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Chapter 13: Freedom of Expression

Modes of Expression:
Freedom of expression is usually exercised through language, oral and
written symbolisms.
Symbolisms may also be used, like a clenched fist, bended knee, the
salute to the flag, the flag itself, and the mace of the legislature, the
picket line, pictures, caricatures, and cartoons.
Elements:
Article III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
Article III, Section 18 (1). No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
(1) Freedom from previous restraint or censorship
a. Censorship conditions the exercise of freedom of expression
upon the prior approval of the government.
b. Only those ideas acceptable to it are allowed to be disseminated;
all others are restricted or suppressed.
c. The censor this assumes the unlikely role of political, moral,
social and artistic arbiter for the people, usually applying only
his own subjective standards in determining what is good and
what is not good for them. Such authority is anathema in a free
society.
d. Censorship need not partake of total suppression; even
restriction of circulation is unconstitutional.
Gonzales vs Commission on Elections:
Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, - proposing that Section 5, Article
VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, - calling a convention to propose amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from
each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the
second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, -proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution,
be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on
June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
on November 14, 1967.
Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the Constitution?
Ruling: In as much as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring
Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the
petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.

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As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It
may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may
the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto
officer. And the reasons are obvious:
(1) It would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and
(2) The acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied
so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain
their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of
delegates to the Convention.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on
Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents
and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of
its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series
as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November
28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV
Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive
Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S.
Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter
the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and
expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger.
Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV
Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and
says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages
Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however
reversed it hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program is not
constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression?

Ruling: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of
invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption.
If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This
is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply
held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTCs ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. Attack is different from offend any race or religion. The respondent
Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any

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religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas
and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics; the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits
the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the
speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions,
even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The
basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only
to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing
of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and
present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech
is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between
the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of
the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls
within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial
function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board
of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by
judges and not left to administrative agencies.
Santiago vs. Far East Broadcasting
Facts: This is an original petition for mandamus. The petitioner prays this court to
issue the writ "directed to the respondent, Far Eastern Broadcasting, commanding
it that the petitioner be allowed to broadcast any speech or address without
previous censorship." The petitioner is a campaign manager of the political party
Popular Front Sumulong; the respondent is a public utility corporation engaged in
radio broadcasting service, and organized and existing in and under the laws of
the Philippines. In September, 1942, the petitioner, as campaign manager of the
Popular Front Sumulong, asked the respondent, through its manager, for the
purchase of air time for the broadcast of the Popular Front political speeches at the
Opera House on September 23, 1941. But the said respondent refused and still
refuses to allow to broadcast except on condition that complete manuscript of
contemplated speeches should be submitted in advance. the act of the respondent
in refusing to allow the use of its station for broadcasting the speeches except
upon prior submission of complete manuscript of the speeches to be broadcast is
discriminatory and constitutes unlawful censorship and a violation of the freedom
of speech guaranteed by our Constitution. The present the constitutional
guarantees are not suspended, the state not being placed under martial law and,
consequently, the conduct of the respondent is unlawful. The respondent, in
refusing to allow the petitioners to use its station except upon prior censorship,
unlawfully excludes and deprives the latter from enjoyment and exercise of the
right and freedom of speech.
The respondent is a corporation organized and existing according to the laws of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines and in its aforesaid capacity owner and
operator of stations, KZRM, KZRF and KZUM by virtue of a specific franchise
granted under Act No. 3180. With reference to the purchase of air time mentioned
in paragraph 2 of the petition, the respondent required the petitioner to submit a
manuscript of contemplated speeches in advance of the broadcast in the exercise
of a right granted by existing laws and regulations and in compliance with its
obligation expressly undertaken to safeguard public morality and to broadcast
programs that are educational, entertaining and not prejudicial to public interest.
The act of the respondent mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof is not discriminatory
for it is applied to all persons alike, and not violative of the constitutional
provision regarding freedom of speech. The act of the respondent mentioned in
paragraph 2 hereof does not signify unlawful censorship and neither it mean that it
will refuse to furnish the petitioner with air time because the latter merely refused
to submit its speeches and never came back. The mandamus should not issue in
the above entitled case because the facts alleged in the petition do not warrant the
same, the act of the respondent not constituting an unlawful exclusion of the
petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right to which it is entitled. It is not the
proper remedy in the case.

