How The Khilafah Was Destroyed

How Ihe
Khlofoh
wos
DesIroyed
Abdul Oodeem Zollum
Al - Khilafah Publications
Suite 298,
56 Gloucester Road,
London S\ 4UB
email: inokhilaah.com
website: http:,,www.khilaah.com
1421 AH , 2000 CL
ISBN 1 89954 050
1ranslation o the Quràn
t .bova be erfect, cear tbat tbe Qvràv i. ov,
avtbevtic iv it. origiva avgvage, .rabic.
ivce erfect trav.atiov of tbe Qvràv i. ivo..ibe, tbe
terv 1rav.atiov of tbe Meavivg of tbe Qvràv ;1MQ)
ba. beev v.ea, a. tbe re.vt i. ov, a crvae
veavivg of tbe .rabic tet.
Sayings o Prophet Muhammad ,saw, appear in bold
swt - subhanahu wa taàla
saw - sallallahu alaihi wa sallam
ra - radhi allaho anha`
AH - Ater Hijrah
CL - Common Lra
ii
How the Khilafah was destroyed
Printed and Bound by- De-Luxe Printers,
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ConIenIs
1he struggle between Islam and Kur
1he conspiracies o the Luropean countries
against the Islamic State
Arousing the nationalist chauinism and
the separatist tendencies
1he missionary and the cultural inasion
1he attempt at introducing the \estern constitutional rules
Adopting the \estern laws
1he impact o the cultural and legislatie inasion
1he Allies` attempt at enticing Jamal Pasha
Mustaa Kemal works towards the withdrawal o
the State rom the war and the signing o a peace treaty
1he capitulation o the Ottoman State
1he British attempt to destroy the Khilaah
through political and legal actions
1he British alter the political and legal style
Britain backs the rebellion o Mustaa Kemal
1he irst phase in Mustaa Kemal`s rebellion
Mustaa Kemal adopts Ankara as his centre
Mustaa Kemal`s return to the rebellion
through a second phase
1he Ankara goernment gets settled and
other states deal with it directly
Mustaa Kemal prepares to settle the
crisis with Greece through war
Separating the Sultanate rom the Khilaah
1
5
13
25
30
39
2
5
82
94
103
113
120
123
139
142
154
160
10
iii
iv
1he atal blow
1he ital issues and the measure o lie and death
1he ital issues according to Islam
Lstablishing the Khilaah and the rule by what Allah has
reealed is the ital issue or the Muslims
180
18
191
201
1be, ravt to etivgvi.b .ab`. igbt ritb tbeir vovtb.,
bvt .ab ri vot aor ecet tbat i. igbt .bova be
erfectea erev tbovgb tbe ai.beierer. bate it.
t i. e rbo ba. .evt i. Me..evger ritb gviaavce ava tbe Deev of trvtb,
to vae it .verior orer a reigiov. erev tbovgb tbe
Mv.brioov ;o,tbei.t.) bate it.
1MQ . 1avba :2
v
1
Ihe sIruggle beIween
slom ond Kufr
1
he ierce struggle between the Islamic thoughts and the Kvfr
thoughts, and between the Muslims and the Kvffar, has been intense
eer since the dawn o Islam. \hen the Messenger o Allah
,saw, was sent, the struggle was only an intellectual one, and was not
associated with any material struggle. 1his status quo continued until the
Islamic State was established in Madinah, whereupon the army and the
authority were established and since then, the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
combined the material struggle with the intellectual struggle. 1he erses
o ]ibaa were reealed and the struggle went on. It will continue in this
way - a bloody struggle alongside the intellectual struggle - until the Hour
comes and Allah ,swt, inherits the Larth and those on it. 1his is why Kvfr
is an enemy o Islam, and this is why the Kuar will be the enemies o
the Muslims as long as there is Islam and Kvfr in this world, Muslims and
Kvffar, until all are resurrected. 1his is a decisie and a constant act. Hence
the understanding o it should remain clear to the Muslims at all times
throughout the whole o their lie, and it should be taken as a criterion to
judge the relationships between Islam and Kvfr and between the Muslims
and the Kvffar.
1he pure intellectual struggle continued or thirteen years. It was the harshest
and most erocious o struggles. Lentually the Islamic thoughts anquished
the Kvfr thoughts, and Allah ,swt, made Islam triumphant. 1he State that
protects the honour o the Muslims and is the shield o Islam and spreads
the guidance amongst people by way o ]ibaa, was established in Madinah.
The Final Version-How the Khilafah was Destroyed.p65 09/08/00, 19:25 1
2
1he iercest and harshest o wars between Islam and Kvfr and between
the Muslim and the Kvffar armies broke out in successie battles. Victory
in all these wars was to the Muslims. Although the Muslims were deeated
in some o the battles, they howeer always won the war, and they did
not lose a war or six centuries, rather remaining ictorious in all o their
wars during that time. 1he Islamic State remained the leading nation
throughout the whole o that period. Apart rom the Muslims, this has
neer happened to mankind, rather it has been exclusie to the Islamic
State. Howeer the disbelieers, especially the Luropean states, had been
mindul o Islam, or they wanted to attack it, and they had been mindul
o the Muslims, or they wanted to destroy their entity. 1hey attempted
to attack or conspire against the Muslims wheneer the opportunity arose.
Between the end o the sixth century i;ri ,eleenth century CL, and the
beginning o the seenth century i;ri ,twelth century CL,, the Luropean
countries sensed the condition that the ruling system in the Islamic State
had reached regarding the ragmentation o the !iayab. ,proinces, rom
the body o the state, and the independence o some !ai. ,goernors,
in key areas concerning the internal policy such as the armed orces, inance,
authority and the like. In act, they had become more like a ederation o
states rather than a single united state. 1he Kbaeefab`. authority had been
reduced in some !iayab. to the supplication or him on the pulpits,
minting coins bearing his name and sending him an amount o money
rom the Kbara;. 1he Luropean states had sensed this, hence they dispatched
the crusades against the Muslims, and war broke out. 1he Muslims were
deeated in this war and the Kvffar captured the whole o .bav :
Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. 1hey occupied these territories or decades,
een keeping some areas such as 1ripoli or a hundred years.
Although the battles which took place between the crusaders and the
Muslims were continuous throughout the hundred years, and although
the Muslims` attempts at recapturing the lands oer which the crusaders
deeated them did not subside, these wars did howeer unsettle the Islamic
|vvab, and they lowered the status o the Islamic State. 1he Muslims
3
lost the war and they were deeated by the Kvffar. Victory in the war was
to the Kvffar against the Muslims. Although the ictory o Kvfr against
Islam neer materialised, neither intellectually nor spiritually, the shame
and humiliation which beell the Muslims was beyond imagination. 1hus,
the era o the crusades, is considered an era o deeat or the Muslims,
or despite their ictory in the end against the crusaders with their expulsion
rom .bav, they did not pursue the conquests and the wars with the
disbelieers. No sooner had the crusades ended, the Mongols arried,
and the massacre o Baghdad took place. 1his setback was ollowed by
the all o Damascus at the hands o the Mongols in the same year, ,656
AH, 1258 CL,. 1hen came the battle o .yv ]aoot on 3rd September
1260 where the Mongols were destroyed. In the wake o the destruction
o the Mongols, the emotions o ]ibaa were aroused in the souls o the
Muslims, and they sensed the need or a resumption o carrying the
Daàrab to the world. Hence, the Muslim conquests o the Kvffar began
once again, and ]ibaa against the Byzantines was resumed. Battles broke
out and successie ictories ollowed. It was around the seenth century
o i;rab ,the 13th century CL, when the Islamic |vvab resumed the
conquests. 1he wars continued and seeral successie battles took place,
and the Muslims always emerged as the ictorious, or although the
Muslims were beaten in some battles, they used to win the wars and
conquer the lands. 1he Islamic State was the leading nation and she
continued to occupy the premier position or our centuries, until the
mid 12th century AH ,the 18th century CL,. 1hen the industrial reolution
in Lurope emerged in a remarkable manner that had a proound impact
on the states` powers. Muslims stood idle and conused by this reolution,
hence the balance o power in the world changed and the Islamic state
began her slide rom the leading spot gradually, until eentually she became
the coeted object o the greedy. Hence, she started eacuating the lands
she had conquered and the lands which had been preiously under her
authority. 1he disbelieing countries started usurping rom her the land
o Islam piece by piece, and this marked the start o the ebb and the end
o the tide or the Muslims. Since then, the Luropean countries started to
The struggle between Islam and Kufr
4
ocus upon the remoal o the Islamic State rom the international scene,
and upon the complete remoal o Islam rom lie`s aairs and rom the
relationships between people. In other words, they started thinking about
a new campaign o crusades. Howeer unlike the irst crusades, the new
crusades were to be more than just a military inasion to deeat the Muslims
and anquish the Islamic State. 1he new crusades were more horriic and
had more proound consequences. 1hey were designed to uproot the
Islamic State so that no trace o it would be let, and so that not one
single root would be able to grow again. 1hey were designed also to
uproot Islam rom the souls o the Muslims so that nothing could remain
except a host o clerical rites and spiritual rituals.
5
Ihe consproces of Ihe
Europeon counIres
ogonsI Ihe slomc SIoIe
Despite the dierences amongst the Kvffar oer the diision o the Muslims`
lands, they were in ull agreement o the idea to destroy Islam. 1hey
pursued seeral methods or this purpose. Initially, they aroused the eelings
o nationalism and independence in the Luropean countries. 1hey incited
people against the Islamic State and they supplied them with weapons
and money in order to reolt against it, as was the case in Serbia and
Greece. In this way, the Luropean countries tried to stab the Islamic State
in the back. lrance inaded Lgypt and occupied it in July 198, then
marched onto Palestine and occupied it. lrance wanted to occupy the
rest o .bav in order to deal the Islamic State the atal blow, but was
howeer deeated, later being orced to leae Lgypt and surrender the
lands she had occupied back to the Islamic State.
1he birth o the Wahhabis and the Saudi rule
Britain had attempted through her agent Abdul-Aziz ibn Muhammad
ibn Saud to strike the Islamic State rom within. 1he !abbabi. by then
had managed to establish an entity within the Islamic State, led by
Muhammad ibn Saud and later by his son Abdul-Aziz. Britain supplied
them with weapons and money and they moed on a sectarian basis to
seize the Islamic lands which were under the authority o the Kbiafab.
1hey took up arms against the Kbaeefab and ought the Islamic armed
The conspiracies of the European countries against
the Islamic State
6
orces ,the army o the .vir vMv`viveev,, all the time goaded and
supplied by the British. 1he !abbabi. wanted to seize the lands ruled by
the Kbaeefab in order to rule these lands according to their Matb`bab ,school
o thought,, and suppress all the other Islamic Matbabib that diered
rom theirs by orce. Hence, they raided Kuwait and occupied it in 188,
then marched northwards until they besieged Baghdad. 1hey wanted to
seize Karbalaa` and the tomb o Al-Hussein ,may Allah be pleased with
him, to destroy it and ban the isiting o it. 1hen in 1803, they launched
an attack on Makkah and occupied it. In the spring o 1804, Madinah ell
under their control. 1hey destroyed the huge domes which used to shade
the grae o the Messenger o Allah ,saw, and stripped them o all the
gems and precious ornaments. Haing completed their seizure o the
whole o Al-Hijaz, they marched on towards Al-Sham. Nearing Hims in
1810 they attacked Damascus or a second time and they also attacked
Al-Naja. Damascus deended itsel braely and gloriously. Howeer
while besieging Damascus, the !abbabi. moed at the same time to the
north and spread their authority oer most o the Syrian lands as ar as
Aleppo. It was a well known act that this !abbabi campaign was instigated
by the British, or Al Saud were British agents. 1hey exploited the !abbabi
Matb`bab, which was Islamic and whose ounder was a Mv;tabia, in political
actiities with the aim o ighting the Islamic State and clashing with the
other Matbabib, in order to incite sectarian wars within the Ottoman state.
1he ollowers o this Matb`bab were unaware o this, but the Saudi .vir
and the Saudis were ully aware. 1his is because the relationship was not
between the British and Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab, but between
the British and Abdul-Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud and then with his
son Saud.
Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab, whose Matb`bab had been avbai, made
!;tibaa in a host o matters and deemed that the Muslims who ollowed
other Matbabib diered with his opinion in such matters. Hence, he set
about calling or his opinions, working towards implementing them and
attacking the other Islamic opinions iercely. He aced a barrage o
opposition and rejection rom the arious scholars, .vir. and prominent
igures, who considered that his opinions diered rom what they had
understood rom the Book o Allah and His Messenger. lor instance, he
used to say that isiting the grae o the Messenger Muhammad ,saw, is
arav and a sinul act. He een went as ar as to say that whoeer set o
in a journey to isit the grae o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,, would not
be allowed to shorten his prayer while traelling, since the purpose o the
journey would be to commit a sinul act. He made reerence to the
aaitb in which the Messenger o Allah ,saw, is reported to hae said:
"Journeys should only be made to three mosques: 1his Mosque
o mine, the Sacred Mosque and Al-Aqsa Mosque." Muhammad
ibn Abdul-\ahhab understood rom this aaitb that the Messenger o
Allah ,saw, had orbidden traelling to other than the three mosques.
Hence, i one were to trael to isit the grae o the Messenger o Allah
,saw,, he would be traelling to other than the three mosques, hence, it
would be arav, and a sinul act. Other Matbabib deemed the isiting o
the grae o the Messenger o Allah ,saw, as being vvvab and a Mavavb
action that yields a reward, because the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said:
"I had in the past orbidden you rom visiting the graves, but you
may now visit them." By greater reason the grae o the Messenger o
Allah ,saw, should be included in this aaitb, in addition to other .baaitb
which they quoted. 1hey said that the aaitb which Muhammad ibn Abdul-
\ahhab used as an eidence, was speciic to mosques. 1hereore, its subject
is related to traelling to mosques and does not exceed it. 1he aaitb is
not general, but rather speciic and related to a certain subject: "Journeys
should only be made to three mosques." Hence, it would be orbidden
or a Muslim to speciically isit the .ya ofia mosque in Istanbul, or the
Ovvayyaa mosque in Damascus, because the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
has conined the trael o mosques to three mosques and no more. It
would be orbidden to trael to other than these three mosques. Apart
rom this, it is permitted to trael on business, to isit amily and riends,
on sightseeing and tourism amongst other reasons. Hence, the aaitb
does not categorically orbid traelling and restrict it to these three mosques,
the Islamic State
8
it rather orbids traelling with the intent to isit mosques other than the
three mosques it mentioned. Likewise, the ollowers o other Matbabib
deemed his opinions as being wrong and contradictory to what they had
understood rom the Book and the Sunnah. Soon, the dierence between
him and them intensiied and he was banished rom the country.
In 140, he sought reuge with Muhammad ibn Saud, the Sheikh o the
tribe o Anzah, who was at odds with the Sheikh o Uyaynah and who
lied in Al-Dirìyyah, which was only six hours away rom Uyaynah.
Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab was made welcome and was met with
hospitality. He started spreading his opinions and thoughts amongst people
in Al-Dirìyyah and the surrounding areas. Ater a period o time his
thoughts and opinions gained some helpers and supporters. .vir
Muhammad ibn Saud inclined towards these thoughts and opinions and
started approaching the Sheikh ,Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab,.
In 14, .vir Muhammad declared his approal and acceptance o the
opinions and thoughts o Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab. He also
pledged his support to the Sheikh ,Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab, and
to these thoughts and opinions. \ith this alliance the !abbabi moement
was established and it came into being in the shape o a Daàrab and in
the shape o a rule, or Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab used to call or
it and teach people its rules, whilst Muhammad ibn Saud used to implement
its rules upon the people who were under his command and authority.
1he !abbabi moement started to spread to the areas and tribes
neighbouring Al-Dirìyyah in both aspects, the Daàrab and the rule. 1he
!vara o Muhammad ibn Saud started to spread as well until he succeeded
in ten years to make an area o 30 square miles submit to his authority
and to the new Matb`bab. Howeer, it was an expansion achieed through
Daàrab and the authority o the Sheikh o Anzah. No person challenged
him and no person opposed him, een the .vir o Al-Ihsaa` who had
expelled Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab rom Uyaynah did not oppose
9
his oe in this expansion and he did not amass his troops to ight him until
15. Howeer, he was deeated, and Muhammad ibn Saud seized his
!vara. Consequently, the authority o Anzah, represented by the authority
o Muhammad ibn Saud and the authority o the new Matb`bab became
the ruling authority o Al-Dirìyyah and its surroundings, as well as Al-
Ihsaa`. In this way the !abbabi Matb`bab was implemented oer these
lands by the orce o the authority.
Howeer, in the wake o its clash with the .vir o Al-Ihsaa and the
conquest o his land, the !abbabi moement stopped there. Little became
known o whether it expanded urther or carried out any actiities. It
rather remained conined to that area. Muhammad ibn Saud stopped at
that point and the !abbabi Matb`bab stopped at the borders o this area
and the moement ell into a slumber and stagnated.
In 165 Muhammad ibn Saud died. He was succeeded to the Sheikhdom
o Anzah by his son Abdul-Aziz. His son ollowed in his athers ootsteps
and ruled the area under his control. Howeer, he did not carry out any
actiities or the moement, nor any expansion into the surrounding areas.
Hence, the moement remained asleep and was characterised by stagnation.
Hardly anything was heard o this moement and none o its neighbours
used to mention it or ear its inasion.
Howeer, 41 years ater the start o the !abbabi moement, rom 14
till 188, and 31 years ater its stoppage and the stagnation o its moement,
,rom 15 till 18,, its actiity suddenly started again. 1he moement
adopted a new method in spreading the Matb`bab and it became widely
and highly publicised beyond its borders and all throughout the Islamic
State as well as to the other superpowers. 1his moement started to
cause its neighbours disquiet and concern and een started to cause disquiet
and concern to the whole o the Islamic State.
In 18 Abdul-Aziz moed to establish a house o Imara and adopt a
the Islamic State
10
hereditary system o rule, or what is known as succession to the throne.
1his entailed that Abdul-Aziz would conirm his son Saud as his successor.
A huge crowd led by Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab gathered.
1his huge crowd o people were addressed by Abdul-Aziz who declared
that the right to Imara was conined to his amily and the right to succeed
him was conined to his sons. He also declared that his son Saud was
conirmed as his successor. Hence this huge crowd o people, headed by
Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab agreed with him and acknowledged his
declarations. A house o !vara or a state rather than a tribe or a host o
tribes was thereore established. It seemed also that the succession to the
head o the !abbabi Matb`bab was also conined to the amily o
Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab. Once the issues o succession to both
the .vir and the head o the Matb`bab were settled, the moement suddenly
came to lie again and resumed its conquests and expansions. It resorted
once more to waging war in order to spread the Matb`bab. In 188, Abdul-
Aziz embarked upon equipping and preparing a huge military raid. He
attacked Kuwait, conquering it and seizing it. 1he British had been trying
or their part to seize Kuwait rom the Ottoman state but they had ailed.
1his was because other states, such as Germany, Russia and lrance had
opposed them, and because the Kbiafab State itsel resisted them. Hence,
the seerance o Kuwait rom the Ottoman state and the adance towards
the north or its protection was suicient to catch the imagination o the
major states such as Russia, Germany and lrance, as well as the Ottoman
State. lurthermore, the characteristics o this war which was a sectarian
one, used to arouse the spiritual emotions.
In this way, the !abbabi. resumed their actiities suddenly, and ater a lull
that had lasted or seeral decades. 1hey resumed this actiity with a new
method, which was to spread the Matb`bab through war and conquest in
order to remoe the eatures o all the other Matbabib rom existence,
and replace them by their Matb`bab. 1hey began their actiities by attacking
Kuwait and seizing it. 1hen they ollowed this actiity with seeral attempts
at expansion. Accordingly they became a cause o concern and a nuisance
11
to their neighbours within the Arabian peninsula - Iraq, .bav, and the
Ottoman state in its capacity as the Kbiafab State. 1hey brandished the
sword to ight the Muslims and to orce them to abandon what they
carried in terms o opinions alien to the !abbabi Matb`bab, and to adopt
the opinions o the !abbabi Matb`bab. 1hey ought the Kbaeefab and
conquered the Islamic lands. 1hen in 192, Muhammad ibn Abdul-\ahhab
died and his son succeeded him in his post just as Saud succeeded his
ather Abdul-Aziz. 1he Saudi .vir. then proceeded in this course,
adopting the !abbabi Matb`bab as a political tool to strike the Ottoman
state ,the Kbiafab State,, and to incite sectarian wars between Muslims.
1he British conspiracy against the Islamic State
1he brokerage and loyalty o Al Saud to the British was a well known
matter to the Kbiafab state and to the major powers such as Germany,
lrance and Russia. It was also known that they were steered by the British.
1he British themseles neer used to conceal the act that they supported
the Saudis as a state. lurthermore, the huge arsenals and equipment which
reached them ia India and the inance to coer the war eort and to
equip the armed orces were but British weapons and money. 1hereore,
the other Luropean countries, especially lrance, were opposed to the
!abbabi campaign or it was considered a British campaign. 1he Kbiafab
State had tried to strike the !abbabi. but to no aail, and her !ai. in
Madinah and Baghdad were unable to curb them. As a result she instructed
her !ai in Lgypt Muhammad Ali, to dispatch a task orce to deal with
them. He hesitated at irst. Indeed he was a lrench agent, and it was
lrance who had helped him stage the coup in Lgypt and seize power,
then orced the Kbiafab to recognise him. So on the basis o lrance`s
agreement and incitement, Muhammad Ali responded to the Sultan`s
demands in 1811 and dispatched his son 1osson to ight the !abbabi..
Seeral battles took place between the Lgyptian army and the !abbabi.,
and the Lgyptian army managed to conquer Madinah in 1812. 1hen in
the Islamic State
12
1816, Muhammad Ali sent his son Ibrahim rom Cairo, who crushed the
!abbabi. until they retreated to their capital, Al-Dirìyyah and ortiied
themseles there. 1hereater, Ibrahim besieged them in April 1818. 1he
siege continued all throughout the summer until 9th September 1818
when the !abbabi. capitulated. 1he armies o Ibrahim destroyed Al-
Dirìyyah and razed it completely. It was said that he ploughed it so that
no trace o it was let. 1his marked the end o the British campaign.
Irance's attempt at hitting the Islamic State
lrance then attempted to strike the Islamic State rom the back through
her agent Muhammad Ali, the \ali o Lgypt. lrance openly supported
him internationally and politically, and he broke away rom the Kbaeefab
and declared war against it. He marched towards .bav in 1831 with
the aim o conquering it. He occupied Palestine, Lebanon and Syria and
started to iniltrate Anatolia. Howeer, the Kbaeefab dispatched a strong
army to ight him. Britain, Russia and two o the German states turned
against Muhammad Ali. In July 1840, Britain, Russia and two German
states held what became known as the "Quadrilateral Alliance", according
to which these states would undertake to deend the unity o the Ottoman
State and to oblige Muhammad Ali, by orce i necessary, to surrender
Syria. 1his stand taken by the Luropean countries turned the international
situation in aour o the Kbaeefab. It helped to resist Muhammad Ali and
drie him out o Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. Muhammad Ali returned
to Lgypt whereupon he accepted to be a !ai under the authority o the
Kbaeefab.
13
Arousng Ihe noIonolsI
chouvnsm ond Ihe
seporoIsI Iendences
1he attempts o the Luropean countries, especially Britain, lrance and
Russia to remoe the Kbiafab State rom existence continued. Howeer,
their attempts were mainly ocused at striking the State rom the back,
through organised wars, armies and battles - but these ailed. 1his ailure
was not exclusiely due to the deensie capabilities o the Kbaeefab, but
primarily due to the international situation and due to dierences oer
the sharing o spoils amongst these states.
As or the attempts undertaken in Lurope by the Luropean states, mainly
in Serbia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and others, these were successul
because the Luropean countries proceeded by inciting nationalist
chauinism and separatist tendencies which they called independence`.
1hus, the Luropean countries adopted this style ,inciting nationalist
chauinism and separatist tendencies, all oer the lands that were shaded
by the banner o Islam and ruled by the Kbaeefab o the Muslims. 1hey
speciically ocused their work on the Arabs and the 1urks. 1he British
and lrench embassies in Istanbul, and those in the main areas o the
Islamic lands started this incitement. 1heir work was notable mostly in
Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo and Jeddah. 1wo main centres were
established to carry out this mission, Istanbul, to strike the state in her
main centre, and Beirut, in order to strike her in the proinces, especially
in the countries inhabited by Arabic speaking Muslims.
Arousing the nationalist chauvinism and the separatist tendencies
1he role o the Beirut Centre in
working against the Khilaah
As or the Beirut centre, it was set up as a centre o Kvfr to hit Islam and
the Islamic State, and its plan was designed to work on a long term basis
which would yield ar reaching results. As or the Istanbul centre, a short
term plan was designed or it, so that it yielded quick results, but also
with ar reaching consequences. Hence, the Beirut centre was used as a
deadly poison, which conerted thousands o Muslim sons into Kvffar,
and transormed the Islamic relations in general to relations conducted
according to the Kvfr rules. Indeed, the centre`s eect in hitting the Islamic
State during her clash with the Kvffar in the lirst world war was deastating.
1he \estern Kvffar started their political actiities in Beirut immediately
ater Ibrahim Pasha`s withdrawal rom .bav. In 1842, a committee
was ormed with the aim o establishing a scientiic association under the
auspices o the American Mission and according to its programme. 1he
committee proceeded according to its programme or ie years, until it
managed in 184 to establish an association known as 1he Science and
Arts Association. 1his association was run by two Christian collaborators,
who were known as the most dangerous o British collaborators. 1hey
were Butros Al-Bustani and Nasee Al-\aziji, backed by Colonel Churchill
rom among the British and Lli Smith and Cornilos Van Dick. 1he goals
o the association were at irst ague, it howeer gae the impression that
it aimed at spreading the arious sciences among adults, just as schools
would do with children, and at motiating adults, just like children would
be motiated, into being cultured with the western culture, gien the western
thoughts and steered towards a speciic direction. Howeer, despite the
actiity o the association`s workers and their huge eorts, oer a period
o two years only ity actie members in the whole o .bav joined.
1hey were all Christians and most o them were rom Beirut. No one
rom amongst the Muslims joined the association.
Hence, another association was established in 1850 under the name o
the Lastern Association. It was established by the Jesuits, under the
tutelage o the lrench Jesuit ather Henri Debrenier, and all its members
were Christians.
In 185 yet another association was established. 1his association howeer
adopted a new style and made its membership exclusie to Arabs and no
oreigners were allowed to join, the ounders were also Arabs. Hence, it
managed to persuade some Muslims and some o the Druze to join in
their capacity as Arabs. A large number joined and they reached 150
members. Among its administration board were some prominent
personalities such as Muhammad Arsalan rom the Druze, Hussein Bayham
rom the Muslims and Ibrahim Al-\aziji and the son o Butros Al-Bustani
rom the Christians. 1he latter two were the ones who adopted the idea
and endeaoured to work towards it. 1he success o the association
encouraged the Kvffar to adopt a direct approach in inciting nationalist
chauinism and tendencies towards independence, without haing to resort
to the ploy o spreading science, and to work in an open manner, not
through intrigue and deceit.
In 185, the Secret Association was established in Beirut by ie young
men rom among those who graduated rom the Protestant College in
Beirut. 1hey were all Christians and they managed to gather a small
number o people. 1he association set about concentrating itsel on the
basis o a political idea. It was established as a political party and built on
the basis o Arab nationalism. 1his association is considered to hae been
the irst political party to be established in the Islamic lands on the basis
o Arab nationalism. 1he association used to call or the Arabs, Arabism
and nationalism. It used to incite hatred against the Ottoman State and
called it the 1urkish state. It worked towards separating the Deev rom
the state, establishing Arab nationalism as a basis or unity and shiting the
Muslims` loyalty rom the Islamic .qeeaab towards being exclusiely or
Arab nationalism. It used to publish lealets and distribute them in secret.
16
Some o its lealets used to accuse 1urkey -according to them - o usurping
the Kbiafab rom the Arabs, iolating the noble Islamic bariàb and abusing
the Deev, despite the act that those who superised and ran the association`s
aairs were all Christians who nurtured hatred against Islam. 1he
nationalist moements started to spread thereon and nationalist chauinism
began to be propagated. Howeer, the actiities o the Luropean countries
at the Beirut centre were designed to recruit spies and carry out actiities
aimed at destroying the thoughts and the souls. Hence the political status
o this association was backward, although its eects were intellectually
deastating.
1he role o the Istanbul centre in working
towards hitting the Khilaah State
1his was as ar as the Beirut centre was concerned. As or the Istanbul
centre, it was used by the \estern Kvffar to strike the Islamic State in the
capital and to strike at the state`s oicials. 1he Kvffar had undertaken seeral
actions, the most important and the most deastating o which was the
establishment o the \oung 1urks, whose alias was Union & Progress.
1he Committee had been established at irst in Paris by 1urkish youth
who had been saturated by lrench thoughts and deeply cultured about
the lrench reolution. It was established as a secret reolutionary
Committee. 1he leader o this reolutionary group was Ahmed Redha
Beik. He was a prominent personality among people and his idea was to
import the \estern culture to his home country o 1urkey. 1he Committee
established other branches in Berlin, Slanik and Istanbul.
1he Paris centre was meticulously organised, its programme was radical
and the means o publicity it relied upon were solid. It published a
newsletter entitled 1he News. It used to be smuggled into Istanbul
along with the Luropean mail and was taken by a group o 1urks who
promised to distribute it secretly. 1he association also published political
1
lealets which were smuggled in the same manner. As or the Berlin branch,
this was ormed by moderates, ormer ministers o state, ormer high
ranking oicials and skilul politicians. 1hey used to call or reorm and
the organising o the state`s aairs according to the German ruling system.
1hey suggested uniting the many groups o people rom whom the
Ottoman empire was ormed, and establishing amongst them something
akin to the German ederation.
As or the Slanik branch, the oerwhelming majority o its members
were rom among educated oicers who had a strong inluence within
the army. 1hey used to prepare or the reolution. Some o the Sheikhs
had joined them, increasing their strength urther. 1hey were also joined
by some junior oicials, such as 1alàt, who later became prime minister.
Howeer, they were goerned and controlled by the Paris centre and
they neer iolated its opinion. 1he Paris centre used to guide them with
ull dedication towards western opinions and theories and arouse within
them inclinations towards struggle.
1he Masonic lodges, especially the greater Italian lodge in Slanik, used to
welcome the actiities o this association and championed their cause
rom a literal iewpoint. Meetings used to take place in the chambers o
the Masonic lodges, where it was impossible or spies to gain access no
matter how hard they tried. Many members o these lodges were ailiated
to the Union & Progress. 1he Committee managed through this means
to increase its members and strengthen its inluence, thanks to the aid it
was receiing. lurthermore, the members o Union & Progress used
to beneit rom Masonic styles in establishing a liaison with Istanbul and
een get closer to the Palace itsel.
1he \oung 1urk or Committee o Union & Progress quickly started
to hold secret meetings and prepare or the reolution. It ollowed this
trend up until 1908, when it staged a coup and seized power. It`s strength
became maniest and Lurope expressed its approal o the Committee.
18
In the autumn o 1908, and shortly beore the opening o parliament,
the members o the Slanik branch held a conerence. 1his was regarded
as its irst muscle lexing exercise. 1he leader o the party at the time was
its Parisian ounder Ahmed Redha Beik. He deliered a speech to the
delegates in which he expressed his happiness and boasted about the
success o the party. He also conirmed that the Luropean kingdoms
themseles had expressed goodwill towards the nationalist moement
and expressed their satisaction about the country`s status quo.
At that time, in the autumn o 1908, Britain appointed a new ambassador
to Istanbul called Gerald Luther. \hen he reached Istanbul, a group rom
the Union & Progress Committee greeted him ery warmly, to the point
that they took the horses o rom his chariot and pulled the chariot
themseles. All this was inspired by the Union & Progress Committee
and rom its own initiatie. 1he ascination o the Committee`s men with
the embellished \estern thoughts reached a point where they were no
longer aware o the contradiction o these thoughts to the reality o the
state they were goerning, in addition to their ailure to perceie their
contradiction to Islam. 1he extent o their recklessness and lack o ision
drew the attention o the Luropeans to their ignorance, until one o the
diplomats working in Istanbul at the time said about them: 1hey oten
take the second step beore the irst. 1he actiists o Union & Progress
rushed into handing the reins o goernment to those amiliar with \estern
laws and \estern thoughts, and they eentually gained the upper hand
within the \oung 1urk party.
\hen they realised that controlling the army leads to controlling the whole
power, they endeaoured to make the new appointments based on a
party policy. Hence, all the oicers became party members rather than
experts or military men. 1hey also introduced legislation stating that by
law, eery citizen o the Ottoman State is entitled to the same rights enjoyed
by the 1urks and should ulil the same obligations.
19
1his Committee gained total control o the whole State, its present and
its uture. Hence the idea which the \est had adopted to hit the State and
destroy the Kbiafab came to ruition. 1his idea came to power through
the members o the ruling party and its supporters who not only deemed
that Islam was unsuitable or this era, they rather deemed that suitability
as whole, lay in \estern thoughts and the \estern culture. 1hey also deemed
the preseration o 1urkish nationalism to be amongst their main actiities
as a party, to the point where their loyalty to 1urkish nationalism came
aboe any other loyalty. Hence, they boasted about it and deoted their
attention to it, to the extent that they considered 1urkey to be better than
the rest o the Islamic countries and the 1urk to be better than the rest o
the Muslims.
1hereore, the ounding o the \oung 1urks or the Union & Progress
party was one o the most horriic acts perpetrated by the \est in its
drie to hit the Islamic State and Islam. 1he results o such a moe were
swit, or no sooner had the party seized the reins o power than the
pickaxe o destruction started to work on the body o the State and to
dig between its subjects a ditch oer which a bridge could not be arched.
1his is so because nationalism is the most harmul thing that diides people
and generates amongst them animosity, hatred and war. Although ailiation
to the Committee was open to all citizens o the state, it was the nationalist
policy o the unionists within the state that eoked the nationalist idea in
the Ottoman elements. Hence, the Albanians in Astana ounded their own
Committee, soon to be ollowed by the Circassians and the Kurds. 1he
Romans and the Armenians had established in the past secret organised
Committees, thus they were made legal.
1he Arabs or their part established the Committee o Arab-Ottoman
Brotherhood in Astana and they opened the Committee`s club under
the same name. Howeer, the Union & Progress Committee was chauinist,
especially towards the Arabs, or they allowed all the nationalities to establish
ethnic groups, but they started at the same time opposing any Arab
20
Committees. So, they dissoled the Arab Committee and shut down its
club by goernment decree. 1hey also pursued a policy o ethnic
discrimination within the armed orces. 1hey summoned all the Arab
oicers rom their respectie lands to Istanbul and preented them rom
joining the Oicers` academic mission to Germany. 1hey decided to
preent the Arab members o the Union & Progress rom joining the
"Central Committee" o this Committee. 1his Committee had been open
to all the citizens o the Ottoman State, with no discrimination between a
1urk, an Arab, an Albanian or a Circassian. Howeer, when this party
seized power and since the 1urks enjoyed most o the inluence, they
acted in this despotic manner by excluding the Arabs within this Committee
rom the sensitie posts. 1hey also embarked upon turning the Committee
into an exclusiely 1urkish Committee. 1his was ollowed by numerous
measures implemented in certain goernment departments, such as
stripping the ministry o Awqa rom the Arab minister and handing it
to a 1urkish minister, and such as the deliberate appointment o 1urks to
the posts o oreign aairs and home aairs ministries. Also the deliberate
posting o 1urkish \alis to the Arab proinces, chosen rom among
people who could not speak Arabic.
1hen they crowned this by adopting the 1urkish language as the oicial
language, to the point where they started teaching Arabic grammar and
inlection in 1urkish. 1heir contempt or the Arabic language was such
that the ambassador o the Ottoman State to \ashington published a
communiqu in 1909 in which he prohibited the Ottomans liing in
America rom addressing the embassy in other than the 1urkish language,
despite his ull knowledge that the State`s subjects in America were no less
than hal a million and none o them could speak 1urkish.
1his racism between Arabs and 1urks became conspicuously rampant
amongst the armed orces. 1he 1urkish oicers ailiated to Union &
Progress used to display this racism in their conduct and when it came to
promotions and to assuming the high ranking military posts. 1he Arab
21
oicers expressed their anger but neer doubted their obligation to remain
loyal to the State, or the point at issue was not an issue o union between
Arabs and 1urks, it was rather an issue o one Islamic |vvab, and a
Kbaeefab in Istanbul whose obedience Allah ,swt, commanded and whose
disobedience He ,swt, prohibited, the Muslim is a brother to another
Muslim, he does not demean him or wrong him. 1hereore, some o the
Arab oicers were aected by this status quo, and at the end o 1909,
they requested a meeting with inluential igures within the Committee o
Union & Progress. 1he latter accepted and they held a lengthy meeting in
Istanbul. 1hey discussed the measures which they had to take in order to
settle this dispute between Arabs and 1urks once and or all. 1he meeting
was on the erge o restoring the unity, discarding racism and rallying
around the Islamic .qeeaab alone, but some o the 1urkish youth, to
whom 1urkish nationalism took precedence to the Islamic .qeeaab, such
as Ahmed Agha Beik and \usu Aqshurah Beik among others, ound it
too painul to relinquish their nationalism and deote their loyalty to Islam
alone. Hence, they interened and lashed out at the Arabs with harsh
words and gloriied the 1urks. As a result, the meeting ended with the
situation becoming worse than it had been beore it started.
1he Committee continued to pursue its policy o racism and when the
1urks gained the upper hand, they embarked upon changing the
programme o the Committee so as to turn it into an exclusiely 1urkish
aair. 1his amendment triggered the resignation o all the Arabs, the
Albanians and the Armenians as well as the 1urks to whom the Islamic
.qeeaab rather than their nationality remained the basis.
1he role o the Luropean embassies in establishing
the Arab Committees and parties
In the wake o these eents, the Luropean embassies became actie in
their contacts with the Arabs. Hence, they established the Decentralisation
22
Party, with Cairo as its centre and Raiq Al-Athim as its president. 1hey
also established the Reorm Committee in Beirut and the Literal
lorum among others. 1he British and the lrench iniltrated the ranks o
the Arabs who had carried the nationalist tendency and opened or them
the coers o their countries. So on 18th June 1913 and under the auspices
o the lrench, the Arab youth held a conerence in Paris, and this
represented the Arab nationalists` irst declaration o alignment towards
Britain and lrance against their Ottoman State.
\hen the Union & Progress men sensed this, they established the "1urk
Ojaghi Committee" meaning the 1urkish amily. Its objectie was to wipe
out Islam and turn the Ottoman elements into 1urkish ones. 1hen they
started encouraging the publication o atheistic books and journals, such
as the book written by the amous 1urkish author Jalal Nouri Beik under
the title o 1he history o the uture, in which he wrote: It is in the
interest o the Astana goernment to coerce the Syrians to leae their
homelands. Arab lands, especially Iraq and \emen, must be turned into
1urkish colonies, in order to spread the 1urkish language which must be
the language o the Deev. In order to protect our entity, it is imperatie
or us to turn all the Arab countries into 1urkish countries, because the
new Arab generation has started to sense a racial chauinism and it is
threatening us with a major calamity against which we should take
precautions as o now. 1hus, the nationalist tendency and the patriotic
chauinism made an impact on the souls, and loyalty to Islam shited to
be replaced by loyalty to nationalism and patriotism. 1his led to resisting
all that Islam carries in terms o what could be regarded as a threat to
patriotism and nationalism. 1he criterion o those who assumed power
within the state was that o nationalism and patriotism rather than Islam,
een when it came to calling or the unity o the ranks between Arabs
and 1urks.
lurthermore, when Jamal Pasha was in Syria, he witnessed the Arab youth
perpetrating treason against the State by acting on the guidance o lrance
23
and the orders o Britain. He became absoloutly certain o this when he
seized documents ound in the lrench consulate in Damascus. He wanted
to win the Arabs oer in order to maintain unity among the citizens o
the State. Hence, he inited the Arab leaders to a gathering held in Damascus
and deliered a speech in which he exhorted them to unity. Some o
what he said in his speech was the ollowing: And you hae to trust the
act that the 1urkish Committee, which you hae witnessed in Astana and
in the other parts inhabited by 1urkish elements, does not clash in any
way with the Arab aspirations. \ou do know beyond any doubt that the
Ottoman empire has witnessed the establishment o Bulgarian, Greek
and Armenian moements, and now there exists an Arab moement.
