ALBINUS' METAPHYSICS

AN ATTEMPT AT REHABILITATION
BY
J. H. LOENEN
I. THE INNER CONSISTENCY AND THE ORIGINAL CHARACTER OF
ALBINUS' INTERPRETATION OF PLATO
R. E. Witt's
book,
published
in
1937
and still the most recen
general
work on this
subject,
claims to be the first "exhaustive
examination of the Didaskalikos
itself" 1).
It
is, however,
mainly-
concerned with an
investigation
into the sources of Albinus'
work and with a
comparison
of his doctrine with those of earlier
Platonists and that of
Plotinus,
but it does not include a
syste-
matical examination of the inner coherence of Albinus' inter-
pretation
of Plato. Now it is
very
remarkable that Witt
repeatedly
reproaches
Albinus that his Platonism is full of contradictions and
logical
inconsistencies
(p.
i 20 ; 128;
133-4; 135).
In its most
general
formulation this criticism
charges
Albinus with the fundamental
mistake of
combining
an Aristotelian
theology
with a literal inter-
pretation
of the Timaests
(p. 135).
This
opinion may
even be said
to be the current
vieiv 2).
Such a fundamental criticism in fact
implies
that Albinus is
unworthy
of the name of a
philosopher.
Yet one asks oneself first of all how on earth Albinus could
possibly
be reckoned in later
antiquity among
the
coryphaei
of Platonism
3).
Would the intellectual
capacities
of Albinus himself and moreover
of those of the
principal
thinkers of the
subsequent
centuries who
judged favourably
about
him,
rank so far below those of modern
historians of
philosophy?
A
very flattering thought
to be sure!
At
any
rate Albinus himself did consider his
interpretation
of Plato
to be
consistent,
a fact which even Witt
acknowledges 4).
Yet I
1)
R. E.
Witt,
Albinus and the
History of
Middle
Platonism, Cambridge
1937.
2)
Cf. F.
Sassen,
Geschiedenis v. d.
Wiisbegeerte
der Grieken en
Romeinen,
(Antwerpen-Nijmegen, 1949), 157
and
Ueberweg-Praechter, 542.
3) Ample
evidence for this statement
may
be found in P.
Louis,
Albinos
pitom (Paris 1945), p.
XIII.
Epitome
is the title of the best
manuscripts
and is therefore to be
preferred
to the usual name Didaskalikos.
4)
"To Albinus there must have
appeared
to be no
inconsistency" (p.
120).
"Yet it would seem that Albinus himself was not aware of these
difficulties"
(134;
cf.
142).
297
cannot
help getting
the
impression
that Witt has not made
any
real
attempt
to see Albinus' doctrine from the historian's
primary
point
of
view,
viz. from the immanent
one,
which tries to under-
stand a
system
from its central
point.
Or to
put
it in another
way:
an
intelligent
and
patient study
of the work itself must
precede
an
examination of the sources and further scientific research.
Moreover,
Witt
gives
the
impression
of
judging
Albinus from a
systematical
point
of view which is that of Plotinus'
philosophy 1).
All these
reflections have induced me to
try
to understand Albinus from
within. It is therefore not
my
intention to discuss the historical
exactness of the
interpretation
which Albinus
gives
of
Plato,
but
only
to examine its inner
consistency.
Because the fundamental
criticism of Albinus touches the
principal points
of the
theological
part
of his doctrine
only,
and
particularly
the relation of the
transcendent God to the
world,
this
inquiry
will not
go beyond
these limits. The
great problems
of the
interpretation
of
Plato
have their central
point
in the relations between
God,
the
Ideas,
the worldsoul and the world-nous. This holds
good
with
regard
to
Albinus as well as to Plotinus and all modem
interpreters.
The method of this
inquiry
is obvious. First I will make an
attempt
to show that the current criticism cannot be
justified
and
that the above-mentioned difficulties and contradictions do not
exist. After that I shall
try
to arrive at a
deeper understanding
of
the
logical
connexion between his fundamental statements and to
show the
original
character of Albinus'
interpretation
of Plato.
In a second
part
I shall discuss the sources of his
interpretation.
But it will
perhaps
be useful to
survey
beforehand Albinus' con-
ception
of the transcendent
God,
as far as there is no difference in
opinion
between
scholars,
that is to
say, letting apart
some
aspects
which touch his relation to the world.
1)
"Yet nowhere
(sc.
in Middle
Platonism)
is there found a coherent
system,
in which the relation between God and the universe is
adequately
explained ...
the doctrine of the Plotinian One has not
yet
been formu-
lated...
Moreover,
as we
may
see in the Didaskalikos
X,
the orthodox
Platonists of the second
century,
whatever refinements
they
introduce
into their
conception
of
God,
are unable to
get
rid of the belief in his
per-
sonality" (123-4).
The
impersonal
Plotinian God is
undoubtedly
used
here as one standard for
judging
the
adequateness
and coherence of Albinus'
interpretation.
298
Albinus
undoubtedly regarded
Plato's God as a
principle
trans-
cending
the world and as an intellect
(vo5q).
At first he
simply
designates
him as
6EOS
(or
o and
vo5q
(IX, p. 51 ff.) 1)
After-
wards, however,
when the soul and the nous of the cosmos have
been
introduced,
he is indicated as
(6)
6Ee;
or
(o)
vo5q
(X
2,
p. 57 ff.),
to avoid confusion
evidently.
The ideas are
his
eternal,
perfect,
and immutable
thoughts (IX
1. 2.
3, p. 51 -53 ) .
On the other hand he is almost ineffable
([LLxpo5
8ew XI
p. 55;
cf. X
4, p. 59) :
he does not have
any qualities (ol<e
yet
he is not
altogether
without
any qualities
either
(ours &7rotoq);
he is neither
part
nor
whole,
neither different
from,
nor identical
with,
other
things;
he does not move and is not moved either.
Nevertheless he can be
known,
not
only by
means of this via ne-
gationis
(xaTOC
M'cpoc'tpecrLv),
but also
by
means of the via
analogiae
(xaT vaaoyiav :
Plato's
comparison
of the
good
to the sun in
508
a,
b)
and
by
means of the via eminentiae
(this
term is
lacking:
the ascent to
beauty
itself in the
Symp.
210
a-d) (X 4-6, p. 59-61 ) .
Several other
predicates,
in addition to that of his
being
an
intellect,
are attributed to him: he is
eternal, ineffable,
perfect;
essence,
divinity,
truth,
symmetry
and the
good (X 3, p. 57).
With
regard
to his relation to the world the statement that he is
father because he is the cause of
everything,
must suffice here
(X 3, p. 59,
1.
2-3).
This
causality,
however,
has
evidently
to be
taken in the Aristotelian sense:
vepyei
8e
a t 2).
For Albinus'
transcendent God is indeed an Aristotelian
vovq
possessing
the
qualities
of Plato's ideas of the Good and the Beautiful.
The
alleged
inconsistencies
I shall
try
to
arrange
Witt's
objections systematically
and as
concisely
as
possible,
c.
q. explain
them more in detail if
necessary.
Firstly
Witt
reproaches
him
(p. 120)
that
though
in his view
the world did not come into existence in the course of
time,
yet,
in a
i )
The
Epitome
is
quoted according
to
chapters,
sections,
and
pages
of
the edition of Louis.
2)
Albinus uses here even the Aristotelian formula
w5
To
opExTOV
xwci
6pciw &.X(\I1)TO\l 1teXPXO\l (X 2, p. 57,
ll.
5-8),
while he
says
further. that the
worldsoul strives after God's
thoughts
XIV
3, p. 81).
299
literal
interpretation
of the
Timaeus,
he maintains that matter
was
moving chaotically 1tpO opocvou Yeva?WS (XII
2,
p. 69),
whereas on the other hand he makes the statement eXd sv
yevaei
E6TL
(XIV 3. p.
81,
1.
3). Secondly
Witt stresses the fact that
Albinus ascribes to his
vo5q
two causal functions which
cannot be combined. On the one side he is the final cause of the
world as the
principle
of its movement. On the other side one has to
conclude from the literal
interpretation
of the Timaeus
(c.
