Almira vs BF Goodrich

What is readily apparent in this appeal from a decision of respondent Court of Industrial Relations, declaring a strike
illegal because of the means employed, and dismissing petitioners, was the high pitch of bitterness that marked the
relationship between labor and management in the establishment of private respondent, B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.
Even a cursory reading of the records will make evident that on both sides, there was the feeling that the other party
was guilty of conduct the most reprehensible resulting in the flagrant disregard of its rights. With such a background,
there was a greater need for objectivity in the application of the authoritative legal norms to the facts as found. It
cannot be said that respondent Court, more precisely respondent Joaquin Salvador, then the Judge whose order is now
on appeal, was fully cognizant that such should be the case. 1 It is hard not to lend credence to the contention of
petitioners that there was undue receptivity to the claim of private respondent, no doubt induced by the skill,
competence, and resourcefulness of its counsel, Atty. Manuel Chan. It was unfortunate that in some of the crucial stages
of the controversy, petitioners did not have the same advantage. 2 Nonetheless, as will be shown, the strike could have
been viewed with a little less disapproval and even if declared illegal, need not have been attended with such a drastic
consequence as termination of employment relationship. This last point is even more compelling considering the
security of tenure which is one of the notable features in the present Constitution. 3
The facts according to the appealed order follow: "As to the conduct of the strike and the picketing, this Court's Order of
July 1, 1971 has fully described the same. In the course of the mass picketing, illegal and unlawful acts were committed
by the respondents such as physically blocking and preventing the entry of complainant's customers, supplies and other
employees who were not on strike, both in complainant's premises in Makati and Marikina, Rizal. Injuries likewise were
inflicted on certain employees of complainant. Such acts of violence and intimidation appear to be of such a widespread
nature so as to create an impression that there is a common pattern of action set into motion by the respondents. The
actuations of respondents are likewise illegal. In the premises of complainant at Makati, Rizal, the respondents who
picketed the same on April 20, 1971 were identified ... . Similarly, some of the respondents who picketed the Marikina
premises of complainants were identified .... 4Further: 'The complainant caused the publication of notices in both the
Manila Times and Daily Mirror, newspapers of general and wide circulation ... for all employees not participating in the
illegal strike to report for work on or before April 23, 1971, otherwise such failure will be considered as participation
therein. Such notices were accompanied by instructions to personnel at all levels on how reporting for work will be
accomplished, considering the precarious situation in relation to the safety of employees brought about by the strike of
respondents. With respect to this particular aspect, certain of the respondents who were not seen in the picket line on
or before April 23, 1971 were identified as having failed to report for work ... . It would appear, however, that these
listed respondents who failed to report for work likewise were seen picketing the premises of complainant after April 26,
1971, ... ." 5 Then came this portion: "It would seem that the picketing by respondents has continued up [to] the present
under the same pattern of coercive activities narrated in our Order Of July 1, 1971. Physical injuries where inflicted on
complainants personnel manager. Mass picketing with the employment of intimidatory statements have again started
on January 3, 1972. The roof of the complainants Makati Recap Plant was set on fire on January 13, 1972 ..." 6
Based on the above facts, it was in the appealed order of Judge Salvador; "On the basis, therefore, of the motivation as
well as the conduct of the strike, the respondent are declared to have committed an illegal strike, which is likewise an
unfair labor practice" 7 As consequence, in the dispositive portion, petitioner where "declared to have lost their status
of employees of the complainant corporation as of April 19, 1971" 8 The appealed order was handed down on February
4, 1972. Had greater awareness been displayed to the approach followed by this court in a 1968 decision, Cebu Portland
Cement Co. v. Cement Workers Union, 9 as well as to Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd.10 there
would have been less certitude displayed in the opinion of Judge Salvador as to the correctness of its decision.
Moreover, as stated at the outset, if there be deference to what of late has been so evident, even on the assumption of
the illegality of the strike, there need not be the automatic termination of the employment relationship, especially so in
view of the command of the present Constitution as to the security of tenure.