1he 1urks had totally orgotten their existence to the point where they
eared to een mention their people. 1he patriotic spirit had completely
died to the point where it was eared that the 1urkish people were about
to completely disintegrate. 1hereore, it was with the aim o quelling this
imminent threat that the men o the \oung 1urks rose with a zeal that
deseres admiration. Hence, they took up arms and embarked upon
teaching the 1urks the patriotic spirit. He added : 1oday, I ind mysel
capable o conirming to you that the 1urkish aspirations do not in any
way clash with the Arab aspirations, or the 1urks and the Arabs are but
brothers in their patriotic objecties. He also added : And briely, the
utmost aspirations o that party, the party o \oung 1urks ,Union &
Progress, are to gain or the 1urkish people the respect o all the peoples
o the world, and to establish its right to exist alongside the peoples o
the twentieth century.
It was with these words that Jamal Pasha wanted to unite the Muslims
under the banner o the Islamic Kbiafab and to oil the endeaours
undertaken by the Arabs to break away rom the 1urks, namely rom the
Kbiafab and to seek the help o the British and the lrench Kvffar.
It is correct to say that Jamal Pasha was right in hanging the traitors who
had been collaborating with lrance and Britain against the Kbiafab, or
24
they were either Kvffar or Muslim apostates or belieing in the unsuitability
o Islam. He was also right in striking eery traitor and eery indiidual
who worked against the Kbiafab, een i he himsel was working or
patriotism, let alone i this indiidual was working against the Kbiafab
with the Kvffar and under their command. Howeer, Jamal Pasha and the
party o the \oung 1urks, namely Union & Progress, desered to be
punished and imprisoned or nursing the patriotic idea. 1his soothing
speech he deliered was wrong and patriotic separatism should not be
dealt with in this manner to say the least, or the speech in act indicates
the presence o corrupt doctrines, and a disregard or Islam as being the
only bond that gathers the citizens o the State and as being the only
ideology upon which the Kbiafab is built.
1he words he should hae uttered, which would hae been considered
decisie and inal, and it is orbidden to say otherwise, is that all o us
should gie our loyalty to the Islamic .qeeaab alone. It is orbidden to
hae loyalty to anything else. 1his .qeeaab should alone be the criterion
or our actions. Howeer, instead o saying this he calmed the Arabic
speaking Muslims by saying : 1he Arab aspirations and the 1urkish
aspirations do not clash with one another, and by saying : 1he 1urks
and the Arabs are but brothers in their patriotic objecties, and also by
saying : 1he utmost aspirations o that party, the party o \oung 1urks,
is to gain or the 1urkish people the respect o all the peoples o the
world and to establish its right to exist alongside the peoples o the
twentieth century, namely with the British, the lrench, the Italians and the
Greeks, in other words with the Kuar.
25
Ihe mssonory ond Ihe
culIurol nvosons
1hereore, the styles o eoking the nationalist tendency and patriotic
chauinism in the capital o the Kbiafab bore ruit and the Luropean
countries, especially Britain and lrance, achieed a great success in dealing
the Islamic State a horriic and deastating blow. Howeer, the Luropean
countries and Britain in particular did not restrict themseles to this style,
despite its wickedness and its horriic results. lor since the 16th century
they adopted another style against Islam. 1his was due to the animosity
simmering in their souls and the grudge eroding their hearts against Islam
and against the thoughts and rules o Islam. Hence, alongside this style,
they used to proceed with another style to hit the Islamic .qaìa ,doctrines,
and the Islamic legislation. Istanbul and Beirut were the two main centres
taken up by the Kvffar as their base and they also attempted to turn Cairo
into another centre.
As or the Beirut centre, the plan designed or it was meant to hae a long
term eect by graduating the youth who would be hostile to Islam and
by aecting the thoughts o the common Muslims. 1hey proceeded with
this plan by way o missionary inasion and cultural inasion under the
guise o science and they dedicated or this huge expenditures. Hence,
they established missionary Committees, most o which were British,
lrench and American Committees. 1hey also proceeded with the cultural
inasion ia the missions and the missionaries in order to win oer the
Christian citizens to their side and to raise the doubts o the Muslims
about their Deev and to shake their .qeeaab.
The missionary and the cultural invasions
26
1he role o the Maltese centre in the missionary invasion
1he disbelieers established at the end o the century a large missionary
centre in Malta which they used as a base or their missionary and cultural
inasion o the Islamic lands. It is rom there that missionary orces used
to be despatched. 1hey settled in Malta or a while but soon they sensed
the need to expand their actiity. Hence they moed to .bav in 1625
and attempted to establish missionary moements. Howeer, their actiity
was limited and did not extend beyond establishing a ew small schools
and publishing some religious books. 1hey endured a great deal o
suering, ranging rom persecution, rejection and hostility rom eeryone,
both Muslims and Christians. Howeer, they perseered until 13,
whereater the missionary Committees o the Jesuits were abolished and
their institutions shut down, except or some o the weaker missionary
Committees such as the Committee o the "Azariyyin" missionaries.
1he spread o the missionary expeditions in Al-Sham
Despite the presence o the missionary Committees, the eect o the
missionaries withered and their actiity was conined to Malta. Howeer,
in 1820, they renewed their actiity and they established the irst missionary
centre in Beirut. 1heir main attention was deoted to religious missionary
work and religious culture, and their concern with education was partial.
In 1834, the missionary expeditions spread throughout the whole o .
bav. 1his was due to the encouragement o Ibrahim Pasha, his opening
o the area widely beore the missionaries, his sympathy towards them
and his support or them under the inluence and the instructions o the
lrench. By that time he had occupied .bav : Palestine, Lebanon and
Syria. Hence, the missionaries were warmly greeted and welcomed by
the goernment o Ibrahim Pasha and consequently their actiity intensiied.
Consequently, a college was opened in the illage o Ainturah in Lebanon
and the American mission transerred its press to Beirut in order to print
2
and publish books. 1he inamous American missionary Lli Smith became
remarkably actie. He had been working in Malta as a olunteer and
used to superise the mission`s press. He came to Beirut in 182 but
became terriied o the Muslims and weary o the lack o productiity.
He went to Malta when he could no longer bear it. He then returned to
Beirut in 1834 when it came under lrench inluence thanks to Muhammad
Ali and his son Ibrahim. 1he missionary and his wie opened a emale
school, then his scope widened. Hence he dedicated his lie to working in
Beirut in particular and in .bav in general. In this way, all these eorts
helped to kick-start the missionary moement.
1he initiatie undertaken by Ibrahim Pasha to implement the education
curriculum in Syria and which was already applied in Lgypt, had been
adopted rom the lrench education curriculum. 1his sered as an
opportunity or those missionaries, to contribute to the educational
moement rom a missionary iewpoint, according to what the Kvffar
had planned. It then widened to include the press moement. Hence, the
missionary moement became actie and participated in the educational
moement in a conspicuous manner.
Inciting strie among the population o Al-Sham
\hen Ibrahim Pasha withdrew rom .bav in 1840 unrest, chaos and
disturbance spread in .bav and the \estern emissaries, especially the
missionaries took adantage o the Ottoman State`s lack o inluence to
lare up strie among the population. Hence, the massacres o 1860 took
place. In the wake o these massacres, the \estern countries interened
and dispatched their warships to the coasts o .bav. lrance
disembarked a land orce in Beirut and this increased the inluence o the
missionaries and strengthened their hand. 1he lrench became actie in
establishing schools and colleges and the Jesuits opened their schools and
colleges, among which were the Jesuit College known as the St Joseph
28
Jesuit Uniersity and in 1866, the Americans opened the Protestant
College known today as the American Uniersity o Beirut. 1his uniersity
is considered to be the most horriic Kvfr institution in the Islamic lands,
or it has launched the iercest campaigns against the Islamic thoughts and
against the Muslims and has managed to shit the allegiance o thousands
o Muslim youth towards the Kvfr thoughts.
1he attention gien to missionary and cultural inasions was not solely
conined to America, lrance and Britain - it rather enguled most o the
disbelieing countries, such as 1sarist Russia, who dispatched a host o
missionary expeditions. A Prussian expedition also arried in the country,
being ormed o Karodt nuns who played their part alongside the other
missionary expeditions in combating Islam. Despite the dierence in
political iewpoints amongst the missionary expeditions and the other
\estern emissaries, as ar as their political approach and their interests
were concerned, they were o one accord about the objectie.1his was
to inspire the \estern culture in the east, establish the .qeeaab o separating
the Deev rom the state as an .qeeaab or the Muslims, arouse in the
Muslims suspicions about their Deev, and to incite them to resent and to
scorn their history and to gloriy the \est and its culture. All o this was
with deep hatred and disdain or Islam and Muslims.
In addition to the schools and colleges, they established a moement
aimed at steering people towards the Arabic language, in order to lead
them away rom Islam by it, and towards what they called Arabism. 1he
banner o this moement was carried by the Christians, despite their lack
o understanding o the Arabic language, due to their inability to
appreciate the eloquence o the Quràn. Hence the Maronites, most o
whom were in the serice o the missionary expeditions, used to discuss
the reial o the old literature and the restoration o the old characteristics
o the classical Arabic language. Among those were Nasi Al-\aziji and
lather Louis Sheikho. 1hus, the Maronites headed the campaign or Arab
nationalism and encouraged people to adopt it. 1hey also headed the
29
campaign or the Arabic language and encouraged people to conine
their attention to it. In addition to this, books and publications carrying
\estern thoughts started to emerge and a strong wae towards Arabs
and Arabism and towards the Arabic language swept the area, coupled
by an increased shunning o Islam and the thoughts o Islam. Hence, the
Beirut centre dealt a blow to :
the .qaìa ,doctrines, o Islam,
the thoughts o Islam and
managed to steer people towards the \est.
1his centre achieed disastrous results which had a major eect in the
remoal o Islam rom relationships, transactions, in arious aspects o
lie and ultimately in the destruction o the Islamic State.
30
Ihe oIIempI oI
nIroducng Ihe WesIern
consIIuIonol rules
As or the Istanbul Centre, the \estern countries were not only satisied
with corrupting the Muslims` children at uniersities and schools and
through propaganda. 1hey also ocused on the State itsel with the aim
o changing the ruling system and the bariàb rules, by remoing them
and replacing them with \estern laws. 1hey pursued seeral styles to
achiee this. In 1839, Abdul-Majid 1st acceded to the position o Kbaeefab
and he was only 16 years old, while Rashid Pasha was ambassador or
the Ottoman State in London. He rushed back to Istanbul and was
appointed oreign minister. He had no sooner taken up his post than he
started campaigning or the parliamentarian constitutional ruling system.
He also declared that he was determined to raise the Ottoman State to
the leel o a deeloped state through a constitution that would endorse
the rights o the citizens, and he also declared the abolishment o the
most prominent shortcomings within the State. Rashid Pasha managed
easily to secure the backing o the young Sultan or his scheme, and the
document o the constitution was prepared in total secrecy.
On 3rd Noember 1839, all the leading personalities o the Sublime
Porte, representaties o the residents o Istanbul, representaties o the
State`s subjects in Lurope and members o the diplomatic corps were
inited to the stand situated on the southern side o the goernment
house along the Marmara Sea to listen to a recitation o the Honourable
Script known as Kalkhanah. 1he constitutional document was read
31
to them. It contained a host o Luropean rules with an attempt at giing
some consideration to Islam. 1his was the irst attempt at introducing the
\estern constitutional laws into the State`s system. Howeer, this
document remained mere ink on paper and was not implemented.
Howeer in 1855 the Luropean states, particularly Britain, pressed the
Ottoman State to carry out constitutional reorms. Under pressure rom
these states, the Sultan issued on 1st lebruary a bill o reorms. 1his bill
became known as the Hemayun Script . 1he Sultan endorsed in this bill
all the rights granted to the subjects in the Honourable Script known
as Kalkhanah.
A host o speciic rights were designed or the Christians, such as reerring
the administration o ciic matters to a Select Committee made up o
ciilians, clerics and others directly elected by the people, the non-coercing
o the Muslim who embraces Christianity into returning to Islam, rather
allowing him to reject Islam and embrace the Christian aith. 1he military
serice was to be made compulsory upon the Christians as it is compulsory
upon the Muslims, whereas beore, it had been exclusiely compulsory
upon the Muslims, and also allowing oreigners the ownership o lands
in the Ottoman State.
1his bill prompted a negatie reaction rom the citizens, or the Muslims
deemed it contradictory to bariàb, while the Christians were apprehensie
about its implementation. Neertheless, the Luropean states pursued it
under the pretext o reorm. Howeer, with the State being Islamic, the
Kbvafa` could not embark upon implementing these constitutional laws.
1his was the case until the name o Midhat Pasha became prominent
within the goernment circles. He was saturated with \estern thoughts
and seduced by \estern culture. Hence, he decided to establish a
constitution or the country that agreed with the \estern thoughts in
order to please the \estern states and to allow the State to proceed on
the same leel as the \estern states.
The attempt at introducing the Western constitutional rules
32
Midhat Pasha's attempt at drating a constitution
or the State rom the Western systems
Midhat Pasha was at the time minister o justice in Muhammad Rushdie
Pasha`s goernment, during the Kbiafab o Abdul-Aziz. He endeaoured
to persuade Abdul-Aziz to drat a constitution rom the \estern
democratic systems. So he wrote to him and urged him to redress the
status quo o the State by establishing a constitution or it. Some o what
he wrote in that letter, once he had gien an account o the State`s
corruption, was the ollowing :
...your excellency is well aware that the eectie cure or this ailment will
be to uproot its causes which we know too well. I the causes were
remoed, the ailment would be remoed. Hence, i you were to issue a
new Hamayunian Script in which you imposed the adherence to the
laws and systems, the equality between rich and poor, and elderly and
young in the eyes o the law, i you were to return the charitable institutions
to their rightul owners and to spend the money on what the donors had
pledged them or, i you were to hand the State`s authority back to the
Sublime Porte ,the goernment,, so that it could adopt its resolutions and
then submit them to your excellency, i you did not monopolise the
State`s inancial and proprietary rights and i the 1reasury were not to
spend a single piaster without the Sublime Porte`s consent, i the duties
o the senior and junior ciil serants were outlined and i the ministers
were held liable or the consequences o their actions, and i this were to
be implemented upon your relaties and priate sta, i all o this were
implemented, the desired result would be achieed with the help o Allah
,swt, and the State would reach the path which your excellency desires.
Prior to submitting the letter to the Kbaeefab, Midhat Pasha tabled it to the
goernment and they approed o it. 1hey also agreed that the president
should submit the letter to Sultan Abdul-Aziz. He duly met him and
handed him the letter. Upon reading the letter, Abdul-Aziz became urious
33
and issued his instructions to immediately dismiss Midhat Pasha rom
goernment and alienate him by appointing him !ai oer Salonika.
Howeer, he did not stay there or long and he soon returned to Istanbul.
He agreed with Hussein Awni Pasha, Secretary o the State Police, to
remoe Abdul-Aziz. 1hey then contacted the Nay Chie and beibv
!.av. 1he our agreed on the remoal o the Sultan. 1hey set a date or
this and this was in the early months o 186. On the ee o that date,
Midhat Pasha sent an anonymous memorandum to the Luropean states,
except Russia, in which he declared that the remoal o the Sultan had
become an ineitable matter according to the Islamic bariàb which
decrees that the Head o State should be o a ully sound mind.
On the ee o 30th May 186, the nay disembarked beore the
goernment house Dumulah Baghjah and the armed orces gathered
and surrounded the Palace. 1he Sultan was told o his remoal and the
atra o his remoal issued by beibv!.av was read to him. He was
taken away rom the Saray ,goernment House, and on the same night,
Murad 5th acceded to the throne.
In this way Midhat Pasha ousted the Kbaeefab with the collaboration o
the Luropean states, especially Britain, Germany and lrance, except Russia,
because he reused to establish a constitution or the Islamic State, deried
rom the \estern democratic systems.
It was thought that the appointment o Murad 5th as a Kbaeefab or the
Muslims, ater the remoal o Abdul-Aziz, would lead to the establishment
o a constitution based on the \estern systems, or Murad had been
brought up in a \estern ashion and he was known to be an enlightened
man. Hence, the hope to establish and implement the constitution rested
on him. Howeer, his health had deteriorated due to his mental instability.
Notwithstanding this, Midhat Pasha was attempting to declare the
constitution. He used to meet with his aides during the illness o Murad,
study the laws and systems o Lurope and drat the constitution until it
34
was inalised. Howeer, the mental state o Murad became known to all
and sundry and his remoal became ineitable. Accordingly beibv
!.av duly declared his remoal on 31st August 186.
On 1st September his brother Abdul-Hamid acceded to the throne and
became Kbaeefab o the Muslims. A short while later Midhat Pasha resumed
the post o Grand Vizier whereupon, Britain called or a conerence in
Istanbul gathering the ambassadors o the major powers, with the aim
o consolidating peace in the Balkans through the introduction o a host
o new proposals. 1he conerence was held and the Ottoman State was
pressed into carrying out the reorms, and accordingly Midhat Pasha
embarked upon carrying out the domestic reorms. He established a
committee ormed o 16 ciil serants, 10 scholars and two high ranking
army oicers. He assigned to this committee the task o drating a
constitution or the State. Ater some extreme diiculties, the committee
inally approed o a drat constitution which was inspired by the Belgian
constitution. It was promulgated under the title o Qavvv ...a. ,Basic
Law, on 23rd December. Hence, a Belgian constitution, with consideration
gien to some Islamic aspects, became the oicial constitution o the
Islamic State.
Among the matters stipulated by this constitution was to address all the
citizens o the State as Ottomans and to recognise their personal reedom.
Instead o Islam being the constitution o the State, as was the case up
until then, the constitution stipulated that Islam was the Deev o the State,
meaning that the State`s public holidays and other related matters would
be considered rom an Islamic iewpoint. 1he constitution also stated
that a popular representation would be established through two assemblies,
one or the deputies known as 1he Council o Deputies, and the other
or the senators known as 1he Senate, with members o both houses
enjoying parliamentarian immunity. 1hey would not be subjected to the
State`s laws nor the bariàb rules until such immunity was waied. It also
stipulated that the two assemblies should conene on the 1st Noember
35
o each year, that they should be inaugurated by the throne`s speech, and
that the laws proposed by the two assemblies should be implemented
once each assembly had endorsed them and once the Sultan had ratiied
them. In other words, legislation would be carried out by the two
assemblies. lurther, it stipulated that the drawing up o the budget should
be reerred to the Deputies Council and that a Supreme Court ormed
o ten members rom the Senate, ten goernment consultants and ten
consultants rom the Appeal Court should be established. It stipulated
that the rule in the !iaya. should be based on decentralisation.
Abdul-Hamid's opposition to Midhat's constitution
Since this constitution was considered a democratic system, it was
composed o Kvfr laws which contradicted Islam. Accordingly as the
rules themseles contradicted Islam, had they been implemented, their
implementation would hae implied the abolishment o the Kbiafab system
and the establishment o a state similar to any other Luropean state, such
as Belgium or instance, whose constitution sered as the source o this
constitution. 1hus the Sublime Porte did not implement it and Abdul-
Hamid, as well as the scholars and prominent Muslim igures opposed it.
In this way the Sublime Porte started to aoid implementing the
constitution and submitting to the demands o the major powers.
Abdul-Hamid sensed Britain`s trickery and hostility and it seemed that he
had also uncoered her attempts at contacting goernment oicials. As a
result o this he dismissed Midhat Pasha rom his post as Grand Vizier
and banished him or perpetrating the high treason, or Midhat Pasha
was in contact with the British and he was behind the policy o relying on
the \estern states. 1he major powers, especially Britain were closely
olowing the Ottoman State and they pursued the implementation o the
constitution drated by Midhat Pasha. Indeed, Britain endeaoured to
hold a conerence to inestigate the issue o the Balkans, the Ottoman
36
State and its domestic reorms.
On 13th June 188 the conerence o Berlin took place, hosting the major
powers, Britain, lrance, Russia and Germany. Disraeli, the Jew, was the
British Prime Minister at the time and he represented Britain at the
conerence. Bismark meanwhile represented Germany and sided with
the Ottoman State by opposing the British throughout the conerence.
1he meetings o the conerence lasted or our weeks, at the end o
which a host o resolutions, were adopted including a demand or the
Ottoman State to introduce modern reorms to its system. Howeer,
Abdul-Hamid snubbed them and concentrated his eorts towards training
his army. He started to crush those who called or the reliance on the
\estern states or who demanded the remoal o Islam and the adoption
o the \estern system. 1he adherents o these ideas were orced to leae
the country and establish their centres in Paris and Genea.
Abdul-Hamid pursued his bid to consolidate the institution o the Kbiafab
among the Muslims through Islam, to make it able to conront the \estern
thoughts. Howeer, he ailed in his attempt and the Luropean states,
although still unable to introduce the democratic system to the state
succeeded in introducing a host o \estern laws. 1hey continued pursuing
this aim until the \oung 1urk party rebelled against the Sultan in 1908.
1hey declared the constitution on 21st July 1908 in Salonika and in the
same month, they marched towards Istanbul and occupied it. 1hey coerced
Sultan Abdul-Hamid into approing the constitution and appointing
ministers acceptable to them.
By 1th Noember, the inauguration o the Ottoman parliament had
become easy and Abdul-Hamid submitted temporarily to the \oung
1urk party. Howeer, he remained determined to abolish the constitution
and return to the Islamic bariàb.
On 13th April, a reolution against the new rulers broke out. 1he soldiers
3
reolted and surrounded their oicers. 1hey shouted : Down with \oung
1urk! Down with \oung 1urk. Hence, the Deev inspired war against the
modern innoations was declared, and the majority o the masses marched
zealously against the constitution.
On 15th April, the Sultan appointed 1awiq Pasha as Grand Vizier and
assigned to him the task o restoring the implementation o the Islamic
bariàb and the Islamic rules and the abolishment o the new constitution.
Howeer, the army in Salonika reolted once more against the Sultan,
seized power and dismissed the goernment.
On 26th April a national committee was held and acting on a atra rom
beibv!.av, it took the decision to remoe Sultan Abdul-Hamid. His
brother Muhammad Rashad acceded to the throne and the constitution
was returned and implemented. Hence, the ruling system within the
Ottoman State changed and became constitutional and parliamentarian
rather than a Kbiafab system. All that was let o it was a head o state
called the Kbaeefab who held the Sultanate. A parliament and a goernment
were in place and the rules were enacted by parliament. 1he role o the
bariàb rules in goernment and legislation was oer.
1his was as ar as the constitutional laws were concerned. As or the
bariàb rules which the judges ruled by, these had been changed een
beore then. It was since 1856 that the moe towards taking the \estern
laws started. Pursuant to pressure rom the \estern states, especially Britain
and lrance, and pressure rom their agents and those smitten by them
rom among the Muslims, the State had adopted a host o \estern laws
since the days o Sultan Abdul-Majid. 1hey had been introduced to the
State and had been implemented, with the judges ruling by them. lor
instance, in 125 AH ,185 CL, the State enacted the Ottoman penal
code. In 126 AH ,1858 CL,, the State enacted the Law o Rights and
commerce. In 1288 AH ,180 CL,, the State split the courts into two
types : bariàb courts and regular law courts or which a system was
38
established. 1hen in 1295 AH ,18 CL, the bill or the establishment o
regular courts was established, and in 1296 AH ,188 CL, a decree o
basics on the Rights and Penalties Procedure was issued, and a atra
rom beibv!.av as well as other atra. rom other scholars were
issued permitting the taking o such laws on the basis that they did not
contradict Islam. \hen the scholars ound no excuse or introducing the
ciil law to the State, the Journal was established as a law or transactions
and the ciil law was discarded, this was in 1286AH ,186CL,. An
imitation o the old lrench ciil law was taken into account. 1he law was
taken rom their books o iqb ,jurisprudence,, while taking into account
what the ciil law contained in terms o actions and what could be taken
in terms o rules, proided a iqbi quote was ound to agree with them.
Len the basis upon which the lrench ciil law was built, that is the
natural tendency or what is known to them as the spirit o the text, was
taken and an article was drated or it which stated: 1he precept in the
contracts lies in the intentions and the meanings, not in the expressions
and the wordings.
39
AdopIng Ihe
WesIern lows
1hereore, the bariàb rules and the Islamic iqb had been abandoned.
1he \estern laws were adopted as was the \estern jurisprudence. 1he
way these laws were taken aried rom one law to another. Some \estern
rules were taken as they were, without any consideration as to whether
these were ound in the Islamic iqb or not, and without any thought
gien as to whether they agreed or contradicted the bariàb rules, such as
the penal code which abolished the vava. Other laws were taken as
rules only, with consideration gien to the act that they were ound in the
Islamic iqb een i this were by an unknown Mv;tabia, or rom a aqib
who was not qualiied to the extent o a Mv;tabia. In other words i the
rule had been ound in the books o iqb or ound amongst the scholars
opinions, it would hae been taken, otherwise it would not hae been
taken, as was the case with the procedure laws. Some o the laws were
imitated in terms o codiication, categorisation and cases, while making
the bariàb rules the exclusie articles o law, such as the Journal, which
represents a host o bariàb rules that was established in imitation o the
lrench ciil law. Hence, the bariàb by which the judges ruled became
\estern rules rather than the Islamic bariàb, een i some o those rules
were bariàb rules.
1he impact o the Iatwas in the
introduction o Western laws
\hat enabled the introduction o the rules o the democratic system as a
Adopting the Western laws
40
constitution or the Islamic State and the \estern laws as legislation
implemented in the courts, in their capacty as Islamic courts within the
Kbiafab State, were the atra. o the scholars which stated that they did
not contradict Islam, particularly the atra. o the beibv!.av. atra.
were issued stating that the democratic system did not contradict Islam
and that Islam was the Deev o democracy. A atra was gien by the
beibv!.av stating that it was permitted to adopt the \estern laws
and implement them in the courts upon the Muslims, because Islam does
not prohibit their adoption. Hence, the rules o the democratic system
were established as a constitution or the Islamic State, and the ruling
system was considered by the majority o Muslims to be a Kbiafab system,
so long as the head o state was called the Kbaeefab, een i the ruling
systems implemented were not rom the rules o Islam. lurthermore,
the \estern laws started to be implemented in courts o the Islamic State
and these became considered as Islamic laws. 1hus the State was still
considered an Islamic State, implementing Islam, een though what in
act she was implementing was \estern laws, as long as Islam permitted
these laws. 1his implementation o the democratic system within the ruling
system and o the \estern laws within the courts did not aect the Islamic
status o the State, nor did it aect the Islamic status o the laws as ar as
the majority o the Muslims were concerned, since Islam did not prohibit
the adoption o these laws. Contrary to this, this implementation was
approed by the Muslims. 1o some it was een regarded as a reorm
initiatie within the State. Nobody looked upon these laws and these
rules as being rules and laws o vfr, they rather approed o them and
kept silent about them. I there had been anyone who disapproed o
those laws and those rules, he neer spoke out, nor did he oppose the
Kbaeefab, nor did he demand anything o him. I there had been anyone
who disapproed o the suspension o the vava, he neer proclaimed
this openly by conronting the Kbaeefab with his disapproal nor did he
demand him to restore them.
1he reasons behind the atra o the beibv!.av and other scholars
41
pertaining to the adoption o the democratic rules and \estern laws was
attributable to three matters:
1- It had become implanted in people`s minds at the time, and een
nowadays, that it was permitted to adopt any matter which did not
contradict Islam and which was not prohibited by a bariàb text. 1hey
used as eidence the act that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, had ound
contracts dating back to the days o ]abiiyyab ,ignorance, existing among
people and he had approed them, and that which he did not approe
o, he prohibited. Hence, that which he approed was permitted and
that which he prohibited was unlawul. Likewise, it was permitted to
adopt any thought, or rule, or law that did not contradict Islam and that
had not been prohibited.
2- 1he Mvbab ,permitted, is that which carries no rebuke. Hence the
absence o the rebuke is a permission. So taking a matter whose prohibition
has not been mentioned would be Mvbab. lurthermore, the bariàb kept
silent about it and did not outline its rule, and whateer bariàb kept
silent about is Mvbab. It has been reported that the Messenger o Allah
,saw, said: ^1ruly Allah has commanded some obligations, hence
do not neglect them, and He prohibited certain matters, hence do
not violate them, and He determined certain limits, hence do not
transgress them and He condoned certain matters out o mercy,
not orgetulness, hence do not search or them. In another
narration, he ,saw, said: Ând that which He kept silent about is a
condonation. 1hereore, anything that bariàb kept silent about is Mvbab.
1he adoption o rules and laws which hae not been mentioned by the
bariàb and which the bariàb did not mention by any prohibition is part
o the Mvbab. 1his is since there is no rebuke about them, and since no
prohibition was mentioned, and since it was not mentioned by the bariàb
and because the bariàb kept silent about it.
3- 1he act that at that time it became widespread that democracy is
42
rom Islam, or it is based on bvra` ,consultation,, justice and equality. It
was also based on giing the authority to the |vvab, and this is what
Islam is concerned with. Islam equates between rich and poor, rights and
duties and between a minister and a shepherd and makes their aairs
amongst them based on bvra` and makes enjoining Maàrvf and
orbidding Mvvar one o the most important principles. Shura` in Islam
has been organised in modern times by what the Luropeans reer to as
parliament. Lnjoining Maàrvf and orbidding Mvvar has been ormulated
in the modern ciilisation through the reedom o press to criticise and
the reedom o indiiduals and groups to write and oice their opinions
rankly. 1hey approe what they see and they disapproe what they see
and they speak as they wish. Hence no person is beyond reproach, nor is
the goernment, or the !ai. \hat straightens them, deters them and
orces them to keep to the straight and narrow is the awareness o public
opinion and its reedom o criticism. 1his is what is reerred to in the
Quràn as joining together in the mutual teaching o 1ruth. In this way
it was deduced that democracy is rom Islam and the Quràn mentioned
it and the Messenger ,saw, commanded it.
1he error o the Iatwas
Consequently, atra. related to the adoption o the democratic constitution
and the \estern laws were issued. 1he State was still considered to be an
Islamic State, unctioning as the Kbiafab system, and the legislation was
still considered Islamic as the laws that had been adopted were Islamic
laws.
1his is where the laws and the deiation occurred, because the thoughts
concerning these three matters contained a undamental error in their
understanding o Islam. 1his is attributable to seeral aspects:
1- 1here is a dierence between the thoughts related to .qeeaab matters
43
namely the doctrines and bariàb rules, and the thoughts related to sciences,
techniques, industries and the like. It is permitted to adopt the thoughts
related to sciences, techniques and the like, proided these do not contradict
Islam. As or the thoughts related to .qeeaab matters and bariàb rules, it
would be orbidden to adopt any o them, except those brought to us
by the Messenger o Allah ,saw, whether it was rom the Book o Allah
,swt,, or the vvvab, or rom what the Book and the vvvab hae guided
to. Lidence about this is relected in what Muslim reported that the
Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: "I am but human like you. Hence, i
I ordered you something related to your ,AA\I aairs, do take it,
and i I ordered you something related to your worldly aairs,
then I am only human. Lidence is also relected in the aaitb about
the pollination o palm trees, where he ,saw, was reported to hae said:
^You are better acquainted with your worldly aairs. 1hereore
that which is not part o the bariàb, namely the .qeeaab matters and the
rules, can be taken as long as it does not contradict Islam. Howeer, that
which is part o the bariàb, namely .qeeaab matters and rules, can only
be taken rom what the Messenger o Allah ,saw, brought and nothing
else. 1he democratic rules and laws are rules taken to sole man`s problems,
hence they orm part o the legislation. 1hus it would be wrong to adopt
them, unless they hae been brought by the Messenger o Allah ,saw,. It
would be wrong to adopt them unless they were bariàb rules only.
2- 1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, has explicitly orbidden us rom taking
anything other than what he brought. Muslim reported on the authority
o Aisha ,ra, that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: ^He who introduces
in our order something that is alien to it, must be rejected. In
another narration, he ,saw, was reported to hae said: ^He who perorms
an action alien to our order, must be rejected. Bukhari also reported
on the authority o Abu Hurayrah ,ra, that the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
said: ^1he Hour shall not come until my Ummah ollows the ways
o the nations beore her, hand span to hand span and arm length
to arm length. Upon this they asked: Is it the Persians and the
44
Romans He ,saw, replied: ^Who else among people but them?
Bukhari also reported on the authority o Abu Said Al-Khudri ,ra, that
the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: ^You shall ollow the ways o
those beore you hand span to hand span and arm length to arm
length, and even i they entered a lizard's hole you will ollow
them. I said: O Messenger o Allah! \ou mean the Jews and the
Christians He ,saw, replied: ^Who else? 1hese texts clearly orbid us
rom taking anything rom others. 1he irst aaitb, with its two narrations,
is clear about the prohibition and about the censure o taking, or it says:
Ît should be rejected. 1he other two .baaitb contain the meaning
o prohibition. 1his prohibition is applicable to the taking o the rules o
the constitution and the laws rom other than Islam, because it is introducing
something alien to our order, een taking rom other than our order. It
is an emulation o those who are like the Persians and the Romans, namely
the British and the lrench, who are rom the Romans, hence, it is orbidden
to take these rules and laws.
3 - 1he Messenger o Allah ,saw,, een in his capacity as a Messenger,
neer used to answer when asked about a rule which had not been
explained by the reelation. He used to wait until Allah ,swt, had reealed
such a rule. Bukhari reported on the authority o ibn Masùd ,ra, that
....the Messenger o Allah ,saw, was asked about the spirit and he remained
silent until the erse was reealed. Bukhari also reported on the authority
o Jabir ibn Abdullah ,ra, who said: I was taken ill once and the Messenger
o Allah ,saw, and Abu Bakr came to isit me. He ,saw, came to me
while I was unconscious, so he perormed \udu` and then poured that
water oer me, so I regained consciousness and then said: O Messenger
o Allah! How do I judge in my assets \hat do I do with my assets He
,saw, said nothing to me until the erse o inheritance was reealed.
1his indicates that it is orbidden to take rom other than the reelation.
I the Messenger o Allah ,saw, rerained rom giing an opinion until
the reelation came to him, this proes that nothing is to be taken apart
rom what the reelation has indicated.
45
4- Allah ,swt, has commanded us to take what the Messenger o Allah
,saw, has ordered and to abstain rom taking what he ,saw, has prohibited.
Allah ,swt, also commanded us to reer in judgement to the Messenger
o Allah ,saw,, namely to what the Messenger o Allah ,saw, has brought.
Allah ,swt, says:
And take whateer the Messenger has brought
to you and rerain rom whateer he has orbidden you.
|1MQ Al Hashr 59:[
1his means that we should not take anything that the Messenger o Allah
,saw, has not brought to us. As or the opposite understanding o
....whateer he has orbidden you..
this is inapplicable and nulliied by the generality o the bariàb texts
which prohibit the taking o anything other than rom the Islamic bariàb,
such as Allah ,swt, saying:
No by your God, they shall not become true belieers until they make
you judges in all disputes amongst them.
|1MQ Al Nisaà 4:65[
And also in His saying ,swt,
1hey wish to reer in judgement to 1agbvt ,eil, whilst
they hae been commanded to reject it.
|1MQ Al-Nisaà 4:60[
46
Also such as the saying o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,: Âny action
alien to our order must be rejected. 1his should be the case with
eery opposite understanding. I a bariàb text were to indicate other
than what we deduce rom it, then this understanding should be nulliied
and should not be applicable, such as Allah ,swt, saying:
And do not coerce your women to commit
ornication i they wished to remain chaste.
|1MQ Al Nur 24:33[
the opposite understanding o which is that i they did not wish to remain
chaste, it would be permitted to coerce them. Howeer, this understanding
is nulliied by the generality o the text which orbids ornication, which
is Allah ,swt, saying:
...and do not approach ornication.
|1MQ Al Isra 1:32[
1hereore, the meaning o the erse would be to abide by what the
Messenger o Allah ,saw, has ordered and to abstain rom what he ,saw,
has orbidden. Hence, we must not only make lawul what Allah ,swt,
has made lawul, we must orbid what Allah ,swt, has orbidden. 1hat
which the Messenger o Allah ,saw, has not brought to us, we do not
take and that which he has not orbidden, we do not orbid. Howeer,
the non prohibition does not mean the permissibility o taking, or it is
orbidden to take rom other than bariàb, it rather means the non
prohibition o that which Allah has not orbidden. 1his is the meaning
o the erse.
4
I this erse were linked to Allah ,swt, saying:
Let those who iolate his command beware o
being struck by itva or by a seere punishment
|1MQ Al Nur 24:63[
i it were known that the phrase whateer in His saying
\hateer he has brought to you and
\hateer he has orbidden you
were a term o generality, the obligation o taking what he has brought
would clearly be maniested, and that the prohibition o taking rom
other than what he had brought would be a sin that carries a seere
penalty.
Allah ,swt, also says:
No by your God, they shall not become true belieers until they
make you judge in matters that are o dispute amongst them.
Hence, He denied !vav rom those who reer in their judgement to other
than the Messenger o Allah in their actions, which indicates conclusiely
that reerence in judgement should be restricted only to what the Messenger
48
o Allah ,saw, has brought.
Besides, Allah ,swt, has rebuked those who wished to reer in judgement
to other than what the Messenger o Allah ,saw, has brought. He ,swt,
says:
Did you not see those who pretend to hae belieed in
what has been reealed to you and what has been reealed
beore you, they wish to reer in judgement to 1agbvt whilst
they hae been ordered to reject it, and baytav wishes
to lead ar astray
1his indicates that reering the judgement to other than what the Messenger
o Allah has brought would be a deiation and a reerence in judgement
to 1agbvt.
5- 1he bariàb rule is the address o the Legislator related to the actions
o the serants, and the Muslims are commanded to reer in their actions
to the address o the Legislator and to conduct their aairs in accordance
with this address. So, een i they adopted something that does not
contradict the address o the legislator in any o their actions or in any
o their conducts, they would hae in this case taken other than the bariàb
rule, or they would not hae taken the original bariàb rule, but rather
that which does not contradict it, hence their adoption would not be an
adoption o the bariàb rule. Besides, i one were to take that which
conorms with the bariàb rule, but rom other than the Book and the
vvvab, this adoption would be orbidden or it is not the taking o the
bariàb rule, but rather an adoption o other than the bariàb rule that
49
happens to agree with the bariàb rule. In this case it would not be a
reerence to what the Messenger o Allah ,saw, has brought, but a
reerence to other than what he ,saw, has brought, despite its agreement
with it. 1his is so because the Muslim is commanded to adopt the bariàb
rule and nothing else. lor instance, marriage according to the bariàb is
subject to a bariàb based oer and acceptance, with the wordings o
!vab ,marrying o, and 1ari; ,acceptance in marriage, and in the
presence o two Muslim witnesses. I a Muslim man and woman went
to a church, and a priest undertook the marriage contract on the basis o
Christianity using the words o !vab and 1ari; in the presence o two
Muslim witnesses, would they be considered to be married according to
the bariàb rule or according to other than that In other words, would
they hae reerred to what the Messenger o Allah ,saw, has brought, or
to what the distorted and abrogated Christianity has brought Also, or
instance, i a Christian died and his amily were to diide his inheritance
among themseles according to the rules o Islam, because Islam is air,
just or beneicial, and i they were to take a limitation o succession
document rom the bariàb court, would they hae reerred to the bariàb
rule, or would they hae merely taken the system because it was air, just
or beneicial 1hey would hae undoubtedly taken other than the bariàb
rule, because the taking o the bariàb rule should be taken because the
Messenger o Allah ,saw, has brought it, as it is part o the commands
and the prohibitions o Allah ,swt,. Only then would its taking be
considered a taking o the bariàb rule. Howeer, the taking o the rule
because the rule is just and air, or because it is beneicial, is not considered
taking the bariàb rule. 1he erse states
Until they make you judge,
and it states
And take whateer the Messenger has brought to you,
50
1hus a rule should be taken on the basis o the act that it has been
brought by the Messenger o Allah ,saw,. Accordingly anything that is
taken on other than this basis, it would not be considered a bariàb rule
regardless o whether this agreed with the bariàb rule or contradicted it
and een i the same bariàb rule were taken as it is, but not taken because
the Messenger o Allah ,saw, has brought it, but rather because it is
beneicial and just.
6- 1he Messenger o Allah`s approal o the Kvfr contracts is exclusie to
him ,saw,, in his quality as the Messenger o Allah, as his approal is
legislation, just like his sayings and his actions. 1his quality is not conerred
upon any other person but him ,saw,. 1hereore, whateer the Messenger
o Allah ,saw, perormed, said, or approed is considered as legislation
and it is based on the reelation. No one apart rom the Messenger o
Allah ,saw, has the right to legislate. Hence, the contracts which the
Messenger o Allah ,saw, has approed hae become bariàb rules, een
i they had been contracts o the times o ]abiiyyab ,ignorance,. 1his is
because their approal by the Messenger o Allah ,saw, seres as eidence
that they are bariàb rules, een i these were acts o worship. Hence,
they would hae been deduced rom the approal o the Messenger o
Allah ,saw, and would hae been taken on that basis, not because they
had been contracts o ]abiiyyab which happened not to contradict Islam.
