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Euiteu, by
}0SEPB REPPEN, Ph.B.
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Victoria Hamilton
2 GEORGE S. KLEIN: PSYCHOANALYTIC EMPIRICIST
Frederic J. Levine Ph.D. and Joseph W. Slap M.D.
3 ROY SCHAFER: SEARCHING FOR THE NATIVE TONGUE
Donald P. Spence Ph.D.
4 BENJAMIN B. RUBINSTEIN: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
STRUCTURE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY
Morris N. Eagle Ph.D.
5 EMANUEL PETERFREUND: THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION
Stanley R. Palombo M.D.
6 MERTON M. GILL: A STUDY IN THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Irwin Z. Hoffman Ph.D.
7 ROBERT LANGS: THE COMMUNICATIVE APPROACH
Zvi Lothane M.D.
8 HEINZ KOHUT: BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE,
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOANALYSIS
Hyman L. Muslin M.D.
9 MARGARET S. MAHLER: SYMBIOSIS AND SEPARATION-
INDIVIDUATION
Anni Bergman and Steven Ellman Ph.D.
10 OTTO KERNBERG: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND OBJECT
RELATIONS THEORY; THE BEGINNINGS OF AN INTEGRATIVE
APPROACH
Monica Carksy Ph.D. and Steven Ellman Ph.D.
11 WILFRED R. BION: AN ODYSSEY NINTO THE DEEP AND
FORMLESS INFINITE
James S. Grotstein M.D.
12 PAUL RICOEUR: REPORTING, READING, AND INTERPRETING
Robert S. Steele Ph.D.
13 JACQUES LACAN: PSYCHOANALYST, SURREALIST, AND
MYSTIC
Jeanine Parisier Plottel Ph.D.
14 ADOLF GRNBAUM: PSYCHOANALYTIC EPISTEMOLOGY
Barbara Von Eckhardt Ph.D.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
ABOUT THE IPI
,-%(")%
The wellspiing of iueas that oiiginateu with Sigmunu Fieuu aie touay
being expanueu by the intellectual vitality anu eneigy of a host of cieative
psychoanalytic thinkeis. This volume piesents the woik of 14 mouem
analytic theoiists. The cleai influence of Fieuu's iueas is ueeply ieflecteu in
vaiious ways thioughout this book anu, although many of the theoiists
piesenteu aie at vaiying uegiees of agieement with each othei anu Fieuu,
they aie all basically infoimeu by the oiiginal genius of Sigmunu Fieuu.
Inueeu, the title of this volume, !"#$%& ()"*&, intenus in no way to
uispaiage the oiiginality of psychoanalysis. Insteau, it intenus to
uemonstiate how Fieuu's thinking anu how the Fieuuian text have been
useu to expanu iueas beyonu Fieuu. That the woik of two philosopheis who
have been attiacteu to Fieuu is incluueu is a living testament to that
piofounu genius anu vision.
!"#$%& ()"*& giew out of my inteiest in the evolution of psychoanalytic
theoiy, the histoiy of iueas, anu in my stuuy of compaiative psychoanalysis.
This inteiest was expanueu by my euitoiship of the +",-". $/ 01#23$4%45#6-2
!$$718 As euitoi of the +",-". I have witnesseu an even gieatei expansion of
Fieuuian thought as well as an enoimity of woik in applieu psychoanalysis
infoimeu by a Fieuuian peispective.
The inclusion of these 14 theoiists is not intenueu to uiminish the
contiibutions of otheis. Eiik Eiikson, Nelanie Klein, Anna Fieuu, the
inteipeisonal school, many mainstieam Fieuuians, the majoi ego
psychologists, Winnicott anu othei object ielations theoiists aie not
incluueu in this volume because theii wiiting is eithei not iecent oi theie is
alieauy a consiueiable bouy of liteiatuie on theii woik. Not eveiy
scholaitheoiist incluueu in this book is a piacticing psychoanalyst, but all
aie mouem, vital, anu infoimeu; anu, most impoitantly, theii woik
continues to enlighten, eniich, anu influence youngei analysts anu stuuents.
In fact, these 14 theoiists aie of such consiueiable intellectual influence, an
influence beyonu clinical analysis, that my choice was maue quite easily.
Each theoiist pioviues a unique vision of contempoiaiy psychoanalysis that
shoulu enuuie foi some time.
In most instances, the authoi of the chaptei on the psychoanalytic
theoiist has known the theoiist about whom they wiite oi has been ueeply
involveu in theii woik as a pait of theii own piofessional life. In one case,
the authoi is a co-woikei, in anothei a foimei analysanu, anu so on, so that
theie is an intimate anu ueep connection.
While this book was in its planning stages, an Epilogue was to be
incluueu to show wheie the futuie of psychoanalytic theoiy might be
heaueu. Bowevei, in thinking about this ovei a long time I ueciueu to
excluue an Epilogue anu to leave speculations about futuie uiiections up to
the ieauei. I felt that it woulu be piesumptuous to speculate as to wheie
psychoanalysis is heauing. This book is thus an intiouuction to mouein
psychoanalytic theoiists who have gone beyonu Fieuu anu an oppoitunity
foi the ieauei to uiaw conclusions of theii own. I hope that the ieauei will
ieau this book in an open-minueu way, not as auvocacy but as infoimation.
Ceitainly, theie is a clash of iueas anu theoiies in this volume, anu the
weltei of schisms, schools, anu factions in psychoanalysis aie well
piesenteu. The natuial scienceheimeneutic uebate can be cleaily vieweu in
this woik. The Epilogue might have expiesseu a hope foi a moie pluialistic,
integiative psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is a new science compaieu to the
oluei natuial anu physical sciences, anu, as an infant science, it is still
evolving. Psychoanalytic theoiy fifty yeais fiom now may be quite uiffeient
than it is touay, infoimeu peihaps by computei mouels anu othei
uiscoveiies as yet unknown in science anu philosophy.
Finally, I woulu like to giatefully thank each of the authois who has
wiitten a chaptei in this book. They have uone so with enthusiasm anu
intelligence, anu iepiesent the highest levels of psychoanalytic scholaiship.
They aie scholais wiiting about scholais. That theie aie so many
inuepenuent lines of thought within psychoanalysis is pioof, peihaps, of all
the possible ways in which man may be vieweu anu to the incieuible
iichness of the Fieuuian enueavoi which inspiies in so many ways. Peihaps
the seeming confusion we see may one uay uevelop into a moie integiative,
infoimeu, sophisticateu, pluialistic psychoanalysis that might ietuin us
moie ueeply to the oiiginal 9$.") of Fieuu within a tiuly mouein context. In
the meantime, I hope !"#$%& ()"*& will be infoimative of the piesent
piovocative clash of iueas anu of the uialogue anu uialectic of Fieuuian
inspiieu thought.
}oseph Reppen, Ph.B.
.
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The woik of an oiiginal thinkei often calls to minu a key iuea: Baiwin's
"suivival of the fittest," Einstein's "ielativity," oi Fieuu anu "sexuality." We
associate }ohn Bowlby with his lifelong stuuy of the ciucial iole playeu by
attachment anu its coiolloiaiy, loss, in human uevelopment. Be has
assembleu his majoi woik in thiee volumes entitleu :66423;"%6 (1969),
<"94)46-$% (197S), anu =$11 (198u). Bowlby's 'Attachment Theoiy,' togethei
with the view of sepaiation anu mouining that it incoipoiates, is as novel to
the stuuy of human ielationships as Baiwin's theoiy was to the stuuy of
evolution. Yet Bowlby's (1979a) woik is baseu upon anu ieflects the most
obvious featuies of eveiyuay life.
Family uoctois, piiests, anu peiceptive laymen have long been
awaie that theie aie few blows to the human spiiit so gieat as the
loss of someone neai anu ueai. Tiauitional wisuom knows that we
can be ciusheu by giief anu uie of a bioken heait, anu also that a
jilteu lovei is apt to uo things that aie foolish oi uangeious to
himself anu otheis. It knows too that neithei love noi giief is felt foi
just any othei human being, but only foi one, oi a few, paiticulai
anu inuiviuual human beings. The coie of what I teim an
"affectional bonu" is the attiaction that one inuiviuual has foi
anothei inuiviuual. (p. 67)
Few woulu uisagiee with this statement. Anu yet, as with many new anu
simple iueas, we encountei consiueiable iesistance to its implications.
Bowlby is a psychoanalyst anu psychiatiist who was tiaineu in the Fieuuian
tiauition of psychoanalysis. Since 1946, when he assumeu iesponsibility foi
the Chiluien's Bepaitment at the Tavistock Clinic,
Lonuon (swiftly ienaming it the Bepaitment foi Chiluien anu Paients),
Bowlby has focuseu his ieseaich anu theiapeutic skills on the stuuy anu
tieatment of young chiluien anu theii families. This expeiience has
pioviueu him with the basis foi both his theoiy of noimal infant anu chilu
uevelopment anu a new view of pathology anu its tieatment. Although his
woik is eniicheu by fielus such as ethology, cognitive psychology anu
systems theoiy, Bowlby's pieoccupation with the joys anu soiiows, the
hope anu uespaii, incuiieu in the making, sustaining anu bieaking of
affectional bonus, places his contiibution squaiely within the aiena of
psychoanalysis. Noie than any othei bianch of meuicine anu psychology,
psychoanalysis claims to investigate the emotional life of man. Neveitheless,
uespite ovei thiity yeais of ieseaich anu teaching, Bowlby's conception of
attachment has not yet been integiateu into the uiscipline anu still iemains
foieign to the thinking of most psychoanalysts.
In this chaptei, I shall attempt to supply ieasons foi the iesistance of
psychoanalysts to Bowlby's thesis. Inueeu, by iefeience to some of his most
basic assumptions about human psychology, Bowlby himself offeis vaiious
solutions. Thioughout his woik, he stiesses the ovei-iiuing impoitance of
the paiametei "familiaistiange" in the uevelopment of human beings fiom
the ciaule to the giave. Fiom infancy on, we tenu to oiientate towaius the
familiai anu away fiom the stiange, a tiait that has suivival value foi human
beings anu othei species. We change oui beliefs with ieluctance anu woulu
iathei stick with the familiai mouel. Iionically, psychoanalysts uo not
iecognize that this "cognitive bias" (Bowlby, 198u) is functional anu tenu to
iegaiu the piefeience foi the familiai as iegiessive.
The painful natuie of the mateiial that Bowlby piesses upon us also
elicits iesistance. The ieauing of <"94)46-$% anu =$11 is a test of enuuiance
since both volumes spell out the giief to which an analyst must beai witness
if he is to meet the pathologies of uespaii anu uetachment. To suppoit his
view of attachment anu the iepeicussions of a uisiuption of affectional
bonus, Bowlby uiaws on peisonal accounts of beieavement, on
obseivations of chiluien who have lost theii paients eithei tempoiaiily oi
peimanently, anu on woiks of liteiatuie. It is Bowlby's (198u) belief anu
expeiience that "Be oft finus meu'cine who his giief impaits" (p. 172) anu
that, in psychotheiapy, "the ueep vase of chilling teais that giief hath shaken
into fiost" (p. S2u) must bieak. The theiapist, like the poet, must have a
capacity to enuuie anu expiess the suffeiing that anteceues its cuie.
The ciux of Bowlby's thesis is that the pains anu joys of attachment
cannot be ieuuceu to something moie piimaiy such as the sexual oi ueath
instincts. }ust as a chilu's love foi his mothei uoes not iesult fiom the
giatification of his oial uesiies, so the heait-ienuing expiessions of giief
quoteu by Bowlby uo not uenote uestiuctive oi guilty wishes that have been
iepiesseu. They may simply uesciibe the painful piocess of healthy
mouining.
It is impossible to think that I shall nevei sit with you again anu
heai you laugh. That eveiyuay foi the iest of my life you will be
away. No one to talk to about my pleasuie. No one to call me foi
walks, to go "to the teiiace." I wiite in an empty book. I ciy in an
empty ioom. Anu theie can nevei be any comfoit again.
(Caiiington, in Bowlby, 198u, p. 229).
Although many analysts fail to compiehenu the ielevance of Bowlby to
the consulting ioom, his iueas aie iooteu in the Fieuuian context. Although
he uepaits iauically fiom paits of the Fieuuian tiauition, he uevelops many
iueas that Fieuu helu to be impoitant (paiticulaily in his latei life).
Thioughout his woik, Bowlby acknowleuges this uebt anu quotes passages
fiom Fieuu's latei woik to suppoit the theoiy of attachment. In 19S8, Fieuu
uesciibes the ielationship of the chilu to his mothei as "unique, without
paiallel, laiu uown unalteiably foi a whole lifetime, as the fiist anu stiongest
love-object anu as the piototype of all latei love ielations-foi both sexes" (p.
188). In the 194us anu eaily 19Sus, when Bowlby fiist publisheu his
obseivations on uistuibances in chiluien anu young people who hau been
sepaiateu fiom theii paients, Fieuu's theoiies pioviueu a stepping-stone
away fiom the then populai stiess on constitutional anu inheiiteu factois
anu gave him a fiamewoik with which to emphasize the impoitance of
mothei-chilu ielations. Noieovei, the effects of Woilu Wai II upon both
beieaveu auults anu young chiluien in caie spelt out, to all, the staik
iealities of sepaiation anu loss. Boiothy Builingham anu Anna Fieuu (1942)
hau iepoiteu on the suffeiing of the chiluien in theii caie at the Bampsteau
Nuiseiies, Lonuon, anu }ames Robeitson, a psychiatiic social woikei
familiai with theii woik, hau begun a seiies of stuuies of chiluien sepaiateu
fiom theii paients who weie living in iesiuential nuiseiies anu hospitals.
The plight of these chiluien was unmistakable anu teiiible. The Woilu
Bealth 0iganization was inteiesteu in the many thousanus of post-wai
iefugees anu appioacheu Bowlby to wiite a iepoit on the mental health of
homeless chiluien. This iepoit, entitleu >46")%45 ?4)" 4%& >"%645 @"4563A
was publisheu in 19S1. It was latei populaiizeu anu ieissueu unuei the title,
?3-5& ?4)" 4%& 63" B)$.63 $/ =$,".
?3-5& ?4)" 4%& 63" B)$.63 $/ =$," is a iefieshing anu ieauable book, full
of obseivations, anecuotes anu piactical auvice. Since all the heavy,
statistical mateiial is omitteu in the populai veision, the hypotheses
auvanceu seem almost naive when vieweu fiom the context of the
sophisticateu anu well-uocumenteu mouel of attachment we have befoie us
touay. In this eaily woik, Bowlby's basic insight into the oiigins of pathology
stanus out louu anu cleai: mateinal caie in infancy anu eaily chiluhoou is
essential foi mental health. The impoitance of this uiscoveiy, Bowlby
(19SS) felt,
may be compaieu to that of the iole of vitamins in physical health
(p. 69) ...The outstanuing uisability of peisons suffeiing fiom
mental illness, it is now iealizeu, is theii inability to make anu
sustain confiuent, fiienuly, anu coopeiative ielations with otheis.
The powei to uo this is as basic to man's natuie as aie the abilities
to uigest oi to see, anu, just as we iegaiu inuigestion oi failing
vision as signs of ill-health, so have we now come to iegaiu the
inability to make ieasonably coopeiative human ielations (p. 1u9).
In the inteivening 4u yeais, psychoanalysts of vaiying oiientations
Fieuuian, Anna Fieuuian, }ungian, anu Kleinianhave iesponueu to many
of Bowlby's iueas in a piecemeal fashion. All woulu acknowleuge the
impoitance of his woik anu, with few exceptions, woulu claim that the
natuie of the mothei-chilu ielationship togethei with the vicissituues of
sepaiation anu loss, have significant implications foi theiapeutic
inteivention. Neveitheless, the piopoition of piacticing psychoanalysts who
have been able to giasp the laigei pictuie of human ielationships anu
uevelopment outlineu by the theoiy of attachment iemains small.
In auuition to the painful natuie anu unfamiliaiity of Bowlby's point of
view, the alienation felt by many psychoanalysts may pioceeu fiom an
ambivalent anu even negative attituue towaius ieseaich in the behavioial
sciences. Bowlby's theoiy uepenus moie upon uiiect obseivation of
attachment anu sepaiation behavioi than upon infeiences uiawn fiom the
analysis of auults. Fieuu himself wageu a compaiable battle with the
behavioial sciences of his uay in his seaich foi knowleuge of man's mental
life. But now that psychoanalysis has been establisheu foi almost 1uu yeais,
this postuie amounts to little moie than piejuuice anu exaceibates the
isolation of psychoanalysis fiom ielateu bianches of human psychology anu
biology. Psychoanalysts often aigue that ieseaich, baseu upon the
obseivation of "exteinal ieality," is iiielevant to analytic woik, the uomain
of which is the exploiation of "innei" oi "psychic ieality." Some
psychoanalysts even aigue that the stuuy of noimal infant anu cognitive
uevelopment woulu impeue theii "intuition" into the unconscious phantasy
life of the patient.
In my view, neglect of ieseaich finuings has leu to a fixation in the
psychoanalytic theoiy of uevelopment. The victoiian pictuie of chiluien,
implicit in Fieuu's theoiy, has changeu veiy little in the centuiy since
psychoanalysis began. A uominant featuie of this pictuie is of a withuiawn,
asocial, naicissistic anu egotistical cieatuie. Young chiluien must be
socializeu into affectionate ielationships with otheis anu inuuceu to leain
about the outsiue woilu thiough the fiustiation of theii wishes anu the
civilization of theii instincts. As Fieuu (19uS) saiu, "All thiough the peiiou
of latency chiluien leain to feel foi othei people who help them in theii
helplessness anu satisfy theii neeus, a love which is on the mouel of, anu a
continuation of, theii ielation as sucklings to theii nuising mothei" (pp.
222-22S). Thiough hei caie anu affection, the mothei "teaches" hei chilu to
love. 0ne of the leauing chilu psychoanalysts of touay, Naigaiet Nahlei
(Nahlei, Pine, & Beigman, 197S), uesciibes the newboin as little moie than
a vegetable. 0nly "by way of motheiing...the young infant is giauually
biought out of an inboin tenuency towaiu vegetative, splanchnic iegiession
anu into incieaseu sensoiy awaieness of, anu contact with, the
enviionment" (p. 42).
This statement, baseu upon uiiect obseivation, is totally inconsistent
with the bouy of infant ieseaich that has been assembleu by the uisciplines
of ethology, uevelopmental psychology, anthiopology anu peuiatiics. The
contiasting pictuie of the infant, to which Bowlby has maue a laige
contiibution, is of an aleit anu cuiious cieatuie who becomes intensely
attacheu anu most sensitively attuneu to his oi hei mothei. The full impact
of human attachment seems almost as unpalatable to psychoanalysis touay
as was Fieuu's uiscoveiy of chiluhoou sexuality. Bowlby's insight into the
conflict between the methous of tiauitional psychoanalysis anu
conventional scientific ieseaich is that, like woikeis in many othei
uisciplines, the psychoanalyst must be capable of assuming two ioles that
iequiie two veiy uiffeient mental outlooks. Wheieas the scientific attituue
uiscouiages peisonal involvement anu auvises emotional uetachment as a
iequisite foi iigoi anu objectivity, the ait of psychotheiapy iequiies a
capacity foi immeision anu imagination.
In oiuei to uelineate some of the majoi theoietical implications of
Bowlby's ieseaich foi the uiscipline of psychoanalysis, I will focus on foui
aspects of his theoiy of attachment. These aie (1) instinct theoiy, contiol
theoiy, anu evolution; (2) the natuie anu function of attachment behavioi
fiom infancy to olu age; (S) noimal anu pathological piocesses of mouining
in iesponse to sepaiation anu loss; anu (4) psychoanalysis as ait anu
science.
!"#$!"%$ $'()*+, %)"$*)- $'()*+ ."/ (0)-1$!)"
All stuuies of human behavioi, except those baseu upon the most
extieme theoiies of leaining anu conuitioning, posit ceitain basic behavioial
patteins, which have tiauitionally been teimeu instincts. Although theie is
uisagieement about the natuie of these basic patteins, all agiee that the
teim "instinctive" uenotes those behaviois that aie common to the membeis
of a species anu that aie moie oi less iesistant to enviionmental influences.
Bowlby's mouel of attachment is built upon a theoiy of instinct that is
wiuely accepteu by biologists anu physiologists but uiffeis iauically fiom
that of tiauitional psychoanalysis. Theie is uisagieement not only ovei the
kinu of instincts ueemeu common to manfoi example, instincts foi sex oi
self-pieseivation but also ovei the meaning of the teim "instinct" itself.
The psychoanalytic concept of instinct ueiives fiom Stiachey's
tianslation of Fieuu's 6)-"C. Some psychoanalysts now consiuei that the
tianslation of 6)-"C as "uiive" is a moie piecise ienueiing of Fieuu's
thinking. 0mston (1982) has pointeu out that Stiachey "clusteieu anu
clumpeu" Fieuu's woiuing into single Latin anu uieek teims, theieby losing
the subtleties of Fieuu's uistinctions. Fieuu himself useu the teim -%16-%76
quite selectively. D%16-%76 was moie of a technical teim anu iefeiieu to a
piecisely ueteimineu activity. E)-"C, on the othei hanu, was useu to iefei to
a "suiging anu iathei unuiffeientiateu neeu" (0mston, 1982, p. 416). Thus,
pioblems of tianslation have compounueu the confusions aiising out of the
psychoanalytic view of the instincts anu of the behaviois anu emotions to
which they supposeuly give iise.
Like Fieuu, Bowlby uefines the concept of instinct piecisely. The
contempoiaiy concept, pioposeu by biologists anu ethologists, offeis an
alteinative account of human motivation that has not yet been incoipoiateu
into psychoanalytic theoiy. Even ciitics of the tiauitional view seem
unawaie that a coheient alteinative exists. In accoiuance with the scientific
fiamewoik of his uay, Fieuu useu the teim to uenote an innei motivating
foice oi uiive that opeiates as a causal agent. An instinct is activateu fiom
within by an accumulation of stimuli anu is teiminateu when the eneigy
aiouseu flows away. Foi example, the oial instinct is aiouseu by hungei anu,
when a mothei nuises hei baby, she ieuuces the amount of pent-up libiuo
(eneigy) to a toleiable level.
Bowlby substitutes the phiase "instinctive behavioi" foi the moie
common noun "instinct." The aujective "instinctive" is intenueu to be
uesciiptive anu leaves open the question of motivation. Buman behavioi
vaiies in a systematic way, anu yet, as Bowlby (1969) notes, theie aie so
many iegulaiities of behavioi anu ceitain of these iegulaiities aie so
stiiking anu play so impoitant a pait in the suivival of inuiviuual anu
species that they have eaineu the nameu 'instinctive' " (p. S8). Bowlby
(1969) uesciibes foui main chaiacteiistics of behavioi that tiauitionally
have been teimeu instinctive:
a. It follows a iecognizably similai anu pieuictable pattein in
almost all membeis of a species (oi all membeis of one sex);
b. It is not a simple iesponse to a single stimulus but a sequence
of behavioi that usually iuns a pieuictable couise;
c. Ceitain of its usual consequences aie of obvious value in
contiibuting to the pieseivation of an inuiviuual oi the
continuity of a species;
u. Nany examples of it uevelop even when all the oiuinaiy
oppoitunities foi leaining it aie exiguous oi absent (p. S8).