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Issues:
1. Whether the petitioner has a clear legal right to broadcast any speech
over one of the radio stations owned and operated by the respondent
without first submitting the manuscript?
2. Whether there is a corresponding duty devolved by law upon the
respondent to permit the petitioner to do so?
Ruling: The respondent did not actually refuse to sell air time to the petitioner. It
required the petitioner to submit the script of the speeches to be broadcasted, and
the petitioner refused to do so. So the question narrows down to whether or not
the Far Eastern Broadcasting has the right to require the submission of the script.
Section 2 of Act No. 3180, which is the franchise of the respondent corporation,
provides that the broadcasting service shall be open to the general public subject
to the general regulations of the grantee for the allotment of time and the class of
communications acceptable for broadcasting. Commonwealth Act No. 98 created
a Radio Board, among the duties of which is "to censor all programs, sustaining
programs, sustaining or sponsored, to be broadcasted or rebroadcasted by all
broadcasting stations." Section 2 of said Act Provides that pending the
appointment of the Radio Board by the President, the Secretary of the Interior
"shall examine all programs, sustaining or sponsored, of all broadcasting stations,"
with the power "to eliminate or cancel from the program such number or parts
thereof as in his opinion are neither moral, educational nor entertaining, and
prejudicial to public interest." Section 3 provides that "any license or owner of
broadcasting station who shall broadcast any program or parts thereof not duly
approved or otherwise eliminated, by the Secretary of the Interior or the Radio
Board, shall, upon his or its recommendation, as the case may be, forfeit his
license."
Pursuant to said Act, the Secretary of the Interior, on November 18, 1936,
promulgated Department Order No. 13. Paragraph 4 of said order requires all
broadcasting stations to submit daily to the Secretary of the Interior at least
twenty-four hours in advance of the actual broadcasting hour, two copies of all
programs to be broadcasted by the stations. Paragraph 6 provides that "if a
program contains any speeches ... copies of these or a gist thereof may be required
by the Secretary of the Interior to be submitted together with the program.
The respondent denies that its requirement that the petitioner submit the script of
the speeches to be broadcasted was discriminatory, asserting that "it is applied to
all persons alike"; and the petitioner has not adduced any proof of its allegation.
It seems clear from the laws and the regulations hereinbefore adverted to that the
respondent had the right to require the petitioner to submit the manuscript of the
speeches which he intended to broadcast. In his memorandum counsel for the
respondent sustains, and cites numerous authorities in support of his contention,
that Commonwealth Act No. 98 is valid as a proper exercise by the state of its
police power.
The petitioner argues that the broadcasting of the speeches of the candidates of the
Sumulong Popular Front Party in the evening of September 23, 1941, could not by
any means offer any danger to public safety or public morality, and that the
respondent was not justified "to previously censor and approve the complete texts
of the speeches of said candidates allowing the same to be broadcasted in its
station." The best proof, the petitioner asserts that there was not the slightest
danger to public peace and order was that the speeches that were delivered in the
Opera House in the evening of September 23, 1941, were heard by the vast
audience and published in some newspapers without causing a single untoward
incident. We fail to perceive the cogency of such argument. It does not bolster up
the case for the petitioner. It impliedly admits and correctly, we think that a
speech that may endanger public safety may be censored and disapproved for
broadcasting. How could the censor verify the petitioner's claim that the speeches
he intended to broadcast offered no danger to public safely or public morality, if
the petitioner refused to submit the manuscript or even the gist thereof? If the
petitioner had complied with respondent's requirement and the respondent had
arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to permit said speeches to be broadcasted, he
might have reason to complain.

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We find it is not the duty of the respondent as a public service corporation to
broadcast speeches without requiring the submission of the manuscript thereof in
advance, but that, on the contrary, the laws and regulations expressly authorize the
respondent to make such requirement. Hence the petition for mandamus must be,
as it hereby, is, denied, with cost against the petitioner. So ordered.
Primicias vs. Fugoso
Facts: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano
Primicias, manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila
City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner
requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public meeting. However, the respondent refused
to issue such permit because he found that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially
on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order. Respondent
based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense
against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public
place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or
collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb
or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is
Sec. 1119, free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence
violating freedom of assembly?

Ruling: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech,
and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances,
are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitution. However, these rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under
the states police power that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society. The
Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the
City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in
the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or
public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored
the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing
the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system
of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of
the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. It is to be noted
that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for the assembly
itself. The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one.

Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito
Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as
violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,
which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute
sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It

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was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded
or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the
phrase and the like.
Issue: Whether jingles falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda
gadgets of R.A. No. 6132?
Ruling: For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such
an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our
approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or
class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for
distribution.
National Press Club vs. Commission on Elections
Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media
which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national
and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections;
and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally
argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted
that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election
Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or
political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional?

Ruling: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of
the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen
to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e.,
"during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one
may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is
the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The
essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative
provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during
an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision
or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11
(b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By
virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications,
political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not
reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates,

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their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments,
opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as
reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is
not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover
only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of
the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
Osmea vs Commission on Elections
Facts: Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections
violates the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof,
providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold
over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been
duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision)
of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect,
shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd
Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of
Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of the
Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less,
valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of
November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all,
Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution,
to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible,
resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for
its amendment or revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of
this petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners
lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory
opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the
merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of
legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed
by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
Issue: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant petition?
Ruling: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary
to SolGens contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political.
And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the
Courts power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding
the challenge to the petitioners standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the
petitioners have no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside
technicalities considered the transcendental importance of the issue being raised
herein.
MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

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The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5
of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and
local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-
synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in
1992. The term of synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision
was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three
years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local
officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court,
quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature
to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear
implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which
the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987
Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except
barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the
second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be
serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to
June 30, 1995, not three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by
changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period,
as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days
before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective
provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the
elections.
Adiong vs Commission on Elections
Facts: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location
or publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner
senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of
decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein
it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due
to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
Issue: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is
constitutional.
Ruling: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which is unconstitutional. There is no public
interest substantial enough to warrant the prohibition
(2) Freedom from subsequent punishment
Freedom of speech includes freedom after speech.
Freedom of expression is not absolute notwithstanding that the language
of the guaranty, unlike some provisions in the Bill of Rights, is
unqualified.
It is subjects to police power and may be properly regulated in the
interest of the public.
Freedom of expression does not cover ideas offensive to public order or
decency or the reputation of persons, which are all entitled to protection
by the State.
To determine the liability of the individual for ideas expressed by him,
three major criteria have been applied to wit:

