RULE 132

Presentation of Evidence
A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in
a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness
is incapacitated to speak, or the questions calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of
the witness shall be given orally.
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including
the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the
judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded
by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the
court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or
recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of
such proceedings. (2a)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO judge
G.R. No. L-41166
FACTS: after the accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel manifested
that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination
by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and
material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario objected to the proposed
procedure contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion because the
aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not such procedure violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
HELD: Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court are reproductions,
respectively, of Sections 77 and 78 of Rule 123, of the Old Rules of Court. Section 77 in turn was
taken from Section 381 of Act No. 190,
1
while Section 78 from Section 32 of General Order No.
58.
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a
trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent",
according to an eminent authority,
3
demands confrontation, not for the Idle purpose of gazing
upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination
which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
immediate answers." There is also the advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of
the witness before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as the trier of facts "to
obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while testifying, and a
certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness.
4
It is only when the witness
testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression,
which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony.
5
Certainly, the physical
condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his
deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by
the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. Indeed, the great weight given the findings of
fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having had just that opportunity
and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.
This has been explained by Chief Justice Appleton, thus:
The witness present, the promptless and unpremeditatedness of his answers or the
reverse, their distinctness and particularity or the want of these essentials, their incorrectness
in generals or particulars, their directness or evasiveness are soon detected. ... The appearance
and manner, the voice, the gestures, the readiness and promptness of the answers, the
evasions, the reluctance the silence, the contumacious silence, the contradictions, the
explanations, the intelligence or the want of intelligence of the witness, the passions which
more or less control-fear, love, have, envy, or revenge are all open to observation, noted and
weighed by jury.
6

Thus, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule
7
requires that in determining the superior
weight of evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein
enumerated, may consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the
witness gives his testimony orally in open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion
immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his impressions of the
witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct result
than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the
opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.
There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct testimony of
the witness be given orally ill court. Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended
to protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts.
Under the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general
rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be
propounded to the witness. A witness in testify only on those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except or,
preliminary matters, or when there is difficult in getting direct and intelligible answer from the
witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or a deaf mute.




ANNA LERIMA PATULA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164457 : April 11, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with estafa. Prosecution presented two witnesses, Go
and Guivencan. Petitioners counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the
figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay.
HELD: To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule
130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she
knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except
as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to
her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial
source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say
about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the
facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight
of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of
the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be
tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be
cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to
explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the
simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author.
[19]
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
[20]
The testimony may have been given under
oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of
the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a
prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief,
this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to
show that the accused uttered those words.
[22]
This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but
is not legal hearsay.
[23]
The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding
hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.
[25]
If
hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court.
[26]
It is
then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to
the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the
truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a partys right to cross-examine her adversarys
witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that all the
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a
trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a)

The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the
adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated
in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test
his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to
criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face
to face xxx, the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to
non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being
given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination
by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-
of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.
Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions, although his
answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or
insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense
unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the
very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a
witness must answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for an offense.
Distinction
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6,
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS
G.R. No. 85215
FACTS: Ramos was accused of estafa. Private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence dated June 21, 1988,

which included "the statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken
on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office where he was investigated.
ISSUE: Whether or not he has a right to refuse to answer.
HELD: The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.
14
The right is
NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.
15
It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."
16
It simply
secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for
some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory
in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the
time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey
it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a
particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on
the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness
knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to
know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of
things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or
effect of a question to be put to the latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It
must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come
into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim
it at the appropriate time. The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from
being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce
evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be
required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for
himself.
33
In other words - unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be
compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular
incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse
to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any
question.
34
And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not
in any manner prejudice or be used against him."
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE v. JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM
G.R. NO. 136051 : June 8, 2006
FACTS: Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before a Complaint for Annulment,
Specific Performance with Damages against AFP-RSBS, et. Al. Respondents filed a Notice to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination. It was opposed by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a right to refuse to answer.
HELD: The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It
secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for
some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory
in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it,
appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular
question is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
57

