GDI 12 Impact Defense

Impact D
China
China forces are purely defensive generals comments
Wong and Ansfeld 11 (Edward and Jonathon, stafs,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/world/asia/01china.html!r"2, dw: #$#1$2011,
da: %$&$2011, lido'
(t stressed that Chinas military buildup was purely defensive a position
Chinese leaders have long ta!en" #he paper had more detail than
previous editions on Chinas e$orts to establish confdence%building
measures with foreign militaries. (n the past year, perceptions )y *orei+n co,ntries o*
Chinas military +rowth and o* a more asserti-e *orei+n policy ha-e res,lted in diplomatic discord and discom*ort,
partic,larly )etween China and the .nited /tates. 0China attaches importance to its
military relationship with the &nited 'tates and has made ongoing
e$orts towards building a sound military relationship1 /enior Col. 2en+
3anshen+ said at a news con*erence on 4h,rsday. 0#he Chinese military is now ta!ing
steps to advance e(changes with the &"'" military this year") 5,t 0theres
no denyin+ that in de-elopin+ military relations, we still *ace di6c,lties and challen+es,1 Colonel 2en+ added.
China doesnt have the capabilities to have a war and relats
chec!
*rueher +, (Joseph, Commander in chie* o* 7aci8c Command, inter-iewed, J9:,
dw: ;,t,mn/<inter &= da: %$&$2011, lido'
China is moderni>in+ its military. ;s 0paid pessimists,1 the *AC-. sta$ is watching
carefully" /ut China will not possess a power pro0ection capability
that could threaten &"'" interests for at least a decade and a half" <e
are p,rs,in+ a lon+$ha,l, )alanced national policy o* constr,cti-e en+a+ement with China to enco,ra+e its
emer+ence as a sec,re, prospero,s, and nonthreatenin+ mem)er o* the international comm,nity. (ncreased Chinese
transparency on sec,rity o)?ecti-es and military moderni>ation wo,ld help reass,re the re+ion. Contacts
between the &"'" military and the *eoples 1iberation Army have
e(panded signifcantly in the last year" #hese e(changes are
important" As *resident 2iang 3emin said to me during his recent
visit to 4awaii 5/efore we can build trust we need to build
understanding.1 E@pandin+ relations amon+ o6cers who will lead the ne@t +eneration is especially
important. 4he trend o* &"'"%Chinese relations is steadily upward although
perturbations can be e(pected" Common interests in regional peace
and security outweigh our di$erences" 'uccessful management of
relations among the &nited 'tates 2apan and China is li!ely to be
the principal determinant of regional peace and security in the
decades ahead"
China wont go to war they have too much at ris! history
4ellyer + (Aarc,s, worBed *or CoC, http://www.de*ence.+o-.a,/?etwc/docs/p,)lications
D202010/7,)lctns!0E0#10!(stheE@pansiono*Chinese.pd*, da: %$&$2011, lido'
China ,nder the Comm,nist 7arty has not )een a paci8st power and has )een willin+ to ,se *orce e-en )eyond its
)orders.10 Fe-ertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that China is
developing its military power in order to use it against its
neighbours 6 with the potential e(ception of #aiwan noted earlier"
China has been very active in presenting a peaceful image of itself
to the world. 7resident 4u 2intao has used the term 7harmonious world
to describe Chinas model of international relations and 3heng
/i0ian developed the term 7peaceful rise to describe Chinas
development.11 4he latest Chinese de*ence <hite 7aper adopts this terminolo+y statin+ that GChina is
,nswer-in+ly taBin+ the road o* peace*,l de-elopmentHendea-o,rin+ to ),ild, to+ether with other co,ntries, a
harmonio,s world o* end,rin+ peace and common prosperity.12 <hile Chinese statements sho,ld not )e taBen at
*ace -al,e, they sho,ld not )e dismissed as mere rhetoric. #here is considerable incentive
for China to avoid con8ict that would interfere with its continued
economic growth" #he need to maintain the international conditions
necessary for economic growth has become a central goal of
Chinese foreign policy.1# China has shown itself 9uite willing to
peacefully resolve I or at least mana+e I disputes with its maritime
neighbours" Indeed its focus on avoiding con8ict to permit
development predates 4u 2intao and motivated its moderate
behaviour over the 'outh China 'eas territorial disputes with A':A;
members in the 1++<s" China acceded to the ;/E;F code o* cond,ct *or the /o,th China /ea and
has em)arBed on ?oint reso,rce de-elopment pro?ects there with ;/E;F mem)ers.14 /imilarly, while Chinas
territorial disp,tes with Japan in the East China /ea ha-e not )een *,lly resol-ed, the two co,ntries ha-e declared
East China /ea a sea o* Gpeace, sta)ility and cooperation and reached a+reement on the ?oint de-elopment o* +as
8elds.1E
China wont use its nuclear weapons
=un>hu ? (3ao, phd, /trate+ic (nsi+hts,
http://www.nps.ed,/;cademics/centers/ccc/p,)lications/JnlineJo,rnal/200E//ep/yao/ep0E.html, dw: /ep 2010, da:
%$&$2011, lido'
.ao 3edong, in ela)oratin+ ChinaKs reason to de-elop n,clear weapons, said
5we will not only have possession of more aircraft and artillery
pieces but also atom bombs" In todays world we must have this
thing if we dont want to be bullied by others"1L#M 4he ori+inal p,rpose o* n,clear
de-elopment in China was to 0)reaB ,p the n,clear threat and smash the n,clear )lacBmail (da),o he wei@ie,
*ens,i he e>ha'.1 ;s a political instr,ment, n,clear weapons are to )e ,tili>ed mainly at the le-el
o* +rand strate+y, not as a winnin+ tool in military operations. #he military
value of nuclear weapons lies only in its deterrent e$ect against
nuclear attac!" #he o@cially declared missions of the 'econd
Artillery Aorce are twofoldB #o deter the use of nuclear weapons
against China and #o launch an e$ective nuclear counter%attac! in
the case of such an attac!.L4M Fo distinction has )een made in cate+ori>in+ n,clear operations. ;
n,clear striBe a+ainst ChinaNwhether cond,cted at strate+ic, operational or tactical le-el, with hi+h or low yield
warheads, or deadly or tolera)le lethalityNis percei-ed as the ,tmost *orm o* war*are in Chinese war
cate+ori>ation, which m,st )e responded strate+ically. (n Chinese strate+ic literat,re, we only see the disc,ssion on
how to deter a n,clear war *rom happenin+, on how to pre-ent a con-entional conOict *rom escalatin+ into a
n,clear war, and how to retaliate a*ter s,ferin+ a n,clear attacBN),t ne-er how to win a n,clear war. 4he
primary Chinese perception is that nuclear wars are not to be won
but to be prevented" CetaliatoryDCather than DenialDDeterrenceLEM
.any Chinese cite Deng Eiaoping when e(plaining ChinaFs nuclear
thin!ing" 4e e(plained in a meeting with foreigners in 1+,GB HWhile
you have some deterrence force we also have someI but we donFt
want much" It will do 0ust to possess it" #hings li!e strategic
weapons and deterrence forces are there to scare others" #hey must
not be used frst" /ut our possession will have some e$ect" #he
limited possession of nuclear weapons itself e(ert some pressure" It
remains our position that we will develop a little Jnuclear weaponsK"
/ut the development will be limited. <e ha-e said repeatedly that o,r small amo,nt (o*
n,clear weapons' is nothin+. (t is only to show that we also ha-e what yo, ha-e. (* yo, want to destroy ,s, yo,
yo,rsel* ha-e to s,fer some p,nishment at the same time.PLQM
China wont use nu!es the nu!es are 0ust for deterrence
e$ects
;ational Intelligence Council ++ (http://www.*as.or+/irp/nic/china!wmd.html,
dw: 11$E$1&&&, da: %$&$2011, lido'
4hird, we fnd that the evolution over time of ChinaFs doctrine and
force structure is the story of trying to close the gap between real
capability, on the one hand, and what one might call Haspirational doctrineP
on the other. (n the .nited /tates, the appropriate analo+ wo,ld )e a comparison o* c,rrent operational doctrine, as o,tlined in the Joint Coctrine p,)lications series, with an aspirational doctrine, s,ch as
Joint Rision 2010. (n the Chinese case, the discontin,ity )etween reality and aspiration is o* times re*erred to as the Pcapa)ilities$doctrine +ap.P ;t the present sta+e in the /econd ;rtilleryKs
moderni>ation, China is nearing an historic convergence between doctrine and
capability allowing it to increasingly achieve a degree of credible
minimal deterrence vis%L%vis the continental &nited 'tates%$a
convergence of its doctrine and capability it has not confdently
possessed since the weaponi>ation of ChinaFs nuclear program in
the mid%1+M<s"
China wont go to war
Aederation of American 'cientists M (http://www.n,Bestrat.com/china/5ooB$
1E$#4.pd*, dwS 11$#0$200Q, da: %$&$2011, lido'
#he tone of the reports, howe-er, has changed considerably during the
current /ush administration. 4he 1&&% report d,rin+ the Clinton era descri)ed si+ni8cant
de-elopments in Chinas moderni>ation, ),t made a ca,tio,s o-erall pro?ection: :vidence suggests N
that China will develop her military strength at a measured pace" A
more rapid or large%scale military build%up is seen by the Chinese
leadership as unnecessary and detrimental to continued economic
growth"... Chinas n,clear strate+y pro)a)ly will contin,e to emphasi>e the de-elopment o* a n,clear
retaliatory capa)ility as a deterrent a+ainst the potential ,se o* n,clear weapons )y e@istin+ n,clear weapons
states. Jn+oin+ )allistic missile moderni>ation encompasses a shi*t *rom liT,id to solid *,el missiles.4#
China wont go to war no political will
.oore M (/cott, Uesearch assistant, http://www.nti.or+/e!research/e#!=0.html, dw:
10$1=$200Q, da: %$&$2011, lido'
#he new generation of Chinese leaders which has risen to power in
the aftermath of the 1+,+ #iananmen '9uare incident (li, si', has
tended to consist of moderate technocrats,L10M who are unli!ely to
support radical policy reversals such as the use of nuclear
weapons" Chinese politics in general have also evolved into a Hmore
pragmatic ris!%adverseH form"L11M #his process was initiated by the
rise of Hinterest group politicsH during the tenure of *resident 2iang
3emin.L12M #his new structure of decision%ma!ing involves the
speciali>ation of bureaucratic institutions which have become more
assertive and occasionally resisted high%level decisions they
believed to be ill conceived.L1#M (t is pro)a)le that certain instit,tions, s,ch as the Ainistry o*
9orei+n ;fairs, wo,ld stron+ly resist the act,al or threatened ,se o* n,clear weapons a+ainst the .nited /tates in
almost any sit,ation. (n a risB$ad-erse policy en-ironment that seeBs consens,s, this Bind o* stron+ opposition may
well pre-ail. It thus appears unli!ely that any impetus for the use of
nuclear weapons in a con8ict with the &nited 'tates would come
from within the established Chinese policyma!ing apparatus. 4here are
s,++estions, howe-er, that press,re *or the act,al or threatened ,se o* n,clear weapons a+ainst the .nited /tates
may come *rom o,tside ChinaKs policymaBin+ elite, -ia a phenomenon that may )e termed Phyper$nationalism.PL14M
4he +rad,al e@pansion o* *reedom o* speech in China has re-ealed some tr,ly radical nationalistic perspecti-es,
ran+in+ *rom a Bind o* Chinese le)ensra,m (shen+ c,n Bon+ ?ian'L1EM to alle+ations o* a Bind o* racist plot in
<estern policy towards China.L1QM (n a crisis sit,ation, there are s,++estions that s,ch hyper$nationalism may e@ert
si+ni8cant press,re on policymaBers to respond with an a++ressi-e response, which co,ld incl,de n,clear weapons.
Chinas :conomy is Cesilient
#he :conomist 1O (0Vow stron+ is Chinas economy Cespite a recent slowdown, the worlds second$
)i++est economy is more resilient than its critics thinB1, http://www.economist.com/node/21EEE&1E,
J2C'
3et the very unfairness of ChinaFs system gives it an unusual resilience" .nliBe
the ti+ers China relies very little on foreign borrowing" Its growth is fnanced
from resources e(tracted from its own population not from fc!le
foreigners free to 8ee as happened in 'outh%:ast Asia (and is happenin+ a+ain in
parts o* the e,ro >one'. ChinaFs saving rate at ?1P of QD* is even higher than its
investment rate" And the repressive state%dominated fnancial system
those savings are !ept in is actually well placed to deal with repayment
delays and defaults .
Chinas :conomy is resilient 1oans and 2obs
-rli! 1O (4om, <all /treet Jo,rnal 0Sa)o,r and credit 8+,res show a resilient Chinese economy1 4he <all
/treet Jo,rnal http://www.thea,stralian.com.a,/),siness/wall$street$?o,rnal/la)o,r$and$
credit$8+,res$show$a$resilient$chinese$economy/story$*nay#@E=$122Q#2EE2%#0&'
#he data for the frst 9uarter suggests that ChinaFs labour mar!ets are
tighter than ever" #here are 1"<, 0ob opportunities for every 0ob see!er
up from 1"<R at the end of O<11 and the highest ratio in the decade%long
history of the series" 4here are str,ct,ral *orces at worB. Cemo+raphic chan+es mean ChinaKs la)o,r
*orce has stopped +rowin+ and will soon start to shrinB. 4he s,pply o* worBers mo-in+ *rom *arm to *actory is
startin+ to )e ,sed ,p. 4hat helps e@plain the recent shi*t to a shorta+e o* worBers, and risin+ la)o,r costs. 5,t
that is a lon+$term trend. (* ChinaKs electronics *actories and constr,ction 8rms were really in dire straits, a cyclical
downt,rn wo,ld still res,lt in mass ,nemployment. 4hatKs what happened in the 8nal T,arter o* 200=, when the
+lo)al 8nancial crisis hit. #he fact that labour mar!ets remain tight with demand
for wor!ers outstripping supply suggests ChinaFs economy continues to
hum" Few$loan data *or Aarch, p,)lished o-erni+ht, also s,rprised on the ,pside. ChinaFs ban!s
pushed 1"<1 trillion yuan (W./1E#)n' in loans out the door up from S1< billion
yuan in Aebruary" ChinaKs )anBs normally start the Few 3ear with a )an+, and lacBl,stre loan 8+,res *or
the 8rst two months were a disappointment. AarchKs ),mper credit crop means total lendin+ *or the 8rst T,arter is
act,ally ,p & per cent compared with a year earlier. 4hat reOects eforts )y the central )anB to ease conditions in
8nancial marBets and shows lendin+ +ettin+ )acB on tracB. Cata on +ross domestic prod,ct, d,e later today, will
pro-ide a more complete o-er-iew o* ChinaKs tra?ectory. 5,t the employment and loan data are
already pointing to resilient growth and policy shifting more frmly into
supportive mode"
;o solvency% government reform !ey
Einhua 1O JChinese news agency 5'lowing economy prompts
calls for reforms)
httpBTTwww"chinadaily"com"cnTbusinessTO<1O%
<ST1MTcontentU1??,R?RG"htmK VQ4
5E(J(F2 $$ Whoever sees the half%year report on ChinaFs economy, whether they )e
policymaBers or economists, would not view the fgures as a glowing result *or the worldKs
second$lar+est economy. Qross domestic prod,ct in China e(panded S"M percent year$on$year in the
second T,arter easing below , percent for the frst time in three years and
mar!ing the si(th 9uarterly decline in a row, accordin+ to the Fational 5,rea, o* /tatistics.
4he 2C7 data in the second T,arter tooB Chinese economic +rowth in the 8rst si@ months to %.= percent year$on$
year, which still s,rpassed the +o-ernment tar+et o* %.E percent *or the *,ll year. 4o some analysts, the slowest
+rowth pace in three years showed China is *acin+ increased risBs o* a hard landin+. 5,t /hen+ Saiy,n, the
spoBesman *or the Fational 5,rea, o* /tatistics, said the %.Q$percent rate was Pa *airly +ood speedP compared with
other ma?or world economies, and he was P*,ll o* con8denceP a)o,t the prospects o* ChinaKs economy. Jptimists
consider the Chinese economy )ottomed o,t in the second T,arter, ),t the co,ntry still needs to contin,e re*orms
to sol-e pro)lems that maBe its c,rrent de-elopment pattern ,n)alanced, ,ncoordinated and ,ns,staina)le.
PChina must ensure its QD* growth does not to drop below S percent
otherwise high unemployment and other deeply%rooted social problems
will emergeH said <ei Jie, a pro*essor at 4sin+h,a .ni-ersity /chool o* Economics and Aana+ement.
Vowe-er, <ei himsel* opposed any massi-e stim,l,s s,ch as the si>e o* the 4 trillion y,an (WQ#4.&2 )illion' in 200&
to sta)ili>e +rowth in the worldKs second$lar+est economy since the )ailo,t o* the economy thro,+h massi-e
stim,l,s Pwill only postpone pro)lems and miss the opport,nity to restr,ct,re the Chinese economyP. Uespondin+
to the c,rrent economic slowdown, the /tate Co,ncil, or the central +o-ernment, adopted new meas,res
enco,ra+in+ pri-ate companies to in-est in sectors s,ch as )anBin+, ener+y and transport $ which are c,rrently
dominated )y /tate$owned companies. 4he 7eopleKs 5anB o* China, the central )anB, e-en anno,nced a s,rprise
rate c,ts twice in a month, slashin+ the )anBsK )enchmarB one$year )orrowin+ and lendin+ rates )y E0 and EQ )asis
points, respecti-ely. 7an Xian+don+, chie* economist with 2ala@y /ec,rities, said the slowing QD*
growth has outweighed in8ation as the top concern for Chinese
policyma!ers. 4o sta)ili>e +rowth in the short term, 7an said, China needs to rely on in-estment a+ain, as
e@ports are easily afected )y the sl,++ish e@ternal demand while a si+ni8cant increase in cons,mption will taBe
time. (n-estment, e@ports and cons,mption are the three ma?or dri-ers o* +rowth in the Chinese economy.
;ccordin+ to the F5/ data, in-estment acco,nted *or a)o,t two$thirds o* ChinaKs 2C7 in the 8rst hal* o* this year.
7an said China needs to speed up reforms in the trans*er o* land ,se ri+hts, the resident
re+istration system as well as systems concernin+ pension, ins,rance and ed,cation that checB the co,ntry *rom
rapid economic +rowth. P<hat we are concerned a)o,t is the possi)le o-erreaction *rom policymaBers,P said Si
CaoB,i, a *ormer monetary policy ad-iser to the 75JC. Si said the e@istin+ meas,res aimed at maintainin+ +rowth
are eno,+h to help China achie-e a .$type re)o,nd this year. /ince 200=, ChinaKs macroeconomic policies ha-e
shi*ted )etween stim,l,s and ti+htenin+ se-eral times, indicatin+ the di6c,lty *or economic restr,ct,rin+ in the
worldKs second$lar+est economy, which ,sed to rely hea-ily on +o-ernment spendin+, the property sector and la)or$
intensi-e e@portin+ ind,stries *or rapid +rowth. 5,t the lingering :uropean sovereign debt
crisis and a fragile &' economic recovery have signifcantly brought down
e(ternal demand *or Chinese +oods and ser-ices this year, while an ageing population
and rising labor costs at home also slac!ened the process of ChinaFs
Htransformation of economic growth patternH" P#he Chinese economy
needs to increase is its e$ectiveness rather than ?,st the si>e,P said Cao 3,an>hen+, chie*
economist with the 5anB o* China. PWhat matters is whether China can successfully
restructure its economy and ma!e it more e$ective and of better 9uality.P
<, XiaoTi,, president o* the 9inancial and /ec,rities (nstit,te o* Uenmin .ni-ersity o* China, said China has to +et
,sed to slower +rowth as China shi*ts itsel* *rom an in-estment$dri-en economy to a cons,mption$dri-en one.
PChina will see its growth ease to %$= percent )y 2020 and slow further to around ?
percent after O<O<,P <, said.
;o solvency% housing
/oesler 1O J.atthew 5/ofAB A 4ard 1anding In China Could
'oon /ecome A 74igh *robably :vent)
httpBTTwww"businessinsider"comTbofa%china%hard%landing%
property%bubble%O<1O%SK VQ4
Cecently it appeared as though ChinaFs property bubble was unwinding as
prices came down" ;ow it loo!s li!e prices are turning up again" 4hese
de-elopments in the property marBet prompted Chinese 7remier <en Jia)ao to comment o-er the weeBend that
Pc,rrently, the property mar!et ad0ustment is still at a crucial stage and we m,st
,nswer-in+ly contin,e the worB and maBe the 8+ht a+ainst spec,lati-e property in-estment demand a lon+$term
policy.P Vowe-er, 5o*; China strate+ist Ca-id C,i thinBs that )ased on remarBs made )y the 7eopleKs Caily, a
Chinese newspaper seen as the Comm,nist 7artyKs mo,thpiece, additional measures to curb the
property mar!et could come sooner than e(pected which in turn could
mean a hard landing for the Chinese economy"
;o solvencyDeconomic bubbles root cause
Woo and Wagner 1O JDee economics lecturer at /ei0ing Coyal
'chool Daniel C:- of Country Cis! 'olutions 5Chinas Coming
Qreat Deleveraging) httpBTTwww"hu@ngtonpost"comTdee%
wooTchina%economy%deleveragingUbU1MSR+?1"htmlK VQ4
ChinaKs )i++est pro)lem is that the state '-:s and crony capitalists wield too much
power over national economy ha-e too m,ch control o-er wealth creation and income distri),tion,
and m,ch o* the 2C7 +rowth and -ested interest +ro,psK economic pro+ress are made at the e@pense o* a-era+e
cons,mers who are st,cB in a spiral o* relati-e po-erty. 9aster 2C7 +rowth will in the end not mean m,ch since
Chinese cons,mers are ,na)le to s,pport the o-ercapacity in the ho,sin+ marBet and lendin+ marBets. China will
try to create more e@port moment,m in an efort to s,stain its +rowth, ),t this is a -icio,s circle o* im)alance that
e-en a re-al,ation o* renmin)i cannot )reaB. .ns,staina)le economic bubbles and collapsing
demand are the root causes of ChinaFs slowing economy" (* these str,ct,ral
de8ciencies are not properly addressed )y the +o-ernment, things will get worse" Aore *ri-olo,s rate
c,ts and other central )anBin+ mane,-erin+ are s,re to come, ),t to no a-ail, as the chain reaction will only )e
accelerated. China will eventually face its end game % the dar! side of a great
deleveraging"
;o solvency government reform !ey
Central )anBin+ mane,-erin+ can at )est ser-e to s,stain the o-er$le-era+ed economy and a-oid a systematic
short$circ,it o* de)t 8nancin+ *or now. #here wonFt be much li9uidity invested in lending
capacity or 0ob creating pro0ects since there is ins,6cient demand, so the economic
return on credit will deteriorate" If these structural defciencies arenFt
properly addressed by the central government $ and soon $ the longer term
deterioration of the Chinese economy can only continue. #he inevitable
chain reaction will accelerate and China will face its economic end game"
4o +a,+e how ?,st how *ar the health o* ChinaKs economy has deteriorated, loo! no further than how
aggressive ChinaFs central ban! % the 7eopleKs 5anB o* China (75JC' $ has been acting
of late" Jn Eth J,ly, the 5anB c,t )enchmarB interest rates *or the second time in less than a month. (n
Cecem)er 2011, the 75JC c,t the reser-e reT,irement ratio (UUU' )y E0 )asis points ()p', to 21D, *ollowed )y a
*,rther E0 )p c,t in 9e)r,ary and another E0 )p c,t in Aay $ to the c,rrent 20D. ;part *rom all the rate c,ts, the
*/-C also made its biggest in0ection of funds into the money mar!ets in
nearly si( months in0ecting a net OO? billion yuan (./W#4.E )illion' through the
re-erse$rep,rchase operations (repoK last wee!, which *ollowed a com)ined in?ection o* 2&1 )illion y,an in
the pre-io,s *o,r weeBs.
;o solvency% growth is decelerating
China canFt rely on e(cessive investment to propel its growth for much
longer. (s demand$led +rowth the answer (n short, no. ChinaFs e(port growth is clearly
decelerating, with the E. and ./ on the ed+e o* a do,)le$dip recession, and m,ch o* the rest o* the world
relyin+ on China *or their own e@port$led +rowth. 4he E. and ./ are ,nliBely to )o,nce )acB any time soon, and the
*ort,nes o* many nat,ral reso,rce e@portin+ co,ntries ,ltimately depend on China. 5ra>il, *or e@ample, has )ecome
hi+hly dependent on China *or the ma?ority o* its iron ore e@ports. ;ccordin+ to a recent .5/ <ealth Aana+ement
Uesearch report, the +reat dele-era+in+ will liBely play o,t thro,+h 2020, so China will have to loo!
elsewhere for salvation. With the *on>i scheme of investment growth and
the e(port growth both collapsing whatFs left for ChinaW Contrary to what many
choose to )elie-e, ChinaFs trade surplus is not caused by Chinese consumersF
high saving rate but has much to do with their deteriorating disposable
incomes which far lag behind QD* growth and in8ation. ;ccordin+ to the ;ll China
9ederation o* 4rade .nions (;C94.', worBersK wa+es to 2C7 ratio ha-e +one down *or 22 consec,ti-e years, since
1&=#. (t +oes witho,t sayin+ that the cons,mption to 2C7 ratio has )een shrinBin+ all the while. (n the meantime,
the a++re+ate sa-in+s rate has increased )y E1D, *rom #QD in 1&&Q to E1D in 200%. 5,t Chinese cons,mers ha-e
not ti+htenin+ their p,rse strin+s. ;ccordin+ to the Ce-elopment Uesearch Center o* the /tate Co,ncilKs report, that
increase is mainly dri-en )y +o-ernment and corporate spendin+ $ not )y the ho,seholds. 9or the past 11 years, the
Vo,sehold /a-in+ Uate has only increased *rom 1&D to 22D. 4he +o-ernment and corporate sa-in+ rate has
increased *rom 1%D to 22D, which acco,nts *or nearly =0D o* the increase in ;++re+ate /a-in+s Uate. Aor the
past decade the governmentFs fscal income has been growing faster than
QD* or 4ousehold Income" (n 200&, the 8scal income was Q== )illion y,an, and achie-ed an ann,al
+rowth o* 11.%D, while 2C7 +rowth was =.%D, .r)an ho,sehold disposa)le income +rowth was =.=D and
a+ric,lt,re ho,sehold disposa)le income +rowth was =.2D. #he state and corporations have
ta!en too much out of national income and therefore continue to wea!en
consumers rather than empower them"
Cisease
Fo impact I diseases ha-e e-ol-ed to )e less dan+ero,s
Achenbach G JJoel ;chen)ach, <ashin+ton 7ost staf, Fo-em)er 200#, PJ,r 9riend, the 7la+,e,P writer
http://n+m.national+eo+raphic.com/n+m/0#11/reso,rces!who.html'
Whenever a new disease appears somewhere on our planet
e(perts invariably pop up on #X with grave summations of the
problem, ,s,ally alon+ the lines o*, P<eKre in a war a+ainst the micro)esPNpa,se *or dramatic efect
NPand the micro)es are winnin+.P <ar, howe-er, is a ridic,lo,sly o-er,sed metaphor and pro)a)ly sho,ld )e
)om)ed )acB to the /tone ;+e. 7a,l Ewald, a )iolo+ist at the .ni-ersity o* So,is-ille, ad-ocates a diferent
approach to lethal micro)es. 9or+et tryin+ to o)literate them, he says, and *oc,s instead on how they co$e-ol-e
with h,mans. AaBe them m,tate in the ri+ht direction. 2et the powers o* e-ol,tion on o,r side. Disease
organisms can, in *act, become less virulent over time" When it was
frst recogni>ed in :urope around 1R+? syphilis !illed its human
hosts within months" #he 9uic! progression of the diseaseDfrom
infection to deathDlimited the ability of syphilis to spread" 'o a
new form evolved one that gave carriers years to infect others"
Aor the same reason the common cold has become less
dangerous" .ilder strains of the virusDspread by people out and
about touching things and sha!ing handsDhave an evolutionary
advantage over more debilitating strains" =ou canFt spread a cold
very easily if youFre incapable of rolling out of bed" #his process
has already wea!ened all ),t one -ir,lent strain o* malaria: Plasmodium falciparum s,cceeds
in part )eca,se )edridden -ictims o* the disease are more -,lnera)le to mosT,itoes that carry and transmit the
parasite. 4o miti+ate malaria, the secret is to impro-e ho,sin+ conditions. (* people p,t screens on doors and
windows, and ,se )ed nets, it creates an e-ol,tionary incenti-e *or Plasmodium falciparum to )ecome milder
and sel*$limitin+. (mmo)ili>ed people protected )y nets and screens canKt easily spread the parasite, so
e-ol,tion wo,ld *a-or *orms that let in*ected people walB aro,nd and +et )itten )y mosT,itoes.