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(a) The Clear and Present Danger Rule
o The most libertarian of the tests created by Justice Holmes.
o The question is whether the words used are in such
circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that the State has a right to prevent.
o It is a question of proximity and degree.
o The character of every act depends upon the circumstances
in which it is done.
o The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear
and present but also traceable to the ideas expressed.
o Unless the nexus is established, the individual may not be
held accountable.
o Clear causal connection with the danger of the substantive
evil arising from the utterance questioned.
o Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified
with imminent and immediate danger.
o The danger must not only be probable but very likely
inevitable.
o What finally emerges from the clear and present danger
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterances can be punished.
Navarro vs. Villegas
Facts: On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of
a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city of
Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from 4-
11pm.On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the
grounds that, they have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit
for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays due
to the events that happened from the past week. On the same letter, the respondent
gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its
rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end before dark. The petitioner filed suit
contesting the Mayors action on the ground that it violates the petitioners right to
peaceable assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances (ART.
3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioners right to the equal protection of the law (art. 3,
sec. 1).
Issue: Whether or not the respondents act on denying the request of the petitioner
violates the petitioners right to peaceable assembly and right to the equal
protection of the law?
Ruling: The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the police
power of the state. The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though
granted by the Constitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that it
may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right
of community and society, This power may be exercised under the police power
of the state, which is the power of the state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, and good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. While the privilege of the citizen to use streets
and parks for communication may be regulated in the interest of all, said privilege
is not absolute. It must be exercised insubordination to the general comfort and
convenience and in consonance with peace and good order, but it must not guise
of regulation be abridged or denied.
Reyes vs. Bagatsing
Facts: Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and
rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the
Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two
blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program
would be held. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise
of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps
would be taken by it to ensure a peaceful march and rally. Petitioner filed suit
for mandamus unaware that permit was denied, because it was sent by ordinary
mail. The reason for refusal of permit was due to police intelligence reports which

10
strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at
the place applied for.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct peaceable assembly to
the gates of U.S. Embassy may be validly enforced?
Ruling: NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The
Constitution is quite explicit: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances. There can be no legal
objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil,
on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can
there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US
Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.
There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of litigation,
the judgment must be confined within the limits of previous decisions. The law
declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide, so it has been
here. While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place
may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.
By way of a summary the applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or
the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
TEEHANKEE, concurring
The salutary desire on the part of respondent to prevent disorder cannot be
pursued by the unjustified denial and suppression of the peoples basic rights,
which would thereby turn out to be mere paper rights.;
MAKASIAR, concurring
With the justification that in case of conflict, the Philippine Constitution
particularly the Bill of Rights should prevail over the Vienna Convention;
ABAD SANTOS, concurring
To add anything to the learned opinion of the Chief Justice is like bringing coal to
Newcastle, I just want to state for the record that I voted for the issuance ex-
parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction;
PLANA, concurring
In my view, without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the
constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its application would collide
with a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of assembly and/or
expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of whether the chancery of any foreign
embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.
AQUINO, dissenting
Voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the holding of the rally in front of
the US Embassy violates Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila.
The case of Reyes vs. Bagatsing is a worthy libertarian affirmation of the
Primicias case.
Ruiz vs. Gordon

11
Facts:
Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National
Reconciliation, filed a petition for mandamus against Richard Gordon to be
allowed to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle
starting at 1:00 P.M. The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents
replied by stating the request for a prayer rally was received in the Office of the
Mayor and that respondent had repeatedly announced in his regular program on
Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday morning flag ceremony before
hundreds of government employees that he would grant the request of any group
that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly. When
interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he mentioned
the fact that he had granted the permit of the petitioner, which interview appeared
in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said newspaper.
Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This was
complied with.

Issue: Can the petition be granted?

Ruling: No, The petition is dismissed.

Ratio:
The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as to the
role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable assembles.
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is
an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
They can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable
assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the
judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred
rights.
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus
could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on
November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of
exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in
ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a
reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on the
request, such party or his representative should be at the office of the public
official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether
adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner.

Teehankee concurring:

The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent danger that would
justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as the licensing authority. There must
be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence
of such clear and present danger. As the Court stated in its Resolution of October
25, 1983 in the J. B. L. Reyes case, "It is essential for the validity of a denial of a
permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that the licensing
authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace
or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such
weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility
that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough."
As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly is not to be 4 abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place" (at paragraph 6) and "It is the duty of the city authorities to
provide the proper police protection to those exercising their right to peaceable
assembly and freedom of expression" (at paragraph 7).

12

J. Conception concurring opinion

In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or wrongly, with
dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the granting or denying of such permits,
the following guidelines are deemed necessary:

(a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or edifice, only
the consent of the owner of the place is necessary. No permit from the government
or any public officer is required.

(b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has to make
use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets, the public authority charged
with the duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider the
convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy these same
facilities.

(c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered
and precautionary steps taken to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and
other criminals from turning into a violent one what otherwise should be a
peaceful demonstration.

(b) The Dangerous Tendency Doctrine
o Under this test a person could be punished for his ideas even if
they only tended to create the evil sought to be prevented.
o It was not necessary to actually create the evil; a mere tendency
toward the evil was enough.
o In Cabansag vs. Fernandez, if the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then
such words are punishable.
(c) The Balancing Test
o It should appear that there is urgent necessity for protecting the
national security against improvident exercise of freedom of
expression, the right must yield.
o If no special justification exists for curtailment of the freedom,
the interest of the State not being especially threatened by its
exercise, it is the right that must prevail.
o Authority is preferred under the dangerous tendency doctrine,
liberty under the clear and present danger rule.
o The balancing test resolves the issue in the light of the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in each particular case.
o The flaw in this method, according to Justice Black, is that it in
effect allows the courts to decide that this freedom may not be
enforced unless they believe it is reasonable to do so.
o In American Communications Association vs. Douds, the US
SC applied, in lieu of the clear and present danger rule, a
different test to determine the validity of a statute requiring non-
Communist affidavits of labor union officials.
o According to the above-mentioned case, the Balancing Test is
when particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public
order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional,
partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the court is to
determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.
Criticism of Official Conduct
US vs. Bustos
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and
O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office
and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace
include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the
judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false,
scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

