no possible pre6udice
to third parties, inas#uch as Mrs. ?od$es had no creditors and all pertinent ta(es have been paid.
More specifically, 7e hold that, on the basis of circu#stances presently e(tant in the record, and on the
assu#ption that ?od$esK purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. ?od$es
inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the co##unity estate of the spouses at the
ti#e of her death, #inus whatever ?od$es had $ratuitously disposed of therefro# durin$ the period fro#,
May -3, 1901, when she died, to Dece#ber -0, 19'-, when he died provided, that with re$ard to
re#unerative dispositions #ade by hi# durin$ the sa#e period, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or
property, should be dee#ed as continuin$ to be part of his wifeKs estate, unless it can be shown that he
had subse%uently disposed of the# gratuitousl;.
2t this 6uncture, it #ay be reiterated that the %uestion of what are the pertinent laws of Te(as and what
would be the estate of Mrs. ?od$es under the# is basically one of fact, and considerin$ the respective
positions of the parties in re$ard to said factual issue, it can already be dee#ed as settled for the
purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her
brothers and sisters by virtue of her will #ay not be less than one-fourth of the con6u$al estate, it
appearin$ that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the le$iti#e of ?od$es,
)3/! bein$ of the view that under the laws of Te(as, there is such a le$iti#e of one-fourth of said
con6u$al estate and Ma$no contendin$, on the other hand, that there is none. /n other words, hereafter,
whatever #i$ht ulti#ately appear, at the subse%uent proceedin$s, to be actually the laws of Te(as on the
#atter would no lon$er be of any conse%uence, since )3/! would anyway be in estoppel already to clai#
that the estate of Mrs. ?od$es should be less than as contended by it now, for ad#issions by a party
related to the effects of forei$n laws, which have to be proven in our courts li+e any other controverted
fact, create estoppel.
/n the process, 7e overrule )3/!Ks contention that the provision in Mrs. ?od$esK will in favor of her
brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. !ut neither are 7e sustainin$, on the
other hand, Ma$noKs pose that it $ave ?od$es only a lifeti#e usufruct. 7e hold that by said provision,
Mrs. ?od$es si#ultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the
condition, however, that the latter would have co#plete ri$hts of do#inion over the whole estate durin$
his lifeti#e and what would $o to the for#er would be only the re#ainder thereof at the ti#e of ?od$esK
death. /n other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of ?od$es, on the other
hand, ?od$es was not obli$ed to preserve anythin$ for the#. 3learly then, the essential ele#ents of
testa#entary substitution are absent4 the provision in %uestion is a si#ple case of conditional
si#ultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of ?od$es is sub6ect to a partial resolutory
condition the operative contin$ency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the
institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which #anner of institution is not prohibited by law.
7e also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. ?od$es inherited by her brothers and sisters could be
#ore than 6ust stated, but this would depend on <1= whether upon the proper application of the principle
of renvoi in relation to 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode and the pertinent laws of Te(as, it will appear that
?od$es had no le$iti#e as contended by Ma$no, and <-= whether or not it can be held that ?od$es had
le$ally and effectively renounced his inheritance fro# his wife. ,nder the circu#stances presently
obtainin$ and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the 3ourt is not in a position to #a+e a
final rulin$, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and 7e, therefore, reserve said issues
for further proceedin$s and resolution in the first instance by the court a %uo, as hereinabove indicated.
7e reiterate, however, that pendin$ such further proceedin$s, as #atters stand at this sta$e, Eur
considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the ter#s of the will of Mrs. ?od$es, her
husband could not have anyway le$ally ad6udicated or caused to be ad6udicated to hi#self her whole
share of their con6u$al partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof durin$ his lifeti#e, the
resultin$ estate of Mrs. ?od$es, of which Ma$no is the uncontested ad#inistratri(, cannot be less than
one-fourth of the con6u$al partnership properties, as of the ti#e of her death, #inus what, as e(plained
earlier, have been gratuitousl; disposed of therefro#, by ?od$es in favor of third persons since then, for
even if it were assu#ed that, as contended by )3/!, under 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode and
applyin$ renvoi the laws of the )hilippines are the ones ulti#ately applicable, such one-fourth share
would be her free disposable portion, ta+in$ into account already the le$iti#e of her husband under 2rticle
900 of the 3ivil 3ode.
The fore$oin$ considerations leave the 3ourt with no alternative than to conclude that in predicatin$ its
orders on the assu#ption, albeit une(pressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. ?od$es to be
distributed a#on$ her brothers and sisters and that respondent Ma$no is the le$al ad#inistratri( thereof,
the trial court acted correctly and within its 6urisdiction. 2ccordin$ly, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition has to be denied. The 3ourt feels however, that pendin$ the li%uidation of the con6u$al
partnership and the deter#ination of the specific properties constitutin$ her estate, the two ad#inistrators
should act con6ointly as ordered in the 3ourtKs resolution of Aepte#ber 8, 191- and as further clarified in
the dispositive portion of its decision.
2nent the appeals fro# the orders of the lower court sanctionin$ pay#ent by appellee Ma$no, as
ad#inistratri(, of e(penses of ad#inistration and attorneyKs fees, it is obvious that, with Eur holdin$ that
there is such an estate of Mrs. ?od$es, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said
orders should be affir#ed. This 7e do on the assu#ption 7e find 6ustified by the evidence of record, and
see#in$ly a$reed to by appellant )3/!, that the si>e and value of the properties that should correspond
to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es far e(ceed the total of the attorneyKs fees and ad#inistration e(penses in
%uestion.
7ith respect to the appeals fro# the orders approvin$ transactions #ade by appellee Ma$no, as
ad#inistratri(, coverin$ properties re$istered in the na#e of ?od$es, the details of which are related
earlier above, a distinction #ust be #ade between those predicated on contracts to sell e(ecuted by
?od$es before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those pre#ised on contracts to sell entered
into by hi# after her death. 2s re$ards the latter, 7e hold that inas#uch as the pay#ents #ade by
appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belon$in$ to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, as #ay be
i#plied fro# the tenor of the #otions of May -1 and Dece#ber 1., 1901, said pay#ents continue to
pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on
the assu#ption that the si>e and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es would
e(ceed the total value of all the properties covered by the i#pu$ned deeds of sale, for which reason, said
properties #ay be dee#ed as pertainin$ to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es. 2nd there bein$ no showin$ that
thus viewin$ the situation, there would be pre6udice to anyone, includin$ the $overn#ent, the 3ourt also
holds that, disre$ardin$ procedural technicalities in favor of a pra$#atic and practical approach as
discussed above, the assailed orders should be affir#ed. !ein$ a stran$er to the estate of Mrs. ?od$es,
)3/! has no personality to raise the procedural and 6urisdictional issues raised by it. 2nd inas#uch as it
does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. ?od$es or the $overn#ent has ob6ected to any of the
orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there e(ists no reason for said orders to be set aside.
D0S/2S0T0:4 /A"T
/; :/7 E" 2** T? "E@8E/;8 )@M/AA, 6ud$#ent is hereby rendered D/AM/AA/;8 the petition
in 8. @. ;os. *--18'0 and *--189', and 2""/@M/;8, in 8. @. ;os. *--193'-31 and the other thirty-one
nu#bers hereunder ordered to be added after pay#ent of the correspondin$ doc+et fees, all the orders of
the trial court under appeal enu#erated in detail on pa$es 30 to 31 and 80 to 8- of this decision4 the
e(istence of the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es, with respondent-appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no, as
ad#inistratri( thereof is reco$ni>ed, and it is declared that, until final 6ud$#ent is ulti#ately rendered
re$ardin$ <1= the #anner of applyin$ 2rticle 1' of the 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines to the situation
obtainin$ in these cases and <-= the factual and le$al issue of whether or not 3harles ;ewton ?od$es
had effectively and le$ally renounced his inheritance under the will of *innie &ane ?od$es, the said estate
consists of one-fourth of the co##unity properties of the said spouses, as of the ti#e of the death of the
wife on May -3, 1901, #inus whatever the husband had already $ratuitously disposed of in favor of third
persons fro# said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to re#unerative dispositions, the
proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wifeKs estate, unless subse%uently disposed of
$ratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be
declared le$ally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be #ade fro# said estate4 in conse%uence,
the preli#inary in6unction of 2u$ust 8, 19'1, as a#ended on Ectober . and Dece#ber ', 19'1, is lifted,
and the resolution of Aepte#ber 8, 191-, directin$ that petitioner-appellant )3/!, as 2d#inistrator of the
Testate state of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es, in Apecial )roceedin$s 1'1-, and respondent-appellee
2velina 2. Ma$no, as 2d#inistratri( of the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es, in Apecial )roceedin$s
1301, should act thenceforth always con6ointly, never independently fro# each other, as such
ad#inistrators, is reiterated, and the sa#e is #ade part of this 6ud$#ent and shall continue in force,
pendin$ the li%uidation of the con6u$al partnership of the deceased spouses and the deter#ination and
se$re$ation fro# each other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this 6ud$#ent,
the trial court should i##ediately proceed to the partition of the presently co#bined estates of the
spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. ?od$es #ay be properly and clearly identified4
thereafter, the trial court should forthwith se$re$ate the re#ainder of the one-fourth herein ad6ud$ed to be
her estate and cause the sa#e to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her e(clusive
ad#inistration in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301, while the other one-fourth shall re#ain under the 6oint
ad#inistration of said respondent and petitioner under a 6oint proceedin$s in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301
and 1'1-, whereas the half un%uestionably pertainin$ to ?od$es shall be ad#inistered by petitioner
e(clusively in Apecial )roceedin$s 1'1-, without pre6udice to the resolution by the trial court of the
pendin$ #otions for its re#oval as ad#inistrator
12
4 and this arran$e#ent shall be #aintained until the final
resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearin$ and
deter#ination, and the correspondin$ co#plete se$re$ation and partition of the two estates in the
proportions that #ay result fro# the said resolution.
8enerally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in
all their actuations in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 and 1'1-, to the views passed and ruled upon by the
3ourt in the fore$oin$ opinion.
2ppellant )3/! is ordered to pay, within five <0= days fro# notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal
doc+et fees, but this decision shall nevertheless beco#e final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen
<10= days fro# the respective notices to the# hereof in accordance with the rules.
3osts a$ainst petitioner-appellant )3/!.
9aldivar, Castro, 4sguerra and 5ernande., JJ., concur.
!akasiar, Antonio, !uo. /alma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.

R!D C!S DI"ST HR.

S)0ara') O0$%$o%&
FERNAN5O, J., concurrin$5
/ concur on the basis of the procedural pronounce#ents in the opinion.
!EE1AN@EE, J., concurrin$5
/ concur in the result of dis#issal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in 3ases *--18'0 and *-
-189' and with the affir#ance of the appealed orders of the probate court in 3ases *--193'-31.
/ also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the 6ud$#ent penned by Mr. &ustice !arredo
decreein$ the lifting of the 3ourtKs writ of preli#inary in6unction of 2u$ust 8, 19'1 as a#ended on Ectober
., and Dece#ber ', 19'1
1
and orderin$ in lieu thereof that the 3ourtKs resolution of Aepte#ber 8,
191-
2
which directed that petitioner$appellant )3/! as ad#inistrator of 3. ;. <3harles ;ewton= ?od$esK
estate <Ap. )roc. ;o. 1'1- and respondent-appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no as ad#inistratri( of *innie &ane
?od$esK estate <Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301= should act always conFointl; never independently fro# each other,
as such ad#inistrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force and #ade part of the 6ud$#ent.
/t is #anifest fro# the record that petitioner-appellant )3/!Ks pri#al contention in the cases at bar
belatedly filed by it with this 3ourt on August ', '?CA <over ten <10= years after *innie &ane ?od$esK death
on !a; =>, '?@A and <over five <0= years after her husband 3.;. ?od$esK death on Decem&er =@,
'?C= J durin$ which ti#e both estates have been pending settle#ent and distribution to the decedentsK
respective ri$htful heirs all this ti#e up to now= J that the probate court per its order of Dece#ber 1.,
1901 <supple#entin$ an earlier order of May -0, 1901=
3
in $rantin$ 3. ;. ?od$esK #otion as (ecutor of
his wife *innieKs estate to continue their P&usiness of buyin$ and sellin$ personal and real propertiesQ and
approvin$ Pall sales, conveyances, leases and #ort$a$esQ #ade and to be #ade by hi# as such e(ecutor
under his obli$ation to sub#it his ;earl; accounts in effect declared hi# as sole heir of his wifeKs estate
and nothin$ re#ains to be done e(cept to for#ally close her estate <Ap. )roc. ;o. 1301= as her estate
was thereby #er$ed with his own so that nothing re#ains of it that #ay be ad6udicated to her brothers
and sisters as her desi$nated heirs after hi#,
9
J is wholly untenable and deserves scant consideration.
2side fro# havin$ been put forth as an obvious afterthou$ht #uch too late in the day, this contention of
)3/! that there no lon$er e(ists any separate estate of *innie &ane ?od$es after the probate courtKs
order of Dece#ber 1., 1901 $oes a$ainst the very acts and 6udicial admissions of 3.;. ?od$es as her
e(ecutor whereby he consistently reco$ni>ed the separate e#istence and identit; of his wifeKs estate apart
fro# his own separate estate and fro# his own share of their con6u$al partnership and estate and Pnever
considered the whole estate as a sin$le one belon$in$ e(clusively to hi#selfQ durin$ the entire period that
he survived her for over five <0= years up to the ti#e of his own death on Dece#ber -0, 19'-
D
and a$ainst
the identical acts and 6udicial admissions of )3/! as ad#inistrator of 3.;. ?od$esK estate until )3/!
sou$ht in 19'' to ta+e over &oth estates as pertainin$ to its sole ad#inistration.
)3/! is now barred and estopped fro# contradictin$ or ta+in$ a belated position contradictory to or
inconsistent with its previous ad#issions ' <as well as those of 3.;. ?od$es hi#self in his lifeti#e and of
whose estate )3/! is #erely an ad#inistrator= reco$ni>in$ the e(istence and identity of *innie &ane
?od$esK separate estate and the le$al ri$hts and interests therein of her brothers and sisters as her
desi$nated heirs in her will.
)3/!Ks petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in *innie &ane ?od$esK
estate subse%uent to its order of Dece#ber 1., 1901 as Pnull and void for havin$ been issued without
6urisdictionQ #ust therefore be dis#issed with the re6ection of its belated and untenable contention that
there is no lon$er any estate of Mrs. ?od$es of which respondent 2velina Ma$no is the duly appointed
and actin$ ad#inistratri(.
)3/!Ks appeal
8
fro# the probate courtKs various orders reco$ni>in$ respondent Ma$no as ad#inistratri( of
*innieKs estate <Ap. )roc ;o. 1301= and sanctionin$ her acts of ad#inistration of said estate and
approvin$ the sales contracts e(ecuted by her with the various individual appellees, which involve
basically the sa#e pri#al issue raised in the petition as to whether there still e(ists a separate estate of
*innie of which respondent-appellee Ma$no #ay continue to be the ad#inistratri(, #ust necessarily fail J
a result of the 3ourtKs #ain opinion at bar that there does e(ist such an estate and that the t)o estates
<husbandKs and wifeKs= #ust be ad#inistered coFointl; by their respective ad#inistrators <)3/! and
Ma$no=.
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The #ain opinion disposes that5
/; :/7 E" 2** T? "E@8E/;8 )@M/AA, 6ud$#ent is hereby rendered D/AM/AA/;8 the petition
in 8. @. ;os. *--18'0 and *--189', and 2""/@M/;8, in 8. @. ;os. *--193'-31 and the other thirty-one
nu#bers hereunder ordered to be added after pay#ent of the correspondin$ doc+et fees, all the orders of
the trial court under appeal enu#erated in detail on pa$es 30 to 31 and 80 to 8- of this decision5
The e#istence of the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es, with respondent-appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no,
as ad#inistratri( thereof is recogni.ed, and
/t is declared that, until final 6ud$#ent is ulti#ately rendered re$ardin$ <1= the #anner of applyin$ 2rticle
1' of the 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines to the situation obtainin$ in these cases and <-= the factual and
le$al issues of whether or not 3harles ;ewton ?od$es has effectively and le$ally renounced his
inheritance under the will of *innie &ane ?od$es, the said estate consists of one$fourth of the co##unity
properties of the said spouses, as of the ti#e of the death of the wife on May -3, 1901, minus whatever
the husband had already gratuitousl; disposed of in favor of third persons fro# said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to
be part of the )ifeIs estate, unless subse%uently disposed of gratuitousl; to third parties by the husband,
and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared le$ally effective, no
deduction whatsoever are to be #ade fro# said estate4
/n conse%uence, the preliminar; inFunction of 2u$ust 8, 19'1, as a#ended on Ectober . and Dece#ber
', 19'1, is lifted and the resolution of Aepte#ber 8, 191-, directin$ that petitioner-appellant )3/!, as
2d#inistrator of the Testate state of 3harles ;ewton ?od$es in Apecial )roceedin$s 1'1-, and
respondent-appellee 2velina 2. Ma$no, as 2d#inistratri( of the Testate state of *innie &ane ?od$es in
Apecial )roceedin$s 1301, should act thenceforth always conFointl;, never independently fro# each
other, as such ad#inistrators, is reiterated, and the sa#e is made part of this Fudgment and shall continue
in force, pending the liquidation of the con6u$al partnership of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation fro# each other of their respective estates4 provided, that upon the
finality of this 6ud$#ent, the trial court should i##ediately proceed to the partition of the presently
co#bined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one$half share thereof of Mrs. ?od$es #ay be
properly and clearly identified4
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith se$re$ate the re#ainder of the one$fourth herein ad6ud$ed to
be her estate and cause the sa#e to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her e#clusive
administration in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301, while the other one$fourth shall re#ain under the 6oint
ad#inistrative of said respondent and petitioner under a Foint proceedings in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301
and 1'1-, whereas the half un%uestionably pertainin$ to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner
e#clusivel; in Apecial )roceedin$s 1'1-, without pre6udice to the resolution by the trial court of
the pending #otions for its removal as ad#inistrator4
2nd this arran$e#ent shall be #aintained until the final resolution of the two issues
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearin$ and deter#ination, and the
correspondin$ complete se$re$ation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that #ay result
fro# the said resolution.
8enerally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in
all their actuations in Apecial )roceedin$s 1301 and 1'1-, to the views passed and ruled upon by the
3ourt in the fore$oin$ opinion.
8
!inimum estimate of !rs. HodgesI estateK
2ne$fourth of conFugal properties.
The #ain opinion in declarin$ the e(istence of a separate estate of *innie &ane ?od$es which shall pass
to her brothers and sisters with ri$ht of representation <by their heirs= as her duly desi$nated heirs
declares that her estate consists as a minimum <i.e. assuming <1= that under 2rticle 1' of the )hilippine
3ivil 3ode 3. ;. ?od$es as survivin$ husband was entitled to one-half of her estate as legitime and <-=
that he had not effectively and le$ally renounced his inheritance under her will= of Pone$fourth of the
co##unity properties of the said spouses, as of the ti#e of the death of the wife on May -3,
1901, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitousl; disposed of in favor of third persons fro#
said date until his death,Q with the proviso that proceeds of remunerative dispositions or sales for valuable
consideration #ade by 3. ;. ?od$es after his wife *innieKs death shall continue to be part of her
estate unless subse%uently disposed of by hi# gratuitousl; to third parties sub6ect to the condition,
however, that if he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his wifeKs
will, no deductions of any dispositions #ade by ?od$es even if gratuitousl; are to be #ade fro# his wife
*innieKs estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her desi$nated heirs called in her will
to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband 3. ;. ?od$es.
Differences )ith the main opinion
/ do not share the #ain opinionKs view that *innie &ane ?od$es instituted her husband as her heir under
her will Pto have do#inion over all her estate durin$ his lifeti#e R as a&solute o)ner of the properties
RQ
9
and that she be%ueathed Pthe whole of her estate to be owned and en6oyed by hi# as universal and
sole heir with a&solute dominion over the# only durin$ his lifeti#e, which #eans that while he could
co#pletely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than hi#self, he was
not free to do so mortis causa, and all his ri$hts to what #i$ht re#ain upon his death would cease entirely
upon the occurrence of that contin$ency, inas#uch as the ri$ht of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the
inheritance, althou$h vested already upon the death of Mrs. ?od$es, would auto#atically beco#e
operative upon the occurrence of the death of ?od$es in the event of actual e(istence of any re#ainder of
her estate then.Q
10
2s will be a#plified hereinafter, / do not subscribe to such a view that *innie &ane ?od$es willed Pfull and
absolute ownershipQ and Pabsolute do#inionQ over her estate to her husband, but rather that she na#ed
her husband 3. ;. ?od$es and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs )ith a term under 2rticle 880 of
our 3ivil 3ode, to wit, ?od$es as instituted heir with a resolutor; ter# whereunder his ri$ht to the
succession ceased in diem upon arrival of the resolutor; ter# of his death on Dece#ber -0, 19'- and her
brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive ter# whereunder their ri$ht to the
succession commenced e# die upon arrival of the suspensive ter# of the death of 3. ;. ?od$es on
Dece#ber -0, 19'-.
?ence, while a$reein$ with the #ain opinion that the proceeds of all re#unerative dispositions #ade by
3. ;. ?od$es after his wifeKs death re#ain an inte$ral part of his wifeKs estate which she willed to her
brothers and sisters, / sub#it that 3. ;. ?od$es could not validly #a+e gratuitous dispositions of any part
or all of his wifeKs estate J Pco#pletely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to
anyone other than hi#selfQ in the lan$ua$e of the #ain opinion, supra J and thereby render ineffectual
and nu$atory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her desi$nated heirs to succeed to
her )hole estate Pat the death of <her= husband.Q /f accordin$ to the #ain opinion, ?od$es could not #a+e
such $ratuitous Pco#plete and absolute dispositionsQ of his wife *innieKs estate Pmortis causa,Q it would
see# that by the sa#e to+en and rationale he was li+ewise proscribed by the will fro# #a+in$ such
dispositions of *innieKs estate inter vivos.
/ believe that the two %uestions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentiall; and e#peditiousl; by the probate court ahead of the partition and se$re$ation of
the minimum one-fourth of the con6u$al or co##unity properties constitutin$ *innie &ane
?od$esK separate estate, which tas+ considerin$ that it is now seventeen <11= years since *innie &ane
?od$esK death and her con6u$al estate with 3. ;. ?od$es has re#ained unliquidated up to now #i$ht
ta+e a si#ilar nu#ber of years to unravel with the nu#erous ite#s, transactions and details of the si>able
estates involved.
Auch partition of the #ini#u# one-fourth would not be final, since if the two pre6udicial %uestions
of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to *innieKs estate #eanin$ to say that if it should be
held that 3. ;. ?od$es is not entitled to any le$iti#e of her estate and at any rate he had totally
renounced his inheritance under the will=, then *innieKs estate would consist not only of the #ini#u# one-
fourth but one$half of the con6u$al or co##unity properties of the ?od$es spouses, which would re%uire
a$ain the partition and se$re$ation of still another one-fourth of said. properties
to complete *innieKs separate estate.
My differences with the #ain opinion involve further the le$al concepts, effects and conse%uences of the
testa#entary dispositions of *innie &ane ?od$es in her will and the %uestion of the best to reach a
solution of the pressin$ %uestion of e(peditin$ the closin$ of the estates which after all do not appear to
involve any outstandin$ debts nor any dispute between the heirs and should therefore be pro#ptly settled
now after all these years without any further undue co#plications and delays and distributed to the heirs
for their full en6oy#ent and benefit. 2s no consensus appears to have been reached thereon by a #a6ority
of the 3ourt, / propose to state views as concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they #ay be
of so#e assistance to the probate court and the parties in reachin$ an e(peditious closin$ and settle#ent
of the estates of the ?od$es spouses.
T)o Assumptions
2s indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. ?od$esK estate as one-fourth of the con6u$al
properties is based on two assu#ptions #ost favorable to 3. ;. ?od$esK estate and his heirs, na#ely <1=
that the probate court #ust accept the renvoi or Preference bac+Q
11
alle$edly provided by the laws of the
Atate of Te(as <of which state the ?od$es spouses were citi>ens= whereby the civil laws of the )hilippines
as the domicile of the ?od$es spouses would $overn their succession not)ithstanding the provisions of
2rticle 1' of our 3ivil 3ode <which provides that the national law of the decedents, in this case, of Te(as,
shall $overn their succession= with the result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of
the con6u$al properties since the legitime of her husband <the other one-fourth of said con6u$al properties
or one-half of her estate, under 2rticle 900 of our 3ivil 3ode= could not then be disposed of nor burdened
with any condition by her and <-= that 3.;. ?od$es had not effectively and le$ally renounced his
inheritance under his wifeKs will.
These two assu#ptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Ma$no as Mrs. ?od$esK
ad#inistratri(, who avers that the law of the Atate of Te(as $overns her succession and does not provide
for and le$iti#e, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of the
con6u$al properties which is one$half thereof and that in any event, ?od$es had totally renounced all his
ri$hts under the will.
The #ain opinion concedes that P</=n the interest of settlin$ the estates herein involved soonest, it would
be best, indeed, if these conflictin$ clai#s of the parties were deter#ined in these proceedin$s.Q /t
observes however that this cannot be done due to the inade%uacy of the evidence sub#itted by the
parties in the probate court and of the partiesK discussion, vi., Pthere is no clear and reliable proof of what
the possibly applicable laws of Te(as are. Then also, the $enuineness of the docu#ents relied upon by
respondent Ma$no Bre ?od$es9 renunciationC is disputed.Q
12
?ence, the #ain opinion e(pressly reserves resolution and deter#ination on these two conflictin$ clai#s
and issues which it dee#s Pare not properly before the 3ourt now,Q
13
and specifically holds that
P<2=ccordin$ly, the onl; %uestion that re#ains to be settled in the further proceedin$s hereby ordered to
be held in the court below is ho) much more than as fi(ed above is the estate of Mrs. ?od$es, and this
would depend on <1= whether or not the applicable laws of Te(as do provide in effect for #ore, such as,
when there is no legitime provided therein, and <-= whether or not ?od$es has validly )aived his whole
inheritance fro# Mrs. ?od$es.Q
19
Suggested guidelines
3onsiderin$ that the onl; unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with the
rulin$ spirit of our probate law callin$ for the pro#pt settle#ent of the estates of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance J considerin$ that the estates
have been lon$ pendin$ settle#ent since '?@A and '?C=, respectively J it was felt that the 3ourt should
lay down specific $uidelines for the $uidance of the probate court towards the end that it #ay e(pedite the
closin$ of the protracted estates proceedin$s below to the #utual satisfaction of the heirs and without
need of a dissatisfied party elevatin$ its resolution of this onl; re#ainin$ issue once #ore to this 3ourt
and dra$$in$ out indefinitely the proceedin$s.
2fter all, the onl; %uestion that re#ains depends for its deter#ination on the resolution of the two
%uestions of renvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether 3. ;. ?od$es can clai# a legitime and )hether he
had renounced the inheritance. !ut as already indicated above, the 3ourt without reachin$ a consensus
which would finally resolve the conflictin$ clai#s here and now in this case opted that Pthese and other
relevant #atters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedin$s hereinafter to be
held for the purpose of ascertainin$ andNor distributin$ the estate of Mrs. ?od$es to her heirs in
accordance with her duly probated will.Q
1D
The writer thus feels that layin$ down the pre#ises and principles $overnin$ the nature, effects and
conse%uences of *innie &ane ?od$esK testa#entary dispositions in relation to her con6u$al partnership
and co-ownership of properties with her husband 3. ;. ?od$es and Pthin+in$ outQ the end results,
dependin$ on whether the evidence directed to be for#ally received by the probate court would bear out
that under renvoi 3. ;. ?od$es was or was not entitled to clai# a le$iti#e of one-half of his wife *innieKs
estate andNor that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should help clear
the dec+s, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolvin$ the onl; re#ainin$ %uestion of ho) much
more than the minimum one-fourth of the co##unity properties of the ?od$es spouses herein finall;
determined should be awarded as the separate estate of *innie, particularly since the views e(pressed in
the #ain opinion have not $ained a consensus of the 3ourt. ?ence, the followin$ su$$ested $uidelines,
which needless to state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer5
1. To be$in with, as pointed out in the #ain opinion, Paccordin$ to ?od$esK own inventory sub#itted by
hi# as e(ecutor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conFugal which #eans that
the spouses have equal shares therein.Q
16
-. ,pon the death of Mrs. ?od$es on !a; =>, '?@A, and the dissolution thereby of the #arria$e, the law
i#posed upon ?od$es as survivin$ husband the duty of inventoryin$, ad#inisterin$ and li%uidatin$ the
con6u$al or co##unity property.
18
?od$es failed to dischar$e this duty of liquidating the con6u$al
partnership and estate. En the contrary, he sou$ht and obtained authori>ation fro# the probate court
to continue the conFugal partnershipKs &usiness of buyin$ and sellin$ real and personal properties.
/n his annual accounts sub#itted to the probate court as e#ecutor of !rs. HodgesI estate, ?od$es
thus consistentl; reported the considerable com&ined inco#e <in si( fi$ures= of the conFugal partnership
or coo)nership and then divided the sa#e equall; between hi#self and Mrs. ?od$esK estate and as
consistently filed separate income ta# returns and paid the inco#e ta(es for each resultin$ half of
such com&ined inco#e correspondin$ to his own and to Mrs. ?od$esK estate. 18 <)arenthetically, he
could not in law do this, had he ad6udicated *innieKs entire estate to hi#self, thus supportin$ the view
advanced even in the #ain opinion that P?od$es )aived not only his ri$hts to the fruits but to the
properties the#selves.Q
19
!y operation of the law of trust
20
as well as by his own ac+nowled$#ent and acts, therefore, all
transactions #ade by ?od$es after his wifeKs death were dee#ed for and on behalf of their unliquidated
conFugal partnership and communit; estate and were so reported and treated by hi#.
3. 7ith this pre#ise established that all transactions of ?od$es after his wifeKs death were for and on
behalf of their unliquidated con6u$al partnership and co##unity estate, share and share ali+e, it should
be clear that no gratuitous dispositions, if any, #ade by 3. ;. ?od$es fro# his wife *innieKs estate should
be deducted fro# her separate estate as held in the #ain opinion. En the contrary, any such $ratuitous
dispositions should be char$ed to his own share of the con6u$al estate since he had no authority or ri$ht
to #a+e any gratuitous dispositions of *innieKs properties to the preFudice of her brothers and sisters
who# she called to her succession upon his death, not to #ention that the very authority obtained by hi#
fro# the probate court per its orders of May -0, and Dece#ber 1., 1901 was to continue the con6u$al
partnershipKs business of buyin$ and sellin$ real properties for the account of their unli%uidated con6u$al
estate and co-ownership, share and share ali+e and not to #a+e any free dispositions of *innieKs estate.
.. 2ll transactions as well after the death on Decem&er =@, '?C= of ?od$es hi#self appear perforce and
necessarily to have been conducted, on the sa#e pre#ise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated
conFugal partnership andNor co-ownership, share and share alike J since the con6u$al partnership
re#ained unli%uidated J which is another way of sayin$ that such transactions, purchases and sales,
#ostly the latter, #ust be dee#ed in effect to have been #ade for the respective estates of 3. ;. ?od$es
and of his wife *innie &ane ?od$es, as both estates continued to have an e%ual sta+e and share in the
con6u$al partnership which was not only left unliquidated &ut continued as a co-ownership or 6oint
business with the probate courtKs approval by ?od$es durin$ the five-year period that he survived his
wife.
This e(plains the probate courtKs action of re%uirin$ that deeds of sale e(ecuted by )3/! as ?od$esK
estateKs ad#inistrator be Psigned Fointl;Q by respondent Ma$no as Mrs. ?od$esK estateKs ad#inistratri(, as
well as its order authori>in$ pay#ent by lot purchasers fro# the ?od$es to either estate, since Pthere is as
yet no 6udicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to who#soever are entitled thereto.Q
22
2nd this e%ually furnishes the rationale of the #ain opinion for continued con6oint ad#inistration by the
ad#inistrators of the two estates of the deceased spouses, Bpending the liquidation of the conFugal
partnership,G
23
since Pit is but lo$ical that both estates should be ad#inistered 6ointly by the representatives
of both, pendin$ their se$re$ation fro# each other. )articularly R because the actuations so far of )3/!
evince a deter#ined, albeit $roundless, intent to e(clude the other heirs of Mrs. ?od$es fro# their
inheritance.Q -. 0. 2ntly by the representatives of both, pendin$ their se$re$ation fro# each other.
)articularly R because the actuations so far of )3/! evince a deter#ined, albeit $roundless, intent to
e(clude the other heirs of Mrs. ?od$es fro# their inheritance.Q
29
0. 2s stressed in the #ain opinion, the deter#ination of the onl; unresolved issue of how #uch #ore than
the #ini#u# of one$fourth of the co##unity or con6u$al properties of the ?od$es spouses pertains to
Mrs. ?od$esK estate depends on the twin %uestions of renunciation and renvoi. /t directed conse%uently
that Pa 6oint hearin$ of the two probate proceedin$s herein involvedQ be held by the probate court for the
reception of Pfurther evidenceQ in order to finally resolved these twin %uestions.
2D
<a= En the %uestion of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive
for#ally in evidence the various docu#ents anne(ed to respondent Ma$noKs answer at bar,
26
na#ely5
3opy of the ,.A. state Ta( @eturn filed on 2u$ust 8, 1908 by 3. ;. ?od$es for his wife *innieKs estate
wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his inheritance under his wifeKs will in favor
of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs desi$nated with hi# and that it was his Pintention <as= survivin$
husband of the deceased to distribute the re#ainin$ property and interests of the deceased in their
co##unity estate to the devisee and legatees named in the )ill when the debts, liabilities, ta(es and
e(penses of ad#inistration are finally deter#ined and paid4Q
28
and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation <which places hi# in estoppel= alle$edly e(ecuted on
2u$ust 9, 19'- by 3. ;. ?od$es in /loilo 3ity wherein he reaffir#ed that PR on August L, '?@L,
/ renounced and disclai#ed any and all ri$ht to receive the rents, e#olu#ents and inco#e fro# said
estateQ and further declared that P<T=he purpose of this affidavit is to ratif; and confirm, and / do hereby
ratify and confir#, the declaration #ade in schedule M of said return and hereby for#ally disclaim and
renounce an; right on m; part to receive an; of the said rents, emoluments and income fro# the estate of
#y deceased wife, *innie &ane ?od$es. This affidavit is #ade to a&solve me or m; estate fro# any
liability for the pay#ent of income ta(es on inco#e which has accrued to the estate of %innie Jane
Hodges since the death of the said *innie &ane ?od$es on May -3, 1901.Q
28
<b= En the %uestion of renvoi, all that re#ains for the probate court to do is to for#ally receive in evidence
duly authenticated copies of the laws of the Atate of Te(as $overnin$ the succession of *innie &ane
?od$es and her husband 3. ;. ?od$es as citi>ens of said Atate at the ti#e of their respective deaths
on !a; =>, '?@A and Decem&er =@, '?C=.
29
'. The te(t and tenor of the declarations by 3. ;. ?od$es of renunciation of his inheritance fro# his wife
in favor of her other na#ed heirs in her will <her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs= as ratified
and reiterated e#pressl; in his affidavit of renunciation e(ecuted four years later for the avowed purpose
of not bein$ held liable for pay#ent of inco#e ta(es on inco#e which has accrued to his wifeKs estate
since her death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.
Ence the evidence has been for#ally ad#itted and its $enuineness and le$al effectivity established by
the probate court, the renunciation by 3. ;. ?od$es #ust be $iven due effect with the result that 3. ;.
?od$es therefore ac%uired no part of his wifeKs one$half share of the co##unity properties since he
re#oved hi#self as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. !y si#ple substitution then under 2rticles 801
and 809 of our 3ivil 3ode
30
and by virtue of the willKs institution of heirs, since Pthe heir ori$inally instituted
3. ;. ?od$es= does not beco#e an heirQ
31
by force of his renunciation, Mrs. ?od$esK brothers and sisters
who# she desi$nated as her heirs upon her husbandKs death are called i##ediately to her succession.
