SEC VS INTERPORT

It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the

prescription period.
[75]
A preliminary investigation is essentially a determination
whether an offense has been committed, and whether there is probable cause for
the accused to have committed an offense:

A preliminary investigation is merely inuisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is not
a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose e!cept that of
determining whether a crime has been committed or whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
[7"]

#nder $ection %5 of the &evised $ecurities Act, which is
entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the $ecurities
'!change (ommission )$'(* has the authority to +ma,e such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to
violate any provision of this Act ---.. After a finding that a person has violated
the &evised $ecurities Act, the $'( may refer the case to the /01 for preliminary
investigation and prosecution.
a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered
by the $'( must first be filed with the latter. If the (ommission finds
that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the /01.
$ince petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural
reuirement, the /01 did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
his complaint in I.$. 2o. 344%5336.

A criminal charge for violation of the $ecurities &egulation (ode is a speciali7ed
dispute. 8ence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special
competence, i.e., the $'(. #nder the doctrine of primary 9urisdiction, courts will not
determine a controversy involving a uestion within the 9urisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the uestion demands the e!ercise of sound
administrative discretion reuiring the speciali7ed ,nowledge and e!pertise of said
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. :he
$ecurities &egulation (ode is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in
the $'(. 8ence, all complaints for any violation of the (ode and its implementing
rules and regulations should be filed with the $'(. ;here the complaint is criminal
in nature, the $'( shall indorse the complaint to the /01 for preliminary
investigation and prosecution as provided in $ection 5<.= earlier uoted.
:o reiterate, the $'( must first conduct its investigations and ma,e a
finding of probable cause in accordance with the doctrine pronounced
in Baviera v.Paglinawan.
[>=]
In this case, the /01 was precluded from initiating a
preliminary investigation since the $'( was halted by the (ourt of Appeals from
continuing with its investigation. $uch a situation leaves the prosecution of the
case at a standstill, and neither the $'( nor the /01 can conduct any investigation
against the respondents, who, in the first place, sought the in9unction to prevent
their prosecution. All that the $'( could do in order to brea, the impasse was to
have the /ecision of the (ourt of Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest
opportunity in this case. :herefore, the period during which the $'( was
prevented from continuing with its investigation should not be counted against
it. :he law on the prescription period was never intended to put the prosecuting
bodies in an impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed
way beyond their control? for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy,
they would still be barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this is
accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. :he prosecution of
offenses punishable under the &evised $ecurities Act and the $ecurities
&egulations (ode is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the $'( or by an
investigation conducted by the $'( motu proprio. 0nly after a finding of probable
cause is made by the $'( can the /01 instigate a preliminary investigation. :hus,
the investigation that was commenced by the $'( in =665, soon after it discovered
the uestionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription
period. @iven the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the $'(,
which is euivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the /01 in
criminal cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.
ARAMBULO
In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the then conflicting views as to whether or not the filing of
a complaint with the Municipal rial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation
suspends the running of the prescriptive period for the crime. he Court restated the
correct and prevailing doctrine, as follows!
+In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the
Aench and Aar, this (ourt has ree!amined the uestion and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the
one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the
Bunicipal (ourt, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary e!amination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try
the case on the merits. $everal reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the te!t of
Article 6= of the &evised Cenal code, in declaring that the period of prescription Dshall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or informationE without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary e!amination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. $econd , even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. :hird, it is un9ust to deprive the in9ured party the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense
may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the reuisite complaint.
he error was pro"a"ly due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of
li"el "rought a"out "y the passage of R.#. $%&'
()'*
which took effect on #pril '+,