1he ababa ,ra, used to reer to the silence o the Messenger o Allah
,saw, oer a rule as eidence about the rule being a bariàb rule. It has
been reported that the lizard was eaten at the table o ,saw, and he did
not eat rom it, thus ibn Abbas ,ra, used his silence ,saw, as eidence
about the permissibility o eating lizard, despite the act that the Messenger
o Allah ,saw, did not eat rom it. In addition, the act that there are
many incidents in which the silence o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
sered as eidence that they were part o the bariàb rules.
- 1he Mvbab is not that which carries no ,ara;, rebuke, or the absence
o rebuke rom the perorming or the reraining does not indicate a
51
bariàb permission, nor does the liting o rebuke necessitate the granting
o choice. 1he prohibition o something does not mean the commanding
o its opposite. Also, the commanding o something does not mean the
prohibition o its opposite. 1he liting o rebuke could be coupled with
the obligation, as is the case in Allah`s ,swt, saying:
And he who makes a;; to the House or |vrab,
there is no rebuke in making 1araf
|1MQ Al Baqarah 2:158[
Hence, the 1araf during a;; and |vrab is an obligation and not Mvbab.
Also, the liting o rebuke could be a Rvb.ab ,licence,, as is the case in
Allah`s ,swt, saying:
Hence, there is no rebuke i you were to shorten your prayers
Here, the liting o rebuke does not mean the permissibility. 1hereore,
the Mvbab is not that which there is no rebuke in it, rather the vvbab is that
which the heard eidence rom the address o the Legislator has indicated
the granting o choice between perorming or abstaining without any
other alternatie. Hence, the !baba ,permissibility, is that which the bariàb
has granted the choice between taking and abstaining, either by directly
mentioning the granting o the choice in the text itsel such as Allah`s
,swt, saying:
52
\our wies are a tilth or you, so go to your tilth,
when or how you will
or such as Allah`s ,swt, saying :
And eat both o you reely with pleasure and delight,
o things therein as whereer you will
or by deducing the understanding rom the text such as Allah`s ,swt,
saying:
But when you inish the !brav,
|1MQ Al Maidah 5:2[
or His ,swt, saying
and when the aab is oer you may disperse,
|1MQ Al-Jumàh 62:10[
or His ,swt, saying
53
Do eat rom the good things \e hae proided or you
Besides, the !baba is part o the bariàb rules, and the bariàb rule is the
address o the Legislator related to the actions o the serants, so it
requires a bariàb eidence rom the heard eidences to indicate that the
thing is Mvbab in order or it to be Mvbab. Hence, the absence o a
bariàb rule about something to indicate that it is !a;ib, or Mavavb, or
arav or Marvb, does not indicate that it is Mvbab, or it still requires a
bariàb rule to indicate its !baba.
As or the things and actions which existed beore the arrial o bariàb,
such as contracts and transactions among others, their !baba was not a
continuation o what they had been beore the arrial o the bariàb, it is
rather deried rom a bariàb text that indicated it. 1rade was mentioned
by a bariàb text, that is Allah ,swt, saying:
And Allah made trade lawul and made usury unlawul
Hiring was perormed by the Messenger o Allah ,saw,, or it has been
reported that he ,saw, hired a man rom Bani Al-Dayl as a guide to show
him the way. Hence, the !baba o trade and that o hire has come rom a
bariàb text, and not rom its continuation rom the days o ]abiiyyab. As
well as being a saying rom the Quràn, or a saying rom the Messenger
o Allah ,saw,, the bariàb text could also be an action, that is the action
o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,, and it could also be a silence, that is the
silence o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,. 1hus whateer continued in
terms o actions, things, contracts and transactions rom the days o
]abiiyyab to the days o Islam, and which the Muslims continued to pursue,
they would hae pursued it because a bariàb eidence had come to
54
indicate its !baba, either by a saying rom the Quràn or the Messenger o
Allah ,saw,, or by an action o the Messenger or by his silence ,saw,, but
not just by a continuation o what had existed in the days o ]abiiyyab.1hat
which has not been established as a bariàb eidence, such as a saying, or
an action or a silence, and had existed in the days o ]abiiyyab, should not
continue and should not be taken, een i no prohibition were mentioned.
A bariàb eidence should rather be sought or it. Hence the !baba o
that which had existed beore the arrial o bariàb and continued ater
its arrial, has been established by a bariàb rule related to it.
It would be wrong to say that because the bariàb has kept silent oer it,
its !baba has continued, and that which the bariàb has kept silent oer
and has not explained, its rule must be Mvbab. 1his is because the bariàb
has not kept silent oer it but demonstrated its rule by an eidence related
to it, and the silence o the Messenger o Allah ,saw, is not considered a
silence o bariàb, but rather a statement rom bariàb, or the silence o
the Messenger o Allah ,saw, is just like his saying and his action and just
like the Quràn, i.e. a statement o a bariàb rule.
No Muslim has the right to say that the Legislator ,swt, has kept silent
oer something and has not stated its rule ater reading Allah's ,swt, saying:
1his day I hae perected your Deev or you, completed
My laour upon you, and hae chosen or you Islam as your Deev
|1MQ Al Maìda 5:3[
Also His saying ,swt,:
And \e hae reealed the Book to you explaining eerything
|1MQ Al Nahl 16: 89[
55
Hence, no Muslim has the right to claim that there are situations deoid
o a bariàb rule, meaning that the bariàb has completely disregarded
such a situation and has not established an eidence or it. 1hat is that the
eidence did not come rom either the Book or the vvvab, or they hae
not gien an indication through a legitimate !ab ,bariàb reason,, that
which the text has mentioned either explicitly, or by way o indication, or
deduction or by way o analogy, to draw the attention through this
eidence or this indication to the rule related to a host o situations,
whether it is !a;ib ,compulsory,, Mavavb ,recommended,, arav
,orbidden,, Marvb ,despised, or Mvbab ,permitted,. No Muslim should
hold this iew, or he would be slandering the bariàb by claiming that it
is imperect and he would be legitimising the reerence in judgements to
other than the bariàb, thus contradicting Allah`s ,swt, saying:
make you judge in matters that are o dispute amongst them
I the bariàb did not come with the rule and the Muslim adopted a rule
that the bariàb had not come with, he would hae reerred in judgement
to other than the bariàb, and this is orbidden. As he would be claiming
that the bariàb has not come with the rules or all situations. So claiming
a permission to reer to other than bariàb under the pretext that bariàb
has not come with these rules, would be a alse claim. 1hereore, it is
inconceiable to state that whateer the bariàb has kept silent oer is
Mvbab, or this would be an !baba to reer to other than bariàb, in addition
to the act that it would be a slander against the bariàb by claiming that
it has kept silent oer certain rules and has not established them. Besides,
this would be in contradiction to reality, as bariàb has in act not kept
silent oer anything at all.
56
As or the Messenger o Allah`s ,saw, saying: 1ruly Allah has decreed
certain obligations, hence do not neglect them. , this denotes the
prohibition o asking about that which has not been mentioned textually
by bariàb. It is similar to his saying ,saw, : 1ruly the gravest sinners
amongst the Muslims would be those who ask about something
that has not been orbidden upon them, then it became orbidden
because o their asking. 1here are many abaaitb to that eect. It has
been reported that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said : Spare me the
things I have not mentioned to you, or those beore you perished
because o their constant asking and their arguing with their
prophets, so rerain rom that which I orbid you and perorm to
your utmost ability that which I order you. It has also been reported
that he ,saw, once recited Allah`s ,swt, saying: And Allah commanded
people to perorm 0=. Upon this a man asked : O Messenger o
Allah! Is it eery year He ,saw, did not reply. So the man asked again :
O Messenger o Allah! Is it eery year Again he ,saw, did not reply.
So the man asked him a third time : O Messenger o Allah! Is it eery
year Upon this the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said : By He Who
owns my soul, i I said it, it will become obligatory, and i it did
become obligatory you would not be able to perorm it, and i you
did not perorm it you would be sinul. So spare me that which I
have not ordered you. Hence, the meaning o the Messenger o Allah
,saw, saying : and He has condoned other things, and in the narration
o : and that which He kept silent over is a condonation, is that
He ,swt, has lightened your obligation, so do not ask lest you oerburden
yourseles. lor instance, the duty o a;; has been decreed in general
terms, and someone asked whether it should be perormed eery year.
Allah ,swt, has reduced this obligation and made it once in a lietime in
order to lighten your load and out o mercy upon the people, so He
,swt, has condoned and kept silent oer this obligation being eery year.
1hus one does not look into these things and does not ask about them.
Lidence about the act that this was the meaning is the saying o Allah`s
Messenger ,saw,: Hence, do not look into them ater he ,saw, had
5
said : And He has condoned certain things So, the point at issue is
prohibiting Muslims rom asking about things whose prohibition has not
been reealed. 1he point at issue is not that He ,swt, has not stated some
o the bariàb rules, or the context o the aaitb reeals the mercy o
Allah ,swt, upon them and His condoning. As or the other narration :
And that which He kept silent over is a condonation, it also
indicates that the issue is related to the prohibition o searching and asking
about that which He ,swt, has lightened or you and has not orbidden
or you. 1hus when something is not prohibited it is a condonation rom
Allah ,swt,, in other words, that which He ,swt, kept silent about its
prohibition denotes a condonation rom Allah ,swt,, thus do not ask
about it. 1his is relected in Allah`s ,swt, saying:
"O you who hae belieed do not ask about matters which,
i made plain to you, may cause you trouble"
|1MQ Al Maìda 5:101[
1hen He ,swt, said:
"Allah has condoned them." i.e. those matters.
58
1he contradiction between Islam and Democracy
8 - Democracy contradicts Islam completely in the undamentals and in
the details, and this is relected in seeral aspects :
,i, Democracy gies the soereignty to the people and entrusts them with
the whole matter. Hence, people are the supreme reerence in eerything.
According to the rules o democracy, people are the source o power.
1hus people are the source o the legislatie power, the judicial power
and the executie power. It is people who legislate, appoint the judges
and establish the rulers. 1his is contrary to Islam which makes the
soereignty to bariàb and not to people. In this way the whole matter is
to the bariàb and it is the supreme reerence in eerything. As or the
powers, Islam has made the legislatie power or Allah ,swt,, not to
people. It is Allah ,swt, alone who legislates the rules in eerything, be it in
regard to worship, transactions, the punishments or otherwise. It is
orbidden or anyone to legislate, een i it was a single rule. People in
Islam hae the authority - namely the rule, so it is the people who elect the
ruler and appoint him. 1hus people are the source o the executie power
only - they select the man who assumes the authority and the rule. As or
the judicial power, this is assumed by the Kbaeefab or whoeer deputises
or him in this. It is the Kbaeefab who appoints the judges or appoints
someone who appoints the judges. No person rom among the people,
indiiduals or groups alike hae the authority to appoint a judge. 1his is
rather restricted to the Kbaeefab and his deputy.
,ii, 1he leadership in the democratic system is collectie and not or the
indiidual. 1he power is also collectie and not or the indiidual. 1he
authority, or the rule is assumed by the council o ministers meaning the
cabinet. 1he head o state, be it a king or a president, is a nominal igure
who reigns but does not rule. 1he body that rules and assumes the power
is the cabinet. 1his is contrary to Islam, where the leadership is or the
indiidual and not a collectie and where the power is also or the indiidual
59
and not a collectie. It has been reported on the authority o Abu Saìd
Al-Khudri ,ra, that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said : I three people
set o on a journey, they should appoint one o them as an )EH.
Abdullah ibn Omar also reported that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said
: It is orbidden or any three people to be anywhere on earth
without having appointed one )EH rom amongst them. 1he word
ove means just that, and it reers to a number, namely one and no more.
1his is deduced rom the opposite understanding o the word ove.
1he opposite understanding can be asked and its indication is equal to the
indication o the text as ar as the eidence is concerned. 1he opposite
understanding can only be made redundant in one single instance, that is
i a text nulliies it. In this instance, no text has come to nulliy it, thus it is
applicable. 1his stipulates the application o : they should appoint
one as )EH and no more, or without having appointed one )EH
and no more. Hence, the opposite understanding in the two .baaitb
indicates that it is absolutely orbidden or the !vara to be conerred to
more than one man. 1his is supported by the action o the Messenger o
Allah ,saw,, or in all the situations in which he appointed .vir., neer
did he ,saw, appoint more than one .vir oer one single area. 1hus the
authority, namely the rule, is assumed by the head o state - the .vir v
Mv`viveev, ,the Kbaeefab, and all o the state related mandatory powers
are conined to him. He is the one with the competence in the authority
and in the rule and no one shares any o this competence with him, rather
it is exclusie to him. 1hus, leadership and authority in Islam is or the
indiidual.
,iii, 1he state in the democratic system consists o seeral institutions and
not one single institution. 1he goernment is one institution, that is the
executie power, and eery syndicate is an independent institution with
the competence o rule and power in the ield or which it has been
established. lor instance, the lawyers syndicate is an institution that has the
power and the rule in all the issues related to the lawyers, ranging rom
the authorising o lawyers to practise the proession, or suspending them,
60
or prosecuting them, and it deals with all matters related to the lawyers in
terms o power and rule. Similar to this are the doctors` syndicate, the
pharmacists` syndicate and the ciil engineers` syndicate, among others.
1he syndicates enjoy within their respectie ields the same competence
enjoyed by the goernment in terms o power. 1he goernment itsel
does not enjoy the same power conerred to the syndicate in its speciic
ield. 1his is contradictory to Islam, where the state and the goernment
are one body, which holds the power, the Kbaeefab. He is exclusiely the
one with the competence and no other person has any competence at all.
1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: 1he Imam is a guardian, and he
is responsible or his guardianship. 1he phrase he is reers in an
Arabic grammatical context to a restrictie orm and it is a separating
pronoun. 1hus His saying ,saw, and he is responsible denotes a
restriction upon the responsibility o the Imam. Hence, there exists nobody
within the state, the indiiduals or groups, who has any power to rule
conerred to him in origin, apart rom the Kbaeefab.
,i, In the democratic system, seeking people`s opinion in ruling matters is
considered an obligation. 1he ruler must seek people`s opinion or the
opinion o the councils elected by the people, and he has no right to
contradict people. 1hus seeking people`s opinion is compulsory in the
democratic system. 1his is contrary to Islam, where seeking the |vvab`.
opinion, that is the bvra` ,consultation,, is Mavavb and not compulsory. It
is Mavavb or the Kbaeefab to seek the |vvab`. opinion and not obligatory
upon him. 1his is so because although Allah ,swt, praised the bvra`, He
,swt, restricted it to the area o Mvbab only. So, the act that it is conined
to the area o Mvbab seres as a Qareevab ,conjunction, that it is not
compulsory, because its subject matter is Mvbab. Hence, a consultation in
such a subject matter cannot be obligatory. 1hereore, it is Mavavb or the
Kbaeefab to consult the |vvab, because Allah ,swt, praised the bvra` and
because it can only be in the area o Mvbab.
,, In the democratic system, the goernment is bound by the majority`s
61
opinion in eery single matter, whether this were in legislation or other
than that. Howeer, they tend in some cases to make the majority rule
binding een i this were 51, and in other cases they tend to impose a
two thirds` majority. In any case, the majority`s opinion is binding in eery
matter. 1his is contrary to Islam, where the majority`s opinion is not gien
preponderance in eerything and is not always binding. lurther elaboration
ollows :
,a, 1he bariàb rve., namely the legislatie opinions : 1hese are not subject
to the majority`s opinion, nor the minority`s opinion, but eeryone should
comply with the bariàb eidence. Lidence about this is relected in the
act that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, did comply in the issue o the
treaty o Al-Hudaybiya with the reelation and brushed aside the opinions
o Abu Bakr ,ra, and Omar ,ra,. He ,saw, een brushed aside the opinion
o all the Muslims and rejected categorically their opinion, and he orced
them to comply with his opinion despite their anger and their resentment
He ,saw, said to them : I am the servant o Allah and I shall not
violate His command. 1his proes that that which is preponderant is
not the majority, nor the minority, but rather what has been established by
the reelation, i.e. the bariàb eidence. I there were seeral eidences,
the strongest eidence would be gien preponderance.1hus, the rule is
taken and gien preponderance according to the strength o its
eidence.Howeer, obliging people to adopt the rule and enacting it as a
law is exclusiely the competence o the Kbaeefab, or he alone reseres
the right to adopt the rules, and this is deried rom the general consensus
o the ababa, which denotes that the !vav reseres the right to adopt
speciic rules and to order their implementation. 1he Muslims or their
part should abide by them and cast aside their own opinions. 1he
established bariàb principles are : 1he order o the !vav is binding
openly and secretly, 1he order o the !vav settles the dierences, and
1he Sultan reseres the right to generate rom the rulings that which is
appropriate to the new problems which arise. \hat applies to the bariàb
rules applies also to the bariàb deinitions, where the preponderant actor
62
is the strength o the eidence, and it is the Kbaeefab alone who reseres
the right to adopt them. 1hereore his own opinion would be the decisie
and binding actor.
,b, 1he opinion that indicates a thought in a speciic subject, whether this
generates one or seeral actions. 1he action or actions will be studied on
the basis o the subject. In other words, the opinion related to the
undertaking o actions, is when the subjects will require understanding
and contemplation. 1he opinion is sought with the aim o reaching a
speciic idea about the subject. 1hus a decision is made on whether to
undertake the action or rerain, or on the manner in which the action is to
be undertaken, namely that which is related to the opinion, warare and
tactics. 1his opinion which indicates a thought in a speciic subject should
be subject to correctness, and not subject to the majority. lor instance :
Should the reial o the |vvab be worked or by eleating her
intellectual leel or by raising her economic standards
\ere the wars o apostasy which broke out in the time o Abu Bakr
,ra, considered a rejection o bariàb rules or a mere armed rebellion
1he way Ali ,ra, dealt with the !ai. when he took oice - should he
hae kept them or remoed them, or should he hae kept some and
remoed the others
1he way he ,ra, dealt with the issue o Muàwiyya in particular - should
he hae remoed him rom the !iaya o .bav immediately or
should he hae kept him until he had established his authority oer all
the territories o the Kbiafab
1he issue o raising the Quràn in the ace o Ali ,ra, - was it really a
reerence in judgement to the Quràn or was it just a trick
63
1he Ottoman State`s building o a railway track between Istanbul and
Baghdad, should they hae gien it to German contractors or Belgian
contractors
Britain`s attempt at joining the Luropean Community in 1962 - should
she hae joined or not In other words, would her entry hae allowed
her to maintain her international standing and keep her inluence oer
Lurope intact or would it hae resulted in economic and political loss
1he deelopment o wealth in Lgypt - should it hae been through the
establishment o heay industry or through the building o the High
Dam
1urkey`s nuclear armament programme - should she hae endeaoured
to acquire nuclear weapons by relying on her own resources and
expenditure or should she hae relied on oreign inestment
1he Ottoman State`s endeaour to improe education - should she
hae opted or increasing the amount o schools and uniersities or
should she hae reiewed the education curricula
1hereore, in eery action whose subject requires understanding and
contemplation, soundness should be gien preponderance oer the
majority. Lidence about this is relected in the action o the Messenger
o Allah ,saw,, or when he ,saw, together with the Muslims, halted by
the nearest water o Badr, Al-Hubab ibn ul-Munthir ,ra, did not like the
spot and he was well acquainted with places and an expert in warare, so
he said to the Messenger o Allah ,saw, : Is this the place which Allah
has ordered you to occupy, so that we can neither adance, nor withdraw
rom it, or is it a matter o opinion, war and tactics1he Messenger o
Allah ,saw, said : It is rather a matter o opinion, war and tactics.
Upon this Al-Hubab said : 1his is not the place to stop. He then pointed
to a spot and soon the Messenger o Allah ,saw, and those with him
64
stood up and ollowed Al-Hubab's opinion. In this aaitb, the Messenger
o Allah ,saw, abandoned his opinion and did not reer to the Muslims`
opinion. He ,saw, ollowed that which was sound and was content with
the opinion o one person in a matter which the Messenger o Allah
,saw, described as being a vatter of opiviov, rar ava tactic.. 1hus he ,saw,
imposed this opinion upon all the Muslims, since it was the correct one
and the soundest opinion. 1his indicates that eery opinion o this type,
i.e. a vatter of opiviov, rar ava tactic., is gien preponderance on the
grounds o soundness, and not that o majority. It is up to the Kbaeefab
alone to decide that which is sound, or it was the Messenger o Allah
,saw, who decided on what was sound in the battle o Badr, in his capacity
as head o state, not in his capacity as a Messenger.
Similar to the opinion that indicates a thought in a speciic subject, is the
technical opinion which the experts understand, because it is o the type
that requires understanding, contemplation and expertise. Lidence about
this is relected in the act that the opinion o Al-Hubab ,ra, was accepted
in a strategic matter. It was an opinion in a technical matter gien by a
person who was well acquainted with places and expertise in warare.
Similar to this are the non-bariàb deinitions, or these also require
understanding and contemplation.
,c, 1he opinion that leads to an action and does not require understanding
and contemplation by the experts and technicians. In this type o opinion,
preponderance is gien to the majority and it is binding, such as the election
o a Kbaeefab - do we ote or this man or that man Or such as the
appointment o a reeree to look into an incident - do we appoint this
person or that person Or such as the establishment o deelopment
projects - do we build hospitals or schools Or such as granting aid to the
armers - do we grant them cash or do we grant them machines, seeds
and ertilisers And so on. Hence, eery action that does not require
understanding and contemplation by the experts and technicians should
be subject to the opinion o the majority and the State is bound by such
65
an opinion. 1hereore, the Kbaeefab is bound by such an opinion. Lidence
about this is relected in the act that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, accepted
the majority`s opinion in Uhud and went outside Madinah despite the
act that he ,saw, deemed this opinion to be wrong and deemed the
sound opinion to be other than that o the majority as did the senior
ababa who also held a dierent opinion to that o the majority, their
opinion was that o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,, that they should remain
inside Madinah. 1his indicates that the majority`s opinion in such an action
is the one that is preponderant and binding.
Some people may get conused about the dierence between an action
whose subject requires understanding and contemplation and an action
that does not require this. Howeer, i one were to scrutinise the eidence
o each o the two actions, the dierence would be clearly maniested.
1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, said to Al-Hubab ,ra, in the battle o Badr
: It is a matter o opinion, war and tactics, which means that
camping in such a place is related to matters which should be reerred to
the experts, i.e. it is part o the military matters which require contemplation
and study and part o the tactics set up or the enemy which require
scrutiny in order to set up such tactics. As or the battle o Uhud, the
Messenger o Allah ,saw, said to the Muslims : I you think it is right
to stop in Madinah and leave them where they have encamped, or
i they halt they will have halted in a bad position and i they try
to enter the city, we can ight them therein. Upon this some o the
Muslims said : O Messenger o Allah! Lead us orth to our enemies, lest
they think that we are too cowardly and too weak to ight them. Upon
this Abdullah ibn Ubay ibn Salool said : O Messenger o Allah! Stay in
Madinah, do not go out to them. \e hae neer gone out to ight an
enemy but we hae met disaster, and no one has come in against us
without being deeated, so leae them where they are. I they stay they
stay in an eil predicament, and i they come in, the men will ight them
and the women and children will throw stones on them rom the walls,
and i they retreat they will retreat low spirited as they came. Hence, the
66
issue was about whether to go out or not to go out, and not about the
place o the battle - meaning that the issue was not about whether they
should hae ortiied themseles inside Madinah and ought rom there
or they should hae ortiied themseles in the mountain o Uhud. 1he
issue was about the enemy coming towards them, should they hae gone
out to meet them and engage in a war with them or should they hae
stayed put and i they were attacked, then to ight back, whereas i the
enemy did not attack them, then to let them be. Hence, there was a
dierence between the reality o both situations and between the ways in
which the Messenger o Allah ,saw, handled each o the two situations.
lrom this dierence between the two situations, the dierence between
the action that was reerred to the sound opinion and the action that was
reerred to the opinion o the majority becomes maniest. In other words,
there is a dierence between the action whose subject requires
understanding and contemplation and the action that does not require
understanding and contemplation. 1he action whose subject is critical
and important and whose understanding requires exertion, is dierent in
its nature rom the action that has no subject, or whose subject is not
critical or is common knowledge. Although this dierence between the
two actions is somewhat subtle, it does howeer exist and can be
understood.
1hereore, the majority`s opinion in Islam is only taken in one single
situation, that is in the actions which do not require understanding and
contemplation by the experts and technicians. As or the other actions,
these are not subject to the majority`s opinion. 1his is supported by what
has been reported that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said to Abu Bakr
,ra, and Omar ,ra, : I you agreed upon a consultation, I would not
contradict you. 1his seres as eidence that the majority`s opinion is
gien preponderance. Howeer, he ,saw, restricted their agreement to an
explanatory qualiication, thus he ,saw, said : Upon a consultation.
And i his ,saw, saying I would not contradict you, were linked to
his contradiction to their opinion in Al-Hudaybiya, and to his enjoining
6
o Al-Hubab`s ,ra, opinion upon them, it would become clear that his
saying : Upon a consultation seres as a qualiication or not
contradicting them. Also their non contradiction is a matter related to a
consultation, which is other than that which is a reelation and other than
that which is a matter o opiviov, rar ava tactic.. \e deduce rom this
that the aaitb indicates that the majority`s opinion is gien preponderance
in matters which are other than the bariàb rules and other than that
which is a matter o opiviov, rar ava tactic.. 1hereore, Islam contradicts
democracy.
,i, In democracy, some indiiduals enjoy an immunity that protects them
rom the law. 1hus the law cannot touch them due to the immunity they
enjoy, as is the case with the head o state and the members o parliament.
I the head o state committed a crime, he would not be prosecuted and
he would not be subject to the law, because he enjoys this immunity.
Likewise are the members o parliament, or i any o them were to
commit a crime during a parliamentary session, he would not be
prosecuted and he would not be subject to a law enorcement until his
immunity is lited. 1his is contradictory to Islam, where no citizen o the
Islamic State is gien any immunity whatsoeer. 1he head o State is like
any ordinary person in that i he committed a crime he would be
prosecuted and the law would be implemented upon him. 1he same
applies to the members o the bvra` Council, or each one o them is
like any ordinary person. Howeer, i the crime o the accused person
were not connected to his proession within the State, and was in other
than ruling or administratie matters, he would be prosecuted beore the
judicial court. \hereas i the crime he was accused o were connected to
his proession within the State, namely a crime related to ruling or
administratie matters, he would be prosecuted beore the court o
Matbaiv. Immunity in the Islamic State is gien to no one except the
enoys who come rom abroad on the diplomatic missions. Only they
enjoy diplomatic immunity and apart rom them, no one at all has any
diplomatic immunity.
68
1he general reedoms in democracy contradict Islam
,ii, 1here exists in the democratic system what is known as general
reedoms : Personal reedom, reedom o ownership, reedom o creed
and reedom o expression. Hence, eery person can do what they wish.
So there is no punishment against ornication, it is een orbidden to
enact such a punishment, or this is regarded as an inringement o personal
reedom. Also, eery person can acquire through any means, anything
they wish. 1hus one can acquire wealth through gambling, deception or
monopoly. Also, eery person can embrace any .qeeaab they wish and
they can express any opinion they wish. 1his is contradictory to Islam, or
in Islam there is no reedom, meaning non adherance to anything when
perorming actions. Islam indeed restricts the Muslim to abiding by the
bariàb rules. Lery action perormed by the Muslim is subject to the
adherence to the bariàb rules. \hat is known as general reedoms has
no existence in Islam. 1here is no personal reedom, or the men and
women ornicators will be lashed and the men and women adulterers
will be stoned. Also there is no reedom o ownership, or the wealth
that is acquired through gambling or unlawul transactions cannot be
owned, and the wealth whose acquisition is orbidden by bariàb such as
Riba ,usury, cannot be owned. One cannot own anything by way o
deception or monopoly. Also, there is no reedom o belie, or i the
Muslim apostasised he would be killed i he did not repent. As or what
is reerred to as reedom o expression, Islam has permitted the Muslim
to express his own opinion, proided it is not sinul and has also ordered
the uttering o the truth eerywhere and at all times. In the aaitb o
Ubada ibn us-Samit ,ra,, when the .v.ar gae their ayaà to the Messenger
o Allah ,saw,, he was reported to hae said : 1hat we would speak
the truth at all times and that in Allah's service, we would ear the
censure o none. Islam has also commanded the conronting and the
accounting o the ruler with regard to his actions. 1he Messenger o
Allah ,saw, said : 1he master o martyrs is Hamza, and a man who
stood up to a tyrant ruler to advise him and was killed by him.
69
1his is not regarded as reedom o expression, but an adherence to bariàb
rules. It is also a permission to oice one`s opinion in some cases and an
obligation to oice it in other cases. 1hereore, Islam contradicts democracy
in terms o what is known as general reedoms, or there are no reedoms
in Islam except or the reedom that means the liberating o slaes rom
slaery.
lrom these seen points alone, the complete contradiction between Islam
and democracy becomes clear. It also becomes clear that the rules o
democracy are one thing and the rules o Islam are another and that there
exists a clear dierence between them. Lach o them is conspicuously
dierent rom the other. 1hereore, democracy is other than Islam.
lrom all that which has been mentioned in these sections, it becomes
clear that the idea stating : 1hat which does not contradict Islam and has
not been prohibited by a text can be taken, is alse in essence. It becomes
clear once the eidences hae been closely studied, that the adoption o
any rule rom other than what the bariàb has brought is an adoption o
a Kvfr rule, or it is an adoption o other than what Allah ,swt, has reealed.
Allah ,swt, has orbidden us rom reerring to other than bariàb, and in
addition to His orbidding it as mentioned in the eidences listed earlier,
such as His ,swt, saying:
make you judge in matters that are o dispute amongst them
|1MQ Al-Nisaà 4:65[
and the saying o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,: "Lvery action not
based on our order is rejected.", He ,swt, has clearly prohibited the
adoption o the rule that He did not reeal, or He ,swt, addresses His
Messenger ,saw, by saying :
0
And rule between them by that which Allah has reealed
And He ,swt, also says:
And beware lest they seduce you away rom that
which Allah reealed to you
Allah ,swt, did not stop at that but went on to censure those who rule by
other than what Allah has reealed. He ,swt, says :
And whoeer does not rule by what Allah has reealed,
they are the disbelieers
|1MQ Al-Mai`da 5:44[
In another erse He ,swt, says :
1hey are the transgressors
and in a third erse :
1hey are the wrong-doers
1
1his indicates the emphasis in abiding by what Allah ,swt, has reealed
and conining onesel in taking the rules rom Him and the absolute
prohibition o taking rom other than Him ,swt,. Hence, the adoption
o the \estern laws and the democratic rules is not only an error, it is
rather an adoption o a Kvfr rule and that is arav, regardless o whether
it agreed with bariàb or contradicted it. In act, een i the identical rule
were adopted, it would still be arav since it was adopted on a basis
other than that o bariàb. Accordingly, that which the Muslims implement
in their transactions nowadays according to the \estern laws is an
implementation o rules o Kvfr, regardless o whether it agreed with or
contradicted the bariàb. Len i a person were to hire a labourer or rent
a house or a car, and conducted the rental transaction according to \estern
laws, it will be a transaction conducted according to a Kvfr law. \hereas
i he were to conduct the transaction according to the bariàb rules, this
would be aa, regardless o whether this agreed or contradicted the
law.
2
Ihe mpocI of Ihe culIurol
ond legsloIve nvoson
1he regression o the Muslims resulted in the enactment o the constitution
and the laws deried rom the \estern constitutions and laws. 1his resulted
in the adoption o Kvfr laws by the Kbaeefab o the Islamic State. \hateer
the case may be, the cultural inasion that swept all the Islamic lands and
the legislatie inasion o the State in the ruling system and the laws
unsettled the .qeeaab o the Muslims and rocked the Islamic thoughts in
the minds o many Muslims. lurthermore, it shook the entity o the
Islamic State entirely, and een demolished her substantially although
sparing her in orm only. 1his is so because the entity o the State is a host
o concepts, criteria and conictions and a group o people bound
together by the authority. 1hus, i these concepts, criteria and conictions
were demolished among the Muslims, the entity o the State would be
demolished as well. 1heir essence, which is the basis upon which the
authority is built - or at least orms its oundations, would be demolished
een i its rame remained intact. Consequently, the destruction o this
rame and the striking o this orm would be made easy. Had it not been
or this cultural and legislatie inasion, the Kvfr states would not hae
been able to deal the Islamic State that atal blow. \hen the Kvfr states
succeeded in diiding the Muslims through nationalism, especially 1urkish
and Arab nationalism, in addition to their success in shaking the Muslims`
concepts, criteria and conictions and in remoing the bariàb rules and
replacing them with the democratic rules and \estern laws to which the
Muslims reerred in judgement and upon which the Kbiafab became based,
they realised that there was nothing let o the State sae or the rame
3
that contained her and the orm in which she appeared. 1hus, they started
thinking about destroying the Kbiafab and remoing her rom existence
or good. No sooner had the lirst \orld \ar broken out and the Ottoman
State had taken part in it alongside Germany, than the Kvfr states deemed
that the opportunity had come to destroy the Kbiafab. Consequently, they
started working towards this.
1he attempt at dismembering the Khilaah State
1he Luropean states could not imagine that one day the Muslims could
be ruled by other than Islam, or that they could rule the Muslims directly,
being seen as Kvffar in the eyes o the Muslims. 1hereore, in order to
weaken the Kbiafab and remoe her, their attention was ocused on
dismembering the Islamic State into Islamic goernments who would be
under their inluence. Indeed, the negotiations which took place in 1915,
during the war between Russia, Britain and lrance, made mention o
this. In a memorandum presented to Russia as a reply to her own
memorandum pertaining to this issue, lrance and Britain included one
clause which stated : Saeguarding the sacred places in the Islamic lands
and the Arab lands under the rule o an independent Islamic state. And
in the Russian memorandum, sent in reply to the Anglo-lrench proposals,
there was a clause stating : 1he undertaking o a crucial decision pertaining
to the uture relations between the Islamic states which you aim at
establishing oer the ruins o the Ottoman State and at separating them
rom the Kbiafab, is a matter that concerns the goernment o his majesty
the Czar. It also added : 1he goernment o his majesty the Czar
would wish wholeheartedly to remoe the Kbiafab rom the 1urks, but at
the same time they wish wholeheartedly to secure the reedom o a;;
and not to interere in any little thing that may oend the Muslims. In a
telegram listing the Italian demands and sent to the Russian oreign minister,
the Russian ambassador to London wrote : 1he Italian goernment
supports the opinion o the Russian goernment about the need to separate
The impact of the cultural and legislative invasion
4
the Islamic goernment to be established in Hijaz, oer the debris o the
Ottoman Sultanate, rom the Kbiafab and to place it under the absolute
control o Britain. 1he Italian goernment support with all its orce the
remoal o the Kbiafab rom the 1urks and its total abolition i necessary.
All this indicates that the main aim o the Allies was to weaken and remoe
the Kbiafab. Howeer, there existed no one rom among the Muslims
who would hae wanted or accepted the remoal o the Kbiafab. Len
the traitors rom amongst the Arab Muslims who were collaborating
with the British, used to call or the Kbiafab to be with the Arabs. As or
the 1urks, they were all assiduously committed to the Kbiafab, their loe
and their deotion to it was deeply rooted in their souls. Len the
Committee o \oung 1urks was committed to the Kbiafab and committed
to maintaining all the parts o the Islamic State as they were. It was neer
heard o anyone who wanted or accepted the remoal o the Kbiafab, let
alone who would be working towards its remoal. Hence, its remoal
was a tall order een i all the Islamic lands were occupied. 1hereore,
the Allies concealed their intentions and these were a guarded secret that
no one knew o. Instead, they worked towards dealing the Ottoman
State a blow rom within by undertaking a host o initiaties to make her
withdraw rom the war and hold a separate peace with her. 1hey
concentrated on this idea and started working towards it.
5
Ihe Alles oIIempI oI
enIcng Jomol Posho
No person was in a position to inluence the Ottoman State and make
her withdraw rom the war or hold a separate peace with her apart rom
the inluential army oicers. As or the others, they were not in a position
to do anything. As or those traitors rom among the Arabs who
collaborated with the British and the lrench, they did not rise to the leel
o the politicians, nor did their masters - the British and the lrench, expect
them to inluence the State. 1heir task was to act as spies against the State
and to carry out acts o sabotage against her. Len the chie traitor, Al-
Shari Hussein ibn Ali, was too weak to hae any inluence oer the State.
All that the British wanted, was to use him in acts o sabotage against the
Islamic army, the Ottoman army, and in generating a public opinion or
them amongst the armed orces, lest the Muslims held eelings o
animosity against them and declared on them the ]ibaa which bariàb
commanded, considering that they were Kvffar. 1hereore, the Arabs were
not the Allies` ocus o attention during the war in their attempt at making
the Ottoman State withdraw rom the war, they rather concentrated their
attention on the 1urkish oicers.
lrom amongst the 1urks two oicers were known or: lirstly, their hatred
or the Germans and their opposition to the Ottoman State`s entry into
the war as an ally to Germany. Secondly, their ambition to seize power
and their endeaour to reach that goal. 1hese two oicers were Jamal
Pasha and Mustaa Kemal. As or Mustaa Kemal, he was a junior oicer
with no alue whatsoeer, although he was cleer, ambitious and actie
The Allies attempt at enticing Jamal Pasha
6
against the State. \hereas Jamal Pasha was in a position to be inluential,
especially because o the act that the whole o the Ottoman State was
goerned by three men : 1alàt, the Prime Minister, Anwar, the war minister
and Jamal Pasha himsel, the commander o the ourth diision and
goernor o Syria. Hence, the Allies attempted to entice Jamal Pasha.
During the Dardanelles campaign ,Gallipoli Campaign, and in the wake
o its ailure, the Allies attempted to contact Jamal Pasha in order or him
to reolt against the Ottoman State. 1his was due to the act that the
British had attacked Istanbul and seized Gallipoli on 25th April 1915,
howeer the Ottoman army had conronted them and halted their
progress. 1hus they could not adance a single step and they suered
heay losses to the point that the commander o the allied orces, General
Hamilton, was orced to send on 16th August a telegram to Lord
Kitchener, the British war secretary, seeking reinorcements and
ammunition. lurthermore, on 14th October, the British goernment
dismissed the commander o the Dardanelles campaign, General Hamilton
and replaced him with General Charles Monro who was ordered to
inestigate the Dardanelles campaign. On 28th October, Monro arried
in the Dardanelles and together with the general sta, he studied the
situation o the allied orces along the Dardanelles coastline and around
the British trenches. He then wrote to the war cabinet recommending
eacuation. Howeer the war secretary Lord Kitchener, was disquietened
by Monro`s telegram and decided to trael to the Dardanelles himsel.
He arried there on 9th Noember and inspected the military positions
along the coastline and around the British and lrench trenches. He came
to the conclusion that the allied orces could maintain their positions unless
the 1urks managed to acquire canons and ammunition rom Germany,
or this would render the allied orces` position ery critical. 1hen on 1st
December, the allied orces suddenly eacuated their positions. It was
during this critical period and time o conusion in which they were
muddled due to the Dardanelles campaign, that the Allies attempted to
contact Jamal Pasha and negotiate with him to rebel against the Ottoman
State. It seems that these negotiations did eectiely take place and Jamal
Pasha agreed in principle and laid down his conditions. lor on 26th
Noember 1915, the Russian oreign ministry sent to its two embassies in
Paris and Rome telegram No 6391, to quote rom the telegram : 1he
news reaching us rom the Armenian circles in Istanbul inorm us that
Jamal Pasha is willing to undertake a hostile moe against the goernment
o Istanbul i the ollowing conditions were met :
1- 1hat the allied states recognise the soereignty o the Ottoman State,
headed by the Sultan, oer the states o Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Arabstan,
Kilikia, Armenia and Kurdistan.
2- 1hat the Sultanate is assumed by Ahmed Jamal Pasha and that his sons
and grand-sons would assume the Sultanate ater him.
3- 1hat Ahmed Jamal Pasha would undertake to proclaim that the present
Sultan and his goernment are prisoners in the hands o the Germans,
and to declare war on them.
4- 1hat in the eent o Jamal Pasha declaring his rebellion and his march
to ight the goernment, the Allies would undertake to supply his army
with the necessary weapons, ood and military equipment.
5- 1hat the allied states would oer Jamal Pasha the necessary inancial
aid till the end o the war.
6- 1hat Jamal Pasha accepts to surrender the straits and Istanbul to the
Allies.
- 1hat Jamal Pasha undertakes to secure a ree route to help the
Armenians.