Disease cant cause e(tinction
Qladwell ++ LAalcolm staf writer *or the Few 3orBer and )est sellin+ a,thor, 1&&&.
Epidemics: Jpposin+ Riewpoints, 1&&&, p. 2&.p. #1$#2M
:very infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to
adapt a specifc strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding
cost and this ma!es human counterattac! possible" .alaria is
vicious and deadly but it relies on mos9uitoes to spread *rom one h,man to the
ne@t, which means that drainin+ swamps and p,ttin+ ,p mosT,ito nettin+ can all h,t halt endemic malaria.
'mallpo( is e(traordinarily durable remaining infectious in the
environment for years but its very durability its essential rigidity is
what ma!es it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine
against" AID' is almost invariably lethal because it attac!s the body
at its point of great vulnerability that is the immune system ),t the
fact that it targets blood cells is what ma!es it so relatively
uninfectious" Xiruses are not superhuman. ( co,ld +o on, ),t the point is o)-io,s.
Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be
everything at onceB as contagious as 8ue as durable as the cold as
lethal as :bola as stealthy as 4IX and so doggedly resistant to
mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long
epidemic" 5,t -ir,ses are not, well, s,perh,man" #hey cannot do everything at
once" It is one of the ironies of the analysis o* alarmists s,ch as 7reston that they are
all too willin+ to point o,t the limitations o* h,man )ein+s, ),t they ne+lect to point o,t the limitations o*
microscopic li*e *orms.
4uman adaptation
Qladwell +? L4he Few Uep,)lic (Aalcom, e@cerpted in Epidemics: Jpposin+ Riewpoints, J,ly 1%th and
24th, 1&&&, p. 2&' M
(n 7la+,es and 7eoples, which appeared in 1&%%. <illiam AeFeill pointed o,t thatHwhile mans eforts to 0remodel1
his en-ironment are sometimes a so,rce o* new disease. 4hey are seldom a so,rce o* serio,s epidemic disease.
:,ite the opposite. As humans and new microorganisms interact they begin
to accommodate each other" V,man populations slowly build ,p resistance to
circ,latin+ infections" What were once virulent infections s,ch as syphilis
become attenuated" -ver time diseases of adults, s,ch as measles and chicBen
po@, become limited to children whose immune systems are still
naYve"
Any disease virulent enough to ris! e(tinction would !ill its
host too 9uic!ly
1ederberg ++ LJosh,a 7ro*. 2enetics Y /tan*ord, (Epidemic: 4he <orld o* (n*ectio,s Cisease, (p. 1#'M
4he toll o* the *o,rteenth$cent,ry pla+,e, the P5lacB Ceath,P was closer to one third. (* the ),+sK potential to
de-elop adaptations that co,ld Bill ,s of were the whole story, we wo,ld not )e here. Vowe-er, with -ery rare
e@ceptions, our microbial adversaries have a shared interest in our
survival" Almost any pathogen comes to a dead end when we dieI it
frst has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive"
'o historically the really severe host% pathogen interactions have
resulted in a wipeout of both host and pathogen . <e h,mans are still here
)eca,se, so *ar, the pathogens that ha-e attacBed ,s ha-e willy$nilly had an interest in our
survival" 4his is a -ery delicate )alance, and it is easily dist,r)ed, o*ten in the waBe o* lar+e$scale ecolo+ical
,psets.
Democracy
Democracy &p
Democracy high now% revolutions in the Arab world and ;orth
Africa
Ariedman 11 (Cr. 2eor+e, Chie* E@ec,ti-e J6cer and *o,nder o* /4U;49JU, Aarch 21,
http://www.strat*or.com/weeBly/20110#21$li)ya$west$narrati-e$democracy %/&/11'
4o ,nderstand this lo+ic, it is essential to )e+in )y considerin+ recent events in ;orth Africa
and the Arab world and the manner in which <estern +o-ernments interpreted them.
/eginning with #unisia spreading to :gypt and then to the
Arabian *eninsula the last two months have seen widespread
unrest in the Arab world" 4hree ass,mptions ha-e )een made a)o,t this ,nrest. 4he 8rst was
that it represented broad%based popular opposition to e(isting
governments, rather than representin+ the discontent o* *ra+mented minorities N in other words, that
they were pop,lar re-ol,tions. /econd, it ass,med that these revolutions had as a
common goal the creation of a democratic society" 4hird, it ass,med that the
Bind o* democratic society they wanted was similar to E,ropean$;merican democracy, in other words, a
constit,tional system s,pportin+ <estern democratic -al,es.
Democracys on the rise with the .iddle :ast catching up
Vimball 11 (/pencer, Q/14, http://www.dw$world.de/dw/article/0,,1E14Q&#&,00.html, %/&/11'
Aor decades the Arab world stagnated under authoritarianism
despite a global e(pansion of democracy )eyond its historic core in Forth ;merica
and <estern E,rope. ;ccordin+ to the ./ thinB tanB 9reedom Vo,se, the number of
democracies in the world more than doubled by the new
millennium as comm,nism collapsed and stron+men *rom Satin ;merica to /o,theast ;sia were *orced
*rom power. Although the .iddle :ast appeared immune to this
liberali>ing trend, pop,lar ,prisin+s now re*erred to as the HArab 'pringH have
successfully forced authoritarian regimes from power in #unisia
and :gypt demonstratin+ that e-en political hea-ywei+hts liBe *ormer E+yptian president Vosni A,)araB
are ,ltimately acco,nta)le to the people. P<eKre seein+ in a sense the global spread of the
aspirations for democracy fnally coming to the surface in the
Arab worldH JacB 2oldstone, an e@pert on re-ol,tions with 2eor+e Aason .ni-ersity in ;rlin+ton,
Rir+inia, told Ce,tsche <elle.
Democracy Down
Democracy low now% -bamas unilateral action in 1ibya
circumvented Congress and the democratic process
Vucinich 11 (Cennis, Cemocratic Vo,se Uepresentati-e, J,ly Q,
http://www.+,ardian.co.,B/commentis*ree/ci*america/2011/?,l/0Q/li)ya$nato1 %/&/11'
9irst, the war is illegal under the &nited 'tates constitution and o,r <ar
7owers ;ct, because only the &' Congress has the authority to declare
war and the president has been unable to show that the &' faced
an imminent threat from 1ibya. #he president even ignored his top le+al
advisers at the 7enta+on and the department o* ?,stice who insisted he needed
congressional approval before bombing 1ibya"
-bamas actions in 1ibya were undemocratic
;ichols 11 (John, <ashin+ton correspondent *or the Fation, Aarch 21, http://www.npr.or+
/2011/0#/21/1#4%#0&Q#/the$nation$in$li)ya$,s$*or+ot$a)o,t$con+ress, %/&/11'
*resident -bamaFs approval of an intervention in 1ibya has also
s!ipped the Congress. <as this necessary J* co,rse not. -bama could have
consulted CongressZ indeed, i* the iss,e was pressin+, he could have as!ed that
the 4ouse and 'enate be called into session over the wee!end"
4ad the president gone to the Congress it is doubtful that he
would have met with opposition" ;s noted a)o-e, Qadhaf has few
defenders. Cons,ltin+ Con+ress does not mean that Con+ress will )locB a war. 4he constit,tional
system o* checBs and )alances was not esta)lished merely to stop warsZ it was esta)lished to allow mem)ers o*
Con+ress to add their insi+hts, to propose timelines, to set limits and parameters *or military initiati-es. 4he
de)ate, the disc,ssion, the si*tin+ and winnowin+ o* in*ormation: 4his is the point. .n*ort,nately, it is a point
that J)ama has missed. #he &nited 'tates is now deep into what C;; calls
the H1ibya WarH yet there has been no con+ressional de)ate, no ad-ice or consent,
no chec!s and balances" #he Cepublic was well served by the
drafters of a constitution who gave the war%ma!ing power to
Congress" #hey were wise and right to do so" ;nd any president
who fails to consult congress )e*ore en+a+in+ in warmaBin+ ill serves the *o,ndin+
doc,ment and the republic.
Democracy ;o Impact Cesilient
Impeachments prove the integrity and e$ectiveness of
governments and the rule of law
Congressional Cecord +, (7roceedin+s and Ce)ates o* the 10E
th
Con+ress /econd /ession,
Jcto)er 1& to Cecem)er 1&, -ol,me 144: part 1&'
4here is no do,)t a)o,t it, Ar. /peaBer, this is a di6c,lt day. ;nd yet it is really a day o* a6rmation, a day that
says o,r system o* +o-ernment worBs. We are showing the world that our
democracy is resilient" It deals fairly and it deals e$ectively with a
leader who fails in his responsibilities" Ar. /peaBer, today we are
defending the rule of law and we are letting freedom wor! in the
lives of Americans. 4his is to,+h *or all o* ,s. <e are all saddened )y it, ),t we will
complete this wor! on this day and then we will go on" We will go
on in a great ;ation and we will +o on in a government that once a+ain stri-es to hold
and preser-e and assert its inte+rity alon+ with its a,thority. 9or Ar. /peaBer, this -ote today is not a)o,t the
character o* a Fation. ;nd, Ar. /peaBer, ( intend to -ote *or the articles o* impeachment and ( intend to -ote *or
the r,le o* law.
Democracy is resilient% empirically proven
:sler +, (2a-in, award$winnin+ )roadcaster with the 55C, Cecem)er 1&, http://www.independent.co.,B/arts$
entertainment/cr,ise$missiles$wont$stop$the$dan+ers$*acin+$,s$democracy$11&2200.html %/&/11'
AmericaFs democracy is resilient" #he republic has survived the
Civil War and civil rights the surprise attac! on *earl 4arbour and
being torn apart by Xietnam" Americans endured the national
tragedy of Watergate" 4hey will s,rely end,re the national *arce o* the SewinsBy scandal. 9or
Fi@on it was once a pro*o,ndly serio,s T,estion o* what did the 7resident Bnow and when did he Bnow it. 9or
many ;mericans that has )een replaced )y the Clinton T,estion o* what did the 7resident to,ch and when did
he to,ch it
AOB Democracy 'olves War
Democracy doesnt prevent wars% Israel and India prove
'haw < (Aartin, pro*essor o* international relations at .ni-ersity o* /,sse@, http://www.s,sse@.ac.,B/
.sers/ha*a#/democracy.htm %/=/11'
(n the +lo)al era, established liberal%democratic states do not fght each
other" /ut once a+ain, it o)-io,s that this is not simply because they are
democracies but because they are embedded in the ra*t o* common
Western and global state institutions. (ndeed it is not ?,st li)eral democracies which
do not 8+ht each other: the ma0or non%Western states (U,ssia, China, (ndia, 5ra>il, etc.',
whether democratic or not are not li!ely to fght with the
dominant Western powers. J,tside the <estern core o* +lo)al state power, howe-er, national
centres are more weaBly inte+rated with its instit,tional str,ct,res, and re+ional instit,tions which mi+ht inhi)it
local conOicts are m,ch weaBer than they are in the core. (n the Cold <ar era, interstate ri-alries )etween ma?or
re+ional powers $ s,ch as )etween U,ssia and China, (ndia and 7aBistan and China, (ndonesia and Aalaysia, (ran
and (raT, (srael and the ;ra) states $ led to wars and )order incidents. While the inte+rati-e tendencies in
the emer+in+ +lo)al polity, incl,din+ the democratisation trends, may increasingly
inhibit wars it clearly remains possible that s,ch interstate rivalries will
generate new wars. (t is clear that democratisation in itsel* is not a
guarantee of war%avoidance in s,ch con8cts. Israel the only internally
democratic state in the .iddle :ast has also been the most
belligerentI Indian democracy has been T,ite compatible with
bellicosity towards *a!istan. Cemocratic as well as military +o-ernments may see war, so
lon+ as it can )e Bept limited and relati-ely cost$*ree, as a means o* )oostin+ pop,larity. 4h,s 3eltsins U,ssia
so,+ht a military sol,tion in the )reaBaway rep,)lic o* Chechnya, despite the lessons o* the late$/o-iet *ail,re in
;*+hanistan. Jnly in de*eat did U,ssias weaB democracy penalise the re+ime *or the new disaster, and then not
decisi-ely.
Democracy doesnt prevent violence% genocides occur within
states
Aerguson M (Fiall, Sa,rence ;. 4isch 7ro*essor o* Vistory at Var-ard, /enior 9ellow o* the Voo-er (nstit,tion,
04he <ar o* the <orld1, p. @@@-iii'
Cid it matter how states were +o-erned (t has )ecome *ashiona)le amon+ political scientists to posit a
correlation )etween democracy and peace, on the +ro,nd that democracies tend not to +o to war with one
another. Jn that )asis, o* co,rse, the lon+$r,n rise o* democracy d,rin+ the twentieth cent,ry sho,ld ha-e
red,ced the incidence o* war. (t may ha-e red,ced the incidence o* war )etween statesZ there is, howe-er, at
least some e-idence that waves of democrati>ation in the 1+O<s 1+M<s and
1+,<s were followed by increases in the number of civil wars and
wars of secession. 4his )rin+s ,s to a central point. #o consider twentieth%
century con8ict purely in terms of warfare between states is to
overloo! the importance of organi>ed violence within states. #he
most notorious e(ample is, o* co,rse, the war waged by the ;a>is and their
colla)orators against the 2ews nearly si@ million o* whom perished. 4he Fa>is sim,ltaneo,sly so,+ht
to annihilate a -ariety o* other social +ro,ps deemed to )e G,nworthy o* li*e, nota)ly mentally ill and
homose@,al 2ermans, the social elite o* occ,pied 7oland and the /inti and Uoma peoples. (n all, more than
three million people *rom these other +ro,ps were m,rdered. 7rior to these e-ents, 'talin had
perpetrated compara)le acts o* violence against national minorities
within the 'oviet &nion as well as e@ec,tin+ or incarceratin+ millions o* U,ssians +,ilty or
merely s,spected o* political dissidence. J* aro,nd *o,r million non$U,ssians who were deported to /i)eria and
Central ;sia, at least 1.Q million are estimated to ha-e died as a res,lt o* the hardships inOicted on them. ;
minim,m estimate *or the total -ictims o* all political -iolence in the /o-iet .nion )etween 1&2= and 1&E# is
twenty$one million. 3et genocide predated totalitarianism" ;s we shall see, the policies
o* *orced resettlement and deli)erate m,rder directed a+ainst Christian minorities in the last years o* the
Jttoman Empire amo,nted to +enocide accordin+ to the 1&4= de8nition o* the term.
:vidence for democracies preventing war is circumstantial at
best
Walt ++ (/te-en A., 7ro*essor o* 7olitical /cience, Jan,ary/9e)r,ary,
http://www.*orei+nafairs.com/articles/E4Q41/stephen$m$walt/ne-er$say$ne-er$wish*,l$thinBin+$on$democracy$
and$warpa+e"#, %/=/11'
Critics o* the democratic$peace hypothesis maBe two main co,nterar+,ments. 4heir 8rst line o* attacB holds
that the apparent paci8sm )etween democracies may )e a statistical arti*act: )eca,se democracies
have been relatively rare throughout history the absence of wars
between them may be due largely to chance" :vidence for a
democratic peace also depends on the time periods one e(amines
and on how one interprets )orderline cases liBe the <ar o* 1=12 or the ;merican Ci-il <ar. Critics also note that
strong statistical support for the proposition is limited to the
period after World War II when both the &"'"%led alliance system and the
'oviet threat to <estern E,ropeKs democracies discouraged con8ict between
republics.
Democracies avoid war for other reasons
; second challen+e *oc,ses on the ca,sal lo+ic o* the theory itsel*. Democratic%peace
proponents often attribute the absence of war between republics
to a sense o* tolerance and shared values that maBes ,sin+ *orce a+ainst *ellow rep,)lics
ille+itimate. (;s noted a)o-e, <eartKs -ersion o* this ar+,ment emphasi>es the tendency *or rep,)lics to see
similar states as part o* their own Pin$+ro,p.P' If this theory is true howe-er, there should
be concrete historical evidence showin+ that democratic leaders eschewed -iolence
a+ainst each other primarily *or this reason. /ut critics liBe Christopher Sayne ha-e shown that when
democratic states have come close to war they have held bac! for
reasons that had more to do with strategic interests than shared
political culture. 4hese cases s,++est that even if democracies have tended
not to fght each other in the past it is not because they were
democracies"
'tates 0ustify violence and imperialism by e(cluding
democracies from their inner circle
<eart does reco+ni>e that shared political culture can be an unreliable
barrier to war when serio,s conOicts o* interest arise because states will simply
use other criteria to e(clude rivals *rom their Pin$+ro,p.P 4h,s, he acBnowled+es that
religious di$erences drove the 'wiss republics o* S,cerne and 5ern to war
in the seventeenth century. Ve *,rther admits that republics have had little
di@culty 0ustifying imperial e(pansion against less%developed but
essentially democratic societies simply by declarin+ the -ictims Pi+norant sa-a+esP and
placing them outside the Hcivili>edH in%group. /imilarly, democracies liBe the
&nited 'tates overthrew *reely elected governments in Quatemala and
Chile because ;merican suspicion that they might Hgo communistH was
enough to e(clude them from the circle of HacceptableH
democracies. <eart, howe-er, does not seem to reali>e how damnin+ these admissions are to his
ar+,ment and instead relies on ad hoc rationali>ations to paper o-er the holes.
#urn% your authors promote a dangerous and false sense of
security
#he :conomist +? (PCemocracies and war,P p. 1%$1=, http://*ac,lty.washin+ton.ed,/
caporaso/co,rses/20#/readin+s/economist!Cemocracies!and!war.pd*, %/&/11'
4he real dan+er, then, is that too great a confdence in a simple correlation
between democracy and peace, )ased on o,tdated ass,mptions, may lull into a
false sense of security those who proclaim it" 4his is not to de-al,e democracy,
nor to ad-ocate a tolerance o* dictatorship. Cemocracy carries o-erwhelmin+ ad-anta+es, incl,din+ a close
correlation with prosperity. 4he indi-id,al *reedom it promotes is inherently +ood. 4he ar+,ment is rather that
there is no easy route to perpetual peace whether through
democracy or anything else" 4uman nature tends to get in the
way"
;o war because of lac! of opportunity and geographic
pro(imity not because of democracy
Cussett +G (5r,ce, Cean ;cheson 7ro*essor o* 7olitical /cience Y 3ale, 04he 9act o* Cemocratic 7eace,1
Grasping the Democratic Peace)
Sar+ely ,nnoticed, howe-er, was the empirical *act that democracies had rarely i* e-er +one to war with each
other d,rin+ this period. /ince there were *ew democracies, o*ten at a distance *rom each other, it is hardly
s,rprisin+ that their *ail,re to 8+ht each other was little noticed. 'tates need both an
opportunity and a willingness. to go to war with each other.
Fonconti+,o,s democracies, ,nless one or )oth were +reat powers, had little opport,nity to 8+ht each other.
'tates cannot fght unless they can e(ert substantial military
power a+ainst each othersK -ital territory. .ost states if not great powers with
P+lo)al reach (lar+e na-ies in this era>#' could e(ert such power only against
conti+,o,s states or at least near neighbors. 9,rthermore, the willin+ness o* states to 8+ht depends in
lar+e part on iss,es o-er which they ha-e conOicts o* interest. #erritorial disputes (o-er )orders,
or ri+hts o* ethnic +ro,ps whose presence is common to )oth' are rare in the absence of
pro(imity.24 /ince relati-ely *ew o* the democracies )ordered each other in the 1&20s and 1&#0s, a S/
not s,rprisin+ that they +enerally a-oided war with each other. 4h,s the empirical fact of
little or no war between democracies up to this time co,ld )e
obscured by the predominance of authoritarian states in the
international system, and the fre9uent wars involving one or more such
a,thoritarian states" Jne co,ld still see the international system as not only anarchic, ),t in principle
threatenin+ the Pwar o* all a+ainst all.P
Democracies still vote for war
; second pro)lem with Vants argument, at least when tested a+ainst modern societies with
,ni-ersal s,fra+e, is that it ris!s imputing too much gentleness of spirit to
the average voter. 4r,e, people tend to recoil at the prospect of
shedding their own blood, which is why the 8ercest and earliest critics o* wars tend to )e
people o* an a+e to )e conscripted, and sometimes ser-in+ soldiersNas happened when ;merica *o,+ht in
Rietnam, and (srael *o,+ht in Se)anon in 1&=2. /ut even otherwise !ind%hearted
citi>ens may not worry much when someone from another part of
the country goes o$ to fght especially if that other person has
volunteered to do so"
;o war now because democracies have a common enemy
4his )rin+s ,s to a 8nal +ap in <eartKs case. E-en i* its historical ?,d+ments are acc,rate, Fe-er at <ar cannot
tell ,s how rep,)lics wo,ld )eha-e in a world in which they were the only type o* +o-ernment. /,ch a world has
ne-er e@isted, o* co,rse, and we simply do not !now if the historical a@nity
among democracies would persist without authoritarian states"
#he struggle between authoritarian and democratic ideals has
been a critical fault line *or the past two millennia, and it is easy to ,nderstand why liBe$minded
re+imes ha-e )een inclined to cooperate when con*ronted )y states whose ideals posed a direct threat to their
own sec,rity. /ut were this basic distinction to evaporate cleavages
between democracies would pro)a)ly become more salient. Jne can easily
ima+ine rep,)lican states maBin+ in-idio,s distinctions amon+ themsel-es as conOicts o* interest +rew more
ac,te, partic,larly i* they no lon+er needed to ?oin *orces a+ainst monarchs and dictators. ;t the hei+ht o* the
Cold <ar, a*ter all, ;mericans tended to see Japan as a li)eral democracy molded lar+ely in their own ima+e.
5,t as soon as ;mericans )e+an to *ear that Japan was o-ertaBin+ them economically, they )e+an to Pdisco-erP
that Japanese politics were less li)eral than they had pre-io,sly tho,+ht. 4his episode s,++ests that if the
&nited 'tates were to face a democracy of roughly e9ual
capabilities both sides would fnd ways to place the other outside
its own democratic Hin%group"H Cepublics may have tended to
band together in the past but a world composed solely of them
might employ di$erent criteria to identify friends and foes" Fot only is
<eartKs interpretation o* history pro)lematic, its rele-ance *or the *,t,re may )e T,ite limited.
;ow that democracies no longer have common enemies they
will turn against each other
; deeper worry a)o,t the 0democracies dont 8+ht one another1 ar+,ment is that it may owe m,ch o* its *orce
to the relati-e pa,city o* democracies in the past. Aost simply, one wo,ld e@pect *ewer democracies to )e
in-ol-ed in *ewer wars. 4o the e@tent that democracies were more thinly spread
they would have fewer shared borders over which to fght. ;nd,
since some o* the )i++est con8icts o* the past cent,ry have been ideological as m,sh
as territorial, liberal countries have almost by defnition found
themselves allies in the str,++les a+ainst *ascism and comm,nism. Cemocracies ha-e th,s tended
not to 8+ht each other lately )eca,se they ha-e )een strate+ic allies in partNscore one *or the peace$thro,+h$
democracy theoristsN)eca,se they are democracies. ;+ain, however this does not mean
democracies will always be allies" In the absence of a comm,nist or *ascist
bloc! of enemies there will be less need for democracies to
huddle together for survival"
AOB Democracy 'olves :verything
1iberal democracies are !ey to solve for their impacts
Ayn C Vey , ()lo+, ;,+,st 2&, http://aynrBey.)lo+spot.com/200=/0=/democracy$is$not$panacea.html,
%/&/11'
*eople seem to thin! that HdemocracyH automatically means
Hliberal democracyH" 4hey *or+et that PdemocracyP is the *orm, and that Pli)eralP is the *,nction.
It is the HliberalH in Hliberal democracyH that provides the
restrained government instituted to protect the rights o* the people. (n
terms o* respectin+ the ri+hts o* the people, what is the e$ective di$erence
between a liberal democracy and a liberal monarchyW Jne co,ld ar+,e that
democracy gives people chec!s on the government should the
government decide to move in an illiberal direction, whereas there are no
checBs i* the Bin+ sho,ld decide so. #he problem is what would be the chec! if
the public decided to move the democratic government in an
illiberal directionW 7roponents o* democracy do not ha-e an answer *or that.
Democracy isnt an e$ective tool at the local or regional level
ID:A M ((nstit,te *or Cemocracy and Electoral ;ssistance, 1E /eptem)er,
http://www.idea.int/conOict/,pload/CCV/!Sa,nch!E-ent!/,mmary.pd*, %/&/11'
/U/2 Coomaarswamy opened the e-ent with an en+a+in+ presentation on how democracy as a c,lt,re and
-al,e system is *,ndamental to handlin+ tense social conOicts: it represents the non-iolent resol,tion o* social
diference thro,+h a set o* principles that *eat,re tolerance o* dissent set a+ainst a *o,ndational element o*
h,man ri+hts. Democracy is not a panacea as a system o* social conOict mana+ement,
especially when it is challen+ed )y pro)lems s,ch as deep socioeconomic ineT,alities or the mo)ili>ation o*
society alon+ e@cl,si-e nationalist or reli+io,s lines. A serious challenge to democracy,
she contended, arises from 5ideologies of e(clusion.1 (n re*erence to the challen+es o*
democracy and conOict in /ri SanBa, she cited disappointment with the performance
of democracy especially at the local and regional level.
