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May until October: thats when southern inland Australia experiences when s
a dramatic drop in temperature, with the mountainous regions of perature
NSW and Victoria, and Tasmania most severely affected. Most pilots mania m
are more than aware of the dangers posed by in-ight icing, whether an ar
carburettor; air-frame or intake, and the steps to take if these ak
are encountered. a e enc
However, there is not the same level of awareness of the potential for Howeve
icing on the upper wing surface when on the ground, and as these icing on the i
outh-eastern states head into winter, it is advisable to remember the south-eastern s
angers associated with the colder conditions. dangers assoc
Sadly, failure to recognise and deal with icing on the ground can have Sadly, fa Sadly fai
fatal consequences, as the following cases demonstrate. While both fa fatal conse
these accidents occurred in aircraft with a specic wing type, tests e acc
have shown that frost, ice or snow with the thickness and surface have
oughness of medium or coarse sandpaper reduces lift by as much as roughn
30 per cent, and increases drag by 40 per cent. Even a small area can 30 pe
signicantly affect the airow.
Photo above: Australian conditions do not demand the de-icing procedure seen here at Denver International Airport Colorado,
but there is no room for complacency about ice. (Photo: MWP 1969 Dreamstime.com)
With winter almost upon us, Flight Safety cautions pilots to beware of aircraft
upper-wing surface ice accumulation, before takeoff.
frost, ice or snow with
the thickness and surface
roughness of medium
or coarse sandpaper
reduces lift by as much
as 30 per cent, and
increases drag by 40 per
cent. Even a small area
can signicantly affect
the airow
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The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)
of the United Kingdom investigated the crash
of a ight data recorder (FDR)- and cockpit
voice recorder (CVR)-equipped Bombardier
Challenger-600-2B16 at Birmingham Airport
on 4 January 2002. The crash resulted in ve
fatalities: the two crew and three passengers.
Evidence from the CVR indicated that the
operating pilots discussed the presence of
frost on the leading edge prior to engine start.
However, neither requested deicing. At 1150
hrs the Birmingham METAR was: surface
wind 150/6 kts; visibility 8,000 metres; win
cloud scattered at 700 feet AGL and broken d sc
at 800 feet AGL; temperature minus 2C with
dew point minus 3C; QNH 1027 mb.
The investigation showed that the aircrafts
takeoff roll was normal up to the time of lift off.
Immediately after lift off, however, the aircraft
rolled to the left despite full-right-aileron and
right-rudder application by the ight crew.
Within three and a half seconds after lift off,
the bank angle aural warning and the stick-
shaker activated, and the aircraft struck the
ground about ve and a half seconds after lift
off at a bank angle of 111 left-wing down and
a pitch angle of 13 aircraft nose-down. The
AAIB investigation concluded the following:
The roll had resulted from the left wing
stalling at an abnormally low angle of attack
due to ow disturbance resulting from frost
contamination of the wing. A relatively small
degree of wing surface roughness had a major
adverse effect on the wing stall characteristics
and the stall protection system was ineffective
i thi it ti in this situation.
(MTJ), Montrose, Colorado. The on-demand charter ight was operating
on an instrument ight rules (IFR) ight plan. According to the National
Transpertation Safety Board (NTSB) report, instrument meteorological
conditions prevailed, and snow was falling. Of the six occupants on board,
the captain, the ight attendant, and one passenger were killed, and the
rst ofcer and two passengers were seriously injured. The aircraft was
destroyed by impact forces and post-crash re. The ight was en route to
South Bend Regional Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana.
Before the accident ight, the airplane had arrived at MTJ from Van
Nuys Airport, California, about 0910. Witnesses observed that the
airplane had landed on runway 17, taxied to the ramp for fuel, and
remained parked on the ramp at the xed-base operator (FBO) for
about 40 to 45 minutes with its auxiliary power unit (APU) running.
According to a passenger, one of the pilots remained on board the
airplane the entire time.
A pilot-certicated witness stated that there appeared to be snow
on the accident airplanes wings, but he could not tell how much. He
made a comment about the contamination to his own co-pilot, and his
co-pilot remarked to him that both the snow and the airplanes paint
scheme were white. The pilot-certicated witness further stated he
did not observe either the captain or the rst ofcer conduct a tactile
examination of the wing surfaces.
