Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 109404 January 22, 1996
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of
amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the
enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"? This is the
major question raised in the instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the respondent
Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order of the
respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his co-
owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the
Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a resolution
on January 17, 1979 inter aliaordering petitioner to cease and desist from making further sales of
lots in said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the Office of
Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo
alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations, but
that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said
property was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he suspended his payments
because of petitioner's failure to develop the village.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for
reconveyance of the lot to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the
contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondent's complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957,
ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private respondent's
purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other, "it appearing that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
269546 has been issued to . . . spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo . . . , the management of E &
S Delta Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the complainant-appellant (herein private
respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal rates from date of receipt
hereof until fully paid."
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of the . . .
Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . " However, in order to hasten
the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the
Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D.
957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified private
respondent's non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land purchase
agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot
govern the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his
discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts
executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory
construction stressed:
The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and
to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . . In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the trite intent of the legislature and to adopt that
sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
apparent policy and objects of the legislature.
1
(emphasis supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and the
disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was
enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may
fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers", and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble, pertinent portions
of which read as follows:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent
human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of
life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide
and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision
lots to different innocent purchasers for value;
2
(emphasis supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the legislative intent
must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively even
upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective
application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise
its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated under or in
connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to have been entered into prior to
P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said
law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative authority intended to permit such a loophole to
remain and continue to be a source of misery for subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain of its
provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and
will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957's enactment:
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water
supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the
subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the
Authority.
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or
disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond
is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or, developer to comply with the obligations under this and the
preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this
Decree.
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a
subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in
favor of the owner or developer, when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount
paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest
thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the application of P.D. 957 to
the contracts in question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves, which
expressly provides:
(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the
entire area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands
subject of this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance
No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide
by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots for
residential purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws
passed by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands,
the General Registration Office and other government agencies. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that Section 23
thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making further
payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. (Such incomplete development
of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual and statutory obligations on the part
of the subdivision-owner had been established in the findings of the HLURB which in turn were
confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent
Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the following matters: although private respondent
started to default on amortization payments beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he
had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who
had the cancellation option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in
timely fashion but delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts.
But by that time the land purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D.
957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and
seconded by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization payments incurred by private
respondent had been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latter's tolerance of the
defaults for a long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that respondent Secretary exceeded his
jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent's payments on Lot 12 although (according to
petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the
supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-development justified such order
inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretary's) Decision dated
March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had become final
and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which
provides that "(d)ecisions/ resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof . . . , unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period."
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is DENIED due
course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.


Footnotes
1
Vol. II, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 693-695.
2
Preamble, Presidential Decree No. 957.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J .:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private
respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988
local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28,
1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits
tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration
Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh.
"D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea,
Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out
of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines
since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was
proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification
for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to
run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation
of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987
and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22,
1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warrantounder Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that
private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and
qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough
basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified
from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by
substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate
of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is
an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath
of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or
not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us
here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a
Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his
Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the
case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1983 per certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed
that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the
Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable,
pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo
who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that
he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government
through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn
statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court
considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign
state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both
as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and
the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24
years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering
the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a
brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a
person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University
Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he
is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And
while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under
the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future
law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento.
Cortes, J., concur in the result.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.