Modern State System

MODERN STATE SYSTEM
2 Report- Modern State System

MODERN
STATE
SYSTEM

INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Report

SUBMITTED TO-

Dr. Sahib Khan Channa
Professor, International Relations
Institute of Business Management

SUBMITTED BY-

Danish Haider (14819)

Section : D

DATED-
November 10
th
, 2013

Contents
Letter of Authorization
Letter of Transmittal
Acknowledgement
Executive Summary
History and Origins of Modern State System
Before Nation-States
Westphalian Sovereignty
Traditional view
Modern views on the Westphalian System
Other views
Globalization and Westphalian Sovereignty
Intervention
o Military intervention
o Humanitarian intervention
o Failed states
Characteristics of the nation-state
Examples
o The nation-state in practice
o The United Kingdom
o Estonia
o Israel
Minorities
Irredentism
Future
"Clash of civilizations"
Is there a future for the nation-state in an era of globalisation? If so, what future?
Introduction
The challenge globalisation presents to the nation-state
- A reduced ability to regulate the economy
- An increase of transnational bodies
- Super and sub national centres of power
Where the nation-state can go next
- Neo-medievalism: the dissolving nation-state
- The resilient nation-state
- The altered nation-state
Conclusion
References
Bibliography

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION

November 10
th
, 2013

Dear Readers,

As a student of BBA Honors; Dr. Sahib Khan Channa Course Instructor for international
Relations has authorized me to prepare a report on the The Modern State System. The
requirement is to conduct a research to determine the origin and evolution of the nation-state
system and all other factors and events relating to it.

This research is conducted by a thorough study of articles on the internet and books related to
International Relations which have been mentioned in the references.

The report is required to be submitted on November 10, 2013
.

Sincerely,


LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

November 10
th
, 2013

Dr. Sahib Khan Channa
Professor, International Relations
Institute of Business Management

Dear Sir,

Here is the report, authorized on Modern State System. In this report I have come up with
history of the Modern State System or the Nation State System and the development that it
underwent over the passage of time.

The research focuses on the origin, characteristics, examples and important events that
underwent since the origin of the International State System and later on how it evolved to
become a universal system.

I hope that this report is helpful in your assessment of the birth and development of Nation
State System. This research paper conveys my feelings about the subject, and I have researched
the topic to the best of my abilities

Sincerely,


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would first like to thank Almighty Allah for giving me the strength and endowing me with the
privilege of completing my report on the topic of Modern State System.

I am also extremely thankful to my mentor and guide Dr. Sahib Khan Channa whose help,
suggestions and encouragement helped me during the time of research and in the making of this
report. I have learnt a lot of new things while preparing this report and found it to be very
interesting.

Thank you,


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order to understand the nature and working of the Modern Nation-State System, it
shall be desirable to know about its meaning, origin and development According to
Palmer the nation-state system "is the pattern of political life in which people are
separately organized into sovereign states that interact with one another in varying
degrees and in varying ways." These states are involved in conflict as well as co-
operation. For the protection of their respective interests these nation states resort to
methods of peaceful persuasion, and when these fail they resort to coercive methods. As
such, each state tries to build up its national power by organizing its coercive resources.

Generally, the scholars trace the origin of state system from the year 1648 when the
Treaty of Westphalia, which brought the thirty year war to an end, was signed. No doubt
even before that the states existed and entered into relations with each other, but they
were not sovereign states as their authority was restrained by the Roman Church and
the Roman Empire. The peace of Westphalia paved the way for the emergence of the
nation-state system by recognizing that the Empire no longer commanded the allegiance
of its parts and that the Pope could not maintain his spiritual authority every where. In
other words, the rulers of a number of countries such as England, France, Germany,
Spain, etc. shook off the authority of the Pope in religious affairs and that of the Emperor
of Rome in secular matters. Henceforth, the supreme authority came to be identified with
the state. This meant that each state had the right to utilize the strength of the people
and its resources as it liked without any restraint from within or from outside. Though
theoretically these states were equal they differed from each other in matters of real
powers

NATION STATE SYSTEM
The nation-state is a state that self-identifies as deriving its political legitimacy from serving as
a sovereign entity for a country as a sovereign territorial unit. The state is
a political and geopolitical entity; the nation is a cultural and/or ethnic entity. The term "nation-
state" implies that the two geographically coincide, and this distinguishes the nation-state from
the other types of state, which historically preceded it.
The concept of a "nation-state" is sometimes contrasted with citizen state.

History and origins
The origins and early history of nation-states are disputed. A major theoretical issue is: "Which
came first the nation or the nation state?" For nationalists themselves, the answer is that the
nation existed first, nationalist movements arose to present its legitimate demand
for sovereignty, and the nation-state met that demand. Some "modernisation theories" of
nationalism see the national identity largely as a product of government policy, to unify and
modernise an already existing state. Most theories see the nation state as a 19
th
-century
European phenomenon, facilitated by developments such as mass literacy and the early mass
media. However, historians also note the early emergence of a relatively unified state, and a
sense of common identity, in Portugal and the Dutch Republic.
In France, Eric Hobsbawm argues the French state preceded the formation of the French people.
Hobsbawm considers that the state made the French nation, and not French nationalism, which
emerged at the end of the 19th century, the time of the Dreyfus Affair. At the time of the
1789 French Revolution, only half of the French people spoke some French, and between 12
percent to 13 percent spoke it "fairly", according to Hobsbawm. DuringItalian unification, the
number of people speaking the Italian language was even lower. The French state promoted the
unification of various dialects and languages into the French language. The introduction
of conscription and the Third Republic's 1880s laws on public instruction, facilitated the creation
of a national identity, under this theory.
The theorist Benedict Anderson argues that nations are "imagined communities" (the members
cannot possibly know each other), and that the main causes of nationalism and the creation of
an imagined community are the reduction of privileged access to particular script languages (e.g.
Latin), the movement to abolish the ideas of divine rule and monarchy, as well as the emergence
of the printing press under a system of capitalism (or, as Anderson calls it, print-capitalism). The
"state-driven" theories of the origin of nation-states tend to emphasise a few specific states,

such as Englandand its rival France. These states expanded from core regions, and developed a
national consciousness and sense of national identity ("Englishness" and "Frenchness"). Both
assimilated peripheral regions (Wales, Cornubia, Brittany, Occitania); these areas experienced a
revival of interest in the regional culture in the 19
th
century, leading to the creation of
autonomist movements in the 20
th
century.
Some nation-states, such as Germany or Italy, came into existence at least partly as a result of
political campaigns by nationalists, during the 19th century. In both cases, the territory was
previously divided among other states, some of them very small. The sense of common identity
was at first a cultural movement, such as in the Vlkisch movement in German-speaking states,
which rapidly acquired a political significance. In these cases, the nationalist sentiment and the
nationalist movement clearly precede the unification of the German and Italian nation-states.
Historians Hans Kohn, Liah Greenfeld, Philip White and others have classified nations such as
Germany or Italy, where cultural unification preceded state unification, as ethnic
nations or ethnic nationalities. Whereas 'state-driven' national unifications, such as in France,
England or China, are more likely to flourish in multiethnic societies, producing a traditional
national heritage of civic nations, or territory-based nationalities.
The idea of a nation-state is associated with the rise of the modern system of states, often called
the "Westphalian system" in reference to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The balance of
power, which characterises that system, depends for its effectiveness upon clearly defined,
centrally controlled, independent entities, whether empires or nation states, which recognise
each other's sovereignty and territory. The Westphalian system did not create the nation-state,
but the nation-state meets the criteria for its component states (assuming that there is no
disputed territory).
The nation-state received a philosophical underpinning in the era of Romanticism, at first as the
'natural' expression of the individual peoples (romantic nationalism see Fichte's conception of
the Volk, which would be later opposed by Ernest Renan). The increasing emphasis during the
19th century on the ethnic and racial origins of the nation, led to a redefinition of the nation-
state in these terms. Racism, which in Boulainvilliers's theories was inherently antipatriotic and
antinationalist, joined itself with colonialist imperialism and "continental imperialism", most
notably in pan-Germanic andpan-Slavic movements. This relation between racism and ethnic
nationalism reached its height in the fascist and Nazi movements of the 20
th
century. The specific
combination of 'nation' ('people') and 'state' expressed in such terms as the Vlkische Staat and
implemented in laws such as the 1935 Nuremberg laws made fascist states such as early Nazi
Germany qualitatively different from non-fascist nation-states. Obviously, minorities, who are

