The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism

Stephen P. Engstrom
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 32, Number 3, July 1994,
pp. 359-380 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1994.0069
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The Transcendental Deducti on
and Skepticism
S T E P HE N E NGS T R OM
IT HAS OFTEN BEEN ASSUMED t h a t Ka n t ' s ai m i n t h e T r a n s c e n d e n t a l De d u c t i o n
i n c l u d e s a r e f u t a t i o n o f s ke pt i c i s m. ' Bu t t hi s a s s u mp t i o n has l ed i n t e r p r e t e r s
t o c o n c l u d e n o t o n l y t h a t t h e De d u c t i o n is at l east i n l a r ge p a r t a f a i l ur e , b u t
al s o t h a t Ka n t is c o n f u s e d a b o u t h o w hi s obj ect i ves s h o u l d be a c h i e v e d a n d
e v e n a b o u t wh a t t h e y ar e. S u c h a c o n c l u s i o n ma y wel l r ai s e d o u b t s a b o u t t h e
i ni t i al a s s u mp t i o n a n d so i nvi t e a c l os e r e x a mi n a t i o n o f wh a t Ka n t h i ms e l f says
c o n c e r n i n g t h e De d u c t i o n ' s r e l a t i o n t o s kept i ci s m. T h e p r e s e n t es s ay u n d e r -
t akes s u c h a n e x a mi n a t i o n i n a n a t t e mp t t o d e t e r mi n e wh a t s or t o f s ke pt i c i s m
Ka n t has i n vi ew a n d h o w h e r e s p o n d s t o it. Co n s i d e r a t i o n o f Ka n t ' s r e ma r k s
will s u g g e s t t h a t t h e De d u c t i o n d o e s n o t a i m at a r e f u t a t i o n o f s ke pt i c i s m, ~ a n d
will t h u s o p e n t h e wa y t o a n a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f its t ask, br i e f l y e n t e r -
t a i n e d i n t h e f i nal s ect i on.
T wo s or t s o f s ke pt i c i s m wi l l b e c o n s i d e r e d . T h e f i r st is t h e vi e w Ka n t
According to P. F. Strawson, for example, "A major part of the role of the Deduction will be
to establish .that experience necessarily involves knowledge of objects, in the weighty sense" (The
Bounds of Sense [London: Methuen, 1966], 88). And according to Barry Stroud, "the transcenden-
tal deduction (along with the Refutation of Idealism) is supposed. . , to give a complete answer to
the sceptic about the existence of things outside us" ("Transcendental Arguments," Journal of
Philosophy 65 [1968]: 242 ). More recently, Paul Guyer has suggested that Kant is ambivalent about
whether to answer the skeptic or the empiricist (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987]; see also "The Failure of the B-Deduction," The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 25, Supplement [ 1986]: 67-84).
Similar conclusions are reached in Karl Ameriks, "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a
Regressive Argument," Kant-Studien 69 (1978): 273-87; Jonathan Lear, "The Disappearing
'We'," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 58 0984): ~x9-42; and Henry
Allison, "Reflections on the B-Deduction," The Southern Journal of Philosophy ~5, Supplement
(x986): 1-15. (For an intermediate position, see Edwin McCann, "Skepticism and Kant's B Deduc-
tion," History of Philosophy Quarterly ~ [1985]: 71-72.) My approach is distinctive primarily in its
focus on what Kant himself says concerning the Deduction's relation to skepticism. To keep the
discussion manageable, I confine my attention to the Deduction as presented in the second
edition, which is where Kant's remarks about skepticism occur.
[359]
360 JOURNAL OF T HE HI S T ORY OF P HI L OS OP HY 3 2 : 3 JULY 1994
a ddr e s s e s i n t he Re f ut a t i on o f I deal i s m: " t he pr obl emat i c [ mat er i al ] i deal i sm o f
Des car t es , " " whi ch decl ar es t he exi s t ence o f obj ect s in s pace out s i de u s . . . t o
be d o u b t f u l a n d i nde mons t r abl e " (B274), a r g u i n g t hat " t he onl y i mme d i a t e
e x p e r i e n c e is i n n e r e xpe r i e nc e , a nd f r o m it we onl y i n f e r o u t e r t hi ngs, a nd,
mo r e o v e r - - a s i n all cases wh e r e we ar e i n f e r r i n g f r o m gi ven ef f ect s t o det er mi -
nat e c a u s e s - - o n l y in a n u n t r u s t wo r t h y ma n n e r , f or t he caus e o f t he r e p r e s e n t a -
t i ons t ha t we ascr i be, p e r h a p s fal sel y, t o o u t e r t hi ngs, ma y lie in our s el ves "
(B276). s T h e s e c ond is t he s kept i ci s m Ka nt associ at es wi t h t he e mpi r i c i s m o f
Hu me . Th i s s kept i ci s m, whi ch will be des cr i bed i n g r e a t e r det ai l bel ow, deni es
t hat a ny o f o u r k n o wl e d g e has its s our c e in r eas on, ma i n t a i n i n g i ns t ead t hat
" what is r e g a r d e d as r e a s on is a uni ver s al i l l usi on o f o u r f acul t y o f knowl e dge "
(B128). Fo r c onve ni e nc e , we ma y call t he f o r me r " Ca r t e s i a n. s ke pt i c i s m" a n d
t he l at t er " Hu me a n s kept i ci s m" ( t hough, as will e me r g e , t hes e l abel s can be
s o me wh a t mi s l eadi ng) .
1 . CART E S I AN S KE P T I CI S M
1. Ka nt me n t i o n s s kept i ci s m onl y t wi ce in c onne c t i on wi t h t he De duc t i on,
once n e a r t he b e g i n n i n g in w , a nd once at t he concl us i on i n w . T h e
s kept i ci s m me n t i o n e d in w is Hu me a n , so i f t he cl ai m t hat t he De duc t i on
a t t e mpt s t o r e f u t e t he Car t es i an skept i c is t o be s u p p o r t e d by wha t Ka nt
hi ms e l f says a b o u t s kept i ci s m, it will ha ve t o be bas ed o n t he r e ma r k s i n w
Be f or e t u r n i n g t o t hos e r e ma r ks , we s houl d br i ef l y c ons i de r t he i r cont ext ,
Kant ' s cr i t i ci sm o f wha t he calls t he " mi ddl e cour s e. "
3 Listed below are the symbols and abbreviations used in references to Kant's works and the
translations on which I have based my own. Page references to the Cr/t/que use the numbering of
the first (A) and second (B) editions. Other page references use the numbering of the appropriate
volume of Kants gesammdte Schr~wn, herausgegeben van der Deutschen (formerly KCmiglich
Preuflischen) Akademie der Wissenschaftan, 99 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [and predecessors],
19de- ); citations of Kant's minor works are given, without abbreviated tide, by the volume and
page numbers from this edition.
AIB Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Company,
19~9).
KpV Critique of Proztical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Com-
pany, 1956 ) .
KU Critique of Judgraem.
L Logic, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1974).
MAN Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 197o).
P Prol egomena to Any Future Metaphysit.s, trans. Paul Carus (revised by James W. Ellington)
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pubfishing Company, t977).
Page references to Hume' s Treatise of Human Nature use the numbering of the L. A. Selby-
Bigge edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888).
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION AND SKEPTICISM 36X
The mi ddl e cour se pur por t s to be an alternative bet ween what Kant ini-
tially pr esent s as t he onl y two ways of conceiving a necessary agr eement be-
t ween concept s and experi ence: ei t her "experi ence makes these concept s possi-
ble," or "t hese concept s make experi ence possible" (B 166). In t he case of t he
categories, Kant insists on t he l at t er alternative on the gr ounds t hat it is t he
onl y way in which t her e can be a necessary agr eement when t he concept s in
quest i on ar e a priori. Thus, as he indicated in w 14, the Deduct i on is to accom-
plish its pr i mar y aim o f showi ng t he legitimacy of our use of t he categories in
exper i ence by pr oceedi ng on t he principle t hat the categories make experi -
ence possible. But in w 4 it is also said that t he categories make experi ence
possible by maki ng possible its objects, so in pr oceedi ng on this principle Kant
is following t he "Coperni can" way of thinking: "objects must conf or m to our
cognition" (Bxvi). The cat egori es can be in necessary agr eement with experi -
ence and its objects onl y by maki ng t hose objects, and hence experi ence itself,
possible. The mi ddl e cour se at t empt s to conceive the necessary agr eement by
supposi ng, not t hat exper i ence depends on t he categories, but that bot h de-
pend on somet hi ng else, namel y, t he Creat or: "A mi ddl e course may be pro-
posed bet ween t he t wo above ment i oned, namely, t hat t he cat egori es are
nei t her s e l f - t h o u g h t first principles a pri ori of our knowl edge nor deri ved f r om
experi ence, but subjective dispositions of t hought , i mpl ant ed in us f r om t he
first moment of our existence, and so or der ed by our Cr eat or t hat t hei r
empl oyment is in compl et e har mony with t he laws of nat ur e in accordance
with which exper i ence pr oc e e ds - - a kind o f p r e f o r m a t i o n - s y s t e m of pur e reason"
(B 167). Thi s i dea of a har mony bet ween i mpl ant ed dispositions and t he laws
of nat ur e recalls Leibniz' s doct r i ne of preest abl i shed har mony and also Des-
cartes' s reliance on t he met aphysi cal claim that God exists and is no decei ver to
s uppor t his concl usi on t hat t her e are out er objects cor r espondi ng to our ideas
of bodies.4 Since met aphysi cal claims of this sort have been called into ques-
tion in t he C r i t i q u e , we mi ght be l ed t o conj ect ure that Kant' s obj ect i on to t he
mi ddl e cour se is that t he Cart esi an conclusion cannot be suppor t ed by such
quest i onabl e claims.