XI-XII :
here
god
has the function of the
Demiurge
of the
Timaezcs)
that he is
at the same time the efficient cause of the
world-process.
Moreover,
ac;ording
to
Witt,
the relation of matter to God remains
completely
in the dark
(p. 133-4).
The reader will
undoubtedly perceive
that
there is a
logical
connexion
between
these two
points
of criticism.
For what the
question
comes to is that a literal
interpretation
of
the Timaeus
brings
Albinus into conflict with
a)
his own thesis
about the
eternity
of the world and
b)
with the essence of
God,
being
a
vo5q
and a final cause. The two contradictions
therefore concern the relation of God to the world and are the
consequence
of a literal
interpretation
of the Timaeus.
The third
important point
is more
particularly
connected with
the relation of God as
volq
to the lower nous
(which
is
subordinated to
him)
and the world-soul. This relation is
obscure,
says
Witt. Albinus here takes three
principles
for
granted,
but he
does not succeed in
giving
them an inner
metaphysical
coherence.
Although
he considers this nous to be
superior
to the
soul,
he does
not mention
anywhere
an emanation of the worldsoul from one of
the two intellects
(p. 135).
This criticism is
founded,
if I understand
him all
right,
on Witt's
opinion
that
according
to Albinus the
subordinate
vo5q
is a
separate hypostasis
between the world-soul
and God
1).
Moreover he asks himself which
purpose
this
doubling
of the nous
might
serve,
if both
possess
the same
activity,
viz.
1)
Witt nowhere
says
so
explicitly,
but attentive
reading
of his text
shows this to be what he means. After
having
remarked
(128-9)
that Plotinus
in a
polemic
with the Gnostics
rejects
a
vo5q
xwo6ycvoq
as a
separate hypo-
stasis,
he concludes
by saying
that in fact Plotinus condemns the
theory
of Albinus that between and 6
Tup6,roq voi5q
a vo5q
kv
8uv<x[jLEt
and a
vo5q
xT'
:\IpYELOC\l
should exist. From this it
appears
that he attributes to Albinus
a
vo5q xwo6ycvoq
as a
separate
hypostasis.
300
that of the
perfect knowledge
of the ideas
(p. 128).
The text of
Albinus on which all this is
founded,
is the statement:
vo5q
(X
2,
p. 57, 1. z).
So we can understand that Witt thinks it
to be a
contradiction,
when Albinus
says
that it
may perhaps
not
be
possible
for a
vo5q
without a soul to exist
(XIV 4, p.
81;
Witt
p. 127).
In connexion with this
problem
of the relation between the
superior
and the inferior
nous,
and more
particularly
the
question
of the
metaphysical
status of the
latter,
two more
reproaches
are
advanced
by
Witt. He concludes that
according
to Albinus the
inferior nous does not
always
exist
actually,
which conclusion he
deduces from the latter's assertion that the worldsoul
gets
its
thoughts by gazing
on God
(cf.
XIV
3, p. 81),
whereas,
on the
other
hand,
this nous is
emphatically
described as o xaT'
vpye:LOC'J
1tocv't'oc vocw xocv xod aei
(X
2,
p. 57;
Witt
p. 128).
Further he
remarks somewhat
ironically
that the inferior
gods,
who are
generated by
the first
god (XVI
z,
p. 91)
and create mortal
living
beings,
"are a somewhat
strange progeny,
if their
parent really
is an
Aristotelian Moreover Albinus does not ask him-
self which is their relation to the worldsoul which receives the ideas
and
imparts
them to matter
(p. 136).
This is an
ample
and
impressive
list of
objections.
It must be
added that with
regard
to the third
point
Witt
only reproduces
current
opinion.
In
Ueberweg-Praechter
this is
expressed
thus:
"unter der ersten Gottheit steht der
vo5q
(der Welt),
unter diesem
die Die
Sonderung
von
vo5q
und
(s.
oben S.
538)
findet so auch auf das
Weltganze Anwendung.
Damit bereitet sich
die
neuplatonische
Lehre von den
Hypostasen
vo5q,
vor"
(p. 542) 1).
Here, too,
a triad of
highest principles
is ascribed to
Albinus. The same view is to be found in
Sassen,
who adds another
point
to the
long
list: "The
theology
of Gaius and Albinus is not
quite
clear. On the one hand the
godhead
is
represented
as a
triad,
of which the
6e:,
the
vo5q
and the are the
members,
on the other hand an
1tOUPOCVLO
8elq
and a
'u7cepoup('XvLor,
6so5
are
i )
The reference in
Ueberweg
to
p. 538 regards
Plutarch's
theory
of the
separation
between the soul itself and its nous :
by
means of a second death
the nous will be
separated
from the
soul,
like at the first death the soul
is freed from its mortal
parts
and from the
body.
30I
distinguished,
whereas it is not made clear how the relation of those
two to each other and to the
6EOS
is to be understood. Where
the
question
of the assimilation to God is dealt
with,
there is no
longer question
of a triad"
1).
An
attempt
at
refutation
The criticism as a whole
may
be reduced to two main
points,
I
think. First the
problem
of the literal
interpretation
of the Timaeus
and its relation to the essence of God as a
vo5q
and se-
condly
the relation of God to the inferior nous and the worldsoul.
As to the first
problem
we know from Proclus that Albinus
thought
"that
according
to Plato the
cosmos,
though ungenerated
did have a
principle becoming (Yev?6?ws
so that it
would be eternal
(&d Wv)
and
generated
at the same
time,
in this sense that it had not been
generated
in the course of
time,
but that an
explanation
for its
generation-it being
a
compound
of
many
dissimilar
parts--was necessary.
Therefore its existence
had to be traced back to another more ancient cause"
(In
Tim.
I
219, 2).
In
short,
according
to Albinus means "not
generated
in the
course of
time" and
"metaphysically
dependent
from an eternal cause". In the
Epitome
we find indeed
the same doctrine
2).
Now it is almost
incomprehensible
that Witt
(himself citing
this
passage
from Proclus and even
considering
it
the most
convincing proof
for Albinus'
authorship
of the Didas-
kalikos,
p. 107)
nevertheless thinks that Albinus
seriously keeps
to a literal
interpretation
of the Timaeus. But it is clear that when
Albinus uses the
expressions 1tpO oupvou YeveaewS
and Ev
1) O.c., 157;
the distinction between the
:1tOUPeX\lLOc; 6e6q
and the
1tEPOU-
pawo5 BEOS
is found in Albinus XXVIII
i, p. 137 (this
is the
only passage).
The immediate source for Sassen's statement
(which
I did not find else-
where)
seems to be the
study
of E. Pelosi S.
J.,
Een Platoonse
gedachte bij
Gaios,
Albinos en
A puleius
van Madaura. Plat. Theait.
176
a: 8:
6?to'Lcoatq
8ch
xaTa To
8uva<6v,
Studia Cath.
15 (1939), 375-394
and 16
(1940), 226-242.
See
esp. 386
and
388-9. Apparently
Sassen did not follow Pelosi in his
wavering
identification of the
??roupvio5 8c6q
with the
7rp6-coq
Oe6q.
2)
This
appears
from the
following
text: oTav 8:
d1t1) , (sc. IIaTwv) ye-
dvai Tov
06X
olhw
(XXOUOTEOV
OCTOU, ds 6vro; Xp6\1ou, \I
o6x
iv
&ncX 8vow aet iv
YE?SOe!.
EQTL xOC6
El,t,?OCGVEI.
(XUTOU 67ro-
a,rckaewq
&pXLx6,repov
TL OChLOV
(XIV 3, p. 81 ) .
302
Y?vasv
earl,
this means to him
respectively
"in so far as it is meta-
physically independent
of the first cause" and "as far as it is eter-
nally dependent upon
the first cause".
Although
one
may
find
fault with this somewhat
confusing
use of the terms
and we have to
accept
it. Moreover it is not so
difficult to understand
why
Albinus does so. We must bear in mind
that this work is meant to
give only
a
systematical survey
of
Plato's
philosophy;
as such it is
only
an
introduction,
as Albinus
explicitly
states and as
everybody
admits
(Witt, too) 1).