1. It is understandable why respondent Judge Salvador was unsympathetic to a strike in which petitioners participated,
considering the pendency of a certification election, just because management would not consider their union as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative. At the very least, it was premature. Nonetheless, there was this
commendable admission in the appealed order of Judge Salvador; "Lest we be miscontrued, the ilegality of the strike for
recognition as general proposition is not absolute. We declare such strike illegal on the basis of the attendant
circumstances in this case." 11 It mentioned the attendant circumstances, but as was apparent in an earlier portion of
such order, what respondent Judge apparently could not resist was the compelling force of what by now should be an
outmoded view of a strike being "by its very nature ... coercive ... ." 12 To display such a predisposition is to ignore the
leading case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers Union. 13 For, as was therein pointed out, the ruling
in National Labor Union, Inc. v. Philippine Match Factory 14 to the effect that a strike "is an economic weapon at war
with the policy of the Constitution and the law," resort to which "is not, in plain terms, outlawed," 15 although certainly
discouraged, is obsolete, for as was so clearly pointed out by Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Cebu Portland Cement Co. v.
Cement Workers Union: 16 "For a time, decisions on the issue under consideration were characterized by strict
adherence to the ruling in the Philippine Match Factory Case." 17 Further, it was stated by him: "The actual break-away
from the doctrine laid down in the Philippine Match Factory case came in Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, when the
discretionary power of the Court of Industrial Relations to grant affirmative relief was recognized. ... Thereafter, the
doctrine enunciated in Interwood Employees Association ... that good faith of the strikers in the staging of the strike is
immaterial in the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike, was abandoned. In the case of Ferrer v. CIR, et
al. the belief of the strikers that the management was committing unfair labor practice was properly considered in
declaring an otherwise premature strike, not unlawful, and in affirming the order of the Labor Court for the
reinstatement without back wages of said employees." 18 This 1968 decision of this Court, if present in the
consciousness of respondent Judge Salvador, certainly could have caused, at the very least, a hesitancy on his part to
declare the strike illegal. This is not to deny that the labor union ought not to have declared a strike under such
circumstances, but at least, while premature, it could have been plausibly viewed as inspired by good faith, although
perhaps not guided by sound legal advice.
2. What was set forth in the facts as found by respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it was during the picketing,
certainly not peaceful, that the imputed acts of violence did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that there were
injuries on both sides because management did not, understandably, play a passive role confronted as it was with the
unruly disruptive tactics of labor. This is not, by any means, to condone activities of such character, irrespective of the
parties responsible. It is merely to explain what cannot be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in question call for an
automatic finding of illegality? Again, the order issued on February 4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious of a 1971 decision
of this Court, Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. 19There it was clearly held: "A strike
otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an
unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid
rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such case should be individual and not collective.
A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and
widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that
even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed. 20 It must be pointed out likewise that
the facts as there found would seem to indicate a greater degree of violence. Thus: "Respondent Court must have been
unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that the strike was marred by acts of
force, intimidation and violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila.
Attention was likewise called to the fact that even on the following day, with police officials stationed at the strike-
bound area, molotov bombs did explode and the streets were obstructed with wooden planks containing protruding
nails. Moreover, in the branches of the Shell Company in Iloilo City as well as in Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical
injuries appeared to have been inflicted on management personnel. Respondent Court in the appealed decision did
penalize with loss of employment the ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to be lost sight of that before the
certification on June 27, 1967, one month had elapsed during which the Union was on strike. Except on those few days
specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful.
Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal." 21 Then, mention was
made of a decision "in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees' Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. [where]
there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being 'inherently explosive.' It
is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of
employment by the guilty party." 22
There was in that case a concurring opinion by Justice Barredo which elicited the approval of the present Chief Justice.
Thus: "All these, however, do not mean, on the other hand, that petitioner's strike should necessarily be held to be
illegal. It is always a wholesome attitude in cases of this nature to give but secondary importance to strict technicalities,
whether of substantive or remedial law, and to constantly bear in mind the human values involved which are beyond
pecuniary estimation. 23
It would seem, therefore, to reiterate a point, that on the date of the appealed order of February 4, 1972, a less
condemnatory attitude to the appearance of violence as such was part of the law of the land. It is to be admitted that
this is one of those close cases. What is merely emphasized is that the imputation of illegality on the ground of the
means employed is not automatically called for.
