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DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants vs. PABLO

G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants and appellees.
Facts:
The petitioner in this case filed a case of partition despite the
existence of debts of the decedent.
Isse:
The petitioner urges that their action for partition and liquidation may
be maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of
the estate, subject to the taking of adequate measures either for the
payment or the security of its creditors. Is his contention correct?
!eld:
No.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a
deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary
action for partition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the
appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of
said estate, but this they may do only if the decedent left no debts
and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians. The reason is that where the
deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for
the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them
and to depri!e the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled
The situation is different, howe!er, where the deceased left pending
obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or
compounded with the creditors before the estate can be di!ided
among the heirs" and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to
how such obligations should be settled, the estate would ine!itably be
submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. #s
compared to ordinary partition, the regular estate proceedings offer
the ad!antage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose
themsel!es and submit their respecti!e claims within a comparati!ely
short period $%& months under 'ule (), unless claims are contingent*,
otherwise, they are fore!er barred" while in ordinary judicial partitions
the creditors+ claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the
period of extincti!e prescription. #n heir, therefore, may ha!e an
interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed
from in!isible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and
initiate the !ery estate proceedings sought to be a!oided, and he may
properly object to an action for partition on this ground. Unless,
therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming personal
liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as
those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings can not be
avoided.
#ppellants claim that there is nothing that would pre!ent the trial court
from directing and ordering that the pending obligations of the estate
be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respecti!e
shares to be recei!ed by the heirs. In other words, appellants propose
that the administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its
debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the ,ourt
performing the duties of the administrator, or an administrator
appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their complaint.
-b!iously, an ordinary action for partition can not be con!erted into a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, without
compliance with the procedure outlined by 'ules )./.0 of the 'ules of
,ourt, especially the pro!isions on publication and notice to creditors.
PEREGRI"A REBO"G, petiti#ne$ vs. FIDEL IBA%E&, 'd(e #f
Fi$st Instance #f La(na, $esp#ndent.
)A ve$* s+#$t case. "eed n#t ,e di(ested. T+e F#ll#-in( is a
$ep$#dcti#n #f t+e #$i(inal case.
This is a petition for certiorari against the respondent judge of the
,ourt of 1irst Instance of 2aguna on the ground that the latter acted in
excess of jurisdiction or with gra!e abuse of discretion in denying the
petition for cancellation of the lien or annotation on the certificate of
title issued to the petitioner, of a land extrajudicially inherited by him
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as the only heir of her predecessors in interest to the effect that the
property described in the title is subject to the claims of the creditors
and other heirs of the deceased 4ose 'ebong and 5aria 'ebong
within two years from 4uly ., %.6), in accordance with sections % and
6, 'ule )6 of the 'ules of ,ourt.
The petitioner based her petition on section %%& of #ct No. 6.7 and
offered to file a bond of 38,000, the estimated !alue of the abo!e
mentioned property to answer for such contingent claims.
The pertinent part of said section %%& of #ct No. 6.7 pro!ides9
:;,. %%&. < < < #ny registered owner or other person in interest
may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the ground that
registered interests of any description, whether !ested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, ha!e terminated and ceased" or that new
interests ha!e arisen or been created which do not appear upon the
certificate" < < < and the court shall ha!e jurisdiction to hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deem
proper" < < <.
#ccording to the abo!e quoted pro!isions, the court may order the
entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum
upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security if necessary, upon application of a
registered owner on the ground that registered interests of any
description, whether !ested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, ha!e
terminated and ceased, or that new interests ha!e arisen or been
created which do not appear upon the certificate. #pplying these
pro!isions to the present case, it is e!ident that, since the registered
or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs of the
petitioner+s predecessors in interest, established by section 6 of 'ule
)6, has not yet terminated or ceased, for the period of two years from
4uly ., %.6), ha!e not yet elapsed, the respondent judge had no
jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien or annotation
as prayed by the petitioner. Neither section 6, 'ule )6, of the 'ules of
,ourt, nor section %%& of #ct No. 6.7 authori=es the substitution of a
bond for a lien or registered interest of any description, whether
!ested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which ha!e not yet
terminated or ceased.