We should
not be
surprised,
then,
at the fact that
Albinus,
evidently,
tries to
represent
Plato's
thoughts
as
faithfully
and as
literally
as
possible.
A careful reader cannot
help receiving
this
impression,
and the
very
fact that his work
consists
for a
great part
of
quotations
from
Plato,
often cited
literally, gives
sufficient
proof
for this. Now
every
reader of the Timaeus knows that
expressions equivalent
to
xpo opocvou yev6ascoq
and ocsi Ev
yevlaei
EaTi occur in
Plato 2),
and that nevertheless the
greater part
of the ancient as well as
of
the modern
interpreters,
from Xenocrates
onward,
have attributed
the same view about the
eternity
of the world to Plato as Albinus
did 3).
So it is not Albinus'
interpretation
as
such,
but his re-
presentation
of Plato's
cosmological exposition,
that is more or
less literal. And
why
should one
reproach
Albinus that his
ability
for
speculative thinking
was not
superior
to that of Plato himself?
Is he to be measured
by
the standard of Plotinus?
Moreover Albinus
applied
this method
consciously.
This wild.
become evident from the discussion of the next
point,
viz. that the
vous
is the final as well as the efficient cause of the world-
process.
This criticism has
strictly speaking already
been
rejected
by
the above
argument:
Albinus
explains
Plato's transcendent
God as a
vouS
and therefore as a final cause
exclusively,
but in his
paraphrase
of the Timaeus he follows Plato's
mythic
mode of
exposition.
So from a
logical point
of view he does not
1)
Albinus
XXXVI,
p. 173 (roaaura <x7T<xpxE? 1tpO claymyiv .......); ;.
Witt
p. 2-3.
2)
xoct
1tpt\l o6paVlV ycViC8aL (Tim. 52 d);
1'0\1 <XTT<X\'T(X
xp6VoV
Ic xoct
&\1 x1
(Tim. 38 c).
3)
See: A. E.
Taylor, A Commentayy
on Plato's Timaeus
(Oxford
1928),
67-9.
303
regard
this God as an efficient cause at all. This
appears
from his
statement that God does not make the worldsoul but
only organizes
it
(06Z,L
1tOL,
xoc't'ocxocrJ.e:?,
XIV
3, p.81).
To this
passage
we
shall have to return later. In this connection attention should
further be drawn to the remarkable fact that Albinus does not call
God
a1jJ.LOupye;,
or uses the verb
8??.coupY?w
of him
anywhere
in the
theological chapters proper (in
which his relation to the world
is not
yet discussed),
whereas this is
everywhere
the case in the
chapters
which-also after an
explicit
announcement
(XI 3, p. 67)-
deal with
physics (c.
XII
ff.).
This
fact justifies
the
supposition
that Albinus
consciously applied
the method of
mythical repre-
sentation. What is
more,
it
can,
I
believe,
be
proved.
For Witt
overlooked the fact that
exactly
in that
passage
from which he
took his
example
of Albinus' "crude and literal
interpretation
of
Plato's
cosmological
account" the
expression
xaTOC Tov eixoT
Xoyov
occurs
I). Everybody
knows that this
expression
in the Timaeus
is the formula to indicate the
process
of
mythopoiie.
Here we have
the
positive proof
of Albinus
being absolutely
conscious of what
he is
doing.
One
might object
to this that it is the
only passage
in
the
Epitome
where Albinus uses this
expression,
so that it
may
be
possible
that he
copied
it
blindly.
But this
objection
is refuted
by
the fact that the
expression
does not occur at all in the corres-
ponding passage
of the Timaeus
(31 bc).
The term is however used
repeatedly
and
emphatically
in the
preceding pages (Tim. 29
c d;
30
b;
the next
passage
is
44 d).
So Albinus has
consciously
inserted
the term in this
place.
Besides we know from Proclus that Albinus
attributed to Plato a double form of
exposition, vi Z. 7) 1tLcr't'1)[J.OVL-
What is more obvious than Albinus fol-
lowing
Plato here? From all this it should be clear that Albinus
has
consciously
chosen a literal
representation
of the Timaeus.
1) Witt, 133-4.
He
fragmentarily quotes
XII
2, p.
69,
11.
8-14, italicizing
EYvvr?ae
....., 8LOC\l0'Y)8d
and The end of this
passage
runs in
Albinus: xaTa
8?
T\l dx6TOC
abYov
ex oc6,r6v xai
nupo5 Perhaps
Louis, too,
failed to see the
importance
of this: his usual references to the
corresponding passages
in Plato are
lacking
here and he translates
"suivant
ce raisonnement"
( 70 ) .
2)
Proclus in Tim.
1,
340.
The text is
quoted amply by
Witt
(117),
but
here, too,
he failed to see the real connection with the
Epitome passage.
304
It is not
up
to us to blame him for this on account of the fact that
Plotinus did not do so. As to Witt's remark that the relation of God
to. matter
remains
obscure,
in the first
place
it is clear that he once
more
argues
from the
standpoint
of
Plotinus,
whereas Albinus here
again
sides with Plato himself.
Secondly,
instead of
being
obscure
here,
Albinus has succeeded in
establishing
a clever and coherent
theory,
as we will
spe
below.
In this connection we can answer two more difficulties. If the
world is
eternal,
then it is evident that the nous of the worldsoul
in fact is
always
actual,
whereas the transition from
potentiality
to
actuality (which
Witt deduces from the statement that it receives
the ideas
by gazing
on God's
thoughts)
of course
belongs
to the
things
said
eLXO't'OOYLx<7>e;, just
like the
expression 1tpO oupvou
And to the same
category
also
belong
the lower
gods,
who,
according
to
Witt,
form such a
strange progeny
of a
The
Exyovot.
auTOU 6e:OL of Albinus
(XVI
I,
p. 91)
are
indicated in the Timaeus
by
the words 8eoi
6e:<7>v,
wv
31jiLoupy'oq
rue
pymv (41 a).
To
require
with Witt that Albinus
ought
to
have
given
his
opinion
about their relation to the worldsoul and
the world-intellect is of no
use,
because Plato does not
speak
about
it either and because Albinus writes an
introductory
work. But
apart
from this it seems certain that he
regarded
these
gods,
just
like Plotinus himself
(cf.
Witt
p. 136),
as souls. Before there is
any question
of "the
gods
born from
God",
Albinus has
already
mentioned two kinds of
gods.
First the 8soi
simply,
viz. the celestial
bodies which
are,
just
as in the
Timaeus,
"thinking living beings"
(XIV 7, p. 87),
therefore
souls,
and which have been "made"
by
God.
Secondly
which
might
also be called
ye:V1j't'OL
who find themselves in the sublunar
region, being
souls, too,
evidently xlapLov ?te'poq
elvi,
XVI
I,
p. 8g).
Which of the two kinds of
gods represent
his
xy6voi
6e:OL is
perhaps
not at once
clear;
anyhow
it is certain that he conceived them as
souls on a cosmic level.
Now it
only
remains for us to discuss the second
problem:
the
obscure relation between the first
nous,
the cosmic
nous,
and the
worldsoul. The central
point
of the
question
is whether this inferior
nous is indeed an
independent
form of
being,
a
hypostasis (to speak
305
with
Plotinus)
between the worldsoul and the first nous
(God).
In
my opinion,
there is conclusive
proof
that this is
absolutely
not the
case. I shall
try
to show that in fact the cosmic nous in Albinus is
always
a function of the worldsoul
voEp
in Plotinus's ter-
minology).
At the same time I think I can
explain
where the
general misunderstanding
took its
origin.
There are
only
four
passages
in Albinus in which a nous on a
cosmic level is mentioned and of which the status is
perhaps
not at
once
clear,
viz. X
2,
p. 57;
X
3, p. 59;
XIV
3;
XIV
4, p. 81 1).
The
most
important passage
is
surely
X 2.