13
Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of
his right to free speech and free press?
Ruling: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for
proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It
is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of
any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any
public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire
into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a
right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear
of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and
efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is
sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes
he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to
be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for
them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The
ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a
person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
The liberal rule regarding criticism of official conduct in general was laid
down in US vs. Bustos.
The official acts, and now even the private life, of a public servant are
legitimate subjects of public comment.
The people have a right to scrutinize and commend or condemn the
conduct of their chosen representatives in the government.
As long as the comments are made in good faith and with justifiable
ends, they are insulated from prosecution or damage suits for defamation
even if such views are found to be inaccurate or erroneous.
These observations are applicable not only to the public officer but also
to the public figure.
The public has a right to know about his qualifications, or lack of them,
for the office he is seeking.
A private individual may still be the subject of public comment even if
he is not a public official or at least a public figure, as long as he is
involved in a public issue.
According to Rosenbloom vs. Metromedia, if a matter is a subject of
general or public interest, it cannot suddenly become less so because a
private individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved.
The publics primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the
conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the
conduct, not the participants prior anonymity or notoriety.
The public issue in this case was the drive against the distribution of
pornographic materials in violation of the obscenity laws, under which
the petitioner had been arrested.
Lagunzad vs. Sotto Vda. De Gonzales

14
Facts: Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a
movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality
of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson,
a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried
and convicted. Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of
Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealtwith his private and family life
including the portrayal insome scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto, private
respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padillas half sister, for
and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to the "exploitation" of his
life anddemanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the
movie.
After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de
Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter
as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to exploit, use, and
develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for
consideration of
P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequen
tly, the movie was shown indifferent theaters all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the
Agreement, Vda. de
Gonzalesinstituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor
ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest
from the filing of the Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting
of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty
therefrom, among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in
the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge
and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public
figure; that private respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the
Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and constitutes an
infringement on the constitutional right of freedom
of speech and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of
P5,000.00 only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a
counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. De Gonzales.
Issues:
1. WON the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion
upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a
publicfigure.2.WON Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property
right over the life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was
a public figure?
2. WON the Licensing Agreement constitutes an
infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the
press.
Ruling:
1. Yes, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in
toto a person's right to privacy. The right to
invade as person's privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter
how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true
that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises
Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
2. Yes, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family.
As held in Schuyler v. Curtis "a privilege may be given the surviving
relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege
exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent
a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the
deceased."
3. No, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the
right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed,

15
occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not,
however, without limitations. One criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the
"balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation." In the case at bar, the
interests observable are the right
to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression
invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those
interests, and
consideringthe obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreemententered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld
particularly because the limits
of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Judge Capulong
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production
company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies
consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a
"docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events,
and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is
Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South
Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction
and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in
any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his
right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious
character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or
marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Ruling: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film
and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to
diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production
of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit,
is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to
any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew
what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no
"clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter
is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical
stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public
figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their
right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be
fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.

16
Worthy of a special note is the rule regarding criticism of the
administration of justice. While courts have taken a lenient view toward
attacks against public officials in general, it would seem they are not
similarly disposed when it come to public comment upon their own
conduct.
Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for
the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as
criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision. This view is
not fully shared in this jurisdiction (because our profession is filled with
messianic, arrogant, self-entitled assholes).
The rule in the Philippines proscribes public comment on pending
litigation, on the ground that it would interfere with the administration of
justice.
People vs. Alarcon
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after
the cause is ended. (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801; In re Abistado, 57
Phil., 668.) It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede,
interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the
publications should be held for contempt. (Nixon v. State 207 Ind., 426, 193 N.E.,
591, 97 A.L.R., 894.) What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and
once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider
or amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that
the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after
that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to
reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently
filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without
power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of
the case, and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.
In re Sotto:
Facts: Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with the
decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the
Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty.
Sotto to show because why he should not be charged with contempt of court. Atty.
Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under
section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
"this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and
that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a
law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief
Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom
of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in
the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack
the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the
respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court?
Ruling: Yes, Rule 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for
contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the
inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle
uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States,
which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice
are patterned after those of that country.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may

17
be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to
the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision.
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo
case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of
the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from
eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case.
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has
to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.
As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said
loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of
today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned
jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. His statement,
are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of
said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the
court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. He is fined 1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also required to show because why he
should not be disbarred.
In re Laureta:
Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the
dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-
resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and
knowingly promulgated by the 1
st
Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry
beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter
that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long
shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustres letter
basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was
established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now
the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.The letters were referred to the SC en
banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding
justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty. Ordonez was the opponents
counsel. It was also made clear thatJustice Yap eventually inhibited himself
from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera,
Cruz), again with more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily
constituting travesty of justice. True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal
complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering
an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged
of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

18
Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulated copies of the complain
to the press, without any copy furnished to the Court, nor the Justices charged. It
was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The
Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with
contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they
did not intend to dishonor the court.
Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated?
Ruling:
The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
entire court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts
authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its
honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his
client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
In re Tulfo:
Facts: In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target'
stating that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing
checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court
stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court".
Tulfo was required to show because why he should not be punished for contempt.
Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of
harassment in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and
"bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been decided
and terminated, there was no contempt. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear
and present danger to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Wheter or not Tulfo is in contempt?
Ruling: Yes, at the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet
been decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from
the CA. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation.
Contempt of ocurt is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It
brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can be
punished for contempt:
a. Those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
b. Those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. Tulfo's article
constituted both.
It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its
object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice.
Nothing constructive can be gained from them. Being emotional is no excuse for
being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse also, because at the end of his article,
Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for
having written the articles. Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely
censured.
In re Jurado:
Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the
Manila Standard. He describes himself as a columnist, who incidentally
happens to be a lawyer,, had been writing about alleged improperties and
irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to
March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the
same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being
extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and
corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently
adverted to by certain sectors of society. Events Directly Giving Rise to the
Proceeding at Bar.
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this
Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called controversial case of Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI), G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote
was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,