As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the
stand as a witness. In People v. Ayson,
58
this Court clarified the rights of an accused in the
matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. We said:
An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the
Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be
cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness
shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against
himself" signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal
case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even
by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness
either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. In other words unlike an
ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena,
having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put
to him the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to
take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. X x x (Underscoring supplied.)
It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the
witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in
administrative cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if
incriminating questions are propounded. This Court applied the exception a party who is not
an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand in administrative
cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a
criminal proceeding.
59
It is likewise the opinion of the Court that said exception applies to
parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the
party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.
60

In the Ayson case, it is evident that the Court treats a party in a civil case as an ordinary
witness, who can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the incriminating
question is propounded. Thus, for a party in a civil case to possess the right to refuse to take
the witness stand, the civil case must also partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding.
In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific
Performance with Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the
witness stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal
proceeding. The case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as such. The fact that there are
two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that of the
civil case will not give them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their
depositions. They are not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they
can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually
asked of them. Only if and when incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse
to answer on the ground of their right against self-incrimination.

Section 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in which the
individual witness may be examined is as follows;
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent.
Section 5. Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by
the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.




Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom
to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., vs. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963
FACTS: Capitol Subdivision is claiming ownership over the land where the Provincial
Hospital of Negros is erected. Alfredo Montelibano, the controlling stockholder and president
and general manager of the subdivision, was presented as a witness. The fiscals efforts to
cross-examine him on those matters were frustrated by Capitol Subdivisions counsels
objections and the trial courts rulings sustaining those objections. The court reasoned that Mr.
Montelibano was then on the stand as Capitol Subdivisions own witness and could not be
questioned in such a way as to make him to the Provinces witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has a right to cross-examine the witness.
HELD: In remanding the case to further proceedings in the interest of justice, the
Supreme Court held that the fact alone that Mr. Montelibano was then testifying as Capitol
Subdivisions witness is no justification for not permitting the fiscal to cross-examine him on
any matter that would elicit all important facts bearing on the issue. In this jurisdiction, adverse
party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose among others, of eliciting all important facts
bearing upon the issue. From this provision it may clearly be inferred that a party may cross-
examine a witness on matters not embraced in his direct examination. But this does not mean
that a party by doing so is making the witness his own.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. BAYANI S. RIVERA, Judge, Branch 129 , Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City, and WILFREDO L. EMBRANO
G.R. No. 98376
FACTS: Wilfredo L. Sembrano was charged of arson. The Government presented Benjamin Lee
as witness. Lee testified on direct examination. But before it could rest its case the defendant's
original withdrew his appearance and was substituted by Eduardo S. Rodriguez.
3
The latter then
filed a motion on June 8, 1988 to recall Benjamin Lee for further examination.
4
The ground
relied upon by Atty. Rodriguez was simply that after he had reviewed the record of Benjamin
Lee's testimony, he came to the conclusion that " there seems to be many points and questions
that should have been asked but were not profounded (sic) by the other defense counsel who
conducted.. (the cross-examination). Respondent seeks that the testimony be stricken out.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony should be stricken out for lack of further cross-
examination.
HELD: The striking out was directed without any showing whatever by the defense of the
indispensability of further cross-examination, what it was that would have been elicited by
further cross-examination rendering valueless all that the witness had previously stated. It
should be stressed that Lee was subjected both to cross-examination and recross-examination
by former counsel of the accused Sembrano. Obviously the latter was satisfied that there had
been sufficient cross-examination of the witness. Absence of cross-examination may not
therefore be invoked as ground to strike out Lee's testimony (as being hearsay). And there is no
showing whatever in this case that it was the prosecution that placed the witness beyond the
reach of the Court, much less of the expected nature or tenor of his additional testimony which,
because not presented, would necessarily cause the evidence earlier given by Lee to become
hearsay or otherwise incompetent, and therefore, amenable to being stricken from the record.
Waiver of Cross- examination