not part of the Volk, have no authentic or legitimate role in such a state. In Germany,
neither Jews nor the Roma were considered part of the Volk, and were specifically targeted for
persecution. However German nationality law defined 'German' on the basis of German
ancestry, excluding all non-Germans from the 'Volk'.
In recent years the nation-state's claim to absolute sovereignty within its borders has been much
criticized. A global political system based on international agreements and supra-national blocs
characterized the post-war era. Non-state actors, such as international corporations and non-
governmental organizations, are widely seen as eroding the economic and political power of
nation-states, potentially leading to their eventual disappearance.

Before nation-states
Division of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into newer
multiethnic countries and states in 1918.

In Europe, in the 18th century, the classic non-
national states were the multi-ethnic empires,
(the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire)
and smaller states at what would now be called sub-national level. The multi-ethnic empire was
a monarchy ruled by a king, emperor or sultan. The population belonged to many ethnic groups,
and they spoke many languages. The empire was dominated by one ethnic group, and their
language was usually the language of public administration. The ruling dynasty was usually, but
not always, from that group. This type of state is not specifically European: such empires existed
on all continents. Some of the smaller European states were not so ethnically diverse, but were
also dynastic states, ruled by a royal house. Their territory could expand by royal
intermarriage or merge with another state when the dynasty merged. In some parts of Europe,
notably Germany, very small territorial units existed. They were recognised by their neighbours
as independent, and had their own government and laws. Some were ruled by princes or other
hereditary rulers, some were governed by bishops orabbots. Because they were so small,
however, they had no separate language or culture: the inhabitants shared the language of the
surrounding region.

In some cases these states were simply overthrown by nationalist uprisings in the 19th century.
Liberal ideas of free trade played a role in German unification, which was preceded by a customs
union, the Zollverein. However, the Austro-Prussian War, and the German alliances in
the Franco-Prussian War, were decisive in the unification. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and
the Ottoman Empire broke up after the First World War and the Russian Empire became
the Soviet Union, after the long Russian Civil War.
Some of the smaller states survived: the independent principalities
of Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, and the republic of San Marino. (Vatican City is different.
Although there was a larger Papal State, it was created in its present form by the 1929 Lateran
treaties between Italy and the Roman Catholic Church.)

Westphalian sovereignty

Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of nation-state sovereignty based on two things:
territoriality and the absence of a role for external agents in domestic structures.
Scholars of international relations have identified the modern, Western originated, international
system of states, multinational corporations, and organizations, as having begun at thePeace of
Westphalia in 1648.
[1]
Both the basis and the conclusion of this view have been attacked by
some revisionist academics and politicians, with revisionists questioning the significance of the
Peace, and some commentators and politicians attacking the Westphalian system of
sovereign nation-states.

Traditional view
Adherents to the concept of a Westphalian system refer to the Peace of Westphalia, signed in
1648, in which the major European countries agreed to respect the principle of territorial
integrity. In the Westphalian system, the national interests and goals of states (and later nation-
states) were widely assumed to go beyond those of any citizen or any ruler. States became the
primary institutional agents in an interstate system of relations.

The Peace of Westphalia is said to have ended attempts to impose supranational authority on
European states. The "Westphalian" doctrine of states as independent agents was bolstered by
the rise in 19th century thought of nationalism, under which legitimate states were assumed to
correspond to nationsgroups of people united by language and culture.Benedict
Anderson refers to these putative nations as "imagined communities."
The Westphalian system reached its peak in the late 19th century. Although practical
considerations still led powerful states to seek to influence the affairs of others, forcible
intervention by one country in the domestic affairs of another was less frequent between 1850
and 1900 than in most previous and subsequent periods (Leurdijk 1986).
The Peace of Westphalia is important in modern international relations theory, and is often
defined as the beginning of the international system with which the discipline deals.
International relations theorists have identified several key principles of the Peace of
Westphalia, which explain the Peace's significance and its impact on the world today:
1. The principle of the sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self
determination
2. The principle of (legal) equality between states
3. The principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state
These principles are shared by the "realist" international relations paradigm today, which
explains why the system of states is referred to as "The Westphalian System".
Both the idea of Westphalian sovereignty and its applicability in practice have been questioned
from the mid-20th century onwards from a variety of viewpoints. Much of the debate has
turned on the ideas of internationalism and globalization which, in various interpretations,
appear to conflict with Westphalian sovereignty.
A notable defense of Westphalian sovereignty is to be found in John Rawls' 1999 book, The Law
of Peoples.

Modern views on the Westphalian system
The Westphalian system is used as a shorthand by academics to describe the system of states
which make up the world today.
In 1998, at a Symposium on the Continuing Political Relevance of the Peace of Westphalia, the
then NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana said that "humanity and democracy [were] two
principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order" and levied a criticism that "the
Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced
the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration.
In 2000, Germany's Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer referred to the Peace of Westphalia in
his Humboldt Speech, which argued that the system of European politics set up by Westphalia
was obsolete: "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the
European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had
emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer
meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational
European institutions.
In the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks, Lewis Atiyyatullah, who claims to
represent the terrorist network al-Qaeda, declared that "the international system built-up by the
West since the Treaty of Westphalia will collapse; and a new international system will rise under
the leadership of a mighty Islamic state".
[8]
It has also been claimed that globalization is bringing
an evolution of the international system past the sovereign Westphalian state.
However others speak favorably of the Westphalian state, notably European nationalists and
American paleo conservative Pat Buchanan. Supporters of the Westphalian state oppose
socialism and some forms of capitalism for undermining the nation state. A major theme of
Buchanan's political career, for example, has been attacking globalization, critical theory, neo
conservatism, and other philosophies he considers detrimental to today's Western nations.

Other views
The above interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia is not without its critics. Revisionist
historians and international relations theorists argue against these points:
1. Neither of the treaties mentions sovereignty. Since the three chief participants (France,
Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire) were all already sovereign, their representatives saw no
need to clarify this situation. In any case, the princes of Germany remained subordinate to
the Holy Roman Emperor by the constitution.
2. While each German principality had its own legal system, the final Courts of Appeal applied to
the whole of the Holy Roman Empire the final appellate was the Emperor himself, and his
decisions in cases brought to him were final and binding on all subordinates. The Emperor could,
and did, depose princes when they were found by the courts to be at fault.
3. Both treaties specifically state that should the treaty be broken, France and Sweden held the
right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Empire.
Rather than cementing sovereignty, revisionists hold that the treaty served to maintain
the status quo ante. As such, the treaty cemented the theory of Landeshoheit, in which state-
like agents have a certain (usually high) degree of autonomy, but are not sovereign since they
are subject to the laws, judiciary, and constitution of a higher body.