Witt,
who
evidently vaguely
surmised that the notion of a
separate hypostasis might
be
open
to
doubt,
regards
this
passage
as the
proof by
excellence of his inter-
pretation :
"It is
true",
he
says,
"that in Did.
69, 32 sqq. [Louis
XIV
3] vo5q
is not
sharply distinguished
from and
may
even
appear
to be
(in
the Plotinian
phrase) voEp.
But the distinc-
tion is
clearly
made in
chapter
X". Witt
undoubtedly
admits that
in c. XIV
3 vous
is not
sharply distinguished
from because of
the words Tov Te vouv xai
(sc.
ro5
which
imply
that this nous is a function of the worldsoul. When we
turn to c. X
2,
it
appears
at first to be evident indeed that this
nous transcends the worldsoul as
being
a
reality
of a
higher
order.
For we read there that "nous is better than
psyche,
and the nous
which knows all
things actually,
at the same time and
always,
is
better than the nous which is
only potential,
the cause of this
(viz.
of the actual
nous) being,
however,
still more
beautifull ...." 2).
1)
For the sake of
completeness
I
give
here all the
places
in Albinus
in which nous occurs. The human nous occurs: IV
i, p.
I and XXIII
2, p.
I I 3 ;
nous in
general
as an
epistemological
function of a soul: IV
6, p. 17;
IX 4, p. 55; X 4, p. 59;
XII
3, p. 73;
of God: IX
2, p. 53; X 2-X 5, p. 57-61
fiassim ;
XXVII
i, p. 129.
For a nous on a cosmic level see
my
text.
2)
That the
interpretation
which assumes a
metaphysical priority
of the
nous to the
soul,
is indeed the usual
one,
appears
from the translation of
Louis,
which is
completely wrong: "Puisque l'intelligence
est
suprieure

l'ame et
qu'au
dessus de
l'intelligence
en
puissance
se tyouve
l'intelligence
en acte ...."
(italics mine).
The relevant
part
of the Greek text runs:
,,'E1tEt
8i
vous
V05 8 TOG SV
8UWX(.LEL
6 xaT'
vpyciav
1teX\lTOC V015V
xai xed
aei,
TouTOU 81 xaxximv 6
aiiio5
TouTOU. Louis' translation of this text
(which
as such
only
needs to
express
a
hierarchy
of
values)
can
only
be
understood in the sense of an
ontological hierarchy.
In his
note, moreover,
he
explicitly
states:
"C'est d4jk
du
n6o-platonisme",
and he refers to A.
306
Because of the fact that there is a hierarchical relation of a meta-
physical
kind between the cause
(God)
and the nous subordinated
to
him,
one
might
conclude from this indeed that between the
worldsoul and the
worldnous, too,
there exists a relation of the
same kind. The
subsequent
lines, however,
immediately
convince
us of the erroneousness of such an
interpretation,
for still in the
same sentence this actual nous is called the nous of the whole
heavens
(TOU cr[J.1tOCv't'oe; o'upocvo5).
Of course one
may
still ask whether the nous of the heavens
should
perhaps
be
distinguished
from the nous of the
worldsoul,
although
this
may
seem to be far-fetched. But because this little
problem,
the solution of which
is,
in
my opinion,
self-evident,
forms the
Pice
de rsistance of the current
view,
we have to
go
into
this
possibility
at
length.
Now it can be
argued
that in the two
remaining passages
the nous of the heavens
appears
to be
explicitly
identical with the nous of the worldsoul. In X
3, p. 59, I. 3
we first
read the words: Tov
OPOCVLOV
vouv XOCL
vxiv
rou
xcrJ.ou;
in the
subsequent
sentence,
in which the same
thought
is once more
expressed
in another
way,
Albinus
says:
Tou vou
(sc.
Tou So the
oup<x?o<;
?ou<;
is
nothing
else but a function
of the worldsoul. And besides we
read : oS
(sc.
o
vo54
Tou
xoapLo6) 8t.(xxo<i{jt.eE crt>[J.1toccrocv cp6aLv
v
TM
The conclusion
from this is evident. The
passage
in XIV
4, p.
81 is not less clear
FouiII6,
La
philosophie
de Platon
(Paris 1869), 285.-The
conclusion of H.
Dbrrie,
that Albinus
"anscheinend
schon wusste von
Versuchen,
den
vou5
noch durch das h6chste Eine zu
iibergipfeln" (Zum Ursprung
der
neupla-
tonischen
Hypostasenlehye,
Hermes 82
331 -42 ; 339 specially),
mani-
fests the same sort of confusion. For this statement he refers to the
"wohl-
bekannte
Stufung
Seele-vous",
apparently interpreting
the
\IO
as trans-
cending
the worldsoul and as identical with the
1tp&TO
vo5q.
So we can
understand the sort of
reasoning
he
adopts: ,,(Albinus) gliedert
auch den
vo5q
in die
Stufen,
in denen er
8U\leX(.LEL (also
wohl als
Sch6pfer)
und
die,
in
denen er
ivepyetqc
wirkt
(also
als Vorbild
:-
Idee)".
If this would be
right,
then the cause of the
vosq
could not but be identical indeed with
"das
Eine
jenseits
alles Seins". But because even to D6rrie it seems difficult to
accept
that this
represents
Albinus' own view
(,,vielleicht
lehnte er dies
ab"),
he
arrives at the conclusion
already
mentioned. Here the confusion is even
worse. At
any
rate one cannot with D6rrie refer to Albinus for the thesis
that such a
neo-platonic interpretation already
existed in Albinus' time.
In so far as he bases himself on the
myth
from Plutarch's De
genio Socratis,
his thesis does not seem to hold much water either.
307
either: 6
6e:e;
...... 6<Ov
(sc.
rov
1tOL1jcre:
xoct
voepov
.......
cac?5
o6x
0 LOU is vou aveu Here
again
the nous of the cosmos
(TOV xcr[J.ov
...
voEp6v)
is in fact
identical with the nous of the worldsoul.
And,
more
important
still,
it is also evident that a cosmic nous
can,
according
to
Albinus,
merely
exist as a function of a soul
i).
Who would after this still
wish to defend the thesis that the nous of the heavens in X 2
may
be
something
else than the nous of the worldsoul?
2).
So we must
conclude that a
separate hypostasis
between the worldsoul and
God is not to be found in Albinus. And we
may
add that this would
be a
strange thought
indeed,
at least in a
system
in which the last
principle
is a nous. For this would lead to a threefold
nous,
and such
a
doubling
of the cosmic nous is nonsense and nowhere to be found
in Greek
philosophy.
The mere fact that Albinus was at least an
intelligent
man makes such an
interpretation appear
to be a
prior
highly improbable.
As there is no
question
at all of a triad in his
work,
we
may
conclude at the same time that Albinus meant the
hierarchical order
-
vo5q
v
-
vo5q
xaT'
EvpY?cav
-
1tp<7>'t'oe;
6e:6
in X 2 to be an order of values and not an
ontological
hierarchy.
Besides the fact that in this case the
potential
nous
itself would have to be a
separate hypostasis,
renders current
opinion
the more
improbable.
Now we can
try
to find the reasons for the current misunder-
standing,
and in
doing
so clear
up
some more
aspects.
The first
i )
Albinus
evidently
thinks that the
"first
nous"
may
exist without a
soul. This
might explain
the addition of which is not to be found in
Plato. I shall return to this
question
later. It is evident at
any
rate that a
cosmic nous
according
to Albinus can
only
exist as a function of a soul.
2)
I add another
argument,
viz. a
comparison
of three
passages: a) (6
1tpWTO 6e6q) OCLTLO
67cipXwv
<05 iet
:\IEPYEi\l
TM ro5
6y<av<oq oupavou
(X 2,
p. 57,
11.
4-5). b) (6
8EO....
X)XTfXXOO[jLE?) ycipmv
xoct
1tpO
auibv ibv TS vouv xai
......., 01tW
&1to?1touO"oc 1tpO
ioc
a<05
8X'Y)TOCL
1'tX
........ (XIV 3, p. 81).