Democracy has generated its own 5anger movements) because
the state has not been able to address problems of povertyZ 0it is the
material and e-eryday LneedsM that are more important to the people,1 she said. 4here is an ,r+ent need to
adopt a needs$)ased approach to democracy ),ildin+, especially with re+ard to peace),ildin+Z for
democracy to 8ourish as an institution contributing to social
peace it must be reali>ed more fully at the local level"
AOB Diamond
Diamonds theories on democracy fail% lying leaders economic
downturns and no protection for human rights
'erun!uma 11 (3,s,*, st,dent o* interational politics and +,est writer *or the J)ser-er, 9e)r,ary &,
http://www.o)ser-er.,+/inde@.phpoption"com!content[tasB"-iew[id"1210%[(temid"QQ, %/&/11'
What 1arry Diamond fails to understand is that the world is
searching for leaders that will not tell them liesI Islamist regimes
often play their politics on this premise. (t is indeed no wonder that the (slamist 7arty
and the A,slim 5rotherhood are smellin+ -ictory in 4,nisia and E+ypt, respecti-ely. /,rely then, there is
no hope that democracy as we Bnow it will ever address the conscience o* the
leaders of these movements. (t will pro)a)ly )e somethin+ else, *o,nd in either reli+ion or
c,lt,re. In the &', Var-ard, /tan*ord and 3ale +rad,ate politicians and lo))yists have
plundered America *or lon+, telling lies while accumulating wealth"
#he hardships that have fomented revolt in :gypt #unisia and
Algeria are 9uite visible in many :uropean countries and ;orth
America" /o many ;mericans are o,t o* worB and there are many str,++lin+ economies in E,rope. 5,t all
these are *,lly Oed+ed democracies. (t will )e rather a)s,rd to ima+ine that the ;ra)s will ,nT,estionin+ly tread
the same line N one that disconnects leaders *rom their consciences as we ha-e seen, )eca,se, 0the ma?ority
has decided.1 ;s lon+ as democracy does not translate into economic
growth and human rights N there will )e reason to do,)t the o,tcomes o* this wa-e o*
chan+e.
Diamonds categori>ation of democracies undermines his
theories
1eicht Z 2en!ins 1< (\e-in 4., 4he .ni-ersity o* (owa Cepartment o* /ociolo+y, J. Crai+, 4he Jhio
/tate .ni-ersity Cepartment o* /ociolo+y, http://w@y.se,.ed,.cn/h,manities/sociolo+y/htmledit/
,pload8le/system/20100%24/20100%241Q#=14Q1=.pd*, %/&/11'
J,r point is that )eca,se Diamond adds 9ualifers e-en to the )aseline type o* electoral
democracy his characteri>ations of 5intermediate democracy) are
then invariably 0ust as vague as his subse9uent
characteri>ations of 5democratic society") (n )oth cases, he lac!s
threshold standards or c,t points which are proced,ralist and bright line. (n addition, as
noted, 5intermediacy) itsel* is a residual category, and all s,ch cate+ories are
intrinsically -a+,e. 3et, ,nliBe his occasional re*erences to the democratic society, this resid,al cate+ory is
far more important for Diamonds purposes at )oth a concept,al or
theoretical le-el and in empirical application. ;*ter all, this categorys potential scope o*
application is e@traordinarily e(pansive" It can potentially include nearly
every esta)lished or consolidated democracy in the world as well as many new democracies.
AOB Areedom
Curtailment of freedom is inevitable% we are constrained by
our own humanity
3upancic O! (;lenBa, researcher at the (nstit,te o* 7hilosophy in the /lo-ene ;cademy
o* /ciences, Ethics o* the Ueal, p. 22'
\ant holds that as human beings we are part of ;ature, which means that we
are entirely, internally and e@ternally, sub0ect to the laws of causality. Vence
our freedom is limited not only from the 7outside but also from
the 7insideB we are no more free 7in ourselves than we are 7in the
world"
#he plan cant solve for freedom% its arbitrary
3upancic O! (;lenBa, researcher at the (nstit,te o* 7hilosophy in the /lo-ene ;cademy
o* /ciences, Ethics o* the Ueal, p. ##'
In order to attain the freedom characteristic o* the s,)?ect, one must not start
with the arbitrary the random as opposed to the lawli!e" <e cannot
*o,nd the *reedom o* the s,)?ect on the *act that her actions may )e ,npredicta)le. 4his approach wo,ld only
esta)lish that we ha-e not yet +one *ar eno,+h in the direction reT,ired )y the Gpost,late o* de$psycholo+i>in+.
(t may in *act )e the case that the moti-es we initially attri),ted to the s,)?ect, which ha-e *allen short o*
acco,ntin+ *or her actions, were not in *act the ones that led her to act, ),t this alone does not mean that there
were not some other moti-es or Gpatholo+ical interests which mo-ed her. /o this freedom cannot
be founded upon the arbitrariness of our actions but on the
contrary only upon law and necessity themselvesB one has to
discover the point where the sub0ect itself plays an (acti-e' part on
lawful, cas,al necessity, the point where the sub0ect itself is already inscribed
in advance in what appear to be laws of causality independent o* the s,)?ect.
Aamine
Aamine ;ow
Aood shortages now% Africa
Alood STS (]oe, staf Y Ranco,-er /,n, 2011,
http://www.-anco,-ers,n.com/news/;*rican^*ood^shorta+e^)ecomes^ma?or^crisis/E0Q#400/story.html, '
'cores of 'omali children are dying on the ?o,rney or within a day o* arri-al at re*,+ee camps
in \enya and Ethiopia, as they 8ee the regionFs worst drought in decades, the
.F re*,+ee a+ency said on <ednesday. 4igh levels of malnutrition, com)ined with -iolence
in the war$torn Vorn o* ;*rica nation, are threatening Ha human tragedy of
unimaginable proportionsH the .FVCU warned. ;*ter se-eral seasons o* *ailed rains and
risin+ +lo)al *ood prices, drought has hit more than 1O million people across
/omalia, Ethiopia, \enya, C?i)o,ti and .+anda Cattle and sheep are dyin+ at hi+her rates than ,s,al, reachin+
,p to Q0 per cent o* mortality in some areas. P-ver 1< million people are a$ected by
the drought in one way or other,P said Elisa)eth 5yrs, spoBeswoman *or the .F J6ce *or the
Coordination o* V,manitarian ;fairs. Aood prices are soaring with +rain prices in some parts o*
\enya ,p to =0$per$cent hi+her than the 8-e$year a-era+e, while in Ethiopia, the cons,mer price inde@ ?,mped
a)o,t 41 per cent. ;s a res,lt, malnutrition rates are also rising, the .F a+ency said. Ele-en
districts in \enya ha-e also reported maln,trition rates a)o-e the emer+ency threshold. Vit hardest are parts o*
/omalia, afected not only )y *amine ),t the contin,in+ ci-il war. 4ho,sands o* /omali re*,+ees are maBin+
perilo,s ?o,rneys o* h,ndreds o* Bilometres to seeB assistance: E4,000 people crossed into Ethiopia and \enya
in J,ne alone" 1evels of serious malnutrition among newly$arri-ed /omali
children in Ethiopia are e(ceeding ?< per cent, while in \enya le-els are reachin+ #0 to
40 per cent. 5ritainKs leadin+ 1# aid a+encies ha-e said that they *ace a short*all o* more than W100 million *or
their emer+ency response in the re+ion. Aany re*,+ees arri-in+ in \enya are streamin+ into Cadaa), the
worldKs lar+est re*,+ee camp and already o-erOowin+ )e*ore the latest crisis. Ueports s,++est that yo,n+
children are dyin+ as *amilies wait to )e re+istered. P7eople are maBin+ incredi)ly +r,ellin+ ?o,rneys: some are
walBin+ *or more than 20 days witho,t *ood or water, *acin+ attacBs *rom armed +ro,ps or wild animals,P
;ndrew <ander, the emer+ency media mana+er *or /a-e the Children, said. PWe donFt have
anything to eatH said /aina) 3,s,* Aohamed, whose child died as they were treBBin+ across the
desert in search o* help. P;s we were ),ryin+ his )ody, my second child died,P she said )y telephone *rom
5ardhere Cistrict in so,thwest /omalia. .FVCU has descri)ed the needs *or *ood, shelter, health ser-ices and
other li*e$sa-in+ aid as P,r+ent and massi-e.P 2o-ernment representati-es in the re+ion warned that the
sit,ation co,ld deteriorate *,rther. PWe havenFt seen the worst of this drought
yetH said Aohamed Elmi, the minister *or de-elopment o* northern \enya. .nderscorin+ the se-erity o* the
crisis, (slamist militants in /omalia ha-e li*ted a two$year$lon+ )an on *orei+n aid a+encies.
1ac! of foresight guarantees a food crisis
'achs , (Jefrey C., staf Y 4ime, 4/24,
http://www.time.com/time/ma+a>ine/article/0,&1%1,1%#4=#4,00.html, '
#he world economy has run into a bric! wall" Despite countless
warnings in recent years about the need to address a looming hunger
crisis in poor countries and a loomin+ ener+y crisis worldwide, world leaders failed
to thin! ahead" #he result is a global food crisis" Wheat corn and
rice prices have more than doubled in the past two years, and oil prices
ha-e more than tripled since the start o* 2004. #hese food%price increases com)ined with
soarin+ ener+y costs will slow i* not stop economic +rowth in many parts o* the world and will e-en
undermine political stability, as e-idenced )y the protest riots that ha-e er,pted in places
liBe Vaiti, 5an+ladesh and 5,rBina 9aso. 7ractical sol,tions to these +rowin+ woes do e@ist, ),t weKll ha-e to
start thinBin+ ahead and actin+ +lo)ally.
Aood shortage now% R warrants
'achs , (Jefrey C., staf Y 4ime, 4/24,
http://www.time.com/time/ma+a>ine/article/0,&1%1,1%#4=#4,00.html, '
#he crisis has its roots in four interlin!ed trends" #he frst is the
chronically low productivity of farmers in the poorest countries, ca,sed )y
their ina)ility to pay *or seeds, *ertili>ers and irri+ation. #he second is the misguided
policy in the &"'" and :urope of subsidi>ing the diversion of food
crops to produce biofuels liBe corn$)ased ethanol. #he third is climate
changeZ taBe the recent dro,+hts in ;,stralia and E,rope, which c,t the +lo)al prod,ction o* +rain in 200E
and K0Q. #he fourth is the growing global demand for food and feed
grains brought on by swelling populations and incomes. (n short,
rising demand has hit a limited supply with the poor ta!ing the
hardest blow"
Aamine &p
Aood shortages now% !ills more than AID'
/ritt 11 (Uo)ert Uoy, Editor in Chie* 4echAediaFetworB, http://www.li-escience.com/1444%$+lo)al$*ood$
shorta+e$,r+ent$climate$+lo)al$warmin+.html, '
A +rowin+ global food shortage has caused prices to double in recent
years, and a +rowin+ consens,s o* scientists now )lames climate chan+e as one *actor in an eT,ation that
incl,des a ),r+eonin+ pop,lation and increasin+ly scarce water s,pplies. .ore people around
the planet are going hungry as a res,lt. E-en as prices ha-e also risen in the .nited /tates,
most residents may not +rasp the scope and se-erity o* the pro)lem. ;mericans toss a)o,t 40 percent o* their
*ood in the +ar)a+e, accordin+ to a 200& st,dy. (n this co,ntry, *ood waste per person has increased E0 percent
since 1&%4. 3et one in seven people go to bed hungry every night accordin+
to the .nited Fations <orld 9ood 7ro+ram. 4unger !ills more people than AID'
malaria and tuberculosis combined" #he problem is worst in
developing countries. 5,t the pro)lem has implications )eyond the )orders o* those poor
co,ntries.
'hortage now% warming
'cientists have been predicting *or years that a warmer planet co,pled
with increasin+ water demands could cause food shortages. ; st,dy in 200%, ),ildin+ on and
con8rmin+ pre-io,s research, warned that climate change could help cause food
shortages leading to war. Jther scientists ha-e predicted that water shorta+es will *,el war.
#he situation became acute in O<<, when food shortages helped
fuel uprisings in several poorer countries" Vi+h *ood prices played a role in the
o,ster o* the Vaitian +o-ernment that year. Aeanwhile, a consens,s had emer+ed that *ood prices wo,ld liBely
do,)le )y the year 20=0. 4hat pro?ection has )een )lown o,t o* the water. Qlobal food prices
have spi!ed since the year O<<<, mostly since 200Q, with some Bey crops do,)lin+.
'hortage now% population growth
4oday (J,ne E', 4he Few 3orB 4imes pro-ided an e@tensi-e looB at a world str,++lin+ to *eed itsel*. After
interviews with do>ens of scientists, *armers and *ood ind,stry e(perts the
article confrmed what many e@perts ha-e )een sayin+: World population growth
is outpacing food production particularly with the four crops that
provide the bul! of the worldFs nutritionB wheat rice corn and
soybeans. ;s st,dies ha-e shown pre-io,sly, thereFs little land left to convert to
farming, water s,pplies are dryin+ ,p, and +lo)al warmin+ is wreaBin+ ha-oc on the +rowin+ seasons and
contri),tin+ to weather e@tremes that destroy crops.
'hortage now% M e(amples
_ 4hanBs to si+ni8cant research dollars spent on de-elopin+ new strains o* Bey crops and )etter +rowin+
techniT,es, global food production outpaced population growth for
much of the O<th century leading to a decline in the percentage
of people going hungry" 4owever grain production per capita has
fallen since the mid%1+,<s" _ Climate change is, as predicted,
contributing to e(tremes N Ooods, dro,+hts, heat wa-es N and alterin+ +rowin+ seasons, all
contributing to crop failures. L<hile no sin+le e-ent can )e tied to climate chan+e, climate
e@perts ha-e lon+ said a warmer planet will ca,se more e@tremes in temperat,res, precipitation and
storminess.M _ /cience had lon+ e@pected that increases in carbon dio(ide would
actually help crops" 5,t that lo+ic has proven faulty in more recent st,dies. 4ho,+h
car)on dio@ide is liBe *ertili>er to plants, the well$doc,mented CJ2 increases since the (nd,strial Ue-ol,tion N
and hi+her le-els predicted *or the *,t,re N donKt ofset strains ca,sed )y heat, dro,+ht and Oood. (n short,
scientists now say, heat !ills. _ (ncreasin+ demand for drin!ing water is
suc!ing ac9uirers dry *aster than Fat,re can possi)ly replenish them, maBin+ water scarcer *or
*armers. _ 4he unrest sweeping the Arab world this year has also been
lin!ed, in part, to the risin+ cost o* food.
'hortage now% unsustainable and overpopulated system
A*C'' +, (;sia$7aci8c Center *or /ec,rity /t,dies, &/11,
http://www.apcss.or+/7,)lications/Ueport!9ood!/ec,rity!&=.html'
Fe-ertheless, as the worlds population grows )y aro,nd =0 million per year, political and
scienti8c leaders around the world are increasingly raising 9uestions
about the viability of the global food system in accommodatin+ this
,nprecedented demo+raphic chan+e. ;ltho,+h pop,lation +rowth is not the only determinant o* *ood sec,rity, it
is an iss,e that *oc,ses pop,lar concernNand e-en alarmNa)o,t the s,staina)ility o* +lo)al *ood prod,ction.
4his is )eca,se int,iti-ely it wo,ld seem that food shortages occur when Hhuman
populations outstrip the production capacity of the agricultural
system on which they rely.P# 5,t *ood shorta+es can also occ,r )eca,se o* ineT,ita)le *ood
distri),tion or a )reaBdownNperhaps res,ltin+ *rom war or ci-il stri*eNo* the distri),tion systems that pro-ide
*ood. Jne st,dy s,++ests that three ma0or factors disrupt the ability of people to
have access to food: ineT,ita)le *ood distri),tion, po-erty, and political unrest"
.illions malnourished now% unstable food system
4oday, more than ,<< million people aro,nd the world are malnourished
despite the fact that food production has doubled d,rin+ the past three
decades. /ome e@perts are warnin+ that the number of malnourished could rise
substantially as global demographic pressures clash with s,ch limits as
diminishing arable land and +rowin+ water scarcity. 9or this reason, so$called *ood
sec,rity pessimists ha-e )ecome more -ocal in recent years and ha-e +ra))ed international headlines with
their predictions o* *ood shorta+es in the not$so$distant *,t,re. Jne pessimist who has +ained considera)le
prominence in recent years is Sester 5rown o* the <ashin+ton C.C$)ased <orldwatch (nstit,te. 5rown ar+,es
that the food system is the Hmissing lin!H that connects global
environmental degradation to loss of food securityNand its economic
conseT,ences. 5rown also asserts that as the pressures of diminishing arable land
and decreasing water s,pplies become more acute food prices will
liBely rise. 9or a`,ent nations, this will not inO,ence *ood sec,rity m,ch at all, since s,ch a small proportion
o* disposa)le income +oes to p,rchase *ood. /ut for the 1"G billion people in the
world who live on less than [1 per day, s,ch price risesNe-en i* they are -ery
smallNcould have a devastating impact.E
Water shortage now
Water shortages were also identifed as a potential food security
challenge" Water is a !ey determinant of crop yields" (n ;sia, there are
serio,s T,estions a)o,t the *,t,re a-aila)ility o* water. Aany co,ntries in the re+ion are already *acin+
si+ni8cant water scarcity iss,es. Jne st,dy that e@amined the a-aila)ility o* water *rom a +lo)al perspecti-e
concl,ded that Pwater availability will be a serious constraint to
achieving the food re9uirements pro0ected for O<O?. 4he need *or irri+ation
water is liBely to )e +reater than c,rrently anticipated, and the a-aila)le s,pply o* it less than anticipated.P#0
Jther st,dies ha-e s,++ested that a lar+er proportion o* water s,pplies in the *,t,re will )e de-oted to domestic
and ind,strial ,sesNat the e@pense o* a+ric,lt,re. 4h,s, Prapid growth in water demand
coupled with escalating costs of development of new water
sources could be a serious threat to future growth in food
production, especially i* it reT,ires meetin+ ho,sehold and ind,strial water demand thro,+h water
sa-in+s *rom irri+ated a+ric,lt,re.P#1 (n China, water constraints serio,sly threaten *ood sec,rityZ more than %0
o* Chinas +rain is prod,ced on irri+ated land. 5,t the water intended for irrigation is increasin+ly
being depleted by three ma?or trends: the diversion o* water *rom ri-ers and reser-oirs to
cities, the depletion o* ,nder+ro,nd water s,pplies in aT,i*ers, and the impact o* +rowin+ pollution
ca,sed )y ind,striali>ation.#2
Aamine Down
:nough food now% multiple warrants
;t the other e@treme, *ood sec,rity optimists tend to )e more san+,ine a)o,t the prospects *or +lo)al *ood
sec,rity in the *,t,re. ;ltho,+h they reco+ni>e that there are real challen+es that m,st )e o-ercome )oth now
and in the *,t,re, they also )elie-e that e$ective and enlightened policy responses
can prevent any disasters. Jne clearly positi-e trend, they wo,ld ar+,e, is the *act that
global population growth is diminishing (in percenta+e terms', altho,+h a)sol,te
increases are e@pected to contin,e ,ntil the year 20E0 primarily as a res,lt o* pop,lation moment,m. Aoreo-er,
the challenges to food security (*or instance land de+radation' tend to be local
rather than global, s,++estin+ that policy chan+es or impro-ements at the local le-el co,ld
dramatically increase a+ric,lt,ral yields. 9ood sec,rity optimists also )elie-e that technology and
research can create abundant food supplies in the future. Uesearch in
)iotechnolo+y, *or instance, can lead to the creation o* plant )reeds that are resistant to pest species and other
threats. 4echnolo+y, moreo-er, is also Bey to the de-elopment o* hi+h$yield plant species.& 9ood sec,rity
optimists ar+,e that there is much evidence that crop yields in many
developing countries could be e(panded signifcantly. China, *or instance,
has m,ch room to increase its +rain yields, despite the *act that s,ch yields are hi+h )y de-elopin+$co,ntry
standards. Chinese *armers co,ld achie-e hi+her yields )y ,sin+ hi+h$yieldin+ seed -arieties, applyin+ impro-ed
chemical *ertili>ers, and practicin+ +reater e6ciency in the ,se o* pesticides and irri+ation water.10 Forman
5orla,+, *ather o* the P2reen Ue-ol,tionP, has recently ar+,ed that small farmers in many de-elopin+
co,ntries are capable of doubling or tripling their yields if they would
integrate technology into their agricultural production.11 4o )olster their
case *or the efects o* technolo+y and +reater e6ciency in *ood prod,ction, *ood sec,rity optimists point to the
*act that *ood prices ha-e *allen s,)stantially in recent decades (real 1&&2 *ood prices are ?,st 22D o* *ood
prices in 1&E0'. ;nother indicator o* +reater *ood sec,rity is e-idence that the per capita calorie
supply of food has increased in every region of the world *rom the early
1&Q0s ,ntil the late 1&=0s.
Aood shortages ;o Impact
Aamine e(aggerated% international humanitarian aid
#he #imes G (Aichael Cynes, staf, 1/22, http://www.timesonline.co.,B/tol/news/world/article=E2E01.ece, '
EFSE/ /(FCJA5;, an impo-erished mother o* ei+ht *rom \a),m)we -illa+e in ]am)ias dro,+ht$stricBen
/o,thern 7ro-ince, insists that her *amily has eaten nothin+ *or *o,r weeBs. 0(ts terri)le,1 she said. 04here is no
*ood in the -illa+e, and it hasnt rained here for a month") /ut none o* her *amily
shows any ill%e$ects from such deprivation" Ars /indom)a is still a)le to )reast$
*eed her child. /he concedes that when she says she has not eaten for a month
she really means that she has not eaten any mai>e" #he family
still have chic!ens goats and a few cattle" #hey are hungry but a
long way from starvation. (t is almost a year since the .nited Fations <orld 9ood 7ro+ramme
(<97' 8rst alerted the international comm,nity to the threat o* millions o* people dyin+ *rom a loomin+ *amine
in so,thern ;*rica. 5,t the most rele-ant T,estion now is whether the international aid
agencies have e(aggerated the danger"
;o food shortage% misinformed media
:thiopian Ceview 11 (Q/%, http://www.ethiopianre-iew.com/content/2%04, '
;CC(/ ;5;5; (Xinh,a' N Ethiopias L.inistry of .isinformationM on /at,rday refuted
some foreign media and humanitarian organi>ations for their
e(aggerated reports on the current food shortage in poc!et areas
o* the co,ntry. 0It is ridiculous and unethical that some media outlets
are reporting as if food grain price hi!e is typical o* Ethiopia, though it is
Bnown that the e@istin+ global price hi!e is a result of soaring price of oil
and e-er$increasin+ demand o* *ood +rain amon+ the de-elopin+ co,ntries,1 the Ainistry o* (n*ormation said in a
statement. /,ch *a)ricated reports can not ,ndermine Ethiopias rapid economic +rowth re+istered d,rin+ the
last s,ccessi-e years, said the ministry. 04he rapid national economic +rowth cannot )e ,ndermined )y
e@a++eratin+ minor pro)lems,1 it said. Cecent reports from some foreign media
said a severe drought in :thiopia threatens up to M million
children" 5#he reporting of some media is very much e(aggerated
and far from the truth,1 it said.
;o global shortage% diet improving
Dyson O (4im, S/E, http://www.*athom.com/*eat,re/122QE&/inde@.html, '
Cyson: #here are a number of prominent people scattered aro,nd Forth ;merica
and, to some e@tent, E,rope who suggest that the world faces ma0or food
problems )eca,se there has )een -ery s,)stantial pop,lation +rowth. #hey suggest that
agriculture faces increasing environmental production constraints
and that we are not +oin+ to )e a)le to prod,ce eno,+h *ood *or the people who are +oin+ to come alon+.
Va-in+ looBed at this sit,ation in some depth o-er a period o* years, I donFt thin! that the
situation is anywhere near as calamitous as is sometimes
portrayed. ( sho,ld immediately say that the world does *ace -ery si+ni8cant *ood pro)lems: there are
se-eral h,ndred million people in the world today who donKt ha-e eno,+h *ood to eat. Vowe-er, over
recent decades things have been improving" Average levels of
calorie and protein inta!e in most parts of the world have been
increasing. /,pplies o* cereals and -e+eta)les ha-e )een increasin+. (n most areas o* the world
human diets have improved 9uite substantially" Diets have in
general become more diverse. 4hey ha-e )ecome richer in calories and richer in proteins.
4he one possi)le e@ception to this is s,)$/aharan ;*rica.
;o timeframe% have enough food for + billion people
Dyson O (4im, S/E, http://www.*athom.com/*eat,re/122QE&/inde@.html, '
(* one looBs into the *,t,re, the Bey iss,e is whether a+ric,lt,ral yields are +oin+ to contin,e to rise at
reasona)le rates. ( see no reason to )elie-e that they will not. I donFt foresee any !ind of
ma0or food crisis in the coming decades" 4here are ma?or pro)lems that we do need
to address, ),t on )alance thin+s ha-e )een +ettin+ )etter. (n terms o* ma?or world pro)lems, ( donKt thinB *ood
prod,ction sho,ld )e at the top o* the a+enda$$certainly not in comparison to the iss,e o* climate chan+e, which
co,ld )e e@tremely serio,s. We should be able to produce enough food for the
+ billion people that there will be on the planet in a few decades
time" 2ettin+ s,6cient *ood to the poorest amon+ the & )illion is an iss,e. 4here will still )e pro)lems in that
area in 20 or #0 years.
;o shortage% grains solve
/runton ++ (Uon, anthropolo+ist, http://www.pop.or+/content/myth$o*$world$*ood$shorta+es$1E#&, '
;ltho,+h the rates o* increase in the yields o* some +rains in certain co,ntries show O,ct,ations and slowdowns
in recent years, the overall prognosis for a continuation of the ma0or
gains of recent decades is very good" Cespite indications that rice yields had )e+,n to
platea, in some East ;sian co,ntries d,rin+ the 1&=0s, a 1&&# st,dy carried o,t )y Conald 7l,cBnett *or the
Cons,ltati-e 2ro,p on (nternational ;+ric,lt,ral Uesearch showed that with only *ew e@ceptions, yields of
the three ma0or grains wheat rice and corn had continued to
increase dramatically around the world over the previous decade"
#he study e(amined per hectare crop yields, which are the most appropriate
measure *or assessin+ pro+ress in prod,cti-ity, rather than total yields, which are afected )y -ariations in
the amo,nt o* c,lti-ated land.1&
;o shortage% on the brin! of Q. revolution
(ndeed, rather than fearing that we are at the tail end of a period of
rapidly increasing agricultural productivity it is far more li!ely
that we are in early phases of a ma0or technological revolution
based on the genetic manipulation of plants and animals.21 ; sin+le e@ample o*
the way in which current developments could bring massive benefts can )e
seen in worB desi+ned to prod,ce al,mini,m$tolerant +rains. ;l,mini,m is a pro)lem on #0 to 40 percent o* the
worlds ara)le lands, partic,larly in the tropics where acidic soils maBe the al,mini,m sol,)le, allowin+ it to )e
taBen ,p )y plant roots. Xarieties of corn which could produce 1< tons per
hectare are only able to achieve around O tons in a$ected soils.22
;o soil shortage% farmland plentiful
5,t e-en i+norin+ the potential o* )iotechnolo+y, some of the warnings about
supposed constraints to increased agricultural yields are greatly
e(aggerated" (n 1&=4 Sester 5rown and Edward <ol* claimed that the +lo)al e@cess o* soil erosion o-er
soil *ormation was o-er 2E )illion tons a year, and that i* this contin,ed it wo,ld )e a ma?or threat to the worlds
a+ric,lt,ral prod,cti-ity.2# (n 1&&E, Ca-id 7imentel and his associates p,)lished a paper in /cience which
stated that the 8+,re was three times hi+her.24 Vowe-er, as an analysis )y 7ierre Crossen *rom Ueso,rces *or
the 9,t,re shows, 0losses due to erosion and other forms of land
degradation Ls,ch as salini>ation and soil compactionM do not pose a serious threat
to the capacity of the global agricultural system to increase
yields1.2E Crossen also notes that 7imentel and his associates, who are not e@perts on soil erosion and its
efects on prod,cti-ity, simply i+nored more comprehensi-e research s,++estin+ a *ar less alarmin+ sit,ation
which had )een carried o,t )y scientists who were e@perts on the topic, e-en tho,+h they were aware o* it.