19
wrote the opinion for the majority. In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374,
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two other newspapers published, on
January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes,
an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had been
commissioned by one of the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines,
Inc. (ETPI), to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to
a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr.
Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part,
by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision looks,
reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDTs counsel, Thus, he speaks of the
Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court
judges in Makati; the Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court, as some
undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the Dirty Dozen, as
unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an
anonymous group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a
party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid
vacation in Hong Kong with their families.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order Creating an Ad Hoc Committee
to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary, to investigate the said
reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the
public utility, denying the allegations in Jurados column. The Supreme Court
then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and
affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official
Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by
Jurado are true.
Ruling: Jurados actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate
gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They
constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the
administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them,
he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible
journalists who live by their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at all
times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of
the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly
false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth,
do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of
any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The provision is
reflective of the universally accepted precept of abuse of rights, one of the
most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of
law.
It is a requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials. Judges, by becoming such, are rightly
regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody
more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are
commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or
accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having
forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to
discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from
becoming judges. The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the
individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the
maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the
other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two
legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who,
invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require

20
that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm
does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or
circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the
truth thereof.
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: (1) having
caused the filing of the information against petitioner in criminal case before the
Sandiganbayan, and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the
media in relation to the proceedings in where respondent is claiming that he is
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. A Resolution from the Supreme Court
required respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
Portion of the published article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview:
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.
Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he
acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are
substantially correct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Atty. Gonzales is entitled to invoke freedom of
speech as a defense?
Ruling: NO. Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. The
Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of
court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar.(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) [F]reedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests.
Art and Obscenity
Our jurisprudence on the regulation of public decency adheres to the
traditional rules, without the adventure, good or bad, of innovation.
In the case of US vs. Kottinger, the defendant was accused of having
offered for sale pictures of half-clad members of the non-Christian tribes.
The SC acquitted him, holding that he had merely presented them in their
native attire.
In People vs. Go Pin, the accused was convicted for exhibiting nude
paintings and pictures notwithstanding his claim that he had done so in
the interest of art. The SC, noting that he had charged a fee for admission
to his exhibition, held that his purpose was merely commercial and not
artistic. There was no question, of course, that a live exhibition of sexual
intercourse, as was held in People vs. Padan, plain pornography.
Gonzales vs. Katigbak
Facts: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board
of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain
deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought
an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.
Ruling: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of
ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited
to the classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions
the exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather
the presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board
committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail
before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However
there are not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained
that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women
erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians.
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies

21
are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that
censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only case
whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other
public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only classify.
But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive
and intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without
having to pay anything.
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity,
the test being whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant
appeal us to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it
found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to
difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes
to rules that the abuse was grave.
In Burstyn vs. Wilson, it was observed that movies, compared to other
media of expression, have a greater capacity for evil and are
consequently subject to more regulation.
In Time Film Corporation vs. City of Chicago, the US SC again affirmed
the right of the State to censor movies, holding that the protection against
previous restraint was not unlimited.
In Freedman vs. Maryland, that the administration of a censorship system
for moving pictures presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally
protected speech. The statute in this case was annulled only because of
procedural defects in the method of censorship, but the US SC stressed
that in any event the burden of proving that the film is unprotected
expression must rest on the censor.
The case of Miller vs. California laid down the Tests of Obscenity:
o Whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest.
o Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law.
o Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
In determining whether the material goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor and affronts contemporary community
standards of decency, the courts should not apply a national standard but
the standard of a community in which the material is being tested.
Assembly and Petition
The right of assembly is important to freedom of expression because
public issues are better resolved after an exchange of views among
citizens meeting with each other for the purpose.
The public meeting is an effective forum for the ventilation of ideas
affecting the common welfare.
The right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It
may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or
authorization from the government authorities. It should be noted that is
the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use
of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.
In the case of Primicias vs. Fugoso, the authority of local officials in this
regard is only one of regulation and not prohibition. This means they
cannot altogether bar the use of public places for lawful assemblies; the
most they can do is indicate the time and conditions for their use.
In Dela Cruz vs. Ela, this power was expanded when the SC upheld a
municipal mayor, who asked to issue a permit for the use of a particular
part of a public plaza, designated another part on the ground that the
place requested might lead to disruption of the rites that might be held in
a nearby church.
The Navarro Case extended the power even further; the mayor was
sustained when he denied the use of Plaza Miranda by the student
activists, suggesting that their rally be held at the Sunken Gardens, a less
sensitive area in the city.

22
In Taada vs. Bagatsing, the respondent mayor of Manila refused a
permit for the holding of a rally at Liwasang Bonifacio and the petitioner
went to the SC on mandamus. The SC granted the writ but changed the
meeting place to Ugarte Field, a private park.
Under the Public Assembly Act, a permit for the holding of a public
assembly shall not be necessary where the meeting is to be held in a
private place, in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution, or in a freedom park.
o The freedom park is to be established in every municipality and
city and shall as far as practicable be centrally located.
Where a permit is required, the written application therefor shall be files
with the mayors office at least five days before the scheduled meeting
and shall be acted upon within two days. Otherwise, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Denial is justified only upon CLEAR and
CONVINCING EVIDENCE that the public assembly will create a clear
and present danger to public order, safety, convenience, morals, or
health.
o Action on the application shall be communicated within twenty-
four hours to the applicant, who may appeal the same to the
appropriate court. Decision must be reached within twenty-four
hours.
The law prohibits law enforcement agencies from interfering with a
lawful assembly, but permits them to detail a contingent under a
responsible commander at least one hundred meters away from the
assembly in case it becomes necessary to maintain order.