1his was the list o conditions mentioned in the telegram and it seems
that Russia had negotiated with the British and the lrench, and while
8
Russia had accepted Jamal Pasha`s terms the British and lrench did not.
On 12th December 1915, the Second Chancellor in the Russian oreign
ministry sent telegram 6130 to the Russian ambassador to Bucharest, to
quote rom the telegram : It is possible to gie Jamal Pasha an undertaking
about what he proposes and i necessary, we are in a position to secure
rom the Allies promises to gie him what he wants. Howeer, it seems
that the Allies rejected this. On 2th December 1915, the Russian
ambassador to Paris sent a telegram to his goernment in which he wrote
: \e are in receipt o your telegram No 6391, a copy o which was
passed on to Monsieur Brian who expressed a great deal o interest in its
contents and he declared that he would present them beore the cabinet
tomorrow, beore it is too late. He also said to me on this occasion that
although these conditions are acceptable to us, they howeer do not agree
with the British ambitions and they would reject them.
1hen the lrench retracted rom accepting the conditions. On 29th
December 1915 the ambassador sent a telegram appendant to his irst
telegram. 1o quote rom the telegram : \hat I learnt is that the lrench
ministers resisted strongly this agreement to the point that they did not
shrink rom expressing their objection. He added : \hat is certain is
that the lrench do appreciate some o your proposals and they are aware
o the importance to instigate a reolt within the Ottoman Sultanate.
1hey een beliee that this reolt would be ery useul to them in the
world war. Howeer, they do see in the proposals put orward to negotiate
with Jamal Pasha nothing but a ulilment o your ambitions to seize
Istanbul and the straits, without making any proisions or the lrench
soereignty oer the Last.
1he British later declared their rejection to take part in these negotiations.
On 2th January 1916, the Russian ambassador to London sent a telegram
to the Russian oreign minister in Petersburg in which he wrote: Nicholson
inormed me that haing reiewed the issue once again and haing closely
examined all o its aspects, the British goernment deem it necessary to
9
desist rom taking part in these negotiations and to relinquish them or
good. 1his indicates that the Allies` idea to make 1urkey withdraw rom
the war and to entice some o the oicers to seize power had its roots.
1hey howeer wanted to dismember the Ottoman State and abolish the
Kbiafab. Since one o Jamal Pasha`s conditions was to presere the unity
o the Islamic lands, at least as a ederation, and as one o his other
conditions was to presere the Kbiafab, they rejected his proposal and
reused to negotiate with him. It is only natural that they must hae
undertaken other initiaties.
As or their attempts with the barif o Makkah, Hussein ibn Ali, these
were known, but they would not hae sered the purpose o making the
Ottoman State withdraw rom the war, and undoubtedly, they must hae
made seeral other attempts with a host o 1urkish oicers. 1here is
nothing to indicate that other negotiations did take place with anyone
rom among the 1urks, but the British did hae their agents within the
State, such as Ari Pasha, Damad larid and others. Beore the lirst \orld
\ar, the British military attach had been ery actie and used to make
many moes and contacts, all with a ree hand. 1his military attach had
returned to Istanbul ater the cease-ire was signed and he played a major
role, together with the commander o the allied orces, in abolishing the
Kbiafab. Hence, it is ery likely that he had made seeral contacts and
established links, although none o these came to light.
1he rise o Mustaa Kemal
Mustaa Kemal was a little known junior oicer when the war broke out,
though he was known or his \estern thoughts and his rebellion against
the Islamic thoughts, and or his inclination towards the British and his
hatred or the Germans. It was only ater his participation in the battle o
Ana lorta that his name became known and celebrated. Since that time,
he acquired a wide publicity, his name became celebrated and he became
80
amous.
In the spring o 1915, at the beginning o the second year o the \orld
\ar, Germany halted her attempts at seizing the lrench territories because
neither Germany nor lrance could deeat one another and achiee a
decisie ictory. 1he Russians had meanwhile suered a seere battering,
rom which they could not rise again and resume their struggle unless the
\estern states acted switly and supplied Russia on a regular basis with
much needed ammunition. 1he \estern Allies loaded ships or this
purpose but they were besieged in the Mediterranean and could not reach
Russia. Hence it became imperatie to launch an attack on Istanbul and
open the straits in order to allow the ships to enter and supply Russia on
a regular basis. 1he command o the Ottoman army was at the time in
the hands o the German General Otto Liman on Sanders. He had
assigned the command o one diision to the Qaìv Qav Mustaa Kemal
Beik and it was at that time that the Allies` oensie took place.
On 15th April 1915, the British attempted to mount a huge oensie,
being adequately prepared or battle. 1hey entered the battle and the
British troops managed to reach Gallipoli and succeed in dispersing the
Ottoman troops. As a result General on Sanders was orced to dismiss
the commander in charge o the battle and he replaced him with the
Qaìv Qav Mustaa Kemal, who at the time was still a colonel. Mustaa
Kemal assumed the command o the Ottoman troops near Ana lorta,
one o the most sensitie areas near the Dardanelles. 1he battle was being
waged oer a alley with the 1urks occupying its peak and the British
down below trying to occupy it. 1he battle went on or seeral days with
neither o the two warring actions gaining the upper hand. 1he status
quo remained with the Ottomans holding on to their positions and the
British holding on to theirs as the ighting between them continued.
1his went on or seeral months when suddenly on the night o 15th
December, in an atmosphere shrouded in total secrecy, the British
81
eacuated rom the position they had occupied along the coast o Gallipoli.
1he warships set sail ater haing been loaded in an astonishing hurry. It
was that eacuation that ended the battle.
\hen the ighting was oer, the commander Mustaa Kemal presented
the German general commander with his report about the battle. He also
presented his watch which had been completely smashed by a bullet, thus
missing Mustaa Kemal. \hen Liman on Sanders receied the watch he
immediately took out his own gold watch and gited it to Mustaa Kemal,
keeping the smashed watch as a souenir.
Ater that battle Mustaa Kemal became a star, gaining widespread
popularity among the Ottoman armed orces, or this battle was gien
huge publicity and was considered a signiicant ictory or Mustaa Kemal
oer the British. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal used to harbour the idea o
not participating in the war, and despite his newly acquired popularity in
the wake o the battle o Ana lorta, he still maintained his opinion regarding
the withdrawal o the Ottoman State rom the war. He was not content
to merely carry such an opinion and with his ame among the armed
orces and the people, he undertook seeral attempts at inluencing a
host o powerul personalities in order to get them to beliee in his ideas,
although he was met with indierence and exation. As such, he became
the object o suspicion. Despite their aith in his military ability ater this
battle, no one was prepared to encourage him in meddling in the political
matters o the country, rather they used to stand in his way wheneer he
attempted to eectiely take part in the country`s politics. He held the
British in great esteem, trusting them and belieing in their ability and that
they would undoubtedly win and that Germany would be anquished,
and this is why he was under suspicion. Indeed een those who became
close to him came under the suspicion o the authorities and their
sureillance.
82
MusIofo Kemol works
Iowords Ihe wIhdrowol of
Ihe SIoIe from Ihe wor
ond Ihe sgnng of o peoce
IreoIy wIh Ihe BrIsh
\hat is striking is that Mustaa Kemal returned rom the Dardanelles to
Istanbul ictorious oer the British. 1he ictory had its eects on the
morale o the Ottoman armed orces and on Muslims all oer the
Ottoman State. It also had an eect on the Allies. Neertheless, Mustaa
Kemal returned rom the battle that he had led and rom which he had
emerged ictorious to arouse people`s doubts about the State`s ability to
ight the British, and to generate the idea o the State withdrawing rom
the war and signing a unilateral peace treaty with the British. He returned
to initiate a domestic battle with the State in order to make her orsake
the Germans and side with the British. I beore the battle he had held
the same opinion, he kept it to himsel, but now that he had returned
rom battle, he started spreading these opinions amongst people, especially
the army oicers, and attempted to inluence the high ranking and
powerul personalities. He een started to meet with ministers and talked
to them openly o his opinions and attempted to inluence them.
On one occasion he isited the oreign minister in his oice. 1he oreign
minister at the time was Nasimi Beik, who was rom amongst those who
suggested that 1urkey should enter the war alongside Germany. Nasimi
83
Beik greeted Mustaa Kemal warmly as the hero o Ana lorta and he
talked to him in a courteous manner. His talk was ull o graceul optimism,
especially in the wake o the ictory achieed by the State and her deeat
and repulsion o the Allies` armed orces in the Dardanelles. 1he oreign
minister was appreciatie o this ictory and was aware o the deeat`s
eect on the Allies, because it meant keeping Russia depried o the
supplies o the war ammunitions she desperately needed, and subjecting
lrance to a German blitzkrieg due to Russia`s inability to ight through a
lack o supplies, which meant that the Germans would secure the eastern
ront. 1he balance o power had tilted in aour o the Germans and
the Ottoman State against the Allies. It was or this reason that the oreign
minister was optimistic. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal attempted to raise
pessimism and to conince the minister o his iews. It seemed that he
sensed the strength o the minister`s arguments, thus he resorted to menace
and said to the minister : \ou ought to take note o what I am about to
tell you! I you allow the politicians to continue aecting you, you will
ind yoursel acing a problem bigger than you and the politicians will
hae imagined. Upon this the minister was disquietened and said
arrogantly : I do not know what you mean. Mustaa Kemal said : I
mean that the country is heading towards destruction, and now you pretend
not to see it heading that way. Obiously you are compelled to say this
because o your position as minister, howeer, your personal belie must
be completely dierent to this. \ou undoubtedly do not ignore the whole
reality, and you are undoubtedly aware o the source o the ailment and
where the calamity lies. 1he minister was stunned. He then turned to
Mustaa Kemal and said to him in a sturdy tone : Colonel! I you hae
come here to cast your doubts about the country`s situation, then let me
tell you that this is neither the time nor the place to cast such doubts. \ou
hae made a mistake by coming to me, or my ellow ministers and I
hae total aith in the Commander in Chie, I thereore suggest that you
go and see him so that he can dissipate these ears o yours and eradicate
the things that are worrying you. He then dismissed him rom his oice.
Mustafa Kemal works towards the withdrawal of the State
from the war and the signing of a peace treaty
84
1he next morning, the oreign minister brieed the Commander in Chie
about the conersation that had taken place between him and Mustaa
Kemal and urged him to inlict on him the appropriate punishment. 1he
Commander in Chie decided to banish Mustaa Kemal to the Caucasus.
He was instantly banished and remained there or oer a year without
being able to undertake any signiicant actiity.
1he meeting with the oreign minister marked the irst oicial endeaour
by Mustaa Kemal to lure the State out o the war and to persuade the
statesmen, ministers and oicers alike, to do so. 1here was no indication
at the time to suggest that he pursued such an initiatie on the basis o
speciic contacts with the British. 1hus his action was deemed to be a
personal opinion and an exertion solely rom his part. By banishing him,
the State was rid o this idea. Howeer, a series o eents took place
aterwards, these being initiated by Mustaa Kemal in order to implement
his thoughts by orce and to seize power by orce, whereupon his treason
became maniest.
Mustaa Kemal's conspiracy against the State
As or the irst eent, this took place while he was in the Caucasus. An
attempted coup was staged and it was thought that he was implicated.
Major \aqub Jamil Beik conspired with his riends to topple the
goernment. 1o quote rom what he said to his riends : 1hose men
who think they are big are in act small and the country calls or their
remoal rom their posts to replace them with men who hae more
patriotism and more sincerity. His riends interrupted : 1he remoal
o such men is a simple matter, but could you tell us about the man who
in your iew could restore the regime to its old sel Upon this \aqub
instantly replied : Mustaa Kemal. 1he conspiracy was later uncoered
and \aqub and his riends were executed. Mustaa Kemal heard o this
news during his stay in the Caucasus. Its impact upon him was like a
85
thunderbolt. 1he news reached him ia Doctor Hilmi Beik, who was an
accessory to the conspiracy, but he had managed to lee rom Istanbul
and go to Mustaa Kemal. 1he goernment in Istanbul had ordered
Mustaa Kemal to arrest Doctor Hilmi and send him back at once, but
Mustaa Kemal sent a telegram to the authorities in which he said : Doctor
Hilmi is as o now under my protection. 1he goernment could do
little but remain silent, or a conrontation with Mustaa Kemal would
hae led to aderse consequences. Hence, it became clear to the goernment
and to many personalities within the State and the army that Mustaa
Kemal was aspiring to seize power and to withdraw rom the war. 1hus
Mustaa Kemal emerged on the political scene not only with the thoughts
that he carried, but also with a method by which he aimed at executing
those thoughts. Consequently, he became the object o caution and
apprehension.
As or the second eent, this took place when the State was deeated in
.rabRvv ,Roman land,, and Baghdad ell in March 191 at the hands o
the British. Mustaa Kemal`s audacity against the State then became clearly
maniest and he started openly calling upon the goernment to withdraw
rom the war. Circumstantially, the Russians intensiied their attack on
.rabRvv, which subsequently ell into their hands. 1he loss o the ortress
could hae been curtailed and the authorities would hae been able to
coer up the scandal. Howeer, the British attacked Iraq and conquered
Baghdad, thus the weakness o the State was exposed and her deeat
became maniest.
1he British had attacked Iraq with an army rom India, but the Ottoman
army conronted them and halted the British onslaught. 1hey also managed
to repel a British relie task orce. On 29th April 1916, they orced the
contingent o 1omshend that was besieged in Kut Al-Amara to surrender
and took eeryone as prisoner. Howeer, the British orces heading towards
Iraq were greater than the Ottoman orces stationed there, so British
military superiority started to be relected in the battles and the scales
86
tilted in aour o the British.
In lebruary 191, the British recaptured Kut Al-Amara. 1hen in March
191 they captured Baghdad and continued their march towards Al-
Moosil. 1his caused disquiet within the goernment and a public opinion
calling or the remoal o Anwar rom the war ministry and his
replacement was generated. Len the Committee o Union & Progress,
which at the time was the ruling party and o whom Anwar was one o
its most prominent igures, was o the same opinion.
Hence, the issue o replacing Anwar at the head o the war ministry by
one o the competent oicers was discussed. 1he names put orward to
assume such a post under such circumstances were Jamal Pasha, Marshal
Izzet and Mustaa Kemal. 1he post o war minister required experience
and shrewdness in political matters. Hence, the appointment o Jamal
Pasha or Marshal Izzet to such a post would hae been a mistake, or the
ormer had ailed in his post as goernor o Syria and the latter had no
experience in politics. 1hus Mustaa Kemal became the obious choice.
Howeer, it was well known that Mustaa Kemal wanted to topple the
goernment and withdraw rom the war. His iews on the war were well
known. Hence, he was rejected as he used to write to the goernment
warning them against pursuing the war. He belieed that Germany had
already lost the war politically and that she was no longer capable o
winning the war militarily. He also doubted whether the Ottoman State
would be able to distance hersel rom the war, because he deemed it
necessary or the Allies to hae a passage in the Dardanelles in order to
establish a link with the allied countries in the east. On the other hand,
Russia used to be considered the archenemy o the Ottoman Lmpire. All
o these opinions were well known and he used to openly declare them.
Hence, nobody was eer in any doubt that had Mustaa Kemal assumed
the general command o the armed orces, he would hae introduced
radical changes to the goernment and its policies. 1hereore, the oice
o those calling or the remoal o Anwar receded and they started
8
calling or the recapture o Baghdad orthwith.
Anwar approached the German High Command and urged them
persistently to supply him with reinorcements in order to recapture
Baghdad. 1he Germans or their part went to great lengths to assist their
ally Anwar and keep him in oice. One o the measures they undertook
was to place General Lrich on lalkenhayn and a large number o
contingents under his disposal. lalkenhayn built up a new orce which he
named 1hunderbolt, with Aleppo as its General Command
headquarters. Mustaa Kemal was promoted to the rank o General and
appointed as the commander o the 4th army under the general command
o lalkenhayn.
Mustaa Kemal was aerse to the idea o haing the general command in
the hands o one o the Germans. He deemed any eort to be spent in
recapturing Baghdad as utile and that the eorts being made to recapture
it were lost and to no aail. He een considered that the undertaking o
such an action would lead to resh heay losses to the Ottoman army.
Consequently, he embarked upon proing to the country the ignorance
o those calling or the recapture o Baghdad and the error o Anwar`s
policies. He also embarked upon outlining the damage that the country
would suer as a result o this crooked policy. 1hen he started to speak
in detail in his speeches about the losses which the Ottoman State suered
because o her capitulation to the Germans. 1hus, it was ineitable or
him to clash with the German commander. 1he German commander
lalkenhayn, or his part attempted to win him oer and paciy him with
all possible means but he ailed. He allowed him to attend the meetings
o the high command.
1he plan was to attack Baghdad by land and the Suez Canal by air. By
attacking the Suez Canal, the British orces would be unable to reinorce
their counterparts in Iraq. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal criticised this plan
and attacked it seerely, declaring that it was doomed to ailure. Howeer,
88
the Germans disregarded his opposition and his criticism and nobody
supported his iews except Jamal Pasha, or he held the same opinion.
Indeed, they were known to be the two oicers who hated the Germans
and who adocated the withdrawal o the State rom the war. Hence,
Jamal Pasha stood by Mustaa Kemal in their discussions with the high
command, but the plan remained in process because the Commander in
Chie lalkenhayn as well as the other commanders deemed it sound and
successul.
1hen the causes o the quarrel between Mustaa Kemal and lalkenhayn
came in succession. One day, the war cabinet held a meeting to start
executing the plans, the meeting was oershadowed by heated debates,
lalkenhayn addressed Mustaa Kemal with harsh words and Mustaa
Kemal or his part replied in kind. Consequently, Mustaa Kemal tabled
his resignation but Anwar rejected it and ordered him to return to the
Caucasus. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal did not abide by the order this time
and reused to go, thus Anwar retracted and deemed that the best style to
get rid o such a bizarre situation and to conceal his rebellion was to
grant him an indeinite sick leae. Howeer lalkenhayn did not agree to
this leae and suggested the prosecution o the rebel commander beore
a court marshal. linally they settled on granting him leae. At the time
Mustaa Kemal was in Aleppo. He attempted to leae the city and reealed
that he needed money. At that time he owned ten thoroughbreds and
wanted to sell them, but could not ind a buyer. Upon this Jamal Pasha
oered to help him, so he gae him _2000, and sent a urther _3000
once he had returned to Istanbul. 1hereore by adopting these actiities,
Mustaa Kemal appeared clearly to be at odds with the Ottoman State
regarding her conlict with the British.
Mustaa Kemal's persistence in seizing power
As or the third eent, it relected the act that the issue was no longer a
89
mere oicing o an opinion and a mere rebellion, or Mustaa Kemal
started to persist in his quest to seize power. He also undertook a host o
actiities rom which one could deduce that he had established contact
with the British in order to implement his thoughts.
On 3rd July 1918, Sultan Muhammad Rashad died and he was succeeded
to the throne by Muhammad \ahid-ud-Deen, otherwise known as
Muhammad 5th. Mustaa Kemal decided that the opportunity had come
or him to seize power, or he had just accompanied \ahid-ud-Deen to
Germany where they met with Hindenburg. Anwar had sent Mustaa
Kemal to Germany with \ahid-ud-Deen, who at the time was heir
apparent, so that he could see or himsel the might o Germany in the
hope that he would change his iews.
No sooner had they returned rom their trip than the death o Muhammad
Rashad occurred and \ahid-ud-Deen acceded to the throne. Mustaa
Kemal jumped at the opportunity o haing just accompanied \ahid-
ud-Deen and attempted to conince him o his iews so that he could
appoint him the head o the goernment. He isited the new Sultan on a
riendly basis and \ahid-ud-Deen greeted him warmly and courteously.
He made him eel welcome and een lit a cigarette or him. 1his encouraged
Mustaa Kemal to speak to him rankly about his iews. Hence, he set
about explaining his strategy and stressing to him that the deastation
threatening the country was imminent. Also that the Sultan should
personally assume total control oer the armed orces and strip Anwar
and the German commanders o all powers in order to become the
eectie man in charge and not just a nominal Sultan. He also conirmed
his readiness to shoulder the responsibility o the High Command, thereby
saing the Ottoman State rom the precipice oer which it was teetering.
He also told him that he should rid himsel o the German alliance and
hold a unilateral peace treaty beore it was too late.
Upon this \ahid-ud-Deen asked him : Are there any more oicers who
90
share your iews Mustaa Kemal replied : 1here are many o them
\our Honour. Howeer, \ahid-ud-Deen did not promise him anything.
So he met him a second time but still \ahid-ud-Deen did not promise
anything. He met him a third time and once again he explained to him his
iewpoint. \ahid-ud-Deen listened to him in silence until he inished,
then he turned to him and said in a harsh and decisie tone : I hae
organised all my aairs in conjunction with their Lxcellencies Anwar Pasha
and 1alàt Pasha. 1hen he instantly dismissed him.
Less than two weeks later, \ahid-ud-Deen summoned Mustaa Kemal,
so he came. 1he Sultan was surrounded by his sta and some German
commanders. Haing greeted him warmly, he turned to them and said :
1his is Mustaa Kemal Pasha. He is one o the most competent oicers
that I trust. He then turned to Mustaa Kemal and said : \our Lxcellency,
I hae appointed you as Commander o the Syrian ront. It is o a great
strategic importance and I want you to go there immediately. Do not let
it all into the hands o the enemy. I am conident that you will accomplish
the task and I am delegating it to you to conduct it in the best possible
manner and that nearest to perection. He then ordered him to leae
instantly without giing him a chance to speak.
Mustaa Kemal evacuates Syria and
surrenders her to the British
As or the ourth eent, this was relected in the act that when Mustaa
Kemal traelled to the Syrian ront to ight the British, he instead
surrendered the country to them and withdrew to Anatolia. Ater haing
been gien his orders, he traelled to his headquarters in the Syrian ront
and arried there at the end o August in 1918 and he reported to the
German High Commander Liman on Sanders, or lalkenhayn had
already returned to Germany in the spring. on Sanders greeted him
warmly, or he knew him since the days o Ana lorta, and he handed
91
him the command o the seenth army which dominated the middle
part o the line o deence. Ater assuming the command o the army at
the ront, he complained o kidney troubles, and he remained bed ridden
at the command`s centre in Nablus rom 1st September 1918. On 19th
September the British attack on the ront started, so Mustaa Kemal
withdrew with his troops back to the Rier Jordan. He then crossed the
rier and gathered his troops and headed towards the desert, hastily
withdrawing with them alongside the railway line, without pause until
they reached Damascus.
In Damascus, the High Commander on Sanders ordered him on 2th
September to establish a new deence line in Riaq, so he went to accomplish
that task. He then went back to Liman on Sanders and inormed him
that it would be useless to organise a line o deence in Riaq and that the
organising o troops would require ample time. He also suggested that
the army should withdraw a urther 100 miles towards Aleppo and
abandon the whole o Syria, so that they could block the way to 1urkey
itsel in the ace o the adancing enemies.
\hen he suggested this opinion, the German commander said to him :
I cannot issue the order to execute such a plan and I cannot take the
responsibility o leaing a large area o the Ottoman Lmpire as an easy
prey to the enemy without giing a last shot. Upon this Mustaa Kemal
said : I take ull responsibility. He then issued the order to immediately
cease all conrontation with the enemy and to prepare or a general
eacuation towards Aleppo, in order to deend 1urkey hersel. 1hen he
set o towards Aleppo reaching her on 6th October.
During that time the Arab leaders, spurred on by the British intelligence
oicer Lawrence, asked Mustaa Kemal to use his inluence to persuade
the goernment to hold a unilateral peace treaty with the Allies.
At the same time, ater Mustaa Kemal`s arrial in Aleppo, the moements
92
o the British warships intensiied in the gul o Iskandaron, and on 14th
October three torpedo boats entered the gul. One o the boats hoisted
a white lag and disembarked a small boat that took a host o British and
lrench oicers ashore where they met with the commander o the 1urkish
garrison and then returned, then the torpedo boats let the gul.
lurthermore, once Mustaa Kemal had set up a deence line ten miles
north o Aleppo, he sent a telegram to the Sultan in which he recommended
that Izzet Pasha head the goernment, and he suggested the orming o
a new goernment with the portolios going to the persons he listed in
his telegram while asking or the war ministry`s portolio to be gien to
him, thus giing him absolute command oer the whole o the 1urkish
army.
He did not receie a reply to his telegram rom the Sultan. Howeer,
news reached him soon aterwards that Anwar and 1alàt had allen and
that Izzet Pasha had been appointed as head o the goernment, and also
that the members o the new goernment were those he had mentioned
in his telegram. Izzet Pasha also sent him a personal telegram in which he
said : Allah willing, I hope that we can meet as riends by the time the
terms o the truce hae been signed.
1his indicates that Mustaa Kemal went to Syria not with the intention to
ight, but in search o a means to carry out his plan once he had ailed to
persuade Sultan \ahid-ud-Deen o his plan and once he had been
banished to the ront. His stay in Nablus under the pretext o illness, then
his swit withdrawal to Damascus raises doubt and suspicion. As or his
withdrawal rom the whole o Syria, to leae her an easy prey to the
British and iolate the orders o the General Commander, it is probable
that he did so in collaboration with the British. 1his is supported by the
act that he had established contact with Lawrence through the Arab
chies who suggested to him the use o his inluence to persuade his
goernment to withdraw rom the war and hold a unilateral peace treaty.
It is also supported by the act that he said that he wanted to establish a
93
line o deence in Aleppo in order to deend 1urkey and then turned his
back to it and took with him only the 1urkish soldiers. It is also supported
by the telegram he sent to \ahid-ud-Deen, and inally it is conirmed
and established by the personal answer he receied rom Izzet Pasha and
his saying in that telegram : I hope that we can meet as riends by the
time the terms o the truce hae been signed.
94
Ihe copIuloIon of Ihe
OIIomon SIoIe
During that time Anwar, who dominated the state, was attempting to
rally the remaining troops which had emerged ictorious rom the many
battles they had ought, and to gie orders to these troops to return to
the capital immediately to ace the enemy. But people around him thought
that the hour had already passed. Len those who had supported him in
the past reused to go along with him and ollow his policy. Hence, he
was orced to surrender and call or a truce. 1hus the Allies accepted and
he signed the truce treaty. All that was let was or the negotiations oer
the terms o the truce. 1he Ottoman State capitulated and the Allies
occupied her.
Howeer, the surrender and this occupation o the State by the Allies did
not mean a surrender to the Allies which entailed that the State had become
a colony o theirs or one o their properties. Nor did it mean that their
occupation was permanent, or this was a war between two states, one
would anquish the other, thus the ictor would dictate the terms o
peace upon the loser, and the deeated state would remain a state as an
entity with domestic and oreign soereignty. 1his is on the one hand,
while on the other hand the surrender was not a surrender by the state o
1urkey, but a surrender by the Kbaeefab o the Muslims, or according to
their own terms a surrender by the Ottoman Lmpire. Hence the deeated
state was the Kbiafab, and not the state o 1urkey. 1hereore, the
international measures by the Allies, in their capacity as ictors, and by the
Ottoman State, in her capacity as the loser, were duly measures related to
95
the Ottoman State, in other words related to eeryone who lied under
the banner o the Kbiafab, or pledged their allegiance to her.
1he British dismember the Khilaah State
Howeer, since the British aim was to dismember the Ottoman State in
her quality as an Islamic State and to abolish the Kbiafab, they trod the
path that led to this and they proceeded in their dealings with the anquished
Ottoman State in a manner dierent to that proceeded with the anquished
Germany, despite the act that the two states had ought alongside each
other. Indeed the Allied ictory oer the Ottoman State was similar to
their ictory oer Germany, thus the two states should hae been treated
equally. Howeer, the British treated Germany as a anquished state
according to international law and what it stipulated in the eent o a war
coming to an end between two states, with one emerging as the ictor
and the other the loser. As or the Ottoman State, she was treated dierently.
lor as soon as the war ended she was dismembered into pieces, most o
which the British occupied and diided into parts according to the plan
that had been deised during the war. 1hey also started to aoid their
Allies in order to gain the lion`s share in the lands o the anquished
Ottoman State. 1hen they concentrated their eorts on the Kbiafab`. centre
in order to adopt the most appropriate styles to ensure its abolition.
Adopting nationalism and patriotism as a
basis or the process or dismemberment
As or the process o dismemberment, the seeds o nationalist tendencies
and patriotic chauinism implanted earlier by the British had by then come
to ruition. 1hus it was the right time or them to use them as a basis or
the process o dismemberment, and they eectiely began to do so.
Accordingly, they turned the lands inhabited by 1urkish speaking Muslims
into one single entity and started to use their direct rule and oerwhelming
The capitulation of the Ottoman State
96
inluence to lare up 1urkish nationalist tendencies. 1hey tried to eoke
the idea o 1urkey`s independence, meaning her separation rom the rest
o the Islamic State, or according to them the Ottoman Lmpire, while
deining the word independence with the meaning o getting rid o the
Allied occupation. 1his was despite the act that the practical reality they
were actually pushing people towards was the independence rom all the
other parts o the State, namely a complete separation. 1hey also broke
the lands inhabited by Arabic speaking Muslims into seeral pieces.
Although the British had occupied most o them, they did not keep them
as one entity. 1hey rather turned those lands into seeral entities according
to the maps they had drawn or them during the war.
Hence they physically carried out the dismemberment o the conquered
State and turned her into seeral states beore holding with her a peace
treaty, and beore een agreeing with her the terms o peace. lor no
sooner had they occupied the lands than they diided them into seeral
countries and started ruling them as i they were seeral states which they
had just occupied. 1his was in iolation o international law and
contradictory to international conentions, because the occupation by the
ictorious state in the war o the land o the anquished state is not
suicient to determine the ate o the occupied state or the occupied
territories, what determines this is rather the peace treaty, een i the
terms o the treaty were dictated and imposed. 1he nearest example to
this is the act that although Berlin was occupied or oer orty years, her
ate was not determined by its occupation but by the peace treaty and the
Allies` agreement upon it.
1hereore, by diiding the Ottoman state soon ater occupying her lands
and soon ater she was deeated in the war, Britain committed an inalid
act which iolated international law. lor she undertook that action
unilaterally beore agreeing terms with the Allies and beore signing the
peace treaty or agreeing on the terms o peace and not een beore the
Allies could dictate the terms, assuming that this dictation would hae
9
been alid.
In act, these countries were all part o the state, or Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
Palestine, Last Jordan, Hijaz and \emen were all under the banner o the
Ottoman state and part o her !iaya.. 1hey had no entity, be it one o
sel-rule or a state, and none o them had any independent soereignty,
be it domestic or oreign. 1hereore, none o her inhabitants had a
mandate to conduct any international negotiations. Any international act
undertaken by any person rom these !iaya. with any state would be
inalid and could not be recognised and would hae no consideration
whatsoeer. Len Lgypt which was under British domination and a British
mandate, was considered part o the Ottoman state. \hen her people,
the Lgyptian people, were calling or the exit o the British, they were
calling or the return o their country under the banner o the Islamic
state, the Ottoman state, so that they become once again under the rule
o the Kbaeefab o the Muslims. Mustaa Kamal called or the eacuation
o the British and or the return o Lgypt as part o the Kbiafab in
Istanbul.
1hereore, any negotiations between the ictorious Allies pertaining to
any matter related to these lands should hae been conducted with the
Kbaeefab and nobody else, represented with the central goernment in
Istanbul. As or Al-Shari Hussein ibn Ali, he had been ailiated to the
Kbiafab and then he had rebelled. His rebellion should not hae gien him
any rights o statehood. As or those whom Britain and lrance had
considered as Arab leaders in Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad, they were
traitors like Al- Hussein and they had no qualiication granting them the
right to negotiate with the ictorious Allies. 1hey were een less worthy
than Al-Hussein, not just in terms o inluence, but een in terms o how
the state, o whom they happened to be her citizen, iewed them. Al-
Shari Hussein was considered a barif oer Hijaz by the anquished
state, whereas they were nothing but indiiduals who betrayed their |vvab
and their state and who worked as spies or the enemies.
98
Howeer Britain in particular, despite her awareness o this, embarked
upon negotiating with the locals o the lands she had occupied oer the
uture o their lands and their ate, knowing ull well that these negotiations
carried no weight internationally and could not be recognised, nor could
they be taken into any consideration. Howeer, she did eectiely negotiate
with them and gae them the right to speak on behal o their countries
with the occupying state. She used this as a means to tighten her grip on
the lands she had occupied, according to the plan that she had designed
or them and according to the maps which she had drawn up to diide
these lands. She then allowed the issue o the oicial international
negotiations to be held with the Kbaeefab, or with whosoeer she would
appoint should she succeed in abolishing the Kbiafab, to take a secondary
role, so that they became nominal and so that they could be completed
once the peace treaty was concluded. 1his would enable her to dictate
her terms to the Kbaeefab should she ail to abolish the Kbiafab. Britain
proceeded on this basis, and with this unlawul action. 1hus the
dismemberment o the Islamic state was carried out by the British.
1his was as ar as the British dismemberment into pieces o the occupied
lands was concerned. As or her aoidance o the Allies, although it does
not concern the Muslims, these manoeures were used by the British as a
style to help them undertake seeral moes aimed at abolishing and
destroying the Kbiafab. Hence it is imperatie to draw attention to these
actions in order to comprehend the British political manoeuring.
1he Allies entered the war or dierent objecties, and although they
ought on the same side, they were howeer at odds with one another,
competing with one another and hateul o each other. Lach state used
to secretly scheme against the other. Britain was at the time the leading
power on the international scene, with lrance, Russia, Germany and Italy
competing with her. \hen she entered the war against Germany and the
Ottoman State she attempted to entice the other countries to take part
with her in the war or at least to hold out until the end o the war. 1o this
99
end she used to make secret deals with the major powers to tempt them
with the abundant spoils which they would share once ictory was
achieed. Hence, she promised to Italy, in the secret agreement signed in
London on 26th April 1915, the 1urkish district o Antalya and the
surrounding districts along the Mediterranean as a reward or entering
the war.
A year later in 1916, Britain, lrance and Russia agreed on the secret Sykes-
Picot Agreement to diide the Ottoman Lmpire. It was on the basis o
this treaty that the peace terms were later agreed with Mustaa Kemal.
Howeer, this secret treaty was not reealed to Italy, who was kept in the
dark or a while until she got wind o it. 1hus she was angered and
started calling or the diiding o the spoils and the ragmentation o the
Ottoman Lmpire.
On the 2th April 191, Britain, lrance and Russia took part in the signing
o a treaty which they had drated themseles. Italy was promised in the
treaty the district o Izmir and all the western side o Anatolia up until
Konya, proided that these estates would be goerned by an Italian
mandate. 1he treaty also contained other clauses. No sooner was the war
oer than Britain rushed to occupy Istanbul and all the Arabic speaking
countries. lrance or her part rushed to occupy what they had agreed
upon, so she occupied Lebanon and Britain attempted to stop her rom
occupying Syria, although lrance succeeded in occupying her in 1920.
In 1919, Italy occupied the city o Antalya and the surrounding estates,
thus Britain turned a blind eye, howeer she did object to Italy`s occupation
o Izmir. She together with lrance conronted Italy and preented her
rom occupying Izmir and the western coastline o Anatolia, under the
pretext that the treaty granting those colonies to Italy had not been signed
by Russia. Hence Britain and lrance considered this treaty null and oid.
In order to resist Italy, Britain inspired Greece into occupying Izmir on
behal o the Allies. She initiated a host o manoeures which lasted or
100
our years until she managed to achiee all she had wanted, that is, taking
the lion`s share, abolishing the Kbiafab and dealing Islam a atal blow in
the international arena. linally she held the 2nd Lausanne conerence and
achieed what she had internationally set out to achiee.
1he British concentration on the Khilaah's
capital to abolish her
As or the concentration o their eorts on the centre o the Kbiafab in
order to adopt the styles which would lead to its abolition, the British
had, in addition to their manoeuring against their Allies and in addition
to their eorts in the lands they had occupied, ocused all their attention
on 1urkey in particular, and more speciically on the centre o the Kbiafab.
1hereore, soon ater the declaration o the truce, British warships rushed
to seize the Bosphorous and their troops occupied the capital and all the
ortresses o the Dardanelles, as well as all the sensitie military areas
throughout 1urkey. Meanwhile, the lrench troops occupied Antep, while
the Italian troops occupied Bira and the railway lines. 1he British
commander, Harrington was appointed as the Allies General Commander
in 1urkey.
1hereore, it was the British troops who eectiely occupied 1urkey and
assumed their hegemony oer her. lrance and Italy`s occupation was
merely nominal and merely to conirm their presence. Hence, contact
between the anquished state, pertaining to the domestic matters o
1urkey, and the Allies meant in act contact with the British. 1hus the
British managed to play their role in 1urkey single-handedly and their
Allies had no role and no eect on the 1urkish domestic matters.
1hey also embarked upon a host o political manoeures in order to
control the Kbiafab State, or the Ottoman Lmpire according to them,
since the truce was declared. 1hey ocused their political game on 1urkey
101
in particular in order to oerthrow the goernment and destroy the
Kbiafab.
1o this end, the British set about attempting to plunge the State into
political crisis the moment the truce was declared. 1hey accepted rom
the Ottoman State the truce and they signed its treaty with 1alàt and
Anwar, but when they were asked to hold negotiations aimed at agreeing
on the terms, they declared that they were not prepared to negotiate with
1alàt and Anwar because they were the ones who had been chiely
responsible or the Ottoman State`s entry into the war. 1hus they demanded
the orming o a new goernment.
1he telegram that Mustaa Kemal had sent rom Aleppo and in which he
recommended that Marshal Izzet Pasha should assume the Prime Minister`s
post arried at that time. Hence, Izzet Pasha ormed the goernment and
he sent his special telegram to Mustaa Kemal in which he wrote : I
hope that we could meet as riends once the terms o the truce hae
been concluded. It is worth noting that or this to happen rom Mustaa
Kemal and rom the Allies simultaneously and on the same subject, could
be interpreted as sheer coincidence. Howeer, the eents which ollowed
proed that the possibility o coincidence was ery remote.
Neertheless, Izzet Pasha started the negotiations in order to conclude
the peace terms. 1he prealent opinion was that i a speedy unilateral
peace treaty was signed, the country could aoid the stalemate in which
she ound hersel without suering heay losses. Some people thought
well o the British and belieed that they would help them and be satisied
with the Ottoman State`s exit rom the war and her remaining a neutral
State. 1hus they attempted to halt the adance o the Allies and preent
them rom occupying the Dardanelles. 1hey sought the mediation o
1ownsend, the British General who had been imprisoned in Kut-Al-
Imara, in order to persuade Colthorpe, the Admiral o the British leet
who had just entered the harbour o Modres at the entrance o the
102
Dardanelles, to halt his adance until they had conducted their negotiations
with the Allies. He rejected their plea and they were orced to surrender
ater they had lost all hope with the British.
1he negotiations took place hastily aboard the warship Super which was
carrying Admiral Colthorpe, and no time was gien to een consult the
Allied lrench orces. Hence, the British held the truce with the Ottoman
State single-handedly on behal o the Allies, and agreement was reached
on 30th October 1918. 1hen the British brieed their Allies the lrench,
but this was ater they had eectiely occupied most o the important
parts o 1urkey, leaing lrance and Italy with a nominal occupation that
was just or the sake o taking part.
Just under a month ater holding the truce, the British ordered the Kbaeefab
to remoe Izzet Pasha rom the goernment and orm a new goernment,
because that goernment was responsible or the decision o 1alàt and
Anwar, who should hae been arrested and handed oer to the Allies, as
a clause in the terms o truce stated that those responsible or the war
should be handed oer. In this way, the British embarked upon generating
a series o political crises or the Kbiafab.
103
Ihe BrIsh oIIempI Io
desIroy Ihe Khlofoh
Ihrough polIcol ond legol
ocIons
It seemed that the British were hoping to generate a radical change in the
ruling system by destroying the Kbiafab and establishing a republic through
legitimate and legal means, without haing to resort to a military coup or
an armed rebellion. So they resorted to purely political styles. Once Izzet
Pasha was remoed, the Kbaeefab instructed 1awiq Pasha to orm the
new goernment. 1awiq Pasha was known to be a British agent. During
the rule o Abdul-Hamid he was a ciil serant, appointed as ambassador
o the Ottoman State to London, where he managed to gain the sympathy
and the pleasure o the British. Howeer, when he ormed his goernment,
he was an old man in his eighties and unit to perorm the role expected
o him. 1hus the British were uneasy about his orming o the
goernment.