Globalization and Westphalian sovereignty
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the emerging literature on globalization focused primarily on
the erosion of interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Much of this
literature was primarily concerned to criticize realist models of international politics in which the
Westphalian notion of the state as a unitary agent are taken as axiomatic (Camilleri and Falk
1992).
The European Union concept of shared sovereignty is also somewhat contrary to historical views
of Westphalian sovereignty, as it provides for external agents to interfere in nations' internal
affairs.
In a 2008 article Phil Williams [1] links the rise of terrorism and other violent non-state
actors (VNSA's), which pose a threat to the Westphalian sovereignty of the state, to
globalization.

Intervention

Military intervention
Since the late 20th century, the idea of Westphalian sovereignty has been brought into further
question by a range of actual and proposed military interventions in the
former Yugoslavia,Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan among others.

Humanitarian intervention
The partial list includes interventions in Cambodia by Vietnam (CambodianVietnamese War),
Bangladesh (then a part of Pakistan) by India (Indo-Pakistani War of 1971), Kosovo by NATO
(1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia), Iraq by the United States (2003 invasion of Iraq) and
Georgia by Russia (2008 South Ossetia war). These interventions had a questionable or weak
basis in international law, but were carried out on the premise that they
constituted humanitarian intervention, aimed at preventing genocide, large-scale loss of life,
ethnic cleansing or the use of weapons of mass destruction. Neoconservatism in particular has
developed this line of thinking further, asserting that a lack of democracy may foreshadow
future humanitarian crises, or that democracy itself constitutes a human right.
[citation
needed]
However, proponents of neoconservatism have been accused of being concerned about
democracy, human rights and humanitarian crises, only in countries where American global
dominance is challenged: the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, China, Belarus,
North Korea, Sudan, Venezuela, etc., while largely ignoring the same issues in other countries
friendlier to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt,
Georgia, and Colombia.
There is debate about whether recent infringements of state sovereignty, such as 1999 NATO
bombing of Yugoslavia and subsequent de facto partition of Kosovo and the 2003 Iraq War,
reflected these higher principles, or the real justification was simply self-defense or the
promotion of political and economic interests. A new notion of contingent sovereignty seems to
be emerging in international law, but it has not yet reached the point of legal legitimacy.

Failed states
A further criticism of Westphalian sovereignty arises in relation to allegedly failed states, of
which Afghanistan (before the 2001 US-led invasion) is often considered an example. In this
case, it is argued that no sovereignty exists and that international intervention is justified on
humanitarian grounds and by the threats posed by failed states to neighboring countries and the
world as a whole.
Some of the recent debate over Somalia is also being cast in these same terms.

Characteristics of the nation-state
Nation-states have their own characteristics, differing from those of the pre-national states. For
a start, they have a different attitude to their territory, compared to the dynasticmonarchies: it
is semi-sacred, and non-transferable. No nation would swap territory with other states simply,
for example, because the king's daughter got married. They have a different type of border, in
principle defined only by the area of settlement of the national group, although many nation
states also sought natural borders (rivers, mountain ranges).
The most noticeable characteristic is the degree to which nation-states use the state as an
instrument of national unity, in economic, social and cultural life.
The nation-state promoted economic unity, first by abolishing internal customs and tolls. In
Germany this process, the creation of the Zollverein, preceded formal national unity. Nation-
states typically have a policy to create and maintain a national transportation infrastructure,
facilitating trade and travel. In 19th-century Europe, the expansion of the rail transportnetworks
was at first largely a matter for private railway companies, but gradually came under control of
the national governments. The French rail network, with its main lines radiating from Paris to all
corners of France, is often seen as a reflection of the centralised French nation-state,
which directed its construction. Nation states continue to build, for instance, specifically
national motorway networks. Specifically trans-national infrastructure programmes, such as
the Trans-European Networks, are a recent innovation.
The nation-states typically had a more centralised and uniform public administration than its
imperial predecessors: they were smaller, and the population less diverse. (The internal diversity
of, for instance, the Ottoman Empire was very great.) After the 19th-century triumph of the
nation-state in Europe, regional identity was subordinate to national identity, in regions such
as Alsace-Lorraine, Catalonia, Brittany, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. In many cases, the regional

administration was also subordinated to central (national) government. This process was
partially reversed from the 1970s onward, with the introduction of various forms of regional
autonomy, in formerly centralised states such as France.
The most obvious impact of the nation-state, as compared to its non-national predecessors, is
the creation of a uniform national culture, through state policy. The model of the nation-state
implies that its population constitutes a nation, united by a common descent, a common
language and many forms of shared culture. When the implied unity was absent, the nation-
state often tried to create it. It promoted a uniform national language, through language policy.
The creation of national systems of compulsory primary education and a relatively
uniform curriculum in secondary schools, was the most effective instrument in the spread of
the national languages. The schools also taught the national history, often in a propagandistic
and mythologised version, and (especially during conflicts) some nation-states still teach this
kind of history.
[10]

Language and cultural policy was sometimes negative, aimed at the suppression of non-national
elements. Language prohibitions were sometimes used to accelerate the adoption of national
languages, and the decline of minority languages, see Germanisation.
In some cases these policies triggered bitter conflicts and further ethnic separatism. But where it
worked, the cultural uniformity and homogeneity of the population increased. Conversely, the
cultural divergence at the border became sharper: in theory, a uniform French identity extends
from the Atlantic coast to the Rhine, and on the other bank of the Rhine, a uniform German
identity begins. To enforce that model, both sides have divergent language policy and
educational systems, although the linguistic boundary is in fact well inside France, and the
Alsace region changed hands four times between 1870 and 1945.

Examples
The nation-state in practice

The largest ethnic group as percent of total
population.
* Dark yellow: 85% and above.
* Yellow: 65-84%.
* Light yellow: 64% and below;
* Blue: Traditional ethnic definitions do not
apply. Ethnicity is replaced by color of skin.
(Source: WFB. Data as of 2000-2008).

In some cases, the geographic boundaries of an ethnic population and a political state largely
coincide. In these cases, there is little immigration or emigration, few members of ethnic
minorities, and few members of the "home" ethnicity living in other countries.
Clear examples of nation states (where ethnic groups which make up more than 95 percent of
the population are shown) include: (For further detail, please see the respective ethnic groups of
the nation states mentioned as examples.)
Albania: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Albanian at about 98.6 percent of
the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
Armenia: The vast majority of Armenia's population consists of ethnic Armenians at about 98
percent of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
Bangladesh: The vast majority ethnic group of Bangladesh are the Bengali people, comprising
98 percent of the population, with the remainder consisting of mostly Bihari migrants and
indigenous tribal groups. Therefore, Bangladeshi society is to a great extent linguistically and
culturally homogeneous, with very small populations of foreign expatriates and workers,
although there is a substantial number of Bengali workers living abroad.
Egypt: The vast majority of Egypt's population consists of ethnic Egyptians at about 99
percent of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities, as
well as refugees or asylum seekers. Modern Egyptian identity is closely tied to the geography
of Egypt and its long history, its development over the centuries saw overlapping or
conflicting ideologies. Though today an Arabic-speaking people, that aspect constitutes for
Egyptians a cultural dimension of their identity, not a necessary attribute of or prop for their

national political being. Today most Egyptians see themselves, their history, culture and
language (the Egyptian variant of Arabic) as specifically Egyptian and not "Arab."
Hungary: The Hungarians or the Magyar people consist of about 95 percent of the
population, with a small Roma and German minority: see Demographics of Hungary.
Iceland: Although the inhabitants are ethnically related to other Scandinavian groups, the
national culture and language are found only in Iceland. There are no cross-border
minorities, the nearest land is too far away:
see Demographics of Iceland

Ainu, an ethnic minority people from Japan(between 1863 and
early 1870s).