(1) Tests
Ideally, the test of a lawfully assembly should be the purpose for which it
is held, regardless of the auspices under which it is organized.
Auspices Test
o In the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw,
Earnshaw the alleged President of the Communist Party of the
Philippines requested a necessary permission to hold a popular
meeting at the plaza. The mayor denied the request
and prohibits all kinds of meeting held in the city. The mayor
was not held liable for Article 131 in as much
as the doctrines and principles
advocated by the communist party were highly seditious in that
they suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies and disturbed
and obstructed the lawful authorities in their duties.
Purpose Test is applied in this jurisdiction. Even if the organizers of the
meeting be unquestionably lawful, the assembly will still be illegal if its
objective is to incite sedition or rebellion.
Untoward incidents arising during a public assembly will not make the
assembly unlawful for that reason alone.
Malabanan vs. Ramento
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent
University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to
hold a meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal
Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such permit, not in the
basketball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering,
they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their
language severely critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in
the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non
academic employees within hearing distance stopped their work because of noise
created. They were asked to explain why they should not be held liable for
holding an assembly.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was
violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
Ruling: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare
or involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive

23
evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid
to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the
time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work
of non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines
Facts:
The petitioners were students of the Technological Institute of the Philippines (TI
P). They filed an action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the TIP had
denied them enrollment because of their involvement in student demonstrations
and activism. On the other hand, the TIP claimed that the students were denied
enrollment because of academic deficiencies. Their records showed that Rufino
Salcon and Remeo Guilatco each failed in 1 subject in the first semester ofthe SY
1984-1985. Venecio Villar failed in 2 subjects in the first semester of SY 1983-
1984.Inocencio Recitis passed all subjects in the first sem of 1983-1984 but failed
1 subject in the 2
nd
semester of that year and the next year he had 2 failing
grades. On the other hand, Noverto Barreto failed in 5 subjects in the 1
st
semester
of SY 1983-1984 and in year 1984-1985, he again failed in 6 subjects. Edgardo de
Leon had 3 failing grades in the 1
st
semester of the SY 1984-1985. Regloban
Laxamana had 5 failing grades and no passing grade in the 1
st
semester of the
1984-1985 SY.
Issue: WON the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain
students of resp. TIP could be a basis for their being banned from enrollment?
Ruling: No, as in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries w/ it the implication that the right to full speech has
also been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression
w/c is the liberty to discuss publicly& truthfully, any matter of public interest w/o
censorship or punishment & w/c is not to be limited nor denied except on a
showing of a clear & present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right
to prevent. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning
"includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what
circumstances failing grades suffice in expulsion of students. However, it cannot
be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise these constitutional
rights to peaceable assembly & full speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate
guidance by the students prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause
being disregarded.
Issue: WON the constitutional provision as to the state maintaining "a system of
full public elementary education & in areas where finances permit, est. &
maintain a system of the public education up to high school level excludes the
exercise of that it in colleges & universities?
Ruling: The Constitutional provision does not per se exclude the exercise of that
right. In colleges & universities, it is only at the most a reflection of the lack of
sufficient funds for such a duly to be obligatory in the case of students in colleges
& Universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, article 26 of the Universal
Declaration of HRs provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Educ. shall be
full at the least in the elem. & fundamental stages. Technical & professional
education shall be made generally available & higher educ. shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit. "Hence, to that extent, there is justification
for excluding 3 of the pets because of their marked academic deficiency. The
denial of enrollment to Barreto, De Leon and Laxamana was justified. However,
with regard to Villar, Salcon, Guitlatco and Recitis, the refusal of the TIP to allow
them to enroll was unjustified. They could not be expelled for exercising their
constitutional right of free speech and peaceable assembly. As J. Fortas said,
students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.
PBM Employees Association vs. PBM
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage
a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against
the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass
demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was

24
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a
strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the
normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs
if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while
the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed.
Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No
Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO
were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Ruling: No, while the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed.
Right of Association
The right of association comprehended in due process because it protects
the persons liberty.
Article III, Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The right of association is deemed embraced in freedom of expression
because the organization can be used as a vehicle for the expression of
views that have bearing on the public welfare.
for purposes not contrary to law built-in limitation of the right.
o This expressed restriction is not necessary at all because it is
understood that all rights are subject to the inherent police
power.
The legislature may not arbitrarily declare any purpose as unlawful even
if it is not inimical to the public.
The new Section 8 expressly allows those employed in both public and
private sectors the right to form unions.
Alliance of Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment
Facts: Petitioner is a federation of unions in government - owned corporations
and in government schools. It petitioned the SC for a ruling that PD 851, requiring
"all employers... to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than
P1,000 a month... a 13th month pay," applies to government employees.

