Request For Competency Hearing and Psych Eval. For A Lawyer 2-24-2014

REQUEST FOR A COMPETENCY HEARING AND
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION FOR ATTORNEY

JOHN S. BENNET (ESSEX)
A
RE: ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL RULE 23, and
C.G.S. 53a-119, Further Competency Violations via: P.B.2-57, P.B.2-58, Exhibits B of
P.B. 1.1, 1.2(a)(b) (Commentary), P.B. 1.0, P.B.1.3, P.B. 1.4, P.B.1-5, P.B.1-6,
P.B.1-7, P.B.1.8, P.B.1-16, P.B. 2-1, P.B.3-1, P.B.3-3, P.B.8-5, etc. P.B. 1.0 - 1.18

Submitted to the Statewide Grievance Committee
and the District Grievance Committee
by Janis Hearrell
cooper@selectmgt.com
February 21, 2014
It is requested due to the fact this Attorney's wife who is a State Employee (Lawyer for the Probate Court Administration)
is a party to the corrupt acts by this lawyer, and that her office mate is the spouse of the Appellate Court Clerk who already
sabotaged one Appeal on behalf of this Lawyer, that this action NOT be submitted to Probate Court for determination,
and that given the weight of the Probate Court employee corruption in complicity with Appellate Court assistance, related to
these couples, this grievance be turned over to US District Court for the District of Connecticut for a determination of this
Lawyer's competency, and that authority should choose the Court of Competency to rule.
To:
Date:
Filed By:
United States District Court
District of Connecticut
February 21,2014 (Sent: Bound Copy and OCR Flash drive copy)
Janis Hearrell
PO Box 1648
Greenwich CT 06836
Tz 203-321-0648
o%
RE: Name of Attornev about whom the complaint is filed:
John S. Bennet
30 Plains Road, Box 959
Essex CT 06426
860-7 67 -27 42 or 860-7 67 -27 42
bennet@gould-larson.com
This lawyer has been exploiting an elder 87 years old (in violation of the Federal Elder Justice Act)
(relative), for the sole p\rrpose,of extorting real property from Janis Hearrell, the sole owner who
paid cash, for the property by fee simple, warranty deed in 2001. The elder is the gtantor, there is
no lender, there never has
heen
a lender and no money has ever been borrowed for the purchase.
This extortion has been in pl,hy since August 2010, and it has encompassed a foreclosure, an
eviction, a vexatious litigafon (against Bennet about which I have been threatened with blackmail
by an insurance lawyer if,4 do not globally release Bennet) and as you will see the 87 yeat old was
coerced to put my land iqiher will for Bennet's financial gain. He is not alone in this. He will fool
you into thinking he is right, you will see enclosed the mental disorders he may suffer from. There
are names you will know and will be shocked to learn arc apafi to serious
judicial corruption.
On June 23,2Ol3,the elder repudiated the validity of the promissory note, which should have ended
any claim to my property, with no debt document there can be no debt. Bennet is still extorting me.
On July I,2073 he coerced the elder to present the same debt document to the court.
Ordinarily competency hearings are held by Probate Court, in this case, both Helen Bennet (wife)
and Thomas Gaffey (husband of the Chief Appellate Clerk who dismissed my foreclosure appeal by
forging en banc on a dismissal) are part of the influence peddling and Probate extortion scam.
Please do not discount this grievance due to form - every one of my lawyers has been threatened by
Bennet, so although I am not without counsel in my real life, in these cases I have had to be self -
represented. My lawyers, advisors and I are out of our depths, Perhaps yoll can stop this man.
COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTORNEY
(GRIEVANCE COMPLAINT)
JDGC6 Rev. 710
P.B. 232(a)
Read the Instructions for this complaint before
filling it out. Complaints that are not filled out
correctly will be returned to you.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL BRANCH
www.jud.ct. gov
After filling out this complaint, mail the original and 6 copies of it to:
Statewide Bar Counsel
Statewide Grievance Committee
287 Main Street, 2nd Floor, Suite 2
East Hartford, CT 06118-11385
1. Complainant's (person making complaint against attorney) Information. A separate complaint form must be
filled out for each Complainant.
Name (First, Middle, Last)
D Mr. D Mrs. Ms. D (Other) Janis Hearrell
Address
P.O. Box 1648 Greenwich CT 06836
Telephone number
203 - 321-0648
Emai l address (optional)
2. Information about the attorney you are making a complaint against. Do not name a law firm. A separate
complaint form must /be filled out for each attorney you are complaining about.
JOHN S. BENNET
Address
30 Plains Road P.O. Bm< 959
Tel ephone number
860-767-9055 /860-767-!742
Attorney's juri s number (if known) Emai l address (if known)
003230 bennet@gould-larson.com
3. Explain how you are connected to t he attorney.
D I hired/retained the attorney. Dates of representation:
to
D
D
The court appointed the attorney to represent me. Date attorney was appointed by the court:
The court appointed the attorney to represent my children. Date attorney was appointed by the court:
The attorney represented the other side against me in a matter.
D The attorney was the prosecutor in my criminal case.
D Other. Explain:
4. Have you ever filed a complaint against this attorney with the Statewide Grievance Committee?
D Yes. Give the name and grievance number of each complaint that you have filed:
No
5. Please give the information asked for below if your complaint is about the attorney's conduct in a lawsuit or a
criminal case.
Name of lawsuit or cri minal case
June Hearrell v. Janis Hearrell
Courthouse locati on
New Haven CT
Docket number
NNH-CV 10-6013782
Your connection to the lawsuit or criminal case (for example: plaintiff. defendant, witness)
Defendant
Do Not Write in This Area - For Statewide Bar Counsel Use Only
Fil e Date:
Complaint number:
Referred to:
Page 1 of 3
06426
6. Please explain the type of legal work done by the attorney in the matter that led to this complaint. Check all that
apply.
0
Criminal law
0
Family law/Divorce
0
Personal injury/Wrongful death/Malpractice
0
Personal real estate matter
0
Business or corporate matter
0
Estate planning/Elder law/Probate
D
Workers' compensation
D
General civil claims
D
Immigration matter
D
Arbitration or mediation
D
Collection matter
Other. (Explain) Foreclosure I Eviction I Vexatious Litigation I Replevin
7. Please explain what kind of complaint this is. Check all that apply. You must still explain your complaint in
detail in question 10.
[RJ Misused funds or other property Neglect, diligence or competence issues
Charged too high a fee
D Did not return records
D Did not safeguard money or property
[RJ Confidentiality issues
Fraud or misrepresentation issues
Communication issues
0 Improper withdrawal
[RJ Conflict of interest
[RJ Did not obey a court order
0 Did not pay a judgment
Harassment Other. (Explain) Exploitation of an elder to extort the "D".
8. Have you paid the attorney any legal fees for the matter complained about or has any other person paid the
attorney any legal for the matter for you?
D Yes. Amount the attorney charged you:
Amount paid to the attorney by you or by another person for you:
D The matter involved a contingency fee that has not been paid.

Attach a copy of the fee agreement to this complaint.
9. Give a list of all that have information about your complaint. Attach additional sheets if necessary.
Name (First, Middle, Last) Telephone number
Address
Name (First, Middle, Last) Telephone number
Address
I Telephone number
Address
J D-GC-6 Rev. 7- 1 0
Page 2 of3
10. Give the details of your complaint in the order that they happened. Attach additional sheets if necessary.
SEE ATTACHED
This is a case of a lawyer financially exploiting an 85-87 year old elder, for the sole purpose of
extorting property and money from the elder's wealthy relative.
The Elder's under oath testimony has been ignored since this lawyer took over the action, and currently the
elder repudiated the debt document as invalid and this lawyer who said he "wi ll make the (Defendant) pay
even if my client (elder) dies" poses a threat to both the elder and the Defendant because of exposure of his
wifes (state employee) influence peddling for his benefit. Nothing can stop this lawyer from extorting what he
wants to extort with no evidence.
Jan is Hearrell
Executed under penalties
of false statement,
JD-GC-6 Rev. 7-10
Date sgned
e Instructions before copying and filing your co plaint.
Page 3 of3
'
Attachment to District and State Grievance Committee
February 21, 2014
1
JOHN S. BENNET, (Essex CT) Competency Hearing Request

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II Model Rule 23, Rule 1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
III Pseudologia Fantastica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
IV Antisocial Personality Disorder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
V Narcissistic Personality Disorder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VI Incompetency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
VII Incapacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
VIII Assessing Federal and State Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Influence Peddling; the Scam, the People, Examples; Money Laundering,
Identity Theft, Falsified Negotiable Instrument, Forgery of Fed. Loss
Mitigation Affidavit, Determination of Priorities; Tampering with an Appeal
IX Permissive State Grievance Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
X Abuse of the Legal System, Lack of Sound Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
XI Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
XII Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Exhibit A Model Rule 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-01
Exhibit B Terms of Agreement - Appendix B; DN 124 (NNH CV 106013782) B-01
Exhibit C Picture Before Purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-01
Exhibit D Picture After Purchase /Renovated . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . D-01
Exhibit E Promissory (forged photocopy) and Repudiation Admission . . . E-01
Exhibit F Promissory Note Photocopy, Motion to Preclude 5-2013 . . . . . . . F-01
Exhibit G Bennet's Exhibit list for Trial of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-01
Exhibit H Analysis of Bennet's Exhibit list for Trial of Evidence . . . . . . . . . H-01
Exhibit I In-Camera Request RE: Probate Court Scam of the Bennets . . . . I-01
Exhibit J Practice Book Sections (P.B. 1.1 - 1.18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-01

February 21, 2014
2

REQUEST FOR A COMPETENCY HEARING AND PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION
FOR ATTORNEY JOHN S. BENNET (ESSEX)
A
RE: ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL RULE 23
1
, and
C.G.S. 53a-119, Further Competency Violations via: P.B.2-57
2
, P.B.2-58
3
, Exhibits B of
P.B.1.1, 1.2(a)(b) (and Commentary)
4
, P.B. 1.0, P.B.1.3, P.B. 1.4, P.B.1-5, P.B.1-6,
P.B.1-7, P.B.1.8, P.B.1-16, P.B. 2-1, P.B.3-1, P.B.3-3, P.B.8-5, etc.

The Complainant's requests that Attorney JOHN S. BENNET (Essex) "Bennet" be
required to undergo Psychiatric Evaluation and a Competency Review Hearing.

I INTRODUCTION

This document has been carefully drafted with assistance from advisors from the fields of
Medicine, Law and Law Enforcement, and from the American Bar Association, State and Federal
Agencies, Commissions and Departments, Congress re: Dodd-Frank and the Healthcare Act,
Chubb, The Hartford, the Foreclosure Fraud Task Force, and members of the Statewide Grievance
Committee who recommended this document be first addressed by the District Grievance
Committee because of the undue influence by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel to obstruct the
Complainant's legal representation on behalf of Bennet.
This Grievance should not be confused with a misconduct grievance regarding corrupt
activity and the pervasive pattern of professional misconduct of this lawyer.
This is a request for determination of the competency of a lawyer who has been attempting
to extort this citizen since June 2011, by the explicit financial exploitation of a now 87 year old,
due to either his mental disorder or corruption.
February 21, 2014
3

The hostile and obsessive financial motive of Attorney John Bennet is against the
Complainant
5,

6
who is a wealthy Registered Investment Advisor ("Fund owner") from Greenwich
Connecticut. The property Bennet is attempting to extort by illegal seizure is the Complainant's
weekend property. After the purchase (cash) of the property, (Exhibit C) from the 74 year old
7
,
the Complainant renovated the property (cash) (Exhibit D) and allowed the elder to live on the
property free of charge enabling her to have the life she always dreamed of with no money
concerns, and by doing what she wanted with the money she was paid (to her satisfaction -
Warranty Deed, Paragraph 1) from the sale of her property to the Complainant. The elder travelled
around the world, went to Florida for six months in the winter, and lived on the property, played
bridge and entertained without incident. She had full access to a checkbook outside of her money
for anything relating to the house, food, etc. This was a much more satisfying existence for the
elder who could not afford to pay $4000 in property taxes in 2001, while living on approx. $12,000
per year and a personal loan that had to be repaid. (Exhibit H, # 10 - Release of Personal loan
(NOT the release of a mortgage for the purchase of the property)). How and when the Grantor
wanted to be paid her cash was outlined in (Exhibit B), the terms (which she submitted to the court
December 29, 2010), and is frankly not the business of a predatory lawyer or executor who falsifies
evidence for submission. Cash real estate transactions when made by successful women in this
State seem to engender jealousy and prejudice regarding socioeconomic status. Civil right
violations are indicative of incompetency and the incapacity to follow the law.
Although this document is drafted with the assistance of Medical Professionals as a
pre-assessment consideration for the Grievance Committees of this State, it is time for a particular
capacity referral, requiring an extensive medical process by a psychiatrist for data collection, prior
to a competency hearing and ruling to articulate a specific capacity or competency opinion by the
February 21, 2014
4

state or the court as to the stability of John Bennet's judgment to practice within the specific
parameters of his profession, as a professional, so as not to cause intentional harm to the citizenry.
The Complainant has been obsessively "wealth-profiled", has been viciously defamed, her
business has been tortuously interfered with, her reputation intentionally discredited, she has been
harassed, stalked, threatened, sued, cyber-harassed, and as organizer of this extortion scheme
Bennet has now indulged in identity theft of the Complainant. (He/someone in his troupe) has
called Atlas Van Lines, in the name of the Complainant, to move the sole, paid in full owner off
her property on March 29, 2014, by making arrangements in the name of the Complainant and by
confirming the move with the complainants telephone number, email address and physical address.
It is believed this lawyer, is suffering from mental delusion, he may believe for some
invented reason, that he owns or believes he should own, the Complainant's renovated property
for his personal enjoyment or for sale for his profit. This is dangerous mental defect.
A case using the same promissory note, repudiated by the Elder (Exhibit E) to claim a life
use, was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the elder it was ordered, has no right to
the Complainant's property, no life use, and there is no debt to "hold" any life use or right, or
anything else, based upon a promissory note, even the elder repudiated.
Bennet does not believe the rules or court orders apply to him so he chooses to ignore court
orders and plans to extort the Complainant, tortuously interfering with her life, reputation and
property ownership evidently until he is legally stopped by State and or Federal authorities. On
June 25, 2013 the elder that Bennet has been exploiting, stated in an Admission SHE NEVER
SUBMITTED THE PROMISSORY NOTE BENNET IS USING. (Exhibit E) It should have stopped
the extortion by withdrawal of the case. No document, no debt. Bennet's mental disorder has him
February 21, 2014
5

claiming a debt due, in spite of the elder's invalidation of the debt. Bennet seems to be suffering
from a mental disorder making him believe he is untouchable and above the law.
There is no document of lending (the elder would not have qualified even as an IRS
sponsored 'Intra-family' lender). In 2001, (Exhibit C) she had property worth $219,000, and
liabilities of $70,000, her unemployment, and total assets of $149,000 would not have qualified her
as any type of lender of $338,000. Connecticut State Statute (C.G.S. 36a-758) requires a loan
made by anyone, including relatives (otherwise it is prejudicial), need to have a physical hand-off
of a wire, bank check, etc., otherwise there is no evidence of a loan. A "Fund" Manager generally
has relationships with at least a dozen banks, there would be no need to "borrow" money or allow a
"take back" or "money mortgage", from a broke, un-employed elder whose life changed 180
degrees after conveying her property to her wealthy daughter. In 1977 she could not realistically
afford the property and the "daughter/Complainant" helped her father pay the mortgage for years,
even after he was wheelchair bound. (The remaining child left for college a year later in 1978/9, it
was not the "family home" Bennet fabricated pure fantasy for the court for a sympathy bias ruling.)
On August 22, 2011, Bennet, seemingly suffering from severe incompetence and a mental
defect, requested that the court "scrub" (remove a public record) (Exhibit B) DN 124 Appendix B,
from the Docket. That he, a lawyer, asked to remove the terms of the sale from 2001, submitted by
his client, to substitute his fabricated evidence, indicates incapacity to understand the requirements
or rules of his profession and of the court.
If Bennet claims there is no forgiveness clause any longer, then there is no debt document.
If there is no debt document there is no debt. It's over.
It is clear he has no mental capacity to understand the rules of this profession. Instead of
having Bennet arrested for extortion and exploitation, it is preferable to first have him examined for
February 21, 2014
6

competency and have him removed from practice, then charge him or not depending on the
severity of his mental defect. If a court finds him competent, then, on the recommendation of law
enforcement officials, formal charges and grievances will be pursued as per Model Rules 23, 24,
25, RPC 1.1.
There is immunity from suit by the lawyer for any citizen reporting this type of behavior to
the State of Connecticut. This is filed in the interest of the Complainant, the elder and to prevent
further caselaw from being created that destroys every citizen's Constitutional right by illegal
seizure of property.
NOTE:
This document is being filed at this time before any relative or co-conspirator
attempts to have a personable, well-liked, active, smart, mobile, 87-year-old elder woman,
who is perfectly suited to take care of herself, and who drives herself perfectly well;
committed to a care facility before her time, in order to save themselves from prosecution for
their illegal acts, by her exploitation.
This is a grievance requesting that a psychiatric assessment and a competency hearing
occur to determine if Attorney John Bennet's exploitation of an elder (which may have
caused her mental or financial harm), was due to a specific mental disorder, his
incompetency, or substance abuse; or, if it was just the premeditated criminal activity of a
sub-standard lawyer.

February 21, 2014
7

II MODEL RULE 23 and RULE 1.1
The American Bar Association, Model Rule 23, is found under the American Bar
Association Center for Professional Responsibility; Rules and Guidelines. It outlines the rules and
guidelines for the competency assessment of a practicing lawyer who may be suffering from
mental defect or mental disorder which affects sound judgment, right from wrong, and the
operative understanding of ethics, the rules of the court, federal law and the laws of the state in
which a license is granted. The ability of a lawyer to plan a legal strategy without unethical or
illegal behavior is imperative. Incompetency indicates a lack of compliance to the obligations of a
profession. This should not be confused with a misconduct grievance.
Model Rule 23 defines the criteria under which a State disciplinary group should seek the
guidance of forensic psychiatric assistance for evaluation and determination of malingering or if
there appears to be mental incapacity due to defect or abusive tendencies rendering a lawyer
incompetent. This is not a determination made by any grievance committee without the assistance
of the Psychiatric Medical (by an MD)
8
community.
Attorney John Bennet's decision-making is governed by amoral parameters and possible
mental disorder(s) that dictate his corrupt and unethical decisions; which shows the lack of ability
and or the mental capacity to handle the professional standards of practice.
In furtherance of the principles stated in the Oath and Preamble of the Rules of Practice in
the State of Connecticut, the American Bar Association has promulgated the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which consists of three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate
agencies both as an inspirational guide to the members of the profession and as a basis for
disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards
February 21, 2014
8

stated in the Disciplinary Rules. The American Bar Association Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement are the guidelines for disciplinary committees for every State. Model
Rule 23 is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and is provided in part below.
PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH LAWYER IS DECLARED TO BE INCOMPETENT OR
ALLEGED TO BE INCAPACITATED
A. Involuntary Commitment or Adjudication of Incompetency
B. Inability to Properly Defend
C. Proceedings to Determine Incapacity
D. Public Notice of Transfer to Disability Inactive Status
E. Reinstatement from Disability Inactive Status
Model Rule 23 (2): Inability to Properly Defend. If a (Lawyer) respondent alleges in the course
of a disciplinary proceeding an inability to assist in the defense due to mental or physical
incapacity, the court shall immediately transfer the lawyer to disability inactive status pending
determination of the incapacity.
If a respondent's evaluation or Competency Hearing determines a mental health
concern, significant character weakness or mental illness then this influences how
this person perceives the world, makes decisions and manages the responsibilities
of one's profession, which has an impact on the failure to conduct oneself honesty,
ethically and effectively within the law, the rules of the court and within the Rules
of Professional Conduct.
Model Rule 23(3): Proceedings to Determine Incapacity. Information relating to a lawyers
ability to practice law shall be investigated, and where warranted, shall be the subject of formal
proceedings to determine whether the lawyer shall be transferred to disability inactive status. The
hearings shall be conducted in the same manner as disciplinary proceedings . . . as to
confidentiality. . . . The committee and court may take or direct whatever action it deems necessary
or proper to determine whether the respondent is so incapacitated, including the examination of the
February 21, 2014
9

respondent by qualified medical experts designated by the court or the State. If, upon due
consideration of the matter, the court concludes that the respondent is incapacitated from
continuing to practice law, it shall enter an order transferring the respondent to disability inactive
status for an indefinite period and until the further order of the court. Any pending disciplinary or
criminal proceedings against the respondent shall be held in abeyance.
Model Rule 23(4) Public Notice of Transfer to Disability Inactive Status. The board shall cause
a notice of transfer to disability inactive status to be published in the journal of the state bar and in
a newspapers of general circulation in each judicial district in which the lawyer (uses the Court
system) maintained an office for the practice of law. (New Haven Register/Hartford Courant).
Model Rule 23 Commentary: Since the principal responsibility of the American Bar Association
Center for Professional Responsibility agency is to protect the public, it must concern
itself with disabled lawyers who endanger the interests of clients (public), even if no misconduct
has been committed. It is important that incapacity not be treated as misconduct, and to clearly
distinguish willful conduct from conduct beyond the control of the lawyer (mental defect). If the
lawyer's disability has been judicially determined or is admitted, there is no need for further
proceedings before the court issues an order of transfer to disability inactive status. The order
transferring the lawyer to disability inactive status should clearly state the conditions which must
be met for the lawyer to be reinstated to active status. (Including medical treatment for mental
disorders) If the respondent in a disciplinary proceeding alleges inability to conduct a defense
because of present disability, he or she should be transferred immediately to disability inactive
status to protect existing and prospective clients. A proceeding to determine whether the
respondent is in fact disabled should be initiated immediately. If the respondent is found to be
disabled, the transfer to disability inactive status remains in force until and unless he or she has
February 21, 2014
10

established that the disability has terminated. At such time the further disposition of proceedings
alleging misconduct or criminal activity should be determined. If it is determined that the claim of
current disability is unsubstantiated, the proceedings predicated on the allegations of misconduct or
criminal activity should be immediately resumed.
Without the citizenry informing the State and Federal authorities that a lawyer is beyond
sound judgment, is criminally inclined and has such bad judgment as to have created a racketeering
type of practice, then the Grievance Committees would have no way to know that corruption
indicative of the level of incompetence in this (Complainant's) case, would be life-shattering to any
citizen of normal or limited resources in this state.
RULE 1.1
The State of Connecticut has a legitimate interest in removing the competency barrier in
order to facilitate the prosecution of lawyers not of sound mind who cannot effect the rules of the
court, the state, or of ethics. A separate classification for lawyers in respect to a competency
requirement rests upon a rational basis and, therefore, does not violate the constitutional principal
of equal protection. Competence under Rule 1.1 Competency -- would include the need for sound
judgment. Bennet shows no sound judgment or the ability to control himself or his illegal activity.
The use of the internet, to gain advantage in a civil action by intentional defamation and
tortious interference of business and reputation with no substantiation, by discrediting unfairly the
opposing party shows a lack of morals, sound judgment and mental stability.
There is a difference between zealous representation and intentional wire fraud, threats to
the well-being of a person, socio-economic prejudice, cyber-harassment, stalking, defamation,
extortion, exploitation, falsifying evidence, ignoring court orders, money laundering, HOBBS and
RICO, identity theft, Larceny, bullying, etc., all of which John Bennet engages in his practice.
February 21, 2014
11

Bennet is a bully and bullying indicates incompetency. Any lawyer can win by bullying lawful
opposition. Bullying by a lawyer by threatening an opposing party or opposing counsel to render
the opposition without counsel, or to dispel the exposure of his misconduct, by calling in a favor of
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Statewide Grievance Committee to get rid of a lawyer, is
beyond mental defect and trespasses on sociopathic behavior. Bennet is this out of control.
Rule 1.1 Competence Commentary, Paragraph #8, states: "[T]o maintain the requisite
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice...and
education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is
subject." Bennet is not sanctioned, accredited or certified by the ABA as a CLEA yet represents
elders. It has been evident that Bennet doesnt believe any rules or laws apply to him. He creates
his own, and when questioned about them, remarks with boredom "it's been pled" and, or, the
"Connecticut Law is well founded...", at which point he will ignore any further questions or
fabricate irrelevance to hear himself talk. Generally, he contradicts his former pleadings, and
evidently no one cares enough to correct him -- or cannot. It has become embarrassing to witness
such gullibility of Judges when they rule on a continual nonsensical diatribe that is relevant to
nothing in the case, simply made to obviate the need for evidence. Bennet's bellicose ranting about
nothing evidently impresses Judges in Connecticut.
For almost three years Bennet has conned Judges into making decisions based on lawyer
oratory to illegally seize property. These Judges apply no law or authority to the order or judgment,
again looking foolish, when articulations of law are requested in Appeal.
Bennet seems to suffer from what appears to be clinical narcissism and antisocial behavior
disorder (TBD by the Medical Community), or has a predominance of Judges who "owe" him.
Bennet lost in housing court, the action was dismissed for lack of subject jurisdiction.
February 21, 2014
12

The Elder was ordered on January 12, 2012, that she had no life use, no debt from the
promissory note and no right to the Complainant's property.
Bennet chooses to ignore the court order and continually attempts to extort the
Complainant's property, by any of his own falsified evidence, tampering with public documents,
misrepresentations of fact, financial fraud, harassment, tortious interference of business, sham
pleadings, abuse of process, defamation, forgery, deception of the court and lying to the court; in
the belief no Judge dare stop him from extortion or exploitation of an elder. Because it's "him".
Bennet coerced the elder to allow him to put the same property, which the elder has no
right to, in her testamentary documents to ensure further distribution to him after her death. (It
certainly does her no good). He has a well-honed probate court scheme that he and his wife run.
Certain lawyers who come before the Probate Court Administration (Mrs. Bennet) are
awarded favors for repayment to Bennet when needed, favors span from "Committee members"
who are to post the signs for foreclosure by sale to judges.
The level of criminal behavior committed by Bennet, with unbridled hubris is indication of
multiple mental disorders.
Bennet ignored the fact that prior to trial the 87 year old elder repudiated the debt document
on which Bennet based his (personal) falsified evidence. He forced the elder to make the claim at
trial, a week after repudiation, that the promissory note was valid. She has committed perjury
dozens of times due to Bennet's coercion and exploitation. Bennet is still claiming a debt is due,
with no debt document from the "PLAITIFF". Bennet has no grasp on reality. The mental disorder
convinces him that his claims, his statements, his oratory are more important than what either party
claims. The Parties are irrelevant to Bennet in a lawsuit, because, it is; -- all about him.
Should anyone ever request evidence from the PLAINTIFF the Complainant would like to
February 21, 2014
13

see it since it has never been submitted to the court, and the elder said she had no evidence.
Everything, including excuses as to why there is no evidence has been fabricated in grand size, by
Bennet.
This is all his incompetence to follow the rules of his profession, the incapacity to tell right
from wrong, and the abuse of the system his profession requires compliance with; as well as
felonious behavior.
Bennet's Partners (and new associate as of November 2012) are all being sued for
Vexatious litigation and all have had an obligation to turn Bennet into the authorities or the
Grievance Committees for at least the years this Complainant has been involved. Under Rule 5.1:
Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyers, provides that managing lawyers
in a firm partner have an obligation to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional conduct, they also have an obligation to report mental defect or corrupt and criminal
acts, including the exploitation of an elder (a Federal Violation). Under Rule 5.3; Responsibilities
Regarding Non-lawyer Assistance; lawyers with managerial responsibilities also have an obligation
to ensure that any non-lawyers employed by the firm comport themselves in accordance with the
lawyers ethical obligations under the Rules. Bennet hired a new lawyer in his firm November
2012 while being sued for Vexatious Litigation. If the new lawyer passed the Bar and condones the
illegal activity he witnesses he is as culpable as Bennet. There is an ethical obligation to report the
possibly mentally defective Bennet to the Grievance committee or the authorities for engaging in
the illegal exploitation of an elder to extort property for his personal gain. Obviously the Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules define the type of ethical conduct that the public has
a right to expect not only of lawyers but also of their non-professional employees and associates in
all matters pertaining to professional employment. A lawyer should ultimately be responsible for
February 21, 2014
14

the conduct of himself, his employees and associates in the course of the professional
representation of the client. The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts
from which the Ethical Consideration and the Disciplinary Rules are derived. The Ethical
Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the
lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The
Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules
should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities.
The Model Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties for
violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for civil liability of
lawyers for professional conduct. The severity of judgment against one found guilty of violating a
Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the character of the offense and the attendant
circumstances. An enforcing agency, in applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive
guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in the
Ethical Considerations. Model Rule 23, protects citizens from lawyers and from a Grievance
Committee that has no interest to expose corruption within the lawyer community. Protection is
needed for the taxpaying citizens of this state if Bennet is indicative of condoned lawyer behavior.
Bennet actually coerced an 85 year old elder to place real property not belonging to her, in
her will, in violation of court order in order to extort the Complainant in Probate Court. How many
February 21, 2014
15

of his employees know this and find no obligation to make a report.
Bennet intends to use his wife, a state employee, lawyer, employed by the Probate Court
Administration and paid approx. $95,909.30, per year, in order to ensure the illegal seizure of the
complainant's real property. Bennet's wife's office mate, a lawyer for the probate court
administration helps by being married to the Chief Clerk of the Appellate and Supreme Court (as a
couple they are paid by the State approx. $154,653.59 and $191,694.81 respectively).
The appeal in the Complainant's foreclosure has already been sabotaged by Bennet and the
Clerk, and when an appeal for the alleged probate action occurs, it will go to the same clerk from
the two spouses running the Probate Court Administration. No doubt the clerk who fancies herself
an Appellate court judge and issues rulings on their behalf, will dismiss the case; again. The
Complainant will be forced to pay cash for her own extortion, to buy back a property she paid cash
for in 2001. State employees may receive money, possibly a bribe pursuant to C.G.S. 53a-
148(a)), for their help in illegally seizing a property in probate court by the coercion of an elder
who is deceased. The extortion is for Bennet.
This is indicative of mental disorders of Bennet.
Should Bennet's actions backfire by the Complainant involving the Legislature, the US
Attorney, the States' Attorney, the Attorney General and a US Senator, Bennet's particular brand of
pathos prevents him from caring about who may lose a job or career, a license or appointment. He
will make up unsubstantiated lies to exonerate himself naturally expecting everyone to believe him
unconditionally.
Generally Bennet can deceive the court into believing him without exposure of his defects
by casting doubts on everyone's judgment, reliability or trustworthiness event a Judges'.
Over the course of the last decade lawyers have increasingly filed disability claims for
February 21, 2014
16

mental disorders. According to Claims sources, mental health and substance abuse disorders
increased from 13% to 40% of all lawyers' disability claims during the years between 1993 and
1998 and another 15% between 1998 and 2010.
9

III PSEUDOLOGIA FANTASTICA
PSEUDOLOGIA FANTASTICA (pathological lying) is not recognized as a disorder in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, according to advisors, but many other
disorders acknowledge pathological lying as a symptom of disorders such as psychopathy, and
antisocial, borderline, narcissistic, and histrionic personality disorders. Excessive lying is a
common symptom of several mental illnesses. This should not be categorized as "lying" under the
doctrine of immunity. It is pathological and underlies a mental disorder.
Bennet's psychopathy as a compulsive liar and members of the judiciary and of the
statewide Grievance Committee have put their careers on the line by believing Bennet's
pathological fantastic and convincing lies without requesting proof or facts. Bennet couldnt care
less about anything. He introduced an expert witness that had been disqualified by court order
months prior to the trial. It didnt matter what the Judge said, it was his witness and how dare a
judge tell him no. There is no way to practice law against a mentally disturbed, unethical and
corrupt lawyer. One cannot win. There was no reason for the Defendant to testify at the trial.
There was no case except in John Bennet's mind, and the evidence he submitted should not have
been dignified by a Senior Judge (Exhibit G/H).
So convinced was the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Statewide Grievance Committee of
the lies Bennet passed around, that she picked up the phone, and chastised the lawyer of the
Complainant because at the Complainant's request, a vexatious litigation against Bennet was filed.
February 21, 2014
17

It was groused, "the (Complainant) is suing members of her own family". The Chief Disciplinary
Counsel, requested the vexatious litigation be dropped. It was not dropped. It is none of Her
business who anyone sues unless it comes before her as a grievance for a decision. It is certainly
not the right of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Statewide Grievance Committee in this state,
to deny a citizen due process right based on her personal belief in Bennet's convincing lies and
fantastic stories, produced out of thin air with no substantiation. Further, the motivation behind the
call had nothing to do with the "family" or the "elder"; it had to do with John Bennet protecting
John Bennet from a vexatious litigation claim at the expense of the Judge who made the call on
behalf of Bennet, and Patricia King's position and career, and ...at the expense of a then 86 year
old. Patricia King involved herself in the facilitation of the exploitation of an 87 year old, and
extortion.
In the vexatious litigation action the admission of the 87 year old elder that the promissory
note used by Bennet in a foreclosure and in an eviction, was never submitted by her, begs the
question as to who exactly wrote it, and cut-and-pasted on the complainants name.
No doubt all Bennet cares about is if the admission by his client will interrupt his plans to
extort the complainant in Probate Court with the help of his wife, by removing all debt and
therefore any claim to the property or by resurrecting the forgiveness clause by admissibility of the
note (which of course means this time the Plaintiff will need to show the State her evidence).
Bennet of course is saying the elder got rid of the forgiveness clause (but not the debt...?) this is
endemic of a pathological liar with an antisocial behavior disorder, he cannot possibly see what
everyone else sees, unless you are paying off all the Judges in Connecticut there will be one that
says sorry, pick your spot, no debt or forgiveness clause....
Bennet's insurance carrier Traveler's Insurance Cos., hired Litchfield Cavo, who threatened
February 21, 2014
18

to blackmail the Complainant into dropping the vexatious litigation "for a "mutual global release"
for Bennet. Travelers will be interested to note as a public company that they hired a law firm to
represent an insured, who is facilitating the exploitation of an elder to extort property from a
shareholder in order to save having to pay a settlement for vexatious litigation by an insured. That
letter has already gone to the Travelers. Same with Updike Kelly Spellacy, they actually signed the
Admission, and did not tell the Trial Court, Pittman, J . the following week that the sole
document J ohn Bennet submitted from the plaintiff was not from the plaintiff at all. I t was
falsified and repudiated by the 87 year old.
The reason perjury and subornation of perjury come so easily to Bennet is because it is
pathological, it is not sanctioned by the immunity doctrine
10
, but he leans not on his pathos, but
on the standard bearer excuse of immunity believing he can say anything unethical or false, case
related or not. Those in the field of law, who do not lie are unpleasantly surprised to discover
criminal acts they may have engaged in, by believing Bennet.
The Complainant has spent well over a million dollars protecting her property from
decisions based on imaginary stories, lawyer oratory, and "sympathy bias", because of what Bennet
wants.
Those citizens who are extorted by Bennet in probate court, who do not have a million
dollars to spend on security, legal fees, investigators and consultants are at the mercy of
pathological liars like John Bennet, who suffer from a prevailing mental disorder that other lawyers
will not expose for fear of retaliation.
It is a Federal Offense to exploit the 85-87 year old under the (2010) Elder Justice Act.
It is a Federal Offense to extort the federally and state registered Complainant.
It is a Federal Offense to attempt to illegally seize property under RICO, and,
February 21, 2014
19

Dodd Frank made it a Federal Offense to attempt to foreclose in the manner exacted by
John Bennet and his co-conspirators.
John Bennet's PSEUDOLOGIA FANTASTICA defines his lack of competency and
possible mental defect. The fact that Bennet invented an entire romantic scenario of HIM saving
the "poor" elder is nothing more than "projection" (see FN 8). It is Bennet who has violated
Federal Act 111-148, Subtitle H - The Elder J ustice Act, he is the lawyer, it is he who has
exploited the elder for his personal financial gain, and it was Bennet who deceived the court due to
pathos or corruption.
The giveaway of pseudologia fantastica (pathological lying) was Bennet, a lawyer, ignoring
all oaths, rules of the court and his profession's rules of conduct simply making up a "story" for the
entertainment of the court.
Bennet set up an 87 year old to look like a fool in court and treated her under oath
testimony (of no debt, no abuse, no removal bodily, no evidence) as though it had no validity or
weight in the face of his pomposity. Bennet's lack of respect for the authority of the Court or any
member of the judiciary is a clear indication that he is not capable to proceed under the
professional guidelines in this profession.