The skeptic is i nt r oduced when Kant describes t he consequences of t he
mi ddl e cour se as "exactly what t he skeptic wishes most of all" (B 168). Now i f
we r ead this r emar k in light of t he conj ect ure j us t ment i oned, itwiU be easy to
i nt er pr et it as confi rmi ng t hat conj ect ure, as indicating t hat Kant has in mi nd
41n fact, Kant seems to be thinking of Crusius: see P 319n.; cf. also Kant's letter of 2x
February 177~ to Marcus Herz ( K a n t : P h ilo s o p h ic a l Correspondence z 7 5 9 - 9 9 , trans. Arnulf Zweig
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, x967], 7~-73). But Kant describes the position occupied by
Crusius as employing the idea of a preestablished harmony (P h ilo so p h ica l Correspondence, 73; MAN
476n.), and he says that for Crusius the Creator cannot deceive (P 3~9n.), so it might be thought
that he also has in mind Leibniz and Descartes.
369 J OUR NAL OF T HE HI S T OR Y OF P HI L OS OP HY 39: 3 J UL Y ~ 9 9 4
a Cartesian skeptic who doubt s whet her t here are out er objects cor r espondi ng
to our ideas of bodies. Kant hi msel f seems to express this doubt in t he Prol ego-
mena when he says, in criticizing t he mi ddl e course, "we can never know with
security what t he spirit of t r ut h or t he f at her of lies may have instilled into us"
(P 319n.). So t he poi nt of Kant' s r emar k would seem to be t hat t he mi ddl e
course, unl i ke t he Deduct i on, fails to r ef ut e t he out er-worl d skeptic. We ar e
t hus l ed to t he t hought that t he Deduction' s pr i mar y aim of legitimating our
use of t he categories is to be achieved by refut i ng t he skeptic.
2. How mi ght s uc h a legitimation proceed? Since t he categories ar e said to
be "concepts of an object in general " (B 198), we mi ght suppose t hat Kant
i nt ends to achieve his ai m by showing that t he skeptic is commi t t ed to empl oy-
i ng such concept s of an object and t hereby also commi t t ed to t he out er "objec-
tive exper i ence" pur por t edl y called into question. I f we ask what t he initial
skeptical position is f r om which t hese commi t ment s ar e t o be deri ved, we find
a r eady answer in w x6, wher e Kant takes t he cogito as a starting poi nt f or t he
Deduct i on and speaks port ent ousl y of t he "many consequences" t hat follow
f r om t he "original combi nat i on" involved in this Cartesian self-consciousness
(B132-33). It is t hus t empt i ng to suppose t hat t he Deduct i on pursues t he
following line of ar gument : Cartesian self-consciousness, whi ch t he skeptic
admits, presupposes t he empl oyment of t he categories, but this empl oyment
constitutes t he "objective experi ence" t he skeptic pur por t s to doubt .
Thi s line of ar gument is in tension, however, with t he fact t hat in w 4 and
again in w Kant makes clear t hat t he Deduction' s cent ral idea is t he Coper-
ni can proposi t i on t hat t he categories make exper i ence possible. For since
Kant is explicit in w t hat he is concer ned with pur e, not empirical,
appercept i on, t he antiskeptical ar gument should focus on t he possibility of
such self-consciousness, not t he possibility of experi ence. This pr obl em can-
not be r emoved by t aki ng t he Coperni can proposition to be an awkward
f or mul at i on of t he st r onger claim that t hr ough t he categories' use "objective
exper i ence" is guar ant eed. Kant says t he categories secure no mor e t han t he
possibility of exper i ence and its objects, for he takes huma n discursive under -
st andi ng and di vi ne i nt ui t i ng under st andi ng to di f f er precisely i n t hat only
t he l at t er can secure t he existence as well as t he possibility of its object (A92/
BI~' 5, BI 38- 39, B145).
To avoid t he difficulty, it mi ght be pr oposed t hat t he exper i ence said to be
made possible by t he categories is t he Cartesian "i nner experi ence" on which
Kant bases his Refut at i on of Idealism (B275); perhaps such exper i ence is t he
st art i ng poi nt in t he Deduct i on as well.5 (Or, to accommodat e t he fact t hat w x 6
sThat the Deduction follows roughly this line of argument has frequently been suggested.
See, for example, Strawson, TheBounds of Sense, 87-88~ The two lines of argument just mentioned
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTI ON AND SKEPTI CI SM 363
b e g i n s wi t h s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i t mi g h t b e p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e De d u c t i o n a r -
g u e s t h a t p u r e a p p e r c e p t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s i n n e r e x p e r i e n c e , a n d t h a t i n n e r
e x p e r i e n c e i n t u r n p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c a t e g o r i e s a n d " o b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . " )
Bu t wh e n Ka n t s p e a k s o f e x p e r i e n c e , h e me a n s " o b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . "
E x p e r i e n c e , as h e r e p e a t e d l y d e f i n e s i t , is " e mp i r i c a l k n o wl e d g e , " k n o wl e d g e
o f o b j e c t s . 6 I n d e e d , h e ma k e s e x p l i c i t i n b o t h w 14 a n d w (cf. al s o Bxvi i ) t h a t
hi s r e a s o n f o r ma i n t a i n i n g hi s C o p e r n i c a n p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i e s ma k e
e x p e r i e n c e p o s s i b l e i s t h a t , s i nc e t h e c a t e g o r i e s a r e a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s , t h i s i s t h e
o n l y wa y i n wh i c h t h e i r n e c e s s a r y a g r e e me n t wi t h e x p e r i e n c e a n d i t s o b j e c t s i s
p o s s i b l e . I f t h e r e is t h u s f o r Ka n t i n i t i a l l y a g e n u i n e q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t hi s n e c e s s a r y a g r e e me n t - - t h e v e r y q u e s t i o n , i n f a c t , t h a t t h e
mi d d l e c o u r s e is a d d r e s s i n g i n i t s a p p c a l t o a c r e a t o r wh o h a r mo n i z e s o u r
correspond to tactics "IIA" and "l i B" in Guyer' s taxonomy (Guyer claims in effect that Kant is
ambivalent about whether to start with pure apperception or inner experience); see C/aims of
Knowledge, 77-86.
6 See B t47, B 165-66, B218, B~34, B277, Bxvii-xviii, and At ~4. Guyer cites two passages to
support his claim that Kant sometimes speaks of experience in a "subjective sense" (C/a/ms of
Knowledge, 80. In the first, Kant says, "Now in experience perceptions do indeed [zwar] come
together only contingently, so that no necessity in their connection comes to light, or can come to
light, from the perceptions themselves" (B219). Guyer says this passage "equates experience with
the mere occurrence of perceptual states, rat her than with any judgment that perceptions represent
an object." But Kant says only that perceptions come together contingendy in experience, not that
their occurrence/ s experience; so experience, though not equated with j udgment , is not said to
exclude it either. Moreover, the fact that Kant uses the word zwar in this sentence and then begins
the next by saying "But since IDa abet] experience is a knowledge of objects through percep-
t i ons . . . " (my emphasis) suggests that in both sentences he is speaking of experience in the same
sense, the sense given in the definition at the beginning of the paragraph: "Experience is an
empirical knowledge," which as such involves, in addition to j udgment , "a synthesis of percep-
tions" (B2 t8; cf. P 3oo, 304). The same perceptions in the same experience can come together
contingendy yet also be necessarily connected, for these two relations arise from different synthe-
ses: the former, Kant explains, from the synthesis of apprehension, the latter from a dynamical
synthesis (cf. B16o, B2ot n. , and especially P 3o5n.). Thus we have, not two conceptions of
experienc e , but one conception with two levels of analysis.
I n the second passage, Kant says, "There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with
experience; for how else should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into exercise i f not by
objects which, affecting our senses, partly of themselves produce representations and partly bri ng
the activity of our underst andi ng in motion to compare these representations, to connect or to
separate them, and so to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into that knowledge of
objects which is called experience?" (BI). Claiming (with Lewis White Beck) that this passage
contains an equivocation, Guyer says that it makes sense only if the first occurrence of' experience"
is taken to mean "merely the raw materials, the subjective states which are the data for all
j udgment and which may or may not be det ermi ned to represent objects." This would be indisput-
able had Kant said that all our knowledge/s preceded by experience, but as he only says it beg'ins with
experience, the passage makes good sense i f ' experience' in both its occurrences is taken to mean
empirical knowledge. Kant is claiming, with the empiricists, that we have no knowledge before
experience, and he is support i ng this claim by pointing out that our faculty of knowledge can be
awakened into activity only by objects affecting our senses, and that the knowledge of objects that
arises in this way is what we call experience.
364 J OURNAL OF T HE HI S T ORY OF P HI L OS OP HY 32: 3 JULY 199 4
concept s with na t ur e - - t he n t he experi ence ment i oned in t he Coper ni can
pr oposi t i on must be "objective experi ence, " for in t he case of i nner experi ence
the quest i on of agr eement with out er objects does not even arise.
Hence t he antiskeptical i nt er pr et at i on- - whet her it starts f r om self-
consci ousness or i nner exper i ence- - makes it seem t hat when in w 4 Kant
identifies his Coper ni can proposi t i on as t he "principle accordi ng to which t he
whol e enqui r y must be di rect ed" (A94/B 126), and when in w he sums up t he
Deduct i on by calling it t he exhibition ( D a r s t e l l u n g ) of t he cat egori es "as princi-
ples of t he possibility of experi ence" (B168), he is conf used about his own
ar gument . For to exhi bi t t he categories as principles on which t he experi ence
of obj ect s depends simply i gnores t he skeptic' s doubt as to whet her such
exper i ence is somet hi ng we do i ndeed have.
3. He r e it mi ght be count er ed that t he Coperni can rhet ori c in w 14 and w
is not par t of t he Deduct i on pr oper , but belongs instead to a pe numbr a of
comment ar y t hat does not provi de a reliable gui de f or negot i at i ng t he
obscurities of t he Deduct i on' s ar gument . Accordingly, it mi ght be pr opos ed
t hat we ar e war r ant ed in at t ri but i ng confusi on to that comment ar y shoul d this
be t he cost of locating in t he Deduct i on an antiskeptical ar gument free of t he
Coper ni can way of t hi nki ng and the confusi on that its pr esence in such an
ar gument woul d entail.