25
Ruling: No, it is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and
acts which impose burdens on the public treasury or which diminish rights and
interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless
the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Philippines as a
sovereign cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless the
language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.
Issue: May government employees act through a labor federation which uses the
collective bargaining power to secure increased compensation for its members?
Ruling: No, the terms and conditions of employment in the government including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law. And this
is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules and regulations and
not through Collective Bargaining agreements. Under the present constitution,
(1973), GOCC's are now part of the civil service, thus, not allowed to use
concerted activities to get other benefits or higher salaries different from that
provided by law and regulation
SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions
demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court
action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining
order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in
taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or
the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute.
The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil
Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not
covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners
from striking.
Issues:
1. Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike?
2. Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Ruling: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social
Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct
peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No.
180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which
states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning
strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any
legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
government employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but
instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by
law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction
thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
People vs. Ferrer

26
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared
RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus,
dismissing the information of subversion against the following:
a. Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to
public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford
impunity.
b. Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,
instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.
Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that:

1. The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2. Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the
CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial.
3. It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw
the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other
purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in
fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force
and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares
that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the
CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated
prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in
court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7
provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to
death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through
writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law?
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression?
Ruling: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A
bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the
trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination
of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following
requisites must be present:
1. The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also
an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes
of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the
CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown
that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the
organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a
members direct participation. Why is membership punished?
Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization.
Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits
acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive
organizations before the passing of this Act are given an opportunity to
escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8.

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The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary
changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This
declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of
Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the
enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful
investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that
whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under
RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion,
the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be
proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the
present Government of the Philippines and establish a
domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive
purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.
3. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the
accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Facts: Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as
the Iglesia ni Cristo, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(Company) since 1958. He was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union
(Union) which had with the Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision
which reads as follows: Membership in the Union shall be required as a
condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement.
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350, the
employer was not precluded from making an agreement with a labor organization
to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees. On June 18, 1961, however,
RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4
of RA 875, as follows: xxx but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members
with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant
Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service because he was resigning from the Union as a
member. The Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the union security clause of the CBA
and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and contends it discriminatorily
favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions.
Issue: Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or not?
Ruling: Yes, the Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. Sec
1 (6) of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides
that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist

28
labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and
other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee is the right to form or join associations. A right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who
should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should
he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would
join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave
and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. The right to join a
union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The law does not
enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such
right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union
and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer
may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees
must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order
to keep their jobs. By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of
RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed
or to keep his employment he must become a member of the collective bargaining
union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed
and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, RA No.3350
introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act the following proviso: but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the
application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging
to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides is that members of said religious sects
cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty
and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding
their religious beliefs, the members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with
the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith,
they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join.
The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had
with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions. It
cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union
security clause.
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and
unqualified. The prohibition is general. The prohibition is not to be read with
literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the
constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests
may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws
read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as
a postulate of the legal order. The contract clause of the Constitution must be not
only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the
reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has
special application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor
which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed
with public interest, must yield to the common good.

29
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of belief and
religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against
those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain
their own life and the life of their dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by
two aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a union, and collective
capital, directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize
labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the
power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee
rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts
with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which
the individual also needs protection the collective bargaining relationship.
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In
case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.
The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons
be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to
work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of
union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment
whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid
objective of the state. The Constitution even mandated that the State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation
between workers and employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a
labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force
of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden
on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic
insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals,
and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of
society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop
agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular
religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of
labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor
Code.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither
does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members
from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a
labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act
Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from
the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is
not required to do a positive act-to exercise the right to join or to resign from the
union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.
The closed-shop is a valid form of union security and a provision therefor
in a collective bargaining agreement is not considered a restriction of the
right of association.
The right of association was also held not violated where political parties
were prohibited from participating in the barangay elections to insure the
non-partisanship of the candidates.
Liberty Flour Mills Employees Association vs. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc.
Facts: On February 6, 1974, respondent Philippine Labor Alliance Council
(PLAC) and Liberty Flour entered into a 3-year CBA effective January 1, 1974

30
providing for a daily wage increase of PhP2.00 for 1974, PhP1.00 for 1975 and
PhP1.00 for 1976. The parties also agreed to establish a union shop by imposing
membership in good standing for the duration of CBA as a condition for
continued employment of workers. PLAC complained against the company for
non-payment of E-COLA under P.D. 525. A similar complaint was filed on March
4, 1975, this time by petitioners who apparently were veering away from
PLAC. Evaristo and Biascan, after organizing a union, filed for a certification
election among rank-and-file employees. PLAC then expelled the two for
disloyalty and demanded their dismissal by the respondent company, who
complied on May 20, 1975. The claims for E-COLA were dismissed as it was
already absorbed by the wage increase. The termination case in relation to back
wages was also dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not E-COLA was also absorbed in the wage increases and won
dismissal of Evaristo and Biascan was illegal?
Ruling: The company agreed to grant the emergency allowance even before the
obligation was imposed by government (P.D. 525). What the petitioners claim
they are being made to waive is the additional allowance but the truth is they are
not entitled to because they are already enjoying the stipulated increases.
As with the case of illegal dismissal, the CBA concluded in 1974 was certifiable
and in fact certified in April 11, 1975 while the two were dismissed on May 20,
1975. Evidence show that after the cancellation of the registration certificate of
the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions, no other union contested the
exclusive representation of the PLAC, consequently there was no more legal
impediment that stood on the way of its validity and enforceability of the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between
respondent corporation and respondent union. Once it was duly entered into and
signed by the parties, a collective bargaining agreement becomes effective as
between the parties regardless of won the same has been certified by the BLR.
Occea vs Commission on Elections
Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the
Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that
framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments and how may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what
is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary
for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission?
Ruling: The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit.
Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the
same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities,
rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of
its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do
so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in
the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far
as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering
that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution
extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior
courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of
retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and
extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the

31
mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue: Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go
far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa
as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than
amendment?
Ruling: The Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely
new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no
moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because
amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution.
At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people.
Issue: What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard
for proper submission?
Ruling: The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can
propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be
an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it
sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as
a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in
this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of
three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not
disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of
land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No.
2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3
on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148
to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite
standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the
standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but
also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention
of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly
informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates
the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable
provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The
three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg.
22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day
period provided by the Constitution.
In re Edillion
Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,

32
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffer constitutional infirmity?
Ruling: No, all legislation directing the integration of the Bar has been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and
are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish
to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why?
The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary.
Access to Information
Article III, Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Subido vs. Ozaeta
This case, decided before the right to information was included in the Bill of
Rights of the Philippine Constitution, involved a request by the editor of the
Manila Post, a morning daily, for the Register of Deeds of Manila to furnish him a
list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with said Register of Deeds, but
which request was denied. In resolving the petition for mandamus, the Court
based its ruling on its interpretation of a statutory regulation which provides that
"All records relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall
be open to the public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office" The Court said that the
power to make regulations does not carry with it the power to prohibit. The
regulations which the Register of Deeds is empowered to promulgate are confined
to prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to, or
loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented,
that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured, and the
like.