Japan: Japan is also traditionally seen as an example of a nation-state and also the largest of
the nation states, with population in excess of 120 million. It should be noted that Japan has
a small number of minorities such as Ryky peoples, Koreans and Chinese, and on the
northern island of Hokkaid, the indigenous Ainu minority. However, they are either
numerically insignificant (Ainu), their difference is not as pronounced (though Ryukyuan
culture is closely related to Japanese culture, it is nonetheless distinctive in that it historically
received much more influence from China and has separate political and nonpolitical and
religious traditions) or well assimilated (Zainichi population is collapsing due to
assimilation/naturalisation).
Lesotho: Lesotho's ethno-linguistic structure consists almost entirely of the Basotho (singular
Mosotho), a Bantu-speaking people; about 99.7 percent of the population are Basotho.
Maldives: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Dhivehi at about 98 percent of the
population, with the remainder consisting of foreign workers; there are no indigenous ethnic
minorities.
Malta: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Maltese at about 95.3 percent of the
population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
North and South Korea, are one of the most ethnically and linguistically homogeneous in the
world. Particularly in reclusive North Korea, there are very few ethnic minority groups and
expatriate foreigners.
Poland: After World War II, with the extermination of the Jews by the invading German
Nazis during the Holocaust, the Expulsion of Germans after World War II and the loss of

eastern territories (Kresy), 96.7 percent of the people of Poland claim Polish nationality, and
97.8 percent declare that they speak Polish at home (Census 2002).
Several Polynesian countries such as Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, etc.
[citation needed]

Portugal: Although surrounded by other lands and people, the Portuguese nation has
occupied the same territory since the romanization or latinization of the native population
during the Roman era. The modern Portuguese nation is a very old amalgam of formerly
distinct historical populations that passed through and settled in the territory of modern
Portugal: native Iberian peoples, Celts, ancient Mediterraneans
(Greeks, Phoenicians, Romans, Jews), invading Germanic peoples like the Suebi and
the Visigoths, and Muslim Arabs andBerbers. Most Berber/Arab people and the Jews were
expelled from the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista and the repopulation
by Christians.
San Marino: The Sammarinese make up about 97 percent of the population and all
speak Italian and are ethnically and linguisticially identical to Italians. San Marino is a
landlocked enclave, completely surrounded by Italy. The state has a population of
approximately 30,000, including 1,000 foreigners, most of whom are Italians.
Swaziland: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Swazi at about 98.6 percent of
the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
The notion of a unifying "national identity" also extends to countries which host multiple ethnic
or language groups, such as India and China. For example, Switzerland is constitutionally a
confederation of cantons, and has four official languages, but it has also a 'Swiss' national
identity, a national history and a classic national hero, Wilhelm Tell.
[11]

Innumerable conflicts have arisen where political boundaries did not correspond with ethnic or
cultural boundaries. For one example, the Hatay Province was transferred
to Turkey fromSyria after the majority-Turkish population complained of mistreatment. The
traditional homeland of the Kurdish people extends between northern Iraq,
southeastern Turkey, and westernIran. Some of its inhabitants call for the creation of an
independent Kurdistan, citing mistreatment by the Turkish and Iraqi governments. An armed
conflict between the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party and the Turkish government over this
issue has been ongoing since 1984.

After WWII in the Tito era, nationalism was appealed to for uniting South Slav peoples. Later in
the 20th century, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, leaders appealed to ancient ethnic
feuds or tensions that ignited conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as
well Bosnians, Montenegrins and Macedonians, eventually breaking up the long collaboration of
peoples and ethnic cleansing was carried out in the Balkans, resulting in the destruction of the
formerly communist republic and produced the civil wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-95,
resulted in mass population displacements and segregation that radically altered what was once
a highly diverse and intermixed ethnic makeup of the region. These conflicts were largely about
creating a new political framework of states, each of which would be ethnically and politically
homogeneous. Serbians, Croatians and Bosnians
insisted they were ethnically distinct although
many communities had a long history of
intermarriage. All could speak the common Serbo-
Croatian Language. Presently Slovenia (89%
Slovene), Croatia(88% Croat) and Serbia (83%
Serb) could be classified as nation-states per se,
whereas Macedonia (66%
Macedonian), Montenegro (42% Montenegrin)
and Bosnia and Herzegovina(47% Bosniak) are
multinational states.
Ethnolinguistic map of mainland China and Taiwan
Belgium is a classic example of an artificial state that is not a nation-state. The state was formed
by secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, whose neutrality and
integrity was protected by the Treaty of London 1839; thus it served as a buffer state between
the European powers France, Prussia (After 1871 the German Empire), the United Kingdom and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands until World War I. Belgium is divided between the Flemings and
the Walloons. The Flemish population in the north speaks Dutch and the Walloon population in
the south speaks French. The Flemish identity is also ethnic and cultural, and there is a strong
separatist movement espoused by the political parties, Vlaams Belang and the Nieuw-Vlaamse
Alliantie. The Francophone Walloon identity of Belgium is linguistically distinct and regionalist.
There is also s unitary Belgian nationalism, several versions of a Greater Netherlands ideal, and
a German-speaking community of Belgium annexed from Prussia in 1920, and re-annexed by
Germany in 19401944. However these ideologies are all very marginal and politically
insignificant during elections.

China covers a large geographic area and uses the concept of "Zhonghua minzu" "Chinese
Nationality", in the sense of ethnic groups although it also officially recognizes the
majority Han ethnic group, and no fewer than 55 ethnic national minorities. In practice,
however, the Han majority represents over 92 percent of the population, and the process
of sinicization has continued under the People's Republic.

The United Kingdom

Map of the United Kingdom showing its four "constituent countries".

The United Kingdom is a complex example of a nation state, due to its
"countries within a country" status. The UK is a unitary state formed
initially by the merger of two independent kingdoms, the Kingdom of
England and the Kingdom of Scotland, but the Treaty of Union (1707)
that set out the agreed terms has ensured the continuation of distinct
features of each state, including separate legal systems and
separate national churches.
In 2003, the British Government described the United Kingdom as "countries within a
country". While the Office for National Statistics and others describe the United Kingdom as a
"nation state", others, including a then Prime Minister, describe it as a "multinational state",and
the term Home Nations is used to describe the four national teams that represent the four
nations of the United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland,Scotland, Wales).

Estonia
Although Estonia is a country with very diverse demographic situation with over 100 different
ethnic groups whereas only 68.7% are Estonians and the biggest minority group (25.6%)
being Russians, the constitution defines as one of the main reasons of the Estonian
independence the goal to preserve the Estonian language, nation and culture, therefore Estonia
could be still seen as a nation-state despite the demographic situation.

The constitution reads:
[The Estonian state] which shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language and
culture through the ages.

Israel
Israel's definition of a nation state differs from other countries as its concept of a nation state is
based on the Ethnoreligious group (Judaism) rather than solely on ethnicity, while the ancient
mother language of the Jews, Hebrew, was revived as a unifying bond between them as
a national and official language.
Israel was founded as a Jewish state in 1948, and the country's Basic Laws describe it as both a
Jewish and a democratic state. According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 75.7% of
Israel's population is Jewish.
[19]
Large numbers of Jews continue to emigrate to Israel. Arabs,
who make up 20.4% of the population, are the largest ethnic minority in Israel. Israel also has
very small communities of Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, Samaritans, and persons of some
Jewish heritage. There are also some non-Jewish spouses of Israeli Jews. However, these
communities are very small, and usually only number in several hundreds and at most several
thousands.