EMILIO DE LA PAZ, JR., et. Al. vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 71537
FACTS: Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against petitioners for a judicial declaration of
ownership of a parcel of land. After Loreto took the witness stand, the counsel of the heirs of
Ponciano began to conduct his cross-examination, however, the counsel moved for
continuance for the crossexamination.
These postponements by the heirs continued a few more times until on one scheduled
trial date, neither the heirs nor their counsel appeared despite due notice. This caused Loreto
to file a motion to present evidence ex parte and such motion was granted. Heirs of Ponciano
filed moved to verbally strike the entire testimony of Loreto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their right to cross-examination had been waived.
HELD: We see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it issued
the questioned order. True, we have consistently ruled on the nature of the right of cross-
examination, to wit:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which
is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino,
et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258).
xxx xxx xxx
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary in invaluable as
it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal
cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution
does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally
based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court
in deciding the case. (Bacrach Motor Co., Inc., v. Court of Industrial Relations, 86
SCRA 27 citing Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et
al., supra, Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610)
But we have also ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party can demand at all times.
This Court has stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right
to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was
given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of the herein petitioner, Savory Luncheonette, easily falls within the
confines of the jurisprudence given above. Private respondents through their
counsel, Atty. Amante, were given not only one but five opportunities to cross-
examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite the warnings and admonitions of
respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct the cross-examination or else it
will be deemed waived, and despite the readiness, willingness and insistence of
the witness that he be cross-examined, said counsel by his repeated absence
and/or unpreparedness failed to do so until death sealed the witness' lips
forever. By such repeated absence and lack of preparation on the part of the
counsel of private respondents, the latter lost their right to examine the witness,
Atty. Morabe, and they alone must suffer the consequences. The mere fact that
the witness died after giving his direct testimony is no ground in itself for
excluding his testimony from the record so long as the adverse party was
afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-examination but through fault of his
own failed to cross-examine the witness. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino,supra; at pp. 263-267)
In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault
of the respondents. As can be gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for cross-
examination from the time she finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to November
7, 1984, the last scheduled hearing of the case before her death on December 1, 1984. The
petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-examination but at times failed to appear
during scheduled hearings. The postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later date duet
o the correction of the stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony may be justified, but the same
cannot be said for the subsequent posponements requested by the petitioners. The scheduled
trials before November 7, 1984, did not push through, because of the petitioners' fault. It may
also be recalled that at the scheduled hearing on September 14, 1984 neither the petitioners
nor their counsel appeared leading to the presentation of evidence ex parte. And also during
the scheduled hearing on September 18, 1984, when the petitioners were allowed to cross-
examine Loreto despite the fact that the case was already deemed submitted for decision, the
petitioners again failed to appear.
Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-
examine Loreto. Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her
testimony stands.

Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the cross-examination of the
witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or
supplement his answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct-examination,
questions on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court
in its discretion.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO
G.R. No. 117217
FACTS: Respondent was charged with rape. Gilda, in her cross-examination, mentioned
the three hours which elapsed from the moment she was at the gate of Meadow Wood
Subdivision and until she reported the incident to Tony Antonio. It was questioned by the
respondent. Gilda explained the same in her re-direct examination.
ISSUE: Whether or not her testimony in the re-direct examination must be upheld.
HELD: The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness
and the party who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the
testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or
inconsistency in his statements, an opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-
examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a
witness, or of adding a new matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible
misinterpretation of testimony.
41
In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda
categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert his penis into her vagina. He failed
in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but succeeded on the third because she
was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-examination she testified that she was
raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three times, no
inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal
qualifications of the three separate acts, i.e., Gildas answers were conclusions of law. A witness
is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law, among which, legal responsibility is one of
the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted to
testify as to whether or not a party is responsible to the law. Law in the sense here used
embraces whatever conclusions belonging properly to the court.