Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5156 March 11, 1954
CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante-apelante,
vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de Obras Publicas, demandado-apelado.
D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.
El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Diaz y el Procurador Sr. Antonio A. Torres en representacion del apelado.
DIOKNO, J .:
Carmen Festejo, duea de unos terrenos azucareros, de un total de unas 9 hectareas y media de superfice,
demando a "Isaias Fernando Director, Bureau of public Works, que como tal Director de Obras Publicas tiene
a su cargo los sistemas y proyectos de irrigacion y es el funcionario responsable de la construccion de los
sistemas de irrigacion en el pais," alegando que
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and
knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of
the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the
portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being
24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ----- R. on A., p. 3.
causando a ella variados daos y perjuicios. Pidio, en su consecuencia, sentencia condenando el demandado:
. . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and
appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square meters and to return the land to its former
condition under the expenses of the defendant. . . .
In the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated can not be returned
to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P19,343.20 as value of the
portions totalling an area of 24,179 square meters; ---- R. on A., p. 5.
y ademas a pagar P9,756.19 de daos y P5,000 de honorarios de abogado, con las costas R. on A., pp. 5-6.
El demandado, por medio del Procurador General, presento mocion de sobreseimiento de la demanda por el
fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene jurisdiccion para dictar sentencia valida contra el, toda vez que
judicialmente la reclamacion es contra la Republica de Filipinas, y esta no ha presentado su consentimiento a
la demanda. El Juzgado inferior estimo la mocion y sobreseyo la demanda sin perjuicio y sin costas.
En apelacion, la demandante sostiene que fue un error considerar la demanda como una contra la Republica y
sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.
La mocion contra "Isaias Fernando, Director de Obras Publicas, encargado y responsable de la construccion
de los sistemas de irrigacion en Filipinas" es una dirigida personalmente contra el, por actos que asumio
ejecutar en su concepto oficial. La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por las extralimitaciones que cometa o
haga cometer en el desempeo de sus funciones oficiales. Un caso semejante es el de Nelson vs. Bobcock
(1933) 18 minn. 584, NW 49, 90 ALR 1472. Alli el Comisionado de Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la
carretera ocupo o se apropio de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal Supremo del Estado
declaro que es personalmenteresponsable al dueo de los daos causados. Declaro ademas que la
ratificacion de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era equivalente a una orden a los mismos. He aqui lo dijo el
Tribunal.
We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's
land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the
boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition an
dusefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.
There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way innocently.
Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway
before construction began. . . .
"Ratification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be inferred from acquiescence
where there is power to restrain." It is unnecessary to consider other cases cited, . . ., for as before
suggested, the jury could find or infer that, in so far as there was actual trespass by appropriation of
plaintiff's land as a dumping place for the rock to be removed from the additional appropriated right of
way, defendant planned, approved, and ratified what was done by his subordinates.
Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A.L.R., 1472, 1476, 1477.
La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos parecidos se resume como sigue:
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as
any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act. 49
Am. Jur. 289.
. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law,
he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent. 43 Am. Jur. 86.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who
acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself
amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot
shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not
personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. 43 Am. Jur. 89-90.
El articulo 32 del Codigo Civil dice a su vez:
ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
x x x x x x x x x
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
x x x x x x x x x
In any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right ot commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The inmdemnity shall include moral damages Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda, No. L-1648, Agosto 17, 1947;
Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412, Septiembre 1950.
Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuacion de la tramitacion de la demanda conforme proveen los
reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas. Asi se ordena.
Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, MM., estan conformes.
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J ., dissenting:
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias Fernando is
a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According to said
pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and
5 of the complaint, it is alleged:
4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation projects and
systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines;
5. That the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent
and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection, unlawfully took possession of portions
of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the
portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being
24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied.)
The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were performed by said defendant
"as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly shows that the designation of his office was included in the
title of the case to indicate that he was being sued in his official capacity. This conclusion is bolstered up by the
fact that, among other things, plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a judgment
Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession of the portions of land
unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square meters and to return the
land to its former condition under the expense of the defendant. (Paragraph a, of the complaint).
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the complaint of which
the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in charge" and for which he is
"responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works are established and operated with public funds,
which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the
construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a
property of the Government. Consequently, in praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the
irrigation canal involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff therein, and that said land be restored to its
former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its possession of said irrigation canal, and, what is
worse, to cause said property of the Government to be removed or destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez (47
Off. Gaz., 665), the Government is, accordingly, "the real party in interest as defendant" in the case at bar. In
other words, the same partakes of the nature of a suit against the state and may not be maintained without its
consent.
Hence I am constrained to dissent.
Bengzon, J., concurs.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avancea for defendant..
TRENT, J .:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff
suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff
was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of
P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision
between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was
going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of
ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,
instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side
of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue,
without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already
six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby,
who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering
from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head,
while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain
was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for
performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little
hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer
skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for
which reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg
showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at
the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of
the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in
his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult
mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical
condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been
discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors
of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his
work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had
before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had
to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated
from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental
faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between
the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a)
P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of
wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the
record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the
trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the
hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly
incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and
twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for
the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on
his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government,
the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of
Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount
of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed
by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order
that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of
the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-
General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of
the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede
its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action
in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is
also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be
sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the
consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of
the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two
questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at
the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for
that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in
the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the
purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says
Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S.
vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for
personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution
created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate
information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the
material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing
upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches,
or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269;
Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St.
Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on
Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha
County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised
for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of
Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark
River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state
for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It
is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from
suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with
the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition
of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only
question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare
liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would
have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8
L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as
follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not
allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein
contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to
such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in
both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where
none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158;
Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In
construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore
unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New
York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had
sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries
arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such
liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or
negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for
the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its
part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in
its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by
the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or
negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down
that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence,
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons
who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an
identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors
of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by
their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however,
because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases
when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a
subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts
through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence,
which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902
respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault
or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its
executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been
occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in
proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property
which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of
the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in
and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court
of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to
that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative
or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of
civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to
the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of
Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to
the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the
chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which
the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and
by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the
Legislature and not with the courts.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.