Minorities

Romani arrivals at the Belzec death camp await instructions.
The most obvious deviation from the ideal of 'one nation, one state', is the presence of
minorities, especially ethnic minorities, which are clearly not members of the majority nation.
An ethnic nationalist definition of a nation is necessarily exclusive: ethnic nations typically do not
have open membership. In most cases, there is a clear idea that surrounding nations are

different, and that includes members of those nations who live on the 'wrong side' of the
border. Historical examples of groups, who have been specifically singled out asoutsiders, are
the Roma and Jews in Europe.
Negative responses to minorities within the nation-state have ranged from state-
enforced cultural assimilation, to expulsion, persecution, violence, and extermination. The
assimilation policies are usually state-enforced, but violence against minorities is not always
state initiated: it can occur in the form of mob violence such as lynching or pogroms. Nation-
states are responsible for some of the worst historical examples of violence against minorities
that is, minorities which were not considered part of the nation.
However, many nation-states do accept specific minorities as being part of the nation, and the
term national minority is often used in this sense. The Sorbs in Germany are an example: for
centuries they have lived in German-speaking states, surrounded by a much larger ethnic
German population, and they have no other historical territory. They are now generally
considered to be part of the German nation, and are accepted as such by the Federal Republic of
Germany, which constitutionally guarantees their cultural rights. Of the thousands of ethnic and
cultural minorities in nation states across the world, only a few have this level of acceptance and
protection.
Multiculturalism is an official policy in many states, establishing the ideal of peaceful existence
among multiple ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups. Many nations have laws
protectingminority rights.
When national boundaries that do not match ethnic boundaries are drawn, such as in
the Balkans and Central Asia, ethnic tension, massacres and even genocide, sometimes has
occurred historically (see Bosnian genocide and the 2010 massacre of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan).

Irredentism

The Greater German Empire under Nazi Germany in 1943
Ideally, the border of a nation-state extends far enough to include all the members of the
nation, and all of the national homeland. Again, in practice some of them always live on the
'wrong side' of the border. Part of the national homeland may be there too, and it may be
inhabited by the 'wrong' nation. The response to the non-inclusion of territory and population
may take the form of irredentism- demands to annexunredeemed territory and incorporate it
into the nation-state. Irredentist claims are usually based on the fact that an identifiable part of
the national group lives across the border. However, they can include claims to territory where
no members of that nation live at present, either because they lived there in the past, or
because the national language is spoken in that region, or because the national culture has
influenced it, or because of geographical unity with the existing territory, or for a wide variety of
other reasons. Past grievances are usually involved (seeRevanchism). It is sometimes difficult to
distinguish irredentism from pan-nationalism, since both claim that all members of an ethnic and
cultural nation belong in one specific state. Pan-nationalism is less likely to ethnically specify the
nation. For instance, variants of Pan-Germanism have different ideas about what
constituted Greater Germany, including the confusing term Grossdeutschland- which in fact
implied the inclusion of huge Slavic minorities from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Typically, irredentist demands are at first made by members of non-state nationalist
movements. When they are adopted by a state, they typically result in tensions, and actual
attempts at annexation are always considered a casus belli, a cause for war. In many cases, such
claims result in long-term hostile relations between neighbouring states. Irredentist movements
typically circulate maps of the claimed national territory, the greater nation-state. That territory,
which is often much larger than the existing state, plays a central role in their propaganda. For
examples, see below.

Irredentism should not be confused with claims to overseas colonies, which are not generally
considered part of the national homeland. Some French overseas colonies would be an
exception: French rule in Algeria did indeed treat the colony legally as a dpartement of France,
unsuccessfully.

Future
It has been speculated by both proponents of globalization and various future fiction writers
that the concept of a nation-state may disappear with the ever-increasingly interconnected
nature of the world. Such ideas are sometimes expressed around concepts of a world
government. Another possibility is a societal collapse and move into communal anarchy orzero
world government, in which nation-states no longer exist and government is done on the local
level based on a global ethic of human rights.
This falls into line with the concept of Internationalism, which states that sovereignty is an
outdated concept and a barrier to achieving peace and harmony in the world, thus also stating
that nation-states are also a similar outdated concept.
If the nation-state does begin to disappear, then it may well be the direct or indirect result
of globalization and Internationalism. The two concepts state that sovereignty is an outdated
concept and, as the concept and existence of a nation-state depends on 'untouchable'
sovereignty, it is therefore reasonable to assume that. Globalization especially has helped to
bring about the discussion about the disappearance of nation states, as global trade and the rise
of the concepts of a 'global citizen' and a common identity have helped to reduce differences
and 'distances' between individual nation states, especially with regards to the internet.

Clash of civilizations"

The front cover for the book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order" by Samuel P. Huntington.

In direct contrast to cosmopolitan theories about an ever more connected world that no longer
requires nation-states, is the Clash of Civilizations theory. The proposal by political
scientist Samuel P. Huntington is that people's cultural and religious identities will be the
primary source of conflict in the postCold War world.
The theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture
[23]
at the American Enterprise Institute,
which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of
Civilizations?",
[24]
in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last
Man. Huntington later expanded histhesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order.
Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global
politics in the postCold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human
rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economics had become the only remaining
ideological alternative for nations in the postCold War world. Specifically, Francis
Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense.
Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a
normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary
axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines.

As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of
cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.
In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most
powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur
between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will
dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the
future.
Scholar Sandra Joireman suggests that Huntington may be characterised as a neo-
primordialist since while he sees people as having strong ties to their ethnicity, he does not
believe that these ties have always existed.

IS THERE A FUTURE FOR THE NATION-STATE IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION?
IF SO, WHAT FUTURE?

INTRODUCTION -
For proponents of the traditional study of international relations most especially those
originating from the realist and neorealist schools of thought there is one primary unit that
determines the way we interact globally. This unit is the nation-state, an amalgamation of
nation (one people) with state (one government). If one were to imagine an abstract image
of the globe one would see gridlines. These lines mark off different nation-states, each one
separate from the others and sovereign inside its defined and unmoving borders. These nation-
states interact with each other, be it through war or trade in a relationship that is theoretically
simple. Each nation-state is equal in terms of having sovereignty (self-determination) and the
sole right to use legitimate force inside its own borders. Actors in the international system such
as transnational businesses, international governmental organisations (IGOs hereafter) and
international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs hereafter) have significantly less
importance than the nation-state. They represent the low politics of trade and business and
temporary agreements compared to the high politics of the nation-state, with its role of
protecting its sovereignty from attack, and of maintaining stability inside its borders. In a world
of anarchy, nation-states provide oases of security and stability in which non-state actors have
the ability to operate. Globalisation affects the traditional conception of world organisation.
Whether globalisation is understood as an example of increasing global capitalism - the success
of the neo-liberal economic project - or as a deeper and more complex example of increased
interconnections of politics, culture and finance globally, it suggests that the world is not a
collection of states floating in a sea of anarchy. The very conception of anything being global
across the entire planet contradicts traditional understandings of world affairs and nation-
state primacy, and introduces the possibility of non-state actors (businesses, IGOs and INGOs)
having a role equal or superior to the nation-state. Nonstate events like capital flows through
international markets, private investment affecting foreign currency prices, and multinational

businesses providing (and removing) jobs according to profitability impact those living inside
individual nation-states, and apparently defy the individual nation-states control.