Howeer, prior to attempting to replace him and bringing a new
goernment, they wanted to dissole the parliament known as the council
o .Mab`vtbav. 1his was because that council was elected by people
rom all oer the Ottoman State, namely the Kbiafab State. Accordingly, it
was not a 1urkish parliament, exclusie to 1urkey. Besides, most o the
deputies were rom the \oung 1urks and the Committee o Union &
Progress ,C.U.P.,. In other words the party o Anwar and Jamal, whose
iews were in aour o maintaining the Kbiafab and all the parts o the
The British attempt to destroy the Khilafah through
political and legal actions
104
Ottoman State. 1hereore, it would be ery unlikely or it to agree to the
abolition o the Kbiafab, or to agree to the seering o the other parts o
the Lmpire rom 1urkey. 1hey also wanted to generate a political acuum
in the country, and dissoling parliament would help them generate this
acuum. Hence, they were determined to dissole it. 1hey wanted at irst
to dissole it through constitutional means, without haing to resort to an
interention rom the Sultan in response to their demand. 1his was when
Mustaa Kemal attempted to apply the constitutional solutions and ailed.
1hen the Sultan, in an unexpected moe, dissoled parliament by a decree,
and this could only be based on a demand o which he was coninced or
which he could not aord to reuse.
More speciically, it became imperatie or 1awiq Pasha to gain a
parliamentary ote o conidence according to the constitutional rules,and
so a parliamentary session to cast that ote was to be held. Mustaa Kemal
who had just returned rom Aleppo and Adhano, rushed to conince the
deputies to gie the goernment a ote o no conidence. He had some
riends rom among the unionists who represented the majority o
parliament. lrom among those was lathi Beik who had power and
inluence. lathi Beik gathered or him a number o deputies and he initiated
a debate with them in an adjacent room, and Mustaa Kemal put orward
his proposal, that is, to gie the goernment a ote o no conidence.
Howeer, they objected to this, claiming that casting a ote o no
conidence would ineitably lead to the dissolution o the council. Upon
this he could no longer conceal the objecties he was aiming or so he
promptly replied : And this would be better in the long term, or through
this, we can bide our time and prepare our aairs to orm the goernment
that we want.
1he diision bell rang and the deputies made their way into the parliament
chamber. But when the time came to cast the otes and the speaker
announced the result, the oerwhelming majority gae the goernment a
ote o conidence.
105
\hen Mustaa Kemal learnt this, he let the parliament buildings and as
soon as he arried home, he telephoned the palace requesting an urgent
meeting with the Sultan. Sultan \ahid-ud-Deen was aware o Mustaa
Kemal`s thoughts and knew about his ambition to seize power. Indeed,
he sensed in him some power and thought that he had powerul allies in
the army and had inluence oer the army. \ahid-ud-Deen`s main concern
was to maintain his throne and he iewed Mustaa Kemal as a threat to
him. 1hus, when he requested an audience with him he immediately agreed.
Howeer, he set the date o the meeting to be on the earliest lriday.
\ahid-ud-Deen chose that day because it was the day when the
aavvai took place, meaning when the Kbaeefab met with the people
who came to greet him. His intention was to get Mustaa Kemal to declare
his links with the Sultan and to conirm his loyalty to the Kbaeefab along
with perorming the ]vvaà prayer with him. 1hen he would take the
appropriate arrangements to listen to his talk -which he knew- in priate.
Once the Salah ended, \ahid-ud-Deen asked Mustaa Kemal to
accompany him to the lounge. 1he Sultan was deliberately prolonging
the meeting and the discussion took one whole hour. 1he Sultan addressed
Mustaa Kemal by saying : I am totally coninced that the army
commanders and oicers hae a great conidence in you, so would you
guarantee to me that the army would not undertake any action against
me Mustaa Kemal replied: \our Lxcellency, I know nothing about
the uture. But what I can see at the present time is that the commanders
do not ind any justiication to rebel against your throne, I can een conirm
to you that there is absolutely nothing to justiy your ears. Upon this the
Sultan said : I am not talking about the present time, but I wish to know
what is expected to happen in the uture. It is not known what Mustaa
Kemal replied, but it seems that he talked to him in a way that reassured
him, or the Sultan said to him aterwards : \ou are a wise commander,
and undoubtedly you can inluence your colleagues and persuade them
to be calm and exhort them to use deliberation.
106
1his special meeting, which no one else attended, caught the imagination
o the people who were in the palace, and they tried to ind out what it
is was about. Howeer, the Kbaeefab issued on the ery day o the meeting
a decree in which he ordered the dissolution o parliament, without setting
a date or new elections. 1his decree took eeryone by surprise, especially
as it was an arbitrary measure with no justiication. No constitutional
justiications or reasons were gien or the dissolution. Hence, people
thought that Mustaa Kemal had suggested to the Kbaeefab to dissole
parliament and inluenced his decision, as indeed he had done. 1his was
particularly so as the request or an audience came in the wake o Mustaa
Kemal`s endeaour to persuade the deputies to gie the goernment a
ote o no conidence, or this would hae ineitably led to the dissolution
o parliament. Howeer, eents surrounding the dissolution suggested
that the Kbaeefab`. decision had absolutely nothing to do with Mustaa
Kemal`s inluence. 1his was because it took place on the same day o the
meeting and it was ery unlikely or it to hae been as a result o what
was said in the meeting, especially as the meeting was on a lriday, which
is a public holiday. Besides, Mustaa Kemal was meeting the Sultan or
the irst time ater the signing o the truce and the end o the war, and no
matter how inluential he had been, the ulilment o his request could
not hae been achieed at such a lightening speed.
1hereore, eents indicate that the issue o dissoling parliament had been
prepared beore the meeting, and that its declaration in such an arbitrary
manner indicates without any shade o a doubt that it was based on a
matter that was beyond the Sultan`s control. One could only deduce that
it was orchestrated by the British, or they were directly in control o the
Kbaeefab and the country through occupation.
Neertheless, the dissolution o parliament caused a major uproar and
conusion throughout the country. Rumours spread that the unionists had
armed their supporters in order to declare the reolution in Asia Minor,
or this was a atal blow to the unionists. Amidst this uproar, 1awiq
10
Pasha disappeared and was succeeded by Damad larid Pasha who was
known as the Lnglish Gentleman and he also was the Sultan`s son-in-
law.
As or Mustaa Kemal, he rented a house in Shilly, a suburb o Bira, and
lied there as an ordinary indiidual. He deserted politics and kept a low
proile. He used to be seen requenting some clubs and mixing with
people in high society. Howeer, he remained ery discreet, his talk did
not imply anything in particular and no one knew whether he was with or
against the Sultan.
Howeer, the Sultan was aware o Mustaa Kemal`s intentions, or he
was acquainted with his thoughts and his designs. Hence, he used to iercely
resist him and attack him. He used to say to his entourage that Mustaa
Kemal wanted to estrange the 1urks rom his amily and cause animosity
between him and the masses in order to remoe him. Howeer, Mustaa
Kemal`s retirement rom political actiity did not gie him any excuse
oer him. So many people disapproed o the Sultan`s hostility towards
Mustaa Kemal.
Once Damad larid had ormed the goernment, and once the British
showed their approal o it, the ears o the Sultan increased and he
thought that he could not maintain his throne without the help o Britain.
1hus he used to see in Damad larid a major ally and supporter o his.
1he Sultan and Damad exhausted all possible means to please the British.
1hey established an association which they named lriends o Britain,
and the goernment backed this association with all means. 1he British
or their part copiously inanced it with tempting gold. Howeer, the
common people, and the majority o the youth and army oicers used
to despise the British and to harbour malice against the occupiers.
1hereore, the Sultan and his Prime Minister threw themseles completely
into the embrace o the British and they ully relied upon them. 1he
108
British had by then appointed a High Commissioner in Istanbul in order
to run the political aairs o the country, alongside the British General
Harrington, the Commander in Chie o the allied orces. Hence, they
started dictating their opinions to the Sultan and manipulating him at will.
Consquently, he lost his eectie authority and became like a prisoner.
1he eectie authority ell into the hands o the allies, or more speciically
in the hands o the British alone, who were represented by the British
High Commissioner and General Harrington.
1he British endeavour to generate the political vacuum
lurthermore, the British wanted to generate a political acuum in the
country so that they could ill it themseles as they wished. On the surace,
they let the political matters o the country to be run by her own people
while they pushed their agents into undertaking the political actiities. 1hen
they stood behind the scenes and generated in the country turmoil and
political instability, in order to highlight the inability o the locals to goern
the country, thereby causing a political acuum. 1his is so because the
acuum means the inability to act and the inability to perseere, in other
words it means that there is a orce, but this orce does not maniest itsel
in its appropriate orm and with an adequate capability.
1he acuum could either be political, military or strategic.
1he political acuum occurs when the state is unstable, uncoordinated
and plunged into disquiet and political instability. It becomes imperatie
in this case to ill this acuum by giing the state the power and the ability
to unction and perseere. Haing occupied the Ottoman State, the British
conined her to the 1urkish region and let her in charge o the country`s
policies and o looking ater the country`s aairs.
So a political orce in the country was generated, but they undertook a
109
host o actions designed to preent this orce rom appearing in a suitable
orm and an adequate capability, also to make it unable to shoulder the
responsibility o goernment and unable to perseere. Hence, they went
ahead with their trick to dissole parliament in order to generate disquiet
and instability.
1hey then encouraged people to undertake the type o political actiities
designed to generate discord and turmoil. Indeed, the dissolution o
parliament did cause uproar and disquiet, and people started to sense the
State`s inability to goern. 1his led to a group o local men attempting to
rescue the situation.
On 29th Noember 1918, Doctor Asàd, a \emeni surgeon inoled in
politics, called or a national conerence in the capital, which gathered
eight parties and a large number o small blocs to look into the country`s
state o aairs. Seeral meetings were held, then the conerence broke up
without yielding anything.
A group o thirty people rom among ormer ministers and prominent
igures was ormed as a bloc under the name o 1he National Unity.
1hey gathered around the ormer speaker o parliament, Ahmed Ridha,
the ounder o the \oung 1urks Committee, but this bloc did not hae
any chance o success. 1he Unionists became remarkably actie, but this
also came to nothing.
Hence, people used to sense the presence o a state and at the same time,
sense its inability to shoulder the burdens o goernment and politics,
those who worked in politics turned into seeral groups and seeral
indiiduals. Howeer, there was no coordination and no concord between
them. Many attempts were made to undertake eectie political work
but all o them ailed and ceased.
1he political acuum in the country became maniest and eeryone could
sense it, or there was no assembly to represent the |vvab, and to which
110
the Sultan could reer to or consultation and adice - thereby generating
coordination, which would hae allowed the Sultan to look ater the
country`s aairs and shoulder the political burdens. 1here was also no
goernment to get in touch with the |vvab, undertaking the actions
which would be in harmony with the politicians` actions and with the
masses, and shoulder the responsibility o politics and o looking ater
the country`s aairs, and no Kbaeefab to share people`s opinions, coordinate
the eorts and generate the political actions. Parliament was dissoled,
the goernment was paralysed and the Kbaeefab was like a prisoner. Hence,
the political acuum was maniest and it was relected in the State`s inability
to unction and to perseere, despite the act people could see the presence
o the State and the rulers.
1he discord, disquiet and political instability were also maniest, and despite
their large number, local politicians ailed to ill this political acuum due
to the lack o coordination between them, which arose rom the dierent
opinions and interests they had. Debates and speeches alone could not
generate a political existence, nor could they ill the political acuum, unless
these yielded a result. 1he result would be to steer the state towards
shouldering its burdens and to make it able to unction and to perseere,
or to seize the reins o rule and shoulder the ull responsibility or to
display the ability to unction and perseere. 1o be contented with
speeches and political memoranda without yielding anything and to leae
the state in such a position o instability and disquiet would be a wasted
eort and a spiral motion akin to the spinning o the donkey around the
millstone, and its ailure would soon become maniest.
Hence, the attempts made by the local politicians and the moes undertaken
by the parties ailed to bear any ruits. 1he status quo continued in this
horriic political acuum or six months, between Noember 1918 and
April 1919.
Meanwhile, the British prooked the idea o independence in the country
111
as being the people`s right, stating that 1urkey should belong to the 1urks,
just like America belonged to the Americans, and that a modern state
should be established on a modern basis and modern pillars. 1hey espoused
that modern 1urkey should be based on the people`s will, and should be
or the people - a 1urkey enjoying absolute authority and absolute
soereignty, and one which does not gie room to the Sultan`s arces.
1hese thoughts were spread amongst people, especially in Istanbul and
amongst the youth and army oicers. In order to comprehend the ability
o the British to propagate these thoughts and gain support or them one
should reiew what the British had achieed when the Ottoman State
was existent, in terms o eoking the nationalist tendencies and the separatist
propensities, under the guise o independence. lor they managed to
inluence the Balkans until they generated unrest and disorder, which led
to the breakaway o many o its parts rom the Ottoman State. Also,
one should reiew what they had perpetrated in terms o prooking the
nationalist tendencies and eelings o independence as the separatist
propensities between the Arabs and the 1urks, until they turned the citizens
o the State into two camps. At that time, the only means they had were
their slogans and their agents, but one can imagine just how much more
they could achiee, once they occupied the country, took oer all the
country`s aairs, and the Sultan and his Prime ministers had become
dummies in their hands which they could control at will. Hence, they
succeeded in making this idea reach many people.
Mustaa Kemal then resumed his actiities, but this time ery discreetly,
and without attracting anyone`s attention. Many people at the time
considered him a riend o the Sultan and he or his part neer gae the
impression that he was plotting against the goernment or that he was
displeased with it. He concealed his moements and proceeded slowly to
orm a group on the basis o resisting occupation and rescuing the country.
Howeer, he conided in the closest people to him and it was mentioned
that on one occasion he explained his plan to those closest to him in
112
Istanbul by saying : 1he goernment is not ree in reaching any decision
and the Sultan is no dierent rom the prisoner in the hands o the
ictorious. Hence the centre o the nationalist goernment should be shited
to the heart o the country, to Anatolia. lor in Anatolia, people could be
tempted to integrate and participate in the nationalist moement. 1he
nationalist moement could lead to the salation o the threatened Sultan`s
throne and to its delierance rom the hands o the occupiers. All eorts
must be exhausted in aoiding a clash with the peoples o Lurope, or
the moement we aim at establishing is a peaceul one and the irst thing
we ought to attend to is saing the Sultan. I cannot ind a good word to
say about the goernment o Damad larid Pasha. 1hereore, I beliee
that the toppling o this goernment would be without any doubt a
nationalist necessity.
Mustaa Kemal coupled this secret actiity o his with his endeaour to
assume the general command o the army, howeer, he was unsuccessul
and then he lost all hope, or he was rankly told that he had no chance
whatsoeer in becoming general commander o the armed orces, nor
in assuming any goernment post, thus he kept silent and did not express
any resentment. He continued pretending to be loyal to the Kbaeefab and
to the goernment and did not undertake any other actiity apart rom
gathering supporters and spreading the idea o independence, stating
that independence should be earned rather than being oered, and all the
similar ideas which the \est, especially the British used to spread.
113
Ihe BrIsh olIer Ihe
polIcol ond legol sIyle
Mustaa Kemal rerained rom undertaking any other actiity apart rom
spreading his thoughts and gathering supporters until May 1919, when
his turn came and the allies started working in a dierent style to achiee
their objectie, i.e that o separating 1urkey rom the other parts o the
Ottoman State, destroying the Kbiafab and establishing a 1urkish republic.
1his took place once their endeaours to cause a political crisis and place
their agents in power through legitimate and legal means had ailed. 1heir
actions were political, international and reolutionary. \hat prompted
them was Italy`s persistence to seize Cilicia as part o her spoils. Hence,
Britain realised that as long as she does not operate rom within 1urkey
proper against the allies, she would not be able to execute her plan in
1urkey and chase her opponents, lrance and Italy, rom 1urkey`s strategic
positions. Once Italy had occupied the city o Antalia and the surrounding
estates in April 1919, and once she had occupied layum, which was part
o \ugoslaia, she attempted to occupy Izmir on behal o the Allies.
Britain and lrance opposed her moe and decided to conront her and
preent her rom occupying Izmir or the western coastline o Anatolia.
1hen they started objecting to her occupation o Antalia arguing that this
would gie her control oer the eastern side o the Mediterranean. 1he
treaty that had been signed between Britain, lrance, Italy and Russia,
endorsing Italy`s occupation o Izmir and the western coastline, was
considered null and oid because Russia had withdrawn orm the war
and neer signed it. 1hey then laid their plan or Greece to occupy Izmir.
The British alter the political and legal style
114
1hey set about executing this plan on the one hand. On the other hand,
Britain simultaneously claimed that disturbances had broken out in Anatolia,
inside Asia Minor, and that robberies, looting and pillaging had become
widespread and that it was on an alarming increase. She claimed also that
the security orces had been roaming the country aimlessly, streesing that
law and order must be obsered and that a heay handed approach was
required to deal with those who breached security. Hence, Britain
demanded rom the goernment in Istanbul to send a strong man to the
eastern proinces and assign to him the task o restoring law and order
and re-establishing the goernment`s authority.
She also unoicially recommended Mustaa Kemal to assume this role.
1he war ministry was approached pertaining this issue and Jawad Pasha,
the Senior Adiser at the war ministry, approed. He knew nothing o
Mustaa Kemal, but the war minister was suspicious o Kemal`s intentions,
or he was aware o his plans. Neertheless, he immediately agreed and
broke the news to Mustaa Kemal, who replied that or a speedy
inestigation to be carried out and or the appropriate measures to be
executed while unrest was rampant in the eastern proinces, this would
ineitably require that he be gien wide powers and or his decisions to
be binding. 1he ministry agreed to all his demands.
Mustaa Kemal had been up until then silent and calm. No one knew that
he harboured eelings o hostility towards the Sultan and the goernment,
or he used to gather supporters in total secrecy. His eagerness to acquire
wide mandatory powers led him to reject the instructions handed to him
at irst. He reiewed them and wrote them anew in a ormat designed to
achiee the goal he was aiming or. Haing reiewed the instructions, he
then presented his own ormat to the Prime Minister who signed it without
checking them. He then took them to the war minister who at irst hesitated
and then signed. Copies were dispatched to the British High Commissioner,
to Harrington, the General Commander o the allied orces, and to all
the oicers o the allied orces.
115
\hat is worth mentioning is that Britain alone was the only country to
show excessie concern and desire to quell the unrest. As or lrance, she
neer expected the breakout o any alarming disturbances in this
anquished empire, hence she did not pay them any attention.
Neertheless, once Mustaa Kemal was gien his instructions, and once
he had secured all the mandatory powers he had wanted, he set sail or
Anatolia and let Istanbul on 15th May aboard the small ship Anipoli,
hoping to reach Samsun ia the Black Sea.
1he British contrivances to allow the
Greek occupation o Izmir
Meanwhile, in the second week o April 1919, the Ottoman goernment
was brieed that according to the seenth article pertaining to the terms
o the truce, the allies were about to carry out their occupation o Izmir,
and that according to this article, they resered the right to execute this
wheneer their interests were threatened. 1hereore, the Prime Minister
Damad larid Pasha gae his instructions to the !ai o Izmir. He
emphasised the need to keep the armies inside their barracks and orced
him to ban by orce any demonstration which the locals may hold.
On 14th May 1919, the British leet was seen inshore around Izmir. 1he
commander o the leet, Admiral Colthorpe, told the !ai to be ready
or the allied orces who were about to disembark. 1hen he summoned
the !ai to meet him. \hen he arried he said to him : I hae just heard
that it will be the Greeks who will be disembarking and occupying Izmir.
1he !ai was deastated and looked at the Admiral in disbelie. He could
not hold back the tears, so they started lowing prousely and he said
with a lump in his throat and in a oice expressing humiliation and dejection
: 1he Greeks! 1he Greeks hae come to occupy Izmir 1he Admiral
replied : 1hese are the orders I receied rom Paris. 1he !ai said : I
116
am not responsible and I cannot predict what will happen. 1he
commander said to him : It is impossible or other than the Greeks to
occupy Izmir. Do you understand Upon this the !ai said to him : I
only need three hundred o your soldiers to reassure the Muslims and to
proe to them that the occupation is carried out by the allies and not the
Greeks, and that this occupation is temporary rather than permanent.
1he Commander replied : Impossible. 1hen he ended the conersation.
In the morning o 15th May 1919, on the same day Mustaa Kemal let
Istanbul, as a delegate o the British and the Ottoman goernment to
quell the disturbances in the eastern proinces, the Greek soldiers started
disembarking on the quay o Izmir`s seaport. All o the Greek community
was out in orce to greet them, and their excitement was hard to describe.
1hey started chanting and the Greek orces roamed the streets o Izmir.
As or the 1urkish armed orces, they rushed and hid in their barracks in
compliance with the strict instructions issued to them by the Prime Minister.
Howeer, the Greek community and the Greek army were celebrating
and roaming the streets in a proocatie and deiant manner, but despite
this the locals o Izmir and the Ottoman army in Izmir showed restraint.
Howeer, no sooner had the Greek armed orces reached the goernment
buildings, than a single bullet was ired. No one knew where the bullet
was ired rom, but what was certain is that it was deliberately ired to
prooke the Greek army. Hence, no sooner had they heard the bullet
than they roze. 1hey then started showering the Ottoman soldiers and
the people o Izmir with a hail o bullets, killing and injuring scores o
people. Some locals started deending themseles and as a result
disturbances broke out and chaos spread. 1he Greek soldiers seized this
opportunity and quenched their burning desire or reenge. 1hey poured
out their hatred and quenched their thirst or shedding the Muslims` blood.
1hey started prooking the oicers by spitting in their aces and orced
eery 1urk to stamp on his tarboosh with his eet, and those who reused
were instantly cut to pieces with their swords in a horriic saagery. 1hen
11
they started remoing the i;ab rom the Muslim women`s aces, and
those who reused to remoe their i;ab were instantly killed. 1hey also
started pillaging Muslim homes, using all types o humiliation and all
styles o proocation. 1his was without any doubt not normal, but rather
a deliberate moe designed to carry out a premeditated plot.
\hile these saage crimes and horriic proocations were taking place on
19th May 1919, the ship Anipoli anchored in the seaport o Izmir between
the British leet and the Greek ships, and Mustaa Kemal disembarked
and entered the city. Mustaa Kemal had set sail rom Istanbul on 15th
May aboard the ship Anipoli in the hope o reaching Samsun ia the
Black Sea, but instead o going to Samsun, he went to Izmir.
It seemed that the goernment got wind o this, or on the ee o 16th
May 1919, in the middle o the night on which Mustaa Kemal had set
sail rom Istanbul, the Prime Minister Damad larid Pasha requested an
urgent meeting with a representatie o the British High Commissioner
and explained to him that the Sultan had changed his mind about sending
Mustaa Kemal to the eastern proinces, because news reached him that
Mustaa Kemal intended to incite unrest in the inner proinces - thus his
trip would hae to be aborted at any cost. 1hey gae him the impression
that orders would be issued to intercept him and orce him to come
back. Howeer, they did nothing and Mustaa Kemal pursued his trip
aboard the ship until he reached Izmir on 19th May, and that was during
the height o the Greeks` deiance and proocation.
As soon as he arried, he gathered the \alis and inormed them that he
was about to take certain measures against Greece and that those measures
had been approed by the goernment. 1hen he started to iliy the
Greeks, gather the military and ciilian leaders and address them to urge
the masses to prepare or nationalist demonstrations, while warning against
the harming o Christians and stressing that these demonstrations should
be peaceul. 1o quote rom what he said to them :
118
By Monday, you will hae inished organising a nationalist demonstration,
when a huge gathering encompassing the largest number o inhabitants
will hae been held and where the iery speeches will hae been deliered.
1he main aim o these speeches is to eoke the nationalist eeling and
highlight the igour o the 1urkish people. \e want our demonstrations
to prooke the sense o injustice among the Allies and make them eel
the oppression that has beallen us. I am absolutely certain that our peaceul
nationalist demonstrations will prompt the nobles rom among the British
and the \estern dignitaries to put an end to this shameul intererence in
our most sensitie national aairs. 1he demonstrations must take place all
oer the !iaya and impressie telegrams must be sent to the major powers
and to the Sublime Porte, and I warn you unequiocally against allowing
anyone to cause any trouble by harming the Christians in any way
whatsoeer. Our demonstrations must be nationalist and peaceul.
1hen he started showering the authorities with a series o harsh telegrams
sent by the locals, o which was a telegram stating : 1he country is in
danger, and another stating : 1he central goernment is no longer capable
o carrying out its basic duties, and another stating : \e can only presere
the independence o our country by the determination o the nation and
the eorts o the nations. One o the harshest telegrams was the one
sent to Istanbul rom the strategic military port o Sinub, in which the
masses expressed a huge uproar. 1o quote rom the telegram: 1he 1urkish
nation cannot be destined to lie with a goernment which Lurope controls
at will and to which it dictates whateer she wishes.
Mustaa Kemal takes the irst step in his
rebellion against the Khilaah
As a result o this telegram, the !ai o Sinop was dismissed rom his
post and telegrams were exchanged between the Prime Minister, acting
on behal o the Sultan, and Mustaa Kemal, with the Sultan insisting that
119
Mustaa Kemal should return immediately. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal
reused and sent a telegram in which he said : I shall remain in Anatolia
until the country`s independence is achieed. 1his lagrant reusal was
the irst step towards the rebellion, and he went on gathering people and
roaming about Anatolia until he had lared up the rebellion.
1his is how Mustaa Kemal started his rebellion which ended in the
abolishment o the Kbiafab and the seerance o 1urkey rom the other
parts o the Ottoman State, or according to the \esterners, the destruction
o the Ottoman Lmpire. lrom these eents alone, one can conclude
without any shade o a doubt that it was the British who had initiated
eerything to lare up this rebellion, and that it was they who had sent
Mustaa Kemal to carry it out. lor it was they who claimed that there had
been disturbances in the eastern proinces, it was they who demanded
that Mustaa Kemal should go to quell the disturbances, it was they who
inspired the Greeks to occupy Izmir, under the guardianship and protection
o their leet, and to carry out such proocations. Also it was the British
who had brought Mustaa Kemal to Izmir, despite the Ottoman
authorities` pleas or him to return, and who paed the way or him to
immediately take adantage o those proocations and start gathering
people around him. 1hese eents speak olumes and indicate most
conspicuously the conclusie truth which eeryone can put their inger
on.
120
BrIon bocks Ihe rebellon
of MusIofo Kemol
Despite all this, had the British aterwards let Mustaa Kemal to pursue
the rebellion he had started by himsel, he would not hae been able to
take one urther step towards the objectie which he later achieed. 1his
is so because een i it had been possible to ind anyone in 1urkey who
would hae agreed to the seerance o the Arabic speaking Islamic lands
rom the Ottoman State and who would hae been contented only with
the 1urkish lands, it would hae been extremely diicult to hae come
across anyone who would hae consented to the abolishment o the
Kbiafab or agreed to it, apart rom Mustaa Kemal and some indiiduals
whose number did not exceed a handul. 1he general consensus was in
aour o maintaining the Kbiafab. 1he loe o the Kbiafab and the loyalty
to her were deeply rooted in the hearts o people, and wheneer the
phrase o aa.babiv 1a;v Ya.ba was mentioned, a chord in eery single
1urk was touched, and his strongest emotions were eoked. Hence, it
would hae been inconceiable or any representaties o the |vvab to
hae decided to abolish the Kbiafab.
Howeer, the styles adopted by the British and their continuous support
o Mustaa Kemal and the actiities he pursued, helped Mustaa Kemal
achiee these results. \hile instigating this rebellion, Britain was preparing
or an international manoeure in order to reap the ruits o the rebellion.
So she launched a wide propaganda campaign or it and hyped up its
news in an attempt to raise the allies` ears about 1urkey.
121
Reports destined to Istanbul sent by the westerners and the oicers
accumulated, replete with the description o the major uproar which
mushroomed in Anatolia and o the nationalist eeling which had erupted.
At the same time, the telegrams and the press agencies started to coer
the news o the rebellion in an exaggerated manner. Meanwhile, a peace
conerence in Paris with the participation o the allies was called or.
Britain seized this opportunity to squeeze into the working agenda o the
conerence the news o the disturbances which Mustaa Kemal had
instigated, in order to kindle rancour in the hearts and urge the imposition
o tough conditions.
lrance howeer was aware o the act that those actions were abricated
by Britain, hence, she dismissed the news o Mustaa Kemal`s disturbances
and een went a step urther when she attempted to win oer the
goernment o Damad larid Pasha. 1hus she led him to beliee that she
was not angry about this rebellion, and when she learnt o his intentions
to come to Paris personally to seek the allies sympathy and win them
oer, she rushed and placed an ironclad at the disposal o the Ottoman
delegation, headed by the Prime Minister, who wanted to attend the peace
conerence in Paris to air the iews o the Ottoman State, beore a decision
on her ate was taken.
Howeer, Britain objected to this and expressed concern oer the lrench
enthusiasm towards the Ottoman goernment. At irst Britain attempted
to preent Damad larid Pasha rom attending, so he pretended that he
had wanted to accompany the delegation but his poor health preented
him rom doing so. He eentually traelled aboard a British ironclad.
1he Paris conerence laid down some ery tough conditions, and it was
Britain who adopted those decisions and championed them. Lloyd
George deliered a speech at the Guildhall on 8th Noember 1919 in
which he said : 1he peace terms hae been ully approed by the allies,
especially those terms concerning the Ottoman Lmpire, and the whole
Britain backs the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal
122
o Lurope unanimously agrees that the eil and rotten Ottoman rule
must be eradicated rom the lands inhabited by the Greeks, the Armenians
and the Arabs. 1he seaports situated along the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean must be opened or all nations. Howeer, lrance and
Italy were aerse to the treaty. Neertheless, Britain`s enthusiasm towards
those terms were not with the aim o implementing them, but rather to
use as a means to threaten the Ottoman State and to incite the 1urks
against the Sultan so that they sided with Mustaa Kemal. 1hat is why she
was later the irst to call or a conerence in London in order to cancel the
treaty. 1he conerence was eectiely held in lebruary 1921.
123
Ihe frsI phose n
MusIofo Kemols rebellon
Neertheless, the rebellion continued with ebbs and lows, and the British
were orced to come to Mustaa Kemal`s rescue wheneer he was about
to all. 1he rebellion was at irst successul, or the young oicers joined
Mustaa Kemal and declared their readiness to ollow him. Some o the
high ranking oicers also joined him, but on condition that he would not
undermine the Kbiafab. Once the oicers joined, thus gathering a
considerable orce, he immediately wanted to set up a goernment. Hence,
he inited Ri àt Pasha rom Sias. Ri àt Pasha had been seduced by the
\estern thoughts and was a great admirer o the Luropeans. Mustaa
Kemal also inited Ali luad, the army commander o the Ankara region,
who was a brilliant military academic and one o the shrewdest politicians.
Ali luad was also accompanied by Ri àt Pasha who had resigned rom
the Naal ministry.
A meeting between the oicers was held with a secretary assuming the
role o writing the minutes or the delegates. Mustaa Kemal expressed
his iewpoint and explained his opinions. Leryone agreed with him that
resistance was the only hope. Hence, they designed a strategy to be
executed, which was summarised as multiplying and organising the militias
acing Izmir, in order to hinder and thwart the adance o the Greek
orces. 1hen building up rom these skirmishes, they would restructure a
strong and uniied national regular army, on the ruins o the diided
armies.
The first phase in Mustafa Kemals rebellion
124
It was also necessary to design a strategy aimed at leading the resistance,
thus they agreed that luad would assume the command o the troops in
the west, that Kathim Qura Bakir would assume the command o the
troops in the east and Mustaa Kemal would command the troops in the
centre.
Mustaa Kemal then went on to say : 1he central goernment and the
Sultan are under the inluence o the enemies, hence, we ought to establish
a temporal goernment here in Anatolia. No sooner had he inished
saying this than eeryone linched and expressed anger and resentment.
Raù expressed his opposition to the undertaking o any measure that
could upset the Khaleeah or his central goernment. All the others also
opposed Mustaa Kemal and said to him as long as he was sering the
country and sacriicing in the way o the country, and that although they
had trust in him, their only condition was that he rerained rom
undertaking any action that would undermine the Sultan`s rights or impair
his eelings. 1hey also stressed to him that the Kbiafab should be aboe
eerything else and that the Sultanate should not come to any harm.
In the ace o this consensus and this persistence Mustaa Kemal was
orced to back down and agree to the people`s opinion. Hence he declared
that the Kbiafab would not come to any harm and he gae them all the
guarantees they wanted. 1hen the rebellious actiity started.
Howeer, since the rebellion was to the majority o those who joined
Mustaa Kemal a rebellion against the allied occupiers, and only nominally
against the Sultan, and since it was in reality or Mustaa Kemal and a
istul o his supporters a rebellion against the Sultan, Mustaa Kemal
was orced to conceal his intentions and gae his assurances that he would
not harm the Kbiafab. 1hereore, clashes with the allies were ineitable.
At this juncture two strange incidents took place :
125
1he comedy o occupying Samsun
1he British declared that they were determined to ortiy Samsun with a
stronger garrison to preent the rebels rom reaching it by sea and seizing
Seas. Mustaa Kemal ordered Ri àt to deend Samsun at any cost. He
ordered him to stand up to the British and preent them rom
disembarking their troops. Hence, Ri àt obeyed and headed towards the
seaport accompanied by a hundred Muslim men. A British colonel had
reached the seaport with a small orce. Howeer, Ri àt and his troops
entered the city and encountered this orce but no ighting took place
between them. 1hen the British colonel and those with him returned to
the British ship that was anchored in the port and let. 1hen it was declared
to eeryone that the British orce had become scared and that its
commander realised that it was hopeless to resist so he retreated, thus
they declared that Samsun was salaged rom the British occupation and
that Sias remained in the hands o the local people.
Mustaa Kemal's rebellion adopts
the character o armed struggle
1he second incident occurred with the Greeks. 1he British were preparing
the Greeks to engage the 1urks in a host o skirmishes, which could
eoke the erour o the locals. 1he British were reluctant to allow British
blood to be shed or this purpose since there was another blood that
could be shed in order to achiee it`s aims, thus the Greeks were chosen
as the scapegoats in these battles. 1he elaboration o this eent was as
ollows : 1he Greeks would not settle or staying in Izmir and the goernor
o Izmir iolated the instructions gien to him to remain in Izmir, thus
the Greeks moed to seize the neighbouring areas. 1he Greek commander
heading his troops, marched towards the district o Aideen, and as soon
as the army moed, a hail o bullets rained down on them repeatedly.
Accordingly, the Greek troops were shocked and panic stricken, and they
126
lost their composure. 1hey opened ire on the ciilians, and the 1urks
replied in kind. As a result o this random ighting, the Greeks were
anquished and the 1urks orced them away and set ire to the Greek
district. 1he Greek army came back once their numbers had risen and
once their military preparations had increased, and they in turn occupied
the city and set ire to the 1urkish district. 1hen they started saagely
killing the ciilians in order to reduce the number o 1urks in order to
become the majority in Izmir. As a result, eery 1urk who was able to
ight took up arms, headed or the hills and started ighting the inaders.
1his guerrilla warare went on sporadically. 1he eeling o resentment
towards the British and the Greeks was triggered as a result, and the
oicers started rallying under the banner o Mustaa Kemal, and he or
his part started sending them to the illages to kindle their erour. 1he
news o this was magniied and relayed to the capital and the British
eigned their protest to the Sultan. 1he Sultan`s telegrams sent to Mustaa
Kemal and his summons were to no aail, or he lagrantly displayed his
disobedience. In response, the Sultan ordered his dismissal and issued
orders to all the military and ciilian authorities to disobey Mustaa Kemal`s
instructions. News o his dismissal was broadcast all oer the country
and the Sultan struck o his name rom the list o army oicers and
threatened anyone who contacted him with summary dismissal. Upon
this Mustaa Kemal issued his instructions to the army oicers, stating
that in case they were dismissed, they should not stop working, proided
they told the Sultan that the newly appointed oicer did not gain the
conidence o the army nor that o the people, and thus he remained
unemployed. Mustaa Kemal continued or weeks to exhort the masses
to rebel, and to exhaust all o his eorts to oil the goernmental measures
and to resist all o its moes.
1he Ardh-Rum conerence
On 23rd July 1919, seeral men gathered in a tiny building similar to a
12
illage school, in a remote district o Mesapotamia. 1hose delegates were
the deputies o the eastern proinces. 1hey were o a strange mixture.
Among them were ormer deputies, beib., senior ciil serants, Kurdish
tribal leaders and oicers. 1he conerence opened in the name o the
|vvab, and the irst item in the agenda was the issue o chairing the
conerence. One o the delegates stood up and said : Could the
honourable delegates gie their opinion on whether Mustaa Kemal would
be suitable to chair this meeting knowing that he had neer in his lie
been a deputy oer any o the eastern proinces. 1he deputy was abruptly
interrupted and Mustaa Kemal was oted with an oerwhelming majority
as chairman o the conerence. 1he conerence lasted ourteen days and
the discussions were conducted in a disorderly and agitated manner. A
host o resolutions were adopted then the conerence was wound up.
Some o the resolutions were as ollows :
1he |vvab is a unit that is not subject to ragmentation or diision, and
all the eastern !iaya. are determined to resist any type o occupation
and to stand up to oreign intererence. I the Istanbul goernment reused
to side with the people and to protect them rom the oreign inasion,
there will be no other option but to call or another interim goernment
to shoulder the running o the country`s aairs, now that the situation has
reached this critical point.
1he delegates also declared unequiocally that they were still loyal to the
Kbaifab \ahid-ud-Deen and that his ayaà was still on their necks. It had
also been decided to establish an apparatus which was named the
Lxecutie Parliamentary Committee, and whose task was to execute
the resolutions adopted by the conerence. Mustaa Kemal was elected as
Chairman o this committee and the resolutions were immediately
broadcast to the |vvab and copies were despatched to the Luropean
countries. 1hen it was decided to hold the conerence o Sias.
Howeer, when the Istanbul goernment learnt o the .rabRvv
128
conerence, it issued a communiqu which it circulated to all the
newspapers, it was also reported by newspapers world-wide. 1o quote
rom the communiqu: Some disturbances took place in Anatolia, during
a host o meetings aimed at breaching the system and lagrantly iolating
the constitution. It was claimed that those meetings were constitutional
and parliamentary, but in act they were not parliamentary. 1hereore, all
the military and ciilian authorities should put an end to this moement
completely and crush those rebels in the seerest o manners.
1hese goernment lealets reached the authorities in .rabRvv, and
they replied to the Astana goernment by saying: 1he holding o
parliamentary sessions has become a pressing necessity, and i parliament
were held, there would be no need or these types o meetings.
1he goernment pondered oer its critical situation and realised that its
dissolution o parliament was unconstitutional and that it had not made
proisions or resh elections. Howeer, it set about undertaking a host
o urgent and decisie measures in order to quell the rebellion. Hence, it
decided to orm an army that would only comprise those who had
shown genuine loyalty. 1hen the army was dispatched to Anatolia.
1he British prevent the Sultan rom sending a
task orce to quell Mustaa Kemal's rebellion
\hen the British learnt o this army, they preented the Sultan, on behal
o the allies, rom orming the army, arguing that one o the clauses in
the terms o the truce stipulated the disbandment o the troops, and
their non-reormation. 1he Sultan attempted to gie himsel a ree hand
in crushing the rebellion but the allies categorically preented him rom
doing so. \hen it is said the allies, it is meant in this context the British, or
they dominated the country and it was the British High Commissioner
and his oice, together with Harrington, the Commander in Chie o
129
the allied orces, who used to act on behal o the allies.
\hen the Sultan realised that the allies were adamant in their reusal to
allow him to send a task orce to quell the disturbances, he requested their
opinion as to who would be able to put an end to the disturbances. He
strongly persisted in his request, until they answered him by saying that
they were taking a neutral stand and that it was beyond their competence
to interere in 1urkey`s domestic aairs. 1hey told him that he alone was
responsible or maintaining law and order i he wanted to rule oer the
country.
Damad larid Pasha elt let down by the British and the Sultan resorted to
using his own means, so he plotted to hae Mustaa Kemal arrested
while on his way to Sias rom .rabRvv, but the plot ailed because
Mustaa Kemal was inormed o the plot and managed to take precautions
and change the time o his journey. 1he soldiers gathered to arrest him
but ailed to ind him in the place designated to them, or he had reached
Sias beore then.
1he Sivas conerence
1hereupon the Sultan asked Ghalib Beik, who was one o the Sultan`s
greatest supporters, to head some o the Kurdish tribes and inade the
city o Sias, and arrest all the members o the conerence. Howeer he
ailed. 1he members o the conerence had arried to Sias rom all
oer Anatolia and the conerence was held on 4th August 1919 and was
chaired by Mustaa Kemal. Howeer, his chairmanship was subject to
objection. Shortly beore the conerence began, Raù Beik, who was
one o Mustaa Kemal`s closest riends, came to him and said : \e hae
looked into the chairmanship o the conerence and consented that you
should not accept it no matter what.