IV ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
Antisocial personality disorder is a chronic mental illness in which someones way of
thinking and perceiving reality is abnormal and destructive. Antisocial personality disorder is also
known as sociopathic personality disorder. Symptoms of antisocial personality disorder include a
disregard for right and wrong, persistent lying, manipulating others by using charm, aggressive
behavior, lack of remorse about ones actions and poor or abusive relationships. There is palpable
February 21, 2014
20

discomfort when not the center of attention, of shifting emotions rapidly, and of constantly seeking
the approval of others regardless of how it is achieved.
In true accord with the definition of the clinical mental disorder Antisocial Personality
Disorder, Bennet seems unable to distinguish between right and wrong, lawful and unlawful, and
the appearance of self-esteem doesn't come from true feelings of self-worth but rather from the
approval of other people then converted to an act. Those suffering from this mental disorder will
often engage in dramatic or inappropriate behaviors to call attention to them. People develop this
disorder because they have a need to be appreciated and to feel valued and worthwhile and special.
Bennet is empowered when he tells people he is a lawyer, not because he is a protector of laws or a
professional, but because it draws attention to him by the cachet he could not otherwise have
earned. No doubt the choice of law was due to self-aggrandizement. Bennet intentionally avoids
that the doctrine of immunity, has only to do with the facts of a case, not fabricated and invented
cases and with no facts or evidence.
The rules of the practice of law are a consumer product to Bennet, used as a tool to cover-
up illegal activity and an easy route to make money, not as a guide to determine the parameters of
an honest practice. Oath's are not taken seriously which is witnessed by his incessant forgery and
averring to forgeries he arranged for, and there is no use for the rules of ethical conduct, they are
for 'less important, less smart, less well connected' lawyers, Bennet has his own rules.
With the need to be the center of attention as a Narcissist, he always believes he could be a
better "Judge" than those he presents in front of, and he resents their mediocrity, smugness and
having to lower himself to their being able to question his standards or practice.
A person with the mental health disorder of Antisocial Behavior would believe it is a waste
of his valuable time to go to court and argue since there is never the consideration he may not win.
February 21, 2014
21

Even when he loses he convinces himself he wins because he doesnt respect the issuer of the
decision -- (witness his ignoring court orders) after all, he believes he "owns" most of them.
Bennet's cheating engenders reverence from less successful lawyers who do not know about the
influence peddling and "dirty law", he achieves the essence of antisocial behavior by becoming the
center of attention. The "hero" who promises charmingly to make money for everyone (illegally).
Normally the internal mechanism as a lawyer is to go to court and win or lose, put on a
good case for a client, with facts and evidence. For someone suffering from Antisocial Behavior
Disorder an appearance will be made due to the misguided belief that "everyone wants to watch him
win". People want to watch him win because he pathologically fabricated everything about the
case. He lied in pleadings, to the public, to his partners, to his client, to her children, to the
executor, to his co-conspirators and to his wife. The story is wild, it's grand, it is ever evolving to a
more dramatic level. And, all fabricated for attention. That's all.
The drama is synthetic -- invented by John Bennet.
It is not a "wholesale invasion of an elder's financial history", as Bennet ranted, it is
discovery, it is evidence and it is believed that the 87 year old elder's records are being covered-up
because of the phony claim of "life use" necessary for the Probate Scam. The elder is not broke, or
poor, she was paid more than in full, lived free for approx. seven years, the banking records are
kept from discovery because under this so called life use fabricated document, there are no
property tax payments by the elder, there are no payments for utilities, rent, upkeep, maintenance,
payments or for anything except the enjoyment of life while living free of charge. Along comes
the executor and Bennet and years without incident destroys the elder's life because they want
money by larceny. The courts must stop allowing uncertified, un-witnessed, photocopies of
documents manufactured by lawyers.
February 21, 2014
22

Bennet claims, that Connecticut Law allows anyone holding a phony photocopy of life use
(not life estate, not life tenancy, not life occupancy) document, has the right to seize a property
whenever they want without a grant of life use, without a deed of life use, without a remainderman,
without certification or a witness or filing or reference to the document -- another falsified
photocopy. Again, this is Bennet's own "internal legislature" that creates 'laws' that apply only to
him. This is not law. This is mental incapacity and incompetence to practice within the standards
of this profession.
One cannot get rid of Bennet. The elder cannot, the court cannot, the co-conspirators
cannot, no one can dislodge this infection, and his persistence to illegally seize property in spite of
the laws he breaks is irrelevant, a narcissist never loses, never gets caught, and is never
accountable. It is more than seizing the property; it is looking good, like a winner. Irrelevant to
Bennet is the corruption or the lives he has ruined of those co-conspirators who believed his lies.
Bennet has been circumventing the laws of this State and Country and the Court for so long that
when confronted with actual compliance he lashes out with irrelevant claims making him look like
more of a fool. Judges are afraid of exposure and will not stop him. Someone must, otherwise this
state's judiciary will continue to ignore the laws put in place by the Legislature. Mentally ill
lawyers like Bennet created the poll results that have determined this state is the 2
nd
most judicially
corrupt of all 50 states.
Removing the good lawyers for exposing corrupt acts, instead of removing the corrupt
lawyers committing the bad acts is perverse.
This Citizen has not spent over a million dollars to save a dressed-up chicken-coop of a
weekend property that came on a truck in 1977, from a fraud by a conspiracy of lawyers who
cannot make payroll. She has done it because some State employees (who are lawyers) are being
February 21, 2014
23

paid off by some Judges who then allow certain lawyers to make a mockery of the laws of this state
in order to exploit the defenseless and extort the wealthy, for personal financial gain.
Bennet illegally falsified evidence of a debt to foreclose on a property paid for in full
with cash in 2001. There is no debt no matter how many documents he invents or kick-backs
he pays, or elders, down-syndrome children or puppies he exploits for the Court.
Bennet was incensed that the Complainant did not testify at trial.
The Complainant knows she never signed the document, why would she allow Bennet to
attempt to use her to prove the negative by asking questions that have nothing to do with evidence
since he presented no evidence of a debt at the trial. Further to that the decision to remove counter
claims was intentional so as to NOT lend subject matter jurisdiction to an action that Judge
Terence Zemetis said had none when he sent the case to be scheduled for trial, on the same day he
was in a snit because the Complainant asked that Zemetis remove himself due to bias and prejudice
toward Bennet (not the elder).
Bennet fraudulently claims he is owed approximately $80,000 of legal fees, his client never
paid him a penny and there is no contingency arrangement, there are no invoices and no cancelled
checks. This is clear disorder and pathos - Bennet believes that in a case he invented, filed without
the consent of the elder, and lost...he should be able to collect fees he was never paid or owed by
either party (and also thousands of dollars were slipped from other cases). Everything is
complicated, everything is muddy, everything is dirty and corrupt, any court trying to keep up
has to simply request Bennet submit proof from his client of her own. Period.
The judgment, awarded was based on a falsified promissory note photocopy (repudiated),
from which Bennet falsified evidence of a debt (Class D Felony),which he gave to an expert
witness (Tampering - Class D Felony) who was already ordered unqualified to act as a witness.
February 21, 2014
24

Originally Judge Flanagan was appointed to the trial, when Bennet said to him in chambers
there is urgency to have this trial ASAP, due to the age of his client, the Judge said "tell your client
she has an 82(?) year old Judge...". Bennet came out of chambers in annoyed, crashed around
packing up papers and threw himself in his seat. Judge Flanagan (who this Complainant is happy
to report is in the 2014 Directory) was replaced by a Senior Judge, who has no capacity whatsoever
to understand evidence needed to establish a debt, and who refused and or is incapable of applying
law to her ruling or articulating her ruling for the appellate court. Exhibit G, is the list of evidence
submitted by Bennet, not a single piece of paper is submitted by the Party -- the plaintiff, and there
is no evidence of debt or payments submitted. It is sick, it is mental illness to go so far out of one's
way to deceive the court.
The checks submitted by Bennet belonged to the Complainant and contained a FORGED
check by the elder from 2002. That is a violation of her privilege not to mention Bennet never
received permission or authorization to use the "PARTIAL" list of photocopied checks owned by
the Complainant (who requested they be destroyed on January 27, 2012, in a letter to Chief Clerk
Suzanne Colasanto of Housing Court). At the request of Bennet, who was embarrassed or about to
lose the case because Judge Flanagan was not having his pathos; Judge Flanagan was replaced.
There is no evidence, no facts, no documentation, a tampered witness, forged and
fabricated evidence, and coercion of an 87 year old for the purposes of attempting to extort real
property to which the 87 year old has no rights according to an action of Bennet's filed without the
consent of the elder, to evict, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. All ignored.
He owes many people money from the attempted illegal seizure of the complainant's
property (not the least of which is the executor). Bennet's delusion is that he will be sitting by the
pool at the Complainant's property (since he does not own a property in Connecticut) or will be
February 21, 2014
25

spending money extorted from the Complainant. Neither are true. The property will never be
seized. First there are senior loans, second the scam of the probate and appellate court has been
reported for investigation by the State of Connecticut and the US Attorney.
The Complainant will pay the judgment before seizure happens, then she will discuss
with the State of Connecticut who should pay her back for the court allowed illegal seizure,
and exploitation of an elder and disruption to her and the elder's lives and the Complainant's
business for almost four years. All for the benefit of John Bennet.
The reason this request for a psychiatric review and competency hearing is being filed now
is the danger Bennet now presents to his elder client and to the Complainant. In fact to get this
man away from further destruction of this elder's life the Complainant just released the 87 year old
from a case of Replevin. (NNH CV-11-6020672) The jewelry the elder wants to keep is
inconsequential to the exposed pathos and coercion by Bennet's defense of the 87 year old, and the
physical danger he presents to the Complainant. Narcissists or those suffering from other mental
disorders discussed herein, engage in sadism.
John Bennet is acting with reckless disregard and impaired mental capacity regarding his
dangerous obsession with the Complainant. Bennet is ignoring the admission his CLIENT signed,
except for the forgiveness clause that would have destroyed his probate scam.
Pittman, the Judge in the foreclosure action, who made a judgment for Bennet, may want to
know during her judicial grievance period, why Bennet, Litchfield Cavo or Updike didnt inform
her there was no debt document at the time of trial - that it had been repudiated by the
"PARTY", which is irrelevant to what the lawyer has to say. The person suffering from
Antisocial Behavior Disorder could care less about this Judge or the co-conspirators lives or
February 21, 2014
26

careers; it is all about him.
The fact is the loss in housing court, is ignored.
The Court's decision of dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is ignored.
The Court's order that his now, 87 year old client has no right to the property, is ignored.
The life use document deemed unusable, is ignored.
The promissory note that lacks subject matter jurisdiction, is ignored.
The warranty deed "paid to her satisfaction", is ignored.
The forgiveness clause in the phony promissory note now repudiated by the elder, ignored.
If it isnt what John Bennet wants to see, it doesnt exist. As proven by judges who rule
with predetermination.
The mental health issues of an Antisocial Behavior Disorder which breeds pathological
lying needs psychiatric (MD) examination. As any layman can see, the longer an investigation into
Bennet's activities goes on by the Complainant (or by the authorities not under his spell), the more
evidence there is of racketeering
11
behavior
V NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
Narcissistic Personality Disorder is a mental illness in which a person possesses an inflated
sense of self and a deep need for the adoration of others. People with narcissistic personality
disorder believe they are better than others and care little for other's feelings, rules or structure.
This confident attitude is generally a pretense to mask fragile self-esteem that is vulnerable to even
slight criticism. Often narcissists truly believe themselves to be grand, their personal puffery does
not hide a depressed sense of self when not the center of attention. Narcissists strut their
pathology. Unfortunately friends and family and co-workers do not perceive the narcissist in the
same grand terms as the narcissist does. Not quite as attractive, not quite as smart, not quite as
February 21, 2014
27

personable, and not quite as fascinating, as the narcissist sees himself. But narcissists dont
generally care how others feel.
Bennet, it is suggested, is likely suffering from classic malignant narcissistic personality
disorder, which is an extreme form of antisocial personality disorder combined with narcissistic
elements manifested in a person who is pathologically grandiose, lacking in conscience and
behavioral regulation and with characteristic demonstrations of joyful cruelty and sadism.
Narcissistic personality disorder is found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), while malignant narcissism is not. As a hypothetical syndrome,
malignant narcissism could include aspects of narcissistic personality disorder as well as paranoia.
The importance of malignant narcissism and of projection
12
as a defense mechanism has been
confirmed in paranoia. The projection of one's negative qualities onto others is more commonly
found in the neurotic or psychotic in personalities functioning at a primitive level, as in narcissistic
personality disorder or borderline personality disorder. Bennet has no productive mechanism to
retain an element of his ego while moderating the negative side effects of narcissism.
Narcissists generally battle deep seated insecurities (lives in a house owned by his wife, is
jealous of the complainant, has to exploit an 87 year old to execute his "story", could lose the
adoration of those whose careers are crashing who believed his lies; his wife, his business partners,
Judges, his co-conspiring lawyers, the two sons and their wives of the executor of the elder's estate,
members of the Grievance Committee, clerks, etc.). But in the end he doesnt care.
Bennet's aggressive self-aggrandizing rants are indicative of classic case of malignant
narcissist personality disorder. This type of lawyer is to be feared, he believes he can get away
with anything and lies or causes harm until he does. He has lied to the Police, he has covered up
crimes, he has stalked and harassed the Complainant, he scared the 87 year old into declining a
February 21, 2014
28

great deal of money at her age. Bennet never submitted settlement offers if he could not attain for
himself a global release, a fact not disclosed by Judge Maronich to the Grievance Committee.
After the offer went off the table, weeks later, Bennet started to manipulate the offer for himself.
One does not negotiate with an extortionist unless there is a Federal Officer in the room.
How does anyone think this Complainant knows all of this... the elder, the sisters in law,
friends of the elder, relatives of the elder, secretaries, court clerks all because the elder is sacred to
death. She is so afraid of losing the attention of her sons and so afraid of repercussions from
Bennet she is not going to Florida any more, she is becoming a shut in. John Bennet has
destroyed her life by his exploitation of her.
Bennet doesnt care. He seems to be waiting breathlessly for this elder to die so he, the
executor and his wife and her office mate have the opportunity to illegally seize property for
personal financial gain in probate court.
His mental disorders has him so deep in denial that he cannot fathom prosecution from the
media, or from federal and state officials or disbarment from law for corrupt acts.
Bennet probably doesnt understand that the security that the Complainant has had in place
since 2011 is due to his mental illness, to protect her from him, not to protect her property.
Typically in the analysis of the malignant narcissist, "the patient attempts to triumph over
the analyst by destroying the analysis and himself or herself"
13
. Ruthlessness in dealing with
others, lasting feeling of being singled out, and his blind belief in his own greatness can be
interpreted easily as syndromes of 'malignant narcissism' that seems to be characteristic of the
infamous dictators of history".

The Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychology published an
interpretation of the film American Psycho as an example of malignant narcissism.
14

February 21, 2014
29

This brand of mental defect is insidious, one believes the Narcissist is engaging, simpatico,
smart, worldly, but it is all a show. A narcissist cannot let another be the center of attention, as was
seen of Bennet in court, when he actually was yelled at for not objecting when he continually
interrupted cross examination. Bennet believes his coy interruption would misdirect the
questioning. Again this is the narcissist fooling the narcissist. A narcissist has his own rules, and
they are the rules by which he lives regardless of anyone else. Symptoms of narcissistic
personality include believing in his superiority over others, falsifying gossip, exaggerating facts,
exaggerating talents and experiences, fantasizing about success, power and attractiveness, jealousy,
expressing disdain for others more successful than he, setting unrealistic goals and trouble keeping
healthy relationships.
The abusive use of protective orders to avoid the orderly and efficient progression of
discovery (P.B. 13-5), in order to impress his co-conspirators that the court rules do not apply to
him is standard operating procedure with Bennet or any narcissist. "She can die trying to get
discovery", "she will pay even if my client dies", "she removed bodily", "she lived at the house
with her mother", "it was the family home", "the (client) is a Florida Resident", the (client) has
spent over $32,000 on legal fees in the foreclosure alone", "the (client) needs the money", "the
(client) has no evidence because the Complainant stole it...in 2007 or 2008 or 2009 or 2010. ", the
photocopy that has an "upon her death" forgiveness paragraph is a negotiable instrument", "the
repudiated fake promissory note photocopy is a security instrument, and there is a security
interest", the lien by the Complainant on her own property "will be dealt with in probate court",
(see influence peddling), "no amount of debt has to be claimed in a foreclosure", "$2500 per month
was due", etc., not a single word is true. All falsified by a lawyer who doesnt realize it is called
pathological lying when there is a mental disorder or defect; not the doctrine of immunity.
February 21, 2014
30

Once a judge is manipulated, Bennet becomes the center of attention and the dramatics
begin, and a case that is ordinary becomes extraordinary because nothing is real -- like Bennet;
phony and falsified, for the applause. Grand statements of taking a property away from a daughter,
a sister, that he believes people as sick as he want to hear.
Had a single Judge asked for the amount to mediate in 2010, ($0 was claimed due in the
complaint) the cases would have ended. Thomas Cronan (Cronan & Sweeney) may have indulged
in misconduct and facilitation, but he is not mentally ill like Bennet -- Cronan walked away.
Narcissists are a special type of controlling personality - generally with men, they are also
bullies. At first glance it might appear as though they are the meaner and more forceful type but
when you analyze their behavior the truth is quite different. They are generally useless, weak,
incompetent, and become bullies out of sheer desperation, for attention.
The Complainant is a woman who is fifty percent owner of an investment firm for 19 years,
she works on wall street. Her brothers and sisters in law have been extorting her since 2008,
because they are jealous and dont want to spend their money on the elder, they dont even want to
buy her a television, but they will spend thousands on Bennet. All these people want an elder to
die for proceeds from the extortion of the Complainant -- based on stories told by John Bennet that
have not a grain of truth to them.
Oddly with all these lawyers and Judges, the Complainant, is taking it upon herself to stop
the exploitation of this elder. There would be no extortion without the exploitation of this elder --
easy prey for a mentally unstable lawyer calling the shots; tough guy Bennet, who only shows
much desired attention to his alleged client, when he wants something -- has destroyed her life and
someone needs to speak out for the protection of the few years left for this and every other 87 year
old, from the judicial system in this State, which encourages predatory lawyers like Bennet.
February 21, 2014
31

The Complainant has over $5.1 Million in senior liens on her property (the lis pendens was
never validated and never filed with the court). Bennet forged the signature of a Marshal and
predated a lis pendens and filed it with the court, November 2012, which is after the liens on the
property were filed. If this goes to auction and someone wants to pay the liens off they can have the
property, or the complainant will pay a nickel for the property and release the liens. If it goes to
probate so Mrs. Bennet can seize the property for her husband, it will go to probate with the
eyes of dozens and dozens watching, and media attention, and federal authorities watching. Dodd-
Frank was very specific about foreclosures in their act and making up ownership doesnt
factor into the Act. This is the extortion of a federally and state registered investment advisor
and this is the antithesis of the Federally enacted Dodd-Frank Bill. One might find it is curious
that the Complainant's taxes are paying the Lawyer, state employee, Mrs. Bennet to extort her, for
the benefit of a mental disorder of her husband's, which as a lawyer she should have reported .
The latitude allowed by the doctrine of immunity, if abused as by Bennet, is the precedent
of racketeering. Wrongly, improperly, and unethically if Bennet doesnt want law or rule to apply
to him -- he convinces himself it does not, and for some reason seemingly weak-willed Judges
allow the behavior.

VI INCOMPETENCY
There is nothing clear about Bennet's sense of competent judgment. The seriousness of
this request is not made lightly and is outside of any grievances for misconduct, violations of the
Professional Rules of Conduct and the Rules of the Court and investigations into criminal behavior
including federal civil right violation of "wealth-profiling" which falls under the Civil Right
violation of socioeconomic prejudice, and violation of the Federal Elder Justice Act, and forging
February 21, 2014
32

and or averring to a forgery of a Federal Loss Mitigation Affidavit, money laundering, tampering
with US Mail sent to Appellate Court Judges and to the Judicial Grievance Counsel
15
, wire fraud,
mail fraud, identity theft, attempted extortion, financial fraud, expert witness tampering, banking
fraud, falsifying a life estate, falsifying a life tenancy, falsifying a life occupancy, falsifying a
testamentary document, undue influence of an elder, falsifying financial documents, falsifying a
scheme to claim a negotiable life use dismissed by court order as invalid, ignoring court orders,
falsifying a negotiable instrument, falsifying a security agreement, falsifying a security interest,
falsifying a monthly amount due, tampering with checks owned by the complainant, falsifying
evidence, frivolous claim of a lawsuit, vexatious litigation, deceiving an Insurance Company, lying
to the Police, aiding in defrauding the State of Connecticut, bribing a Judge, bribing state workers,
threatening opposing counsel, lying to the tribunal, withholding evidence to dismiss a case,
threatening the Complainant, bribing housing court officials, bribing tampering, fraudulent fees
submitted to the court, tampering with public land documents, financial forgery, falsifying loan
documents and trust and estate documents for personal gain, forging the signature of a Marshal,
violating the US Constitutional Rights of the Complainant, violating the due process rights of
Complainants counsel, tortious interference of business of counsel, bribing a Grievance Committee
member, conspiring to violate the HOBBS and RICO Acts, colluding with the executor for
personal gain, awarding personal gifts in an estate of an 87 year old, falsifying evidence, the
implied threat of blackmail of a registered investment advisor (to plant false information with the
SEC or IRS if certain discovery was requested), the implied threat of blackmail that a frivolous
case against the Complainant would be filed from which she would want release, in order to secure
a release for Bennet's illegal activity, by a lawyer appointed by the Traveler's Insurance Company
from Litchfield Cavo, etc....
February 21, 2014
33

An investigation into nepotistic hiring and influence peddling by state employees to
lawyers nominated to the bench has been requested. This barely scratches the surface.
This is about Bennet's behavior which indicates a mental disorder that begs for
interference from a competent committee to psychiatrically assess his competence to fulfill
the requirements the profession of law.
The soundness of judgment is questioned, and the requisite knowledge and skill Bennet's
profession demands have been replaced with the abuse of the laws of the state and rules of the
court and the Constitutional rights of citizens, by filing frivolous claims with no evidence or
probable cause which are used solely to extort.
The term incompetency has several meanings in the law often it is used to describe the
mental fitness of a person subject to legal proceedings (that includes lawyers re: Model Rule 23).
Legal incapacity to employ a professional duty or obligation and a demonstrated lack of
ability to perform professional functions invites a request for a competency hearing to be held on
the matter, and a psychiatric or psychological evaluation to be conducted. If any of the Grievance
Committees finds incompetence, the goal is to determine if the defendant's competence can be
restored.
Subject to the Grievance Committee's psychiatric diagnosis and a competency hearing, the
information returned back from advisors to the Complainant who read every transcript and
witnessed Bennet's court appearances, concluded (in their opinion) Bennet has clinical mental
disorders compounded by pathological lying (a non-clinical mental disorder). Sociopaths generally
have a superficial charm and lack of remorse or shame, however put; lawyers who break the law
are not above reproach.
Should the Committee find this lawyer competent he is still subject to and has no immunity
February 21, 2014
34

from, criminal prosecution, for the underlying criminal complaints and grievances and grievable
misconduct for bad faith activity. Filing false damage claims for personal financial gain, forgery,
suborning perjury, financial fraud, abuse of Banking regulations for Loans, falsified evidence,
misimpersonation of a property owner, intentional destruction of credit, claiming a fraudulent life
estate, attempt to fraudulently evict for purposes of illegal seizure, tortious interference of
reputation, tortious interference of business, lying to the tribunal, abuse of process, defamation,
false accusation of a felony, false accusation of elder abuse as well as dozens and dozens of
violations of the Professional Rules of Conduct, intentional abuse of process and intentional
sabotage of the Appellate process, etc.
Model Rule 12(1) From Civil Suits. Communications to the board, hearing committees, or
disciplinary counsel relating to lawyer misconduct or disability and testimony given in the
proceedings shall be absolutely privileged, and no lawsuit predicated thereon may be instituted
against any complainant or witness. Members of the board, members of hearing committees,
disciplinary counsel, monitors, or any person acting on their behalf, and staff shall be immune from
suit for any conduct or in the course of duties.
Model Rule 12(2) From Criminal Prosecution. Upon application by disciplinary counsel
and notice to [appropriate prosecuting authority], the court may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to a witness in a discipline or disability proceeding.
Model Rule 12 Commentary Agency personnel are an integral part of the judicial process
and are entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting lawyers. Immunity protects
the independent judgment of the agency and avoids diverting the attention of its personnel as well
as its resources toward resisting collateral attack and harassment. The Rule recommends absolute
privilege rather than qualified privilege; qualified privilege may not protect against harassment
February 21, 2014
35

made possible by simply alleging malice in a lawsuit. Conduct on the part of agency personnel
which is not authorized or exceeds assigned duties is not protected. A policy of conferring absolute
immunity on the complainant encourages those who have some doubt about a lawyer's conduct to
submit the matter to the proper agency, where it may be examined and determined. Without
immunity, some valid complaints will not be filed. An individual lawyer may suffer some hardship
as the result of the occasional filing of a malicious complaint, but a profession that wants to retain
the power to police its own members must be prepared to make some sacrifice to that cause. It is
unlikely that even a malicious complaint will cause any damage beyond some inconvenience. The
members of the agency to whom the complaint is submitted will surely not hold it against the
lawyer, for their very function is to separate meritorious from undeserving complaints. The policy
of agencies not to divulge the existence of complaints while they are being investigated effectively
protects the lawyer from any unwarranted public disclosure. Thus, the lawyer is given more
practical protection than a party to an ordinary suit, in which pleadings are public. Immunity from
civil actions attaches only to communications made to the agency. As disciplinary agencies have
grown, they have increasingly recognized the necessity for initiating investigations into areas of
misconduct that are unlikely to generate complaints, and the problem of uncooperative witnesses
has become more prevalent. Witnesses are reluctant to testify, particularly in the course of
investigations into areas of practice involving such acts as ambulance chasing, the filing of false
damage claims, immigration frauds, illegal adoptions and other misconduct from which the client
derives substantial benefits. The client is reluctant to answer any questions concerning such matters
since the truth may implicate him or her as well as the lawyer in criminal conduct. As a result, a
client may rely on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to avoid disclosure of the
misconduct. When that occurs, testimony can be obtained only if there is a procedure by which the
February 21, 2014
36

witness can be granted immunity from criminal prosecution. The conferring of immunity on a
witness in the course of a disciplinary proceeding concerns the local law enforcement authorities,
because it prevents the institution of a criminal prosecution based on the witness's disclosures in
the course of his or her subsequent testimony. Any procedure authorizing immunity should
therefore require that local law enforcement authorities be served with a copy of the application
requesting immunity and that the application itself be judicially determined. This will enable law
enforcement authorities to assert any objection they may have to immunizing the witness and to
have that objection judicially weighed against the necessity for granting immunity for purposes of
the disciplinary proceedings. Because a grant of immunity is a waiver of the state's right to proceed
criminally against the individual, legislation may be necessary to implement this Rule. A lawyer
granted witness immunity, although protected from criminal prosecution, is still subject to
discipline for the underlying misconduct revealed by his or her testimony.
SPECIFIC ACTS OF INCOMPTENCE
Many State Bar ethical opinions acknowledge the difficulty and individual nature of a
lawyer with impaired judgment representing a client, and indicate that as long as the attorney
operates in good faith and attempts to serve his or her client with diligence the attorney's individual
decisions on the best and most ethical way to proceed will not be second-guessed. Bennet does not
operate in good faith. He contradicts his own client's testimony for his personal benefit of financial
gain. Bennet has no internal judgment mechanism and has no sense of his own actions. He files
sham pleadings tucking in facts that are untrue and that have no relevance so that when he receives
an order to his liking he can claim the untrue fact ruled on by the court. If one wants to Appeal he
sabotages the Appeal with the help of his wife's office mate's spouse the Clerk of the Appellate
February 21, 2014
37

Court. He drills the same unsubstantiated facts into the court until a Judge succumbs (for some
reason) and then the Judge applies no law because there is no law to apply to the falsified claim.
Bennet then uses the front-loaded order or decision as his only evidence, claiming it is the
Judge's fault not his. Because it is NEVER his fault. In other words, this lawyer is creating case
law giving other unethical lawyers (already used by the elder's new lawyers) the tools to seize
property without a single piece of evidence; this is a dangerous precedent to set. Bennet files
pleadings and two months later forgets what he last made up, and contradicts himself and his client.
Bennet filed an eviction action without a single piece of evidence, and without the consent
of the named plaintiff. He then coerced the named plaintiff who is in her 80's to change her under
oath testimony to unhinge him from culpability of the vexatious litigation. Put differently he
coerces his clients to perjurer themselves to accommodate his falsified evidence or a falsified
claims for his financial benefit.
When one exposes Bennet he fabricates more evidence, defames, tampers with more public
records as a cover-up. When confronted with the fact that his other action is collaterally estopped
he vacillates between the two actions claiming they are joined or not, depending on his needs at the
moment. In the foreclosure action he invalidated the promissory note on December 19, 2011 by
publicly making the claim that he could falsify a debt based upon paragraph 2, but would not
"allow" the court to accept paragraph 3,the forgiveness clause that removes all debt upon his
client's death, a forgiveness clause would obviously destroy his Probate Scam. Since when does
the law, a.) allow a lawyer to continue presenting a document repudiated by his client and or b.)
allow a lawyer to cherry-pick the paragraphs he wants to use and those he doesnt.
Abuse of process is available when someone uses the legal process against another in an
improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed
February 21, 2014
38

Slander of title is also a possibility when the disparagement of title to land is involved
(which Bennet is banking on since 2009 the legislature gave the (un-corrupt) probate court to
determine title - that does not include the intentional exploitation of the deceased to extort
however). The fraudulent claims, false, malicious written statement about the title to property by
Bennet and CGS 47-33j sets out recoverable damages for the Complainant. Under that statute, if
someone records a claim to an interest in land with the purpose of slandering title, the court can
award the (Complainant) the costs of the action, including attorneys' fees and damages the
plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the notice of claim having been recorded (which in
this case is well over a million dollars).
The American Bar Association definition of Serious Crime is: Any felony or any lesser
crime that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects or any crime a necessary element of which, as determined by the statutory or
common law definition of the crime, involves interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt,
conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit one of the above (all actions by Bennet).
Bennet it is believed suffers from false memory syndrome where he genuinely believes his
invented fictitious events have taken place, it is a kin to narcissism. Many other disorders
acknowledge pathological lying as excessive lying is a common symptom of mental illness.
Bennet's client claimed she never submitted a promissory note photocopy that had a
forgiveness clause she exposes Bennet's pathos and her coercion and exploitation. The Court
has turned its back on both the plaintiff and the defendant to indulge Bennet for some reason.
Either way, it shows a distinct lack of competence on Bennet's part, to grasp the concept that he
must comply with laws and rules that are not of his invention, even if Judges do not. When one has
February 21, 2014
39

pathologically lied for so many years, one becomes quite clever in seducing others to follow. It is
the bully in the pathological liar that creates the bellicose arrogance, and the 'you dare question me'
attitude. The coercion of this elder to extort this complainant was met with his own client exposing
the extortion, and yet there is interference to the request for In Camera review (Exhibit I) by Judge
Fisher, who has no desire to stop the exploitation of an elder or stop extortion.. The level of
corruption is deeply rooted and one will not have any idea how deep until the authorities
investigate.
Bennet has a general lack of respect for the law and for rules and for his profession and the
integrity of the structure and standards of the court. He has no respect for any Judge that he
believes "owes" him.
"A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to
deliver such property to himself or a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the
property is not so delivered, the actor or another will ... (H) use or abuse his position as a public
servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to
perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely...." General Statutes
53a-119(5) "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental
state required for commission of the crime he ... (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything
which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime."
General Statutes 53a-49(a). (See Larceny C.G.S. 53a-119)