3onse%uently, the said co##unity and con6u$al properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and
share ali+e to their respective estates, with each estate, however, shoulderin$ its own e(penses of
ad#inistration, estate and inheritance ta(es, if any re#ain unpaid, attorneysK fees and other li+e e(penses
and the net re#ainder to be ad6udicated directly to the decedentsK respective brothers and sisters <and
their heirs= as the heirs duly desi$nated in their respective wills. The %uestion of renvoi beco#es
i##aterial since #ost laws and our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
1. /f there were no renunciation <or the sa#e #ay so#ehow be declared to have not been valid and
effective= by 3. ;. ?od$es of his inheritance fro# his wife, however, what would be the conse%uenceL
<a= /f the laws on succession of the Atate of Te(as do provide for renvoi or Preference bac+Q to )hilippine
law as the do#iciliary law of the ?od$esK spouses $overnin$ their succession, then petitionersK view that
Mrs. ?od$esK estate would consist only of the #ini#u# of Pone$fourth of the co##unity properties of the
said spouses, as of the ti#e of <her= death on May -3, 1901S would have to be sustained and 3. ;.
?od$esK estate would consist of three$fourths of the co##unity properties, co#prisin$ his own one-half
<or two-fourths= share and the other fourth of Mrs. ?od$esK estate as the le$iti#e $ranted hi# as surviving
spouse by /hilippine la) <2rticle 900 of the 3ivil 3ode= which could not be disposed of nor burdened with
any condition by Mrs. ?od$es as testatri(.
<b= /f the laws on succession of the Atate of Te(as do not provide for such renvoi and respondent
Ma$noKs assertion is correct that the Te(as law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for 3.
;. ?od$es as the survivin$ spouse, then respondent Ma$noKs assertion that Mrs. ?od$esK estate would
consist of one-half of the co##unity properties <with the other half pertainin$ to 3. ;. ?od$es= would
have to be sustained. The co##unity and con6u$al properties would then pertain share and share alike to
their respective estates, with each estate shoulderin$ its own e(penses of ad#inistration in the sa#e
#anner stated in the last para$raph of para$raph ' hereof. .
8. 2s to the nature of the institution of heirs #ade by Mrs. ?od$es in her will, the #ain opinion holds that
P<T=he brothers and sisters of Mrs. ?od$es are not su&stitutes for ?od$es4 rather, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneousl; with ?od$es,Q but $oes further and holds that Pit was not the usufruct alone of
her estate R that she be%ueathed to ?od$es during his lifetime, but the full o)nership thereof, although
the same )as to last also during his lifetime onl;, even as there was no restriction a$ainst his disposin$ or
conveyin$ the whole or any portion thereof an;&od; other than himselfQ and describes ?od$es
Pas universal and sole heir with a&solute dominion over Mrs. ?od$esK estate <e(cept over their *ubboc+,
Te(as property =,
32
addin$ that P?od$es was not obli$ed to preserve anythin$ for the#Q <referrin$ to Mrs.
?od$esK brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs=.
33
3ontrary to this view of the #ain opinion, the writer sub#its that the provisions of Mrs. ?od$esK will
did not $rant to 3.;. ?od$es Pfull ownershipQ nor Pabsolute do#inionQ over her estate, such that he could
as Puniversal and sole heirQ by the #ere e(pedient of gratuitousl; disposin$ to third persons
her )hole estate durin$ his lifeti#e nullif; her institution of her brothers and sisters as his co-heirs to
succeed to her )hole estate Pat the death of DherE hus&and,Q deprive the# of any inheritance and #a+e
his own brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his )ifeIs estate as well.
Thus, while *innie &ane ?od$es did not e(pressly na#e her brothers and sisters as substitutes for
?od$es because she willed that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be
$ainsaid, as the #ain opinion concedes, Pthat they are also heirs instituted simultaneousl; with ?od$es,
sub6ect however to certain conditions, partially resolutor; insofar as ?od$es was concerned and
correspondin$ly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law.Q
39
?ence, if ?od$es is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs
in fact and in law since *innieKs brothers and sisters as the heirs Psi#ultaneously institutedQ with
a suspensive ter# would be called immediatel; to her succession instead of waitin$ for the arrival
of suspensive ter# of ?od$esK death, since as the heir ori$inally instituted he does not beco#e an heir by
force of his renunciation and therefore they would Penter into the inheritance in default of the heir ori$inally
institutedQ <?od$es= under the provisions of 2rticle 801 and 809 of our 3ivil 3ode, supra,
3D
thus
acceleratin$ their succession to her estate as a conse%uence of ?od$esK renunciation.
3onse%uently, *innie &ane ?od$es willed that her husband 3.;. ?od$es would Pdurin$ his natural lifeti#e
R manage, control, use and enFo; said estateQ and that only Pall rents,
emoluments and incomeP alone shall belon$ to hi#. Ahe further willed that while he
could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and Puse any part of the principal estate,Q such principal
notwithstandin$ Pany changes in the ph;sical properties of said estateQ<i.e. new properties ac%uired or
e(chan$ed= would still pertain to her estate, which at the ti#e of his death would pass in full dominion to
her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate.
36
The testatri( *innie &ane ?od$es in her will thus principally provided that P/ $ive, devise and be%ueath all
of the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both personal and real R to #y beloved hus&and,
3harles ;ewton ?od$es, to have and to hold with hi# R during his natural lifetime4Q
38
that P<he= shall have
the ri$ht to manage, control, use and enFo; said estate during his lifetime, R to #a+e any changes in
the ph;sical properties of said estate, by sale R and the purchase of any other or additional property as
he #ay thin+ best R . All rents, emoluments and income fro# said estate shall &elong to him and he is
further authori>ed to use any part of the principal of said estate as he #ay need or desire, R he shall not
sell or otherwise dispose of any of the i#proved property now owned by us, located at R 3ity of *ubboc+,
Te(as R . ?e shall have the ri$ht to su&divide any farm land and sell lots therein, and #ay
sell unimproved to)n lots4Q
38
that PDAEt the death of m; said hus&and, 3harles ;ewton, / $ive, devise and
be%ueath all of the rest, residue and re#ainder of #y estate, both personal and real, R to be equall;
divided a#on$ #y brothers and sisters, share and share alike, na#ely5 sta ?i$don, ##a ?owell,
*eonard ?i$don, @oy ?i$don, Aadie @ascoe, ra @o#an and ;i#roy ?i$don4Q
39
and that PD0En case of the
death of an; of #y brothers andNor sisters R prior to the death of #y husband R the heirs of such
deceased &rother or sister shall ta+e Fointl; the share which would have $one to such brother or sister had
she or he survived.Q
90
Auch provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully e(pounded above that all transactions
and sales #ade by ?od$es after his wife *innieKs death were by operation of the law of trust as well as
by his own ackno)ledgment and acts dee#ed for and on behalf of their unliquidated con6u$al partnership
and co##unity estate, share and share ali+e, with the e(press authori.ation of the probate court per its
orders of May -0, and Dece#ber 1., 1901 $rantin$ ?od$esK #otion to continue the con6u$al partnership
business of buyin$ and sellin$ real estate even after her death. !y the sa#e to+en, ?od$es could not
conceivably be dee#ed to have had any authority or ri$ht to dispose gratuitousl; of any portion of her
estate to whose succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Auch institutions of heirs )ith a term are e(pressly reco$ni>ed and per#itted under !oo+ ///, 3hapter -,
section . of our 3ivil 3ode dealin$ with Pconditional testa#entary dispositions and testa#entary
dispositions )ith a term.Q
91
Thus, 2rticle 880 of our 3ivil 3ode e(pressly provides that5
2@T 880. The desi$nation of the day or ti#e when the effects of the institution of an heir
shall commence or cease shall be valid.
/n both cases, the le$al heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival of the period
or its e(piration. !ut in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the property until after havin$
$iven sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir.
2ccordin$ly, under the ter#s of Mrs. ?od$esK will, her husbandKs ri$ht to the succession as the instituted
heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of the resolutor; ter# of his death on Dece#ber -0, 19'-, while
her brothersK and sistersK ri$ht to the succession also as instituted heirs co##enced e# die, i.e. upon the
e(piration of the suspensive ter# <as far as they were concerned= of the death of 3. ;. ?od$es on
Dece#ber -0, 19'- .
92
2s stated in )adillaKs treatise on the 3ivil 3ode, P2 ter# is a period whose arrival is certain althou$h the
e(act date thereof #ay be uncertain. 2 ter# #ay have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The
desi$nation of the day when the le$acy Pshall co##enceQ is e# die, or a ter# with a suspensive
effect, from a certain day. The desi$nation of the day when the le$acy Pshall ceaseQ is in diem or a ter#
with a resolutory effect, until a certain day.Q ?e adds that P2 le$acy based upon a certain a$e or upon
the death of a person is not a condition but a term. /f the arrival of the ter# would co##ence the ri$ht of
the heir, it is suspensive. /f the arrival of the ter# would ter#inate his ri$ht, it is resolutoryQ and that Pupon
the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive ter#, the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and
in case of a resolutory ter#, his ri$ht ter#inates.Q
93
10. The si>able estates herein involved have now been pendin$ settle#ent for a considerably protracted
period <of seventeen years counted fro# *innieKs death in 1901=, and all that is left to be done is to
resolve the onl; re#ainin$ issue <involvin$ the two %uestions of renunciation and renvoi= hereinabove
discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased spousesK
respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills lon$ ad#itted to
probate. ?ence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn
99
to co#e to ter#s for the
ad6udication and distribution to the# pro-indiviso of the up to now unli%uidated co##unity properties of
the estates of the ?od$es spouses <derived fro# their unliquidated con6u$al partnership= rather than to
$et bo$$ed down with the for#idable tas+ of ph;sicall; segregating and partitioning the two estates with
the nu#erous transactions, ite#s and details and physical chan$es of properties involved. The estates
proceedin$s would thus be closed and they could then na#e their respective attorneys-in-fact to wor+ out
the details of se$re$atin$, dividin$ or partitionin$ the unliquidated co##unity properties or li%uidatin$
the# J which can be done then on their own without further need of intervention on the part of the
probate court as well as allow the# #eanwhile to en6oy and #a+e use of the inco#e and cash and li%uid
assets of the estates in such #anner as #ay be a$reed upon between the#.
Auch a settle#ent or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unli%uidated two estates for the #utual
benefit of all of the# should not prove difficult, considerin$ that it appears as stated in the #ain opinion
that --.9'81.9U of the share or undivided estate of 3. ;. ?od$es have already been ac%uired by the
heirs of *innie &ane ?od$es fro# certain heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs representin$
11.3.310U of ?od$esK estate were 6oinin$ cause with *innieKs heirs in their pendin$ and unresolved
#otion for the re#oval of petitioner )3/! as ad#inistrator of ?od$esK estate,
9D
apparently i#patient with
the situation which has apparently de$enerated into a runnin$ battle between the ad#inistrators of the
two estates to the co##on pre6udice of all the heirs.
11. 2s earlier stated, the writer has ta+en the pain of su$$estin$ these $uidelines which #ay serve to
$uide the probate court as well as the parties towards e(peditin$ the windin$ up and closin$ of the
estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly entitled
thereto. The probate court should e(ert all effort towards this desired ob6ective pursuant to the #andate of
our probate law, bearin$ in #ind the 3ourtKs ad#onition in previous cases that Pcourts of first instance
should e(ert the#selves to close up estate within twelve #onths fro# the ti#e they are presented,
and the; ma; refuse to allo) an; compensation to e(ecutors and ad#inistrators )ho do not activel;
la&or to that end, and they #ay even adopt harsher measures.Q
96
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirt;$one D>'E additional docket fees
Two appeals were doc+eted with this 3ourt, as per the two records on appeal sub#itted <one with a $reen
cover and the other with a yellow cover=. 2s stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the sa#e
pri#al issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still e(ists a separate estate of *innie
&ane ?od$es which has to continue to be ad#inistered by respondent Ma$no. 3onsiderin$ the #ain
opinionKs rulin$ in the affir#ative and that her estate and that of her husband <since they 6ointly
co#prise unliquidated co##unity properties= #ust be ad#inistered conFointl; by their respective
ad#inistrators <)3/! and Ma$no=, the said appeals <involvin$ thirty-three different orders of the probate
court approvin$ sales contracts and other acts of ad#inistration e(ecuted and perfor#ed by respondent
Ma$no on behalf of *innieKs estate= have been necessarily overruled by the 3ourtKs decision at bar.
<a= The Ppriority %uestionQ raised by respondent Ma$no as to the patent failure of the two records on
appeal to show on their face and state the #aterial data that the appeals were ti#ely ta+en within the 30-
day re$la#entary period as re%uired by @ule .1, section ' of the @ules of 3ourt, has been brushed aside
by the #ain opinion with the state#ent that it is Pnot necessary to pass upon the ti#eliness of any of said
appealsQ since they Prevolve around practically the sa#e #ain issues and R it is ad#itted that so#e of
the# have been ti#ely ta+en.Q
98
The #ain opinion thus proceeded with the deter#ination of the thirty-
three appealed orders despite the $rave defect of the appellant )3/!Ks records on appeal and their failure
to state the re%uired #aterial data showin$ the ti#eliness of the appeals.
Auch disposition of the %uestion of ti#eliness dee#ed as P#andatory and 6urisdictionalQ in a nu#ber of
cases #erits the writerKs concurrence in that the %uestion raised has been subordinated to the para#ount
considerations of substantial 6ustice and a Pliberal interpretation of the rulesQ applied so as not to dero$ate
and detract fro# the pri#ary intent and purpose of the rules, vi. Qthe proper and 6ust deter#ination of a
liti$ationQ
98
J which calls for Padherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain
their ob6ective of substantial 6ustice and of avoidin$ denials of substantial 6ustice due to procedural
technicalities.Q
99
Thus, the #ain opinion in consonance with the sa#e para#ount considerations of substantial 6ustice has
li+ewise overruled respondentsK ob6ection to petitionerKs ta+in$ the recourse of Pthe present re#edy
of certiorari and prohibitionQ J Pdespite the conceded availability of appealQ J on the $round that Pthere is
a co##on thread a#on$ the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals J <which= deal with
practically the sa#e basic issues that can be #ore e(peditiously resolved or deter#ined in a sin$le
special civil action . . . P
D0
<b= Aince the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar <as above stated=
with the dis#issal of the petition by virtue of the 3ourtKs 6ud$#ent as to the continued e(istence of
a separate estate of *innie &ane ?od$es and the affirmance as a necessary conse%uence of the
appealed orders approvin$ and sanctionin$ respondent Ma$noKs sales contracts and acts of
ad#inistration, so#e doubt would arise as to the propriety of the #ain opinion re%uirin$ the pay#ent by
)3/! of thirty-one <31= additional appeal doc+et fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the %uestion of
whether it would #a+e the cost of appeal unduly e(pensive or prohibitive by re%uirin$ the pay#ent of a
separate appeal doc+et fee for each incidental order %uestioned when the resolution of all such incidental
%uestioned orders involve basically one and the sa#e #ain issue <in this case, the e(istence of a
separate estate of *innie &ane ?od$es= and can be #ore e(peditiously resolved or deter#ined in
a single special civil actionQ <for which a single doc+et fee is re%uired= as stated in the #ain
opinion.
D1
3onsiderin$ the i#portance of the basic issues and the #a$nitude of the estates involved,
however, the writer has pro hac vice $iven his concurrence to the assess#ent of the said thirty-one <31=
additional appeal doc+et fees.

Case digest
@C scra =CC
7ationalit; /rinciple
*innie &ane ?od$es, a #arried wo#an and a citi>en of Te(as, ,A2, was a do#iciliary of the )hilippines
at the #o#ent of her death. 7ith respect to the validity of certain testa#entary provisions she had #ade
in favor of her husband, a %uestion arose as to what e(actly were the laws of Te(as on the #atter at the
precise #o#ent of her death <for while one $roup contended that the Te(an law should result to renvoi,
the other $roup contended that no renvoi was possible=.
ISS>E/ 7hether or not Te(as *aw should apply.
1EL5/ The Aupre#e 3ourt held that for what the Te(as law is on the #atter, is a %uestion of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Te(as law at the ti#e of her death
<and not said law at any other ti#e=. ;ET5 Dyna#ics of law.
[G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]
FEDERICO C. SUNTA, petitioner, vs. ISA!E" CO#UANGCO$
SUNTA
%
&'( )ON. GREGORIO S. SA*+AGA, +re,-(-'. #/(.e,
!r&'c0 18, Re.-o'&2 Tr-&2 Co/r3, *&2o2o,, !/2&c&', respondents.
D E C I S I O N
*ARTINE4, J.5
(h'.h *houl+ preva'l bet,een the ration decidendi an+ the fallo of a +e.'*'on '* the
pr'mar/ '**ue 'n th'* pet't'on for certiorari un+er Rule 6; f'le+ b/ pet't'oner =e+er'.o C. Sunta/
,ho oppo*e* re*pon+ent 7*abel@* pet't'on for appo'ntment a* a+m'n'*tratr'2 of her -ran+mother@*
e*tate b/ v'rtue of her r'-ht of repre*entat'on.
&he *u't *temme+ from the follo,'n->
An %ul/ 9, 19;8, #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/ (*on of pet't'oner =e+er'.o Sunta/ an+ 7*abel
Co0uan-.o:Sunta/ ,ere marr'e+ 'n the Bortu-ue*e Colon/ of !a.ao. Aut of th'* marr'a-e, three
.h'l+ren ,ere born namel/> !ar-ar'ta Gua+alupe, 7*abel A-u'nal+o an+ #m'l'o A-u'nal+o all
*urname+ Co0uan-.o Sunta/. After C /ear*, the marr'a-e *oure+ *o that 'n 1962, 7*abel
Co0uan.o:Sunta/ f'le+ a .r'm'nal .a*e
D1E
a-a'n*t her hu*ban+ #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/. 7n
retal'at'on, #m'l'o A-u'nal+o f'le+ before the then Court of ='r*t 7n*tan.e (C=7
D2E
a .ompla'nt for
le-al *eparat'on a-a'n*t h'* ,'fe, .har-'n- her, amon- other*, ,'th 'nf'+el't/ an+ pra/'n- for the
.u*to+/ an+ .are of the'r .h'l+ren ,ho ,ere l'v'n- ,'th the'r mother.
D3E
&he *u't ,a* +o.3ete+ a*
.'v'l .a*e number F:7180.
An A.tober 3, 1967, the tr'al .ourt ren+ere+ a +e.'*'on the +'*po*'t've port'on ,h'.h rea+*>
G(H#R#=AR#, the marr'a-e .elebrate+ bet,een #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/ an+ 7*abel
Co0uan-.o:Sunta/ on %ul/ 9, 19;8 '* hereb/ +e.lare+ null an+ vo'+ an+ of no effe.t a* bet,een
the part'e*. 7t be'n- a+m'tte+ b/ the part'e* an+ *ho,n b/ the re.or+* that the 9ue*t'on of the
.a*e an+ .u*to+/ of the three .h'l+ren have been the *ub0e.t of another .a*e bet,een the *ame
part'e* 'n another bran.h of th'* Court 'n Spe.'al Bro.ee+'n- $o. 6C28, the *ame .annot be
l't'-ate+ 'n th'* .a*e.
G('th re-ar+ to .ounter.la'm, 'n v'e, of the man'fe*tat'on of .oun*el that the th'r+
part/ +efen+ant* are ,'ll'n- to pa/ B;0,000.00 for +ama-e* an+ that +efen+ant '*
,'ll'n- to a..ept the offer 'n*tea+ of her or'-'nal +eman+ for B130,000.00, the
+efen+ant '* a,ar+e+ the *um of B;0,000.00 a* her .ounter.la'm an+ to pa/ attorne/@*
fee* 'n the amount of B;,000.00.
GSA AR)#R#).
DCE
(#mpha*'* *uppl'e+
A* ba*'* thereof, the C=7 *a'+>
G=rom =ebruar/ 196; thru )e.ember 196; pla'nt'ff ,a* .onf'ne+ 'n the Ieteran*
!emor'al Ho*p'tal. Althou-h at the t'me of the tr'al of parr'.'+e .a*e (September 8,
1967 the pat'ent ,a* alrea+/ out of the ho*p'tal he .ont'nue+ to be un+er ob*ervat'on
an+ treatment.
G7t '* the op'n'on of )r. Aram'l that the */mptom* of the pla'nt'ff@* mental aberrat'on
.la**'f'e+ a* *.h'1ophern'a (*'. ha+ ma+e them*elve* man'fe*t even a* earl/ a* 19;;6
that the +'*ea*e ,or*ene+ ,'th t'me, unt'l 196; ,hen he ,a* a.tuall/ pla.e+ un+er
e2pert neuro:p*/.h'atr'*t (*'. treatment6 that even 'f the *ub0e.t ha* *ho,n mar3e+
pro-re**, the rema'n* bereft of a+e9uate un+er*tan+'n- of r'-ht an+ ,ron-.
G&here '* no .ontrover*/ that the marr'a-e bet,een the part'e* ,a* effe.te+ on %ul/ 9,
19;8, /ear* after pla'nt'ff@* mental 'llne** ha+ *et 'n. &h'* fa.t ,oul+ 0u*t'f/ a
+e.larat'on of null't/ of the marr'a-e un+er Art'.le 8; of the C'v'l Co+e ,h'.h
prov'+e*>
GArt. 9;. (*'. A marr'a-e ma/ be annulle+ for na/ of the follo,'n- .au*e* after (*'.
e2'*t'n- at the t'me of the marr'a-e>
G222 222 222
G(3 &hat e'ther part/ ,a* of un*oun+ m'n+, unle** *u.h part/, after .om'n- to rea*on,
freel/ .ohab'te+ ,'th the other a* hu*ban+ or ,'fe.
G&here '* a +earth of proof at the t'me of the marr'a-e +efen+ant 3ne, about the mental
.on+'t'on of the pla'nt'ff6 an+ there '* proof that pla'nt'ff .ont'nue* to be ,'thout *oun+
rea*on. &he .har-e* 'n th'* ver/ .ompla'nt a++ empha*'* to the f'n+'n-* of the neuro:p*/.h'atr'*t
han+l'n- the pat'ent, that pla'nt'ff reall/ l've* more 'n fan./ that 'n real't/, a *tron- 'n+'.at'on of
*.h'1ophern'a (*'..
D;E
(empha*'* *uppl'e+
An %une 1, 1979, #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/ pre+e.ea*e+ h'* mother, the +e.e+ent Cr'*t'na
A-u'nal+o:Sunta/. &he latter '* re*pon+ent 7*abel@* paternal -ran+mother. &he +e.e+ent +'e+
on %une C, 1990 ,'thout leav'n- a ,'ll.
D6E
='ve /ear* later or on A.tober 26 199;, re*pon+ent 7*abel A-u'nal+o Co0uan-.o Sunta/ f'le+
before the Re-'onal &r'al Court (R&C
D7E
a pet't'on for '**uan.e 'n her favor of "etter* of
A+m'n'*trat'on of the 7nte*tate #*tate of her late -ran+mother Cr'*t'na A-u'nal+o Sunta/ ,h'.h
.a*e ,a* +o.3ete+ a* Spe.'al Bro.ee+'n- Ca*e $o. 117:!:9;. 7n her pet't'on, *he alle-e+ amon-
other*, that *he '* one of the le-'t'mate -ran+.h'l+ren of the +e.e+ent an+ pra/e+ that *he be
appo'nte+ a* a+m'n'*tratr'2 of the e*tate.
D8E
An )e.ember 1;, 199;, pet't'oner f'le+ an Appo*'t'on .la'm'n- that he '* the *urv'v'n-
*pou*e of the +e.e+ent, that he ha* been mana-'n- the .on0u-al propert'e* even ,h'le the
+e.e+ent ha* been al've an+ '* better *'tuate+ to prote.t the 'nte-r't/ of the e*tate than the
pet't'oner, that pet't'oner an+ her fam'l/ have been al'enate+ from the +e.e+ent an+ the
Appo*'tor for more than th'rt/ (30 /ear* an+ thu*, pra/e+ that "etter* of A+m'n'*trat'on be
'**ue+ 'n*tea+ to h'm.
D9E
An September 22, 1997 or almo*t t,o /ear* after f'l'n- an oppo*'t'on, pet't'oner move+ to
+'*m'** the *pe.'al pro.ee+'n- .a*e alle-'n- 'n the ma'n that re*pon+ent 7*abel *houl+ not be
appo'nte+ a* a+m'n'*tratr'2 of the +e.e+ent@* e*tate. 7n *upport thereof, pet't'oner ar-ue* that
un+er Art'.le 992 of the C'v'l Co+e an 'lle-'t'mate .h'l+ ha* no r'-ht to *u..ee+ b/ r'-ht of
repre*entat'on the le-'t'mate relat've* of her father or mother. #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/,
re*pon+ent 7*abel@* father pre+e.ea*e+ h'* mother, the late Cr'*t'na A-u'nal+o Sunta/ an+ thu*,
opene+ *u..e**'on b/ repre*entat'on. Bet't'oner .onten+* that a* a .on*e9uen.e of the
+e.larat'on b/ the then C=7 of R'1al that the marr'a-e of the re*pon+ent 7*abel@* parent* '* Gnull
an+ vo'+,J the latter '* an 'lle-'t'mate .h'l+, an+ ha* no r'-ht nor 'ntere*t 'n the e*tate of her
paternal -ran+mother K the +e.e+ent.
D10E
An A.tober 16, 1997, the tr'al .ourt '**ue+ the a**a'le+
or+er +en/'n- pet't'oner@* !ot'on to )'*m'**.
D11E
(hen h'* mot'on for re.on*'+erat'on ,a* +en'e+
b/ the tr'al .ourt 'n an or+er +ate+ %anuar/ 9, 1998,
D12E
pet't'oner, a* ment'one+ above f'le+ th'*
pet't'on.
Bet't'oner 'mpute* -rave abu*e of +'*.ret'on to re*pon+ent .ourt 'n +en/'n- h'* mot'on to
+'*m'** a* ,ell a* h'* mot'on for re.on*'+erat'on on the -roun+* that> (a a mot'on to +'*m'** '*
appropr'ate 'n a *pe.'al pro.ee+'n- for the *ettlement of e*tate of a +e.ea*e+ per*on6 (b the
mot'on to +'*m'** ,a* t'mel/ f'le+6 (. the +'*po*'t've port'on of the +e.'*'on +e.lar'n- the
marr'a-e of re*pon+ent 7*abel@* parent* Gnull an+ vo'+J mu*t be uphel+6 an+ (+ *a'+ +e.'*'on
ha+ lon- be.ome f'nal an+ ha+, 'n fa.t, been e2e.ute+.
An the other han+, re*pon+ent 7*abel a**ert* that pet't'oner@* mot'on to +'*m'** ,a* late
hav'n- been f'le+ after the oppo*'t'on ,a* alrea+/ f'le+ 'n .ourt, the .ounterpart of an an*,er 'n
an or+'nar/ .'v'l a.t'on an+ that pet't'oner 'n h'* oppo*'t'on l'3e,'*e fa'le+ to *pe.'f'.all/ +en/
re*pon+ent 7*abel@* alle-at'on that *he '* a le-'t'mate .h'l+ of #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/, the
+e.e+ent@* *on. She further .onten+* that pet't'oner pro.ee+* from a m'*.omprehen*'on of the
0u+-ment 'n C'v'l Ca*e $o. F:7180 an+ the erroneou* prem'*e that there '* a .onfl'.t bet,een
the bo+/ of the +e.'*'on an+ 't* +'*po*'t've port'on be.au*e 'n an a.t'on for annulment of a
marr'a-e, the .ourt e'ther *u*ta'n* the val'+'t/ of marr'a-e or null'f'e* 't. 7t +oe* not, after
hear'n- a marr'a-e Gvo'+ableJ other,'*e, the .ourt ,'ll fa'l to +e.'+e an+ la*tl/, that the *tatu* of
marr'a-e* un+er Art'.le 8; of the C'v'l Co+e before the/ are annulle+ '* Gvo'+able.J
&he pet't'on mu*t fa'l.
Certiorari a* a *pe.'al .'v'l a.t'on .an be ava'le+ of onl/ 'f there '* .on.urren.e of the
e**ent'al re9u'*'te*, to ,'t> (a the tr'bunal, boar+ or off'.er e2er.'*'n- 0u+'.'al fun.t'on* ha*
a.te+ ,'thout or 'n e2.e** of 0ur'*+'.t'on or ,'th -rave abu*e of +'*.ret'on amount'n- to la.3 or
'n e2.e** or 0ur'*+'.t'on, an+ (b there '* no appeal, nor an/ pla'n, *pee+/ an+ a+e9uate reme+/ 'n
the or+'nar/ .our*e of la, for the purpo*e of annull'n- or mo+'f/'n- the pro.ee+'n-.
D13E
&here
mu*t be a .apr'.'ou*, arb'trar/ an+ ,h'm*'.al e2er.'*e of po,er for 't to pro*per.
D1CE
A rea+'n- of the a**a'le+ or+er, ho,ever, *ho,* that the re*pon+ent .ourt +'+ not abu*e 't*
+'*.ret'on 'n +en/'n- pet't'oner@* mot'on to +'*m'**, pert'nent port'on* of ,h'.h are 9uote+
hereun+er. &o ,'th>
G&he ar-ument* of both part'e* 0u+'.'ou*l/ an+ ob0e.t'vel/ a**e**e+ an+ the pert'nent
la,* appl'e+, the Court f'n+* that a mot'on to +'*m'** at th'* 0un.ture '* 'nappropr'ate
.on*'+er'n- the pe.ul'ar nature of th'* *pe.'al pro.ee+'n- a* +'*t'n-u'*he+ from an
or+'nar/ .'v'l a.t'on. At the out*et, th'* pro.ee+'n- ,a* not a+ver*ar'al 'n nature an+
the pet't'oner ,a* not .alle+ upon to a**ert a .au*e of a.t'on a-a'n*t a part'.ular
+efen+ant. =urthermore, the State ha* a v'tal 'ntere*t 'n the ma'ntenan.e of the
pro.ee+'n-*, not onl/ be.au*e of the ta2e* +ue 't, but al*o be.au*e 'f no he'r* 9ual'f/,
the State *hall a.9u're the e*tate b/ e*.heat.
G222 222 222
G&he .ourt rule*, for the purpo*e of e*tabl'*h'n- the per*onal't/ of the pet't'oner to f'le
a+ ma'nta'n th'* *pe.'al pro.ee+'n-*, that 'n the .a*e at ben.h, the bo+/ of the
+e.'*'on +eterm'ne* the nature of the a.t'on ,h'.h '* for annulment, not +e.larat'on of
null't/.
G&he oppo*'tor@* .ontent'on that the fallo of the 9ue*t'one+ +e.'*'on (Anne2 GAJ K
!ot'on preva'l* over the bo+/ thereof '* not of a f'nal +e.'*'on '* +ef'n'te, .lear an+
une9u'vo.al an+ .an be ,holl/ -'ven effe.t ,'thout nee+ of 'nterpretat'on or
.on*tru.t'on.
G(here there '* amb'-u't/ or un.erta'nt/, the op'n'on or bo+/ of the +e.'*'on ma/ be
referre+ to for purpo*e* of .on*tru'n- the 0u+-ementJ (78 SCRA ;C1 .'t'n- !orelo* v.
Go Ch'n "'n-6 an+ He'r* of %uan Bre*to v. Galan-. &he rea*on '* that the +'*po*'t've
port'on mu*t f'n+ *upport from the +e.'*'on@* ratio decidendi.
GBer +e.'*'on of the Court of ='r*t 7n*tan.e 4ran.h 7L of Fue1on C't/, mar3e+ a* Anne2 GAJ of
oppo*'tor@* mot'on, the marr'a-e of #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/ an+ 7*abel Co0uan-.o:Sunta/ ,a*
annulle+ on the ba*'* of Art. 8; par. 3 of the C'v'l Co+e ,h'.h refer* to marr'a-e* ,h'.h are
.on*'+ere+ vo'+able. Bet't'oner be'n- .on.e've+ an+ born of a vo'+able marr'a-e before the
+e.ree of annulment, *he '* .on*'+ere+ le-'t'mate (Art. 89, par. 2, C'v'l Co+e of the Bh'l*..J
D1;E
&he tr'al .ourt .orre.tl/ rule+ that Ga mot'on to +'*m'** at th'* 0un.ture '*
'nappropr'ate.J &he 1997 Rule* of C'v'l Bro.e+ure -overn* the pro.e+ure to be ob*erve+ 'n
a.t'on*, .'v'l or .r'm'nal an+ ,6ec-&2 6rocee(-'.,.J
D16E
&he Rule* +o not o'27 appl/ to ele.t'on
.a*e*, lan+ re-'*trat'on, .a+a*tral, natural'1at'on an+ 'n*olven./ pro.ee+'n-*, an+ other .a*e* not
there'n prov'+e+ for.
Spe.'al pro.ee+'n-* be'n- one of the a.t'on* un+er the .overa-e of the Rule* on C'v'l
Bro.e+ure, a mot'on to +'*m'** f'le+ thereun+er ,oul+ fall un+er Se.t'on 1, Rule 16
thereof. Sa'+ rule prov'+e* that the mot'on to +'*m'** ma/ be f'le+ G8-30-' 30e 3-me 9or b/3
be9ore f'l'n- the an*,er to the .ompla'nt.J Clearl/, the mot'on *houl+ have been f'le+ on or
before the f'l'n- of pet't'oner@* oppo*'t'on.
D17E
,h'.h '* the .ounterpart of an an*,er 'n or+'nar/
.'v'l a.t'on*.
$ot onl/ ,a* pet't'oner@* mot'on to +'*m'** f'le+ out of t'me, 't ,a* f'le+ almo*t t,o /ear*
after re*pon+ent 7*abel ,a* alrea+/ throu-h ,'th the pre*entat'on of her ,'tne**e* an+ ev'+en.e
an+ pet't'oner ha+ pre*ente+ t,o ,'tne**e*. &he f'l'n- of the mot'on to +'*m'** '* not onl/
'mproper but al*o +'lator/.
&he re*pon+ent .ourt, far from +ev'at'n- or *tra/'n- off .our*e from e*tabl'*he+
0ur'*pru+en.e on th'* matter, a* pet't'oner a**ert*, ha+ 'n fa.t fa'thfull/ ob*erve+ the la, an+
le-al pre.e+ent* 'n th'* .a*e. 7n fa.t, the alle-e+ .onfl'.t bet,een the bo+/ of the +e.'*'on an+
the +'*po*'t've port'on thereof ,h'.h .reate+ the amb'-u't/ or un.erta'nt/ 'n the +e.'*'on of the
C=7 of R'1al '* re.on.'lable. &he le-al ba*'* for *ett'n- a*'+e the marr'a-e of re*pon+ent 7*abel@*
parent* '* .lear un+er para-raph 3, Art'.le 8; of the $e, C'v'l Co+e, the la, 'n for.e pr'or to the
ena.tment of the =am'l/ Co+e.
Bet't'oner, ho,ever, *tron-l/ 'n*'*t* that the +'*po*'t've port'on of the C=7 +e.'*'on ha*
.ate-or'.all/ +e.lare+ that the marr'a-e of re*pon+ent 7*abel@* parent* '* Gnull an+ vo'+J an+ that
the le-al effe.t of *u.h +e.larat'on '* that the marr'a-e from 't* 'n.ept'on '* vo'+ an+ the .h'l+ren
born out of *a'+ marr'a-e '* 'lle-'t'mate. Su.h ar-ument .annot be *u*ta'ne+. Art'.le* 80, 81, 82
an+ 83
D18E
of the $e, C'v'l Co+e .la**'f/ ,hat marr'a-e* are vo'+ ,h'le Art'.le 8; enumerate*
the .au*e* for ,h'.h a marr'a-e ma/ be annulle+.