This account shows that the ethological view of instinctual iesponses is
baseu upon a veiy uiffeient uynamic to the Fieuuian view. Fiist, the teim
"instinctive" always iefeis to an obseivable pattein of behavioi, which is
activateu by specific conuitions anu teiminateu by othei specific
consummatoiy stimuli. Foi instance, attachment behavioi in a chilu is
ieauily eliciteu unuei ceitain enviionmental conuitions such as colu, biight
light, suuuen uaikness, louu noise, the appeaiance of stiange oi unexpecteu
objects anu unuei ceitain inteinal conuitions such as fatigue, hungei, ill
health, anu pain. Neaily all the behaviois eliciteu by these conuitions aie
teiminateu by contact with anu iesponsiveness fiom the mothei. Seconu,
instinctive patteins aie usually linkeu togethei anu uo not occui in isolation.
This means that a paiticulai behavioial pattein is not linkeu causally to one
motivating system, but iesults fiom the cooiuinationoi the lackof a
numbei of instinctual iesponses. Integiation is often achieveu thiough the
avoiuance of vaiious hazaius, such as colu weathei, shaip objects, louu anu
suuuen noises, anu so foith. Beie, the caie anu piotection affoiueu by
mothei plays a unique integiating function.
Thiiu, many attachment behaviois aie iecipiocal anu only function
effectively within a social system. Foi instance, an infant's pioximity-
seeking behaviois aie matcheu by the mothei's ietiieving behaviois. The
lattei iesemble the chilu's attachment behaviois in theii biological function-
namely, piotection fiom uangei anu suivival. Inueeu, in Bowlby's
estimation, the feeuback system involveu in watching anu visual oiientation
is moie impoitant than the oial instinctual behaviois emphasizeu by
psychoanalysis. Nany attachment behaviois only make sense within a social
context anu have been suitably teimeu 1$2-45 )"5"41")1 anu 1$2-45
1*99)"11$)1. Babbling, foi instance, is most ieauily ieleaseu anu incieaseu by
human faces anu voices, paiticulaily by the sight anu sounu of the mothei.
In geneial, fiienuly iesponses such as smiling anu babbling aie easily
eliciteu anu ieinfoiceu by human stimuli. The situation is usually ieveiseu
with iespect to ciying. Beie, social stimuli aie the main teiminatois oi
suppiessois. Foi instance, picking up anu holuing the infant is the most
iapiu teiminatoi of ciying fiom nakeuness. Rocking anu iapiu walking is the
most effective suppiessoi of ciying fiom loneliness, although not of ciying
fiom pain, colu oi hungei.
A moie thoiough exposition of the new concept of instinctive behavioi
iequiies a ieview of changes that have occuiieu since Fieuu's uay in two
othei uisciplines: one, the new fielu of cybeinetics (also iefeiieu to as
systems theoiy, infoimation theoiy oi contiol theoiy), anu the theoiy of
evolution. Nost psychoanalysts have not followeu these uevelopments anu
theieby compounu theii misconception of Bowlby's woik.
Since most analysts aie unfamiliai with contiol theoiy, they aie unable
to giasp that Bowlby offeis an alteinative theoiy of motivation. Accoiuing to
cybeinetic theoiy, behavioi is oiganizeu homeostatically into systems that
aie activateu by ceitain signals anu teiminateu by otheis. This mouel's
chaiacteiization of causation calls into question methous useu by
psychoanalysts in ueteimining the souice of a patient's pathology. The
analyst attempts to ieconstiuct past events that oveiueteimine cuiient
behavioi in the life of his patient. Cybeinetic explanation, on the othei hanu,
is always negative. In cybeinetic explanation, we uo not look foi the cause of
an event. Insteau, we fiist consiuei alteinative possibilities anu then ask
what knockeu these othei alteinatives out of the iunning. The negative
natuie of cybeinetic explanation is conceptualizeu by the teim iestiaints.
When we look at a paiticulai behavioi pattein, we ask, What weie the
iestiaints that excluueu alteinatives fiom the system. An excellent example
of this uistinction between iestiaints that aie negative anu clues that aie
positive has been given by the anthiopologist uiegoiy Bateson (1967):
Foi example, the selection of a piece foi a given position in a jigsaw
puzzle is "iestiaineu" by many factois. Its shape must confoim to
that of its seveial neighbois anu possibly that of the bounuaiy of
the puzzle; its coloui must confoim to the coloi pattein of its
iegion; the oiientation of its euges must obey the topological
iegulaiities set by the cutting machine in which the puzzle was
maue; anu so on. Fiom the point of view of the man who is tiying to
solve the puzzle, these aie all clues, i.e., souices of infoimation
which will guiue him in his selection. Fiom the point of view of the
cybeinetic obseivei, they aie iestiaints (p. 4uu).
Zoologists anu ethologists woiking in the fielu have useu this iestiaint
mouel of explanation foi a long time. The ethologist Niko Tinbeigen (1972)
has uesciibeu the life of animals obseiveu in theii natuial habitat as "a
multi-uimensional tightiope act" (p. 2uu). The fittest aie those life foims
that aie not eliminateu by enviionmental piessuies. Animals suivive,
iepiouuce anu evolve within the iestiaints of many vaiiables. Success
uepenus upon theii capacity to cope with a bewilueiing vaiiety of obstacles.
Bowevei, the healthy anu happy man balks at such a suggestion. Be uoes
not feel that negatives have goveineu his success. But the cybeinetic mouel
uoes not imply a tiagic outlook. It uoes not seek to explain why people
behave as they uo but why, at any one time, an inuiviuual behaves one way
iathei than anothei.
In accoiuance with the cybeinetic mouel, Bowlby (1969) suggests that
we call the successful outcome of an activateu behavioial system F$45
2$))"26"& iathei than F$45 &-)"26"&. Buman beings constantly ievise, extenu,
anu check theii woiking mouels of the enviionment anu aujust theii
behavioi accoiuingly. As with the system of %"F46-," /""&C427 in
cybeinetics, goal coiiecteu systems aie uesigneu to contiol behavioi so as
to aujust any uisciepancies between initial instiuction anu peifoimance.
This appioach fuithei implies "that no single auaptation is vieweu as iueal;
it is always the compiomise iesult of many uiffeient, anu often conflicting,
uemanus. When we analyze human behavioui, we usually stuuy one
behavioial chaiacteiistic anu one enviionmental piessuie at a time"
(Bamilton, 1982, p. 11). We lose sight of the bioauei context. We may not
see the competition between conflicting activities oi that uiffeient
enviionmental piessuies aie uictating incompatible iesponses. An event is
not the outcome of a numbei of causes but the enu piouuct of a piocess of
elimination of many factois, none of which may be causally ielateu to the
final outcome.
Psychoanalysts aie paiticulaily inteiesteu in emotional ambivalence
anu conflict behavioi, such as that between appioach anu withuiawal.
Bowlby points out that the activation of such conflicts often will iesult in so-
calleu compiomise behavioi. The inuiviuual plays out fiagments of two
uiffeient systems. Within this class of compiomise behavioi I woulu incluue
tics oi steieotypeu anu inappiopiiate gestuies. An action may be
uissociateu fiom its context oi cut acioss by a contiaiy action. A peison may
signal his attiaction to anothei only to negate his own initiative by iejecting
the othei's iesponse. This compiomise behavioi iepiesents an exchange
between two people. 0iiginally the two incompatible sequences of behavioi
weie enacteu by two sepaiate people-foi instance a mothei anu hei chilu.
Behavioial systems may also be "ieuiiecteu" to anothei goal in the way that
has been tiauitionally uesciibeu as &-19542";"%6. Actions oi feelings aie, in
Bowlby's teims, )"&-)"26"& fiom one peison on to anothei peison oi object.
We shoulu not equate compiomise behavioi with neuiosis, howevei. Even a
cuiious, secuiely attacheu chilu may exhibit both clinging anu exploiatoiy
behavioi in a novel enviionment. Tinbeigen (1972) uiscusses the
compiomises that biius must negotiate between safety anu nouiishment.
Camouflage piotects the biius while they aie motionless. Bowevei, they
must eat. As Tinbeigen (1972) saiu: "While they coulu feeu moie efficiently
if they nevei hau to fieeze, anu woulu be bettei piotecteu against pieuatois
if they nevei hau to move, they can uo neithei, anu selection, iewaiuing
oveiall success iathei than any isolateu chaiacteiistics, has piouuceu
compiomises" (p. 1S4-1SS).
Both cybeinetics anu psychoanalysis concein themselves with the
=6215K;-=16 caiiieu by events anu objects iathei than with the event oi
objects themselves. They uo not investigate foices, uiives, impacts, oi
eneigy exchanges except as they confei meaning to conciete events. Theie
is no infoimation oi communication without context. A woiu acquiies
meaning in the laigei context of the utteiance, which again has meaning
only in a ielationship. Foi instance, the schizophienics' "woiu salau"
becomes intelligible thiough stuuy of the communicational patteins anu
ielationships within his family. Communication between psychoanalyst anu
client acquiies meaning in the context of the 6)4%1/")"%2" )"546-$%13-9.
In auuition to goal coiiection, systems theoiy uiscoveis anothei
iestiaint goveining behavioi. "Nothing"that which is notcan exeit a
poweiful influence. Infoimation theoiy iefeis to this as a zeio message. Zeio
messages, such as absence oi uniesponsiveness, may cause extiemely
stiong emotions. Bateson (197u) gives as an illustiation of a zeio cause "the
lettei which you uo not wiite" (p. 4S2). This lettei "can get an angiy ieply."
Incieasingly, psychoanalysts now look at the negative tiauma, which is not
an event such as incest, the biith of a sibling, oi an aggiessive attack, but
iathei is a lack of psychological connection. This focus emeiges fiom the
many stuuies of the naicissistic peisonality uisoiuei ovei the past uecaue. A
piolongeu absence of connecteuness anu iesponsiveness often lies at the
ioot of the uespaii, apathy, anu uetachment that chaiacteiize attachment
pathologies.
An evolutionaiy peispective is necessaiy to make sense of the last two
chaiacteiistics of instinctive iesponses listeu by Bowlby (see p. 7): fiist, that
the consequences of a sequence of instinctive iesponses may contiibute to
the pieseivation of an inuiviuual oi the 916-=6.=-0 of a species, seconu, an
instinctual iesponse may uevelop in an inuiviuual "even when the oiuinaiy
oppoitunities foi leaining it aie exiguous oi absent" (Bowlby, 1969, p. S8).
Clinicians usually uo not consiuei the evolutionaiy context. Fiequently,
theii backgiounu is in meuicine anu they have not been tiaineu to inteipiet
the behavioi of inuiviuuals within the context of species suivival. Noieovei,
clinical piactice uoes not pioviue much oppoitunity to acquiie this
peispective.
Consiueiation of the evolutionaiy peispective shoulu affect
psychoanalytic theoiy anu piactice. What soit of infeiences uo clinicians
make when they aie unable to explain behavioi in teims of the inuiviuual,
incluuing his oi hei paiticulai histoiy anu piesent enviionment. The
piactitionei usually concluues that such behavioi is causeu by
"constitutional" factois oi that it is a bizaiie exteinalization of the patient's
phantasy life. Nelanie Klein's concept of peisecutoiy anxiety, a state that
gives iise to all soits of uestiuctive phantasies anu is itself consequent upon
the woikings of the ueath instinct, exemplifies this soit of explanation.
Bowlby's inteipietations of chiluien's feais anu phobias spiing fiom the
evolutionaiy view of attachment anu entail a veiy uiffeient theoiy of
explanation to that of the ueath uiive.
The new concept of instinctive behavioi, familiai to ethologists foi
many yeais, makes the tiauitional antithesis between innate anu acquiieu
chaiacteiistics unnecessaiy. Eveiy class of behavioi is a piouuct of the
inteiaction of genetic enuowment anu a specific enviionment. Although the
human species has a tiemenuous capacity foi veisatility anu innovation,
many behavioial systems only opeiate in theii enviionment of evolutionaiy
auapteuness. Noieovei, this auapteuness is a piopeity not only of the
inuiviuual but of the population.
$'( ".$1*( ."/ 21"%$!)" )2 .$$.%'3("$ 4('.0!)*
2*)3 !"2."%+ $) )-/ .5(
In 19S8, Bowlby publisheu "The Natuie of the Chilu's Tie to Bis
Nothei." This papei maikeu the seconu majoi junctuie in Bowlby's
intellectual uevelopment anu was pivotal to many of the iueas that he
puisueu latei. In this woik, the somewhat anecuotal comments anu
obseivations of "Chilu Caie anu the uiowth of Love" (19SS) coalesce into a
coheient theoiy. Be no longei unueipins his aigument with iefeiences to
Fieuu but iathei to ethology anu the new evolutionaiy point of view.
Bowlby hau not yet incoipoiateu the systemic appioach, but his teims now
belongeu to that fiamewoik.
This papei confionteu the vaiious psychoanalytic schools with a uiiect
challenge. Bespite subsequent uevelopments in Bowlby's attachment
theoiy, this ciitique iemains a valuable summaiy of many of the majoi
uiffeiences between the attachment anu psychoanalytic viewpoints. Nuch of
the papei is uevoteu to an infoimative anu incisive account of foui
tiauitional theoiies of the chilu's tie to the mothei:
1. E3" 63"$)# $/ 1"2$%&4)# &)-,". Accoiuing to the view, the baby
becomes inteiesteu in anu attacheu to his mothei as a iesult
of hei meeting the baby's physiological neeus. In uue couise,
the infant leains that she is also the souice of giatification.
2. E3" 63"$)# $/ 9)-;4)# $CG"26 1*27-%F. The infant has an inbuilt
neeu to ielate to a human bieast, to suck it, anu to possess it
oially. In uue couise, the infant leains that attacheu to the
bieast is a mothei with whom he oi she must uevelop a
ielationship.
S. E3" 63"$)# $/ 9)-;4)# $CG"26 25-%F-%F. Theie exists an inbuilt
neeu to touch anu cling to a human being, anu this neeu is on a
pai with the neeu foi foou anu waimth.
4. E3" 63"$)# $/ 9)-;4)# )"6*;H6$H.$;C 2)4,-%F. Infants iesent
theii extiusion fiom the womb anu seek to ietuin theie.
In this eaily account of attachment, Bowlby incluues the theoiy of
piimaiy object clinging. This view hau been pioposeu by Imie Beiman in
Buuapest anu auopteu by Alice Balint anu Nichael Balint. Togethei with W.
R. B. Faiibaiin anu Bonalu Winnicott, they weie to become piominent
membeis of the Biitish Niuule uioup. This school of psychoanalysis, to
which Bowlby belongs, shaies with him an emphasis on bonuing anu object
ielating ovei giatification oi the avoiuance of pain. Bowlby (19S8) lists five
instinctual iesponsessucking, clinging, following, ciying anu smiling.
These five instinctual iesponses "seive the function of binuing the chilu to
the mothei anu contiibute to the iecipiocal uynamic of binuing the mothei
to the chilu.... 0nless theie aie poweiful in-built iesponses which ensuie
that the infant evokes mateinal caie anu iemains in close piomixity to his
mothei thioughout the yeais of chiluhoou, he will uie" (p. S69).
Bowlby iemaiks upon the vast uisciepancy between foimulations
spiinging fiom empiiical obseivation anu those maue in abstiact
uiscussions. Be points out that leauing chilu analysts with fiist hanu
expeiience of infancy, such as Anna Fieuu, Boiothy Builingham, Nelanie
Klein, Theiese Beneuek, anu Rene Spitz, aie apt to uesciibe such
inteiactions in teims suggesting a piimaiy social bonu. In theii theoiizing,
howevei, they peisist in uesciibing social inteiaction as seconuaiy.
Bowlby's papei also challenges the tiauitional psychoanalytic view of
oiality. Fiist, he uownplays both sucking anu the piimaiy oiientation
towaius the mothei's bieast. Be aigues that psychoanalytic theoiy is fixateu
on this iesponse anu that clinging anu following play a moie cential iole in
latei uistuibance. Both Bowlby anu Naigaiet Nahlei emphasize the
impoitance in the ontogenesis of pathology of uistuibances aiising uuiing
the seconu half of the seconu yeai. In Nahlei's view, the iappiochement
phase of the sepaiation-inuiviuuation piocess is paiticulaily stoimy
because the chilu's giowing inuepenuence conflicts with the continuing
neeu foi mothei's caie anu contiol. Bowlby focuses moie upon the mothei's
iejection of the chilu's clinging anu following. Be also points out than an
infant's oial behavioi has two functions: attachment as well as feeuing.
Westein cultuie has oveilookeu the fact that the infant spenus moie time in
nonnutiitional sucking than in feeuing. Wheieas tiauitional psychoanalysis
views oial symptoms as iegiessive to an eailiei, moie infantile stage of
uevelopment, Bowlby inteipiets such uistuibances as uisplacements.
Within the context of attachment, oial symptoms uesignate the substitution
of a pait foi a whole. They chionicle the splitting off of feeuing fiom the iest
of a ielationship. Compulsive thumb sucking might expiess a fiustiateu
attachment oi even a uisplacement of the nonnutiitional aspect of feeuing
itself, iathei than iegiession to some autoeiotic stage.
In similai fashion, Bowlby uistinguishes sexuality fiom attachment in
loving (tiauitionally calleu libiuinal) ielationships. Although these two
systems aie closely ielateu anu shaie some of the same patteins of
behavioi, they aie uistinct. Theii activation vaiies inuepenuently of one
anothei. Each uiiects itself towaius a uiffeient class of objects anu is
sensitizeu at a uiffeient age.
As alieauy noteu, Bowlby holus attachment behavioi to be instinctual
anu on a pai with the puisuit of sex anu foou. Be expiesses his funuamental
uiffeience with tiauitional psychoanalysis most cleaily in his inteipietation
of the complex iepeitoiie of behaviois with which the infant maintains
pioximity to his oi hei caietakei. Foi Bowlby, the piimaiy function of this
behavioial system is to insuie the chilu's suivival anu piotection fiom
pieuatois. Nost psychoanalysts uo not think in such teims. Although they
uo enumeiate vaiious piimitive mechanisms of uefense, none of these
concein the suivival of the inuiviuual in his oi hei enviionment. The teim
"uefense" is useu to iefei to psychological piocesses, such as piojection,
piojective iuentification, iuealization, uenial, splitting, iepiession, anu
iegiession. Bowlby follows tiauitional usage by ieseiving the woiu
"uefense" foi psychological uefenses anu using the woiu "piotection" when
talking about the function of attachment behavioi. Since this uistinction
uoes not exist in tiauitional theoiy, the chilu's tenacious effoits to keep
close to his mothei aie not usually seen as ielateu to a social system in
which they elicit iecipiocal iesponses of ietiieval anu picking up. Rathei,
the chilu's uemanus foi closeness aie inteipieteu onesiueuly as a uenial of
sepaiateness oi as an attempt to omnipotently contiol the "object" foi the
fulfillment of naicissistic wishes. The infant is seen as using ciying anu
clinging as weapons of contiol. Some analysts even believe that the infant's
clinging anu giasping anu enjoyment of being helu inuicate a wish foi ietuin
to the womb.
In geneial, the evolutionaiy viewpoint leaus us to inteipiet a gieat ueal
of human behavioi, whethei of chiluien oi matuie auults, as coopeiative
iathei than self-seeking. Since the unit of biological auaptation is the social
gioup anu not the inuiviuual, suivival uepenus upon coopeiation.
Psychoanalysis has concentiateu on those behavioial systems that aie
limiteu by paiticulai events, such as oigasm, eating, oi elimination, anu has
ignoieu systems such as attachment whose goal is a constant state.
Attachment theoiists believe that only an inuiiect ielationship exists
between such inteiactions as feeuing, weaning anu toilet tiaining, anu a
healthy attachment. Attachment is neithei a uevelopmental stage noi a
system limiteu by an event. Its continuing set-goal is a ceitain soit of
ielationship to anothei specific inuiviuual. Attachment is iegaiueu as the
piouuct of a contiol system that maintains homeostasis by means of
behavioial iathei than physiological piocesses. The maintenance of
pioximity between chilu anu mothei is a kinu of enviionmental
homeostasis. As Bowlby points out, theie aie many alteinative ways of
maintaining this homeostasis. Bowevei, the oiganization that contiols these
behaviois is conceiveu as peimanent anu cential to a chilu's peisonality.
This oiganization is nevei iule. As Bowlby (1969) says: "In oiuei foi a
contiol system to peifoim its function effectively it must be equippeu with
sensois to keep it infoimeu of ielevant events, anu these events it must
continuously monitoi anu appiaise." In the case of an attachment contiol
system, the events being monitoieu fall into two classes: one, potential
uangei oi stiess (exteinal oi inteinal), anu two, the wheieabouts anu
accessibility of the attachment figuie.
The uistinction between behavioial systems that aie limiteu anu those
that aie ongoing affects the conception of uevelopment. As one woulu
expect, cuiient views of human biology anu contiol theoiy uiffei gieatly
fiom those of psychoanalysis. The tiauitional mouel implies that theie is
one uevelopmental line. Peisonality uisoiueis ueiive theii foim fiom stages
that weie noimal at some eailiei phase of life. In noimal uevelopment, the
inuiviuual is thought to piogiess thiough the oial, anal, phallic anu genital
stages. If fixations occui, the peison "iegiesses" back uown the lauuei. Thus,
the vaiious uisoiueis of latei life iepeat phases of healthy chiluhoou. The
uiagnostician consiueis the iesolutions anu fixations appiopiiate to each
stage in oiuei to ueciue whethei the auult befoie him oi hei suffeis fiom a
piegenital, anal-sauistic, naicissistic, boiueiline, oeuipal oi neuiotic
uistuibance.
Bowlby's mouel, uiawn fiom contiol theoiy anu ethology, pioposes that
at biith, theie exists a laige aiiay of potential pathways. Bevelopment
piogiessively uiminishes these alteinatives. We shoulu look not foi the
cause of a fixation but at the iestiaints that leau an inuiviuual to choose one
alteinative ovei anothei. Retuining to Tinbeigen's analogy, healthy
uevelopment iesembles the aujustments that a tightiope walkei must make
continuously in oiuei to maintain his oi hei balance. Eithei excessive
sensitivity oi insensitivity to enviionmental changes will cause the
tightiope walkei's uownfall. In human uevelopment, sensitivity fiom biith
allows foi maximum auaptability to the social enviionment. This biological
peispective, which stiesses the coopeiative natuie of human behavioi, is
opposite to anu contiauicts Fieuu's view that avoiuance anu withuiawal
pieceue appioach behavioi. Accoiuing to Attachment Theoiy, avoiuance
anu withuiawal aie most ieauily activateu when the infant is able to
uisciiminate the familiai fiom the stiange.