February 21, 2014
40

VII INCAPACITY
Disability proceedings remain confidential until the final order of the court, because
medical evidence or other peculiarly personal information relating to the lawyer is often involved.
Public disclosure is necessary whenever a lawyer's license to practice has been limited in any way.
Failure to reveal the fact of transfer to disability inactive status would mislead the public and others
likely to come into contact with the lawyer into believing that he remains eligible to practice. The
filing of a petition for reinstatement from disability inactive status must be accompanied by a
waiver of doctor-patient privilege so that the court may obtain the information needed to evaluate
the claim of rehabilitation. This waiver need apply only to information relating to the disability
upon which the transfer to disability inactive status was predicated. Incompetency to fulfill his
obligation to the law and to the court is first being raised now and not lightly, and not without
consultation with other professionals from varying fields. The Complainant is not a Doctor, but
has hired many and a precipitating event was the evident lack of professional judgment and
disregard for the rules of the court and laws of the State and rules that guide the profession
ethically blatantly presented in court by Bennet. Bennet knowingly submitted a promissory note at
a Foreclosure Trial that his client repudiated as fake, the week prior. Bennet has engaged in
coercing an 87 year old to put the complainant's land in her will to extort the land (a court ruled in
2012 that the elder had no right to the property), he colluded with his wife, her work mate and the
Appellate court clerk to seize the property in probate court and if it goes to appeal, seize it in
appeal. In an attempt to collect for his time exploiting and extorting, bennet must make sure a
citizen of this state is suitably destroyed so that she will pay for her own extortion and or give her
real property away.
The felonies perpetrated by this disturbed incapacitated lawyer are shocking, more
February 21, 2014
41

shocking is that they were allowed and that is the root to corruption. A lawyer as disturbed as
Bennet cannot be this corrupt without the help of the Court -- that is Psych. 101 on any college
campus.
IX ASSESSING FEDERAL AND STATE ISSUES
The Complainant will leave it to the Authorities to fight the criminal aspect of Bennet's
mental defect and the most compelling arguments for a Motion for a psychiatric exam and a
competency hearing for John Bennet. Below are only a few of the criminal acts;
INFLUENCE PEDDLING is the illegal practice of using one's influence in government or
connections with persons in authority to obtain favors or preferential treatment for another, usually in
return for payment. However, influence peddling bears the stench of corruption that may de-legitimize a
judiciary system with the general public.
The Scam: In 2011, an elder (now) 87 years old, was coerced by Bennet to put the
complainant's property, in her will. Money was paid to Bennet by her executor (son), and
put into the elder's client account for appearances (money laundering). When the elder
dies, her estate goes to probate court, the action goes to appeal, and I lose even though in
2012, a court ordered the (now) 87 year old had no right to the property. The executor
will distribute the property through Bennet, first paying himself back with clean money,
and unless the complainant pays for her own extortion, the property will be sold and cash
will be distributed to all of the co-conspirators who facilitated this extortion by federal
violation of the exploitation of the 87 year old elder under the Federal Elder Justice Act, for
over three years. No one would ever hear about paying off my own extortion because
settlement would be outside of the court actions.
February 21, 2014
42

The People: Have been reported to the appropriate federal and state authorities.
Example: A probate case comes before the Probate Court Administration, by a lawyer nominated
to the bench. The nomination process takes a while. The probate is contentious and the
case goes to appeal. A probate court / appeal hat trick is pulled, the nomination is
confirmed and a favor is owed. John Bennet collects.
Example: A probate scheme is delayed because the elder will not die; the Appeals person needs
to bounce the appeal so it cannot be ruled on or dismissed due to the repudiation of the
elder.
Example: A committee member who is predominately a probate attorney, is chosen to handle a
foreclosure by sale he is willfully negligent of complying with the JD-CV-75, and allows the
liens on the public record to be omitted on the JD-CV-77. In spite of letters written he allows
the fact there is no affidavit of debt and a forged Federal Loss Mitigation Affidavit, he did not
request a title search and is allowing a foreclosure by sale, as an attorney who was informed of
the admission and as an attorney who knows there is no legitimate lis pendens and the court
ruled the elder has no right to the property. The Committee member is on the payroll of Bennet
as a lawyer in this state.
MONEY LAUNDERING: A court clerk (or probate court official) acts as a "bagman" for
judges willing to issue favorable rulings to Bennet for a fee. Or, an executor submits his 85 year
old mother to Bennet for exploitation to extort his sister. The executor (crosses state lines) puts
money in to the client account of the 85 year old (who has no idea an eviction action was filed in
her name (as she testified in Court)). At some point the extortion of the sister is executed and the
property sold, money is distributed and the executor is paid back for underwriting the extortion. 8
February 21, 2014
43

U.S. CODE 1956 - LAUNDERING OF MONETARY INSTRUMENTS PROVIDES IN PART:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which
in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity...
IDENTITY THEFT: This conspiracy, organized by Bennet, recently called Atlas Van
Lines, and contracted a move using the Complainant name, and the Complaint's telephone number
and the Complainant's physical and email address, it was requested that the Complainant's furniture
be moved from her solely owned, paid for in full address of residence in Madison Connecticut (the
extortion) to Greenwich Connecticut (no address given). The move was requested by an unknown
person to occur on March 29, 2014. The lead from Atlas was given to a moving company in
Windsor Connecticut. This is identity theft, not humorous and quite illegal, Bennet being the
organizer of this racket, should be held responsible for whichever co-conspirator (no doubt living
near Windsor) called in the Move. Allowing a lawyers conspirators to move anyone they want any
time, without criminal punishment, sets the prescient that any mentally disturbed lawyer or his hire,
or bribe can violate Constitutional Rights of others, for their own financial gain, it is attempted
intimidation and extortion under the RICO Act (if called in by anyone out of state it is HOBBS
violation) and Identity Theft of a Registered Investment Advisor, all federal crimes. . .
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT (FALSE, UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIM). Using a
promissory note photocopy (repudiated as valid on June 23 by the Plaintiff/Client/Elder herself)
that is cherry picked for only the words or paragraphs Bennet wants to use or apply, then based on
inventing a falsified a security instrument and interest, a falsified negotiable instrument, a falsified
security agreement, a falsified "loan", a falsified life use claim (extinguished in 2001 upon
"payment to her satisfaction" and demand for the first drawdown (as per DN 124 Appendix B)), the
February 21, 2014
44

invention of a life estate, a life tenancy, a life occupancy and a falsified debt five times in two
cases, with no original (claiming with no proof "the Complainant destroyed it" yet the last lawyer
said the elder "had it for inspection upon his client's terms", no lost note affidavit, no evidence of
interest owed by any document filed on the record, no mortgagor, no commercial transaction and
lying about discovery (October 18, 2012) no lis pendens, no lender, no borrower, and he Elder,
Plaintiff, Client herself telling the court she never sold, assigned, put in her will or gave any
document (that could be used to determine "any debt", the Judge Terence Zemetis stating his claim
of a "loan" that he fabricated for some reason, nor a single finding of his could be used by any trier
of fact- eliminates not only a negotiable instrument but any debt document or any debt. Finally any
attempt now to claim the elder is addlepated because that has compromised his extortion should be
recognized as MENTAL DEFECT, INCOMPETENCY and a criminal pattern of behavior.
FORGED FEDERAL LOSS MITIGATION AFFIDAVIT; one need only look at the
signature on the warranty deed filed as a public record March 1, 2011 or any one of the checks
Bennet submitted to the court without permission from the owner to verify that John Bennet forged
or had forged a signature on the Federal Loss Mitigation Affidavit. The curious aspect is why after
all the letters sent to (Probate lawyer) Christian Edmonds, the Committee Member, from Branford,
CT, he hasnt formally reported the illegal act of forging and averring to a forgery of a Federal
Document so he has been grieved for aiding in the extortion of property by fraudulent foreclosure
and mortgage fraud and for facilitation of the exploitation of an elder for Bennet's gain. The JD CV
75, reflects no liens the title search (JD-CV-77) should have listed, again there is no report to the
Grievance Committee regarding Bennet's illegal acts. Any moron can make a sign, there are
reporting requirements as a lawyer who witnesses a lawyers criminal acts.
February 21, 2014
45

FORECLOSURE WITHOUT DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES- to date Bennet
has said that the liens that are senior will be dealt with in probate court (see influence peddling
above). There are $5.1 million of liens put on this property by the owner which are senior to the
defective and invalid lis pendens. Bennet forged a falsified JD-CV-77 which does not reflect the
liens. Perhaps he wants his wife and Mr. Gaffey to wipe them out for him at the Probate Court
Administration level, and if that goes to appeal perhaps Mr. Gaffey's wife, Michele Angers can
dismiss another appeal under falsified signature of an Appellate Court Judge. Perhaps this Probate
cabal would like to determine ownership of a property that never had a single debt, on behalf of
paying the debts for this 'racket' of extortion by exploiting the deceased before and after they are
dead. Jeffrey Hearrell the executor and John Hearrell a co-conspirator (who gave up the appellate
link in the hallway of the courthouse) have been reported to the authorities for their parts in the
exploitation of their mother to extort their wealthy sister by mortgage, foreclosure, probate, identity
theft, cyber, etc. fraud -- they started the entire extortion in a 2009 email with their spouses
Elizabeth and Rachelle when they offered unsolicited advise to their 84 year old mother on how to
extort their sister (in law), then some paid lawyers to help.
The priority of liens is first the owner, then the 87 year old might want to submit proof
instead of lawyer oratory.
TAMPERING WITH THE APPEALS PROCESS - is a separate grievance of note.

It is requested that US Attorney handle this competency hearing request, given the
bulk of the federal felonies committed without remorse are federal, as a result if
Bennet is found to be competent a request has already been submitted to investigate
(with specificity) the corrupt acts committed against this citizen and this state.
February 21, 2014
46

X PERMISSIVE OUTDATED STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
State courts' approach to lawyer discipline has not changed fundamentally. Courts still
place faith in the idea that "moral character" is a stable trait that reliably predicts whether an
individual will be honest in any given situation. Although research in neuroscience, cognitive
science, psychiatry, research psychology, and behavioral economics (collectively "cognitive and
social science") has influenced prevailing concepts of personality and trustworthiness, courts to
date have not considered whether they might change or refine their approach to "moral character"
in light of scientific insights.
Any narcissist with criminal tendencies would not suffer from trustworthiness to abuse
prevailing concepts in order to circumvent the system. Feigning sincerity to engage people to help
him break the rules is the hallmark of mental defect. Model Rule 23, 24, 25 examine whether
grievance committee's should reevaluate the current marginal utility of the way in which they
deferentially allow "friends" with sociopathic issues, like Bennet, special favors, or would also
allow them to return to law practice after suspension or disbarment for impermissibly deceptive or
illegal conduct.
It is not evident that the Connecticut Courts or the Grievance Committees have a solid grip
on the level of corruption in front of them with Bennet or why it is so easy to peddle influence, or
have citizens land illegally seized in the court of equity with no economic evidence, and or be
committed, with no evidence, no proof and no facts, and most importantly no injury to anyone and
no standing. Despite remarkable advances in all aspects of cognitive and social science, grievance
committees proceed on aphorisms and intuition to decide whether lawyers are ethically fit to
practice. Mental illness policies, practices and procedures appropriately must balance the
individual lawyer with the interests of the public.
February 21, 2014
47

Disabilities considered in the context of professional discipline do not necessarily consider
impairment as a mitigating factor, rather the focus is on status, in addressing situations.
The Grievance Committee should recognize its responsibility to protect the public and not
excuse misconduct of a lawyer even when related to disability. Lawyers are trained to develop a
facade of imperviousness and implacability to personal problems. Some would suggest that lawyers
are encouraged to continue a steady progression of self-destructive conduct without interruption or
intervention by their colleagues.
That John Bennet is allowed to change legislative laws into his own like the wild west, he
can have appeals dismissed, file nonsense, and exploit an elder, all for his personal financial gain,
this smacks of larger corruption and influence peddling, most likely run out of the Probate Court
Administration, that infects all Connecticut citizens.
Within the disciplinary process, the problems of mental disorders really do stem from key
principles and from lawyers forgetting about the key principles. In disciplinary cases, the problem
begins when a lawyer puts his or her own interests ahead of the clients interests, which could be
something simple like staying on a case too long to ensure hes getting paid, or not wanting to bite
the bullet and let the client know that they have a case that has no merit. Or it could be
premeditated extortion.
The determination of a lawyer's perspective, sense of judgment and competency are
manifest in a lawyer's mental health acuity and competency to fulfill his professional obligations
not only to a client, but to others around him. The State of Connecticut has a legitimate interest in
removing the competency barrier in order to facilitate the prosecution of lawyers who are not of
sound mind to facilitate the rules of the court. A separate classification for lawyers in respect to a
competency requirement rests upon a rational basis and, therefore, does not violate the
February 21, 2014
48

constitutional principal of equal protection.
Autonomy is not in the best interest of the State of Connecticut to attempt to protect a
lawyer who has lost his sense of what his profession stands for.
It would appear that everyone is afraid of the reign of terror of John Bennet and the
Complainant requests before more attempts to seize her property illegally occur that the State
Grievance Committee's agree to order a psychiatric evaluation of Bennet's mental fitness as a
lawyer, and hold a competency hearing and perhaps a public hearing for the Probate court victims
of his and Probate Court and Appellate court scams. No doubt many people will want restitution
from him and his co-conspirators.

XI ABUSE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Lawyers have a special privilege to lie and defraud and falsify facts called the doctrine of
immunity. That privilege is narrow and case and evidence specific. When an attorney like Bennet
flagrantly abuses that privilege to influence peddle, or to destroy a citizens rights, or life, for
personal financial gain, that lawyer's act is not misconduct, that lawyer's action is without the
knowledge of right and wrong, which in turn is evidence that the lawyer does not possess the moral
attributes, sound judgment or characteristics to act as a professional under the guidelines set forth
by the American Bar Association in this profession.
Bennet thinks noting to using an e-file heading (Affidavit of Debt) and filing something
different under the heading. His Narcissism knows Judges only peruse the headings, if it looks like
a duck... arrogant clerks do not open the document to see (in this case) it is a fraudulent affidavit
required by law, it is preliminary debt (which should have been filed in 2010) with no
February 21, 2014
49

substantiation. This is not only falsifying evidence, it facilitates extortion by foreclosure fraud, and
lies to the and disrespects the tribunal - which Bennet could not care less about.
Lack of respect for the U.S. Constitution, the Laws of the State, the Rules of the Court, the
Rules of Professional Conduct, of his client, the opposing counsel and party, or for the Judiciary;
indicate a serious mental defect of Antisocial Behavior and Narcissism which includes delusional
underlying pathological lying. It is time for the Bennet to be stopped from the intentional
creation of bad or dangerous caselaw that turns the one place citizens of this state have the right to
be heard fairly and equally into a farce, laughable playpen, a wild west for amoral lawyers who
know in Connecticut abuse of the doctrine of immunity, extortion and influence peddling can
create a lucrative career path.
It is this racketeering mentality of exploitation, abuse and illegality that is the new law John
Bennet helped to create and ascribes to. Bennet cannot admit that his practice is dependent on
illegal and corrupt behavior, he has no idea that "it's been pled" is not only incorrect English but it
is not evidence, he has no idea that saying he has "no obligation to the opposing party to submit
evidence" is heard as saying he has no obligation to the Judge, the Court, the rules. He has no
idea that falsifying documents of debt to facilitate extortion is disbarable not to mention a felony,
and, he has no idea that exploiting an 87 year old to regurgitate his testimony, and to coerce an 87
year old to put land not belonging to her in her will for HIS benefit is wrong and a crime. Nor does
he care.
Bennet has no idea that it is wrong to stalk, harass, cyberbully, defame or that it is wrong to
money launder, or wrong to extort - because it is him, and he is never wrong. It is the essence of
mental disorder. Indeed Bennet's judgment is not sound nor is it acceptable behavior for any
committee member on the Statewide Grievance Committee, to accept this type of behavior.
February 21, 2014
50

Mental defect is discernible by agencies requesting a Competency hearing and psychiatric
evaluation. The assessment of Bennet's professional standards, his pathological lying, his agenda,
his recruitment of fellow unethical lawyers because of him, and the assessment of his competence
and fitness to follow the Ethical Rules of Conduct of his Profession area and the law, is key.
Under Connecticut law, the term 'willfulness' is synonymous with 'intentional. `While
[courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or
reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.' 'Willful
misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct', legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful,
intentional and malicious conduct is indistinguishable. 'A willful act is one done intentionally or
with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'.
The issue of lawyer competence sometimes arises when a client is exploited or coerced
against her will, to cooperate with an attorney. In this case it was willful that John Bennet never
passed along and refused to accept a settlement of $300,000 for the 87 year old on February 26,
2013, because the complainant would not globally release him from the Vexatious litigation.
"CGS 53a-49. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT: SUFFICIENCY OF CONDUCT; RENUNCIATION AS
DEFENSE. (a) A person (which includes lawyers) is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime he: (1) Intentionally
engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he
believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the
circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime." Bennet has shown (as
seen previously in this document) that he abused the legal system process which included but is not
limited to directing the Clerk of the Appellate Court to reject for filing any future pleadings,
February 21, 2014
51

petitions, motions, letters, documents, or other filings and with an en banc forgery (it is assumed)
to sabotage an appeal, which is a right of any person in the United States to file.
The phrase numerous frivolous and inappropriate filings should stand out to any member of
the legal community familiar with Bennet's less-than-honest record in attempting to sway Judges.
Bennet's false and vitriolic responses to any filing by the Complainant was an attempt to
bully, and not as amusing as two Judges evidently found it to be when they falsified evidence FOR
Bennet in their orders, that they could not articulate for appeal. Perhaps they can "articulate" for
the Judicial Review Committee or the Governor.

XV CONCLUSION and DISCLAIMER
The Complainant requests the court order a state sanctioned psychiatric evaluation and a
competency hearing, in order to prevent further fraudulent attempts to extort the Complainants
property, and to protect other citizens from this level of harassment and corruption by extortion of
real property. Self-representation on and off for the last three years has not been due to
money or due to being "difficult" as declared by Bennet who never represented the
Complainant, it was solely due to illegal and unethical threats made by Bennet and his
predecessor to the Complainant, and to her lawyers of what would happen if they didnt drop
this client. This is extortion of a lawyer by a lawyer. John Bennet cannot win with an
adversary who calls him on his violations and unethical practice, so he must remove the
lawyer by any means. This is not rational, not ethical, not sound judgment and further
indication of a mental disorder NOT addressed in this document that the psychiatric
evaluation may uncover. who taunted, threatened and coerced the Complainant's lawyers until
they were requested to leave representation by the Complainant to save their careers.
February 21, 2014
52

This request is made in good faith, there are over 7000 pages of pleadings, transcripts and
other evidence of the criminal path Attorney John Bennet of Gould Larson Bennet Wells &
McDonnell of Essex, and his co-conspirators have taken to exploit an 87 year old in order to extort
a property worth over $1 Million dollars belonging to the Complainant.
The property has only senior debt that was put on the property by the owner / Complainant,
due to an invalid lis pendens. The Complainant never borrowed money for the purchase or the
renovations of her "weekend" home in Madison. Nor is the word Mortgagor, lender, loan or
borrower found in any document. There is no life use, the warranty deed states that the grantor was
paid to her satisfaction. Demands for money were made since April 2001 due to her requested
drawdowns (see DN 124 Appendix B - Exhibit B - submitted to the court by the ELDER in
December 2010).
In probate court John Bennet and Helen Bennet will attempt to legitimize a phony,
uncertified, un-witnessed, unfiled life use document claiming because it is in Bennet's or the
executor's possession it gives them the right to the property. A court has ruled it does not.
It is the opinion of the Complainant who has been harassed and threatened and bullied, and
extorted at great expense, by wire fraud and by mail fraud, by John Bennet, that John Bennet is
suffering from at least the mental disorders outlined in this grievance, which was drafted with
the assistance of qualified professionals in the areas of medicine and law.
The plight of elder exploitation has been investigated by this Complainant since 2003.
Attorney Richard Cramer (now deceased) informed the Complainant of issues with the elder
referenced herein. Being a resident of NYC as well as CT gave the Complainant access to world
class Geriatric Psychiatrists she began paying since 2003 to understand irrational anger, fears etc.,
it is why the ABA requests that elder lawyers become certified (which Bennet is not). Even the
February 21, 2014
53

most efficient and competent female elder in their later years is subject to exploitation. Predatory
fiduciaries / lawyers are outlined in the Federal Elder Justice Act for a Reason. Bennet and the
Executor (son) exploitation of this elder is ordinary, (illegal) predatory exploitative behavior. The
Elder is not without Funds (Approx. $200,000 remaining from the sale of the property in 2001.
The Complainant has repeatedly offered the Elder thousands and thousands of dollars and offered
to pay all her bills and send her to Florida, but the stranglehold of this sick and demented lawyer,
Bennet is too strong. (Exhibit H - in camera review of testamentary documents). If Bennet and the
executor cannot extort the Complainant they will no doubt pillage the estate of the elder to pay the
co-conspirators. This mental deficiency of Bennet causes incompetence and shows a lack of sound
judgment to commit to the most mundane of legal tasks, which prevents him from representing the
laws of the State, the Rules of the Court and the Rules of Professional Conduct, and should prevent
him from representing or opposing any citizen in this State because his corrupt, racketeering
inclined mental attitude that creates caselaw harmful to every citizen in this State.
This complainant requests before further injury is caused that this lawyer be required to
undergo psychiatric evaluation and be held over for a competency hearing.
After such evaluation it is requested that the US Attorney consider this as complaint of
illegal offenses performed against the Complainant since June 2011, the likes of which have not
ended or slowed down.as of this date.

A request has been submitted to remove the Probate Court and those on a separate list for
investigation as co-conspirators, to determine competency of Bennet - competency is generally
the job of the Court of Probate.

February 21, 2014
54

Janis Hearrell
Complainant
PO Box 1648
Greenwich CT 06836
Fax: 203-245-4466

Submitted to the Statewide Grievance Committee by USPS Mail and Federal Express,
Submitted to the District Grievance Committee by USPS Mail and Federal Express

1
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are issued by the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility
which includes Model Rule 23, which instructs Grievance Committee's in this state on their ethical requirements
to the American Bar Association and the State of Connecticut.

2
P.B. 2-57. - Prior Judicial Determination of Incompetency or Involuntary Commitment provides: In
the event an attorney is by a court of competent jurisdiction (1) declared to be incapable of managing his or her
affairs or (2) committed involuntarily to a mental hospital for drug dependency, mental illness, or the addictive,
intemperate, or excessive use of alcohol, the superior court, upon notice from a grievance panel, a reviewing
committee, the statewide grievance committee or a states attorney and upon proof of the fact of incapacity to
engage in the practice of law, shall enter an order placing such attorney upon inactive status, effective
immediately, for an indefinite period and until further order of the court. A copy of such order shall be served, in
such manner as the court shall direct, upon such attorney, the attorneys conservator if any, and the director of any
mental hospital in which the attorney may reside. (P.B. 1978-1997, Sec. 40.

3
P.B. 2-58. - No Prior Determination of Incompetency or Involuntary Commitment provides: (a)
Whenever a grievance panel, a reviewing committee, the statewide grievance committee or the disciplinary
counsel shall have reason to believe that an attorney is incapacitated from continuing to practice law by reason of
mental infirmity or illness or because of drug dependency or addiction to alcohol, such panel, committee or
counsel, shall petition the court to determine if the attorney is so incapacitated and the court may take or direct
such action as it deems necessary or proper for such determination, including examination of the attorney by such
qualified medical expert or experts as the court shall designate, at the expense of the judicial branch. If, upon due
consideration of the matter, the court is satisfied and concludes that the attorney is incapacitated from continuing
to practice law, it shall enter an order placing the attorney in an inactive status on the ground of such disability for
an indefinite period and until the further order of the court, and any pending disciplinary proceedings against the
attorney shall be held in abeyance. (b) The court may provide for such notice to the respondent attorney of
proceedings in the matter as is deemed proper and advisable and shall appoint an attorney, at the expense of the
judicial .SUPERIOR COURTGENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 2-64 branch, to represent any respondent who
is without adequate representation. (P.B. 1978-1997, Sec. 41.) Amended June 24, 2002, to take effect July 1,
2003; May 14, 2003, effective date changed to Oct. 1, 2003; Sept. 30, 2003, date changed to Jan. 1, 2004.)

February 21, 2014
55

4
P.B. 1.1 -A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person in our society
should have ready access to the independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence.
Maintaining the integrity and improving the competence of the bar to meet the highest standards is the ethical
responsibility of every lawyer. The public should be protected from those who are not qualified to be lawyers by
reason of a deficiency in education or moral standards or of other relevant factors but who nevertheless seek to
practice law. To assure the maintenance of high moral and educational standards of the legal profession, lawyers
should affirmatively assist courts and other appropriate bodies in promulgating, enforcing, and improving
requirements for admission to the bar. In like manner, the bar has a positive obligation to aid in the continued
improvement of all phases of pre-admission and post-admission legal education. The integrity of the profession
can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the attention of
the proper officials. A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those officials all unprivileged knowledge of conduct of
lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules. A lawyer should, upon request
serve on, and assist committees and boards having responsibility for the administration of the Disciplinary Rules.

5
The Complainant does not take this Competency Review request lightly, nor does she take mental illness
lightly, nor does she take influence peddling by state employees or the abuse of the US Constitutional rights of the
citizens of this state lightly. The complainant hired (no one with a current license to practice law in any state) as
advisors; psychiatrists, judicial and constitutional scholars, JAG officers, private investigators, ex- judges,
disbarred lawyers attempting to expose fraud in the CT Courts and probate and trust and estate professionals, in
order to understand the enormity of John Bennet's lack of sound judgment and corrupt acts, possible
mental defect and marriage to racketeering-type activities. The way in which Bennet's fragmented mind
"manages Judges", is indicative of influence peddling, and his need for adoration and money transcends any
respect for his professional requirements. Obsessive jealousy of the wealth and success of the female
Complainant is palpable and made obvious by the attempt at solidarity with Judges by intentionally discrediting
the self-represented businesswoman by false and unfounded and un-provable slander and libel. The attempted
destruction of a citizen due to that jealously was uncaringly driven by the incessant coercion and exploitation of
an 85-87 year old elder, for no reason other than to be seen as a winner to his co-conspirators who are aiding in
this extortion for money. Callous disregard for law, rules, or another person's being, is indicative of Bennet's
sociopathic personality. Bennet's clear and dramatic personality disorders are marked by unstable emotions and a
distorted self-image. Bennet's self-esteem doesn't come from true feelings of self-worth, but rather from approval
from other people, and engagement in dramatic or inappropriate behaviors which calls attention to him by
lawsuits built on his fantasy of being a hero or a winner, or liked or revered. There is no attention paid to his
predatory illegal siege of property. The cases are not as "grand" as his bellicose arrogance or sweeping testimony
would have one believe, which he invented. His fantasy of the foreclosure did not take into consideration that the
target is quite wealthy and unlike him could pay off any debt. However there was no debt, therefore the posturing
and conspiracy had to become grander. In actual fact he exploited an elder because he cannot make payroll by the
actual practice of law. The fact that the target of his wrath is a woman, is wealthy, is self-confident, and has been
willing to stand up to his phony "emperor has no clothes act" creates a sociopathic danger to society. He will
make any promise to anyone. All of these lawyers who have now sacrificed their careers for his "act" will get no
money and will be disgraced and most likely disbarred for criminal facilitation, and, it will not matter at all to
Bennet. This is all for show. All of these illegal acts and grand promises of liquidating a property in probate
court, or his hold over the appellate court is all so it "looks" like he has won. The property he lives in is not in his
name, his wife supports them and yet he has spent three years attempting to extort a business woman by exploiting
an elder to look successful, to look like his target, the successful, female, investment advisor. Since he believes
himself to be impenetrable and "owed favors by the decision-makers" (judges), any damage done to the careers of
February 21, 2014
56

those he engaged (Judges, lawyers, the executor, his wife, his client) is irrelevant to him, he will simply move
on to the next grand act. The US Attorney has been contacted to investigate the nepotistic state hiring and
collusion within departments to commit illegal acts. The exploitation of an 87 year old to exact an extortion
conspiracy is a federal crime. Bennet's partner in this scam is the executor of the elder's estate and the executor's
brother, both of whom crossed state lines to harass, extort and to exploit their 87 year old mother to steal from
their wealthy sister. Bennet throws around the term elder abuse without having the slightest idea of what he is
talking about, to grand-stand, for effect, for his own self-aggrandizement. Since August 2010 there has not been a
single document submitted by the hero from his alleged client -- no facts, proof or evidence. Bennet is a
dangerous sociopath with a law license who has immunity from the State of Connecticut to lie and defraud under
the doctrine of immunity, he abuses the privilege as he abuses everything. Instead of giving the money to the
elder for her well-being, the sons and daughters in law paid Bennet to help extort their sister, the one person who
financially supported their parents since 1981.

6
The Complainant has been self-represented in these actions (she is not without counsels) due to Attorney
John Bennet's threats to her counsels, and help to bennet from Patricia King, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, who has
interfered with the due process rights of the complainant to attempt to have the vexatious litigation action against
Bennet dropped. The lawyer who was exposing the illegal acts of Bennet and his co-conspirators was suspended
due to an internal grievance (not one filed by a citizen), initiated by Patricia King. The chief disciplinary counsel
seems to have no issue with the corruptness of John Bennet, just the exposure of such.

7
Since 1996, there always existed a contentedly indifferent relationship between mother / daughter.
Notwithstanding, the Complainant supported her parents partially since1981, and almost exclusively, after the
father died, since 1996, the purchase of the property was auxiliary to the life of the Complainant, who had homes
elsewhere, and it allowed the elder dignity, freedom and security. The brothers never stepped in having left
Madison in 1971 and 1978/9 except occasionally. There was no one else who ever stepped in to support the
parents, especially when the father was in a wheelchair for three years prior to death. The brothers (executor,
NSA employee, Jeffrey Hearrell) sent an email to his mother in 2008 advising the elder on ways to extort the
Complainant for money and property. The Complainant had planned to sell the Madison Property around that
time. The elder had plenty of money from the sale, had lived entirely free on the property since 2001, and was
offered a condominium in the same town for $1 a year, the same offer as 2001 (Exhibit B). She also was
financially stopped out with her daughter. (Seeing the impending burst of the real estate market, and the
maximization of the profit of the property there was no reason to keep the property the Complainant had never
cared for Madison CT- it was her mother's home, the complainants home was Greenwich since 1981). The
brothers, afraid they may have to bear financial responsibility for even one parent, paid lawyers to fabricate
evidence and facts, misrepresent both the elder and the Complainant in order to exploit their mother to extort their
wealthy sister. John Bennet's mental state took this extortion by family members, to a level of criminal activity
and federal and state violations of law.

8
John Bennet is a very clever narcissist, an MD is required, Bennet's "game" would be to attempt to
"triumph" over a less qualified therapist" or psychologist, or any non-Medical School trained Doctor.