;nalysin+ these other st,dies, Crossen calc,lates that *rom 1&4E ,ntil 1&&0, Gthe cumulative
average degradation%induced loss of global soil productivity was
roughly <"1 to <"O percent per year and that 7there is reason to
believe that in the future losses are more li!ely to decrease than
to increase. 4his is )eca,se economic technological and legal
developments in many #hird World countries are providing
increasing incentives for farmers to ta!e measures to protect
their land from degradation.
Aamine ;o 'olveB *olitics
Aamines are politically motivated
:ncyclopedia of *ublic 4ealth ? (&/1E, http://www.enotes.com/p,)lic$health$
encyclopedia/*amine, '
4he immediate causes of famine are inadeT,ate *ood prod,ction or marBet a-aila)ility, price
O,ct,ations, and limited ho,sehold assets. .nderlyin+ ca,ses, howe-er almost always involve
misguided or deliberate public policy repressive political systems
or nat,ral or h,man$ca,sed disaster. (n co,ntries with pree@istin+ widespread po-erty, ,nemployment, or de)t,
nat,ral and h,man$ca,sed disasters are the most common ca,ses o* *ood shorta+es and *amine. ;dditionally
hunger has been often used as a deliberate weapon" Access to
food is s,ch a )asic h,man need that control o* the *ood supply translates into direct
political and economic power. J-er and o-er a+ain in history, speci8c pop,lations ha-e )een the
-ictims o* an interr,ption o* their *ood s,pply with the intent to s,)d,e them or dri-e them away.
Authoritarian government is the cause not 9uantity of food
Qerhart ++ (2ail A., V,man Ui+hts <atch ;*rica ;d-isory Committee,
http://www.*orei+nafairs.com/articles/E4%%&/+ail$m$+erhart/*amine$crimes$politics$and$the$disaster$ind,stry$in$
a*rica, '
; power*,l critiT,e o* the international h,manitarian a+encies dominatin+ *amine relie* in ;*rica. Crawin+ on the
worB o* economist ;martya /en, the a,thor ar+,es that famine prevention re9uires a
political contract that allows citi>ens to hold governments
accountable for famine. /,ch a contract is rare in ;*rica, altho,+h most +o-ernments did
reco+ni>e a political imperati-e to s,pport their ,r)an pop,lations )e*ore the imposition o* str,ct,ral
ad?,stment pro+rams in the 1&=0s *orced 8scal a,sterity. 4oday, international humanitarian
agencies have unintentionally eliminated accountability by
obliging ;*ricans to cede responsebility for famine alleviation to
foreign technical e(perts %% who often fail to address the
fundamental political causes of famine. Cri-en )y narrow de8nitions o* social
responsi)ility and their own instit,tional interests, relief organi>ations ma!e
compromises that often strengthen authoritarian regimes
disempower victims and debase humanitarian ideals by using
crude media hype to compete for funds" 4he phony *amine alert in eastern ]aire in
Fo-em)er 1&&Q, -i-idly descri)ed in chapter ten, lends wei+ht to de <aalKs pro-ocati-e concl,sion that Pmost
c,rrent h,manitarian acti-ity in ;*rica is ,seless or dama+in+ and sho,ld )e a)andoned.P
Access level determines famine% not amount
9ood /ec,rity in terms o* P;ccessi)ilityP -s. P;-aila)ilityP: 9ood security is almost always a
matter of HaccessH instead of HavailabilityH (in other words, food is often
available$$and the +lo)al a+ric,lt,ral system is capa)le o* ass,rin+ this a-aila)ilityN),t people
cannot always get access for various reasonsB economic, social or
political'. J-erall, the seminar participants were -ery optimistic a)o,t Pa-aila)ilityP o* *ood (i.e. the act,al
+rowin+ o* the *ood', ),t they were more pessimistic a)o,t PaccessibilityH to food which is
more dependent on political, economic and social factors. 9ood /ec,rity and 7artic,lar
7olitical /ystems: #he cause of sudden famines is very complicated but
evidence suggests a correlation between famine and non%
democratic political systems" In democratic societies there is
more accountability and power*,l interest +ro,ps (which lessens the chance
for famine'. 4his e@plains why many democratic co,ntries, e-en a*ter e@periencin+ s,ccessi-e periods o*
poor har-ests, rarely ha-e e@perienced *amines.
Aamines are politically caused
WomenAid O! (2/20, http://www.womenaid.or+/press/in*o/*ood/*ood4.html, '
Why does hunger e(istW 4he ca,ses o* h,n+er are many and -aried. /ome are o* nat,ral ori+in,
dro,+ht, crop pests, nat,ral disastersZ others are created by humans *or e@ample by war or
over e(ploitation o* nat,ral reso,rces essential to *ood prod,ction. =et the most
important causes of hunger have their roots in economic, social and
political factors having to do with the ways in which the
production and distribution of food are organised in the world" If
you as!ed why a malnourished person is hungry, that persons answer wo,ld
pro)a)ly )e: P5eca,se there is nothin+ to eat.P C,rin+ the co,rse o* the year, many *arm comm,nities only
+row eno,+h *ood to last *or a si@, ei+ht, or ten month period, or m,st sell all they prod,ce in order to meet
,r+ent needs *or cash. ;nother answer mi+ht )e: P( ha-e no money to ),y *ood *or my *amilyP. 4he man or
woman s,pportin+ a *amily may )e short o* cash )eca,se o* a poorly paid ?o), )eca,se o* low prices recei-ed
*or a+ric,lt,ral prod,cts or other +oods, or simply )eca,se he or she has )een o,t o* a ?o) . 3et a third
cause stems from problems facing the nation as a whole" Aood
may be available in a nei+h)o,rin+ co,ntry, but access to it may not be
possible i* there are no connectin+ roads or other means o* transportation, i* there is ins,6cient *orei+n
e@chan+e to ),y it or i* trade relationships )etween co,ntries are poor. (n +eneral, hunger is
concentrated where incomes are low reinforcing the obvious
connection between hunger and poverty"
Distribution not 9uantity is !ey
Vruschandl , (Felson, en+ineer, 11/2Q, http://www.solarna-i+ator.net/*amine.htm, '
;s o)ser-ed )y the economist ;martya /en, famine is usually a problem of food
distribution and poverty rather than an absolute lac! of food. In
many cases such as the Qreat 1eap Aorward ;orth Vorea in the mid$1&&0s,
or 3imbabwe in the early 2000s, famine can be ca,sed as an ,nintentional result of
government policy" Aamine is sometimes used as a tool of repressive
governments as a means to eliminate opponents as in the .Brainian 9amine
o* the 1&#0s. In other cases, s,ch as /omalia, famine is a conse9uence of civil
disorder as *ood distri),tion systems )reaB down. #here are a number of ongoing
famines caused by war or deliberate political intervention" #oday,
nitro+en *ertili>ers, new nat,ral pesticides, desert *armin+, and other new agricultural
technologies are being used as weapons against famine" 4hey increase
crop yields )y two, three, or more times. Ce-eloped nations share these technolo+ies with de-elopin+ nations
with a *amine pro)lem. Vowe-er, since modern famine is usually the result of war
and distribution problems it is 9uestionable how much rele-ance or
impact new a+ric,lt,ral technologies would have on this problem"
*olitics ta!es%out famine solvency
.enon , (Uoshni, .F Aillieni,m Campai+n, http://hdr.,ndp.or+/en/reports/+lo)al/hdr200%$
200=/papers/menon!roshni!200%a!malawi.pd*, '
Xulnerabilities o*ten arise as a result of political systems and
,ns,staina)le de-elopment policies that put people at ris!. (n the case o* Aalawi, po-erty and
-,lnera)ility was already steadily inclinin+ *or se-eral years as a conseT,ence o* an ad-erse com)ination o*
economic, climactic, demo+raphic and political shocBs and stresses. (ndeed, the rapidly rising
livelihood vulnerability of the predominantly rural population
played a signifcant role in e(acerbating the crisis" Contributing
factors included: a' intensi*yin+ press,re on the land, compo,nded )y a steady pop,lation +rowthZ )'
declinin+ soil *ertility associated with the lacB o* application o* a+ric,lt,ral inp,tsZ c' strictly limited of$*arm and
non$a+ric,lt,ral income +eneratin+ opport,nitiesZ d' the contin,in+ spread and impact o* the V(R/;(C/
pandemic, leadin+ to a red,ced la)or *orce and increased ho,sehold dependency ratiosZ e' government
policies favoring urban populations and the business sectorI and *'
economic li)erali>ation meas,res that ha-e ,ndermined *armers access to inp,ts and eliminated cons,mer
s,)sidies and *ood price sta)ili>ation inter-entions. ; com)ination o* these factors placed the
poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population at ris! and in
*act, it was this se+ment o* the pop,lation that paid the hi+hest price in terms o* li-es lost and destroyed
li-elihoods, leadin+ to li*e$lon+ destit,tion.
Corruption prevents distribution
.enon , (Uoshni, .F Aillieni,m Campai+n, http://hdr.,ndp.or+/en/reports/+lo)al/hdr200%$
200=/papers/menon!roshni!200%a!malawi.pd*, '
Donor%government relations were also terse at this time, as a result of
donor claims o* economic mismana+ement and governance failures. (t is *,rther alle+ed that the
donors delayed responding to the impending crisis as relations with
the Qovernment o* Aalawi had soured d,rin+ 2001 d,e to contention o-er a n,m)er o*
+o-ernance iss,esNone o* which was how the /2U had )een emptied. (n *act, the I.A withheld
balance of payment support, C9(C, the :& and &'AID suspended
development assistance, and CenmarB terminated its de-elopment pro?ects and withdrew *rom
Aalawi entirely. .uch of these suspensions were based on the belief that
corruption and fraud were rampant in government,E tho,+h these co,ld not
ha-e occ,rred at a worse time *or Aalawi. (n *act, it was only a*ter reports o* star-ation$related deaths had )een
p,)lished )y the media that the donors re-ersed their hard$line stance and ofered *ood aid witho,t condition.
Imperialism
American imperialism should be embraced it has been the
greatest force for good in the world
/oot G (Aa@, Jlin senior *ellow at the Co,ncil on 9orei+n Uelations, P;merican (mperialism Fo Feed to U,n
;way *rom Sa)el,P E$1=$200#, www.attac)erlin.de/8leadmin//ommeraBademie/5oot!(mperialim!8ne.pd*,'
#he greatest danger is that we wonFt use all of our power for fear of the
FFIFF word %% imperialism" <hen asBed on ;pril 2= on al$Ja>eera whether the .nited /tates was KKempire
),ildin+,KK /ecretary o* Ce*ense Conald U,ms*eld reacted as i* heKd )een asBed whether he wears womenKs
,nderwear. KK<e donKt seeB empires,KK he replied h,6ly. KK<eKre not imperialistic. <e ne-er ha-e )een.KK 4hatKs a 8ne
answer *or p,)lic cons,mption. 4he pro)lem is that it isnKt tr,e. 4he .nited /tates has )een an empire since at least
1=0#, when 4homas Jeferson p,rchased the So,isiana 4erritory. 4hro,+ho,t the 1&th cent,ry, what Jeferson called
the KKempire o* li)ertyKK e@panded across the continent. <hen ../. power stretched *rom KKsea to shinin+ sea,KK the
;merican empire mo-ed a)road, acT,irin+ colonies ran+in+ *rom 7,erto Uico and the 7hilippines to Vawaii and
;lasBa. <hile the *ormal empire mostly disappeared a*ter <orld <ar ((, the .nited /tates set o,t on another )o,t o*
imperialism in 2ermany and Japan. Jh, sorry $$ that wasnKt imperialismZ it was KKocc,pation.KK 5,t when ;mericans
are r,nnin+ *orei+n +o-ernments, itKs a distinction witho,t a diference. SiBewise, recent KKnation$),ildin+KK
e@periments in /omalia, Vaiti, 5osnia, \oso-o and ;*+hanistan (news $ we) sites' are imperialism ,nder another
name. Aind yo,, this is not meant as a condemnation. #he history of American imperialism is
hardly one of unadorned good doingI there have been plenty of shameful
episodes s,ch as the mistreatment o* the (ndians. /ut on the whole &"'" imperialism
has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century"
It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and ;a>ism and lesser
evils such as the #aliban and 'erbian ethnic cleansing" Along the way it
has helped spread liberal institutions to co,ntries as di-erse as /o,th \orea (news $ we) sites'
and 7anama. 3et, while +enerally s,ccess*,l as imperialists, ;mericans ha-e )een loath to con8rm thatKs what they
were doin+. 4hatKs J\. 2i-en the historical )a++a+e that KKimperialismKK carries, thereKs no need *or the &"'"
government to em)race the term. 5,t it should defnitely embrace the practice . 4hat
doesnKt mean lootin+ (raT o* its nat,ral reso,rcesZ nothin+ co,ld )e more destr,cti-e o* o,r +oal o* ),ildin+ a sta)le
+o-ernment in 5a+hdad. (t means imposin+ the r,le o* law, property ri+hts, *ree speech and other +,arantees, at
+,npoint i* need )e. 4his will reT,ire selectin+ a new r,ler who is committed to pl,ralism and then )acBin+ him or
her to the hilt. (ran and other nei+h)orin+ states wonKt hesitate to impose their despotic -iews on (raTZ we sho,ldnKt
hesitate to impose o,r democratic -iews. 4he indications are mi@ed as to whether the .nited /tates is prepared to
em)race its imperial role ,napolo+etically. U,ms*eld has said that an (ranian$style theocracy KKisnKt +oin+ to
happen,KK and 7resident 5,sh (news $ we) sites' has pled+ed to Beep ../. troops in (raT as lon+ as necessary to
KK),ild a peace*,l and representati-e +o-ernment.KK ;*ter allowin+ a temporary power -ac,,m to de-elop, ../.
troops now are mo-in+ a++ressi-ely to p,t down challen+es to their a,thority )y, *or e@ample, arrestin+ the sel*$
declared KKmayorKK o* 5a+hdad. 4hatKs all *or the +ood. 5,t there are also some worrisome si+ns. 5,sh asBed *or only
W2.E )illion *rom Con+ress *or re),ildin+ (raT, e-en tho,+h a st,dy *rom the Co,ncil on 9orei+n Uelations and the
James ;. 5aBer ((( (nstit,te *or 7,)lic 7olicy estimates that W2E )illion to W100 )illion will )e needed. (raTKs oil
re-en,es and contri),tions *rom allies wonKt co-er the entire short*all. 4he president sho,ld )e doin+ more to
prepare the ../. p,)lic and Con+ress *or a costly commitment. Jtherwise, (raTis T,icBly co,ld )ecome disill,sioned
a)o,t the )ene8ts o* li)eration. 4he cost o* o,r commitment will )e meas,red not only in money ),t also in troops.
<hile 5,sh and U,ms*eld ha-e wisely eschewed any talB o* an early KKe@it strate+y,KK they still seem to thinB that
../. *orces wonKt need to stay more than two years. U,ms*eld e-en denied a report that the ../. armed *orces are
plannin+ to open permanent )ases in (raT. (* theyKre not, they sho,ld )e. 4hatKs the only way to ens,re the sec,rity
o* a nascent democracy in s,ch a ro,+h nei+h)orhood. Coes the administration really ima+ine that (raT will ha-e
t,rned into /wit>erland in two yearsK time ;llied r,le lasted *o,r years in 2ermany and se-en years in Japan.
;merican troops remain stationed in )oth places more than E0 years later. 4hatKs why these two co,ntries ha-e
)ecome para+ons o* li)eral democracy. (t is cra>y to thinB that (raT $$ which has less o* a democratic tradition than
either 2ermany or Japan had in 1&4E $$ co,ld maBe the leap o-erni+ht. 4he record o* nation$),ildin+ d,rin+ the past
decade is clear: 4he .nited /tates *ailed in /omalia and Vaiti, where it p,lled o,t troops premat,rely. 5osnia,
\oso-o and ;*+hanistan show more promise )eca,se ../. troops remain stationed there. ;*+hanistan wo,ld )e
maBin+ e-en more pro+ress i* the .nited /tates and its allies had made a )i++er commitment to sec,re the
co,ntryside, not ?,st \a),l. If we want Ira9 to avoid becoming a 'omalia on steroids
weFd better get used to &"'" troops being deployed there for years
possibly decades to come" If that raises hac!les about American
imperialism so be it" WeFre going to be called an empire whatever we do"
We might as well be a successful empire "
Critici>ing Western 5imperialism) obscures more insidious
practices by regional powers
'haw O (Aartin /haw, pro*essor o* international relations at .ni-ersity o* /,sse@, .ses and ;),ses o* ;nti$
(mperialism in the 2lo)al Era, 4$%$2002, http://www.martinshaw.or+/empire.htm'
(t is *ashiona)le in some circles, amon+ which we m,st clearly incl,de the or+ani>ers o* this con*erence, to ar+,e
that the +lo)al era is seein+ Ka new imperialismK $ that can )e )lamed *or the pro)lem o* K*ailed statesK (pro)a)ly
amon+ many others'. Ciferent contri),tors to this strand o* tho,+ht name this imperialism in diferent ways, ),t
no-elty is clearly a critical iss,e. 4he lo+ic o* ,sin+ the term imperialism is act,ally to esta)lish contin,ity )etween
contemporary *orms o* <estern world power and older *orms 8rst so named )y Aar@ist and other theorists a
cent,ry a+o. 4he last thin+ that critics o* a new imperialism wish to allow is that <estern power has chan+ed
s,6ciently to in-alidate the -ery application o* this critical concept. For ha-e many considered the possi)ility that
if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today it applies to certain
aggressive authoritarian regimes of the non%Western world rather than to
the contemporary West . (n this paper ( *,lly accept that there is a concentration o* m,ch world power
$ economic, c,lt,ral, political and military $ in the hands o* <estern elites. (n my recent )ooB, 4heory o* the 2lo)al
/tate, ( disc,ss the de-elopment o* a K+lo)al$<estern state con+lomerateK (/haw 2000'. ( ar+,e that K+lo)alK ideas
and instit,tions, whose si+ni8cance characteri>es the new political era that has opened with the end o* the Cold
<ar, depend lar+ely $ ),t not solely $ on <estern power. ( hold no )rie* and intend no apolo+y *or o6cial <estern
ideas and )eha-io,r. ;nd yet ( propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly
misleading indeed ideolo+ical concept that obscures the realities of power and
especially o* empire in the twenty%frst century" 4his notion is an o)stacle to ,nderstandin+ the
si+ni8cance, e@tent and limits o* contemporary <estern power" It simultaneously serves to
obscure many real causes of oppression su$ering and struggle for
transformation against the 9uasi%imperial power of many regional states" (
ar+,e that in the +lo)al era, this separation has 8nally )ecome critical. 4his is *or two related reasons. Jn the one
hand, <estern power has mo-ed into new territory, lar+ely ,ncharted $$ and ( ar+,e ,ncharta)le $$ with the critical
tools o* anti$imperialism. Jn the other hand, the politics o* empire remain all too real, in classic *orms that recall
)oth modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non$<estern states, and they are re-i-ed in many political
str,++les today. 4h,s the concept of a Fnew imperialismF fails to deal with both !ey
post%imperial features of Western power and the 9uasi%imperial character
of many non%Western states" #he concept overstates Western power and
understates the dangers posed by other more authoritarian and imperial
centres of power. 7olitically it identifes the West as the principal enemy of the
worldFs people when for many of them there are far more real and
dangerous enemies closer to home. ( shall ret,rn to these political iss,es at the end o* this
paper.
Imperialism is goodB the defeat of ;a>ism and the promotion of
democracy are proof"
/oot G 0;merican (mperialism Fo need to r,n away *rom Sa)el1 Aa@ 5oot, /enior *ellow o* the Co,ncil o*
*orei+n relations, ./; 4oday, Aay Q, 200#. http://QQ.102.1.104/scholar
hl"en[lr"[T"cache:s7Eso7yCt>;J:www.attac)erlin.de/8leadmin//ommeraBademie/5oot!(mperialim!8ne.pd*^a,th
or:ma@^a,thor:)oot'.
Aind yo,, this is not meant as a condemnation. 4he history o* ;merican imperialism is hardly one o* ,nadorned
+ood doin+Z there ha-e )een plenty o* shame*,l episodes, s,ch as the mistreatment o* the (ndians. 5,t, on the
whole, &"'" imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world
during the past century" It has defeated the monstrous evils of
communism and ;a>ism and lesser e-ils s,ch as the 4ali)an and /er)ian ethnic cleansin+. ;lon+ the
way it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as
'outh Vorea Jnews % web sitesK and *anama. 3et, while +enerally s,ccess*,l as imperialists,
;mericans ha-e )een loath to con8rm thatKs what they were doin+. 4hatKs J\. Qiven the historical
baggage that FFimperialismFF carries thereFs no need for the &"'"
government to embrace the term" /ut it should defnitely embrace the
practice. 4hat doesnKt mean lootin+ (raT o* its nat,ral reso,rcesZ nothin+ co,ld )e more destr,cti-e o* o,r +oal
o* ),ildin+ a sta)le +o-ernment in 5a+hdad" It means imposing the rule of law property
rights free speech and other guarantees at gunpoint if need be" #his will
re9uire selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then
bac!ing him or her to the hilt" Iran and other neighboring states wonFt
hesitate to impose their despotic views on Ira9I we shouldnFt hesitate to
impose our democratic views"
Critici>ing benevolent action on the grounds of imperialism
undermines liberation of oppressed people imperialism
is 0ustifed in some instances"
'haw O (Aartin /haw, pro*essor o* international relations at .ni-ersity o* /,sse@, .ses and ;),ses o* ;nti$
(mperialism in the 2lo)al Era, 4$%$2002, http://www.martinshaw.or+/empire.htm'
Conclusion: The abuses of anti-imperialism (t is worth asBin+ how the politics of anti%imperialism
distorts Western leftistsF responses to global struggles for 0ustice . John 7il+er,
*or e@ample, consistently seeBs to minimise the crimes o* Ailose-ic in \oso-o, and to deny their +enocidal character
$ p,rely )eca,se these crimes *ormed part o* the rationale *or <estern inter-ention a+ainst /er)ia. Ve ne-er
attempted to minimise the crimes o* the pro$<estern /,harto re+ime in the same way. 4he crimes o* T,asi$imperial
re+imes are similar in cases liBe 3,+osla-ia and (ndonesia, ),t the <estKs attit,des towards them are ,ndenia)ly
,ne-en and inconsistent. To take as the criterion of one's politics opposition to Western policy rather than the
demands for !ustice of the "ictims of oppression as such distorts our responses to the "ictims and our commitment
to !ustice# We need to support the victims regardless of whether Western
governments ta!e up their cause or notI we need to 0udge Western power
not according to a general assumption of Fnew imperialismF but according
to its actual role in relation to the victims" #he tas! for civil society in the
West is not therefore to oppose Western state policies as a matter o* co,rse, $ la
Cold <ar, ),t to mobilise solidarity with democratic oppositions and repressed peoples
against authoritarian, T,asi$imperial states" It is to demand more e$ective
globa l political, le+al and military institutions that genuinely and consistently
defend the interests of the most threatened groups . (t is to +rasp the contradictions
amon+ and within <estern elites, conditionally allyin+ themsel-es with internationalisin+ elements in +lo)al
instit,tions and <estern +o-ernments, a+ainst nationalist and reactionary elements. 4he arri-al in power o* 2eor+e
5,sh (( maBes this discrimination all the more ,r+ent. (n the lon+ r,n, we need to develop a larger
politics of global social democracy and an ethic of global responsibility
that address the profound economic, political and c,lt,ral ine9ualities between
Western and non%Western worlds. <e will not mo-e *ar in these directions, howe-er, ,nless we
+rasp the li*e$and$death str,++les )etween many oppressed peoples and the new local imperialisms, rather
than subsuming all regional contradictions into the false synthesis of a
new Western imperialism .
An imperialist hegemon in society is a necessity without it our
world would see civili>ation reduce itself to anarchic and
barbaric ways of life
9er+,son 4 J;iall *rof of 4istory at ;=& 'tern Aoreign *olicy 5A World Without *ower)
httpBTTwww"foreignpolicy"comTarticlesTO<<RT<ST<1TaUworldUwithoutUpowerK .A#
Critics of &"'" global dominance should pause and consider the alternative" If the &nited
'tates retreats from its hegemonic role who would supplant itW ;ot
:urope not China not the .uslim worldDand certainly not the &nited ;ations" &nfortunately
the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia
but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dar! Age" We tend to assume that power
li!e nature abhors a vacuum" In the history of world politics it seems someone
is always the hegemon or bidding to become it" #oday it is the &nited
'tatesI a century ago it was the &nited Vingdom" /efore that it
was Arance 'pain and so on" #he famed 1+th%century Qerman historian
1eopold von Can!e doyen of the study of statecraft portrayed modern
:uropean history as an incessant struggle for mastery in which a
balance of power was possible only through recurrent con8ict" #he
in8uence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confrm the notion that history is
a competition between rival powers" In his bestselling 1+,S wor! #he Cise and Aall
of the Qreat *owersB :conomic Change and .ilitary Con8ict from 1?<< to O<<< =ale &niversity
historian *aul Vennedy concluded that li!e all past empires the &"'" and Cussian superpowers would
inevitably succumb to overstretch" /ut their place would soon be usurped Vennedy argued by the
rising powers of China and 2apan both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial military
commitments" In his O<<1 boo! #he #ragedy of Qreat *ower *olitics &niversity of Chicago political
scientist 2ohn 2" .earsheimer updates VennedyFs account" 4aving failed to succumb to overstretch
and after surviving the Qerman and 2apanese challenges he argues the &nited 'tates must now brace
for the ascent of new rivals" 5\A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the &nited
'tates in the early twenty%frst century) contends .earsheimer" 5\#]he &nited 'tates has a profound
interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead") China is not the
only threat .earsheimer foresees" #he :uropean &nion J:&K too has the potential to become 5a
formidable rival") *ower in other words is not a natural monopolyI the struggle for mastery is both
perennial and universal" #he 5unipolarity) identifed by some commentators
following the 'oviet collapse cannot last much longer for the simple reason that
history hates a hyperpower" 'ooner or later challengers will
emerge and bac! we must go to a multipolar multipower world" /ut
what if these esteemed theorists are all wrongW What if the world is actually heading for a period
when there is no hegemonW What if instead of a balance of power there is an absence of powerW 'uch
a situation is not un!nown in history" Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied
with the achievements of great powersDwhether civili>ations empires or nation%statesDthey have
not wholly overloo!ed eras when power receded" &nfortunately the worldFs e(perience with power
vacuums Jeras of 5apolarity) if you willK is hardly encouraging" Anyone who disli!es &"'"
hegemony should bear in mind that rather than a multipolar world of competing
great powers a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative
to &"'" primacy" Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new
Dar! Age B an era of waning empires and religious fanaticismI of
endemic plunder and pillage in the worldFs forgotten regionsI of
economic stagnation and civili>ationFs retreat into a few fortifed
enclaves"
4istory proves that any future without a dominant
e(pansionist nation acting within global society spurs on
a world in which chaos and discontinuity pervades all
parts of the globe
Aerguson R (Fiall, 7ro* o* Vistory at F3. /tern, 9orei+n 7olicy, 0; <orld <itho,t 7ower1,
http://www.*orei+npolicy.com/articles/2004/0%/01/a!world!witho,t!power' A;4
/,ppose, in a worst$case scenario, that ../. neoconser-ati-e h,)ris is h,m)led in (raT and that the 5,sh
administrationKs pro?ect to democrati>e the Aiddle East at +,npoint ends in i+nominio,s withdrawal, +oin+ *rom
empire to decoloni>ation in less than two years. /,ppose also that no aspirin+ ri-al power shows interest in
8llin+ the res,ltin+ -ac,,msNnot only in copin+ with (raT ),t concei-a)ly also ;*+hanistan, the 5alBans, and
Vaiti. What would an apolar future loo! li!eW 4he answer is not easy, as there ha-e
)een -ery *ew periods in world history with no contenders *or the role o* +lo)al, or at least re+ional, he+emon.