In !iew of the foregoing, it is plain that the respondent judge has not
acted in excess of jurisdiction nor with gra!e abuse of discretion, but
in conformity with the law, in denying the petitioner+s petition, and the
petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
Intestate estate #f t+e deceased LU& Ga$cia PABLO G. UTULO,
applicant and appellee, vs. LEO"A PASIO" 0IUDA DE GARCIA,
#pp#sit#$ and appellant.
Facts:
4uan >arcia :anche= died intestate, 2eona 3asion ?da. de
>arcia, the sur!i!ing spouse and the herein oppositor, was
appointed judicial administratrix.
The said deceased left legitimate children, named 4uan
>arcia, jr., 3atrocinio >arcia and 2u= >arcia who, with the
widow, are the presumpti!e forced heirs.
2u= >arcia married the applicant 3ablo >. @tulo and during
the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said
deceased, she died in the said pro!ince without any legitimate
descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her
husband.
The latter commenced in the same court the judicial
administration of the property of his deceased wife, stating in
his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother/
in/law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the
deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of
her father, 4uan >arcia :anche=, and asking that he be
named administrator of the property of said deceased.
The oppositor $mother of the decdent* objected to the petition,
opposing the judicial administration of the property of her
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daughter and the appointment of the applicant as
administrator. :he alleged that inasmuch as the said
deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the
said judicial administration" but she stated that should the
court grant the administration of the property, she should be
appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a
better right than the applicant.
Isses:
%. Is judicial administration is proper in this case?
&. Aho has the better right to be the administrator, the husband
or the mother?
!eld:
%. #s to the first question, we ha!e section 76& of the ,ode of ,i!il
3rocedure pro!iding in part that if no executor is named in the will, or
if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted etc. This
pro!ision enunciates the general rule that when a person dies lea!ing
property in the 3hilippine Islands, his property should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name
an executor therein. This rule, howe!er, is subject to the exceptions
established by sections 8.7 and 8.) of the same ,ode, as finally
amended. #ccording to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age
and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing
to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator. #ccording to the
second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the
heirs may apply to the competent court, after the required
publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying
all the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the
inheritance among themsel!es pursuant to law, without instituting the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.
,onstruing the scope of section 8.7, this court repeatedly held that
when a person dies without lea!ing pending obligations to be paid, his
heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment
of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the
effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so
that he may ha!e legal, capacity to appear in the intestate of the
deceased 4uan >arcia :anche=. #s he would appear in the said
intestate by the right of representation, it would suffice for him to
allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of
his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an
interested and necessary party if she were li!ing. In order to inter!ene
in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is
not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased
wife be instituted/an administration which will take up time and
occasion incon!eniences and unnecessary expenses.
&. :ince there is no need for judicial administration, there is no need
to determine who has the better right to administer the estate of the
decedent.
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CRESE"CIA !ER"A"DE&, plaintiff and appellee, 0S. &ACARIAS
A"DAL, defendant and appellant. 1UIRI"O DI2ASACAT, 2ARIA
!ER"A"DE& and A1UILI"A !ER"A"DE&, inte$ven#$s and
appellants.
Facts:
3laintiff and the inter!enors were siblings. They inherited a
parcel of land from their father.
The inter!enors sold their share to #ndal, allegedly for 3%80
The plaintiff now sought to repurchase the said parts of the
land. Cowe!er, #ndal refused, e!en when she offered a higher
price which is 3(70.
Then, #ndal allegedly made a simulated sale back to the
inter!enors.
Now, plaintiff sought brought the action to repurchase the land
from #ndal.
The inter!enorsD and #ndalDs defense9 They said that there
was already partition between the siblings. #ccording to the
facts there was a document of partition, howe!er it was not
presented in trial. $I think they in!oked this defense in order to
show that there was already a termination of the co/ownership,
therefore plaintiffDs right to redeem was already extinguished*
Euring trial, when the defendant and inter!enors tried to
present witnesses to pro!e such partition, the counsel of the
plaintiff objected in!oking the best e!idence rule. The
document of partition is the best e!idence of the terms of
partition.