'&&,. -nder .ection ) of the said Repu"lic #ct, the /urisdiction of Metropolitan rial
Courts, Municipal rial Courts and Municipal Circuit rial Courts was e0panded to
include all offenses punisha"le with imprisonment not e0ceeding si0 1%2 years. 3owever,
li"el, which is punisha"le "y imprisonment ranging from si0 months and one day to four
years
())*
is not covered as the said law e0cludes from its coverage cases within the
e0clusive /urisdiction of the Regional rial Courts
()4*
. -nder #rticle 4%5 of the Revised
6enal Code, the information for li"el should "e filed with the Court of 7irst Instance, now
the Regional rial Court. he confusion was cleared up when this Court issued
#dministrative 8rder 9o. '5,:&% dated 8cto"er )', '&&% which categorically stated that
;LIB<L C#.<. .3#LL B< RI<= B> 3< R<?I89#L RI#L C8-R. 3#@I9?
J-RI.=ICI89 8@<R 3<M 8 3< <ACL-.I89 87 3< M<R868LI#9 RI#L
C8-R., M-9ICI6#L RI#L C8-R. I9 CII<., M-9ICI6#L RI#L C8-R. #9=
M-9ICI6#L CIRC-I RI#L C8-R..B
(),*
<vidently, "ranch )'+ of the Metropolitan rial Court of CueDon City was not spared
the confusion "rought a"out "y R.#. $%&', as its dismissal of the case then pending
"efore it was made only on 9ovem"er E, '&&% or more than two years after it had taken
cogniDance of the case. 9ota"ly, the dismissal "y the Metropolitan rial Court took
place a mere eighteen 1'E2 days after the issuance of ..C. #dministrative 8rder 9o.
'5,:&%.
he mistake of the 8ffice of the City 6rosecutor in filing the complaint and of the
Metropolitan rial Court in taking cogniDance of the case was thus understanda"le. he
error was immediately rectified "y the said court upon realiDing its mistake when it ruled
it was the Regional rial Court which had the proper /urisdiction over the case. his
mistake should not operate to pre/udice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal
offenses and, more importantly, the right of the offended party to o"tain grievance.
Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later cases, was not
meant to apply solely to cases where the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial
court or the prosecutorFs office operates to interrupt the prescription period for the
prosecution of a crime.
6etitionerFs other argument that she has "een denied her right to a speedy trial
deserves scant consideration. Gell:esta"lished is the doctrine that the right to a speedy
trial is violated only where there is an unreasona"le, ve0atious and oppressive delay
without participation or fault of the accused, or when un/ustified postponements are
sought which prolong the trial for an unreasona"le length of time
(45*
. In the case at
"ench, "esides the filing of the petitions "efore the Court of #ppeals and this Court,
petitioner had likewise filed a Motion to Cuash and a Motion for Reconsideration with
the Regional rial Court of CueDon City, Branch )'E. #s such, it is clear that petitioner
is not without fault in the delay in the prosecution of the case against her.pp
6p vs "autista
he C# and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutorHs
recommendation for the filing of an information against respondent, the period of prescription "egan
to run again. he Court does not agree. It is a well:settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscalFs office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
%
he proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City 6rosecutorHs approval of the
investigating prosecutorHs recommendation that an information "e filed with the court. he
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the 8ffice of the
6rosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acIuitted "y the proper court.
Tan
since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the .tate, it is "ut natural that the
representatives of the .tate should direct and control the prosecution. #s stressed in Suarez v.
Platon, et al.,
3
the prosecuting officer Jis the representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, "ut
of a sovereignty whose o"ligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its o"ligation to govern at allK
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, "ut that /ustice shall
"e done. #s such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 3e may prosecute with earnestness and vigorL
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard "lows, he is not at li"erty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to "ring a"out a /ust one.J
there is an a"solute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay J"efore the court the pertinent facts at their
disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and
loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the courtHs mind may not "e tortured "y dou"ts, that the
innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. 8"vious to all, this is the prosecutionHs
prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state.J It is for the purpose of realiDing the afore:
mentioned o"/ectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and
responsi"ility of the prosecuting officer.
he role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts, with
respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil lia"ility arising from the offense. Hhis civil action
is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either e0pressly waives the
civil action or reserves to institute it separately.
5
hus, Jan offended party may intervene in the
proceedings, personally or "y attorney, specially in case of offenses which can not "e prosecuted e0cept
at the instance of the offended party.
6
he only e0ception to this is when the offended party waives his
right to civil action or e0pressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which
case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its
prosecution.
7