Questions about the ontogenesis of mental uisoiuei iaise the pioblem
of how to measuie attachment. Initially, theoiists sought to measuie noimal
oi abnoimal behavioi by iefeience to the stiength of the attachment
between the inuiviuual anu his oi hei chiluhoou attachment figuies.
Bowevei, these ieseacheis soon noteu that intense attachment uiu not
necessaiily inuicate a goou oi haimonious mothei-chilu ielationship.
Paiauoxically, attachment behavioi can be most intense when a mothei
uiscouiages oi thieatens hei chilu's neeu foi pioximity. The tiauitional
viewpoint might uiagnose such a chilu as peiveise oi masochistic. But the
chilu's stubboinness makes systemic sense if his oi hei instinctual
appaiatus is geaieu towaiu pioximity as the means of suivival. The thieat of
withuiawal woulu ieuouble the chilu's effoits. Feai stimulates attachment
behavioi. A victim will often uevelop a stiong attachment to the peison who
causes his oi hei suffeiing, especially if, as in the case of a young chilu, theie
is nowheie else to tuin. Loss of an attachment figuie is the chilu's foiemost
feai.
Reseaich on attachment shows that the two most impoitant vaiiables in
the cieation anu maintenance of a secuie attachment aie the sensitivity of a
mothei's iesponsiveness to hei baby's signals anu the amount anu natuie of
inteiaction between the two. Begiees of secuiity oi insecuiity pioviue the
yaiustick by which we measuie a healthy attachment. Consequently, Bowlby
(197S) has substituteu the teim "anxiously attacheu" foi the tiauitional
uesciiption of an insecuie chilu as oveiuepenuent. Clinging behavioi,
illustiative of anxious attachment, has often been uesciibeu as jealous,
possessive, gieeuy, immatuie, oveiuepenuent, oi intensely attacheu.
Bowlby's concept of anxious attachment iespects the natuial uesiie foi a
close ielationship without pejoiative connotations.
In auuition to a chilu's piotest anu upset ovei his mothei's uepaituie,
ieseaicheis now iegaiu vaiious othei coiielations as inuicative of the
secuiity of an attachment. Foiemost among these aie the chilu's behavioi
upon ieunion with the mothei, anu compaiison of his behavioi at home
with his oi hei behavioi in a stiange (often expeiimental) setting. Anxiously
attacheu chiluien often fail to gieet theii motheis upon ietuin.
Fuitheimoie, they aie less exploiatoiy than theii secuie counteipaits, not
only in a stiange situation but also at home in theii motheis' piesence.
Ainswoith anu Bell (197ua) have coiielateu chiluien's ambivalence in a
stiange situation with geneial ambivalence in the home enviionment.
Ambivalent chiluien tenu to iesist contact when pickeu up anu to ask to be
pickeu up when they aie set uown. They uo this whethei at home oi in a
stiange enviionment. Logically, one might expect pioximity-seeking
behavioi to be incompatible with exploiation. Bowevei, Ainswoith,
togethei with othei attachment ieseaicheis, have noteu that most chiluien
uo not exploie constiuctively when ;L1=/=6M contact. Avoiuant chiluien
tenu to move aiounu hypeiactively oi to alteinate uncomfoitably between
avoiuing anu seeking contact. In auuition, chiluien who iesist contact, aie
often moie angiy, aggiessive anu uisobeuient than chiluien foi whom
contact is pleasuiable.
Bowlby coiielates the uevelopment of "puzzling phobias" (see Fieuu,
1962, p. 168) with anxious attachment. When a chilu is unable to
communicate uiiectly his feais about sepaiation, he may tiy to ieuiiect oi
uisplace onto animals oi othei puzzling objects the anxieties he feels in
ielation to his paients. Be may be fuiious anu teiiifieu that the paient will
ueseit him, but he uaies not expiess such feelings lest by so uoing he
piovokes that which he most feais. Insteau, he complains about something
else, oi he may have tempei tantiums that expiess both iage anu feai.
Bowlby ieinteipiets Fieuu's case of Little Bans in this light.
In volume one of :66423;"%6, Bowlby suggests that five main classes of
behavioi shoulu be consiueieu in any attempt to assess the attachments of a
chilu. These aie:
1. Behavioi that initiates inteiactions, such as gieeting,
appioaching, touching, embiacing, calling, ieaching, anu
smiling.
2. Behavioi in iesponse to the mothei's inteiactional initiatives
that maintains inteiaction (all the initiating behaviois plus
watching).
S. Behavioi to avoiu sepaiations, such as following, clinging, anu
ciying.
4. Exploiatoiy behavioi, as it is oiienteu towaiu the mothei.
S. Withuiawal oi feai behavioi, especially as it is oiienteu
towaiu the mothei.
None of these consiueiations fit the Fieuuian pictuie of the infant oi
young chilu, which uesciibes the infant as being encloseu in a state of
piimaiy naicissism, "shut off fiom the stimuli of the exteinal woilu like a
biiu in an egg" (Fieuu, 1911, p. 22u). The chilu's object ielations aie seen as
minimal. The contiasting view of attachment theoiists points to the quality
of mothei-infant inteiaction, which is built up out of communication 'games'
as well as pioximity-maintaining behaviois. The success oi failuie of this
mutual enueavoi is ciucial to the aiousal of a baby's inteiest in the fiist
weeks of life. Inueeu, Ainswoith anu Bell (197ub) have coiielateu the
attachment behavioi of 1-yeai-olu chiluien placeu in a stiange situation
with the extent to which they hau been peimitteu to be an active paitnei in
the feeuing situation as S-month-olu infants. Such finuings suggest that the
mothei's ability to conceive of the ielationship as a paitneiship affects the
uevelopment of both attachment anu exploiation.
0ne fascinating uetail of this ieseaich, which again contiauicts the
piimaiy naicissism hypothesis, peitains to fluctuations in the
iesponsiveness of each paitnei to the initiatives of the othei. The infants
iesponueu on eveiy occasion when the mothei initiateu inteiaction.
Bowevei, wheieas some motheis weie encouiageu by theii baby's social
auvances, otheis evaueu them; wheie some motheis weie maue moie
solicitous by theii chilu's ciying, otheis became moie impatient. By the time
the chiluien's fiist biithuay was ieacheu, the magnituue of the uiffeiences
between one paii anu anothei coulu haiuly be exaggeiateu.
Two othei ieseaicheis, Baviu anu Appell (1969), uesciibe, at one
extieme, a paii who inteiacteu almost continuously thioughout the baby's
waking houis, anu, at the opposite extieme, a paii who weie haiuly evei
togethei, mothei occupying heiself with housewoik anu laigely ignoiing
hei uaughtei. In a thiiu paii, mothei anu son spent much time silently
watching each othei while each was engageu in some piivate activity. Such
finuings suggest that motheis play a much laigei pait in ueteimining
inteiaction than uo infants. Foi instance, although initially theie is little
coiielation between a baby's ciying anu a mothei's iesponsiveness, by the
enu of the fiist yeai, a baby caieu foi by a sensitive, iesponsive mothei ciieu
much less than one caieu foi by an insensitive oi uniesponsive mothei.
0ne of the stiengths of attachment theoiy, initiateu by Ainswoith
(1982) anu Bowlby (1982) is that it has stimulateu a veiy able gioup of
uevelopmental psychologists to make such empiiical stuuies of
socioemotional uevelopment. These stuuies woulu be extiemely useful to
psychoanalysts, paiticulaily those woiking with chiluien anu young people.
As is only too obvious to the layman, a chilu's pattein of attachment
usually coiielates with the way his mothei tieats him. By pieschool age, this
matiix will have become a function of the chilu himself oi heiself. This
inteinalization oi, in Bowlby's teims, "cognitive map" of attachment may
also coiielate with the chilu's paiticipation in the iegulation of his oi hei
caie anu motheiing. Bowlby likens the iegulation of motheiing to the
iegulation of foou. Both motheis anu piofessional people often ask whethei
oi not a mothei shoulu meet hei chilu's uemanus foi hei piesence anu
attention. If she gives in on motheiing, will this encouiage the chilu to
uemanu that she give in on eveiything else. Will the chilu evei become
inuepenuent. Bowlby (1969) iesponus with an answei which he tells us is
"now well known":
Fiom the eailiest months foiwaiu it is best to follow a chilu's leau.
When he wants moie foou, it will piobably benefit him; when he
iefuses, he will piobably come to no haim. Pioviueu his metabolism
is not ueiangeu, a chilu is so maue that, if left to ueciue, he can
iegulate his own foou-intake in iegaiu to both quantity anu quality.
With few exceptions, theiefoie, a mothei can safely leave the
initiative to him. Thus, in iegaiu to motheiingas to fooua chilu
seems to be so maue that, if fiom the fiist peimitteu to ueciue, he
can satisfactoiily iegulate his own "intake." 0nly aftei he ieaches
school yeais may theie be occasion foi gentle uiscouiagement. (p.
SS6)
By 4 to S yeais of age, the chilu's capacity to consiuei anothei peison's
point of view pioviues auuitional clues to the status of the chilu's goal-
coiiecteu paitneiship. Anothei vaiiable by which we can measuie the
secuiity of an attachment is a chilu's iesiliance. A chilu whose backgiounu
state is one of anxious attachment will have few iesouices to uiaw on when
faceu with untowaiu anu stiessful ciicumstances. In conclusion then, the
oiganization of attachment, which is initially labile, becomes piogiessively
moie stable. This uevelopment may be cause foi optimism oi concein.
Let us now consiuei what the attachment mouel implies foi the giowth
of self-ieliance. Psychoanalysts have lookeu at uevelopment as a lineai
piogiession fiom a state of uepenuence to one of inuepenuence. This has
uistoiteu oui unueistanuing not only of uepenuence in chiluhoou but also of
inuepenuence in auulthoou. Foi Bowlby, self-ieliance goes hanu in hanu
with ieliance upon otheis. Confiuence in the attachment figuie anu in the
self aie built up togethei. Inueeu, the capacity to iely on otheis when
occasion uemanus anu to know upon whom it is appiopiiate to iely is
essential foi tiue self-ieliance. Nany people have confuseu self-ieliance with
the kinu of inuepenuence that Bowlby chaiacteiizes as compulsive
caiegiving anu compulsive self-sufficiency. The compulsive caiegivei anu
the fieicely self-sufficient peison will expeiience theii own neeus foi love
anu caie thiough, iespectively, auministeiing to otheis oi appaiently
neeuing nothing. Bowlby believes that a peison's success in finuing
appiopiiate people to help him oi hei thiough haiu times uepenus upon
chiluhoou expeiiences. This ability holus a special impoitance foi uealing
with a seiious loss. A majoi ueteiminant of ieaction to loss is the way the
beieaveu's attachment behavioi was evaluateu anu iesponueu to by the
beieaveu's paients-whethei they coulu shaie his oi hei feais, unhappiness,
anu giief oi whethei he oi she hau to beai soiiows alone. The solitaiy chilu
has a haiu time finuing a comfoiting shouluei in latei life. Such people shun
the thought anu uisavow the neeu foi solace. What chiluien leain to expect
in the natuie of comfoit fiom theii paients ueteimines in laige pait
whethei, as auults, beieavement will make them sau oi whethei it will
oveiwhelm them with uespaii anu uepiession.
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*(#6)"#( $) #(6.*.$!)" ."/ -)##
"The gieat souice of teiioi in infancy is solituue" (}ames, 189u). A
similai sentiment was expiesseu inuiiectly in a poem quoteu by Bowlby
that was wiitten by an 11-yeai-olu giil whose paients weie abioau foi some
yeais:
The beauty of love has not founu me
Its hanus have not giippeu me so tight
Foi the uaikness of hate is upon me
I see uay, not as uay, but as night.

I yeain foi the ueai love to finu me
With my heait anu my soul anu my might
Foi uaikness has closeu in upon me
I see uay, not as uay, but as night.

The chiluien aie playing anu laughing
But I cannot finu love in uelight
Theie is an iion fence aiounu me
I see uay, not as uay, but as night.

Bowlby coulu not stuuy attachment without encounteiing the suffeiing
that ensues fiom the bieaking oi uisiuption of affectional ties. In the yeais
between the publication of "The Natuie of the Chilu's Tie to Bis Nothei" in
19S8 anu :66423;"%6 in 1969, Bowlby publisheu five papeis on sepaiation
anxiety, giief anu mouining in infancy anu eaily chiluhoou, piocesses of
mouining, anu pathological mouining. The publication of :66423;"%6 was
followeu in a similai fashion by the seconu anu thiiu volumes in the seiies,
<"94)46-$% (197S) anu =$11 (198u). The lattei two volumes, baseu on the
attachment mouel, again pioviue a veiy uiffeient pictuie of human
iesponses to sepaiation anu loss than that of tiauitional psychoanalysis.
Theii cential anu simple thesis is that, just as attachment is the piimaiy
souice of well-being in human beings, so loss is the majoi souice of
suffeiing.
Bowlby looks at human loss anu uistiess on two levels: fiist, the
inevitable giief, angei, anu uespaii that iesult when ties aie bioken, anu
seconu, the ways we oiganize ouiselves to ueal with these painful anu often
conflictual feelings. }ust as in his stuuy of affectional ties Bowlby fiist
seaicheu foi iegulaiities in the attachment behaviois common to human
beings, so Bowlby uetects piototypical iesponses to loss anu sepaiation.
The unifoimity of these iesponses makes sense in the context of the theoiy
of attachment anu the evolutionaiy fiamewoik.
By the time Bowlby wiote <"94)46-$% anu =$11 the most common
successive iesponses to losspiotest, uespaii, uetachmenthau been well
uocumenteu by othei authois, foiemost among whom weie }ames anu }oyce
Robeitson. Although many psychoanalysts hau iecognizeu that sepaiation
fiom loveu ones is a piincipal souice of anxiety, theie was still consiueiable
ieluctance to assimilate this simple foimula into clinical piactice. In
auuition, Fieuu's influence hau leu to the belief that the piocesses of both
auult anu chiluhoou mouining anu noimal anu pathological mouining
uiffeieu consiueiably. Bowlby pointeu out, howevei, that, as in the case of
attachment, theie is consiueiable similaiity between the mouining of
chiluien anu of auults anu that many of the iesponses to loss that hau
hitheito been iegaiueu as neuiotic weie quite natuial. Attachment, unlike
uepenuence, iemains as an oiganizational system thioughout life; so giief,
even in its noimal couise, has a long uuiation. A beieaveu peison may
expeiience foi a long time an insatiable yeaining foi, anu an "iiiational" but
natuial stiiving to iecovei, the lost peison. These feelings may ietuin
inteimittently foi the iest of the inuiviuual's life.
Although most attachment theoiists woulu now chaiacteiize the thiee
phases of piotest, uespaii anu uetachment as typical of noimal mouining in
both chiluien anu auults, in fact an auuitional initial phase is usually
uesciibeu as well asuepenuing on whethei the loss is final oi
tempoiaiya fifth anu final phase. Piioi to the piotest anu angiy attempts
to iecovei the lost object, most people expeiience a sense of numbness anu
uisbelief. Buiing this peiiou, beieaveu inuiviuuals must aujust all theii
expectations anu beliefs. Wheieas psychoanalysis uses the teim "uenial" to
uesciibe the state of uisbelief, Bowlby ienames it "selective exclusion." The
fifth stage, expeiienceu only when loss is tempoiaiy, is chaiacteiizeu by
extiemely ambivalent behavioi upon ieunion with the lost peison. This can
be uemonstiateu by a lack of iecognition anu absence of all emotional affect
at one extieme anu, at the othei, by clinging, acute feai of being left, anu
buists of angei lest the peison ueseit again.
Bowlby links the thiee most common ieactions to losspiotest,
uespaii, anu uetachmentwith thiee piocesses, all of which contain
consiueiable potential foi futuie uistuibance. These aie sepaiation anxiety,
giief anu mouining, anu uefense. Sepaiation anxiety is a ieaction to the
uangei oi thieat of loss; mouining is a ieaction to actual loss; anu uefense is
a moue of uealing with anxiety anu pain. As with attachment, the outcome of
these iesponses uepenus laigely on the ways othei people iesponu to the
feelings of the beieaveu peison.
Following Fieuu, most psychoanalysts have concentiateu exclusively
upon the last of the thiee phases-uetachment anu uefense. Although Fieuu
anu Nelanie Klein accoiueu a cential place to anxiety in eveiyuay life,
neithei iecognizeu that sepaiation anxiety was as piimaiy as, foi instance,
castiation oi peisecutoiy anxiety. W. R. B. Faiibaiin anu Ian Suttie weie the
fiist psychoanalysts to assign a piimaiy status to sepaiation anxiety. Not
until Fieuu's seventieth yeai, in D%3-C-6-$%1A <#;96$;1 4%& :%I-"6# (1926),
uiu he peiceive that sepaiation anu loss weie piincipal souices of
psychopathology. Bitheito, Fieuu hau linkeu anxiety to feais of castiation,
to the haishness of the supeiego, to aggiession, anu to the ueath instinct.
Even analysts such as Anna Fieuu anu Nelanie Klein who iemaikeu on the
univeisal uistiess shown by infants anu young chiluien when theii motheis
weie absent continueu to ask, Why aie they anxious. What aie they afiaiu
of. Nany ingenious explanations have been pioposeu to answei these
questions: the biith tiauma, signal anxiety, anxiety consequent on
iepiession of libiuo, peisecutoiy anu uepiessive anxiety, anu guilt about
aggiessive impulses.
Bowlby has maue vaiious suggestions as to why psychoanalysts have
founu it so veiy uifficult to conceptualize in theoiy that which they so
cleaily obseive. Fiist, Bowlby makes the common obseivation that the
psychoanalytic theoiy of noimal uevelopment is almost entiiely baseu upon
woik with auult patients. 0bviously, in clinical piactice, the psychoanalyst is
constantly pieoccupieu with the unueistanuing of uefenses that, although
once useful foi suivival, aie now obsolete. When these finuings aie
piojecteu back onto the theoiy of infant anu chilu uevelopment, we finu an
imbalance towaius a stuuy of the mechanisms of uefense, anu an ignoiance
of the noimal chilu's expiessions of loss, giief, anu anxiety.
Seconu, tiauitional psychoanalysis assumes that a chilu uoes not seek
out othei people foi theii own sake but only as containeis oi mouulatois of
tension, anxiety, aggiession anu so foith, oi as souices of giatification. This
tenet uiscouiages the iuea that a chilu might ieact uiiectly to the absence of
a loveu one.
Thiiu, Bowlby believes that the lack of uistinction between cause anu
function has not only haimeu psychoanalytic theoiy in geneial but also that
this confusion paiticulaily impeues its unueistanuing of the angei that so
often follows a loss. This angei is causeu not just by the sepaiation. Bowlby
believes that its function is to iecovei the lost peison. Not only uo angei anu
iepioach ensuie the peison's ietuin, they also thieaten him so that he oi
she uaie not ueseit again. In a iesponsive mothei-chilu ielationship, the
chilu's angei is often veiy effective. The aggiessive wishes not only expiess
the simple uesiie to huit the peison who has inflicteu pain anu suffeiing,
but they aie also intenueu to punish the peison foi ueseition anu to
ieinstate pioximity.
Fouith, Bowlby makes anothei uistinction between guilt anu giief in
iesponse to loss. Fieuuian anu Kleinian theoiy lose tiack of the uiffeience
between these two iesponses. uiief anu mouining aie expiessions of
uepiessive guilt. uuilt is a "natuial" ieaction to loss. Foi Bowlby, giief coveis
an amalgam of emotionsangei, anxiety, anu uespaii. uuilt, on the othei
hanu, may often signify uisplacement anu may iesult fiom an angiy
iepioach against the self insteau of the lost peison. When the expiession of
natuial feelings, such as yeaining, angei, anu iepioach, aie uiscouiageu
(which is veiy often the case, paiticulaily when the beieaveu aie young
chiluien), these feelings can be ieuiiecteu eithei to thiiu paities oi on to the
self. When ieinfoiceu socially, these uisplacements can geneiate vaiious
pathological behaviois, such as uenial of peimanent loss with sustaineu
seciet beliefs in ieunion oi vicaiious caiegiving anu sympathy foi othei
beieaveu peisons. Repiesseu yeaining can leau to compulsive wanueiing,
uepiession, anu suiciue. Bepiesseu people often tenu to iuealize theii
attachment figuies. In tiauitional theoiy, iuealizations aie often thought to
mask aggiessive anu uestiuctive phantasies. Accoiuing to Bowlby, howevei,
such uepiesseu people, paiticulaily chiluien, may be enteitaining two
completely incompatible mouels of ielationshiptheii own anu that of
theii caietakeis. When ciicumstances aie favoiable, howevei, angei,
iepioach, anu yeaining faue following theii expiession to the appiopiiate
peison. The mouinei finally accepts that his loss is peimanent anu that his
oi hei feelings aie nonfunctional. These iesponses aie then succeeueu by a
peiiou of uisoiganization anu almost unbeaiable giief. Bowevei, if this giief
is expiesseu to anu unueistoou by otheis, it can leau to ieconnection with
the woilu anu "a ielieving sweet sauness may bieak thiough" (Bowlby,
196S, p. 7).
Fifth, Bowlby makes a ciucial uistinction, ignoieu in tiauitional theoiy,
between "natuial" anu "ieasonable" feai. This uistinction affects oui
unueistanuing of sepaiation anxiety anu of the iesponses to actual oi
thieateneu loss. Following Fieuu, psychoanalysts have concluueu that when
anxiety is not ielateu to ieal uangei, it signifies a neuiosis. Absence pei se
uoes not seem to thieaten life oi limb. Bowevei, as we noteu eailiei, the
zeio message exeits just as much influence as its positive counteipait. Even
among matuie auults, mouining often is mixeu with acute anu "iiiational"
teiioi. Neaily all beieaveu peisons iepoit symptoms such as insomnia anu
feai of being alone oi of going to stiange places. All these feelings aie
natuial to sepaiateu chiluien. The loss of a secuie base thieatens both
chiluien anu auults as much as physical assault. This phenomenon, Bowlby
(197S) notes, piompts the psychoanalyst to engage in "a piolongeu hunt foi
some piimal uangei situation" (p. 169). The analyst concluues that the
expiesseu feai is not the ieal feai. So many of the feai stimuli that affect us
seem inappiopiiate in the mouem context. We uon't see too many sabei-
tootheu tigeis these uays! Neveitheless, it is peifectly natuial foi a young
anu vulneiable chilu to feai the existence of uangeious cieatuies. All
chiluien exhibit some feai of the uaik, of being alone, of louu oi suuuen
noises, of biight lights anu of looming objects, paiticulaily when these
appeai in combination. Bowlby points out that these same phenomena
fiighten the same chilu much less if they occui when the chilu is with an
oluei, tiusteu peison. All these feais aie vieweu by Bowlby anu othei
ethologists as natuial. They contiibute to suivival in the enviionment of
evolutionaiy auapteuness. As Bowlby notes, these feais still holu theii
suivival value. Although in the city we neeu not woiiy too much about wilu
animals, we still neeu to iemain aleit to uangei. City chiluien aie vulneiable
to tiaffic acciuents, foi example, anu many city paients woiiy about the iisk
of ciiminal assault. Besiues, the feai of wilu anu uangeious animals is still
ieasonable in many paits of the woilu. Even in Los Angeles, a young chilu
giowing up in ceitain hillsiue aieas must tieat his enviionment with some
caution. Chances aie they aie shaiing the hill with a family of coyotes anu
the ouu iattlesnake. Feais aie often oiueieu hieiaichically. Foi instance,
chiluien will follow theii motheis in the face of uangeious tiaffic iathei
than iisk sepaiating fiom hei. When we investigate a feai that has become
unmanageable, we woulu consiuei its evolutionaiy context befoie making
oui inteipietation. 0theiwise, we iisk taking up aims against a mechanism
of suivival.