Thi s pr oposal woul d r equi r e us to i gnore not onl y Kant' s identification of
t he Coper ni can proposi t i on as t he Deduct i on' s gui di ng pri nci pl e in w 4, but
also his assert i on t hat precisely t he par agr aph in w 4 t hat expounds t hat
pr oposi t i on is "sufficient by itself" for t he essential deduct i on of t he categories
(Axvii).7 The chi ef difficulty with this proposal , however, is t hat t he Deduc-
tion' s ar gument does not addr ess the skeptic' s doubt , s Af t er i nt r oduci ng t he
concept of combi nat i on in w i 5, Kant claims in w 16 t hat sel f-consci ousness--
the awareness of onesel f as t he identical subject of all one' s r epr es ent at i ons - -
pr es uppos es t he possibility of uni t i ng all t hose r epr esent at i ons in a single
uni versal consci ousness and hence that t hose represent at i ons ar e subj ect to
t he condi t i on (yet unspeci fi ed) under which alone such uni t y of consciousness
is possible. Kant t hen decl ares in w 7 t hat an object is "that in t he concept of
which t he mani f ol d of a given intuition is u n i t e c f ' and adds t hat this unification
of r epr esent at i ons "requi res uni t y of consciousness in t he synthesis of t hem"
Kant says the paragraph is sufficient for the Deduction's "objective" side, which, unlike the
"subjective" s!de, is "essential" to his purposes because it is intended to "expound and render
intelligible the objective validity" of the categories (Axvi-xvii). These remarks occur only in the
first edition, but the paragraph in w is retained in the second.
s In what follows I summarize only the argument of the first part of the Deduction (w167 15-2o);
it is this argument, with its focus on the cogito, that inspires the antiskeptical reading.
T HE T R ANS C E NDE NT AL DE DUC T I ON AND S KE P T I C I S M 365
(B137); accordingly, uni t y of consci ousness is "an objective condi t i on of all
knowl edge, " one "under whi ch ever y intuition must st and i n order to become an
object f o r me" (B138). Thus uni t y of consciousness has a Coperni can status: it
makes possible t he obj ect of knowl edge, and hence knowl edge itself. Kant
goes on t o ar gue in w 19 t hat t he uni t y of a j udgme nt consists in this objective
uni t y of consciousness, and concl udes in w that since t he cat egori es are j us t
t he f or ms of j udgme nt i nsofar as t he mani fol d of sensible intuition is det er-
mi ned in respect of t hem and t her eby uni t ed in a single intuition, "all sensible
intuitions st and unde r t he cat egori es, as conditions under which al one t hei r
mani fol d can come t oget her in one consciousness" (B143). In claiming t he
categories to be requisite for t he uni t y of intuition in w Kant is in effect
i dent i fyi ng t hem with t he concept ment i oned in w 17, t he concept in which an
intuition has t he uni t y wher eby it can be an obj ect for knowl edge. Hence t he
categories are j us t "concept s of an obj ect in general" (B128; cf. B146 ), con-
cepts t hat br i ng a mani fol d of intuition to t he unity of consciousness, t he
condi t i on " under which every i nt ui t i on must stand in or der to become an
obj ect f or me, " and t hus t he Coper ni can status at t ri but ed to t he uni t y of
consciousness in w is ext ended to t he categories in w t hey make t hei r
objects possible.
Faced with this ar gument , t he skeptic mi ght grant t hat self-consciousness
pr esupposes t he possibility of br i ngi ng t he mani fol d of intuition to t he uni t y
of consciousness unde r which intuitions must stand in or der to become objects
for us, and grant f ur t her t hat t he cat egori es serve to bri ng t he mani fol d to this
unity, but still doubt whet her out er objects exist. In particular, t he skeptic can
still doubt whet her we do i ndeed have an out er sense by which we exper i ence
such objects, or whet her t he mani f ol d of spatial intuition we at t ri but e to out er
sense is merel y t he i nvent i on of our imagination: "t he c a u s e . . , may lie in
ourselves" (B276). Thes e doubt s, which Kant knows t he skeptic will raise, and
which he addresses in t he Ref ut at i on of Idealism ( B275- 77; cf. Bxxxi x-xl i n. ),
are not conf r ont ed in t he Deduct i on. Kant argues that self-consciousness pre-
supposes t hat all intuitions ar e subj ect to certain condi t i ons (the uni t y of
consci ousness and t he categories) t o which t hey must conf or m f or t her e to be
objects of knowl edge at all and hence f or us to have any knowl edge of objects
in space, but he does not ar gue t hat self-consciousness pr esupposes t hat we do
i ndeed have such knowl edge.
4. Havi ng encount er ed t hese difficulties, let us look mor e closely at Kant' s
discussion of t he mi ddl e course. Kant ' s descri pt i on of t he consequences of t he
mi ddl e cour se as "exactly what t he skeptic wishes most of all" was initially
i nt er pr et ed as linking t he mi ddl e cour se to t he Cartesian skeptic, and this
linkage was t aken to imply a concer n to r ef ut e such a skeptic in t he Deduct i on.
366 J OURNAL OF THE HI S T ORY OF P HI L OS OP HY 3 2 : 3 JULY ~994
But t hi s i nt e r pr e t a t i on does not fit what Kant says in his "decisive" obj ect i on t o
t he mi ddl e cour se: I f t he mi ddl e cour se were correct ,
the necessity of the categories, which belongs essentially to their concept, would then be
lacking. For the concept of cause, for instance, which declares the necessity of an out-
come under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary
subjective necessity, implanted in us, of combining certain empirical representations
according to such a rule of [causal] relation. I would not then be able to say that the effect
is combined with the cause in the object (that is, necessarily), but only that I am so
constituted that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as thus connected.
This is exactly what the sceptic wishes most of all. For then all our insight, t hrough the
supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but sheer illusion . . . . (B 168)
I n w 14 Hu me ' s skept i ci sm is descr i bed as ari si ng in t he same way (B 1 a 7- 28;
cf. MAN 476n. ): Because it di d not occur t o Hu me t hat t he pur e concept s of
u n d e r s t a n d i n g mi ght be gr ounds o f t he possibility o f exper i ence, h e was un-
abl e t o c o mp r e h e n d how t hey coul d have t hei r or i gi n i n t he unde r s t a ndi ng,
and cons equent l y " he was compel l ed [durch Not gedrungen] to der i ve t he m
f r o m exper i ence ( namel y, f r om a subjective necessi t y whi ch arises t hr ough
r e pe a t e d associ at i on i n e xpe r i e nc e , a nd whi ch event ual l y comes mi st akenl y t o
be r e ga r de d as objective, t hat is, f r om custom)" (B 1UT). Li ke Hu me a n empi r i -
cism, t he mi ddl e cour se t races t he concept of cause and t he ot her pur e con-
cept s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g to subj ect i ve di sposi t i ons a nd hence i mpl i es t hat all
our "i nsi ght , " t hat is, knowl edge t hr ough r eason (L 65), is illusory. Thi s is
Kant ' s decisive obj ect i on.
Si nce f or Ka nt a j u d g me n t is objectively va l i d- - t ha t is, t r ue (cf. A1 2 5 ) - -
j us t in case it is necessari l y uni ver sal l y valid (necessarily valid f or ever yone) (P
~'98), he concl udes his obj ect i on by recast i ng it in t er ms o f t he l at t er i dea: " nor
woul d t her e be want i ng peopl e who woul d not admi t this subjective necessi t y
( whi ch' mus t be felt); at t he ver y least one cannot di s put e wi t h a nyone r egar d-
i ng t hat whi ch de pe nds mer el y on t he mode in whi ch one' s own subj ect is
or ga ni z e d" (B 168). Th e di s put e whose possibility is at stake her e is not si mpl y
over whe t he r a gi ven event has s ome specific cause. I t concer ns s ome t hi ng
i nt o whi ch we pr e s ume to have "i nsi ght ": when we speci fy a cause f or an
event , we pr e s ume t o know t h r o u g h r eason t hat t he event does i nde e d have a
cause. I n o r d e r to di s put e wi t h peopl e who de ny t hat a gi ven event has a cause,
I mus t be in a posi t i on to r equi r e t hat t hey must , i f t hei r j u d g me n t is t o be
obj ect i vel y val i d, agr ee t hat t he event r esul t ed f r om s ome c a u s e - - t h a t is, my
j u d g me n t mus t be, or p u r p o r t t o be, necessari l y uni versal l y valid. But i f I were
t o s uppos e t hat my j u d g me n t de pe nds on an i mpl ant ed di sposi t i on, t hen i n
connect i ng my r epr es ent at i on o f t he event wi t h t he r epr es ent at i on o f a cause
in gener al , I woul d onl y be ent i t l ed t o say t hat I am so const i t ut ed t hat I cannot
t hi nk this r epr es ent at i on ot her wi se t han as t hus connect ed; I woul d not be
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION AND SKEPTICISM 367
ent i t l ed t o r e qui r e ot her s ' a gr e e me nt , a nd he nc e I coul d not di s put e t he i r
deni al . 9
Kant ' s deci si ve obj ect i on t o t he mi ddl e cour s e shows t hat (as we coul d onl y
expect ) he will r ej ect a way o f concei vi ng how t he cat egor i es can be i n neces-
sary a g r e e me n t wi t h e xpe r i e nc e i f it i mpl i es t hat o u r i nsi ght is i l l usory. But his
obj ect i on does not show t hat hc t hi nks he mus t de mons t r a t e , by r e f ut i ng t he
skept i c me n t i o n e d in w t hat i nsi ght is possible, or t hat out e r obj ect s exi st ;
a n d he nc e it does not show t hat t he r e f ut a t i on o f t he skept i c bel ongs t o t he ai m
o f t he Deduct i on.
5. Yet what o f t he fact , br i ef l y not i ced above, t hat in t he Prol egomena Ka nt
says, in cri t i ci zi ng t he mi ddl e cour s e, "we can ne ve r know wi t h secur i t y what
t he spi ri t o f t r u t h or t he f a t he r o f lies ma y have i nst i l l ed i nt o us"? Does n' t this
suggest t hat Ka nt is c onc e r ne d wi t h Car t es i an skept i ci sm in t he Deduct i on?