D19E
&he fun+amental +'*t'n.t'on bet,een vo'+ an+ vo'+able marr'a-e* '* that vo'+ marr'a-e '*
+eeme+ never to have ta3en pla.e at all. &he effe.t* of vo'+ marr'a-e*, ,'th re*pe.t to propert/
relat'on* of the *pou*e* are prov'+e+ for un+er Art'.le 1CC of the C'v'l Co+e. Ch'l+ren born of
*u.h marr'a-e* ,ho are .alle+ natural .h'l+ren b/ le-al f'.t'on have the *ame *tatu*, r'-ht* an+
obl'-at'on* a* a.3no,le+-e+ natural .h'l+ren un+er Art'.le 89
D20E
'rre*pe.t've of ,hether or not
the part'e* to the vo'+ marr'a-e are 'n -oo+ fa'th or 'n ba+ fa'th.
An the other han+, a vo'+able marr'a-e, '* .on*'+ere+ val'+ an+ pro+u.e* all 't* .'v'l effe.t*,
unt'l 't '* *et a*'+e b/ f'nal 0u+-ment of a .ompetent .ourt 'n an a.t'on for
annulment. %ur'+'.all/, the annulment of a marr'a-e +'**olve* the *pe.'al .ontra.t a* 'f 't ha+
never been entere+ 'nto but the la, ma3e* e2pre** prov'*'on* to prevent the effe.t* of the
marr'a-e from be'n- totall/ ,'pe+ out. &he *tatu* of .h'l+ren born 'n vo'+able marr'a-e* '*
-overne+ b/ the *e.on+ para-raph of Art'.le 89 ,h'.h prov'+e* that>
GCh'l+ren .on.e've+ of vo'+able marr'a-e* before the +e.ree of annulment *hall be .on*'+ere+
le-'t'mate6 an+ .h'l+ren .on.e've+ thereafter *hall have the *ame *tatu*, r'-ht* an+ obl'-at'on* a*
a.3no,le+-e+ natural .h'l+ren, an+ are al*o .alle+ natural .h'l+ren b/ le-al
f'.t'on.J
D21E
(#mpha*'* *uppl'e+
State+ other,'*e, the annulment of Gthe marr'a-e b/ the .ourt abol'*he* the le-al .hara.ter
of the *o.'et/ forme+ b/ the putat've *pou*e*, but 't .annot +e*tro/ the 0ur'+'.al .on*e9uen.e*
,h'.h the mar'tal un'on pro+u.e+ +ur'n- 't* .ont'nuan.e.J
D22E
7n+ee+, the term* GannulJ an+ null and voidJ have +'fferent le-al .onnotat'on* an+
'mpl'.at'on*. Annul mean* to re+u.e to noth'n-6 ann'h'late6 obl'terate6 to ma3e vo'+ or of no
effe.t6 to null'f/6 to abol'*h6 to +o a,a/ ,'th
D23E
,herea* null an+ vo'+ '* *ometh'n- that +oe* not
e2'*t from the be-'nn'n-. A marr'a-e that '* annulled pre*uppo*e* that 't *ub*'*t* but later .ea*e*
to have le-al effe.t ,hen 't '* term'nate+ throu-h a .ourt a.t'on. 4ut 'n null'f/'n- a marr'a-e, the
.ourt *'mpl/ +e.lare* a *tatu* .on+'t'on ,h'.h alrea+/ e2'*t* from the ver/ be-'nn'n-.
&here '* l'3e,'*e no mer't 'n pet't'oner@* ar-ument that 't '* the +'*po*'t've port'on of the
+e.'*'on ,h'.h mu*t .ontrol a* to ,hether or not the marr'a-e of re*pon+ent 7*abel@* parent* ,a*
vo'+ or vo'+able. Su.h ar-ument *pr'n-* from a m'*.omprehen*'on of the 0u+-ment of the C'v'l
Ca*e $o. F:7180 an+ the erroneou* prem'*e that there '* a .onfl'.t bet,een the bo+/ of the
+e.'*'on an+ 't* +'*po*'t've port'on.
Barenthet'.all/, 't '* an elementar/ pr'n.'ple of pro.e+ure that the re*olut'on of the .ourt 'n a
-'ven '**ue a* embo+'e+ 'n the +'*po*'t've part of a +e.'*'on or or+er '* the .ontroll'n- fa.tor a*
to *ettlement of r'-ht* of the part'e* an+ the 9ue*t'on* pre*ente+, not,'th*tan+'n- *tatement 'n
the bo+/ of the +e.'*'on or or+er ,h'.h ma/ be *ome,hat .onfu*'n-,
D2CE
the *ame '* not ,'thout
9ual'f'.at'on. &he fore-o'n- rule hol+* true onl/ ,hen the +'*po*'t've part of a f'nal +e.'*'on or
or+er '* +ef'n'te, .lear an+ une9u'vo.al an+ .an be ,holl/ -'ven effe.t ,'thout nee+ of
'nterpretat'on or .on*tru.t'on K ,h'.h u*uall/ '* Gthe .a*e ,here the or+er or +e.'*'on 'n 9ue*t'on
'* that of a .ourt not of re.or+ ,h'.h '* not .on*t'tut'onall/ re9u're+ to *tate the fa.t* an+ the la,
on ,h'.h the 0u+-ment '* ba*e+.J
D2;E
A**um'n- that a +oubt or un.erta'nt/ e2'*t* bet,een the +'*po*'t've port'on an+ the bo+/ of
the +e.'*'on, effort mu*t be ma+e to harmon'1e the ,hole bo+/ of the +e.'*'on 'n or+er to -'ve
effe.t to the 'ntent'on, purpo*e an+ 0u+-ment of the .ourt. 7n Republic v. delos Angeles
D26E
the
Court *a'+>
GA++'t'onall/, Art'.le 10 of the C'v'l Co+e *tate* that MD'En .a*e of +oubt 'n the
'nterpretat'on or appl'.at'on of la,*, 't '* pre*ume+ that the la,ma3'n- bo+/ 'nten+e+
r'-ht an+ 0u*t'.e to preva'l.@ &h'* man+ate of la,, obv'ou*l/ .annot be an/ le**
b'n+'n- upon the .ourt* 'n relat'on to 't* 0u+-ment*.
G2 2 2 &he 0u+-ment mu*t be rea+ 'n 't* ent'ret/, an+ mu*t be .on*true+ a* a ,hole *o
a* to br'n- all of 't* part* 'nto harmon/ a* far a* th'* .an be +one b/ fa'r an+
rea*onable 'nterpretat'on an+ *o a* to -'ve effe.t to ever/ ,or+ an+ part 'f po**'ble,
an+ to effe.tuate the 'ntent'on an+ purpo*e of the Court, .on*'*tent ,'th the prov'*'on*
of the or-an'. la,. (C9 C.%.S., pp. 863:86CJ D#mpha*'* *uppl'e+E
&hu*, a rea+'n- of the pert'nent port'on* of the +e.'*'on of the C=7 of R'1al 9uote+ earl'er
*ho,* that the marr'a-e '* vo'+able>
G7t '* the op'n'on of )r. Aram'l that the */mptom* of the pla'nt'ff@* mental aberrat'on
.la**'f'e+ a* *.h'1ophern'a (*'. ha+ ma+e them*elve* man'fe*t even a* earl/ a* 19;;6
that the +'*ea*e ,or*ene+ ,'th t'me, unt'l 196; ,hen he ,a* a.tuall/ pla.e+ un+er
e2pert neuro:p*/.h'atr'.t (*'. treatment6 that even 'f the *ub0e.t ha* *ho,n mar3e+
pro-re**, he rema'n* bereft of a+e9uate un+er*tan+'n- of r'-ht an+ ,ron-.
G&here '* no .ontrover*/ that the marr'a-e bet,een the part'e* ,a* effe.te+ on %ul/ 9,
19;8, /ear* after pla'nt'ff@* mental 'llne** ha+ *et 'n. &h'* fa.t ,oul+ 0u*t'f/ a
+e.larat'on of null't/ of the marr'a-e un+er Art'.le 8; of the C'v'l Co+e ,h'.h
prov'+e*>
GArt. 9; (*'. A marr'a-e ma/ be annulle+ for an/ of the follo,'n- .au*e*, e2'*t'n- at
the t'me of the marr'a-e>
222 222 222
G(3 &hat e'ther part/ ,a* of un*oun+ m'n+, unle** *u.h part/, after .om'n- to rea*on,
freel/ .ohab'te+ ,'th the other a* hu*ban+ an+ ,'fe6
222 222 222
G&here '* a +earth of proof at the t'me of the marr'a-e +efen+ant 3ne, about the mental
.on+'t'on of pla'nt'ff6 an+ there '* proof that pla'nt'ff .ont'nue* to be ,'thout *oun+ rea*on. &he
.har-e* 'n th'* ver/ .ompla'nt a++ empha*'* to the f'n+'n- of the neuro:p*/.h'atr'*t han+l'n- the
pat'ent, that pla'nt'ff reall/ l've* more 'n fan./ than 'n real't/, a *tron- 'n+'.at'on of
*.h'1ophern'a (*'..J
D27E
7nev'tabl/, the +e.'*'on of the C=7 of R'1al +e.lare+ null an+ vo'+ the marr'a-e of re*pon+ent
7*abel@* parent* ba*e+ on para-raph 3, Art'.le 8; of the $e, C'v'l Co+e. &he le-al
.on*e9uen.e* a* to the r'-ht* of the .h'l+ren are therefore -overne+ b/ the f'r*t .lau*e of the
*e.on+ para-raph of Art'.le 89. A .ontrar/ 'nterpretat'on ,oul+ be anathema to the rule 0u*t
above:ment'one+. 4a*e+ on *a'+ prov'*'on the .h'l+ren of #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/ an+ 7*abel
Co0uan-.o:Sunta/ ,ho ,ere .on.e've+ an+ born pr'or to the +e.ree of the tr'al .ourt *ett'n-
a*'+e the'r marr'a-e on A.tober 3, 1967 are .on*'+ere+ le-'t'mate. =or purpo*e* of *ee3'n-
appo'ntment a* e*tate a+m'n'*tratr'2, the le-'t'mate -ran+.h'l+ren, 'n.lu+'n- re*pon+ent 7*abel,
ma/ 'nvo3e the'r *u..e**'onal r'-ht of repre*entat'on 'n the e*tate of the'r -ran+mother C'r*t'na
A-u'nal+o Sunta/ after the'r father, #m'l'o A-u'nal+o Sunta/, ha+ pre+e.ea*e+ the'r
-ran+mother. &h'* '*, ho,ever, ,'thout pre0u+'.e to a +eterm'nat'on b/ the .ourt* of ,hether
"etter* of A+m'n'*trat'on ma/ be -rante+ to her. $e'ther +o the Court a+0u+-e+ here'n the
*u..e**'onal r'-ht* of the per*onal't'e* 'nvolve+ over the +e.e+ent@* e*tate.
7t ,oul+ not therefore be am'** to re'terate at th'* po'nt ,hat the Court, *pea3'n- throu-h
Ch'ef %u*t'.e Ru'1 Ca*tro, empha*'1e+ to Gall ma-'*trate* of all level* of the 0u+'.'al h'erar.h/
that e2treme +e-ree of .are *houl+ be e2er.'*e+ 'n the formulat'on of the +'*po*'t've port'on of a
+e.'*'on, be.au*e 't '* th'* port'on that '* to be e2e.ute+ on.e the +e.'*'on be.ome* f'nal. &he
a+0u+'.at'on of the r'-ht* an+ obl'-at'on* of thoe part'e*, an+ the +'*po*'t'on* ma+e a* ,ell a* the
+'re.t'on* an+ 'n*tru.t'on* -'ven b/ the .ourt 'n the prem'*e* 'n .onform't/ ,'th the bo+/ of the
+e.'*'on, mu*t all be *pelle+ out .learl/, +'*t'n.tl/ an+ une9u'vo.all/ leav'n- ab*olutel/ no room
for +'*pute, +ebate or 'nterpretat'on.
D28E
:)EREFORE, f'n+'n- no -rave abu*e of +'*.ret'on, the 'n*tant pet't'on '*
)7S!7SS#).
SO ORDERED.
OH HEK HOW vs REPUBLIC 29 SCRA 94
Facts:
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging that he had
complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. !" and pra#ing that he be allowed to take his oath of
allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. $he %ourt of &irst 'nstance of
(amboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date) petitioner
took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. $he *overnment seasonabl# gave notice of its
intention to appeal from said order of &ebruar#+) ,+-- and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the
oath was taken prior to .udgment having been final and e/ecutor#.
Issue:
0 's the oath valid
0 1hether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessar# from the 2inister of the 'nterior of Nationalist
%hina.
Held:
&irst issue3
$he order of &ebruar# +) ,+-- 4oath0taking5 had not 6 and up to the present has not become final and e/ecutor#in
view of the appeal dul# taken b# the *overnment.
7
nd
'ssue3
't is argued that the permission is not required b# our laws and that the naturalization of an alien) as a citizen of
the Philippines) is governed e/clusivel# b# such laws and cannot be controlled b# an# foreign law.
However) the question of how a %hinese citizen ma# strip himself of that status is necessaril# governed 6pursuant
to Articles , and ,- of our %ivil %ode 6 b# the laws of %hina) not b# those of the Philippines. As a consequence) a
%hinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines) unless he has complied with the laws of
Nationalist %hina requiring previous permission of its 2inister of the 'nterior for the renunciation of nationalit#.
8ection ,7 of %ommonwealth Act No.9:! provides) however) that before the naturalization certificate is issued)
the petitioner shall ;solemnl# swear); interalia) that he renounces ;absolutel# and forever all allegiance and
fidelit# to an# foreign prince) potentate; and particularl# to the state ;of which; he is ;a sub.ect or citizen.; $he
obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationalit#) before acquiring Philippine
citizenship) because) otherwise) he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two 475 distinct
sovereignties) which our laws do not permit) e/cept that) pursuant to Republic Act No. 7-!+) ;the acquisition of
citizenship b# a natural0born &ilipino citizen from one of the 'berian and an# friendl# democratic 'bero0American
countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship) if the law of that countr# grants the
same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon b# treat# between the Philippines and the foreign
countr# from which citizenship is acquired.;
RO$!ALDE9-$AROS vs. O$ELE
N);) 0o) 1199:A, /eptem'er 18, 1995
FATS:
Petitioner !melda ;omualde6"#arcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy 8C5C< for the position
of ;epresentati%e of the irst District of ?eyte, stating that she is :"months resident in the
said district) Pri%ate respondent #onte-o, incum'ent ;epresentati%e and a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Dis.ualification, alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional one"year residency re.uirement) Petitioner thus amended
her C5C, changing 2se%en3 months to 2since childhood)3 *he pro%incial
election super%isorrefused to admit the amended C5C for the reason that it &as filed out of
time) Petitioner, thus, filed her amended C5C &ith C5#E?EC in di%ision)
*he C5#E?EC /econd Di%ision found the petition for dis.ualification meritorious and struck
off the amended as &ell as original C5Cs) !n ruling thus, C5#E?EC in di%ision found that
&hen petitioner chose to stay in !locos and later on in #anila, coupled &ith her intention to
stay there 'y registering as a %oter there and e(pressly declaring that she is a resident of
that place, she is deemed to ha%e a'andoned *aclo'an City, &here she spent her childhood
and school days, as her place of domicile) *he C5#E?EC en 'anc affirmed this ruling)
During the pendency of the dis.ualification case, petitioner &on in the election) $ut the
C5#E?EC suspended her proclamation)
ISS!ES:
1) 4hether or not petitioner &as a resident, for election purposes, of the irstDistrict of
?eyte for a period of one year at the time of the #ay 9, 1995elections)
B) 4hether or not the C5#E?EC properly e(ercised its -urisdiction in dis.ualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated 'y the 5mni'us Election Code for dis.ualification cases under
>rticle :8 of the said Code)
3< 4hether or not the ,ouse of ;epresentati%es Electoral *ri'unal assumed e(clusi%e
-urisdiction o%er the .uestion of petitionerOs .ualifications after the #ay 8, 1995 elections)
HELD:
D*8010;e vs. Res0&en1e
!n 5ng %s) ;epu'lic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean anindi%idualOs
Ppermanent homeP, Pa place to &hich, &hene%er a'sent for 'usiness or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent)P $ased on the foregoing, domicile includes the t&in elements of Pthe fact of residing
or physical presence in a fi(ed placeP and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently)
;esidence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of anindi%idual to a
certain place) !t is the physical presence of a person in a gi%en area, community or country)
*he essential distinction 'et&een residence and domicile in la& is that residence in%ol%es
the intent to lea%e &hen the purpose for &hich the resident has taken up his a'ode ends)
5ne may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, 'usiness, or health) !f a personOs
intent 'e to remain, it 'ecomes his domicile= if his intent is to lea%e as soon as his purpose
is esta'lished it is residence) !t is thus, .uite perfectly normal for an indi%idual to ha%e
different residences in %arious places) ,o&e%er, a person can only ha%e asingle domicile,
unless, for %arious reasons, he successfully a'andons his domicile in fa%or of another
domicile of choice) !n Cytengsu %s) ;epu'lic, &e laid this distinction .uite clearly:
*here is a difference 'et&een domicile and residence) P;esidenceP is used to indicate a
place of a'ode, &hether permanent or temporary= PdomicileP denotes a fi(ed permanent
residence to &hich, &hen a'sent, one has the intention of returning) > man may ha%e a
residence in one place and a domicile in another) ;esidence is not domicile, 'ut domicile is
residence coupled &ith the intention to remain for an unlimited time) > man can ha%e 'ut
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, 'ut he may ha%e numerous places of
residence) ,is place of residence is generally his place of domicile, 'ut it is not 'y any
means necessarily so since no length of residence &ithout intention of remaining &ill
constitute domicile)
1) 1E/) !melda ;omualde6"#arcos &as a resident of the irst District of ?eyte for election
purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence .ualifications to run in ?eyte as
a candidate for a seat in the ,ouse of ;epresentati%es for the follo&ing reasons:
a) #inor follo&s the domicile of his parents) >s domicile, once ac.uired is retained until a
ne& one is gained, it follo&s that in spite of the fact of petitionerOs 'eing 'orn in
#anila, *aclo'an, ?eyte &as her domicile of origin 'y operation of la&) *his domicile &as
esta'lished &hen her father 'rought his family 'ack to ?eyte)
') Domicile of origin is not easily lost) *o successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1) >n actual remo%al or an actual change of domicile=
B) > 'ona fide intention of a'andoning the former place of residence and esta'lishing a ne&
one= and
3) >cts &hich correspond &ith the purpose)
!n the a'sence of clear and positi%e proof 'ased on these criteria, the residence of origin
should 'e deemed to continue) 5nly &ith e%idence sho&ing concurrence of all three
re.uirements can the presumption of continuity or residence 'e re'utted, for a change of
residence re.uires an actual and deli'erate a'andonment, and one cannot ha%e t&o legal
residences at the same time)
Petitioner held %arious residences for different purposes during the last four decades) 0one
of these purposes une.ui%ocally point to an intention to a'andon her domicile of origin
in *aclo'an, ?eyte)
c) !t cannot 'e correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin 'y operation of la&
as a result of her marriage to the late President erdinand E) #arcos in 195B)
K> &ife does not automatically gain the hus'and+s domicile)L 4hat petitioner gained upon
marriage &as actual residence) /he did not lose her domicile of origin) *he term residence
may mean one thing in ci%il la& 8or under the Ci%il Code< and .uite another thing in political
la&) 4hat stands clear is that insofar as the Ci%il Code is concerned"affecting the rights and
o'ligations of hus'and and &ife Q the term residence should only 'e interpreted to mean
Pactual residence)P *he inescapa'le conclusion deri%ed from this unam'iguous ci%il la&
delineation therefore, is that &hen petitioner married the former President in 1959, she kept
her domicile of origin and merely gained a ne& home , not a domicilium necessarium)
d) E%en assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a ne& PdomicileP after her
marriage and only ac.uired a right to choose a ne& one after her hus'and died, petitionerOs
acts follo&ing her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly 'ut
e(pressly chose her domicile of origin 8assuming this &as lost 'y operation of la&< as her
domicile) *his PchoiceP &as une.ui%ocally e(pressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCNN &hen petitioner sought the PCNNOs permission to Preha'ilitate 8our< ancestral house
in *aclo'an and arm in 5lot, ?eyte) ) ) to make them li%a'le for the #arcos family to ha%e
a home in our homeland)P urthermore, petitioner o'tained her residence certificate in 199B
in*aclo'an, ?eyte, &hile li%ing in her 'rotherOs house, an act &hich supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCNN Chairman)
E++e1' *+ D0s<u%;0+01%'0*n %se
B) !t is a settled doctrine that a statute re.uiring rendition of -udgment &ithin a specified
time is generally construed to 'e merely directory, Pso that non"compliance &ith them does
not in%alidate the -udgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it
&ould ha%e clearly indicated it)P *he difference 'et&een a mandatory and a
directory pro%ision is often made on grounds of necessity)
!n any e%ent, &ith the enactment of /ections A and : of ;)>) AA9A in relation to /ection :8
of $)P) 881, it is e%ident that the respondent Commission does not lose -urisdiction to hear
and decide a pending dis.ualification case under /ection :8 of $)P) 881 e%en after
the elections)
Se1'0*n ,. E++e1' *+ D0s<u%;0+01%'0*n %se) " >ny candidate &ho has 'een declared 'y
final -udgment to 'e dis.ualified shall not 'e %oted for, and the %otes cast for him shall not
'e counted) !f for any reason a candidate is not declared 'y final -udgment 'efore an
election to 'e dis.ualified and he is %oted for and recei%es the &inning num'er of %otes in
such election, theCourt or Commission shall continue &ith the trial and hearing of the
action, in.uiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any inter%enor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
&hene%er the e%idence of his guilt is strong)
HRET Ju)0s&01'0*n
3) ,;E*Os -urisdiction as the sole -udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
.ualifications of mem'ers of Congress 'egins only after a candidate has 'ecome a mem'er
of the ,ouse of ;epresentati%es) Petitioner not 'eing a mem'er of the ,ouse of
;epresentati%es, it is o'%ious that the ,;E* at this point has no -urisdiction o%er the
.uestion)
>pril B5, 19AB
N);) 0o) ?"15787
IN THE $ATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE $INOR NOR$A LEE A"ER, RIARDO R.
ARA"ALLO, petitioner"appellee,
%s)
REP!"LI OF THE PHILIPPINES, opponent"appellant)
Clemente N. Dayrit for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for opponent-appellant.
P%&0;;%, J.:
05;#> ?EE C>$E;) ;!C>;D5 ;) C>;>$>??5 %s) ;EPC$?!C 5 *,E P,!?!PP!0E/
;epu'lic of the Philippines/CP;E#E C5C;*#anila
E0 $>0C
N);) 0o) ?"15787 En'sp En'sp En'sp En'sp En'sp En'sp >pril B5, 19AB
!0 *,E #>**E; 5 *,E >D5P*!50 5 *,E #!05; 05;#> ?EE C>$E;, ;!C>;D5 ;) C>;>$>??5,
petitioner"appellee,
%s)
;EPC$?!C 5 *,E P,!?!PP!0E/, opponent"appellant)
Clemente 0) Dayrit for petitioner"appellee)
5ffice of the /olicitor Neneral for opponent"appellant)
P>D!??>, J):
!n a %erified petition filed on BA /eptem'er 1958 in the Court of irst !nstance of Pampanga, ;icardo
;) Cara'allo, an >merican citi6en enlisted in the Cnited /tates >ir orce as staff sergeant detailed in
Clark ield, >ngeles, Pampanga, &here he and his &ife Nraciela N) Cara'allo li%e, alleges that he and
his &ife ha%e no legitimate, legitimated, ackno&ledged natural children, natural children 'y legal
fiction or any other descendant= that &ith his &ife+s &ritten consent 8E(hi'it C< he desires to adopt as
his child 0orma ?ee Ca'er, a fi%e"day old natural daughter of #ercedes J) Ca'er 'egotten 'y an
unkno&n father, &ho ga%e her consent to the adoption in a s&orn statement 8E(hi'it $<= that since
the day follo&ing her 'irth 0orma ?ee Ca'er has 'een reared and cared for 'y him and his &ife &ho
ha%e de%eloped lo%e and affection for her= that he ne%er has 'een con%icted of any crime in%ol%ing
moral turpitude= that financially and morally he is a'le to support, 'ring up and educate the child= and
prays that after notice, pu'lication and hearing 0orma ?ee Ca'er 'e declared his child for all intents
and purposes, free from any o'ligation of o'edience and maintenance &ith respect to her natural
mother #ercedes J) Ca'er 8/p) Proc) 0o) 1391<)
5n BA /eptem'er 1958 the Court ordered the %erified petition filed 'y ;icardo ;) Cara'allo to 'e
pu'lished and &as pu'lished in the Daily #irror once a &eek for three consecuti%e &eeks setting the
petition for hearing on 18 5cto'er 1958 8E(hi'it ><) >s at the hearing no'ody appeared to o'-ect to
the petition for adoption, petitioner+s counsel prayed for an order of default, &hich &as entered
against all interested parties, e(cept the /olicitor Neneral or Pro%incial iscal &ho, according to the
Court must appear in adoption cases)
5n B: 5cto'er 1958 the Pro%incial and >ssistant Pro%incial iscal of Pampanga mo%ed for the
dismissal of the petition for adoption on the ground that it states no cause of action and that the
petitioner, 'eing a non"resident alien, is not .ualified to adopt)
5n B8 5cto'er 1958 the Court granted the petitioner ten days &ithin &hich to file an ans&er to the
motion to dismiss and su'mit a memorandum of authorities, and the fiscal the same num'er of days
to reply)
5n 3 0o%em'er 1958 the petitioner filed an ans&er or o'-ection to the motion to dismiss, to &hich on
19 0o%em'er the Pro%incial iscal replied)
5n 1: 0o%em'er 1958 the Court denied the motion to dismiss)
5n 1B Decem'er 1958 the petitioner mo%ed that the case 'e set for hearing) 5n 15 Decem'er 1958
the Court set the petition for hearing on BB Decem'er 1958 at 9:77 o+clock in the morning)
>fter hearing, the Court found the follo&ing:
R Petitioner is 3B years old &hile the child sought to 'e adopted is three months old, ha%ing 'een 'orn
on /eptem'er B7, 1958 8E(hi'it E<) *he petitioner has 'een residing at Clark >ir $ase for the last B5
months) ,e has had the child, 0orma ?ee Ca'er, in his household as a daughter since the day
follo&ing that of her 'irth and has de%eloped a fondness for her and intends to 'ring her up and
educate her as his o&n to the 'est of his a'ility) ,e has ne%er had any children, either &ith his &ife,
Nraciela N) Cara'allo, &ith &hom he has 'een married for 1B years, or &ith any other &oman)
,e is a staff sergeant in the Cnited /tates >ir orce and recei%es appro(imately F9A5)77 a month,
including allo&ances) ,e e(pects to retire as a master sergeant after A years and 3 months, and as
such, he &ould recei%e a monthly pension of a'out F1:5)77 to F197)77 for the rest of his life) ,e has
an allotment check made out to a 'ank for F89)77 a month) ,e has t&o insurance policies &ith an
aggregate %alue of P15,777)77 and has a sa%ings of FA,777)77 to F:,777)77 &hich he has 'een
accumulating for the last 15 to B7 years) >fter retirement, he intends to settle do&n permanently in
the Philippines &here he &ill engage in the tourist 'usiness 'y putting up a hotel)
!t also appears that petitioner has ne%er 'een con%icted of any crime &hatsoe%er and rendered a
decree as follo&s: )
P;E#!/E/ C50/!DE;ED, the Court 'elie%es that it &ould 'e to the 'est interest of the child to 'e
placed under the care and custody of petitioner &ho is materially and morally a'le to educate and
'ring her up properly and ade.uately, and, therefore, ad-udges that henceforth 0orma ?ee Ca'er shall
'e, for all legitimate intents and purposes, the child of ;icardo ;) Cara'allo and shall 'e freed from all
legal o'ligations of o'edience and maintenance &ith respect to her natural mother, #ercedes Ca'er,
and that her surname shall 'e changed to that of petitioner, and pursuant to >rticle 39A of the Ci%il
Code of the Philippines, this decision shall 'e recorded in the local ci%il registry of >ngeles, Pampanga,
and the name and surname of the said minor shall thereafter 'e 0orma ?ee Cara'allo)
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
*he point to determine is &hether under the la& the petitioner is a person .ualified to adopt) *he
No%ernment contends that he is not, in%oking the pro%isions of article 335 of the Ci%il Code) *he
article pro%ides: )
*he follo&ing cannot adopt "
81< *hose &ho ha%e legitimate, legitimated, ackno&ledged natural children, or natural children 'y
legal fiction=
8B< *he guardian, &ith respect to the &ard, 'efore the final appro%al of his accounts=
83< > married person, &ithout the consent of the other spouse=
89< 0on"resident aliens=
85< ;esident aliens &ith &hose go%ernment the ;epu'lic of the Philippines has 'roken diplomatic
relations=
8A< >ny person &ho has 'een con%icted of a crime in%ol%ing moral turpitude, &hen the penalty
imposed &as si( months+ imprisonment or more)
> person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or state &here he has his a'ode and li%es there
permanently) !t is a place chosen 'y him freely and %oluntarily, although he may later on change his
mind and li%e else&here) > place in a country or state &here he li%es and stays permanently and to
&hich he intends to return after a temporary a'sence, no matter ho& long, is his domicile) > so-ourn
such as a tourist though actually present at a place of his free choice cannot 'e deemed a resident of
that place) > foreigner &ho has a 'usiness or interest therein or property located in a country or state
and goes and stays in that country or state to look after his 'usiness or property or to check up the
manner or &ay his 'usiness or property is 'eing conducted or run 'y his manager 'ut does not intend
to remain in the country indefinitely cannot 'e deemed a resident of such country) >ctual or physical
presence or stay of a person in a place, not of his free and %oluntary choice and &ithout intent to
remain there indefinitely, does not make him a resident of the place) ?ooking after the &elfare of a
minor to 'e adopted the la& has surrounded him &ith safeguards to achie%e and insure such &elfare)
!t cannot 'e gainsaid that an adopted minor may 'e remo%ed from the country 'y the adopter, &ho is
not a resident of the Philippines, and placed 'eyond the reach and protection of the country of his
'irth)
;icardo ;) Cara'allo, the petitioner, an >merican citi6en &ho no& li%es in Clark ield, municipality of
>ngeles, pro%ince of Pampanga, ;epu'lic of the Philippines, 'ecause of his assignment as staff
sergeant in the Cnited /tates >ir orce S his stay in the Philippines then 'eing temporary S is a non"
resident alien &ho, pursuant to clause 9 of the a'o%e .uoted article of the Ci%il Code, is dis.ualified to
adopt a child in the Philippines)
*he decree appealed from is set aside and the petition dismissed, &ithout pronouncement as to costs)
$eng6on, C)J), $autista >ngelo, ?a'rador, ;eyes, J)$)?), Paredes and Di6on, JJ), concur)
Concepcion, J), concurs in the result)
$arrera, J), took no part)
G.R. No. L-19681 No7)#E)r 29, 196D
PAS!OR B. !ENC1AE<, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ICEN!A F. ESCAO, E! AL., defendants-appellees.
0. :. 1inamira M 5. 1. 1arria for plaintiff$appellant.
Jalandoni M Jarnir for defendants$appellees.
RE?ES, :.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and le$al %uestions, fro# the 6ud$#ent of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of
3ebu, in its 3ivil 3ase ;o. @-.111, denyin$ the clai# of the plaintiff-appellant, )astor !. Tenchave>,
for le$al separation and one #illion pesos in da#a$es a$ainst his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, :icente, Ma#erto and Mena,
1
all surna#ed "scaHo," respectively.
-
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the followin$5
Missin$ her late afternoon classes on -. "ebruary 19.8 in the ,niversity of Aan 3arlos, 3ebu 3ity,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of co##erce, :icenta scaHo, -1 years of
a$e <scion of a well-to-do and socially pro#inent "ilipino fa#ily of Apanish ancestry and a "sheltered
cole$iala"=, e(chan$ed #arria$e vows with )astor Tenchave>, 3- years of a$e, an en$ineer, e(-
ar#y officer and of undistin$uished stoc+, without the +nowled$e of her parents, before a 3atholic
chaplain, *t. Moises *avares, in the house of one &uan 2lburo in the said city. The #arria$e was the
cul#ination of a previous love affair and was duly re$istered with the local civil re$ister.
:icenta9s letters to )astor, and his to her, before the #arria$e, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. To$ether with a friend, )acita ;oel, their #atch#a+er and $o-between, they had planned out
their #arital future whereby )acita would be the $overness of their first-born4 they started savin$
#oney in a pi$$y ban+. 2 few wee+s before their secret #arria$e, their en$a$e#ent was bro+en4
:icenta returned the en$a$e#ent rin$ and accepted another suitor, &oselin$ *ao. ?er love for )astor
bec+oned4 she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This ti#e they planned to $et #arried and
then elope. To facilitate the elope#ent, :icenta had brou$ht so#e of her clothes to the roo# of
)acita ;oel in At. Mary9s ?all, which was their usual trystin$ place.
2lthou$h planned for the #idni$ht followin$ their #arria$e, the elope#ent did not, however,
#ateriali>e because when :icente went bac+ to her classes after the #arria$e, her #other, who $ot
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waitin$ for her at the colle$e. :icenta was ta+en ho#e
where she ad#itted that she had already #arried )astor. Ma#erto and Mena scaHo were
surprised, because )astor never as+ed for the hand of :icente, and were dis$usted because of the
$reat scandal that the clandestine #arria$e would provo+e <t.s.n., vol. ///, pp. 1100-0'=. The
followin$ #ornin$, the scaHo spouses sou$ht priestly advice. "ather @eynes su$$ested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid #arria$e, fro# the standpoint of the
3hurch, due to the lac+ of authority fro# the 2rchbishop or the parish priest for the officiatin$
chaplain to celebrate the #arria$e. The recelebration did not ta+e place, because on -' "ebruary
19.8 Ma#erto scaHo was handed by a #aid, whose na#e he clai#s he does not re#e#ber, a
letter purportedly co#in$ fro# Aan 3arlos colle$e students and disclosin$ an a#orous relationship
between )astor Tenchave> and )acita ;oel4 :icenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not a$ree to a new #arria$e. :icenta and )astor #et that day in the house of Mrs.
)ilar Mende>ona. Thereafter, :icenta continued livin$ with her parents while )astor returned to his
6ob in Manila. ?er letter of -- March 19.8 <(h. "M"=, while still solicitous of her husband9s welfare,
was not as endearin$ as her previous letters when their love was afla#e.
:icenta was bred in 3atholic ways but is of a chan$eable disposition, and )astor +new it. Ahe fondly
accepted her bein$ called a "6ellyfish." Ahe was not prevented by her parents fro# co##unicatin$
with )astor <(h. "1-scaHo"=, but her letters beca#e less fre%uent as the days passed. 2s of &une,
19.8 the newlyweds were already estran$ed <(h. "--scaHo"=. :icenta had $one to &i#ene>,
Misa#is Eccidental, to escape fro# the scandal that her #arria$e stirred in 3ebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Aenator ##anuel )elae>, to annul her #arria$e. Ahe
did not si$n the petition <(h. "!-0"=. The case was dis#issed without pre6udice because of her non-
appearance at the hearin$ <(h. "!-."=.