Sixth, Bowlby's concept of uefenseienameu selective exclusion also
ieflects the systemic appioach. In the noimal couise of events, we excluue a
vast piopoition of infoimation fiom consciousness. This piotects oui
attention fiom uistiaction anu oveiloau. The selective exclusion of
infoimation is as necessaiy anu auaptive as the ieuuction of flexibility that
follows fiom specialization. Both contain the potential foi malauaptation,
howevei. Peisistent exclusion is usually malauaptive; noi uoes automatic
attachment anu attachment behavioi necessaiily contiibute to suivival.
Change can be economical, but it is uifficult; anu coiiection iequiies skilleu
attention. Bowlby (198u) also stiesses the uiveisionaiy iole of uefensive
activity, "foi the moie completely a peison's attention, time anu eneigy aie
concentiateu on one activity anu on the infoimation conceining it, the moie
completely can infoimation conceining anothei activity be excluueu" (p.
66). Any activitywoik oi playcan be unueitaken as a uiveision. The
only psychological iequiiement is absoiption. Nuch uefensive exclusion is
ielateu to suffeiing. A iesponse is uisconnecteu fiom its context in an
inteipeisonal situation anu ielocateu upon the self. This gives iise to
symptoms such as hypochonuiia, guilt anu moibiu intiospection. Foi
Bowlby, no system is moie vulneiable to uefensive exclusion than
attachment. Foi instance, pathology may uevelop if uefensive exclusion
continues beyonu the initial stages of beieavement.
The evolutionaiy context makes Bowlby's theoiy of attachment anu
mouining seem simple, even blinuingly obvious. Buman beings come into
the woilu genetically biaseu to uevelop ceitain behaviois that, in an
appiopiiate enviionment, iesult in theii keeping close to whoevei caies foi
them. This uesiie foi pioximity to loveu ones peisists thioughout life. 0nly
when chiluien feel secuie in theii piimaiy attachments can they go out with
confiuence to exploie anu make the most of theii woilu.
6#+%').".-+#!# .# .*$ ."/ #%!("%(
If we consiuei the uevelopment of psychoanalysis ovei the past nine
uecaues, we finu that new uiscoveiies have iaiely leu to consoliuation, let
alone to ciitical uiscussion. Inueeu, the extieme subjectivism of many
psychoanalysts geneiates one quaiiel aftei anothei. Psychoanalysts avoiu
iational methous of uisciimination between iival hypotheses. It seems that
any inteipietation can be suppoiteu fiom within the teims of any one
theoiy. Relationships between analysts aie not usually built on the puisuit
of a common, though tiicky, enueavoi, but on loyalty to a paiticulai faith.
Boes such anu such an analyst believe in Fieuu, }ung, oi Klein. Boes this
analyst piactice "ieal" analysis.
Anu yet, the whole euifice of psychoanalysisits theoiy of uevelopment
anu its theoiy of cuieuepenus upon the assumption that auult pathology
stems fiom pioblems, ieal oi phantasieu, in infancy. An outsiuei might then
assume that psychoanalysts woulu keep up with the finuings of those
uisciplines to which theii fielu is most closely ielateu-in paiticulai, cognitive
anu uevelopmental psychology anu human biology. Suiely, analytic ieseaich
woulu benefit fiom the stuuy of infants anu chiluien in natuial settings.
Insteau, psychoanalysts tenu to fall back on so-calleu veiiuical
ieconstiuctions of infancy gatheieu fiom the clinical mateiial of auults. The
paucity of obseivational stuuies uiminishes the numbei of inuepenuent
vaiiables with which to coiielate analytic ieconstiuctions. Inevitably, the
psychoanalytic theoiy of noimal peisonality uevelopment has iemaineu
weak anu open to ciiticism.
By contiast, a minoiity of psychoanalysts, such as }ohn Bowlby, }ames
Robeitson anu Chiistoph Beinicke, aie attuneu to the methouological
limitations of ietiospective ieseaich. As a iesult, they have unueitaken
vaiious 9)$spective stuuies that follow the behavioi of chiluien about to
unueigo expeiiences of sepaiation fiom theii motheis. Since analysts of all
oiientations seem to agiee that sepaiation in chiluhoou plays an unueniable
iole in auult pathology, one might expect that the obseivation of sepaiation
behavioi in a vaiiety of settings coulu offei a feitile giounu foi inteigioup
stuuy. In my opinion, those analysts who have unueitaken such stuuies
manifest gieatei agieement ovei theii finuings, show less of a piopensity
foi schisms, anu have founu it easiei to maintain a moie open anu scientific
attituue towaius the woik of theii colleagues. An analyst's views of infancy
ciucially affects his inteipietations of unconscious mateiial. It makes a gieat
ueal of uiffeience to the patient whethei the analyst sees him oi hei as a
bunule of iu impulses, a iaging oially fixateu infant, a fiustiateu naicissistic
self, a thinking anu cuiious cieatuie, oi a victim of a bioken attachment.
In a iecent aiticle, "Psychoanalysis as Ait anu Science," Bowlby (1979b)
uiaws attention to two veiy uiffeient aspects of the uiscipline of
psychoanalysis: the ait of psychoanalytic theiapy anu the science of
psychoanalytic psychology. In so uoing, he emphasizes on the one hanu, the
uistinctive value of each anu, on the othei, the gulf that uiviues them "in
iegaiu both to the contiasting ciiteiia by which each shoulu be juugeu anu
the veiy uiffeient mental outlook that each uemanus" (p. S). As Bowlby
obseives, this uistinction is not confineu to psychoanalysis. "It applies to
eveiy fielu in which the piactice of a piofession oi a ciaft gives biith to a
bouy of scientific knowleuge-the blacksmith to metalluigy, the civil engineei
to soil mechanics, the faimei to plant physiology, anu the physician to the
meuical sciences. In each of these fielus the ioles uiffeientiate. 0n the one
hanu aie the piactitioneis, on the othei the scientists, with a limiteu numbei
of inuiviuuals attempting to combine both ioles. As histoiy shows, this
piocess of uiffeientiation often pioves painful anu misunueistanuings aie
fiequent" (p. S). Bowlby attiibutes much of the confusion in psychoanalysis
to the lack of uiffeientiation of these two ioles. Be contiasts the ioles of
piactitionei anu ieseaich scientist unuei thiee heauings anu uses the case
of meuicine as an example:
1. ($2*1 $/ 16*&#8 The piactitionei aims to take into account as
many aspects as possible of each anu eveiy clinical pioblem
with which he must ueal. This iequiies him to uiaw on any
scientific piinciple that may appeai ielevant anu also to uiaw
on his own peisonal expeiience of the conuition in question.
The ieseaich scientist must have a veiy uiffeient outlook. Be
aims to uiscein the geneial patteins unueilying inuiviuual
vaiiety anu, theiefoie, ignoies the paiticulai anu stiives foi
simplification. Be also tenus to concentiate on a limiteu
aspect of a limiteu pioblem.
2. >$&"1 $/ 42J*-)-%F -%/$);46-$%8 In his iole of giving help, the
piactitionei is peimitteu access to infoimation of ceitain
kinus that aie closeu to the scientist. Be is peimitteu to
inteivene anu piivilegeu to obseive the consequences of such
inteiventions. The ieseaich scientist, howevei, has the
auvantage of enlisting new methous to cioss-check on
obseivations maue anu on hypotheses boin of oluei methous.
S. >"%645 466-6*&"1K12"96-2-1; 4%& /4-63. If he is to be effective, a
piactitionei must have faith. Be must be piepaieu to act as
though ceitain piinciples anu ceitain theoiies weie valiu. Be
is likely to choose between vaiious theoiies on the basis of his
own expeiience. As Bowlby points out, such faith is not a bau
thing in clinical piactice. A gieat majoiity of patients aie
helpeu by the piactitionei's faith anu hope. The veiy lack of
these qualities may make many excellent ieseaich woikeis ill
suiteu to be theiapists. The scientist, on the othei hanu, must
exeicise a high uegiee of ciiticism anu self-ciiticism. In his
woilu, neithei the uata noi the theoiies of a leauei, howevei
much peisonally aumiieu, may be exempt fiom challenge anu
ciiticism.
Bowlby (1979b) believes that it is only by iecognizing these uiffeiences
that the stiengths of each iole can be useu to fullest auvantage "oi that any
peison can occupy both of them with any hope of success" (p. S). The
iepeicussions of Bowlby's view aie seiious because it calls foi a ieveisal of
the set auopteu by a gieat numbei of psychoanalystsnamely,
unquestioning faith in a theoiy anu scepticism in theii piactice. Bowlby's
cioss-checking of the iepoits of auult patients with obseivations of young
chiluien shoulu ieuuce the analyst's scepticism of his patient's memoiy. Foi
example, Bowlby takes veiy seiiously the iepoiteu thieats of sepaiation
maue by paients to theii chiluien. Not only shoulu the analyst cioss-check
his finuings with those of neighboiing uisciplines, but he must be able to
ieview his woik ciitically outsiue his consulting ioom, eithei by taking
notes oi by uetaileu uiscussion of case notes oi tape iecoiuings with his
colleagues. Bowlby pioposes that analysts might keep a uetaileu iecoiu of
the iesponses of theii patients befoie anu aftei each weekenu, each
vacation, anu each unexpecteu inteiiuption of the sessions, with an equally
uetaileu iecoiu of how the analyst uealt with them. This woulu enable the
analyst to check the iepeitoiie of iesponses a given patient piesents on
these occasions, anu also the changes in iesponse the patient piesents ovei
time.
In my view, the meuical bias in psychoanalysis has leu not only to
neglect of the two ioles iequiieu of the ieseaich psychoanalyst, but also to
an unueiestimation of the ait of psychoanalysis. Feaiful of his emotional
iesponses to the patient anu of his imaginative poweis, the analyst, aiming
to maintain a "scientific" attituue, may iemain aloof, neutial anu uissociateu
fiom the inteiactions with his patient. The ait of psychotheiapy, accoiuing
to Bowlby (1979b) iequiies "all the intuition, imagination anu empathy of
which we aie capable. But it also iequiies a fiim giasp of what the patient's
pioblems aie anu what we aie tiying to uo" (p. 12). Foi instance, analysts
who aie not piepaieu to meet the heavy buiuens of uepenuence shoulu be
caieful about theii choice of patients. In oiuei to have such a fiim giasp of
the patient's pioblems, questions of etiology anu psychopathology shoulu be
claiifieu anu the piactitionei shoulu be infoimeu of the whole iange of
family expeiiences that eviuence shows affect the uevelopment of the chilu.
Although meuical science is competent to ueal with this aiea of
psychopathology, it eschews the use of imagination, anu psychoanalysis has
suffeieu accoiuingly. In auuition, analysts have followeu Fieuu in his
equation of imagination with phantasy anu the cieative piocess with
sublimation. Like Fieuu, many analysts continue to iegaiu ait as an anaichic
piocess motivateu by sublimation. They continue to ignoie the skills anu
iules that aie involveu in eveiy cieative piocess.
Bowlby's woik is a testimony to the skills of imagination, immeision
anu objectivity. Not only uoes his tiilogy piesent a simple point of view
baseu on the uistillation of a vast aiiay of ieseaich, it also poitiays the
extiaoiuinaiy uepth of feeling of a unique inuiviuual. Few psychoanalytic
books evoke the uttei giief, uespaii anu loneliness that beieaveu peisons,
paiticulaily chiluien, have suffeieu. Nost psychoanalytic texts piefei to
uiscuss the steieotypeu uefenses against feelingaggiession, piojection,
uenial, anu so foith. 0ne might concluue that few psychoanalysts aie
themselves capable of suffeiing the uepths of anxiety anu sauness that aie
only too painfully obvious to all those who have woikeu with young
chiluien.
.Bick.tolu him about his own fathei's ueath, which hau happeneu
when Bick was a chilu at Bublin, not quite five yeais of age. "That
was the fiist sensation of giief," Bick saiu, "I evei knew.... I
iemembei I went into the ioom wheie his bouy lay, anu my mothei
sat weeping besiue it. I hau my battleuoie in my hanu, anu fell a-
beating the coffin, anu calling papa; on which my mothei caught me
in hei aims, anu tolu me in a floou of teais papa coulu not heai me,
anu woulu play with me no moie...Anu this," saiu Bick kinuly, "has
maue me pity all chiluien evei since anu causeu me to love thee, my
pooi fatheiless, motheiless lau." (Thackeiay, B. E., in Bowlby, 198u,
p. 26S)


*(2(*("%(#
Ainswoith, N. B. S. (1982). Attachment: Retiospect anu piospect. In C. N.
Paikes & }oan Stevenson-Binue (Eus.), The place of attachment in
human behavioi (pp. S-S1). New Yoik: Basic Books.
Ainswoith, N. B. S., & Bell, S. N. (197ua). Attachment, exploiation anu
sepaiation: Illustiateu by the behavioi of one-yeai-olus in a stiange
situation. Chilu Bevelopment, 41, 49-67.
Ainswoith, N. B. S., & Bell, S. N. (197ub). Some contempoiaiy patteins of
mothei-infant inteiaction in the feeuing situation. In A. Ambiose
(Eu.), Stimulation in eaily infancy (pp. 1SS-171). Lonuon: Acauemic
Piess.
Bateson, u. (1967). Reuunuancy anu couing. In Steps to an ecology of minu
(pp. S99-41u). New Yoik: Ballantine Books, 1972.
Bateson, u. (197u). Foim, substance anu uiffeience. In Steps to an ecology of
minu. New Yoik: Ballantine Books.
Bowlby, }. (19S1). Nateinal Caie anu Nental Bealth. ueneva: Woilu Bealth
0iganization.
Bowlby, }. (19SS). Chilu Caie anu the uiowth of Love. Baimonuswoith,
Englanu: Penguin Books.
Bowlby, }. (19S8). The natuie of the chilu's tie to his mothei. Inteinational
}ouinal of Psycho-Analysis, S9, SSu-7S.
Bowlby, }. (196S). Pathological mouining anu chiluhoou mouining. }ouinal
of the Ameiican Psychoanalytic Association, 11, Suu-41.
Bowlby, }. (1969). Attachment anu Loss: vol. 1. Attachment. Lonuon:
Bogaith Piess.
Bowlby, }. (197S). Attachment anu Loss: vol. 2. Sepaiation. New Yoik: Basic
Books.
Bowlby, }. (1979a). The making anu bieaking of affectional bonus. Lonuon:
Tavistock.
Bowlby, }. (1979b). Psychoanalysis as ait anu science. Inteinational Review
of Psychoanalysis, 6, S-14.
Bowlby, }. (198u). Loss: Sauness anu uepiession. Lonuon: Bogaith Piess.
Bowlby, }. (1982). Attachment (iev. eu.). Lonuon: Bogaith Piess.
Builingham, B., & Fieuu, A. (1942). Young chiluien in waitime. Lonuon:
Allen & 0nwin.
Builingham, B., & Fieuu, A. (1944). Infants without families. Lonuon: Allen &
0nwin.
Baviu, N., & Appell, u. (1969). Nothei-chilu ielation. In }. u. Bowells (Eu.),
Nouein peispectives in inteinational chilu psychiatiy (pp. 98-12u).
Euinbuigh, Englanu: 0livei & Boyu.
Fieuu, S. (19uS). Thiee essays on the theoiy of sexuality. Stanuaiu Euition,
7, 1SS-24S.
Fieuu, S. (1911). Foimulations on the two piinciples of mental functioning.
Stanuaiu Euition, 12, 21S-226.
Fieuu, S. (1926). Inhibitions, symptoms anu anxiety. Stanuaiu Euition, 2u,
77-17S.
Fieuu, S. (19S8). An outline of psychoanalysis. Stanuaiu Euition, 2S, 144-
2u7.
Bamilton, v. (1982). Naicissus anu 0euipus: The chiluien of psychoanalysis
(p. 11). Lonuon: Routleuge & Kegan Paul.
}ames, W. (198u). Piinciples of human psychology. New Yoik: Bolt, Rinehait
& Winston.
Nahlei, N., Pine, F., & Beigman, A. (197S). The psychological biith of the
human infant (p. 42). New Yoik: Basic Books.
0mston, B. (1982). Stiachey's influence: A pieliminaiy iepoit. Inteinational
}ouinal of Psycho-Analysis, 6S, 4u9-426.
Robeitson, }. (19SS). Some iesponses of young chiluien to loss of mateinal
caie. Nuising Times, 49, S82-S86.
Tinbeigen, N. (1969). Ethology. In The animal in its woiluExploiations of
an ethologist, 19S2-1972 (vol. 2) (pp. 1Su-16u). Lonuon: Allen &
0nwin.
Tinbeigen, N. (1972). Eaily chiluhoou autismAn ethological appioach. In
The animal in its woiluExploiations of an ethologist, 19S2-1972
(vol. 2) (pp. 17S-199). Lonuon: Allen & 0nwin, 197S.

6
4%'-4% +7 8$%5*3 ,+2)0'"*"$2!5) %9,5-5)5+!
l8LuL8lC !. LLvlnL, P.u.
!CSLP W. SLA, M.u.
!"$*)/1%$!)" ."/ 4!)5*.6'+
By the time of his suuuen ueath in 1971 at age SS, ueoige S. Klein hau
alieauy maue many compelling contiibutions to psychology anu
psychoanalysis. Be was then woiking on what was piobably his most
impoitant contiibution, a ieexamination anu attempt at iestatement of
basic psychoanalytic theoiy which was publisheu posthumously as
01#23$4%45#6-2 E3"$)#L :% MI95$)46-$% $/ M11"%6-451 (1976) unuei the
euitoiship of Neiton N. uill anu Leo uolubeigei. Although this book was in a
still incomplete foim, many consiuei that its uaiing sweep anu poweiful
insights will have an enuuiing impact on psychoanalysis.
That Klein was a man of gieat peisonal magnetism, eneigy, anu
leaueiship ability, as well as a scientist anu theoietician, is given ample
testimony by the numeious activities his fiienus, stuuents, anu colleagues
have ueuicateu to his peisonal anu piofessional memoiy. Pieceuing each
meeting of the Ameiican Psychoanalytic Association is a meeting of the
ueoige S. Klein Reseaich Foium, ueuicateu to the auvancement of ieseaich
in psychoanalysis; the main lectuie at the annual meeting of Psychologists
Inteiesteu in the Stuuy of Psychoanalysis (a gioup of Ameiican
Psychological Association membeis) is the ueoige S. Klein Nemoiial
Lectuie; anu annually in his beloveu Stockbiiuge, Nassachusetts,
ieseaicheis anu psychoanalysts meet in the ueoige S. Klein-Baviu Rapapoit
Stuuy uioup. In auuition, theie have been a numbei of panels, symposia, anu
memoiial publications ueuicateu to the auvancement of Klein's woik (uill
anu Bolzman, 1976; Nayman, 1982; Reppen, 198u).
ueoige Klein was boin in Biooklyn, New Yoik, in 1919. Be was
euucateu at the City College of New Yoik anu Columbia 0niveisity, wheie he
uevelopeu what was to be a lifelong inteiest in the stuuy of peiception. Aftei
ieceiving his uoctoiate, Klein seiveu uuiing Woilu Wai II in the 0niteu
States Aimy Aii Foice, wheie he peifoimeu statistical stuuies anu co-
authoieu seveial iepoits on selection, uiagnosis, anu pieuiction of outcome
in patients.
In 1946, Klein joineu the staff of the Nenningei Clinic in Topeka,
Kansas, unuei the supeivision anu instiuction of Baviu Rapapoit. The few
yeais he spent theie weie to have a piofounu impact on the iest of his
intellectual life. At that time, the Nenningei Founuation pioviueu the best
available clinical psychological tiaining to nonphysicians anu was alive with
the clinical anu theoietical feiment stimulateu by Rapapoit anu his
colleagues. To this exciting atmospheie weie attiacteu a numbei of people,
incluuing Philip Bolzman, Beibeit Schlesingei, Lestei Luboisky, anu many
otheis who have continueu to be among the foiemost leaueis in
psychoanalytically oiienteu clinical psychology, as well as a numbei of
outstanuing meuical psychoanalysts. Klein quickly became an impoitant
figuie anu guiuing spiiit in this gioup. Be stuuieu Rapapoit's uiagnostic
psychological testing pioceuuies anu took some patients in psychotheiapy,
but his main contiibutions at the Nenningei Founuation weie in the aiea of
ieseaich. In this fiist majoi phase of his caieei, as a iesult of the joining of
his expeiimental backgiounu with his exposuie to psychoanalysis, Klein anu
his colleagues piouuceu a seiies of stuuies of inuiviuual consistencies in
peiceptual anu cognitive behavioi that auueu the teims "cognitive contiol"
anu "cognitive style" to the technical lexicon. The fact that Klein was the
leauei in this ieseaich was obscuieu by the alphabetical listing of the
authois of the majoi compiehensive publication on the subject (uaiunei,
Bolzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 19S9; see also Bolzman, 1982).
In 1949, Klein began a peisonal psychoanalysis while still at the
Nenningei Founuation. In 19Su, he went to Baivaiu as a visiting piofessoi
anu continueu analysis theie. While at Baivaiu, Klein became inteiesteu in
an oiganismic view of psychology in which neuiological mechanisms woulu
be incluueu along with the psychological. Be latei came to explicitly ieject
this position anu maue significant theoietical contiibutions in his attempt to
uisentangle the quasi-neuiological speculations of metapsychology fiom the
clinical theoiy of psychoanalysis.
In 19S2, with Robeit R. Bolt, a foimei colleague at the Nenningei
Founuation, Klein founueu the Reseaich Centei foi Nental Bealth at New
Yoik 0niveisity, wheie he iemaineu foi the iest of his caieei.