Isses:
The defendant and inter!enors now assail that the trial court was in
error in denying the admissibility of their e!idence pro!ing the
existence of the partition due to the fact that the partition should be
put into writing. #re their contentions correct?
!eld:
Fes.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition
is such a contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of
frauds. -ne line of authorities holds the affirmati!e !iew, other
authorities say no. The reason for the rule that excludes partition from
the operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a
con!eyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the
land which belongs to each tenant in common. $&) ,. 4., &07.* The
differences in the conclusions reached are due perhaps to !aried
phraseology of the statutes in the se!eral states. $60 #mer. 4ur., %8.*
#332I,#G2; -N2F T- ;H;,@T-'F ,-NT'#,T:.
#s enacted in the 3hilippines, first in section BB8 of the former ,ode
of ,i!il 3rocedure, and now in 'ule %&B, section &%, of the 'ules of
,ourt, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases to
be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed
contracts. $&) ,. 4., &07.* In this jurisdiction performance of the
contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. $>ome= !s.
:alcedo, &7 3hil., 6(8" #lmirol and ,ariIo !s. 5onserrat, 6( 3hil., 7).*
The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein
enumerated !oid and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffecti!e the
action for specific performance. $#lmirol and ,ariIo !s. 5onserrat,
supra.*
-'#2 3#'TITI-N ;N1-',;E IN ;J@ITF AC;N 3;'1-'5;E
-n general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity ha!e enforced oral partition when it has been
completely or partly performed.
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#s a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the
parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of
jural !alidity or as a means of pro!iding e!idence to pro!e the
transactions. Aritten form exacted by the statute of frauds, for
example, is for e!idential purposes only. $Eomalagan !s. Golifer, BB
3hil., 6)%.* The ,i!il ,ode, too, requires the accomplishment of acts
or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to !alidate the act or
contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the
acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be
compelled to execute the document. $Cawaiian 3hilippine ,o. !s.
Cernae=, 68 3hil., )67.*
:;,TI-N % -1 '@2; )6, N-T ,-N:TIT@TI?; G@T 5;';2F
;?IE;NTI#2 -1 3#'TITI-N.
:ection % of 'ule )6 contains no express or clear declaration that the
public instrument therein required is to be constituti!e of a contract of
partition or an inherent element of its effecti!eness as between the
parties. #nd this ,ourt had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule,
to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties de/pendent
on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. The
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the
same time the protection of the heirs themsel!es against tardy claims.
Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and
creditors. The object of registration is to ser!e as constructi!e notice,
and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic !alidity
of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being in!ol!ed, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those pro!ided by law.
2ARIA 0DA. DE RE3ES, EFRE" RE3ES, EL0IRA RE3ES,
TI2BOL, ERLI"DA RE3ES40ALERIO, ER"ESTO RE3ES,
ELI&ABET! RE3ES, ALE5, RAFAEL II, E2ELI"A and E0EL3", all
s$na6ed RE3ES, $ep$esented ,* t+ei$ 6#t+e$,2ARIA 0DA. DE
RE3ES, petiti#ne$s, vs. T!E COURT OF APPEALS A"D
SPOUSES DAL2ACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARTO 2ARTILLA"O,
$esp#ndents.
Facts:
Euring his lifetime, one >a!ino 'eyes owned a parcel of land
of approximately )0 hectares, more or less, located at
:angayad, @long/Tubig, ,armona, ,a!ite. Ce sought to bring
said land under the operation of the Torrens :ystem of
registration of property. @nfortunately, he died in %.&% without
the title ha!ing been issued to him. The application was
prosecuted by his son, 5arcelo 'eyes, who was the
administrator of his property.
In %.B7 the abo!e property was sur!eyed and subdi!ided by
>a!ino+s heirs $;xh. 7*. In the subdi!ision plan, each
resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a
specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is
2ot No. %#/%6 $;xh. 7/#*, were allotted to 'afael 'eyes, :r.,
one of >a!ino+s children. 3er testimony of 4uan 3oblete, the
children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respecti!e
shares.