In
a)
God is the cause
of the noetic
activity
of the nous of the whole
heavens;
in
b)
he awakens
the noetic
activity
of the nous of the worldsoul. So these two are identical.
With
b)
we
may compare
a third
passage: c) (-r6v 8EO\l)
Tov
o6pckvLov
vouv xoct
<iv uxiv
<05
x60"(.Lou 1tpO
EauTOV xai
1tpO
.OCUTO
vo?ae?5 (X 3,
p. 59,
11.
3-4).
In
b)
and
c)
the same
process
is
dexcribed
in various
ways,
viz. the
awakening
of the nous of the worlsoul and of the
heavenly
nous res-
pectively.
Both are therefore identical.
308
reason is
undoubtedly
the
metaphysical interpretation
of the above
mentioned order of values. It seems to me that its
origin
is to be
found in the
interpreters
of Plotinus. For Plotinus concludes from
the difference in value between
psyche
and nous to a
metaphysical
priority
of the nous to the
soul,
which view is based on the Aristote-
lian doctrine that
actuality
is
prior
to
potentiality (Enn.
V
9, 4).
Aristotle himself
already
let his
vo5q
xal come from
without. This has been
wrongly applied
to Albinus. From a text
already quoted
it
appears
that,
according
to
Albinus,
a naus cannot
exist in this world unless in a soul. In
fact,
perhaps unconsciously,
Albinus takes the
point
of view of the
Stoics-rejected by
Plotinus
(VII 7, ii)-that
a soul which is
potentially intelligent
must exist
before a nous can be actualized in it. In the case of Albinus this is
of course to be understood in the sense of a
metaphysical,
instead
of a
chronological, priority.
Secondly
the belief that the thesis
vo5q
is of Aristote-
lian
origin,
seems to
play a part
in this
misunderstanding.
Now
I do not wish to maintain that this should not be an Aristotelian
idea and
expression,
but I think that it can be shown
that,
if not
the
formulation,
yet
the
thought
it
represents
is
authentically
Platonic. The later Platonists cannot be blamed for
choosing
a
direct and short
expression
of Aristotle to
express
a
conception
which is
implicit
in Plato. Now is this
really
a Platonic
thought?
We must remember beforehand that in Plato nous never indicates
the immortal
part
of the soul
itself,
but
always
and
exclusively
a
function of
it,
as I have tried to show elsewhere
1).
It seems to me
that we
may
attribute to Plato the idea that this nous
(as
a
function)
is of
greater
value than the immortal
part
of the soul
itself,
because this
part may possess
or lack
nous,
or to
put
it in the
Aristotelian
terminology,
because the soul
only possesses
nous
potentially.
When Plato
says
that a soul
possessing
nous is better
than one
lacking
nous,
Albinus' statement that "nous is better
than soul" is
simply
another formulation. For this means that the
soul as such
(as
the
principle
of life and
thought)
is
ethically
and
intellectually
indifferent. This
thought
is
frequently
and in various
i )
Cf.
my thesis,
De nous in het
systeenz
van Plato's
Philosophle (Amsterdam
1950), 50-51 specially.
309
ways expressed by
Plato,
e.g.
in the Laws
(897 b).
There he
says
that
every
soul,
also the cosmic
soul,
which is endowed with
nous,
produces good only,
but that on the
contrary
a soul endowed with
anoia cannot but
produce
evil. The same
thought
underlies his
words that a universe without nous could not
possibly
be more
beautiful than one endowed with nous
(Tim. 3ob).
His belief that
every
man is born without nous and that
finally only
the
gods
and a small number of men
possess
nous
(Tim. 5'c) implies
the
same
thing,
because
every
man
possesses
the immortal
part
of the
soul of course. Now all the
points
of Witt's criticism have been
considered,
and I
hope
it has become evident that all of them are
founded on some basic
misunderstandings.
It remains to make a
few remarks on
the judgements
of
Ueberweg-Praechter and
Sassen.
There is no reason to
hold,
with
Ueberweg-Praechter,
that
Albinus in his
theology
is a
precursor
of the neo-Platonic
hypostases.
Albinus knows
only
two
principles:
the transcendent God and the
immanent worldsoul with its nous-function. Moreover his
highest
principle
is a nous and the ideas are his
thoughts.
The
emphasis
laid on "the almost ineffable" character of this God is the
only
indication towards Neo-Platonism. But
apart
from this the
mysti-
cal element is
completely lacking
in Albinus. What is
more,
there
is a
strong
dualism between God and world. From this it
appears
that the
place
of Albinus in the
history
of later Platonism is ab-
solutely
different from that which it is
generally thought
to be.
Finally
we come to the
obscurity, alleged by
Sassen,
with
regard
to the relation between the
'e7coupo'cvto?,
the
'u7cepoupc'CvLoq,
and the
1tp<7>'t'oe;
Albinus indeed is silent about
it, but,
because he does
not show "such a confusion of
thought ...
not uncommon in the
Platonism of the first and second centuries"
1),
it
may
be assumed
that this
relation,
in his
eyes,
was so clear and so
simple
that he
did
not,
not even in an
introductory
work,
think an
explanation
necessary.
And in fact it is a
very simple problem,
at least in
my
opinion,
and
Witt, too,
does not seem to have found
any
diffi-
culties in it. Witt
casually
identifies
(p. 128)
the "first nous" with
the
'u7repoupo'EvLoq
and the
1tOUpOCVLOe;
6e:e;
with the
oupav?o5
vovS
i )
Witt,
i 34.
3I0
(in
X
3),
and this
certainly
seems to be all
right.
What else can the
L7repoupm'vtoq
6eds
be than the "first
God",
who is in fact the
only
principle transcending
the cosmic nous and the
worldsoul,
the ideas
being
his
thoughts?
We, too,
can call this God transcendent or
extra-cosmic. This
interpretation
is
supported by
the fact that of
this
"super-cosmic"
God it is said that he is above
virtue,
whereas
the "first God" had
already
been said to have no
qualities.
The
identity
between the
1tOUPOCVLO
6EOS
and the
o'upo'cvto?
vo5q
is also
obvious,
though perhaps
not so
easy
to be demonstrated. The
'
1tp<7>'t'o vov5
(which
is at the same time
1tp<7>'t'oe;
is contrasted
with the nous of the worldsoul. Even if no
corresponding simple
6e:
can be found in Albinus
(for simple
6eoS
always
means the
1tp<7>'t'oe; 6e6<;),
it should nevertheless be clear that in the
only place
where he
speaks
of an
1tOUpOCVLOe;
6EOS
in contradistinction to a
uTr?poupocvco5
6e6<;
(which
is identical with the
1tp<7>'t'o Oe6q)
he
means to indicate the cosmic nous. With this
agrees
the fact that
the
o?.oicoac5 r6 6e6
does not consist in
imitating
the
1te:POUpOCVLOe;
but the
1tOUPOCVLO
for the cosmic nous is a nous in a
soul,
just
as the human nous. Platonic influence is clear
enough
here
indeed. For the older Plato substituted the thesis that man has to
imitate the
ideas,
by
that of the imitation of the cosmic
nous,
so
that the famous
J.O((OcrLe; TM
at least in this later
phase,
is not
to be taken as an assimilation to the transcendent God. In the Tim.
(47
bc;
cf.
go cd)
Plato
explicitly says
that man must use "the
revolutions of nous in the
sky"
for his own
thoughts,
thus
"imitating
those of God". This
god
seems to be also the cosmic
nous,
though
it would be
possible
to assume that Albinus as well as Plato meant the
cosmos as a whole
(viz.
the worldsoul and its nous
together),
be-
cause the
cosmos, too,
is
emphatically
called
by
Plato a "visible
God"
(Tim. 92 a) 1).
This
criticism,
so far
only negative,
has,
I
hope, prepared
the
way
for an
attempt
to
penetrate, positively,
somewhat
deeper
into the
i)
At
any
rate the
supposition
of Pelosi
(I.c., 389)
that it is obvious to
identify
the
:1tOUPeX\lLO 6e6S
as the model of imitation with the
1tp>TO
8cOq
is
absolutely
baseless. The cause of the whole confusion
is,
in
my opinion,
the isolation of a Platonic
expression (i.c.
the
(.LOLWcrL TM 6eM,
as it is defined
in the Theaet.