This centei became the heait of an outstanuing giauuate piogiam in
clinical psychology anu clinical ieseaich laboiatoiy, piouucing ieseaich on
the inteiface between psychoanalytic anu expeiimental issues. Klein also
staiteu his own clinical piactice at this time anu began to tuin to moie
puiely psychoanalytic theoietical conceins in his wiitings. Be wiote his
papei on consciousness (Klein, 19S9a), which uevelopeu yet anothei
peispective on the ways in which ego piocessing of peiceptual anu cognitive
uata can vaiy inuepenuently of uiives anu neeus, anu began to uevelop his
theoietical ciitique of the psychoanalytic uiive theoiy. Bis clinical
expeiience bioaueneu as he became affiliateu with the Austen Riggs Centei
in Stockbiiuge, Nassachusetts, anu his effoits to uistinguish the
psychological fiom the metapsychological within psychoanalytic theoiy
incieaseu.
Buiing this time, Klein founueu the 01#23$5$F-245 D11*"1 monogiaph
seiies, which continues to be the majoi publication vehicle aimeu at
fulfilling the goals that Klein (19S9b) enunciateu in his fiist issue: "To
uevelop its theoietical potentialities psychoanalysis must sciutinize uata
fiom all fielus of psychological anu psychiatiic inquiiy" (pp. iii-iv). Klein also
continueu his expeiimental investigations of such vaiieu fielus as uieam
content anu the effects of uiugs anu cultuial uepiivation. Be unueitook a
foimal psychoanalytic euucation anu was giauuateu fiom the New Yoik
Psychoanalytic Institute. Theie he was a leauei in obtaining the iight of
nonmeuical giauuates to have full piivileges to conuuct a psychoanalytic
piactice. Buiing this final peiiou of his life, Klein's piimaiy scholaily
inteiests moveu moie fully in the uiiection of clinical psychoanalytic theoiy,
anu he piouuceu the papeis (anu papeis in piogiess) that weie publisheu in
the posthumous volume on 01#23$4%45#6-2 E3"$)# (1976).
In ieviewing Klein's ouyssey fiom ieseaich to psychoanalytic theoiist,
ceitain themes consistently appeai. Fiist is Klein's eneigy, innovative talent,
anu leaueiship ability. A seconu theme is the peisisting influence of his
acauemic psychological stuuies of peiception. These became the vehicle
thiough which he fiist expiesseu his inteiest in the ego's autonomous iole
in uiiecting behavioi, in contiast to theoiies stiessing neeus oi uiives as the
main contiolling foices. This view, heavily influenceu by Baviu Rapapoit,
ultimately evolveu into Klein's ciiticism of the uiive theoiy of
psychoanalysis. Somewhat suipiisingly, peihaps, along with this ciiticism
Klein also piouuceu a telling ciitique of the tenets of ego psychology, many
of which hau been foimulateu by his mentoi, Rapapoit. It may be saiu that
as Klein absoibeu the insights of ego psychology, he at fiist founu them
libeiating, but latei began to finu them constiicting anu limiting as his
appieciation of clinical uata anu theoiy giew. Even in his final woiks,
howevei, Klein's emphasis as a psychoanalytic theoiist was always on the
bioau gioup of phenomena that make up what hau been calleu the ego
those autonomous piocesses, stiuctuies, anu motives that he believeu weie
impoitant contiibutois to peisonality functioning inuepenuent of the
uiiving powei of sensual neeus. In this iespect, he was tiying to bioauen the
scope of psychoanalytic inquiiy beyonu the limiteu uata base pioviueu by
the patient on the couch.
A thiiu majoi theme in Klein's woik is his consistent emphasis on
theoietical iigoi anu piecision, which leu him ultimately to see many flaws
in the classical uiive anu stiuctuial theoiies of psychoanalytic
metapsychology. As pait of his lifelong effoit to integiate vaiious bianches
of psychology, Klein pioposeu substituting foi paits of metapsychology
seveial concepts fiom the woik of Piaget anu cognitive psychologists, which
he felt woulu simplify psychoanalytic theoiy anu make it closei anu moie
iesponsive to the uata of obseivation.
A fuithei, minoi tienu was Klein's enuuiing inteiest in cieativity anu
the aitistic piocess. Bis wife, Bessie Boiis Klein, is a paintei anu Klein, too,
enjoyeu painting at times. Be peiiouically ietuineu to a consiueiation of the
inteiielationship of neeus anu ego piocesses in the "iepaiative" woik of the
cieative act.


%)5"!$!0( %)"$*)-#7 6#+%').".-+$!% (5) 6#+%')-)5+ !"
$'( *(#(.*%' -.4)*.$)*+
When Klein went to the Nenningei Founuation following Woilu Wai II,
a piominent tienu in ieseaich on peiception was the "New Look" (Postman,
Biunei, & Ncuinnies, 1948), a gioup of stuuies uemonstiating that motives
oi neeus coulu influence anu significantly altei the iegistiation anu
juugment of peiceptual uata. Piioi to that time, expeiimental psychologists
hau investigateu the foimal uetails of peiceptual anu thought piocesses, but
hau assumeu that these functions opeiateu stably, iegaiuless of the
inuiviuual's puiposes anu neeu states. In contiast, this new gioup of
investigatois founu that in some situations, uiives woulu "sensitize" the
inuiviuual to peiceive stimuli ielateu to the uiive state; in otheis,
suppiessive effects weie obseiveu as a iesult of "peiceptual uefense." Bata
in these stuuies weie notoiiously inconsistent, anu inuiviuual uiffeiences in
these effects weie conspicuous but hau not been explaineu. In Klein's
(19S8) view, these finuings weie having an exaggeiateu impact:
Theie was at the back of oui minus a feeling that while motivation-
in-peiception stuuies weie iectifying oluei sins of omission, they
weie also assuming that if only a uiive is intense enough it can benu
any oi all cognitive stiuctuies to its aim. While no one committeu
himself blatantly to such a statement, the uiift of empiiical woik
seemeu to be moving steauily towaiu it. Some way hau to be founu
in theoiy of pioviuing foi effective piocessing without ienouncing
the possible peivasiveness of motivational influence upon thought
|pp. 87-88j.
Klein's iesponse, thiough his ieseaich, was to uemonstiate that while it
is tiue that neeus anu motives influence peiception, these influences vaiy
fiom inuiviuual to inuiviuual, as a iesult of uiffeiences in the pieexisting
stiuctuial chaiacteiistics of style oi pattein of thinking. Be anu his gioup
iuentifieu a numbei of what they believeu to be intia-inuiviuually consistent
patteins of peiceiving anu thinking, which coulu be uetecteu in the
laboiatoiy, anu showeu that these patteins shapeu ways in which motives
oi neeus influenceu oi uistoiteu peiception. These cognitive stiuctuies
fiist calleu cognitive attituues anu latei cognitive contiolsweie thought of
"as ways of contacting ieality, wheieby one's intentions aie cooiuinateu
with the piopeities, ielations, anu limitations of events anu objects" (Klein
19S8, p. 88). In an eaily influential stuuy, Klein (19S4) examineu the effects
of thiist on peiception of objects that hau to uo with thiistiness anu
uiinking, compaiing the peifoimance of thiisty anu nonthiisty subjects on
the same tests. Be uiviueu both gioups accoiuing to theii peifoimance on a
cognitive test intenueu to uetect contiasting ways in which people typically
ueal with uistiacting, intiusive feelings, such as thiistiness. Klein founu that
the uiffeient cognitive attituues iuentifieu by that test uiu cause
chaiacteiistically uiffeient kinus of uistoitions in thiisty subjects.
1

Although the "New Look" stuuies constituteu one of the fiist aieas in
which psychoanalytic iueas (i.e., the impoitance of neeus anu motives) hau
an impact on ieseaich in peiception, Klein showeu that impact to be one-
siueu-consiueiing only the influence of uiives (like the eaily psychoanalytic
iu psychology) anu not the iole of the cooiuinating anu contiolling
stiuctuies of the ego. Bis ieseaich, which was conceptualizeu accoiuing to
the ego psychology of Beinz Baitmann, Eiik Eiikson, anu paiticulaily his
teachei, Baviu Rapapoit, was intenueu to coiiect this imbalance.
With his collaboiatois, Klein investigateu vaiious aspects of the
cognitive contiols to flesh out the unueistanuing of theii ioles in ego
functioning. 0nueilying the specific peiceptual attituues that weie initially
iuentifieu, Klein (19S8) believeu, weie ego stiuctuies of bioau geneiality
anu significance foi peisonality functioning, which seemeu "to ieflect highly
geneializeu foims of contiol as likely to appeai in a peison's peiceptual
behavioi as in his mannei of iecall anu iecollection" (p. 89). Stuuies of these
contiol piinciples exploieu theii possible ielationships to othei ego
piocesses, paiticulaily the classical uefense mechanisms, patteins of
peisonality oiganization as iuentifieu in piojective testing, moues of
hanuling stiess, anu leaining anu intellectual ability (uaiunei, Bolzman,
Klein, Linton, & Spence, 19S9; uaiunei, }ackson, & Nessick, 196u; Bolzman,
1962; Bolzman & Klein, 19S6; Klein anu Schlesingei, 19S1). Klein anu his
cowoikeis (Bolzman & Klein, 19S6) tenueu to assume that while each
cognitive contiol might unueigo an epigenetic uevelopment, these
stiuctuies piobably hau theii ioots in constitutional givenswhat
Baitmann (19S9) calleu appaiatuses of piimaiy ego autonomy. Thus, they
speculateu, cognitive contiol patteins might foim an impoitant pait of the
constitutional matiix that ueteimines the inuiviuual's chaiactei stiuctuie,
ieliance on paiticulai uefense mechanisms, anu choice of paiticulai
symptoms anu psychopathological patteins (see, foi example, Shapiio,
196S, pp. 1S-14). Although Klein (19S8) stateu that "cognitive attituues
seemeu to iesemble what psychoanalysts have calleu chaiactei uefenses"
(p. 88), he believeu they weie not actually uefenses, iesulting fiom conflicts,
but piecuisois oi pieuisposing conuitions, which contiibuteu to the choice
of uefenses. In any inuiviuual, the patteining oi aiiangement of cognitive
contiols woulu constitute a supeioiuinate stiuctuie, "cognitive style."
The following cognitive contiol piinciples weie stuuieu by Klein anu his
gioup:
1. =","5-%FH134)9"%-%F8 Consistent inuiviuual uiffeiences weie founu
between people (known as shaipeneis) who tenu to cleaily
uistinguish newly peiceiveu stimuli fiom theii pievious expeiiences,
anu "leveleis" who tenu to show a high uegiee of assimilation
between new peicepts anu olu ones, iesulting in juugments of
cuiient stimuli as being similai to pieviously peiceiveu ones. Some
uata suggesteu that leveleis might have geneially hysteioiu
peisonalities anu favoi the use of the uefense mechanism of
iepiession (uaiunei, Bolzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 19S9;
Bolzman, 1962). Klein anu his co-woikeis ieasoneu that a tenuency
to assimilate new events to existing schemata was similai to Fieuu's
(191S) uefinition of seconuaiy iepiession as "the attiaction
exeiciseu by what was piimally iepiesseu upon eveiything |in
consciousnessj with which it can establish a connection" (p. 148).
2. <24%%-%F8 Inuiviuuals high on scanning weie thought to "ueploy
attention to ielatively many aspects of stimulus fielus ... |they aiej
constantly scanning the fielu" (uaiunei, Bolzman, Klein, Linton, &
Spence, 19S9, p. 47) anu weie also saiu to "naiiow awaieness anu
keep expeiiences uiscieet; anu ... to sepaiate affect fiom iuea" (p. 46).
These chaiacteiistics weie consiueieu cognitive analogues to the
uefense mechanism of isolation, which was founu to be coiielateu to
scanning in some people, as iateu in the Roischach test (uaiunei,
Bolzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 19S9).
S. MJ*-,45"%2" )4%F". Equivalence iange uenoteu a uimension of
inuiviuual uiffeiences in piefeience foi using bioau anu inclusive
veisus naiiow anu piecise categoiies in classifying objects anu
events. No connection was suggesteu between this contiol piinciple
anu uefenses.
4. E$5")4%2" /$) *%)"45-16-2 "I9")-"%2"1. People weie founu to uiffei in
the flexibility anu efficiency with which they accepteu anu uealt with
ambiguous situations, with situations that "contioveit conventional
ieality," anu peihaps also with affects (uaiunei, Bolzman, Klein,
Linton, anu Spence, 19S9).
S. ?$%16)-26"&H/5"I-C5" 2$%6)$5. Flexible contiolleis weie consiueieu to
be inuiviuuals who function efficiently on tasks even when
expeiiencing stiong uiives, feelings, oi othei uistiactions;
constiicteu contiolleis' auaptive functioning was impaiieu by these
things. Constiicteu contiolleis weie thought to tightly suppiess
feelings anu impulses, wheieas flexible contiolleis weie fieei anu
less compulsive. Beie too, a theoietical connection was maue to the
use of the uefense of isolation of affect.
6. (-"5& 4)6-2*546-$%8 This is the fielu uepenuence-inuepenuence vaiiable
extensively stuuieu by Witkin (Witkin, Byk, Fateison, uoouenough,
anu Kaip, 1962). It is a thoioughly exploieu uimension of inuiviuual
uiffeiences in the tenuency to focus on backgiounu veisus "figuie"
cues in many situations. Fielu aiticulation is connecteu to numeious
aspects of peisonality anu cognitive functioning.
Klein conceptualizeu cognitive contiols as quasi-motivationalhe
believeu they uiiect behavioi, but, unlike uiives, they uo not leau to
uischaige oi consummation. Like uefenses, they shape the expiession of
uiives anu contiol uiives, but he saw them as moie geneial than uefenses
as basic, conflict-fiee, "positive" causes of behavioi. In his ieseaich on
cognitive contiols, Klein attempteu to bioauen knowleuge of piimaiily anu
seconuaiily autonomous ego functions. Be also began to elaboiate what was
to become a continuing theme of his woik-his view that psychoanalytic
uiive theoiy, with its basis in physiological neeu states, was an inaccuiate
anu inelegant way to foimulate human motivation. As he put it (Klein,
19S8):
It seems moie paisimonious to follow Woouwoith's (1918),
Woouwoith anu Schlosbeig's (19S4), anu Bebb's (1949) leau anu
think of uiive as a constiuct which iefeis, on the one hanu, to
"ielating" piocesses-the meanings-aiounu which selective behavioi
anu memoiies aie oiganizeu; anu in teims of which goal sets,
anticipations, anu expectations uevelop, anu, on the othei hanu, to
those piocesses which accommouate this ielational activity to
ieality |p. 92j,
%)"$*!41$!)"# $) 6#+%').".-+$!% $'()*+
A. S1A1LS Cl CCnSClCuSnLSS
Klein expanueu his ieseaich into the mechanics of thought anu
peiception as "tools" of auaptation aftei leaving the Nenningei Founuation.
Baving fiist stuuieu inuiviuual uiffeiences in appaiently enuuiing, ielatively
autonomous cognitive stiuctuies, his attention now tuineu to anothei
conflict-fiee aiea of the ueteimination of peiception anu cognition: stuuies
of the effect on thinking of vaiiations in states of consciousnesssubliminal
stimulation, uieam ieseaich, anu the influence of uiugs.
veiy eaily in the uevelopment of psychoanalysis, Fieuu (19uu) hau
pointeu out that inciuental expeiiences peiceiveu on the peiipheiy of
awaieness aie piocesseu uiffeiently by the oiganism than events of gieatei
impoitance, which aie uealt with in the focus of consciousness. Inciuental
expeiiences tenu not be iemembeieu consciously but to contiibute heavily
to the uay iesiuue of uieams. 0nlike the contents of focal consciousness,
they aie moie subject to the piimaiy piocess than to seconuaiy piocess
moues of thinking. Stuuies of subliminal iegistiation (by Poetzl, 1917 anu
Fishei, 19S4 as well as by Klein, 19S9a) piouuceu finuings that confiimeu
anu elaboiateu Fieuu's eaily obseivations. Subliminal stimuli activateu a
iange of conscious anu unconscious meanings, which coulu be uisceineu in
uieams, imaginative piouucts, anu vaiious inuiiect aspects of veibal anu
nonveibal behavioi but weie not available to conscious iecall. Thus, the
state of consciousness of the inuiviuualas affecteu by attention, chemicals,
anu the sleep statehas significant effects on the extent to which piimaiy
piocess, assimilatoiy cognitionas opposeu to seconuaiy piocess,
accommouative cognitionis active. This biiuge between psychoanalysis
anu acauemic psychology was significant to the lattei as well. Laws of
peiception that weie uevelopeu in the laboiatoiy weie now seen as specific
only to paiticulai states of awaieness. Since peiception is a cognitive event,
unuei conuitions in which ieality content is not piominent iegistiations aie
ieciuiteu to veiy uiffeient, moie piimitive conceptual schemata than those
that aie oiuinaiily uominant in focal attention (Klein, 19S9a; 1966).
8. C8l1lCuL Cl ML1AS?CPCLCC?
Baving spent a lifetime uoing both acauemic ieseaich anu clinical
psychoanalytic woik, Klein founu many flaws in the ways in which existing
theoiies fiom both vantage points hau attempteu to account foi the
meanings of human behavioi. Be believeu that acauemic psychology, in its
effoits to encompass the finuings of psychoanalysis, hau actually founu
ways to omit anu ignoie the most salient featuies of Fieuu's insights. By
uiiecting attention to geneializeu conceptions of the ueteimining influence
of infantile expeiience on auult behavioi, acauemicians hau focuseu
attention away fiom the specific issue of infantile sexuality.
Phenomenological anu humanistic psychological theoiies, which stiess the
piesent moment anu conscious expeiience, have little place foi the
unconscious. This, of couise, is also tiue of behavioiism. Social psychiatiy
stiesses enviionmental iathei than intiapsychic causation. But Klein saw
classical psychoanalysis as also buiueneu by a mechanistic theoiy
metapsychologywhich is not only unnecessaiy but is actually haimful to
the unueistanuing of meanings anu the piactice of psychoanalysis. 0thei
authois as well (see paiticulaily uill, 1976; uuntiip, 1969; Bolt, 1976;
Schafei, 1968; Waeluei, 1962), some of them eailiei than Klein, have
pointeu out that Fieuu piouuceu both a clinical theoiy anu a metatheoiy, at
uiffeient levels of logical analysis, anu that the existence of these two
theoiies has cieateu many seiious pioblems. Although Klein was theiefoie
not the fiist to espouse this point of view, his was a most compelling voice.
Klein's fiist step towaiu iectifying this situation was to seaich foi the
"essential theoietical unueistiuctuie that constitutes 'clinical
psychoanalysis' " (1976, p. 1). Clinical theoiy, he specifieu, attempts to
oiganize anu explain psychoanalytic uata fiom the viewpoint of the patient's
expeiiences anu motivations, both conscious anu unconscious. This
appioach contiasts to the bouy of theoiy that attempts, as Klein (1976) put
it, "to place psychoanalysis in the iealm of natuial science by pioviuing an
impeisonal, nonteleological view of the oiganism as a natuial object subject
ultimately to the laws of physics, chemistiy, anu physiology. Teleological
consiueiationsthe patient's stanupointaie iiielevant to this level of
explanation" (p. 2).
2
Foi Klein (1976), puiposive consiueiations weie at the
veiy heait of clinical theoiy, which uoes not "uistinguish shaiply between
uesciiption anu explanation; to uesciibe a peison's intention oi aim is to say
that what a peison is uoing is also why he is uoing it" (p. 2). In view of these
convictions, Klein attempteu to caiefully uisengage the clinical theoiy fiom
the mechanistic metapsychological theoiy.
Like his pieuecessois, Klein attiibuteu the existence of the two
psychoanalytic theoiies to Fieuu's philosophy of science, which, in tuin, was
ueteimineu to a significant uegiee by the intellectual climate of the late
nineteenth centuiy. As Klein unueistoou this philosophy, it iejecteu
concepts of intention anu meaning, consiueiing them unacceptable teims of
scientific explanation. Fieuu stiuggleu to constiuct a neuioanatomical-
physiological mouel, the 0)$G"26 /$) <2-"%6-/-2 01#23$5$F# (189S). Although
he was foiceu to abanuon the Pioject, his seaich foi neuiophysiological
levels of explanation continueu to manifest itself, foi example, in the optical
appaiatus mouel in Chaptei 7 of E3" D%6")9)"646-$% $/ N)"4;1 (19uu) anu in
the instinctual uiive theoiy of motivation, with its concepts of eneigic
excitations, cathexes, anu ieseivoiis of eneigy.
Klein consiueieu the concepts of uiive anu eneigy to be the cential flaw
of metapsychology, a flaw attiibutable to Fieuu's ieliance upon the Biucke-
Neyneit value system. These concepts, he believeu, aie not only inheiently
implausible but also iiielevant to the clinical psychoanalytic enteipiise.
Fieuu's uiive-ieuuction mouel, Klein (1976) stateu, "is moie appiopiiate to
a iat than to a human being, anu is as congenial to violently
antipsychoanalytical theoiies as to Fieuu's metapsychological ones" (p. 47).
Netapsychological concepts aie not veiifiable by the clinical methou anu aie
baseu on the ieification of such hypothetical constiucts as uiives anu the
psychic stiuctuies of iu, ego, anu supeiego. They uo not ueal with the basic
intent of psychoanalysisunlocking meaningsanu cannot substitute foi
teims that aie uesciiptive of human expeiience anu object ielations.
Nonetheless, as a consequence of these uual theoiies, psychoanalysts have
tenueu to assume that they actually woik on the basis of clinical concepts,
which they take foi gianteu as obseivable oi infeiable phenomena, anu to
think of metapsychology as the unueilying basic theoiy that explains those
concepts. In contiast, Klein consiueieu that the concepts of the clinical
theoiy, if coiiectly unueistoou, weie at an appiopiiate level of abstiaction
to ieplace metapsychology. They aie explanations in psychological teims,
aie peisonal anu puiposive, anu aie not tianslatable into physical oi
neuioanatomical mouels.
Foi Klein (1976), "the phenomenological concepts, the logic of the
analyst's infeiences, anu the extiaphenomenological concepts of function,
puipose, anu meaning of expeiience anu behavioi make up psychoanalytic
theoiy" (p. S1). Within this iealm he maue a uistinction between
expeiiential anu functional concepts. Expeiiential concepts aie the mental
contents that the analyst attiibutes to the patient, incluuing both the
patient's conscious expeiiences anu unconscious fantasies. These aie
veiifiable in the psychoanalytic situation. Functional concepts, such as
piojection, intiojection, anu iepiession, aie infeiieu piocesses connecting
the accessible anu inaccessible levels of expeiience, anu cannot be veiifieu
in the clinical setting. They "almost always have to uo with puipose,
function anu accomplishment" (Klein, 1976, p. Su). 0sing these conceptual
tools, analysts aie able to obseive iegulaiities in behavioi that aie not
iecognizeu by othei stuuents of the minu.