3. This is not to say that the appealed order is totally bereft of support in law. It is merely to point out that the facts as
found did not point automatically and unerringly to so severe a result, namely the dismissal of petitioners. From a
perspective more attuned to the trend indicated in current decisions of this Court, the three cited cases being
representative, the conclusion reached could have been cast in a different mold. In labor law, as in constitutional law, it
is no doubt true that the issues submitted, in the language of Justice Malcolm, may be "determined by the court's
approach to them." 24 It is submitted that the direction indicated in the express language of both the 1935 and the
present Constitution, is that which leads to protection to labor. 25
As previously noted, both petitioners and private respondent were guilty of practices far from peaceful in character. The
original blame must of course be assumed by petitioners, for they ought to have known that the picketing that comes
within the protection of the free speech guarantee is one that is peaceful. It involves people marching to and fro with
placards to acquaint the public with the facts of a labor dispute. So it has been ruled fromMortera v. Court of Industrial
Relations 26 a 1947 decision, to Chan Bros., Inc. v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de
Filipinas 27 decided in January of this year. When they obstructed entrance into the premises of private respondent,
they ought to have known that they were inviting reprisal. It has been observed of course that in labor controversies the
unstructured incoherencies of vehement protest for grievances, sincerely even if erroneously felt, may easily flare up
into rowdy conduct. So it did come about. The appealed order took note of the resulting melee. From the standpoint of
settling a dispute, it would not suffice just to visit recriminations on either or both parties. The more crucial question is
what to do next.
We start with the circumstances that ought to be considered. To repeat, the breach of the peace, though started by
petitioners, was not solely their responsibility as it turned out. For criminal charges and counter charges were filed by
one group against the other. The reply brief of private respondent, submitted on March 8, 1973, included a
memorandum from a certain Attorney Rolando A. Velasco, speaking of the status of the criminal cases filed by the group
of petitioners against management men, 28 , and of thirteen criminal cases as well as complaints against at least thirty
individuals identified with private respondent. 29 In some of them the complainants did not press charges, and the cases
were dismissed. With the submission of such data, its objection to the admission of information similar in character as to
the status of the criminal cases against petitioners loses weight. What is more, it does not appear as of this date as to
who of the petitioners were found guilty of what was referred to it in the Shell opinion as committing serious acts of
violence. As a matter of fact, the appealed order merely referred to the instances of picketing conducted illegally
without specifically pin-pointing the culprits to whom such kind of conduct could be ascribed. It would seem therefore,
that the wholesale dismissal of petitioners is far from warranted. It is to be admitted though that on a showing of having
engaged in non-peaceful activities of a serious character, the right to re-admission is defeated.
This conclusion is further fortified by the stress on the security of tenure that is a notable feature of the present
Constitution. As pointed out in a decision rendered only last month, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines
Employees Association: 30 "The futility of this appeal becomes even more apparent considering the express provision in
the Constitution already noted, requiring the State to assure workers 'security of tenure.' It was not that specific in the
1935 Charter. The mandate was limited to the State affording protection to labor, especially to working women and
minors, ....
... That is to conform to the ideal of the New Society, the establishment of which was to felicitously referred to by the
First Lady as the Compassionate Society. 31 To the possible objection that in this Philippine Air Lines case, there was an
order of reinstatement, it suffices by way of an answer that while the facts could be distinguished, the basic principle in
accordance with a constitutional mandate, in the language of Justice Cardozo, speaks with a reverberating clang that
drowns all weaker sounds.
It would imply at the very least that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed
by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the
workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those
dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be
acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means
of livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them. For all this while, since private respondent considered
them separated from the service, they had not been paid. From the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly
stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, 32 that where a decision may be made to rest an
informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight. Finally, labor
law determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be not only secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.
4. This is all that needs to be said except to remind petitioners that the basic doctrine underlying the provisions of the
Constitution so solicitous of labor as well as the applicable statutory norms is that both the working force and
management are necessary components of the economy. The rights of labor have been expanded. Concern is evident
for its welfare. The advantages thus conferred, however, call for attendant responsibilities. The ways of the law are not
to be ignored. Those who seek comfort from the Shelter that it affords should be the last to engage in activities which
negate the very concept of a legal order as antithetical to force and coercion. What is equally important is that in the
steps to be taken by it in the pursuit of what it believes to be its rights, the advice of those conversant with the
requirements of legal norms should be sought and should not be ignored. It is even more important that reason and not
violence should be its milieu.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of February 4, 1972 as affirmed in a resolution of March 14, 1972 is reversed and set
aside. Petitioners against whom no criminal charges filed in relation to their acts referred to in this decision are still
pending are ordered reinstated to their employment, with the right to backpay corresponding to eighteen (18) months,
at the respective rates of compensation they were being paid on February 4, 1972, without any deduction
corresponding to any possible income earned elsewhere since their dismissal to the present. Those petitioners against
whom criminal complaints have been filed shall be reinstated, with the right to backpay as herein indicated, only upon
the final dismissal of said cases or their acquittal therein. Respondent Court is hereby ordered to implement this
decision as expeditiously as possible. No costs.