En -. &une 1900, without infor#in$ her husband, she applied for a passport, indicatin$ in her
application that she was sin$le, that her purpose was to study, and she was do#iciled in 3ebu 3ity,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
,nited Atates. En -- 2u$ust 1900, she filed a verified co#plaint for divorce a$ainst the herein
plaintiff in the Aecond &udicial District 3ourt of the Atate of ;evada in and for the 3ounty of 7ashoe,
on the $round of "e(tre#e cruelty, entirely #ental in character." En -1 Ectober 1900, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
/n 1901 Ma#erto and Mena scaHo filed a petition with the 2rchbishop of 3ebu to annul their
dau$hter9s #arria$e to )astor <(h. "D"=. En 10 Aepte#ber 190., :icenta sou$ht papal dispensation
of her #arria$e <(h. "D"--=.
En 13 Aepte#ber 190., :icenta #arried an 2#erican, @ussell *eo Moran, in ;evada. Ahe now lives
with hi# in 3alifornia, and, by hi#, has be$otten children. Ahe ac%uired 2#erican citi>enship on 8
2u$ust 1908.
!ut on 30 &uly 1900, Tenchave> had initiated the proceedin$s at bar by a co#plaint in the 3ourt of
"irst /nstance of 3ebu, and a#ended on 31 May 190', a$ainst :icenta ". scaHo, her parents,
Ma#erto and Mena scaHo, who# he char$ed with havin$ dissuaded and discoura$ed :icenta fro#
6oinin$ her husband, and alienatin$ her affections, and a$ainst the @o#an 3atholic 3hurch, for
havin$, throu$h its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annul#ent of the #arria$e, and as+ed for le$al
separation and one #illion pesos in da#a$es. :icenta clai#ed a valid divorce fro# plaintiff and an
e%ually valid #arria$e to her present husband, @ussell *eo Moran4 while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their dau$hter9s acts, and counterclai#ed for #oral da#a$es.
The appealed 6ud$#ent did not decree a le$al separation, but freed the plaintiff fro# supportin$ his
wife and to ac%uire property to the e(clusion of his wife. /t allowed the counterclai# of Ma#erto
scaHo and Mena scaHo for #oral and e(e#plary da#a$es and attorney9s fees a$ainst the
plaintiff-appellant, to the e(tent of ).0,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this 3ourt.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the followin$5
1. /n not declarin$ le$al separation4 in not holdin$ defendant :icenta ". scaHo liable for
da#a$es and in dis#issin$ the co#plaint4.
-. /n not holdin$ the defendant parents Ma#erto scano and the heirs of DoHa Mena
scaHo liable for da#a$es4.
3 /n holdin$ the plaintiff liable for and re%uirin$ hi# to pay the da#a$es to the defendant
parents on their counterclai#s4 and.
.. /n dis#issin$ the co#plaint and in denyin$ the relief sou$ht by the plaintiff.
That on -. "ebruary 19.8 the plaintiff-appellant, )astor Tenchave>, and the defendant-appellee,
:icenta scaHo, were validly #arried to each other, fro# the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. !oth parties were then above the a$e of #a6ority, and otherwise
%ualified4 and both consented to the #arria$e, which was perfor#ed by a 3atholic priest <ar#y
chaplain *avares= in the presence of co#petent witnesses. /t is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authori>ed under civil law to sole#ni>e #arria$es.
The chaplain9s alle$ed lac+ of ecclesiastical authori>ation fro# the parish priest and the Erdinary, as
re%uired by 3anon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of 3hurch
and Atate but also because 2ct 3'13 of the )hilippine *e$islature <which was the #arria$e law in
force at the ti#e= e(pressly provided that J
A3. 1. 4ssential requisites. ssential re%uisites for #arria$e are the le$al capacity of the
contractin$ parties and consent. <#phasis supplied=
The actual authority of the sole#ni>in$ officer was thus only a for#al re%uire#ent, and, therefore,
not essential to $ive the #arria$e civil effects,
3
and this is e#phasi>ed by section -1 of said #arria$e
act, which provided the followin$5
A3. -1. 5ailure to compl; )ith formal requirements. ;o #arria$e shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the for#al re%uire#ents of this 2ct if, when it
was perfor#ed, the spouses or one of the# believed in $ood faith that the person who
sole#ni>ed the #arria$e was actually e#powered to do so, and that the #arria$e was
perfectly le$al.
The $ood faith of all the parties to the #arria$e <and hence the validity of their #arria$e= will be
presu#ed until the contrary is positively proved <*ao vs. Dee Ti#, .0 )hil. 139, 1.04 "rancisco vs.
&ason, '0 )hil. ..-, ..8=. /t is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the sole#ni>in$ priest arose only after the #arria$e, when :icenta9s parents consulted "ather
@eynes and the archbishop of 3ebu. Moreover, the very act of :icenta in abandonin$ her ori$inal
action for annul#ent and subse%uently suin$ for divorce i#plies an ad#ission that her #arria$e to
plaintiff was valid and bindin$.
Defendant :icenta scaHo ar$ues that when she contracted the #arria$e she was under the undue
influence of )acita ;oel, who# she char$es to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchave>.
ven $rantin$, for ar$u#ent9s sa+e, the truth of that contention, and assu#in$ that :icenta9s consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her #arria$e a& initio void, but
#erely voidable, and the #arria$e re#ained valid until annulled by a co#petent civil court. This was
never done, and ad#ittedly, :icenta9s suit for annul#ent in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of Misa#is
was dis#issed for non-prosecution.
/t is e%ually clear fro# the record that the valid #arria$e between )astor Tenchave> and :icenta
scaHo re#ained subsistin$ and undissolved under )hilippine law, notwithstandin$ the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sou$ht and obtained on -1 Ectober 1900 fro# the Aecond &udicial
District 3ourt of 7ashoe 3ounty, Atate of ;evada, on $rounds of "e(tre#e cruelty, entirely #ental in
character." 2t the ti#e the divorce decree was issued, :icenta scaHo, li+e her husband, was still a
"ilipino citi>en.
.
Ahe was then sub6ect to )hilippine law, and 2rticle 10 of the 3ivil 3ode of the
)hilippines <@ep. 2ct ;o. 38'=, already in force at the ti#e, e(pressly provided5
*aws relatin$ to fa#ily ri$hts and duties or to the status, condition and le$al capacity of
persons are bindin$ upon the citi>ens of the )hilippines, even thou$h livin$ abroad.
The 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines, now in force, does not ad#it absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii4 and in fact does not even use that ter#, to further e#phasi>e its restrictive policy on the
#atter, in contrast to the precedin$ le$islation that ad#itted absolute divorce on $rounds of adultery
of the wife or concubina$e of the husband <2ct -110=. /nstead of divorce, the present 3ivil 3ode only
provides for legal separation <Title /:, !oo+ 1, 2rts. 91 to 108=, and, even in that case, it e(pressly
prescribes that "the #arria$e bonds shall not be severed" <2rt. 10', subpar. 1=.
"or the )hilippine courts to reco$ni>e and $ive reco$nition or effect to a forei$n decree of absolute
divorce betiveen "ilipino citi>ens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third para$raph of 2rticle 11 of the 3ivil 3ode that prescribes the followin$5
)rohibitive laws concernin$ persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
ob6ect public order, policy and $ood custo#s, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
6ud$#ents pro#ul$ated, or by deter#inations or conventions a$reed upon in a forei$n
country.
ven #ore, the $rant of effectivity in this 6urisdiction to such forei$n divorce decrees would, in effect,
$ive rise to an irritatin$ and scandalous discri#ination in favor of wealthy citi>ens, to the detri#ent of
those #e#bers of our polity whose #eans do not per#it the# to so6ourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the )hilippines.
"ro# this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant )astor Tenchave> should have appeared in the
;evada divorce court. )ri#arily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties <3ivil 3ode,2rt. 11, 6a# %uot.=4 and additionally, because the #ere appearance of a non-
resident consort cannot confer 6urisdiction where the court ori$inally had none <2rea vs. &avier, 90
)hil. 019=.
"ro# the precedin$ facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary conse%uence that in this
6urisdiction :icenta scaHo9s divorce and second #arria$e are not entitled to reco$nition as valid4 for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchave> #ust be declared to be e(istent and undissolved. /t follows,
li+ewise, that her refusal to perfor# her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wron$ caused throu$h her fault, for which the husband is entitled
to the correspondin$ inde#nity <3ivil 3ode, 2rt. -11'=. ;either an unsubstantiated char$e of deceit
nor an anony#ous letter char$in$ i##orality a$ainst the husband constitute, contrary to her clai#,
ade%uate e(cuse. 7herefore, her #arria$e and cohabitation with @ussell *eo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" fro# the standpoint of )hilippine *aw, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchave> to a decree of "le$al separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
<@evised )enal 3ode, 2rt. 333=.
The fore$oin$ conclusions as to the untoward effect of a #arria$e after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulin$s of this court on the sub6ect, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act <2ct -110 of the
)hilippine *e$islature=. 2s a #atter of le$al history, our statutes did not reco$ni>e divorces a
vinculo before 1911, when 2ct -110 beca#e effective4 and the present 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines,
in disre$ardin$ absolute divorces, in effect #erely reverted to the policies on the sub6ect prevailin$
before 2ct -110. The rulin$s, therefore, under the 3ivil 3ode of 1889, prior to the 2ct above-
#entioned, are now, fully applicable. Ef these, the decision in "amire. vs. -mur, .- )hil. 800, is of
particular interest. Aaid this 3ourt in that case5
2s the divorce $ranted by the "rench 3ourt #ust be i$nored, it results that the #arria$e of
Dr. Mory and *eona 3astro, celebrated in *ondon in 1900, could not le$ali>e their relations4
and the circu#stance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Awit>erland until
her death is wholly without le$al si$nificance. The clai#s of the very children to participate in
the estate of Aa#uel !ishop #ust therefore be re6ected. The ri$ht to inherit is li#ited to
le$iti#ate, le$iti#ated and ac+nowled$ed natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly e(cluded. The word "descendants" as used in 2rticle 9.1 of the 3ivil
3ode cannot be interpreted to include ille$iti#ates born of adulterous relations. <#phasis
supplied=
(cept for the fact that the successional ri$hts of the children, be$otten fro# :icenta9s #arria$e to
*eo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the -mur case is authority
for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this 6urisdiction, and, therefore, 6ustifies an action
for le$al separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first #arria$e, that stands undissolved
in )hilippine law. /n not so declarin$, the trial court co##itted error.
True it is that our rulin$ $ives rise to ano#alous situations where the status of a person <whether
divorced or not= would depend on the territory where the %uestion arises. 2no#alies of this +ind are
not new in the )hilippines, and the answer to the# was $iven in 1arretto vs. -on.ales, 08 )hil. ''15
The hardship of the e(istin$ divorce laws in the )hilippine /slands are well +nown to the
#e#bers of the *e$islature. /t is the duty of the 3ourts to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by *e$islature if they are constitutional. 3ourts have no ri$ht to say that such laws are
too strict or too liberal. <p. 1-=
The appellant9s first assi$n#ent of error is, therefore, sustained.
?owever, the plaintiff-appellant9s char$e that his wife9s parents, Dr. Ma#erto scaHo and his wife,
the late DoHa Mena scaHo, alienated the affections of their dau$hter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testi#ony of )astor Tenchave>
about the scaHo9s ani#osity toward hi# stri+es us to be #erely con6ecture and e(a$$eration, and
are belied by )astor9s own letters written before this suit was be$un <(h. "--scaHo" and ":icenta,"
@ec. on 2pp., pp. -10--1.=. /n these letters he e(pressly apolo$i>ed to the defendants for
"#is6ud$in$ the#" and for the "$reat unhappiness" caused by his "i#pulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" BsicC. )laintiff was ad#itted to the scaHo house to visit and court
:icenta, and the record shows nothin$ to prove that he would not have been accepted to #arry
:icente had he openly as+ed for her hand, as $ood #anners and breedin$ de#anded. ven after
learnin$ of the clandestine #arria$e, and despite their shoc+ at such une(pected event, the parents
of :icenta proposed and arran$ed that the #arria$e be recelebrated in strict confor#ity with the
canons of their reli$ion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. /f no
recelebration of the #arria$e cere#ony was had it was not due to defendants Ma#erto scaHo and
his wife, but to the refusal of :icenta to proceed with it. That the spouses scaHo did not see+ to
co#pel or induce their dau$hter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. ;either does the
fact that :icenta9s parents sent her #oney while she was in the ,nited Atates4 for it was natural that
they should not wish their dau$hter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchave> <-1 2#. &ur. 130-13-=.
There is no evidence that the parents of :icenta, out of i#proper #otives, aided and abetted her
ori$inal suit for annul#ent, or her subse%uent divorce4 she appears to have acted independently,
and bein$ of a$e, she was entitled to 6ud$e what was best for her and as+ that her decisions be
respected. ?er parents, in so doin$, certainly cannot be char$ed with alienation of affections in the
absence of #alice or unworthy #otives, which have not been shown, $ood faith bein$ always
presu#ed until the contrary is proved.
A3. 0-9. %ia&ilit; of /arents, -uardians or Nin. J The law distin$uishes between the ri$ht
of a parent to interest hi#self in the #arital affairs of his child and the absence of ri$hts in a
stran$er to inter#eddle in such affairs. ?owever, such distinction between the liability of
parents and that of stran$ers is only in re$ard to what will 6ustify interference. 2 parent
isliable for alienation of affections resultin$ fro# his own #alicious conduct, as where he
wron$fully entices his son or dau$hter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts #aliciously, without 6ustification and fro# unworthy #otives. ?e is not liable where
he acts and advises his child in $ood faith with respect to his child9s #arital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the #arria$e of his child not ter#inatin$ his ri$ht and liberty
to interest hi#self in, and be e(tre#ely solicitous for, his child9s welfare and happiness, even
where his conduct and advice su$$est or result in the separation of the spouses or the
obtainin$ of a divorce or annul#ent, or where he acts under #ista+e or #isinfor#ation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, althou$h it has been held that
the parent is liable for conse%uences resultin$ fro# rec+lessness. ?e #ay in $ood faith ta+e
his child into his ho#e and afford hi# or her protection and support, so lon$ as he has not
#aliciously enticed his child away, or does not #aliciously entice or cause hi# or her to stay
away, fro# his or her spouse. This rule has #ore fre%uently been applied in the case of
advice $iven to a #arried dau$hter, but it is e%ually applicable in the case of advice $iven to
a son.
)laintiff Tenchave>, in falsely char$in$ :icenta9s a$ed parents with racial or social discri#ination and
with havin$ e(erted efforts and pressured her to see+ annul#ent and divorce, un%uestionably
caused the# unrest and an(iety, entitlin$ the# to recover da#a$es. 7hile this suit #ay not have
been i#pelled by actual #alice, the char$es were certainly rec+less in the face of the proven facts
and circu#stances. 3ourt actions are not established for parties to $ive vent to their pre6udices or
spleen.
/n the assess#ent of the #oral da#a$es recoverable by appellant )astor Tenchave> fro#
defendant :icente scaHo, it is proper to ta+e into account, a$ainst his patently unreasonable clai#
for a #illion pesos in da#a$es, that <a= the #arria$e was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characteri>ed by publicity or undue hu#iliation on appellant9s part4 <b= that the parties never lived
to$ether4 and <c= that there is evidence that appellant had ori$inally a$reed to the annul#ent of the
#arria$e, althou$h such a pro#ise was le$ally invalid, bein$ a$ainst public policy <cf. 2rt. 88, 3iv.
3ode=. 7hile appellant is unable to re#arry under our law, this fact is a conse%uence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second #arria$e. 2ll told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover )-0,000 only by way of #oral da#a$es and attorney9s fees.
7ith re$ard to the ).0,000 da#a$es awarded to the defendants, Dr. Ma#erto scaHo and Mena
scaHo, by the court below, we opine that the sa#e are e(cessive. 7hile the filin$ of this unfounded
suit #ust have wounded said defendants9 feelin$s and caused the# an(iety, the sa#e could in no
way have seriously in6ured their reputation, or otherwise pre6udiced the#, lawsuits havin$ beco#e a
co##on occurrence in present society. 7hat is i#portant, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not $uilty of any i#proper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This 3ourt, therefore, reduces the da#a$es awarded to )0,000 only.
Au##in$ up, the 3ourt rules5
<1= That a forei$n divorce between "ilipino citi>ens, sou$ht and decreed after the effectivity of the
present 3ivil 3ode <@ep. 2ct 38'=, is not entitled to reco$nition as valid in this 6urisdiction4 and
neither is the #arria$e contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subse%uently to the
forei$n decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country4
<-= That the re#arria$e of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of le$al separation confor#ably to )hilippine law4
<3= That the desertion and securin$ of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover da#a$es4
<.= That an action for alienation of affections a$ainst the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of #alice or unworthy #otives on their part.
7?@"E@, the decision under appeal is hereby #odified as follows4
<1= 2d6ud$in$ plaintiff-appellant )astor Tenchave> entitled to a decree of le$al separation fro#
defendant :icenta ". scaHo4
<-= Aentencin$ defendant-appellee :icenta scaHo to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchave> the a#ount
of )-0,000 for da#a$es and attorneys9 fees4
<3= Aentencin$ appellant )astor Tenchave> to pay the appellee, Ma#erto scaHo and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena scaHo, )0,000 by way of da#a$es and attorneys9 fees.
;either party to recover costs.
1eng.on, C.J., 1autista Angelo, Concepcion, Di.on, "egala, !akalintal, 1eng.on, J./. and 9aldivar,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 89833 :a%-ar. 21, 1991
!1OMAS C. C1EESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
IN!ERME5IA!E APPELLA!E CO>R! a%" ES!ELI!A PA5ILLA, respondents.
4stanislao %. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner.
1enFamin 0. 5ernande. for private respondent.

NARASA, J.:#
This appeal concerns the atte#pt by an 2#erican citi>en <petitioner Tho#as 3hees#an= to annul J
for lac+ of consent on his part J the sale by his "ilipino wife <3riselda= of a residential lot and
buildin$ to stelita )adilla, also a "ilipino.
Tho#as 3hees#an and 3riselda ). 3hees#an were #arried on Dece#ber ., 1910 but have been
separated since "ebruary 10,1981.
1
En &une ., 191., a "Deed of Aale and Transfer of )ossessory @i$hts" was e(ecuted by 2r#ando
2ltares conveyin$ a parcel of unre$istered land and the house thereon <at ;o. 1 ;eptune Atreet,
8ordon ?ei$hts, Elon$apo 3ity= in favor of "3riselda ). 3hees#an, of le$al a$e, "ilipino citi>en,
#arried to Tho#as 3hees#an, and residin$ at *ot ;o. 1, !l+. 8, "iltration @oad, Ata. @ita, Elon$apo
3ity . . ."
2
Tho#as 3hees#an, althou$h aware of the deed, did not ob6ect to the transfer bein$ #ade
only to his wife.
3
ThereafterJand a$ain with the +nowled$e of Tho#as 3hees#an and also without any protest by
hi#Jta( declarations for the property purchased were issued in the na#e only of 3riselda
3hees#an and 3riselda assu#ed e(clusive #ana$e#ent and ad#inistration of said property,
leasin$ it to tenants.
9
En &uly 1, 1981, 3riselda 3hees#an sold the property to stelita M. )adilla,
without the +nowled$e or consent of Tho#as 3hees#an.
D
The deed described 3riselda as bein$" . .
. of le$al a$e, #arried to an 2#erican citi>en,. . ."
6
Thirty days later, or on &uly 31, 1981, Tho#as 3hees#an brou$ht suit in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance
at Elon$apo 3ity a$ainst his wife, 3riselda, and stelita )adilla, prayin$ for the annul#ent of the
sale on the $round that the transaction had been e(ecuted without his +nowled$e and consent.
8
2n
answer was filed in the na#es of both defendants, alle$in$ that <1= the property sold was
paraphernal, havin$ been purchased by 3riselda with funds e(clusively belon$in$ to her <"her own
separate #oney"=4 <-= Tho#as 3hees#an, bein$ an 2#erican, was dis%ualified to have any interest
or ri$ht of ownership in the land4 and <3= stelita )adilla was a buyer in $ood faith.
8
Durin$ the pre-trial conference, the parties a$reed upon certain facts which were subse%uently set
out in a pre-trial Erder dated Ectober --, 1981,
9
as follows5
1. !oth parties reco$ni>e the e(istence of the Deed of Aale over the residential
house located at ;o. 1 8ranada At., 8ordon ?ei$hts, Elon$apo 3ity, which was
ac%uired fro# 2r#ando 2ltares on &une ., 191. and sold by defendant 3riselda
3hees#an to stelita )adilla on &uly 1-, 19814 and
-. That the transaction re$ardin$ the transfer of their property too+ place durin$ the
e(istence of their #arria$e as the couple were #arried on Dece#ber ., 1910 and the
%uestioned property was ac%uired so#eti#e on &une .,191..
The action resulted in a 6ud$#ent dated &une -., 198-,
10
declarin$ void a& initio the sale e(ecuted
by 3riselda 3hees#an in favor of stelita M. )adilla, and orderin$ the delivery of the property to
Tho#as 3hees#an as ad#inistrator of the con6u$al partnership property, and the pay#ent to hi# of
)0,000.00 as attorney9s fees and e(penses of liti$ation.
11
The 6ud$#ent was however set aside as re$ards stelita )adilla on a petition for relief filed by the
latter, $rounded on "fraud, #ista+e andNor e(cusable ne$li$ence" which had seriously i#paired her
ri$ht to present her case ade%uately.
12
"2fter the petition for relief fro# 6ud$#ent was $iven due
course," accordin$ to petitioner, "a new 6ud$e presided over the case."
13
stelita )adilla filed a supple#ental pleadin$ on Dece#ber -0, 198- as her own answer to the
co#plaint, and a #otion for su##ary 6ud$#ent on May 11, 1983. 2lthou$h there was initial
opposition by Tho#as 3hees#an to the #otion, the parties ulti#ately a$reed on the rendition by the
court of a su##ary 6ud$#ent after enterin$ into a stipulation of facts, at the hearin$ of the #otion on
&une -1, 1983, the stipulation bein$ of the followin$ tenor5
19
<1= that the property in %uestion was bou$ht durin$ the e(istence of the #arria$e
between the plaintiff and the defendant 3riselda ). 3hees#an4
<-= that the property bou$ht durin$ the #arria$e was re$istered in the na#e of
3riselda 3hees#an and that the Deed of Aale and Transfer of )ossessory @i$hts
e(ecuted by the for#er owner-vendor 2r#ando 2ltares in favor of 3riselda
3hees#an #ade no #ention of the plaintiff4
<3= that the property, sub6ect of the proceedin$s, was sold by defendant 3riselda
3hees#an in favor of the other defendant stelita M. )adilla, without the written
consent of the plaintiff.
Ebviously upon the theory that no $enuine issue e(isted any lon$er and there was hence no need of
a trial, the parties havin$ in fact sub#itted, as also stipulated, their respective #e#oranda each
prayin$ for a favorable verdict, the Trial 3ourt
1D
rendered a "Au##ary &ud$#ent" dated 2u$ust 3,
198- declarin$ "the sale e(ecuted by . . . 3riselda 3hees#an in favor of . . . stelita )adilla to be
valid," dis#issin$ Tho#as 3hees#an9s co#plaint and orderin$ hi# "to i##ediately turn over the
possession of the house and lot sub6ect of . . . <the= case to . . . stelita )adilla . . ."
16
The Trial 3ourt found that J
1= the evidence on record satisfactorily overca#e the disputable presu#ption in
2rticle 1'0 of the 3ivil 3odeJthat all property of the #arria$e belon$s to the
con6u$al partnership "unless it be proved that it pertains e(clusively to the husband
or to the wife"Jand that the i##ovable in %uestion was in truth 3riselda9s
paraphernal property4
-= that #oreover, said le$al presu#ption in 2rticle 1'0 could not apply "inas#uch as
the husband-plaintiff is an 2#erican citi>en and therefore dis%ualified under the
3onstitution to ac%uire and own real properties4 and
3= that the e(ercise by 3riselda of e(clusive acts of do#inion with the +nowled$e of
her husband "had led . . . stelita )adilla to believe that the properties were the
e(clusive properties of 3riselda 3hees#an and on the faith of such a belief she
bou$ht the properties fro# her and for value," and therefore, Tho#as 3hees#an
was, under 2rticle 1.13 of the 3ivil 3ode, estopped to i#pu$n the transfer to stelita
)adilla.
Tho#as 3hees#an appealed to the /nter#ediate 2ppellate 3ourt. There he assailed the Trial 3ourt
acts <1= of $rantin$ stelita )adilla9s petition for relief, and its resolution of #atters not sub6ect of said
petition4 <-= of declarin$ valid the sale to stelita )adilla despite the lac+ of consent thereto by hi#,
and the presu#ption of the con6u$al character of the property in %uestion pursuant to 2rticle 1'0 of
the 3ivil 3ode4 <3= of disre$ardin$ the 6ud$#ent of &une -., 198- which, not havin$ been set aside
as a$ainst 3riselda 3hees#an, continued to be bindin$ on her4 and <.= of #a+in$ findin$s of fact not
supported by evidence. 2ll of these contentions were found to be without #erit by the 2ppellate
Tribunal which, on &anuary 1, 198', pro#ul$ated a decision <erroneously deno#inated,
"@eport"=
18
affir#in$ the "Au##ary &ud$#ent co#plained of," "havin$ found no reversible error"
therein.
Ence #ore, Tho#as 3hees#an availed of the re#edy of appeal, this ti#e to this 3ourt. ?ere, he
ar$ues that it was reversible error for the /nter#ediate 2ppellate 3ourt J
1= to find that the presu#ption that the property in %uestion is con6u$al in accordance with 2rticle 1'0
had been satisfactorily overco#e by stelita )adilla4
18
-= to rule that stelita )adilla was a purchaser of said property in $ood faith, it appearin$5
a= that the deed by which the property was conveyed to 3riselda 3hees#an
described her as "#arried to Tho#as 3. 3hees#an," as well as the deed by which
the property was later conveyed to stelita )adilla by 3riselda 3hees#an also
described her as "#arried to an 2#erican citi>en," and both said descriptions had
thus "placed stelita on +nowled$e of the con6u$al nature of the property4" and
b= that further#ore, stelita had ad#itted to statin$ in the deed by which she
ac%uired the property a price #uch lower than that actually paid "in order to avoid
pay#ent of #ore obli$ation to the $overn#ent4"
19
3= to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the $rant of stelita )adilla9s petition for
relief on the $round of "fraud, #ista+e andNor e(cusable ne$li$ence4"
20
.= to hold that Tho#as 3hees#an had waived his ob6ection to stelita9s petition for relief by failin$ to
appeal fro# the order $rantin$ the sa#e4
0= to accord to stelita )adilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in her petition
for relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which stelita alle$edly paid to 3riselda4"
21
and
'= to fail to declare that Tho#as 3hees#an9s citi>enship is not a bar to his action to recover the lot
and house for the con6u$al partnership.
22
Auch conclusions as that <1= fraud, #ista+e or e(cusable ne$li$ence e(isted in the pre#ises
6ustifyin$ relief to stelita )adilla under @ule 38 of the @ules of 3ourt, or <-= that 3riselda 3hees#an
had used #oney she had brou$ht into her #arria$e to Tho#as 3hees#an to purchase the lot and
house in %uestion, or <3= that stelita )adilla believed in $ood faith that 3riselda 3hees#an was the
e(clusive owner of the property that she <stelita= intended to and did in fact buyJderived fro# the
evidence adduced by the parties, the facts set out in the pleadin$s or otherwise appearin$ on record
Jare conclusions or findin$s of fact. 2s distin$uished fro# a %uestion of lawJwhich e(ists "when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" J "there is a %uestion
of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alle$ed facts4"
23
or
when the "%uery necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considerin$ #ainly the
credibility of witnesses, e(istence and relevancy of specific surroundin$ circu#stances, their relation4
to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."
29
;ow, it is a(io#atic that only %uestions of law, distinctly set forth, #ay be raised in a petition for the
review oncertiorari of a decision of the 3ourt of 2ppeals presented to this 3ourt.
2D
2s everyone
+nows or ou$ht to +now, the appellate 6urisdiction of this 3ourt is li#ited to reviewin$ errors of law,
acceptin$ as conclusive the factual findin$s of the lower court upon its own assess#ent of the
evidence.
26
The creation of the 3ourt of 2ppeals was precisely intended to ta+e away fro# the
Aupre#e 3ourt the wor+ of e(a#inin$ the evidence, and confine its tas+ to the deter#ination of
%uestions which do not call for the readin$ and study of transcripts containin$ the testi#ony of
witnesses.
28
The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findin$s or conclusions of the 3ourt of 2ppeals
is, to be sure, sub6ect to certain e(ceptions,
28
none of which however obtains in the case at bar.
/t is noteworthy that both the Trial 3ourt and the /nter#ediate 2ppellate 3ourt reached the sa#e
conclusions on the three <3= factual #atters above set forth, after assess#ent of the evidence and
deter#ination of the probative value thereof. !oth 3ourts found that the facts on record ade%uately
proved fraud, #ista+e or e(cusable ne$li$ence by which stelita )adilla9s ri$hts had been
substantially i#paired4 that the funds used by 3riselda 3hees#an was #oney she had earned and
saved prior to her #arria$e to Tho#as 3hees#an, and that stelita )adilla did believe in $ood faith
that 3riselda 3hees#an was the sole owner of the property in %uestion. 3onse%uently, these
deter#inations of fact will not be here disturbed, this 3ourt havin$ been cited to no reason for doin$
so.
These considerations dispose of the first three <3= points that petitioner 3hees#an see+s to #a+e in
his appeal. They also #a+e unnecessary an e(tended discussion of the other issues raised by hi#.
2s to the#, it should suffice to restate certain funda#ental propositions.
2n order of a 3ourt of "irst /nstance <now @e$ional Trial 3ourt= $rantin$ a petition for relief under
@ule 38 is interlocutory and is not appealable. ?ence, the failure of the party who opposed the
petition to appeal fro# said order, or his participation in the proceedin$s subse%uently had, cannot
be construed as a waiver of his ob6ection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raisin$ the
sa#e %uestion on appeal fro# the 6ud$#ent on the #erits of the #ain case. Auch a party need not
repeat his ob6ections to the petition for relief, or perfor# any act thereafter <e.$., ta+e for#al
e(ception= in order to preserve his ri$ht to %uestion the sa#e eventually, on appeal, it bein$
sufficient for this purpose that he has #ade of record "the action which he desires the court to ta+e
or his ob6ection to the action of the court and his $rounds therefor."
29
2$ain, the prayer in a petition for relief fro# 6ud$#ent under @ule 38 is not necessarily the sa#e
prayer in the petitioner9s co#plaint, answer or other basic pleadin$. This should be obvious. %ually
obvious is that once a petition for relief is $ranted and the 6ud$#ent sub6ect thereof set aside, and
further proceedin$s are thereafter had, the 3ourt in its 6ud$#ent on the #erits #ay properly $rant
the relief sou$ht in the petitioner9s basic pleadin$s, althou$h different fro# that stated in his petition
for relief.
"inally, the funda#ental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Aection 1., 2rticle M/: of
the 1913 3onstitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditar; succession, no private land shall &e
transferred or conve;ed e#cept to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the pu&lic domain."
30
)etitioner Tho#as 3hees#an was, of course, char$ed with
+nowled$e of this prohibition. Thus, assu#in$ that it was his intention that the lot in %uestion be
purchased by hi# and his wife, he ac%uired no ri$ht whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase4 and in atte#ptin$ to ac%uire a ri$ht or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
+nowin$ly violated the 3onstitution4 the sale as to hi# was null and void.
31
/n any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to %uestion the subse%uent sale of the sa#e property by his wife on
the theory that in so doin$ he is #erely e(ercisin$ the prero$ative of a husband in respect of
con6u$al property. To sustain such a theory would per#it indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. /f the property were to be declared con6u$al, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and ri$ht over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a ri$ht that the 3onstitution does not per#it hi# to have.
2s already observed, the findin$ that his wife had used her own #oney to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this sta$e of the proceedin$s be reviewed and overturned. !ut even if it were
a fact that said wife had used con6u$al funds to #a+e the ac%uisition, the considerations 6ust set out
#ilitate, on hi$h constitutional $rounds, a$ainst his recoverin$ and holdin$ the property so ac%uired
or any part thereof. 2nd whether in such an event, he #ay recover fro# his wife any share of the
#oney used for the purchase or char$e her with unauthori>ed disposition or e(penditure of con6u$al
funds is not now in%uired into4 that would be, in the pre#ises, a purely acade#ic e(ercise. 2n
e%ually decisive consideration is that stelita )adilla is a purchaser in $ood faith, both the Trial 3ourt
and the 2ppellate 3ourt havin$ found that 3hees#an9s own conduct had led her to believe the
property to be e(clusive property of the latter9s wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or
intervention. 2n innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase,
particularly as a$ainst 3hees#an, who would assert ri$hts to the property denied hi# by both letter
and spirit of the 3onstitution itself.
7?@"E@, the appealed decision is 2""/@MD, with costs a$ainst petitioner.
AE E@D@D.
G.R. No. L-D898 A0r$+ 23, 19D9
@ING MA> ;>, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO S?CIP, defendant-appellant.
0.C. !onsod for appellant.
J.A. Wolfson and /. /. -allardo for appellee.
PA5ILLA, J./
This is an action to collect )09,08-.9-, to$ether with lawful interests fro# 1. Ectober 19.1, the date
of the written de#and for pay#ent, and costs. The clai# arises out of a ship#ent of 1,000 tons of
coconut oil e#ulsion sold by the plaintiff, as a$ent of the defendant, to &as. Ma(well "assett, who in
turn assi$ned it to "ortrade 3orporation. ,nder an a$ency a$ree#ent set forth in a letter dated 1
;ove#ber 19.' in ;ew Gor+ addressed to the defendant and accepted by the latter on the --nd day
of the sa#e #onth, the plaintiff was #ade the e(clusive a$ent of the defendant in the sale of
coconut oil and its derivatives outside the )hilippines and was to be paid - 1N- per cent on the total
actual sale price of sales obtained throu$h his efforts in addition thereto 00 per cent of the difference
between the authori>ed sale price and the actual sale price.
2fter the trial where the depositions of the plaintiff and of &as. Ma(well "assett and several letters in
connection therewith were introduced and the testi#ony of the defendant was heard, the 3ourt
rendered 6ud$#ent as prayed for in the co#plaint. 2 #otion for reconsideration was denied. 2
#otion for a new trial was filed, supported by the defendant9s affidavit, based on newly discovered
evidence which consists of a duplicate ori$inal of a letter dated 1' Ectober 19.' coverin$ the sale of
1,000 tons of coconut oil soap e#ulsion si$ned by &as. Ma(well "assett assi$ned by the latter to the
defendant4 the letter of credit ;o. -01-- of the 3he#ical !an+ V Trust 3o#pany in favor of &as.
Ma(well "assett assi$ned by the latter to the defendant4 and a letter dated 1' Dece#ber 19.' by
the "ortrade 3orporation to &as. Ma(well "assett accepted it on -. Dece#ber 19.', all of which
docu#ents, accordin$ to the defendant, could not be produced at the trial, despite the use of
reasonable dili$ence, and if produced they would alter the result of the controversy. The #otion for
new trial was denied. The defendant is appealin$ fro# said 6ud$#ent.
!oth parties a$reed that the only transaction or sale #ade by the plaintiff, as a$ent of the defendant,
was that of 1,000 #etric tons of coconut oil e#ulsion f.o.b. in Manila, )hilippines, to &as. Ma(well
"assett, in whose favor letter of credit ;o. -011- of the 3he#ical !an+ V Trust 3o#pany for a su#
not to e(ceed X.00,000 was established and who assi$ned to "ortrade 3orporation his fi$ht to the
1,000 #etric tons of coconut oil e#ulsion and in the defendant the letter of credit referred to for a
su# not to e(ceed X.00,000.