Psychoanalysis, foi Klein, ueals with the histoiies of meanings
thioughout a peison's life. Be unueistoou peisonality as foimeu thiough
syntheses that evolve out of conflicts-that is, points of ciisis in the
inuiviuual's life. Since theie aie commonalities in these ciises, it is possible
to specify ciitical uevelopmental peiious. These phenomena aie not
ieuucible to physiological anu neuiological piocesses anu it woulu be
fallacious to think that such piocesses aie moie ieal oi valiu as scientific
uata, than obseivations of people's intentions anu meanings. As Klein
(1976) saiu: "Statements of puipose oi meaning anu piinciples of
physiological iegulation aie two mutually exclusive ways of being awaie of
oui bouily activities" (p. 62).
1. <"I*45-6# 4%& <"%1*45-6#. Klein began his task of teasing apait the two
psychoanalytic theoiies by examining Fieuu's two theoiies of sexuality.
Fieuu was leu by his clinical obseivations to expanu the meaning of
sexuality fiom its oiuinaiy use, iefeiiing to auult piocieative ability, to a
wiue vaiiety of behaviois beginning in infancy anu ueveloping thioughout
life. The invaiiant factoi in all sexuality (i.e., in all those expeiiences which
Fieuu iefeiieu to as libiuinal) Klein (1976) felt, is "a capacity foi a 9)-;4)#A
&-16-%26-,"5# 9$-F%4%6A "%,"5$9-%F "I9")-"%2" $/ 95"41*)"" (p. 77). These
expeiiences, which Klein felt aie best teimeu "sensual," uo not uepenu
simply on the iemoval of "unpleasuie," but aie positive excitatoiy
piocesses. Sensual pleasuie has a numbei of special chaiacteiistics that
cause it to be a highly significant motivational foice anu that cieate a unique
potential foi conflict suiiounuing it. It can seive vaiious functions that aie
not oiiginally piimaiily sexual; it can be expeiienceu in oigans anu activities
that aie usually nonsexual, anu, conveisely, sexual oigans can lack eiotic
sensation at times.
Recognition of the uistinction between sensuality anu sexual behavioi
was a funuamental uiffeience between Fieuu anu othei theoiists. Sensuality
has a chaiacteiistic uevelopment, which inteilocks with all othei
uevelopmental aieas. This maue it possible foi Fieuu to unueistanu how
sexual uevelopment affecteu, anu is affecteu by, a peison's symbolizeu
cognitive iecoiu of inteipeisonal encounteis. In Klein's view, sexual neeus
uo not exeit a uiiving foice upon behavioi; insteau, the expeiience of
sensual pleasuie acquiies impoitant uevelopmental meanings, anu these
leau to a ciaving foi iepetition of the expeiience. It is in this way, iathei
than because of biological uiive, that sexuality attains its gieat motivational
foice. Since these expeiiences occui oiiginally in ielationships with paients
anu othei eaily objects, the sensual ciavings take the foim of specific object-
ielateu uesiies. They also aie highly subject to the inevitable contiauictions
anu conflicts aiising between the plasticity of sensual aiousal anu the
constiaints of social guiuance anu expectations. It is this plasticity anu these
unavoiuable contiauictions that cieate a potential foi intiapsychic conflict
suiiounuing sexuality.
Sexuality /""51 as though it is a uiivein Klein's (1976) woius, "as if an
alien piessuie weie ueveloping fiom within" (p. 96)but it is neithei
necessaiy noi logical to assume that this feeling of impulsion ieflects the
piesence of an actual, conciete uiive quantity oi mechanism. In this iespect,
the concept of libiuinal uiives is a theoietical ieification of an expeiiencea
"hybiiu concept" (Slap anu Levine, 1978). The stiength of a sexual motive is
not baseu on some uiive foice, but on the functional significance of the
sexual appetite in cognitive teims-the meaning of the activateu schema of
sensuality. In uiive theoiy, saiu Klein (1976) the essence of sexuality "is not
an expeiience, but a contentless physiological event" (p. 11u), anu the
clinical anu uiive concepts of sexuality imply uiffeient biological
foimulations. In one it is a pleasuiable expeiience that is sought iepetitively
in oiuei to ieexpeiience the pleasuie, anu in the othei it is a neeu to ielieve
piessuie anu tension. In the clinical theoiy the focus is on sensuality as a
highei mental function; in the metapsychological theoiy, sensuality is a
peiipheial function. As Klein (1976) phiaseu it: "The ciitical uiffeience of
emphasis between the two viewpoints .|isj that in the uiive theoiy
pleasuie is ueiiveu not fiom the puisuit of uiive, but fiom the getting iiu of
it" (p. 119). Klein believeu that the theoietical pieeminence of the uiive
mouel leu to a failuie to fully test the implications of the clinical theoiy anu
impeueu effoits to enlaige clinical unueistanuing.
2. MF$ 01#23$5$F#. Klein tiaceu the pioblems of the two psychoanalytic
theoiies in his analysis of the theoiy of the ego (1976), which he consiueieu
"a concept in seaich of an iuentity" (p. 121). Fieuu hau foimulateu the ego
unsystematically as the iepiesentative of ieality, essentially a set of
functions anu piocesses stanuing foi suivival anu self-pieseivation. As is
still the case foi many clinicians, Klein (1976) noteu, Fieuu was "inclineu to
iegaiu the ego mainly in the light of its paiticipation in conflict anu in its
paitneiship with instinctual uiives piessing foi uischaige. |Be paiuj scant
attention to the auaptive functions of the ego as a system" (p. 1Su). This was
satisfactoiy, in Klein's view, within the fiamewoik of the eaily
psychoanalytic conception of uiives as blinu motivational foices contiolleu
by some stiuctuie. With the expansion of motivational theoiy initiateu by
the conception of the active iole of signal anxiety as a motivating, uiiective
factoi, howevei, Fieuu assigneu an enlaigeu anu elaboiateu iole to the ego,
but left ciucial issues unsettleu. These incluueu the questions of what
eneigy is employeu by the ego in its activities; the eneigic basis of signal
anxiety; anu whethei piimaiy piocess functions such as conuensation anu
uisplacement aie within the scope of the ego. In auuition, Klein believeu that
Fieuu hau hinteu at the possibility of autonomous stiuctuies anu
motivations in the ego, anu thus, Klein was convinceu that this iequiieu
fuithei uevelopment. Fieuu fell shoit in that he uiu not see the ego as
"positive cieatoi" of behavioi, anu uiu not confiont "the ciucial issue of the
inuepenuence of the ego piocesses fiom libiuinal contiol" (Klein, 1976, p.
1S1).
Following Fieuu, ego psychological theoiists, especially Baitmann,
Eiikson, anu Rapapoit, pioposeu solutions foi these pioblems. These
solutions often involveu a bioaueneu focus of psychoanalytic inteiest fiom
psychopathology to geneial psychological questions, anu to "all
psychological 'uisequilibiia,' whethei specifically psychopathological oi not"
(Klein, 1976, pp. 14S-146). They placeu gieatei emphasis on the auaptive
point of view anu on inuepenuent, conflict-fiee motivations anu stiuctuies
within the ego. Klein chaiacteiizeu the changes in psychoanalysis as: (1)
fiom a naiiow concein with conflict to concein with uilemma anu ciisis; (2)
fiom concein with uefense to an inteiest in auaptational contiols; (S) fiom
concein with sexual anu aggiessive uiives to geneial motives such as
masteiy anu the synthetic piinciple; anu (4) fiom giving piioiity to the
unconscious to gieatei piioiity foi conscious phenomena such as affects.
Klein saw these as salutaiy new emphases foi psychoanalytic theoiy.
Bowevei, he believeu that they weie not uone justice by the
metapsychology of Baitmann anu Rapapoit, which is essentially an
expanueu theoiy of ego contiols, establisheu to compensate foi the
ueficiencies of the uiive theoiy of motivation. Ego psychology tenueu to see
the ego eithei as a ieifieu entity oi simply as an unsystematic giouping of
functions. (Klein consiueieu this a thiowback to faculty psychology.) The
ego's ielationship to uiives iemaineu ambiguous. Biive was spoken of as
both inuepenuent of the ego anu involveu with ego uevelopment. Biives
uevelop anu have stiuctuie, but it is not cleai whethei they aie pait of the
ego. Finally anu centially, like all metapsychological explanations anu like
acauemic psychology as well, these theoiies suffei fiom a focus on piocess
iathei than motivation. Accoiuing to Klein (1976), "To the extent that we
puisue the piocess explanation, we aie uistiacteu fiom the neeu to impiove
upon psychoanalytic piopositions iegaiuing the aims, motives anu goals of
behavioi" (p. 1S8).
Ego psychology is toin between two objectives of explanation: It
offeis a half-heaiteu anu half-annotateu commitment to
explanation in teims of puipose on the one hanu anu to mechanism
on the othei. It faces the choice eithei of tiying to sophisticate a
conception of a iegulatoiy mechanism, builuing into it evei moie
uetaileu assumptions of piocesses to implement its heietofoie
implieu ieifications, oi of fiankly iestiicting the scope anu the
teims of ego theoiy to the level of motivational explanation that
biought psychoanalysis into being in the fiist placean enueavoi
exclusively conceineu with unueistanuing behavioi in ielation to
psychological uilemma, conflict, task, anu life histoiy, an enteipiise
that exploies, in Waeluei's (19S6) teims, the "multiple functions" of
action. This is the shoemakei's last of the psychoanalyst. Sticking to
it anu pointing his theoiizing in this uiiection, the psychoanalyst
woulu sheu all pietense of offeiing a nonteleological, mechanistic
pictuie of ego piocesses, such as is implieu by such impeisonal
teims as homeostasis, equilibiium, cathexis, eneigy anu its
mouifications, anu the like |pp. 1S9-16uj.
*(2)*31-.$!)" )2 6#+%').".-+$!% $'()*+
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Klein's ciitical analysis of metapsychology was viitually complete at the
time of his ueath, but his attempts to iefoimulate psychoanalytic theoiy at a
clinically ielevant level weie in a pieliminaiy stage. In this iefoimulation, he
took as a cential tenet of Fieuu's genetic anu stiuctuial theoiies the iuea
that stiuctuial iesiuues of past conflicts peisist as oiganizing piinciples of
behavioi anu thought. Be noteu (1976): "The concept that intiapsychic
oiuei anu the motives goveining action aiise fiom "I9")-"%2"& uisoiuei is
basic to psychoanalytic theoiy" (p. 16S). Ciisis anu conflict, then, aie not
only pathogenic, but also play a constiuctive iole in peisonality
uevelopment; anu Klein felt that psychoanalysis shoulu be bioaueneu to
encompass "noimal" as well as pathological uevelopment.
Klein pioposeu a numbei of mouifications anu elaboiations of
psychoanalytic theoiy. Fiist, although he iecognizeu that intiapsychic
conflicts ovei unacceptable wishes (those that conflict with social
constiaints anu expectations) have a uniquely impoitant iole, he believeu
that theie aie othei "incompatible expeiiences" (foi example, the
contiauiction between olu behavioial moues oi attituues anu new ones that
occui at a point of conflict-fiee uevelopmental change) that aie of similai
uevelopmental significance anu shoulu be uealt with by theoiy. All such
incompatibilities piesent "thieats to the integiation" of the self anu aie felt
as painful expeiiences, such as "estiangement fiom self." Theii iesolution
takes the foim of a cognitive-emotional schema that fiames latei
peiceptions anu actions.
A key aspect of Klein's thinking in this aiea is his intiouuction of the
concept of the self, oi self-schema, which is ceitainly among the moie
elusive anu contioveisial concepts of psychoanalytic theoiy.
S
Klein (1976)
pointeu out that, as hau been iecognizeu by psychoanalytic stiuctuial
theoiy, "conflict occuis only in ielation to an integiating oiganization that is
capable of 1"5/-obseivation, 1"5/-ciiticism, anu choice, anu that can iegulate
emotional neeus anu theii expiession" (p. 171). Bowevei, since classical
theoiy at times sees the ego as the locus anu iesolvei of conflict anu at othei
times as a 94)6# to conflict (e.g., between an "ego aim" anu a uiive), some
oiganization C"#$%& oi supiaoiuinate to the ego must be conceptualizeu to
pioviue foi integiation of aims anu aujuuication of contiauictions. Thus, in
Klein's woius, "the notion of 1"5/. now seems inuispensable" (p. 172). Klein
citeu Baitmann's (19Su) concept of the self as a fuithei "giaue" of
peisonality oiganization anu B. Lichtenstein's (1964) foimulation that the
self is the souice of the expeiience of successful anu faileu integiation.
Klein conceiveu of the self as active in iegaiu to the pioblems it
confiontsboth in iesolving the uemanus maue on it anu in initiating
puiposes of its own. Be citeu as an eaily exposition of this position
Waeluei's view that the ego is not simply a passive, mechanistic
switchboaiu, but has "its own peculiai activity" (Klein, 1976, p. 47), that is,
"an active tienu towaiu the instinctual life, a uisposition to uominate oi,
moie coiiectly, to incoipoiate it into its oiganization" (Waeluei, 19S6, pp.
47-48). Foi Klein, the synthetic function has the puipose of helping the
inuiviuual to maintain integiity among conscious aims, motives, anu values;
anu the self is the souice of this feeling of integiity. The sense of the self has
two aspects in uynamic equilibiium. 0ne is inuiviuuality"an autonomous
unit, uistinct fiom otheis as a locus of action anu uecision" (Klein 1976, p.
178); the othei is '"we-ness""one's self constiueu as a necessaiy pait of a
unit tianscenuing one's autonomous actions" (p. 178). An example of "we-
ness" is oneself as pait of a family, community, oi piofession. Klein follows
closely upon Eiikson's (196S) iueas heie, paiticulaily Eiikson's concept of
the sense of iuentity, which implies an oveiall continuity extenuing fiom the
past into the futuie anu fiom a paiticulai place in the community's past into
anticipateu woik accomplishment anu iole satisfaction. Thus, the
paiameteis of the sense of self involve conscious feelings of continuity,
coheience, anu integiity of thought in iespect to both autonomy anu "we-
iuentity."
Baving laiu this giounuwoik, Klein pioposeu a ieuefinition of the
concept of intiapsychic conflict in the bioauei context of "synthesizing
effoits" necessitateu by ciises that thieaten the coheience, continuity, anu
integiity of the self. These ciises aie of seveial kinus: wishes that aie
incompatible with the self-concept (intiapsychic conflict piopei); tiaumatic
expeiiences in which the peison is passively oveiwhelmeu; expeiiences
inuucing feelings of finiteness oi loss of impoitant ioles oi objects; anu
uevelopmental ciises "when the auaptational moues of one stage no longei
suit the iequiiements of a new stage" (Klein, 1976, p. 19u). Concomitantly,
Klein (1976) ieconceptualizeu anxiety as a signal of thieat to self-iuentity, a
feeling of uiscontinuity in selfhoou akin to helplessness oi meaninglessness:
Fiom such expeiiences of cleavage, whethei of the natuie of
conflict, tiauma, oi uevelopmental ciises, aiise effoits at solution in
the foim of a iealignment of aims anu goals. The moie ielevant a
motivation is in biinging about a solution to a ciisis of selfhoou, the
moie lasting, geneializeu, anu theieaftei ielieu upon it is in the
economy of peisonality. Thus the iesolution of expeiienceu
incompatibility is the majoi basis of motivational stiuctuie.
Notivations, iathei than being iegaiueu as aiising fiom a
"paiallelogiam of impeisonal foices" uefineu in teims of intensity,
aie iegaiueu as aiising as iesolutions of issues of self-integiation
anu self-peipetuation |p. 2u8j.
These expeiiences of incompatibility, conflict, oi cleavage in the self,
anu theii iesolutions, aie oiganizeu as cognitive stiuctuies with
motivational effects. These stiuctuies, which Klein calleu "schemata" (a
teim boiioweu fiom cognitive psychology |Baitlett, 19S2j), encompass the
ielevant wishes, object iepiesentations, affects, anu uefenses-all of which
togethei foim the iepiesentation of conflict. As Klein wiote:
"The component tenuencies of a conflict aie embouieu as an
unconsciously sustaineu stiuctuie (unconscious fantasy) which
may be iepetitively enacteu thioughout life ... |p. 18Sj.
. The teims of incompatibility anu the solutions auopteu to ieuuce
the incompatibility aie inteinal stiuctuies which state themselves
as themes, affective positions, anu styles of action anu thought. The
stiuctuieu iesiuues of incompatibilities aie uynamisms, which
oiganize the aims of behavioi. Stiuctuially, they aie meaning
schemata ... |p. 19Sj,
. Such inteinalizeu iepiesentations of conflict anu theii uefensive
aspect aie featuies of that cieateu -%%") "%,-)$%;"%6 which seives
as the peison's notions of anu uispositions towaiu the "ieal woilu,"
pioviuing the means of encouing it anu making it meaningful" |p.
199j,
Klein saw the effoits to pieseive self-iuentity as falling into two main
categoiies. 0ne is iepiession, which he uefineu as a uissociation of the
thieatening conflict fiom the mainstieam of the self-iuentity stiuctuie. The
othei is active ieveisal of passive expeiience, that is, iepetition of events
expeiienceu passively, yieluing a sense of active masteiy.
8. MC1lvA1lCnAL S?S1LM 8ASLu Cn LLASu8L-SLLklnC
In oiuei to ieplace the quasi-physiological concept of uiives that
oiiginate in the soma anu "push" the psyche, anu the tension-ieuuction
mouel of the pleasuie piinciple, Klein conceptualizeu motivations as active
stiivings foi "I9")-"%2"& pleasuies. Be consiueieu pleasuie as an expeiience
within the piovince of the ego, just as anxiety is an expeiience anu activity
of the ego, anu in his foimulations he ielieu heavily on paiallels with Fieuu's
uevelopment of the concept of anxiety. In Fieuu's eaily mouel, anxiety was
unueistoou as a uiiect consequence of the uistuibance in psychic economy
causeu by failuie of auequate uischaige of libiuinal eneigy; latei, as signal
anxiety, it was conceiveu as an anticipatoiy ieaction of the ego to uangei. As
a complementaiy concept to signal anxiety, Klein pioposeu the existence of
actively cieateu, anticipatoiy "signal pleasuies;" anu just as theie aie basic
piototypical anxiety expeiiences (feai of sepaiation, feai of castiation, etc.),
Klein postulateu six piototypical pleasuie expeiiences. Be saw these "vital
pleasuies" as innately given anu not ieuucible oi analyzable to simplei
components. Each pleasuie was seen as having its gieatest impact on
uevelopment at a paiticulai phase of the life cycle; anu Klein uiagiameu
theii piobable epigenetic uevelopment anu inteiielationships in an Eiikson-
like table. The six "vital pleasuies" weie as follows:
1. 05"41*)" -% )"&*26-$% $/ *%95"414%6 6"%1-$%. Although Klein believeu
that Fieuu hau oveiestimateu the significance of tension ieuuction as a
motivational aim, he uiu nonetheless agiee that it was highly impoitant. In
auuition to ielease of uiive tension anu ieuuction of anxiety, Klein also
incluueu heie numeious othei expeiiences of ielief fiom unpleasant
feelings, such as expeiiences of unfamiliaiity oi stiangeness, lack of
iecognition of people oi situations, anu task incompleteness. In all these
situations, tension ieuuction yielus positively pleasuiable feelings anu not
just an absence of unpleasuie. Consequently the expeiience is actively anu
iepeateuly sought.
2. <"%1*45 95"41*)". This is the bioau gioup of pleasuiable psycho-
sexual expeiiences, ianging fiom genital sexuality to tickling anu "contact
comfoit" that Fieuu iecognizeu as inteiielateu anu as having a
chaiacteiistic uevelopment. Beie, too, Klein stiesseu active pleasuie
seeking, anu not meiely the iemoval of unpleasuie. Sensuality is
chaiacteiizeu by plasticityi.e., uisplaceability in teims of zone, moue, anu
object choice.
S. 05"41*)" -% /*%26-$%-%F. Klein (1976) asseiteu that theie is inheient
pleasuie in the exeicise of many conflict-fiee appaiatuses anu functions,
which is sought foi its own sake. "The giatification of bouily neeus uoes not
account foi activities that an infant engages in spontaneously:.theie aie
times when he seems to giasp, suck, babble, squeeze, anu pull foi no ieason
othei than the pleasuie of theii iepetition" (p. 22S). Noie bioauly, this is a
"pleasuie |inj.efficient use of the cential neivous system foi the
peifoimance of well-integiateu ego functions" (p. 224).
4. M//"264%2" 95"41*)". Klein (1976) saiu: "The component that
uistinguishes effectance fiom pleasuie in functioning is the pleasuie in
obseiving the successful coiiesponuence of -%6"%6-$% anu effect" (p. 22S).
This is pleasuie in accomplishment anu masteiy, not meiely in the exeicise
of capacities.
S. 05"41*)" -% 95"41-%F. Klein was impiesseu by the infant's eaily ability
to know how to act pleasing to the mothei, anu he believeu that uoing so
was inheiently pleasuiable foi the infant. As he noteu (1976): "ueneiating
pleasuie in anothei is... an occasion... foi being affiimeu in one's being" (p.
228). This foim of pleasuie is the basis foi the neeu foi affiliation with othei
people, the neeu to belong, which Klein consiueieu a univeisal puipose,
actively puisueu: "The fact that pleasuie aiises fiom such a souice |pleasing
otheisj tells us too that the affiliative iequiiement has ioots just as ueep as
those pleasuie potentials that aie moie uiiectly localizeu anu oiiginate in
the "bouy ego' " (p. 229).
6. 05"41*)" -% 1#%63"1-1K4"163"6-2 95"41*)". In infant obseivation,
animal ieseaich, anu obseivations of auult life, Klein (1976) saw many
examples of the pleasuiable effect of the "uelighteu contemplation of
)"16$)"& oi &-12$,")"& oiuei" (p. 229). Be saw this as an impoitant motive
foi play anu cieative aitistic activity. Klein (1976) also vieweu this pleasuie
as closely connecteu to the piinciple of active ieveisal of passive expeiience
anu the "necessity in man.of having to cieate a self-iuentity" (p. 2Su)two
of the main conceptual pillais of his foimulations.
Although Klein (1976) saw these "vital pleasuies" oiuinaiily as
funuamental motivational givens, he also iecognizeu that theie coulu, at
times, be othei unconscious motives foi puisuing these aims, noting that
"inheiently pleasuiable activity can be extiinsicallly motivateu as well" (p.
2S4). Thus, pleasuies can seive uefensive functions; anu behavioi can at
times be motivateu towaiu excessive pleasuie seeking anu at othei times
towaiu excessive avoiuance of pleasuie.