G.R. No. 102993 July 14, 1995
CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CREA) and ARNELIO M. CLARETE, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division), CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or EDGARDO C.
CATAQUIS, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse the Resolution dated August 30,
1991 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. L-000063 and its Resolution dated October
15, 1991 denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision.
I
Petitioner Arnelio M. Clarete was hired by respondent Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) as Mechanic C on November 3,
1981. He was later promoted to the position of Mechanic B and assigned to the Mechanical/Metal Grades Section of
respondent Caltex's refinery in San Pascual, Batangas.
According to Clarete, at about 4:00 p.m. on April 13, 1989, on his way to the refinery's main gate after completing a
day's work at the Maintenance Area IV, he saw on a pile of rubbish a bottle of lighter fluid, which mechanics use to
remove grease from their hands. He picked up the bottle and placed it in the basket attached to the handlebar of his
bicycle with the intention of asking the security guard at the gate to allow him to bring it home.
Upon reaching the gate, he took the bottle of lighter fluid from the basket, punched out his time card at the bundy clock
and then asked Juan de Villa, the security guard on duty, permission to take home the bottle. Replying that he was not
authorized to grant the permission sought, de Villa referred Clarete to Dominador Castillo, the security supervisor. When
so approached, however, Castillo told Clarete to leave the bottle in his office. Clarete complied and left for home.
Respondent Caltex gave a different version of the incident: On said date, de Villa noticed a black bag which Clarete did
not submit for inspection. When requested by de Villa to open the same for inspection, Clarete retorted that it was not
necessary to inspect the bag as it contained only dirty clothes. Unconvinced, de Villa opened the bag and found a one-
liter sample bottle filled with lighter fluid surreptitiously hidden inside in the sleeves of Clarete's working clothes, which,
in turn, were covered by other clothes. When asked if he had a gate pass to bring the bottle out of the premises, Clarete
replied that he did not secure a gate pass as the lighter fluid was for his personal use.
On April 18, 1989, Clarete received a letter from his immediate supervisor, requiring him to explain in writing why he
should not be subjected to disciplinary action for violation of company rules and regulations. In his written explanation
of April 20, 1989, Clarete stated: (1) that he had no intention of bringing the bottle of lighter fluid out of the company
premises without the guard's permission; (2) that he did seek permission but was denied; and (3) that he left the bottle
behind with the guard when told to do so.
On August 16, 1989, Clarete was charged with the crime of theft before the Municipal Trial Court of San Pascual,
Batangas (Criminal Case No. 3331). On October 19, 1989, he received a letter from Antonio Z. Palad, Section Head,
Mechanical/Metal Section, requiring him to explain why his services should not be terminated for cause in view of
Criminal Case No. 3331 and his violation of the "policy on disciplinary action per G.M. Circular No. 484 of August 28,
1974, specifically '(f) Removing or attempting to remove Company property from the Refinery without authorization.'"
(Rollo, p. 58).
In reply, Clarete requested time to consult his lawyer, which request respondent Caltex granted on November 14, 1989.
Clarete was given up to November 30, 1989 to submit his explanation. However, instead of submitting a written
explanation, petitioner served a letter on Palad, requesting a formal investigation of the allegations against him, at the
same time, invoking his right to be represented by the Union and his legal counsel. The request was granted and a
hearing was scheduled on January 5, 1990. Said hearing, as well as a subsequent one, was however deferred upon the
request of Clarete.
Believing that Clarete has been given enough time to consult his lawyer and to prepare his explanation, a final meeting
was scheduled on February 27, 1990. At the said meeting, Clarete, through counsel, requested a formal trial-type
investigation of the case. A letter reiterating that request was addressed by Clarete's counsel to Palad on March 12,
1990. In his letter dated April 26, 1990, Palad denied the request on the ground that a trial-type hearing and
confrontation of witnesses were not applicable to the company's administrative fact-finding investigation. Clarete was
then given only up to May 4, 1990 to submit his written explanation. He finally did so on May 3, 1990.