4he nearest appro@imation in modern times co,ld )e the 1&20s, when the .nited /tates walBed away *rom
7resident <oodrow <ilsonKs pro?ect o* +lo)al democracy and collecti-e sec,rity centered on the Sea+,e o*
Fations. 4here was certainly a power -ac,,m in Central and Eastern E,rope a*ter the collapse o* the Uomano-,
Va)s),r+, Vohen>ollern, and Jttoman empires, ),t it did not last lon+. 4he old <est E,ropean empires were
T,icB to snap ,p the choice le*to-ers o* Jttoman r,le in the Aiddle East. 4he 5olshe-iBs had reassem)led the
c>arist empire )y 1&22. ;nd )y 1&#Q, 2erman re-anche was already *ar ad-anced. -ne must go
bac! m,ch *,rther in history to 8nd a period o* tr,e and end,rin+ apolarityZ as *ar )acB, in *act, as the
ninth and 1<th centuries. (n this era, the remains o* the Uoman EmpireNUome and 5y>anti,m
Nreceded *rom the hei+ht o* their power. #he leadership of the West was divided
between the pope, who led Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who
di-ided ,p his short$li-ed empire ,nder the 4reaty o* Rerd,n in =4#. ;o credible claimant to
the title of emperor emerged until -tto was crowned in &Q2, and e-en he
was merely a 2erman prince with pretensions (ne-er reali>ed' to r,le (taly. /y>antium, meanwhile,
was dealing with the /ulgar rebellion to the north" 5y &00, the
Abbasid caliphate initially esta)lished )y ;), al$;))as in %E0 had passed its pea!Z it
was in steep decline )y the middle o* the 10th cent,ry. In China, too, imperial power was in
a dip )etween the 4Kan+ and /,n+ dynasties. 5oth these empires had splendid capitalsN5a+hdad and
ChKan+$anN),t neither had serio,s aspirations o* territorial e@pansion. #he wea!ness of the
old empires allowed new and smaller entities to 8ourish" <hen the
\ha>ar tri)e con-erted to J,daism in %40, their Bhanate occ,pied a E,rasian power -ac,,m )etween the 5lacB
/ea and the Caspian /ea. (n \ie-, *ar *rom the reach o* 5y>anti,m, the re+ent Jl+a laid the *o,ndation *or the
*,t,re U,ssian Empire in &E% when she con-erted to the Jrthodo@ Ch,rch. 4he /el?,BsN*ore)ears o* the
Jttoman 4,rBsNcar-ed the /,ltanate o* U,m as the ;))asid caliphate lost its +rip o-er ;sia Ainor. ;*rica had its
mini$empire in 2hanaZ Central ;merica had its Aayan ci-ili>ation. Connections )etween these entities were
minimal or none@istent. #his condition was the antithesis of globali>ation" It
was a world bro!en up into disconnected introverted civili>ations.
Jne *eat,re o* the a+e was that, in the a)sence o* stron+ sec,lar polities, reli+io,s T,estions o*ten prod,ced
serio,s con-,lsions. (ndeed, reli+io,s instit,tions o*ten set the political a+enda. (n the ei+hth and ninth
cent,ries, 5y>anti,m was racBed )y contro-ersy o-er the proper role o* icons in worship. 5y the 11th cent,ry,
the pope *elt con8dent eno,+h to h,m)le Voly Uoman Emperor Venry (R d,rin+ the )attle o-er which o* them
sho,ld ha-e the ri+ht to appoint )ishops. 4he new monastic orders amassed considera)le power in
Christendom, partic,larly the Cl,niacs, the 8rst order to centrali>e monastic a,thority. (n the A,slim world, it
was the ,lema (clerics' who tr,ly r,led. 4his atmosphere helps e@plain why the period ended with the
e@traordinary holy wars Bnown as the Cr,sades, the 8rst o* which was la,nched )y E,ropean Christians in 10&E.
3et, this apparent clash of civili>ations was in many ways 0ust
another e(ample of the apolar worldFs susceptibility to long%
distance military raids directed at urban centers by more
bac!ward peoples" 4he RiBin+s repeatedly attacBed <est E,ropean towns in the ninth cent,ryN
Fantes in =42, /e-ille in =44, to name ?,st two. Jne 9ranBish chronicler lamented 0the endless Oood o* RiBin+s1
sweepin+ so,thward. 5y>anti,m, too, was sacBed in =Q0 )y raiders *rom U,s, the Bernel o* the *,t,re U,ssia.
4his 08erce and sa-a+e tri)e1 showed 0no mercy,1 lamented the 5y>antine patriarch. (t was liBe 0the roarin+ sea
H destroyin+ e-erythin+, sparin+ nothin+.1 'uch were the conditions of an anarchic
age. /mall wonder that the *,t,re seemed to lie in creatin+ small, de*ensi)le, political ,nits: the Renetian
rep,)licNthe T,intessential city$state, which was cond,ctin+ its own *orei+n policy )y =40Nor ;l*red the 2reatKs
En+land, ar+,a)ly the 8rst thin+ resem)lin+ a nation$state in E,ropean history, created in ==Q.
#urn proliferation
a" A withdrawal of American imperialism would result in a rapid
arms races of biological and nuclear weapons
Cosen G (/tephen, 0;n Empire, (* 3o, Can \eep (t,1 Fational (nterest, /prin+'
;s *or imperial r,le o-er other peoples, the &nited 'tates has always preferred indirect
ruleB the installation of local governments compatible with American
policies" Direct rule will be seen as a temporary measure to prepare
conditions for a transfer of power to local inhabitants. 5,t e$ective transfer
could be a long time coming in places liBe ;*+hanistan and (raT, or in other places where the .nited
/tates esta)lishes military +arrisons intended to )e temporary. 4he .nited /tates is *,lly capa)le o* enlar+in+ its
army to maintain s,ch +arrisons o-er lon+ periods o* timeZ in li-in+ memory, a*ter all, the peacetime ../. military
has had o-er three million men and women. 4he real constraint will )e political: <ill the elites and +eneral
pop,lation o* the .nited /tates re+ard it as ?,st to r,le other peoples, some o* whom hate ;mericans eno,+h to
en+a+e in s,icidal attacBs, and many o* whom may e@ploit ;merican power *or their own mali+n p,rposes Uather
than wrestle with s,ch di6c,lt and ,npleasant pro)lems, the &nited 'tates could give up the
imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. 4his wo,ld essentially mean the withdrawal o* all ../. *orces
*rom the Aiddle East, E,rope and mainland ;sia. (t may )e that all other peoples, witho,t si+ni8cant e@ception, will
then t,rn to their own afairs and lea-e the .nited /tates alone. 5,t those who are hostile to us
might remain hostile and be much less afraid of the &nited 'tates after
such a withdrawal" Current friends would feel less secure and in the most
probable post%imperial world would revert to the logic of self%help in
which all states do what they must to protect themselves" #his would
imply the relatively rapid ac9uisition of weapons of mass destruction by
2apan 'outh Vorea #aiwan Iran Ira9 and perhaps Algeria 'audi Arabia
.alaysia Indonesia and others" Constraints on the ac9uisition of
biological weapons would be e-en wea!er than they are today. .a0or regional arms
races would also b e very li!ely throughout Asia and the .iddle :ast. 4his
wo,ld not )e a pleasant world *or ;mericans, or anyone else. (t is di6c,lt to +,ess what the costs o* s,ch a world
wo,ld )e to the .nited /tates. 4hey wo,ld pro)a)ly not p,t the end o* the .nited /tates in prospect, ),t they wo,ld
not )e small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing it is not at all clear
that the alternatives are that much more attractive"
/" *roliferation leads to e(tinction
&tgo$ O (Rictor, Cep,ty Cirector o* /trate+y, 9orces, and Ueso,rces Ci-ision o* the (nstit,te *or Ce*ense
;nalysis, 07roli*eration, Aissile Ce*ense and ;merican ;m)itions,1 %ur"i"al, /,mmer, p. =%$&0'
(n s,m, widespread proliferation is li!ely to lead to an occasional shoot%out with
nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability
of escalating to the ma(imum destruction possible with the weapons at hand.
&nless n,clear proliferation is stopped we are headed towards a world that
will mirror the American <ild West o* the late 1=00s. With most if not all nations
wearing nuclear 5si( shooters1 on their hips, the world may e-en )e a more polite place than it is
today, ),t e-ery once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of
dead cities or e-en whole nations"
Indo%*a!
;o escalation &' will try not to get involved
.ar!ey 1< (Caniel, Co,ncil on 9orei+n Uelations staf, 04errorism and (ndo$7aBistani Esclation,1 ?store, dw:
Jan,ary 2010, da: %$&$2011, lido'
;side *rom ../. h,manitarian concerns, the need to protect American citi>ens and
business interests in 'outh Asia and the ris! of nuclear escalation
whenever tension rises between India and *a!istan Washingtons
immediate concern in the event of another terrorist attac! in India
lies in avoiding an Indo%*a!istani crisis that would undermine the
&"'" war e$ort in Afghanistan or distract *a!istan from ongoing
counterterror and counterinsurgency operations. 4he potential disr,ption o* ../.
eforts in ;*+hanistan stems in part *rom the *act that 7aBistan ser-es as a -italNin many ways irreplacea)leN
lo+istics h,) and o-erland corridor *or ../. and F;4J operations. ;n (ndo$7aBistani military con*rontation co,ld
close 7aBistans ports or otherwise delay shipments *or a si+ni8cant time. /hort o* war, i* (slama)ad )elie-es
<ashin+ton is i+norin+ its concerns, it can manip,late these s,pply ro,tes to demonstrate its strate+ic -al,e to
<ashin+ton. ;s the J)ama administration ramps ,p its military commitment in ;*+hanistan, <ashin+tons lo+istical
dependence ,pon 7aBistan will only deepen. *revious Indo%*a!istani crises show that
*a!istans military will give greater priority to the threat from India
than to the threat from militants operating along the Afghan border"
At the very least a crisis with India would compel *a!istans
general sta$ to redirect attention and time from ongoing operations
in the 9ederally ;dministered 4ri)al ;reas (AA#AK and could derail intelligence and
law enforcement activities connected to a range of counterterror
e$orts" :ven a relatively brief disruption of these activities could
impose high costs on the &nited 'tates, +i-en the *act that al$:aeda and other anti$
<estern terrorist +ro,ps operate *rom 7aBistani territory. Aore )roadly, the &nited 'tates would
also su$er if an Indo%*a!istani crisis wea!ens the stability and
capacity of *a!istans government or creates new long%lasting
tensions between &"'" partners in ;ew Delhi and Islamabad. 4he *railty o*
7aBistans +o-ernin+ instit,tions already ofers a permissi-e en-ironment to antistate militants and e@tremists. ;
*ailed military e@chan+e with (ndia co,ld deli-er a )ody )low to the le+itimacy and a,thority o* 7aBistani state
instit,tions, openin+ e-en more space *or e@treme alternati-es. ;nd altho,+h the .nited /tates has li-ed thro,+h
periods o* intense (ndo7aBistani hostility in the past, there has ne-er )een a time when )ilateral relations with the
two co,ntries were sim,ltaneo,sly considered as strate+ically pri>ed as they are today. Washingtons
interest in Indo%*a!istani d^tente also grows the more the &nited
'tates invests in Afghanistans stabilityI heightened violence
between warring Afghan pro(ies supported by India and *a!istan
would be an almost certain conse9uence of new hostilities between
;ew Delhi and Islamabad"
Deterrence chec!s indo%pa! con8ict con8icts dont escalate
Varl +M (Ca-id, phd, moodle#stoa#usp#br&mod&resource&"ie'#php(id)*+*,* d': Winter -../ da: 0-.-*1--
lido)
Jne co,ld ar+,e that the presence o* important constrainin+ *actors, s,ch as (slama)adKs military and
economic dependency on the .nited /tates as well as (ndiaKs dire 8nancial condition, maBe the 1&&0
\ashmir crisis a less than de8niti-e test *or proli*eration pessimism. 5,t the impact o* these *actors
sho,ld not )e e@a++erated. #he .uslim insurgency in Vashmir and alleged
*a!istani support for it was perceived in ;ew Delhi as a
manifest threat to IndiaFs territorial integrity and national
identityI there was growing temptation in government circles
as well as important political groups to use military force to
resolve the crisis.E# ../. sec,rity protection o* 7aBistan was )o,nd to )e seen as 8cBle )y
(slama)ad, +i-en the rocBy history o* ../.$7aBistani rela$ tions. Aoreo-er, whatever restraint
&"'" military and economic assistance engendered in *a!istanFs
nuclear activities it came to an end in late 1++< when this
assistance was terminated due to WashingtonFs proliferation
an(ieties. Jn )alance, 'outh AsiaFs nuclear dynamics lend greater
credence to proliferation optimism than to its critics" /te-en Ailler ar+,es
that the (ndo$7aBistani n,clear relationship to date is so temporally limited, compared to the span o* the Cold
<ar, that it does not pro-ide concl,si-e data a)o,t the sec,rity and sta)ility efects o* n,clear
proli*eration.E4 5,t what this dyad lacBs in a temporal dimension, it more than maBes ,p *or in terms o* the
o-erall intensity o* the ri-alry. 'outh AsiaFs political%military circumstances
give rise to a rather star! setting for deterrence encounters and
epitomi>e the conditions many Western analysts fear will lead to
catastrophe if proliferation increases in the world" /ecause of a
surfeit of powerful and interloc!ing factors that are at wor! in
pushing India and *a!istan toward military con8ict one would
intuitively e(pect that the subcontinent is a Hleast li!elyH case
for peaceful proliferation outcomes"
;o threat between India and *a!istan % intel
Inewsite + (http://www.inewsit.com/articles/entry/(s$there$no$threat$*rom$(ndia$)y$;*shain$;*>aladw: Q$=$
200&, da: %$&$2011, lido'
&' intelligence o@cials have confrmed that Washington is wor!ing
to improve cooperation between *a!istan and India to share more
information on counterterrorism matters. A Central (ntelli+ence ;+ency (CIAK
o@cial added that the cooperation also included intelligence sharing
on #aliban commanders who are carrying out insurgency against the
*a!istani government. (n the same re+ard, the <all /treet Jo,rnal also reported that C(; arran+ed *or
7aBistan and (ndia to share in*ormation on the 7aBistan$)ased A,?ahideen or+ani>ation SashBar$e$4ayyia)a (Se4'.
#he &' also shares regular intelligence with India on *a!istan
ArmyFs operations against elements in 5a?a,r, the /wat Ralley and 5,ner in 7aBistan. (n
another de-elopment mediated )y C(;, the /rina+ar$A,>afara)ad ),s ser-ice has )een thrown open to e-eryone in
(ndia. Earlier, it was restricted only to people with relati-es across the di-idin+ Sine o* Control (SoC'. (ndian
2o-ernment has eased the e@istin+ r,les, as a res,lt o* which more people can now tra-el across the SoC. 4hey
donKt need a -alid passport ),t instead a permit iss,ed )y the 7assport J6cer in (ndian Jamm, and \ashmir wo,ld
s,6ce. 4his permit wo,ld )e -alid *or -isit any where in ;>ad Jamm, and \ashmir. (n the same re+ard (ndian
Ainistry o* E@ternal ;fair has iss,ed clari8cations that all (ndian national can apply *or across SoC tra-el in 7aBistan.
(ndian Ainistry o* 9orei+n ;fairs has +i-en +o ahead si+nal to a plan in which Ktriple entry permitK wo,ld )e +ranted
to *reT,ent tra-elers, which will p,t an end to +oin+ thro,+h -ario,s *ormalities. It appears that days
are counted when the Indian nationals would also be allowed to visit
*a!istan without necessary formalities"
/oth countries are entering peace tal!s wont go to war
Islamabad 'unday #imes 11 (<hy (ndia is not ;merica, dw: Q$12$2011, dw: %$Q$2011, le@is,
lido'
(nterestin+ly, the &' % which incessantly tal!s of peace between two
countries whose bic!ering has given it great leverage over both %
supports hardliners such as C-A' * A Vayani and connives at
moves that wea!en the few doves in the *a!istan establishment
such as *resident A A 3ardari"Aor a brief while *resident 3ardari
pointed out the very truth that *rime .inister .anmohan 'ingh
never fails to mention which is that both India and *a!istan need to
enter into a period of stable and peaceable relations with neither
side see!ing to destabili>e the other. ;nalysts estimate that s,ch tranT,ility )etween the
two /o,th ;sian +iants wo,ld add a)o,t ED to 7aBistanKs rate o* +rowth, and more than 1D to (ndiaKs. 4his
col,mnist )elie-es that more and more people across )oth sides o* the )order appreciate the *olly o* seeBin+
concessions *rom the other side that are politically impossi)le *or them to accept. 4here is a need to *orm,late ?oint
strate+ies a+ainst terrorism and economic and social )acBwardness, rather than Beep away *rom +en,ine
cooperation. (nterestin+ly, these days the power*,l 7,n?a)i politcian, Aian Fawa> /hari*, seems to )e artic,latin+
?,st s,ch a -iewpoint. 'harif has been realistic in his acceptance of the need
for peace between India and *a!istan and of the immense benefts
that this would bring to both"'hould there be greater cross%border
trade both sides of *un0ab can develop at a much more rapid pace
as indeed can other parts of both India and *a!istan" 'adly
apparently because he is wary of being seen by the military as too
soft on India *resident 3ardari has distanced himself from his
earlier views and is tal!ing in harsher tones about India"
;o war deterrence .usharaf
'ule!ha news , (http://newshopper.s,leBha.com/no$threat$o*$india$paBistan$war$
m,sharra*!news!1014E%=.htm, da: %$&$2011, lido'
KSet me maBe clear to all that 7aBistani *orces are *,lly eT,ipped and ready to *ace any a++ression... ),t ( wo,ld
say that India should not dare to attac! *a!istan ,K .usharraf said when pressed
by reporters as to what would happen if India attac!s *a!istan" .usharraf , who had to resign
in August under national and international pressure after ruling the country for almost nine years
said there were no chances of war between the two countries but
was 9uic! to add that *a!istan was capable of defending its
borders if attac!ed"
;o war % public
'ify news + (http://www.si*y.com/news/no$threat$o*$war$with$india$+ilani$news$international$
?e+,rJed*hc.html,, dw: 1$1E$200&, da: %$&$2011, lido'
H/oth countries are nuclear powers" I thin! there is no threat of
warH Qilani told a brief news conference d,rin+ a -isit to the (n*ormation Ainistry.
Ve was respondin+ to a T,estion a)o,t army chie* 2eneral CeepaB \apoorKs comments on <ednesday that all
options were open )e*ore Few Celhi, incl,din+ the P8+htin+ optionP as last resort, *or dealin+ with 7aBistan.
2ilani indicated that the Indian governmentFs stance is being in8uenced by
public pressure" H#here is tremendous pressure of the public on
the government of IndiaH he said. 7aB doesnKt want war, says 2ilani ;nswerin+ another
T,estion a)o,t 7aBistan possi)ly a)andonin+ the (ran$7aBistan$(ndia +as pipeline pro?ect, 2ilani said a special
en-oy o* (ran who met him recently had +i-en no indication that the -ent,re will not )e implemented.
;o Indo%*a! war % empirics
.oore S (Carl, )lo++er, http://www.carolmoore.net/n,clearwar/inde@.htmlb4hreats, dw: Aay 200%, da: %$4$
2011, lido'
India and *a!istan have repeatedly threatened nuclear war against
each other most seriously in the last few years" (n late Cecem)er 2002 7aBistanKs
president, 2eneral 7er-e> .usharraf, addressin+ ;ir 9orce -eterans in \arachi, saidB he last year
HpersonallyH conveyed a clear HmessageH to 7rime Ainister Xa0payee
Hthrough every international leader who came to *a!istanH namely
that Indian troops Hshould not e(pect a conventional war from
*a!istanH if they Hmoved a single step across the international
border or the 1ine of ControlH" (n response (ndian Ce*ense Ainister 2eor+e 9ernande> said:
P<e can taBe a )om) or two, or more. <hen we respond, there will )e no 7aBistan.P ;)o,t the same time *ormer
;rmy Chie* o* /taf ;slam 5e+, then headin+ a ri+ht$win+ 7aBistani thinB tanB said: PJ,r policy o* deterrence is
(ndia$speci8c. Fo matter who comes *or ,s, (srael, the .nited /tates or (ndia we will taBe on (ndia. (* someone is
thinBin+ o* taBin+ on 7aBistan they sho,ld Bnow we will taBe on (ndia.P ;nd despite subse9uent
detente between the two nations during the remainder of O<<G as
late as fall O<<G Ariel 'haron visited India worrying *a!istan that
he was once again proposing India do a surgical stri!e against
*a!istani nuclear assets.

;o war % communications
CIA ;ovosti , (http://en.rian.r,/analysis/200=012E/&%%%2224.html, dw: 1$2E$200=, da: %$&$2011, lido'
*a!istan is strictly observing the schedule of tests it has agreed
with India" #here are no deviations in the type or range of missiles.
4here is one important detail in this conte@t. (n 200%, *a!istan and India tested missiles, ha-in+
noti8ed each other in ad-ance. 4hey conducted some test launches almost
simultaneously as if emphasi>ing their commitment to the principle
of parallel testing" 4his tradition +oes )acB to 1&&=, when 7aBistan tested n,clear weapons a*ter (ndia.
5,t the principle o* parallel testin+ is only limited to time. Comparison o* missile systemsK characteristics is
o)-io,sly not in *a-or o* 7aBistan. ;ot without help from the great powers India
has gone so far ahead in the sphere of arms that it is pursuing its
national interests from the *ersian Qulf to the .alacca archipelago"
Islamabad 0ustifably believes that the &nited 'tates is ready to
support IndiaFs claims to the status of a world power in e(change for
its e$orts to deter China and Iran"
.iddle%:ast War
A .ideast war would not escalate or go nuclear
'tevens O LEli>a)eth /te-ens, /eptem)er 1&, 2002,
http://in*omana+e.com/nonproli*eration/na?o,rnal/israelin,cs.htmlM
4h,s *ar, Israel has confronted continuous hostility with a strong
conventional superiority" It is doubtful that it would resort to a
nuclear weapon given the fact that it could repel the attac! of any
one of its Arab opponents and probably a combination of them"
Israel has signed a peace treaty with :gypt and moderating forces
in 2ordan are strong" #he recent peace treaty with the *1- and
di$erences between Ira9 and 'yria further reduce the possibility of
a united Arab attac!. (t wo,ld appear that (srael does not need a n,clear arsenal.
.iddle :ast war wont escalate
1i 1 L7ro*. Si /hao@ian, an e@pert in the Aiddle East and a senior researcher in the (nstit,te o* Contemporary
(nternational Uelations, ;,+,st 1%, 2001, http://www.china.or+.cn/en+lish/2001/;,+/1%Q%1.htm, accessed Aarch &,
200%M
Although the situation in the .iddle :ast is alarming it will not
start a war" 4he main reasons are: 9irst both the international community and
international environment will not allow another .iddle :ast war to
brea! out" 7eace and de-elopment is still the theme o* todays world. ;o big power wants to
see a new war between Arab and Israel in this area so crucial to oil
production. /econd, war is not in line with the interests of several
countries in the .iddle :ast" ;one of the Israelis (incl,din+ /haron himsel*'
wants war because war would again put the very e(istence of the
country in dangerZ 3asser ;*ra*at, as well, does not want war, )eca,se war wo,ld t,rn his 10 years
peace eforts into nothin+I :gypt and 'yria, the other two )i+ powers in Aiddle East, do not want
war either. 4he president o* E+ypt Vosni A,)araB 8rmly re?ected the possi)ility o* war in an inter-iew with
(sraeli 4R. 5ashar al$;ssad, the new president o* /yria, has p,t most his attention on domestic afairs. 4hird, the
countries and e(tremists who do want to see war have neither the
capablities or means for war.
Deterrence chec!s middle east con8ict emperics and fear
Walt> O! L\enneth, pro*, http://www.ciaonet.or+/ol?/+?ia/+?ia!winspr00*.html, dw: /prin+ 2000, da: %$=$2011,
lidoM
<e ha-e this pec,liar notion a)o,t the irrationality o* ro+,e states. <hen he was /ecretary o* Ce*ense, Ses ;spin
said these ro+,e leaders mi+ht )e ,ndeterra)le. -thers contend that some states may
underta!e courses of action even if they !now that catastrophe may
result" /ut who would do thatW ;ot 'addam 4ussein" Fot \im (l /,n+ when he
was r,ler o* Forth \orea. <hat is a Bey characteristic o* all those r,lers #hey are survivors as
they struggle to live in a harsh environmentboth internally with
the constant danger of assassination and e(ternally as theyre
surrounded by enemies" And they survive for decades until they are
carried out in a bo(" Are they irrationalW #heir behavior is ugly and
nasty to be sure but irrationalW 4ow could they surviveW If they
were not deterrable how would they ever have survivedW 4hey dont r,n
the Bind o* risBs that wo,ld p,t their re+ime into T,estion. \im (l /,n+ wanted to pass his rei+n onto his son, \im
Jon+ (l. 4hey o)-io,sly lo-e to r,le, ),t they-e +ot to ha-e a co,ntry. #heyre not going to ris!
the e(istence of their country" Aor e(ample 'addam 4ussein was
deterred during the *ersian Qulf War" 4e did not arm the 'C&D
missiles with lethal warheads and shoot them at Israel" #hey were
nuisance attac!s" WhyW /ecause he didnt want us to pound him
more heavily than he was being pounded" #he allies led by the
&nited 'tates could have substantially destroyed that country
without ever using nuclear weapons and he !new it" 'ure he was
deterred" /o how can we say irrational or ,ndeterra)le 5,t we do say it.