T h e r e ma r k is i nde e d r emi ni s cent o f Descart es, a nd it also i ndi cat es t hat , i n
addi t i on t o his deci si ve obj ect i on, Ka nt has a f u r t h e r obj ect i on t o t he mi ddl e
cour s e. But cl oser e xa mi na t i on shows t hat Kant does not have Car t esi an skept i -
ci sm in mi nd. Kant obj ect s t o t he mi ddl e cour se' s way o f account i ng f or a pr i or i
pr i nci pl es on t he g r o u n d s t hat "si nce decept i ve pr i nci pl es of t en i nt r ude t he m-
s e l v e s . . , t he use o f such a pr i nci pl e [i.e., t he mi ddl e cour se] seems ver y pr ob-
l emat i c in t he abs ence o f secur e cr i t er i a t o di st i ngui sh t he ge nui ne or i gi n f r o m
t he s pur i ous , f or we can ne ve r know wi t h secur i t y what t he spi ri t o f t r ut h or t he
f a t he r o f lies ma y have i nst i l l ed i nt o us" (P 319n. ) . ' ~ Si nce t he mi ddl e cour s e
l eaves us wi t h no cr i t er i on f or d e t e r mi n i n g whi ch o f t he ost ensi bl y a pr i or i
pr i nci pl es p u r p o r t i n g t o be i n neces s ar y a g r e e me n t wi t h t he laws o f na t ur e have
be e n i nst i l l ed by t he spi ri t of t r ut h a n d whi ch by t he f a t he r of lies, it i nvi t es a
d o u b t a bout t hat neces s ar y a g r e e me n t itself, t he ver y t hi ng it was i n t r o d u c e d t o
expl ai n a nd gua r a nt e e . Thi s d o u b t is r ecogni zabl y a ki nd o f skept i ci sm, yet
si nce it does not e x t e n d t o all j u d g me n t s about out e r objects, but onl y t o t hose
p u r p o r t i n g t o be a pr i or i , it di f f er s f r o m Car t esi an skept i ci sm.
T o see this di f f e r e nc e cl earl y, we mus t be a r in mi nd t hat t he mi ddl e c our s e
is c o n c e r n e d onl y wi t h concept s a nd pr i nci pl es t hat ar e a pr i or i . I n t he empi r i -
cal case, whe r e t he necessar y a g r e e me n t is concei vabl e onl y on t he s uppos i t i on
t hat o u r concept s a nd j u d g me n t s a r e ma d e possi bl e by exper i ence, it woul d
9 Kant's objection that the middle course implies there can be no dispute over whether an
event has a cause does not mean that for him this question is open to dispute. Insofar as the
proposition that every event has a cause is an a priori principle known through reason, it does not
address a question on which different subjects are free to hold different opinions: it is beyond
dispute, whereas the middle course implies that it falls short of dispute.
~o This objection that the middle course provides no secure criteria can also be found in w
"there is no end to be seen of the extent to which one might push the assumption of predeter-
mined dispositions to future judgments" (B167; cf. also A783-84/B811-12 and the criticism of
Crusius at L ~ l ).
3 6 8 J OUR NAL OF T HE HI S T ORY OF P HI L OS OP HY 3 2 : 3 J UL Y 1 9 9 4
make no sense to appeal to i mpl ant ed dispositions. ~ Consequent l y, t he crite-
rion Kant claims we woul d lose by adopt i ng t he mi ddl e course bears onl y on
concept s and pri nci pl es t hat pur por t to be a priori. (For such concept s and
principles t he onl y suitable cri t eri on is that pr ovi ded by t he Coper ni can way of
t hi nki ng--speci fi cal l y, by t he i dea of a condi t i on of t he possibility of experi -
ence.) Since t he empi ri cal cri t eri on ( agr eement with experi ence) was never
t hought to be appr opr i at e f or a priori concept s and principles, it woul d not be
under mi ned by t he adopt i on of t he mi ddl e course.
So t he doubt t hat Kant' s f ur t her obj ect i on identifies t he mi ddl e course as
engender i ng is not global Cartesian doubt . Her e again, as in t he case of t he
doubt descr i bed in t he decisive objection, t he skepticism is of a ki nd t hat
Kant associates with empi ri ci sm (as will become cl earer bel ow in section 2).
The Cart esi an skept i c doubt s whet her t her e is an out er worl d for us to
know; t he empi ri ci st skeptic associated with the mi ddl e course doubt s onl y
whet her we know t hat t he worl d is as the categories r epr esent it (namely, as
necessarily a mat hemat i cal l y descri babl e worl d o f subst ances in l aw-governed
causal i nt eract i on). ' '
And even i f t he doubt in quest i on were Cartesian, Kant' s rejection of t he
mi ddl e cour se f or engender i ng it woul d not show t hat t he Deduct i on aims to
r ef ut e it. Like his decisive objection, Kant' s f ur t her obj ect i on indicates t hat he
thinks we shoul d rej ect a concept i on of t he necessary agr eement be t we e n the
categories and exper i ence i f it commits us to skepticism; but this does not
imply t hat he t hi nks we ar e not entitled to any such concept i on unless we can
show, conversel y and t hr ough refut at i on, t hat skepticism commi t s us to i t .
Nei t her of Kant ' s obj ect i ons implies t hat t he doubt it i mput es to t he mi ddl e
course needs to be r ef ut ed, and nei t her conceives of t hat doubt as Cartesian,
so nei t her pr ovi des gr ounds f or supposi ng t hat the Deduct i on aims t o r ef ut e
t he Cart esi an skeptic. And since this supposi t i on leads to t he serious i nt erpre-
tive difficulties not ed earlier, we have good reason to rej ect it.
6. Kant does, of course, aim to r ef ut e t he Cartesian skeptic in t he Refut a-
~l All t hat is needed is a general principle of nat ure' s suitability for cognition by our under -
standing. See KU, Int ro. , w
" We r e t he skepticism associated with t he mi ddl e course to i ncorporat e t he i dea that empi ri -
cal concepts and j udgment s depend on t he categories, it could be devel oped to the poi nt of
effectively coi nci di ng with Cartesian skepticism. Yet it should be not ed not only that Kant does
not descri be t he doubt as t hus devel oped, but in addi t i on that it woul d be i nappr opr i at e f or hi m to
do so, since such devel opment woul d rely on precisely t he Coperni can recogni t i on (that t he
categories make empi ri cal cogni t i on possible) with which the mi ddl e course is bei ng contrasted,
and hence woul d be not so much a worki ng out of t he consequences of t he mi ddl e course as a
(partial) r et ur n to Kant' s own al t ernat i ve position. The skepticism resulting f r om t he mi ddl e
course is supposed to be a consequence of t he failure to adopt t he Coper ni can way of thinking.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTI ON AND SKEPTI CI SM 369
t i on o f Idcalism.~S But it is not e wor t hy t hat t her e he speaks of Car t esi an
i deal i sm r a t he r t ha n skept i ci sm. For al t hough he does descri be t he Car t esi an
idealist as "skept i cal " (A377) , t hus i mpl yi ng t hat this idealist resembl es t he
skeptic, a br i ef revi ew of what he says about skept i ci sm itself, its sources, and
t he knowl edge claims it quest i ons will suggest t hat , cont r ar y t o t he anachr oni s-
tic expect at i ons we mi ght have t oday, he does not t hi nk o f t he skeptic as
rai si ng t he i deal i st doubt .
Kant opposes skept i ci sm not t o real i sm, but t o its t r adi t i onal foil, dogma-
tism, t he pr e s umpt i on t hat r eason can gai n a pr i or i knowl edge ent i rel y f r om
its own pri nci pl es wi t hout first e nga gi ng in sel f-cri t i que (see Bxxxv, B7). I n its
f ai l ur e to engage in such criticism, dogmat i s m falls i nt o confl i ct wi t h i t sel f a nd
t her eby l eads t o skept i ci sm, whi ch, c ount e r i ng dogmat i sm' s pr es umpt i ve claim
to t he st at us of a pur e r at i onal s dcnce, opposes its assert i ons wi t h "equal l y
speci ous assert i ons" ( B22- 23; of. Ai x, P 351) a nd t hus " unde r mi ne s t he f oun-
dat i ons of all knowl edge, i n or de r t hat , i f possible, none of its reliability a nd
secur i t y r emai n" (A424/ B451; cf. 8:226). Since it first arises f r om t he conflicts
wi t hi n dogmat i c met aphysi cs, skept i ci sm may initially concer n onl y reason' s
claims to know be yond t he limits of exper i ence; but as t he pri nci pl es gr ound-
i ng such claims ar e gr adual l y r ecogni zed to be also at wor k i n reason' s empi ri -
cal appl i cat i on, i n t he absence of a cr i t i que t o det er mi ne t he doma i n of t hei r
l egi t i mat e e mpl oyme nt a f ur t he r st age of skept i ci sm results, chal l engi ng t he
use o f r eason even i n exper i ence (P 351). Hume ' s skept i ci sm is at this second
stage. Bel i evi ng hi ms el f t o have di scover ed t hat "what is r egar ded as r eason is
a uni ver sal i l l usi on o f o u r f acul t y o f knowl edge" (B 128), Hu me doubt ed t ea-
son' s claims (in par t i cul ar wi t h r e ga r d t o t he concept of cause) in all mat t er s of
fact and exi st ence. But skept i ci sm can advance still f ur t her , f or once it recog-
nizes t he pr oposi t i ons o f mat hemat i cs t o be synt het i c (a r ecogni t i on t hat
Hu me fai l ed to achieve), it will event ual l y ext end even t o this science (KpV
52)24 Th e t hr ee wi deni ng stages of doubt t hus chal l enge t he use of r eason
wi t h r e g a r d to, first, t he exi st ence o f t hi ngs be yond t he limits of exper i ence;
second, t he exi st ence of t hi ngs in gener al , even wi t hi n exper i ence; and t hi r d,
,3 But his remarks in the Refutation (and elsewhere; see Bxxxixn.) suggest that he does not
think this skeptic has already been refuted in the Deduction. In the Refutation two species of
(material) idealism are distinguished: Berkeley's "dogmatic idealism" and Cartesian "problematic
idealism." With regard to the former, Kant announces that it has already been disposed of (in the
Transcendental Aesthetic), and thus excuses himself from arguing against it in the Refutation.
But he does neither of these things in the case of problematic idealism. Why these differences, if
he thinks he has already refuted the Cartesian idealist in the Deduction?
,4 In this instance, however, what Kant is prepared to claim about skepticism in general he is
not prepared to claim about Hume. Because of his high regard for Hume, Kant is not ready to
think that had Hume recognized that mathematical propositions are synthetic he would have
taken a further skeptical step. See note ~8 below.
