India's invasion by the British brought about, in the course of time, a comlete transformation in the country's land tenure system. The !ast India Comany e"erienced difficulty in its trading because the sale of British goods in India #as insignificant. $n the other hand, the e"ortation of gold and silver from !ngland to ay for Indian goods #as soon rohibited. The comany found a solution by securing money from India to ay for Indian goods. It collected ta"es for the Indian rulers #hich, in the beginning, brought revenues of only 1% & of the levied ta"es, but, since the control over the amount of levied ta"es became la" at the end of the 'ogul eriod, its revenues increased. In addition, they #ere assigned areas as ()agir*+' The decisive brea,through came #hen, in 1-./, the office of 'de#an' for Bengal, $rissa, and Bihar, namely the financial sovereignty for these areas, #as assigned to the Comany #ith the concession for levying ta"es in e"change for a global sum of Rs. 2.. million er annum. 0fter some time of e"erimentation, in 1-12, Cor#allis' 3ermanent 4ettlement brought a final regulation of the rocedure for levying ta"es, #hich led to decisive changes in land tenure. The British did as if all the land belonged to the state and #as thus at their disosal. They registered the local ta" collectors, #ho #ere called 5amindars, as o#ners of the land in their district. These 5amindars had to collect and deliver the ta"es6 the amount #as fi"ed at the beginning and remained the same ermanently. To give them an incentive, they #ere free to decide ho# much to demand from the cultivators. $n the other hand, the fi"ed lum ta" sum #as an incentive to ut more land under cultivation and, thus, have more ta"ayers in one region. In order to do so, one could rot bleed the individual farmers too much. The right to the land conferred on the 5amindars #as alienable, rentable, and heritable. This meant the introduction of a comlete novelty, in India. The rivilege of utili5ing land had become a saleable good. Those #ho had been cultivators until then obtained the status of 'occuancy tenants.' These occuancy rights #ere heritable and transferrable and #ere not tamered #ith as long as the holders aid their ta"es. In contrast to these, the tenants #ho cultivated land o#ned by the ta" collectors #ere'' tenants at #ill', i.e., they could be evicted. In the beginning, there #ere hardly any roblems. The scarcity of cultivators revented the 5amindars from demanding too high ta"es. They #ere interested in attracting eole to cultivate the land and, thus, to increase the number of ta" ayers in order to increase the difference bet#een the revenues and the fi"ed amount that bad to be remitted. The detrimental conse7uences of recogni5ing the ta" collectors as landlords and of introducing the legal institution of saleable rivate landed roerty first became evident as, later, considerable changes occurred in India in the demograhic and economic situation. The industrial revolution in !ngland, namely, brought about a change in the British olicy in India. The ob)ective #as no longer to imort from India, but to sell !nglish roducts in India. 4ince the te"tile industry layed an imortant role at the beginning of industriali5ation in !ngland, very large amounts of chea roducts manufactured by mechanical looms #ere e"orted to India and this soon led to a collase in the te"tile home industry in India. 0 large number of #eavers became unemloyed. In order to secure a basis of e"istence, they migrated to the rural areas and tried to lease land they could farm. The scoe of this migration89acca's inhabitants alone decreased from 1/%,%%% to 2%,%%% bet#een 1:2; and 1:2-8 caused ressure on the rural areas and brought about a comlete change in the relationshis bet#een 5amindars and tenants. The monooly of controlling the means to secure livelihood shifted o#er unilaterally into the hands of the 5amindars #ho #ere able to e"tort more and more ta"es as the demand for land increased. This led to indebtedness and often to the loss of occuancy rights and relegation to tenants at #ill. The great discreancy bet#een the fi"ed amount of ta"es to be remitted and the increasing revenues made the 5amindars #ealthy. 4oon they no longer #ent to the trouble of collecting the ta"es themselves but rather sub leased this office to others #hile they themselves lived on the remainder bet#een the amount claimed as ta"es and that aid to the (sub assignees.( The difference bet#een the revenues and the amounts to be remitted #as so great that even the (sub assignees( tried to sub lease. 0fter some time, it became 7uite common to have 1% to 2% intermediaries, more or less #ithout a secific function, bet#een the government and the farmers, and they all had a share in the cultivation yield. In addition, ab#abs, sulements and fees for the most curious reasons #ere introduced6 for e"amle, for using an umbrella, for ermission to sit do#n in the 5amindar's office, for being allo#ed to stand u again, etc. 