In the meantime, on April 19, 1990, a decision was rendered in Criminal Case No. 3331, acquitting Clarete of the crime
charged based on the insufficiency of the evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On August 20, 1990, Clarete was informed that his services were being terminated effective August 24, 1990 for "serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence resulting from your having violated a lawful order of the Company, i.e., GM
Circular No. 484 of 8-28-74 which gave notice that the Company considers 'removing or attempting to remove Company
property from the Refinery without authorization' to be sufficiently serious that the erring employee be dismissed."
(Rollo, p. 63). Clarete was placed under preventive suspension with pay upon notice up to the termination of his services
on August 24, 1990.
On August 27, 1990, Clarete filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondents Caltex and/or Edgardo C.
Cataquio, in his capacity as Vice President of the Company with the Regional Arbitration Branch IV of the National Labor
Relations Commission. On January 15, 1991, Labor Arbiter Joaquin A. Tanodra rendered a decision, finding Clarete
neither culpable of theft nor of violating GM Circular No. 484 of August 28, 1974 as "his purpose in going to security
guard de Villa was precisely to ask the latter's permission to bring out the lighter fluid from the Refinery Compound."
(Rollo, p. 27). He, therefore, directed the reinstatement of Clarete with full back wages which then totaled P40,081.60,
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
On appeal by private respondents, NLRC rendered judgment on August 20, 1991, vacating the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and entering a new one dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC gave credence to the version of
respondent Caltex of the incident. It found no reason to doubt the veracity of the narration of the security guard, who
was simply doing his job of protecting the property of private respondent and who was not shown to hold a personal
grudge or ill motive to testify falsely against Clarete. Nonetheless, NLRC awarded Clarete financial assistance equivalent
to one month salary for every year of service in the amount of P76,752.00.
Both parties moved for reconsideration Clarete, on the ground that his dismissal was without valid cause as there was
no violation of company rules, and private respondents on the ground that Clarete was not entitled to the award of
financial assistance pursuant to the ruling in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.National Labor Relations
Commission, 164 SCRA 671 (1988).
Hence, this petition filed by Clarete and The Caltex Refinery Employees Association, the exclusive bargaining
representative of all rank and file employees of respondent Caltex.
II
Petitioners contend that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion calling for the exercise of this Court's corrective
power. They maintain that Clarete's version of the incident is more in accord with logic and common experience. They
further allege that loss of confidence, to be valid ground for dismissal, must be based on just and duly substantiated
causes. Since Clarete's position as mechanic is not one of trust and does not involve the production, safekeeping or even
the handling of lighter fluid, his act of picking up the bottle of lighter fluid with the intention of asking permission to
bring it home, cannot serve as basis for loss of confidence.
Respondent Caltex, on the other hand, asserts that G.M. Circular No. 484 was issued pursuant to its management
prerogative to prescribe rules and regulations necessary for the conduct of its business and specifically to put a stop to
rampant pilferages of company property by its employees, which has resulted not only in substantial losses in its
operations but also in the perceptible breakdown in employee discipline. The findings of fact of NLRC, which are
supported by evidence on record, show that petitioner Clarete attempted to remove a bottle of lighter fluid owned by
respondent Caltex from the company premises; therefore, Clarete committed not only a serious misconduct but also a
willful breach of trust and confidence reposed upon him in the performance of his duties. The loss of trust and
confidence is not precluded by the fact that Clarete's position does not require the safekeeping or handling a lighter
fluid. If this were the rule, an employee may then help himself to his employer's property without fear of disciplinary
action as long as the property taken was not entrusted to his care or is not related to his function.
III
The prerogative of employers to regulate all aspects of employment subject to the limitation of special laws is
recognized. A valid exercise of management prerogative encompasses hiring, work assignments, working methods, time,
place and manner of work, tools to be used, procedure to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. (San Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo, 218 SCRA 293
[1993]). This prerogative must, however, be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and
not for the purpose of defeating the rights of the employees granted by law or contract. (Garcia v. Manila Times, 224
SCRA 399 [1993]). There are restrictions to guide the employers in the exercise of management prerogatives, particularly
the right to discipline or dismiss employees, for both the Constitution and the law guarantee employees' security of
tenure. Thus, employees may be dismissed only in the manner provided by law. (Radio Communications of the Phil., Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 223 SCRA 656 [1993]). The right of the employer must not be exercised
arbitrarily and without just cause. Otherwise, the constitutional mandate of security of tenure of the workers would be
rendered nugatory. (China City Restaurant Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 217 SCRA 443 [1993]).