Any truly global movement transcends the traditional nation-states sovereignty, and occurs
outside of its authority. The sovereignty to direct any global event is a global sovereignty, and
suggests that an authority (or series of authorities) other than the nation-state must be included
in our understanding of international relations.

This paper asks whether the nation-state has a future in an era of globalisation, and what that
future may be. It begins by outlining the challenge globalisation presents to the nation-state,
and progresses to an examination of where the nation-state may go next. Because of the sheer
complexity of the issues involved, and the enormous wealth of topical information available on
the subject, this paper cannot hope to be fully comprehensive. Nevertheless, by its conclusion
the reader will have a clear understanding of the effect globalisation has on the notion of the
state, and what form or forms the nation-state may assume or maintain in the future.

THE CHALLENGE GLOBALISATION PRESENTS TO THE NATION-STATE

Globalisation can be understood as an intensification of global interconnectedness (McGrew,
1998, pp. 300) that transcends states and societies as individual units, and may even denote a
fundamental reorganisation of human social activity to an inter-regional or transcontinental
form. If globalisation in its most complete sense takes effect then the nation-state will be its
chief victim (Waters, 2001: pp. 98). The world would be interconnected in global institutions of
politics, economics, and society. Citizenship - if it were to exist at all - could be understood as
global citizenship, a citizenship of shared existence including all humans and the role of
nationaism, and hence the role of the nation-state, would be irrelevant. However, even without
globalisation creating some form of world-state it still provides significant challenges to the
nation-state. As mentioned in the introduction, the very existence of any truly global tendency,
be it in a market or in a political organisation, poses problems for the nation-state. The inability

of any national actor to exert authoritative influence on the global stage means that global
tendencies potentially escape sovereign control. Three distinct aspects of globalisation that
challenge the nation-state are identified below. The first is the reduced ability of the nation-
state to exert influence on its economy when economic transactions increasingly take place on a
global level. The second is the increase of transnational bodies, be they political (the UN),
economic (NAFTA), a combination of the two (the EU) or some form of NGO (ranging from
businessesto civilian pressure groups). The third and final aspect is the emergence of super-
national and sub-national centres of power (ranging from local councils to the aforementioned
UN).

A REDUCED ABILITY TO REGULATE THE ECONOMY

Holton (1998, pp.80) says that flows of investment, technology, communications, and profit
across national boundaries are *+ the most striking symptom of global challenge to the nation-
state. The regulatory ability of the nationstate is reduced because those it wishes to police
operate outside its sovereign borders, and the existence of global actors means that the nation-
state is sidelined by world market forces which are stronger than even the most powerful
states (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, pp.175). The nation-state therefore has a severely reduced
ability to control economic flows in globalisation, and loses control of the capital that it needs to
sustain itelf (for it needs capital to pay for the cost of maintaining its internal authority and its
external sovereignty). The nation-state is subsumed into the global economic system and
becomes what Kenichi Ohmae would call a local authority of that system (Hirst and Thompson,
1996, pp.176). The nation-state changes from being the primary unit of international relations
to being a provider of public goods and infrastructure to global businesses. A harsh fate indeed
for what was once the key unit of global interaction.

The economic challenge of globalisation to the nation-state is one of decreased legislative ability
(or sovereign control) over markets inside the state, and increased market ability to affect the
nation-state. It is a twofold problem of losing control andbeing increasingly controlled, with

global organisations and global trends transcending and perhaps ultimately replacing the nation-
state as the primary units of international organisation or importance. This leads to what Oran
Young calls a retreat from the postulate of the state as the fundamental unit of world politics
(Young in McGrew and Lewis, 1992, pp. 263), and to a conception of an international system of
mixed actors without a settled hierarchical relationship.

AN INCREASE OF TRANSNATIONAL BODIES

The essence of the state and the main practical condition for its viability lies in the fact that
sovereign and autonomous political institutions are capable of deriving legitimacy from a distinct
citizenry located in a defined territory (Cerny in Kofman and Young, 1996, pp. 123). If nation-
state sovereignty is reduced, or its autonomy decreased, then the question remains of what
institutions or bodies are replacing it in matters of governance, most especially forms of
governance that require a global reach. This question leads us to the second serious challenge
to the nation-state in globalisation, that of transnational bodies.

Transnational bodies can be IGOs, INGOs or businesses. IGOs such as the UN, the EU, the IMF
and the WTO/GATT present challenges to traditional nation-state sovereignty through
international (if limited) legislative or coercive power. INGOs such as Greenpeace International
and Amnesty International outflank nation-states and threaten borders [while] their complexity
defies command and their capacity to link diverse people *+ to common causes and interests
undermines the saliency of the state (Waters, 2001, pp. 117). INGOs have the ability to unite
people from many nation-states into new groupings based on shared interests that may
collectively have substantial global financial and political influence, particularly through lobby
groups affecting individual nation-state autonomy. Finally, businesses, in the form of
transnational corporations (TNCs), are often larger and more powerful than many
governments (Waters, 2001, pp. 124), and may have the ability to affect both nation-state
sovereignty and autonomy while pursuing their own goals. TNCs can demand labour

concessions, taxation concessions, and trade concessions from nation-states in exchange for
basing their manufacturing or production divisions in a particular country.

SUPER AND SUB-NATIONAL CENTRES OF POWER -

Daniel Bell (in Waters, 2001, pp.123) is quoted as saying that The nation-state is becoming too
small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life. The nation-state is
seen as becoming unable to control the increasingly global problems it (or its people) faces, and
unwieldy in dealing with local issues like regional education, regional governance, and regional
social matters. In short, the central paradox of globalization is that rather than creating one big
economy or one big polity (what has also been called the airport bookshop image of
globalization), it also divides, fragments and polarizes (Cerny in Germain, 2001, pp. 137),
shifting the effective deployment of governing power to super and sub-national levels.

On the international level, this includes bodies like the aforementioned UN, EU, IMF and
WTO/GATT, which all have some form of limited legislative and/or coercive powers. On the local
(or sub-national) level, there are challenges to state sovereignty through local councils, regional
governments (like the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly in the UK), and other forms
of decentralised governmental organisation. Thus, person living in Scotland can be both a
European Union citizen and a British subject on their passport, Scottish by proclamation, and
have their local services provided by the Glasgow City Council. This would appear to suggest that
the state is becoming, once more and as in the past, just one source of authority among
several, with limited powers and resources (Strange, 1996, pp. 73).
Where the nation-state may go next It is suggested in the section above that the nation-state
faces many potential problems in an era of globalisation. There are three key conceptions of
how the nationstate may respond to these challenges, each of which we examine below. One
view is that the nation-state is dissolving as in institution, and is obsolete. Another is that the
nation-state has increased importance for maintaining and evolving globalisation trends, and is
essential to organisation stability. Finally, there are those who think the nationstate faces

restructuring through globalisation, and while it will not disappear, it will evolve into an
altered state, with a substantially different role from the Keynesian Welfare State we have
known during much of the 20
th
century.