9
American Bar Association Assessment of Older Adults: A Handbook for Psychologists. Mass. Lawyers
File Claims for Disability, both Physical and Mental, Workers Comp Executive, May 27, 1998, Vol. 8, No. 10.
Health Insurance Association of America. Data on Disability Income Insurance from 1995 to 2010. Monitoring
Attitudes of the Public (MAP). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health
February 21, 2014
57

Statistics, Vital and Health Statistics, Current Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, 1994 - 2010.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (2010).
10
Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator's Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985,
1043(1993, 2009) ("Litigators will often make others angry, and that anger may spawn purely retaliatory legal
actions."); In his article entitled Reconsidering the Litigator's Absolute Privilege to Defame, supra note Professor
Hayden calls for the elimination of absolute immunity. His opinion is premised, in part, on the idea that the
privilege is intended to protect attorneys from inquiries into their mental processes. See id. at 1028. Because
attorneys are already subject to the same inquiries from their own clients, Professor Hayden concludes that
absolute immunity is not necessary and unfairly discriminates against "a certain class of plaintiffs and
defendants." Id.
11
Racketeering activity under federal law includes a number of criminal offenses, including: Bribery;
sports bribery; counterfeiting; felony theft from interstate shipment; Embezzlement from Pension and Welfare
funds; extortionate credit transactions; Fraud relating to identification documents; fraud relating to access devices;
transmission of gambling information; Mail Fraud; wire fraud; financial institution fraud; citizenship or
naturalization fraud; obscene matter; Obstruction of Justice; obstruction of criminal investigation; obstruction of
state or local law enforcement; witness tampering; retaliation against witness; interference with commerce,
bribery, or extortion; interstate transportation in aid of racketeering; interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia; unlawful welfare fund payments; prohibition of illegal gambling business; Money Laundering;
monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activities; murder for hire; sexual exploitation of
children; interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles; interstate transportation of stolen property; sale of
stolen goods; trafficking in motor vehicles and parts; trafficking in contraband cigarettes; white slave traffic;
restrictions of payments and loans to labor organizations; embezzlement from union funds; Bankruptcy fraud;
fraud in the sale of Securities; felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs; and any act that is indictable under the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. RICO outlaws every manner in which an enterprise can be used for long-
term racketeering activity. Under the law, no person may invest racketeering proceeds to acquire any interest in an
enterprise; no person may acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity; and no person associated with or employed by an enterprise may conduct that enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity. The punishment for violating the criminal provisions of RICO is exceptionally
severe. If convicted, a defendant is fined and sentenced to not more than 20 years in prison for each RICO
violation. Furthermore, the defendant must forfeit any interest, claim against, or property or contractual right over
the criminal enterprise, as well as any property that constitutes the racketeering activity or that was derived
from the racketeering activity. Finally, RICO contains civil provisions that allow a party who has been
injured by a RICO defendant to recover from the defendant in civil court. A successful civil RICO plaintiff
may collect treble damages, or three times the amount lost to the defendant, as well as attorney's fees and
other costs associated with the litigation. The intent of the many and various sanctions is to cripple, and
ultimately eradicate, organized crime enterprises. RICO employs broad definitions to sweep a wide variety of
enterprise criminal activity into its purview. Congress uses broad language to define racketeering. The far-
reaching language of the statute has subjected a wide range of criminal defendants to RICO's penalties. The
typical RICO defendant is far from the stereotypical violent mobster. A RICO defendant can be anyone who uses
a business in any way to commit two or more of the many racketeering offenses. RICO has proved to be a
powerful tool in the federal government's fight against organized crime. Many states also have enacted
RICO-style statutes designed to apprehend organized crime that somehow escapes the provisions of RICO,
February 21, 2014
58

including: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. While occasionally using different language, these state RICO statues
generally concern the same legal areas and provide for damages similar to those under federal law. Prosecutors
have used RICO against a variety of criminals and have obtained lengthy sentences for them. This includes law
firms engaging in illegal activity. (Federal Handbook, 2013, Free Legal Dictionary: Racketeering).
12
Psychological projection was conceptualized by Sigmund Freud (6 May 1856 23 September 1939) in
the 1900s as a defense mechanism in which a person unconsciously rejects his or her own unacceptable attributes
by ascribing them to objects or persons in the outside world. For example, a person who is rude may accuse other
people of being rude. The projection of one's negative qualities onto others is more commonly found in the
neurotic or psychotic in personalities functioning at a primitive level as in narcissistic personality disorder or
borderline personality disorder.
13
Otto Kernberg, in Elsa Ronningstam, Disorders of Narcissism (1997) p. 185

14
American Psycho: Malignant narcissism on the screen. By Issac Tylim, Psychoanalytic Psychology,
Vol 18(4), 2001, 737-742

15
John Bennet is the principal in this scam any act by a co-conspirator including the Chief Disciplinary
Counsel of the Statewide Grievance Committee, Patricia King, is seen as initiated or authorized by him.

Janis Hearrell
PO BOX 1648
Greenwich CT 06836
Fax: 203-245-4466

EXHIBITS A - J
EXHIBIT A
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
RULE 23
PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH LAWYER IS DECLARED TO BE INCOMPETENT OR
ALLEGED TO BE INCAPACITATED
A. Involuntary Commitment or Adjudication of Incompetency
B. Inability to Properly Defend
C. Proceedings to Determine Incapacity
D. Public Notice of Transfer to Disabil ity Inactive Status
E. Reinstatement from Disability Inactive Status
1. Involuntary Commitment or Adjudication of Incompetency. If a lawyer has been
judicially declared incompetent or is involuntarily committed on the grounds of
incompetency or disability, the court, upon proper proof of the fact, shall enter an order
immediately transferring the lawyer to disability inactive status for an indefinite period until
the further order of the court. A copy of the order shall be served, in the manner the court
may direct, upon the lawyer, his or her guardian, or the director of the institution to which
the lawyer has been committed.
2. Inability to Properly Defend. If a respondent alleges in the course of a disciplinary
proceeding an inability to assist in the defense due to mental or physical incapacity, the
court shall immediately transfer the lawyer to disability inactive status pending
determination of the incapacity.
(1) If the court determines the claim of inability to defend is valid, the disciplinary proceeding
shall be deferred and the respondent retained on disability inactive status until the court
subsequently considers a petition for transfer of the respondent to active status. If the court
considering the petition for transfer to active status determines the petition shall be granted,
the court shall also determine the disposition of the interrupted disciplinary proceedings.
(2) If the court determines the claim of incapacity to defend to be invalid, the disciplinary
EXHIBIT A
proceeding shall resume and the respondent shall immediately be placed on interim
suspension pending the final disposition of the matter.
3. Proceedings to Determine Incapacity. Information relating to a lawyer's physical or
mental condition which adversely affects the lawyer's ability to practice law shall be
investigated, and where warranted, shall be the subject of formal proceedings to determine
whether the lawyer shall be transferred to disability inactive status. The hearings shall be
conducted in the same manner as disciplinary proceedings, except that all of the
proceedings shall be confidential. The court shall provide for such notice to the respondent
of proceedings in the matter as it deems proper and advisable and may appoint a lawyer to
represent the respondent if the respondent is without adequate representation. The court
may take or direct whatever action it deems necessary or proper to determine whether the
respondent is so incapacitated, including the examination of the respondent by qualified
medical experts designated by the court. If, upon due consideration of the matter, the court
concludes that the respondent is incapacitated from continuing to practice law, it shall enter
an order transferring the respondent to disability inactive status for an indefinite period and
until the further order of the court. Any pending disciplinary proceedings against the
respondent shall be held in abeyance.
4. Public Notice of Transfer to Disability Inactive Status. The board shall cause a
notice of transfer to disability inactive status to be published in the journal of the state bar
and in a newspaper of general circulation in each judicial district in which the lawyer
maintained an office for the practice of law.
5. Reinstatement from Disability Inactive Status.
(1) Generally. No respondent transferred to disability inactive status may resume active
status except by order of this court .
(2) Petition. Any respondent transferred to disability inactive status shall be entitled to
petition for transfer to active status once a year, or at whatever shorter intervals the court
may direct in the order transferring the respondent to disability inactive status or any
modifications thereof.
(3) Examination. Upon the filing of a petition for transfer to active status, the court may take
or direct whatever action it deems necessary or proper to determine whether the disability
has been removed, including a direction for an examination of the respondent by qualified
medical experts designated by the court. In its discretion, the court may direct that the
expense of the examination be paid by the respondent.
EXHIBIT A
(4) Waiver of Doctor-Patient Privilege. With the filing of a petition for reinstatement to active
status, the respondent shall be required to disclose the name of each psychiatrist,
psychologist, physician and hospital or other institution by whom or in which the respondent
has been examined or treated since the transfer to disability inactive status. The respondent
shall furnish to this court written consent to the release of information and records relating
to the disability if requested by the court or court-appointed medical experts.
(5) Learning in Law; Bar Examination. The court may also direct that the respondent
establish proof of competence and learning in law, which proof may include certification by
the bar examiners of successful completion of an examination for admission to practice.
(6) Granting Petition for Transfer to Active Status. The court shall grant the petition for
transfer to active status upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the disability
has been removed.
(7) Judicial Declaration of Competence. If a respondent transferred to disability inactive
status on the basis of a judicial determination of incompetence has been judiciall y declared
to be competent, the court may dispense with further evidence that his disability has been
removed and may immediately direct his reinstatement to active status upon terms as are
deemed proper and advisable.
Commentary
Since the principal responsibility of the agency is to protect the public; it must concern itself with
disabled lawyers who endanger the interests of clients, even if no misconduct has been
committed. It is important that incapacity not be treated as misconduct, and to clearly distinguish
willful conduct from conduct beyond the control of the lawyer.
If the lawyer's disability has been judicially determined or is admitted, there is no need for
further proceedings before the court issues an order of transfer to disability inactive status. The
order transferring the lawyer to disability inactive status should clearly state the conditions which
must be met for the lawyer to be reinstated to active status.
If the respondent in a disciplinary proceeding alleges inability to conduct a defense because of
present disability, he or she should be transferred immediately to disability inactive status to
protect existing and prospective clients. A proceeding to determine whether the respondent is in
fact disabled should be initiated immediately. If the respondent is found to be disabled, the
transfer to disability inactive status remains in force until and unless he or she has established
that the disability has terminated. At such time the further disposition of proceedings alleging
misconduct should be determined. If it is determined that the claim of current disability is
unsubstantiated, the proceedings predicated on the allegations of misconduct should be
immediately resumed.
EXHIBIT A
Disability proceedings remain confidential until the final order of the court, because medical
evidence or other peculiarly personal information relating to the lawyer is often involved. Public
disclosure is necessary whenever a lawyer's license to practice has been limited in any
way. Failure to reveal the fact of transfer to disability inactive status would mislead the
publ ic and others likely to come into contact with the lawyer into believing that he
remains eligible to practice.
Petitions for reinstatement from disability inactive status should be filed with the board and
served on counsel. Factual issues underlying petitions for reinstatement should be assigned by
the board to a hearing committee for recommendation to the board and to the court. Orders of
reinstatement to active status should be published in the journal of the state bar and in a
newspaper of general circulation in each judicial district in which the lawyer maintained an office
for the practice of law.
The filing of a petition for reinstatement from disability inactive status must be accompanied by a
waiver of doctor-patient privilege so that the court may obtain the information needed to
evaluate the claim of rehabilitation. This waiver need apply only to information relating to the
disability upon which the transfer to disability inactive status was predicated.
RULE 24
REINSTATEMENT FOLLOWING A SUSPENSION OF SIX MONTHS OR LESS
RULE 25
REINSTATEMENT AFTER SUSPENSION FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AND
READMISSION
A. Generally
B. Petition
C. Service of Petition
D. Publication of Notice of Petition
E. Criteria for Reinstatement and Readmission
F. Review of Petition
G. Hearing; Report
H. Decision as to Reinstatement or Readmission
I. Conditions of Reinstatement or Readmission
J. Reciprocal Reinstatement or Readmission
JANIS L. HEARRELL
February 4, 2001
Mom,
" Exhibit B -Page 1
Filed by Plaintiff/Elder
12-29-2010 as ON 124 Apx. 8
Hope you are having a good time and the weather is great. Say hi to Bobbie.
I want to have an understanding in writing or there is no deal here, you are playing fast and
loose with language and lawyering and my money.
As per all of the emails going back and forth let me clarify this is what my deal is;
1. I will pay off your mortgage you said roughly between $60-65,000, send me Jeffrey
Beatty's address and I will send a bank check for the law firm's escrow account. I would
prefer that your mortgage be paid off before you sign the warranty deed. If you sign the
WD before I get there (doesn't need my signature) then I will presume the mtg is paid
off. They will probably send you some types of process letter ending or releasing the
mtg. Just make sure I get copies for my files please since it will go to you. This isn't a
deposit and I want you to pay me back or we can deduct from house cost.
2. I said I would pay $335,000 for the house - whatever the tax is you are talking about ok,
I will pay that just tack the three thousandish to my number ,so we are at 338,000. Fine
that is it. Stop jacking around with this. I would prefer to split the closing costs but
understand you don't have any money so if that is a hardship I will pay them.
3. I am not understanding this life use thing. What is that? From what you said you want
me to buy your house- I will not be tenants in common- I will buy the house fee simple
I b e l i ~ V e is the term, I will own the house. How is it if I own the house that you can live
there for life? What if I want to sell the house? Sounds fishy - no
1
1 will have a
gentleman's agreement, and if this life use piece of paper will give you peace of mind
then so be it . But know this; I will own the house outright, you will not have ownership; it
JANIS L. HEARRELL
Exhibit B -Page 2
will go the person of my choosing when I die in spite of what Jeffrey Beatty child-lawyer
wants or thinks if)fair. Would he have done that for his mother? You will not tell me to
whom I will leave my estate.
4. God, again. I have the money. I am not borrowing money. YOU are not my banker,
you are not loaning me money, the house is collateral which makes me crazy. There is
no mortgage note. If you want to do a mortgage "deed" to secure the note (which is
insane) then do your banker-lawyer thing. I will make available whatever, however you
want the money and I will sign a promissory note as long as I can prepay without penalty
and there is no interest, I don't know why you keep saying that. Just because everyone
you know pays for your houses two and three times doesn't mean I have to or will .
There are no penalties and you are not an owner, under any stretch of your little
imagination. I don't have to take out a loan and you don't want a lump for your own
reasons. So I will have the money available but will need 60 days instead of 30 to
liquidate in case in a month or two you decide you do want it all -- I just want you to
know. We are raising Funds and if you want this up front fine - but if n o ~ I will always
have 20,000 give or take in a joint checking account you can access, but 60 days is what
I need for anything over 200,000, I want to wait for the end of the quarter for fees rather
than liquidate a holding - different tax consequences.
5. My rules
a. No smoking on the property even on the deck
b. The house you are selling me is not up to code!! I do not want you trying to live
there while it is gutted- every wall has to come down. If you need to spend time
in Florida and Bobbie is tired of you living with her then I will spot you during this
first renovation. If I had half a brain I would tear it down and just build what I
want. But I won't be living there.
c. I would rather the boys not come there to stay. John ok - Jeff never. He is rude
and entitled. I don't need or want his criticism or demeaning attitude.
JANIS L. HEARRELL
Exhibit B -Page 3
d. You can pay for the gas in your car! That pretty much covers your expenses.
e. Again no smoking, no smoking no smoking
f. I will put one of my computers in your room for you to use to email Bobbie.
6. The money you take from the checkbook, ask me to wire to you or send a check to you
is your money. Anytime you ask me for money it is yours from t11e sale of the house-
remember that.
7. I will own the house so I will pay all expenses as well I will make sure there are all things
needed in the house for you (groceries/laundry/ mowing etc, etc.) your money from this
house is for your life. However if you get crazy, hardly likely, but if you do that's the end.
You will have to go to John and Jeff for more or a car or any other big item. I think I am
doing plenty. I don't mean to sound terse but again you are cheap, and I am not your
atm.
8. All of your furniture goes. To storage wherever. Only in your bedroom can you keep
what you want. I have a storage unit of my furniture from Greenwich and want to use it
in this house. EVERYTHING goes. So make sure you contact ,Jeff and john and
anything you don't have moved to storage gets pitched. I don't want to hear a story later.
I am not buying your house to renovate it for you. I am buying your house as an investment for
me and so you have some money, no debt and some peace of mind. The price minus the
mortgage pay off is more than I trust you have ever had; find someone smart to help you invest
it. I will not help you-1 don't do that with family or friends you are no exception.
Rethink the condo thing I suggested. I would much rather buy a condo, doll it up, charge you $1
a year rent and let you sell the 15 FCD house and deal with it. I don't like the feeling I get with
Jeff Beatty and all these little notes and things. Are you sure he has done this before? Where
. ~ : k \
l
I ''
/
Exhibit B -Page 4
JANIS L. HEARRELL
is Dick Beatty? People in Madison don't as a rule buy houses without a mortgage - does he
know that the money is available on day one?
Make sure you do not practice law.
I look forward to it and I am sure once we get the renovation done it will be cake.
Let me know approximately when you want to close - I am in Europe most of the time these
days.
Having this witnessed a p ~ ~ l e a -as Len says "there's never a problem until there's a
problem. Pass a copy along to Jeff if you will please.
~
~
Allonge to "Terms ofPurchase
11
Signed by
11
Seller
11
and
11
Maker of Allonge
Dated, This date, Sunday. February 4, 2001
Exhibit 8 -Page 5
This Allonge signed by June Hearrell, is a party to Janis Heanel1
1
s
1
Terms
11
to purchase 15
Fence Creek Drive in Madison CT, fee simple, as sole purchaser, from June Hearrell, owner.
The terms here outlined by the purchaser create a legally binding
11
sales contract
11
and.is the only
11
sales'' contract or agreement of terms written for the purchase of the property. Seller, in her
own words plans to submit no property disclosures or sales contract defining the sales price and I
or any terms of agreement in writing.
This signature allonge represent8 the signature.; of the seller.
There shall be no covenants, restrictions or encumbrance on the Warranty Deed, without the
permission of buyer Janis Hearrell in writing and the direct signature of Janis Hean-ell, on the
Warranty Deed itself to be filed with the Town of Madison and certified by the filing clerk. The
Warranty Deed, as discussed with seller shall be drafted exactly as the 1977 Warranty Deed,:
Drafted and signed by Janis Hearrell C'Buyer'
1
) I Witnessed. ' \ .. .
. ( ' \ ~ \ ' \ 7
Signed by: - ~ iFAUb_tJiJt/l!J R L e
JU0 .u. HEARRE:t.'L .
AC 35938 A -192
EXHIBIT C
2001 - BEFORE
AC 35938 A- 193
EXHIBIT D
AFTER
I
EXHIBIT IE I
; SUPERiOl':. COURT
JANIS. HI2ARRELt.
.JUDICIA!. IJISTRICT OF 1\!EW
v.
!Vi AY 23, 2013
Pursuant to Practice Boo!< et SEI(J th(7 Plaintiff requests the Defendant
.June Hearn::'ll (hereinafter "the Defentiant") to admit or deny, for the purposes of this
litigation, the trLith of the following matters, inclucling the existE:HICe, due execution and
genuineness of any doeument described herein. Pursuant to Pr<:1ctice Book 13-23, the
Defen:iant's answer shall spec:ifically cieny tl1e matter or set forttJ in clet<lil tr1e reasons
why she cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the
of the requested adrnisslon, and when good faith requires that a party
qualify Ills or 11er answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is
such party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the
remainder. An answel'ing party may not give lacl< of information or knowledge as a
reason for failure to admit or deny unless sucll party states that he or she has mad<l
reasonable inquiry and that the information l<nown or readily obtainable by l1im or her is
to enable an admission or denial. A party who considers that a matter of
which admission 11as been requested presents a genuine issue for trial m<w not, on
tl1cAt ground alone, to the request; the patty may deny the matter or set forth
rea.c;ons why 11e or she cannot admit or denylt. Any reference to Jol1n Bennet or Gould
Larson, Bennet, Wells and McDonnell, P.C. are collectively referred to as "Bennet, et
Eli). Any referencf; to "property" or "Property" st1all refer to the property known as
Fence Creek Drive, Madison, Connecticut.
I
EXHI BIT E
1 ~ 3 i he Defendant ,June Hee1rrell confirms that the promissory note she Is using to
c1lh:1ge a debt provides! that upon her death the balance or the note, including
principle and intereBt shall be forgiven.
Answer:
E:.><H IF31T E
PROi'!USSORY NOTE
$33fl,OOO .. OO Guilford, Connecticut March l , 200:1.
FOR 'iJ'AJ:.UE :RJ:lJCEJ:tVED, the 1.mdersigned, >JANIS L, HEARRELL, an
individual residing at .15 F'r::nce Creek Drive, Madison, Connecticut ,
06443, promi se.s t:o 1,> <1.:\" b; ;rcJ.U D .. :UEARREI:,L , ('' ,J:DH" )an in.div:i.dual
:cesJd:Lng at 15 ien.c<-l r :r:c.>,e./c :o:cJ.vc , Madison, Connecticut , her heiJ:-.s,
and .L8 t:::1. 11.1.:1, o:c at hex residenc e at 15 Penoe
Creek Drive, IVJad:i.r.:ou , c:onn(:! ct::i.uLri: or at suoh otl.1er place as
the holder (including J'Uhe D. Hea:r:;:-ell he:r.e:i.nafter referred
t.o as the " HoJ.der" ). may desigm1.te, on demand , t.he principal s um
of THREE HO:NDUI) THI.R.'l'Y .EIGHT 'rHOUSAND and no/100ths ($338, 000 .. OQ )
J."lOLl.ARS, in J.awfuJ mcm.ey of the 'ffu:i.Le:HL of Atn :ci. ca , i,:n9f:')i:l1\') :t'
with on' the unpaid balanc' o:r' Lh.i. t>J not e , .beH:i. m. in\ 611 t h "'
date hereof, be :f. ore and af.te:r. matm::i.t: y,
annua1 :rate C!qua. l to seven pe:r: armtnll, r: ugcl:J:t .:c w:LU1
a11 taxes J.evied or C:ISS<?.SSed a9a'i.U!;L i'JI.< OU not(. , 0 :1:
t:he debt eviden ced hm;eJJy, and togeth.e:t: wJ. th a11 costs , expen .ses;
reasonable attorneys ' and p:.cof:es s io:nals ' fees incurred :i.:u any
act: :Lon' to coJ l . c:L t:J:I(-! i.n of t ld .. s not., !, t:n J:o:t"' lose a n}r
mort ga.ge o:c 13ecnx::Lty the l.nc1o ted.ne..; r o:f: t:his
note, or in p:rnt <::: ct:i .. 19 :. f:'m:l'or e.h1q c).l'l:\f right :J <lri.:,; note o:t'
any mo:ctqage -:i.Hq t:h..i. :;: uui. r:l .
'l'hi r;
without iJ.
.in 01: :i.:n pa:rt at any 1: i rne
Upon the de,:), th of ,June D. J:!c.: a:r:n!.l J, any principal
balance, w:i.t;h r.:iny OJ.J. said unpaid balance, shall
be forgi ven and the note shall Lo c onu.i.clered paid in :EulJ,
'I'hi. s not:<1 i.::> secured by a mort9a9e of even herewi th on
real property at 15 l!'ence c reek Drive., .Maci:lson , Connecticut (the
"
'I'he Maker U:t<:J.t i.f .tVii:tll.e'l: (:l) r:llta.U fa.:i.J Lo ma.ke.
payment; ,s .. c tmd' .i:' th:i.r.; not o wl.L<.! H .nt;: , o:r (.:i.:i.) au o:E
de.fau1t s hs1ll J:J ot.v e occv. e:r.<:cld undn:1: l:h n or ;;my u t:..tJ.e :r
documents executed in connect i on or i:hc:J- e w:l.tl:l. (:' ncl ud:i. ng
t: h:l.s Note a.nd t.he Mo:t:tgage, coJ.Ject :brely the ":t. r 1
then , upo11 the occur:renc:e of an event of de;e;;t,Uli.; , t.h' ent .h.e
i nd(>. btednesE: with accrued. .i n terest thereon due under this not e
shal l , at the 9pt:J.on of the Holder , accelerate and . ,bqcome
:i.mm<:>d.i ate1y due and
This Promissory note was filed August 17, 2010
This Promissory note was filed July 15, 2011
This Promissory note was submitted to the court October 6, 2011
This Promissory note was submitted to the court November 18, 2011
This Promissory note was submitted to the court December 19,2011
This Promissory note was repudiated by the Plaintiff June 23, 2013
This Promissory note was submitted to the Court at Trial July 1, 2013
This Promissory note was submitted to the Appellate Court November 2013
EXHIBIT F-Page 1
DOCKET NO. NNH-CV-10-6013782-S SUPEIUOR COURT
JUNE llEARRELL .J.D. OF NEW HAVEN
v. AT NEW HAVEN
JANIS HEARRELL MAY3,2013
MOTION TO J>RECLlJDE PROMISSORY NOTE PHOTOCOPY
iNVALIDATED BY THE PLAI.NTJFF
Defendant moves as follows:
That the Court precludes further use of the unauthenticated Promissory note
photocQQY, since the Plaintiff counsel John S. Bennet ("Bennet") stated during a
motion hearing that his intent is, to invalidate the document after his cli ent dies so he
doesn't have to adhere to Paragraph 3 of the document.
The Plaintiff in the entire first year of this case never made a claim of a lost
note or mi ssing original. The compl aint was filed without disclosure of a lost or
mi ssin!) note which would infer the Original Lawyer checked to make sure there was
an original for standing. The Original was offered for inspection on or about May 20,
2011 . It would be in bad faith if a lawyer (Thomas Cronan) intentionally lied about
of an Original offering it to the Defense Lawyer in a foreclosure.
The Plaintiff therefore must still be in possession of the Original Promissory
Note since she stated under oath , she never sold, or issued, nor assigned nor "left"
the ori9inal to anyone for free or for payment. It is conceivable that the Original does
,.ludtolal Oill''fi"'\' . U\1
not match the photocopy, and that was discovered by
,,..,, ,y ![ ,,/;,';, It
MAY o 2ow
CHief tN. IC' ..
IN'\\ v rrHCE.,
EXHIBIT F -Page 2
On August 22, 2011, (page 6 lines 18-27/page 7 lines 1-16) ,Judge Terence
Zemetis stated;
"[T]HE COURT: Mr. Bennett, the Appellate Court tells me that the
plaintiff in a foreclosure action based upon a promissory note must
possess the original, and I should have a hearing to dotermine whether
the plaintiff possess the original; and if the plaintiff does not possess the
original, the case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
MR. BENNETT: Well, your 1-lonor, I will tell you, we do not have the
original and I would look forward to that hearing because at that hearing
if we have to address that ...
THE COURT: We have to address that-- It's a subject matter jurisdiction
matter. We must address it with a hearing, and I'm going to give you the
citation because 1- - ... not that you don't have it already memorized, but
the case is, the string of cases that you may want to look at are
Oeutche Bank and Bialobrzeski, but the easiest way to find that one,
BIALOBRZESKI '123 Connecticut Appellate page 781. And
interestingly, there's a second case right after it the same names,
different bank
1
this time and it's 197. They both address this same issue
of subject matter jurisdiction, the possession, ownership of the note ... "]
1
Deutsehe_!}_ank National Trust Co. 123 Conn. App. 791 (20 I 0). Prior to the amended
complaint being filed--"[W]hen the question regarding the plaintiff's standing was raised, the court
should have held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was the owner or holder of the note at
the time the action was commenced. (court improperly failed to conduct evidentiary hearing because
jurisdiction hinged on factual determination) (Robinson, J.)
EXHIBIT F-Page 3
Attorney Cronan stepped away from this case June 2011 when the Original
Promissory Note was compelled by court order.
Attorney John S. Bennet ("Bennet") stepped in with a fantastic, imaginary
claim of a NOW m s s n ~ l Original Promissory Note, of wild false accusation for which
he has no facts in evidence.
Bennet then misdirected the Court to a fraudulently filed summary process he
filed (his client stated under oath she never filed an eviction) regarding this same
property, which is now in Vexatious litigation lawsuit filed by this Defendant. (CV-12-
60346'11)
Bennet told the Court (Zemetis, J) the photocopy being used was a "valid
copy" (November '18, 2011) , yet it was never filed with the land records and has no
authentication stamp. It is not valid, but the court took him at his word and used this
illegitimate photocopy and, a lawyer's intentional misrepresentation of material facts
as its findings.
For over a year Bennet has falsified financial documents based on nothing
other than Paragra.Q.h.1 of the promissory note photocopy, and his contradiction
of his clients testimony; such as the Plaintiff's s statement under oath that "the
mortgage was paid off" . (November 18, 2011 ), with full intent to to invalidate the
same Promissory note Paragraph 3,
EXHIBIT F-Page 4
On December 19, 2011 (Transcript pages 31 -33), Bennet said in court that he
has every intention after his client dies and that unequivocally he will not abide by the
contract's forgiveness clause (paragraph 3). He admitted premeditated breach of
contract.
This all simply means the photocopy is not authentic now if Bennet plans to
declan3 it unauthentic later.
The Defendant would have no recourse legally when Bennet invalidates the
photocopy, if it is not authenticated.
There is no presumption that any part of the photocopy is legitimate if it
will intentionally be breached and invalidated after plaintiff's death.
Since the Plaintiff must have had the original promissory note for standing,
then there is no reason to continue to allow the photocopy to be used for purposes of
"inventing" a debt where none exists. The contract (as defined by ON 124 Appendix
B) does not call for a loan, interest, borrowing, etc.
Only an unauthentic photocopy could be breached and only an AUTHENTIC
photo copy would be acceptable under Statute and the UCC as a stand in. Surely
one cannot believe that our legislature would allow any random UN-authenticated
document to be used in the seizure of property. It would be court room chaos and
rampant fraud.
EXHIBIT F -Page 5
Further why would this lawyer care about forgiveness of a debt at his clients death,
unless he has arranged a personal financial gain for himself.
The Judge had indicated prior to Bennet's appearance he would not admit a
photocopy as per our appellate court .
The Plaintiff asserts in her Complaint (#4) she is a lender and as such under
the Appellate Court she must have been in possession of the Original Note at the
time she filed the complaint and or amended her complaint. Her assertion by filing
the action is that she is the "owner and holder" of the Note and Mortgage, but has
presented no evidence substantiating that assertion. The photocopy of the Note
presented does not contain an endorsement (authentication) evidencing a filing of
this note or an assignment of the Note. There is no affidavit of truth filed with the
complaint (as alleged lender) nor is there a mention in 2010 of the location of the
original Note or who has /had possession of it at the time of filing.
The Plaintiff proffered no business records or testimony in the first year (or
ever) of this case tracing ownership of the Note and establishing Plaintiff was in
possession of the original at the time she filed the foreclosure action or was the
present holder during the first year. There is no lost note affidavit filed with the
Complaint and the
EXHIBIT F-Page 6
_Defendant argues that the unauthenticated, un-witnessed, unfiled photocopy
of the promissory note attached to the complaint is insufficient to establish that the
alleged lender held the original note and was entitled to enforce the note at the time
she filed suit.
The plaintiff has never proved she lent money and it is doubtful she would
have qualified to lend money by income/equity and assets.
This court has NEVER seen a loan document signed by the defendant, (which
the findings claim) .
This court has NEVER seen a document signed by either the Plaintiff or
Defendant that states $2500 per month is due, which is what Bennet claims in his
falsified financial documents.
This court has never seen a document which uses the word loan, lend, borrow,
creditor, debtor, or mortgagor (a word found
This court has never seen a debt in arrears submitted by the Plaintiff with
proof.
If the Plaintiff will not submit the Original to the Court now that the Plaintiff
counse!l has all but invalidated the photocopy for use, then the Court must
dismiss the case because it must be determined that the Plaintiff lacked
standing and had no capacity to sue on August 17, 2010.
EXHIBIT F-Page 7
ORDER
The foregoing motion having come before the Court it here hereby ORDERED:
GRANTED/DENIED
BY THE COURT ( .J)
JUDGE I ASST. CLERK I CLERK
OF SERVICE
On the date about stated, a copy hereof was sent to JohnS. Bennet , Gould Larson
Bennet Wells & McDonnell, PC, 30 Plains Road, R. . Box 959, Essex CT 06426;
I
860-767-2742, bennet@gould-larson.com

This Motion was Denied in court, it was chastised for being submitted by "pro-se", the (Fully disclosed
Limited Scope Represented) Defendant was told by Judge Pittman, to stop submitting Motions on her own,
and that thi s would be discussed at Trial. It was not.
June 23,20 13, a week before trial (July I, 20 13) the Plaintiff repudi ated the validity of the note by saying
she never submitted any document to the cowt with a forgiveness clause invalidating the only debt
document which is what Bennet did December 20 II , re: this Motion.
Had Judge Pittman or the Defendant been notified of the June 23, 20 13 Admission the action would have
been dismissed.
Had Judge Pittman been less focused on who submitted the Motion and more focused on the content
perhaps she could have articulated for the appellate court her reason behind not dismissing the case, and
aiding in the illegal seizure by a predatory lawyer.

LIST OF EXHIBITS
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Court Use Only
JD..CL-28 Rev. 4-13
SUPERIOR COURT
USTEXH
Type of Proceeding: Foreclosure
Date(s) of Proceeding:
1-3, 2013 11111111110
Court O Geographic
Area number
[BJ Judicial
District of: New Haven
Housing l At (Town}
D Sessi on New HAven
Name of case Name(f.of Clerk(s) .
June Hearrell v Janis Hearrell . Jed, CA._ ';(,c\.....
Name of Judge I of court reporter(s)
Pi ttman, J . U ) ,5 t OJL"Y/ (_X .s-3 2Cf )
l Docket number
NNH-CV1 0-601 3782-S
Plaintiffs Exhibits
Entered
Defendant's Exhibits
Entered
Into Evidence Into Ev:ldence
10
1. Appraisal Rept. Nadeau 6-12-13
1/t /1:?
ID
A.
Full
Yu?
2. Ltr J.Hearrell to Dic:k and Jeff 2-2-02(sic)
111 )\3
ID
B.
I Full
ID

10
-
rfU[p
3. Warranty Deed 3-1-01 (Cert copy) C.
Full
lD
-+-/1) 13
ID
-
4 . Conveyance Tax Strnt 3-1-01 D.
(l'ull)_ Full
6i
5. Closing Statment 3+01
1--/1 j 13
10
E.
Full
ID
6. Promissory Note 3-1-01, $338,000; 7% int ::j-jt /l3
ID
F.
rFuiD Full
lD
7. Mortgage Deed 3-1-01; $338, 000
--:r/ t 1 t3
10
G.
cFuiD
Full
ID
8. Agreement Regarding Life Use 3-1.-01
?--/ t/ Js
ID
H.

Full
Q9)
9. June Hearrell 2001 tax return
-:r /1 /}3
10
/.
Full Full
ID
10. Release of Mortgago vol 958 pg 20
1 /1 )1
3
ID
J .

Full
lD
11 . Lis pendens vol1682, pg 21
'f/l/13
10
K.
Q Full

12. E-mail Janis H to Beatty 212-2001

ID
L
Full
JU
13. 11-18-11 Transcript
ID
M.
Full Full
ID
14. 12..05-11 Transcript

N.N
o( cw. cJ .. dOv"t{:d 2{2 K'(D/
7/ t /13 Full
ID
15. Janis Hearrell Payments records
fl t/ 13
1!?.
o.o.
CDI{JIVJ of C\tt..e..cl s (ui))
I

16. Mark Howland Report 8-31-12
l{z/13
10"
P. P fJc+\ce_ (c . bl(i:[t:f Cfi,L-vlf.;ts

lA
in< u
ID
17. Howland Calc to all checks

O{;)l.etr.eA. to Pa:Jn'cJ.. Fi/lllfli.-j. 1/2/is Full
10
18. Howland Calc to 7-1-1.3 adj usted
:t/"L- /13

R.R. ::t/2..)