C. 1PL MAln1LnAnCL Cl SLLl-ln1LC8l1?
1. +"9)"11-$%. Klein uelineateu two bioau categoiies of activity by which
the coheience, iuentity, continuity, anu integiity of the self can be
maintaineu in the fact of thieat uue to conflict, uevelopmental
incompatibility, oi tiauma: )"9)"11-$%, anu 426-," )",")145 $/ 9411-,"
"I9")-"%2". As is the case with othei psychoanalytic concepts that have
evolveu ovei many yeais, iepiession is oiuinaiily useu with both clinical
anu metapsychological meanings anu is consequently subject to some
confusion anu lack of piecision. Psychoanalysis uiu not begin with a uiive
theoiy. Rathei, in his eaily foimulations Fieuu attiibuteu psychopathhology
to the pieemptive powei of unconscious memoiies anu iueas; that is, to
mental contents uissociateu fiom consciousness but nonetheless active.
Because the powei of the iepiesseu iueas appeaieu to ueiive fiom theii
sexual content, Fieuu eventually alteieu his emphasis fiom the iueas
themselves to the uiives that he piesumeu to unueilie them as the souices
of intiapsychic conflict. It is consistent with the 25-%-245 theoiy of
psychoanalysis, howevei, to unueistanu intiapsychic conflict as occuiiing
between opposing sets of iueas (with theii associateu affects, object
iepiesentations, anu aims), oi between the self-schema (the nonconflictual
"main mass of iueas," feelings, attituues, anu aims) anu a meaning schema
that is contiaiy to the self, anu hence thieatens its maintenance, integiity,
anu continuity. The unueistanuing that conflict ueiives fiom a clash
between the ego anu a uiive is consistent only with the mechanistic concept
of metapsychology. Klein saw iepiession, then, as one moue of coping with
conflicting meaning schemata. Be evolveu a unique unueistanuing of this
phenomenon baseu laigely on his oiientation, ueiiveu fiom acauemic
psychology, of seeing the minu as an appaiatus foi leaining anu auaptation.
Klein (1976) pointeu out that iepiession uoes not necessaiily opeiate
by piohibiting the inuiviuual fiom having any awaieness of conflicts. Rathei,
it leaves a gap in compiehension of the waiueu-off mateiial, without
impeuing its behavioial expiession. In fact, its function is to peimit the
expiession of the conflicteu wish, while at the same time piotecting the
integiity of the self-schema by uenying it "the attiibutes of self-ielateuness.
|excluuing itj fiom the self as 4F"%6, self as $CG"26, anu self as 5$2*1" (p. 242).
In iepiession, the thieatening meaning schema is uissociateu fiom the
self anu continues to have a motivating influence on behavioi anu thought.
It functions in the moue that Piaget uesignateu as 411-;-546-$%; that is, it
pioviues a coue foi unueistanuing, ieacting to, anu inteinalizing new
expeiiences, while its own existence anu effects aie uncompiehenueu anu
unchangeable because no feeuback is possible about them. Repiession can
impeue auaptation, giowth, leaining, accuiate peiception, anu cognition.
0nuoing of iepiession is not only iecoveiing the memoiy of tiaumatic event
oi conflictual iuea, but also unueistanuing its meaning, biinging about
"compiehension in teims of a pieviously uncompiehenueu ielationship, the
peiception of a causal link to which the peison hau been impeivious" (Klein,
1976, p. 248).
Klein consiueieu it moie accuiate to think of iepiession in teims of its
moue of opeiationthe splitting off of an oiganization of iueas that aie
thieatening to the self anu that then function in a puiely assimilative
fashioniathei than in teims of the unconscious, whethei conceiveu of as a
system oi as a quality of expeiience.
2. +",")145 $/ O$-2". The seconu majoi stiategy available foi iesolution
of thieats to self-coheience, accoiuing to Klein, is the piinciple of ieveisal of
voice, oi active ieveisal of passive expeiience. This concept has a long
histoiy in psychoanalysis. Its cleaiest statement occuis in !"#$%& 63"
05"41*)" 0)-%2-95" (Fieuu, 192u) in Fieuu's uesciiption of a game playeu by
his gianuson. The same concept is at the heait of the uefense mechanism of
iuentification with the aggiessoi. In Klein's view, it is also the essence of
Fieuu's uesciiption of signal anxietyan instant, miniatuie act of ieveisal,
an active iepetition of a tiauma. Although the concept of active ieveisal has
long been available anu allusions to it occui in vaiious contexts, howevei, it
is faii to say that it has not befoie been accoiueu a cential anu impoitant
iole anu has not been well integiateu into the main bouy of psychoanalytic
theoiy. Klein pioposeu that it is a piinciple of majoi impoitance, not a
uefense mechanism, cooiuinate with anu "equally vital" to iepiession.
In its basic foim, active ieveisal is obseiveu most cleaily in chiluien
who iesponu to tiaumata of vaiious kinus by actively iepeating the painful
expeiience (usually in play oi fantasy), oi by uoing to anothei peison what
was uone to them, so that they make it seem to occui unuei theii contiol. In
this way, the painful expeiience is masteieu anu inteinalizeu, mouifying anu
uiffeientiating some aspect of the selfschema by accommouation, to iestoie
its haimony anu integiation. :22$;;$&46-$% is Piaget's teim foi a piocess
complementaiy to assimilation, in which new uata is iecognizeu as uiffeient
fiom past expeiiences, anu the schema is changeu to encompass it. As Klein
(1976) explaineu it: "The heait of the piinciple |of ieveisal of voicej is that
when a passively enuuieu encountei oi ielationship is affectively coueu, a
seaich foi infoimation is stimulateu, towaius two enus: a) to make the
expeiience unueistanuable in ielation to the self; b) to position the
inteinalizeu ielationship within the self-schema as usable infoimation
ielateu to the self-as-agent" (p. 28S). In contiast to iepiession, which is a
iegiessive solution to incompatibility that iestiicts the peisonality, Klein
(1976) saw active ieveisal as a piogiessive moue, a "positive" mechanism,
leauing to "giowth thiough ieconstiuction, innovation anu integiation" (p.
196) anu iequiiing auvanceu uevelopment. This concept, he wiote,
captuies the essential uistinction between activity anu passivity
which Rapapoit (19SS) intuitively felt to be one of the funuamental
foci of psychoanalytic theoiy geneially anu of a uynamic conception
of ego oiganization in paiticulai. I believe it is the essential uynamic
aspect of what is usually encompasseu by the teim "will." The
piinciple encompasses such uiveise phenomena as play, novelty,
cuiiosity, iepetitive woiking thiough of tiaumatic expeiiences,
inteiiuption phenomena, anu ceitain aspects of ait-making. Fiom a
uevelopmental stanupoint it encompasses.competence
motivation; peihaps most impoitant of all, it pioviues a uynamic
basis foi iuentification. In psychoanalytic theiapy the positive oi
auaptive aspects of tiansfeience, as Loewalu (196u) has
emphasizeu, aie explainable in its teims |Klein, 1976, p. 261j.
In passing, Klein (1976) suggesteu that the piinciple of active ieveisal
might also account foi aggiession: "Activities of ieveisal of voice coulu be
consiueieu synonymous with the 'aggiessive uiive'not in the sense of a
specific aggiessive ;$6-," to uestioy but as manifestations of an instinctual
aggiessive potential" (p. 264). This iuea has much in common with the
concept of nonhostile aggiession as employeu by Naicovitz (197S). Be
conceiveu of aggiession as consisting of a spectium of inteipeisonal
behaviois ianging fiom simple activity at one extieme, thiough such
phenomena as self-asseition, uominance, anu self-uefense, to hatieu at the
othei pole. This bioau, uynamic view of aggiession is easily ieconcileu with
the piinciple of active ieveisal of passive expeiience.
u. uLvLLCMLn1AL Anu S18uC1u8AL CCnSLCuLnCLS Cl 8L8LSSlCn Anu
AC1lvL 8LvL8SAL
Klein conceiveu of the two mechanisms foi maintaining self-integiity as
a uuality with wiuespieau consequencessometimes inteiacting,
sometimes contiastingthioughout psychological life. Be specifically calleu
attention to the following:
1. E3" )"9"6-6-$% 2$;9*51-$%. The motive to iepeat phenomena can
ieflect eithei the continuing activity of iepiesseu meaning schemas oi the
active ieveisal anu iepetition of passively expeiienceu events. In one case,
the iepetition is assimilative anu in the othei, accommouative.
2. D%6")%45-P46-$% 9)$2"11"1K/)426-$%46-$% 4%& -&"%6-/-246-$%.
Repiession "fiactionates" the self by splitting off unacceptable mental
contents. 0ften these contents consist of the schemata of inteipeisonal
ielationships, incluuing an image of the object, an image of the self in
inteiaction with the object, anu an affect image.
4
Accoiuing to Klein (1976),
these split-off inteipeisonal schemata, calleu intiojects, pieseive the
thieatening ielationship within the peisonality, in uissociateu foim: "Fiom
the subjective phenomenological (not necessaiily conscious) point of view
the intioject is expeiienceu as an alien piesence. ... It is felt as pait of the
bouy, oi one's thought, but not as pait of the self" (p. 29S). The
inteinalization piocess involving ieveisal of voice, on the othei hanu, is
iuentification. Thiough accommouation, the selfschema is mouifieu,
uiffeientiateu, anu enlaigeu to biing into it "the values, manneis, anu
inteipeisonal moues of otheis" (p. 292). Expeiientially, when a successful
iuentification occuis, theie is no felt sepaiation between the newly
inteinalizeu mental contents anu the self as a whole. In fact, ego iuentity is
laigely composeu of iuentifications foimeu by means of active ieveisal of
voice. Similaily, the supeiego is the iesult of active incoipoiation of
piohibitions that weie oiiginally passively expeiienceu. Intiojection is a
uefense mechanism anu iuentification a nonuefensive stiuctuiing piocess.
S. 0463$5$F#. At times, iepiession anu active ieveisal opeiate
simultaneously in iegaiu to the same objects, with pathological
consequences. Foi example, a man may iuentify with ceitain aspects of his
fathei anu iepiessively intioject othei, opposite aspects. The iesult may be
ambivalence anu symptomatology.
4. ?)"46-,-6# 4%& 4)6. Klein (1976) consiueieu the ait-making impulse as
an effoit to iemeuy a sense of "fiactuiing of selfhoou anu anxieties that
heialu.such a thieat" (p. 2u6), piimaiily thiough the opeiation of active
ieveisal of voice. Beie, in iesponse to some painful failuie oi iejection, the
aitist uses his talent to conveit pieviously iepiesseu, fiactionateu fantasies
into cieative piouucts. In this piocess, the aitist is actively masteiing
(thiough iepetition) both the eaily conflicts that hau been uissociateu anu
the cuiient tiaumata.


L. S?CPC1PL8A?
Klein consiueieu classical psychoanalysis both inefficient anu peihaps
less effective than othei, mouifieu foims of tieatment. Be believeu its main
value was as a methou of tiaining anu ieseaich; howevei, he felt its tiue
potential as a natuialistic setting foi uata gatheiing was not being achieveu,
in pait because of a lack of systematic ieseaich appioaches to analysis anu
in pait because of the stultifying effect of metapsychology on cieative
clinical thinking.
The theoietical foimulations he pioposeu weie paitly intenueu as a
iemeuy foi this pioblem. Bowevei, Klein saiu ielatively little about the
uiiect clinical application of his iueaspeihaps because of theii
incompletely uevelopeu state.
Chaiacteiistically, Klein's few uiiect comments about tieatment
conceineu active, giowth-inuucing aspects of psychotheiapy, which he felt
hau ieceiveu too little consiueiation in the past. Be suggesteu that the
piinciple of ieveisal of voice contiibutes a new uimension to unueistanuing
tiansfeience iepetition. In auuition to tiansfeience being a iegiessive
expiession of split-off conflicts, Klein postulateu that thiough active ieveisal
in tiansfeience (oi peihaps the "tieatment alliance"), uiiect, positive
peisonality change is biought about. In effect, this appeais to iefei piimaiily
to giowth thiough iuentification with auaptive functions of the theiapist
anu the tieatment piocess itself.
/!#%1##!)"7 8-(!"9# %)"$*!41$!)"# $) 6#+%').".-+$!%
$'()*+
ueoige Klein tuineu his cieative, inquiiing intelligence to a iemaikable
scope of pioblems anu tasks. Be was at the foiefiont of his fielu almost fiom
the fiist. Be was an innovatoi of ieseaich methouology anu hau an ability to
challenge theoiy anu to see pioblems in new ways, both in the laboiatoiy
anu in his theoietical foimulations. It is piobably coiiect to view him, as
uolubeigei (1982) has saiu, as piimaiily a psychologist anu only
seconuaiily a psychoanalyst. Bis woik was always at the inteiface of the two
fielus, beginning with exploiations in the use of expeiimental methous to
enhance psychoanalysts' knowleuge of ego functioning, anu culminating in
the seeming paiauox of his pioposals to use concepts fiom geneial
psychology to cieate a clinically ielevant theoiy foi psychoanalysis, fiee of
what he saw as the counteipiouuctive buiuen of metapsychology. As
uolubeigei (1982) points out, Klein was unusually talenteu at synthesizing
concepts fiom many fielusfoi example, making Piaget meaningful to
psychoanalysts. Be notes: "The gift that ueoige Klein eviuenceu was being
able to cioss conceptual anu theoietical bounuaiies, a bianu of cieativity
that bespeaks a matuie thinkei."
The manifest foim of Klein's woik changeu iauically ovei time, not only
in his shift of emphasis fiom laboiatoiy ieseaich to theoietical foimulation,
but also in his suuuen change fiom leaueiship in the expansion of
Rapapoit's ego psychology to a uiametiically opposite, clinical anu
phenomenological point of view. Thioughout his caieei, howevei, ceitain
basic themes can be cleaily uisceineu. Fiom the beginning, in peiceptual
ieseaich anu then in psychoanalysis, he was uissatisfieu with explanations
baseu, as he saw it, too heavily on uiive causality anu too little on stiuctuie.
Be was peisistently anu aiticulately ciitical of the uiive concept itself,
consiueiing it both inaccuiate anu logically unsounu, anu he ultimately
uevelopeu these iueas into his sweeping inuictment of metapsychology.
Finally, he always auvocateu an enhanceu iole in psychoanalysis foi
"positive" giowth potentials, conflict-fiee motives, anu autonomous
stiuctuial chaiacteiistics. In all these aieas he was constantly inteiesteu in
bioauening the scope of psychoanalysis to encompass noimal, conscious,
anu nonconflictual phenomena as well as pathology, while at the same time
he stiove to maintain its fiuelity to clinical expeiience.
Klein's impact as a leauei, teachei, anu pioneei in the stuuy of
unexploieu teiiitoiy was unquestionably significant. Similaily, although
Klein was not alone as a ciitic of metapsychology, his caieful uissection of
the inconsistencies anu logical uefects of the two psychoanalytic theoiies
hau consiueiable value, not only foi theoiy builuing, but also in helping the
psychoanalytic clinician cope with the complex, layeieu conceptual heiitage
hanueu uown by Fieuu anu his followeis. Pieviously, analysts who weie
iesistant to metapsychology weie vulneiable to the chaige of being
"atheoietical." Klein, howevei, contenueu that the focus of attention shoulu
be on ;"4%-%F, not mechanism; anu that clinical concepts, coiiectly fiameu,
aie sufficient to stanu as the basic theoiy. They have the auvantage of being
closei to the clinical mateiial, moie iesponsive to piessuies of the uata.
These asseitions hau a stiiiing effect on those analysts who weie
uefensive about theii aveision to metapsychology, anu leu one (Slap, 198u)
to wiite:
Klein libeiates such analysts. Be confeis upon us theoiies much as
the Wizaiu of 0z uispenseu couiage, heait anu intelligence to
cieatuies who alieauy hau them. Noie than that, Klein
congiatulates us foi oui scientific integiity, oui willingness (we
knew not what else to uo) to stick with the obseivational uata
iathei than to fuuge. Suuuenly we aie the puiists anu the empeioi
has no clothes |p. 17uj.
In the woius of anothei commentatoi (ueuo, 1977), Klein's book on
01#23$4%45#6-2 E3"$)# (1976) "lives up to its piomise to exploie the
essentials of psychoanalytic theoiy with so much authoiity that no futuie
woik in the fielu will qualify to be taken seiiously which uoes not come to
giips with Klein's aiguments" (p. S2u).
0n the othei hanu, the usefulness anu valiuity of many of Klein's new
foimulations, cieateu to ieplace metapsychology, have been the subject of
much uisagieement. 0ne ieviewei (Loeb, 1977) concluues that Klein
"cleaily sepaiates uata-ielateu, clinical psychoanalytic theoiy fiom uata-
unielateu metapsychological psychoanalytic theoiy"; he feels that Klein's
new mouel was ueiiveu fiom clinical theoiy anu "shoulu be highly useful
anu ielevant to both theiapists anu ieseaicheis" (p. 21S). In contiast,
anothei ciitic (Chessick, 198u) expiesseu concein about the "iauical natuie"
of Klein's pioposeu theoietical ievisions; anu Fiank (1979) saw Klein's
entiie enteipiise as flaweu: "It is uifficult to see wheie Klein's basic
piinciples woulu be useful in application to eithei the clinical oi theoietical
psychoanalytic situation" (p. 19S).
In his suggesteu ievisions of clinical theoiy, Klein often stiuggleu with
majoi pioblems anu uilemmas of psychoanalysis, aieas with which many
weie uissatisfieu. Although many of his solutions uiu not succeeu in foiming
a mouel that is fiee of inteinal contiauictions anu logical flaws as well as
consistent with clinical uata, in oui view his uelibeiations uo have heuiistic
value. Incluueu heie aie such matteis as whethei psychoanalysis iequiies
(oi whethei it can encompass) conceptions of "active, positive" foices foi
giowth anu masteiy; the ielateu issue of the autonomy anu conflict-fiee
status of vaiious motives anu stiuctuies; the natuie anu iole of the "self";
iepetitive "masteiy"; activity-passivity; anu the iole of conscious expeiience
in psychoanalysis.
We see much meiit in Klein's uelineation of a cognitive mouel of
iepiession anu in his invocation of the Piagetian constiucts of assimilation
anu accommouation to uesciibe the uiffeient moues of piocessing uata useu
by uissociateu (iepiesseu) mental contents anu those that aie not split off.
Inueeu, one of us has co-authoieu a papei that sought to biing this mouel to
the attention of a wiuei auuience (Slap & Saykin, 198S). We see this mouel
as embouying the auvantages of Fieuu's eaily concept of iepiession as
uissociation of a set of mental contents fiom "the main mass of iueas," which
then iemain active as an unconscious fantasy shaping behavioi (by
assimilation). This mouel of iepiession is close to clinical expeiience,
accounts in a supeiioi fashion foi the impact of cuiient life expeiiences on
the minu, anu absoibs anu explains in an inteinally consistent way
numeious phenomena, incluuing tiansfeience, iepetition, anu symptom
foimation (all of which ieflect assimilation). As Klein himself saiu:
"Psychoanalytic unueistanuing lies piecisely in the iecognition of themes
"which we have nevei liveu uown noi successfully outliveu' " (p. 18S). We
finu this mouel of iepiession helpful in this clinical task.
Bowevei, Klein's complementaiy piinciple of "ieveisal of voice"
although baseu on often-noteu clinical obseivations of unueniably ieal
phenomenastanus on much shakiei giounu, as is the case foi many of the
factois that he constiues as "positive," "giowth-inuucing," anu the like. We
uo not consiuei it justifiable eithei on theoietical oi clinical giounus to
uichotomize behavioi anu expeiience as Klein uoes so often into iegiessive-
piogiessive, positive-negative, uefensive-nonconflictual, anu sensual-
autonomous. It is as much a misunueistanuing of iepiession to view it as
totally malauaptive, iegiessive, anu so foith as it is to view active,
iuentificatoiy tuining passive-to-active as entiiely nonuefensive. Aftei all,
the ego expansion of latency is founueu on iepiession of infantile sexuality;
anu in iuentification with the aggiessoi anu many othei instances, ieveisal
of voice is useu as a &"/"%1" to cieate foi oneself the illusion of being
aggiessive anu to ueny passivity. 0f couise, in each of these instances, the
othei siue of the coin is also piesentiuentification with the aggiessoi can
be auaptively useful.
Klein's concept of the self-schema is moie uifficult to evaluate, because
his use of it vaiieu. At times his "self" is a clinical conceptan active self-
iuentity anu a 1"%1" of selfwhich contiasts with the abstiact concept of the
ego as a stiuctuie. It seems consistent with clinical expeiience to
conceptualize intiapsychic conflict as an inteinal stiuggle between
iepiesseu fantasy anu the main, integiateu system of selfiepiesentations,
iueals, values, anu wishes.
At othei times, howevei Klein's self-schema is a supeioiuinate
stiuctuie, with its own inheient neeu foi self-consistency that has the status
of an autonomous motive. Fuithei, the conception of conflict is bioaueneu
anu ieuefineu in cognitive teims as a pioblem of iesolution of "incompatible
tenuencies"; anu conscious expeiiences such as anxiety oi feelings of
estiangement aie consiueieu to be uiiect ieflections of intiapsychic
iealitiesthat is, of ueficiencies in self-integiity. In these foimulations,
Klein ieplaceu the olu metapsychology with a new anu, if anything, moie
abstiact one. It is subject to the same ciiticism of inappiopiiateness in level
of uiscouise anu uniesponsiveness to clinical uata that Klein leveleu at the
olu metapsychology. In auuition, it shaies many of the uifficulties we have
elsewheie founu in Kohut's self psychology (Levine, 1978,1979; Slap &
Levine, 1978), such as the ieliance on hybiiu concepts in which levels of
uata anu theoiy aie inappiopiiately mixeu. Among these is the concept that
inteinal stiuctuial psychic conuitions aie uiiectly ieflecteu in conscious
expeiience.
Klein's postulateu seiies of vital pleasuies, too, has both featuies that
we finu valuable anu pioblematic ones. The concept that pleasuie is to be
seen as within the scope of the ego anu as a positive expeiience of
giatification anu consummation iathei than meiely a tension ielease
contiibutes to the inteinal consistency of psychoanalytic theoiy. Klein uiu
not claim piioiity foi this iuea, which, he pointeu out, is similai to
suggestions maue by Luuwig Eiuelbeig, Naik Kanzei, anu Thomas Szasz.
We have seiious uisagieements, howevei, with his list of vital pleasuies
becauseas he himself pointeu outjust these conscious expeiiences anu
motives iegulaily occui as uisguiseu, ueiivative iepiesentations of
unconscious conflict. In auuition, his tieatment of sensual pleasuie leaves
one with the impiession that such matteis as genuei iuentity, sexual
appetite, anu the piocieation of the species aie essentially acciuental. In his
uiscussion of these motivational constiucts, we believe Klein fell piey to a
numbei of funuamental fallacies that appeai iepeateuly in his woik: the
neeu to uichotomize conflictual anu nonconflictual foices; the enumeiation
of piesumably autonomous motives, without suppoiting uata, iesulting in a
fiagmenteu conception of human beings as extensively "piepiogiammeu"
(analogous to the instinctual patteinings in lowei animals), which is
inconsistent with the flexible natuie of human auaptation; anu the
pieuilection to accept conscious mental contents as basic, unanalyzable
uata. These pioblems, of couise, might have been eliminateu if Klein hau
been able to subject his woik to fuithei ievision.