NEO-MEDIEVALISM: THE DISSOLVING NATION-STATE -

It is possible nation-states are being surpassed by other bodies and authorities and are
becoming unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy (Ohmae in McGrew,
1998, pp. 303). Because of increased activity by IGOs, INGOs, TNCs and other global or local
actors the nation-state is increasingly archaistic, and will eventually be obsolete. At their most
extreme the changes wrought by globalisation can be understood to mean that in place of the
self-contained nation-state is a network, modelled after transnational firms, detached from
territorial forms of order and epresenting an open system without borders (Dittgen, 1999,
pp.165). Thus the nationstate and its national economic organisation is effectively dissolving,
and a world closer to that of late medieval Europe, with its elaborate networks of trading cities
(Barry Jones, 2000, pp. 224) is emerging to replace it.

As Stephen Kobrin pointed out (Prakash and Hart, 1999, pp. 167), neomedievalism does not
suggest that we are about to return to an age of lords and peasants. At its most basic neo-
medievalism is about regarding the nation-state, and state politics as a whole, as something of
a historic abnormality. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is taken as marking the beginning of the
modern state system, and the materialising global world of interconnection is taken as marking
its end. Neo-medievalism proposes that Discrete and meaningful borders and the clear
separation of the domestic from the foreign, indeed the very idea of the international, may be a
modern anomaly (Kobrin in Prakash and Hart, 1999, pp. 182). The medieval existence of
overlapping authorities and multiple or overlapping loyalties may return to us, albeit in a
substantially altered form, due to the forces of globalisation. These authorities and loyalties
would create a new international power structure that undermines the sovereignty of states
(Waters, 2001, pp. 100), and potentially even replaces them altogether.


THE RESILIENT NATION-STATE

For realists (and others) the nation-state is far from finished, and indeed importance of the
state has even actually increased in some areas, certainly with respect to promoting
international competitiveness through support for R & D, for technology policy, and for other
assistance to domestic firms (Gilpin, 2001, pp. 363). The challenges that globalisation presents
to the nation-state are not regarded as insurmountable, and globalisation may even be a
construct of the nation-state rather than an exclusionary force aligned against it. Virtually all
states have become involved in the process of internationalization (Jessop in Delorme and
Dopfer, 1994, pp. 109), even if only to maximise potential national benefit or to minimise
possible harmful effects. Globalisation need not reduce state autonomy, and Keohane
(McGrew, 1998, pp. 316) goes so far as to suggest that nation-states use international regimes
to accomplish policy that benefits them on a national level, and which may not be possible
through unilateral action. Furthermore, it can be argued that nation-state need not be replaced
or significantly reconstructed in the face of globalisation, and remains the most powerful
insitution to channel and tame the power of markets (Boyer in Boyer and Drache, 1996, pp.).
The state is currently the most effective method of organising international relations currently in
existence, and while bodies like the UN or EU possess limited power on an international level,
and bodies like the Scottish Parliament have limited power on a regional level, the nation-state
must remain the primary unit in international relations. In short, The nation-state is still the
most important institution to ensure the rule of law in an explosive world (Dittgen, 1999,
pp.174).

THE ALTERED NATION-STATE -

It can be said, globalization is authored by states and is primarily about reorganizing rather than
bypassing them (Panitch in Mittelman, 1996, pp. 85). This is a similar assertion to the resilient

state suggestion of nation-state involvement in globalisation above, but assumes a slightly
different outcome. Rather than suggesting that the nation-state is fated to dissolve in the face
of globalisation, or that it will remain the primary unaltered unit of international relations, there
is a postulation of an altered state. The nation-state is said to exist now in one form, to have
existed in the past in another, and to be transforming itself actively into a third. This is a
proposition that assumes a resilient but elastic nation-state, one that evolves over time, and
which becomes more or less influential in different spheres depending on the utility of that
influence.

One example of this altered state thesis is that proposed by Philip Cerny, who suggests that
the nation-state is not dead (Cerny in Germain, 2000, pp. 133), although its role has changed.
He envisages the transformation of the nation-state from being a governing system concerned
with welfare to being a system concerned with competition. Unsurprisingly he calls this the
competition state. The competition state exists in a world of increased fragmentation and
globalisation, and is characterised by a decrease of public services and an increase of private
services or industry. The competition state is a mix of civil and business organisation, and is
concerned with effective returns on investment or effort. In the long run the state is
developing into an enterprise association, with key civic, public and constitutional functions *+
subordinate to the global marketplace (Cerny in Kofman and Young, 1996, pp. 136).

Another example of the altered state is envisioned by Leo Panitch. Panitch thinks that
globalising pressures even on advanced industrial states has led to a reorganisation of the
structural power relations within states *but has+ not diminished the role of the state (Biswas,
2002, pp. 18). The nation-state is changing, but is not facing a disempowerment or loss of
sovereignty. Indeed, Panitch would understand globalisation as being authored by nation-
states, and the role of the state in collecting taxation, providing security, and having the
monopoly of legitimate violence inside its sovereign borders as being unchanged. Globalisation
and alteration of the state role is an attempt to secure global and domestic rights of capital
(Panitch in Biswas, 2002, pp. 18), and not a neo-medieval dissolution of the state apparatus. If

true globalisation is occurring then we must evolve our understanding of human interaction and
organisation from one based on nationalism to one based on a global society. We must create
new paradigms of human communication, politics, and culture to deal with the problems of
conceptualising a world of interconnection and interrelations. This is what neo-medievalists
forecast, and this is why they predict the death of the nation-state as a useful unit in the
understanding of international relations. However, advocates of the resilient state and the
altered state both say globalisation need not be understood as something challenging to the
nation-state. They would argue that in the face of globalisation the nation-state can persevere,
either almost unchanged or in an evolved form, and that it may even be the primary author of
globalisation tendencies.

State and economy

Masterminding Bill Clintons successful presidential campaign back in 1992 was George Stephanopoulos.
Above his desk, as a constant reminder of the key issue of this (or any other) presidential contest, was a
sign that read: Its the Economy, stupid! At the start of the twenty-first century, almost everyone
realizes the importance of the economy not just in deciding elections but also in shaping the more
general processes of government. Indeed, some commentators claim that we are now living in an age of
pocket-book politics, in which, with the decline of traditional political ideologies, narrowly conceived
economic self-interest is the overwhelming driving force of the political process. Voters may have other
concerns, such as health and education, but the anticipated competence of a government in economic
management is seen to trump all these other issues. Of course, state and government are about very
much more than the winning and losing of elections. The day-to-day business of the state is, among other
things, about the making and implementing of policy, the management of consent, the waging of wars,
the processing of societal pressures, the provision of welfare services, the maintenance of law and order
and so on. All of these activities have an economic dimension. They cost money which the state has to
raise (through user charges, taxes or the sale of public debt), and the ways in which these monies are
raised will itself have an effect upon the forms and levels of economic activity. The modern state is, as we

have seen Schumpeter (1954) observe, a tax state. In the last instance, it is dependent upon the health
of the wider economy to fund its own activity.

Differing attitudes to the question of state and economy have also helped to define what is probably the
single most important cleavage in political opinion of the past two hundred years. On one side there have
been those, now best represented by the neo-liberals, who have argued for a minimal state and the
greatest possible autonomy for an economy founded upon the private ownership of economic resources.
We have seen in Chapter 3 how Hayek argued that the best economic outcomes could be guaranteed by
trusting to the institutions of the free market. Given private proprietorship of their economic assets, self-
interest would direct asset-holders towards the most efficient use of societys productive resources in an
arrangement that was consistent with the greatest possible levels of individual freedom. In the neo-
liberal view, the states functions should ideally be limited to the provision of a neutral framework for
law and order and the maintenance of contract plus the provision of a very small number of genuinely
public goods. On the other side have been those traditional socialists (not all of them Marxists) who
have seen private ownership in a market economy not as a solution, but as the core problem which the
state has a duty to address. We have already seen that Marxists (and indeed socialists more generally)
have diverse views on the desirable character and functions of the state. But there is certainly a very
widely held view in traditional socialist accounts that a society which is to deliver on equality and liberty
must be one in which the state (as representative of the people) owns and controls at least the
commanding heights of the economy. In this traditional socialist view, the economy is the site of
societys most fundamental powers and individuals most deep-seated interests. Under a market
capitalist economy, these powers are expropriated by the owners of private capital at the expense of the
great majority of working people. Economic power can only be reclaimed by the mass of the people by
instituting the collective or common ownership of the economy, and this, in many accounts, is most
effectively done through state ownership and control of all large-scale property.