37 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HI S T ORY OF P HI L OS OP HY 3 2 : 3 JULY 1 9 9 4
all t heor et i cal sci ences, i nc l udi ng mat hemat i cg, so t ha t ul t i mat el y all o f r ea-
son' s "i ns i ght " c o me s t o be r e g a r d e d as " not hi ng but s h e e r i l l usi on" (B 168).~5
No wh e r e i n t hi s s e que nc e doe s t he d o u b t c onc e r n t he exi s t ence o f o u t e r
obj ect s. Exc e pt f or t he speci al case o f r eas on' s e mp l o y me n t be yond t he ]i mi t s o f
e xpe r i e nc e , t he d o u b t f ocuses not on whe t he r t he r e is a subj ect ma t t e r f or
r e a s on' s sci ent i fi c use, but onl y on wh e t h e r r e a s on has i nsi ght into its subj ect
ma t t e r . So t he f act t ha t Ka nt s pe a ks o f " t h e skept i c" in w pr ovi de s no e vi de nc e
t hat he has in mi n d Ca r t e s i a n skept i ci sm, a nd t hus o u r e a r l i e r concl us i on t hat
t he De duc t i on doe s not a i m t o r e f u t e t he Car t es i an s kept i c is c onf i r me d.
2 . HUME AN S KE P T I C I S M AND HUME AN E MP I R I C I S M
1. I t is mu c h mo r e pl aus i bl e t o s u p p o s e t hat t he s kept i ci s m Ka nt i mp u t e s t o t he
mi ddl e c our s e is k i n d r e d t o t he skept i ci sm he associ at es wi t h Hu me ' s e mpi r i -
ci sm. I t s houl d not be i n f e r r e d f r o m t hi s, however , t hat t he De duc t i on ai ms t o
r e f ut e t he Hu me a n skept i c. For s uch a n ai m woul d not be in k e e p i n g wi t h
Ka nt ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t he c ha r a c t e r a nd t he or i gi n o f Hu me ' s s kept i ci s m.
T h e wor d ' r e f u t a t i o n ' can call u p t he i mage o f o p p o n e n t s who, wi t h a n
adver s ar i al t u r n o f mi n d , s eek t o de f e a t one a n o t h e r i n de ba t e . T h e a dve r s a r -
ial a t t i t ude is p e r h a p s de t e c t a bl e i n t he skept i c me n t i o n e d i n w who "wi shes
mos t o f all" f or t he c ons e que nc e s o f t he mi ddl e c our s e i n vi r t ue o f be i ng
p r e d i s p o s e d t o r e g a r d all o u r i nsi ght as " not hi ng but s he e r i l l usi on. " But
t h o u g h Ka nt occasi onal l y at t r i but es such an at t i t ude t o t he s kepdc, h e r a r e l y i f
e ve r does so t o Hu me i n par t i cul ar , ' 8 n o r does he vi ew Hu me as hi s o p p o n e n t .
For Kant , s kept i ci s m r esul t s wh e n r e a s on fails t o see a way o f achi evi ng its
neces s ar y ai ms: it is "a way o f t hi nki ng in whi ch r e a s on doe s s uch vi ol ence t o
i t sel f t ha t it coul d n e v e r ha ve ar i s en save f r o m c ompl e t e de s pa i r [Verzweiflung]
o f e ve r achi evi ng sat i sf act i on wi t h r e g a r d t o its mos t i mp o r t a n t p u r p o s e s " ( P
271). ' 7 Hu me ' s s kept i ci s m is n o except i on. As we ha ve seen, Kant says Hu me
was compelled t o de r i ve t he p u r e c onc e pt s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m e x p e r i e n c e
( f r o m a subj ect i ve necessi t y, c us t om) becaus e he f ai l ed t o hi t u p o n t he Co p e r n i -
can sol ut i on t o t he p r o b l e m o f how t hos e concept s can be in neces s ar y a gr e e -
,5 Throughout these stages, skepddsm, itself a cultivated exercise of reason Ca principle of
technical and scientific ignorance" [A494/B451]) , challenges the use of reason in the sciences.
Whether skepticism might undermine even the prescientific employment of common reason,
Kant leaves to the reader to judge (KpV 5~), though he also says there is no danger, since "the
sound understanding will always maintain its rights" with regard to the principles of experience
(P 351; see also Bxxxiv).
'r See P ~73 for a disputable instance.
'~ We could say that skepticism will amount to misology if the violence reason does to itself
involves self-hatred, which could result if reason, failing to see a way of achieving its necessary
aims, turns on itself in frnstration (cf. A75fi/B784). In this way we might account for the perverse
wish of the skeptic mentioned in w
T HE T R ANS C E NDE NT AL DE DUC T I ON AND S KE P T I CI S M 3 7 1
ment with exper i ence ( B127) - - t he solution t hat makes comprehensi bl e how
such ostensibly a pri ori concept s can have their origin in the underst andi ng.
But since Hu me coul d find no al t ernat i ve to t he empirical derivation, skepti-
cism was unavoi dabl e: "Hume' s empi ri ci sm with r egar d to principles inevita-
bly leads to skepticism" (KpV 5e). Thus, Kant says, Hume believed hi msel f to
have di scovered t hat "what is r egar ded as reason is a universal illusion of our
faculty of knowl edge, " and so "gave hi msel f over entirely to skepticism" (B x 28).
Hume' s skepticism t hus arose f r om his "compl et e despai r" of compr ehendi ng
how the pur e concept s coul d have t hei r origin in the underst andi ng. Hence
Kant sees Hume, not as a skeptical adversary to be r ef ut ed, but as a philoso-
pher who was compel l ed to adopt a skeptical position for under st andabl e
reasons.X8
2. The l anguage of refut at i on can also be used in nonadversari al contexts
wher e t he pur pose in ar gument is not to def end a thesis, but simply to det er-
mi ne the t rut h. Any ar gument mi ght be called a refut at i on i f it demonst rat es
t he t rut h of a claim t hat someone happens to deny. In or der for t her e to be
such a demonst r at i on, however, t he initial pr esumpt i on must of course favor
t he position to be r ef ut ed at least to t he ext ent that t he ar gument against it
cannot assume it to be in error. But as will become clear in what follows, Kant
does not r egar d Hume' s skepticism as t hus f avor ed in the initial presumpt i on.
So even when t he l anguage of r ef ut at i on is not i nt ended to imply any adversar-
ial relation, it woul d be i nappr opr i at e to descri be the Deduct i on' s aim as
i ncl udi ng a refut at i on of t he Hu me a n skeptic.
As we have seen, Kant says Hu me was "compel l ed" to deri ve t he pur e
concept s of under st andi ng f r om experi ence. But Kant also regards Hume as
havi ng been "overly hasty and i ncorrect " in concl udi ng t hat the concept of
cause arises f r om this source (P ~58). I f Hu me was "overly hasty," t hen t he
empirical deri vat i on must not have been his only available opt i on, even i f he
was in a sense compel l ed to adopt it. Kant apparent l y supposes that, al t hough
t he failure to compr ehend how t he pur e concept s coul d have their origin in
t he under st andi ng will compel one to deri ve t hem f r om e xpe r i e nc e / f one is
commi t t ed to pr ovi di ng an account of their origin (even i f it has skeptical
consequences), t hat fai l ure does not compel one absolutely, for one can always
,s Kant goes so f ar as t o say t hat ha d Hu me r ecogni zed t hat his pr obl em concer ni ng t he
concept of cause was mer el y one c ompone nt of a gener al pr obl em concer ni ng synt het i c a pr i or i
knowl edge, a pr obl em t hat arises even i n t he case of mat hemat i cs, he woul d have r ecogni zed t he
necessity of pr ovi di ng a gener al sol ut i on, a nd since he was muc h t oo i nsi ght ful to base mat hemat -
ics upon exper i ence, he woul d have been st i mul at ed ( awakened f r om his empi ri ci st sl umber , as i t
were) to seek a sol ut i on al ong t he very l i nes Kant devel ops i n t he Cr/t/que (P 272- 73; see also BI 9 -
2o). (I shall not consi der t o what ext ent Kant ' s unde r s t a ndi ng of Hume is accurat e, Since my
pur pos e is m de t e r mi ne Kant ' s objectives i n t he Deduct i on, I am conf i ni ng my at t ent i on to Kant ' s
own unde r s t a ndi ng of hi s r el adon to Hume. )
372 J OURNAL OF T HE HI S T ORY OF P HI L OS OP HY 32: 3 JULY ~994
l eave t he pr obl em ope n to f u r t h e r consi der at i on. Kant t hus appear s t o r e ga r d
Hume ' s adopt i on o f t he empi r i cal der i vat i on as cont i ngent upon an overl y
eager desi re t o account f or t he or i gi n of t he pur e concept s, a desi r e t hat l ed
hi m to at t empt a sol ut i on t o t he pr obl em he conf r ont ed pr i or to gr as pi ng it i n
its ful l gener al i t y (cf. P 260, 272- 73; B 19-20). Det er mi ned to account f or t he
pur e concept s, yet f ai l i ng t o c o mp r e h e n d how t hey coul d have t hei r or i gi n i n
t he u n d e r s t a n d i n g a nd hence unabl e to c ompr e he nd how synt het i c a pr i or i
knowl edge is possible, Hu me was compel l ed t o der i ve t hem f r om exper i ence,
despi t e t he fact t hat t hi s der i vat i on had t he skeptical consequence t hat syn-
t het i c a pr i or i knowl edge is i mpossi bl e.