In %.6%, or about twenty $&0* years after the death of >a!ino,
the original certificate of title for the whole property/-,T No.
&88/was issued. It was, howe!er, kept by 4uan 3oblete, son/
inlaw of 5arcelo 'eyes, who was by then already deceased.
The heirs of >a!ino were not aware of this fact.
-n B Eecember %.6B, 'afael 'eyes, :r. sold a parcel of land
with an area of &B,6B% square meters, more or less, to pri!ate
respondent Ealmacio >ardiola $;xh. 8*. #ccording to the
!endee, this parcel corresponds to 2ot No.%/#/%6 of the
subdi!ision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, howe!er, did
not specifically mention 2ot No. I/#/%6. The !endee
immediately took possession of the property and started
paying the land taxes therein.
In %.7), the sur!i!ing heirs ga!e effect to the subdi!ision plan
created on %.B7. They formally partitioned the property.
Therefore, the heirs recei!ed their share of this land. Including
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'afael 'eyes, 4r. :on of 'afael :r. T,Ts were issued to him
representing the land which should ha!e been recei!ed by his
father.
Now, the heirs of 'afael 4r. sued >ardiola, saying that they
are the true owners of the land, as shown by the torrens title
o!er the land.
>ardiolaDs defense was that he bought the land from 'afael
:r. and that 'afael 4r. could not ha!e inherited this land for it
was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.
The trial court ruled in fa!or of 'afael 4r.Ds heirs. :tating that
there was no e!idence that the >a!inoDs children had a written
partition agreement. ,# re!ersed.
Isse:
Is the ,# correct in re!ersing the trial court?
!eld:
No.
The ,ourt of #ppeals correctly held that the partition made by the
children of >a!ino 'eyes in %.B7, although oral, was !alid and
binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in
writing to be !alid.&6 In Cernande= !s. #ndal, supra, this ,ourt,
interpreting :ection % of 'ule )6 of the 'ules of ,ourt, held that the
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the
same time the protection of the heirs themsel!es against tardy claims.
The object of registration is to ser!e as constructi!e notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic !alidity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Ahere no such
rights are in!ol!ed, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan
different from those pro!ided by law. There is nothing in said section
from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an
essential requisite to the !alidity of the partition. #ccordingly, an oral
partition is !alid. Garcelona, et al. !s. Garcelona, et al., supra,
pro!ides the reason why oral partition is !alid and why it is not
co!ered by the :tatute of 1rauds9 partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
con!eyance of real property for the reason that it does not in!ol!e
transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in fa!or of
another heir accepting and recei!ing the inheritance. #dditionally, the
!alidity of such oral partition in %.B7 has been expressly sustained by
this ,ourt in the 'esolution of &0 #ugust %..0 in >.'. No. .&(%%.&8
Gut e!en if Ae are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed
in %.B7 was not !alid for some reason or another, we would still arri!e
at the same conclusion for upon the death of >a!ino 'eyes in %.&%,
his heirs automatically became co/own, era of his )0/hectare parcel of
land. The rights to the succession. are transmitted horn the moment of
death of the decedent,&7 The estate of the decedent would then be
held in co/ownership by the heirs. The co/heir or co/owner may !alidly
dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition
that the portion disposed of is e!entually allotted to him in the di!ision
upon termination of the co/ownership.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by 'afael 'eyes, :r. to pri!ate
respondent Ealmacio >ardiola is his share in the estate of his
deceased father, >a!ino 'eyes. It is the same property which was
e!entually adjudicated to his son and heir, 'afael 'eyes, 4r.,
represented in turn by his heirs/petitioners herein/in the extrajudicial
settlement of %.7).
The same did not operate to di!est the !endee of the share of 'afael
'eyes, :r. in the estate of >a!ino. 3etitioners, as mere successors/
in/interest of 'afael 'eyes, 4r., son of 'afael 'eyes, :r., can only
acquire that which 'afael, 4r. could transmit to them upon his death.