130
\hen the conerence was conened under Mustaa Kemal`s chairmanship,
some stood up and objected to his autocratic actions, or he had appointed
himsel chairman o the conerence without a ballot. Upon this Mustaa
Kemal stood up to deend himsel. 1o quote rom what he said : \e
are not today in conerences which allow us to ight and dispute with
each other, otherwise the star o the Lmpire would eclipse and her
inluence would be ineitably obliterated. 1his emotional talk had its
eect and his supporters stood to applaud and cheer him, then eeryone
kept quiet oer his chairmanship. \hen the ote was taken, it was
announced that Mustaa Kemal had gained a majority.
No sooner was Mustaa Kemal elected chairman than he stood up to
delier a speech. He started by clearly oicing his loyalty to the Sultan,
then the sessions o the conerence started and went on or seeral days
in an atmosphere o clamour, heated debates and a great deal o
whispering. 1hen seeral objections suraced and one o the deputies
stood up to say : 1he Lxecutie Committee o the conerence had no
right to claim that it is the goernment, and what would they do i the
Luropeans interered in the aairs o Anatolia and occupied it all \here
would they ind the unds to pay the expenses o the troops and the
salaries o the employees Another deputy stood up and said : 1he
United States hae no colonialist ambitions, she is the only state who can
sae 1urkey rom the critical deadlock that she has allen into. 1he only
way that 1urkey could ollow i she were genuine about aoiding
degeneration and extinction would be to throw hersel into the embrace
o America. 1hen Raù Beik, Bakr Sami Beik, Kathim Qura Bakir,
Ri àt, Ali luàd and the three Pashas stood up and oiced their approal
o this opinion and deended it wholeheartedly. Another deputy stood
up and said : 1he American mandate does not kill o independence. By
this we can rid ourseles rom the British protectorate, this British
protectorate is going to turn 1urkey into a humiliated colony and bring
her standing down to the leel o slaery.
131
1he conerence proceeded in this trend, oiling all o Mustaa Kemal`s
endeaours, and ater all these deliberations, the conerence adopted a
host o resolutions which did not dier rom those adopted in .rab
Rvv. Howeer, the conerence was wound up with its members angry
with Mustaa Kemal. Kathim Qura Bakir Pasha, who was the only army
commander to retain his status and not to hand oer his equipment to the
allies and not to surrender to them, approached Mustaa Kemal and said
to him : 1he undertaking o communications on your behal has raised
criticism O Pasha, you can imagine, your excellency, the consequences o
such an action and o treading such a diicult path. So please, let the
Committee rom now on speak on its own behal.
1hereore, Mustaa Kemal was ery annoyed when he let the conerence.
Howeer, he incited the delegates during the conerence to deend
themseles, or he inormed them that Ghalib Beik, who was loyal to the
goernment, had come at the head o some Kurdish tribes to arrest the
delegates o the conerence. Hence, they demanded a direct contact with
the palace but their request was turned down. 1hey were outraged by this
and issued an ultimatum to the Prime Minister Damad larid Pasha stating
that i they were not allowed to contact the palace directly within an
hour, they would seer all their links with the central goernment, and
they would be ree to act as they pleased. 1he deadline passed in the
morning o 12th August 1919, thus they carried out their threat and all
links between the deputies and the palace were seered.
Mustaa Kemal seized the opportunity and intensiied his actiity. He
managed to alienate Istanbul rom the rest o the country. Since he ailed
to achiee anything during the conerence, and since he could not dare to
orm a goernment in Anatolia, he settled or conincing those with him
to demand a change o the goernment in Istanbul. 1hey remained silent
and it was not reported whether they backed or resisted such an initiatie.
Mustaa Kemal deemed that he could not control the army unless the
oicers were at the head o his supporters, and that he could not subjugate
132
those who rebelled against him unless he was backed by the army. 1he
army was with the Kbaeefab and not him. 1hey also made it absolutely
clear to him that it would be impossible to do away with the Kbaeefab no
matter what the circumstances were. Hence, he decided to come to terms
with the Kbaeefab rather than with Damad larid Pasha.
Mustaa Kemal comes to terms with the
Khaliah in preparation or a resh phase
1his was on the one hand, on the other hand, news o the Sias conerence
reached Istanbul in a dierent light, as i it were a ictory to Mustaa
Kemal. 1his was backed by the conerence`s boycott o the Istanbul
goernment. Although this boycott was triggered by what the Prime
Minister had perpetrated, when he preented direct contact between the
conerence and the palace, and also when Ghalib Beik headed the Kurdish
tribes to arrest the delegates, this boycott in itsel and the success in holding
the conerence had portrayed eents in a dierent light.
lurthermore, the allies, namely the British recommended to the oicials
in Istanbul to come to terms with Mustaa Kemal, and amidst this
atmosphere, one o Mustaa Kemal`s closest riends, rom the days o
Salonika, and whose name was Abdul-Karim, came orward and proposed
to the Kbaeefab to act as a mediator between him and Mustaa Kemal. He
told him that Mustaa Kemal had always been loyal to the Kbiafab and to
the Kbaeefab, and to him personally. He also told him that he was ready to
persuade him to come to terms. In the light o this relectie mood,
Sultan \ahid-ud-Deen agreed with Mustaa Kemal propounding his
demands to end the rebellion or good. Upon this Abdul-Karim
telephoned Sias and spoke to Mustaa Kemal, who agreed to end the
rebellion and demanded the dismissal o Damad larid Pasha`s
goernment and the orming o a new parliament to replace the parliament
that the Sultan had dissoled. Accordingly, Sultan \ahid-ud-Deen agreed
133
to this.
1hree days ater these telephone contacts had been made, lasting one
night only, on 2nd Noember 1919, larid Pasha resigned rom the
goernment. He talked openly to people and told them that he had been
let down by the British, who in the past used to back him, but then they
washed their hands o him. 1hereupon Ali Ridha Pasha, the war minister,
ormed the new goernment. 1his was regarded as a ictory or Mustaa
Kemal.
Hence, Mustaa Kemal declared to the |vvab through a lealet that the
Lxecutie Committee o the nationalists had recognised the new
goernment headed by Ali Ridha and that it supported him
unconditionally. He also praised his Lxcellency the Sultan or being gracious
enough to dictate his honourable ordinance and dismiss the goernment
o Damad larid Pasha.
Howeer, the Sultan was angered by this lealet and expressed his
disapprobation o Mustaa Kemal`s discourse on behal o the |vvab.
1he rebellion was almost resumed but Mustaa Kemal preented those
inclined to rebel rom doing so. 1he Sias Committee decided to aoid
a conrontation with the goernment and most o the oicers heaed a
deep sigh o relie, because the oerwhelming majority rom amongst
them were aerse to the renewal o the rebellion and they were all loyal
to the Khaleeah.
Howeer, Mustaa Kemal started to stall the dissolution o the Committee,
or his aim was to establish a republic and abolish the Sultanate and the
Kbiafab, but he had ailed in this phase. 1hereore he had to maintain this
Committee as a weapon to undertake another attempt. He started to
abricate all types o excuses and pretexts in order to deer the dissolution
o the Committee. He was not seeking excuses or not dissoling it, he
rather agreed to do so but he was using delaying tactics in order to delay
134
its dissolution. 1hese delaying tactics angered his supporters and many o
them expressed to him openly that the continued unctioning o this
committee was unnecessary now that the |vvab had declared her approal
o the goernment. Some o Mustaa Kemal`s supporters and riends,
such as Marshal Izzet Pasha, went een urther and raised their oices in
protest and admonition, demanding ehemently the end o this internal
eud and shameul diision. 1hey deemed that the continuity o the
Committee meant the continuity o the disunity. Howeer, Mustaa
Kemal`s answer to them was that the new goernment had to proe irst
that it was worthy o the conidence gien to it by the |vvab, and that
this could not be established until ample time was gien, allowing it to
put orward its programme and to practically proe its sincerity. He said
: 1he point at issue at present can only be the preparation or the new
parliamentary elections so that the oerwhelming majority becomes that
o the nationalist deputies.
1his was the irst phase o Mustaa Kemal`s rebellion and these were its
eents. It indicates that it was the British who were responsible or
prompting and protecting it. 1he arce o the British attempt to occupy
the city o Samsun then their consequent withdrawal rom the city was
clearly seen as a show aimed at gathering people around Mustaa Kemal.
Otherwise, how could the British be incapable o occupying Samsun at
that time, while they were sitting heaily on the heart o the Ottoman
State and occupying the most impregnable o its areas Besides, who
inormed Mustaa Kemal that the British were determined to occupy
Samsun, thus allowing him to dispatch Ri àt to preent her occupation
\ere the hundred men led by Ri àt enough to preent the British rom
occupying a city such as Samsun had they really been determined to do
so lurthermore, was Samsun really saed rom the British occupation
due to this orce that he had dispatched \as this not a deliberate arce
aimed at making people beliee that Mustaa Kemal was against the British
and against the allies and that he wanted to expel them rom the country
lurthermore, why did the clash with the Greeks take place 1he
135
instructions gien to the Greek commander by his goernment were to
conine his operation to Izmir, so why did he oerstep these instructions
and attempt to occupy the surrounding areas o Izmir \as it his own
initiatie or was he instructed by the General Commander o the allied
orces \hy did this happen \as it not to establish militias and gie the
rebellion the character o armed struggle against the occupiers by ighting
the Greeks thus making people come under the banner o Mustaa Kemal
to ight the occupying allies \as this not a prompting and a kindling o
the rebellion I Britain managed to keep a low proile while prompting
and laring up the rebellion, because she had proceeded by twisted means,
was her decision to preent the Kbaeefab rom preparing a task orce to
quell the disturbances not a lagrant protection and backing o the
rebellion It would hae been possible to crush the rebellion in the summer
o 1919, and the Sultan had started to prepare a task orce but the British,
representing the allies, preented him under the pretext that this was in
iolation o the terms o the truce which stipulated that the troops should
be disbanded. 1hereore why this interdiction rom preparing a task orce
to quell the disturbances, een though there was no clause within the truce
terms to stipulate that troops should be disarmed and disbanded or that
they should surrender their ammunitions It only stipulated that the 1urkish
army should be disbanded as soon as possible but excluded the troops
necessary to protect the borders and maintain law and order in the country.
So where did their claim that the orming o a task orce to crush the
rebellion was in contradiction o the truce terms come rom
Besides, it was the British, representing the allies, who at the beginning o
May 1919 claimed that disturbances had broken out in the Lastern
proinces and demanded rom the Sultan to send a commander to quell
them, and they proposed Mustaa Kemal. \hy did they suggest the
dispatching o a task orce to quell disturbances they had abricated and
which did not exist, and then preented the Kbaeefab rom preparing a
task orce to crush a declared rebellion the eents o which the world
136
press and telegrams were coering lurthermore, when the Kbaeefab
gae them the option o either assuming or themseles the quelling o
the rebellion in their quality as occupiers, or allowing him to prepare a
task orce to crush it, they replied : \e are taking a neutral stand. So
where is the neutrality in preenting the Kbaeefab rom preparing a task
orce to crush a domestic rebellion which on the surace was against the
allies and which clashed with one o their states, namely Greece \as this
a neutral position, or was it a lagrant support and protection o the
rebellion
1here is no doubt about the act that by preenting the Sultan rom
preparing a task orce to crush the rebellion, while the truce terms enjoined
the deployment o the necessary troops to maintain law and order, the
allies, the British, wanted to protect the rebellion and neutralise the Kbaeefab,
thus preenting him rom crushing the rebellion. Neertheless, the rebellion
could not achiee its objectie and establish a goernment to rial the
Sultan, thus it was orced to come to terms with him and come under his
authority. Howeer, the rebels succeeded in inciting people against the
allies and in giing the impression that they had preented the British
rom occupying Samsun. Also, their clash with the Greeks helped them
to generate the idea o ighting occupation and gae Mustaa Kemal its
leadership.
Mustaa Kemal succeeds in gathering people around
him on the basis o liberating the country
1hereore, Mustaa Kemal emerged as the winner, because he succeeded
in gathering people around him on the basis o an idea that eeryone was
coninced o, that is the expulsion o the Allies rom the country and her
liberation rom the nightmare o their occupation. He managed to eoke
in them the possibility o ighting occupation and o undertaking actions
against it. Hence, he became the object o the masses` hope and the army
13
oicers` admiration, although they all harboured doubt about his intentions
towards the Kbaeefab, and they considered these intentions to be against
their sanctiication, because the post o the Kbaeefab was to them a sanctity.
Hence, people`s hope was or Mustaa Kemal to come to terms with the
Kbaeefab, so that the sanctiied post o the Kbaeefab remained intact and
so that they could achiee the expulsion o the occupying enemies. 1his
was especially so ater sensing through the preenting o the British rom
occupying Samsun and the ighting o the Greeks, the possibility o
resisting the occupiers. 1hus they clung to that hope or which they deemed
Mustaa Kemal to be its hero, and they could not see in the Kbaeefab this
possibility.
1hereore, all eyes were on Mustaa Kemal. 1he majority o people could
not discern the complexities o political actiity and its reaches, and it was
diicult or the ordinary man to comprehend them, and also diicult or
the military oicers i they did not undertake political actiities. Hence,
they ailed to perceie these British games. 1hey were also not amiliar
with international relations, thus they could not appreciate the British
persistence to deprie her allies rom the spoils, een i this meant giing
them or keeping them in the hands o the anquished state, so that the
international balance o power remained in Britain`s aour and so that
they remained the leading power. 1hey did not also know that Italy`s or
lrance`s occupation o any part o the 1urkish coastline would undermine
the British inluence in the east and their orces in the Mediterranean. 1hus
they did not allow them to take anything. 1he people also could not
discern that Britain did not remoe the Italians and the lrench away by
her own orce, nor by oert actions, but by inciting others and through
manoeures and deceit.
lurthermore, none o the Muslims quite realised the extent o the ear in
the hearts o all the states, especially the British, o the preseration o
the Kbiafab, which was considered a constant threat to them. 1hus the
Muslims did not realise the ilthy conspiracy which the British were plotting
138
through Mustaa Kemal`s rebellion in order to abolish the Kbiafab at the
hands o the Muslims. As Mustaa Kemal took oer the leadership o
1urkey to ight the occupiers he was considered to hae won the irst
round.
139
MusIofo Kemol odopIs
Ankoro os hs cenIre
Haing achieed this ictory, Mustaa Kemal attempted once again to
seize power through legitimate means through parliament. Preparations
or the new parliamentary elections were set in motion, but they were on
the old basis, namely an Ottoman parliament subordinate to the Kbaeefab`.
goernment. Howeer, the Prime Minister Ali Ridha was weak and he
sensed people`s drit towards Mustaa Kemal. 1hus he deemed it wise to
come to terms with him. Accordingly he sent Salih Pasha, the Nay minister
to Anatolia, where on 18th October 1919, he held with the Parliamentary
Committee a meeting which became later known as the Amasia
Conerence. 1he conerence lasted seeral days and Salih Pasha succeeded
in reconciling between the deputies and the goernment. 1he irst motion
to be proposed at the conerence and to be instantly agreed upon by the
two parties was the non inringement o the Sultanate and the Kbiafab.
1he Istanbul delegate then endorsed all the resolutions adopted at the
.rabRvv conerence and the Sias conerence. A heated argument
broke out pertaining the issue o dissoling the Parliamentary Committee,
and ater the debate intensiied, the issue was let unsettled and it was
decided that it would remain suspended until the members o the new
parliament could meet to settle it.
1hen Mustaa Kemal moed to Ankara to take up residence there and to
use it as his centre. Arrangements were made to greet him and on the
morning o his scheduled arrial, the local residents were up early and the
whole city waited in anticipation. 1he armers let their arms to take part
Mustafa Kemal adopts Ankara as his centre
140
in greeting him and the derish came out in a large procession, carrying
large green banners bearing the exalted Qurànic Verses. \hen he arried
people cheered, women shrilled, and chants o 1abir and acclaim
reerberated, he entered the city as a hero and took up residence.
lresh elections took place and Mustaa Kemal was elected as a member
o parliament or Ankara. Seeral deputies then locked to Ankara and
held a preliminary meeting to discuss their aairs. During the meeting, a
proposal was put orward to conene parliament in the capital and to
dissole the conerence now that its members had become oicial deputies.
Howeer, Mustaa Kemal opposed both ideas ehemently and persistently
by saying : 1he conerence must continue until the extent o parliament`s
adherence to justice becomes maniest and until its policy becomes clear.
As or moing to the capital, this could only be regarded as sheer idiocy.
I you did this, you would be under the mercy o the \estern enemy, or
the British are still in control o the country and the authority would
interere in your aairs, and you might be arrested. 1hereore, parliament
should be conened here in Ankara, so that it remains ree and
independent.
Howeer, all the deputies insisted that the inauguration o parliament
should take place in the capital Istanbul and in the house o parliament,
so that they could be there under the wing o the legitimate ruler o the
country, Sultan \ahid-ud-Deen, the Kbaeefab o the Muslims. Upon this
Mustaa Kemal kept silent and accepted it. Howeer, he did not go to
Istanbul but remained in Ankara. Prior to this, he had held a parliamentary
meeting with the Ankara deputies and had gien them the necessary
instructions. He requested rom them to ote or him as speaker o
parliament in his absence.
On 11th Noember 1919, parliament was inaugurated by a speech o
the throne then the election o a speaker took place. 1he deputies reused
to elect Mustaa Kemal as speaker and they opted or Raù Beik instead.
141
1hen on 28th January 1920, parliament ratiied the national charter known
as the amous Milli Charter, which conirmed the resolutions o the
.rabRvv and Sias conerences. 1he charter called or the total
independence and reedom o all the proinces inhabited by a 1urkish
majority, including Istanbul and its suburbs, stretching alongside the sea
o Marmara, proided that the ate o all parts o the Lmpire would be
decided through a reerendum.
Meanwhile, the Luropean countries inormed the Ottoman goernment
through an oicial memorandum that Istanbul and the straits must remain
under the disposal o the Sultan. 1he ollowers o Mustaa Kemal
interpreted this as a ictory to their policy and that it would be possible to
come to terms with the Luropeans oer airer truce terms. 1hereore,
Mustaa Kemal started to work towards bringing down the goernment
o Ali Ridha Pasha and towards replacing it by an outright nationalist
goernment. He persisted and pressed the deputies ehemently to
undertake this initiatie and exhausted all his eorts, but the deputies
recoiled and reused to listen to Mustaa Kemal. 1hus he became enraged
and realised that his plan to seize power through legitimate means and to
replace the Kbiafab system by a republican system was ineitably doomed
to ailure. 1hereore, he set about rekindling the rebellion in order to
seize power by orce.
Mustafa Kemal adopts Ankara as his centre
142
MusIofo Kemols reIurn Io
Ihe rebellon Ihrough o
second phose
Mustaa Kemal was the one who called or the election o new members
and recognised the constitutionality o the assembly. He approed o the
selected deputies, and he promised to abide by the resolutions o the
assembly, who had dissoled the ormer goernment and accepted the
current goernment, with the demands that the country should be goerned
through constitutional rule. Despite all this, he decided to declare the
rebellion once again, ater he had lost all hope o seizing power through
parliament. Hence, he started to equip the troops and prepare or battle.
\eapons and unds started to low towards him rom Istanbul with the
ull knowledge o the British High Commissioner and the lrench High
Commissioner. 1hey both used to nominally express their objection to
this but they would generally keep silent and decline to reeal anything,
een an incident ar more signiicant than this occurred, which was when
Mustaa Kemal gathered trucks ull o weapons and ammunition in the
peninsula o Gallipoli, right under the nose o the British High
Commissioner and despite his sureillance.
A guerrilla war broke out against the allies, and Biria was besieged and
orced to capitulate, thus the rebels allowed the Italian garrison to eacuate.
1hen the eastern side o Cilicia was attacked and the lrench garrison
eacuated. London and Paris called or an absolute halt to the military
operations, but these went on regardless as they were.
143
On th March 1920, the allies orced Ali Ridha to resign, thus he tendered
his resignation and was replaced by Salih Pasha, who was the nay minister,
and who had in the past struck a deal with Mustaa Kemal in Amasia.
Hence, he proceeded in goernment while attempting to diuse and
paciy the situation.
Howeer, on 10th March 1920, Lord Curzon deliered a speech in the
House o Lords in which he said: 1he a-llies can no longer tolerate the
leel o belittlement the Luropeans are haing to endure in Istanbul, while
Christians are being persecuted and slaughtered all oer the place.
1he British occupy Istanbul
In the wake o this statement, the harbour o Golden Horn was illed
with British warships. British sta were eacuated rom Anatolia and
orders were issued to the remaining British garrison to eacuate as soon
as possible. 1he British liing in Ankara let the city in a hurry.
1he speaker o parliament in Istanbul, Raù Beik, declared that the British
intended to arrest the nationalist deputies and to restore the goernment
o Damad larid Pasha. Hence, Mustaa Kemal telegraphed his deputies
urging them ehemently to lee and not to surrender themseles to the
British, but they reused to lee.
In the early hours o 16th March 1920, all the measures aimed at occupying
Istanbul militarily and at tightening the grip on the local residents were
undertaken. 1his task was delegated to the British General Henry \ilson,
who had been appointed earlier as the Commander in Chie o the
allied orces.
Paris and Rome agreed that the three goernments o Britain, lrance and
Italy should take part in imposing sanctions. Howeer, it was Britain alone
Mustafa Kemals return to the rebellion through a second phase
144
who dispatched her marines. \hen lrance and Italy realised that Britain
had succeeded in occupying Istanbul, they interened once again to block
the categorically British initiatie in order to presere the international
balance o power, thus they demanded to take part in ruling the country,
but the British did not enable them to do so, and acted alone.
1hen without any delay, the British troops roamed the main streets o the
city, proudly showing o, occupying the post oice and all the main
goernment buildings, ater haing terrorised the local residents and een
the 1urkish soldiers themseles. 1hey arrested a number o deputies rom
Mustaa Kemal`s party, among whom were Raù Beik and lathi Beik.
1hey also arrested the ormer Prime Minister Said Halim, taking them all
to prison. 1he next morning, they were loaded into a ship which took
them to Malta. Hence, some o the deputies and army oicers led Istanbul
or Ankara. And so, the allies took oer Istanbul and siezed total control
oer it, ruling it just as they willed. Martial law was declared in Istanbul
and strict censorship was enorced on the press, postal and telegraphic
communications and on the goernment.
People's resentment o the Sultan or his
support o the British measures
1he Sultan backed the measures which the British had undertaken and the
goernment issued a public communiqu in which it exhorted people to
obsere calm, stating that it was their duty to do so. 1he goernment
began the communiqu by saying: 1he most important duty o eery
1urkish citizen is to abide by the orders o the Sultan. Consequently, the
masses and the 1urkish soldiers were enguled in an atmosphere o terror
which in turn led to people`s resentment o the Sultan and the intensiication
rom all sides o the attacks upon him. 1hen parliament was oicially
dissoled.
145
On 5th April 1920, Salih Pasha resigned and Damad lerid Pasha ormed
the new goernment at the request o the British and started ruling the
country in a despotic manner. Once parliament had been dissoled, he
became the sole power broker and started to openly take into account
the British interests and attempt to win them oer through arious means,
until he almost became more British than the British themseles. 1he Sultan
was not too ar behind in his attempt at winning the British oer and in
his attack on Mustaa Kemal`s ollowers. He incited beibv!.av to
issue a fatra against them and so he did. 1he fatra stated that all the
nationalists were rom amongst the cursed ones and rom amongst those
who strayed, and that the belieers rom amongst Allah`s serants should
declare war on those reolting insurgents. A Sultanic decree was
simultaneously issued endorsing this atwa and sentencing Mustaa Kemal
and his supporters to capital punishment.
\hen Mustaa Kemal heard o this, he arrested the small number o
Britons who remained in Anatolia and had not eacuated when they had
been instructed to do so. 1hen he ordered the 1urkish garrison to attack
the British and besiege the city o Lskisehir where a British platoon was
stationed. At that time, the British were waiting or an Italian garrison
heading towards Konia. Hence, the 1urkish troops attacked the British
and managed to lay siege to the city. 1hey also attacked the Italian garrison
while on its way to Konia. 1he Italians howeer managed to reach Konia
ater suering heay losses. Consequently, the Italian garrison was orced
to moe westwards and join the Greeks in Izmir. 1he British eacuated
Lskisehir as the Italians eacuated Konia. 1hereore, not one single soldier
rom the allied orces was let in Anatolia, howeer, no clashes whatsoeer
took place with the British, while a single skirmish took place with the
Italians while on their way to Konia to link up with the British. 1hen they
all eacuated.
146
Mustaa Kemal announces resh parliamentary elections
In the light o these operations, the situation became apparent in that two
camps dominated the country: the British on one side, backed by the
Kbaeefab and the goernment, and Mustaa Kemal`s party on the other
side, backed by all the people. Hence, Mustaa Kemal became opposite
to the goernment and people regarded him as their leader against the
British. 1hereore, public opinion was in his aour and most o the
army oicers and ciil serants were on his side. So, amidst this aourable
mood, he seized the opportunity to announce on behal o the
Parliamentary Committee, which was still in place and had neer been
dissoled, that resh elections would be held and that the new parliament
would hae no connection with the old assembly. Also that it would not
be an Ottoman parliament, but a nationalist legislatie institution with
exceptional powers. Ankara was selected as the centre where the sessions
o this nationalist institution would be held.
Llections did eectiely take place, but these were not genuine elections -
they were rather a nominal exercise aimed at creating the appearance o
legitimate elections. 1he general mood was that the status quo necessitated
the election o the Kemalists only, to the exclusion o all others, so they
become the representaties o the nation. 1his indeed was the case and
no other deputy apart rom the Kemalists was elected.
On 23rd April 1920, the nationalist conerence was held in Ankara. 1he
inaugural session was deliberately scheduled to take place on a lriday.
Hence, ater the lriday prayer at the mosque o Hajj Birem, the deputies
came out hoisting the lags and proceeded towards the enue o the
meeting. 1hey slaughtered two sheep at the threshold, then they entered
the hall and held the inaugural session. Meanwhile, similar celebrations
took place in eery single mosque in Anatolia, een those in the smallest
o illages.
14
During his preparation or the National Assembly and its inauguration,
Mustaa Kemal had been bringing the ciil serants to Ankara. Local
residents witnessed an inlux o migrants locking to their city, amongst
whom were oicers, teachers and senior ciil serants. 1hey did not know
at irst the reason or their arrial, but they later realised that they were the
goernment sta.
Mustaa Kemal establishes a
government apparatus in Ankara
And so, Mustaa Kemal established a goernment apparatus in Ankara.
He also established a regular army and seeral goernment departments.
He also brought a press and a team o journalists. A newspaper called
Hakmit Milla was published and Mustaa Kemal prepared Ankara to
become the goernment centre and the capital o the country. He set
about laying the oundations o the 1urkish republic. Howeer, he
undertook this initiatie with extreme caution and total secrecy by
pretending that his struggle was a struggle against oreign occupation and
that his war was a war against the occupiers. He used to justiy his actions
by claiming that he was deending the country and used to address the
Luropeans through oicial statements in which he would say: \ou can
occupy all the Arab countries and occupy Syria, but I shall not allow you
to occupy 1urkey. \e are only claiming a right which eery single nation
should enjoy. \e want to be a ree nation within our natural national
borders. \e do not accept one carat less than that. During and ater the
inauguration o the National Assembly, he declared: All the measures to
be taken would be aimed at maintaining the Kbiafab and the Sultanate
and at ridding the Sultan and the country rom \estern slaery. He then
gae a statement in which he said: Since the Sultan is prisoner o the
\estern countries who control the capital as they please, thus he is not a
ree soereign, nor does he enjoy any soereignty whatsoeer. 1hereore,
the Supreme National Assembly is going to assume temporarily the running
148
o the country`s aairs.
Consequently, an executie committee was set up and delegated with the
task o running the country`s aairs. It was ormed o eleen ministers
elected by the National Assembly, and Mustaa Kemal was oted as its
president. Prior to this, he had been elected as speaker o the National
Assembly, whereater Colonel Ismat Pasha joined the goernment.
1he National Assembly started to hold its meetings and adopt resolutions.
It adopted a host o ery important resolutions, one o which was the
considering o all the trade agreements and treaties signed between the
Istanbul goernment and the oreign countries as null and oid. Another
resolution stipulated that all the state`s reenues, een those coming rom
the Sultan`s assets, estates and .rqaf ,endowments,, should be placed
under the disposal o the Ankara goernment.
Hence, a goernment was established in Ankara, which had a parliament,
goernmental departments and a regular army. It adopted a host o ery
serious resolutions. 1hus, it became imperatie upon the Sultan to either
abolish this goernment or surrender to it. An armed conrontation
between the two camps became ineitable.
1he Sultan dispatches a task orce to abolish
the Ankara government
1he Sultan dispatched a task orce to Ankara led by oicers loyal to him.
1he troops marched towards the north-west o Asia Minor. Many
olunteers joined the task orce and the Sultan sent some o his supporters
to Kurdistan in order to incite the tribes in that region. 1hen he started to
exhort the whole |vvab to deend the throne and the Kbiafab. Loyalty
to the Kbaeefab was still strong to the point that his orders were met with
respect and his obedience was considered to be an obedience to Allah
149
,swt,, while his disobedience was considered to be a disobedience to
Allah ,swt,. Hence, all the proinces joined the Kbaeefab while some o
them reolted against the Ankara goernment. 1he army o the Kbaeefab
succeeded in taking a whole Kemalist diision as prisoners.
Battles between the two armies went on throughout the month o May
1920 and the Sultan`s army managed to rout Mustaa Kemal`s orces
eerywhere. All the proinces joined the Kbaeefab and the masses were on
his side, apart rom Ankara, which was the centre o the rebellion. Ankara
itsel was about to all, or the neighbouring illages were coming under
the Sultan`s banner one ater the other and joining the Kbaeefab`. army.
Mustaa Kemal and his supporters in Ankara were in dire straits, and in
Ankara itsel, despair crept in the hearts o those who were with him and
they contemplated surrendering to the Kbaeefab and joining him. Mustaa
Kemal`s lie was hanging by a thread and he was on the erge o being
destroyed.
1he broadcast o the truce terms tips the balance in
avour o Mustaa Kemal ater his deeat
Precisely at that moment, the terms o truce which had been signed a
year and a hal beore in Paris, known as the 1reaty o Seres which the
Sultan had accepted and the Prime Minister Damad larid Pasha had
signed, were broadcast. 1hese terms had been kept secret and the 1urkish
people knew nothing about them. 1hey were now broadcast all oer
1urkey . Hence, public opinion was outraged in eery part o the country,
against the Kbaeefab and against the Prime Minister Damad larid Pasha.
\hen the outrage was at his highest, the British Prime Minister Lloyd
George, made an announcement in the House o Parliament saying: 1he
aim o the allies is to liberate the non-1urkish nations rom the 1urkish
yoke. 1his announcement was also circulated amongst the masses, causing
the outrage to intensiy, and the resentment became directed at the British
and their puppets, the Kbaeefab and his Prime Minister Damad larid
150
Pasha.
In this way, the situation was turned upside down and people started to
drit away rom the Kbaeefab and join Mustaa Kemal. 1he areas which
reolted against Mustaa Kemal were all purged rom the Kbaeefab`. army
and rom those who were opposed to Mustaa Kemal. 1he Kbaeefab`.
army was heaily deeated and the Sultan`s power was diminished. People
were owing to seek reenge rom Damad larid Pasha who had signed
the 1reaty and surrendered the country. Consequently, Ankara regained
control o the situation and all people sided with Mustaa Kemal. 1hey
considered him to be the saiour rom occupation and he was restored
as the leader o the country. 1his 1reaty incensed the 1urks, or it meant
the end o the Ottoman Lmpire and its diision amongst the Luropeans,
or its ragmentation into seeral independent !iaya., thus turning 1urkey
into a small country within Asia Minor and bringing Istanbul, the capital
o 1urkey and her only passage to Lurope under an international mandate.
1he 1reaty also changed the Sultan`s authority into insigniicant orms
and reduced 1urkey to areas o inluence or Britain, lrance and Italy.
1he 1reaty contained a host o horriying clauses, among which were :
1- 1he Arab countries: 1urkey was stripped o all the Arab countries
ormerly part o her Lmpire. As or the kingdom o Hijaz, it was
recognised as an independent state and 1urkey renounced her dominion
oer Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia whose uture was to be decided
by the allies.
2- Luropean 1urkey: \est Damas was handed to Greece up until the
Catalca line. At the same time Greece receied rom the Allies the heritage
o Al-Gharbiyyah and thus extending her borders to approximately 20
miles rom the 1urkish capital.
3- Smirna and the Aegean Islands, together with Smirna city, were placed
151
under the Greek administration or ie years, ater which time, the locals
could opt to join the kingdom o Greece by way o a reerendum. As
or the islands o Jambros and 1inides, these were oered to Greece in
addition to other Aegean islands. 1he Dodicaniz islands, which include
the strategic island o Rhodes were oered to Italy.
4- Armenia: 1urkey recognised Armenia as being an independent state
and she accepted the arbitration o President \ilson pertaining the issue
o the borders between the two countries.
5- Kurdistan: 1urkey agreed to grant the Kurdish lands situated to the
east o the Luphrates rier a sel-rule, and to accept any plan pertaining
to this issue submitted by an international select committee represented
by Britain, lrance and Italy. 1urkey also agreed to approe certain
modiications to her borders with Iran in the Kurdish region, in addition
to approing that one year ater the execution o this treaty, the Kurds
could request or independence which would be granted i the council
o the League o Nations deemed the Kurds worthy o this independence.
1hus 1urkey would hae to renounce all her authority oer these lands.
1he texts o this renouncement would orm a new agreement between
the allies and 1urkey.
6 - 1he straits and Constantinople: 1urkey agreed to hae the straits
under international administration and to demilitarise the surrounding areas.
As or Constantinople, ,Istanbul,, she would remain under 1urkish
soereignty. In addition to this, the 1urkish army was restricted to 50,000
soldiers and subjugated to abide by the allies directies and
recommendations. 1urkey also agreed to allow the long-term control o
Britain, lrance and Italy oer her inancial aairs, in addition to maintaining
the old concessions and adding a host o humiliating clauses. In addition
to 1urkey accepting to grant the ethnic minorities a host o rights and
priileges, in particular the Armenians, the Greeks and the Kurds, and all
the Christians in general.
152
1he broadcast o such a horriic and humiliating treaty was enough to
lare up the rebellion in 1urkey against the Sultan, who had accepted the
treaty and signed or it. Hence, the sweeping current started to rapidly
moe in aour o Ankara and the whole country sided with the new
Ankara goernment giing it a military and popular orce. 1he goernment
o Ankara went as ar as threatening the capital Istanbul itsel which was
occupied by the allies. Hence, Mustaa Kemal won the second phase and
succeeded in establishing a second goernment in the country, with Ankara
as its centre, and in gaining the upper hand oer the country and the army.
1his was the second phase o Mustaa Kemal`s rebellion and these were
its eents. Any person discerning these eents can tangibly sense that it
was the British who prepared or this phase and who instigated it, also
that it was them who protected it and preented its destruction and
abolishment. It was the allies who inormed the 1urkish goernment
through an oicial memorandum that Istanbul and the straits should
remain under the auspices o the Sultan, while the goernment did not
ask or this. At the time, no one could comprehend the reasons behind
this generosity, as the allies were still occupying the country. 1he reason
was later uncoered, or it enabled Britain to return later on her own to
occupy the straits and Istanbul, not giing the opportunity or Italy. Hence,
it was a British manoeure aimed at enabling them to occupy the capital
and the straits single-handedly.
Besides this, the money and the weapons which used to go to Mustaa
Kemal ater he resumed the rebellion, reached him with the ull knowledge
o the British and the lrench High Commissioners, so why this silence
rom their part \hy this encouragement to allow the loading o ull
trucks rom the peninsula o Gallipoli lurthermore, the aked anger
which led to Mustaa Kemal`s clash with the allies should hae been
directed at Mustaa Kemal himsel, not at Istanbul. 1hus, the natural thing
to do would hae been or the allies to attack the centre o the rebellion
in Ankara and the rebellious army, not or the British to return on their
153
own with their warships and perpetrate proocatie acts in the capital
without inlicting any harm on the rebels.
In addition, the rebels did not clash with the British, but with the lrench
in Cilicia and the Italians in Konya. No clashes whatsoeer took place
with the British troops. Had there been any anger towards the rebellion
o Mustaa Kemal, it would hae been natural had it come rom the
lrench and the Italians, not rom the British. In the end it was the British
who returned on their own to occupy the country thereby preenting the
lrench and the Italians rom returning.
lurthermore, why would Britain broadcast the 1reaty o Seres at a
moment when Mustaa Kemal was surrounded in Ankara and was about
to all \hy had this 1reaty been kept secret beore, knowing that it had
been signed oer a year earlier \as this not a maniestation o Mustaa
Kemal`s rebellion being against the allies 1his action was without any
shade o a doubt a conspiracy perpetrated by the British themseles, or
they were the ones who broadcasted the articles o the 1reaty at that
speciic moment in order to sae Mustaa Kemal and to deal the Kbaeefab
a blow so that a second goernment could be established in the country,
thus moing towards the third and last phase. 1he phase o international
conerences and inal treaties.
154
Ihe Ankoro governmenI
geIs seIIled ond oIher
sIoIes deol wIh I drecIly
1his is how the second phase ended with the settlement o the second
goernment o the country in Ankara, making it the holder o the reins
o power and the eectie authority. Meanwhile, the Istanbul goernment
turned into a powerless and deicient authority. No sooner than this second
goernment had settled and took control o the country, Britain called in
the wake o these eents or the conerence o London, to be attended
by a host o deputies rom Greece and 1urkey. Britain said: 1he purpose
o holding this conerence is to seek a solution or the Lastern crisis.
1his could only mean a reiew o the peace terms o the Seres 1reaty
signed in Paris because the holding o a conerence to look into the
Lastern Issue, which had been settled at an oicial peace conerence,
could only mean that the Seres 1reaty which had been ratiied in Paris
would again be the object o discussion and study beore it could hae
any eect, or beore it could be implemented altogether. Indeed the 1reaty
had not been applied and not one single article o it was implemented.
1his conirms that Britain concluded the 1reaty in order to threaten 1urkey
and use it as a means to carry out her aims, not to implement it. 1he
proo or this is that it had been concluded or about a year during
which time it was kept secret, it was only broadcast when Mustaa Kemal
was surrounded and was nearly destroyed and his rebellion almost crushed.
1he mere act that the British called or the London conerence to reiew
the Seres 1reaty was seen as bizarre because the 1reaty was in aour o
the British. Len though lrance was not satisied with the Seres 1reaty
155
in the slightest and she had been coerced into agreeing to that 1reaty, she
deemed that the Ottoman legacy had become the property o her ally
Britain, who had gained rom it the lion`s share. 1hus lrance had to be
content with Syria and Cilicia. Still, Syria and Cilicia were, as ar as lrance
was concerned, a git that was open to debate. Italy was also angry about
the 1reaty, or she was aerse to the Greek soereignty in the Mediterranean,
especially because the Greek expansion in Asia Minor was in act at the
expense o the Italian areas o inluence which had been drawn up
between the allies during the war. 1hereore, it was due to the greed o
these two states, lrance and Italy, in gaining more spoils that they had
signed the 1reaty reluctantly.
Accordingly, when Britain chose not to implement anything rom the
1reaty, despite that act the it would hae yielded or her the largest spoils
in comparison with her allies, this attracted attention and was deemed
unnatural. \hen she aterwards demanded a reiew o this 1reaty, it
came as a surprise and was deemed most odd. \hat was more surprising
than this was or a delegation representing the new Ankara goernment
to attend the conerence alongside the delegation which came to represent
the Ottoman goernment, which clearly no other institution whether
1urkish or Ottoman alike had the right to take part in apart rom it,
because the Ottoman goernment was the legitimate goernment that
had entered the war and had been deeated. Ater all, it was that
goernment that had signed the 1reaty o Seres which this conerence
was held in order to reiew. Hence, it is to be asked what was the position
o the new Ankara goernment which no one had yet recognised, and
why was it attending this international conerence held to reiew the terms
o peace \as this alone not ample proo that the establishment o this
goernment in Ankara was staged by the British in order to make it irst
take part in the peace negotiations and then allow it to become the sole
negotiator oer the inal terms o peace
1he Ottoman goernment, the Kbiafab goernment, should hae rejected
The Ankara government gets settled and other states deal with it directly
156
the participation o the Ankara goernment alongside it in the negotiations,
or its acceptance would hae meant recognising it oicially beore other
states, and because the presence o two goernments in one country,
acing the enemy and negotiating oer peace terms demonstrates extreme
weakness and deastation. Hence, it would hae been natural or the
Kbiafab goernment to reject the attendance o the representaties o the
Ankara goernment, but in act it accepted it. Its weakness een led it to
use Mustaa Kemal`s initation to attend the conerence as a means to try
and win him oer and reconcile him. In this regard, 1awiq Pasha
approached Mustaa Kemal with the Luropean states initation to attend
the London conerence and said: In the name o the 1urkish state and
or the sake o the Ottoman Lmpire, the 1urkish delegation attending
the conerence should present a strong united ront, and the agenda which
the 1urks are proposing should also be one, indicating the co-operation
and the unity o the |vvab as a whole, rather than her conlict and
diision. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal reused this and said: It is only the
National Assembly in Ankara that enjoys the constitutional soereignty,
and which enjoys the exclusie power and rule in the country. 1he Luropean
countries should hae sent the initation through this Assembly.