But what j ust i f i es Kant in r e ga r di ng Hume' s concl usi on t hat t he pur e
concept s der i ve f r om exper i ence as "overl y hast y a nd i ncorrect "? Th e follow-
i ng passage suggest s t he answer :
We are actually [wirklich] in possession of synthetic knowledge a priori, as is shown by
the principles of understanding, which anticipate experience. Now if someone cannot
at all comprehend the possibility of these principles, be may indeed at first doubt
whether they actually dwell in us a priori; but he cannot yet proclaim this [inability to
comprehend their possibility] to be an impossibility of these principles t hrough mere
powers of the understanding, nor proclaim all steps that reason takes under their
guidance to be null. He can say onl y this: i f we had insight into their origin and
authenticity, we would be able to determine the scope and limits of our reason; but
until we do, all assertions of the limits of reason are blindly ventured. In this manner a
thoroughgoing doubt of all dogmatic philosophy, which goes its way without a critique
of reason itself, is perfectly well grounded; but reason cannot on these grounds be
altogether denied such forward steps, if they are prepared and secured t hrough a
better laying of the ground. (A762-63/B79o-9 l)
Kant ' s t hought he r e is t hat t he inability t o c ompr e he nd t he possibility o f
s ome t hi ng does not add u p t o knowl edge of its impossibility. Al t hough a
f ai l ur e t o c o mp r e h e n d how synt het i c a pr i or i knowl edge is possible can raise a
l egi t i mat e doubt as t o whe t he r we act ual l y have such knowl edge ( and t her eby
pose a chal l enge t o dogmat i c cl ai ms to t he cont rary), it does not j us t i f y an
i nf er ence t o t he skept i cal concl usi on t hat such knowl edge is i mpossi bl e. Since
t he empi r i cal der i vat i on ent ai l s t hi s skeptical concl usi on, a d o p d n g it as a r esul t
o f fai l i ng t o c o mp r e h e n d t he possibility of synt het i c a pri ori knowl edge is
t a nt a mount to ma ki ng this unj ust i f i ed i nf er ence. So al t hough t her e is a sense
in whi ch Hu me was unde r s t a nda bl y compel l ed to der i ve t he pur e concept s
f r om exper i ence, t hi s de r i va don is not one to whi ch he was strictly speaki ng
ent i t l ed. Si nce his der i vat i on was not based on an adequat e i nvest i gat i on o f t he
pr obl em o f synt het i c a pr i or i knowl edge, his skeptical concl usi ons wer e t hem-
selves, i n a sense, dogmat i c a nd subj ect to doubt (cf. A767- 68/ B795- 96) .
3. Bu t Ka n t ' s cri t i ci sm of Hu me a n skept i ci sm is not conf i ned t o t he sugges-
T HE T R ANS C E NDE NT AL DE DUC T I ON AND S KEP TI CI S M. 3 7 3
t i on t ha t Hu me ' s c onc l us i ons a r e i nsuf f i ci ent l y s u p p o r t e d . For Kant , t he e m-
pi r i cal de r i va t i on p r o v i d e d by Loc ke a n d H u me is mani f es t l y i n a d e q u a t e as a n
a c c o u n t o f t he or i gi n o f t he cat egor i es. Be f or e he even begi ns t he De duc t i on,
Ka nt tells us t ha t t he empi r i ci st s' de r i va t i on is a l r e a dy r e f u t e d : " But t hi s erap/ri-
cal de r i va t i on, i n whi c h b o t h p h i l o s o p h e r s agr ee, c a n n o t be r econci l ed wi t h t he
act ual i t y [Wirklichkeit] o f t h e sci ent i fi c a pr i or i k n o wl e d g e t h a t we possess,
na me l y, pure mathematics a n d general nat ural science, a n d it is t h e r e f o r e r e f u t e d
by t hi s f act [durch das Fakt um widerlegt]" ( BI 2 7 - 2 8 ; cf. also B 4 - 5, B2o). ( Th e
i mpossi bi l i t y o f achi evi ng t h e r econci l i at i on i n que s t i on h e r e is o f c our s e j u s t
wh a t H u m e has a d mi t t e d i n gi vi ng h i ms e l f ove r t o skept i ci sm. ) T h a t we act u-
ally possess (scientific) s y n t h e d c a pr i or i k n o wl e d g e is s o me t h i n g Ka nt has
p r e s u me d f r o m t he st art . I t is p o i n t e d o u t i n w a n d w o f t he I n t r o d u c t i o n
(B3ff. , B 14ff.), a n d it is t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d i n t he f o r mu l a t i o n o f t he cent r al
p r o b l e m o f t he Cr/t/que i n w (B19ff. ). Si nce as we have j u s t s een t he e mpi r i -
cal de r i va t i on is u n s u p p o r t e d , a n d si nce it confl i ct s wi t h t h e act ual i t y o f t he a
pr i or i sci ences, i t is suf f i ci ent l y r e f u t e d by t hi s fact . ' 9
I n t h e s e c ond Critique Ka n t goes e ve n f u r t h e r , s ugge s t i ng t ha t i ns of ar as
t h e e mpi r i c a l de r i va t i on i mpl i es t h e skept i cal de ni a l o f t he possi bi l i t y o f syn-
t he t i c a pr i or i k n o wl e d g e , it is r e f u t e d by itself. Af t e r bri efl y de s c r i bi ng hi s
cri t i cal pr oj e c t o f l ayi ng a s e c ur e g r o u n d f o r a syst emat i c sci ent i fi c phi l os ophy,
b o t h t he or e t i c a l a n d pract i cal , h e says (i n a r e ma r k t ha t agai n r ef l ect s t he
p r e s u mp t i o n t ha t s ynt het i c a pr i or i k n o wl e d g e is act ual l y i n o u r possessi on):
,9 Kant' s appeal to t he fact of t he a pri ori sciences fits with t he Prolegomena's analytic met hod,
which assumes that .the a pri ori sciences of pur e mathematics and p u r e (or general) natural
science are actual and seeks to ascertain t he gr ounds of t hei r possibility; but it may appear to be at
odds with t he synthetic met hod of t he C r i t ~ , which does not assume t he actualit~ of such
sciences, but confines itself to t he concept of pur e reason as a faculty of knowledge and aft er
det er mi ni ng t he elements of this faculty devel ops f r om t hem t he system of synthetic a pri ori
knowl edge whose actuality t he analytic met hod took as its starting poi nt (see P 263, 274, 279).
However, t her e is no real conflict here, f or di f f er ent questions are at stake. Because it leads to
skepticism, t he empirical deri vat i on is in effect a negadve answer to t he quest i on whether synthetic
a pri ori knowl edge is possible. But in bot h t he Prolegomena and t he Cr/t/que t he fundament al
quest i on is how such knowledge is possible (P w B 19): Thus both methods, analydc and synthetic,
take f or gr ant ed that synthetic a pri ori knowl edge is possible. They can do so because the possibil-
ity of this knowl edge is shown by t he actuality of t he a pri ori sciences. The di fference between t he
two met hods lies in t hei r explanations of how such knowledge is possible. Whereas the Prolegomena
relies again on t he actuality of t he a pri ori sciences, this fact is not appeal ed to in t he synthetic
expl anat i on furni shed by t he Cr/t/que. I n t hat explanation, Kant first analyzes our power of
cogni t i on to isolate t he elements (such as t he categories) in virtue of which experi ence and
synthetic knowl edge/ n general ar e possible and t h e n employs t he Coperni can way o f thinking,
accordi ng to which these el ement s or condi t i ons make possible the objects of experi ence, to make
comprehensi bl e how synthetic a pr/ or/ knowl edge is possible (see A154- 58/ B 193-97). Thus in t he
Cr/t/que Kant does not ar gue fr0ra the assumpt i on that synthetic a pri ori knowl edge is actual, but
nei t her does he ar gue against the empiricist' s claim t hat it is impossible.
3 7 4 . J OURNAL OF T HE HI S T OR Y OF P HI L OS OP HY 3 2 : 3 . JULY 1 9 9 4
No t h i n g wor s e c o u l d bef al l t he s e l abor s , t h a n t ha t s o me o n e s h o u l d ma k e t he u n e x -
p e c t e d d i s c o v e r y t ha t t h e r e n e i t h e r is n o r c a n be a ny a p r i o r i k n o wl e d g e at all. Bu t h e r e
t h e r e is n o d a n g e r . I t wo u l d be t h e s a me as i f s o me o n e wa n t e d t o p r o v e t h r o u g h r e a s o n
t hat t h e r e is n o r e a s on. F o r we onl y say t ha t we know s o me t h i n g t h r o u g h r e a s o n wh e n
we a r e c ons c i ous t ha t we c o u l d ha ve k n o wn i t e v e n i f it h a d n o t c o me b e f o r e us i n
e x p e r i e n c e ; t hus r a t i ona l k n o wl e d g e a n d a p r i o r i k n o wl e d g e a r e o n e a n d t h e s ame. T o
wa nt to squeeze neces s i t y from an empirical p r o p o s i t i o n (expum/ ce aquam) and with this
[sc. necessi t y] t o s e c u r e t r u e u n i v e r s a l i t y . . , f o r a j u d g me n t is a di r e c t c ont r a di c t i on.
(KpV 1~)
Kant' s poi nt her e appears to be t he following: To deny t hat (synthetic) a pri ori
knowl edge is possible is to assert that all our knowl edge is necessarily der i ved
f r om exper i ence; but since this (synthetic) assertion involves necessity, it can
never be j ust i fi ed by exper i ence and hence cannot be gr ounded unless it has
an a pri ori basis in reason; yet t he possibility of such a basis is precisely what
t he assertion denies. The "cont radi ct i on" t hat this ar gument points out lies,
not within t he proposi t i on t hat synthetic a pri ori knowl edge is impossible, but
bet ween this proposi t i on and what is implied in supposi ng it to be knowable.
The a r gume nt is t hus meant to show, not t hat synthetic a priori knowl edge is
possible (its possibility is shown by its actuality), but r at her that it is impossible
to know t hat synthetic a pri ori knowl edge is impossible. Al t hough t he argu-
ment does not ment i on Hume a n empiri{:ism and skepticism by name, it is fai r
to say in light of t he ensui ng discussion (KpV I :t-14) t hat Kant takes it to show
t hat t he Hume a n skeptical deni al of t he possibility of synthetic a pri ori knowl-
edge di rect l y refut es itself, and t hat i nsofar as t he empirical deri vat i on implies
this denial, it t oo is sel f-refut i ng. ~~
The empi ri cal deri vat i on and t he skepticism it implies are t hus al ready,
pri or to any appeal to t he consi derat i ons ent er t ai ned in t he Deduct i on, re-
f ut ed bot h on a pri ori gr ounds and also by appeal to t he actuality of t he a
priori sciences. Evidently, t hen, t her e is no initial pr esumpt i on in favor of t he
empi ri cal deri vat i on and t he skepticism to which it gives rise. The issue is
t her ef or e not whether synthetic a priori knowl edge is possible, but how (B 19),
*o The at t empt to squeeze wat er f r om pumi ce can be seen in t he openi ng pages of Hume' s
Treatise, in which t he empirical deri vat i on is i nt r oduced as an empirical hypothesis and t hen
empl oyed as i f it were an a pri ori principle. Hume first treats his claim t hat f or ever y simple i dea
t here is a resembl i ng simple i mpressi on as an inductively support ed empirical proposition, and he
challenges anyone who mi ght deny this dai m to pr oduce a count erexampl e ( T r e a t i s e , 3-4). But
later, when consi deri ng t he cat egory of substance, he proceeds as t hough this proposi t i on had
al ready been established as an exceptionless rule. I n supposing that t he idea of substance cannot
be "distinct f r om that of a collection of particular qualities" unless it " b e deri v' d f r om t he i mpres-
sions of sensation or refl exi on" ( T r e a t i s e , 15-16), he excludes in advance the possibility that it
mi ght be a simple i dea f or which no resembl i ng impression can be f ound and so j ust the sort of
count er exampl e he had previously chal l enged t he unconvi nced r eader to supply.