where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged
does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the
offense.
12
whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always
be subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official. J
8
#s e0plained in Herrero v. Diaz,
supra, the Jintervention of the offended party or his attorney is authoriDed "y section '+ of Rule '5% of the
Rules of Court, su"/ect to the provisions of section , of the same Rule that all criminal actions either
commenced "y complaint or "y information shall "e prosecuted under the direction and control of the
7iscal.J
since the .olicitor ?eneral alone is authoriDed to represent the .tate or the 6eople of the 6hilippines
the interest of the private prosecutors is su"ordinate to that of the .tate and they cannot "e allowed
to take a stand inconsistent with that of the .olicitor ?eneral, for that would "e tantamount to giving
the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and
the settled rules on the matter.
the .olicitor ?eneral represents the 6eople of the 6hilippines or the .tate in criminal proceedings
pending either in the Court of #ppeals or in this Court.
PP VS GREY
7orum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse /udgment or order has "een rendered
in one forum, of seeking and possi"ly getting a favora"le opinion in another forum, other than "y
appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also involve the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make
a favora"le disposition.
4&
7orum shopping e0ists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final /udgment
in one case will amount to res /udicata in the other. he elements of forum shopping are! 1a2 identity
of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in "oth actionsK 1"2 identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief "eing founded on the same factsK and 1c2 identity of
the two preceding particulars such that any /udgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res /udicata in the action under consideration.
,5
he elements of res /udicita are! 1a2 the former /udgment must "e finalK 1"2 the court which rendered
/udgment had /urisdiction over the parties and the su"/ect matterK 1c2 it must "e a /udgment on the
meritsK and 1d2 there must "e, "etween the first and second actions, identity of parties, su"/ect
matter, and cau It is well to remem"er that there is a distinction "etween the preliminary inIuiry
which determines pro"a"le cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should "e held for trial or "e released.
he determination of pro"a"le cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made "y the
/udge. he preliminary investigation proper M whether or not there is reasona"le ground to "elieve
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged M is the function of the investigating prosecutor.se of
action.
,'
In Soliven v. a!asiar,
,&
the Court e0plained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily
reIuire the /udge to personally e0amine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents su"mitted "y the prosecutor or he may
disregard the prosecutorFs report and reIuire the su"mission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
Ghat the law reIuires as personal determination on the part of a /udge is that he should not
rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
+'
his means that the /udge should consider
not only the report of the investigating prosecutor "ut also the affidavit and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter:affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, su"mitted to the
court "y the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
he Court has also ruled that the personal e0amination of the complainant and his witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensa"le in the determination of pro"a"le cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. he necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the e0istence
of pro"a"le cause.
+4
8therwise, the /udge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
he C# likewise overlooked a fundamental rule we follow in this /urisdiction. It is an esta"lished
doctrine that in/unction will not lie to en/oin a criminal prosecution "ecause pu"lic interest reIuires
that criminal acts "e immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
+$
3owever, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid down e0ceptions to this rule,
among which are!
a. o afford adeIuate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused 13ernandeD v.
#l"ano, et al., L:'&)$), January )+, '&%$, '& .CR# &+2K
". Ghen necessary for the orderly administration of /ustice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions 1=imayuga, et al. v. 7ernandeD, ,4 6hil. 45,K 3ernandeD v. #l"ano,
supraK 7ortun v. La"ang, et al., L:4E4E4, May )$, '&E', '5, .CR# %5$2K
c. Ghen there is a pre:/udicial Iuestion which is su"(:*/udice 1=e Leon v. Ma"anag, $5 6hil.
)5)2K
d. Ghen the acts of the officer are without or in e0cess of authority 16lanas v. ?il, %$ 6hil.
%)2K
e. Ghere the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation 1>oung v. Rafferty,
44 6hil. ++%K >u Cong <ng v. rinidad, ,$ 6hil. 4E+, 4E&2K
f. Ghen dou"le /eopardy is clearly apparent 1.angalang v. 6eople and #vendia, '5& 6hil.
'',52K
g. Ghere the court has no /urisdiction over the offense 1LopeD v. City Judge, L:)+$&+,
8cto"er )&, '&%%, 'E .CR# %'%2K
h. Ghere there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution 1Rustia v. 8campo, C#:?.R.
9o. ,$%5, March )+, '&%52K
i. Ghere the charges are manifestly false and motivated "y the lust for vengeance 1Recto v.
Castelo, 'E L.J. ('&+4*, cited in RaNoa v. #lvendia, C#:?.R. 9o. 45$)5:R, 8cto"er E, '&%)K
Cf. ?uingona, et al. v. City 7iscal, L:%5544, #pril ,, '&E,, ')E .CR# +$$2K 0 0 0
/. Ghen there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to Iuash on
that ground has "een denied 1.alonga v. 6aNo, et al., L:+&+),, 7e"ruary 'E, '&E+, '4,
.CR# ,4E2(K and*
(k.* 6reliminary in/unction has "een issued "y the .upreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners 1RodrigueD v. Castelo, L:%4$,, #ugust ', '&+42.