During that time, the National Assembly turned itsel into a permanent
assembly. It also drated a new constitution whose drating lasted nine
whole months. 1he main obstacle that aced the drating o the constitution
and which generated a great deal o debate and deliberation was the
issue o the Sultanate and the Kbiafab. Mustaa Kemal was orced
under the pressure o the oerwhelming consensus and the sweeping
trend in the National Assembly - which was considered to be the Assembly
o Ata 1urk, or its members were all rom among his supporters, was
orced to state explicitly in the constitution that the Sultanate and the
Kbiafab would be maintained. Hence, Mustaa Kemal said in reply to the
Prime Minister 1awiq Pasha when he inited him and urged him to let
the 1urkish delegation show unity and harmony, 1he National Assembly
has in the irst article o its constitution stipulated that there would be no
15
prejudice to the Sultanate and no detriment to the sanctity o the Khilaah,
the Sultan should recognise the National Assembly so that the Ankara
goernment could participate with its delegation with the delegation o
the Sultan`s goernment.
Howeer, the Sultan reused to recognise the National Assembly and the
constitution that it drated, because recognising it would imply the remoal
o the Kbiafab een i the constitution mentioned the nominal saeguard
o the Kbiafab. Additionally, the constitution stipulated that the authority
as a whole, without any preconditions, had gone down to the nation as a
whole and that the nation had become the source o legislation, also that
the National Assembly had acquired the exclusie and absolute right to
represent the soereignty o the people, and it is the Assembly that decides
on the issue o war and peace. Clearly, it was impossible or the Sultan to
accept this. 1hus negotiations between the Kbaeefab`. goernment and the
Ankara goernment about the orming o the delegation were cut o.
Howeer when the Luropean countries realised that Mustaa Kemal had
reused the initation because it had reached him through the Sultan`s
goernment, Britain sent him a direct initation to Ankara on behal o
the allied states. 1his initation was regarded as a clear recognition rom
her o the Ankara goernment. Hence, the two delegations traelled
separately. 1awiq Pasha was the head o the Kbaeefab`. delegation, while
Bakir Sami Beik was the head o the Ankara delegation. 1he London
conerence was held in lebruary 1921.
1he head o the Sultan's delegation abdicates to
the head o the Ankara delegation the right to
speak on behal o the two delegations
\hen the two delegations sat at the negotiating table, Premier 1awiq
Pasha stood up and said that in his capacity as head o the Istanbul
158
delegation, he was abdicating his right to speak to Bakir Sami Beik, who
would speak on behal o the two delegations and would deend the
national aspirations o the 1urks. Upon this Istanbul remained silent and
only the oice o Ankara was raised.
1hen Lloyd George o Britain, Brian o lrance and Count Sorza o
Italy set about explaining the purpose o the conerence, stating that it
merely aimed at harmonising relations between the nations which had
clashed in the war, and that the allies were prepared to introduce certain
modiications to the terms o peace, especially those pertaining the
priileges oered to Greece. 1hey decided to establish a special committee
and assign to it the task o reiewing the situation o the local residents in
the region o Izmir, stating that the decisions reached by this committee
would be binding upon the two parties. 1he head o the delegation Bakir
Sami agreed to the idea o the sending o the committee but the Greeks
categorically rejected it. Upon this the Ankara representatie and the head
o the delegation, speaking on behal o the two delegations, suggested
during the conerence that Izmir could be turned into a domestically
independent !iaya under a Christian ruler. Howeer, the British rejected
this proposal and so did the Greeks, the lrench and the Italians. 1he
lrench delegation agreed to eacuate Cilicia and hand it back to the 1urks,
giing their assurances to honour this promise. Bakir Sami or his part
agreed to grant lrance a commercial priilege which would gie her
preerence oer the other states which 1urkey traded with, to which eect
1urkey and lrance concluded a treaty.
Howeer, the London conerence ailed and was wound up without
achieing anything apart rom what the lrench and the 1urkish delegations
had agreed upon. No sooner had the two delegations returned, than
Mustaa Kemal rejected the treaty which Bakir Sami had signed with
lrance. Bakir Sami was then orced to resign his post as oreign minister
and he immediately joined those who opposed Mustaa Kemal.
159
Mustaa Kemal then wrote to the lrench goernment stating that the
delegation he had dispatched to the conerence had acted in a manner
which exceeded the powers with which it was delegated, thus all the
resolutions it had adopted were null and oid and the country would not
accept them nor would she be liable to honour them.
Negotiations then took place between the Ankara goernment and lrance
at the end o which the Ankara goernment signed an agreement on 20th
October 1921 with lrance, under which 1urkey undertook to surrender
Syria to lrance. 1hey also agreed to determine the borders between 1urkey
and Syria. Pursuant to this agreement, lrance also eacuated her troops
rom Cilicia. Hence, Mustaa Kemal assumed contacts with other states
and other states in turn contacted him and dealt with him, signing treaties
with him despite the presence o the Kbiafab goernment.
1he Luropean states thereater started to display their inclination towards
him. lrance and Italy started attempting to win him oer and get closer
to him, while Britain started to openly support him in international issues
and seemed to hae snubbed Greece and started to show resentment
towards her.
Mustaa Kemal also contacted Russia, which had withdrawn rom the
war and where the communist goernment had been established, and
sought her help. He surrendered Batum to her and endeaoured to make
her sign a treaty o riendship with him on behal o 1urkey, so as to
consider it as an oicial recognition o his goernment. Russia agreed to
this, as she did not loose anything by it and because she was against Islam
and against the existence o an Islamic Kbiafab. Hence, she supported
Mustaa Kemal against the British and against the Kbiafab, then she took
Batum without loosing anything, and this was on 16th March 1921. Prior
to this, Italy had relinquished Altalia out o her own ree will and eacuated
it in January 1921. Hence, lrance, Italy and Russia sided with the Ankara
goernment and this strengthened the hand o Mustaa Kemal.
160
MusIofo Kemol prepores
Io seIIle Ihe crss wIh
Greece Ihrough wor
In the wake o the London conerence ailure, and the signing o the
treaties between Mustaa Kemal and lrance, Italy and Russia, the only
war related issue to remain unsettled was the Greek crisis. Hence, Mustaa
Kemal was either gien a ree rein or inspired to settle the outstanding
problems with Greece through war.
1hereore, Mustaa Kemal set about amassing weapons, equipment and
ammunition, equipping the army and increasing his orce. \eapons and
ammunition started to low towards him abundantly in a manner that
indicated clearly that he was preparing or war, reaching him rom Russia
ia the British lines in the Bosphorus and the Black Sea shores. lrance
eacuated Cilicia and withdrew her troops rom there, thus the 1urkish
orces stationed themseles there and an estimated 80,000 soldiers moed
towards the \estern ront in order to reinorce and consolidate it.
Consequently, the Greeks became worried and realised that this military
build-up was against them. 1he Greek goernment sensed that the
Luropean states were against them, that Britain had turned her back on
them and began to suspect that she was inciting 1urkey against them.
Greece initiates war against the 1urks
1hereore, Greece decided to initiate an attack against the 1urks without
161
seeking the permission o the Allies, or she became certain that they
were against her. \hen the Allies sensed that Greece was on the erge o
launching an attack on the 1urks, they put orward a proposal to the
Greeks and the 1urks with the aim o reconciling them. Howeer, it
seemed that the Greeks sensed that this proposal was a delaying tactic
aimed at giing the 1urks a chance to prepare and equip their orces
urther. Hence, they initiated the ighting against the 1urks beore responding
to the Allies` proposal. lighting broke out between the Greeks and the
1urks, and this lasted or approximately a year and a hal.
As soon as the hostilities had broken out, the Allies declared oicially
their neutrality. Howeer, this neutrality seemed bizarre, or the Ottoman
State was still under eectie British occupation and was considered
internationally to be occupied by the Allies. Hence, any ighting taking
place in 1urkey would undoubtedly aect the position o the occupiers.
So how could it be possible or them to remain neutral 1he natural
course o action would hae been or them to support Greece, or to
stand against her in order to preent the ighting rom taking place. But
to take a neutral stand was unnatural, especially in this critical situation.
Neertheless the neutrality did eectiely occur and Greece was let
wondering in conusion ater being let down by her British ally. Naturally
she should hae surrendered and accepted negotiations, but she did not.
She rather insisted to continue the ight. As a result, the British goernment
oered oicially to act as a mediator between Greece and 1urkey, but
Greece rejected this categorically. It seemed that she was wary o this
mediation, or she might hae sensed Britain`s support o Mustaa Kemal.
1hus, she rejected Britain`s mediation and continued to ight.
1he ighting between the two states had its ups and downs, and war
changed rom being a mere guerrilla war against the Greeks to an organised
war with battles like any other war. On 23rd March 1922, the Greeks
marched towards Lskisehir and Ayon Karahisar, these being considered
to be strategic railway line junctions. 1he Greeks occupied Ayon Kara
Mustafa Kemal prepares to settle the crisis with Greece through war
162
or a short spell, but they suered a decisie deeat in the north at Ayn
Otto during the irst days o April 1922 and were orced to retreat to
Brossa.
1hen in July, the Greeks gathered their troops and decided to launch an
attack on Istanbul. 1hey attempted to occupy Istanbul but General
Harrington, the Commander in chie o the allied lorces intercepted
them and preented them rom doing so. 1hey moed towards the east
and reached the railway line, where they came ace to ace with the 1urks.
Ismat Pasha was the Commander o the 1urkish armed orces and he
managed to repel the Greek onslaught or ten days. Howeer, on the
11th day the Greek army managed to penetrate deeply into Kutahya
which was regarded as a 1urkish rontline. Ismat Pasha attempted to
repel these oensies one ater the other, but the Greek army was
gradually tightening its grip around him. 1he Greek platoon deployed in
the south managed to seize Ayon Karahisar and began looking to seize
the northern parts. As the battles went on, the situation became more and
more critical.
Neertheless, the army commanders elt that their national duty was to
keep up the ight until the last minute.
At this point, Mustaa Kemal arried and the High Command broke the
disturbing news to him. Haing examined the whole situation, he issued
his instructions to stop the ighting immediately and to withdraw to the
Lastern ront. 1he 1urkish soldiers managed to retreat, haing been near
despair and haing suered heay losses, abandoning large amounts o
military hardware as a booty or their enemy. 1he chariots started to
carry whateer could be carried, and women and children proceeded
along with the chariots in a state o seere exhaustion. 1he 1urkish soldiers`
retreat ended when they reached Sakarya.
163
As or Mustaa Kemal, he returned rom Lskisehir to Ankara by train.
Negotiations with the Greeks took place, but they proed utile. Mustaa
Kemal was prepared to gie the Greeks a host o concessions which
were all reused.
1he morale o the 1urks was depleted. 1he National Assembly held
numerous boisterous meetings, in which the opposition used to pour out
their anger on Mustaa Kemal and his commanders. 1he members who
championed and supported Mustaa Kemal were shaken, becoming
extremely worried and conused.
\hen Mustaa Kemal returned to his headquarters, he heard the
commanders talking amongst themseles - they were in a ery bad state.
He met with them and attempted to motiate them. 1o quote rom what
he said to them: \hat is the importance o the railway line \hat is the
importance o Lskisehir or any other city Nothing. 1he army is eerything,
and the army is still strong. In our weeks time we will hae anquished
our enemies. \hen the commander heard what he had to say, they looked
at him in bewilderment, thinking that his talk was totally absurd.
Howeer, the battle went on and the Greek troops continued their adance.
1he platoons o General Papolas gathered west o Sakarya and the 1urks
were orced to surrender Kara. 1he right lank managed to escape with
great diiculty. As or the let lank, no sooner was it orced to abandon
one area, then it was orced to abandon another. 1he headquarters o
Mustaa Kemal were in the illage o Al-Ajwash, and he used to gie
instructions rom his room which he neer let, Ismat being the
commander o the army. 1he 1urkish army was yet again deeated and
the General Commander was conused not knowing whether to order
the troops to retreat or to stay put. Mustaa Kemal realised that i the
troops remained where they were, the calamity might or might not happen,
whereas i they retreated, it would undoubtedly beall them. 1hus, he
164
decided against the army`s retreat, the situation was extremely critical.
1he Greek army withdraws under the Allies
pressure despite its victory
On th September 1922 at 2.00 am, news came that the Greek army had
aborted its oensie and had started to withdraw. At this, the 1urkish
army turned on the Greeks and launched a counter attack while they
were retreating, the Greeks retreated beyond Sakarya then back to their
initial position near the Anatolian railway line. Along the way, they burnt
the illages and wrecked wells with dynamite, carrying along cattle and
killing anyone they encountered. 1hey let behind hundreds o miles o
destruction and inally eacuated Izmir. On 9th September, the 1urks
recaptured Izmir without een iring one single shot. Howeer, they in
turn burnt hal the city in order to erase the last trace o the Greek
occupation. Britain, lrance and Italy called or a truce, which was held on
11th September 1922 and the Greeks relinquished 1rakya up to Marij.
1hus, the war between Greece and 1urkey came to an end.
1his was the summary o the war eents which took place between
Mustaa Kemal and the Greeks as they really occurred, not as the \estern
propaganda wanted to portray them at the time. 1hese eents indicate
that the withdrawal o the Greeks and their retraction rom the lands
they had occupied was not as a consequence o a decisie battle that took
place between them and Mustaa Kemal and which they lost. Contrary to
this, at the time when the Greeks started to retreat and eacuate, they had
the upper hand and the 1urkish armed orces were the anquished, and
their morale was ery low and despair had started to eneeble them.
It is clear that the Greeks` withdrawal in this manner indicates that an
international pressure was applied upon the Greeks, which orced them
to withdraw. 1here is no doubt in the act that the pressure came rom
the Allies, because it was Britain, lrance, and Italy who called or the
165
truce once the Greeks had already retreated and withdrawn. 1hus, the
truce was eectiely held.
1he British launch a huge publicity or Mustaa Kemal
1he British exploited these battles between the 1urks and the Greeks as a
means to enable Mustaa Kemal to abolish the Kbiafab. Britain in particular,
gae wing to the news and spread it widely throughout the Islamic world,
she generated a huge publicity or Mustaa Kemal inside and outside
1urkey until he became known eerywhere as the ictor who repelled the
Greeks and ought all the allies and expelled them. He was een reerred
to as the Conqueror. 1his was what enabled Mustaa Kemal to irmly
establish himsel in the country and to deal the Muslims and the rule o
Islam a atal blow, relected in the abolishment o the Kbiafab and the
remoal o the authority o Islam rom the ace o the earth.
As or the issue o expelling the Greeks rom 1rakya, this was a lagrant
arce maniested by the act that once the Greek orces eacuated Asia
Minor, the orces o Mustaa Kemal moed northwards in order to
recapture 1rakya rom them. \hen lrance, Italy and Britain declared
their neutral stand on 15th May 1921, they established a neutral zone
which was composed o an area spread around the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles shores, and they preented the two warring actions rom
passing through this zone. In act the Greeks had attempted to pass
through the zone beore when they were about to occupy Istanbul, but
Harrington preented them rom doing so. 1hen Mustaa Kemal
attempted to pass through it but Harrington also attempted to preent
him. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal ignored this preention and the army
went on penetrating the area regardless. 1he 1urkish armed orces gathered
along the coast and stopped near the Dardanelles. 1hus Harrington
prepared or a showdown. He gathered the troops deployed in Istanbul
and sent seeral platoons to protect Canak Kale and the Asian coastline.
166
His allies, the lrench and the Italians, ound this strange. 1hen he sent a
warning to 1urkey, which the three states Britain, lrance and Italy had
approed, stressing the prohibition o passing through the neutral zone.
Howeer, Mustaa Kemal did not pay any attention to this and this
prompted Britain to put her orces on high alert and order them to
prepare or battle. She also asked lrance and Italy to put their orces on
high alert but they reused. 1hen the lrench garrison pulled out o neutral
zone Canak Kale and rom the Asian coastline. Italy ollowed lrance`s
example and Britain remained on her own.
1he issue was no longer between 1urkey and the Allies, but rather between
1urkey and the British alone. 1he 1urkish orces came ace to ace with
the British orces. 1he British orces could hae taken on the 1urkish
orces and preented them rom pursuing the Greeks, and i they had
really wanted to ight the 1urkish orces they would hae been able to
inlict upon them a crushing deeat with their land troops. Otherwise
their nay and warplanes were on standby. Mustaa Kemal had no
warplanes nor did he hae any warships at the time, and his course o
action was to penetrate the Dardanelles.
Some o Mustaa Kemal`s adisors did not want him to expose himsel
to a certain deeat beore the British army, but he insisted on continuing
his march to penetrate the neutral zone and reach the Greeks. Hence, the
1urkish orces adanced and the British troops conronted them to halt
their adance. Howeer, no clashes took place between the two sides.
1he British troops appeared conused and not knowing what to do.
Orders reaching them were ambiguous, instructing them to preent the
1urks rom passing through and at the same time banning the iring o
arms and the use o iolence.
Meanwhile, lrance sent an enoy called lranklin Bouillon to negotiate
with Mustaa Kemal on her behal. 1he lrench enoy expressed his
readiness to gie the Allies` undertaking that they would make the Greeks
16
eacuate 1riss and to return Luropean 1urkey to the 1urks.
Upon this Harrington requested rom Mustaa Kemal some time in order
to consult his goernment, and ten days later a reply came rom the
British goernment agreeing to the Greek armies eacuation but rejecting
the eacuation o the Luropean orces. In act no other orces were there
apart rom the British orces.
Mustaa Kemal agreed and ordered his troops to halt their adance and
dispatched Ismat to meet Harrington in the illage o Mudanya to work
out the details. 1he allies agreed to expel the Greeks rom 1riss and
eectiely it was so. 1he Greek troops eacuated and the Ankara
goernment took oer the reins o administratie matters. Hence, no
other oreign garrison was let in 1urkey apart rom the British army.
1his was also regarded as a ictory or Mustaa Kemal oer the Allies or
chasing them rom Istanbul and the Straits. He was gien wide publicity
just like the publicity campaign pertaining the battles with the Greeks,
though a little rational judgement would show that these theatrical acts
were prearranged with the British, in order to alienate their Allies and
remain on their own in the country.
1he politicians and the oicers warn Mustaa Kemal
against abolishing the Khilaah
By now, the phase o the domestic actions had ended and only the
settlement o the issue o the peace conerence was still pending.
Meanwhile, the politicians and oicers sensed that Mustaa Kemal intended
to abolish the Kbiafab. An oerwhelming majority was ormed in the
National Assembly to oppose him in this critical issue, and they made it
clear to him that they were ready to stand against him in it. A large section
o the armed orces also sensed this.
168
General Kathim Qara Bakir Pasha was the most ardent supporter o the
Sultan among them, thus he warned Mustaa Kemal in a speech in which
he said: 1he new constitution could not be regarded rom a legitimate
angle as a sound law since the country has not been consulted and her
opinion has not been sought regarding such a critical matter. Only the
nation can decide on the type o ruling system she wants. He then ended
his speech with the ollowing threatening words: I hae owed to preent
any steps undertaken with the aim o transorming the country rom a
Sultanate to a republic, no matter how dear the sacriice.
Since Kathim Qara Bakir was a respected personality among the whole
army, and since the masses appreciated his sound reasoning and his
oresight and trusted him, he was capable o inciting the nation and the
army against Mustaa Kemal, who realised this and immediately moed
to calm him. 1hus he wrote to him saying: 1he constitution drated by
the National Assembly is not inal. It is rather a host o general principles
which hae been drated to act as leads and guidelines to those who wish
to rule the country by a democratic system ree o chaos. 1here is nothing
in these laws to suggest that the sacred Sultanate and the sacred Kbiafab
would be undermined, or to suggest an incitement towards adopting a
republican ruling system. 1hose who imagine that we wish to destroy the
Sultanate and substitute the Sultanic rule by the republican rule are in act
liing in another planet than the one we lie in, that is the planet o iction
and imagination.
1his letter had its eect upon Kathim Qara Bakir and upon eeryone
else. 1hus, the storm was calmed and Mustaa Kemal realised that he
would not be able to establish a republic unless he relied on a ormidable
orce that would enable him to oerwhelm these opponents. So, he set
about preparing such a orce with all his eorts. He was assisted by the
huge publicity which the British had spread about him inside 1urkey and
throughout the Islamic world. 1hereore, when he sensed that he had
acquired the necessary orce, and when he was able to rely upon a
169
ormidable orce supporting him within the army, he set about executing
the aims he had been harbouring or the Kbiafab - he started thinking
about abolishing it while the peace conerence was being held to look
into the country`s matters.
10
SeporoIng Ihe SulIonoIe
from Ihe Khlofoh
It seems that Britain did not call or the inal peace conerence until she
had inished all her manoeures and achieed the results that she had
wanted. By reiewing all the actions undertaken in 1urkey alone since the
holding o the Mondros truce, up until the irst conerence o Lausanne,
it appears that the British had played with utmost shrewdness the dirtiest
o roles in order to destroy the Kbiafab. 1he British General Harrington
was the Commander in Chie o the Allied armies occupying the 1urkish
lands and he was in total control o Istanbul and all the 1urkish lands.
1urkey by then had already been seered rom the rest o the Islamic
lands. Hence, the prospect o undertaking what they had been harbouring
had become aourable. 1heir actiities were ocused on destroying the
Kbiafab and alienating the allies - lrance, Italy and Greece, rom 1urkey.
So they proceeded to initiate their manoeures while realising that these
two tasks, o destroying the Kbiafab and alienating the allies was not
going to be an easy ride.
1hereore, they proceeded with the utmost malice and shrewdness. 1he
process o secluding the allies was assumed by the British goernment
through arious political and diplomatic styles, international and military
manoeuring and through laring up a domestic war, which she also used
as one o the means to destroy the Kbiafab. As or the process o
destroying the Kbiafab, this was carried out by the British goernment
through direct actions inside 1urkey itsel , with the two British Generals,
Harrington and \ilson being used to execute it, in addition to these political
styles and international manoeures. Mustaa Kemal was the man who
11
aided in this horriic role, and had it not been or him their conspiracies
would hae been doomed to ailure.
It appears also that there were other little renowned men rom among
the British who perormed a host o direct actions inside the 1urkish
territories themseles. It seems that Captain H.S. Armstrong, although he
was an unknown and low ranking oicer, was neertheless undertaking
certain actions at the time. Just beore the lirst \orld \ar, he was the
British Military Attach in Istanbul, and during the war, he was taken
prisoner along with the whole o the sixth army diision. During his
imprisonment, he requested a meeting with Anwar Pasha. His request
was astonishing, or Anwar Pasha was at the time the \ar Minister and
the whole country was under his control. lor a British prisoner to request
a meeting with him was extraordinary. Nonethless Anwar met him and a
long conersation took place between them, which ended with Anwar
ordering that he should be placed in solitary coninement as a punishment.
It neer became known what caused Anwar to become angry with this
prisoner, howeer, it is said that he attempted to initiate a war o neres
against Anwar and that he insulted him or the state, thus leading to his
punishment. Howeer, it seems that this prisoner was in act in contact
with some o the army oicers, or beore the end o the war he escaped
rom prison and returned to the British orces. It neer became known
who helped him escape. No sooner had the war ended than the British
goernment dispatched him back to Istanbul and the British occupying
authorities delegated to him a host o oicial duties. He remained there
or seeral years, during which time he was in direct contact with the
1urks in general and with Mustaa Kemal in particular, and he witnessed
all the moes undertaken to remoe the Kbiafab. Hence, it is ery likely
that he was rom among those who colluded with Mustaa Kemal in his
endeaour to destroy the Kbiafab.
Howeer, the principal role was assigned to Harrington, or he was the
Commander in Chie and he was in total control o all aairs. It seems
Separating the Sultanate from the Khilafah
12
that when Mustaa Kemal was playing his role, his main contact was with
Harrington. 1he British considered Harrington as the supreme authority
in 1urkey and there exists a host o oicial statements highlighting his
role in 1urkey.
On 25th lebruary 1924, Lieutenant-Colonel Dalemass addressed the
Commons by saying: Britain`s reputation in the east is muddled. He
then added: Britain should not interere in the Armenian issue, and
reerred to many letters reaching him rom the Armenians stating that
they wished to lie with the 1urks in peace.
Upon this Charles Bate replied: 1he eeling o the 1urks towards us is
ery riendly and our actions there are ery successul. He was basing his
answers on the inormation that had reached him rom Sir Charles
Harrington, but he did not disclose the nature o this inormation. On
24th March 1940, two days ater the death o Harrington, the 1imes
newspaper wrote an article in which it mentioned the ollowing: In the
wake o the Greeks` deeat by the 1urks in 1921, the allied orces
Commander in Chie Sir Harrington was gien wide powers to cooperate
with Mustaa Kemal. Howeer, the nature o this cooperation was not
mentioned. 1he paper added: Harrington`s lirtation with politics
concealed his resoluteness and determination to achiee his ambitions,
and he was worthy o this.
\ith these wide powers to cooperate with Mustaa Kemal, the inal phase
to settle the issue and deal the Kbiafab the atal blow had started. Ater the
holding o the truce in July 1922, the eacuation o the Greeks and ater
the eacuation o the lrench and the Italians, the country was rid o all
the oreign garrisons, apart rom the British garrison. Accordingly
Harrington became the sole operator, and the orce o Mustaa Kemal
with his inluence and popularity throughout the whole country had reached
their peak. Meanwhile, the Istanbul goernment was a nominal
goernment that had no say in matters whatsoeer, or the ull authority
13
was in the hands o the Ankara goernment, whether pertaining domestic
matters such as the execution o laws, controlling the armed orces and
superising all the state`s aairs, or pertaining oreign matters such as
relations with other states and signing o treaties.
1he Sultan meanwhile was in his palace experiencing a great deal o anguish,
without inding anyone to listen to him. 1he British used to display
sympathy towards him and pity him. Indeed, they used to gie him money
rom time to time, ater the treasury became empty and he had run out
o unds. So he used to receie money rom them as a git, i.e. as a charity
rom them. It was amidst this status quo in 1urkey, that the allied states
Britain, lrance and Italy sent an initation to the Ankara goernment and
another initation to the Sultan`s goernment in Istanbul to attend the
Lausanne conerence in order to sign the peace treaty. 1his was on 1th
October 1922. 1his initation o the two goernments in the country
was met with anger by the National Assembly, thus the direct attempt at
abolishing the Kbiafab had started and the struggle oer it had also started.
1he National Assembly, i.e. the assembly o Mustaa Kemal - was unhappy
about these games, that is the initation o two 1urkish goernments to
attend the peace conerence, the National Assembly wanted to put an
end to this situation and rid the country rom its dual rule. 1he National
Assembly wanted to settle the score, and some o the deputies suggested
the resignation o the Istanbul goernment and the establishment o a
new goernment headed by Mustaa Kemal or lie.
\hilst the National Assembly was debating this issue Mustaa Kemal was
in Izmir, but he was closely ollowing the news o the current debates.
1he Assembly contacted him twice to discuss with him the issue o the
orthcoming peace conerence, but he replied with apologies or not
being able to attend claiming that his military duties are holding him in
Izmir. Upon this Raù and a host o politicians joined him in Izmir to
seek his opinion on how the new goernment in 1urkey should be, or it
was inconceiable to hae two goernments, one being an interim
14
goernment in authority with Ankara as its centre and the other an oicial
nominal goernment in the capital, headed by the Sultan and his ministerial
cabinet. 1hey suggested to Mustaa Kemal the merger o the two
goernments into one single goernment, with the Kbaifab becoming a
constitutional Sultan and Mustaa Kemal becoming the Prime Minister.
He, howeer, did not reply to this proposal and they began to suspect his
intentions. Raù continued to press him with a series o questions and
inally Mustaa Kemal promised to meet him in Ankara.
Consequently, the National Assembly conened and the deputies debated
the issue. Mustaa Kemal`s supporters said: \hat did the capital`s
goernment do to salage 1urkey 1urkey has one single goernment,
that is the goernment o Ankara, and the majority o the deputies suggest
that the Istanbul goernment should resign and that Mustaa Kemal should
orm the new goernment, and that the Kbaeefab should become a
constitutional Sultan.
Amidst such heated debate and the gloomy atmosphere which enguled
the Assembly, Mustaa Kemal took to the podium and requested the
deputies to pay attention to him. He then suggested the separation between
the Sultanate and the Kbiafab, thereby abolishing the Sultanate and remoing
\ahid-ud-Deen. At this point the danger acing the Kbiafab became
rightully apparent and the uproar increased dramatically. Hence, Mustaa
Kemal backed by eight o his personal ollowers demanded the holding
o an immediate ballot, but the Assembly reerred the matter to the
oreign aairs committee in order to study it.
On the ollowing day, the committee gathered, being ormed o a group
o lawyers and scholars. It spent long hours studying the issue o separating
the Sultanate rom the Kbiafab and its members reerred to texts rom
the Quràn and the vvvab, in addition to hundreds o examples rom
the history o the Kbvafa`, both in Baghdad and in Cairo. It ollowed that
the committee as a whole was aerse to the proposal and it unanimously
15
rejected it.
Mustaa Kemal was present at the time, so when heard o their general
consensus and realised that the committee`s decision was a unanimous
rejection o the proposal, he angrily leapt up onto a chair, interrupting the
debate o the attendees and shouted: Sirs! 1he Ottoman Sultan has
usurped the authority rom the people by orce, and it is by orce that the
people are determined to regain it rom him. 1he Sultanate must be
separated rom the Kbiafab and abolished. 1his will happen whether you
agree to it or not. All there is to it is that some o your heads will roll in
the process.
Upon hearing this the committee members became panic stricken and
their knees trembled. All they could do was to reer the proposal to the
National Assembly.
1he National Assembly then conened to debate the proposal. 1he
oerwhelming majority declared their rejection o the proposal and
expressed their resentment towards it and een towards Mustaa Kemal
himsel. Mustaa Kemal sensed this and when the procedures to organise
an open ballot on the proposal were about to start, he realised that it was
ineitably going to be rejected and that the oerwhelming majority was
against it. Hence, he gathered his priate supporters around him to protect
him and demanded that a ote on the proposal should be taken only
once, but some deputies reused and suggested taking the ote by calling
each one by name. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal reused this. His supporters
were clearly armed and he shouted threats while they rested their hands
on their pistols: I am sure that the Assembly would accept the proposal
with a general consensus and it will be suicient to take a ote just by
raising hands. Upon this the proposal was put orward to be oted on
and ew hands were raised, howeer, the speaker announced the result
o the ballot as ollows: 1he Assembly has endorsed the proposal by a
general consensus. Upon this a number o deputies jumped on to their
16
seats protesting and shouting: 1his is not true, we did not agree to this.
So the supporters o Mustaa Kemal shouted back: Sit down! Shut up.
1hen chaos broke out and the uproar intensiied, and the session was
noisily wound up.
In the beginning o Noember 1922, Mustaa Kemal let the building o
the National Assembly surrounded by his supporters. 1his was 14 days
ater the initation to attend the Lausanne conerence had arried.
lie days ater taking this decision, Ri àt Pasha staged a sudden military
coup in Istanbul through which he seized the reins o power in the capital
with the help o the army and the military power. 1his occurred right
under the nose o General Harrington. Hence, he abolished the
goernment o the Sultan by orce. 1he Sultan pretended to know nothing
about this situation or a ew days, then he sent to Harrington a message
with the maestro o the musical band at the Sultanic Palace. 1he message
was erbal and a man coneyed it to Harrington by saying: 1he Sultan is
seeking the protection o the British Commander and the British
goernment, or his majesty is certain that his lie is in danger.
1wo days later on 1th Noember 1922, a British ambulance came to
the Sultan`s palace and \ahid-ud-Deen climbed on board ollowed by
his son, a eunuch carrying a small suitcase and a porter carrying his baggage.
1he car took him to where he boarded a steam boat, which in turn took
him to a British warship that was waiting in the port. 1he warship took
him to Malta.
In the wake o \ahid-ud-Deen`s departure, his cousin the .vir Abdul-
Majid ibn Abdul-Aziz was appointed as Kbaeefab o the Muslims ater
the consent o the Greater National Assembly on this matter had been
sought. Hence, many men rom among the supporters o the Kbiafab
rushed to him to pledge their support or him. He was also isited by
Raù Beik and Doctor Adnan Beik, as well as Ali luàd and Kathim
1
Qara Bakir and they openly declared their allegiance to him in order to let
the world know that they were still loyal to the Kbaeefab and that the
Kbiafab still existed. Mustaa Kemal was contented with the separation
o the Sultanate rom the Kbiafab and he took oer the reins o power,
leaing the Kbaeefab stripped o all authority. He then started to prepare
or the peace conerence.
1he British stipulate the abolishment o the Khilaah and
the secularisation o the state
On 20th Noember 1922, the Lausanne conerence was inaugurated. It
was attended on behal o the Ottoman State by a delegation o the
Ankara goernment only, who acted as the representatie o the Ottoman
State that was deeated in the \orld \ar. It was also attended by Curzon
the British loreign Secretary, as head o the British delegation, or the
goernment o Lloyd George had resigned on 19th October 1922. 1he
conerence started its sessions and during it, the head o the British
delegation Curzon, stipulated our conditions prior to recognising the
independence o 1urkey. 1hese conditions were: the total abolishment
o the Kbiafab, the expulsion o the Kbaifab beyond the borders, the
coniscation o his assets and declaration o the state`s secularisation. 1he
success o the conerence rested on the ulilment o these our conditions.
Howeer, it was wound up on 4th lebruary 1923 without yielding any
result and it was declared a ailure.
Ismat returned to 1urkey and Mustaa Kemal rushed to meet him in
Lskisehir where he learnt rom him all the matters which had been raised
at the conerence, then he returned with him to Ankara.
On their arrial at Ankara station, the pair were surprised by the ailure
o Raù, the Prime Minister, and the city`s deputies to turn up to greet
them. Mustaa Kemal was incensed by this and summoned Raù and
18
demanded him to explain his behaiour. Raù replied by expressing his
protest against the sending o Ismet to the conerence without consulting
the goernment and against Mustaa Kemal`s rushing to meet Ismet in
Lskisehir also without consulting the goernment, stressing that this was
an unconstitutional act, he then ollowed his protest by handing in his
resignation rom the Premiership.
Consequently, the National Assembly conened to debate the peace
conerence. 1he Assembly sided with Raù and gathered to lend him
support and the majority o its members were against Mustaa Kemal.
1he debate was heated and the deliberation lasted or nine days, during
which time the deputies condemned Mustaa Kemal`s acceptance o the
truce with the enemies in Mudanya and described it as a trick which he
had allen or, stating that he should hae rather continued his adance
towards Istanbul, and een towards Athens i necessary.
1he deputies then launched a ierce attack on Ismet, accusing him o
inringement o procedure and imbecility in negotiating with Curzon.
1hey also criticised his being sent without their consent and they decided
to take a ote pertaining to his dismissal and the sending o a successor to
resume negotiations in Lausanne. Upon this Mustaa Kemal became rantic
and started to issue threats and to incite the deputies against Raù, until he
managed to oil the decision o dismissing Ismat, or he was his conidante
and his aithul enoy in his contacts with the British and the man who
obeyed him with no questions asked. 1o send someone else would
jeopardise all o Mustaa Kemal`s plans and it could hae spelt his end.
Hence, he ought desperately until he managed to oerturn the decision
o his dismissal and replacement.
He then set about plotting against the National Assembly and the struggle
between them intensiied. At this point most o the colleagues who had
sided with him in the darkest hours during the past our years started to
join orces against him, led by Raù. Amongst them were Rahmi, Adnan,
19
Kathim Qara Bakir, Ri àt, Ali luàd, Noureddine and others. Only Ismet,
lawzi and some o his riends remained on his side. 1he deputies joined
Raù one ater the other and started criticising Mustaa Kemal openly.
1he majority in the National Assembly gathered against him and he realised
that his deeat was a certainty.
180
Ihe foIol blow
\hen Mustaa Kemal sensed that the whole atmosphere was against him
and that the majority o the National Assembly was also against him, he
thought o a way out rom this critical impasse. 1hese circumstances
were not aourable to the resumption o the peace conerence in
Lausanne, or they would not allow the execution o the our conditions
stipulated by the British which Curzon, the British loreign Secretary, had
made conditional or the success o the conerence. Hence, it was
imperatie or him to undertake an action which would enable him to
ulil these conditions. It was also imperatie to obtain a decision rom
the National Assembly endorsing the establishment o the Republic and
electing him as President o the Republic, and to obtain a decision
endorsing the total abolishment o the Kbiafab. Since the majority o the
National Assembly was against him and since it was unlikely that it would
execute his plans or agree to proceed with him, he thought about
dissoling the National Assembly and holding resh elections which would
enable him to bring a new National Assembly rom among his own
men, who would support him, execute his aspirations and endorse the
resolutions he wanted.
Hence, he endeaoured to dissole the National Assembly and hold resh
elections, hoping to acquire a majority. Howeer, the Assembly which the
election produced was against him just like the old one. 1hus, he resorted
to plotting against the National Assembly in order to throw it into
conusion and to place it in a position that would make it seem unable to
unction. Hence, he staged a political conspiracy in order to generate a
crisis and exploit it. He inited the ministers to dinner at his house in the
181
suburb o Cankaya during which they discussed the political status quo
rom all aspects. 1hen, on the basis o a request, the next day, all the
ministers resigned in accordance to what they had agreed upon the night
beore.
1he National Assembly conened in order to orm the new goernment
but it could not do so, or arguments between the deputies increased and
quarrels broke out. Lach deputy attempted to impose his own opinion
and look ater his own interests until the situation resulted in total chaos.
1wo days later, Mustaa Kemal hosted another dinner party or some o
his loyal riends, among whom were Ismat, lathi and Kemal-ud-din and
they talked about the crisis into which the National Assembly had allen
due to its ailure to agree upon the ormation o a goernment. 1hey
exchanged their iews about the situation and at the end o their discussion
Mustaa Kemal addressed them by saying: it is high time we put an end
to this mess. 1omorrow we are going to declare the establishment o the
Republic. It is the solution to all these problems. 1hereore, you lathi
complicate matters in the Assembly as much as you can tomorrow, so
you will incite the deputies against each other. 1hen you Kemal-ud-din
will propose that I should be inited to take control in order to sae the
Assembly rom its crisis.
1he next day, eery one set about carrying out what they had agreed
upon. 1he Assembly conened and noisy arguments broke out. 1he
deputies came close to ighting each other physically. Amidst this huge
uproar between the deputies, Kemal-ud-din suggested initing Mustaa
Kemal to orm the goernment. 1he deputies agreed and orgot all their
dierences with him. Howeer, Mustaa Kemal turned down their request
at irst. 1hus, they sent him a new message in which the Assembly admitted
its ailure in soling the goernmental crisis and requested his help. Hence,
he stipulated that the National Assembly should accept his opinion without
any discussion i they wanted him to orm the goernment to which they
The fatal blow
182
agreed.
On 29th October 1923, the National Assembly held an important meeting
and Mustaa Kemal took to the platorm and deliered a speech in which
he declared turning 1urkey into a republic. 1o quote rom his speech:
\ou hae sent or me so I could salage the situation at this critical time.
Howeer, the crisis is o your own doing. 1he origin o this crisis is not
a passing matter, but rather a undamental error in the system o our
goernment. 1he National Assembly is undertaking the unction o the
legislatie power and the executie power at the same time. Lery deputy
rom amongst you must interere in eery goernment resolution being
adopted and stick his ingers in eery goernmental department and eery
ministerial decision. Sirs! No minister can ulil his responsibility and accept
the post under such circumstances. \ou ought to realise that a goernment
built upon such a basis would be impossible to establish, and i it were
established, it would not be a goernment but an anarchy. \e ought to
change this status quo. 1hereore, I hae decided that 1urkey should become
a republic with an elected president.