10
19. Howland Calc to 7-1-13 w/o 5 checks
1(7-)13
10
cFu\1)
s.
Full
10"
20. Atty. Thomas Cronan Fee affidavit
't-{2-( 13
ID
T.
(fuji)
Full

21 . Atty. Bennet Fee Affidavit

ID
Full
u.
ID
22. Howland Depostion Supoena and Invoice
1(t--( 13
10
tfull:
V.
Full
'1rf
23. Not ice of Lien vol 1 i'65 p 254
ride)
ID
w.
(F;;rr;
Full
cz; 24. A-{(idcwi-l erf ;vta.rc !V a..Aea. u
ID -
-:t-/Z/13
X.
Full
ID
25.
ID
Full
y
Full
ID
26.
10
z.
FuM
Full
Plaintiffs exhibits retumed to Date Defendant' s exhibits retumed to Date
Receipt acknowledged (Attorney for P/.9intlfl) Date Receipt acknowledged (Attorney for Defendant) Date
-
Page 1 of 2
LIST OF EXHI BITS
STATE OF CONNECTI CUT
Court Use Only
JD-CL-28 Rev. 4-13
SUPERIOR COURT
LISTEXH
Type of Proceeding: Date(s) of Proceeding:
7-1-2013 llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Court D Geographic
Area number
D Judicial
District of:
D Housing
Session
I At (Town)
Name of case Name(s) of Clerk(s)
Name of Judge I Name(s) of court reporter(s) I Docket number
Plaintiffs Exhibits
Entered
Defendant's Exhi bits
Entered
into Evidence
Into Evidence
10
1. NOT EVIDENCE OF A DEFAULT
10
FALSIFIED
A. THERE IS NO AFFIDAVIT OF DEBT REQUIRED
Full Ful l
ID
2.
NOT EVIDENCE OF A DEFAULT
10
FALSIFIED B.
Full
Full
10
3. P-1 PAID TO HER SATISFACTION
10
p#1 C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM THE REQUIRED
Full Full
10
4. NOT EVIDENCE OF A DEBT
ID
EMBZ. FEE D. PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH A DEBT
Full Full
ID
5. NOT SIGNED - NOT EVID. OF A DEBT
ID
FALSIFIED E.
Full Full
10
6. REPUDIATED VALIDITY BY "E" 6/23/1 3
10
INVALID F. ALL-- INTENTIONAL FALSE EVIDENCE FELONY
Full Full
ID
7. HAS NO MORTGAGOR OR LENDER
ID
Full
NO BORW. G. LAWYER PREPARED, OFFERED
Full
ID
8. DOC. DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SMJ 1/12/2012
ID
H. AND SUBMITTED TO DECEIVE COURT
Full Full
ID
9.
Full
JUDGE DID NOT ACCEPT-HEARSAY DECEIT
ID
TO EXACT JUDGMENT AND FEES I.
Full
10
10. RELEASE OF PERSONAL LOAN (2001) NOT MTG.
10
J.
Full Full
ID
11. NOT FILED IN COMPLIANCE W/ LAW INVALID
ID
K.
Full Full
ID
12. NOT EVIDENCE OF A DEBT (FALSE) FORGED
ID
L.
Full Full
10
13. NOT EVIDENCE OF A DEBT DIFF CASE
ID
M. EXHI BITS
Full Full
10
14. NOT EVIDENCE OF A DEBT DIFF CASE
10
N. NN -PAID OFF PERSONAL LOAN #1 0 DN124/ 8
Full Full
ID
15. PARTIAL NOT AUTHORI Z./CERTIFI ED TAMPER
ID
0. 00- TAMPERED WITH- PARTIAL LIST TAMPER
Full Full
ID
16. DISQUALIFIED AS EXPERT DN 324. '10 4/30/13
ID
p
PP - FORGED BY EMPLOYEE PLAINT. TAMPER
Full Full
ID
17. DISQUALIFIED AS EXPERT DN 324.'10 4/30/13
ID
Q. QQ - ZEMETIS RECCOMENDED - BIAS NO EVID.
Full Full
ID
18. DISQUALIFIED AS EXPERT DN 324.10 4/30/13
ID
R. RR -DISQUALIFI ED AS EXPERT 324.10 4/30/13
Full Full
ID
19. DISQUALIFIED AS EXPERT DN 324.1 0 4/30/13
ID
s.
Full Full
ID
20. CRONAN NO PAYMENTS - INVOICES FALSIFIED
ID
T.
Full Full
ID
21 . PADDED FEES BY BENNET-NO INV.'S FALSIFIED
ID
U. FORGED FEDERAL LOSS MITIGATION FELONY
Full Full
ID
22. DISQUALIFIED AS EXPERT DN 324.10 4/30/13
ID
V. FALSI FIED JD-CV-77 FELONY
Full Full
ID
23. DEFENDANT' S LIEN (NOT ON JDCV77) FELONY
ID
w
Ful l Full
ID
24. NOT GERMANE-BENNET'S PICTURES PICS 2011
ID
CHECK 4/30/1- DATED 9/30/2002
Full
X. FELONY
Full
ID
25.
ID
Y. IS FORGED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND
Full Full
OF "P"
ID
26.
ID
USED AS EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT Z. PRIVILEGE
Full Full
Plaintiff's exhibits returned to Date Defendant's exhibits returned to Date
Receipt acknowledged (Attorney for Date Receipt acknowledged (Attorney for Defendant) Date
Page 1 of 2
DOCKET NO. NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
JANIS HEARRELL
V.
JUNE D. HEARRELL
JOHN S. BENNET
GOULD LARSON BENNET WELLS &
MCDONNELL
EXHIBIT I-Page 1
: SUPERJOR COURT
: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW HAVEN
:AT NEW HAVEN
:DECEMBER 11,2013
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR COURT ORDER FOR PETITION OF
"IN CAMERA" REVIEW OF TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS
BELONGING TO DEFENDANT JUNE HARRELL
The Plaintiff moves for a Court Order to perform an in camera review of the Defendant
June Hearrell ' s testamentary documents. The testamentary documents are not bound by
confidentiality and are the sole property of June Hearrell. Any protective order request should be
denied and should be seen as an indication of possible undue influence to place a property not
belonging to a cli ent, in testamentary documents, as stated by June Hearrell and her family and
friends .
An in camera review is directly imperative and germane to the underlying action to this
vexatious litigation. An inadvertent statement by Defendant June Hearrell, witnessed by a notary
(present for other purposes) was made on November 8, 2012. She said, "I left vour house in my
will". This was memorialized in an affidavit of fact, (a copy of which was sent and received by
Defendant JohnS. Bennet on June 30, 2013) and went unaddressed until recent extraordinary
developments.
1 I NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 2
A permanently estranged family member to the Plaintiff (herein) and "friends" of June
Hearrell have reached out to the Plaintiff (herein) on different occasions to help the "elder"
Defendant June Hearrell , who is being allegedly coerced and exploited by her co-defendant John
Bennet and she is allegedly afraid.
It is being alleged by that the Defendant June Hearrell has been coerced by Defendant
John Bennet, to sign a will in which she leaves real estate that does not belong to her (that is the
sole property of the Plaintiff's), to her heirs and assigns, who will then distribute the cash from
the sale of someone else's. Her heirs (who paid the legal fees in the underlying action this elder
stated (under oath) she never consented to file in her name), will then distribute the sale proceeds
''after the Probate Court (premeditated) seizes the property based on the will, and testimony of
John Bennet (an officer of the court and co-defendant (herein). Evidently the manipulation to
"change her "stories" and testimony from case to case, to intentionally confuse the court, has June
Hearrell worried about pe1jury charges, in spite of Bennet telling her "no Judge will put someone
your age in jail". An embarrassment is that every time she told the truth, Bennet made her look
like a fool by his contradiction ofher testimony, for his own "story", by making up claims of elder
abuse, etc. On any given day with all the coaching she could hardly remember what lie she was
supposed to tell on what day. When she was informed she filed an eviction action against the
person who bought her house with cash and after a renovation let her live there free, she was
horrifi{:d.
This vexatious litigation is the result of that eviction in which a judge ruled June Hearrell
had no superior right to possession. YET, the co-defendant lawyers (herein) put the property she
has no right to in a testamentary document.
21 NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 3
June Hearrell further said she is afraid she will lose her license and her fi'eedom because
Bennet filed in court papers she could no longer drive which was because he did not want to
attend a deposition in New Haven. The quote from the family member is "he (Bennet) is
"maniacal about destroying Janis Hearrell (Plaintiff) and taking her house". She (June Hearrell) is
also embarrassed that her personal , small ploy to get money from her daughter has been turned
into something never intended by John Bennet, and she looks like a fool , but cannot stop him.
To further attempt to stop all ofthis on June 25, 2013, Defendant June Hearrell implicated
herself in an extortion scheme, by setting the record straight in this vexatious litigation, and in a
foreclosure action that for three years she used an illegitimate promissory note photocopy, to try to
get money from her wealthy daughter.
June Hearrell contends ifthere is no debt due then there is no foreclosure and there can be
no claim of a debt in the testamentary documents. But after making the "admission" in this case
Bennet made her go to trial and submit the same illegitimate document. The Court entered
judgment on the basis of an admitted falsified document Bennet submitted as evidence (Class D
Felony). At great expense the case is on appeal.
The Plaintiff and June Hearrell have had no relationship for close to a decade, and never
will again. For June Hearrell's family and her friends to reach out to the Plaintiff, is
extraordinary.
,Any effort made by the Plaintiff to request that a Judge secure and conduct an in camera
review of the testamentary documents of Defendant June HeatTell, is to protect the Plaintiffs
solely owned real property and prevent its deed from being compromised unlawfully and unduly
in Probate Court, simply or payment of fees .. It is also to create awareness of the Courts to the
3 1 NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 4
predatory exploitation of elders in general, by "undue influence" of Testamentary Capacity, by
Overriding Individual Preferences , as referenced by the American Bar Association, such as in 24
Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 253 (200 1 ).
On behalf of this Defendant June Hearrell, the Defendant John Bennet has previously
averred to her forged signature on a Federal Loss Mitigation Affidavit, Interrogatories, an
affidavit of debt, etc. It wouldn ' t surprise, if the signature is on a 2011 testamentary document
prior to a Judge ruling the Defendant had no right to the property. That would be premeditation.
As further impeachment of the credibility of these Defendant officers of the Court, on
November 19, 2013, Defendant Bennet intentionally and irreparably sabotaged an attempt of the
Plaintiff to Appeal the judgment of foreclosure.
In an affidavit by a Connecticut Notary, duly sworn to by a second Notary she averred that
she witnessed a conversation on November 18, 2012, between the Plaintiff and Defendant,
whereby the Defendant June Hearrell said "I left your house in my will" (said affidavit is attached
hereto as Exhibit A, the word "your" is operative.)
Prior to that statement, on December 19, 2011 , Defendant Bennet said, in lawyer oratory
at a hearing for the underlying action to this vexatious litigation, the Plaintiff (herein) "will pay
even if(his client) dies." The fake promissory note had a forgiveness clause, so to who would
Defendant John Bennet like the Plaintiff to pay and based on what? On what basis was this
lawyer cherry-picking paragraphs in a phony photocopied document to enable a debt in one
paragraph and to ignore the forgiveness of "any" debt outlined in another paragraph of the same
document?
4 1 NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 5
It is alleged by the Defendant June Hearrell's family member, that Bennet paid the elder a
large amount of cash, "for the privilege of extorting the Plaintiff"on her behalf, and Bennet wants
his money back ... The Plaintiff has no knowledge of this since protective orders were secured
frantically by Defendant Bennet to preclude the Plaintiff from attempting to obtain financial
records of the Defendant, claiming that subpoenas for banking records were "the wholesale abuse
of an elder to expose her financ ial history". The Defendant June Hearrell on the other hand,
testified under oath in this underlying action, " ... the only records I have are bank records". These
records are such that if the Court (Maronich J.) had not allowed preclusion would have shut down
all of these frauds, and extortions in a continual wealth-profiling exercise, are the only proof the
Defendant June Hearrell has that she was "paid to her full satisfaction". (Warranty Deed
Paragraph I) .
EVIDENCE OF A CRIME
The Appellate court has stated, "This comt has held that "if the trial court discovers
material exculpatory evidence in the in camera inspection, it has a duty to disclose it to the
defense and the defendant has a due process right to its disclosure .. . The defendant [is] not
entitled however, to an unlimited inspection of [confidential documents] in the hope of
discovering material evidence. Access to confidential records should be left to the discretion of
the trial court better able to assess the probative value of such evidence as it relates to the
particular case ... and to weigh that value against the interest in confidentiality of the records. "
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harris, 227 Conr1. 751 ,_762, 631
A.2d 309 (1993). _This vexatious litigation is the second attempt by these defendants to illegally
5 I NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 6
extort the Plaintiffs real property by falsifying evidence. The alleged premeditated intestate
attempt in a future probate court can be stopped with an in-camera review. An in camera review
would also assist the Court in determining whether Defendant John Bennet has engaged in elder
exploitation or abuse by extorting escalated legal fees needlessly. If he was not paid for drafting
testamentary documents, it is not the fault of an irrelevant party, and there is no legal justification
to seize an unrelated patty's property for the payment of such.
The underlying action to this vexatious litigation was dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Period. It was established that June Hearrell has no superior (or any) right to the
Plaintiff's property.
The Defendant has failed to disclose she is being coerced, it is believed she is afraid of
John Bennet and allows the demeaning and dangerous coercion for his attention.
CRJMINAL ELEMENT WORTHY OF IN CAMERA REVIEW
" ... [I]f the in camera inspection does not revel relevant material .. . " State v. Kemah, 289
Conn. 411 , 425-26, 957 A.2d 852 (2008) ..
The Plaintiff requests the order that the Defendant not attempt to devise the real estate in
any testamentary document unless she has lawful title to the property so as to avoid confusion as
to the title to the property under the presumption that the Court undertakes the proper analysis of
the law and the facts to prevent further criminal activity by the Defendants to extort this property.
Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 251 Conn. 59, 72, 752 A.2d 1037 (1999L
The Appellate Court states, "In State v. Esposito, [192 Conn. 166, 179-80, 471 A.2d 949
1984) we set forth the following perspective for the disclosure of confidential 'if ... the
6 I NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 7
claimed impeaching information is privileged there must be a showing that there is reasonable
ground to believe that failure to produce the information is likely to impair the defendant's right of
confrontation such that the witness ' direct testimony should be stricken.'
In this action of vexatious litigation, June Hearrell raised, "advise of counsel" as a
defense, therefore there is no reason for an expectation of privilege or of exception to piercing of
the attorney- client privilege, by the groundless claims of Defendant John Bennet, (who has a
conflict of interest) nor is there privilege applicability under of Section 1-210 (b) (1 0), nor does
General Statutes 52-146r (a) (2), apply which defines, '[c]onfidential communications' , nor does
any Rule of Professional Conduct apply. Privilege belongs to the client, not to the lawyer and the
testamentary documents belong to the client (Defendant herein).
Since the testamentary document would become evidence in a Probate court action,
falsifying a testamentary document by coercing a person before death, to add falsified
information, would be falsifying testamentary evidence. Defendant June Hearrell admitted there
is no debt due, by invalidation of the phony promissory note photocopy.
If there is no debt of any type there is no legitimate life use, which is what Bennet
attempted to claim in the underlying "Eviction", which and the Defendant June Hearrell stated
under oath she never gave consent to file in her name.
If there is no debt there would be no reason for a claim of neither unsatisfied debt nor lien
securing the same and therefore no justifiable reason to add the Plaintiff's real estate in the
Defendant's testamentary documents.
Pretrial discovery is allowed in civil cases " .. . if the disclosure sought would be of
assistance in the prosecution or defense ofthe action ... " Practice Book 13-2. Here in this
71 NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT 1-Page 8
vexatious litigation any documents ordered to be produced at this point would be admissible in
evidence or could lead to discovery of admissible evidence.
It is the Plaintiff's right to know about any other illegitimate attempt to take the Plaintiff's
property or to create a cloud on her title in light of the Defendant' s admission that she has been
effectively extorting the Plaintiff (herein) for over three years with a phony debt document.
Privilege does not apply, nor does an officer of the court (Defendant herein) coercing a
client to add prope1ty not belonging to the client in testamentary documents, for a windfall to the
lawyer after death of the client.
All impediments to clear title should be removed given that the Defendant has no debt
instrument that is valid as per own admission, and she extinguished any semblance of life use in
2009, by making repeated demands for money. This life use is not a statutory life estate, nor is it
a life tenancy nor did the owner of the propetty (Plaintiff) agree (DN 124 Appendix B /CV 10-
6013782S)
IMPEACHED CREDIBILITY
The Defendants credibility has been impeached beyond repair by unbridled perjury,
forgery, falsifying evidence and the possibility that lawyers could get away with seizing property
in probate court by coercion of an elder' s signature on testamentary documents, is royally
arrogant, prejudicial and corrupt. That is, if the documents were not forged, as is the usual
procedure with Defendant Bennet.
EVIDENCE
81 Nr--IH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXH][BIT I-Page 9
The evidence favorable to encourage the court to order an in camera review is the
statement by Defendant June Heanell, from November 8, 2012, that she said to the Plaintiff,
(Affidavit Exhibit A) "I left your house in my will" the very use of the words; "your house"
indicates something groundless is afoot.
The statement went unaddressed for a year, until these last two months of2013, when
after the affidavit was made known to June Hearrell ' s family, one family member and two of her
alleged friends reached out to the Plaintiff. One afraid for family members "in deep with Bennet"
and the other seeing the all-consuming fear and embarrassment of an elder who fears loss of her
freedom for a self-fulfilling prophecy ofBennet's to seize a million dollar property for himself,
and his false claims about her that she is broke, cannot drive, was abused; ... which are all untrue.
A Judge has ruled in the underlying action to this vexatious litigation, that Defendant
(herein) June Hearrell has no superior right of possession.
The in camera review of the testamentary documents is directly correlated to this
vexatious litigation and an appropriate filing under this action to ensure further extortion attempts
will not occur at the death of June Hearrell in Probate Court. The executor of her will is not a
party, but paid for the eviction action, to which June Hearrell said she did not consent. It is not
known if the executor directed Bennet' s actions.
CRJMINAL ELEMENT WORTHY OF IN CAMERA REVIEW
Upon the motion of any party and a finding by the court that such party would be
prejudiced by the disclosure of the documents, the court may consider some or all of the exhibits
in camera. An in camera review is germane to statements made by June Hearrell regarding
9 I NNH -CV -12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 10
leaving a piece of real estate of which she has no ownership in her will under coercion of lawyers,
in spite of a Judge's order that June Hearrell has no superior right to possession of the Plaintiffs
property and to the issue of whether June Hearrell is being exploited. Defendant John Bennet is
obsessed with the extortion of this prope1ty and the Plaintiff testamentary documents would be the
third attempt and would be revealing as to his motive.
LEGAL FEES
The Defendant June Hearrell stated under oath she never filed an eviction, and paid no
legal fees for the action. The underlying action was lost in housing court by Defendant John
Bennet on January 12, 2012, who deserves no payment of fees by this Plaintiff. He was paid fees
however by the executor of the estate (of the very much alive Defendant June Hearrell), according
to admissions in this vexatious litigation prior to releasing the executor from t h ~ action.
Defendant Client June Hearrell paid no legal fees for the underlying action yet Defendant
John Bennet offioaded approximately $12,000 of legal fees into the foreclosure action bill
submitted (in which he used the admitted I2.h2.D.Y promissory note to exact a judgment). There is
no reference of any payment for the $90,000 bill submitted by Bennet. If that is the case then the
foreclosure action was contingency, and there would be no bill.
The In camera review will indicate if the Defendant John Bennet and the Executor
1
ofthe
estate are attempting to seize property from the Plaintiff (herein) (who won the action which
declared there is no life use and no debt due), in order to be paid legal fees on behalfofthe person
1
The Executor submitted Evidence #3 in the underlying case, which is falsified evidence of an "email chain" the
reviewing pane is still open in the fabricated Word document and all of the "changes" were not accepted.
10 I NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 11
who "never filed the eviction", Defendant June Hearrell. Why should the Plaintiff herein pay for
her own attempted extortion.
June Hearrell has had no rights to the prope1ty since she sold it in 2001,
2
cashing in by
undue influence of an elder starved for attention is pathetic and shows no sound judgment.
It is incumbent upon a lawyer drafting a last will and testament to ensure that any real
property included is legitimate.
Defendant June Heanell is lucid, mobile, and apparently healthy She drives herself in
multiple States without incident, and she shops, travels, and plays bridge almost daily. She
winters' in Florida and is a club member in both Florida and Madison CT. She is the same age as
Alan Greenspan and the Queen of England. She is old which does not make her honest or nice or
kind, it just means she has lived a certain number of yeaTs. This woman allowed her elder status
to be exploited setting a president for every unethical "elder" lawyer to abuse age to obviate the
need for evidence.
This in-camera request for review is imperative to discern whether or not the property
belonging to the Plaintiff was put into testamentary documents, by one who has no ownership
rights, purely for the fut ure attempted extortion by her Lawyers for their windfall.
The in-camera review by the Court would only be objected to, ifthere were something to
hide, or ifthe elder was still being coerced to act or say certain things by Bennet.
2
lt was ruled that June Hearrell had no superior right to possession on January 12,2012 by dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction of the claim, with this same lawyer. The Court (Zemetis, J) then on September 10,
2012 claimed all findings to be of no force or effect. June Hearrell never appealed the dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction decision. The Defendant claimed in Fami ly Court as respondent to a TRO, she never
consented to fi ling the eviction action in the first place. The claim by the Defendant lawyers is that this was
taken out of context. The Pl aintiff (herein) and the Complainant (therein), contends ALL testimony under oath,
IS context .. . what else could it be.)
Il l NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 12
WHEREFORE, The Plaintiff requests the cowt order June Hearrell, Defendant in this case, to
submit for in camera review, of all of her Testamentary documents to ensure there is not the
illegal attempt to extort the solely owned prope1ty of the Plaintiff (Janis Hearrell) after the death
ofthe Defendant, by false claim of ownership or false claim of debt or false inheritance in her
testamentary documents. The court must find a way to stop these obsessive attempts by
Defendant John Bennet to extort the plaintiff, and a capias is requested if June Hearrell will not
submit her documents ..
1. The Plaintiff requests that if the cowt discovers that the property owned by Plaintiff Janis
Hearrell (15 Fence Creek Drive, Madison CT) is in the Defendant' s testamentary
documents, that by court order it be removed immediately, and issue an order to
prevent further attempts by Attorney John Bennet, and the other Defendants to extort this
property after the death of June Hearrell.
2. The Plaintiff requests that if there is no reference to the Plaintiffs prope1ty in the
testamentary documents that the Court Order a prohibition to attempt to add to
testamentary documents any attempt to seize the real or personal Prope1ty of Plaintiffs by
the Defendants or any other heir or assign of June Heat-rell ' s before or after her death.
3. The court order the release of all encumbrances on this property on which there is no loan,
no debt and nothing owed to June Hearrell or any one of her heirs or assigns, and so the
Defendant John Bennet may stop attempting to exact money or property for his personal
financial gain.
THE PLAINTIFF
JANIS HEARRELL
12 1 NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 13
By /s/ _____ _
Janis L. Heatrell (JLH Cooper)
Self-Represented
PO Box 1648
Greenwich CT 06836
Fax 203-245-4466
ORDER
The foregoing motion having come before the Court it here hereby ORDERED:
GRANTED I DENIED
BY THE COURT ( .J)
JUDGE
This Motion was "DENIED" by Judge Brian
Fisher who simply wrote DENIED. No law
was attached, no protective motion for either
the Elder or the Plaintiff herein was attached.
The Parties would like to know why there is
no law or authority attached and requested
the Judicial Counsel assist in answering the
question, to protect these citizens from a
predatory lawyer.
13 1 NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
EXHIBIT I-Page 14
CERTIFICATION
The undersigned hereby certified that a copy of the foregoing was sent on this date via
Federal Express /overnight mail upon all counsel and pro se parties of record as follows:
Richard Carella, Esq.
Kevin J. McEleney, Esq.
1 00 Pearl Street, 1 ?'h Floor
P.O. Box 231227
Harford, CT 06123-12 77 I
(860) 548-2681 I Fax 860-346-4580
Charles E. Vermette, Jr., Esq.
Litchfield Cavo
82 Hopmeadow Street, Suite 210
Simsbury, CT 06089
(860) 413-2707 I (860) 413-2801 Fax
email: vermette@litchfieldcavo.com
/203 Main Street, 300 Plaza Middlesex
/Middletown CT 06457
_____ Is! _______ _
Janis L. Hearrell I CooperJLH
Self- Represented
14 1 NNH-CV-12-6034611-S
November 8, 2012
EXHIBIT I-Page 15
EXHIBIT A
!, Al ison S. Gould, am a Licensed Real Estate l:lroker of 1 years, a Licensed Real Estate Salesperson
for 23 years, and a former Licensed Insurance Agent in the State of Connecticut.
I, Ali son S. Gould, do swear that I am over the age of 18, and am aware of the responsibility of my
oath, as I have been a Notary Public in the State of Connecticut for over 25 years, and have abided
by the rules established by the Connecticut Secretary of State for Notary Publics during that time.
I do swear and affirm the following:
That I have known, janis 1-l ea rrell, for over 25 years, and have found her to be honest and
responsible, as well as a successful business woman in New York, New York; Greenwich,
Connecticut; and Madison, Connecticut.
That on November 6th, 2012, Janis Hearrell cont<lctec! me and requested that I accompany her on
November 8
1
h, 2012, to her mother' s (june Hearrell) apartment for the purpose of notarizing
documents.
That on November U
1
", 2012, Janis Hea rrell and I met at her horne on 15 Fence Creek, where she
signed two checks in front of me, made payable to june Hearrel l. I reviewed the documents
(releases) she was presenting to june Hearrell, and would be requesting that 1 notari ze.
That we then left janis Hea rrell's home and went to Clippership Row Apartments, where june
Hearrell resides. I brought my notary seal, date stamp and the documents attached to a clipboard
with a pad. I stood next to Janis Hearrell when she knocked on the door of june Hearrell's
apartment. The following is the conversation 1 heard and witnessed:
June Hearrell: "Come in"
Janis Hearrell: "Please come to the door to tal k, it's janis"
june Hearrell opened the door: "What do you want?"
Jani s Hearrell: ''I'm here to offer you a cash settlement to release my property, and stop this
ridiculous foreclosur e"
June Hea 1Tcll : "1 don't want your money, and I'm not involved in the forec losure anymore.
left your ho liSe in my wi II ... you jerk Take your money and get out of here". At this poilit
june Hearre\l slammed the door shut on janis Hearrell.
As per jani s Hearrell 's request, I wrote out the above conversation and CV(:Jilts I witnessed.
. .. LP r / 1f l:? a.d-
_J\.1_ . _ r ___ _
11
L' L_ :Ji/1; jJ, CfriV::.ecJ, ,
S. Gou ld Date ; v '- (
----.
1ftttuJ1ULiJ.flil
OONNA BASSETI
Notary eublic, State of Connecticut
My Commission ExPires May 31,201 5
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
THE ATTORNEY'S OATH
You solemnly swear or solemnly and sincerely affirm, as the case may be, that you will do
nothing dishonest, and will not knowingly allow anything dishonest to be done in court, and
that you will inform the court of any dishonesty of which you have knowledge; that you will not
knowingly maintain or assist in maintaining any cause of action that is false or unlawful; that
you will not obstruct any cause of action for personal gain or malice; but that you will exercise
the office of attorney, in any court in which you may practice, according to the best of your
learning and judgment, faithfully, to both your client and the court; so help you God or upon
penalty of perjury. (General Statutes 1-25 and annotations.)
(Amended pursuant to Public Act 02-71 to take effect Oct. 1, 2002.)
Preamble
Scope
Rules
Commentaries
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities
A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession,
is a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.
As a representative of clients, a lawyer per-
forms various functions. As advisor, a lawyer pro-
vides a client with an informed understanding of
the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications. As advocate,
a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position
under the rules of the adversary system. As nego-
tiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the
client but consistent with requirements of honest
dealing with others. As evaluator, a lawyer exam-
ines a client's legal affairs and reports about them
to the client or to others on the client's behalf.
In addition to these representational functions,
a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, a
nonrepresentational role helping the parties to
resolve a dispute or other matter. Some of these
Rules apply directly to lawyers who are or have
served as third-party neutrals. See, e.g., Rules
1.12 and 2.4. In addition, there are Rules that
apply to lawyers who are not active in the practice
of law or to practicing lawyers even when they
are acting in a nonprofessional capacity. For
example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the con-
duct of a business is subject to discipline for
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation. See Rule 8.4.
In all professional functions a lawyer should be
competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should
maintain communication with a client concerning
the representation. A lawyer should keep in confi-
dence information relating to representation of a
client except so far as disclosure is required or
permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct
or other law.
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the
requirements of the law, both in professional ser-
vice to clients and in the lawyer's business and
personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's
procedures only for legitimate purposes and not
to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should
demonstrate respect for the legal system and for
those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers
and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty,
when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of offi-
cial action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold
legal process.
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek
improvement of the law, access to the legal sys-
tem, the administration of justice and the quality
of service rendered by the legal profession. As a
member of a learned profession, a lawyer should
cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for
clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the
law and work to strengthen legal education. All
lawyers should work to ensure equal access to
our system of justice for all those wt10, because
of economic or social barriers, cannot afford or
Copyrighted by the Secretary of the State of the State of Connecticut
J
secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should
aid the legal profession in pursuing these objec-
tives and should help the bar regulate itself in the
public interest.
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities
are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, as well as substantive and procedural law.
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal
conscience and the approbation of professional
peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest
level of skill, to improve the law and the legal
profession and to exemplify the legal profession's
ideals of public service.
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative
of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when
an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer
can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client
and at the same time assume that justice is being
done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserv-
ing client confidences ordinarily serves the public
interest because people are more likely to seek
legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obliga-
tions, when they know their communications will
be private.
In the nature of law practice, however, conflict-
ing responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all
difficult ethical problems arise from conflict
between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to
the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest
in remaining an ethical person while earning a
satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Con-
duct often prescribe terms for resolving such con-
flicts. Within the framework of these Rules,
however, many difficult issues of professional dis-
cretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved
through the exercise of sensitive professional and
moral judgment guided by the basic principles
underlying the Rules. These principles include the
lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pur-
sue a client's legitimate interests, within the
bounds of the law, while maintaining a profes-
sional , courteous and civil attitude toward all per-
sons involved in the legal system.
The legal profession is largely self-governing.
Although other professions also have been
granted powers of self-government, the legal pro-
fession is unique in this respect because of the
close relationship between the profession and the
processes of government and law enforcement.
This connection is manifested in the fact that ulti -
mate authority over the legal profession is vested
largely in the courts.
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations
of their professional calling, the occasion for gov-
ernment regulation is obviated. Self-regulation
2
also helps maintain the legal profesHion's inde-
pendence from government domination. An inde-
pendent legal profession is an important force in
preserving government under law, for abuse of
legal authority is more readily challemged by a
profession whose members are not dependent on
government for the right to practice.
The legal profession's relative autonomy car-
ries with it special responsibilities of self-govern-
ment. The profession has a responsibility to
assure that its regulations are conceived in the
public interest and not in furtherance of parochial
or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every law-
yer is responsible for observance of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid
in securing their observance by other lawyers.
Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the
independence of the profession and the public
interest which it serves.
Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of
society. The fulfillment of this role requires an
understanding by lawyers of their relationship to
our legal system. The Rules of Professional Con-
duct, when properly applied, serve to define
that relationship.
(Amended June 26, 2006, to take effect Jan. 1, 2007.)
Scope
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of
reason. They should be interpreted with reference
to the purposes of legal representation and of the
law itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast
in the terms "shall " or "shall not. " These define
proper conduct for purposes of professional disci-
pline. Others, generally cast in the term " may,"
are permissive and define areas u n l e ~ r the Rules
in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise pro-
fessional judgment. No disciplinary action should
be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or
acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other
Rules define the nature of relationships between
the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly
obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive
and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's pro-
fessional role.
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context
shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes
court rules and statutes relating to matters of licen-
sure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers
and substantive and procedural law in general.
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an
open society, depends primarily upon under-
standing and voluntary compliance, secondarily
upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion
and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement
through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do
not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical con-
siderations that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be completely
defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide
a framework for the ethical practice of law.
Furthermore, for purposes of determining the
lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of
substantive law external to these Rules determine
whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most
of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer rela-
tionship attach only after the client has requested
the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer
has agreed to do so. But there are some duties,
such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that
attach when the lawyer agrees to consider
whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be
established. See Rule 1.18. Whether a client-law-
yer relationship exists for any specific purpose
can depend on the circumstances and may be a
question of fact.
Under various legal provisions, including con-
stitutional , statutory and common law, the respon-
sibilities of government lawyers may include
authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily
reposes in the client in private client-lawyer rela-
tionships. For example, a lawyer for a government
agency may have authority on behalf of the gov-
ernment to decide upon settlement or whether to
appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority
in various respects is generally vested in the attor-
ney general and the state's attorney in state gov-
ernment, and their federal counterparts, and the
same may be true of other government law offi-
cers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these
officers may be authorized to represent several
government agencies in intragovernmental legal
controversies in circumstances where a private
lawyer could not represent multiple private clients.
They also may have authority to represent the
"public interest" in circumstances where a private
lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These
Rules do not abrogate any such authority.
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibi-
tion imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the
disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that
disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will
be made on the basis of the facts and circum-
stances as they existed at the time of the conduct
in question and in recognition of the fact that a
lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incom-
plete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the
Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline
should be imposed for a violation, and the severity
of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances,
such as the willfulness and seriousness of the
violation, extenuating factors and whether there
have been previous violations.
3
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to
a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does
not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in
pending litigation. The Rules are d e s i ~ n e d to pro-
vide guidance to lawyers and to provide a struc-
ture for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis
for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked
by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The
fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-
assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not
imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding
or transaction has standing to seek enforcement
of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do
establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a law-
yer's violation of a Rule may be Ewidence of
breach of the applicable standard of conduct.
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to gov-
ern or affect judicial application of either the attor-
ney-client or work product privilege. Those
privileges were developed to promote compliance
with law and fairness in litigation. In reliance on
the attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to
expect that communications within the scope of
the privilege will be protected against compelled
disclosure. The attorney-client privilege is that of
the client and not of the lawyer. ThH fact that in
exceptional situations the lawyer undf3r the Rules
has a limited discretion to disclose a client confi-
dence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a
general matter, the client has a reasonable expec-
tation that information relating to the client will
not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of
such information may be judicially compelled only
in accordance with recognized exceptions to the
attorney-client and work product privileges.
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to dis-
close information under Rule 1.6 should not be
subject to reexamination. Permitting such reex-
amination would be incompatible with the general
policy of promoting compliance with law through
assurances that communications will be protected
against disclosure.
The Commentary accompanying each Rule
explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose
of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope
provide general orientation. The Commentaries
are intended as guides to interpretation, but the
text of each Rule is authoritative. Commentaries
do not add obligations to the Rules but provide
guidance for practicing in compliance with the
Rules. The Commentaries are sometimes used
to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under other
law, such as court rules and statutes relating to
matters of licensure, laws defining specific obliga-
tions of lawyers and substantive and procedural
law in general.
Rule
1.0. Terminology
Client-Lawyer Relationships
1.1. Competence
1.2. Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority
between Client and Lawyer
1.3. Diligence
1.4. Communication
1.5. Fees
1.6. Confidentiality of Information
1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Cli ents
1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibi ted Transactions
1.9. Duties to Former Clients
1.10. Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule
1.11. Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current
Government Officers and Employees
1.12. Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-
Party Neutral
1.13. Organization as Client
1.14. Client with Impaired Capacity
1.15. Safekeeping Property
1.16. Declining or Termi nating Representation
1.17. Sale of Law Practi ce
1.18. Duties to Prospective Client
Counselor
2. 1. Advisor
2.2. Intermediary [Repealed]
2.3. Evaluation for Use by Third Persons
2.4. Lawyer Serving as Thi rd- Party Neutral
Advocate
3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions
3.2. Expediting Litigation
3.3. Candor toward the Tribunal
3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
3.5. Impartiality and Decorum
3.6. Trial Publicity
3.7. Lawyer as Witness
3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
Rule 1.0. Terminology
(a) "Belief" or "believes" denotes that the per-
son involved actually supposed the fact in ques-
tion to be true. A person's belief may be inferred
from circumstances.
4
Rule
3.9. Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings
Transactions with Persons Other than Clients
4.1 . Truthfulness in Statements to Others
4.2. Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Person
4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons
Law Firms and Associations
5. 1. Responsibi lities of Partners, Managers, and Supervi-
sory Lawyers
5.2. Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer
5.3. Responsibilities regarding Nonlawyer Assistants
5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer
5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law
5.6. Restrictions on Ri ght to Practice
Public Service
6.1 . Pro Bono Publico Service
6.2. Accepting Appointments
6.3. Membership in Legal Services Organization
6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests
6.5. Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Ser-
vices Programs
Information about Legal Services
7.1. Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services
7.2. Advertising
7.3. Personal Contact wi th Prospective Clients
7.4. Communication of Fields of Practice
7.4A. Certification as Specialist
7.4B. Legal Specialization Screening Committee
7.4C. Application by Board or Entity to Certify Lawyers as
Speciali sts
7.5. Firm Names and Letterheads
Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession
8.1. Bar Admission and Di sciplinary Matters
8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials
8.3. Reporting Professional Mi sconduct
8.4. Misconduct
8.5. Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law
(b) "Client" or "person" as used in these Rules
includes an authorized representative unless
otherwise stated.
(c) "Confirmed in writing," when used in refer-
ence to the informed consent of a person, denotes
informed consent that is given in writing by the
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.0
person or a writing that a lawyer promptly trans-
mits to the person confirming an oral informed
consent. See subsection (f) for the definition of
"informed consent. " If it is not feasible to obtain
or transmit the writing at the time the person gives
informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or
transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.
(d) " Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or
lawyers in a law partnership, professional corpo-
ration, sole proprietorship or other association
authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed
in a legal services organization or the legal depart-
ment of a corporation or other organization.
(e) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct
that is fraudulent under the substantive or proce-
dural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a
purpose to deceive.
(f) " Informed consent" denotes the agreement
by a person to a proposed course of conduct after
the lawyer has communicated adequate informa-
tion and explanation about the material risks of
and reasonably available alternatives to the pro-
posed course of conduct.
(g) "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes
actual knowledge of the fact in question. A per-
son's knowledge may be inferred from circum-
stances.
(h) " Partner" denotes a member of a partner-
ship, a shareholder in a law firm organized as
a professional corporation, or a member of an
association authorized to practice law.
(i) " Reasonable" or "reasonably," when used
in relation to conduct by a lawyer, denotes the
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent
lawyer.
(j) " Reasonable belief" or "reasonably be-
lieves," when used in reference to a lawyer,
denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in
question and that the circumstances are such that
the belief is reasonable.
(k) "Reasonably should know," when used in
reference to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of
reasonable prudence and competence would
ascertain the matter in question.
(0 "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer
from any participation in a matter through the
timely imposition of procedures within a firm that
are reasonably adequate under the circum-
stances to protect information that the isolated
lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules
or other law.
(m) "Substantial ," when used in reference to
degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear
and weighty importance.
(n) "Tribunal " denotes a court , an arbitrator in
a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative
body, administrative agency or other body acting
5
in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body,
administrative agency or other body acts in an
adjudicative capacity when a neutral official , after
the presentation of evidence or legal argument
by a party or parties, will render a tJinding legal
judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a
particular matter.
(o) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or
electronic record of a communication or represen-
tation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostatting, photography, audio or videore-
cording and electronic communications. A
"signed" writing includes an electronic sound,
symbol or process attached to or logically associ -
ated with a writing and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the writing.
(Amended June 26, 2006, to take effect Jan. 1, 2007;
amended June 14, 2013, to take effect Jan. 1, 2014.)
HISTORY-2014: In 2014, "electronic communi cations"
was substituted for "e-mail " in the first sentence of subsection
(o) , following "videorecording and."
COMMENTARY: Confirmed in Writing. If it is not feasi bl e
to obtain or transmit a wri tt en confirmation at the ti me the
client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or
transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has
obtained a cl ient's informed consent, the lawyer may act in
rel iance on that consent so long as it is confi rmed in writing
within a reasonable time thereafter.
Firm. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within
subsection (d) can depend on the specific facts. For example,
two practiti oners who share office space and occasionally
consult or assist each other ordinari ly woul d not be regarded
as constituting a firm. However, if they present themsel ves to
the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct
themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for
purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement
between associated lawyers are relevant in determining
whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual
access to informati on concerning the clients they seNe. Fur-
thermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the under-
lying purpose of the Rul e that is invol ved. A group of lawyers
could be regarded as a firm for purposes of t11e Rul e that the
same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation,
whil e it might not be so regarded for purposes of the Rul e that
information acqui red by one lawyer is attributed to another.
With respect to the law department of an organization,
including the government, there is ordinarily no question that
the members of the department constitute a firm within the
meaning of the Rul es of Professional Conduct. There can
be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For
example, it may not be clear whether the law department of
a corporati on represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corpora-
tion, as well as the corporation by which the members of the
department are directly empl oyed. A similar question can arise
concerning an unincorporated association and its local
affiliates.
Simi lar questions can also arise wi th respect to lawyers in
legal aid and legal seNices organizations. Depending upon
the structure of the organization, the entire organization or
different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for
purposes of these Rul es.
Fraud. When used in these Rules, the terms "fraud" or
"fraudul ent" refer to conduct that is characterized as such
Rule 1.0 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable juris
diction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include
merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to
apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these
Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages
or reli ed on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.
Informed Consent. Many of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a
cli ent or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain
circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or con-
tinuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See,
e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication
necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the
Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need
to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses
information reasonably adequate to make an informed deci -
sion. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes
a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the
situation, any explanati on reasonably necessary to inform the
cl ient or other person of the material advantages and disadvan-
tages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of
the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some
circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a
client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A
lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or
implications already known to the client or other person; never-
theless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or
other person assumes the risk that the client or other person
is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In
determining whether the information and explanati on provided
are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the
client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally
and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the
client or other person is independently represented by other
counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need
less information and explanation than others, and generally
a client or other person who is independently represented by
other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to
have given informed consent.
Obtaining informed consent will usually requi re an affirma-
tive response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer
may not assume consent from a client's or other person's
silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct
of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate infor-
mation about the matter. A number of Rules require that a
person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b)
and 1.9 (a). For a definition of " writing" and "confirmed in
writing," see subsections (o) and (c). Other Rules require that
a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client.
See, e.g. , Rules 1.8 (a) and (g). For a definition of "signed, "
see subsection (o).
Screened. The definition of "screened" applies to situations
where screening of a personall y disqualified lawyer is permit-
ted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules
1.1 0, 1.11 , 1.12 or 1.18.
The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties
that confidential information known by the personally disquali -
fied lawyer remains protected. The personally di squalified law-
yer shall acknowledge in writing to the client the obligation
not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm
with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm
who are working on the matter should be informed that the
screening is in place and that they may not communicate with
the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter.
Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the
6
particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To imple-
ment, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence
of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake
such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened
lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel
and any contact with any firm files or other information, includ-
ing information in electronic form, relating to the matter, written
notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding
any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the
matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files
or other information, including information in electronic form,
relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to
the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.
In order to be effective, screening measures must be imple-
mented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows
or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.
HISTORY-2014: In 2014, " 1.10" was added to the com-
mentary under the heading " Screened," before "1 .11 ," and
"information, including information in electronic form" was sub-
stituted for " material s" twice in the last sentence of the second
paragraph under the same heading.
CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIPS
Rule 1.1. Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representa-
tion to a client. Competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill , thoroughness and prep-
aration reasonably necessary for tl1e represen-
tation.
(P.B. 1978-1997, Rule 1.1.}
COMMENTARY: Legal Knowledge and Sklll .ln determin-
ing whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and
skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative
complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's
general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in
the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is
able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the
matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question. In many instances, the
required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise
in a particular field of law may be required in some circum-
stances.
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior
experience to handle legal problems of a type with which
the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as
competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some
important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the
evaluat ion of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all
legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill con-
sists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation
may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular
speciali zed knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate repre-
sentation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
Competent representation can also be provided through the
association of a lawyer of established competence in the field
in question.
In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance
in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily
required where referral to or consultation or association with
another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency,
however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably nec-
essary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under
emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest. A
lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of
competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This
applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for
an unrepresented person. See also Rul e 6.2.
Thoroughness and Preparation. Competent handling of
a particular matter incl udes inquiry into and analysis of the
factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods
and procedures meeti ng the standards of competent prac-
titioners. It also incl udes adequate preparation. The required
attention and preparation are determined in part by what is
at stake; major liti gati on and complex transacti ons ordinaril y
require more extensive treatment than matt ers of lesser com-
pl exity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer
and the cli ent regarding the scope of the representation may
li mit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rul e
1.2 (c) .
Maintaining Competence. To maintain the requisite
knowledge and ski ll , a lawyer shoul d keep abreast of changes
in the law and its practi ce, includi ng the benefit s and risks
associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing
study and educati on and comply with all conti nuing legal edu-
cation requi rements to which the lawyer is subject.
HISTORY-201 4: In 2014, " including the benefi ts and risks
associated with relevant technology" was added to the com-
mentary, under the heading " Maintaining Competence, " fol-
lowi ng "changes in the law and its practice."
Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation and Allo-
cation of Authority between Client and
Lawyer
(Amended June 26, 2006, to take effect Jan. 1, 2007. )
(a) Subject to subsections (c) and (d), a lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and, as requi red by
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer
may take such action on behalf of the client as is
impliedly authorized to carry out the representa-
tion. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether
the client will testify. Subject to revocation by the
client and to the terms of the contract, a client' s
decision to settle a matter shall be implied where
the lawyer is retained to represent the client by a
third party obligated under the terms of a contract
to provide the client with a defense and indemnity
for the loss, and the third party elects to settle a
matter without contribution by the client.
(b) A lawyer's representat ion of a cl ient, includ-
ing representation by appointment, does not con-
stitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activiti es.
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the represen-
tation if the limitation is reasonable under the ci r-
cumstances and the cli ent gives informed
consent. Such informed consent shall not be
requi red when a client cannot be located despite
reasonable efforts where the lawyer is retained
7
to represent a cli ent by a third party which is obli -
gated by contract to provide the client with a
defense.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent , but a lawyer may discuss
the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist
a cl ient to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
(P.B. 1978-1997, Rule 1.2.) (Amended Jum1 26, 2006, to
take effect Jan. 1, 2007; amended June 29, 2007, to take
effect Jan. 1, 2008.)
COMMENTARY: Allocation of Authority bE1tween Client
and Lawyer. Subsecti on (a) confers upon the client the ulti -
mate authori ty to determine the purposes to be served by
legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the
lawyer's professional obl igati ons. The decisions specifi ed in
subsection (a), such as whether to settle a civil matt er, must
also be made by the client. See Rul e 1.4 (a) (1) for the lawyer's
duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With
respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to
be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the cli ent as required
by Rule 1.4 (a) (2) and may take such acti on as is impli edly
authorized to carry out the representation.
On occasion, however, a lawyer and a cli ent may disagree
about the means to be used to accompli sh the cli ent's objec-
tives. Clients normall y defer to the special knowledge and
skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to
accompli sh their objectives, particul arl y with respect to techni -
cal, legal and tactical matt ers. Conversely, lawyers usuall y
defer to the cl ient regarding such questions as the expense
to be incurred and concern for thi rd persons who mi ght be
adversely affected. Because of the vari ed nat ure of the matters
about which a lawyer and client mi ght disagree and because
the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal
or other persons, this Rul e does not prescribe how such dis-
agreements are to be resol ved. Other law, however, may be
appli cable and shoul d be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer
should also consult with the client and seek a mutually accept-
able resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavail-
ing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the
cl ient, the lawyer may withdraw from the representati on. See
Rul e 1. 16 (b) (4). Conversely, the cli ent may resolve the dis-
agreement by discharging the lawyer. See Ruli3 1.16 (a) (3).
At the outset of a representati on, the client may authori ze
the lawyer to take specifi c action on the cli ent' s behalf wi thout
furt her consultation. Absent a material change in circum-
stances and subject to Rul e 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such
an advance authorizati on. The cli ent may, however, revoke
such authority at any time.
In a case in whi ch the cli ent appears to be :;uttering dimin-
ished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the cli ent's deci-
sions is to be guided by reference to Rul e 1. 14.
Independence from Client's Views or Activities. Legal
representation shoul d not be denied to people who are unabl e
to afford legal services or whose cause is cont roversi al or the
subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, represent-
ing a cli ent does not constitute approval of the cli ent's views
or acti vities.
Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation. The
scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited
by agreement with the client or by the terms under whi ch the
lawyer's services are made avai labl e to the cli ent . For exam-
ple, when a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent
Copyri ghted by the Secretary of the State of the State of Connecticut
an insured, the representation may be limited to matters
related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation
may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives
for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which repre-
sentation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might
otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such
limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too
costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.
Nothing in Rule 1.2 shall be construed to authorize limited
appearances before any tribunal unless otherwise authorized
by law or rule.
Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial
latitude to limit the scope of representation, the limitation must
be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a
client's objective is limited to securing general information
about the law the client needs in order to handle a common
and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and
client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to
a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however,
would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient
to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an
agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a
lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the
limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the
legal knowledge, skill , thoroughness and preparation reason-
ably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1.
All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a
client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and
other law. See, e.g. , Rules 1.1 , 1.8 and 5.6.
Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions. Sub-
section (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or
assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition,
however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest
opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to
result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client
uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent
of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There
is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the
means by which a crime or fraud might be committed.
When the client's course of action has already begun and
is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate.
The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example,
by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are
fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be
concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in
conduct that the lawyer originally believed legally proper but
then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must,
therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the
matter. See Rule 1.16 (a). In some cases, withdrawal alone
might be insufficient. it may be necessary for the lawyer to give
notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion,
document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1.
Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged
with special obligations in deali ngs with a beneficiary.
Subsection (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party
is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not partici-
pate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoid-
ance of tax liability. Subsection (d) does not preclude
undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer
for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of
subsection (d) recognizes that determining the validity or inter-
pretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of
action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of
the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.
8
If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that
a client expects assistance not permitted by tt1e Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act
contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult
with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct.
See Rule 1.4 (a) (5} .
Rule 1 .3. Diligence
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.
(P.B. 1978-1997, Rule 1.3.)
COMMENTARY: A lawyer must pursue a matter on behalf
of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconve-
nience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedica-
tion to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to
press for every advantage that might be realiwd for a client.
For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise profes-
sional discretion in determining the means by which a matter
should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer's duty to act
with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive
tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the
legal process with courtesy and respect.
A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter
can be handled competently.
Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely
resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can
be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of
conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a
statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be
destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected
in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client
needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's
trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable prompt-
ness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing
to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not preju-
dice the lawyer's client.
Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule
1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters
undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to
a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter
has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a
substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes
may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continu-
ing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt
about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should
be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the
client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after
the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For
example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative
proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and
the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will
handle the matter on appeal , the lawyer must consult with
the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing
responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4 (a) (2). Whether
the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client
depends on the scope of the representation tt1e lawyer has
agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2.
To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole
practitioner's death or disabi lity, the duty of diligence may
require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity
with applicable rules, that designates another competent law-
yer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer's
death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for
immediate protective action. Ct. Rul e 28 of the Ameri can Bar
Associ ati on Model Rules for Lawyer Di sciplinary Enforcement
(providing for court appoi ntment of a lawyer to inventory files
and take other protective acti on in absence of a plan providi ng
for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a
deceased or disabled lawyer) .
Rule 1.4. Communication
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the cl ient of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client' s
informed consent , as defined in Rule 1.0 (f), is
required by these Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client' s objectives are to be
accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about
the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant
limitation on the lawyer' s conduct when the lawyer
knows that the client expects assi stance not per-
mitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the cl ient to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.
(P.B. 1978-1997, Rule 1.4.) (Amended June 26, 2006, to
take effect Jan. 1, 2007.)
COMMENTARY: Reasonable communication between the
lawyer and the client is necessary for the cli ent effectively to
participate in the representation.
Communicating with Client. If these Rul es or other law
require that a particul ar decision about the representation be
made by the cli ent , subsecti on (a) (1) requires that the lawyer
promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to
taki ng action. See Rul e 1.2 (a).
Subsecti on (a) (2) requi res the lawyer to reasonably consult
with the client about the means to be used to accompli sh the
client's objectives. In some situations-depending on both the
importance of the acti on under consideration and the feasibility
of consulting with the cli ent-thi s duty wi ll requi re consul tation
prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during
a trial when an immedi ate decision must be made, the exigency
of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior
consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act
reasonably to inform the client of acti ons the lawyer has taken
on the client's behalf. Additional ly, subsection (a) (3) requires
that the lawyer keep the cli ent reasonably informed about the
status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting
the timing or the substance of the representation.
A lawyer's regul ar communi cation with clients wi ll mi nimi ze
the occasions on which a cl ient will need to request information
concerning the representation. When a client makes a reason-
able request for informati on, however, subsection (a) (4)
requires prompt compli ance with the request, or if a prompt
response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the
lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise
the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should
promptl y respond to or acknowledge client communications.
Explaining Matters. The cl ient shoul d have sufficient infor-
mati on to parti cipate intell igentl y in decisions concerning the
9
objectives of the representati on and the means by whi ch they
are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able
to do so. Adequacy of communi cation depends in part on the
kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example,
when there is ti me to explain a proposal made in a negoti ation,
the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client
before proceeding to an agreement. In liti gation, a lawyer
should expl ain the general strategy and prospects of success
and ordinaril y shoul d consult the cli ent on tactics that are li kely
to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others.
On the other hand, a lawyer ordinari ly will not be expected to
describe trial or negoti ati on strategy in detail. The gui ding
principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client
expectati ons for information consistent wi th the duty to act in
the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements
as to the character of representation. In certai n circumstances,
such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representa-
tion affected by a confl ict of interest, the cli ent must give
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (f) .
Ordi narily, the information to be provided is that appropriate
for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult.
However, full y informing the cli ent according to thi s standard
may be impracticable, for example, when the cli ent is a chi ld
or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the
client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or
inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its
legal affairs; ordi naril y, the lawyer shoul d address communica-
tions to the appropriate offi cials of the organization. See Rule
1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of
limited or occasional reporti ng may be arranged with the cli ent.
Withholding Information. In some circumstances, a law-
yer may be justified in delaying transmission of information
when the cli ent woul d be likely to react imprudentl y to an
immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer mi!Jht withhold a
psychiatric diagnosis of a cli ent when the examining psychi a-
trist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer
may not withhold informati on to serve the lawyer's own interest
or conveni ence or the interests or convenience of another
person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide
that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to
the client. Rule 3.4 (3) directs compliance with such rul es
or orders.
HISTORY- 2014: Prior to 2014, the last sentence of the
commentary under the heading "Communi cating with Cli ent"
read: "Client telephone call s should be prompl'ly returned or
acknowledged. " In 2014, that sentence was replaced with the
foll owing: "A lawyer should promptl y respond to or acknowl-
edge client communicati ons."
Rule 1.5. Fees
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for,
charge, or coll ect an unreasonable fee or an
unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors
to be considered in determining the naasonable-
ness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requi site to perform the legal service properly;
(2) The likel ihood, if made known to the client ,
that the acceptance of the particular employment
wi ll preclude other employment by thH lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality
for simi lar legal services;
(4) The amount involved and the results ob-
tained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) The scope of the representation, the basis
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client
will be responsible, shall be communicated to the
client, in writing, before or within a reasonable
time after commencing the representation, except
when the lawyer will charge a regularly repre-
sented client on the same basis or rate. Any
changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses
shall also be communicated to the client in writing
before the fees or expenses to be billed at higher
rates are actually incurred. In any representation
in which the lawyer and the client agree that the
lawyer will file a limited appearance, the limited
appearance engagement agreement shall also
include the following: identification of the proceed-
ing in which the lawyer will file the limited appear-
ance; identification of the court events for which
the lawyer will appear on behalf of the client; and
notification to the client that after the limited
appearance services have been completed, the
lawyer will file a certificate of completion of limited
appearance with the court , which will serve to
terminate the lawyer's obligation to the client in
the matter, and as to which the client will have no
right to object. Any change in the scope of the
representation requires the client's informed con-
sent, shall be confirmed to the client in writing,
and shall require the lawyer to file a new limited
appearance with the court reflecting the change(s)
in the scope of representation. This subsection
shall not apply to public defenders or in situations
where the lawyer will be paid by the court or a
state agency.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of
the matter for which the service is rendered,
except in a matter in which a contingent fee is
prohibited by subsection (d) or other law. A contin-
gent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed
by the client and shall state the method by which
the fee is to be determined, including the percent-
age or percentages of the recovery that shall
accrue to the lawyer as a fee in the event of settle-
ment, trial or appeal, whether and to what extent
the client will be responsible for any court costs
and expenses of litigation, and whether such
expenses are to be deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must
clearly notify the client of any expenses for which
10
the client will be liable whether or not the client
is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a con-
tingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the
client with a written statement stating the outcome
of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing
the remittance to the client and the method of
its determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement
for, charge, or collect:
(1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the
payment or amount of which is contingent upon
the securing of a dissolution of marriage or civil
union or upon the amount of alimony or support,
or property settlement in lieu thereof ; or
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defend-
ant in a criminal case.
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) The client is advised in writing of the com-
pensation sharing agreement and of tt1e participa-
tion of all the lawyers involved, and does not
object ; and
(2) The total fee is reasonable.
(P.B. 1978-1997. Rule 1.5.) (Amended June 26, 2006, to
effect Oct. 1, 2013.)
HISTORY-October, 2013: In October, 2013, what are now
the third and fourth sentences of subsection (b) were added.
COMMENTARY: Basis or Rate of Fee. Subsection (a)
requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under
the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are
not exclusive. Nor wi ll each factor be relevant in each instance.
Subsection (a) also requires that expenses for which the client
will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer rnay seek rei m-
bursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such
as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as
telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount
to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an
amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the
lawyer.
When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, the
lawyer and the client ordinarily will have evolved an under-
standing concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the
expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new
cli ent-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to
fees and expenses must be promptly establi shed. Generally,
it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memo-
randum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements
that states the general nature of the legal services to be pro-
vided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee and whether
and to what extent the client will be responsibl e for any costs,
expenses or disbursements in the course of the representa-
tion. A written statement concerning the terms of the engage-
ment reduces the possibi lity of misunderstanding. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the lawyer should send the writ-
ten fee statement to the client before any substantial services
are rendered, but in any event, not later than ten days after
commencing the representation.
Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the
reasonableness standard of subsection (a) of this Rule. In
determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable,
or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent
fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under
the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on
contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable,
or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis
for the fee. Applicable law also may apply to si tuations other
than a contingent fee, for example, government regulati ons
regarding fees in certain tax matters. In matters where a contin-
gent fee agreement has been signed by the cli ent and is
in accordance with General Statutes 52-251c, the fee is
presumed to be reasonable.
Terms of Payment. A lawyer may require advance pay-
ment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion.
See Rul e 1.16 (d). A lawyer may accept property in payment
for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise,
providing thi s does not involve acquisition of a proprietary
interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation
contrary to Rul e 1.8 (i ). However, a fee paid in property instead
of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8 (a)
because such fees often have the essential qualities of a
business transaction with the cli ent.
An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce
the lawyer improperly to curtai l services for the client or perform
them in a way contrary to the cli ent's interest. For example,
a lawyer shoul d not enter into an agreement whereby services
are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is
foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be
required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the
cli ent . Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further
assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. How-
ever, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of
the cli ent's ability to pay. A lawyer shoul d not exploit a fee
arrangement based primaril y on hourly charges by using
wasteful procedures.
Prohibited Contingent Fees. Subsection (d) prohi bits a
lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations
matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a
divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property
settl ement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude
a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in con-
nection with the recovery of postjudgment balances due under
support, alimony or other financial orders because such con-
tracts do not implicate the same poli cy concerns.
Division of Fee. A division of fee is a single bi lling to a
cli ent covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in
the same fi rm. A division of fee facili tates association of more
than one lawyer in a matter in which nei ther alone could serve
the cli ent as well and most often is used when the fee is
contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and
a trial specialist. Contingent fee agreements must be in wri ti ng
signed by the cli ent and must otherwise comply with subsec-
tion (c) of thi s Rule. A lawyer should only refer a matter to
a lawyer whom the referri ng lawyer reasonably believes is
competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.
Subsection (e) does not prohibi t or regulate divisions of
fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers
were previously associated in a law firm.
Disputes over Fees. If an arbit ration or mediation proce-
dure such as that in Practice Book Section 2-32 (a) (3) has
been establi shed for resolution of fee disputes, the lawyer
must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and,
even when it is voluntary, the lawyer shoul d conscientiously
consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for
determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of
an executor or admi ni strator, a class or a person entitled to
a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The
lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another
party concerned with the fee should comply with the pre-
scribed procedure.
11
AMENDMENT NOTE: The above change is made in con-
nection with the revision to Secti on 3-8 (b) that all ows an
attorney to file a limited appearance pursuant to a pilot program
that may be establi shed by the chief court administrator.
Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent , the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the rElpresentation,
or the disclosure is permitted by subsection (b),
(c), or (d).
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
to prevent the client from committing a criminal
or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely
to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes neces-
sary to:
(1) Prevent the client from committing a criminal
or fraudulent act that the lawyer belielVes is likely
to result in substantial injury to the financial inter-
est or property of another;
(2) Prevent, mitigate or rectify the consequence
of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the com-
mission of which the lawyer's services had
been used;
(3) Secure legal advice about the lawyer's com-
pliance with these Rules;
(4) Comply with other law or a court order.
(5) Detect and resolve conflicts of interest aris-
ing from the lawyer's change of employment or
from changes in the composition or ownership of
a firm, but only if the revealed information would
not compromise the attorney-client privilege or
otherwise prejudice the client.
(d) A lawyer may reveal such information to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the law-
yer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon con-
duct in which the client was involved, or to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the clien1.
(e) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclo-
sure of, or unauthorized access to, information
relating to the representation of a cl ient.
(P.B. 1978-1997, Rul e 1.6.) (Amended June 26, 2006, to
HISTORY-2014: In 2014, subdivision (5) of subsection
(c) and subsection (e) were added.
COMMENTARY: This Rul e governs the disclosure by a
lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client
during the lawyer's representation of the cli ent. See Rule 1.18
for the lawyer's duti es with respect to information provided to
the lawyer by a prospective cli ent, Rule 1.9 (c) (2) for the
lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's
prior representation of a former cli ent and Rules 1.8 (b) and
1.9 (c) (1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such
information to the disadvantage of cl ients and former cli ents.
A fundamental principle in the cli ent- lawyer relationship is
that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer
must not reveal information relating to the representati on. See
Rule 1.0 (I) lor the defini tion of informed consent. This contri -
butes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer rela-
tionship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal
assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the law-
yer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject mat-
ter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the cli ent
effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from
wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, cli ents come to
lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the
complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and
correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all
cl ients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect
by related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege, the work
product doctrine and the Rul e of confidentiality established
in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in
which a lawyer may be call ed as a witness or otherwise
required to produce evidence concerning a cli ent. The Rule
of cli ent-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through com-
pulsion of law. The confidentiali ty Rule, for example, appli es
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client
but also to all information relating to the representation, what-
ever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information
except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
Subsection (a) prohibi ts a lawyer from revealing information
relating to the representation of a client . This prohibition also
appli es to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves
reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the
discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's
use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the represen-
tation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likeli-
hood that the li stener will be able to ascertain the identity of
the cli ent or the si tuation involved.
Authorized Disclosure. Except to the extent that the cli-
ent's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority,
a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a
client when appropriate in carrying out the representation.
In some situati ons, lor example, a lawyer may be impliedly
authorized to adrnit a fact that cannot properly be disputed to
make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to
a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's
practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client
of the firm, unl ess the cli ent has instructed that particular
information be confined to specific lawyers.
Disclosure Adverse to Client. Although the public interest
is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to
preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the repre-
sentation of their cli ents, the confidentiality Rule is subject to
li mited excepti ons. Subsection (b) recognizes the overriding
value of life and physical integrity and requires disclosure in
certai n circumstances.
Subsection (c) (1) is a limited exception to the Rule of
confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information to
the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate
authorities to prevent the cli ent from committing a crime or
fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0 (e), that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the financial or property interests of
12
another. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship
by the client forfeits the protection of thi s Rule. The client
can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the
wrongful conduct. Although subsection (c) (1) does not require
the lawyer to reveal the cli ent's misconduct, the lawyer may
not counsel or assist the client in conduct tt1e lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). See also Rule 1.16
with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from
the representation of the client in such circumstances, and
Rule 1.13 (c), which permits the lawyer, where the client is
an organization, to reveal information relating to the represen-
tation in limited circumstances.
Subsection (c) (2) addresses the situation in which the
lawyer does not learn of the cli ent's crime or fraud until after
it has been consummated. Although the cli ent no longer has
the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the
wrongful conduct , there will be situations in which the loss
suffered by the affected person can be prevented, rectified or
mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose informa-
tion relating to the representation to the extent necessary to
enable the affected persons to prevent or miti gate reasonably
certain losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Subsection
(c) (2) does not apply when a person who has committed a
crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation
concerning that offense.
A lawyer's confidenti ality obli gations do not precl ude a law-
yer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's
personal responsibil ity to comply with these Rules. In most
si tuations, disclosing information to secure such advice wi ll
be impli edly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the represen-
tation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized,
subsection (c) (3) permits such disclosure because of the
importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. The lawyer's right to disclose such information
to a second lawyer pursuant to subsection (c) (3) does not
give the second lawyer the duty or right to disclose such
information under subsections (b), (c) and (d). The first law-
yer's client does not become the client of the second lawyer
just because the first lawyer seeks the second lawyer's advice
under (c) (3).
Subsection (c) (5) recognizes that lawyers in different firms
may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect
and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is
considering an associati on with another firm, two or more
firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the
purchase of a law practice. See Rul e 1.1 7, commentary. Under
these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to
disclose limited information, but only once substantive discus-
sions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such
disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity
of the persons and entities invol ved in a matter, a brief sum-
mary of the general issues involved, and information about
whether the matter has terminated. Even this limited informa-
tion, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reason-
ably necessary to detect and resolve confli cts of interest that
might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the
disclosure of any information is prohibited if it woul d compro-
mise the attorney-cli ent privilege or otherwise prejudice the
cli ent (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice
on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced,
that a person consulted a lawyer about the possibi lity of divorce
before the person's intentions are known to the person's
spouse, or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a
criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge) .
Under those circumstances, subsection (a) prohibits disclo-
sure unless the client or former client gives informed consent.
A lawyer's fiduciary duty to the lawyer's firm may also govern
a lawyer's conduct when exploring an association with another
firm and is beyond the scope of these Rules. Any information
disclosed pursuant to subsection (c) (5) may be used or further
disclosed only to the extent necessary to detect and resolve
confl icts of interest. Subsection (c) (5) does not restrict the
use of information acquired by means independent of any
disclosure pursuant to subsection (c) (5). Subsection (c) (5)
also does not affect the disclosure of information within a law
firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, such as when
a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in
the same firm to detect and resolve confli cts of interest that
could arise in connecti on with undertaking a new represen-
tation.
Where a legal claim or discipli nary charge alleges complicity
of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the
lawyer involving representation of the cli ent, the lawyer may
respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes neces-
sary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to
a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former
client. Such a charge can arise in a civil , criminal , disciplinary
or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong all egedly
committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong
alleged by a thi rd person, for example, a person claiming to
have been defrauded by the lawyer and cli ent acting together.
The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such
compl icity has been made. Subsection (d) does not require
the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or pro-
ceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may
be establ ished by responding di rectly to a third party who has
made such an assertion. The right to defend al so applies, of
course, where a proceeding has been commenced.
A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by subsection (d) to
prove the services rendered in an action to coll ect it. This
aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary
of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment
of the fiduciary.
Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information
about a cli ent. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is
a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When
disclosure of information relating to the representation appears
to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter
with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however,
the other law supersedes this Rule and requi res disclosure,
subsection (c) (4) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures
as are necessary to comply with the law.
A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to
the representation of a cli ent by a court or by another tribunal
or governmental entity clai ming authority pursuant to other
law to compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent of the
cli ent to do otherwise, the lawyer shoul d assert on behalf of
the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized
by other law or that the information sought is protected against
disclosure by the attorney-client privil ege or other applicable
law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult
with the cli ent about the possibility of appeal to the extent
required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, sub-
section (c) (4) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's
order.
Subsection (b) requires and subsection (c) permits disclo-
sure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the
disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes
specified. Where practi cable, the lawyer should first seek to
persuade the client to take sui table action to obviate the need
for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's
interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
beli eves necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclo-
sure wi ll be made in connection wi th a judicial proceedi ng,
13
the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access
to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a
need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other
arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest
extent practicable.
Subsection (c) permits but does not require the disclosure
of information relating to a cli ent's representati on to accom-
plish the purposes specified in subsections (c) (1) through (c)
(4) . In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the
lawyer may consider such factors as the naturE! of the lawyer's
relationship with the cli ent and with those who rnight be injured
by the cli ent, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction
and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A
lawyer' s decision not to disclose as permitted by subsection
(c) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required,
however, by other Rules. Some Rul es require disclosure only
if such disclosure would be permitted by subsection (b). See
Rules 1.2 (d), 4. 1 {b), 8.1 and 8.3. Rule 3.3, on the other
hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless
of whether such disclosure is permitted by thi s Rul e. See Rule
3.3 (c) .
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality. Sub-
section (e) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard
information relating to the representation of a client against
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other
persons who are participati ng in the representation of the cli ent
or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1,
5.1 and 5.3. The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent
or unauthorized disclosure of, information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client does not constitute a violation of subsec-
tion (e) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent
the access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in determin-
ing the reasonableness of the lawyer's efforts include, but are
not limi ted to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood
of disclosure if additi onal safeguards are not employed, the
cost of employing addit ional safeguards, the difficulty of imple-
menting the safeguards, and the extent to whi ch the safe-
guards adversely affect the lawyer's ability to represent clients
(e.g., by making a device or important piece of software exces-
sively difficult to use). A client may require the lawyer to imple-
ment special security measures not requi red by this Rule or
may give informed consent to forgo security measures that
would otherwise be requi red by this Rul e. Whether a lawyer
may be required to take addi ti onal steps to safeguard a client's
information in order to comply with other law, such as state and
federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification
requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to,
electronic information, is beyond the scope of these Rules. For
a lawyer's duti es when sharing information with nonlawyers
outside the lawyer's own firm, see Rule 5.3, commentary.
When transmitting a communication that includes informa-
tion relating to the representation of a cli ent, ttle lawyer must
take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from
coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty,
however, does not require that the lawyer use special security
measures if the method of communication affords a reason-
able expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however,
may warrant special precauti ons. Factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation
of confidentiality include the sensitivi ty of the information and
the extent to which the privacy of the communication is pro-
tected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may
require the lawyer to implement special security measures not
required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the
use of a means of communication that would otherwise be
prohibited by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be requi red to
take additional steps in order to comply with other law, such
as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond
the scope of these Rules.
Former Client. The duty of confidentiality continues after
the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rul e 1. 9 (c)
(2). See Rule 1.9 (c) (1) for the prohibition against using such
information to the disadvantage of the former client.
HISTORY-2014: In 2014, what is now the fifth paragraph
in the commentary under the heading " Discl osure Adverse to
Client" was added.
Prior to 2014, the fi rst paragraph in the commentary under
the heading "Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality"
read: "A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information
relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent
or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who
are participating in the representation of the client or who
are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1 , 5.1
and 5.3."
Also, in 2014, the last sentence in the second paragraph
under that heading was added.
TECHNICAL CHANGE: In the commentary, under the
heading "Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality, " the
references to subsection (c) in the first and second sentences
that appeared in the Connecticut Law Journal of July 16, 2013,
were changed to subsection (e).
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a law-
yer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concur-
rent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representa-
tion of one or more clients will be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client ,
a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concur-
rent conflict of interest under subsection (a), a
lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the law-
yer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client ;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the
assertion of a claim by one client against another
client represented by the lawyer in the same litiga-
tion or the same proceeding before any tribu-
nal ; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.
COMMENTARY: General Principles. Loyalty and inde-
pendent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's rela-
tionship to a client . Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise
from the lawyer's responsibilities to another cli ent, a former
client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For
specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest,
see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule
1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see
14
Rul e 1.18. For definiti ons of "informed consent" and "con-
firmed in writing, " see Rule 1.0 (f) and (c).
Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule
requi res the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients;
2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide
whether the representation may be undertaken despite the
existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable;
and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under subsection
(a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing.
The clients affected under subsection (a) include both of the
clients referred to in subsection (a) (1) and the one or more
cli ents whose representation might be materially limited under
subsection (a) (2) .
A confli ct of interest may exist before representation is
undertaken, in which event the representation must be
declined, unl ess the lawyer obtains the informed consent of
each client under the conditions of subsecti on (b). To deter-
mi ne whether a confli ct of interest exists, a lawyer should
adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and
type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and
nonlitigation matters the persons and issues involved. See
also Commentary to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure
to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation
of thi s Rul e. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists
or, having once been established, is continuin!], see Commen-
tary to Rul e 1.3 and Scope.
If a confli ct arises after representation has been undertaken,
the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation,
unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the
cli ent under the conditions of subsection (b). See Rule 1.16.
Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer
may continue to represent any of the clients is determined
both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the
former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately
the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the
former cli ent. See Rul e 1.9; see also the next paragraph in
this Commentary and the first paragraph under the "Special
Considerations in Common Representation" heading, below.
Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corpo-
rate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or
real ignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the
midst of a representati on, as when a company sued by the
lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client
represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending
on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to with
draw from one of the representations in ordE!r to avoid the
conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary
and take steps to minimize harm to the cli ents. See Rul e 1.16.
The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the
cli ent from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn.
See Rul e 1.9 (c) .
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse. Loy-
alty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation
directl y adverse to that client without that cli ent's informed
consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as advo-
cate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in
some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unre-
lated. The client as to whom the representation is directly
adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage
to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's
ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client
on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken
reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's
case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e.,
that the representation may be materially limited by the law-
yer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly
adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-
examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involv-
ing another client , as when the testimony will be damaging to
the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand,
simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients
whose interests are only economically adverse, such as repre-
sentation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated liti-
gation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and
thus may not require consent of the respective clients.
Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional
matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the
seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented
by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another,
unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the represen-
tation without the informed consent of each client.
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation.
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest
exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to
consider, recommend or carry out an appropri ate course of
action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a
lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form
a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's
ability to recommend or advocate all possibl e positions that
each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the
others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would
otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of
subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and con-
sent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference
in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materi-
ally interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judg-
ment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action
that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client .
Lawyer' s Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other
Third Persons. In addition to conflicts with other current cli -
ents, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be
materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under
Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons,
such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a
trustee, executor or corporate director.
Personal Interest Conflicts. The lawyer's own interests
must not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representa-
tion of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult
or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.
Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible
employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with
a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could
materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client . In
addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to
affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an
enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial
interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number
of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions
with clients; see also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts
under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in
a law firm).
When lawyers representing different clients in the same
matter or in substantially related matters are closely related
by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that
client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family
relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent
professional judgment. As a result , each client is entitled to
know of the existence and implications of the relationship
between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake
the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer,
e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not
15
represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing
another party, unless each client gives informe1d consent. The
disqualification arising from a close family relationship is per-
sonal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with
whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.1 0.
A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in a sexual relationship
with a client unless the sexual relationship pre1dates the forma-
tion of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8 0).
Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service. A
lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, includ-
ing a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents
and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty
of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule
1.8 (f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source
presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of
the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest
in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by
the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client,
then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of subsec-
tion (b) before accepting the representation, including
determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that
the client has adequate information about the material risks
of the representation.
Prohibited Representations. Ordinarily, clients may con-
sent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as
indicated in subsection (b) , some conflicts are noncon-
sentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly
ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis
of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more
than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved
as to each client.
Consentability is typically determined by considering
whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected
if the clients are permitted to give thei r informed consent to
representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under
subsection (b) (1 ), representation is prohibited if in the circum-
stances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer
will be able to provide competent and diligent representation.
See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (dil igence) .
Subsection (b) (2) describes conflicts that are noncon-
sentable because the representation is prohibited by applica-
ble law.
Subsection (b) (3) describes conflicts that are noncon-
sentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous devel-
opment of each client's position when the clients are aligned
directly against each other in the same litigation or the same
proceeding before any tribunal. Whether clients are aligned
directly against each other within the meaning of this para-
graph requires examination of the context of the proceeding.
Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple
representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because
mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal " under Rule
1.0 [n]), such representation may be precluded by subsection
(b) (1 ).
Informed Consent. Informed consent requires that each
affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of
the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict
could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See
Rule 1.0 (f) (informed consent). The information required
depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the
risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the information must include the
implications of the common representation, including possible
effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privi-
lege and the advantages and risks involved. See second and
third paragraphs under the "Special Considerations in Com-
mon Representation" heading in this Commentary, below
(effect of common representation on confidentiality).
Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make
the disclosure necessary to obtain consent . For example,
when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters
and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure
necessary to permit the other client to make an informed deci-
sion, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In
some cases the alternative to common representation can be
that each party may have to obtain separate representation
with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs,
along with the benefits of securing separate representation,
are factors that may be considered by the affected client in
determining whether common representation is in the eli
ent's interests.
Consent Confirmed in Writing. Subsection (b) requires
the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, con-
firmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document
executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records
and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See
Rule 1.0 (c); see also Rule 1.0 (o) (writing includes electronic
transmission) . If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the
writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the
lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time
thereafter. See Rule 1.0 (c). The requirement of a writing does
not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk
with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of
representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as
reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a
reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives
and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is
required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of
the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid
disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence
of a writing.
Revoking Consent. A client who has given consent to a
conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client , may
terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether
revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes
the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends
on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict ,
whether the client revoked consent because of a material
change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the
other clients and whether material detriment to the other clients
or the lawyer would result .
Consent to Future Conflict. Whether a lawyer may prop-
erly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the
future is subject to the test of subsection (b). The effectiveness
of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which
the client reasonably understands the material risks that the
waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of
the types of future conflicts that might arise and the actual
and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those
conflicts, the greater the likelihood that the cl ient will have the
requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent
to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already
familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard
to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-
ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because
it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood
the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is
an experienced user of the legal services involved and is
reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may
arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly
if , e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel
in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts
16
unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case,
advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that
materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict
nonconsentable under subsection (b).
Conflicts in Litigation. Subsection (b) (3) prohibits repre-
sentation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless
of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous repre-
sentation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict,
such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by subsec-
tion (a) (2) . A conflict may exist by reason of substantial dis-
crepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions
in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are
substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims
or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal
cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in
representing multiple defendants in a criminal c:ase is so grave
that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than
one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation
of persons having similar interests in civil is proper
if the requirements of subsection (b) are met.
Ordinarily, a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions
in different tribunals at different times on bel1alf of different
clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf
of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests
of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter
does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest
exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's
action on behalf of one client will materially lirnit the lawyer's
effectiveness in representing another client in a different case;
for example, when a decision favoring one client will create
a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on
behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining
whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include:
where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive
or procedural , the temporal relationship between the matters,
the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term
interests of the clients involved and the cli ents' reasonable
expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk
of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the
affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representa-
tions or withdraw from one or both matters.
When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of
plaintiffs or defendants in a class action lawsuit, unnamed
members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients
of the lawyer for purposes of applying subsection (a) (1) of
this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the
consent of such a person before representing a client suing
the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking
to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically
need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom
the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.
Non litigation Conflicts. Conflicts of interest under subsec-
tions (a) (1) and (a) (2) arise in contexts other than litigation.
For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional
matters, see second paragraph under " Identifying Conflicts of
Interest: Directly Adverse" heading in this Commentary,
above. Relevant factors in determining whether there is signifi-
cant risk of material limitation include the duration and intimacy
of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved,
the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood
that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the
client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity
and degree. See first paragraph under "Identifying Conflicts
of Interest: Material Limitation" heading in tt1is Commentary,
above.
For example, conflict questions may also arise in estate
planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called
upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as
husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances,
a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration,
the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fidu-
ciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust ,
including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of
interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's rela-
tionship to the parties involved.
Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circum-
stances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally
antagonistic to each other, but common representation is per-
missible where the clients are generally aligned in interest
even though there is some difference in interest among them.
Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship
between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous
basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which
two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial
reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients
have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settle-
ment of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially
adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests.
Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate represen-
tation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complica-
tion or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors,
the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.
Special Considerations in Common Representation. In
considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same
matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common repre-
sentation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot
be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embar-
rassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be
forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the
common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of
failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impos-
sible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common repre-
sentation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations
between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover,
because the lawyer is required to be impartial between com-
monly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is
improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained.
Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already
assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests
can be adequately served by common representation is not
very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer sub-
sequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis
and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a
relationship between the parties.
A particularly important factor in determining the appropri-
ateness of common representation is the effect on client-law-
yer confidentiality and the attorney-client pri vilege.
As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common repre-
sentation will almost certainly be inappropriate if one client
asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information
relevant to the common representation. Thi s is so because
the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and the
lawyer should inform each client that each client has the right
to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that
might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that
the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See
Rule 1.4. To that end, the lawyer must, at the outset of the
common representation and as part of the process of obtaining
each client's informed consent, advise each client that informa-
tion will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw
if one client decides prior to disclosure that some matter mate-
rial to the representation should be disclosed to the lawyer
17
but be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may
be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representa-
tion when the clients have agreed, after being properly
informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confi-
dential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude
that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another
client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint
venture between the clients and agree to keep that information
confidential with the informed consent of both clients.
When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between
clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is
not that of partisanship normally expected in other circum-
stances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume
greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is
separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the
representation made necessary as a result of the common
representation should be fully explained to the clients at the
outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2 (c).
Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common
representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation
and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to
a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the
lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
Organizational Clients. A lawyer who represents a corpo-
ration or other organization does not, by virtue of that represen-
tation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated
organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13
(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from
accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated
matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate
should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is
an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational
client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the
client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organi-
zational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the
lawyer's representation of the other client.
A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also
a member of its board of directors should delelrmine whether
the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer
may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving
actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the
frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential
intensity of the conflict , the effect of the lawyer's resignation
from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining
legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there
is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's
independence of professional judgment , the lawyer should not
serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's
lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should
advise the other members of the board that in some circum-
stances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer
is present in the capacity of director might not be protected
by the attorney-client privi lege and that conflict of interest
considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director
or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline
representation of the corporation in a matter.
Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party. Resolving ques-
tions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the
lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court
may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the
lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case,
inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer repre-
sents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly
to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice,
opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an
objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can
be misused as a technique of harassment.
Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited
Transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction, including investment services, with a
client or former client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuni-
ary interest adverse to a client or former client
unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the law-
yer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable
to the client or former client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the client or former
client in a manner that can be reasonably under-
stood by the client or former client ;
(2) The client or former client is advised in writ-
ing that the client or former client should consider
the desirability of seeking and is given a reason-
able opportunity to seek the advice of independent
legal counsel in the transaction;
(3) The client or former client gives informed
consent in writing signed by the cl ient or former
client, to the essential terms of the transaction
and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including
whether the lawyer is representing the client in
the transaction;
(4) With regard to a business transaction, the
lawyer advises the client or former client in writing
either (A) that the lawyer will provide legal services
to the client or former client concerning the trans-
action, or (B) that the lawyer will not provide legal
services to the client or former client and that the
lawyer is involved as a business person only and
not as a lawyer representing the client or former
client and that the lawyer is not one to whom the
client or former client can turn for legal advice
concerning the transaction; and
(5) With regard to the providing of investment
services, the lawyer advises the client or former
client in writing (A) whether such services are
covered by legal liability insurance or other insur-
ance, and either (B) that the lawyer will provide
legal services to the client or former client con-
cerning the transaction, or (C) that the lawyer will
not provide legal services to the client or former
client and that the lawyer is involved as a business
person only and not as a lawyer representing the
client or former client and that the lawyer is not
one to whom the client or former client can turn
to for legal services concerning the transaction.
Investment services shall only apply where the
lawyer has either a direct or indirect control over
the invested funds and a direct or indirect interest
in the underlying investment.
For purposes of subsection (a) (1) through (a)
(5), the phrase "former client" shall mean a client
for whom the two-year period starting from the
conclusion of representation has not expired.
18
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating
to representation of a client to the disadvantage of
the client unless the client gives informed consent,
except as permitted or required by these Rules.
(c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift
from a client, including a testamentary gift, or pre-
pare on behalf of a client an instrument giving
the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any
substantial gift, unless the lawyer or other recipi-
ent of the gift is related to the client. For purposes
of this paragraph, related persons include a
spouse, child, grandchild, parent , or
other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or
the client maintains a close, familial relationship.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of repmsentation of
a client , a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an
agreement giving the lawyer literary or media
rights to a portrayal or account based in substan-
tial part on information relating to the represen-
tation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assis-
tance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) A lawyer may pay court costs and expenses
of litigation on behalf of a client, thH repayment
of which may be contingent on the outcome of
the matter;
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may
pay court costs and expenses of litigation on
behalf of the client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for
representing a client from one other than the cli-
ent unless:
(1) The client gives informed consent; subject
to revocation by the client , such informed consent
shall be implied where the lawyer is retained to
represent a client by a third party obligated under
the terms of a contract to provide the client with
a defense;
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's
independence of professional judgment or with
the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) Information relating to representation of a
client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients
shall not participate in making an aggmgate settle-
ment of the claims of or against the clients, or in
a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to
guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the
client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the
existence and nature of all the claims or pleas
involved and of the participation of each person
in the settlement. Subject to revocation by the
client and to the terms of the contract, such
informed consent shall be implied and need not
be in writing where the lawyer is retained to repre-
sent a client by a third party obligated under the
terms of a contract to provide the client with a
defense and indemnity for the loss and the third
party elects to settle a matter without contribution
by the client.
(h) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Make an agreement prospectively limiting