The plaintiff clai#s that for that sale he is entitled under the a$ency contract dated 1 ;ove#ber 19.'
and accepted by the defendant on -- ;ove#ber of the sa#e year to a co##ission of - 1N- per cent
on the total actual sale price of 1,000 tons of coconut oil e#ulsion, part of which has been paid by
the defendant, there bein$ only a balance of X3,19..9. for co##ission due and unpaid on the last
ship#ent of 319..9. tons and 00 per cent of the difference between the authori>ed sale price of
X300 per ton and the actual sellin$ price of X.00 per ton, which a#ounts to X-0,000 due and unpaid,
and X1.'.0- for interest fro# 1. Ectober 19.1, the date of the written de#and.
The defendant, on the other hand, contends that the transaction for the sale of 1,000 #etric tons of
coconut oil e#ulsion was not covered by the a$ency contract of -- ;ove#ber 19.' because it was
a$reed upon on 1' Ectober 19.'4 that it was an independent and separate transaction for which the
plaintiff has been duly co#pensated. The contention is not borne out by the evidence. The plaintiff
and his witness depose that there were several drafts of docu#ents or letter prepared by &as.
Ma(well "assett preparatory or leadin$ to the e(ecution of the a$ency a$ree#ent of 1 ;ove#ber
19.', which was accepted by the defendant on -- ;ove#ber 19.', and that the letter, on which the
defendant bases his contention that the transaction on the 1,000 #etric tons of coconut oil e#ulsion
was not covered by the a$ency a$ree#ent, was one of those letters. That is believable. The letter
upon which defendant relies for his defense does not stipulate on the co##ission to be paid to the
plaintiff as a$ent, and yet if he paid the plaintiff a - 1N- per cent co##ission on the first three
coconut oil e#ulsion ship#ents, there is no reason why he should not pay hi# the sa#e co##ission
on the last ship#ent a#ountin$ to X3,19..9.. There can be no doubt that the sale of 1,000 #etric
tons of coconut oil e#ulsion was not a separate and independent contract fro# that of the a$ency
a$ree#ent on 1 ;ove#ber and accepted on -- ;ove#ber 19.' by the defendant, because in a
letter dated - &anuary 19.1 addressed to the plaintiff, referrin$ to the transaction of 1,000 #etric
tons of coconut oil e#ulsion, the defendant says J
. . . / a# doin$ everythin$ possible to fulfill these 1,000 tons of e#ulsion, and until such ti#e
that we co#pleted this order / do not feel it very sensible on #y part to accept any #ore
orders. / want to prove to "ortrade, yourself and other people that we deliver our $oods.
@e$ardin$ your co##ission, it is understood to be - 1N- per cent of all prices %uoted by #e
plus 00-00 on over price. <Achedule !.=
/n another letter dated 1' &anuary 1901 to the plaintiff, spea+in$ of the sa#e transaction, the
defendant says J
2s per our understandin$ when / was in the Atates the overprice is sub6ect to any increase in
the cost of production. / a# not tryin$ to #a+e thin$s difficult for you and / shall $ive you your
- 1N- per cent co##ission plus our overprice provided you can $ive #e substantial order in
order for #e to a#orti>e #y loss on this first deal. ,nless such could be arran$ed / shall
re#it to you for the present your co##ission upon collection fro# the ban+. <Achedule 3.=
/n a tele$ra# sent by the defendant to the plaintiff the for#er says J
. . . Gour #oney pendin$ stop understand you authori>ed so#e local attorneys and #y
relatives to intervene your behalf. <Achedule D.=
The defendant9s clai# that the a$ree#ent for the sale of the 1,000 #etric tons of coconut oil
e#ulsion was a$reed upon in a docu#ent, referrin$ to the letter of 1' Ectober 19.', is a$ain
disproved by his letter dated - Dece#ber 19.' to "ortrade 3orporation where he says5
The purpose of this letter is to confir# in final for# the oral agreement which we have
heretofore reached, as between ourselves, durin$ the course of various conversations
between us and our respective representatives upon the sub6ect #atter of this letter.
/t is understood that / a# to sell to you, and you are to purchase fro# #e, 1,000 tons of
coconut oil soap e#ulsion at a price of X.00. per #etric ton, i.e. -,-0..' pounds, ".E.!.
shipboard, Manila, )./. <(hibit A, Apecial. #phasis supplied.=
The contention that as the contract was e(ecuted in ;ew Gor+, the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of Manila
has no 6urisdiction over this case, is without #erit, because a non-resident #ay sue a resident in the
courts of this country
1
where the defendant #ay be su##oned and his property leviable upon
e(ecution in the case of a favorable, final and e(ecutory 6ud$#ent. /t is a personal action for the
collection of a su# of #oney which the 3ourts of "irst /nstance have 6urisdiction to try and decide.
There is no conflict of laws involved in the case, because it is only a %uestion of enforcin$ an
obli$ation created by or arisin$ fro# contract4 and unless the enforce#ent of the contract be a$ainst
public policy of the foru#, it #ust be enforced.
The plaintiff is entitled to collect )1,089.88 for co##ission and )00,000 for one-half of the overprice,
or a total of )01,089.88, lawful interests thereon fro# the date of the filin$ of the co#plaint, and
costs in both instances.
2s thus #odified the 6ud$#ent appealed fro# is affir#ed, with costs a$ainst the appellant.
/aras, C.J., /a&lo, 1eng.on, !ontema;or, "e;es, Jugo, 1autista Angelo, and Concepcion,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 86819 :-%) 2, 1999
SAL>5 !EO5ORO 5A. 5E PERE<, petitioner,
vs.
1ON. <O!ICO A. !OLE!E $% h$& ca0ac$'. a& Pr)&$"$%* :-"*), Bra%ch 18, R!C,
B-+aca%, respondent.
7atividad T. /ere. for petitioner.
1enedicto T. %i&roFo for private respondents.

B>IASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under @ule '0 of the @evised @ules of 3ourt to set aside the Erder
dated ;ove#ber 19, 198' of the @e$ional Trial 3ourt, !ranch 18, !ulacan presided by respondent
&ud$e Ootico 2. Tolete, in Apecial )roceedin$s ;o. 1193-M.
7e $rant the petition.
//
Dr. &ose ". 3unanan and his wife, Dr. velyn )ere>-3unanan, who beca#e 2#erican citi>ens,
established a successful #edical practice in ;ew Gor+, ,.A.2. The 3unanans lived at ;o. -89'
3itation Drive, )o#pey, Ayracuse, ;ew Gor+, with their children, &ocelyn, 184 &ac%ueline, 1'4 and
&osephine, 1..
En 2u$ust -3, 1919, Dr. 3unanan e(ecuted a last will and testa#ent, be%ueathin$ to his wife "all the
re#ainder" of his real and personal property at the ti#e of his death "wheresoever situated" <"ollo,
p. 30=. /n the event he would survive his wife, he be%ueathed all his property to his children and
$randchildren with Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r. as trustee. ?e appointed his wife as e(ecutri( of his
last will and testa#ent and Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r. as substitute e(ecutor. 2rticle :/// of his will
states5
/f #y wife, :*G; )@O-3,;2;2;, and / shall die under such circu#stances
that there is not sufficient evidence to deter#ine the order of our deaths, then it shall
be presu#ed that / predeceased her, and #y estate shall be ad#inistered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presu#ption <"ollo, p. .1=.
"our days later, on 2u$ust -1, Dr. velyn ). 3unanan e(ecuted her own last will and testa#ent
containin$ the sa#e provisions as that of the will of her husband. 2rticle :/// of her will states5
/f #y husband, &EA ". 3,;2;2;, and / shall die under such circu#stances that
there is not sufficient evidence to deter#ine the order of our deaths, then it shall be
presu#ed that he predeceased #e, and #y estate shall be ad#inistered and
distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presu#ption. <"ollo, p. 31=.
En &anuary 9, 198-, Dr. 3unanan and his entire fa#ily perished when they were trapped by fire that
$utted their ho#e. Thereafter, Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r. as trustee and substitute e(ecutor of the
two wills, filed separate proceedin$s for the probate thereof with the Aurro$ate 3ourt of the 3ounty
of Enonda$a, ;ew Gor+. En 2pril 1, these two wills were ad#itted to probate and letters
testa#entary were issued in his favor.
En "ebruary -1, 1983, Aalud Teodoro )ere>, the #other of Dr. velyn ). 3unanan, and petitioner
herein, filed with the @e$ional ). 3unanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the @e$ional Trial 3ourt,
Malolos, !ulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedin$s in
;ew Gor+. Ahe also as+ed that she be appointed the special ad#inistratri( of the estate of the
deceased couple consistin$ pri#arily of a far# land in Aan Mi$uel, !ulacan.
En March 9, the @e$ional Trial 3ourt, !ranch 1', Malolos, !ulacan, presided by &ud$e 8ualberto &.
de la *lana, issued an order, directin$ the issuance of letters of special ad#inistration in favor of
petitioner upon her filin$ of a )10,000.00 bond. The followin$ day, petitioner posted the bond and
too+ her oath as special ad#inistration.
2s her first act of ad#inistration, petitioner filed a #otion, prayin$ that the )hilippine *ife /nsurance
3o#pany be directed to deliver the proceeds in the a#ount of )00,000.00 of the life insurance policy
ta+en by Dr. &ose ". 3unanan with Dr. velyn )ere>-3unanan and their dau$hter &ocelyn as
beneficiaries. The trial court $ranted the #otion.
3ounsel for the )hilippine 2#erican *ife /nsurance 3o#pany then filed a #anifestation, statin$ that
said co#pany then filed a #anifestation, statin$ that said co#pany had delivered to petitioner the
a#ount of ).9,1'0.80, representin$ the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. &ose ".
3unanan.
/n a #otion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner as+ed that Dr. @afael 3unanan, Ar. be ordered to deliver
to her a )hilippine Trust 3o#pany passboo+ with )-0,09..00 in savin$s deposit, and the "a#ily
Aavin$s !an+ ti#e deposit certificates in the total a#ount of )1-,.1-.0-.
En May 31, 2tty. "ederico 2lday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. &ose ".
3unanan, na#ely, Dr. @afael 3unanan, Ar., )riscilla 3unanan !autista, *ydia 3unanan /$nacio,
"elipe ". 3unanan and *oreto 3unanan 3oncepcion <3unanan heirs=. ?e also #anifested that
before receivin$ petitioner9s #otion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filin$ of the
testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of si#ple fair play," they should be notified of the
proceedin$s <@ecords, p. 110=. ?e prayed for defer#ent of the hearin$ on the #otions of May 19,
1983.
)etitioner then filed a counter #anifestation dated &une 13, 1983, assertin$5 <1= that the "3unanan
collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. &ose ". 3unanan" and therefore, they had
"no le$al or proprietary interests to protect" and "no ri$ht to intervene"4 <-= that the wills of Dr. &ose ".
3unanan and Dr. velyn )ere>-3unanan, bein$ 2#erican citi>ens, were e(ecuted in accordance
with the sole#nities and for#alities of ;ew Gor+ laws, and produced "effects in this 6urisdiction in
accordance with 2rt. 1' in relation to 2rt. 81' of the 3ivil 3ode"4 <3= that under 2rticle :/// of the two
wills, it was presu#ed that the husband predeceased the wife4 and <.= that "the 3unanan collaterals
are neither distributees, le$atees or beneficiaries, #uch less, heirs as heirship is only by institution"
under a will or by operation of the law of ;ew Gor+ <@ecords, pp. 11--113=.
En &une -3, the probate court $ranted petitioner9s #otion of May 19, 1983. ?owever, on &uly -1, the
3unanan heirs filed a #otion to nullify the proceedin$s and to set aside the appoint#ent of, or to
dis%ualify, petitioner as special ad#inistratri( of the estates of Dr. &ose ". 3unanan and Dr. velyn
)ere>-3unanan. The #otion stated5 <1= that bein$ the "brothers and sisters and the le$al and
survivin$ heirs" of Dr. &ose ". 3unanan, they had been "deliberately e(cluded" in the petition for the
probate of the separate wills of the 3unanan spouses thereby #isleadin$ the !ulacan court to
believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses4 that such "#isrepresentation" deprived the#
of their ri$ht to "due process in violation of Aection ., @ule 1' of the @evised @ules of 3ourt4 <-= that
Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r., the e(ecutor of the estate of the 3unanan spouses, was li+ewise not
notified of the hearin$s in the !ulacan court4 <3= that the "#isrepresentation and conceal#ent
co##itted by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special ad#inistratri(4 <.= that Dr. @afael 8.
3unanan, &r. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authori>ed his father,
Dr. @afael 3unanan, Ar., to be his attorney-in-fact4 and <0= that Dr. @afael 3unanan, Ar. is %ualified
to be a re$ular ad#inistrator "as practically all of the sub6ect estate in the )hilippines belon$s to their
brother, Dr. &ose ". 3unanan" <@ecords, pp. 118-1--=. ?ence, they prayed5 <1= that the proceedin$s
in the case be declared null and void4 <-= that the appoint#ent of petitioner as special ad#inistratri(
be set aside4 and <3= that Dr. @afael 3unanan, Ar. be appointed the re$ular ad#inistrator of the
estate of the deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the 3unanan heirs filed a #otion re%uirin$ petitioner to sub#it an inventory or accountin$
of all #onies received by her in trust for the estate.
/n her opposition, petitioner asserted5 <1= that she was the "sole and only heir" of her dau$hter, Dr.
velyn )ere>-3unanan to the e(clusion of the "3unanan collaterals"4 hence they were co#plete
stran$ers to the proceedin$s and were not entitled to notice4 <-= that she could not have "concealed"
the na#e and address of Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r. because his na#e was pro#inently #entioned
not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the 2#erican surro$ate court4 <3= that the rule
applicable to the case is @ule 11, not @ule 1', because it involved the allowance of wills proved
outside of the )hilippines and that nowhere in Aection - of @ule 11 is there a #ention of notice bein$
$iven to the e(ecutor who, by the sa#e provision, should hi#self file the necessary ancillary
proceedin$s in this country4 <.= that even if the !ulacan estate ca#e fro# the "capital" of Dr. &ose ".
3unanan, he had willed all his worldly $oods to his wife and nothin$ to his brothers and sisters4 and
<0= that Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r. had unlawfully disbursed X-10,000.00 to the 3unanan heirs,
#isappropriated X10,000.00 for hi#self and irre$ularly assi$ned assets of the estates to his
2#erican lawyer <@ecords, pp. 101-1'0=.
/n their reply, the 3unanan heirs stressed that on ;ove#ber -., 198-, petitioner and the 3unanan
heirs had entered into an a$ree#ent in the ,nited Atates "to settle and divide e%ually the estates,"
and that under Aection - of @ule 11 the "court shall fi( a ti#e and place for the hearin$ and cause
notice thereof to be $iven as in case of an ori$inal will presented for allowance" <@ecords, pp. 18.-
180=.
)etitioner as+ed that Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r. be cited for conte#pt of court for failure to co#ply
with the Erder of &une -3, 1983 and for appropriatin$ #oney of the estate for his own benefit. Ahe
also alle$ed that she had i#pu$ned the a$ree#ent of ;ove#ber -., 198- before the Aurro$ate
3ourt of Enonda$a, ;ew Gor+ which rendered a decision on 2pril 13, 1983, findin$ that "all assets
are payable to Dr. velyn ). 3unananKs e(ecutor to be then distributed pursuant to )T*.-1.1 subd
BaC par B.C" <"ollo, p. 0-=.
En their part, the 3unanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped fro# clai#in$ that they were
heirs by the a$ree#ent to divide e%ually the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Aection - of
@ule 11 of the @ules of 3ourt, the provisions of Aections 3, . and 0 of @ule 1' on the re%uire#ent of
notice to all heirs, e(ecutors, devisees and le$atees #ust be co#plied with. They reiterated their
prayer5 <1= that the proceedin$s in the case be nullified4 <-= that petitioner be dis%ualified as special
ad#inistratri(4 <3= that she be ordered to sub#it an inventory of all $oods, chattels and #onies which
she had received and to surrender the sa#e to the court4 and <.= that Dr. @afael 3unanan, Ar. be
appointed the re$ular ad#inistrator.
)etitioner filed a re6oinder, statin$ that in violation of the 2pril 13, 1983 decision of the 2#erican
court Dr. @afael 8. 3unanan, &r. #ade "unauthori>ed disburse#ents fro# the estates as early as
&uly 1, 198-" <@ecords, p. -31=. Thereafter, petitioner #oved for the suspension of the proceedin$s
as she had "to attend to the settle#ent proceedin$s" of the estate of the 3unanan spouses in ;ew
Gor+ <@ecords, p. -.-=. The 3unanans heirs opposed this #otion and filed a #anifestation, statin$
that petitioner had received X-10,000.00 "fro# the Aurro$ateKs 3ourt as part of le$acy" based on the
aforesaid a$ree#ent of ;ove#ber -., 198- <@ecords, p. -.8=.
En "ebruary -1, 198., &ud$e de la *lana issued an order, disallowin$ the reprobate of the two wills,
recallin$ the appoint#ent of petitioner as special ad#inistratri(, re%uirin$ the sub#ission of petitioner
of an inventory of the property received by her as special ad#inistratri( and declarin$ all pendin$
incidents #oot and acade#ic. &ud$e de la *lana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law
of ;ew Gor+ on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of tellin$ whether the
wills were e(ecuted in accordance with the law of ;ew Gor+. /n the absence of such evidence, the
presu#ption is that the law of succession of the forei$n country is the sa#e as the law of the
)hilippines. ?owever, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the 3unanan
spouses and the )hilippine law re%uires three witnesses and that the wills were not si$ned on each
and every pa$e, a re%uire#ent of the )hilippine law.
En 2u$ust -1, 1980, petitioner filed a #otion for reconsideration of the Erder dated "ebruary -1,
198., where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of ;ew Gor+ $overnin$ the e(ecution of
last wills and testa#ents.
En the sa#e day, &ud$e de la *lana issued another order, denyin$ the #otion of petitioner for the
suspension of the proceedin$s but $ave her 10 days upon arrival in the country within which to act
on the other order issued that sa#e day. 3ontendin$ that the second portion of the second order left
its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the 3unanans filed a #otion for the
reconsideration of the ob6ectionable portion of the said order so that it would confor# with the
pertinent provisions of the &udiciary @eor$ani>ation 2ct of 1980 and the /nteri# @ules of 3ourt.
En 2pril 30, 1980, the respondent &ud$e of !ranch 18 of the @e$ional Trial 3ourt, Malolos, to which
the reprobate case was reassi$ned, issued an order statin$ that "<7=hen the last will and testa#ent .
. . was denied probate," the case was ter#inated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should
be $iven finality. The sa#e Erder a#ended the "ebruary -1, 198. Erder by re%uirin$ petitioner to
turn over to the estate the inventoried property. /t considered the proceedin$s for all intents and
purposes, closed <@ecords,
p. 30-=.
En 2u$ust 1-, petitioner filed a #otion to resu#e proceedin$s on account of the final settle#ent and
ter#ination of the probate cases in ;ew Gor+. Three days later, petitioner filed a #otion prayin$ for
the reconsideration of the Erder of 2pril 30, 1980 on the stren$th of the "ebruary -1, 198. Erder
$rantin$ her a period of 10 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of
probate of the wills of the 3unanan spouses. En 2u$ust 19, respondent &ud$e $ranted the #otion
and reconsidered the Erder of 2pril 30, 1980.
En 2u$ust -9, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her dau$hter, ;atividad, filed a #otion
prayin$ that since petitioner was ailin$ in "ort *ee, ;ew &ersey, ,.A.2. and therefore incapacitated
to act as special ad#inistratri(, she <the counsel= should be na#ed substitute special ad#inistratri(.
Ahe also filed a #otion for the reconsideration of the Erder of "ebruary -1, 198., denyin$ probate to
the wills of the 3unanan spouses, alle$in$ that respondent &ud$e "failed to appreciate the si$nificant
probative value of the e(hibits . . . which all refer to the offer and ad#ission to probate of the last
wills of the 3unanan spouses includin$ all procedures underta+en and decrees issued in connection
with the said probate" <@ecords, pp. 313-3-3=.
Thereafter, the 3unanans heirs filed a #otion for reconsideration of the Erder of 2u$ust 19, 1980,
alle$in$ lac+ of notice to their counsel.
En March 31, 198', respondent &ud$e to which the case was reassi$ned denied the #otion for
reconsideration holdin$ that the docu#ents sub#itted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the
testator do#iciled abroad were properly e(ecuted, $enuine and sufficient to possess real and
personal property4 that letters testa#entary were issued4 and that proceedin$s were held on a
forei$n tribunal and proofs ta+en by a co#petent 6ud$e who in%uired into all the facts and
circu#stances and bein$ satisfied with his findin$s issued a decree ad#ittin$ to probate the wills in
%uestion." ?owever, respondent &ud$e said that the docu#ents did not establish the law of ;ew
Gor+ on the procedure and allowance of wills <@ecords, p. 381=.
En 2pril 9, 198', petitioner filed a #otion to allow her to present further evidence on the forei$n law.
2fter the hearin$ of the #otion on 2pril -0, 198', respondent &ud$e issued an order wherein he
conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the forei$n law was not a fatal defect and was
curable by adducin$ additional evidence. ?e $ranted petitioner .0 days to sub#it the evidence to
that effect.
?owever, without waitin$ for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent &ud$e ruled in
his order dated &une -0, 198' that he found "no co#pellin$ reason to disturb its rulin$ of March 31,
198'" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedin$s for each of the
testator" <@ecords, p. 391=.
The Erder dated &une -0, 198' pro#pted petitioner to file a second #otion for reconsideration
statin$ that she was "ready to sub#it further evidence on the law obtainin$ in the Atate of ;ew Gor+"
and prayin$ that she be $ranted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the Atate of
;ew Gor+ has on the probate and allowance of wills" <@ecords, p. 393=.
En &uly 18, respondent &ud$e denied the #otion holdin$ that to allow the probate of two wills in a
sin$le proceedin$ "would be a departure fro# the typical and established #ode of probate where
one petition ta+es care of one will." ?e pointed out that even in ;ew Gor+ "where the wills in
%uestion were first sub#itted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedin$s" <@ecords, p.
390=.
En 2u$ust 13, 198', petitioner filed a #otion for the reconsideration of the Erder of &uly 18, 198',
citin$ Aection 3, @ule - of the @ules of 3ourt, which provides that no party #ay institute #ore than
one suit for a sin$le cause of action. Ahe pointed out that separate proceedin$s for the wills of the
spouses which contain basically the sa#e provisions as they even na#ed each other as a
beneficiary in their respective wills, would $o a$ainst "the $rain of ine(pensive, 6ust and speedy
deter#ination of the proceedin$s" <@ecords, pp. .00-.01=.
En Aepte#ber 11, 198', petitioner filed a supple#ent to the #otion for reconsideration,
citin$ 1enigno v. De %a /ea, 01 )hil. 300 <193-= <@ecords,
p. .11=, but respondent &ud$e found that this pleadin$ had been filed out of ti#e and that the
adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. /n her co#pliance, petitioner stated that
she had furnished a copy of the #otion to the counsel of the 3unanan heirs and reiterated her
#otion for a "final rulin$ on her supple#ental #otion" <@ecords, p. .-1=.
En ;ove#ber 19, respondent &ud$e issued an order, denyin$ the #otion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner on the $rounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or #ore different persons even if
they are husband and wife cannot be underta+en in a sin$le petition" <@ecords, pp. 31'-318=.
?ence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, ar$uin$ that the evidence offered at the hearin$ of
2pril 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the Atate of ;ew Gor+ on the allowance of wills, and
that the separate wills of the 3unanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedin$s.
//
)etitioner contends that the followin$ pieces of evidence she had sub#itted before respondent
&ud$e are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills5
<a= two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of velyn and &ose by the
3onsulate 8eneral of the )hilippines <(hs. """ and "8"=4
<b= two certifications fro# the Aecretary of Atate of ;ew Gor+ and 3ustodian of the
8reat Aeal on the facts that &ud$e !ernard *. @ea$an is the Aurro$ate of the
3ountry of Enonda$a which is a court of record, that his si$nature and seal of office
are $enuine, and that the Aurro$ate is duly authori>ed to $rant copy of the respective
wills of velyn and &ose
<(hs. ""-1" and "8-1"=4
<c= two certificates of &ud$e @ea$an and 3hief 3ler+ Donald . Moore statin$ that
they have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on 2pril 1,
198- <(hs. ""--" and "8--"=4
<d= the respective wills of velyn and &ose <(hs. ""-3", ""-'" and (h. "8-3" J "8-
'"=4
<e= certificates of &ud$e @ea$an and the 3hief 3ler+ certifyin$ to the $enuineness
and authenticity of the e(e#plified copies of the two wills <(hs. ""-1" and ""-1"=4
<f= two certificates of authentication fro# the 3onsulate 8eneral of the )hilippines in
;ew Gor+ <(h. "?" and """=.
<$= certifications fro# the Aecretary of Atate that &ud$e @ea$an is duly authori>ed to
$rant e(e#plified copies of the decree of probate, letters testa#entary and all
proceedin$s had and proofs duly ta+en
<(hs. "?-1" and "/-1"=4
<h= certificates of &ud$e @ea$an and the 3hief 3ler+ that letters testa#entary were
issued to @afael 8. 3unanan <(hs. "?--" and "/--"=4
<i= certification to the effect that it was durin$ the ter# of &ud$e @ea$an that a decree
ad#ittin$ the wills to probate had been issued and appointin$ @afael 8. 3unanan as
alternate e(ecutor <(hs. "?-3" and
"/-10"=4
<6= the decrees on probate of the two wills specifyin$ that proceedin$s were held and
proofs duly ta+en <(hs. "?-." and "/-0"=4
<+= decrees on probate of the two wills statin$ that they were properly e(ecuted,
$enuine and valid and that the said instru#ents were ad#itted to probate and
established as wills valid to pass real and personal property <(hs. "?-0" and "/-0"=4
and
<l= certificates of &ud$e @ea$an and the 3hief 3ler+ on the $enuineness and
authenticity of each otherKs si$natures in the e(e#plified copies of the decrees of
probate, letters testa#entary and proceedin$s held in their court <(hs. "?-'" and "/-
'"= <"ollo, pp. 13-1'=.
)etitioner adds that the wills had been ad#itted to probate in the Aurro$ate 3ourtKs Decision of 2pril
13, 1983 and that the proceedin$s were ter#inated on ;ove#ber -9, 198..
The respective wills of the 3unanan spouses, who were 2#erican citi>ens, will only be effective in
this country upon co#pliance with the followin$ provision of the 3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines5
2rt. 81'. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the )hilippines if #ade
with the for#alities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
accordin$ to the for#alities observed in his country, or in confor#ity with those which
this 3ode prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills confor# with the for#alities prescribed by ;ew Gor+ laws or by )hilippine
laws is i#perative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of
the )hilippines are as follows5 <1= the due e(ecution of the will in accordance with the forei$n laws4
<-= the testator has his do#icile in the forei$n country and not in the )hilippines4 <3= the will has been
ad#itted to probate in such country4 <.= the fact that the forei$n tribunal is a probate court, and <0=
the laws of a forei$n country on procedure and allowance of wills </// Moran 3o##entaries on the
@ules of 3ourt, 1910 ed., pp. .19-.-94 Auntay v. Auntay, 90 )hil. 000 B190.C4 "lue#er v. ?i(, 0.
)hil. '10 B1930C=. (cept for the first and last re%uire#ents, the petitioner sub#itted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presentin$ evidence on the forei$n laws upon which the probate in the forei$n
country is based is i#pelled by the fact that our courts cannot ta+e 6udicial notice of the# <)hilippine
3o##ercial and /ndustrial !an+ v. scolin, 0' A3@2 -'' B191.C=.
)etitioner #ust have perceived this o#ission as in fact she #oved for #ore ti#e to sub#it the
pertinent procedural and substantive ;ew Gor+ laws but which re%uest respondent &ud$e 6ust
$lossed over. 7hile the probate of a will is a special proceedin$ wherein courts should rela( the
rules on evidence, the $oal is to receive the best evidence of which the #atter is susceptible before
a purported will is probated or denied probate <:da. de @a#os v. 3ourt of 2ppeals, 81 A3@2 393
B1918C=.
There is #erit in petitionerKs insistence that the separate wills of the 3unanan spouses should be
probated 6ointly. @espondent &ud$eKs view that the @ules on allowance of wills is couched in sin$ular
ter#s and therefore should be interpreted to #ean that there should be separate probate
proceedin$s for the wills of the 3unanan spouses is too literal and si#plistic an approach. Auch view
overloo+s the provisions of Aection -, @ule 1 of the @evised @ules of 3ourt, which advise that the
rules shall be "liberally construed in order to pro#ote their ob6ect and to assist the parties in
obtainin$ 6ust, speedy, and ine(pensive deter#ination of every action and proceedin$."
2 literal application of the @ules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the
ad#inistration of 6ustice <2cain v. /nter#ediate 2ppellate 3ourt, 100 A3@2 100 B1981C4 @oberts v.
*eonidas, 1-9 A3@2 33 B198.C=.
7hat the law e(pressly prohibits is the #a+in$ of 6oint wills either for the testatorKs reciprocal benefit
or for the benefit of a third person <3ivil 3ode of the )hilippines, 2rticle 818=. /n the case at bench,
the 3unanan spouses e(ecuted separate wills. Aince the two wills contain essentially the sa#e
provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are con6u$al in nature, practical
considerations dictate their 6oint probate. 2s this 3ourt has held a nu#ber of ti#es, it will always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a sin$le proceedin$ leavin$ no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future liti$ation <Motoo#ull v. Dela )a>, 181 A3@2 1.3 B1990C=.
This petition cannot be co#pletely resolved without touchin$ on a very $larin$ fact J petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. velyn )ere> 3unanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. &ose ".
3unanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filin$ of the proceedin$s. Thus, even in the
instant petition, she only i#pleaded respondent &ud$e, for$ettin$ that a 6ud$e whose order is bein$
assailed is #erely a no#inal or for#al party <3alderon v. Aolicitor 8eneral, -10 A3@2 81' B199-C=.
The rule that the court havin$ 6urisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be
$iven as in case of an ori$inal will presented for allowance" <@evised @ules of 3ourt, @ule -1,
Aection -= #eans that with re$ard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were
an "ori$inal will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first ti#e. 2ccordin$ly, co#pliance with
Aections 3 and . of @ule 1', which re%uire publication and notice by #ail or personally to the "+nown
heirs, le$atees, and devisees of the testator resident in the )hilippines" and to the e(ecutor, if he is
not the petitioner, are re%uired.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. &ose ". 3unanan, contrary to petitioner9s clai#, are entitled to notices
of the ti#e and place for provin$ the wills. ,nder Aection . of @ule 1' of the @evised @ules of 3ourt,
the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the ti#e and place fi(ed for provin$ the will to be
addressed to the desi$nated or other +nown heirs, le$atees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
7?@"E@, the %uestioned Erder is AT 2A/D. @espondent &ud$e shall allow petitioner
reasonable ti#e within which to sub#it evidence needed for the 6oint probate of the wills of the
3unanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. &ose ". 3unanan are $iven all
notices and copies of all pleadin$s pertinent to the probate proceedin$s.
AE E@D@D.
G.R. No. L-28882 Ma. 31, 1981
!IME, INC., petitioner,
vs.
1ON. AN5RES RE?ES, a& :-"*) o( 'h) Co-r' o( F$r&' I%&'a%c) o( R$Fa+, ELISEO S. <ARI, a&
5)0-'. C+)rG o( Co-r', Bra%ch I, Co-r' o( F$r&' I%&'a%c) o( R$Fa+, AN!ONIO :. ILLEGAS a%"
:>AN PONCE ENRILE,respondents.
S;cip, Sala.ar, %una, !analo M 5eliciano for petitioner.
Angel C. Cru. %a) 2ffice for respondents.

RE?ES, :.B.L., J.:
)etition for certiorari and prohibition, with preli#inary in6unction, to annul certain orders of the
respondent 3ourt of "irst /nstance of @i>al, issued in its 3ivil 3ase ;o. 10.03, entitled "2ntonio &.
:ille$as and &uan )once nrile vs. Ti#e, /nc., and Ti#e-*ife /nternational, )ublisher of 9Ti#e9
Ma$a>ine <2sia dition=", and to prohibit the said court fro# further proceedin$ with the said civil
case.
,pon petitioner9s postin$ a bond of )1,000.00, this 3ourt, as prayed for, ordered, on 10 2pril 19'8,
the issuance of a writ of preli#inary in6unction.
The petition alle$es that petitioner Ti#e, /nc.,
1
is an 2#erican corporation with principal offices at
@oc+etfeller 3enter, ;ew Gor+ 3ity, ;. G., and is the publisher of "Ti#e", a wee+ly news #a$a>ine4
the petition, however, does not alle$e the petitioner9s le$al capacity to sue in the courts of the
)hilippine.
2
/n the aforesaid 3ivil 3ase ;o. 10.03, therein plaintiffs <herein respondents= 2ntonio &. :ille$as and
&uan )once nrile see+ to recover fro# the herein petitioner da#a$es upon an alle$ed libel arisin$
fro# a publication of Ti#e <2sia dition= #a$a>ine, in its issue of 18 2u$ust 19'1, of an essay,
entitled "3orruption in 2sia", which, in part, reads, as follows5
The proble# of Manila9s #ayor, 2;TE;/E :/**82A, is a case in point. 7hen it was
discovered last year that the #ayor9s coffers contained far #ore pesos than see#ed
reasonable in the li$ht of his inco#e, an investi$ation was launched. 7itnesses who had
helped hi# out under curious circu#stance were as+ed to e(plain in court. Ene
$overn#ent official ad#itted lendin$ :ille$as )30,000 pesos <X1,100= without interest
because he was the #ayor9s co#padre. 2n assistant declared he had $iven :ille$as
loans without collateral because he re$arded the boss as #y own son. 2 wealthy Manila
business#an testified that he had lent :ille$as9 wife 10,000 pesos because the #ayor
was li+e a brother to #e. 7ith that, :ille$as denounced the investi$ation as an invasion
of his fa#ily9s privacy. The case was dis#issed on a technicality, and :ille$as is still
#ayor.
3
More specifically, the plaintiffs9 co#plaint alle$es, inter alia that5
<.= Defendants, conspirin$ and confederatin$, published a libelous article, publicly,
falsely and #aliciously i#putin$ to )laintiffs the co##ission of the cri#es of $raft,
corruption and nepotis#4 that said publication particularly referred to )laintiff Mayor
2ntonio &. :ille$as as a case in point in connection with $raft, corruption and
nepotis# in 2sia4 that said publication without any doubt referred to co-plaintiff &uan
)once nrile as the hi$h $overn#ent official who helped under curious
circu#stances )laintiff Mayor 2ntonio &. :ille$as in lendin$ the latter appro(i#ately
)30,000.00 <X1,100.00= without interest because he was the Mayor9s co#padre4 that
the purpose of said )ublications is to cause the dishonor, discredit and put in public
conte#pt the )laintiffs, particularly )laintiff Mayor 2ntonio &. :ille$as.
En #otion of the respondents-plaintiffs, the respondent 6ud$e, on -0 ;ove#ber 19'1, $ranted the#
leave to ta+e the depositions "of Mr. 2nthony 8on>ales, Ti#e-*ife international", and "Mr. 3esar !.
nri%ue>, Muller V )hipps <Manila= *td.", in connection with the activities and operations in the
)hilippines of the petitioner, and, on -1 ;ove#ber 19'1, issued a writ of attach#ent on the real and
personal estate of Ti#e, /nc.
)etitioner received the su##ons and a copy of the co#plaint at its offices in ;ew Gor+ on 13
Dece#ber 19'1 and, on -1 Dece#ber 19'1, it filed a #otion to dis#iss the co#plaint for lac+ of
6urisdiction and i#proper venue, relyin$ upon the provisions of @epublic 2ct .3'3. )rivate
respondents opposed the #otion.
/n an order dated -' "ebruary 19'8, respondent court deferred the deter#ination of the #otion to
dis#iss until after trial of the case on the #erits, the court havin$ considered that the $rounds relied
upon in the #otion do not appear to be indubitable.
)etitioner #oved for reconsideration of the defer#ent private respondents a$ain opposed.