The latter ne!er became the owner of 2ot No. %/#/%6 because it was
sold by his father in %.6B. The issuance of T,T No. T/&)&8) in the
name of 'afael 'eyes, 4r., in so far as 2ot No. %/%6/# is concerned,
was clearly erroneous because he ne!er became its owner. #n
extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in fa!or of an heir. #s
this ,ourt stated in the Garcelona case, &( it is but a confirmation or
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ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he ne!er had any
title of right to 2ot No. %/%6/#, the mere execution of the settlement
did not impro!e his condition, and the subsequent registration of the
deed did not create any right or !est any title o!er the property in fa!or
of the petitioners as heirs of 'afael 'eyes, 4r, The latter cannot gi!e
them what he ne!er had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. 3etitioners+
immediate predecessor/in/interest, 'afael 'eyes, 4r., ne!er took any
action against pri!ate respondents from the time his father sold the lot
to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to reco!er from
pri!ate respondents the owner. ship and possession of the lot from
the time 'afael 'eyes, 4r. died. #s categorically admitted by
petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or
about :eptember %.7. when, after the deli!ery of T,T No. &)&8) by
,andido Cebron to them, that they definitely disco!ered that they
were the owners of the property in question. #nd yet, despite full
knowledge that pri!ate respondents were in actual physical
possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and onehalf $%B
%K&* years later that they decided to file an action for reco!ery of
possession. #s stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the
trial court on %6 5arch %.(B. There was then absolutely no basis for
the trial court to place the burden on pri!ate respondents to bring an
action for recon!eyance within four $6* years from their disco!ery of
the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of 'afael
'eyes, 4r.
In t+e 6atte$ #f t+e I"TESTATE ESTATE #f PA& E. SIGUIO"
TORRES, Deceased, ALBERTO S. TORRES, petiti#ne$ and
appellant vs. CO"C!ITA TORRES and A"GEL S. TORRES,
#pp#sit#$s and appellees.
Facts:
#lberto Torres prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration in his fa!or, for the administration of 3a=
:iguion TorresD, his father, estate.
,onchita Torres opposed this saying that there was already an
extrajudicial partition between the heirs pursuant to the rules of
court.
Then #lberto then a!erred that the attempts actually designate
their respecti!e shares had failed, and properties of
considerable !alue were not included in the partition.
Ce also then a!erred that there was a 380,000 debt of the
estate
The trial court dismissed #lbertoDs petition.
Isse:
Is the trial court correct in ruling that the judicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased is not necessary in this case?
!eld:
Fes.
It appears from the pleadings filed herein that the petition to place the
estate under administration was predicated mainly on the alleged
inability of the heirs to agree on a physical di!ision of the properties.
The alleged existence of an indebtedness and noninclusion in the list
incorporated in the deed of extrajudicial partition, of certain properties
that form part of the estate, seemed to be merely an afterthought as
the reference to them was made only in the answer to the opposition
and motion for dismissal of the petition, and is riot made under oath.
There is also no allegation as to the particulars of the debt and the
omitted properties sufficient to identify them. In the circumstances, we
agree with the lower court that a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased is not here necessary.
This is not to o!erlook the allegation that the estate has an
outstanding obligation of 380,000.00. It is to be noted, howe!er, that
appellant, as heretofore obser!ed, did not specify from whom and in
what manner the said debt was contracted. Indeed, the bare
allegation that the estate has an existing debt of 380,000.00 from
third persons cannot be considered a concise statement to constitute
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a cause of action. It must be for this reason that the lower court,
notwithstanding the existence of such a!erment in appellant+s
supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed the petition filed by
said appellant.
Nor does the un!erified statement that there are other properties, not
included in the deed of extrajudicial partition in the possession of one
of the heirs, justify the institution of an administration proceeding
because the same questions that may arise as to them, !i=. the title
thereto, and their partition, if pro!en to belong to the intestate, can be
properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.
PEDRO ER2AC, and +is c+ild$en, ELE"A, CARLOS, A"TO"IO,
LUCIA"O7, !ILARIO, I"DALECIO and FRA"CISCA, all s$na6ed
ER2AC, petiti#ne$s, vs. CE"O" 2EDELO and 'UDGE
!ER"A"DO PI"EDA as p$esidin( 8d(e #f B$anc+ II #f t+e
LA"AO DEL "ORTE C#$t #f Fi$st Instance, $esp#ndents.