.iddle :ast 'tates dont want war
'hao(ian 1 LSi, pro*, http://www.china.or+.cn/en+lish/2001/;,+/1%Q%1.htm, dw: =$1%$2001, da: %$&$2011,
lidoM
/econd, war is not in line with the interests of several countries in the
.iddle :ast" ;one of the Israelis (incl,din+ /haron himsel*' wants war because
war would again put the very e(istence of the country in dangerZ 3asser
;*ra*at, as well, does not want war, )eca,se war wo,ld t,rn his 10 years peace eforts into nothin+Z E+ypt and
/yria, the other two )i+ powers in Aiddle East, do not want war either. #he president of :gypt
4osni .ubara! frmly re0ected the possibility of war in an interview
with Israeli #X" /ashar al%Assad the new president of 'yria has put
most his attention on domestic a$airs"
;o war in the middle east all con8icts are settling over
1uttwa! S LEdward, staf, http://www.prospectma+a>ine.co.,B/200%/0E/themiddleo*nowhere/, dw: E$2Q$
200%, da: %$&$2011, lidoM
/trate+ically, the Arab%Israeli con8ict has been almost irrelevant since the
end of the cold war" And as for the impact of the con8ict on oil
prices it was powerful in 1+SG when the 'audis declared embargoes
and cut production but that was the frst and last time that the 5oil
weapon) was wielded. 9or decades now, the largest Arab oil producers have
publicly foresworn any lin!age between politics and pricin+, and an
em)ar+o wo,ld )e a disaster *or their oil$re-en,e dependent economies. (n any case, the relationship
between turmoil in the middle east and oil prices is far from
straightforward" ;s 7hilip ;,erswald recently noted in the ;merican (nterest, )etween 1&=1 and 1&&&N
a period when a *,ndamentalist re+ime consolidated power in (ran, (ran and (raT *o,+ht an ei+ht$year war within
-iew o* oil and +as installations, the Qulf war came and went and the frst
*alestinian intifada ragedDoil prices ad0usted for in8ation actually
fell" And global dependence on middle eastern oil is decliningB today
the region produces under G< per cent of the worlds crude oil
compared to almost R< per cent in 1+SR%S?" (n 200E 1% per cent o* ;merican oil
imports came *rom the 2,l*, compared to 2= per cent in 1&%E, and 7resident 5,sh ,sed his 200Q state o* the ,nion
address to anno,nce his intention o* c,ttin+ ./ oil imports *rom the middle east )y three T,arters )y 202E. 3es, it
wo,ld )e nice i* (sraelis and 7alestinians co,ld settle their diferences, ),t it would do little or
nothing to calm the other con8icts in the middle east from Algeria
to Ira9 or to stop .uslim%4indu violence in Vashmir, A,slim$Christian -iolence
in (ndonesia and the 7hilippines, A,slim$5,ddhist -iolence in 4hailand, A,slim$animist -iolence in /,dan, A,slim$
(+)o -iolence in Fi+eria, A,slim$A,sco-ite -iolence in Chechnya, or the diferent -arieties o* inter$A,slim -iolence
)etween traditionalists and (slamists, and )etween /,nnis and /hia, nor wo,ld it ass,a+e the per*ectly
,nderstanda)le hostility o* con-inced (slamists towards the trans+ressi-e west that relentlessly in-ades their minds,
and sometimes their co,ntries.
&' and other western countries intervention in the middle east
chec! con8ict
3ein + LAosta*a, http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/Q1#4=m dw: &$#0$200&, da: %$&$2011, lidoM
#he Westerners, especially the .nited /tates, reali>e this -ery well. 4hey also reali>e that
their interests in the .iddle :ast re9uire from them to spread
stability" /esides large international institutions view the Iranian
nuclear program as a primitive one that it is still very far from
manufacturing a \nuclear] bomb or weapons" 4heir reaction was -ery -iolent *or two
additional reasons. 9irst, to con8rm, on the e-e o* the ne+otiations, that the <est is ,nited in con*rontin+ it L(ranM,
and that U,ssia which s,pports it, is willin+ to a)andon it and adopt the comprehensi-e sanctions i* (ran does not
s,cc,m) to conditions. 4he second reason is an American one par e(cellence and is
aimed at covering the retreat of -bama in front of /en0amin
;etanyahu who returned from Washington and ;ew =or! with a
resounding victory over the White 4ouse when he insisted on
re0ecting the suspension of settlement activities on the universal
recognition of the 2ewish aspect of Israel and on normali>ing the
relations with the Arabs to start negotiations Hwithout
preconditionsH" (n order to complete the pict,re and maBe e-eryone *or+et the pled+es o* J)amaKs
administration re+ardin+ the Aiddle East, emphasis was made on demoni>in+ (ran and its n,clear aspirations.
#he 0oint American%Israeli military maneuvers were depicted as a
need to rea@rm their alliance in the face of the imminent Iranian
threat" #he Western%Iranian negotiations will last a long time" Israel
will be the absent%present factor in all their details" Whenever the
situation gets complicated Israel will threaten to stri!e Iran" (t will
manip,late any <estern concession to rein*orce its arsenal and consolidate its occ,pation. <e are a*raid to )elie-e
the ar+,ment o* the n,clear res,rrection and to ),ild o,r policies accordin+ly.
*overty
#urnB Capitalism is closing the global income gap
;orberg <G (9ellow, 4im)ro instit,te, <GcJohan, (n Ce*ense o* 2lo)al Capitalism p+ E4d'
4his pro+ress is all -ery well, many critics of globali>ation will argue, ),t e-en i* the ma?ority
are )etter of, +aps ha-e widened and wealthy people and co,ntries ha-e impro-ed their lot more rapidly than
others. /o ine9uality has grown. 4he critics point to the *act that the com)ined per capita 2C7 o*
the 20 richest co,ntries was 1E times +reater than that o* the 20 poorest co,ntries 40 years a+o and is now
a)o,t #0 times +reater. 4here are two reasons why this o)?ection to +lo)ali>ation does not hold ,p. 9irst,
even if this were true it would not matter very much" If everyone is coming
to be better o$ what does it matter that the improvement comes faster
for some than for othersW /,rely the important thin+ is *or e-eryone to )e as well of as possi)le,
not whether one +ro,p is )etter of than another. Jnly those who consider wealth a +reater pro)lem than
po-erty can 8nd a pro)lem in some )ecomin+ millionaires while others +row wealthier *rom their own startin+
points. It is better to be poor in the ine+alitarian . nited / tates, where the po-erty line *or
indi-id,als in 2001 was a)o,t W&,0#& per year, than to be e9ual in countries li!e Cwanda,
where in 2001 2C7 per capita (ad?,sted *or p,rchasin+ power' was W1,000, or 5an+ladesh (W1,%E0', or
.>)eBistan (W2,E00'.ef J*ten the reason why gaps have widened in certain
reforming countries, s,ch as China, is that the towns and cities have grown
faster than the countryside. 5,t given the unprecedented poverty reduction
this has entailed in )oth town and co,ntry, can anyone wish that this development
had never happenedW 'econd the allegation of increased ine9uality is
0ust wrong" #he notion that +lo)al ine9uality has increased is lar+ely based on
the fgures from the &; Development *rogram, in partic,lar its 2uman De"elopment
report *rom 1&&&. /ut the problem with these fgures is that they are not
ad0usted for purchasing power" 4hat is, the .FC7 n,m)ers dont taBe into acco,nt what people
can act,ally ),y with their money. <itho,t that ad?,stment the 8+,res mainly show the le-el o* a co,ntrys
o6cial e@chan+e rate and what its c,rrency is worth on the international, marBet, which is a poor yardsticB o*
po-erty. 7oor peoples act,al li-in+ standard, needless to say, hin+es *ar more on the cost o* their *ood, clothin+,
and ho,sin+ than on what they wo,ld +et *or their money when -acationin+ in E,rope. 4he odd thin+ is that the
.FC7 itsel* ,ses p,rchasin+ powerNad?,sted 8+,res in its V,man Ce-elopment (nde@ (VC(', which is its ,ni-ersal
yardsticB o* li-in+ standards. (t only resorts to the ,nad?,sted 8+,res in order to pro-e a thesis o* ineT,ality. A
report from the ;orwegian Institute for Aoreign A$airs investigated global
ine9uality by means of fgures ad0usted for purchasing power" #heir data
show that contrary to the conventional wisdom ine9uality between
countries has been continuously declining e-er since the end o* the 1&%0s. 4his decline was
especially rapid )etween 1&&# and 1&&=, when +lo)ali>ation really +athered speed.22 Aore recently, similar
research by Columbia &niversity development economist Xa-ier /ala$i$Aartin has
confrmed those fndings. <hen the .FC7s own n,m)ers are ad?,sted *or p,rchasin+ power, /ala$i$
Aartin *o,nd that world ineT,ality declined sharply )y any o* the common ways o* meas,rin+ it.2# 5halla and /ala$
i$Aartin also independently *o,nd that i* we *oc,s on ineT,ality )etween persons, rather than ineT,ality )etween
co,ntries, +lo)al ineT,ality at the end o* 2000 was at its lowest point since the end o* <orld <ar ((. :stimates
that compare countries rather than individuals, as )oth a,thors note, grossly
overestimate real ine9uality )eca,se they allow +ains *or h,+e n,m)ers o* people to )e o,twei+hed
)y compara)le losses *or *ar *ewer. Co,ntry a++re+ates treat China and 2renada as data points o* eT,al wei+ht,
e-en tho,+h Chinas pop,lation is 12,000 times 2renadas. -nce we shift our focus to people
rather than nations the evidence is overwhelming that the past G< years
have witnessed a global e9uali>ation.24 Comparin+ ?,st the richest and poorest tenths,
ineT,ality has increased, s,++estin+ that a small +ro,p has la++ed )ehind (we shall )e ret,rnin+ to see which
co,ntries and why', ),t a st,dy o* all co,ntries clearly points to a +eneral +rowth o* eT,ality. (*, *or e@ample, we
compare the richest and poorest 8*th or the richest and poorest third, we 8nd the diferences diminishin+.
4istory proves capitalism is driving force in reducing ine9uality
/ernstein ? Jsenior writer *or the ;yn Uand (nstit,te, J,ne 1E, 200E L;ndrew, Capitalism 3s the Cure for
4frica5s Problems, http://www.aim.or+/+,est$col,mn/capitalism$is$the$c,re$*or$a*ricas$pro)lems/M'
4he <est sho,ld re?ect the idea that it is o,r responsi)ility to li*t ;*ricans o,t o*
their po-erty$$and then tell them o* the system that ena)led the <est to +ain its c,rrent wealth and power:
capitalism. Aost people *or+et that pre$ind,strial E,rope was -astly poorer than
contemporary ;*rica and had a m,ch lower li*e e@pectancy. E-en a relati-ely well$of co,ntry liBe 9rance
is estimated to ha-e s,fered se-en +eneral *amines in the 1Eth cent,ry, thirteen in the 1Qth, ele-en in the 1%th
and si@teen in the 1=th. ;nd disease was rampant. 2i-en an ,tter lacB o* sanitation, the ),)onic pla+,e, typh,s and
other diseases rec,rred incessantly into the 1=th cent,ry, Billin+ tens, sometimes h,ndreds o* tho,sands at a time.
4he efect on li*e e@pectancy was predicta)le. (n parts o* 9rance, in the middle o* the 1%th cent,ry, only E= percent
reached their 1Eth )irthday, and li*e e@pectancy was 20. (n (reland, li*e e@pectancy in 1=00 was a mere 1& years. (n
early 1=th cent,ry Sondon, more than %4 percent o* the children died )e*ore reachin+ a+e 8-e. 4hen a dramatic
chan+e occ,rred thro,+ho,t E,rope. 4he pop,lation o* En+land do,)led )etween 1%E0 and 1=20, with childhood
mortality droppin+ to #1.= percent )y 1=#0. /omethin+ happened that ena)led people to
stay ali-e. <hat did that early period lacB that the later period had Capitalism. <hat does
;*rica lacB today that the <est has Capitalism (or, more acc,rately, partial capitalism'. <hat is capitalism (t
is an economic system in which all property is pri-ately owned, a system witho,t +o-ernment re+,lation and
+o-ernment hando,ts. (t is a *ree economy, a system in which indi-id,als are *ree to prod,ce, to trade, and to
maBe$$and Beep$$a pro8t. Aore *,ndamentally, capitalism is the social system that ,pholds indi-id,al ri+hts, the
ri+ht o* e-ery indi-id,al to his li*e, his li)erty, his property, and the p,rs,it o* his own happiness. 4he thinBers
o* the Enli+htenmen t, incl,din+ John SocBe and the 9o,ndin+ 9athers, )ro,+ht these ideas to
the *ore*ront in E,rope and ;merica. 4he res,lt was an economic re-ol,tion,
which$$in a relati-ely )rie* time$$trans*ormed the <est *rom a po-erty$stricBen re+ion
to one o* +reat prod,cti-e wealth. 4his system o* *reedom li)erated the most
creati-e minds o* <estern society, res,ltin+ in a torrent o* inno-ations$$*rom James <atts
steam en+ine to So,is 7aste,rs +erm theory to Venry 9ords a,tomo)ile to the <ri+ht 5rothers airplane and m,ch
more. 4his new *reedom, and the (nd,strial Ue-ol,tion it spawned, res,lted in
-ast increases in a+ric,lt,ral and ind,strial prod,ction. Creati-e minds$$*rom 4homas
Edison to /te-e Jo)s$$Oo,rish only ,nder *reedom. 4he res,lt is new prod,cts, new ?o)s, new
wealth, in short: the *,rtherance o* li*e on earth, in len+th, T,antity and T,ality.
Cap guarantees better standard of living than any alternative
/os!in ++ (senior *ellow at the Voo-er (nstit,tion and the 4. A. 9riedman 7ro*essor o* Economics at /tan*ord
.ni-ersity, 1&&& LAichael J., Capitalism and 3ts Discontents, http://www.hoo-er.or+/p,)lications/epp/2=4Q011.html
show"essayM'
Aany o* ,s are too yo,n+ to ha-e Bnown *rom personal e@perience ),t recall, *rom what we were ta,+ht and what
we read, that, in the 2reat Cepression o* the 1&#0s, a lar+e n,m)er o* intellect,als and others in <estern E,rope
and Forth ;merica t,rned to comm,nism or at least lent it a sympathetic ear, +i-en the horri)le destit,tion o* that
period. ((n the .nited /tates, real +ross domestic prod,ct *ell )y one$third *rom 1&2& to 1&## and the
,nemployment rate reached almost 2E percent.' Aany writers had emphasi>ed )ooms and ),sts in economic
systems or economic history. 4hese were not, o* co,rse, con8ned to the post$(nd,strial Ue-ol,tion capitalist marBet
economies. (n earlier times, a )ad a+ric,lt,ral har-est co,ld de-astate a co,ntry
operatin+ ,nder a monarchy or *e,dal system. 5,t Aar@, and others, had preached the collapse o* capitalism
and its tendency to e@acer)ate )ooms and ),sts. <hether it is the case that an economic
system that leads to s,)stantial economic pro+ress is more s,)?ect to
episodic downt,rns than those that do not is an open T,estion, ),t ( Bnow o* no con-incin+
st,dy that s,++ests this is more liBely in a modern mi@ed capitalist economy than in
other economic systems. 5,t the long%run improvement in the standards of
living of large segments of the worldFs population has been greatest
in the capitalist era, as has the correlated e-ol,tion o* personal *reedom. 4here has ne-er
)een a period in h,man history that e-en remotely compares to the tremendo,s
+rowth in material wealth and personal *reedom in the period since /mith wrote The Wealth of
6ations (see C. Sandes 1&&='. 4o )e s,re, lar+e se+ments o* manBind were le*t )ehind, )oth economically and
politically. ;s a +ross historical +enerali>ation, they were in societies that lacBed )oth economic and political
*reedoms and competition. ;ltho,+h the capitalist economies ha-e wide dispersions in the distri),tion o*
cons,mption, the a-era+e poor *amily in the .nited /tates has a standard o*
li-in+ well )eyond that o* the a-era+e U,ssian *amily, *or e@ample, and a)o-e that o* the
a-era+e ;merican *amily o* a co,ple o* +enerations a+o.(2' ;nd the most entrenched po-erty in the
;merican economy occ,rs in pocBets o* a T,asi$socialist economy, with little competition,
pri-ate capital, or pri-ate incenti-es, s,ch as inner$city p,)lic ho,sin+ and schools.
Qlobal poverty decreasingDcap is the root cause
/al!o O (Uadley senior editor at Ueason ma+a>ine. 7re-io,sly, he was a policy analyst *or the Cato (nstit,te,
speciali>in+ in -ice and ci-il li)erties iss,esM (Jcto)er 20, 2002' Capitalism \ey to Endin+ 7o-erty
(http://www.capma+.com/article.asp(C"1&=1'
<orld po-erty is down. ;nd the reasons *or all o* this are, to the protestersK cha+rin,
none other than capitalism, +lo)ali>ation, and *ree trade. 4he 8rst st,dy is the 2002
edition o* the .nited FationsK ann,al PV,man Ce-elopment Ueport.P 4he report
in*orms ,s that as o* 2002, 140 o* the worldKs 200 co,ntries $$ %0 percent $$ now
hold m,lti$party elections. Ei+hty$two co,ntries representin+ E% percent o* the
h,man pop,lation are *,lly democratic, the hi+hest percenta+e in h,man history.
;*ter a cent,ry in which totalitarianism $$ Fa>ism, *ascism and comm,nism $$ Billed
more than 1%0 million people, a clear mo-e toward ,ni-ersal political *reedom is
a*oot. 4he n,m)ers on world economics are +ood, too. <orld po-erty *ell more than 20 percent
)etween 1&&0 and 1&&&, a decade o* a++ressi-e +lo)ali>ation. 4he n,m)er o* world (nternet
,sers is e@pected to do,)le )y 200E to one )illion. (n those re+ions o* the world most sympathetic to li)eral re*orm,
the news is e-en )etter. (n ten years, po-erty hal-ed in in East ;sia and the 7aci8c re+ions. /ince 1&&0, =00
million people ha-e +ained new access to impro-ed water s,pplies, and %E0 million
to impro-ed sanitation. (n the last #0 years, in*ant mortality rates ha-e dropped
*rom &Q deaths per 1,000 li-e )irths to ?,st EQ . ; st,dy *rom the (nstit,te *or (nternational /t,dies
)oasts e-en more +ood news. 4he a,thor o* that st,dy, /,r?it /. 5halla, employed acco,ntin+ statistics )ased on
indi-id,al incomes instead o* national incomes, which allowed him to more acc,rately meas,re wealth and po-erty
rates. 5halla concl,des that the world po-erty rate has declined e-en more dramatically than the ..F. reports, *rom
44 percent in 1&=0 to ?,st 1# percent in 2000. 5halla attri),tes the decline to pro+ress in China and (ndia, the two
most pop,lo,s nations in the world, and two nations that ha-e made si+ni8cant mo-es toward more economic
*reedom in the last 20 years. 5,t not all the news is +ood . V,+e swaths o* h,manity still *ester in
a)?ect po-erty. Fot s,rprisin+ly, the re+ions witnessin+ the most po-erty also
happen to ho,se those c,lt,res and re+imes most a-erse to marBets and capitalism
$$ s,)$/aharan ;*rica and the ;ra) world.
CichT*oor gap reduced by capitalism
/utters S, (;ssistant 7ro*essor o* Economics at .ni-ersity o* Fe)rasBa I Sincoln, 200% LUo+er, Teaching the
7ene8ts of Capitalism, http://www.hillsdale.ed,/ima+es/,ser(ma+es/a*olsom/7a+e!Q2=1/5,tters.pd*M'
; common response to the traditional presentation o* economic +rowth )e+innin+ with the (nd,strial
Ue-ol,tion and res,ltin+ *rom capitalism is that it is a E,rogcentric interpretation o* history, and that the
wealth was not so m,ch created as trans*erred as lar+e colonial powers har-ested reso,rces
and la)or witho,t re+ard to the wel*are o* the indi+eno,s pop,lations. 4his *ollows the
)asic 0di-ided pie1 e@planation o* prod,ction and distri),tion where it is ass,med that there
are a 8@ed n,m)er o* reso,rces prod,cin+ a 8@ed le-el o* o,tp,tZ i* one indi-id,al or +ro,p is
wealthier than another, it is )eca,se they were a)le to car-e o,t a lar+er slice o*
the 8@ed pie to the detriment o* others. 4his interpretation o* how wealth is created completely i+nores the
ad-ances in prod,cti-e capacity )ro,+ht on )y competiti-e marBets and inno-ation.
(t ass,mes a statist -iew and has dri-en the pop,lar panics s,rro,ndin+ reso,rces since the time o* Aalth,s. Aore
dama+in+ly, it i+nores )asic data and presents a )arrier to ,nderstandin+ the nat,re o*
modern economic +rowth. /imply p,t, ;*rica is poor not )eca,se E,rope is rich, ),t
)eca,se ;*rica has always )een poor and )eca,se E,rope adopted a recipe *or
creatin+ wealth. ;nother pro)lem with the 0colonial e@ploitation1 -iew o* economic +rowth is that it *ails to
e@plain the e@periences o* the .nited /tates (a colony', ;,stralia (a penal colony', or Von+
\on+ (a colony', to mention a *ew. ; )etter e@planation is that the colonial masters )ro,+ht with them social
instit,tions that laid the *o,ndations *or s,stained economic +rowth. <ithingco,ntry e@amples also a)o,nd. (t is
important to remem)er that e-ery co,ntry mentioned in this paper was a third world co,ntry in 1Q00. Aodern,
de-eloped co,ntries did not )ecome rich )y maBin+ others poorZ they merely adopted social
instit,tions that promoted +rowth and were s,)seT,ently a)le to a)andon the
impo-erished norm o* h,man e@istence. ; second response to the e@planations o* economic +rowth
in-aria)ly re-ol-es aro,nd the a-aila)ility o* nat,ral reso,rces that can )e ,sed in the prod,cti-e process. Aany
te@t)ooBs point to the -ast nat,ral reso,rces made a-aila)le to the .nited /tates in its western e@pansion or the
wholesale import o* reso,rces *rom colonies and *orei+n possessions. ;s with other e@planations this one can also
)e a)andoned. (ndeed, in many respects the presence o* -ast nat,ral reso,rces seems to )e a hindrance to
s,stained +rowth, not a )ene8t. Consider *or e@ample Von+ \on+. Von+ \on+ is a nation with *ew i* any nat,ral
reso,rces and yet it commands a stron+ presence on the world sta+e as a de-eloped co,ntry (now a /pecial
;dministrati-e Ue+ion o* China'. ;s a 5ritish colony, Von+ \on+ was pro-ided with stron+ social instit,tions,
property ri+hts were de8ned and en*orced, the r,le o* law was esta)lished, competition was *ostered and
,n*ettered, entreprene,rs were enco,ra+ed and as a res,lt Von+ \on+ di-er+ed dramatically *rom the 7eoples
Uep,)lic o* China: ;ll witho,t the )ene8t o* nat,ral reso,rces. (ndeed, Von+ \on+s wealth was the res,lt o* trade in
the sin+le nat,ral reso,rce it hadNits social instit,tions. 9,rther e@amples incl,de /in+apore, Japan, S,@em),r+ and
/wit>erland. SiBewise consider the many co,ntries that possess tremendo,s nat,ral
wealth ),t are ,na)le to de-elop economically. 7oorly de8ned property ri+hts, the
lacB o* a *,nctional le+al system or the centrali>ed ownership o* the reso,rces )y
the p,)lic sector are the o)-io,s c,lprits.
*roliferation
*roliferation is slow
Qray O! (Colin, pro*, http://*ds.o,p.com/www.o,p.com/pd*/1#/&%=01&=2&Q24&.pd*, da:%$Q$2011, lido'
4he n,m)ers o* n,clear$weapon, and n,clear$threshold, states, remain m,ch lower than proli*eration pessimists
were predictin+ in the 1&E0s and 1&Q0s. 4here is no T,estion ),t that the pace of proliferation
has been slow and at present shows no thoroughly convincing signs
of a prospect for other than a distinctly steady acceleration" /ut this
trend if that is what it is of a deliberate pace in proliferation is
vulnerable to nuclear learning from any crisis anywhere that seems
to demonstrate a strategic necessity for nuclear arms" 4he trend that has
prod,ced only 8-e F74$licensed n,clear$weapon statesNwhich happen to )e the 9i-e 7ermanent Aem)ers o* the
.F /ec,rity Co,ncilNthree ,nlicensed n,clear$weapon states ((srael, (ndia, 7aBistan', at least one near$n,clear$
weapon threshold state (Forth \orea', and three wo,ld$)e n,clear$weapon states ((raT, (ran, Si)ya', is indeed
impressi-e. Also it is impressive that inter alia 'weden 'wit>erland
2apan Argentina /ra>il :gypt and #aiwan have stepped bac! from
active pursuit of the military nuclear option" Aore noteworthy still was the
ren,nciation in 1&&0 o* act,al, as opposed to -irt,al, n,clear weapons )y a /o,th ;*rica whose internal and
e@ternal sec,rity condition has )een trans*ormed )y and lar+e *or the )etter, and )y the distinctly insec,re e@tra$
U,ssian le+atees o* part o* the erstwhile /o-iet n,clear arsenal.
;o mass prolif countries give up
#epperman + (Jonathon, staf, dw: =$2&$200&, da: %$=$2011, http://www.newsweeB.com/200&/0=/2=/why$
o)ama$sho,ld$learn$to$lo-e$the$)om).html, lido'
4he risB o* an arms raceNwith, say, other 7ersian 2,l* states r,shin+ to ),ild a )om) a*ter (ran +ot oneNis a )it
harder to dispel. Jnce a+ain, howe-er, history is instr,cti-e. PIn MR years the most nuclear%
weapons states weFve ever had is 1OP says <alt>. PFow with Forth \orea weKre at nine.
4hatKs not proli*erationZ thatKs spread at +lacial pace.P ;uclear weapons are so
controversial and e(pensive that only countries that deem them
absolutely critical to their survival go through the e(treme trouble
of ac9uiring them" #hatFs why 'outh Africa &!raine /elarus and
Va>a!hstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early F+<s and why
other countries li!e /ra>il and Argentina dropped nascent programs"
4his doesnKt +,arantee that one or more o* (ranKs nei+h)orsNE+ypt or /a,di ;ra)ia, sayNmi+ht not still +o *or the
)om) i* (ran mana+es to ),ild one. /ut the ris!s of a rapid spread are low
especially given 'ecretary of 'tate 4illary ClintonFs recent
suggestion that the &nited 'tates would e(tend a nuclear umbrella
over the region as Washington has over 'outh Vorea and 2apan if
Iran does complete a bomb" If one or two Qulf states nonetheless
decided to pursue their own weapon that still might not be so
disastrous given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior"
Deterrence and security chec! accidents
Walt> O! (\enneth, pro*, http://www.ciaonet.or+/ol?/+?ia/+?ia!winspr00*.html, dw: /prin+ 2000, da: %$=$2011,
lido'
( thinB lar+e n,m)ers o* weapons wo,ld raise that concern. 5,t I thin! we can rely on their
selfinterest and their ingenuity to prevent accidents" :very country
goes through a period where it has relatively crude weapons
although relatively crude weapons are not as crude as they used to
be and where they have small numbers and where there are some
9uestions of vulnerability" /ut we have managed to get through
those periods" 4he only striBes we-e had ha-e )een at n,clear *acilities )e*ore any warheads were
prod,ced, with no attacBs where there were e@istin+ warheads and *or +ood reason: Ceterrence worBs.