Something like the latter argument was used to justify the massive state owner-ship that characterized
the economies of the former Soviet states of the USSR and Eastern Europe. It was also one of the
principal justifications for the process of nationalization through which productive assets in Western
Europe were brought under state ownership. The argument of the neo-liberals, by contrast, has been
used to justify the wholesale withdrawal of the state from immediate involvement in the economy,
especially in the virtually world-wide process of privatization (moving state-owned economic assets into
the private sector) which has been one of the most important political developments in the years since
1980. It has also been used to justify a whole series of reforms within the state apparatus which have
sought to mimic market disciplines and incentives in the public sector (see below, pp. 846). Although

the issue of capitalism versus socialism has receded, disagreement about the stateeconomy relationship
continues to be at the heart of divided opinions about the general character of the modern state and its
legitimate functions.

While most people would agree that the stateeconomy relationship is extremely important, in trying to
explain it we face what is by now a familiar problem. How do we establish the boundaries between state
and economy and, still more importantly, what is the flow of causation between the two? Do states
shape economies, or do economies shape states? As might be expected following our discussion of the
parallel problem of states and societies, neither question yields a straightforward answer. Indeed, there
is a problem with posing the question in quite this way. There is an ever present danger that we may reify
both terms, arguing as if state and economy were neatly demarcated things in the external
environment which could act and react upon each other. Without entering into the arcane debate about
what sorts of things there are in the world and how we might know about them, it is clear that the state
and the economy are not observable social actors, but parts of a generally convenient (though
sometimes quite misleading) shorthand with which we try to make sense of our surroundings. We saw in
the opening pages of Chapter 1 how some critics insist that talk of the state actually leads us to
misunderstand the nature of the exercise of power. Similarly, feminist critics, for example, have long
argued that the way in which the economy is conventionally understood (as the sphere of paid labour
performed outside the household) has systematically disprivileged women (McIntosh 1978). Defining the
economy is an inherently political task.

In this chapter, I try to make sense of the complex relationship between state and economy first by
considering in some detail the various ways in which states have been seen to generate economic effects
and then, rather more briefly, by outlining the ways in which economies may be said to shape states. I
develop this latter position by focusing upon the ways in which states are inserted in the economy and
considering the specific context of change in the stateeconomy relationship since the 1960s. In reading
these sections, it is always important to remember that the shorthand categories of state and
economy are far from unproblematic.

States acting in the economy

For the purposes of our analysis, the economic activity of the state may be divided into two. First, there
are those areas in which the state is directly involved as an economic actor. A second field of activity is

defined by those instruments of policy through which the state seeks to influence the economic process.
This second category may itself be further divided between those state policies which are directly
addressed to the economy (such as industrial and monetary policy) and those which have a profound but
indirect impact on economic activity (above all, the govern-ments social policy). Of course, in the real
world these several areas of state activity almost always overlap and feed back upon each other. All are
addressed in the coming sections.

The state as owner

Perhaps the most obvious way in which the state has an impact as an economic actor is in its role as the
owner of both land and capital. Modern states, at both the national and local level, are often societys
largest landowners. Many have significant (sometimes controlling) shareholdings in what are formally
private corporations. Much of a nations underdeveloped or common land will be in the ownership of the
state, and states property also generally includes large numbers of valuable public buildings
government offices, schools, hospitals, universities, army establishments and so on often in prime-site
locations. In the UK, for example, the post-war state held title to as much as one-fifth of the nations land
and, despite the wholesale sell-offs of the 1980s and 1990s, it still owns something like 3 million private
dwellings (Scott 1991; CSO 1995; www.housing.adpm.gov.uk/information/keyfigures/ #stock).
Technically, in Britain, the Crown is the only fully legitimate owner of land (Cahill 2001).

In fact, ownership is not a single, simple principle, but rather, it is conventionally argued, a bundle of
rights and claims, not all of which will be in the hands of a single legal entity (Honor 1961). Once we
recognize ownership as constituting a bundle of rights we can see that the actual pattern of state
ownership is likely to be under- reported. The rights of private property-holders are actually qualified by
certain powers which the state characteristically retains to itself (in the form of planning laws,
environmental laws, the right to compulsory purchase and so on). Matters of dispute over ownership are
generally adjudicated and then upheld by the states judicial and police apparatus. Furthermore, in the
last instance, most states, in claiming to be sovereign, retain certain special rights of ownership
throughout their jurisdiction, which they may evoke in times of national emergency.

The state as ownerproducer

Generally more prominent in discussions of the states economic role has been its function as the owner
of public enterprises. In the state-socialist societies of East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union, state
ownership was the preponderant (though not normally the exclusive) form of ownership within the
formal economy. Disposing of these state assets in ways which are fair, efficient and lawful has been
acutely problematic (Earle et al. 1993). In the societies of the developed West with which we are
principally concerned, private ownership has always remained the predominant form. But, especially in
the period after 1945, most of these countries developed a public enterprise sector of varying
proportions, leading them to be described as mixed economies. In the mid-1970s, public corporations
across a range of these mixed economies (excluding the USA) accounted for some 13.5 per cent of capital
formation, nearly 10 per cent of GDP and about 68 per cent of employment. By 1980, 54 of the 500
largest firms outside the USA were public enterprises. In the UK, at the end of the 1970s, the state sector
accounted for about 11.5 per cent of GDP and had a workforce of close to 2 million (Parris et al. 1987;
Mulgan 1993).

State ownership tended to be strongly focused upon the public utilities, that is, in providing basic services
which were essential to everyone (gas, electricity, water, etc.), and whose supply was often seen to
constitute a natural monopoly. But public ownership was also extended more generally into larger
corporations in particular key industries (energy supply, banking) and/or industries that faced particular
competitive difficulties (e.g. the car industry in France and the UK). This reflected the fact that state
ownership was initiated not solely, nor indeed primarily, to transfer rights of ownership to the public (the
ideological grounds for public owner-ship). Rather, it was variously argued that the absence of effective
competition required that these industries be publicly managed, that private management had failed to
deliver services efficiently and effectively or that particular strategic industries should not be available for
foreign ownership. At times, nationalization could also be an instrument of regional policy (encouraging
industrial activity in underdeveloped regions), of employment policy (maintaining employment levels by
subsidizing large but non-competitive enterprises) and of industrial policy (helping to subsidize firms in
the private sector by providing inputs below cost price). It also seemed at one time that no self-
respecting state could possibly be without its own flag-carrying national airline, from the globe-spanning
British Airways to the rather more modest Air Malta!

CONCLUSION

The future of the nation-state in an era of globalisation is a topic pertinent to all the people who live
inside a state, and is an increasingly important subject as global tendencies play an expanding role in the
political rhetoric of our day. Whether or not some cataclysmic change to our method of governmental
organisation is looming, it is vital that we attempt to understand how political, economic or social
interconnections affect the governance of people in individual countries, regions and continents.

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