Facts:
3otenciano ;rmac and #nastacia 5ariquit died lea!ing a
parcel of land.
Their heirs filed for the summary settlement of the estate. They
presented a plan of partition.
3edro ;rmac sought to exclude 2ot %B&) from the estate as it
belongs to him and his wife. The court denied it saying that
they should file a separate suit.
They filed a separate suit. The probate court appro!ed the
partition despite the objection of 3edro saying that the court
should await the outcome of their separate suit.
Isse:
Ahether or not the trial court should ha!e waited for the outcome of
the separate suit?
!eld:
No.
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time. This is
specially true with small estates for which the rules pro!ide precisely a
summary procedure dispensing with the appointment of an
administrator together with the other in!ol!ed and cumbersome steps
ordinarily required in tha determination of the assets of the deceased
and the persons entitled to inherit therefrom and the payment of his
obligations. Eefinitely, the probate court is not the best forum for the
resolution of ad!erse claims of ownership of any property ostensibly
belonging to the decedent+s estate.% Ahile there are settled
exceptions to this rule as applied to regular administration
proceedings,& it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a
deceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that
certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him.B :uch claim
must be !entilated in an independent action, and the probate court
should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other
legal obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be
subject to the results of the suit. 1or the protection of the claimant, the
appropriate step is to ha!e the proper annotation of lis pendens
entered.
BE""3 SA2PILO and !O"ORATO SALACUP, petiti#ne$s, vs.
T!E COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SI"OPERA $esp#ndents.
Facts:
Teodoro Tolete died, lea!ing his wife and nephews and nieces
who are children of his deceased brothers and sisters.
Cis wife executed an affida!it of self/adjudicating saying that
Teodoro had no children or dependents, neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces..
Then, his wife sold the property to :ampilo, then :ampilo sold
it to :alacup.
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:inopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of
administration. :he alleged that TeodoroDs wife, 2eonicia de
2eon has no right to execute the affida!it of self adjudication
for there are other heirs aside from her.
The trial court ruled in fa!or of :inopera. The ,# modified the
ruling stating that the affida!it of 2eonicia is null and !oid, but
the subsequent sales are !alid insofar as it is not abo!e
2eoniciaDs share from TeodoroDs estate.
Isses:
The petitioners now argue that :inoperaDs cause of action has already
prescribed because according to the rules of court, personDs depri!ed
of their right due to the partition or self adjudication must bring their
action within two years from the date of partition or self/adjudication.
Is their contention correct?
!eld:
No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in the said
proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not ha!e the
chance to participate.
Ae notice two significant pro!isions in :ections % and 6 of 'ule )6. in
:ection %, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all
of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This
requirement is made more imperati!e in the old law $:ection 8.7, #ct
No. %.0* by the addition of the clause and not otherwise. Gy the title
of :ection 6, the distributees and estate are Indicated was the
persons to answer for right !iolated by the extrajudicial settlement. -n
the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly
of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not
take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot
be any doubt that those who took part or bad knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. #s to them the law is clear
that if they claim to ha!e been in any manner ,depri!ed of their lawful
right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may
demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both
the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or
interest. ;!idently, they are the persons who, in accordance with the
pro!ision, may seek to remedy the prejudice to their rights within, the
two/year 3eriod. Gut as to those who did not take part in the
settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the
setlement, there is no direct or express pro!ision, and it is
unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their
claims within the period extend the effects of the settlement to the
two years. To to them, to those who did no t take part or had no
knowledge thereof, without any express legal pro!ision to that effect,
would be !iolati!e of the fundamental right to due 3rocess law.
The procedure outlined in :ection % of 'ule )6 of exrajudicial
settlement or by affida!it, is ail ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution
would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death
of the decedent or of the extrajudicialy settlement or affida!it,
especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by
implication. Ae ha!e examined the two cases cited by appellants and
there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on which the
ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
The two year rule is applicable only:
(1 to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice
of the e!tra"udicial partition, and, in addition,
(# when the provisions of $ection 1 of %ule &' have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent
have taken part in the e!tra"udicial settlement or are represented
by themselves or through guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all
the heirs interested ha!e participated in the extrajudicial settlement,
the ,ourt of #ppeals ha!ing found that the decedent left, aside from
his widow, nephews and nieces li!ing at the time of his death.