33
Justice Briones: the citizen obviously has a right to know what is going
on in the country and in his government so he can express his views
thereon knowledgeably and intelligently.
Article VI, Section 16 (4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and
nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record
of its proceedings.
o Related to Article III, Section 7.
Baldoza vs. Dimaano
Facts: Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Dimaano
with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to
examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in
connection with their contemplated report on peace and order conditions of
the municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to
official court records but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation
as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a
court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and
furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate
interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or
promote public scandal. Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse
in the exercise of the right.
There has been recent tampering of padlocks of the door of the Court and with
this, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access,
might do more harm than good. Request of such a magnitude cannot
b immediately granted without adequate deliberation and advisement. Authority
should first be secured from the Supreme Court. Case was referred to
Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing, Taal
Mayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve
harmony and cooperation among officers. This motion was denied by
Investigating Judge but he recommended the exoneration of respondent.
Investigating Judges report avers that complainant was aware of the motion to
dismiss and he was in conformity with it. Communications between complainant
and respondent reveal that respondent allowed the complainant to open and view
the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and under his control
and supervision. Under the conditions, the Court found that the respondent has not
committed any abuse of authority
Issue: WON respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises (when he allowed the
complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent)?
Ruling: No, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket
books of respondent under certain conditions and under his control and
supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and condition imposed by the
respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the
right of the people to acquire information on public concern.
Legazpi vs. Civil Service Commission
Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspis request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who
passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Issue: Whether or not Legaspis request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed must be granted on the basis of his right
to information?

Held: Yes, Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads:


34
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence,
the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized
that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the
duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a
mandamus proceeding such as this one.

Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or
access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records
on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public.

The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does
not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the
discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to particular information
and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The
first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought which
only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second
pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its
authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or
loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said
agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to
disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records
cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance
cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.

The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern
is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are subject to limitations as
may be provided by law (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access
to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public
interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to bring the mandamus suit?

Held: Yes, the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public
right. When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is
to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws.

When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner
is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

35

The petitioner, being a citizen, is clothed with personality to seek redress
for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

Issue: Whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public
concern?

Held: The above question is first addressed to the government agency having
custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not
give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial
of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has
been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is
subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled
by a writ of Mandamus.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the
positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a
State policy that:

Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are
policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive
examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).

But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest.
For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the
species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law
which would limit the petitioners right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. The names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as
in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about ones civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioners request is, therefore, neither unusual
nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a
right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that
certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able
to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986
election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and
the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and
46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums,
interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as
well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to
manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the
revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to
preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent
himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.]
It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are
managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to
the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds
for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS

36
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions
were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office
held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of
public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced
through mandamus proceedings that the information sought must not be among
those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and
its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle
policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain
of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power.
Chavez vs. PCGG
Facts: Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a
former government official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to prohibit
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets
of -
compel respondent[s] to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents
related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and
the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy; he says that
what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a
number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred
to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in
various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on
how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents
make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the
alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public
interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would
be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the
people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived
and effected by the government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not
deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though,
that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has,
PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed
terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.-
PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the
above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not
to those still being considered.

37
Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public
the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses?
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and
Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos
heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to
law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government
functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are
DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise
settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten
wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.
Restrictions of the Right to Information:
o National security matters and intelligence information
o Trade secrets and banking transactions
o Criminal matters
o Other confidential information
In the case of Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, a divided SC
denied the request of the organization for the radio-TV coverage of the
Estrada trial at the Sandiganbayan, the majority holding that it might,
intentionally or not, unduly influence the decision of the case, as against
the minority view invoking the peoples right to information on such a
vital matter.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
Facts: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the
imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The
Court denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of
the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act
No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS
THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the
lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading,
or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the
Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of
the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that
the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution
by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or
impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly
delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177
confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of
Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due
course to the petition.

38
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do
not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international
treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d)
being discriminatory.
Issues:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Ruling: No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for
the drugs to be used in carryingout lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2)
R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution,
which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3)
the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs
renders lethal injectioninherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack
in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by
lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court
believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177
are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court"
will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of
notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused.
The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its
promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below
including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any
uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date
of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction
with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen
(18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final
and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of
eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and
attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained
and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that
lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained
personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective.
Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by
lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the
convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.

39
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained
prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials
entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid
inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental
in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In
a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and
since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime,
for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most
serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of
the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989.
The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative
policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies
which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death
sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person
under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall
take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to
cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that
"all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained
prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful
purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the
penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials
concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer
serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic
appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual
for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to
promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not
promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative

40
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No.
8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said
paragraph invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is
unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise
of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section
17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an
express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH
SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman
within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is
pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case,
the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as
well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a
woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance
when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of
sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in
petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory
basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and
implement. I