'oreover, the (began( unaid #or, #hich the tenants #ere forced to erform on the 5amindar's land, too, on larger and larger roortions. $n the average, it amounted to 2% 2/ & of the lease. <nder the effect of these develoments #hich should be regarded as late conse7uences of the changes in the land tenure brought about by the (3ermanent 4ettlement,( more and more cultivators became indebted, lost their occuancy rights, and droed in status to tenants at #ill or agricultural labourers. $n the other hand, the #ealth of the 5amindars ,et increasing on account of the income they earned from the difference bet#een the amount of ta"es and the rentals, the increase in cultivated areas, ,money lending, and e"roriation of debtors. In the course of time, the 5amindari region #as characteri5ed by the mar,ed difference bet#een #ealth, o#er, and rosects in life. !ven the government e"erienced dra#bac,s on account of this system. Changes in the monetary value, rices, and the amount of cultivated areas turned the fi"ed ta", after 1/% years, into nothing but a to,en sum, and considerable ta" tosses ensued. The 5amindari system #as not introduced in the #hole of India. Because of the e"erience made #ith the system, better ,no#ledge of the conditions in India, and liberal influences on the colonial olicy, the rovinces #hich became British ossessions later #ere assigned other ta"ation systems. The ryot#ari system #as introduced in 'adras, Bombay, and 0ssam. <nder that system, the government claimed the roerty rights to all of the land. but allotted it to the cultivators on the condition that they ay the ta"es. They could use, sell, mortgage, be7ueath, and lease the land as long as they aid their ta"es. $ther#ise, they #ere evicted. This direct ta" relation bet#een the government and the cultivators #as meant to revent sub ta" collectors, thus increasing urchasing o#er, and, in that #ay,imroving the mar,eting rosects for !nglish roducts. =ere, the ta"es #ere only fi"ed in a temorary settlement for a eriod of thirty years and then revised. This #ay, the government increased its revenue. In >orth India and in the 3un)ab #here villages #ith )oint land rights #ere common, an attemt #as made to utili5e this structure in the 'ahal#ari system. Ta"ation #as imosed #ith the village community as theoretical landlord, since it had the land rights. The village community had to distribute these ta"es among the cultivators #ho o#ed ta"es individually and )ointly. !veryone #as thus liable for the others' arrears. 0 village inhabitant8 the lambardar8 collected the amounts and remitted them in bul,. =ere, too, ta" assessment #as revised at intervals. 9esite this different system, the conditions for cultivators constantly deteriorated in these regions as #ell. The high ta"es fi"ed by the governmen8t half to t#o thirds of the net yield #as the usual amount made investments imossible. Because of fragmentation resulting from inheritance, the farms became smaller and smaller. The fact that land could be used as collateral made it ossible to borro# money to ay ta"es in the case of cro failures. But, in that #ay, more and more farms assed into the hbands of moneylenders, often better off cultivators in the village. In the course of time, these ceased to cultivate their land themselves and sub leased it instead. ?inally, the ryot#ari region #as no longer a self cultivator region. 'ore than one third of the land #as leased and in many districts more than t#o thirds. The great demand for land o#ing to the oulation gro#th made it ossible to let others #or, for oneself. In the 'ahal#ari region as #ell, sub leasing and indebtedness became ,more and more common. Indeed, it #as not ossible to transfer the land to eole #ho #ere not from the locality, but the result #as that landed roerty became concentrated in the hands of a fe# #ealthy eole, #hereas the others lost their rights. 0 constantly increasing number of eole #ere or became landless. @hile in the middle of the last century there #ere still no landless, in 1121 and 11;/, resectively 22 and -% million landless labourers #ere registered. $thers succeeded in renting some land, but on less favourable terms. 4hare tenancy, in articular, increased greatly. The British land olicy #hich lasted 1/% years as #ell as the conse7uences of economic changes and the drastic oulation gro#th led to a comlete change in the land tenure system in India. @hereas, formerly, the cultivators ossessed the right of use and the government the right to imose ta"es, no# the rights in land #ere slit into many ieces. In this rocess, not only did a large number of cultivators lose their valid land rights and fell in status to unrotected tenants and labourers. 