176a)
out of the whole of Plato's
philosophy.
Albinus
evidently
referred to the doctrine of the Timaeus.
3II
inner coherence of Albinus' work. In
doing
this we shall discover
that here we have a
really original interpretation
of Plato and not a
purely
eclectic,
or even
syncretic,
combination of Platonic and
Aristotelian
thoughts.
The inner
consistency
'
Let us start from the heart of the
matter,
viz. his thesis that God
is the final cause in the sense of an Aristotelian unmoved mover.
Now,
can this be understood as an
interpretation
of Plato?
When
Albinus
says:
"God does not make the
worldsoul,
which
exists
always,
but he
organizes
it and in that sense
one
might say
that he also makes it"
(XIV 3, p.
81,
11.
4-6),
this
is
undoubtedly
an
interpretation
of Tim.
34
c
ff.,
running something
like this: "when Plato
says
that the
Demiurge
makes the
worldsoul,
this must be understood in the sense that God is the cause of its
actual
organized
structure,
of its
nous,
but not of its existence as
such,
because the worldsoul has not been
generated
in the course
of time". Albinus at the same
time,
as we have seen
already,
conceives of God's
causality
as an
extra-temporal process.
It is
true that some lines before he
says
that the existence of the cosmos
presupposes
a
higher
cause,
but this is
expressly
stated of the
cosmos,
and not of the worldsoul. From this it
appears
that the
term cosmos is to be taken in its most strict and
proper
sense of
ordered universe. So
only
the order in the world finds its
origin
in
God,
and He is no more than an
organizing
cause,
a former of
the world. Still this
cosmos, too,
exists as a cosmos from
eternity,
but in
dependence
on
God,
whereas matter and the
unorganized
worldsoul exist from
eternity independent
of God. But for God
matter and world-soul-as-such would be an animated mass
moving
chaotically 1).
The contrast between animated chaos and cosmos
(the
chaos not
being pre-existent
in
time)
is essential here. Chaos
as such
actually
never existed.
Therefore,
if God did not
exist,
the
universe
would,
but as a chaos. Now the
original
and
revolutionary
element in this
interpretation
is
exactly,
as we shall see later
on,
i) Just
as Plato
(Phaedr. 245c-e)
Albinus describes the soul as
&y6v-n-roq
and To
oc-rOX(\IYjTO\l
(V
5, p. 27), "because
it has life in
itself, being always
active
through
itself"
(XXV 4, p. 121).
3I2
the combination of the
concept
of the
independent
eternal existence
of matter and world-soul-as-such with that of the
dependent
eternal existence of the cosmos as such.
Now,
Albinus conceived God's
organizing causality
as
organizing
the
worldsoul,
as
appears
from the above-mentioned text. This
becomes still clearer from the
following passage:
"God awakens
and draws to himself its nous as well as the worldsoul
itself,
as
from a
lethargy
or a
deep sleep,
in order that it
[the soul] by gazing
at his
thoughts,
receives the ideas and the
forms,
while
striving
towards his
thoughts" (I.c.
11.
6-9).
This nous of the worldsoul
which God draws to
himself,
is
evidently
identical with the nous
which Albinus elsewhere calls its
potential
nous
(X
2,
p. 57).
God is therefore the cause of the existence of an actual nous in the
worldsoul,
i.e. of the
knowledge
of the
ideas,
the
thoughts
in God's
mind. But he does not infuse this
knowledge
into the worldsoul from
outside: this nous
originates
in the worldsoul
itself,
but it is
actual
solely
because of the existence of God. We have
already
seen that Albinus
explicitly
defines this
causality
in a
purely
Aristotelian sense elsewhere
(X
2,
p. 57,
11.
4-9).
It is in this sense
only
that
Albinus,
just
as
Plato,
can call God
"father",
"because
he is the cause of
everything
and
organizes
the
heavenly
nous
and the worldsoul and draws them to himself"
X
3, p. 59, 11. 2-3). Consequently
this cosmic nous must be
interpreted
as the immediate
(though intermediary)
cause of
order and
finality
in the world. And in fact this conclusion follows
promptly:
8e;
(sc.
o
vo5q
vxiq
Tov
x&apLo.J) xocy;jL7j6E?
lxl Tou
7roc-cpoq 8KXXO(T(JLSl crJ.1toccrocv yu'alv
v So the cosmos
as such is an autarchic whole
(XII 3, p. 71), just
as in Plato
(Tim.
68
e).
The fact that Albinus almost
imperceptibly slips
over the
passage referring
to the creation of the worldsoul in the Timaeais
(34 c ff.)
now becomes
comprehensible,
too. Since he
rejects
the
literal
interpretation,
this
passage
does not
belong
to his intro-
ductory
work. He
merely
makes a few remarks about divisible and
indivisible
being
on account of this
passage,
in connection with
knowledge,
but he does so with
regard
to the soul in
general (XIV
2,
P. 79).
So with
regard
to the relation between matter and
God,
or be-
313
tween the worldsoul and
God,
there is no
question
of
obscurity
or
confusion as
presumed by
Witt. Albinus
appears
to have solved
this
problem
in a
personal way,
in the sense of a fundamental
dualism between God and
worldsoul,
a dualism which is
slightly
mitigated,
however,
by
the fact that God is the final cause of all
things.
This combination of Aristotle's
vo6q
eXxLV1j't'Oe;
with the
philo-
sophy
of Plato has two
particular
characteristics. First it
every-
where bears the
stamp
of an
interpretation
of
Plato,
though
of an
original
character,
and
secondly
it aims at
logical consistency.
It is
therefore not to be entitled as
eclecticism,
still less as
syncretism.
These characteristics
ought
to ensure it the
position
of an inde-
pendent
form of Platonism in the
history
of
philosophy,
next
to,
and in contrast
with,
the neo-Platonism of Plotinus. I do not
doubt that this would still-as it was in later
antiquity-be
the
case,
if the Plato-commentaries of Albinus would have been
pre-
served
1).
Nevertheless it can be shown
that,
apart
from the
all the
aspects
of his
metaphysics
are either founded
(or may
be
founded)
on his
interpretation
of
Plato,
or are a ne-
cessary consequence
of the xweiv whereas
exactly
this
Aristotelian notion has been introduced to solve a central
problem
of the
interpretation
of Plato. Let us check the
subsequent parts
of this thesis.
Modern
interpreters
of Plato's
philosophy
have often
expressed
the view
(which
I
myself
think to be
historically wrong)
that the
fundamental
principle
in Plato is a God
who,
while
transcending
the
world,
must be
regarded
as an intellect
(vo5q).
This is even
the current
opinion. Probably
Albinus, too,
considered the
figure
of the
Demiurge
in the Tiynaeus to be the
proof
of this
interpretation.
This is a fundamental
point,
for,
thinking consistently,
in that case
the ideas can
hardly
be
anything
else than the contents of this
very
nous,
i. e.
they
are,
as Albinus
says,
God's eternal
thoughts.
So the
interpretation
of the fundamental
principle
in Plato as a
nous,
is
i )
The list of his works is not better known to us than his life. Neveithe-
less it is certain that he left numerous works
(cf.
Louis
o.c., XIV).
The data
have been collected
by
H. Diels-W.
Schubart, Anonymer
Commentar zu
Platons Theaetet
(Berlin 1905),
XXVIII-XXX. On a
newly
discovered little
work of Albinus see: E.
Orth,
Les oeuvyes d'Albinos le
Platonicien, Antiq.
Class. 16
113-4.
314
no Aristotelian feature at
all,
the more so as the
exemplarism
defended
by
Albinus
(e.g.
IX
I,
p. 51),
as
by
all
Platonists,
is com-
pletely lacking
in Aristotle. The Aristotelian definition
(Metaph.
A
9, 174
b
33-35)
of the Nous as the
v'olalq
is not as such
to be found in
Albinus 1).