T HE T R ANS C E NDE NT AL DE DUC T I ON AND S KE P T I CI S M 3 7 5
and accordi ngl y t he Deduct i on aims nei t her to r ef ut e t he skeptic nor to r ef ut e
t he empiricist.
4- Yet even t hough t hey have al r eady been refuted, empiricism and its at t en-
dant skepticism have not t hereby been satisfactorily removed. For t hei r refut a-
tion does not el i mi nat e t he difficulty t hat leaves those seeking an account of t he
ori gi n of t he pur e concepts feeling compel l ed to adopt t he empirical derivation.
As l ong as Hume is unabl e to c ompr e he nd how t he pur e concepts coul d have
t hei r ori gi n in t he under st andi ng, he will be left with t he sense of having no way
of account i ng f or t hem except by deri vi ng t hem f r om experi ence, despite t he
i mpl i cat i on t hat synthetic a priori knowl edge is impossible. ~
Hence what is needed is "a bet t er laying of t he gr ound, " a way of under -
st andi ng t he categories that will af f or d us "insight" into t he "origin and au-
thenticity" of t he principles of pur e under st andi ng and t hereby enable us to
see how t he synthetic a priori propositions of t he Sciences ar e possible. Thi s is
what Kant at t empt s to provi de in t he Deduct i on. Thus, in t he second Critique,
speaki ng of t he cat egory of cause in part i cul ar, he explains t hat his deduct i on
of it as an a priori concept consisted in "show[ing] its possibility f r om pur e
under s t andi ng wi t hout empirical sources" (KpV 53). He continues: "So, aft er
doi ng away [Wegschaffung] with t he empi ri ci sm of t he ori gi n of this concept, I
was able to ut t erl y r emove [aus dem Grunde heben] its inevitable consequence,
skepticism . . . . Thus I utterly r emoved t he total doubt of everyt hi ng into
whi ch t heoret i cal reason professes to have insight" (KpV 53-54). So t he Deduc-
tion r emoves skepticism and does so by indirect, even doubl y i ndi rect means:
skepticism is r emoved by doi ng away with its cause, empiricism, and empi ri -
cism is done away with by showing t he categories' possibility f r om pur e under -
st andi ng wi t hout empirical sources and t her eby r emovi ng what made empi ri -
cism seem inevitable to Hume - - de s pi t e its mani fest i nadequacy as an account
of t he ori gi n of t he cat egor i es- - namel y, t he mi st aken assumpt i on t hat this
possibility cannot be known.
For Kant, t he empiricist' s skepticism is a sign of t he i nadequacy of t he
empi ri cal derivation. The pr oper response, given this diagnosis, is to show
'~ Fr om t he inability to compr ehend how t he pur e concepts could have their origin in t he
under st andi ng t here can also arise, even wi t hout adopt i on of the empi r i cal derivation, a doubt
concer ni ng t he a c t u a l i t y of synthetic a pri ori knowledge. For this inability is t he basis of the failure
to compr ehend how t he principles of synthetic a pri ori knowledge ar e possible, and that failure,
as we have seen, may raise a doubt concer ni ng whet her they " a c t u a l l y dwell in us a pri ori " (A763/
B79o ). Thi s doubt is not sufficient, however, to eradi cat e t he presumpt i on that we actually possess
such principles, and hence it is not sufficient to under mi ne t he refut at i on of t he empi ri cal
deri vat i on t hat this presumpt i on provides. For as we have noted, "t he sound under st andi ng will
always mai nt ai n its rights" with regard to t he principles of experi ence (P 351). Wi t hout eradicat-
i ng t he presumpt i on, t he doubt may persist alongside it until comprehensi on is achieved of how
t he pur e concepts can ori gi nat e in the underst andi ng.
3 7 6 JOURNAL OF THE HI STORY OF PHI LOSOPHY 3~: 3 JULY 1994
how it is possible for the categories to have their origin in the understanding.
Skepticism is not the position of an adversary, but the symptom of an infir-
mity. It is not to be vanquished, but rather prevented; and when it arises the
cure must work on the underlying cause.
3. THE DEDUCTION'S DIALECTICAL TASK
1. Although the Deduction does not aim to refute skepticism, it does, of
course, address a doubt concerning the categories insofar as it aims to show
how it is possible for them to have their origin in the understanding. This
doubt is raised in w 13 in the form of a question of our right to employ them.
The fact that the doubt is raised as a question of right suggests that Kant' s
approach in the Deduction (and in the Cr/t/que as a whole) is dialectical in the
sense that it seeks to reconcile apparently conflicting claims of reason. For on
the one hand, asking whether we have the right to employ the categories
presumes that we have all along, even if only implicidy, taken ourselves to
have this right. Otherwise the question would be idle. And on the other hand,
the question also involves the presumption that there is some reason, an
apparently conflicting claim, on which its challenge is based. Thus in raising
the question of right Kant indicates that the problem of the Deduction consists
in an apparent conflict between claims recognized by reason. ~* But if the
claims are recognized by reason, they are not arbitrary or contingent, and
hence we cannot remove the conflict by simply relinquishing one of them. In
such a case the problem is dialectical; the aim must be to reconcile the claims
by showing t hem to be in systematic agreement.
The question of right is based on the Metaphysical Deduction' s a priori
doctrine that the origin of the categories lies in the understanding. This doc-
trine appears to conflict with our presumption that we have a right to apply the
categories--indeed, to apply t hem a pri ori --i n synthetic j udgment s to objects
that are external to the underst andi ng in the sense that they are not simply
consequences of the understanding' s activity, but are given to the understand-
ing only to the extent that they affect the mind. Insofar as the Metaphysical
Deduction bases its doctrine on a systematic derivation of the categories from
the underst andi ng conceived as fundamentally a faculty of j udgment , and
insofar as the presumption that we have a right to apply the categories origi-
nates in "the sound understanding, " which "will always maintain its rights" (P
351), neither of these apparently conflicting claims can be simply relinquished.
*" For further discussion of Kant's use of the question of right, see Dieter Henrich, "Kant's
Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Crit/que," in Kant's Tran-
scendental Deductions: The Three "Critiques" and the "Opus postumum," ed. Eckart F6rster (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1989), ~9-46-
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTI ON AND SKEPTI CI SM 377
T h e Tr a n s c e n d e n t a l Deduct i on t hus faces t he di al ect i cal t ask o f r econci l i ng
t hese a pr i or i claims.
Di al ect i c i n t he sense j us t i n t r o d u c e d is di st i nct f r o m di al ect i c i n Kant ' s
t echni cal sense a n d in par t i cul ar f r o m his " t r a ns c e nde nt a l di al ect i c, " whi ch
consi st s i n t he cri t i ci sm a nd di agnosi s of r eason' s i l l egi t i mat e met aphysi cal
cl ai ms t o know b e y o n d t he limits o f e xpe r i e nc e (see A6 o - 6 4 / B8 5 - 8 8 ) . Yet it is
r el at ed t o t r a ns c e nde nt a l di al ect i c as genus t o species, f or whi l e t r ans cendent al
di al ect i c is di st i nct i ve in t hat it empl oys t he speci al means o f expos i ng an
i l l usi on u n d e r l y i n g r eason' s i l l egi t i mat e claims, its ul t i mat e ai m is t o r econci l e
t he cl ai ms o f r e a s on a nd t he r e by j us t i f y or vi ndi cat e r e a s on itself. Th u s Kant
says at one poi nt t hat it was t he a nt i nomy of p u r e r eas on t hat fi rst awoke hi m
f r o m his dogma t i c s l umbe r a nd d r o v e hi m t o t he cr i t i que o f r e a s on "i n o r d e r
t o r e move [heben] t he scandal o f t he s eemi ng [scheinbaren] cont r adi ct i on o f
r eas on wi t h itself."~s Reason' s sel f-cri t i ci sm is u n d e r t a k e n f or t he sake o f self-
j ust i f i cat i on, whi ch consists in exhi bi t i ng t he syst emat i c c ohe r e nc e a mo n g r ea-
son' s cons t i t ut i ng pr i nci pl es a nd i nt e r e s t s .
On Kant ' s di al ect i cal a ppr oa c h, t hen, t he cl ai ms o f r eas on ar e initially
p r e s u me d t o be true.24 Si nce d o u b t ari ses onl y t h r o u g h a p p a r e n t confl i ct , onl y
r econci l i at i on will r e move it.
a. Kant ' s i dea t hat phi l os ophy is c onc e r ne d wi t h t he j ust i f i cat i on o f r eas on
echoes, or r a t h e r r econcei ves, t he Lei bni zi an i dea of phi l os ophy as t heodi cy,
a nd accor di ngl y t he Deduct i on' s di al ect i cal task can be el uci dat ed by poi nt i ng
out an anal ogy it bear s t o t he t r adi t i onal task o f t heodi cy. T h e task o f t heodi cy
is not t o r e f ut e or t o c onve r t t he i nfi del , but r a t he r to j us t i f y or ma ke intelligi-
bl e t he ways o f Go d t o t hose who bel i eve, or ar e at l east initially di sposed t o
bel i eve, yet who ar e at a loss t o u n d e r s t a n d how God' s j ust i ce, benevol ence,
wi sdom, a nd powe r can be r econci l ed wi t h t he mani f es t evil i n t he wor l d.