;o accidents will happen from prolif
lido)
/ome proli*eration optimists concede the crisis$sta)ility dan+ers posed )y emer+in+ n,clear arsenals, ),t
contend that s,ch dan+ers are transitory as post,res de-elop in si>e and sophistication, and can )e
alle-iated e-en more T,icBly )y the trans*er o* command and control technolo+y *rom esta)lished n,clear
powers to newer ones. <hile /rito and Intriligator see the pro+ressi-e increase in the n,m)er
o* n,clear powers as a *actor o* sta)ility, they also admit that proli*eration increases the statistical pro)a)ility o*
accidental war )eca,se newer n,clear powers will )e less a)le to de-elop adeT,ate technical sa*e$
+,ards a+ainst accidental or ,na,thori>ed ,se. 4hey, howe-er, -iew this pro)lem as Ha relatively
FlowF%probability event.P%4 /ut the resource limitations faced by
#hird World states ma!e it 9uestionable whether postures will
evolve 9uic!ly or dramatically.%E #hey lac! both the wherewithal
to e(pand li!e the superpowers and the doctrinal impetus which
in the &"'" case came from e(tended%deterrence commitments
to cover an e(traordinary range of targets under a variety of
circumstances and with a high degree of redundancy. 4he centrality o*
e@tended deterrence in ../. strate+ic policy had two principal efects. 9irst, by tying force
re9uirements in an implicitly open$ended manner to the si>e o* the /o-iet military esta)lishment,
it sanctioned the deployment of an e(tensive number and
variety of nuclear weapons" (t also had the conseT,ence o* rein*orcin+ and rationali>in+
the lon+$standin+ preempti-e imp,lses and emphasis on co,nter*orce tar+etin+ in ../. n,clear plannin+. ;s
one scholar notes, the risB o* preempti-e war in the Cold <ar was a *,nction o* the co,nter*orce doctrines
the s,perpowers *ollowed, and not o* any inherent lo+ic o* n,clear strate+y. P(n this respect, the s,perpower
n,clear arms competition was s,i +eneris: witho,t e@ception, e-ery s,)$s,perpower proli*erant has em)raced
co,nter-al,e, not co,nter*orce, n,clear doctrines.P%Q
;o mass prolif countries dont develop very much
Qavin + (9rancis, pro*, http://www.mitpress?o,rnals.or+/doi/pd*/10.11Q2/isec.2010.#4.#.%, da: %$=$2011, lido'
(n his analysis o* more than si@ty years o* *ailed eforts to acc,rately predict n,clear proli*eration, analyst Aoeed
3,s,* concl,des that 0the pace o* proli*$eration has )een m,ch slower than anticipated )y most.1 #he
ma0ority of countries suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear
weapons capability 5never even came close to crossing the
threshold" In fact most did not even initiate a weapons program") If
all the countries that were considered prime suspects over the past
si(ty years had developed nuclear weapons 5the world would have
at least 1+ nuclear powers today")RR As *otter and .u!hat>hanova
argue government and academic e(perts fre9uently 5e(aggerated
the scope and pace of nuclear weapons proliferation"14E
;o con8ict nucleari>ed rivals create fear within each other
lido)
-ptimists have rela(ed views of the preventive%war dangers
entailed in situations in which a nuclear power confronts a
nucleari>ing rival. 4he practical di6c,lties o* ens,rin+ a disarmin+ striBe to precl,de any possi)ility
o* n,clear retaliation maBe pre-enti-e actions a military +am)le that states are -ery ,nliBely to taBe. ;s
<alt> e@plains, Ppre-ention and pre$emption are di6c,lt +ames )eca,se the costs are so hi+h i* the +ames
are not per*ectly played.... .ltimately, the inhi)itions La+ainst s,ch attacBsM lie in the impossi)ility o*
Bnowin+ *or s,re that a disarmin+ striBe will totally destroy an opposin+ *orce and in the immense
destr,ction e-en a *ew warheads can wreaB.P2E 4o optimists, states will have to learn to
live with a rivalFs emerging nuclear armory /ecause strategic
uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive e$ect
optimists usually view the very increase in the numbers of
nuclear%armed states as an additional element of stability" Ca+o)ert
/rito and Aichael Intriliator, *or instance, argue that uncertainty over the
reaction of other nuclear powers will ma!e all hesitant to stri!e
individually 2Q ;s an e@ample, they point to the restraint the s,perpowers e@ercised on each other
in the 1&Q0s, when 8rst the .nited /tates and then the /o-iet .nion contemplated military action a+ainst
ChinaKs nascent n,clear weapon sites. 4he net efect o* the ,ncertain reaction o* others is that Pthe
pro)a)ility o* deli)erate n,clear attacB *alls to near >ero with three, *o,r, or more n,clear nations.P2%
/imilarly, Walt> reasons that even in cases of asymmetric
proliferation within con8ict dyads nuclear weapons will prove
Hpoor instruments for blac!mailH because a Hcountry that ta!es
the nuclear o$ensive has to fear an appropriately punishing
stri!e by someone. 9ar *rom lowerin+ the e@pected cost o* a++ression, a n,clear ofense e-en
a+ainst a non$n,clear state raises the possi)le costs o* a++ression to incalc,la)le hei+hts )eca,se the
a++ressor cannot )e s,re o* the reaction o* other n,clear powers.P2=
Cussia Celations
Deterrence chec!s &'%Cussia war
.c.ahon +S (/cott, /ec,rity analyst, http://www.*as.or+/news/,sa/1&&%/0#/)md&%0##1d.htm, da: %$&$
2011, lido'
; cooperati-e ../.$U,ssian approach to red,cin+ strate+ic ofensi-e arsenals and deployin+ 5AC systems will
rein*orce peace and strate+ic sta)ility. If a future confrontation nonetheless occurs
it would be unli!ely to escalate as deterrence and crisis stability
would prevailB ;either side could e(pect to launch a successful frst
stri!e using its limited /.D system for protection" In fact even if
the attac!er found its victimFs strategic forces at a peacetime level
of preparedness (a heroically optimistic scenario' and destroyed a large portion of
them the attac!er would still su$er a devastating retaliatory blow"
#his will be the case with the reduced force levels envisioned in the
1++1 and 1++G '#AC# accords and at even lower strategic force
levels"
Deterrence chec!s &'%Cussia con8ict
1antis et al S (Jefrey Santis, 4om /a,er, James <irt>, \eir Sie)er, (nternational /ec,rity, -ol #1, dw:
<inter 200%, da: %$&$2011, lido'
(n 1&%4 /ecretary o* /tate Venry \issin+er T,estioned the principle o* n,clear s,periority: 0<hat in the name o*
2od is strate+ic s,periority <hat is the si+nihcance o* it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these le-els o*
n,m)ers <hat do yo, do with it111 :ven in the e(tremely unli!ely event the
&nited 'tates uses nuclear weapons against Cussia or China
whether either country can retaliate with one fve ten or a hundred
nuclear weapons does not really matter for deterrence calculations"
As advocates of minimum deterrence Jli!e myselfK argue one accurate
and invulnerable nuclear weapon is su$cient as a second%stri!e
force" I can hardly imagine an attac! against vital &"'" interests in
the foreseeable future destructive enough to ris! an assured
nuclear response and the annihilation of one ma0or &"'" city" 4h,s, the
si>e o* the n,clear arsenal does not matter, ,nless one )elie-es that the .nited /tates can en+a+e in a prolon+ed
n,clear war and emer+e -ictorio,s.12 5eca,se a minim,m deterrent is s,*hcient, U,ssia and China need not worry
+reatly a)o,t the e@act nat,re o* the .nited /tates n,clear post,re. (n practice, China can apparently li-e with the
tremendo,s n,clear im)alance that has e@isted since the mid1&Q0s. (t c,rrently possesses =0I1#0 n,clear
weapons, o* which only #0 co,ld )e ,sed on an intercontinental scale.1# /ecause of a lac! of
resources Cussia may have to pursue a similar course over time" In
addition some &"'" e(perts have argued that the security of the
&nited 'tates would be enhanced with a much smaller nuclear
arsenal"1R A decision to shrin! the &"'" arsenal would also
strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime at a time when
many observers believe that it is on the verge of collapse"1?
;o nu!es .oscow only has weapons for deterrence e$ect
//C + (U,ssian commentator -iews reasons *or chan+es to n,clear weapons policy, le@is, dw: 10$2#$200&, da:
%$Q$2011, lido'
;o less curious is the intention to institutionali>e and prescribe the conditions of the employment of
nuclear weapons in regional and local wars" &ntil recently .oscow had stated that
these weapons are political" .oscow said that they e(ist only in
order to deter the possessors of nuclear weapons from war with
each other Jit is no accident that war between the &nited 'tates and the &''C also remained
than!s to you Qod HcoldHK" Aor G< years now it has been considered to be
impossible to win a nuclear war"
Cussia will not attac!
Ariedman and 1ogan + (5en?amin and J,stin, phd and writer, e@pert,
http://www.cato.or+/p,)s/articles/*riedman!lo+an!hittin+stop),ttononnatoe@pansion.pd*, dw: %$Q$2010, da: %$=$
2011, lido'
4his narrati-e is de-oid o* strate+ic lo+ic. 1eaving aside nuclear weapons, which deterrence
renders ,n,sa)le, Cussia is nor a great power and is incapable of
threatening Western :urope let alone the &nited 'tates. 4he World /an!
predicts that CussiaFs economy will shrin! by R"? percent this year,
and its ,nemployment will hit 12 percent. E-en close to the hei+ht o* oil prices, U,ssia possessed a 2C7 only
ro,+hly eT,i-alent co that o* (taly and 7ort,+al com)ined. (ts stocB marBet is down )y mere than hal* since this
time last year. (ts de*ense spendin+ totals a)o,t W%0 )illion ann,ally less than what the ../. spends on de*ense
research and in-estment alonei, tor what remains a second$rate military. #his is a country strong
enough to pummel wea! neighbors li!e Qeorgia but one that
shouldnFt worry :urope which spends roughly four times more"
/alance of power theory tells us that if Cussia grow more
threatening the members of the :uropean &nionNnow collecti-ely richer than
the ../.Nwill respond by investing more on defense than their current
average of O percent of QD* and by further integrating their
military capacity. ;o longer driven by a revolutionary ideology
Cussia also lac!s the 'oviet &nionFs ambitions" 4r,e, U,ssia does not liBe the
democratic +o-ernments on its OanBs in .Braine and 2eor+ia. 5,t that is )eca,se these +o-ernments are p,rs,in+
policies that an+er U,ssia, not )eca,se they are democratic per se. What Cussia wants are
pliant neighbors" #hat desire is typical of relatively powerful statesB
#he long &"'" his tory of violent interventions in 1atin America
undermines whatever lectures we might direct at .oscow"
Cussia doesnt have the incentive to go to war
Ariedman and 1ogan + (5en?amin and J,stin, phd and writer, e@pert,
http://www.cato.or+/p,)s/articles/*riedman!lo+an!hittin+stop),ttononnatoe@pansion.pd*, dw: %$Q$2010, da: %$=$
2011, lido'
Fo lon+er dri-en )y a re-ol,tionary ideolo+y, Cussia also lac!s the 'oviet &nions
ambitions. 4r,e, U,ssia does not liBe the democratic +o-ernments on its OanBs in .Braine and 2eor+ia. 5,t
that is )eca,se these +o-ernments are p,rs,in+ policies that an+er U,ssia, not )eca,se they are democratic per se.
What Cussia wants are pliant neighbors" #hat desire is typical of
relatively powerful statesB #he long &"'" history of violent
interventions in 1atin America undermines whatever lectures we
might direct at .oscow" Fow compare todays sec,rity sit,ation to the one that ca,sed natos
*ormation in 1&4&. #he 'oviets had at least S<<<<< troops deemed capable
of overrunning a Western :urope left vulnerable by bro!en armies
and empty treasuries" :uropean poverty gave .oscow%bac!ed
Communist parties a realistic chance at ta!ing power
democratically" Aearing that the 'oviet &nionDby con9uest or
revolutionDcould sei>e enough of :uropes industrial might to
threaten the &"'" Americans sent aid via the .arshall *lan and
troops via nato" &"'" intervention restored the balance of power
serving its own interests" ;o similar rationale 0ustifes defending
Qeorgia and &!raine" In fact allying with these countries simply
creates defense liabilities for nato members. ;lliances are not *ree. Credi)le de*ense
commitments reT,ire spendin+ and troops, partic,larly to de*end lon+ )orders liBe .Braines. <ith m,ch o* natos
manpower tied down in (raT and ;*+hanistan, new commitments may reT,ire new recr,its, an e@pensi-e
proposition in an era when the cost o* military manpower is T,icBly appreciatin+. 4hese are precisely the sorts o*
allies a pr,dent s,perpower wo,ld a-oid. 4hey ofer *ew )ene8ts, and come carryin+ pre$e@istin+ territorial conOicts
with a stron+er nei+h)or. .Braine appears to )e li-in+ ,p to its rep,tation *or political insta)ility, dan+ero,sly
-er+in+ on the precipice o* collapse in the waBe o* the +lo)al 8nancial meltdown. Aoreo-er, a recent poll indicated
that Q# percent o* .Brainians do not e-en want nato mem)ership. 2eor+ia c,rrently has U,ssian troops on its
territory and is r,n )y a leader with a demonstrated capacity *or recBlessness. nato )acBin+ will only enco,ra+e
him.
;o war Cussia understands potential economic harm
/ush , J2ason sta$
http://www.),sinessweeB.com/+lo)al)i>/)lo+/e,ropeinsi+ht/archi-es/200=/0=/the!new!cold!war.html, dw: =$22$
200=, da: %$&$2011, lido'
#he biggest loser from a prolonged cool%o$ will be Cussia though"
-ne interesting angle of the Qeorgian crisis is the negative impact
on the Cussian economy. (n the days a*ter the o,t)reaB o* war, the stoc! mar!et and
even the rouble plunged and Cussian ban!s found it harder to get
credit lines abroad. 4his shows how *ar the new +lo)ali>ed U,ssia depends economically on the o,tside
world. 4his economic dependence increases the <estKs options, ),t also means that the <est doesnt necessarily
need to taBe stron+$arm meas,res to restrain the U,ssians. 4he dan+er is that the <est will now o-er$react,
p,nishin+ U,ssia ,nnecessarily )eca,se o* the o-er)lown *ears and simplistic analysis o* the n,mero,s Cold
<arriors )acB home.
;o war Diplomacy chec!s
/ush , (Jason, staff,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europeinsight/archives/2008/08/thenewcol!war.html, !w: 8"22"2008, !a:
#"$"20%%, li!o&
;mid the ?,mpy hysteria o* recent days, many people in the West have assumed
that 9uiet diplomacy is powerless" #his isnFt true howe-er, as the
Arench%bro!ered peace plan showed. Aor diplomacy to be e$ective
tho,+h, the West has to be seen as an honest bro!er. (nstead o* that, we ha-e
typically seen Bnee$?erB s,pport *or 2eor+ia, and the ,s,al anti$U,ssian stereotypes. .n*ort,nately, there
appear to be plenty of people in the West who are now arguing for
a new Cold War" #hey have fallen into the trap of believing that
*utin is the new 4itler and Qeorgia the new C>echoslova!ia so
5the West must ma!e a stand)" (n efect, these people are ar+,in+ *or a c,re that is
act,ally a lot worse than the disease.
;o scenario for any conventional war going nuclear
.anning O! LUo)ert, 9ormer C.R. /tarr /enior 9ellow *or ;sia /t,dies, and Cirector, ;sia /t,dies, Co,ncil on
9orei+n Uelations, ;))ott and Costello n,clear policy, Aarch 10, 2000, 4he <ashin+ton 7ost,
http://www.washin+tontimes.com/news/2000/mar/10/20000#10$011011$EE&#r/print/M
<e donKt want to +o any lower )eca,se we need these weapons *or n,clear deterrence, accordin+ to /tate
Cepartment spoBesman James U,)in. 5,t how many n,Bes do we need *or deterrence to )e credi)le China, which
7resident Clinton has talBed o* as a Pstrate+ic partner,P has a +rand total o* 20 $ co,nt them $ strate+ic warheads
that co,ld hit the .nited /tates. F,clear wanna)es liBe Forth \orea, (ran, and (raT wo,ld ha-e only a hand*,l i* they
did mana+e to s,cceed in ?oinin+ the n,clear cl,). U,ssia, which has Q,000 strate+ic warheads, is no lon+er an
ad-ersary. During the Cold War it was not hard to envision a conventional war
in :urope escalating into n,clear conOict. /ut today it is di@cult to spin a
plausible scenario in which the &nited 'tates and Cussia escalate hostilities
into a nuclear e(change" Cussia has no Warsaw *act and not much of a
conventional force to speaB o*. 3et ../. n,clear planners still )ase their tar+etin+ plans on prospecti-e
U,ssian tar+ets, tho,+h no one will say so.
Cussia cant be a great power in the short term which
precludes it having a large role in international problem%
solving
Cumer and Wallander G LE,+ene 5., U,mer, senior *ellow at the (nstit,te *or Fational /trate+ic
/t,dies at the Fational Ce*ense .ni-ersity, and Celeste ;. <allander, director o* the U,ssia and E,rasia 7ro+ram
and the 4r,stee 9ellow at C/(/, <inter 200#, 4he <ashin+ton :,arterlyM
#he internal political economic societal and defense challenges with
which the Cussian leadership continues to struggle will preclude Cussia from
achieving great%power status in the near *,t,re. 4his reality has pro*o,nd implications *or ../.
policy and e@pectations that U,ssia can )e a partner that can and will help the .nited /tates sho,lder the ),rdens
o* the international system. CussiaFs internal trends suggest that it is unli!ely to
bring to the international table the !ind of resources and reliability needed to
ta!e a leading role in solving comple( global problems and threats.
Cussia doesnt have the capacity to a$ect anything signifcant"
Cumer and Wallander G LE,+ene 5., U,mer, senior *ellow at the (nstit,te *or Fational /trate+ic
/t,dies at the Fational Ce*ense .ni-ersity, and Celeste ;. <allander, director o* the U,ssia and E,rasia 7ro+ram
and the 4r,stee 9ellow at C/(/, <inter 200#, 4he <ashin+ton :,arterlyM
A loo! beneath the veneer of upbeat a++re+ate statistics and diplomatic photo$ops
suggests that a large gap e(ists between Cussian aspirations and images, on
one hand, and the U,ssian ability to be one of the ma0or pillars of the
international system, on the other. Despite se-eral years o* economic growth and a new
dynamic leader, Cussia remains a power in decline" ;either its recent economic
success nor its -i+oro,s leadership is su@cient to ma!e up for the long%term
losses the country has su$ered or to compensate *or the contemporary shortcomin+s that )elie
Bey elements o* U,ssian power. 4hese shortcomings will inevitably taint CussiaFs ability
to help solve the most cr,cial global problems to cooperate with other +reat powers, to impro-e
+lo)al sec,rity and economic well$)ein+, and to pro-e a relia)le partner.
'pace War
Cussia and China are wor!ing towards space weaponi>ation
prevention
'u 1< (/ilB Uoad (nstit,te o* (nternational Saw and the Sa,terpacht Centre *or (nternational Saw
/cience Cirect, 04he 0peace*,l p,rposes1 principle in o,ter space and the U,ssiaIChina 77<4 7roposal,1 4/=/2010,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii//02QE&Q4Q1000024X LSocBwoodM
:arly calls for preventing space weaponi>ation and an arms race date bac!
to the early 1+,<s" (n 1&=1 the .//U introd,ced the topic o* the pre-ention o* an arms race in o,ter
space into the a+enda o* the #Qth 2eneral ;ssem)ly,#= and also s,)mitted to the .nited Fations a GCra*t 4reaty on
the 7rohi)ition o* the /tationin+ o* <eapons o* any \ind in J,ter /pace.#& 4he proposal was considered )y the ./;
as ins,6cient *or the +oal o* a peace*,l world, partic,larly since it seemed desi+ned to accord the .//U with
special )ene8ts as a res,lt o* its anti$satellite (;/;4' worB.40 In recent years China has played
an increasingly active role in international a$airs, with its worB on pre-ention o* space
weaponi>ation and an arms race )ein+ one e@ample" China is wor!ing with Cussia in the CD
to promote a weapons%free outer space" (ts earliest efort in this *or,m dates )acB to a speech
)y :ian Jiadon+ in 1&=Q, callin+ *or the ne+otiation o* an international a+reement on a complete prohi)ition o*
space weapons.41 ; compilation o* comments and s,++estions made )y mem)er states and o)ser-er dele+ations
to the CC, the .nited Fations (nstit,te *or Cisarmament Uesearch (.F(C(U' and the <eapons o* Aass Cestr,ction
(<AC' Commission re-eals that CussiaFs and ChinaFs e$orts are widely appreciated
and the draft treaty is regarded as a good starting point for a new
international convention on prohibiting space weaponi>ation"RO /ome
commentators consider it 0the most promisin+ proposal to 8ll the normati-e -oid in the c,rrent space sec,rity
treaty re+ime1, 0the most hi+hly str,ct,red state$ori+inatin+ proposal that has )een introd,ced in the CC with the
aim o* pre-entin+ the weaponi>ation o* space1 and 0a ),ildin+ )locB in a )roader space sec,rity le+al re+ime1.4#
CritiT,es ha-e )een presented as well. ;shley J. 4ellis, a senior associate at the Carne+ie Endowment *or
(nternational 7eace, writes that the 77<4 0wo,ld neither efecti-ely prohi)it LtheM deployment Lo* weaponsM, nor
concl,si-ely ann,l the threat o* *orce a+ainst space o)?ects1 and that it 0wo,ld only prod,ce the ill,sion o* sec,rity,
while doin+ nothin+ to eliminate the co,nter$space capa)ilities c,rrently present in many co,ntries1.44 4he 5,sh
administration tended to ne+lect the 77<4 initially, ),t has responded to it on se-eral occasions, mainly in the CC
and the 2eneral ;ssem)ly 9irst Committee. J* most rele-ance is an o6cial response entitled 0;nalysis o* a Cra*t
4reaty on 7re-ention o* the 7lacement o* <eapons in J,ter /pace, or the 4hreat or .se o* 9orce a+ainst J,ter
/pace J)?ects1 s,)mitted )y Christina 5. Uocca, the permanent representati-e o* the ./; to the CC, on 2Q ;,+,st
200=.4E 4he -bama administration seems li!ely to move toward a more multilateral
approach to &' space policy" 5,t a m,ltilateral approach does not eliminate disa+reements in
s,)stance, which are reOected in the responses *rom the 5,sh administration.
A'A# prevent 'pace War
/la>e0ews!i <, (\enneth /la>e0ews!i pri-ate practice in Few 3orB City, *oc,sin+ primarily on
international corporate and 8nancial transactions, JC *rom F3. Saw, O<<,. 0/pace <eaponi>ation and ./ China
Uelations,1 http://www.a,.a*.mil/a,/ssT/200=//prin+/)la>e?ewsBi.pd*'
Jn this acco,nt, Chinas primary concern with ./ space weaponi>a$ tion is its contri),tion to a ./ m,ltilayered
missile de*ense shield. (n$ deed, Chinas campai+n *or 7;UJ/ ne+otiation at the CC seems to inten$ si*y a*ter each
new de-elopment in .nited /tates 5AC plans.20 ;ltho,+h China co,ld respond to a 5AC shield with efecti-e
co,ntermeas,res,21 *,t,re technolo+ical de-elopments may permit the 5AC system to -iti$ ate Chinas n,clear
deterrent.22 (n the case o* a conOict o-er 4aiwan, *or e@ample, a ./ space$)ased 5AC system co,ld pro-e -ery
-al,a)le to the .nited 'tates" According to this view if the &nited 'tates decides to
advance with such a /.D program China will respond so as to main% tain its
nuclear deterrence" It will moderni>e its IC/. 8eet Ja program it has already
initiatedK develop further countermeasures to circumvent the /.D shield and
develop the means to launch multiple A'A# attac!s" &ltimately an arms race
could ensue" #his however would not be Chinas chosen outcome" Its
development of space weapons is merely a counter% strategy to
what it views as li!ely &' space weaponi>ation" OG China would much
prefer that the &nited 'tates negotiate a *AC-' agreement not to
build the /.D shield"OR If this were the case Chinas 2anuary A'A# test would
appear to be an attempt to get the &nited 'tates to the negotiating
table" /y launching the A'A# China sought to put the &nited 'tates
on notice that any attempt to weaponi>e outer space would lead to
this mutu% ally undesirable path"
#he 5space sanctuary) idea is an irrational cold war relic %
space is already being weaponi>ed
Dolman 11 J7hC and 7ro*essor o* Comparati-e Ailitary /t,dies, and Cooper, 9ormer Cep,ty o* the CJCs
/trate+ic and /pace /ystems, 11 (E-erett, 7hC and 7ro*essor o* Comparati-e Ailitary /t,dies Y ./ ;ir 9orce /chool
o* ;d-anced ;ir and /pace /t,dies and Uecipient o* Central (ntelli+ences J,tstandin+ (ntelli+ence ;nalyst ;ward,
and Venry, 9ormer Cep,ty *or the /trate+ic and /pace /ystems o* the CJC and Chairman o* Vi+h 9rontier, a non$
pro8t or+ani>ation st,dyin+ iss,es o* missile de*ense and space, 0Chapter 1&: (ncreasin+ the Ailitary .ses o*
/pace,1 7art o* 04oward a 4heory o* /pacepower,1 Edited )y Charles S,tes and 7eter Vays, Fational Ce*ense
.ni-ersity 7ress, http://www.nd,.ed,/press/li)/pd*/spacepower/spacepower.pd*,'
(n this chapter, we maBe the case that opposition to increasin+ the militari>ation and
weaponi>ation o* space is a misapplied le+acy o* the Cold <ar and that
dramatic policy shi*ts are necessary to *ree the scienti8c, academic, and
military comm,nities to de-elop and deploy an optim,m array o* space
capa)ilities, incl,din+ weapons in space, e-ent,ally ,nder the control o* a ../.
/pace 9orce. Creatin+ the Ayth o* /pace /anct,ary C,rin+ <orld <ar ((N)e*ore the ad-ent o* the atomic
)om) or intercontinental )allistic missiles ((C5As'Nthe Chie* o* the ../. ;rmy ;ir Corps, 2eneral PVapP ;rnold, had
a prescient -iew o* the *,t,re: /omeday, not too distantZ there can come streaBin+ o,t o* somewhere (we wonKt )e
a)le to hear it, it will come so *ast' some Bind o* +ad+et with an e@plosi-e so power*,l that one pro?ectile will )e
a)le to wipe o,t completely this city o* <ashin+ton. . . . ( thinB we will meet the attacB alri+ht LsicM and, o* co,rse, in
the air. 5,t (Kll tell yo, one thin+, there wonKt )e a +oddam pilot in the sByi 4hat attacB will )e met )y machines
+,ided not )y h,man )rains, ),t )y de-ices con?,red ,p )y h,man )rains. <ithin a)o,t 1E years o* ;rnoldKs
comments, /o-iet (C5As armed with n,clear warheads did indeed ha-e the a)ility to threaten <ashin+ton, ),t o-er
40 years later, ;mericaKs a)ility to relia)ly de*end itsel* *rom (C5As remains minimalNd,e not to technolo+y
limitations ),t to lon+$standin+ policy and political constraints. 4o ,nderstand the passion o* the
c,rrent opposition to space weapons, one m,st looB into the *,ndamental iss,e o*
the Cold <ar: n,clear weapons deployed at a scale to threaten the e@istence
o* all li*e on the planet. 4he specter o* potential n,clear de-astation was so
horrendo,s that a neo$ideal o* a world witho,t war )ecame a political
imperati-e. Son+standin+ realist pre*erence *or peace thro,+h stren+th was
stymied )y the in-,lnera)ility o* )allistic missiles tra-elin+ at s,)or)ital -elocities. 4h,s,
;merica accepted a policy o* ass,red and m,t,al destr,ction to deter its opponents in a horri)le (i* efecti-e'
)alance o* terror. 4his meant it )ecame politically in*easi)le e-en to contemplate
shootin+ down missiles aimed at ;merica or its alliesN especially *rom
machines in space that mi+ht pro-e so e6cient as to *orce an opponent to
striBe while it co,ld, )e*ore s,ch a system )ecame operational. <ith the co,plin+ o*
space capa)ilities, incl,din+ the e@tremely important roles o* *orce monitorin+ and treaty -eri8cation, to n,clear
policy, the ,niT,e characteristics o* n,clear weapons and war*are )ecame
interconnected with military space. 4his is perhaps ,nderstanda)le, i* *,ndamentally in
error, ),t not only did space weapons )ecome anathema *or missile de*ense, ),t also weapons in space *or the
protection o* interests there )ecame a *or)idden topic. (ronically, elements o* the elite scienti8c comm,nity in the
1&E0s and 1&Q0s created the conditions that *r,strated the second hal* o* ;rnoldKs -ision, which called ,pon
;mericaKs ed+e in technolo+y to pro-ide *or the FationKs de*enseN)eca,se they )elie-ed reachin+ that o)?ecti-e
was not achie-a)le and that seeBin+ to achie-e it was not desira)le. 7erhaps )eca,se they were moti-ated
)y +,ilt *or their complicity in )rin+in+ the n,clear )om) to *r,ition, these indi-id,als
pre*erred to rely solely on diplomacy and arms control and ar+,ed a+ainst
e@ploitin+ technolo+y, which they )elie-ed wo,ld only pro-oBe an arms race. 4hey ad-ocated this point
o* -iew at the hi+hest political le-elsNand they were -ery s,ccess*,l in meetin+ their o)?ecti-es. <hether )y desi+n
or chance, the ci-ilian leadership 40 to E0 years a+o also imposed ),rea,cratic instit,tional constraints that limited
the a)ility o* the /er-ices to e@ploit c,ttin+$ed+e technolo+ies to taBe ad-anta+e o* space *or traditional military
p,rposes. <hen com)ined with arms control constraints and the c,rrent lacB o*
-ision amon+ the military /er-ices, this same dys*,nctional space
),rea,cracy is simply not responsi-e to the +rowin+ threat *rom proli*eratin+
space technolo+y amon+ o,r ad-ersaries as well as o,r *riends.