The definition of the
causality
of this
nous as a xLveZv
however,
is
certainly
not
Platonic,
but
it is still a
consequence
of his
interpretation
of Plato. For the
ideas,
which,
according
to
Albinus,
are God's
thoughts
and therefore
identical with
God,
are defined
by
Plato as immutable and
always
self-identical.
The real
problem,
however,
which Albinus wanted to
solve,
is
that of the nature of God's
causality.
From our
perspective
of the
history
of
philosophy to-day
there are a
priori
three
possibilities
with
regard
to the relation of God to the world-soul: Plotinian
emanation,
viz. the
proceeding
of the soul
(and
of all
being,
in-
cluding matter)
from God in a hierarchical
order;
Christian cre-
ation out of
nothing; independent,
eternal existence of
(matter and)
worldsoul,
and the
causing
of MOMS in that worldsoul
by
God
2).
i )
We do find in his work the formulation that God thinks himself
(e'ocu-r6v
av ...
vool<),
an
expression
which but for Aristotle would
perhaps
not be
possible,
but how we are to understand
this,
becomes clear at once from
the addition: xod Ta iocuro5
vo7jj?(XT<x (X 3, p. 57 ).
For Albinus the ideas are
undoubtedly
the
point
of
departure.
Now because
they
are God's
thoughts
and because there are no real distinctions in God
(cf.
X
3: aeYw
8i
ouX
6q
xmpl(mv
TocUroc
[viz.
God's
qualities],
&xx'
6q
xaTa Tcckvroc
iv6q
Albinus
probably along
this
way,
and not
by simply borrowing
an Aristote-
lian
notion,
came to
express
himself in this manner. How far another Aristote-
lian notion is contained in this
concept
of
God,
viz. that God does not know
the world
(cf.
Arist. Eth. Eudem.
1245
b
17),
is not clear in AlbinUF. For
one,
it is not allowed to draw
any
conclusion from the
demiurgic activity
of the first God with
regard
to the actual view of Albinus. But a
tendency
towards this Aristotelian
conception
seems the most
probable one, espe-
cially
because Albinus nowhere attributes
providentiality
to his trans-
cendent God
(unless
in a
mythical context)
and this would not fit in with
his
system
either.
But,
after
all,
he
may
have found the same sort of solution
as Thomas
Aquinas gave
a thousand
years
later: God then would know the
world
through
his own ideas.
2)
The third
possibility
has on
purpose
been
expressed
in rather
vague
terms. The nature of this
causality
is left
undetermined,
because there
are various
possibilities
in this
respect,
as will
appear
below. It is rather
noteworthy that,
wheieas in modern
interpretations
of Plato the first two
possibilities
have
been,
or are
being, defended,
the
third,
as far as I
know,
315
Whether the first two
possibilities
were known to Albinus
may
be
justly
doubted
1),
but he at
any
rate
appears
to have
preferred
the last
possibility,
and in
doing
so to have
interpreted
the
causality
of
God,
under the influence of
Aristotle,
more
precisely
as a final
causality.
This
question
of the nature of God's
causality
is con-
nected with another
big problem (which
was
very
much
disputed
already
in that time and which therefore
probably
was the real
starting-point
for
Albinus),
viz. that the soul was sometimes
regarded
by
Plato as
generated,
sometimes as
ungenerated 2).
He solved this
by
interpreting
the Platonic worldsoul on the one hand as
being
inde-
pendent
of God in its existence
(ungenerated),
on the other hand
by
taking
its
being generated
as an
extra-temporal dependency
of its
actual nous on God. This
dependence
he further understood as the
worldsoul
being organized by
God,
and
precisely
on this
point
(and
on this
point only),
Aristotle
proved
of much
use,
so that he
was able to
interpret
this
organizing activity
as a final
causality.
The choice of this Aristotelian idea is
clearly
determined
by
a desire
to
get
at a consistent
interpretation
of Plato. It means the solution
of two
problems simultaneously.
In Albinus'
theology
and
physics
it is moreover the
only important
Aristotelian notion. For
though
the doctrine of act and
potency
does
play a
roll in Albinus
(also
e.g.
VIII
3, p. 51;
X
2,
p. 57), yet
it is
only
a
secondary
notion,
for his
physics
are
entirely
Platonic.
Moreover,
germs
of this
theory
are to be found in
Plato,
as in the case of the
nous,
the
potential
has no adherents. Those who attribute to matter and to the worldsoul in
Plato an
independent
eternal
existence, deny
the existence of a transcendent
God,
i.e.
they interpret
Plato in a
pantheistic
sense. So the
problem
of
the nature of God's
causality
is solved for them
by
means of elimination.
Other
possibilities may,
I
think,
be reduced to the three mentioned above.
i )
In Philo of Alexandria
only
the first
vague
traces of emanation are
to be
found,
viz.
regarding
the relation between God and
Logos (in
which
he hesitates
though,
cf.
Ueberweg-Praechter, 577).
Plutarch did not know
Philo
(cf.
Del
Re,
11
pensieyo metafisico
di
Plutarco,
Studi italiani di filol.
class.
24 (ig5o), 60).
As to
Albinus,
there is not a
single
reason to assume the
opposite
to be true.
Concerning
the Christian notion of creation it must be
remarked that in Albinus' time
Christianity
had not
yet produced
a thinker
of real
importance.
2) E.g.
Phaedy.
245
c d,
in contrast with Tim.
37 a.,
Laws
892
c. From
a
passage
discussed above it is evident that Albinus was conscious of this
problem (XIV 3, p. 81).
3I6
nous
being nothing
but the worldsoul as the
principle
of
knowledge.
Albinus can
hardly
be criticized for
having
made a limited use of
this Aristotelian
doctrine,
as
long
as this
reproach
is not directed
against
Plotinus.
Plotinus, however,
is
commonly praised
for the
fact that his
genius
has
proved capable
of
combining
all the im-
portant
notions of earlier
philosophy
into a new
unity.
Albinus must not be
regarded
as an eclectic
1),
for he is in fact
an
independent interpreter
of Plato. His
interpretation
shows inner
consistency
as well as
originality:
it is
unique
in its kind. This is
already apparent
from the fact that the central
point
of Albinus'
doctrine has not been understood at all. This
misunderstanding
may
be
partly explained
from the fact that such an
interpretation
of
Plato,
as far as I
know,
has not been defended
by any
modern
interpreter.
This form of Platonism would of course have been
i )
I do not
deny
at all that Aristotelian as well as Stoic elements are to be
found in Albinus. Their existence has been
sufficiently
demonstrated. The
essential
point, however,
is that-with the
exception
of the fundamental
problem
we are
studying
now-these are for the most
part
"technical"
questions,
which were almost common
property
in later
philosophy.
Cf. the
critical remarks of Breshier on Witt's book
(A ctualits scientifiques
et indus-
trielles, Philosophie I;
Les tudes de
philosophie antique par
E.
Br6hier,
Paris
1939, 40),
who mentions as such: the
syllogism
with its three
figures,
the ten
categories
and the induction in
logic,
the doctrine of matter and form
and the
conception
of God as intellect in act in
physics
and
theology (Aristo-
telian) ;
the
problem
of the criterion and the
hypothetical syllogism
in
logic,
and the connection between the virtues in ethics
(Stoic). Although
there
are other
elements,
in which this technical feature is
lacking, yet they may,
at
any rate,
be
regarded
as
attempts
to
complete
Plato's doctrine
by
means
of the
terminological equipment
and some definite results of
post-Platonic
philosophy.
So
e.g.
the distinction between the terms 18a and
E18oq,
in which
et8os
denotes the
image
of the idea in matter
(IV 7, p. i9),
and the corres-
ponding
distinction between and
puJixi
vvoia,
in which
\I1)O'L
indi-
cates the
knowledge
of the idea in
pre-existence,
while the Stoic term is
reserved for the
knowledge
of the idea in incarnate man
(IV 6, p. 17).
The
distinction between
"perfect
virtues"
(for
which Albinus finds
points
of
correspondence
in the
Stoa)
and their
synonyms,
which are no more than
good
natural
dispositions (XXIX 4-XXX, p. 145)
are also to be
regarded
as a further elaboration of Platonic
thoughts.