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GE"O0E0A BELTRA", ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees, vs.
CORA&O" A3SO" and FABIA" 'I2E"E&, defendants and
appellants.
Facts:
5acario Geltran died. Then, his wife, ,ora=on #yson and 4ose
de la ,ru= executed an deed of partition apportioning the
estate amongst themsel!es.
Thereafter, nephews and nieces of the deceased appeared
sought to set aside the extra/judicial partition.
The defendants/appellants now are saying that the plaintiffsD
rights has already prescribed because the case was filed
beyond two years from the date of the partition.
Isses:
Ahether or not the cause of action of the plaintiffs already prescribed?
!eld:
No.
This ,ourt has pre!iously ruled out such contention in the similar case
of :ampilo, et al. !s. ,ourt of #ppeals, et al., %0B 3hil., )0" 88 -ff.
>a=., 8))&., wherein the case of 5c5icking !s.. :y ,on Gieng, supra,
was also cited by the appellants therein9
< < <the pro!isions of :ection 6 of 'ule )6, barring distributees or
heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition is applicable only $%*
to persons who ha!e participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, $&* when the pro!isions of
:ection % of 'ule )6 ha!e been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent ha!e taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themsel!es or through guardians.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiffs action is barred by
the statute of limitations. The origin of the pro!ision $:ection 6, 'ule
)6*, upon which this contention is predicated, which is :ection 8.7 of
#ct No. %.0, fails to support the contention. In the first place, there is
nothing therein, or in its sources, which shows clearly a statute of
limitations and a bar of action against third persons. It is only a bar
against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial
proceedings, but not against third persons not parties thereto. In the
second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different
chapter of #ct No. %.0, ,hapter H2, and if :ection 8.7 of the #ct had
been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally ha!e been
included in the chapter which defines the statute.
In the instant case, both requirements were not complied with,
because not all the interested heirs ha!e participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, it being admitted that the deceased left, aside
from his widow, appellant ,ora=on #yson, and his half/brother, 4ose
de la ,ru=, nephews, nieces and a sister li!ing at the time of his
death, and that the latter heirs were not aware of the deed of
extrajudicial partition until shortly before the filing of their complaint
$pars. 6 and 7, :tipulation of 1acts*.
Neither is :ection 6B, par. B, of #ct %.0 $now #rticle %%67, New ,i!il
,ode*, also in!oked by appellants, applicable to the facts of the case.
#ssuming that there was fraud as the widow and half/brother of the
deceased had declared in the deed of extrajudicial partition that they
are the sole sur!i!ing and exclusi!e heirs of the late 5acario Geltran,
it does not appear that the fouryear period ha!e elapsed when the
action was instituted. It is interesting to note that the court a quo
rejected the contention of appellees that appellant ,ora=on #yson
executed the deed of extrajudicial partition fraudulently and in bad
faith, while the parties stipulated that the appellees were not aware of
the deed of extrajudicial partition until shortly before the filing of their
complaint.
LI9ALUG A2EROL, 2ACATA"TO A2EROL, TAIB A2EROL,
DIBARATU" A2EROL, DIBARATU" 2ATABALAO, 2I"DALA"O
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DIBARATU", DIPU"DUGU" 2ORO, and 2A"UCAO 2ORO,
petiti#ne$s, vs. 2OLO: BAGU2BARA", $esp#ndent.
Facts:
Gagumabaran sought to eject the petitioners from the parcel
land registered to his name. Ce got it through a free patent
and subsequently registered it in his name obtaining a Torrens
title.
The petitioners interposed a counterclaim stating that
Gagumbaran applied for a free patent through fraud, knowing
that the said land was already subject to a pre!ious application
for free patent.
The trial court said that indeed there was fraud, howe!er, it
dismissed the counterclaim of the petitioners because,
according to the trial court, their action has prescribed. 1or 6
four years has already lapsed from the date of the issuance of
the Torrens title. ;!en though Gagumbaran acquired the
property through fraud, it was adjudicated to him due to
prescription.