En 30 March 19'8, respondent 6ud$e issued an order re-affir#in$ the previous order of defer#ent
for the reason that "the rule laid down under @epublic 2ct. ;o. .3'3, a#endin$ 2rticle 3'0 of the
@evised )enal 3ode, is not applicable to actions a$ainst non-resident defendants, and because
%uestions involvin$ harass#ent and inconvenience, as well as disruption of public service do not
appear indubitable. ..."
"ailin$ in its efforts to discontinue the ta+in$ of the depositions, previously adverted to, and to have
action ta+en, before trial, on its #otion to dis#iss, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
The orders for the ta+in$ of the said depositions, for deferrin$ deter#ination of the #otion to dis#iss,
and for reaffir#in$ the defer#ent, and the writ of attach#ent are sou$ht to be annulled in the
petition..
There is no dispute that at the ti#e of the publication of the alle$edly offendin$ essay, private
respondents 2ntonio :ille$as and &uan )once nrile were the Mayor Ef the 3ity of Manila and
,ndersecretary of "inance and concurrently 2ctin$ 3o##issioner of 3usto#s, respectively, with
offices in the 3ity of Manila. The issues in this case are5
1. 7hether or not, under the provisions of @epublic 2ct ;o. .3'3 the respondent 3ourt of "irst
/nstance of @i>al has 6urisdiction to ta+e co$ni>ance of the civil suit for da#a$es arisin$ fro# an
alle$edly libelous publication, considerin$ that the action was instituted by public officers whose
offices were in the 3ity of Manila at the ti#e of the publication4 if it has no 6urisdiction, whether or not
its erroneous assu#ption of 6urisdiction #ay be challen$ed by a forei$n corporation by writ
of certiorari or prohibition4 and
-. 7hether or not @epublic 2ct .3'3 is applicable to action a$ainst a forei$n corporation or non-
resident defendant.
)rovisions of @epublic 2ct ;o. .3'3, which are relevant to the resolution of the fore$oin$ issues,
read, as follows5
Aection 1. 2rticle three hundred si(ty of the @evised )enal 3ode, as a#ended by
@epublic 2ct ;u#bered Twelve hundred and ei$hty-nine, is further a#ended to read
as follows5
92@T. 3'0. /ersons responsi&le. J 2ny person who shall publish,
e(hibit, or cause the publication or e(hibition of any defa#ation in
writin$ or by si#ilar #eans, shall be responsible for the sa#e.
The author or editor of a boo+ or pa#phlet, or the editor or business #ana$er of a
daily newspaper, #a$a>ine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defa#ations contained therein to the e(tent as if he were the author thereof.
The cri#inal and civil action for da#a$es in cases of written defa#ations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed si#ultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the ti#e of the co##ission of
the offense4 /rovided, ho)ever, That where one of the offended parties is a public
officer whose office is in the 3ity of Manila at the ti#e of the co##ission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of the 3ity of Manila or
of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the 3ity of Manila, the action shall be
filed in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of the province or city where he held office at the
ti#e of the co##ission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action
shall be filed in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the ti#e of the co##ission of the offense or where the libelous #atter is
printed and first published4 /rovided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the
sa#e court where the cri#inal action is filed and vice versa4 /rovided, furthermore,
That the court where the cri#inal action or civil action for da#a$es is first filed, shall
ac%uire 6urisdiction to the e(clusion of other courts4 2nd provided finally, That this
a#end#ent shall not apply to cases of written defa#ations, the civil andNor cri#inal
actions which have been filed in court at the ti#e of the effectivity of the law
((( ((( (((
((( ((( (((
Aec. 3. This 2ct shall ta+e effect only if and when, within thirty days fro# its approval,
the newspaper#en in the )hilippines shall or$ani>e, and elect the #e#bers of, a
)hilippine )ress 3ouncil, a private a$ency of the said newspaper#en, whose
function shall be to pro#ul$ate a 3ode of thics for the# and the )hilippine press
investi$ate violations thereof, and censure any newspaper#an or newspaper $uilty
of any violation of the said 3ode, and the fact that such )hilippine )ress 3ouncil has
been or$ani>ed and its #e#bers have been duly elected in accordance herewith
shall be ascertained and proclai#ed by the )resident of the )hilippines.
,nder the first proviso in section 1, the venue of a civil action for da#a$es in cases of written
defa#ations is locali>ed upon the basis of, first, whether the offended party or plaintiff is a public
officer or a private individual4 and second, if he is a public officer, whether his office is in Manila or
not in Manila, at the ti#e of the co##ission of the offense. /f the offended party is a public officer in
the office in the 3ity of Manila, the proviso li#its hi# to two <-= choices of venue, na#ely, in the
3ourt of "irst instance of the 3ity of Manila or in the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published ..."
The co#plaint lod$ed in the court of @i>al by respondents does not alle$e that the libelous article
was printed and first published in the province of @i>al and, since the respondents-plaintiffs are
public officers with offices in Manila at the ti#e of the co##ission of the alle$ed offense, it is clear
that the only place left for the# wherein to file their action, is the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of Manila.
The li#itation of the choices of venue, as introduced into the )enal 3ode throu$h its a#end#ents by
@epublic 2ct .3'3, was intended "to #ini#i>e or li#it the filin$ of out-of-town libel suits" to protect an
alle$ed offender fro# "hardships, inconveniences and harass#ents" and, further#ore, to protect
"the interest of the public service" where one of the offended parties is a public officer."
9
The intent,
of the law is clear5 a libeled public official #i$ht sue in the court of the locality where he holds office,
in order that the prosecution of the action should interfere as little as possible with the dischar$e of
his official duties and labors. The only alternative allowed hi# by law is to prosecute those
responsible for the libel in the place where the offendin$ article was printed and first published. ?ere,
the law tolerates the interference with the libeled officer9s duties only for the sa+e of avoidin$
unnecessary harass#ent of the accused. Aince the offendin$ publication was not printed in the
)hilippines, the alternative venue was not open to respondent Mayor :ille$as of Manila and
,ndersecretary of "inance nrile, who were the offended parties.
!ut respondents-plaintiffs ar$ue that @epublic 2ct ;o. .3'3 is not applicable where the action is
a$ainst non-e(istent defendant, as petitioner Ti#e, /nc., for several reasons. They ur$e that, in
enactin$ @epublic 2ct ;o. .3'3, 3on$ress did not intend to protect non-resident defendants as
shown by Aection 3, which provides for the effectivity of the statute only if and when the
"newspaper#en in the )hilippines" have or$ani>ed a ")hilippine )ress 3ouncil" whose function shall
be to pro#ul$ate a 3ode of thics for "the#" and "the )hilippine press"4 and since a non-resident
defendant is not in a position to co#ply with the conditions i#posed for the effectivity of the statute,
such defendant #ay not invo+e its provisions4 that a forei$n corporation is not inconvenienced by an
out-of-town libel suit4 that it would be absurd and incon$ruous, in the absence of an e(tradition
treaty, for the law to $ive to public officers with office in Manila the second option of filin$ a cri#inal
case in the court of the place where the libelous article is printed and first published if the defendant
is a forei$n corporation and that, under the "sin$le publication" rule which ori$inated in the ,nited
Atates and i#ported into the )hilippines, the rule was understood to #ean that publications in
another state are not covered by venue statutes of the foru#.
The i#plication of respondents9 ar$u#ent is that the law would not ta+e effect as to non-resident
defendants or accused. 7e see nothin$ in the te(t of the law that would sustain such une%ual
protection to so#e of those who #ay be char$ed with libel. The official procla#ation that a )hilippine
)ress 3ouncil has been or$ani>ed is #ade a pre-condition to the effectivity of the entire @epublic
2ct ;o. .3'3, and no ter#s are e#ployed therein to indicate that the law can or will be effective only
as to so#e, but not all, of those that #ay be char$ed with libelin$ our public officers.
The assertion that a forei$n corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced by an
out-of-town suit is irrelevant and untenable, for venue and 6urisdiction are not dependent upon
convenience or inconvenience to a party4 and #oreover, venue was fi(ed under @epublic 2ct ;o.
.3'3, pursuant to the basic policy of the law that is, as previously stated, to protect the interest of the
public service when the offended party is a public officer, by #ini#i>in$ as #uch as possible any
interference with the dischar$e of his duties.
That respondents-plaintiffs could not file a cri#inal case for libel a$ainst a non-resident defendant
does not #a+e @epublic 2ct ;o. .3'3 incon$ruous of absurd, for such inability to file a cri#inal case
a$ainst a non-resident natural person e%ually e(ists in cri#es other than libel. /t is a funda#ental
rule of international 6urisdiction that no state can by its laws, and no court which is only a creature of
the state, can by its 6ud$#ents or decrees, directly bind or affect property or persons beyond the
li#its of the state.
D
;ot only this, but if the accused is a corporation, no cri#inal action can lie a$ainst
it,
6
whether such corporation or resident or non-resident. 2t any rate, the case filed by respondents-
plaintiffs is case for da#a$es.
00 2#. &ur. -d '09 differentiates the "#ultiple publication" and "sin$le publication" rules <invo+ed by
private respondents= to be as follows5
The co##on law as to causes of action for tort arisin$ out of a sin$le publication was
to the effect that each co##unication of written or printed #atter was a distinct and
separate publication of a libel contained therein, $ivin$ rise to a separate cause of
action. This rule <9#ultiple publication9 rule= is still followed in several 2#erican
6urisdictions, and see#s to be favored by the 2#erican *aw /nstitute. Ether
6urisdictions have adopted the 9sin$le publication9 rule which ori$inated in ;ew Gor+,
under which any sin$le inte$rated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper,
boo+, or #a$a>ine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, $ivin$ rise to only one
cause of action, re$ardless of the nu#ber of ti#es it is e(posed to different people. ...
These rules are not pertinent in the present sche#e because the nu#ber of causes of action that
#ay be available to the respondents-plaintiffs is not here in issue. 7e are here confronted by a
specific venue statute, conferrin$ 6urisdiction in cases of libel a$ainst )ublic officials to specified
courts, and no other. The rule is that where a statute creates a ri$ht and provides a re#edy for its
enforce#ent, the re#edy is e(clusive4 and where it confers 6urisdiction upon a particular court, that
6urisdiction is li+ewise e(clusive, unless otherwise provided. ?ence, the venue provisions of @epublic
2ct ;o. .3'3 should be dee#ed #andatory for the party brin$in$ the action, unless the %uestion of
venue should be waived by the defendant, which was not the case here. Enly thus can the policy of
the 2ct be upheld and #aintained. ;or is there any reason why the inapplicability of one alternative
venue should result in renderin$ the other alternative, also inapplicable.
The dis#issal of the present petition is as+ed on the $round that the petitioner forei$n corporation
failed to alle$e its capacity to sue in the courts of the )hilippines. @espondents rely on section '9 of
the 3orporation law, which provides5
A3. '9. ;o forei$n corporation or corporations for#ed, or$ani>ed, or e(istin$ under
any laws other than those of the )hilippines shall be per#itted to ... #aintain by itself
or assi$nee any suit for the recovery of any debt, clai#, or de#and whatever, unless
it shall have the license prescribed in the section i##ediately precedin$. ..." ...4
They also invo+e the rulin$ in !arshall$Wells Co. vs. 4lser M Co., 0nc.
8
that no forei$n corporation
#ay be per#itted to #aintain any suit in the local courts unless it shall have the license re%uired by
the law, and the rulin$ in Atlantic !utual 0ns. Co., 0nc. vs. Ce&u Stevedoring Co., 0nc.
8
that "where ...
the law denies to a forei$n corporation the ri$ht to #aintain suit unless it has previously co#plied
with a certain re%uire#ent, then such co#pliance or the fact that the suin$ corporation is e(e#pt
therefro#, beco#es a necessary aver#ent in the co#plaint." 7e fail to see how these doctrines can
be a propos in the case at bar, since the petitioner is not "#aintainin$ any suit" but is #erely
defendin$ one a$ainst itself4 it did not file any co#plaint but only a corollary defensive petition to
prohibit the lower court fro# further proceedin$ with a suit that it had no 6urisdiction to entertain.
)etitioner9s failure to aver its le$al capacity to institute the present petition is not fatal, for ...
2 forei$n corporation #ay, by writ of prohibition, see+ relief a$ainst the wron$ful
assu#ption of 6urisdiction. 2nd a forei$n corporation see+in$ a writ of prohibition a$ainst
further #aintenance of a suit, on the $round of want of 6urisdiction in which 6urisdiction is
not bound by the rulin$ of the court in which the suit was brou$ht, on a #otion to %uash
service of su##ons, that it has 6urisdiction.
9
/t is also advanced that the present petition is pre#ature, since respondent court has not definitely
ruled on the #otion to dis#iss, nor held that it has 6urisdiction, but only ar$u#ent is untenable. The
#otion to dis#iss was predicated on the respondent court9s lac+ of 6urisdiction to entertain the
action4 and the rulin$s of this 3ourt are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, #ay issue in
case of a denial or defer#ent of action on such a #otion to dis#iss for lac+ of 6urisdiction.
/f the %uestion of 6urisdiction were not the #ain $round for this petition for review
by certiorari, it would be pre#ature because it see+s to have a review of an
interlocutory order. !ut as it would be useless and futile to $o ahead with the
proceedin$s if the court below had no 6urisdiction this petition was $iven due course.9
<Aan !eda vs. 3/@, 01 E.8. 0'3', 0'38=.
97hile it is true that action on a #otion to dis#iss #ay be deferred until the trial and
an order to that effect is interlocutory, still where it clearly appears that the trial 6ud$e
or court is proceedin$ in e(cess or outside of its 6urisdiction, the re#edy of prohibition
would lie since it would be useless and a waste of ti#e to $o ahead with the
proceedin$s. <)hilippine /nternational "air, /nc., et al. vs. /baHe>, et al., 00 Eff. 8a>.
103'4 nri%ue v. Macadae$, et al., .1 Eff. 8a>. 1-014 see also Aan !eda 3olle$e vs.
3/@, 01 Eff. 8a>. 0'3'.=9 <,niversity of Ato. To#as v. :illanueva, *-131.8, 30
Ectober 1909.=.
Ai#ilarly, in 4d)ard J. 7ell Co. vs. Cu&acu&, *--08.3, -3 &une 19'0, 1. A3@2 .19, this 3ourt held5
9.......................................................... /t is a settledrule that the 6urisdiction of a court
over the sub6ect-#atter is deter#ined by the alle$ations in the co#plaint4 and when a
#otion to dis#iss is filed for lac+ of 6urisdiction those alle$ations are dee#ed
ad#itted for purposes of such #otion, so that it #ay be resolved without waitin$ for
the trial. Thus it has been held that the consideration thereof #ay not be postponed
in the hope that the evidence #ay yield other %ualifyin$ or concurrin$ data which
would brin$ the case under the court9s 6urisdiction.9
To the sa#e effect are the rulin$s in5 "uperto vs. 5ernando, 83 )hil. 9.34 Administrator of Hacienda
%uisita 4state vs. Al&erto, *-1-133, -1 Ectober 1908.
Au##in$ up, 7e hold5
<1= The under 2rticle 3'0 of the @evised )enal 3ode, as a#ended by @epublic 2ct ;o. .3'3,
actions for da#a$es by public officials for libelous publications a$ainst the# can only be filed in the
courts of first instance ofthe city or province where the offended functionary held office at the ti#e
ofthe co##ission of the offense, in case the libelous article was first printed or published outside the
)hilippines.
<-= That the action of a court in refusin$ to rule, or deferrin$ its rulin$, on a #otion to dis#iss for lac+
of 6urisdiction over the sub6ect #atter, or for i#proper venue, is in e(cess of 6urisdiction and
correctable by writ of prohibition or certiorari sued out in the appellate 3ourt, even before trial on the
#erits is had.
7?@"E@, the writs applied for are $ranted5 the respondent 3ourt of "irst /nstance of @i>al is
declared without 6urisdiction to ta+e co$ni>ance of its 3ivil 3ase ;o. 10.034 and its orders issued in
connection therewith are hereby annulled and set aside,. @espondent court is further co##anded to
desist fro# further proceedin$s in 3ivil case ;o. 10.03 aforesaid. 3osts a$ainst private
respondents, 2ntonio &. :ille$as and &uan )once nrile.
The writ of preli#inary in6unction heretofore issued by this Aupre#e 3ourt is #ade per#anent.
Concepcion, C.J., Di.on, !akalintal, 5ernando, Teehankee, 1arredo, :illamor and concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

>%$')" S'a')& 7. Fo6+)r
Br$)( Fac' S-##ar.. "owler, 2ppellant, was convicted of failure to file ta( returns for the years
1911-1910. ?e had not filed a ta( return since 1903. ?e represented hi#self at trial and appealed
the conviction because the trial court did not let hi# testify because he would not swear or affir# to
tell the truth.
S.%o0&$& o( R-+) o( La6. "ederal @ule of vidence '03 provides that Pbefore testifyin$, every
witness shall be re%uired to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affir#ation.Q
Fac'&. "owler, 2ppellant, stopped filin$ ta( returns in 1903. ?e was indicted for failin$ to
file returns fro# 1911-1910, and he was convicted. 2ppellant represented hi#self at trial
but was represented by counsel on appeal. ?e clai#s the court erred in not allowin$
hi# to testify because he would not swear to tell the truth and would not allow cross
e(a#ination. 2ppellant was willin$ to state P/ a# a truthful #an,Q and P/ would not tell a
lie to stay out of 6ail.Q The 6ud$e was willin$ to allow hi# to say P/ state / will tell the truth
in #y testi#ony,Q but 2ppellant did not a$ree.
I&&-). Did the trial court err in refusin$ to allow hi# to testify because he would not
swear or affir# that he would tell the truthL
G.R. No. L-D888 5)c)#E)r 16, 1910
!1E >NI!E5 S!A!ES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOO@ C1A; 2a+$a& L>@ C1I>3, defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorne;$-eneral :illamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first co#plaint filed a$ainst the defendant, in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of 3ebu, stated that he
"carried, +ept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 9' +ilo$ra##es of opiu#," and that
"he had been surprised in the act of sellin$ 1,000 pesos worth prepared opiu#."
The defense presented a de#urrer based on two $rounds, the second of which was the #ore than
one cri#e was char$ed in the co#plaint. The de#urrer was sustained, as the court found that the
co#plaint contained two char$es, one, for the unlawful possession of opiu#, and the other, for the
unlawful sale of opiu#, and, conse%uence of that rulin$, it ordered that the fiscal should separated
one char$e fro# the other and file a co#plaint for each violation4 this, the fiscal did, and this cause
concerns only the unlawful possession of opiu#. /t is re$istered as ;o. 310, in the 3ourt of "irst
/nstance of 3ebu, and as ;o. 0881 on the $eneral doc+et of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the followin$ findin$ of the trial court5
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 1- o9cloc+ a. #. on the present #onth
<stated as 2u$ust 19, 1909=, several persons, a#on$ the# Messrs. &ac+s and Milliron, chief
of the depart#ent of the port of 3ebu and internal-revenue a$ent of 3ebu, respectively, went
abroad the stea#ship 4rroll to inspect and search its car$o, and found, first in a cabin near
the saloon, one sac+ <(hibit 2= and afterwards in the hold, another sac+ <(hibit !=. The
sac+ referred to as (hibit 2 contained .9 cans of opiu#, and the other, (hibit !, the lar$er
sac+, also contained several cans of the sa#e substance. The hold, in which the sac+
#entioned in (hibit ! was found, was under the defendant9s control, who #oreover, freely
and of his own will and accord ad#itted that this sac+, as well as the other referred to in
(hibit ! and found in the cabin, belon$ed to hi#. The said defendant also stated, freely and
voluntarily, that he had bou$ht these sac+s of opiu#, in ?on$+on$ with the intention of
sellin$ the# as contraband in Me(ico or :era 3ru>, and that, as his hold had already been
searched several ti#es for opiu#, he ordered two other 3hina#en to +eep the sac+. (hibit
2.
/t is to be ta+en into account that the two sac+s of opiu#, desi$nated as (hibits 2 and !, properly
constitute thecorpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opiu#, #ar+ed, as (hibit 3, was
the sub6ect #atter of investi$ation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the depart#ent
of the port of 3ebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where the fire#en habitually
sleep, and that they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said fire#en
after the vessel should have left the )hilippines, because the fire#en and crew of forei$n vessels,
pursuant to the instructions he had fro# the Manila custo#-house, were per#itted to retain certain
a#ounts of opiu#, always provided it should not be ta+en shore.
2nd, finally, another can of opiu#, #ar+ed "(hibit D," is also corpus delicti and i#portant as
evidence in this cause. 7ith re$ard to this the internal-revenue a$ent testified as follows5i tc$al f
"/A32*. 7hat is itL
7/T;AA. /t is a can opiu# which was bou$ht fro# the defendant by a secret-service a$ent
and ta+en to the office of the $overnor to prove that the accused had opiu# in his
possession to sell.
En #otion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer #i$ht be stric+en out "because it refers to
a sale." !ut, with respect to this answer, the chief of the depart#ent of custo#s had already $iven
this testi#ony, to wit5
"/A32*. 7ho as+ed you to search the vesselL
7/T;AA. The internal-revenue a$ent ca#e to #y office and said that a party brou$ht hi# a
sa#ple of opiu# and that the sa#e party +new that there was #ore opiu# on board the
stea#er, and the a$ent as+ed that the vessel be searched.
The defense #oved that this testi#ony be re6ected, on the $round of its bein$ hearsay evidence,
and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was #ore opiu#, on board the vessel" be
stric+en out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedin$s, ad#itted that the receptacles #entioned as (hibits 2, !,
and 3, contained opiu# and were found on board the stea#ship 4rroll, a vessel of n$lish
nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sac+s of opiu# were his and that
he had the# in his possession.
2ccordin$ to the testi#ony of the internal-revenue a$ent, the defendant stated to hi#, in the
presence of the provincial fiscal, of a 3hinese interpreter <who afterwards was not needed, because
the defendant spo+e n$lish=, the warden of the 6ail, and four $uards, that the opiu# sei>ed in the
vessel had been bou$ht by hi# in ?on$+on$, at three pesos for each round can and five pesos for
each one of the others, for the purpose of sellin$ it, as contraband, in Me(ico and )uerto de :era
3ru>4 that on the 10th the vessel arrived at 3ebu, and on the sa#e day he sold opiu#4 that he had
tried to sell opiu# for )1' a can4 that he had a contract to sell an a#ount of the value of about )0004
that the opiu# found in the roo# of the other two 3hina#en prosecuted in another cause, was his,
and that he had left it in their stateroo# to avoid its bein$ found in his roo#, which had already been
searched #any ti#es4 and that, accordin$ to the defendant, the contents of the lar$e sac+ was 80
cans of opiu#, and of the s#all one, .9, and the total nu#ber, 1-9.
/t was established that the stea#ship 4rroll was of n$lish nationality, that it ca#e fro# ?on$+on$,
and that it was bound for Me(ico, via the call ports of Manila and 3ebu.
The defense #oved for a dis#issal of the case, on the $rounds that the court had no 6urisdiction to
try the sa#e and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a cri#e. The fiscal, at the conclusion
of his ar$u#ent, as+ed that the #a(i#u# penalty of the law be i#posed upon the defendant, in view
of the considerable a#ount of opiu# sei>ed. The court ruled that it did not lac+ 6urisdiction, inas#uch
as the cri#e had been co##itted within its district, on the wharf of 3ebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years9 i#prison#ent, to pay a fine of )10,000, with
additional subsidiary i#prison#ent in case of insolvency, thou$h not to e(ceed one third of the
principal penalty, and to the pay#ent of the costs. /t further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the
/nsular 8overn#ent, of the e(hibits presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal bein$
ta+en or a bond $iven, or when the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not
released fro# custody, but turned over to the custo#s authorities for the purpose of the fulfill#ent of
the e(istin$ laws on i##i$ration.
"ro# this 6ud$#ent, the defendant appealed to this court.la)phi '.net
The appeal havin$ been heard, to$ether with the alle$ations #ade therein by the parties, it is found5
That, althou$h the #ere possession of a thin$ of prohibited use in these /slands, aboard a forei$n
vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a $eneral rule, constitute a cri#e triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel bein$ considered as an e(tension of its own
nationality, the sa#e rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
)hilippine /slands, in the present case a can of opiu#, is landed fro# the vessel upon )hilippine soil,
thus co##ittin$ an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the co##ission of the cri#e, only the court established in that
said place itself had co#petent 6urisdiction, in the absence of an a$ree#ent under an international
treaty.
/t is also found5 That, even ad#ittin$ that the %uantity of the dru$ sei>ed, the sub6ect #atter of the
present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fi(ed by
the law on the sub6ect, should be i#posed in the #a(i#u# de$ree.
Therefore, reducin$ the i#prison#ent and the fine i#posed to si( #onths and )1,000, respectively,
we affir# in all other respects the 6ud$#ent appealed fro#, with the costs of this instance a$ainst the
appellant. Ao ordered.
G.R. N*. L-45144 A=)0; >, 19>9
$. E. GRE2, Plaintiff-Appellant, %s) INS!LAR L!$"ER
O$PAN2, defendant"appelle)
C. H. Van Hoven and Harvey and O'Brien for appellant.
Ross, Larence, !elp" and Carrascoso for appellee.
ONEPION, J.: chanro'les %irtual la& li'rary
*he only .uestion of la& raised in this appeal is &hether the
plaintiff"appellant is entitled, as stockholder of the defendant"
appellee !nsular ?um'er Company, to inspect and e(amine the
'ooks records of the transactions of said defendant)chanro'les%irtuala&li'rary chanro'les %irtual la& li'rary
*he parties su'mitted a stipulation of facts on &hich the lo&er court
'ased its -udgment denying the mandamus against the defendant
and a'sol%ing it from the complaint)chanro'les%irtuala&li'rary chanro'les %irtual la& li'rary
>ccording to the stipulation of facts, the defendants &as and is a
corporation organi6ed and e(isting under the la&s of the /tate of
0e& 1ork, licensed to engage in 'usiness in the Philippines, &ith
offices in the City of #anila, in a'rica, 5ccidental 0egros, in 0e&
1ork and in Philadelphia) *he plaintiff &as and is the o&ner and
possessor of 5: shares of the capital stock of the defendant
corporation, registered in his name in the 'ooks thereof= that he
does not o&n three per cent of the total capital stock of the
corporation, nor does he represent stockholders &ho o&n three per
cent of its capital= that during the years 193B and 1933, the plaintiff
asked the offices of the defendant in #anila and in a'rica to permit
him to e(amine the 'ooks and records of the 'usiness of said
defendant, 'ut he &as not allo&ed to do so= that under the la& of
0e& 1ork, the right of a stockholder to e(amine the 'ooks and
records of a corporation organi6ed under the la&s of that /tate,
ha%e 'een, during the entire period material to this action, only
those pro%ided in section :: of the /tock Corporation ?a&, &hich
reads as follo&s:
inancial /tatement to /tockholders: /tockholders o&ning three per
centum of the shares of any corporation other than a moneyed
corporation may make a &ritten re.uest to the treasurer or other
fiscal officer thereof for a statement of its affairs, under oath,
em'racing a particular account of all its assets and lia'ilities, and
the treasurer shall make such statement and deli%er it to the person
making the re.uest &ithin thirty days thereafter, and keep on file in
the office of the corporation for t&el%e months thereafter a copy of
such statement, &hich shall at all times during 'usiness hours 'e
e(hi'ited to any stockholders demanding an e(amination thereof=
'ut the treasurer shall not 'e re.uired to deli%er more than one
such statement in any one year) *he /upreme Court, or any -ustice
thereof, may upon application, for good cause sho&n, e(tend the
time for making and deli%ering such statement) or e%ery neglect or
refusal to comply &ith the pro%isions of this section the corporation
shall and pay to the person making such re.uest the sum of ifty
Dollars, and the further sum of ten dollars for e%ery t&enty"four
hours thereafter until such statement shall 'e furnished) 8/) C) ?),
sec) ::)<
*hat neither the plaintiff nor any other stockholder of the defendant
corporation has asked its treasurer or any of its officers for a
statement of its affairs, as pro%ided in the statutes of 0e& 1ork=
neither did the plaintiff ask to 'e allo&ed to e(amine any of the
statements prepared 'y the defendant corporation and e(isting in
its files, as pro%ided 'y the statutes of 0e& 1ork)chanro'les%irtuala&li'rary chanro'les %irtual la& li'rary
!n the light of the foregoing facts agreed upon 'y the parties and in
accordance &ith section :: of the /tock Corporation ?a& of 0e&
1ork &hich is conceded to 'e the la& that go%erns the right of a
stockholder to e(amine the 'ooks and papers of a corporation, it is
a .uestion fully settled that the plaintiff not 'eing a stockholder
o&ning at least three per cent of the capital stock of the defendant
corporation, has no right to e(amine the 'ooks and records of the
corporation nor to re.uire a statement of its affairs em'racing a
particular account of its assets and lia'ilities)chanro'les%irtuala&li'rary chanro'les %irtual la& li'rary
Plaintiff"appellant contends, ho&e%er, that, in accordance &ith our
Corporation ?a&, under &hich the defendant company &as
registered to do 'usiness in the Philippines, the plaintiff, as
stockholder, is entitled to inspect the record of the transactions of
the defendant corporation 8sec) 51, >ct 0o) 1959, and this right,
&hich is recogni6ed in the common la&, has not 'een altered 'y
section :: of the /tock Corporation ?a& of 0e& 1ork .uoted in the
stipulation of facts, and can 'e enforced 'y mandamus)chanro'les%irtuala&li'rary chanro'les %irtual la& li'rary
*o this, defendant corporation ans&ers, in the first place, that
stipulation of facts is finding upon 'oth parties and cannot 'e
altered 'y either of them) 8B5 ;) C) ?), 1179, 1175)< !n the second
place, on the strength of this principle, plaintiff"appellant is 'ound
to adhere to the agreement made 'y him &ith the defendant
corporation in paragraph four of the stipulation of facts, to the effect
that the rights of a stockholder, under the la& of 0e& 1ork, to
e(amine the 'ooks and records of a corporation organi6ed under the
la&s of said /tate, and during the entire period material to this
action, are only those pro%ided in section :: /tock Corporation ?a&
of 0e& 1ork) Cnder this la&, plaintiff has the right to 'e furnished
'y the treasurer or other fiscal officer of the corporation &ith
statement of its affairs em'racing a particular account of all its
assets and lia'ilities) !n the third place, inasmuch as plaintiff, either
at the hearing or in his motion for ne& trial, did not ask to ha%e the
stipulation of facts altered or changed, he cannot no&, for the first
time on appeal, raise the .uestion that aside from the right
conferred upon him 'y section :: of the /tock Corporation ?a& of
0e& 1ork, he also entitled under the common la& to e(amine and
inspect the 'ooks and records of the defendant corporation) !n the
fourth place, neither can this right under the common la& 'e
granted the defendant in the present case, since the same can only
'e granted at the discretion of the court, under certain conditions,
to &it:
8 a< *hat the stockholder of a corporation in 0e& 1ork has the right
to inspect its 'ooks and records if it can 'e sho&n that he seeks
information for an honest purpose 819 C) J), 853<, or to protect his
interest as stockholder) 8 #n re/tein&ay, 159 0) 1), B57= 53 0) E),
1173= 95 ?) ;) >), 9A1 Kaff) 31 >pp) Di%), :7= 5B 0) 1) /), 393L<)chanro'les%irtuala&li'rary chanro'les %irtual
la& li'rary
8 $< *hat said right to e(amine and inspect the 'ooks of the
corporation must 'e e(ercised in good faith, for a specific and
honest purpose, and not to gratify curiosity, or for speculati%e or
%e(atious purposes) 819 C) J), 859, 855)<
*he appellant has made no effort to pro%e or e%en allege that the
information he desired to o'tain through the e(amination and
inspection of defendantOs 'ooks &as necessary to protect his
interests as stockholder of the corporation, or that it &as for a
specific and honest purpose, and not to gratify curiosity, nor for
speculati%e or %e(atious purposes)chanro'les%irtuala&li'rary chanro'les %irtual la& li'rary
!n %ie& of the foregoing, &e affirm the -udgment of the lo&er court,
&ith costs against the appellant) /o ordered)
G.R. No. L-2299 Ma. 2D, 19D1
FILIPINAS COMPAIA 5E SEG>ROS, petitioner,
vs.
C1RIS!ERN, 1>ENEFEL5 a%" CO., INC., respondent.
"amire. and 2rtigas for petitioner.
4)ald Huenefeld for respondent.
PARAS, C.J./
En Ectober 1, 19.1, the respondent corporation, 3hristern ?uenefeld, V 3o., /nc., after pay#ent of
correspondin$ pre#iu#, obtained fro# the petitioner ,"ilipinas 3ia. de Ae$uros, fire policy ;o.
-9333 in the su# of )1000,000, coverin$ #erchandise contained in a buildin$ located at ;o. 111
@o#an Atreet, !inondo Manila. En "ebruary -1, 19.-, or durin$ the &apanese #ilitary occupation,
the buildin$ and insured #erchandise were burned. /n due ti#e the respondent sub#itted to the
petitioner its clai# under the policy. The salva$e $oods were sold at public auction and, after
deductin$ their value, the total loss suffered by the respondent was fi(ed at )9-,'00. The petitioner
refused to pay the clai# on the $round that the policy in favor of the respondent had ceased to be in
force on the date the ,nited Atates declared war a$ainst 8er#any, the respondent 3orporation
<thou$h or$ani>ed under and by virtue of the laws of the )hilippines= bein$ controlled by the 8er#an
sub6ects and the petitioner bein$ a co#pany under 2#erican 6urisdiction when said policy was
issued on Ectober 1, 19.1. The petitioner, however, in pursuance of the order of the Director of
!ureau of "inancin$, )hilippine (ecutive 3o##ission, dated 2pril 9, 19.3, paid to the respondent
the su# of )9-,'00 on 2pril 19, 19.3.
The present action was filed on 2u$ust ', 19.', in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of Manila for the
purpose of recoverin$ fro# the respondent the su# of )9-,'00 above #entioned. The theory of the
petitioner is that the insured #erchandise were burned up after the policy issued in 19.1 in favor of
the respondent corporation has ceased to be effective because of the outbrea+ of the war between
the ,nited Atates and 8er#any on Dece#ber 10, 19.1, and that the pay#ent #ade by the
petitioner to the respondent corporation durin$ the &apanese #ilitary occupation was under
pressure. 2fter trial, the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of Manila dis#issed the action without
pronounce#ent as to costs. ,pon appeal to the 3ourt of 2ppeals, the 6ud$#ent of the 3ourt of "irst
/nstance of Manila was affir#ed, with costs. The case is now before us on appeal by certiorari fro#
the decision of the 3ourt of 2ppeals.
The 3ourt of 2ppeals overruled the contention of the petitioner that the respondent corporation
beca#e an ene#y when the ,nited Atates declared war a$ainst 8er#any, relyin$ on n$lish and
2#erican cases which held that a corporation is a citi>en of the country or state by and under the
laws of which it was created or or$ani>ed. /t re6ected the theory that nationality of private corporation
is deter#ine by the character or citi>enship of its controllin$ stoc+holders.
There is no %uestion that #a6ority of the stoc+holders of the respondent corporation were 8er#an
sub6ects. This bein$ so, we have to rule that said respondent beca#e an ene#y corporation upon
the outbrea+ of the war between the ,nited Atates and 8er#any. The n$lish and 2#erican cases
relied upon by the 3ourt of 2ppeals have lost their force in view of the latest decision of the Aupre#e
3ourt of the ,nited Atates in 3lar+ vs. ,ebersee "inan> Iorporation, decided on Dece#ber 8, 19.1,
9- *aw. d. 2dvance Epinions, ;o. ., pp. 1.8-103, in which the controls test has been adopted. /n
"ne#y 3orporation" by Martin Do#+e, a paper presented to the Aecond /nternational 3onference
of the *e$al )rofession held at the ?a$ue <;etherlands= in 2u$ust. 19.8 the followin$ enli$htenin$
passa$es appear5
Aince 7orld 7ar /, the deter#ination of ene#y nationality of corporations has been
discussion in #any countries, belli$erent and neutral. 2 corporation was sub6ect to ene#y
le$islation when it was controlled by ene#ies, na#ely #ana$ed under the influence of
individuals or corporations, the#selves considered as ene#ies. /t was the n$lish courts
which first the Daimler case applied this new concept of "piercin$ the corporate veil," which
was adopted by the peace of Treaties of 1919 and the Mi(ed 2rbitral established after the
"irst 7orld 7ar.