A lineman fuelled the accident airplane at its single-point fuel ller
port, which is located at the right-wing root, with 400 gallons of Jet
A fuel. The fuel was pumped from a fuel truck that was kept outside
and unheated. The lineman stated that he noticed ice on the airplanes
nose landing gear area and slush-type ice on the wheels, but did not
look at the airplanes wings. Personnel in the FBO ofce and a lineman
who was on the ramp de-icing other airplanes stated that the accident
ight crewmembers did not request de-icing services for the airplane
According to the cockpit voice recorder transcript, while the airplane
was parked on the ramp, at 0942:15, the captain asked the rst ofcer,
How do you see the wings? The rst ofcer stated, Good, and the
captain replied, Looks clear to me.
At 0949:02, during engine start procedures, the rst ofcer asked the
captain if he wanted engine bleeds open (on) or closed (off), and the
captain replied that he wanted them open. The rst ofcer stated,
Yup. Okay so we need to a [sic] eight thousand foot of runway. The
captain stated, So it means [runway] three ve.
The rst ofcer announced over the airports common trafc
advisory frequency (CTAF) the crews intention to taxi the airplane
to runway 35. The airport operations manager, who was monitoring
A relatively small degree of wing surface roughness had a major adverse effect on the wing
stall characteristics and the stall protection system was ineffective in this situation.
aa
Challenger operating an on-demand charter
ight suffered a similar fate.
On 28 November 2004, a Canadair Ltd CL-
600-2A12, N873G, collided with the ground
during takeoff at Montrose Regional Airport
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the frequency while operating a radio-
equipped snow plough on that runway,
advised the ight crew over the CTAF that
snow removal was in progress on runway 35.
The rst ofcer asked how long it would take for
the snow removal equipment to exit the runway,
and the CVR recorded no reply. He repeated the
question, and, again, no reply was recorded.
At 0953:31, the rst ofcer stated, Oh well,
we gotta get out there anyway, and the
captain replied, Well runway three one is
here. According to the airport conguration
diagram, the airplane was parked on the ramp
adjacent to runway 31; the taxi distance from
the airplanes parked location to runway 35 was
approximately one mile.
At 0953:35, the rst ofcer stated to the captain
that runway 31 was 7,500 feet long, and the
captain asked what length of runway would be
needed for takeoff, lets say with the bleeds
off. The rst ofcer replied, thats seventy
eight hundred [feet], I thinktenth [stage]
closed. The captain asked, Six thousand
[feet]? The rst ofcer replied, Seventy ve
ninetyseventy eight [hundred feet].
The captain stated, Well we are between we
are forty one thousand [pounds] so The rst
ofcer replied, Sixty eight seventy ve so right
at seven thousand [feet], I guess. seventy two
hundred [feet]? The captain stated, Okay, we
can do thatokay. okay well go for [runway]
three one, then. you agree? The rst ofcer
then stated, These number [sic] are always
conservative anyway.
At 0954:54, the rst ofcer contacted the Denver
Air Route Trafc Control Center controller and
received the ights IFR clearance to SBN. The
controller instructed the rst ofcer to report
back on his frequency after departure, the
rst ofcer acknowledged, and the controller
received no further radio communication from
the ight.
According to the passenger seated on the right
side of the cabin, while the airplane taxied for
takeoff, slushy clumps of snow and water slid
down from the top of the fuselage and across
his window. Another passenger stated he
noticed water ran off the airplanes skin, like it
had taken a shower.
At 0957:32, the captain stated to the rst ofcer, You know what lets
[sic] have the (engine) cowls and ah do a performance takeoff. At
0958:09, the captain stated, Set power. Ten seconds later, the rst
ofcer reported, Eighty knots. At 0958:32, the rst ofcer stated,
Theres vee one, followed by, Rotate. At 0958:39, the rst ofcer
asked, Want the gear up? Immediately thereafter, the CVR recorded
the sound of the stick-pusher horn, and the mechanical voice bank
angle warning, followed by mechanical voice ve hundred warning.
The recording ended at 0958:46 with the sound of a loud rumble.
The passenger seated on the right side of the cabin stated that the
airplane lifted off and climbed to about 20 to 50 feet; then the left wing
dropped abruptly and banked to an angle he described as greater than
the 7 oclock position. He indicated that the right wing then dropped
to about the 5:30 position, then the left wing dropped again. He stated
that he heard a loud thump, his upper body was knocked into the aisle,
and he was hanging by the seatbelt. He stated the airplane then fell
straight onto its nose. Witnesses in a building near the departure end
of the runway reported that they heard a loud boom and whooshing
noise, and that they looked out the window and saw the airplane on y
the ground in ames.