Isse:
The petitioners contend that the prescripti!e period is %0 years and
not 6 years. Therefore, if it is %0 years, their action can still prosper
because they brought the same . years after the issuance of the
Torrens title. Is their contention correct?
!eld:
Fes.
Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in
actual possession and occupation of the property in question,
obtaining a patent and -riginal ,ertificate of Title No. 3/677 in his
name, created an implied trust in fa!or of the actual possessor of the
said property.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in
respondent+s name by and through his false pretenses. 5olok
Gagumbaran fraudulently misrepresented that he was the occupant
and actual possessor of the land in question when he was not
because it was 2iwalug Eatomanong. Gagumbaran falsely 3retended
that there was no prior applicant for a free patent o!er the land but
there was/2iwalug Eatomanong. Gy such fraudulent acts, 5olok
Gagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the property in trust and for
the benefit of petitioner 2iwalug Eatomanong. Notwithstanding the
irre!ocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of
respondent, he, e!en being already the registered owner under the
Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to recon!ey the
subject property to 2iwalug Eatomanong. #fter all, the Torrens system
was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud
or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. 1urther, contrary
to the erroneous claim of the respondent,. recon!eyance does not
work to set aside and put under re!iew anew the findings of facts of
the Gureau of 2ands. In an action for recon!eyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontro!ertible. Ahat is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person+s name,
to its rightful and legal owner,%0 or to one with a better right. That is
what recon!eyance is all about.
#n action for recon!eyance based on an implied or constructi!e trust
must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. # long line of
decisions of this ,ourt, and of !ery recent !intage at that, illustrates
this rule. @ndoubtedly, it is now well/settled that an action for
recon!eyance based on an implied or constructi!e trust prescribes in
ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title o!er the property.%7
The only discordant note, it seems, is Galbin !s. 5edalla,%) which
states that the prescripti!e period for a recon!eyance action is four
years. Cowe!er, this !ariance can be explained by the erroneous
reliance on >erona !s. de >u=man.%( Gut in >erona, the fraud was
disco!ered on 4une &8, %.6(, hence :ection 6B$B* of #ct No. %.0,
was applied, the new ,i!il ,ode not coming into effect until #ugust
B0,%.80 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture,
that #rticle %%66 and #rticle %687, are new pro!isions. They ha!e no
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counterparts in the old ,i!il ,ode or in the old ,ode of ,i!il
3rocedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four/
year prescripti!e period for an action for recon!eyance of title of real
property acquired under false pretenses.
%egarding the "urisprudence invoked by the respondent to
support its claim that the ' year period applies:
:ignificantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to buttress his
position and support the ruling of the trial court ha!e a common
denominator, so to speak. The cause of action assailing the frauds
committed and impugning the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all
accrued prior to the effecti!ity of the present ,i!il ,ode. The accrual
of the cause of action in 1abian was in %.&(, in 5iguel, 1ebruary,
%.80, and in 'amire=, %.66. It must be remembered that before
#ugust B0, %.80, the date of the effecti!ity of the new ,i!il ,ode, the
old ,ode of ,i!il 3rocedure $#ct No. %.0* go!erned prescription. It
pro!ided9
:;,. 6B. -ther ci!il actions" how limited./,i!il actions other than for
the reco!ery of real property can only be brought within the following
periods after the right of action accrues9
x x xx x x x x x
B. Aithin four years9 x x x #n action for relief on the ground of fraud,
but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to ha!e
accrued until the disco!ery of the fraud"
x x xx x x x x x
In contrast, under the present ,i!il ,ode, we find that just as an
implied or constructi!e trust is an offspring of the law $#rt. %687, ,i!il
,ode*, so is the corresponding obligation to recon!ey the property
and the title thereto in fa!or of the true owner. In this context, and !is/
a/!is prescription, #rticle %%66 of the ,i!il ,ode is applicable.
#rticle %%66. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues9
$%* @pon a written contract"
$&* @pon an obligation created by law" $B* @pon a judgment.
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