The ,nited Atates of 2#erica did not adopt the control test durin$ the "irst 7orld 7ar.
3ourts refused to reco$ni>ed the concept whereby 2#erican-re$istered corporations could
be considered as ene#ies and thus sub6ect to do#estic le$islation and ad#inistrative
#easures re$ardin$ ene#y property.
7orld 7ar // revived the proble# a$ain. /t was +nown that 8er#an and other ene#y
interests were cloa+ed by do#estic corporation structure. /t was not only by le$al ownership
of shares that a #aterial influence could be e(ercised on the #ana$e#ent of the corporation
but also by lon$ ter# loans and other factual situations. "or that reason, le$islation on
ene#y property enacted in various countries durin$ 7orld 7ar // adopted by statutory
provisions to the control test and deter#ined, to various de$rees, the incidents of control.
3ourt decisions were rendered on the basis of such newly enacted statutory provisions in
deter#inin$ ene#y character of do#estic corporation.
The ,nited Atates did not, in the a#end#ents of the Tradin$ with the ne#y 2ct durin$ the
last war, include as did other le$islations the applications of the control test and a$ain, as in
7orld 7ar /, courts refused to apply this concept whereby the ene#y character of an
2#erican or neutral-re$istered corporation is deter#ined by the ene#y nationality of the
controllin$ stoc+holders.
Measures of bloc+in$ forei$n funds, the so called free>in$ re$ulations, and other
ad#inistrative practice in the treat#ent of forei$n-owned property in the ,nited Atates
allowed to lar$e de$ree the deter#ination of ene#y interest in do#estic corporations and
thus the application of the control test. 3ourt decisions sanctioned such ad#inistrative
practice enacted under the "irst 7ar )owers 2ct of 19.1, and #ore recently, on Dece#ber
8, 19.1, the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates definitely approved of the control theory. /n
3lar+ vs. ,ebersee "inan> Iorporation, 2. 8., dealin$ with a Awiss corporation alle$edly
controlled by 8er#an interest, the 3ourt5 "The property of all forei$n interest was placed
within the reach of the vestin$ power <of the 2lien )roperty 3ustodian= not to appropriate
friendly or neutral assets but to reach ene#y interest which #as%ueraded under those
innocent fronts. . . . The power of sei>ure and vestin$ was e(tended to all property of any
forei$n country or national so that no innocent appearin$ device could beco#e a Tro6an
horse."
/t beco#es unnecessary, therefore, to dwell at len$th on the authorities cited in support of the
appealed decision. ?owever, we #ay add that, in Ha) /ia vs. China 1anking Corporation,
Y
.0 Eff
8a>., <Aupp. 9= -99, we already held that 3hina !an+in$ 3orporation ca#e within the #eanin$ of
the word "ene#y" as used in the Tradin$ with the ne#y 2cts of civili>ed countries not only because
it was incorporated under the laws of an ene#y country but because it was controlled by ene#ies.
The )hilippine /nsurance *aw <2ct ;o. -.-1, as a#ended,= in section 8, provides that "anyone
e(cept a public ene#y #ay be insured." /t stands to reason that an insurance policy ceases to be
allowable as soon as an insured beco#es a public ene#y.
4ffect of )ar, generall;. J 2ll intercourse between citi>ens of belli$erent powers which is
inconsistent with a state of war is prohibited by the law of nations. Auch prohibition includes
all ne$otiations, co##erce, or tradin$ with the ene#y4 all acts which will increase, or tend to
increase, its inco#e or resources4 all acts of voluntary sub#ission to it4 or receivin$ its
protection4 also all acts concernin$ the trans#ission of #oney or $oods4 and all contracts
relatin$ thereto are thereby nullified. /t further prohibits insurance upon trade with or by the
ene#y, upon the life or lives of aliens en$a$ed in service with the ene#y4 this for the reason
that the sub6ects of one country cannot be per#itted to lend their assistance to protect by
insurance the co##erce or property of belli$erent, alien sub6ects, or to do anythin$
detri#ental too their country9s interest. The purpose of war is to cripple the power and
e(haust the resources of the ene#y, and it is inconsistent that one country should destroy its
ene#y9s property and repay in insurance the value of what has been so destroyed, or that it
should in such #anner increase the resources of the ene#y, or render it aid, and the
co##ence#ent of war deter#ines, for li+e reasons, all tradin$ intercourse with the ene#y,
which prior thereto #ay have been lawful. 2ll individuals therefore, who co#pose the
belli$erent powers, e(ist, as to each other, in a state of utter e(clusion, and are public
ene#ies. <' 3ouch, 3yc. of /ns. *aw, pp. 030--0303.=
/n the case of an ordinary fire policy, which $rants insurance only fro# year, or for so#e
other specified ter# it is plain that when the parties beco#e alien ene#ies, the contractual
tie is bro+en and the contractual ri$hts of the parties, so far as not vested. lost. <:ance, the
*aw on /nsurance, Aec. .., p. 11-.=
The respondent havin$ beco#e an ene#y corporation on Dece#ber 10, 19.1, the insurance policy
issued in its favor on Ectober 1, 19.1, by the petitioner <a )hilippine corporation= had ceased to be
valid and enforcible, and since the insured $oods were burned after Dece#ber 10, 19.1, and durin$
the war, the respondent was not entitled to any inde#nity under said policy fro# the petitioner.
?owever, ele#entary rules of 6ustice <in the absence of specific provision in the /nsurance *aw=
re%uire that the pre#iu# paid by the respondent for the period covered by its policy fro# Dece#ber
11, 19.1, should be returned by the petitioner.
The 3ourt of 2ppeals, in decidin$ the case, stated that the #ain issue hin$es on the %uestion of
whether the policy in %uestion beca#e null and void upon the declaration of war between the ,nited
Atates and 8er#any on Dece#ber 10, 19.1, and its 6ud$#ent in favor of the respondent corporation
was predicated on its conclusion that the policy did not cease to be in force. The 3ourt of 2ppeals
necessarily assu#ed that, even if the pay#ent by the petitioner to the respondent was involuntary,
its action is not tenable in view of the rulin$ on the validity of the policy. 2s a #atter of fact, the 3ourt
of 2ppeals held that "any inti#idation resorted to by the appellee was not un6ust but the e(ercise of
its lawful ri$ht to clai# for and received the pay#ent of the insurance policy," and that the rulin$ of
the !ureau of "inancin$ to the effect that "the appellee was entitled to pay#ent fro# the appellant
was, well founded." "actually, there can be no doubt that the Director of the !ureau of "inancin$, in
orderin$ the petitioner to pay the clai# of the respondent, #erely obeyed the instruction of the
&apanese Military 2d#inistration, as #ay be seen fro# the followin$5 "/n view of the findin$s and
conclusion of this office contained in its decision on 2d#inistrative 3ase dated "ebruary 9, 19.3
copy of which was sent to your office and the concurrence therein of the "inancial Depart#ent of the
&apanese Military 2d#inistration, and follo)ing the instruction of said authorit;, you are hereby
ordered to pay the clai# of Messrs. 3hristern, ?uenefeld V 3o., /nc. The pay#ent of said clai#,
however, should be #ade by #eans of crossed chec+." <#phasis supplied.=
/t results that the petitioner is entitled to recover what paid to the respondent under the
circu#stances on this case. ?owever, the petitioner will be entitled to recover only the e%uivalent, in
actual )hilippines currency of )9-,'00 paid on 2pril 19, 19.3, in accordance with the rate fi(ed in
the !allantyne scale.
7herefore, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and the respondent corporation is ordered to
pay to the petitioner the su# of )11,-08.33, )hilippine currency, less the a#ount of the pre#iu#, in
)hilippine currency, that should be returned by the petitioner for the une(pired ter# of the policy in
%uestion, be$innin$ Dece#ber 11, 19.1. 7ithout costs. Ao ordered.
G.R. No&. 89926-28 Oc'oE)r 18, 1991
S!A!E INES!MEN! 1O>SE, INC. a%" S!A!E FINANCING CEN!ER, INC., petitioners,
vs.
CI!IBAN@, N.A., BAN@ OF AMERICA, N! A SA, 1ONG@ONG A S1ANG1AI BAN@ING
CORPORA!ION, a%" 'h) CO>R! OF APPEALS, respondents.
"oco, 1unag, Napunan M !igallos for petitioners.
Agcaoili M Associates for Citi&ank, 7.A, and 1ank of America 7T M SA.
1elo, A&iera M Associates for Hongkong M Shanghai 1anking Corp.

NARASA, J.:#
The chief %uestion in the appeal at bar is whether or not forei$n ban+s licensed to do business in the
)hilippines, #ay be considered ,residents of the /hilippine 0slands, within the #eanin$ of Aection -0
of the /nsolvency *aw <2ct ;o. 190', as a#ended, eff. May -0, 1909= readin$ in part as follows5 1
2n ad6udication of insolvency #ay be #ade on the petition of three or #ore
creditors, residents of the /hilippine 0slands, whose credits or de#ands accrued in
the )hilippine /slands, and the a#ount of which credits or de#ands are in the
a$$re$ate not less than one thousand pesos5 )rovided, that none of said creditors
has beco#e a creditor by assi$n#ent, however #ade, within thirty days prior to the
filin$ of said petition. Auch petition #ust be filed in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of the
province or city in which the debtor resides or has his principal place of business,
and #ust be verified by at least three <3= of the petitioners. . . .
The forei$n ban+s involved in the controversy are !an+ of 2#erica ;T and A2, 3itiban+ ;.2. and
?on$+on$ and Ahan$hai !an+in$ 3orporation. En Dece#ber 11, 1981, they 6ointly filed with the
3ourt of "irst /nstance of @i>al a petition for involuntary insolvency of 3onsolidated Mines, /nc.
<3M/=, which they a#ended four days later. 2 The case was doc+eted as Ap. )roc. ;o. 9-'3 and
assi$ned to !ranch -8 of the 3ourt.
The petition for involuntary insolvency alle$ed5
1= that 3M/ had obtained loans fro# the three petitionin$ ban+s, and that as of
;ove#berNDece#ber, 1981, its outstandin$ obli$ations were as follows5
a= /n favor of !an+ of 2#erica <!2= )10,-91,3'1.'1
<as of Dece#ber 10, 1981= ,AX .,110,831.88
<b= /n favor of 3itiban+ ,AX .,9-0,0.8.80
<as of Dece#ber 10, 1981=
c= /n favor of ?on$+on$ V Ahan$hai !an+ ,AX 0,389,.3..1-
<as of ;ove#ber 30, 1981=4 )',-33,9'9.-.
-= that in ;ove#ber, 1981, Atate /nvest#ent ?ouse, /nc. <A/?/= and Atate "inancin$ 3enter, /nc.
<A"3/= had separately instituted actions for collection of su#s of #oney and da#a$es in the 3ourt of
"irst /nstance of @i>al a$ainst 3M/, doc+eted respectively as 3ivil 3ases ;u#bered .3088 and
.3'114 and that on application of said plaintiffs, writs of preli#inary attach#ent had been issued
which were e(ecuted on "the royaltyNprofit sharin$ pay#ents due 3M/ fro# !en$uet 3onsolidated
Minin$, /nc4" and
3= that 3M/ had "co##itted specific acts of insolvency as provided in Aection -0 of the /nsolvency
*aw, to wit5
((( ((( (((
0. that he <3M/= has suffered his <3M/9s= property to re#ain under attach#ent or
le$al process for three days for the purpose of hinderin$ or delayin$ or defraudin$ his
<3M/9s= creditors4
((( ((( (((
11. that bein$ a #erchant or trades#an he <3M/= has $enerally defaulted in the
pay#ent of his <3M/9s= current obli$ations for a period of thirty days4 . . .
The petition was opposed by Atate /nvest#ent ?ouse, /nc. <A/?/= and Atate "inancin$ 3enter, /nc.
<A"3/=. 3 /t clai#ed that5
1= the three petitioner ban+s had co#e to court with unclean hands in that they filed the petition for
insolvency J alle$in$ the 3M/ was defraudin$ its creditors, and they wished all creditors to share in
its assets J althou$h a few days earlier, they had "received for the account of 3M/ substantial
pay#ents a$$re$atin$ )10,800,000.004"
-= the 3ourt had no 6urisdiction because the alle$ed acts of insolvency were false5 the writs of
attach#ent a$ainst 3M/ had re#ained in force because there were "6ust, valid and lawful $rounds for
the<ir= issuance," and 3M/ was not a "#erchant or trades#an" nor had it "$enerally defaulted in the
pay#ent of <its= obli$ations for a period of thirty days . . . 4"
3= the 3ourt had no 6urisdiction to ta+e co$ni>ance of the petition for insolvency because petitioners
are notresident creditors of 3M/ in conte#plation of the /nsolvency *aw4 and
.= the 3ourt has no power to set aside the attach#ent issued in favor of intervenors-oppositors A/?/
and A"3/.
3M/ filed its 2nswer to the petition for insolvency, assertin$ in the #ain that it was not
insolvent, 9 and later filed a "Motion to Dis#iss !ased on 2ffir#ative Defense of )etitioner9s *ac+ of
3apacity to Aue," echoin$ the theory of A/?/ and A"3/ that the petitioner ban+s are not ")hilippine
residents." D @esolution on the #otion was "deferred until after hearin$ of the case on the #erits" it
appearin$ to the 3ourt that the $rounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. 6
A/?/ and A"3/ filed their own 2nswer-in-/ntervention, 8 and served on the three petitioner ban+s
re%uests for ad#ission of certain facts in accordance with @ule -' of the @ules of 3ourt, 8 receivin$ a
response only fro# ?on$+on$ V Ahan$hai !an+. 9
A/?/ and A"3/ then filed a Motion for Au##ary &ud$#ent dated May -3, 1983 "on the $round that,
based on the pleadin$s and ad#issions on record, the trial court had no 6urisdiction to ad6udicate
3M/ insolvent since the petitioners <respondent forei$n ban+s= are not "resident creditors" of 3M/ as
re%uired under the /nsolvency *aw."10 Eppositions to the #otion were filed, 11 to which a reply was
sub#itted. 12
The @e$ional Trial 3ourt 13 found #erit in the #otion for su##ary 6ud$#ent. !y Erder dated
Ectober 10, 1983, it rendered "su##ary 6ud$#ent dis#issin$ the . . . petition for lac+ of 6urisdiction
over the sub6ect #atter, with costs a$ainst petitioners." 19 /t ruled that on the basis of the "facts on
record, as shown in the pleadin$s, #otions and ad#issions of the parties, an insolvency court could
"not ac%uire 6urisdiction to ad6udicate the debtor as insolvent if the creditors petitionin$ for
ad6udication of insolvency are not "residents" of the )hilippines" J citing a decision of the 3alifornia
Aupre#e 3ourt which it declared "s%uarely applicable especially considerin$ that one of the sources
of our /nsolvency *aw is the /nsolvency 2ct of 3alifornia of 1890 . . . " 2nd it declared that since
petitioners had been #erely licensed to do business in the )hilippines, they could not be dee#ed
residents thereof.
The three forei$n ban+s sou$ht to ta+e an appeal fro# the Erder of Ectober 10, 1983. They filed a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal. 1D A/?/ and A"3/ #oved to dis#iss their appeal clai#in$ it
was atte#pted out of ti#e. The Trial 3ourt denied the #otion.
A/?/ and A"3/ filed with this 3ourt a petition for certiorari and prohibition <8.@. ;E. ''..9=,
i#pu$nin$ that denial. The 3ourt dis#issed the petition and instead re%uired the three ban+s to file a
petition for review in accordance with @ule .0 of the @ules of 3ourt. 16 This the ban+s did <their
petition was doc+eted as 8.@. ;o. ''80.=. ?owever, by @esolution dated May 1', 198., the court
referred the petition for review to the /nter#ediate 2ppellate 3ourt, where it was doc+eted as 23 A)-
03'1.. 18
/n the #eanti#e, the Trial 3ourt approved on May 3, 1980 the ban+s9 record on appeal and
trans#itted it to this 3ourt, where it was recorded as ,DI-'8''. 2s #i$ht have been e(pected, this
3ourt re%uired the ban+s to file a petition for review under @ule .0, but they as+ed to be e(cused
fro# doin$ so since they had already filed such a petition, which had been referred to the
/nter#ediate 2ppellate 3ourt and was there pendin$ as 23-8.@. ;o. A) 03'1., supra. This 3ourt
then also referred ,DI-'8'' to the /nter#ediate 2ppellate 3ourt where it was doc+eted as 23-8.@.
;o. 3: 01830.
!oth referred cases, 23-8.@. ;o. A) 03'1. and 23-8.@. ;o. 3: 01830, were consolidated by
@esolution of the 3ourt of 2ppeals dated 2pril 9, 198', and Decision thereon was pro#ul$ated on
&uly 1., 1981 by the "ifteenth Division of said 3ourt. 18
The 2ppellate 3ourt reversed the Trial 3ourt9s Erder of Ectober 10, 1983 and re#anded the case to
it for further proceedin$s. /t ruled5
1= that the purpose of the /nsolvency *aw was "to convert the assets of the ban+rupt in cash for
distribution a#on$ creditors, and then to relieve the honest debtor fro# the wei$ht of oppressive
indebtedness and per#it hi# to start life anew, free fro# the obli$ations and responsibilities
conse%uent upon business #isfortunes4" 19 and that it was "crystal clear" that the law was "desi$ned
not only for the benefit of the creditors but #ore i#portantly for the benefit of the debtor hi#self," the
ob6ect bein$ "to provide not only for the suspension of pay#ents and the protection of creditors but
also the dischar$e of insolvent honest debtors to enable the# to have a fresh start4"
-= that the Trial 3ourt had placed "a very strained and restrictive interpretation of the ter# "resident,"
as to e(clude forei$n ban+s which have been operatin$ in this country since the early part of the
century," and "the better approach . . . would have been to har#oni>e the provisions . . . <of the
/nsolvency *aw= with si#ilar provisions of other succeedin$ laws, li+e the 3orporation 3ode of the
)hilippines, the 8eneral !an+in$ 2ct, the Effshore !an+in$ *aw and the ;ational /nternal @evenue
3ode in connection with or related to their doin$ business in the )hilippines4"
3= that in li$ht of said statutes, the three ban+s "are in truth and in fact considered as "residents" of
the )hilippines for purposes of doin$ business in the )hilippines and even for ta(ation #atters4"
.= that the ban+s had "co#plied with all the laws, rules and re$ulations <for doin$ business in the
country= and have been doin$ business in the )hilippines for #any years now4" that the authority
$ranted to the# by the Aecurities and (chan$e 3o##ission upon orders of the Monetary !oard
"covers not only transactin$ ban+in$ business . . . but li+ewise #aintainin$ suits "for recovery of any
debt, clai#s or de#and whatsoever," and that their petition for involuntary insolvency was "nothin$
#ore than a suit ai#ed at recoverin$ a debt $ranted by the# to 3onsolidated Mines, /nc., or at least
a portion thereof4"
.= that to deprive the forei$n ban+s of their ri$ht to proceed a$ainst their debtors throu$h insolvency
proceedin$s would "contravene the basic standards of e%uity and fair play, . . . would discoura$e
their operations in econo#ic develop#ent pro6ects that create not only 6obs for our people but also
opportunities for advance#ent as a nation4" and
0= that the ter#s "residence" and "do#icile" do not #ean the sa#e thin$, and that as re$ards a
corporation, it is $enerally dee#ed an "inhabitant" of the state under whose law it is incorporated,
and has a "residence" wherever it conducts its ordinary business, and #ay have its le$al "do#icile"
in one place and "residence" in another.
A/?/ and A"3/ #oved for reconsideration and then, when rebuffed, too+ an appeal to this 3ourt.
?ere, they ar$ue that the 2ppellate 3ourt9s 6ud$#ent should be reversed because it failed to declare
that J
1= the failure of the three forei$n ban+s to alle$e under oath in their petition for involuntary
insolvency that they are )hilippine residents, wishin$ only to "be considered )hilippine residents," is
fatal to their cause4
-= also fatal to their cause is their failure to prove, #uch less alle$e, that under the do#iciliary laws
of the forei$n ban+s, a )hilippine corporation is allowed the reciprocal ri$ht to petition for a debtor9s
involuntary insolvency4
3= in fact and in law, the three ban+s are not )hilippine residents because5
a= corporations have do#icile and residence only in the state of their
incorporation or in the place desi$nated by law, althou$h for limited
and e#clusive purposes, other states #ay consider the# as
residents4
b= 6uridical persons #ay not have residence separate fro# their
do#icile4
.= actually, the non-resident status of the ban+s within the conte(t of the /nsolvency *aw is
confir#ed by other laws4
0= the license $ranted to the ban+s to do business in the )hilippines does not #a+e the# residents4
'= no substantive law e(plicitly $rants forei$n ban+s the power to petition for the ad6udication of the
)hilippine corporation as a ban+rupt4
1= the Monetary !oard can not appoint a conservator or receiver for a forei$n ban+ or orders its
li%uidation havin$ only the power to revo+e its license, sub6ect to such proceedin$s as the Aolicitor
8eneral #ay thereafter dee# proper to protect its creditors4
8= the forei$n ban+s are not denied the ri$ht to collect their credits a$ainst )hilippine debtors, only
the ri$ht to "petition for the harsh re#edy of involuntary insolvency" not bein$ conceded to the#4
9= said ban+s have co#e to court with unclean hands, their filin$ of the petition for involuntary
insolvency bein$ an atte#pt to defeat validly ac%uired ri$hts of do#estic corporations.
The concept of a forei$n corporation under Aection 1-3 of the 3orporation 3ode is of "one for#ed,
or$ani>ed or e(istin$ under laws other than those of the )hilippines and . . . <which= laws allow
"ilipino citi>ens and corporations to do business . . . ." There is no %uestion that the three ban+s are
forei$n corporations in this sence, with principal offices situated outside of the )hilippines. There is
no %uestion either that said ban+s have been licensed to do business in this country and have in fact
been doin$ business here for #any years, throu$h branch offices or a$encies, includin$ "forei$n
currency deposit units4" in fact, one of the#, ?on$+on$ V Ahan$hai !an+ has been doin$ business
in the )hilippines since as early as 1810.
The issue is whether these )hilippine branches or units #ay be considered "residents of the
)hilippine /slands" as that ter# is used in Aection -0 of the /nsolvency *aw, supra, 20 or residents of
the state under the laws of which they were respectively incorporated. The answer cannot be found
in the /nsolvency *aw itself, which contains no definition of the ter#, resident, or any clear indication
of its #eanin$. There are however other statutes, albeit of subse%uent enact#ent and effectivity,
fro# which enli$htenin$ notions of the ter# #ay be derived.
The ;ational /nternal @evenue 3ode declares that the ter# "9resident forei$n corporation9 applies to
a forei$n corporation en$a$ed in trade or business within the )hilippines," as distin$uished fro# a "
"non-resident forei$n corporation" . . . <which is one= not en$a$ed in trade or business within the
)hilippines." 21
The Effshore !an+in$ *aw, )residential Decree ;o. 103., states "that branches, subsidiaries,
affiliation, e(tension offices or any other units of corporation or 6uridical person or$ani>ed under the
laws of any forei$n country operatin$ in the )hilippines shall be considered residents of the
)hilippines." 22
The 8eneral !an+in$ 2ct, @epublic 2ct ;o. 331, places "branches and a$encies in the )hilippines of
forei$n ban+s . . . <which are= called )hilippine branches," in the sa#e cate$ory as "co##ercial
ban+s, savin$s associations, #ort$a$e ban+s, develop#ent ban+s, rural ban+s, stoc+ savin$s and
loan associations" <which have been for#ed and or$ani>ed under )hilippine laws=, #a+in$ no
distinction between the for#er and the later in so far, as the ter#s "ban+in$ institutions" and "ban+"
are used in the 2ct, 23 declarin$ on the contrary that in "all #atters not specifically covered by special
provisions applicable only to forei$n ban+s, or their branches and a$encies in the )hilippines, said
forei$n ban+s or their branches and a$encies lawfully doin$ business in the )hilippines "shall be
bound by all laws, rules, and re$ulations applicable to do#estic ban+in$ corporations of the sa#e
class, e(cept such laws, rules and re$ulations as provided for the creation, for#ation, or$ani>ation,
or dissolution of corporations or as fi( the relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of #e#bers,
stoc+holders or officers or corporations." 29
This 3ourt itself has already had occasion to hold 2D that a forei$n corporation licitly doin$ business
in the )hilippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, #ay not be considered a non$resident within
the scope of the le$al provision authori>in$ attach#ent a$ainst a defendant not residing in the
/hilippine 0slands4" 26 in other words, a preli#inary attach#ent #ay not be applied for and $ranted
solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a forei$n corporation authori>ed to do business in
the )hilippines J and is conse%uently and necessarily, "a party who resides out of the )hilippines."
)arenthetically, if it #ay not be considered as a party not residin$ in the )hilippines, or as a party
who resides out of the country, then, lo$ically, it #ust be considered a party who does reside in the
)hilippines, who is a resident of the country. !e this as it #ay, this 3ourt pointed out that5
. . . Eur laws and 6urisprudence indicate a purpose to assi#ilate forei$n corporations,
duly licensed to do business here, to the status of do#estic corporations. <3f.
Aection 13, 2ct ;o. 1.09, and Marshall 7ells 3o. vs. ?enry 7. lser V 3o., .' )hil.
10, 1'4 Gu4 3on$ n$ vs. Trinidad, .1 )hil. 380, .11= 7e thin+ it would be entirely
out of line with this policy should we #a+e a discri#ination a$ainst a forei$n
corporation, li+e the petitioner, and sub6ect its property to the harsh writ of sei>ure by
attach#ent when it has co#plied not only with every re%uire#ent of law #ade
specially of forei$n corporations, but in addition with every re%uire#ent of law #ade
of do#estic corporations. . . . .
Ebviously, the assi#ilation of forei$n corporations authori>ed to do business in the )hilippines "to
the status ofdomestic corporations," subsu#es their bein$ found and operatin$ as corporations,
hence, residing, in the country.
The sa#e principle is reco$ni>ed in 2#erican law5 that the "residence of a corporation, if it can be
said to have a residence, is necessarily where it e(ercises corporate functions . . . 4" that it is
.considered as dwellin$ "in the place where its business is done . . . ," as bein$ "located where its
franchises are e(ercised . . . ," and as bein$ "present where it is en$a$ed in the prosecution of the
corporate enterprise4" that a "forei$n corporation licensed to do business in a state is a resident of
any country where it #aintains an office or a$ent for transaction of its usual and custo#ary business
for venue purposes4" and that the "necessary ele#ent in its si$nification is locality of
e(istence." 28 3ourts have held that "a do#estic corporation is re$arded as havin$ a residence within
the state at any place where it is en$a$ed in the particulars of the corporate enterprise, and not only
at its chief place or ho#e office4" 28 that "a corporation #ay be do#iciled in one state and resident in
another4 its le$al do#icil in the state of its creation presents no i#pedi#ent to its residence in a real
and practical sense in the state of its business activities." 29
The fore$oin$ propositions are in accord with the dictionary concept of residence as applied to
6uridical persons, a ter# which appears to co#prehend per#anent as well as te#porary residence.
The 3ourt cannot thus accept the petitioners9 theory that corporations #ay not have a residence
<i.e., the place where they operate and transact business= separate fro# their do#icile <i.e., the state
of their for#ation or or$ani>ation=, and that they #ay be considered by other states as residents only
for limited and e#clusive purposes. Ef course, as petitioners correctly aver, it is not really the $rant of
a license to a forei$n corporation to do business in this country that #a+es it a resident4 the license
#erely $ives le$iti#acy to its doin$ business here. 7hat effectively #a+es such a forei$n
corporation a resident corporation in the )hilippines is its actually bein$ in the )hilippines and licitly
doin$ business here, "locality of e(istence" bein$, to repeat, the "necessary ele#ent in . . . <the=
si$nification" of the ter#, resident corporation.
;either can the 3ourt accept the theory that the o#ission by the ban+s in their petition for
involuntary insolvency of an e(plicit and cate$orical state#ent that they are "residents of the
)hilippine /slands," is fatal to their cause. /n truth, in li$ht of the concept of resident forei$n
corporations 6ust e(pounded, when they alle$ed in that petition that they are forei$n ban+in$
corporations, licensed to do business in the )hilippines, and actually doin$ business in this 3ountry
throu$h branch offices or a$encies, they were in effect statin$ that they are resident forei$n
corporations in the )hilippines.
There is, of course, as petitioners ar$ue, no substantive law e(plicitly $rantin$ foreign &anks the
power to petition for the ad6udication of a )hilippine corporation as a ban+rupt. This is
inconse%uential, for neither is there any le$al provision e(pressly $ivin$ domestic &anks the sa#e
power, althou$h their capacity to petition for insolvency can scarcely be disputed and is not in truth
disputed by petitioners. The law plainly $rants to a 6uridical person, whether it be a ban+ or not or it
be a forei$n or do#estic corporation, as to natural persons as well, such a power to petition for the
ad6udication of ban+ruptcy of any person, natural or 6uridical, provided that it is a resident corporation
and 6oins at least two other residents in presentin$ the petition to the !an+ruptcy 3ourt.
The petitioners ne(t ar$ue that ")hilippine law is e#phatic that only forei$n corporations whose own
laws $ive )hilippine nationals reciprocal ri$hts #ay do business in the )hilippines." 2s basis for the
ar$u#ent they invo+e Aection 1-3 of the 3orporation 3ode which, however, does not for#ulate the
proposition in the sa#e way. Aection 1-3 does not say, as petitioners assert, that it is re%uired that
the laws under which forei$n corporations are for#ed "give /hilippine nationals, reciprocal rights."
7hat it does say is that the laws of the country or state under which a forei$n corporation is "for#ed,
or$ani>ed or e(istin$ . . . allo) 5ilipino citi.ens and corporations to do &usiness in its o)n countr; or
state," which is not %uite the sa#e thin$. ;ow, it see#s to the 3ourt that there can be no serious
debate about the fact that the laws of the countries under which the three <3= respondent ban+s were
for#ed or or$ani>ed <?on$+on$ and the ,nited Atates= do "allow "ilipino citi>ens and corporations to
do business" in their own territory and 6urisdiction. /t also see#s to the 3ourt %uite apparent that the
/nsolvency *aw contains no re%uire#ent that the laws of the state under which a forei$n corporation
has been for#ed or or$ani>ed should $rant reciprocal ri$hts to )hilippine citi>ens to apply for
involuntary insolvency of a resident or citi>en thereof. The petitioners9 point is thus not well ta+en and
need not be belabored.
That the Monetary !oard can not appoint a conservator or receiver for a forei$n ban+ or order its
li%uidation havin$ only the power to revo+e its license, sub6ect to such proceedin$s as the Aolicitor
8eneral #ay thereafter dee# proper to protect its creditors, which is another point that petitioners
see+ to #a+e, is of no #o#ent. /t has no lo$ical connection to the #atter of whether or not the
forei$n ban+ #ay properly as+ for a 6udicial declaration of the involuntary insolvency of a do#estic
corporation, which is the issue at hand. The fact is, in any event, that the law is not lac+in$ in
sanctions a$ainst forei$n ban+s or powerless to protect the latter9s creditors.
The petitioners contend, too, that the respondent ban+s have co#e to court with unclean hands,
their filin$ of the petition for involuntary insolvency bein$ an atte#pt to defeat validly ac%uired ri$hts
of do#estic corporations. The 3ourt wishes to si#ply point out that the effects of the institution of
ban+ruptcy proceedin$s on all the creditors of the alle$ed ban+rupt are clearly spelled out by the
law, and will be observed by the /nsolvency 3ourt re$ardless of whatever #otives J apart fro# the
desire to share in the assets of the insolvent in satisfyin$ its credits J that the party institutin$ the
proceedin$s #i$ht have.
Atill another ar$u#ent put forth by the petitioners is that the three ban+s9 failure to incorporate their
branches in the )hilippines into new ban+s in accordance with said Aection '8 of the 8eneral
!an+in$ 2ct connotes an intention on their part to continue as residents of their respective states of
incorporation and not to be re$arded as residents of the )hilippines. The ar$u#ent is based on an
inco#plete and inaccurate %uotation of the cited Aection. 7hat Aection '8 re%uired of a "forei$n
ban+ presently havin$ branches and a$encies in the )hilippines, . . . within one year fro# the
effectivity" of the 8eneral !an+in$ 2ct, was to co#ply with an; of three D>E options, not merel; )ith
one sole requirement. These three <3= options are the followin$5
1= <that singled out and quoted by the petitioners, i.e.5= "incorporate its branch or
branches into a new ban+ in accordance with )hilippine laws . . . 4 or
-= "assi$n capital per#anently to the local branch with the concurrent #aintenance of
a 9net due to9 head office account which shall include all net a#ounts due to other
branches outside the )hilippines in an a#ount which when added to the assi$ned
capital shall at all ti#es be not less than the #ini#u# a#ount of capital accounts
re%uired for do#estic co##ercial ban+s under section twenty-two of this 2ct4" or
3= "#aintain a "net due to" head office account which shall include all net a#ounts
due to other branches outside the )hilippines, in an a#ount which shall not be less
than the #ini#u# a#ount of capital accounts re%uired for do#estic co##ercial
ban+s under section twenty-two of this 2ct."
The less said about this ar$u#ent then, the better.
The petitioners alle$e that three days before respondent ban+s filed their petition for involuntary
insolvency a$ainst 3M/, they received fro# the latter substantial pay#ents on account in the
a$$re$ate a#ount of )',010,800.00, with the result that they were "preferred in the distribution of
3M/9s assets thereby defraudin$ other creditors of 3M/." 7on sequitur. /t is in any case a
circu#stance that the !an+ruptcy 3ourt #ay well ta+e into consideration in deter#inin$ the #anner
and proportion by which the assets of the insolvent co#pany shall be distributed a#on$ its creditors4
but it should not be considered a $round for $ivin$ the petition for insolvency short shrift. Moreover,
the pay#ent adverted to does not appear to be all that lar$e. The total liabilities of 3M/ to the three
respondent ban+s as of Dece#ber, 1981 was )-1,031,33'.91, and ,AX1.,.80,81..80. 3onverted
into )hilippine currency at the rate of )1.899 to the dollar, the avera$e rate of e(chan$e durin$
Dece#ber, 1981, 30the dollar account would be )11.,.-3,.01.00. Thus, the a$$re$ate liabilities of
3M/ to the ban+s, e(pressed in )hilippine currency, was )130,90.,188..1 as of Dece#ber, 1981,
and therefore the pay#ent to the# of )',010,800.00 constituted only so#e ...-U of the total
indebtedness.
7?@"E@, the petition is D;/D and the challen$ed Decision of the 3ourt of 2ppeals is
2""/@MD in toto, with costs a$ainst the petitioners.
AE E@D@D.
-rio$Aquino and !edialdea, JJ., concur.
Cru., J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-11896 A-*-&' D, 1918
I% 'h) #a'')r o( )&'a') o( Sa#-)+ B$&cho(( ;)r'h#-++)r. ANA M. RAMIRE<, e(ecutri(-appellant,
vs.
O!!O GM>R, a& *-ar"$a% o( 'h) #$%or& E&'h)r R)%a') Mor., Car#)% Mar$a Mor., a%"
L)o%'$%a E+$FaE)'h, clai#ant-appellant.