Wha t is des i r ed is not a p r o o f t hat Go d exists, but r a t he r a de mons t r a t i on o f
how God' s at t r i but es ar e compat i bl e wi t h t he de f e a t a nd s uf f e r i ng o f t he
i nnoc e nt a nd t he t r i u mp h and pr os pe r i t y o f t he wi cked. T h e t ask o f t heodi cy
is accor di ngl y t o pr ovi de a vi ndi cat i on of t he di vi ne at t r i but es in t he face o f t he
exi st ence o f evil.
Si mi l arl y, Kant ' s task in t he De duc t i on does not r e qui r e t hat he addr es s
9 s Letter to Christian Garve, 21 September 1798 (Philosophical Correspondence, ~52; my transla-
tion); see also Bxxxiv. In revealing the illusion underlying reason's illegitimate claims, transcen-
dental dialectic shows that such claims stem not from any contradiction within reason itself, but
merely from a misunderstanding, to which we are naturally susceptible, of reason's proper em-
ployment. The illegitimacy is shown to consist in the misapplication of principles that are in
themselves free of contradiction and whose proper employment (as regulative principles) is
therefore fully justified. (Cf. A64~-43/B67o-7 l, A669/B697.)
,4 Hence the fact, noted earlier, that Kant takes pure mathematics and general natural science
for granted as actual (as Fakta) is a further sign that his approach is dialectical.
378 JOURNAL OF THE HI STORY OF PHI LOSOPHY 32: 3 JULY x994
someone initially disposed to radically doubt that t her e ar e any pur e concept s
of under st andi ng. That t he categories ar e such concepts is pr esumed; t he task
is to show how it is possible f or t hese pur e concept s- - concept s we have been
empl oyi ng all al ong- - t o rel at e a pri ori to objects (A85/ Bl I7). Just as a
t heodi cy addresses t hose who ar e disposed to believe in God and at t empt s to
show how God' s at t ri but es ar e compat i bl e with munda ne evil, s o t he Deduc-
tion addresses t hose who r egar d t he categories as a priori concepts and at-
t empt s to show how t he categories' ori gi n in t he under st andi ng is compatible
with t hei r r el adng a pri ori to objects. Thus in t he Prolegomena when he ex-
plains how he has solved Hume' s probl em (and in so doi ng indicates how t he
pur e concept s can rel at e to objects), Kant says t hat his sol udon "rescues" or
"vindicates" (retteO f or t he pur e concepts t hei r a priori ori gi n (P 313; see also
KpV 54). It mi ght even be said that t he Tr anscendent al Deduct i on is meant to
"vindicate" t he Metaphysical Deduct i on, for an expl anat i on of how concept s
t hat pur por t to rel at e a pri ori to objects can in fact do so woul d r emove t he
doubt t o whi ch t he table of categories gives rise and t her eby r emove t he
assumpt i on t hat made empi ri ci sm seem inevitable to Hume, namel y, t hat such
an expl anat i on is impossible.
3. How is t he task to be accomplished? A detailed answer to this quest i on
lies well beyond t he scope of this paper, but t he out l i ne of an answer is
provi ded by t he Coper ni can proposi t i on that, as was not ed above, Kant i nt ro-
duces in w 14 as t he pri nci pl e he will follow in showing how t he categories can
relate a priori to obj ect s- - t he pri nci pl e t hat t he categories make exper i ence
and its objects possible. The doubt as to t he possibility of t he categories'
r el adng a priori to objects is to be r emoved by showi ng t hat given this princi-
ple, t he proposi t i on t hat t he categories originate in t he under s t andi ng and t he
proposi t i on that t he objects t o which t hey pur por t to rel at e a priori ar e given
to t he under st andi ng f r om wi t hout , al t hough seemingly in conflict, are in fact
in necessary agr eement . Thi s pri nci pl e can yield t he needed reconciliation if,
as Kant argues in w 4 and w t her e is no ot her way o f conceiving how
concepts ori gi nat i ng in t he under s t andi ng can relate a pri ori to objects, and if,
when this relation is concei ved accordi ng to t he principle, t he two appar ent l y
conflicting propositions ar e in systematic agr eement . And it is clear, at least in
outline, how this systematic agr eement is supposed to be shown. For if, as t he
Metaphysical Deduct i on asserts, t he categories originate in t he under st andi ng,
as conditions of t hought , t hen given t he Coperni can pri nci pl e t hat such condi-
tions make experi ence and its objects possible, t he cat egori es will be in agr ee-
ment with those objects and not mer el y contingently. The categories' a pri ori
rel at i on to objects, whi ch initially appear ed to conflict with t hei r ori gi n in t he
under st andi ng, will t ur n out to be a consequence of it.
4. I nt er pr et i ng Kant' s task as dialectical may appear to make it too easy.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTI ON AND SKEPTI CI SM 379
Kant does not rul e out t he possibility of subjects whose sensibility has forms
ot her t han space and time, and it may be asked whet her, despi t e t he catego-
ries' pur por t ed universal validity, t her e can be subjects whose under st andi ng
has di f f er ent pur e concepts, or even no pur e concepts at all. On t he i nt erpret a-
tion out l i ned above, t he Deduct i on will fail to exclude t he possibility of such
subjects, j ust as a t heodi cy fails to excl ude t he possibility t hat God does not
exist. But i f t he Deduct i on does not establish t he categories' universal validity,
it will not excl ude t he possibility t hat t hey ar e merel y "the mode in which one' s
own subject is organi zed, " which is "what t he skeptic wishes most of all"
(B ~68). Though t he Deduct i on will not lead to skepticism, it will not excl ude it
ei t her.
I f t he i nt er pr et at i on out l i ned above is correct, however, t he possibility of
subjects t hat t hi nk but wi t hout t he categories has al ready been excl uded by t he
Metaphysical Deduct i on' s ar gument t hat t he categories have t hei r origin in
t he under st andi ng. The mi ddl e course, in conceiving of t he categories as
i mpl ant ed dispositions, takes t hei r ori gi n to lie outside t he under st andi ng; by
failing to recogni ze t hat t hey bel ong to t he underst andi ng' s constitution, it
invites t he t hought t hat t her e mi ght be subjects in whom ot her dispositions or
perhaps no dispositions at all are i mpl ant ed. I n t he Metaphysical Deduct i on,
on t he ot her hand, Kant first identifies j udgme nt as t he f undament al act of
discursive under s t andi ng (A69/B94) and t hen undert akes a systematic elabora-
tion of t he forms of j udgment , f r om which he derives t he table of categories.
Thi s deri vat i on enables hi m to claim of t he under st andi ng t hat "it is because it
contains t hese concept s t hat it is a pur e under st andi ng; f or t hr ough t hem
al one can it under s t and anyt hi ng in t he mani fol d of intuition, t hat is, t hi nk an
object for intuition" (A8o/B lo6). I n t hus ar gui ng t hat t he categories ar e condi-
tions of under st andi ng, t he Metaphysical Deduct i on, i f successful, establishes
t hat t hey constitute t he under st andi ng and hence excludes t he possibility of a
subject t hat thinks but wi t hout t he categories. This conclusion is t hen vindi-
cat ed by t he Tr ans cendent al Deduct i on.
Yet even i f t he ar gument of t he Metaphysical Deduct i on is gr ant ed, a doubt
may linger. The forms of space and time constitute our sensibility, but not
sensibility in general , so why suppose that t he Metaphysical Deduct i on estab-
lishes anyt hi ng mor e t han that t he categories constitute our under st andi ng,
r at her t han under s t andi ng in general? Simply to deny t he possibility of subjects
t hat t hi nk but wi t hout t he categories woul d be to lapse into dogmat i sm.
Kant does deny this possibility, but af t er acknowl edgi ng t hat such a deni al
will initially seem har d to accept, he gives his reason: "we must assign to
things, necessarily and a priori, all t he propert i es that constitute t he conditions
unde r whi ch al one we t hi nk t hem. Now I cannot have t he least r epr esent at i on
of a t hi nki ng bei ng t hr ough any out er experi ence, but only t hr ough self-
3 8 0 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 32: 3 JULY 199 4
consci ousness. Obj ect s of t hi s ki nd are, t her ef or e, not hi ng mor e t ha n t he
t r ans f er ence o f this consci ousness of mi ne t o ot her t hi ngs, whi ch in this way
al one can be r e pr e s e nt e d as t hi nki ng bei ngs" ( A346- 47/ B4o4- 4o5; cf. A3 5 3 -
54). Th e possibility o f subjects whose f or ms o f sensibility ar e ot he r t ha n space
a nd t i me c a nnot be r u l e d o u t , because space and t i me are nei t her i mpl i cat ed
i n o u r concept i on o f sensibility i n gener al (as receptivity), nor condi t i ons o f
sel f-consci ousness, a nd hence not condi t i ons u n d e r whi ch al one we t hi nk a
t hi nki ng bei ng. But t he cat egor i es are precisely such condi t i ons (if, as t he
Met aphysi cal Deduct i on ar gues, t hey ar e condi t i ons o f t hought ) . So t he "t r ans-
f er ence" of sel f-consci ousness wher eby I r epr es ent a not he r t hi nki ng bei ng is
t he t r ans f er ence o f t he cat egor i es t hemsel ves, and hence t hey ar e valid f or
ever yt hi ng t hat t hi nks.
Needl ess t o say, t he pr ecedi ng r emar ks char act er i ze t he Deduct i on' s task
onl y i n t he mos t gener al t erms. Th e y ar e onl y me a nt t o open t he way t o an
i nt er pr et at i on t hat does not i mpos e on t he Deduct i on t he task of r e f ut i ng a
skept i c, but r ecogni zes i nst ead t hat f or Kant , al t hough skept i ci sm s houl d not
be t he concl usi on of phi l osophy, nei t her s houl d it be t he pr emi se. 2~
University of Pittsburgh
,51 am grateful to James Conant, Hannah Ginsborg, Frederick Neuhouser, Charles Parsons,
John Rawls, Manley Thompson, and two anonymous readers for their detailed comments and
suggestions. I also thank the participants of a conference at Rice University on first principles in
philosophy, at which an earlier version of this paper was presented.