0t the same time, the ta" collectors became landlords and large lando#ners. 0 stratum of intermediaries #ho did not have a secific function develoed, and the land assed into the hands of moneylenders. This caused an enormous differentiation in financial conditions, #hereby, the mass of farmers lived in ab)ect overty. To e"lain the further develoment follo#ing India and 3a,istan's indeendence, it is very imortant tonote that, admittedly, the economic situation of the different grous of the rural oulation had develoed very differently, and a large art of the oulation became oor, but, in its main traits, the social system remained intact, There e"isted namely a comlicated relationshi attern bet#een landlords, cultivators, and landless eole #hich #as based on mutual rights and obligations and #hich rovided everyone #ith a lace8even if a oor one 8 #ithin the rural society. The system aimed at satisfying the needs of everyone in the economic and social sector, and #as based on the fact that all members deended uon one another. Thus, the landlords o#ned land, it is true, but #ere deendent uon the landless tenants, agricultural labourers, and village craftsmen to cultivate it. Inversely, the landless could rot utili5e their labour in an agrarian society if the landlords did rot give them the ossibility of #or,ing on the fields. This made it necessary for the landlords to maintain the landless' economic situation at least at a level #hich #as not detrimental to their caacity to #or,, nor caused them to migrate. This not only forced the e"istence of a minimum #age, although very lo#, but also induced financial aid in emergencies, cro failures, etc. In addition, the landlords referred to face #ant than not meet the obligations resulting from their labour relationshis. 4uch mutual relationshis e"isted even in the social sector. The landlord assured the rotection and reresentation of their #or,ers e"ternally, #hereas the landless adoted a loyal attitude to#ards their emloyers and #ere, so to say, automatically on his side. This secured him o#er and influence and ut him in a osition to reresent their interests #ell e"ternally. In the #ars. these behavioural atterns became so ingrained that the obligations of the strong to#ards the #ea, became social norms, and aternalistic behaviour #as a rere7uisite for being recogni5ed as a leading ersonality. This norm, #hich is tyical for rural societies, sets obvious limits to e"loitation. It is true that the level of these limits is very lo#, but they guaranteed subsistence. It is also imortant to observe that the rights had been unilaterally shifted to the benefit of the landlords, but the landless did not consider themselves to be e"loited. =ere, religion may have layed an imortant role, but the e"istence of mutual relationshis even if they #ere une7ual #hich granted security against threat to e"istence #ere also of e"treme imortance. htt*AAecon.lse.ac.u,AstaffAmghata,Alandref.df* for effects of land reforms II. $eration Barga 0fter indeendence, India sought to imrove the living standards of sharecroers through tenancy reform. The Land Reforms 0ct of 11// and its successive amendments have t#o main clauses* B1C 4harecroers #ill have ermanent and inheritable incumbency rights to land that is registered in their name rovided that they ay the legally stiulated share to the landlords, do not leave the land fallo#, and do not sublease the land. !"cet in such cases, the sharecroer #ill lose his right to the land only if the landlord #ants to use the land for ersonal cultivation. These rights are inheritable but not transferable. B2C The share that the landlord can demand from a registered tenant #ill be no greater than 2/ ercent. . This hase of tenancy reform is #idely recogni5ed as a failure B0u 11-/C. Looholes in the la# allo#ed landlords to abuse the ersonal cultivation e"emtion and to threaten to evict the tenant #henever he tried to register. 'oreover, the tenant #as resonsible for registering himself, and the government rovided little institutional suort for him to do so. By virtue of their #ealth and suerior caste, landlords #ielded a lot of o#er #ithin the village and #ere therefore able to intimidate tenants. This #as comounded by the fact that the government usually too, the landlordDs side in disutes. 0s a result, before $eration Barga, very fe# sharecroers #ere registered, cro shares #ere signiEcantly belo# the legal minimum, and tenure #as #idely erceived as being insecure BBardhan and Rudra 11:;C. In 11--, the ne#ly elected government assed the @est Bengal Land Reforms 0ct, #hich closed most of the looholes in the 11// act. 'ost imortant, it set very stringent and #ell8deEned conditions under #hich the landlord could utili5e the ersonal cultivation clause to evict a tenant. 0t the same time, the ne# government launched $eration Barga, a massive and #ell8ublici5ed village8to8village camaign to register tenants and ensure their rights. <nder this rogram the rocess used to register tenants #as altered to ma,e it easier for the sharecroer to register. $eration Barga ofEcials sought out hesitant sharecroers, e"lained the la#, and offered them the oortunity to register. 'oreover, the ne# government used its o#n village olitical organi5ations to ma,e sure that landlords did not intimidate tenants, that tenants #ho registered did not face rerisal from the landlords, and that disutes #ere handled fairly in the courts. $eration Barga is #idely regarded as a success. By 1112, more than ./ ercent of an estimated 2.2 million share tenants had been registered.