1he deputies were stunned by this horriic decision and they became
speechless, or they were not expecting it. \hen the oting took place,
ewer than 40 o the deputies took part. Nonetheless, the decree that
had been prepared beorehand, stipulating that 1urkey should be turned
into a republic was approed and Mustaa Kemal was elected as the irst
president o the 1urkish republic. 1hen he embarked upon working
towards abolishing the Kbiafab and declaring the secularisation o the
state. People sensed his moes and public opinion started to attack him.
1he word was spread eerywhere that the new rulers o Ankara were
Kvffar. 1he orators and preachers started to attack Mustaa Kemal. Lealets
and caricatures which attacked him iercely were distributed. 1hen many
o the deputies and prominent igures started to leae Ankara and headed
towards Istanbul to rally around the Kbaeefab Abdul-Majid. 1he
atmosphere throughout the whole o 1urkey turned against him. In
183
response, he started to try to win oer supporters and thereby alleiate
the onslaught.
Amidst such a status quo, the British supplied him with a weapon to use
against those who were deoted to the Kbiafab. At the height o the
campaign against him, the two Indian Muslim leaders Agha Khan and
Amir Ali sent a letter o protest on behal o India`s Muslims, demanding
that the dignity o the Ottoman Kbaeefab, the Kbaeefab o the Muslims
should be respected. Agha Khan was the leader o the Ismaeli sect, and it
was known in 1urkey and other parts that he was a riend o the British
and their agent. Hence, the letter was published in the Istanbul press beore
it reached the Ankara goernment. 1hen Mustaa Kemal started to dig
into Agha Khan`s past. He highlighted the act that he lied in Britain, that
he ran his horses in the British race courses and mingled with the British
politicians and ambassadors. He pointed out that the British had promoted
his status through their propaganda machine during the \orld \ar until
he was regarded as the leader o India`s Muslims so that they could use
him to threaten the Sultan o 1urkey wheneer necessary, thus he was a
British puppet.
Mustaa Kemal became ery actie in striking the right note and inciting
the public opinion against the Kbaeefab. He used to say to people: \hen
Britain, the wicked arch enemy, ailed to destroy 1urkey through Greece,
she resorted to her old tricks. 1hus, she inspired her puppet Agha Khan
to support the Kbaeefab and split 1urkey into two camps. He then set
about stirring up the erour o the National Assembly and this led the
orators rom among the deputies to rush into launching a ierce attack
against the Kbiafab, the clerics and the opposition leaders. 1hey also
endorsed a bill enjoining the act that any opposition to the republic and
any inclination towards the deposed Sultan would be considered a treason
that carries capital punishment.
\hen some deputies highlighted the merits o the Kbiafab rom a
The fatal blow
184
diplomatic aspect, Mustaa Kemal`s supporters attempted to silence them
by yelling and screaming and protesting. 1hen Mustaa Kemal stood up
and said: \as it not because o the Kbiafab, Islam and the clerics that the
1urkish peasants hae ought and lost their lies or ie centuries It is
high time 1urkey attended to her interests, ignored the Indians and the
Arabs and saed hersel rom the burden o leading the Islamic lands.
1hen he sought to scrutinise the army and ind out the extent o their
support or their opposition to the abolishment o the Kbiafab and the
separation o the Deev rom the state. So he attended the annual military
manoeures near Izmir and spent days reiewing the situation with lawzi
and Ismet and probing the low ranking oicers and soldiers. He ound a
strong opposition and ailed to reach a conclusie outcome that reassured
him.
He then spent seeral nights pondering on the matter rom eery angle,
inally deciding to resort to terrorism. Mustaa Kamal picked rom the
Assembly one o the opposing deputies on a day when he had shown his
ierce opposition in one o the sessions, and ordered someone to
assassinate him on the same night while he was returning home. Another
deputy deliered a speech in which he supported the Kbaeefab, so Mustaa
Kemal threatened him with hanging i he opened his mouth with the
same thing again. He then summoned Raù rom Istanbul and orced
him to take the oath o allegiance to him and to the Republic beore the
central committee o the People`s Party, threatening him with dismissal
rom the party and rom the committee i he ailed to do so. He also sent
a strict order to the goernor o Istanbul, commanding him to cancel the
pompous protocol surrounding the Kbaeefab during the perormance o
prayer, he also lowered his standing to the lowest leel and ordered his
ollowers to abandon him.
Amidst this atmosphere o terror, and this propaganda and rumours, the
Greater National Assembly called or a meeting. 1hus, the Assembly
185
conened on 1st March 1924. 1he inaugural speech ocused on the necessity
to destroy the Kbiafab. 1his was greeted with a barrage o ierce opposition.
Mustaa Kemal put orward to the Assembly a decree enjoining the
abolishment o the Kbiafab, the expulsion o the Kbaeefab and separating
the Deev rom the state, then he addressed the angry deputies by saying:
\e must at all costs saeguard the endangered republic and make her
rise upon solid scientiic bases. 1he Kbaeefab and the legacies o the
Ottoman lamily must go, the dilapidated religious courts and their
laws must be replaced by modern courts and laws, and the clerics` schools
must concede their place to goernmental secular schools.
Heated debates took place and bitter disputes broke out, but these came
to nothing. On the second day, the National Assembly conened once
more in order to reiew this decree, the session went on all night until
6.30 a.m. with ierce argument and unabated debate.
In the morning o the third day o March 1924, it was announced that
the Greater National Assembly had approed the abolishment o the
Kbiafab and the separation o the Deev rom the state. On the same night,
Mustaa Kemal sent an order to the goernor o Istanbul stipulating that
the Kbaifab Abdul-Majid should leae 1urkey beore the dawn o the
next day, so he went with a garrison rom the police and the army to the
Kbaeefab`. palace in the middle o the night and the Kbaeefab was orced
to climb aboard a car that took him through the borders towards
Switzerland, ater he had been supplied with a suitcase containing some
clothes and money. 1wo days later, Mustaa Kemal gathered all the throne`s
princes and princesses and deported them outside the country. All religious
unctions were cancelled and the .rqaf ,endowments, o the Muslims
became the property o the state, and the religious schools were turned
into ciil schools under the auspices o the education ministry.
In this way, Mustaa Kemal ulilled the our conditions which Curzon,
The fatal blow
186
the British loreign Secretary had demanded, and the impediment
preenting the conening and the success o the peace conerence no
longer existed. Hence on 8th March 1924, Ismet Pasha 1urkey`s oreign
minister and head o the delegation, sent a letter to the conerence
requesting the resumption o negotiations, and the Allies agreed. On 23rd
April 1924, the conerence was reconened and the conerees agreed
upon the peace terms. 1he Lausanne 1reaty was signed on 24th July
1924. 1he states recognised 1urkey`s independence, Britain eacuated
Istanbul and the straits and Harrington let 1urkey. Consequently, one o
the British MPs protested against Curzon in the House o Commons or
recognising 1urkey`s independence. Curzon answered him by saying: 1he
point at issue is that 1urkey has been destroyed and shall neer rise again,
because we hae destroyed her spiritual power : the Kbiafab and Islam.
1his is how the Kbiafab was destroyed. It was completely destroyed and
Islam was also destroyed as a state constitution, an |vvab`. source o
legislation and as a way o lie. All o this was at the hands o the British
through their collaborator and agent, the treacherous Mustaa Kemal.
1hereore, when the discerning and sincere people say that the British are
the head o Kvfr among all the other Kvfr states, they mean exactly that,
or they are indeed the head o Kvfr and they are the arch enemies o
Islam. 1he Muslims should indeed harbour hatred or the British and a
yearning or reenge oer them. 1he British hae managed to destroy the
Kbiafab and Islam through Mustaa Kemal in spite o the Muslims
throughout the whole world in general and in spite o the Muslims in
1urkey in particular. Hence, the rule by what Allah has reealed dwindled
away rom the ace o the earth and the rule by other than what Allah has
reealed has remained. 1he rule o Kvfr remained. 1he rule o 1agbvt
remained alone dominant oer all people and was implemented throughout
the whole world.
18
Ihe vIol ssues ond Ihe
meosure of lfe ond deoIh
Here one may ask: \as it with such ease that the Kvffar managed to
destroy the Kbiafab and wipe out Islam rom the political scene, and
while the Muslims number hundreds o millions, yet they do not deend
their Deev nor do they deend their political entity
1he answer to this is: \es! It was that easy or the Kvffar to topple the
Kbiafab and wipe out Islam rom the political scene, and the Muslims did
not deend it, they did not een ight to the last ditch, like the anquished
would do beore leaing the battleield. 1he reason why this occurred
was because these ital issues were not perceied by the |vvab as those
which necessitated lie and death measures to be taken. 1hus the |vvab
was dealt this atal blow without a complete eort to repel it. 1his was
because the |vvab did not consider what took place as being a ital issue
upon which her surial or her demise depended. Hence, she did not
iew this calamity with the importance with which she would normally
iew issues upon which her surial depends. Consequently, she did not
undertake the resolution o this calamity with the urgency o lie and
death. As a result, the Kvffar managed to topple the Kbiafab and to wipe
out the system o Islam rom existence.
1he instinct o surial makes it incumbent upon eery nation in the
world and eery people on Larth to hae its own ital issues, or which
a nation or a people would gie its blood with consent and with utmost
erour, without any hesitation or any argument or debate. 1hese issues
are those related to either perishing or staying alie, or related to the
The vital issues and the measure of life and death
188
remoal o a people rom existence or the saeguard o their surial.
Such measures are unique and almost identical to all people and the
measures undertaken towards them are similar or ery similar to all people,
because they are tangibly lie threatening. Hence, the issues are the same
and the measures are also the same. Howeer, the issues related to the
surial instinct do not compose all o the ital issues, nor are the ital
issues only those related to the surial instinct, or there are other ital
issues related to the spiritual instinct and to the procreation instinct.
Howeer, people dier in these issues according to the dierence in their
iewpoint about lie, thus they dier in the measures undertaken towards
them, this is so because what makes these issues ital is the speciic
iewpoint about lie, thus they dier and the measures they undertake
also dier. 1hereore, some ital issues dier between peoples and nations
according to the dierence in their iewpoint about lie. 1he Muslims are
one |vvab and they undoubtedly hae a host o ital issues. 1he |vvab`.
ital issues, whether these were related to the surial instinct or the spiritual
instinct or the procreation instinct, should be according to their iewpoint
about lie. 1heir iewpoint about lie is determined by Islam alone. Hence,
it is Islam that determines the ital issues and also determines the measures
which need to be taken.
Islam has explained to people what are the ital issues, and made the
measure o lie and death towards them an obligation. Hence, the Muslims
hae no choice in determining their ital issues. 1hat which is considered
by Islam to be a ital issue must be iewed by the Muslims as such.
Likewise, they hae no choice in the measure o lie and death undertaken
towards such issues, because when Islam determined the ital issues, it
also determined the measure that Muslims should undertake towards
them.
lor Islam to hae aced eents which threatened it and or Muslims to
hae come up against what threatened their existence, in their capacity as
Muslims, was ineitable. It is sel eident that any moement in lie would
189
ace that which threatens its existence, especially the moements o reorm
and more speciically the sound moements. Ler since the dawn o
Islam, the struggle has been ierce between Islam and Kvfr. 1his struggle
has been about the ate o Kvfr and the ate o Islam. 1he bloody struggle
that was added to the intellectual struggle since the establishment o the
Islamic State in Madinah was in deence o the ital issues. Hence, the
existence o ital issues was to the Muslims ineitable and axiomatic, and
their undertaking o the measure o lie and death towards them was
also ineitable and axiomatic. It is a matter or which ]ibaa has been made
one o the most important duties, in which the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
said: 1he head o the matter is Islam, its pillar is the Salah and the
peak o its hump is Jihad. It is also a matter or which ]ibaa will
continue until the Hour comes, or he ,saw, said: And Jihad has been
constant since Allah sent me until the last generation o my Ummah
ight the Dajjal, it will not be revoked by the tyranny o a tyrant
nor by the justness o a just. 1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, also said:
Jihad is constant with the pious and the dissolute. Hence, the
Muslims did not slacken or one moment in deending the ital issues,
nor did they eer hesitate in undertaking the measure o lie and death
towards eery ital issue.
1hereore, when they were aced with what threatened their ate as an
|vvab and as a state during the crusades, the Muslims undertook measures
which necessitated lie and death. 1hus, they engaged the Kvffar crusaders
in a ierce war or more than a century. 1he Islamic |vvab managed to
repel the atal blow that threatened her. Likewise, the Muslims acted in
the same way when the Mongols inaded the Islamic lands. 1he Islamic
|vvab considered this inasion as a matter that threatened her existence,
thus she undertook towards it the measure o lie and death, and the
Muslims engaged the Mongols in a war in which they sacriiced their lies
without seeking any worldly gains until the decisie ictory was theirs.
1hereore, the Muslims used to perceie the ital issues and used to
The vital issues and the measure of life and death
190
undertake towards them what was obligatory upon them, that is the
measure o lie and death. 1his was so because that which Islam had
explained in terms o ital issues was considered as acts by the Muslims,
which they clutched with a tight grip, and the perception o any danger
was clearly maniested to them. Hence, it was inconceiable or them to
ace a situation that threatened their existence without undertaking towards
it that which Islam has obliged upon them, that is the measure o lie and
death. Neither the Islamic |vvab, nor the Islamic State eer ailed in the
past to perceie and be aware o the ital issues. Howeer, when the
perception o Islam receded to the leel o deiation and when the piety
in the souls weakened to the leel o keeping silent oer the lagrant Kvfr,
these ital issues lost their consideration as being ital, and the measure o
lie and death was not undertaken towards them. Consequently, the threat
to the existence loomed and the Muslims ailed to gie their blood and
their lies generously in order to repel this threat. Hence, the Kbiafab was
destroyed, the system o Islam was abolished and the whole o the Islamic
|vvab was threatened with extinction.
1hus, it is imperatie to perceie the ital issues rom the Islamic iewpoint
as Islam decreed in the Book and the vvvab. It is also imperatie to
perceie the compulsory measures which ought to be undertaken towards
them as outlined by the Quràn and by the aaitb o the Messenger o
Allah ,saw,. Only then would awareness o the ital issues and o the
compulsory measure towards them be generated and their neglect would
then become inconceiable.
191
Ihe vIol ssues
occordng Io slom
I one were to reiew the Book and the vvvab, one would ind that
Islam has determined these ital issues in an explicit manner and that it
has also determined the compulsory measures towards them as being a
matter o lie and death. Islam has or instance considered apostasy rom
Islam, be it by an indiidual or a group, as a ital issue and has made the
measure undertaken towards it one o lie and death, that is either the
guilty would repent or ace death. Hence, Islam has determined the issue
and also the measure. 1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: He who
changes his Deen must be killed. It is also reported on the authority
o ibn Masud who said: 1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: 1he blood
o a Muslim person who proesses that there is no god but Allah
and that I am the messenger o Allah is not violable except in
three instances: the adulterer, the slayer o another person and the
apostate who abandons the group. 1his issue was to the Muslim a
dominant concept and a act which they irmly adhered to.
1he Muslims used to implement it, and accordingly they would kill the
apostate who reused to repent. 1he ababa did this in \emen in the
lietime o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,, they also did this ater him
,saw, and those who succeeded them did the same. In the aaitb o Abu
Moussa, it is reported that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said to him:
Go to \emen! 1hen he ,saw, sent Muàth ibn Jabal to join him. \hen
he reached him Abu Moussa threw him a pillow and said to him: Get
down. As Muàth was about to dismount, he noticed a man who was
tied up, so he asked: \hat is this. Abu Moussa replied: He had been a
The vital issues according to Islam
192
Jew, he then embraced Islam and then he became a Jew again. Upon
this Muàth said to him: I shall not sit until he is killed. He who reokes
his Deev must be killed. Abu Dawood reported this as ollows: A man
who apostatised rom Islam was brought to Abu Moussa, so he inited
him to repent or twenty nights or so, then Muàth came and inited him
to repent but he reused so he struck his neck.
Al-Darqutni and Al-Bayhaqi extracted the ollowing: Abu Bakr inited a
woman called Umm Qarah to repent, haing embraced Islam and then
apostatised, but she reused to repent, so he killed her. Also, when many
o the Arab tribes rejected the obligation o Zaat, Abu Bakr considered
this to be apostasy rom Islam. 1hus, he brandished the sword against
them and ought them until he brought them back to the old o Islam.
It is reported in Al-latah on the authority o Abdullah ibn Sharik on that
o his ather who said: It was said to Ali: 1here are people here at the
door o the mosque who claim that you are their god. So he summoned
them and said to them: \oe to you! \hat are you saying 1hey said:
\ou are our god, our creator and our proider. He said: \oe to you,
I am but a serant like you. I eat just like you do and I drink just like you
do. I I obeyed Allah He would reward me i He wished, and i I
disobeyed Him I eared that He would punish me. So ear Allah and
repent. 1hey still reused to repent. On the ollowing day, they were
brought to him and Qanbar came and said: By Allah they went back to
saying the same thing. So Ali said: Let them in. So they again said the
same thing. On the third day Ali said to them: I you were to say the
same thing again I shall kill you in the worst possible way. 1hey still
reused. So Ali ordered or a hole to be dug or them between the entrance
o the mosque and the palace, then he ordered or wood to be thrown
in the hole and lit up. He then said to them: I shall throw you in i you
do not repent. 1hey still reused, so he threw them in.
\hen ibn Abbas heard o their burning, he expressed his disagreement
193
oer their burning and said that they should hae been killed. Akrama
reported: A group o apostates were brought to the .vir o the belieers,
Ali so he burnt them. Ibn Abbas heard o this and said: I I had been
him, I would not hae burnt them because the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
has prohibited this by saying: Do not punish with the punishment o
Allah. I would hae killed them because the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
said: He who changes his Deen must be killed. In the days o Al-
Mahdi the number o atheists and apostates increased, and he used to
inite them to repent, and he who reused used to be killed. Al-Mahdi
killed a considerable number rom them.
Hence, the Muslims, among them the ababa, those who succeeded them
and the Kbvafa` used to kill the apostates. 1hey were irm in the matter
without any slackness. Howeer, when the Kbvafa` became weak and the
understanding o Islam also weakened, slackness in the killing o the
apostates occurred, until atheism and apostasy spread. 1his reached the
point where some o the apostates established groups and adopted a
Deev alien to Islam, as a consequence, the ear crept into the hearts o the
Muslims, despite the act that this was a ital issue on the one hand and a
matter in which intercession and orgieness were out o the question on
the other hand.
Hence, it was not surprising or a man like Mustaa Kemal to declare war
against Islam, i.e. apostasise against Islam with no one to execute the rule
o bariàb upon him, since the issue o apostasy was no longer deemed
a ital issue, and this is what happened. 1hereore, it is imperatie to put
back this issue in its rightul place and consider it to be a ital issue, by
killing eery apostate, een i they numbered millions.
Howeer, this does not mean that we can be casual in judging a person to
be an apostate because he carries a doubtul opinion. \e ought to be
absolutely certain beore we can judge him to be a Kafir and an apostate.
I what he says makes him 99 an apostate and 1 does not make an
194
apostate, then the 1 should take precedence and he should be considered
a Muslim, and he should not be judged as an apostate. 1his is because the
Muslim in essence is a Muslim and he should not be judged to be a Kafir
or an apostate unless this was conclusie. Likewise, we should not make
excuses or him or seek pretexts to remoe the rule o apostasy rom
him i he was conclusiely an apostate, because this would impede the
measure o lie and death to be undertaken in a ital issue.
Hence, i a Muslim was to perpetrate that which renders him an apostate,
such as praying in a church with the Christians and in the way they pray, or
i he were to utter something that renders him an apostate, such as: 1he
story o Ibrahim mentioned in the Quràn was not narrated by history,
thus it is a alse story, or i he were to beliee in that which renders him
an apostate, such as belieing that Islam is not alid or this age, or such as
belieing in the separation o the Deev rom the state, or i he were to
doubt a conclusie act o Islam, thus becoming an apostate, such as
doubting that the Quràn is the word o Allah, in all such cases and in
other similar cases, he would conclusiely become an apostate. 1hen the
issue must be treated as a ital one, thus the measure o lie and death
must be undertaken towards it, which is either repentance or death.
Likewise, Islam has made the unity o the Islamic |vvab and the unity
o the State one o the ital issues, and made the measure undertaken
towards it a measure o lie and death. 1hus, it has determined the issue
and the measure.
1his is maniested in two cases: one is the issue o the plurality o Kbvafa`
and the other is the issue o the rebels. It has been reported on the authority
o Abdullah ibn Amr ibn ul-Aàs that he heard the Messenger o Allah
,saw, said: He who pledged his Bay'a to an Imam giving him the
clasp o his hand and the ruit o his heart shall obey him as long
as he can, and i another comes to dispute with him, you must
strike the neck o that man. It has also been reported on the authority
195
o Abu Said Al-Khudri that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: I a
Bay'a has been taken or two Khaliahs, kill the latter o them.
Hence, he ,saw, made the unity o the State a ital issue when he prohibited
the plurality o the Kbvafa` and ordered the killing o the one who attempts
to establish a plurality in the Kbiafab, unless he retracts. It has also been
reported on the authority o Ajraa who said: I heard the Messenger
o Allah (saw) say: He who comes to you while your aair has
been united under one man, intending to drive a wedge between
you or ragment your group, kill him. Hence, he ,saw, made the
issue o the |vvab`. unity and the issue o the State`s unity a ital issue
when he prohibited the ragmentation o the group and ordered the
killing o he who attempts to cause it, unless he retracts.
As or the rebels, Allah ,swt, says:
I two actions rom among the belieers all into a quarrel, make
peace between them, and i one o them transgresses against the other,
then ight the one that transgresses until it complies with the Command
o Allah.
|1.M.Q. Al Hujarat 49: 9[
1his is so because rebellion against him whose !vava o the Muslims has
been established, namely the one who has been established as Kbaeefab o
the Muslims, is orbidden, due to the act that rebellion leads to the disunity
o the Muslims, the shedding o their blood and the squandering o their
wealth. 1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: He who rebels against
my Ummah while they are united, strike his neck with the sword
whoever he may be. Hence, those who rebel against the Imam are
196
considered rebels. 1hey should be inited to repent and their doubts
should be dissipated, but i they persist, they should be killed.
By prohibiting the plurality o the state and the rebellion against it and by
prohibiting the diision o the |vvab, the unity o State and that o the
|vvab becomes a ital issue, because the Legislator ,swt, has decreed
that the measure to be undertaken towards them is a measure o lie and
death. Hence, he who perpetrates such an act should either repent or be
killed. 1he Muslims had implemented this and used to consider it to be
amongst the most important and most critical o matters. 1hey neer
used to be lenient in this towards any Muslim whoeer he might hae
been. Ali was neer lenient with Muàwiyyah, nor were Ali, the Ommayyads
or the Abbasids lenient with the Khawarij, and the established acts
pertaining to this are innumerable. Howeer, when the Kbiafab became
weak and the understanding o Islam declined, Muslims kept silent oer
the breakaway o Islamic lands rom the body o the Kbiafab. 1hus, a
wedge was drien between the Muslims and they dissembled into seeral
states, despite the act that the breakaway o any country rom the body
o the State is a ital issue that stipulates either the repentance o the
rebels or the waging o war against them, regardless o the cost in lies
or in wealth.
1he situation reached the point where Muslims lied in seeral states and
the Kbiafab became one o these states. 1he situation een worsened to
the point where some Muslims started to call or an Islamic league, where
the Kbiafab state would enter into agreements with the states which broke
away rom her. In this way the Kbiafab State would approe o their
separation and o it becoming seeral states. 1his would support the
disunity o the Muslims so that they turn into seeral peoples and nations,
despite the act that this was a ital issue and despite the explicitness o
the abaaitb about repentance or death. Hence, it came as no surprise when
Mustaa Kemal declared the dismemberment o 1urkey rom the rest
o the Islamic lands, and een when he declared his approal o
surrendering the Islamic lands to the Kvfr states to decide their ate because
19
the issue was relegated rom the leel o being a ital issue. So, the calamity
took place and the Muslims became indierent towards haing to lie in
seeral states, and being diided into seeral peoples and nations. 1his
was only because the issue o the |vvab`. unity and the issue o the
state`s unity were no longer regarded as ital issues and the measure
undertaken towards them was no longer a measure o lie and death.
Hence, it is imperatie to restore this issue to its rightul place and to
consider it as a ital issue, thus preenting the dismemberment o any
country rom the body o the Kbiafab, een i this led to seeral years o
ighting and een i it led to the killing o millions o Muslims.
Likewise, Islam has made the displaying o lagrant disbelie ,Kvfr, one
o the ital issues, and made the measure undertaken towards it a measure
o lie and death. Islam determined the issue and the measure. Muslim
reported in the aaitb o Au ibn Malik that the Messenger o Allah
,saw, said: Amirs will be appointed over you, and you will ind
them doing good deeds as well as bad deeds. 1he one who hates
their bad deeds is absolved rom blame, the one who disapproves
o their bad deeds is also sae, but the one who approves and
ollows is doomed. It was said: O Messenger o Allah! Should we
not ight them with the sword He said: No, as long as they continue
to establish prayer amongst you. In another narration : 1hey said:
O Messenger o Allah, should we not ight them then He ,saw, replied:
No, as long as they continue to establish prayer amongst you.
Bukhari reported on the authority o Ubadah ibn us-Samit who said:
1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, inited us so we pledged our ayaà to
him to hear and to obey in weal and woe, in ease and in hardship and eil
circumstances, that we would not dispute with the people in authority,
unless one witnessed a lagrant Kvfr o which one had a conclusie proo
rom Allah. In Al-1abarani`s narration it said: evident Kur, and in a
narration by Ahmed, it said: As long as he does not order you to
commit a lagrant sin. It was also reported on the authority o Au
ibn Malik Al-Ashjayi who said: 1he best o your Imams are those
198
whom you love and they love you and who pray or you and you
pray or them, and the worst o your Imams are those whom you
hate and they hate you and you curse them and they curse you.
\e asked: O Messenger o Allah shall we not then resist them He said:
as long as they continue to establish Salah among you.
Lstablishing Salah is relected in the establishment o the Deev. It is also
tantamount to the rule by Islam and the maniestation o its rites. 1he
lagrant Kvfr is the Kvfr maniested in the actions perormed by the ruler,
which is the rule by Kvfr.
Hence, the concept behind these .baaitb is that we ought to resist the
rulers i they ail to establish the rule o Islam and i they ail to uphold its
rites, and that we ought to ight them i they establish the rule o Kvfr.
Also to challenge the people in authority i we witness a lagrant Kvfr.
Challenging them means generating the challenge een i this led to ighting
them. It is mentioned in Al- latah: 1he scholars hae agreed upon the
obligation o obeying the dominant Sultan and o perorming ]ibaa
alongside him. His obedience is better than rebellion against him, or this
would spare lies and appease the populace. Howeer, they excluded
rom this the case where lagrant Kvfr is displayed by the Sultan, in which
case it would be orbidden to obey him, he should rather be ought by
those who are capable, as mentioned in the aaitb. Al-Shawkani wrote
in his book entitled Nayl-ul-Awtar : 1hose who hold the opinion that it
is obligatory to resist the wrongdoers with the sword and struggle against
them, they used as eidence the general texts in the Book and the vvvab
. Hence, the issue pertaining the obligation o ruling by Islam and
preenting the rule by Kvfr is a ital issue, because the Legislator ,swt, has
made the measure that should be undertaken towards it a measure o lie
and death, thus, he who does not rule by Islam and rules by a Kvfr system
should either retract or be killed.
1he Muslims are ordered not to keep silent oer the rule by other than
what Allah ,swt, has reealed, because it is a ital issue. Howeer, when
199
1aqra ,piety, weakened in the souls o the Muslims and their understanding
o Islam also weakened, it became easy or them to keep silent oer the
Kbvafa` and the rulers i they ruled by Kvfr in one single matter, and when
their weakness increased, they ound it easy to keep silent oer the rulers
i they ruled by Kvfr in seeral matters. 1he long term consequence o
this silence was that the rulers had the audacity to implement Kvfr in a
lagrant manner. 1he Muslims in Lgypt kept silent when the ruler
implemented the lrench ciil law and abolished the bariàb rules. 1he
Muslims kept silent in the Islamic State when the rules o Kvfr were
established as a constitution or the Muslims in 1909. 1hough they reolted
against them at irst, they remained silent aterwards. Hence, it came as no
surprise when Mustaa Kemal destroyed the Kbiafab and all the rules o
Islam and declared the rule o Kvfr. 1his was so because the Muslims no
longer regarded this issue as a ital one, thus the calamity occurred and it
became easy or the Muslims to witness the lagrant Kvfr without
brandishing the sword to remoe it, it een became easy or them to be
ruled by Kvfr without condemning it. \orse still, the majority o Muslims
accepted the rules o Kvfr, became accustomed to them and relinquished
the rules o Islam by choice. 1his situation reached such a point that
Muslims accepted Kvfr and called or it, in addition to keeping silent oer
it and not ighting against it. All this was only because the issue o ruling
by a Kur system was no longer considered to be a ital issue, and the
measure undertaken towards it was no longer that o lie and death.
Hence, it is imperatie to reinstate this issue in its rightul place and to
consider it a ital issue. 1hus, the rule by a Kvfr system would be preented
een i this led to seeral years o ighting and een i it led to the killing
o millions o Muslims and to the martyrdom o millions o belieers.
1hereore, the perception o all the ital issues which the Legislator ,swt,
had outlined and determined and or which He made the measure to be
undertaken towards them one o lie and death, had weakened. 1he
linkage o these issues to the Islamic .qeeaab had weakened, and they
were relegated rom their position to the point where they were no longer
200
perceied as being ery critical bariaàb rules, or which arms should be
taken up, thus they were relegated rom the position in which the Legislator
,swt, had placed them, i.e. they were relegated rom the position o the
ital issue. Consequently, the measure which the bariàb had decreed
towards them was no longer deemed to be resistance by orce to remoe
the rule o Kvfr and restore the rule o Islam. 1hereore the issue o
destroying the Kbiafab and remoing the system o Islam was not
perceied as a ital issue, and the act that the issue was a ital one was not
dominant consideration. So Mustaa Kemal went ahead with his action,
destroyed the Kbiafab and wiped out Islam rom the political map without
anyone taking up arms against him and ighting him. 1hereore, the Kvffar`.
destruction o the Kbiafab and their remoal o the system o Islam
rom existence occurred with ease and simplicity, beore the eyes o millions
o Muslims. Had the Muslims been at the time aware o the act that this
issue was a ital one, upon which the ate o the Muslims and the ate o
Islam depended and that the necessary measure towards it was to take up
arms and ight Mustaa Kemal, the Muslims would not hae been dealt
this tragic blow. Hence, the Muslims` ailure to perceie that this issue
was a ital issue which necessitated a measure o lie and death, was the
cause o the calamity that beell them.
201
EsIoblshng Ihe Khlofoh
ond Ihe rule by whoI Alloh
hos reveoled s Ihe vIol
ssue for Ihe Muslms
1he Muslims are at present experiencing the seerest o trials and the
worst o ordeals. 1he eectie remedy or them lies in the perception o
whether their issues are ital or not, and in the undertaking o a lie and
death measure towards eery ital issue. 1his is particularly necessary i
the issue in question encompasses all the ital issues put together. As long
as this perception is not achieed in a manner that dominates oer the
souls o people and the atmospheres around them, the Muslims will
continue to be in a constant state o decline and degeneration, and they
will neer rise among the nations. 1hereore, it is incumbent upon the
Muslims to discern their ital issues and to hae their perception o these
issues ind its way to the hearts, the souls and the general atmospheres
around them so that it becomes a perception that dries them towards
undertaking what the ital issues necessitate in terms o lie and death
measures, and this with an unshakable resole and unrelenting zeal. 1his is
the point at issue, and this is the basis o all that which the Muslims are
attempting to undertake in order to deal with the reality they are currently
acing.
1he reality o the Muslims today is sensed by eery Muslim, it does not
require any explanation nor does it necessitate any elaboration. 1heir lands
are ruled by Kvfr systems, thus they are conclusiely Kvfr homelands. 1hey
Establishing the Khilafah and the rule by what Allah has revealed
is the vital issue for the Muslims
202
are diided into more than our types o entities, including States, Lmirates,
Sultanates and Sheikhdoms. 1hey are too weak to stand up to the Kvffar.
Hence the primary issue o concern or eery country in the Islamic world
is to become Islamic homelands and then unite with the rest o the Islamic
countries. 1his issue is a ital issue, it is moreoer the whole o the ital
issues put together, thus it is imperatie to undertake the necessary measures
as a matter o lie and death.
Howeer, this ital issue, which is the issue o transorming the lands into
the Islamic homeland and uniting them with the rest o the Islamic lands
is an objectie which the Muslims aim to achiee, and the method which
ought to be undertaken to achiee this objectie is that o re-establishing
Kbiafab. Hence the issue acing the Muslims today is the establishment o
the Kbiafab as a ruling system through which the transormation o the
lands into an Islamic household is achieed and consequently to unite
them with the rest o the lands o Islam.
Howeer, it should be made absolutely clear that what is acing the Muslims
today is not merely the appointment o a Kbaeefab by saying that this is a
duty o suiciency upon the Muslims, according to what ibn Omar
reported that the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: And he who dies
without an Imam or the group ruling over him, his death is a
death o Jahilyyah, thus making it a non-ital issue. \hat is rather
acing the Muslims today is establishing the Kbiafab, which requires
generating the Kbiafab system as a ruling system, and the reality o this
task is greater than the appointment o a Kbaeefab, although the
establishment o the Kbiafab necessitates the appointment o a Kbaeefab.
Lstablishing the Kbiafab is conclusiely a ital issue, because in addition to
being a method to transorm our lands rom a Kvfr homeland into an
Islamic homeland, its establishment is also aimed at destroying the Kvfr
systems, i.e. aimed at remoing the lagrant Kvfr that is implemented -
which is a ital issue, or the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said: Unless you
203
witness a lagrant Kur. And also because it is mentioned in the aaitb
: . 1hey said: O Messenger o Allah, should we not resist them with
the sword He ,saw, said : No, as long as they continue to establish
the Salah among you. 1hereore, the method to achiee the Muslims`
issue is a ital issue, because it is the method o a ital issue, and because
the bariàb eidence rom the vvvab indicates that it is a ital issue. 1hus,
it is imperatie to undertake towards it the measure o lie and death.
Howeer, since the Kvfr has been sitting on the Muslims` chests and since
their aairs ell in to the hands o the Kvffar, the hypocrites and the apostates,
they hae not ceased to attempt to break ree rom the noose o the Kvfr
authority and the hegemony o its masters and agents. 1hey ailed to
realise that the issue or which they were struggling was ital, and that it
had no other measure but the measure o lie and death. Hence, it was
the lack o perception among the group o Muslims, that stripped them
in their quality as a group or an |vvab rom their readiness to endure
harm, imprisonment and torture, in addition to enduring poerty,
deastation and death, something which can neer be detached rom the
struggle oer the ital issues. Hence, these attempts had been destined to
ineitable ailure and they ailed to moe one single step towards achieing
the issue they were ighting or.
1he Muslims were not in need o a great deal o thought and
contemplation to perceie that their issue was a ital one. lor it was
eident rom the irst moment, just as it is eident today to any sighted
person that it is rationally impossible or the Kvffar to enable Islam to
return to the political scene ,to the rule,, as long as they had one iota o
oppression against those who work towards this. 1he rank o the apostates
and the hypocrites is not lower in terms o crime and oppression. 1hey
will throw eerything they hae in terms o power in the battleield to
ight those belieers who aim at taking the power rom them in order to
establish the rules o Allah and to protect the sanctities o Allah through
establishing the vava ,penal codes, o Allah.
204
1hereore, it would be impossible or any attempt undertaken by the
Muslims in this issue to bear ruit unless they considered it to be a ital
issue, whose achieement depends on the measure o lie and death. Due
to the act that the Muslims ailed to perceie the nature o the battle and
the sound rule o Allah ,swt, pertaining to this battle, they set about
attempting to liberate themseles in a method unworthy o the ital issues.
Hence, their eorts towards this were below the measures o lie and
death. Indeed, the act is that in regard to ital issues, such as the remoal
o the Kvfr system and the establishment o the system o Islam, regardless
o whether or not they were perceied as ital, one could not succeed in
achieing them, no matter how great were one`s orce and no matter
how tremendous the eorts exhausted were, unless they were considered
as being ital and unless measures o lie and death were undertaken
towards them. Hence, the Muslims should be rankly told, be it indiiduals
or groups, that they hae no other choice but to carry out the struggle
against Kvfr on the basis o the lie and death measures, because the
nature o the issue at hand necessitates such measures and because the
bariàb has in the Book and the vvvab decreed such measures.
Besides, the Messenger o Allah ,saw, has taught us how to determine
our issues and ordered us to undertake the measures o lie and death
towards eery ital issue. \hen Allah ,swt, sent him with the Message o
Islam, and when he started coneying the Daàrab through the intellectual
struggle, he ,saw, determined his issue as being the triumph o Islam and
he undertook towards it the measure o lie and death. It is reported that
when he ,saw, was told by his uncle Abu 1alib what Quraysh had wanted
rom him, i.e. to make Muhammad rerain rom attacking them and
when he said to him: Spare me and yoursel, and do not put on me a
burden greater than I can bear. 1he Messenger o Allah ,saw, said to
him: O uncle, by Allah, i they were to put the sun in my right
hand and the moon in my let on condition that I relinquished this
matter, until Allah has made it triumphant or I perish therein I
would not relinquish it. \hen he ,saw, established the State and
205
perormed ]ibaa by the sword, he also determined his issue as being the
triumph o Islam and he undertook towards this issue the measure o
lie and death. It has been reported that when he ,saw, was in Usan, two
junctions away rom Makkah on his way to perorm |vrab, he met a
man rom Bani Kaàb and asked him whether he had any news about
Quraysh. His answer was: 1here are Quraysh who hae heard o your
coming and hae come out wearing leopards` skins and hae encamped
at Dhu 1uwa owing that you shall neer enter Makkah in deiance o
them. 1his man Khalid ibn ul-\alid is with their caalry which they hae
sent in adance to Kura Al-Ghamim. Upon this the Messenger o Allah
,saw, said: ^Woe unto Quraysh! War has devoured them. What harm
would they have suered i they have let me and the rest o the
Arabs to go our own ways? I they should kill me, that is what
they desired, and i Allah should give me victory over them they
would enter Islam in locks. I they do not do that they will ight
while they have the strength, so what are Quraysh thinking o ? By
Allah, I shall not cease to ight or the mission with which Allah
has entrusted me until He makes it triumphant or this Saliah gets
severed. 1he aifab is the surace o the neck, and its seerance is
tantamount to death. 1hen the Messenger o Allah ,saw, continued his
March until he reached Al-Hudaybiya.
In these two cases: the case o carrying the Daàrab through intellectual
struggle, and the case o carrying it through ]ibaa, the Messenger o Allah
,saw, determined his issue as being the triumph o Islam, and he ,saw,
made it a ital issue. 1hus, undertaking towards it the required and ineitable
measure in both cases, that is the measure o lie and death. 1hereore,
the Messenger o Allah ,saw, said in the irst instance: O uncle, by
Allah, i they were to put the sun in my right hand and the moon
in my let on condition that I relinquished this matter, until Allah
has made it triumphant or I perish therein I would not relinquish
it. , and he ,saw, said in the second instance: By Allah, I shall not
cease to ight or the mission with which Allah has entrusted me
206
until He makes it triumphant or this Saliah gets severed. Had the
Messenger o Allah ,saw, not made this issue a ital one and had he not
undertaken the measure o lie and death towards it, Islam would not
hae triumphed, neither by coneying the Daàrab through intellectual
struggle, nor by coneying it through ]ibaa with the sword. 1his is similar
to the Muslims` reality today, that is the dominance o the Kvfr systems
oer them and the hegemony o the Kvffar and the hypocrites oer them,
i they do not treat their issue as a ital issue, and i they do not undertake
the measure o lie and death towards it, their endeaour would not yield
anything and they would not be able to moe one single step orward.
1hereore, we call upon eery single Muslim, amidst this Kvfr dominating
the Islamic lands, to work towards establishing the Kbiafab as a method
to transorm his own country into an Islamic household and unite it with
the rest o the Islamic lands and to carry the Daàrab to the world in
order to make Islam triumphant, while reiterating with truthul belie,
enlightenment and awareness the saying o the Messenger o Allah ,saw,
: By Allah, i they were to put the sun in my right hand and the
moon in my let on condition that I relinquished this matter, until
Allah has made it triumphant or I perish therein I would not
relinquish it, and his saying : By Allah, I shall not cease to ight or
the mission with which Allah has entrusted me until He makes it
triumphant or this Saliah gets severed.
Rajab 1382 AH
December 1962 CL
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How The Khilafah Was Destroyed

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