SUPERCRITICAL WING
The accident aircrafts wing design uses what is known as
a supercritical airfoil, which is designed to reduce drag
at the airplanes cruise airspeed. This airfoil design, when
contrasted with more conventional airfoils, is characterised
by a larger leading-edge radius, reduced upper-surface
camber, and a concavity in the lower aft surface. These
features provide a reduced drag at high airspeeds, yet the
airfoil behaves much like a conventional airfoil at lower
airspeeds. At lower airspeeds, the pressure distribution on
the upper surface of the wing is peaked near the leading
edge, and this peak increases with increasing angle of attack.
As this increases beyond the natural stall angle of attack,
the pressure gradient in the leading-edge region reaches a
critical value, and ow separation initiates. Depending on
the span-wise location of the separation onset, the region
of separated ow can grow rapidly to adjacent span-wise
locations, eventually stalling the entire wing and resulting in
a large drop in lift and an increase in drag.
Temperatures in Australia may not reach the extreme lows seen in n
the UK and the US, but similar occurrences are possible, leaving little ittle
room for complacency. The NTSB, concerned about a spate of such such
accidents, especially involving Cessna 208s, issued a safety warning, ning, y involving Cessna 208s, issued
ion an adapted version of which is reproduced below.
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THERE IS NO SUCH THING
AS A LITTLE ICE
Fine particles of frost or ice, the size of a grain
of table salt and distributed as sparsely as one
per square centimetre over the upper surface
of an aircrafts wing, can destroy enough lift
to prevent a plane from taking off.
Almost virtually imperceptible amounts
of ice on an aircraft wings upper surface
during takeoff can result in signicant
performance degradation.
Small, almost visually imperceptible
amounts of ice distributed on an aircrafts
wing upper surface cause the same
aerodynamic penalties as much larger (and
more visible) ice accumulations.
Small patches of ice or frost can result in
localised, asymmetrical stalls on the wing,
which can result in roll control problems
during lift off.
It is nearly impossible to determine by
observation whether a wing is wet or has
a thin lm of ice. A very thin lm of ice
or frost will degrade the aerodynamic
performance of any aircraft.
Ice accumulation on the wing upper surface
may be very difcult to detect from the
cockpit, cabin, or front and back of the wing
because it is clear/white.
Accident history shows that non-slatted,
turbojet, transport-category airplanes have
been involved in a disproportionate number
of takeoff accidents where undetected upper
wing ice contamination has been cited as the
probable cause or sole contributing factor.
Most pilots understand that visible ice
contamination on a wing can cause severe
aerodynamic and control penalties, but it is
apparent that many pilots do not recognise
that minute amounts of ice adhering to a
wing can result in similar penalties.
Despite evidence to the contrary, these
beliefs may still exist because many pilots
have seen their aircraft operate with large
amounts of ice adhering to the leading amounts of ice adhering to the leadin
edges (including the dramatic double horn
accretion) and consider a thin layer of ice
or frost on the wing upper surface to be
more benign.
WHAT SHOULD PILOTS KNOW AND
DO ABOUT AIRCRAFT ICING BEFORE
TAKEOFF?
Pilots should be aware that no amount of snow, ice or frost
accumulation on the wing upper surface should be considered
safe for takeoff. It is critically important to ensure, by any means
necessary, that the upper wing surface is clear of contamination
before takeoff.
The NTSB believes strongly that the only way to ensure that the
wing is free from critical contamination is to touch it.
With a careful and thorough pre-ight inspection, including tactile
inspections and proper and liberal use of de-icing processes and
techniques, aircraft can be operated safely in spite of the adversities
encountered during winter months.
Pilot should be aware that even with the wing inspection light, the
observation of a wing from a ten metre distance, through a window
that may be wet from precipitation, does not constitute a careful
examination.
Depending on the aircrafts design (size, high-wing, low-wing, etc.)
and the environmental and lighting conditions (wet wings, dark
night, dim lights, etc.) it may be difcult for a pilot to see frost, snow
and rime ice on the upper wing surface from the ground or through
the cockpit or other windows.
Frost, snow, and rime ice may be very difcult to detect on a white
upper wing surface and clear ice can be difcult to detect on an
upper wing surface of any colour.
Many pilots may believe that if they have sufcient engine power
available, they can simply power through any performance
degradation that might result from almost imperceptible amounts
of upper wing surface ice accumulation. However, engine power
will not prevent a stall and loss of control at lift off, where the
highest angles of attack are normally achieved.
FOR MORE INFORMATION
Winter ying SafetySense leaet no.3 UK Civil
Aviation Authority March 2009
Aircraft ground icing NTSB Safety Alert
Into the cold Flight Safety Australia May-June y-June
2007 p25-27