We concur in NLRC's conclusion that the version of respondent Caltex of the incident under consideration is more
credible. As correctly pointed out by NLRC, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the Report of Security Guard Juan
de Villa dated April 14, 1989 and his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated April 21, 1989 as "he simply did what he was primarily
tasked to do to protect the company property and to apprehend misdeeds committed thereat neither ill motive
nor personal grudge against complainant-appellee (Clarete) was attributed to him to falsely testify against the former"
(Rollo, p. 36). Undoubtedly, the lighter fluid is a property of private respondent and to take the same out of its premises
without the corresponding gate pass is a violation of company rules on theft and pilferage of company property.
But while Clarete may be guilty of violation of company rules, we find the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him by
respondent Caltex too harsh and unreasonable. As enunciated in Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. v.National Labor Relations Commission, supra, "such a penalty (of dismissal) must be commensurate with the act,
conduct or omission imputed to the employee and imposed in connection with the employer's disciplinary authority" (at
p. 667). Even when there exist some rules agreed upon between the employer and employee on the subject of dismissal,
we have ruled in Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 176 SCRA 295 (1989), that the
same cannot preclude the State from inquiring on whether its rigid application would work too harshly on the employee.
Of the same mind is the Solicitor General who, invoking Gelmart Industries, prayed in his Manifestation, in lieu of
Comment, that the assailed decision of NLRC be set aside and reinstatement of petitioner Clarete be ordered.
Indeed, considering that Clarete has no previous record in his eight years of service; that the value of the lighter fluid,
placed at P8.00, is very minimal compared to his salary of P325.00 a day; that after his dismissal, he has undergone
mental torture; that respondent Caltex did not lose anything as the bottle of lighter fluid was retrieved on time; and that
there was no showing that Clarete's retention in the service would work undue prejudice to the viability of employer's
operations or is patently inimical to its interest, we hold that the penalty of dismissal imposed on Clarete is unduly harsh
and grossly disproportionate to the reason for terminating his employment. Hence, we find that the preventive
suspension imposed upon private respondent is a sufficient penalty for the misdemeanor committed by petitioner.
(Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra).
Since the dismissal took place on August 24, 1990, or after the passage of R.A. No. 6715, Clarete is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and his full back wages inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement. (Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 501
[1992]). As in the case of Pines City v. National Labor Relations Commission, 224 SCRA 110 (1993) and Pines City
Educational Center v. National Labor Relations Commission, 227 SCRA 655 (1993), the Court stated that in ascertaining
the total amount of back wages payable to them, we go back to the rule prior to theMercury Drug rule that the total
amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of
reinstatement, if any, should be deducted therefrom. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Sangilo-Itogon Workers' Union, et al.,
24 SCRA 873 [1968]). Inasmuch as petitioner received pay during his preventive suspension, the same must also be
deducted from the monetary awards to be received by him.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of National Labor Relations Commission dated August 30, 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Caltex Phil., Inc. is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner Clarete to his former position of Mechanic B without
loss of seniority rights and to pay him his full back wages inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent pursuant to Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of R.A. No. 6715, computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement deducting therefrom the amount
received by petitioner during his preventive suspension and any income earned elsewhere during the period of dismissal
if any. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.Ponente: Laurel,
Facts: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed apetition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents.It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passingalong Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from therailroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one
yearfrom the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on
July 18, 1940 recommended to theDirector of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance
of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director with the approval from theSecretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rul
es and regulations toregulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director
recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940.The
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and causedto be enforced the rules and
regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are notallowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places
above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1.Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondentspursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitutean unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridgedthe right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon theconstitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice toinsure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoidobstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. Inenacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relievecongestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the
fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2.No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex. Social justice must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of
theprotection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as acombined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

Maya Farms Employees Organization v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 508

Facts: Private respondents Maya Farms, Inc. and Maya Realty and LivestockCorporation belong to the Liberty Mills group
of companies whose undertakingsinclude the operation of a meat processing plant which produces ham, bacon,cold
cuts, sausages and other meat and poultry products.Petitioners, on the other hand, are the exclusive bargaining agents
of theemployees of Maya Farms, Inc. and the Maya Realty and Livestock Corporation.On April 12, 1991, private
respondents announced the adoption of an earlyretirement program as a cost-cutting measure considering that
their businessoperations suffered major setbacks over the years. The program was voluntaryand could be availed of
only by employees with at least eight (8) years of service.