.ultiple rising powers possess all the elements of an A'A#
program
.ac!ey + (St. Col o* the ./;9 (9all, James, 0Uecent ./ and Chinese ;ntisatellite ;cti-ities,1 ;ir [ /pace
7ower Jo,rnal, proT,est'
;ny nation with the space$li*t capa)ility to place the necessary payload into SEJ
co,ld theoretically 8eld a r,dimentary ;/;4 pro+ram )ased ,pon hi+h e@plosi-e
warheads or small n,clear warheads. 4he d,al ,se o* ci-ilian and military rocBets
)ein+ de-eloped and placed into operation )y se-eral co,ntries (e.+., (srael, (ran,
Forth \orea, and (ndia' opens the door to rapid +rowth in the n,m)er o* potential
players in the weaponi>ation o* space.
7rimary amon+ the ;sian co,ntries is China, a pro-en player in the ;/;4
arena. ChinaKs +rowin+ manned space pro+ram$ witness its recent s,ccess
with the /hen>ho, spacecra*t$ reOects its con8dence and technolo+ical
capa)ilities .40 4he p,rs,it o* Chinese ,nmanned l,nar missions, constellations o* comm,nications satellites,
and plans *or a na-i+ational satellite constellation ofer *,rther e-idence o* a de-elopin+ command and control
capa)ility. 4his series o* s,ccesses and technolo+ical ad-ances 8res a sense o*
national pride and a desire to assert a Chinese presence in space. ;s ChinaKs
dependence on satellites +rows, so will its -,lnera)ility, *orcin+ senior
leaders to p,rs,e a more ro),st ;/;4 capa)ility or a)andon s,ch eforts entirely. 4he latter
seems ,nliBely since China considers space one o* its 8-e war*are domains.
'pace debris and .AD means space weapons will ;:X:C be
used in a war
'hi(iu S (5ao, senior *ellow o* military theory st,dies and international relations at the (nstit,te *or Ailitary
4ho,+ht /t,dies, ;cademy o* Ailitary /ciences o* the 7S; o* China, -isitin+ scholar at the Rir+inia Ailitary (nstit,te
0Ceterrence Ue-isited: J,ter /pace,1 China /ec,rity, <inter, 200%, p2$11, http://www.wsichina.or+/csE!1.pd*'
(t is a well$Bnown phenomenon that the ,se o* n,clear weapons is considered ta)oo. ;lon+ with the doctrine o*
m,t,al ass,red destr,ction, the ,se o* n,clear weapons in war is almost ,nima+ina)le. 4he ,tiliti>ation o* n,clear
weapons is there*ore almost entirely limited to a role o* deterrence. <hat a)o,t the ta)oo o* space
weapons Aore and more specialists are looBin+ at the impact o* space de)ris that res,lts *rom the ,se o* space
weapons.10 Sar+e amo,nts o* space de)ris ca,sed )y space weapons will in-aria)ly
threaten space assets o* all space$*arin+ co,ntries, not ?,st intended tar+et
co,ntries. ;ny attacB )y one co,ntry a+ainst another ,sin+ space weapons will
res,lt in many losers. <ith so m,ch o* commercial, scienti8c and military acti-ity
increasin+ly reliant on space, there e@ists a considera)le and +rowin+ ta)oo a+ainst
,sin+ space weapons in a sit,ation o* conOict. 4h,s, ,nder the conditions o* ;merican strate+ic dominance
in space, relia)le deterrents in space will decrease the possi)ility o* the .nited /tates attacBin+ Chinese space
assets. ;t a *,ndamental le-el, space weapons I liBe n,clear weapons I will not alter the
essential nat,re o* war. 4hro,+ho,t history, there has )een m,ch inB spilled o-er
new weapons that ha-e the ,niT,e power and a)ility to chan+e the ,nderlyin+
T,ality o* war. 9or e@ample, military theorists once e@a++erated the tanBs role in
decidin+ the wars o,tcome d,rin+ <orld <ar (.11 4he atom )om) itsel* is pro)a)ly the
most salient e@ample, as many analysts and politicians descri)ed the weapon as the ,niT,e ,ltimate
weapon.12 5,t this was a *,ndamental mis,nderstandin+ o* war and its implements. F,clear weapons
crossed a threshold in terms o* their immense capacity *or destr,ction. 5,t deterrence,
m,t,al ass,red destr,ction and the n,clear ta)oo e-ol-ed to consi+n the ,se o*
n,clear weapons to a near impossi)ility, ne+atin+ its ,tility as a tool o* war$8+htin+.
<eapons to chan+e the nat,re o* war ha-e not emer+ed in the past and will not
emer+e in the *,t,re. ;s s,ch, space weapons will not )e the ,ltimate weapon nor will
they )e a)le to decide the o,tcome o* war, e-en i* they are ,sed as a 8rst striBe.
Commerciali>ation of 'pace prevents weaponi>ation history
proves
.olt> S J;ssociate 7ro*essor and ;cademic ;ssociate *or /ec,rity /t,dies at the Fational /ec,rity ;fairs,
7h.C. and A.;. in 7olitical /cience *rom the .ni-ersity o* Cali*ornia, 5erBeley, holds an A.;. in U,ssian and East
E,ropean /t,dies and a 5.;. in (nternational Uelations *rom /tan*ord .ni-ersityZ pre-io,s staf mem)er in the ../.
/enate and cons,ltant to the F;/; ;mes Uesearch Center, the Cepartment o* Ener+ys Fational F,clear /ec,rity
;dministration, and the Cepartment o* Ce*enses J6ce o* Fet ;ssessmentZ prior academic positions at C,Be
.ni-ersity and at the .ni-ersity o* Cali*ornia, /an Cie+o. (James Clay Aolt> P7rotectin+ /a*e ;ccess to /pace:
Sessons *rom the 9irst E0 3ears o* /pace /ec,rity,P Fo-em)er 200%,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii//02QE&Q4Q0%000=Q0' mihe
(* these are some o* the lessons o* the past E0 years o* space sec,rity, what can )e said o* the ne@t E0 years
.ndo,)tedly, new national actors will emer+e callin+ *or the deployment o* space$)ased weapons o* -ario,s sorts
to deter or de*end a+ainst real, anticipated, or e-en hypothetical threats. ;t the same time, howe-er, impro-ed
space sit,ational awareness in many co,ntries will +reatly red,ce the chances *or national )reaBo,t and increase
international Bnowled+e o* the pro)lem o* space de)ris. /imilarly, the rise o* new, non$military
actors in space, incl,din+ pri-ate companies oferin+ new space ser-ices, ,ni-ersities, and new international
consortia in-ol-ed in science, commerce, and h,man e@ploration will )e+in to red,ce
the comparati-e wei+ht o* hostile actors and their militaries, who tended to dominate
the early decades o* space acti-ity. 4hese *actors co,ld increase the prospects *or
cooperati-e o,tcomes in space . Jn the other hand, there are those who ar+,e the con-erse,
speci8cally, that commerce will dri-e weapons into space as co,ntries seeB to de*end their
assets. ;s 9ran> 2ayl ar+,es: 0H as with a-iation, access and technolo+y will dri-e *orward to e@ploit any and all
war8+htin+ rele-ance, application, and ad-anta+e *rom space, T,ite independent o* a nationKs will to pre-ent it.1
Vowe-er, s,ch prospects hold tr,e only i* commercial actors remained as tied to
indi-id,al nations as they were in the 1&th cent,ry model o* mercantilism.
/,ch conditions are ,nliBely to +o-ern in space, +i-en the rapidly +rowin+
internationali>ation o* space commerce, where companies may ,se technolo+y *rom se-eral
co,ntries, )e )ased in another, and recei-e *,ndin+ or contracts *rom c,stomers in still other parts o* the world.
/,ch *actors are liBely to miti+ate the p,rported commercial 0demand1 *or de*enses. 9or these reasons, predictions
re+ardin+ the *,t,re o* space sec,rity )ased on the e@perience o* other past en-ironments and periods sho,ld )e
-iewed with at least some sBepticism. 4h,s *ar, ar+,ments and predictions a)o,t 0ine-ita)le1 o,tcomes in space
ha-e held ,p s,rprisin+ly poorly.
#errorism
;uclear terrorist threats are e(aggerated
Qert> and 1a!e 1< (5ill and Eli, <ashin+ton 4imes,
http://www.washin+tontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/o)ama$says$terrorist$n,clear$risB$is$+rowin+/pa+e"1, dw:4$14$
2010, da: %$Q$2011, lido'
5,t Venry 'o!ols!i, a member of the congressional Commission on the
*revention of Weapons of .ass Destruction *roliferation and
#errorism said that there is no specifc intelligence on ongoing
terrorist procurement of nuclear material" 0<e were +i-en )rie8n+s and when we tried
to 8nd speci8c intelli+ence on the threat o* any Bnown terrorist eforts to +et a )om), the answer was we did not
ha-e any.1 Ar. J)ama told reporters that there was a ran+e o* -iews on the dan+er ),t that all the con*erees
0a+reed on the ,r+ency and serio,sness o* the threat.1 Ar. /oBolsBi said the idea that 0we !now that
this is eminent has got to be somehow informed con0ecture and
apprehension \but] it is not driven by any specifc intelligence per
se"1 0<e ha-e reasons to )elie-e this and to )e worried, ),t we dont ha-e speci8c intelli+ence a)o,t terrorist
eforts to +et the )om),1 he said. 0/o we ha-e to do +eneral eforts to +,ard a+ainst his possi)ility, liBe sec,rin+ the
material e-erywhere.1 ; senior ../. intelli+ence o6cial also dismissed the administrations assertion that the threat
o* n,clear terrorism is +rowin+. 0#he threat has been there1 the o6cial said. 0/ut there
is no new intelligence.1 4he o6cial said the administration appears to )e inOatin+ the dan+er in
ways similar to what critics o* the 5,sh administration char+ed with re+ard to (raT: hypin+ intelli+ence to s,pport its
policies. #he o@cial said one li!ely motivation for the administrations
new emphasis on preventing nuclear terrorism is to further the
presidents goal of eliminating nuclear weapons" While the &"'"
nuclear arsenal would be useful in retaliating against a sovereign
state it would be less so against a terrorist group" /ut if the latter
is the worlds ma0or nuclear threat the o@cial e(plained then the
&"'" giving up its weapons seems less ris!y"
#errorists wont get nu!es
Qert> and 1a!e 1< (5ill and Eli, <ashin+ton 4imes,
http://www.washin+tontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/o)ama$says$terrorist$n,clear$risB$is$+rowin+/pa+e"1, dw:4$14$
2010, da: %$Q$2011, lido'
Vowe-er, 5rian 2en!ins, author of the boo! 5Will #errorists Qo ;uclearW) and
a Uand Corp. ad-iser, said that al _aeda in the past has been duped by
supposed nuclear suppliers who initiated scams that suggest a
5naivete and lac! of technical capability on the part of the
organi>ation,1 he said. 0<e ha-e e-idence o* terrorist am)itions to o)tain n,clear weapons or n,clear
material ),t we have no evidence of terrorist capabilities to do either,1 he
said. (n late 2001, a*ter the ../. in-aded ;*+hanistan in the waBe o* the /ept. 11 terrorist attacBs, some materials
were disco-ered in al :aeda )ases s,ch as cr,de dia+rams o* the )asic components o* a n,clear )om). Ar.
2en!ins, howe-er, said that &"'" technical specialists concluded from the
designs that al _aeda did not have the ability to produce a nuclear
weapon. (n 2002, mem)ers o* al :aedas a6liate in /a,di ;ra)ia attempted to p,rchase U,ssian n,clear
de-ices thro,+h al :aedas leadership in (ran, tho,+h the transactions did not mo-e *orward. (n his 200% memoir,
0At the Center of the 'torm,1 Ar. 4enet wrote that 0from the end of O<<O to
the spring of O<<G we received a stream of reliable reporting that
the senior al%_aeda leadership in 'audi Arabia was negotiating for
the purchase of three Cussian nuclear devices") 2raham ;llison, a Var-ard
pro*essor and a,thor o* a )ooB on n,clear terrorism, said he a+rees with the president that the threat is +rowin+,
)ased on Forth \oreas n,clear proli*eration to /yria and insta)ility in n,clear$armed 7aBistan.
#errorists would not be able to steal a bomb security no
place to buy
.ilhollin O (2ary, director o* the <isconsin 7ro?ect on F,clear ;rms Control, commentary ma+a>ine,
http://www.wisconsinpro?ect.or+/p,)s/articles/2002/terror$)om).htm, dw:;,+ 2001, da: %$&$2011, lido'
If ma!ing nuclear%bomb fuel is a no%go why not 0ust steal it or buy
it on the blac! mar!etW Consider plutonium" 4here are h,ndreds o* reactors in the
world, and they cranB o,t tons o* the st,f e-ery year. 'urely a dedicated band of
terrorists could get their hands on some" #his too is not so simple"
*lutonium is only created inside reactor fuel rods and the rods
after being irradiated become so hot that they melt unless !ept
under water" #hey are also radioactive which is why they have to
travel submerged from the reactor to storage ponds with the water
acting as both coolant and radiation shield" And in most power
reactors the rods are welded together into long assemblies that can
be lifted only by crane" #rue after the rods cool down they can be
stored dry but their radioactivity is still lethal" 4o pre-ent spent *,el rods *rom
Billin+ the people who come near them, they are transported in +iant radiation$shieldin+ casBs that are not
s,pposed to )reaB open e-en in head$on collisions. 4he casBs are also +,arded. If terrorists managed
to hi0ac! one from a country that had reactors they would still have
to ta!e it to a plant in another country that could e(tract the
plutonium from the rods" #hey would be hunted at every step of the
way"
/iological and Chemical terrorism is hard to have
'ievers 1 (Uod, staf, http://news.si,c.ed,/news/Jcto)er01/100&01r11E2.html, dw: 10$&$2001, da: %$&$
2011, lido'
PCertainly, bio and chemical terrorism is a credi)le threat,P said 4alley, the associate director o*
/(.CKs Center *or En-ironmental Vealth and /a*ety, P),t itKs not very practical for terrorists
who want immediate results.P 4aBe crop d,sters *or instance. P/,re, someone could
load up a crop duster with deadly chemicals or biologicals but those
agents would have to be spread over a very large populated area to
have any chance of causing a lot of harmP 4alley said. PQetting a crop
duster to 8y over a large city at a low altitude 0ust isnFt very
probable"H /prayin+ deadly chemicals onto crops is a more liBely scenario, ),t 4alley )elie-es the ../.
Cepartment o* ;+ric,lt,re or the 9ood and Cr,+ ;dministration, responsi)le *or ens,rin+ the sa*ety o* ;mericaKs
*ood s,pply, wo,ld )e T,icB to T,arantine contaminated *ood.
/iological and chemical terrorism have too many barriers
'ievers 1 (Uod, staf, http://news.si,c.ed,/news/Jcto)er01/100&01r11E2.html, dw: 10$&$2001, da: %$&$
2011, lido'
4alley admits that )ioha>ards s,ch as anthra@ can do T,ite a )it o* dama+e. 5,t he notes that they are hard to
prod,ce in lar+e T,antities. P-ther materials such as 'arin gas are more
deadly #alley said Hbut again it is very di@cult to ac9uire these
materials" ;nd anyone handlin+ this st,f wo,ld ha-e to Bnow what heKs doin+ in order to minimi>e the risBs
to themsel-es. P#hereFs something to be concerned about regarding all the
di$erent ways that a terrorist might use bioha>ards in an attac!"
/ut since each method and each type of chemical or biological
involves so many factors it would be pretty di@cult to carry o$ a
successful large%scale attac!"H
#heres no impact to chemical weaponsdilution weather
reverse contamination and historical e(amples prove
Cothstein Auer A;D 'igel R (Sinda, editor, Catherine, mana+in+ editor, and Jonas, assistant
editor o* the 5,lletin o* ;tomic /cientists, 5;/, Fo-em)er/Cecem)er, http://www.the),lletin.or+/article.php
art!o*n"nd04rothstein'
(n P4he Cew o* Ceath,P Joel RilensBy and 7andy /inish reco,nted the stran+e story o* lewisite, an arsenic$)ased
chemical weapon de-eloped )y the Chemical <ar*are /er-ice d,rin+ <orld <ar (. 5y the end o* the war, the .nited
/tates was prod,cin+ 10 tons a day o* the st,f, yet it was ne-er ,sed in )attle, where it wo,ld pro)a)ly ha-e
Oopped. Sewisite shares many o* the problems that have prevented most chemical
weapons from entering the worldKs armiesK )attle8eld arsenalsB .ost chemicals
are very hard to disseminate in s,6ciently ,ndil,ted *orm, and might not wor!
in weather that is too hot too cold too windy or too wet" #he
dilution problem would also ma!e it very di@cult to carry out an
attac! involving the poisoning of a ma0or cityFs water supply" Fearly e-ery
article a)o,t terrorist ,ses o* chemical or )iolo+ical weapons )e+ins )y recallin+ ;,m /hinriByoKs ,se o* sarin +as in
1&&E in the 4oByo s,)way. Employin+ 8-e separate pacBa+es o* poison, c,lt mem)ers mana+ed to Bill 12
comm,ters, altho,+h another 1,000 had to seeB hospital treatment. 4he attacB was shocBin+, yet *ell short o* the
c,ltKs am)itions. (/hoBo ;sahara, the leader o* the +ro,p, aspired either to )e JapanKs prime minister or to Bill as
many o* his co,ntrymen as possi)le.' /addam V,sseinKs *orces ,sed poison +as at Vala)?a in the open air. Vala)?a,
a \,rdish city in northern (raT, is perhaps the )est Bnown o* the se-eral do>en towns and -illa+es /addam V,ssein
is tho,+ht to ha-e +assed in 1&=% and 1&==. /ome E,000 o* its pop,lation o* %0,000 died as a res,lt o* )ein+
)om)arded with what mi+ht ha-e )een a com)ination o* m,stard +as, ner-e a+ent, and possi)ly cyanide. 4he
attacB was a monstro,s crime, ),t the Ira9i military succeeded by having
complete control over the place the time and the choice of a day
with ideal weather%%and because it faced no danger of e(periencing
any resistance. /addamKs men were a)le to spread the poisons systematically (deli-ery mi+ht ha-e )een
)y a com)ination o* dispersal *rom low$Oyin+ planes and attacB with chemical shells'. #he 4alab0a
massacre was not a demonstration of the uni9ue power of chemical
weapons but of the fact that the population was defenseless. (raT, and
pro)a)ly (ran, also ,sed poison +as d,rin+ the (ran$(raT war (1&=0$1&=='. E-en as tho,sands o* yo,n+ people were
sla,+htered in a war that ended in stalemate, the warKs less$controlled, )attle8eld ,se o* chemical weapons is
c,stomarily assessed as ha-in+ lent neither side an ad-anta+e. #oday few of the worldFs
militaries would even consider using chemical weapons$$they can
contaminate the )attle+ro,nd and come )acB on the attacBers i* the wind taBes an ,ne@pected t,rn. 4he ma?or
militaries$$incl,din+ those o* the .nited /tates, 5ritain, U,ssia, and 2ermany$$ha-e d,mped old m,nitions (not
always care*,lly' or ha-e spent, or need to spend, )illions o* dollars to ne,trali>e decayin+ m,nitions that co,ld
threaten ci-ilians who li-e near stora+e sites. /ome tiny amo,nt o* worry sho,ld pro)a)ly )e de-oted to leaBin+
chemical m,nitions.
;o impact to chemical terrorism
.ueller R (John, <oody Vayes Chair o* Fational /ec,rity /t,dies at the Aershon Center at Jhio /tate
.ni-ersity, Ue+,lation, 9all'
7JJU UE/.S4/ 9or their part, biological and chemical weapons have not proven
to be great !illers. ;ltho,+h the )asic science a)o,t them has )een well Bnown *or a cent,ry at least,
both !inds of weapons are notoriously di@cult to create control
and focus (and e-en more so *or n,clear weapons'. 4o this point in history, biological weapons
have !illed almost no one" And the notion that large numbers of
people would perish if a small number of chemical weapons were to
be set o$ is highly 9uestionable. ;ltho,+h they can )e h,+ely lethal when released in +as
cham)ers, their e$ectiveness as weapons has been unimpressive" In
World War I *or e@ample, chemical weapons ca,sed less than one percent o* the total com)at deathsZ on
average it too! a ton of gas to produce one fatality. (n the concl,sion to the
o6cial 5ritish history o* the war, chemical weapons are rele+ated to a *ootnote that asserts that +as 0made war
,ncom*orta)le...to no p,rpose.1 ; 1&&# analysis by the -@ce of #echnology
Assessment fnds that a terrorist would have to deliver a full ton of
'arin nerve gas perfectly and under absolutely ideal conditions over
a heavily populated area to cause between G<<< and ,<<< deaths
Dsomething that would re9uire the near%simultaneous detonation of
do>ens even hundreds of weapons" &nder slightly less ideal
circumstances D if there were a moderate wind or if the sun were
out, *or e@ample N the death rate would be only one%tenth as +reat. 4he 1&&E
chemical attacB la,nched in 4oByo )y the well$*,nded ;,m /hinriByo (attempted only a*ter se-eral eforts to ,se
)iolo+ical weaponry had *ailed completely' mana+ed to Bill only 12 people.
;u!e war outweighs nuclear terrorism
Cothstein Auer and 'iegel R (Sinda, editor, Catherine, mana+in+ editor, and Jonas, assistant
editor o* the 5,lletin o* ;tomic /cientists, 5;/, Fo-em)er/Cecem)er, http://www.the),lletin.or+/article.php
art!o*n"nd04rothstein'
;uclear terrorism would be horrifc but nuclear war would be far
worse. ;s Synn Eden reported in PCity on 9ire,P 8re dama+e *rom n,clear e@plosions has )een -astly and
systematically ,nderestimated$$a mo-e that allowed early ../. war planners to demand a m,ch lar+er n,clear
arsenal. ;s Eden wrote, a sin+le #00$Biloton n,clear weapon detonated a)o-e the 7enta+on on a clear day wo,ld
en+,l* the s,rro,ndin+ QE sT,are miles in 8restorms that wo,ld Pe@tin+,ish all li*e and destroy almost e-erythin+
else.P ;nd thatKs a conser-ati-e estimate. SetKs recap. ;n attacB *rom a weapons state is hi+hly ,nliBelyZ an
accidental n,clear la,nch is *ar more worrisome. ;s remote as the possi)ility is, all%out nuclear war
has the potential to end human life on the planet%%still the true
doomsday scenario"
;uclear terrorism wont cause e(tinctionthe &"'" would easily
recover
Arost ? (Uo)in, teaches political science at /imon 9raser .ni-ersity, 5ritish Colom)ia, 0F,clear 4errorism a*ter
&/11,1 ;delphi 7apers, Cecem)er'
;n e@istential threat. When applied to nuclear terrorism the phrase
7e(istential threat implies that a state such as the &nited 'tates
could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons" =et to
destroy the &nited 'tates or any other large industrial state, in the sense
o* inOictin+ s,ch dama+e to its +o-ernment, economy, pop,lation and in*rastr,ct,re that it co,ld no lon+er *,nction
as a coherent political and economic entity, would re9uire a large number of well%
placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of
!ilotons" It is unli!ely that terrorists could successfully obtain
emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon while no plausible
radiological device or devices could do any signifcant damage on a
national level"
Catastrophic terrorism may be bad but it would have no
permanent e$ect on the &nited 'tates
.uller R (John, <oody Vayes Chair o* Fational /ec,rity /t,dies at the Aershon Center at Jhio /tate
4he cosmic alarmism reached a Bind o* o6cial pinnacle d,rin+ last winters Jran+e ;lert. ;t the time, Vomeland
/ec,rity c>ar 4om Uid+e declared that 0;merica is a co,ntry that will not )e )ent )y terror. ;merica is a co,ntry that
will not )e )roBen )y *ear.1 Aeanwhile, howe-er, 2en. Uichard Ayers, chairman o* the Joint Chie*s o* /taf, was
tellin+ a tele-ision a,dience that i* terrorists were a)le to en+ineer a catastrophic e-ent that Billed 10,000 people,
they wo,ld s,ccess*,lly 0do away with o,r way o* li*e.1 #he sudden deaths of that many
Americans D although representing less than four%thousandths of
one percent of the population D would indeed be horrifying and
tragic but the only way it could 5do away with our way of life)
would be if we did that to ourselves in reaction" ;ll societies are 0-,lnera)le1 to
tiny )ands o* s,icidal *anatics in the sense that it is impossi)le to pre-ent e-ery terrorist act. /ut the
&nited 'tates is hardly 5vulnerable) in the sense that it can be
e(punged by dramatic acts of terrorist destruction even e(treme
ones" In fact the country can readily if grimly overcome that !ind
of damage D as it overcomes some R<<<< deaths each year from
automobile accidents. ;s rands 5r,ce Vofman p,t it, 0.n*ort,nately, terrorism is ?,st another *act o*
modern li*e. (ts somethin+ we ha-e to li-e with.1
#errorism threats are e(aggeratedDthere are institutional and
professional reasons to in8ate ris!
.uller R (John, <oody Vayes Chair o* Fational /ec,rity /t,dies at the Aershon Center at Jhio /tate
(n addition, it sho,ld )e pointed o,t that the response to 'eptember 11 has created a
vast and often well%funded terrorism industry" Its members would
be nearly out of business if terrorism were to be bac!%burnered and
accordingly they have every competitive incentive (and they are nothin+ i* not
competiti-e' to conclude that it is their civic duty to !eep the pot boiling"
.oreover there is more reputational danger in underplaying ris!s
than in e(aggerating them. 7eople ro,tinely ridic,le *,t,rist V.2. <ells prediction that the
conOict )e+innin+ in 1&14 wo,ld )e 0the war that will end war,1 ),t not his eT,ally con8dent declaration at the end
o* <orld <ar (( that 0the end o* e-erythin+ we call li*e is close at hand.1 Disproved doomsayers
can always claim that caution induced by their warnings prevented
the predicted calamity from occurring. (Call this the 32\ efect.' Cispro-ed 7ollyannas
ha-e no s,ch con-enient re*,+e.

GDI 12 Impact Defense

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

GDI 12 Impact Defense

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Impact D

You might also like