Moreover,
Albinus-in the
spirit
of Plato-describes these
perfect
virtues as summits and
only secondarily
with Aristotle as the mean between
two, extremes (XXX
4, p. 149). Consequently,
if eclecticism is taken in its
specific sense,
viz.
as a conscious
design,
we are
not justified
in
calling
Albinus an
eclecticist,
no more than Plotinus. But of course these and other
aspects
of Albinus'
doctrine should be reexamined in detail from a
positive point
of view.
317
historically impossible,
if it had not been influenced
by
Aristotle.
But this is also true for
Plotinus,
who would never have been able
to conceive of the nous as a
hypostasis
in the
way
he
does,
if he had
not known the doctrine of act and
potency.
If this does not detract
anything
from Plotinus'
originality,
it does not so from Albinus'
either.
Albinus'
originality
consists in the consistent combination of
three notions:
a)
the
independent
eternal existence of matter and
worldsoul;
b)
the
extra-temporal generation
of the cosmos-as-
such
by
God;
c)
the
concept
of the final character of God's cau-
sality. Notions a)
and
b) require
for their
consequent
and
logical
connection notion
c),
for there is no other
way
of
realizing
a co-
herent connection between the two. This is the measure
by
which
we must
judge
Albinus'
significance
as a
philosopher.
In this connection it
may
be useful to show more in detail that
Albinus at
any
rate reflected on Plato
quite independently.
He
undoubtedly
saw
problems, although
the character of the
Epitome
involved a
dogmatic
tone and the
impression
of Plato's
philosophy
being easy
to understand. The
opinion
that "he
proceeds
with his
account as
though
difficulties were almost non-existent"
1)
is,
in
my opinion, completely wrong.
For there are still some other
indications of Albinus
having
seen some fundamental
problems,
viz. difficulties which
might
be
put
forward
against
his own inter-
pretation
of Plato. How he has
thought
himself able to refute these
objections,
we can
only
surmise. First of all he seems to have
realized that one
might
refer to the ineffable character of Plato's
ultimate
principle
as
being incompatible
with his own
interpretation
of the first God as a
nous,
as
e.g.
Plotinus did
(V
1,
8), basing
himself on
Rep. 505
ff. and on a
passage
from the second Letter
(312 e).
This seems to
appear
from the fact that Albinus adds
[LpOU
3e?v the first time he uses the term
(X
I,
p. 55).
It is also remarkable that Albinus avoids Plato's formula 1txe:LVOC
ovaia5
for the Idea of the Good
(which
is identified
by
him
with God and with the first
nous,
XXVII
i,
p. 129),
as well as the
term To
"Ev,
with which the Good in the
theory
of ideal numbers
was identified. From all this it
appears
that Albinus
keeps
to a
1)
Wltt 0. C.
p. 142.
3I8
consistent and
consciously non-mystical interpretation
of Plato
(also
the
o?o?Mc?concept
has,
according
to the conclusions of
Pelosi 1)
a
strongly
intellectualistic
character).
Yet he wants at the
same time to do
justice
to the
undeniably mystical tendency
in
Plato. A second and much more serious
objection against
the
conception
of the transcendent God as a nous is
implied
in the
notion,
repeatedly expressed by
Plato,
that nous cannot exist out-
side a soul. We know that
Atticus,
a
younger contemporary
of
Albinus,
gave
this thesis its strict
meaning,
viz. that Plato in
contrast to Aristotle
absolutely rejected
a nous outside a
soul 2).
So it cannot
possibly
be accidental that
Albinus,
when
citing
Tinx.
30
b,
adds an which in Plato is
lacking 3).
This addition can
only
have the
purpose
of
moderating
an assertion too
positive
according
to Albinus'
taste,
at least so far that the thesis cannot
be
accepted
in its absolute sense. At
any
rate it
may
be concluded.
with
certainty
that Albinus saw a
problem
here,
viz. how it
might
be
possible
to conceive of Plato's transcendent God as a nous. How
did he solve this?
Taking
for
granted
that Albinus had a keen in--
tellect,
he cannot have
regarded
this nous as a
"pure
soul",
as.
some modern
interpreters
have done. For Albinus as well as for
Plato a
soul,
and therefore its
MOMS, too,
belong
to the
category
of
the
OC't'OXLV1j't'OV. Consequently
he cannot have
regarded
a
vouc
eXXLV1j't'O
as a
soul,
if he wanted his
interpretation
to remain con-
sistent. Moreover the cosmic nous is
essentially
the movement of
the worldsoul towards God. So he will have
supposed,
like
many
modern
interpreters,
that Plato wanted to
apply
his statement
only
to this
world,
perhaps
in this sense that it
only
holds
good
for
the
vo5q
x?ou?Evot;
of the worldsoul and of
man,
not for the
4).
If this
supposition
should be
correct,
this would also-
I)
O.C.
p. 393.
2)
In
Eusebius,
Prep. evangel. 15, 9,
1 ff.
3)
XIV
4, p.
81. I do not see how Louis is
justified
in
translating
this
by
sans doute. It
may be,
as in
Aristotle, "non
dubitanti,s
..,
sed cum modestia.
quadam
asseverantis"
(Bonitz,
Index
Aristotelicus, s.v. ),
but
certainly
sans
doute is too
strong
a translation.
4)
This
supposition
does not seem too
artificial,
if one remembers that
Plotinus
(II 9, i )
in a
polemic
with Gnostics
rejects
a
vo5q
olov
as a
separate hypostasis.
The term does not
occur, however,
in Albinus-
3I9
be an
original
and consistent
(but,
in
my opinion,
a
wrong)
solution
of the
problem,
for it does not occur in this
special
form in modern
interpretations
of Plato. But this
supposition may go
too far. At
any
rate Albinus did not resort to the rather week
argument
that
the
very
use of the word
xpyevla81
in Plato should confine
this notion to the
region
of the
yiyv6pLev.
For we find in his work
the term
1tOcr't'?VOCL
in stead of
1tOCpocye:'Jcr6ocL 1)..
The
question
of Albinus'
originality
is of course not
yet
com-
pletely
settled. Thus far we are
only justified
in
stating
that the
real centre of his
metaphysics,
viz. the consistent combination of
the three notions above-mentioned is
proper
to him.
.
(to
be
concluded).
LEIDEN,
De Sitterlaan 66A.
1)
The word
1tOCPiXYE\lcr6ocL
in Plato Tim.
30 b; 1tOcrT?\IiXL
in Albinus
XIV,
4, p.
81. For the whole
question
of the relation
nous-psyche
in
Plato,
and its
modern
interpretations,
see
my
thesis
(particularly p. 55-60, 69-71
and
chapter VII).
PSEUDO-ANDRONICUS
DE VARIIS POETARUM GENERIBUS
Postquam
:Vlnem. S.
IV,
V.
VIII, 1955, P. 23 sq.
dubia movi de auctore
tractatus
1tEpt
in cod. Par.
2929
traditi sub nomine Andronici
et a Bekkero
primo
editi
(Anecd.
Gy.
p. I46I ) ,
codicem illum iterum
inspicere
potui
occasione mihi data ex
pactione
de viris doctis in vicem
stipendio
adiuvandis a Consilio Batavo
Investigationi
Sincerae Scientiarum Promo-
vendae
(Z. W.O. )
cum
Francogallorum "Centre
National de la Recherche
Scientifique"
constituta.
Comperi id, quod
de vero auctores iam
suspicatus
eram: eum sive
Palaeocappam
sive Diassorinum
esse,
scriptura
codicis
comprobari.
Manus enim
Palaeocappae est,
sicut
legimus
in Omontii In-
ventaiye sommaire III
p. 61 ;
codex Violayli
Pseudo-Eudociae
(Par. 307)
comparatus
nullum dubium
reliquit,
nec
quicquam obstat, quominus
P a I a e o c a p p a
auctor eius tractatus habeatur.
GRONINGEN,
Verl.
Heereweg 141.
W.
J.
W. KOSTER