C. %o.ano for e#ecutri#$appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for claimant$appellant.
S!REE!, J./
Aa#uel !ischoff 7erth#uller, native of the @epublic of Awit>erland, but for #any years a resident of
the )hilippine /slands, died in the city of /loilo on &une -9, 1913, leavin$ a valuable estate of which
he disposed by will. 2 few days after his de#ise the will was offered for probate in the 3ourt of "irst
/nstance of /loilo and, upon publication of notice, was duly allowed and established by the court. ?is
widow, DoHa 2na M. @a#ire>, was na#ed as e(ecutri( in the will, and to her accordin$ly letters
testa#entary were issued. !y the will everythin$ was $iven to the widow, with the e(ception of a
piece of real property located in the 3ity of Thun, Awit>erland, which was devised to the testator9s
brothers and sisters.
The first cause of the will contains a state#ent to the effect that inas#uch as the testator had no
children fro# his #arria$e with 2na M. @a#ire> he was therefore devoid of forced heirs. /n #a+in$
this state#ent the testator i$nored the possible clai#s of two sets of children, born to his natural
dau$hter, *eona 3astro.
The pertinent bio$raphical facts concernin$ *eona 3astro are these5 2s appears fro# the ori$inal
baptis#al entry #ade in the church record of !acolod, she was born in that pue&lo on 2pril 11,
1810, her #other bein$ "elisa 3astro, and father "un+nown." ,pon the #ar$in of this record there is
written in Apanish an additional annotation of the followin$ tenor5 "2ccordin$ to a public docu#ent
<escritura= which was e(hibited, she was reco$ni>ed by Aa#uel !ischoff on &une --, 1811." This
annotation as well as the ori$inal entry is authenticated by the si$nature of "ather "errero, whose
deposition was ta+en in this case. ?e testifies that the wor+ "escritura" in this entry #eans a public
docu#ent4 and he says that such docu#ent was e(hibited to hi# when the #ar$inal note which has
been %uoted was added to the baptis#al record and supplied the basis for the annotation in
%uestion.
2s the years passed *eona 3astro was ta+en into the fa#ily of Aa#uel !ischoff and brou$ht up by
hi# and his wife a a #e#ber of the fa#ily4 and it is sufficiently shown by the evidence adduced in
this case that Aa#uel !ischoff tacitly reco$ni>ed *eona a his dau$hter and treated her as such. /n
the year 1890 *eona 3astro was #arried to "rederic+ von Iauff#an, a !ritish sub6ect, born in ?on$
Ion$, who had co#e to live in the city of /loilo. Three children were born of this #arria$e, na#ely,
lena, "ederico, and rnesto, the youn$est havin$ been born on ;ove#ber 10, 1898. /n the #onth
of 2pril 1899, *eona 3astro was ta+en by her husband fro# /loilo to the 3ity of Thun, Awit>erland,
for the purpose of recuperatin$ her health. Ahe was there placed in a sanitariu#, and on 2u$ust
-0th the husband departed for the )hilippine /slands, where he arrived on Ectober 10, 1899.
*eona 3astro continued to re#ain in Awit>erland, and a few years later infor#ed her husband,
who# she had not seen a$ain, that she desired to re#ain free and would not resu#e life in co##on
with hi#. 2s a conse%uence, in the year 190., Mr. Iauff#an went to the 3ity of )aris, "rance, for
the purpose of obtainin$ a divorce fro# his wife under the "rench laws4 and there is sub#itted in
evidence in this case a certified copy of an e(tract fro# the #inutes of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of
the Depart#ent of the Aeine, fro# which it appears that a divorce was there decreed on &anuary 0,
1900, in favor of Mr. Iauff#an and a$ainst his wife, *eona, in default. Thou$h the record recites that
*eona was then in fact residin$ at ;o. ', @ue Doni>etti, )aris, there is no evidence that she had
ac%uired a per#anent do#icile in that city.
The estran$e#ent between the von Iauff#an spouses is e(plained by the fact that *eona 3astro
had beco#e attracted to Dr. rnest #il Mory, the physician in char$e of the sanatoriu# in
Awit>erland where she was ori$inally placed4 and soon after the decree of divorce was entered, as
aforesaid, Doctor Mory and *eona 3astro repaired to the 3ity of *ondon, n$land, and on May 0,
1900, in the re$istrar9s office in the district of 7est#inster, went throu$h the for#s of a #arria$e
cere#ony before an officer duly %ualified to celebrate #arria$e under the n$lish law. /t appears that
Doctor Mory hi#self had been previously #arried to one ?elena 7olp#an, and had been divorced
fro# her4 but how or under what circu#stances this divorce had been obtained does not appear.
)rior to the celebration of this cere#ony of #arria$e a dau$hter, na#ed *eontina li>abeth, had
been born <&uly -1, 1900= to Doctor Mory and *eona 3astro, in Thun, Awit>erland. En &uly -, 190',
a second dau$hter, na#ed 3ar#en Maria, was born to the# in !erne, Awit>erland, now the place of
their abode4 and on &une 10, 1909, a third dau$hter was born, na#e sther. En Ectober ', 1910,
the #other died.
/n the present proceedin$s Etto 8#ur has appeared as the $uardian of the three Mory clai#ants,
while "rederic+ von Iauff#an has appeared as the $uardian of his own three children, lena,
"ederico, and rnesto.
2s will be sur#ised fro# the fore$oin$ state#ent, the clai#s of both sets of children are founded
upon the contention that *eona 3astro was the reco$ni>ed natural dau$hter of Aa#uel !ischoff and
that as such she would, if livin$, at the ti#e of her father9s death, have been a forced heir of his
estate and would have been entitled to participate therein to the e(tend of a one-third interest. 2na
M. @a#ire>, as the widow of Aa#uel !ischoff and residuary le$atee under his will, insists J at least
as a$ainst the Mory clai#ants, J that *eona 3astro had never been reco$ni>ed at all by Aa#uel
!ischoff.
/n behalf of *eontina, the oldest of the Mory clai#ants, it was ori$inally insisted in the court below,
that, havin$ been born while her #other still passed as the wife of "rederic+ von Iauff#an, she was
to be considered as a le$iti#ate dau$hter of the wedded pair. This contention has been abandoned
on this appeal a untenable4 and it is now contended here #erely that, bein$ ori$inally the ille$iti#ate
dau$hter of Doctor Mory and *eona 3astro, she was le$iti#ated by their subse%uent #arria$e.
/n behalf of 3ar#en Maria and sther @enate, the two youn$er of the Mory clai#ants, it is ar$ued
that the bonds of #atri#ony which united "rederic+ von Iauff#an and *eona 3astro were dissolved
by the decree of divorce $ranted by the )aris court on &anuary 0, 19004 that the #arria$e cere#ony
which was soon thereafter celebrated between Doctor Mory and *eona in *ondon was in all respects
valid4 and that therefore these clai#ants are to be considered the le$iti#ate offsprin$ of their #other.
/n behalf of the children of "rederic+ von Iauff#an it is insisted that the decree of divorce was wholly
invalid, that all three of the Mory children are the offsprin$ of adulterous relations, and that the von
Iauff#an children, as the le$iti#ate offsprin$ of *eona 3astro, are alone entitled to participate in the
division of such part of the estate of Aa#uel !ischoff as would have been inherited by their #other, if
livin$.
7e are of the opinion that the status of *eona 3astro as reco$ni>ed natural dau$hter of Aa#uel
!ischoff is fully and satisfactorily shown. /t is proved that prior to her #arria$e with "rederic+ von
Iauff#an she was in an uninterrupted en6oy#ent of the de facto status of a natural child and was
treated as such by Aa#uel !ischoff and his +indred. The proof of tacit reco$nition is full and
co#plete.
"ro# the #e#orandu# #ade by )adre "errero in the record of the birth, as well as fro# the
testi#ony of this priest, ta+en upon the deposition, it also appears that Aa#uel !ischoff had
e(ecuted a docu#ent, authenticated by a notarial act, reco$ni>in$ *eona as his dau$hter, that said
docu#ent was presented to the priest, as custodian of the church records, and upon the faith of that
docu#ent the #ar$inal note was added to the baptis#al record, showin$ the fact of such
reco$nition. The ori$inal docu#ent itself was not produced in evidence but it is shown that dili$ent
search was #ade to discover its whereabouts, without avail. This was sufficient to 6ustify the
introduction of secondary evidence concernin$ its contents4 and the testi#ony of the priest show that
the fact of reco$nition was therein stated. "urther#ore, the #e#orandu# in the baptis#al record
itself constitutes ori$inal and substantive proof of the facts therein recited.
/t will be observed that the reco$nition of *eona 3astro as the dau$hter of Aa#uel !ischoff occurred
prior to the date when the 3ivil 3ode was put in force in these /slands4 and conse%uently her ri$hts
as derived fro# the reco$nition #ust be deter#ined under the law as it then e(isted, that is, under
*aw 11 of Toro, which afterwards beca#e *aw 1, title 0, boo+ 10, of the 7ovisima "ecopilacion.
<See 3apistrano vs. state of 8abino, 8 )hil., 130, 139, where this statute is %uoted in the opinion
written by Mr. &ustice Torres.= ,nder that law reco$nition could be established by proof of acts on
the part of the parent une%uivocally reco$ni>in$ the status of his offsprin$. <3osiovs. )ili, 10 )hil.,
1-, 11.= /n other words at tacit reco$nition was sufficient. ,nder article 131 of the present 3ivil 3ode,
the ac+nowled$#ent of a natural child #ust be #ade in the record of birth, by will, or in other public
instru#ent. 7e are of the opinion that the reco$nition of *eona 3astro is sufficiently shown whether
the case be 6ud$ed by the one provision or the other.
!ut it is contended by counsel for DoHa 2na @a#ire> that only children born of persons free to #arry
#ay possess the status of reco$ni>ed natural children, and there is no evidence to show that "elisa
3atro was either a sin$le wo#an or widow at the ti#e of the conception or birth of *eona. /n the
absence of proof to the contrary, however, it #ust be presu#ed that she was a sin$le wo#an or a
widow.
@elative to this presu#ption of the capacity of the parents to #arry, the author Aanche> @o#an
#a+es the followin$ co##ent5
"urther#ore, viewin$ the conception of natural child in connection with two #utually
interrelated circu#stances, to wit, the freedo# of the parents to inter#arry, with or without
dispensation, at the ti#e of the conception of the offsprin$ sti$#ati>ed as natural, the first of
these, or freedo# to #arry, is a point upon which there is, accordin$ to the 6urisprudence of
our for#er law, whose spirit is #aintained in the 3ode, an affir#ative presu#ption which
places the burden of provin$ the contrary upon those who are interested in i#pu$nin$ the
natural filiation. <:ol. 0, Derecho Civil, pp. 1018-1019.=
The contrary presu#ption would be that "elisa 3astro was $uilty of adultery, which cannot be
entertained. /f such had in fact been the case, the burden of provin$ it would have been upon the
persons i#pu$nin$ the reco$nition of the child by her father. <Aec. 33., par. 1, 3ode of 3ivil
)rocedure.=
"ro# the fact that *eona 3astro was an ac+nowled$ed natural dau$hter of her father, it follows that
had she survived hi# she would have been his forced heir, he havin$ died after the 3ivil 3ode too+
effect. <3ivil 3ode, article 801 B3C, art. 9394 3ivil 3ode, first transitory disposition=4 and as such forced
heir she would have been entitled to one-third of the inheritance <art. 8.-, 3ivil 3ode=.
7ith reference to the ri$ht of the von Iauff#an children, it is enou$h to say that they are le$iti#ate
children, born to their parents in lawful wedloc+4 and they are therefore entitled to participate in the
inheritance which would have devolved upon their #other, if he had survived the testator.
2s re$ards the Mory clai#ants, it is evident that their ri$hts principally depend upon the effect to be
$iven by this court to the decree of divorce $ranted to von Iauff#an by the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of
the 3ity of )aris. /f this decree is valid, the subse%uent #arria$e of Doctor Mory and *eona 3astro
#ust also be conceded to be valid4 and as a conse%uence the two youn$er children, born after said
#arria$e, would be the le$iti#ate offsprin$ of their #other, and would be entitle to participate in their
#other9s portion of Mr. !ischoff9s estate. 7ith respect to *eontina li>abeth, the older one of the
Mory clai#ants, there would in the case still be the insuperable obstacle which results fro# the fact
that she was the offsprin$ of adulterous intercourse and a such was incapable of le$iti#ation <art.
119, 3ivil 3ode=.
7e are of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by the representation
of the Mory children cannot be reco$ni>ed as valid in the courts of the )hilippine /slands. The "rench
tribunal has no 6urisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a #arria$e contracted in these
/slands by person do#iciled here, such #arria$e bein$ indissoluble under the laws then prevailin$ in
this country.
The evidence shows conclusively that "rederic+ von Iauff#an at all ti#es since earliest youth has
been, and is now, do#iciled in the city of /loilo in the )hilippine /slands4 that he there #arried *eona
3astro, who was a citi>en of the )hilippine /slands, and that /loilo was their #atri#onial do#icile4
that his departure fro# iloilo for the purpose of ta+in$ his wife to Awit>erland was li#ited to that
purpose alone, without any intent to establish a do#icile elsewhere4 and finally that he went to )aris
in 190., for the sole purpose of $ettin$ a divorce, without any intention of establishin$ a per#anent
residence in that city. The evidence shows that the decree was entered a$ainst the defendant in
default, for failure to answer, and there is nothin$ to show that she had ac%uired, or had atte#pted to
ac%uire, a per#anent do#icile in the 3ity of )aris. /t is evident of course that the presence of both
the spouses in that city was due #erely to the #utual desire to procure a divorce fro# each other.
/t is established by the $reat wei$ht of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is do#iciled and to which one or both of the# #ay resort #erely for the purpose of
obtainin$ a divorce has no 6urisdiction to deter#ine their #atri#onial status4 and a divorce $ranted
by such a court is not entitled to reco$nition elsewhere. <See ;ote to Auccession of !enton, 09 *. @.
2., 1.3.= The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court
with 6urisdiction. <2ndrews vs. 2ndrews, 188 ,. A., 1.4 .1 *. ed., 3''.=
/t follows that, to $ive a court 6urisdiction on the $round of the plaintiff9s residence in the Atate or
country of the 6udicial foru#, his residence #ust be &ona fide. /f a spouse leaves the fa#ily do#icile
and $oes to another Atate for the sole purpose of obtainin$ a divorce, and with no intention of
re#ainin$, his residence there is not sufficient to confer 6urisdiction on the courts of that Atate. This
is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not reco$ni>ed by the laws of the Atate of his
own do#icile. <1. 3yc., 811, 818.=
2s have been well said by the Aupre#e 3ourt of the ,nited Atates #arria$e is an institution in the
#aintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the fa#ily
and of society, without which there could be neither civili>ation nor pro$ress. <Maynard vs. ?ill, 1-0
,. A., -104 31 *. ed., '09.= ,ntil the adoption of 2ct ;o. -110 by the )hilippine *e$islature <March
11, 1911=, it had been the law of these /slands that #arria$e, validly contracted, could not be
dissolved absolutely e(cept by the death of one of the parties4 and such was the law in this
6urisdiction at the ti#e when the divorce in %uestion was procured. The 2ct to which we have
referred per#its an absolute divorce to be $ranted where the wife has been $uilty of adultery or the
husband of concubina$e. The enact#ent of this statute undoubtedly reflect a chan$e in the policy of
our laws upon the sub6ect of divorce, the e(act effect and bearin$ of which need not be here
discussed. !ut inas#uch as the tenets of the 3atholic 3hurch absolutely deny the validity of
#arria$es where one of the parties is divorced, it is evident that the reco$nition of a divorce obtained
under the conditions revealed in this case would be as repu$nant to the #oral sensibilities of our
people as it is contrary to the well-established rules of law.
2s the divorce $ranted by the "rench court #ust be i$nored, it results that the #arria$e of Doctor
Mory and *eona 3astro, celebrated in *ondon in 1900, could not le$ali>e their relations4 and the
circu#stance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Awit>erland until her death is
wholly without le$al si$nificance. The clai#s of the Mory children to participate in the estate of
Aa#uel !ischoff #ust therefore be re6ected. The ri$ht to inherit is li#ited to le$iti#ate, le$iti#ated,
and ac+nowled$ed natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly e(cluded. The
word "descendants," as used in article 9.1 of the 3ivil 3ode cannot be interpreted to include
ille$iti#ates born of adulterous relations.
2n i#portant %uestion arises in connection with the ti#e within which the clai#s of the two sets of
children were presented to the court. /n this connection it appears that the will of Aa#uel !ischoff
was probated in 2u$ust, 1913. 2 co##ittee on clai#s was appointed and it report was field and
accepted "ebruary -0, 191.. 2bout the sa#e ti#e Etto 8#ur entered an appearance for the Mory
clai#ants and petitioned the court to enter a decree establishin$ their ri$ht to participate in the
distribution of the estate. The e(ecutri(, DoHa 2na @a#ire>, answered the petition denyin$ that said
#inors were the le$iti#ate children of *eona 3astro and further denyin$ that the latter was the
reco$ni>ed natural dau$hter of Aa#uel !ischoff. ,pon the issues thus presented a trial was had
before the ?onorable "er#in Mariano, and on Dece#ber -9, 1910, he rendered a decision in which
he held <1= that *eona 3astro was the reco$ni>ed natural dau$hter of Aa#uel !ischoff4 <-= that the
#inor, *eontina li>abeth, is a le$iti#ate dau$hter of *eona 3astro4 and <3= that the #inors 3ar#en
Maria and sther @enate are ille$iti#ate children of *eona 3astro.
"ro# these facts the court drew the conclusion that *eontina li>abeth was entitled to one-third of
the estate of the late Aa#uel !ischoff, and that his widow, DoHa 2na @a#ire>, was entitled to the
re#ainin$ two-thirds. "ro# this decision both DoHa 2na @a#ire> and Etto 8#ur, as $uardian,
appealed.
Ahortly after the appeals above-#entioned were ta+en, Mr. "rederic+ von Iauff#an #ade
application to the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of /loilo by petition filed in the proceedin$s therein pendin$
upon the estate of the late Aa#uel !ischoff for appoint#ent as $uardian ad litem of his #inor
children, the von Iauff#an heirs, which petition was $ranted by order dated March ., 191'.
Thereafter, on 2pril 1, 191', von Iauff#an, on behalf of the said #inors, filed in the cause a petition
settin$ forth their ri$ht to share in the estate. This petition was answered by Mr. Etto 8#ur,
$uardian, on 2pril -', 191', the sole contention of said answer bein$ that the #atter to which the
petition relates had been disposed of by the decision of the 3ourt of "irst /nstance rendered in said
proceedin$s by &ud$e Mariano on Dece#ber 9, 1910. DoHa 2na @a#ire> answered denyin$ all the
alle$ations of von Iauff#an9s petition.
The trial of the petition of von Iauff#an, as $uardian, ca#e on for hearin$ before the 3ourt of "irst
/nstance of /loilo on the 10th day of 2u$ust, 191'. ,pon the evidence ta+en at that hearin$ the
?onorable &. A. )owell, as 6ud$e then presidin$ in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance of /loilo, rendered a
decision under date of ;ove#ber 1., 191', in which he found as a fact *eona 3astro was the
ac+nowled$ed natural dau$hter of Aa#uel !ischoff and that the #inors, lena, "rit>, and rnesto,
are the le$iti#ate children of "rederic+ von Iauff#an and the said *eona 3astro, born in lawful
wedloc+. ,pon the facts so found, &ud$e )owell based his conclusion that all that portion of the
estate of Aa#uel !ischoff pertainin$ to *eona 3astro should be e%ually divided a#on$ the children
"ederico, rnesto, and lena, thereby e(cludin$ by inference the Mory clai#ants fro# all
participation in the estate.
"ro# this 6ud$#ents an appeal was ta+en by Mr. Etto 8#ur as $uardian, no appeal havin$ ta+en by
DoHa 2#a @a#ire>.
Thou$h the circu#stance is now of no practical i#portance, it #ay be stated in passin$ that the
appeals of DoHa 2na @a#ire> and of Etto 8#ur, $uardian, fro# the decision of &ud$e Mariano of
Dece#ber 9, 1910, and the appeal of Etto 8#ur, $uardian fro# the decision of &ud$e )owell, of
;ove#ber 1., 191', were brou$ht to this court separately4 but the causes were subse%uently
consolidated and have been heard to$ether. The parties to the liti$ation have also stipulated that all
the "evidence, stipulations and ad#issions in each of the two proceedin$s above-#entioned #ay be
considered for all purposes by this court in the other." The case is therefore considered here as
thou$h there had been but one trial below and all the issues of law and fact arisin$ fro# the
contentions of the oppossin$ clai#ants had been heard at the sa#e ti#e.
,pon the facts above stated it is insisted for 2na M. @a#ire> that her ri$hts to the estate under the
will of Aa#uel !ischoff were at the latest deter#ined by the final decree of Dece#ber -9, 19104 and
that it was thereafter inco#petent for the court to ta+e co$ni>ance of the application of the Mory
clai#ants. /f this contention is sustainable, the sa#e considerations would operate to defeat the later
application filed on behalf of the von Iauff#an children J and indeed with even $reater force, J
since this application was not #ade until the appeals fro# the decree of Dece#ber 9, 1910, had
actually been perfected and the cause had been transferred to the Aupre#e 3ourt.
Two %uestions are here involved, one as to the effect of the probate of a will upon the ri$hts of
forced heirs who do not appear to contest the probate, and the other as to the conclusiveness and
finality of an order for the distribution of an estate, as a$ainst persons who are not before the court.
,pon the first of these %uestions it is enou$h to say that the ri$hts of forced heirs to their le$iti#e are
not divested by the decree ad#ittin$ a will to probate, J and this re$ardless of the fact that no
provision has been #ade for the# in the will, for the decree of probate is conclusive only a re$ards
the due e(ecution of the will, the %uestion of its intrinsic validity not bein$ deter#ined by such
decree. <3ode of 3ivil )rocedure, sec. '-04 3astaHeda vs.2le#any, 3 )hil., .-'4 Aaha$un vs. De
8orosti>a, 1 )hil., 3.14 &ocAoy vs. :aHo, 8 )hil., 1194 *i#6uco vs. 8anara, 11 )hil., 393, 3904
2ustria vs. :entenilla, -1 )hil., 180.=
/ndeed it is evident, under the e(press ter#s of the proviso to section 103 of the 3ode of 3ivil
)rocedure, that the forced heirs cannot be pre6udiced by the failure of the testator to provide for
the# in his will4 and re$ardless of the intention of the testator to leave all his property, or practically
all of it, to his wife, the will is intrinsically invalid so far a it would operate to cut off their ri$hts.
The %uestion as to the conclusiveness of the order of distribution can best be considered with
reference to the von Iauff#an children, as the solution of the proble# as to the# necessarily
involves the disposition of the %uestion as to the Mory clai#ants.
/t is evident that the von Iauff#an children cannot be considered to have been in any sense parties
to the proceedin$ at the ti#e &ud$e Mariano rendered his decision. Ao far a the record shows the
court was then unaware even of their e(istence. ;o notice of any +ind was served upon the#4 nor
was any person then before the court authori>ed to act in their behalf. ;evertheless, as we have
already shown, upon the death of Aa#uel !ischoff, the ri$ht to participate in his estate vested
i##ediately in this children, to the e(tent to which their #other would have been entitled to
participate had she survived her father. /f the ri$ht vested upon the death of Aa#uel !ischoff, how
has it been since divestedL
The record shows that the decision of Dece#ber -9, 1910, in which &ud$e Mariano holds that the
estate should be divided between *eontina li>abeth and the residuary le$atee DoHa 2na @a#ire>,
was #ade without publication of notice, or service of any +ind upon other persons who #i$ht
consider the#selves entitled to participate in the estate.
The law in force in the )hilippine /slands re$ardin$ the distribution of estates of deceased persons is
to be found in section 103 et seq., of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure. /n $eneral ter#s the law is that
after the pay#ent of the debts and e(penses of ad#inistration the court shall distribute the residue
of the estate a#on$ the persons who are entitled to receive it, whether by the ter#s of the will or by
operation of law. /t will be noted that while the law <sec. 10.= provides that the order of distribution
#ay be had upon the application of the e(ecutor or ad#inistrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, no provision is #ade for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The
proceedin$, therefore, is to all intents and purposes e# parte. 2 will be seen our law is very va$ue
and inco#plete4 and certainly it cannot be held that a purely e# parte proceedin$, had without notice
by personal service or by publication, by which the court underta+es to distribute the property of
deceased persons, can be conclusive upon #inor heirs who are not represented therein.
Aection .1 of the 3ode of 3ivil )rocedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by
"occupancy, $rant, descent, or otherwise9 shall vest title in the possessor. This would indicate that a
decree of distribution under which one #ay be placed in possession of land ac%uired by descent, is
not in itself conclusive, and that, a held in *ayre vs. )asco <0 @ob. B*a.C, 9=, the action of
revindication #ay be brou$ht by the heir a$ainst the persons put in possession by decree of the
probate court at any ti#e within the period allowed by the $eneral statute of li#itations.
Eur conclusion is that the application of the von Iauff#an children was presented in a#ple ti#e and
that the 6ud$#ent entered in their favor by &ud$e )owell was correct. The Mory clai#ants, as
already stated, are debarred fro# participation in the estate on other $rounds.
Ao #uch of the 6ud$#ent entered in the 3ourt of "irst /nstance, pursuant to the decision of &ud$e
Mariano of Dece#ber -9, 1910, as ad#its *eontina li>abeth Mory to participate in the estate of
Aa#uel !ischoff is reversed4 and instead the von Iauff#an children will be ad#itted to share e%ually
in one-third of the estate as provided in the decision of &ud$e )owell of ;ove#ber 1., 191'. /n other
respects the 6ud$#ent of &ud$e Mariano is affir#ed. The costs of this instance will be paid out of the
estate. Ao ordered.
Ingenohl vs olsen
This is a suit to recover the costs adjudged to the plaintiff, the petitioner here, in a former suit
that was brought by him against the defendant in the British Colony of Hongkong and was
determined in his favor by the Supreme Court there The judgment declared the plaintiff to be
the owner of certain trade!marks and trade!names and entitled to the e"clusive use of them in
connection with his business as a cigar manufacturer It restrained the defendants from selling
cigars under these trade!marks and awarded the costs now sued for The Court of #irst Instance
of $anila gave judgment for the plaintiff %n appeal the Supreme Court of the &hilippine Islands
reversed this decision on the ground that by section '(()*+ of the Code of Civil &rocedure a
judgment against a person ,may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact,, and that the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Hongkong showed such a clear mistake
The supposed mistake consisted in denying effect in Hongkong to a sale of business and
trade!marks by the -lien &roperty Custodian to the defendant, the circumstances and nature of
which may be stated in few words so far as they concern the present case The plaintiff Ingenohl
had built up a great business as a cigar manufacturer and e"porter having his factory at $anila
In (./0 he established a factory at Hongkong and thereafter goods from both factories were sold
under the same trade!marks, the outside bo" or package of the Hongkong goods having a label
indicating that they came from there The trade!marks were registered in Hongkong and the
cigars covered by them had ac1uired a reputation In (.(0 the -lien &roperty Custodian sei2ed
and sold all the property ,wheresoever situate in the &hilippine Islands 3 3 3 including the
business as going concern, and the good will, trade!names and trade!marks thereof, of Syndicat
%riente,, being the above mentioned business of the plaintiff in the &hilippines The Supreme
Court of the &hilippines held that it was plain error in the Supreme Court of the British Colony
to hold that this sale did not carry the e"clusive right to use the trade!marks in the latter place
- trade!mark started elsewhere would depend for its protection in Hongkong upon the law
prevailing in Hongkong and would confer no rights e"cept by the consent of that law Hanover
Star $illing Co v $etcalf, *4/ 5 S 4/', '6 S Ct '78, 6/ 9 :d 8(', 5nited ;rug Co v
Theodore <ectanus Co, *40 5 S ./, '. S Ct 40, 6' 9 :d (4( =hen then the judge who, in
the absence of an appeal to the &rivy Council, is the final e"ponent of that law, authoritatively
declares that the assignment by the Custodian of the assets of the $anila firm cannot and will
not be allowed to affect the rights of the party concerned in Hongkong, we do not see how it is
possible for a foreign Court to pronounce his decision wrong It will be acted on and settles the
rights of the parties in Hongkong and in view of that fact it seems somewhat parado"ical to say
that it is not the law If the -lien &roperty Custodian purported to convey rights in :nglish
territory valid as against those whom the :nglish law protects he e"ceeded the powers that were
or could be given to him by the 5nited States
It is not necessary to consider whether the section of the Code of Civil &rocedure relied upon
was within the power of the &hilippine Commission to pass In any event as interpreted it
involved delicate considerations of international relations and therefore we should not hold
ourselves bound to that deference that we show to the judgment of the local Court upon matters
of only local concern =e are of opinion that whatever scope may be given to the section it is far
from warranting the refusal to enforce this :nglish judgment for costs, obtained after a fair trial
before a court having jurisdiction of the parties, when the judgment is un1uestionably valid and
in other respects will be enforced %f course a foreign state might accept the Custodian,s transfer
as good within its jurisdiction, if there were no opposing local interest or right, and that may be
the fact for China outside of Hongkong as seems to have been held in another case not yet finally
disposed of, but no principle re1uires the transfer to be given effect outside of the 5nited States
and when as here it has been decided to have been ineffectual it is unnecessary to in1uire
whether in the other event the -lien &roperty Custodian was authori2ed by the statute to use or
did use in fact words purporting to have that effect, or what the effect, if any, would be
Some 1uestion was made of the jurisdiction of this Court The jurisdiction was asserted, at
least provisionally, when the writ of certiorari was granted There are few cases in which it is
more important to maintain it, and we confirm it now The validity of the section of the Code of
Civil &rocedure is drawn in 1uestion, and also the construction of the Trading with the :nemy
-ct )Comp St >> '((7 (?* a!'((7 (?* j+ which is treated as purporting to authori2e what in our
opinion it could not authori2e if it tried
@udgment reversed
G.R. No. L-20169 F)Er-ar. 26, 196D
IN !1E MA!!ER OF !1E PE!I!ION OF ?> @IAN C1IE !O BE A5MI!!E5 A CI!I<EN OF !1E
P1ILIPPINES.
?> @IAN C1IE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REP>BLIC OF !1E P1ILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
". %. "a&a;on for petitioner$appellee.
2ffice of the Solicitor -eneral for oppositor$appellant.
PARE5ES, J.:
Gu Iian 3hie, a citi>en of the @epublic of 3hina, presented with the 3"/ of Manila, on "ebruary .,
19'0, a petition for naturali>ation, containin$ all the 6urisdictional re%uire#ents, the pertinent portion
of which is hereby reproduced5
T?/@D.J My trade or profession is that of an e#ployee in which / have been en$a$ed since
1901 and fro# which / derive an avera$e annual inco#e of )3,000.00.
2ttached to the petition were affidavits of Marcelo de la 3ru> and "ederico 8. Aantos, who acted as
character witnesses4 Declaration of /ntention and 3ertificate of 2rrival. 2fter the trial, the Effice of the
Aolicitor 8eneral on Ectober ., 19'1, filed an "Epposition" clai#in$ that the two witnesses of
petitioner are not credible and did not testify as to petitioner9s $ood reputation and #oral
irreproachability.
En Dece#ber 18, 19'1, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states5
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
/n view of the fore$oin$, this 3ourt finds that petitioner has all the %ualifications re%uired by, and
none of the dis%ualifications specified in, 3o##onwealth 2ct ;o. .13, as a#ended by
3o##onwealth 2ct ;o. 030, and has co#plied with all the re%uisites established therein..
7?@"E@, the said petition of Gu Iian 3hie to be ad#itted a citi>en of the )hilippines is
hereby $ranted, and let the proper naturali>ation certificate be issued in his favor and the
re$istration thereof in the proper civil re$istry, this decision to beco#e e(ecutory in
accordance with the provisions of Aection 1 of @epublic 2ct ;o. 03.
2fter the Aolicitor 8eneral has perfected his appeal fro# the above 6ud$#ent, but durin$ the
pendency of the approval of the record on appeal, petitioner-appellee herein presented with the
lower court a "Motion to @eopen 3ase to nable )etitioner to present 2dditional Docu#entary )roof
of his /nco#e," clai#in$ that his inco#e has risen fro# )3,000.00 in 1901, to )0,100.00 in 19'0 and
)0,-00.00 in 19'1. The increase in the inco#e had been due to a little increase in the salary, plus,
the bonuses of )100.00 in 19'0 and )1,000.00 in 19'1. The #otion was heard, and on &uly 18,
19'-, the court a quo rendered a "Aupple#ental Decision." !oth the ori$inal and the supple#ental
decisions are the sub6ects of the instant appeal, the Aolicitor 8eneral ur$in$ a reversal thereof on a
sin$ular assi$n#ent of error, alle$edly co##itted by the court a quo, to wit5 in not findin$ that the
petitioner failed to prove that he has a lucrative inco#e.
There see# to be no %uestion re$ardin$ the fact that there has been an increase in the inco#e of
petitioner, fro# the ti#e he presented his petition, to the rendition of the Aupple#ental Decision. /n
19'1 also, there has been a chan$e in the status of petitioner, fro# sin$le to #arried. ven $rantin$,
for purposes of ar$u#ent, that the fi$ures appearin$ in the docu#entary evidence sub#itted are
correct, althou$h 7e entertain serious doubts re$ardin$ their veracity J a point which 7e will
discuss later J the overridin$ issue would be, the sa#e lucrative inco#e. 2s a starter on this point,
7e %uote a portion of the ar$u#ent of counsel for petitioner-appellee, which states5
... . ?e received a unifor# livin$ allowance of )100.00 a #onth, aside fro# the yearly bonus
which the co#pany $ives hi#, dependin$ of course, on the profit which said co#pany
reali>es every year fro# its business. <p. 3, brief.=
2nd the livin$ allowance is $iven re$ularly fro# the ti#e the petitioner started wor+in$ with
the @epublic ?ardware in 1909 up to the present. /n other words, it <livin$ allowance= has
assu#ed its re$ularity as a part of the salary in consideration of the services rendered by the
petitioner. ...
The above-%uoted portion of the ar$u#ents of petitioner9s counsel is a clear indication that as far as
salary is concerned, his client, appellee herein, was only receivin$ )100.00, the rest bein$ in the
for# of allowances and bonuses which #ay or #ay not be $iven to appellee. /n other words,
petitioner9s e#ployer was not duty bound to $ive such allowances and bonuses, but #ust sprin$
fro# purely voluntary actuations, conditioned to the circu#stance that the e#ployer was #a+in$
profits. 7hen there are no profits, the allowances and the bonuses are not $iven. /t is not, therefore,
safe to consider that the inco#e of petitioner is )3,000.00 yearly, or #ore. /nsofar as the evidence is
concerned, it beco#es indisputable that petitioner9s true inco#e is only )100.00, any additional
thereof bein$ purely contin$ent, accidental or incidental, which a#ount does not co#e up to the
cate$ory of a lucrative inco#e, considerin$ that the petitioner is now a #arried #an.'()ph*'.+t
"urther#ore, 7e are not convinced that petitioner9s e#ployee could be that $enerous to hi#. /t will
be noted that the @epublic ?ardware did not present its boo+s to show that it was #a+in$ a $ood
profit, as to enable it to $ive such bi$ allowance and bonus to appellee, and considerin$ that the
raise in salary was $iven durin$ the pendency of his naturali>ation case.
!ut even $rantin$, for purpose of ar$u#ent, that petitioner started to receive a fi(ed salary of
).00.00 a #onth in 19'-, still this a#ount cannot be considered lucrative in the face of the fact that
in 19'1 he $ot #arried, as pointed out in his /nco#e Ta( @eturn for 19'1 <(h. )-.=.
)@M/AA 3E;A/D@D, the decision appealed fro#, should be, as it is hereby reversed and
another entered denyin$ Gu Iian 3hie9s petition for )hilippine citi>enship. 3osts a$ainst petitioner-
appellee.