the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice
unless the client is independently represented in
making the agreement; or
(2) Settle a claim or potential claim for such
liability with an unrepresented client or former cli-
ent unless that person is advised in writing of the
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable
opportunity to seek the advice of independent
legal counsel in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary inter-
est in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client ,
except that the lawyer may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the
lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable con-
tingent fee in a civil case.
(j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with
a client unless a consensual sexual relationship
existed between them when the client-lawyer rela-
tionship commenced.
(k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a
prohibition in the foregoing subsection (a) through
(i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to
all of them.
COMMENTARY: Business Transactions between Client
and Lawyer. Subsection (a) expressly applies to former clients
as well as existing clients. A lawyer's legal skill and training,
together with the relationship of trust and confi dence between
lawyer and client , create the possibility of overreaching when
the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial
transaction with a client , tor example, a loan or sales transac-
tion or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client . The require-
ments of subsection (a) must be met even when the transaction
is not closely related to the subject matter ott he representation,
as when a lawyer drafting a will tor a client learns that the
cli ent needs money tor unrelated expenses and offers to make
a loan to the client. It also applies to lawyers purchasing prop-
erty from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary
tee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are gov-
erned by Rule 1.5, although its requi rements must be met
when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business
or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a
tee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard commer-
cial transactions between the lawyer and the client tor products
or services that the client generally markets to others, tor
example, banking or brokerage services, products manufac-
tured or distributed by the client , and util ities' services. In such
transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the
19
client, and the restrictions in subsection (a) are Lmnecessary
and impracticable.
Subsection (a) (1) requires that the transaction itself be fair
to the client and that its essential terms be communicated
to the client , in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably
understood. Subsection (a) (2) requires that the client also be
advised, in writing , of the desirability of seeking the advice of
independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be
given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Subsec-
tion (a) (3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed
consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential
terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When neces-
sary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of
the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the
lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably avail-
able alternatives and should explain why the advice of inde-
pendent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0 (f) (definition
of informed consent) .
The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the
lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when
the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk
that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially
limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction.
Here, the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply,
not only with the requirements of subsection (a), but also with
the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must
disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as
both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as
the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give
legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the
expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the
client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest
may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking
the client's consent to the transaction.
If the client is independently represented in tile transaction,
subsection (a) (2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the subsec-
tion (a) (1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by
a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction
or by the client's independent counsel. The tact that the client
was independently represented in the transaction is relevant
in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable
to the client as subsection (a) (1) further requires.
Use of Information Related to Representation. Use of
information relating to the representation to the disadvantage
of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Subsection
(b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the
lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business
associate of the lawyer. For example, it a lawyer learns that
a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of
land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one
of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend
that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does not
prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example,
a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of
trade legislation during the representation of one client may
properly use that information to benefit other clients. Subsec-
tion (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information
unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted
or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2 (d), 1.6, 1.9 (c),
3.3, 4.1 (b), 8.1 and 8.3.
Gifts to Lawyers. A lawyer may accept a gift from a client,
if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For
example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday
or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client otters the
lawyer a more substantial gift , subsection (c) dc1es not prohibit
the lawyer from accepting it , although such a gift may be
voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence,
------------ - -
which treats client gi fts as presumptively fraudulent. In any
event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on
clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be
made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where
the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c) .
If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal
instrument such as a wi ll or conveyance, the client should
have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide.
The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a relative
of the donee.
This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have
the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as
executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative
fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be
subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7
when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in
obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's inde-
pendent professional judgment in advising the client concern-
ing the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining
the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should
advise the cli ent concerning the nature and extent of the law-
yer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the avail-
ability of alternative candidates for the position.
Literary Rights. An agreement by which a lawyer acquires
literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the represen-
tation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and
the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the
representation of the client may detract from the publication
value of an account of the representation. Subsection (d) does
not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction
concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's
fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the
arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and subsections (a) and (i).
Financial Assistance. Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits
or administrative proceedings broughton behalfoftheirclients,
including making or guaranteeing loans to their cli ents for living
expenses, because to do so would encourage cli ents to pursue
lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because
such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in
the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on
a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses,
including the expenses of medical examination and the costs
of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these
advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees
and help ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception
allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court
costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these
funds will be repaid is warranted.
Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services. Subsection (f)
requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are
being paid for by a third party. Such an arrangement must
also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confi-
dentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where
the cl ient is a class, consent may be obtained on behalf of
the class by court-supervised procedure.
Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under
circumstances in which a third person will compensate the
lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative
or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company)
or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or
more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently
have interests that differ from those of the client, including
interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation
and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers
are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representa-
tions unless the lawyer determines that there wi ll be no interfer-
ence with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and
20
there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4
(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judg-
ment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer
to render legal services for another).
Sometimes, it wi ll be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the
client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment
and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee
arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then
the lawyer must comply with Rule 1. 7. The lawyer must also
conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidenti-
ality. Under Rule 1. 7 (a), a conflict of interest exists if there
is significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client
will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the
fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-
party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-
client). Under Rule 1.7 (b), the lawyer may accept or continue
the representation with the informed consent of each affected
client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that subsec-
tion. Under Rul e 1.7 (b), the informed consent must be con-
firmed in writing.
Aggregate Settlements. Differences in willingness to
make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of
common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer.
Under Rul e 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed
before undertaking the representation, as part of the process
of obtaining the cl ients' informed consent. In addition, Rule
1.2 (a) protects each cli ent's right to have tile final say in
deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and
in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea
in a criminal case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corol-
lary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settle-
ment offer or plea bargain is made or accep!Eld on behalf of
multiple cli ents, the lawyer must inform each of them about
all the material terms of the settlement, including what the
other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is
accepted. See also Rule 1.0 (f) {definition of informed consent).
Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or
those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer
relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such
lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notifica-
tion of class members and other procedural requirements
designed to ensure adequate protection of t h ~ entire class.
Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims.
Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for mal-
practice are prohibited unless the client is independently repre-
sented in making the agreement because they are likely to
undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many
clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such
an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they
are then represented by the lawyer seeking t t'1e agreement.
This subsection does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from
entering into an agreement wi th the client to arbitrate legal
malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforce-
able and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of
the agreement. Nor does this subsection limit the ability of
lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where
permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally
liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm
complies with any conditions required by law, such as provi-
sions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate
liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accord-
ance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation,
although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of
representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.
Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malprac-
tice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of
the danger that a lawyer will take unfair a<Jvantage of an
unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first
advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of
independent representation in connection with such a settle-
ment. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former
client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult indepen-
dent counsel.
Acquiring Proprietary Interest In Litigation. Subsection
(i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like subsec-
tion (e), the general rule, which has its basis in common-law
champerty and maintenance, is designed to avoid giving the
lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition,
when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject
of the representation, it will be more di fficult for a client to
discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject
to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and contin-
ued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the
costs of litigation is set forth in subsection (e). In addition,
subsection (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law
to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for
reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction deter-
mines which liens are authorized by law. These may include
liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and
liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer
acquires by contract a security interest in property other than
that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation,
such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with
a client and is governed by the requirements of subsection
(a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed
by Rule 1.5.
Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships. The relationship
between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer
occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The
relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relation-
ship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation
of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic
ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's
disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a signif-
icant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involve-
ment, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without
impairment of the exercise of independent professional judg-
ment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and
personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what
extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-
client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are pro-
tected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context
of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant
danger of harm to client interest and because the client's own
emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could
give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer
from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether
the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence
of prejudice to the client .
Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relation-
ship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of
the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are dimin-
ished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the com-
mencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before
proceeding with the representation in these circumstances,
the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to rep-
resent the client will be materially limited by the relationship.
See Rule 1.7 (a) (2).
Imputation of Prohibitions. Under subsection (k), a prohi-
bition on conduct by an individual lawyer in subsections (a)
through (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with
the personally prohibited lawyer. The prohibition set forth in
21
subsection U) is personal and is not applied to associated
lawyers.
Rule 1.9. Duties to Former Clients
(a) A lawyer who has formerly repmsented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed con-
sent, confirmed in writing.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a
person in the same or a substantially related mat-
ter in which a firm with which the lawyElr formerly
was associated had previously represented a
client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to
that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired infor-
mation protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c) that is
material to the matter; unless the former client
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a
client in a matter or whose present or former firm
has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representa-
tion to the disadvantage of the former client except
as these Rules would permit or require with
respect to a client, or when the information has
become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to thE! representa-
tion except as these Rules would permit or require
with respect to a client.
COMMENTARY: After termination of a client-lawyer rela-
tionship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect
to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not
represent another client except in conformit11 with this Rule.
Under this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek
to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf
of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an
accused person could not properly represent the accused in
a subsequent civil action against the government concerning
the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented
multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against
the interest of the others in the same or a substantially related
matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter,
unless all affected clients give informed consent. See last
paragraph of this Commentary, below. Current and former
government lawyers must comply with this Rul e to the extent
required by Rule 1.11 .
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of this Rule depends
on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's
involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree.
When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transac-
tion, subsequent representation of other clients with materially
adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On
the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of
supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated
associations have essentially the same right. Such an action
may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in
tact , a legal controversy over management of the organization.
The question can arise whether counsel tor the organization
may defend such an action. The proposition that the organiza-
tion is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most
derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's
affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any
other suit. However, it the claim involves serious charges of
wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict
may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and
the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those ci rcum-
stances, Rule 1. 7 governs who should represent the directors
and the organization.
Rule 1.14. Client with Impaired Capacity
(Amended June 26, 2006, to take effect Jan. 1, 2007;
amended June 30, 2008, to take effect Jan. 1, 2009.)
(a) When a client's capacity to make or commu-
nicate adequately considered decisions in con-
nection with a representation is impaired, whether
because of minority, mental impairment or for
some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-law-
yer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that
the client is unable to make or communicate ade-
quately considered decisions, is likely to suffer
substantial physical, financial or other harm
unless action is taken and cannot adequately act
in the client's own interest , the lawyer may take
reasonably necessary protective action, including
consulting with individuals or entities that have
the ability to take action to protect the client and,
in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of
a legal representative.
(c) Information relating to the representation of
a client with impaired capacity is protected by Rule
1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to
subsection (b) , the lawyer is impliedly authorized
under Rule 1.6 (a) to reveal information about the
client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary
to protect the client's interests.
COMMENTARY: The normal client-lawyer relationship is
based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised
and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important
matters. When the client is a minor or is unable to make
or communicate adequately considered decisions, however,
maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be
possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated
person may have no power to make legally binding decisions.
Nevertheless, a client with impaired capacity often has the
ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions
about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For exam-
ple, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainl y
those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that
are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their
custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of
28
advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine finan-
cial matters while needing special legal protection concerning
major transactions.
The tact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish
the lawyer's obligation under these rules. EvHn it the person
has a legal representative, the lawyer should as tar as possible
accord the represented person the status of client, particularly
in maintaining communication.
The client may wish to have family members or other per-
sons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When neces-
sary to assist in the representation, the presence of such
persons generally does not constitute a waiver ot the attorney-
client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must
keep the client's interests foremost and, exc:ept tor protective
action authorized under subsection (b) , must look to the client,
and not family members, to make decisions on the client's
behalf.
If a legal representative has already been appointed for the
client, the lawyer should look to the representative tor deci -
sions on behalf of the client only when such decisions are
within the scope of the authority of the legal representative.
In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look
to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type
ot proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing
the minor. It the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from
the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to
the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an oiJiigation to pre-
vent or rectify the guardian's misconduct . See Rule 1.2 (d).
Taking Protective Action. It a lawyer reasonably believes
that a client is likely to sutter substantial physical , financial or
other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-
lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in sub-
section (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to com-
municate or to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with the representation, then subsection (b) per-
mits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed neces-
sary. Such measures could include: consulting with family
members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification
or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate
decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney or
consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-
protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have
the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action,
the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes
and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best
interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decision-
making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing cli-
ent capacities and respecting the client's family and social con-
nections.
In determining the extent of the client's impaired capacity,
the lawyer should consider and balance suc:h factors as: the
client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision,
variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate conse-
quences of a decision; the substantive fairnElSS of a decision;
and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term
commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circum-
stances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate
diagnostician.
It a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer
should consider whether appointment of a legal representative
is necessary to protect the client's interests. In addition, rules
of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or
persons with impaired capacity must be represented by a
guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian.
In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal repre-
sentative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client
than circumstances in fact require. Evaluati on of such circum-
stances is a matter ent rusted to the professional judgment of
the lawyer. In considering alternati ves, however, the lawyer
should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate
the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.
Disclosure of the Client's Condition. Disclosure of the
client's impaired capaci ty could adversely affect the cli ent's
interests. For example, raising the questi on of impaired capac-
ity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for invol-
untary conservatorship and/or commitment. Information
relating to the representation is protected by Rul e 1.6. There-
fore, unless authori zed to do so by these rul es or other law,
the lawyer may not discl ose such informati on. When taking
protective action pursuant to subsecti on (b) , the lawyer is
impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even
when the cli ent directs the lawyer to the contrary. Neverthe-
less, given the risks of disclosure, subsecti on (c) limits what
the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals
or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative.
At the very least, the lawyer shoul d determine whether it is
likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely
to the cli ent's interests before discussi ng matters related to the
cli ent. The lawyer's positi on in such cases is an unavoidably
difficult one.
Emergency Legal Assistance. In an emergency where the
health, safety or a financial interest of a person with impaired
capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a
lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even
though the person is unabl e to establi sh a cli ent-lawyer rela-
ti onship or to make or express considered judgments about
the matt er, when the person or another acting in good faith
on that person's behalf has consulted wi th the lawyer. Even
in such an emergency, however, the lawyer shoul d not act
unless the lawyer reasonabl y beli eves that the person has
no other lawyer, agent or other representati ve avai lable. The
lawyer shoul d take legal acti on on behal f of the person only
to the extent reasonably necessary to mai ntain the status quo
or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer
who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent
situation has the same duti es under these Rul es as the lawyer
would with respect to a cli ent.
A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with impaired
capacity in an emergency should keep the confi dences of the
person as if deali ng with a cli ent, disclosing them onl y to the
extent necessary to accompli sh the intended protective acti on.
The lawyer should disclose to any tri bunal involved and to
any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationshi p
with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regul arize
the relationship or implement other protecti ve solutions as
soon as possi bl e. Normall y, a lawyer woul d not seek compen-
sati on for such emergency acti ons taken.
Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property
(a) As used in this Rule, the terms below shall
have the following meanings:
(1) "Allowable reasonable fees" for IOL T A
accounts are per check charges, per deposit
charges, a fee in lieu of a minimum balance, fed-
eral deposit insurance fees, sweep fees, and a
reasonable IOLTA account administrative or
maintenance fee.
(2) An "eligible institution" means (i) a bank or
savings and loan association authorized by fed-
eral or state law to do business in Connecticut,
29
the deposits of which are insured by an agency of
the United States government , or (ii) an openend
investment company registered with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission and
authorized by federal or state law to do business
in Connecticut. In addition, an eligible institution
shall meet the requi rements set forth in subsection
(h) (3) below. The determination of whether or not
an institution is an eligible institution shall be made
by the organization designated by tl1e judges of
the superior court to administer the program pur-
suant to subsection (h) (4) below, subject to the
dispute resolution process provided in subsection
(h) (4) (E) below.
(3) " Federal Funds Target RatH" means the
target level for the federal funds rate set by the
Federal Open Market Committee of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System from
ti me to time or, if such rate is no longer available,
any comparable successor rate. If such rate or
successor rate is set as a range, the tmm " Federal
Funds Target Rate" means the upper limit of
such range.
(4) " Interest- or dividend-bearing account"
means (i) an interest-bearing checking account,
or (ii) an investment product which is a daily (over-
night) financial institution repurchase agreement
or an open-end money market fund. A daily finan-
cial institution repurchase agreement must be fully
col lateralized by U.S. Government SHcurities and
may be established only with an eligible institution
that is "well -capitalized" or "adequately capital -
ized" as those terms are defined by applicable
federal statutes and regulations. An open-end
money marke.t fund must be invested solely in
U.S. Government Securities or repurchase
agreements fully collateralized by U.S. Govern-
ment Securities, must hold itself out as a "money
market fund" as that term is defined by federal
statutes and regulations under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and, at the time of the
investment, must have total assets of at least
$250,000,000.
(5) " IOL T A account" means an interest- or divi -
dend-bearing account established by a lawyer or
law firm for clients' funds at an eligible institution
from which funds may be withdrawn upon request
by the depositor without delay. An IOLT A account
shall include only client or third person funds,
except as permitted by subsection (h) (6) below.
The determination of whether or not an interest- or
dividend-bearing account meets the mquirements
of an IOL T A account shall be made by the organi-
zation designated by the judges of the superior
court to administer the program pursuant to sub-
section (h) (4) below.
(6) "Non-IOLTA account" means an interest-
or dividend-bearing account , other than an IOL T A
account, from which funds may be withdrawn
upon request by the depositor without delay.
(7) "U.S. Government Securities" means direct
obligations of the United States government, or
obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal
and interest by the United States or any agency
or instrumentality thereof, including United States
government-sponsored enterprises, as such term
is defined by applicable federal statutes and regu-
lations.
(b) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or
third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in
connection with a representation separate from
the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in
a separate account maintained in the state where
the lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with
the consent of the client or third person. Other
property shall be identified as such and appropri -
ately safeguarded. Complete records of such
account funds and other property shall be kept
by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period
of seven years after termination of the represen-
tation.
(c) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds
in a client trust account for the sole purposes of
paying bank service charges on that account or
obtaining a waiver of fees and servi ce charges
on the account , but only in an amount necessary
for those purposes.
(d) Absent a written agreement with the client
otherwise, a lawyer shall deposit into a client trust
account legal fees and expenses that have been
paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer
only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
(e) Upon receiving funds or other property in
which a client or third person has an interest,
a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third
person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client
or third person, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to
the client or third person any funds or other prop-
erty that the client or third person is entitled to
receive and, upon request by the client or third
person, shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property.
(f) When in the course of representation a law-
yer is in possession of property in which two or
more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer)
claim interests, the property shall be kept separate
by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The
lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the
property as to which the interests are not in
dispute.
(g) Notwithstanding subsections (b), (c), (d) , (e)
and (f) , lawyers and law firms shall participate in
30
the statutory program for the use of interest
earned on lawyers' clients' funds accounts to pro-
vide funding for the delivery of legal services to
the poor by nonprofit corporations whose principal
purpose is providing legal services to the poor
and for law school scholarships based on financial
need. Lawyers and law firms shall place a client's
or third person's funds in an IOL T A account if the
lawyer or law firm determines, in good faith, that
the funds cannot earn income for the client in
excess of the costs incurred to secure such
income. For the purpose of making this good faith
determination of whether a client's funds cannot
earn income for the client in excess of the costs
incurred to secure such income, the lawyer or law
firm shall consider the following factors: (1) The
amount of the funds to be deposited; (2) the
expected duration of the deposit, including the
likelihood of delay in resolving the relevant trans-
action, proceeding or matter for whicll the funds
are held; (3) the rates of interest, dividends or
yield at eligible institutions where thEl funds are
to be deposited; (4) the costs associated with
establishing and administering interest-bearing
accounts or other appropriate investments for the
benefit of the client, including service charges,
minimum balance requirements or fees imposed
by the eligible institutions; (5) the costs of the
services of the lawyer or law firm in connection
with establishing and maintaining the account or
other appropriate investments; (6) the costs of
preparing any tax reports required for income
earned on the funds in the account or other appro-
priate investments; and (7) any on1er circum-
stances that affect the capability of the funds to
earn income for the client in excess of the costs
incurred to secure such income. No lawyer shall
be subject to discipline for determining in good
faith to deposit funds in the interest earned on
lawyers' clients' funds account in accordance with
this subsection.
(h) An IOL T A account may only be established
at an eligible institution that meets the following
requirements:
(1) No earnings from the IOL T A account shall
be made available to a lawyer or law firm.
(2) Lawyers or law firms depositin1 a client's or
third person's funds in an IOLTA account shall
direct the depository institution:
(A) To remit interest or dividends, net of allow-
able reasonable fees, if any, on the average
monthly balance in the account, or as otherwise
computed in accordance with the institution's
standard accounting practices, at least quarterly,
to the organization designated by the judges of
the superior court to administer this statutory
program;
(B) To transmit to the organization administer-
ing the program with each remittance a report that
identifies the name of the lawyer or law firm for
whom the remittance is sent, the amount of remit-
tance attributable to each IOLTA account, the rate
and type of interest or dividends applied, the
amount of interest or dividends earned, the
amount and type of fees and service charges
deducted, if any, and the average account bal-
ance for the period for which the report is made
and such other information as is reasonably
required by such organization; and
(C) To transmit to the depositing lawyer or law
firm at the same time a report in accordance with
the institution's normal procedures for reporting
to its depositors.
(3) Participation by banks, savings and loan
associations, and investment companies in the
IOL TA program is voluntary. An eligible institution
that elects to offer and maintain IOL T A accounts
shall meet the following requirements:
(A) The eligible institution shall pay no less on
its IOL T A accounts than the highest interest rate
or dividend generally available from the institution
to its non-IOL T A customers when the IOL TA
account meets or exceeds the same minimum
balance or other eligibility qualifications on its non-
IOLTA accounts, if any.ln determining the highest
interest rate or dividend generally available from
the institution to its non-IOLTA customers, an eli-
gible institution may consider , in addition to the
balance in the IOL T A account, factors customarily
considered by the institution when setting interest
rates or dividends for its non-IOL T A customers,
provided that such factors do not discriminate
between IOL T A accounts and non-IOL T A
accounts and that these factors do not include the
fact that the account is an IOLTA account. In lieu
of the rate set forth in the first sentence of this
subparagraph, an eligible institution may pay a
rate equal to the higher of either (i) one percent
per annum, or (ii) sixty percent of the Federal
Funds Target Rate. Such alternate rate shall be
determined for each calendar quarter as of the
first business day of such quarter and shall be
deemed net of allowable reasonable fees and ser-
vice charges. The eligible institution may offer,
and the lawyer or law firm may request , a sweep
account that provides a mechanism for the over-
night investment of balances in the IOL T A account
in an interest- or dividend-bearing account that is
a daily financial institution repurchase agreement
or a money market fund. Nothing in this Rule shall
preclude an eligible institution from paying a
higher interest rate or dividend than described
above or electing to waive any fees and service
31
charges on an IOL T A account. An eligible institu-
tion may choose to pay the higher interest or divi-
dend rate on an IOL T A account in lieu of
establishing it as a higher rate product.
(B) Interest and dividends shall be calculated in
accordance with the eligible institution's standard
practices for non-IOL T A customers.
(C) Allowable reasonable fees am the only fees
and service charges that may be deducted by
an eligible institution from interest earned on an
IOL T A account. Allowable reasonable fees may
be deducted from interest or dividends on an
IOL TA account only at the rates and in accord-
ance with the customary practices of the eligible
institution for non-IOL T A customers. No fees or
service charges other than allowabi1:J reasonable
fees may be assessed against the accrued inter-
est or dividends on an IOL TA account. Any fees
and service charges other than allowable reason-
able fees shall be the sole responsibility of, and
may only be charged to, the lawyer or law firm
maintaining the IOLTA account. Fees and service
charges in excess of the interest or dividends
earned on one IOL T A account for any period shall
not be taken from interest or dividends earned on
any other IOL T A account or accounts or from the
principal of any IOL T A account.
(4) The judges of the superior court, upon rec-
ommendation of the chief court administrator,
shall designate an organization qualified under
Sec. 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or
any subsequent corresponding Internal Revenue
Code of the United States, as from time to time
amended, to administer the program. The chief
court administrator shall cause to be printed in
the Connecticut Law Journal an appropriate
announcement identifying the designated organi-
zation. The organization administering the pro-
gram shall comply with the
(A) Each June mail to each judge of the superior
court and to each lawyer or law firm participating
in the program a detailed annual report of all funds
disbursed under the program including the
amount disbursed to each recipient of funds;
(B) Each June submit the following in detail
to the chief court administrator for approval and
comment by the Executive Committee of the
superior court: (i) its proposed goals and objec-
tives for the program; (ii) the procedures it has
established to avoid discrimination in the award-
ing of grants; (iii) information regarding the insur-
ance and fidelity bond it has procured; (iv) a
description of the recommendations and advice
it has received from the Advisory Panel estab-
lished by General Statutes 51 -l31 c and the
action it has taken to implement sucl1 recommen-
dations and advice; (v) the method it utilizes to
allocate between the two uses of funds provided
for in 51-81 c and the frequency with which it
disburses funds for such purposes; (vi) the proce-
dures it has established to monitor grantees to
ensure that any limitations or restrictions on the
use of the granted funds have been observed
by the grantees, such procedures to include the
receipt of annual audits of each grantee showing
compliance with grant awards and setting forth
quantifiable levels of services that each grantee
has provided with grant funds; (vii) the procedures
it has established to ensure that no funds that
have been awarded to grantees are used for lob-
bying purposes; and (viii) the procedures it has
established to segregate funds to be disbursed
under the program from other funds of the organi-
zation;
(C) Allow the judicial branch access to its books
and records upon reasonable notice;
(D) Submit to audits by the judicial branch; and
(E) Provide for a dispute resolution process for
resolving disputes as to whether a bank, savings
and loan association, or open-end investment
company is an eligible institution within the mean-
ing of this Rule.
(5) Before an organization may be designated
to administer this program, it shall file with the
chief court administrator, and the judges of the
superior court shall have approved, a resolution
of the board of directors of such an organization
which includes provisions:
(A) Establishing that all funds the organization
might receive pursuant to subsection (h) (2) (A)
above will be exclusively devoted to providing
funding for the delivery of legal services to the
poor by nonprofit corporations whose principal
purpose is providing legal services to the poor
and for law school scholarships basecl on financial
need and to the collection, management and dis-
tribution of such funds;
(B) Establishing that all interest and dividends
earned on such funds, less allowable reasonable
fees, if any, shall be used exclusively for such
purposes;
(C) Establishing and describing t11e methods
the organization will utilize to implement and
administer the program and to allocate funds to
be disbursed under the program, the frequency
with which the funds will be disbursed by the orga-
nization for such purposes, and the segregation
of such funds from other funds of the organi zation;
(D) Establishing that the organization shall con-
sult with and receive recommendations from the
Advisory Panel established by General Statutes
51-81 c regarding the implementation and
administration of the program, including the
32
method of allocation and the allocation of funds
to be disbursed under such program;
(E) Establishing that the organization shall com-
ply with the requirements of this Rule; and
(F) Establishing that said resolution will not be
amended, and the facts and undertakings set forth
in it will not be altered, until the same shall have
been approved by the judges of the superior court
and ninety days have elapsed after publication by
the chief court administrator of the notice of such
approval in the Connecticut Law Journal.
(6) Nothing in this subsection (h) shall prevent
a lawyer or law firm from depositing a client's or
third person's funds, regardless of the amount of
such funds or the period for which such funds are
expected to be held, in a separate non-IOL T A
account established on behalf of and for the bene-
fit of the client or third person. Such an account
shall be established as:
(A) A separate clients' funds account for the
particular client or third person on which the inter-
est or dividends will be paid to the client or third
person; or
(B) A pooled clients' funds account with subac-
counting by the bank, savings and loan associa-
tion or investment company or by the lawyer or
law firm, which provides for the computation of
interest or dividends earned by each client's or
third person's funds and the payment thereof to
the client or third person.
(i) A lawyer who practices in thi s jurisdiction
shall maintain current financial records as pro-
vided in this Rule and shall retain the following
records for a period of seven years after termina-
tion of the representation:
(1 ) receipt and disbursement journals con-
taining a record of deposits to and withdrawals
from client trust accounts, specifical ly identifying
the date, source, and description of each item
deposited, as well as the date, payee and purpose
of each disbursement;
(2) ledger records for all client trust accounts
showing, for each separate trust client or benefi-
ciary, the source of all funds deposited, the names
of all persons for whom the funds are or were
held, the amount of such funds, the descriptions
and amounts of charges or withdrawals, and the
names of all persons or entities to whom such
funds were disbursed;
(3) copies of retainer and compensation
agreements with clients as required by Rule 1.5
of the Rules of Professional Conduct ;
(4) copies of accountings to clients or third per-
sons showing the disbursement of funds to them
or on their behalf;
(5) copies of bills for legal fees and expenses
rendered to cl ients;
(6) copies of records showing disbursements
on behalf of clients;
(7) the physical or electronic equivalents of all
checkbook registers, bank statements, records of
deposit, pre-numbered canceled checks, and
substitute checks provided by a financial insti-
tution;
(8) records of all electronic transfers from client
trust accounts, including the name of the person
authorizing transfer, the date of transfer, the name
of the recipient and confirmation from the financial
institution of the trust account number from which
money was withdrawn and the date and the time
the transfer was completed;
(9) copies of monthly trial balances and at least
quarterly reconciliations of the client trust
accounts maintained by the lawyer; and
(1 0) copies of those portions of client files that
are reasonably related to client trust account
transactions.
(j) With respect to client trust accounts required
by this Rule:
(1) only a lawyer admitted to practice law in this
jurisdiction or a person under the direct supervi-
sion of the lawyer shall be an authorized signatory
or authorize transfers from a client trust account;
(2) receipts shall be deposited intact and
records of deposit should be sufficiently detailed
to identify each item; and
(3) withdrawals shall be made only by check
payable to a named payee or by authorized elec-
tronic transfer and not to cash.
(k) The records required by this Rule may be
maintained by electronic, photographic, or other
media provided that they otherwise comply with
these Rules and that printed copies can be pro-
duced. These records shall be readily accessible
to the lawyer.
~ Upon dissolution of a law firm or of any legal
professional corporation, the partners shall make
reasonable arrangements for the maintenance of
client trust account records specified in this Rule.
(m) Upon the sale of a law practice, the seller
shall make reasonable arrangements for the
maintenance of records specified in this Rule.
take effect Sept. 1, 2006; amended June 29, 2007, to take
effect Sept. 1, 2007; amended June 30, 2008, to take effect
Aug. 1, 2008; amended June 21, 2010, to take effect Aug. 1,
201 0; amended June 20, 2011 , to take effect Jan. 1, 2012.)
COMMENTARY: A lawyer should hold property of others
with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities
should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other
form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances.
All property that is the property of clients or third persons,
including prospective clients, must be kept separate from the
lawyer' s business and personal property and, if moneys, in
one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be
33
warranted when administering estate moneys or acting in simi -
lar fiduciary capacities. A lawyer should maintain on a current
basis books and records in accordance with generally
accepted accounting practices.
While normally it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer's
own funds with client funds, subsection (c) provides that it is
permissible when necessary to pay bank service charges on
that account. Accurate records must be kept regarding which
part of the funds are the lawyer's.
Lawyers often receive funds from which the lawyer's fee
will be paid. The lawyer is not required to remit to the clients'
funds account funds that the lawyer reasonably believes repre-
sent fees owed. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to
coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The
disputed portion of the funds must be kept in a trust account
and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution
of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of
the funds shall be promptly distributed.
Subsection (f) also recognizes that third parties, such as a
client's creditor who has a lien on funds recovered in a personal
injury action, may have lawful claims against specific funds
or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a
duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims
against wrongful interference by the client. In such cases the
lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client
until the claims are resolved. A lawyer should not unilaterally
assume to arbitrate a dispute between the cli ent and the third
party, but, when there are substantial grouncls for dispute as
to the person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an
action to have a court resolve the dispute.
The word "interests" as used in subsection (f) includes, but
is not limited to, the following: a valid judgment concerning
disposition of the property; a valid statutory or judgment lien,
or other lien recognized by law, against the property; a letter
of protection or similar obligation that is both (a) directly related
to the property held by the lawyer, and (b) an obligation specifi -
cally entered into to aid the lawyer in obtaining the property;
or a written assignment, signed by the client, conveying an
interest in the funds or other property to another person or
entity.
The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent
of those arising from activity other than rendering legal ser-
vices. For exampl e, a lawyer who serves only as an escrow
agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries
even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the
transaction and is not governed by this Rule. A "lawyers' fund"
for client protection provides a means througll the collective
efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money
or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where
such a fund has been established, a lawyer must participate
where it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the
lawyer should participate.
Subsection (h) requires lawyers and law firms to participate
in the statutory IOLTA program. The lawyer or law firm should
review its IOL TA account at reasonable intervals to determine
whether changed circumstances require further action with
respect to the funds of any client or third person.
Subsection (i) lists the basic financial records that a lawyer
must maintain with regard to all trust accounts of a law firm.
These include the standard books of account, and the support-
ing records that are necessary to safeguard and account for
the receipt and disbursement of client or third person funds
as required by Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Subsection (i) requires that lawyers maintain client trust
account records, including the physical or electronic equiva-
lents of all checkbook registers, bank statements, records of
deposit, prenumbered canceled checks, and substitute checks
for a period of at least seven years after termination of each
particular legal engagement or representation. The "Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act" or "Check 21 Act", codified
at 12 U.S.C. 5001 et seq., recognizes "substitute checks"
as the legal equivalent of an original check. A "substitute
check" is defined at 12 U.S.C. 5002 (16) as paper reproduc-
tion of the original check that contains an image of the front
and back of the original check; bears a magnetic ink character
recognition ("MICR") line containing all the information
appearing on the MICR line of the original check; conforms
with generally applicable industry standards for substitute
checks; and is suitable for automated processing in the same
manner as the original check. Banks, as defined in 12 U.S.C.
5002 (2), are not required to return to customers the original
canceled checks. Most banks now provide electronic images
of checks to customers who have access to their accounts on
internet based websites. It is the lawyer's responsibility to
download electronic images. El ectroni c images shall be main-
tained for the requisite number of years and shall be readil y
available for printing upon request or shall be printed and
maintained for the requisite number years.
The ACH (Automated Clearing House) Network is an elec-
tronic funds transfer or payment system that primarily provides
for the inter-bank clearing of electronic payments between
originating and receivi ng participating financial institutions.
ACH transactions are payment instructions to either debit or
credit a deposit account. ACH payments are used in a variety
of payment environments including bill payments, business-
to-business payments, and government payments (e.g. tax
refunds). In addition to the primary use of ACH transactions,
retailers and third parties use the ACH system for other types
of transactions including electronic check conversion (ECC).
ECC is the process of transmitting MICR information from
the bottom of a check, converting check payments to ACH
transactions depending upon the authorization given by the
account holder at the point-of-purchase. In this type of transac-
tion, the lawyer should be careful to comply with the require-
ments of subsection (i) (8) .
There are five types of check conversions where a lawyer
should be careful to comply with the requirements of subsec-
tion (i) (8) . First, in a "point-of-purchase conversion," a paper
check is converted into a debit at the point of purchase, and
the paper check is returned to the issuer. Second, in a "back-
office conversion, " a paper check is presented at the point-
of-purchase and is later converted into a debit, and the paper
check is destroyed. Third, in a "account-recei vable conver-
sion," a paper check is converted into a debit, and the paper
check is destroyed. Fourth, in a "telephone-initiated debit"
or "check-by-phone" conversion, bank account information is
provided via the telephone, and the information is converted
to a debit. Fifth, in a "web-initiated debit," an electronic pay-
ment is initiated through a secure web environment. Subsec-
tion (i) (8) applies to each of the types of electronic funds
transfers described. All electronic funds transfers shall be
recorded, and a lawyer should not reuse a check number which
has been previously used in an electronic transfer transaction.
The potential of these records to serve as safeguards is
realized only if the procedures set forth in subsection (i) (9) are
regularly performed. The trial balance is the sum of balances of
each cli ent's ledger card (or the electronic equivalent).lts value
li es in comparing it on a monthly basis to a control balance.
The control balance starts with the previous month's balance,
then adds receipts from the Trust Receipts Journal and sub-
tracts disbursements from the Trust Disbursements Journal.
Once the total matches the trial balance, the reconciliation
readily follows by adding amounts of any outstanding checks
and subtracting any deposits not credited by the bank at
34
month's end. This balance should agree with the bank state-
ment. Quarterly reconciliation is recommended only as a mini-
mum requirement; monthly reconciliation is the preferred
practice given the difficul ty of identifying an error (whether by
the lawyer or the bank) among three months' transactions.
In some situations, documentation in addition to that listed
in subdivisions (1) through (9) of subsection (h) is necessary
for a complete understanding of a trust account transaction.
The type of document that a lawyer must retain under subdivi-
sion (10) of subsection (h) because it is " reasonably related"
to a client trust transaction will vary depending on the nature
of the transaction and the significance of the document in
shedding light on the transaction. Examples of documents
that typically must be retained under thi s subdivision include
correspondence between the client and lawyer relating to a
disagreement over fees or costs or the distribution of proceeds,
settlement agreements contemplating payment of funds, set-
tlement statements issued to the client, documentation relating
to sharing liti gation costs and attorney fees for subrogated
claims, agreements for division of fees between lawyers, guar-
antees of payment to third parties out of proceeds recovered
on behalf of a client , and copies of bills, recei pts or correspon-
dence related to any payments to third parties on behalf of a
client (whether made from the client's funds or from the law-
yer's funds advanced for the benefit of the client).
Subsection U) lists minimal accounting controls for client
trust accounts. It also enuciates the requirement that only a
lawyer admitted to the practice of law in this jurisdiction or a
person who is under the direct supervision of the lawyer shall
be the authorized signatory or authorized to rnake electronic
transfers from a client trust account. While it is permissible to
grant limited nonlawyer access to a client trust account, such
access should be limited and closely monitored by the lawyer.
The lawyer has a nondelegable duty to protect and preserve
the funds in a cli ent trust account and can bE' disciplined for
failure to supervise subordinates who misappropriate client
funds. See Rules 5.1 and 5.3 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Authorized electronic transfers shall be limited to (1) money
required for payment to a client or third person on behalf of
a cli ent; (2) expenses properly incurred on behalf of a client ,
such as filing fees or payment to third persons for services
rendered in connection with the representation; or (3) money
transferred to the lawyer for fees that are earned in connection
with the representation and are not in disputE!; or (4) money
transferred from one cl ient trust account to another client
trust account.
The requirements in subdivision (2) of subsection U) that
receipts shall be deposited intact mean that a lawyer cannot
deposit one check or negotiable instrument into two or more
accounts at the same time, a practice commonly known as a
split deposit.
Subsection (k) all ows the use of alternative media for the
maintenance of cli ent trust account records if printed copies
of necessary reports can be produced. If trust records are
computerized, a system of regular and frequent (preferably
daily) backup procedures is essential. If a lawyer uses third-
party electronic or internet based file storage, the lawyer must
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the company has in
place, or will establish reasonable procedures to protect the
confidentiality of cli ent information. See, ABA Formal Ethics
Opinion 398 (1995). Records required by subsection (i) shall
be readily accessible and shall be readily available to be pro-
duced upon request by the client or third person who has an
interest as provided in Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, or by the official request of a disciplinary authority,
including but not limited to, a subpoena duces tecum. Personal
court having jurisdicti on authori zing their transfer or other dis-
position. The court can be expected to determi ne whether
reasonabl e efforts to locate the cli ent have been exhausted,
and whether the absent cli ent's legiti mate interests will be
served by authori zing the transfer of the fi le so that the pur-
chaser may continue the representati on. Preservati on of client
confi dences requi res that the petiti on for a court order be
considered in camera. Thi s procedure is contemplated as an
in camera revi ew of privil eged materi als.
All the elements of cli ent autonomy, incl uding the cl ient's
absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the represen-
tati on to another, survi ve the sale of the practi ce or area of
practice.
Fee Arrangements between Client and Purchaser. The
sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged exclu-
sively to the clients of the purchased practice. Existing
agreements between the sell er and the cl ient as to fees and
the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser.
Other Applicable Ethical Standards. Lawyers participat-
ing in the sale of a law practice or a practi ce area are subject
to the ethi cal standards appli cable to involvi ng another lawyer
in the representati on of a client. These include, for example,
the sell er's obli gati on to exercise competence in identifying a
purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's
obli gati on to undertake the representati on competentl y (see
Rul e 1.1 ); the obl igation to avoid disqualifying confl icts, and
to secure the client's informed consent for those conflicts that
can be agreed to (see Rul e 1.7 regarding confli cts and Rul e
1.0 for the definition of informed consent); and the obli gation
to protect informati on relating to the representation (see Rules
1.6 and 1.9).
If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for
the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tri bunal in
whi ch a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained
before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16).
Applicability of the Rule. Thi s Rul e applies to the sale of
a law practice by representati ves of a deceased, disabled or
disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by
a nonl awyer representati ve not subject to these Rul es. Si nce,
however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice
whi ch does not conform to the requirements of this Rul e, the
representatives of the sell er as well as the purchasi ng lawyer
can be expected to see to it that they are met.
Admission to or retirement from a law partnershi p or profes-
sional association, retirement pl ans and similar arrangements,
and a sale of tangibl e assets of a law practi ce, do not constitute
a sale or purchase governed by this Rul e.
Thi s Rul e does not apply to the transfers of legal representa-
tion between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to
the sale of a practi ce or an area of practice.
HI STORY- 201 4: In 201 4, "See Rul e 1.6 (c) (5) " was
added to the commentary with the headi ng "Client Confi -
dences, Consent and Notice," after the first sentence.
Pri or to 2014, the second sentence under that heading read:
"Providi ng the purchaser access to cli ent-specific information
relating to the representati on and to the fil e, however, requi res
client consent. "
Rule 1.18. Duties to Prospective Client
(a) A person who discusses or communi cates
with a lawyer concerning the possibility of forming
a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a mat-
ter is a prospective client.
(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship
ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with
37
a prospective client shall not use or reveal infor-
mation learned in the consultation, except as Rule
1.9 would permit with respect to information of a
former cl ient.
(c) A lawyer subject to subsection (b) shall not
represent a client with interests materially adverse
to those of a prospective client in the same or a
substantially related matter if the lawyer received
information from the prospective client that could
be significantly harmful to that person in the mat-
ter, except as provided in subsection (d). If a law-
yer is disqualified from representation under this
paragraph, no lawyer in a firm witll which that
lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or
continue representation in such a matter, except
as provided in subsection (d) .
(d) When the lawyer has received disquali fying
information as defined in subsection (c) , represen-
tation is permissible if:
(1) both the affected client and the prospective
client have given informed consent , confirmed in
writing, or
(2) the lawyer who received the information took
reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more
di squalifying information than was reasonably
necessary to determine whether to rHpresent the
prospective client ; and
(i ) the disqualified lawyer is ti mely screened
from any participation in the matter; and
(i i) written notice is promptly given to the pro-
spective client .
(Adopted June 26, 2006, to take effect Jan. 1, 2007.)
COMMENTARY: Prospective cli ents, like cli ents, may dis-
close information to a lawyer, place documents or other prop-
ert y in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A
lawyer's discussions with a prospecti ve cli ent usuall y are lim-
ited in time and depth and leave both the prospective cli ent
and the lawyer free (and someti mes requi red) to proceed no
further. Hence, prospective cli ents shoul d receive some but
not all of the protecti on afforded clients.
Not all persons who transmit informati on to a lawyer are
entitl ed to protection under thi s Rul e. A person who transmits
information unil aterall y to a lawyer, without any reasonable
expectati on that the lawyer is willing to di scuss the possibility
of forming a cli ent-lawyer relationship, is not a "prospective
cli ent" within the meaning of subsection (a).
It is often necessary for a prospecti ve cli ent to reveal infor-
mation to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the
decision about formati on of a cli ent-lawyer relati onshi p. The
lawyer oft en must learn such informati on to determine whether
there is a conflict of interest with an existing cli ent and whether
the matt er is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Subsec-
tion (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that infor-
mation, except as permi tted by Rul e 1.9, even if the cli ent or
lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The
duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference
may be.
In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from
a prospective cl ient, a lawyer considering wll ether or not to
undertake a new matt er should limit the initial interview to onl y
such informati on as reasonably appears necHssary for that
VERIFICATION
PLEASE READ THIS FORM CAREFULLY.
CHOOSE ONLY ONE FORM OF VERIFICATION.
Check this box and sign the form. You Do Not Need A Notary Public If You Check This.
I declare under penalty of perjury that:
(a) I have read Rule 83.2 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut, governing complaints against attorneys, and
(2) Check this box and SIGN THE FORM IN THE PRESENCE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC.
[ ] I swear (affirm) that:
(a) I have read Rule 83.2 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut, governing complaints against attorneys, and
(b) The statements made in this complaint (including attachments [if appropriate]) are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Executed on: ________ _
(Date) (Signature)
Sworn and subscribed to before me on: ___________ _
My commission expires on: -----------------
(Notary Public Signature): ________________ _
(Seal)
Rev 7/25/13
See page 132 for copy of Original
Request letter attached to the
document submitted to the US
District Court.
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