Dialogues were thereafter conducted to give the parties an opportunityto discuss the details of the program.
Accordingly, the program was amended toreduce the minimum requirement of eight (8) years of service to only five
(5)years.However, the response to the program was nil. There were only a few takers. Toavert further losses, private
respondents were constrained to look into thecompanies' organizational set-up in order to streamline
operations.Consequently, the early retirement program was converted into a specialredundancy program intended to
reduce the work force to an optimum numberso as to make operations more viable.In December 1991, a total of sixty-
nine (69) employees from the two companiesavailed of the special redundancy program. On January 17, 1992, the
twocompanies sent letters to sixty-six (66) employees informing them that theirrespective positions had been declared
redundant. The notices likewise statedthat their services would be terminated effective thirty (30) days
from receiptthereof. Separation benefits, including the conversion of all earned leave creditsand other benefits due
under existing CBAs were thereafter paid to thoseaffected.On January 24, 1992, a notice of strike was filed by the
petitioners whichaccused private respondents, among others, of unfair labor practice, violation of CBA and
discrimination. Conciliation proceedings were held by the NationalConciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) but the
parties failed to arrive at asettlement.On February 6, 1992, the two companies filed a petition with the Secretary
of Labor and Employment asking the latter to assume jurisdiction over the caseand/or certify the same for compulsory
arbitration. Thus, on February 12, 1992,the then Acting Labor Secretary (now Secretary) Nieves Confesor certified
thecase to herein public respondent for compulsory arbitration.On March 4, 1992, the parties were called to a hearing
to identify the issuesinvolved in the case. Thereafter, they were ordered to submit their respectiveposition papers.
In their position paper, petitioners averred that in the dismissal of sixty-six (66)union officers and members on
the ground of redundancy, private respondentscircumvented the provisions in their CBA. Petitioners also alleged that
thecompanies' claim that they were in economic crisis was fabricated because in1990, a net income of over 83 million
pesos was realized by Liberty Flour MillsGroup of Companies.

Invoking the workers' constitutional right to security of tenure, petitioners prayed for the reinstatement of the sixty-six
(66) employeesand the payment of attorney's fees as they were constrained to hire theservices of counsel in order to
protect the workers' rights.On their part, private respondents contend that their decision to implement aspecial
redundancy program was an exercise of management prerogative whichcould not be interfered with unless it is shown
to be tainted with bad faith and illmotive. Private respondents explained that they had no choice but to reducetheir
work force, otherwise, they would suffer more losses. Furthermore, theydenied that the program violated CBA
provisions. NLRC favored the company.
Issue: WON there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction with the factual findings
of public respondent
Held: The termination of the sixty-six employees was done in accordance withArticle 283 of the Labor Code. The basis
for this was the companies' study tostreamline operations so as to make them more viable. Positions whichoverlapped
each other, or which are in excess of the requirements of theservice, were declared redundant. We fully agree with the
findings andconclusions of the public respondent on the issue of termination.A close examination of the positions
retained by management show that saidpositions such as egg sorter, debonner were but the minimal positions
requiredto sustain the limited functions/operations of the meat processing department.In the absence of any evidence
to prove bad faith on the part of management inarriving at such decision, which records on hand failed to show in
instant case,the rationality of the act of management in this regard must be sustained. The rule is well-settled that labor
laws discourage interference with anemployer's judgment in the conduct of his business. Even as the law is solicitousof
the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer toexercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. As long as the company'sexercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for
thepurpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws orvalid agreements, such exercise will
be upheld.Finally, contrary to petitioners' contention, there is nothing on record to showthat the 30-day notice of
termination to the workers was disregarded and thatthe same substituted with separation pay by private respondents.
As found bypublic respondent, written notices of separation were sent to the employees on January 17, 1992. The
notices expressly stated that the termination of employment was to take effect one month from receipt thereof.
Therefore, theallegation that separation pay was given in lieu of the 30-day notice required bylaw is baseless. Petition
dismissed.