____________________________________
)
JANIS HEARRELL ) Case No.: 3:14-gp-4 (EBB)
)
v. )
)
JOHN S. BENNET ) MARCH 5, 2014

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on March 5, 2014, the following members
of the Grievance Committee and the attorney against whom the complaint is filed
were served with a copy of the Grievance Complaint by Federal Express:

Committee Members:

ERNEST J. MATTEI, Chairman
Day Pitney LLP
242 Trumbull Street
Hartford, CT 06103

WILLIAM M. BLOSS
Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder,P.C.
350 Fairfield Ave.
Bridgeport, CT 06604

ALICE A. BRUNO
Superior Court
235 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06510

2

MARGARET Q. CHAPPLE
Associate Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
55 Elm Street
P.O. Box 120
Hartford, CT 06106

DENNIS E. CURTIS
Yale Law School
P.O. Box 280215

STEPHEN B. REYNOLDS
U.S. Attorneys Office
1000 Lafayette Blvd. 10th
Bridgeport, CT 06604

STEPHEN P. FOGERTY
Halloran & Sage
315 Post Rd. West
Westport, CT 06880

ROBERT M. FROST
Frost Bussert, LLC
129 Church Street
Suite 226
New Haven, CT 06510

SARAH A.L. MERRIAM
Federal Public Defenders Office
265 Church St., Suite 702
New Haven, CT 06510

JONATHAN B. ORLEANS
Pullman and Comley
850 Main Street
P.O. Box 7006
Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006

3

MOY N. OGILVIE
McCarter & English
City Place I
185 Asylum Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06103

JOSE M. ROJAS
The Rojas Las Firm
40 Russ Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06106

COUNSEL:
WICK R. CHAMBERS
Winnick Ruben Chambers
Hoffnung & Peabody, LLC
110 Whitney Avenue

Respondent:
John S. Bennet
Gould Larson Bennet Wells & McDonnell
30 Plains Road - Box 959
Essex, CT 06426

THE COMPLAINANT

By: ___________________________ _____
Janis L. Hearrell
P.O. Box 1648
Greenwich, CT 06836
(203) 321-0648
FAX (203) 245-4466

Request For Competency Hearing and Psych Eval. For A Lawyer 2-24-2014

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Request For Competency Hearing and Psych Eval. For A Lawyer 2-24-2014

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

REQUEST FOR A COMPETENCY HEARING AND

PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION FOR ATTORNEY

You might also like