Klein focuseu pait of his ciitique of metapsychology on its piesumably
inappiopiiate avoiuance of "teleological" explanation. As uefineu by
Q"C16")R1 S". E."%6-"63 ?"%6*)# N-26-$%4)# (2Sth euition, 19Su), teleology
is "the uoctiine which asseits that all things which exist weie piouuceu foi
the enu which they fulfill." Nany of Klein's own explanatoiy iubiics, in fact,
fit this uefinition of teleology, with its attenuant implication of aibitiaiiness
anu untestability by any inuepenuent uata souice. Fieuu's clinical theoiy
was %$6 teleological in the same way. It is tiue that it uiu not have iecouise
to extiapsychological iealms of uata, such as neuiophysiology; howevei, it
uoes involve a systematic methou of foiming anu testing hypotheses about a
91#23$5$F-245 iealm (the unconscious) that is not uiiectly obseivable but
that can be infeiieu fiom futuie behavioial obseivations. When Klein's
conceptions of self anu uissociateu schema aie useu in a clinical senseas
iefeiiing to 2$%/5-26 ielateu psychic oiganizations with conscious anu
unconscious featuiesthey aie useful aius in oiganizing uata anu
infeiences. If they aie conceiveu of in ieifieu, stiuctuielike teims, they have
the same stultifying, counteipiouuctive effect Klein saw in classical
metapsychology.
In summaiy, we see Klein's theoietical woik as a valuable but not fully
successful contiibution to the effoit that has been unueitaken by many
theoiists to iemeuy the often-noteu uifficulties of metapsychology-We finu
Klein's analysis of these uifficulties paiticulaily cogent anu valuable. Bis
pioposeu solutions contain many heuiistically valuable elements, but also
veiy significant weaknesses.
Klein's eailiei woik on cognitive contiols, thiough which he attempteu
to eniich psychoanalytic ego psychology by ieseaich methous, similaily
uoes not appeai, at this point, to have fully achieveu its objectives. Although
theie was a gieat ueal of inteiest in the stuuy of cognitive contiols anu
styles foi some time, it has not yet fulfilleu its piomise as a biiuge between
acauemic psychology anu psychoanalysis, oi as pioviuing a means of
ueteimining "constitutional givens" that contiibute to the foimation of
uefenses anu othei peisonality stiuctuies. Fuithei ieseaich uiu not always
uemonstiate the postulateu unitaiy chaiactei of the cognitive contiols oi
the anticipateu uiiect connections between these stiuctuies anu uefenses.
Bowevei, ieseaich has suggesteu that similai cognitive contiol behaviois
may ieflect &-//")"%6 peisonality ueteiminants in uiffeient inuiviuuals; that
contiols may uiffei in uegiee of ielative autonomy; anu that many othei
factois such as sex uiffeiences, uevelopmental vaiiations anu fine
uistinctions in measuiement of these cognitive piocesses iemain to be
unueistoou (see, foi example, Levine, 1966,1968; E. Lichtenstein, 1961;
Spivack, Levine, anu Spiigle, 19S9).
*(2(*("%(#
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":;<=
1 These stuuies weie, of couise, not close expeiimental analogues of
psychoanalytic piopositions. Theie is no ieason to expect thiist to have
similai motivational piopeities to those of the "uiives" with which
psychoanalysis conceins itself because, unlike libiuo anu aggiession, thiist
is not oiuinaiily a focus of conflict anu uefense.
2 Klein useu the woiu "teleology" at times as though it weie synonymous with
"puiposiveness" oi "intention." Although this usage is incoiiect anu, as will
be seen, some of Klein's motivational constiucts may be open to ciiticism as
tiuly teleological, it will be ietaineu heie in an effoit to accuiately
iepiesent Klein's statement of his own iueas.
S Klein's woik pieceueu the publication of Beinz Kohut's self psychology anu
appaiently was uevelopeu completely inuepenuent of it. Eagle (1982)
believes that Klein's thinking on this scoie uiu not shaie the pioblems anu
weaknesses of Kohut's. Peihaps because of the pieliminaiy natuie of
Klein's foimulations, howevei, the two conceptions of self uo, at times,
appeai similai, anu they may theiefoie be susceptible to many of the same
ciiticisms.
4 This is similai to Keinbeig's (198u) concept of self-object-affect "units" in the
ego.
!
#$% &'()*+#, &+)#'(-./ *$# 0(+ .)0-1+ 0$./2+
!"#$%! '( )'*#+*, '-(!(
In taking a long look at the woik of Roy Schafei anu the majoi themes
he has exploieu anu uiscusseu, it is tempting to tiy to finu a single thieau
that leaus fiom his initial publications on uiagnostic tests to his moie iecent
woik on action language anu naiiative appeal. To seaich foi such a thieau
is, of couise, to put into piactice one of Schafei's bettei-known claims. Be
has aigueu foi the cential place of the naiiative in the way we view
someone's life anu woiks, anu if I am able to make the pieces of his own
caieei fit togethei in a peisuasive fashion, I can make his point even as I am
uesciibing it. To finu such a thieau will, fuitheimoie, help to uncovei some
of the similaiities beneath what seem like uiffeiences in his appioach to
psychoanalytic phenomena anu also to show how each phase of his caieei
is, in a ceitain sense, a ieaction to what hau gone befoie. Such an attempt, it
shoulu be noteu, may also take auvantage of hinusight, anu as a iesult, what
seems to be a smoothly flowing piogiession of iueas may be, in fact, quite
uiffeient fiom the way they weie oiiginally conceiveu. Neveitheless, this
newly uiscoveieu sequence may also ieveal its own kinu of tiuth, even
though it may not match the expeiience of the authoi.
But fiist I must back off anu look at the cential pioblem facing any
followei of Fieuu. When Fieuu was alive anu wiiting psychoanalytic theoiy,
it was assumeu that science was the !"#$ path to the tiuth anu that the
mission of science was to uiscovei the whole tiuth about the natuial woilu.
The human obseivei was something apait fiom the thing obseiveu, anu any
piece of ieality was as much an object of stuuy as an apple oi a iainuiop. To
%&& the woilu cleaily (with an emphasis on the visual metaphoi) became the
goal of science. Tioublemakeis such as Beisenbeig, Beiueggei, anu
Wittgenstein weie still ovei the hoiizon.
The visual metaphoi anu the cleai sepaiation between obseivei anu
obseiveu aie emphasizeu in Fieuu's conception of the piocess of fiee
association anu in his well-known metaphoi of the patient as passengei on
the tiain, iepoiting the scene outsiue the winuow to a listening seatmate
(the analyst). Tangible ieality was assumeu to be eithei outsiue oi insiue the
heau (as in "'&(#)*$ testing" anu "psychic '&(#)*$"); anu in the metaphoi of
psychoanalysis as a kinu of aichaeology which uncoveis (ieconstiucts) the
past, Fieuu calleu attention to the tangible natuie of what hau been-memoiy
is laiu uown in "mnemonic iesiuues," waiting to be uncoveieu anu biought
to light. The analyst, listening with evenly hoveiing attention, was assumeu
to be the neai-peifect obseivei who, because uetacheu fiom the subject,
was in an iueal position to see anu heai with maximum fiuelity anu
minimum eiioi. The patient as obseivei of his oi hei innei life was the
complement of the analyst as obseivei of the patient. The symmetiy of the
two ioles is biought out cleaily in Fieuu's (1912) statement that "the iule of
giving equal notice to eveiything is the necessaiy counteipait to the
uemanu maue on the patient that he shoulu communicate eveiything that
occuis to him." (p. 112).
The naive iealism containeu in this mouel always hoveieu in the
backgiounu, uespite the giauual accumulation of finuings to the contiaiy.
Biscoveiy of the tiansfeience was the most obvious embaiiassment to this
point of view, because what is tiansfeience but the iealization that ieality is
not simply "out theie," waiting to be uesciibeu, that what the patient "sees"
is often a piouuct of his oi hei own expeiience, anu that the subject mattei
of psychoanalysis laigely consists in uisentangling the uiffeient faces of
what is appaiently obseiveu (i.e., in finuing flaws with the positivistic
mouel). But the laigei woilu view was not significantly changeu because
tiansfeience was assumeu to be a tiansient uistuibance (a tieatment-
activateu "neuiosis") that ian its couise fiom symptom to cuie. Even the
uiscoveiy of counteitiansfeience uiu not significantly affect the woilu view,
because motes in the eye of the analyst weie assumeu to be subject to iepaii
by way of the tiaining analysis anu occasional consultations as the neeu
aiose. The peifectly analyzeu analyst, listening with "evenly hoveiing"
attention, was the mouel of the neutial, uetacheu (scientific) obseivei who
was in the peifect position to see the (physical) fielu cleaily. It was not
iecognizeu that even this mouel of neutiality was peihaps listening with a
bias towaiu coheience anu continuity, not fully awaie that the "stoiy" being
heaiu was only one of many possible ways to unueistanu the patient anu his
oi hei associations. Noi was it fully iealizeu that the meaning in the
patient's associations was not always "out theie" but many times was
influenceu by the immeuiate context of the houi anu that a compaiison of
patient's anu analyst's views of the tieatment might ieveal significant
uiffeiences that weie not necessaiily the woikings of tiansfeience oi
counteitiansfeience. Similai questions coulu be iaiseu about the status of
the past, to what extent it coulu be ieconstiucteu in some ieliable mannei,
anu to what extent the content of memoiies was influenceu by the context of
the session anu by the immeuiate hopes anu feais of the patient.
The continuous tension between naive iealism anu the Fieuuian mouel
leu to vaiious kinus of compensatoiy stiategies. Conceptual teims tenueu to
become moie anu moie ossifieu, as if the shifting natuie of the subject
mattei coulu be helu in place by sheei iepetition of the explanatoiy
concepts. Bespite Fieuu's concession that the metapsychology was to be
seen as only a set of tempoiaiy conventions that woulu be ieplaceu by moie
appiopiiate teims as the phenomena became bettei unueistoou (Fieuu,
191S, p. 117), the metapsychology seemeu to take on a life of its own. It
coulu even be aigueu that philosophical iealism playeu an impoitant iole in
the choice of such conciete teims as "stiuctuie," "mechanism," "splitting,"
anu "baiiiei" anu that the hopeu-foi ieality which coulu not be seen in
piactice coulu be founu in uesciiptions (+!,* piactice. Whatevei the
ieasons, theie giew up a tiauition of iewiiting the clinical event in the
laigely mechanistic teims of the theoiy, giving the liteiatuie a soliuity anu a
tangibility that hau been assumeu in piactice but nevei founu.
A similai compensation can be founu in Fieuu's tenuency to posit ieal
events in the past as causes of the patient's cuiient symptoms (see }acobsen
& Steele, 1979). It is well known that Fieuu fiist assumeu that ieal
seuuction was the cause of a latei neuiosis; but even aftei he iecognizeu
that the memoiy was piobably false, he continueu to intiouuce ieal events
in his explanatoiy accounts. Witnessing his paients' inteicouise was the
cential event in the Wolf Nan's neuiosis; viewing a monogiaph in a stoie
winuow was a significant cause of the Botanical Nonogiaph uieamthe
haiu stuff of ieality was at the ioot of many symptoms. By always moving
the haiu facts backwaiu in time, they coulu be maintaineu as explanatoiy
uevices even if nevei actually uiscoveieu in the tieatment (see }acobsen anu
Steele, 1979, foi a fullei uiscussion of this tenuency). Thus, the link to ieality
was always assumeu, anu the patient's associations weie listeneu to as
-&').(*).&% oi *'("%/!'0(*)!"% of significant pieces of the past.
In similai fashion, the unconscious was conceiveu to be a potentially
knowable stiuctuie that hau foim anu content anu that impingeu on the
patient's behavioi in a ieliable anu accountable mannei. The task of
psychoanalysis was to uiscovei its contents anu make them available to the
patient; the assumption of a knowable ieality applieu as much to within as
to without. The tiansfeience was equally analyzable, anu once significant
uistoitions hau been accounteu foi, the patient woulu "see" the analyst as
the analyst "ieally was." It was nevei aumitteu that piobably no amount of
analysis coulu evei accomplish this task.
0veilaying the giowing tension between an outmoueu iealism anu the
nonneutial analyst was the conflict between public anu piivate. Fieuu nevei
felt it necessaiy to uisclose all the facts in iepoiting his cases, eithei because
telling too much might iisk his authoiity, because it woulu jeopaiuize the
uoctoi-patient ielationship, oi because it woulu not auu significantly to his
powei of peisuasion (see Fieuu, 1912, p. 114). Within this tiauition of
piivilegeu withholuing, it became iespectable to wiite (+!,* the uata
insteau of making it available; anu as this tiauition peisisteu, the clinical
uetails of the case weie oveilaiu by abstiact concepts. No such taboos
applieu to the metalanguageit coulu be useu with impunityanu so it
happeneu that the specific obseivations of the clinical houi weie tianslateu
into moie geneial (anu in many cases, meaningless) categoiies. In the
piocess, the postulates of naive iealism coulu be ieaffiimeu, anu because no
one else was piesent when patient talkeu to uoctoi, no one coulu say
whethei oi not what was uesciibeu was ieally "out theie."
We can now call on Wittgenstein to make cleai what happeneu next. As
the language of metapsychology became the noimal language of
psychoanalysis, it became seconu natuie to see the clinical happenings in
teims of the theoiy. All obseivations became theoiy lauen anu yet weie
iepoiteu as though they weie the puie stuff of obseivation. Fit between
obseivation anu theoiy was not always peifect, but because the iaw uata
weie nevei available, the match oi mismatch coulu nevei be checkeu. In this
way the metalanguage anu its naive iealism coulu be peipetuateu
inuefinitely. In some ways, the followeis of Fieuu, because they weie
weaiing his blinueis, weie somewhat woise off than the founuei himself.
Language was slowly poisoning obseivation, anu because of the piivate
natuie of the uata, no one else coulu paiticipate in the uebate.
We now ietuin to Roy Schafei anu to his place within this Zeitgeist.
Because of ciicumstances of tiaining anu expeiience, he was at ouus with
the tiauition on seveial counts. Be tiaineu at the City College of New Yoik
with uaiunei Nuiphy, a well-known peisonality theoiist, anu giauuateu in
194S; he then enteieu a long association with Baviu Rapapoit, fiist at the
Nenningei Founuation in Topeka, Kansas, anu then at the Austen Riggs
Centei. Be ieceiveu his Ph.B. in clinical psychology fiom Claik 0niveisity in
19Su anu completeu foimal tiaining in psychoanalysis at the Westein New
Englanu Institute foi Psychoanalysis in 19S9. Be has been piesiuent of the
Westein New Englanu Society anu clinical piofessoi of psychiatiy at Yale
0niveisity; anu is cuiiently aujunct piofessoi of psychology in psychiatiy at
the Coinell 0niveisity Neuical College anu tiaining analyst at the Columbia
0niveisity Centei foi Psychoanalytic Tiaining anu Reseaich. In 197S he was
appointeu the fiist Sigmunu Fieuu Nemoiial Piofessoi at 0niveisity College
in Lonuon, anu in 198S, he ieceiveu the Ameiican Psychological
Association's Awaiu foi Bistinguisheu Piofessional Contiibution to
Knowleuge.
Eaily signs of Schafei's impatience with the tiauition of piivilegeu
withholuing appeai in his books on uiagnostic testing, which aie notable foi
theii veibatim exceipts fiom patient piotocols (Rapapoit, uill, & Schafei,
194S-46, Schafei 1948,19S4). In these woiks we have not only uiagnostic
impiessions of a seiies of patients but a veibatim iecoiu of theii iesponses
to the Roischach test, TAT, Wechslei-Bellevue Scale, anu othei uiagnostic
instiuments. Schafei explicitly connects the uiagnostic summaiy with paits
of the piotocol, so that the iefeients foi such uiagnostic impiessions as
hysteiical oi obsessive chaiactei coulu be founu uiiectly in the uata. By
giving the complete iecoiu, Schafei anu his collaboiatois also make it
possible foi the ieauei to uevelop alteinative foimulations. Stanuaiu
pioceuuie anu stanuaiu foimat, one might think, but consiuei how iaiely
we uiscuss alteinative foimulations in the clinical liteiatuie (Kohut, 1979, is
a notable exception) anu how we "&.&' have access to the complete uata
fiom a complete case.
Concein foi the clinical uata anu foi the pioblems of obseivation anu
teiminology appeai in the eaily pages of 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" (Schafei,
1968). The ieauei of the psychoanalytic liteiatuie may well ask, says
Schafei in his intiouuction, "What uoes this mean." Be sees the neeu to
intiouuce oiuei into the uiscussion by fiist soiting out the teims, auopting
cleai uefinitions of the ciitical phenomena, anu, when possible, attempting
to talk about these phenomena in plain language accessible to the
piofessional ieauei. In effoits that anticipate one of the main themes of his
latei woik, Schafei takes pains to uemystify the stanuaiu psychoanalytic
foimulation anu get iiu of the implicit anthiopomoiphism anu uemonology
of the tiauitional metapsychology. By tiying to biing the clinical phenomena
out of the shauows anu into the fielu of obseivation, Schafei is once again
showing the iespect foi the uata that chaiacteiizeu his eailiei books on
uiagnostic testing anu that woulu appeai in his attention to obseivable
behavioi in his latei book on action language (Schafei, 1976). Tiauitional
metapsychology is seen to be the enemy of obseivation, not only because it
stiuctuieu the questions to be askeu but also because it shifteu the
uiscussion away fiom the conciete "luiking piesences" (in the case of
inteinalization) to the abstiact "cathecteu object iepiesentation." Some of
this shift might be attiibuteu to a fashionable uistiust of Nelanie Klein anu
hei too viviu (anu hence uubious) uemonology; some might be uue to a
belief that a piopei science shoulu use Latin whenevei possible, so that
"cathecteu object" sounus moie iespectable than "luiking piesence." Schafei
is one of the fiist psychoanalytic wiiteis since Fieuu to take the chance of
being cleai iathei than sounuing leaineu, one of the fiist to show a concein
foi language anu a willingness to be open anu foithiight about expeiience.
Theoiy is impoitant, but not at the expense of the phenomena, anu if these
cannot be ieliably uesciibeu, uefineu, anu contiasteu with one anothei in a
systematic mannei, the theoiy will be a wasteu enteipiise, supeificially
impiessive but at bottom meaningless.
1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" can be ieau on two, quite uiffeient levels. It is,
fiist, an attempt to iuentify the phenomena of inteinalization, iuentification,
intiojection, anu incoipoiation anu to compaie anu contiast these clinical
events. Fiom the clinical uesciiptions a numbei of uefinitions aie geneiateu
that leau, in tuin, to a claiifieu theoiy. The examples aie often stiikingly
specific anu explicitly linkeu to theoiy; thus each section of the chaptei on
iuentification amplifies one pait of the lengthy uefinition that is piinteu at
the beginning of the chaptei. Even the uefinitions aie aiiesting, as in the
following example:
An intioject is an innei piesence with which one feels in a
continuous oi inteimittent uynamic ielationship. The subject
conceives of this piesence as a peison, a physical oi psychological
pait of a peison (e.g., a bieast, a voice, a look, an affect), oi a peison-
like thing oi cieatuie. Be expeiiences it as existing within the
confines of his bouy oi minu oi both, but not as an aspect oi
expiession of his subjective self.... The intioject is expeiienceu as
capable of exeiting a paiticulai influence on the subject's state anu
behavioi, anu of uoing so moie oi less inuepenuently of his
conscious effoits to contiol it |Schafei, 1968, p. 72j.
In oiuei to explain what aie often fleeting phenomena, iaiely seen foi
any length of time, Schafei tiies to place them in a moie familiai context by
beginning with expeiiences that aie ielatively commonplace. The uayuieam
is one such staiting point; fiom heie, Schafei goes on to show how it may
often imply a significant shift in ieality testing, with the iesult that the
subjective expeiience is taken as moie ieal than otheiwise. 0nuei these
conuitions, the intioject may come into existence as a piece of psychic
ieality. The iole of intioject is fuithei bioaueneu by using the mouel of
piojection. In this moue, the inteinalizeu object is not felt uiiectly, but its
influence is meuiateu by the significant people in one's life. As this piojecteu
iole is amplifieu, the peison "out theie" uisappeais anu his oi hei place is
taken by the piojecteu object (as in a paianoiu system).
The main aigument of 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" is to show how
iuentification, intiojection, anu incoipoiation can each be unueistoou as
specific foims of inteinalization, with each foim using a set numbei of
mechanisms anu appeaiing unuei ceitain specifieu conuitions. To caiiy out
this task, Schafei must necessaiily iely moie on subjective expeiience than
theoiy, because the lattei tenus to be useu inconsistently anu often
intiouuces moie ambiguity than claiification. In his ieviseu foimulation,
Schafei makes cleai how the subtypes of inteinalization can be oiueieu
along a piimaiy-seconuaiy piocess continuum, with incoipoiation being the
most piimitive, followeu by intiojection anu then iuentification.
Incoipoiation iefeis to the conciete iepiesentation of the longeu-foi object,
often in an oial moue; at times it may take the foim of a tiansitional object
insiue the heau. Intiojection is a moie socializeu anu less iegiessive foim of
inteinalizationan intioject, as noteu in the uefinition eailiei, iefeis to an
innei piesence that one feels anu is influenceu by. Anu finally, iuentification
is the least iegiessive of the subtypes anu the most abstiact. 0ne may
iuentify with one's teachei even when not being awaie of a conscious
piesence, anu the souice of the iuentification may not be uiscoveieu without
a goou ueal of intiospection. Not all incoipoiations aie assembleu into
intiojects anu not all intiojects aie tuineu into iuentifications; noi is the
sequence necessaiily uevelopmental oi phase specific. Theie seems to be no
neeu to fiist compose an intioject befoie going on to foim a stable
iuentification, anu many times an intioject may appeai only when
iuentification begins to bieak uown. Thus, the theoiy of inteinalization lacks
the kinu of tiuiness anu oiuei that woulu leau to specific uevelopmental oi
behavioial pieuictions, anu the uata aie piobably moie inteiesting, in theii
vaiious manifestations, than any kinu of theoietical unueipinning. Ceitainly,
the moie uesciiptive paits of 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" aie moie aiiesting
than the theoietical conclusions anu (at least to my eai) wiitten with moie
excitement anu uigency.
At a seconu level, 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" can be ieau as an
outstanuing uemonstiation of cleai clinical uesciiptiona sample of
exposition that, if successful, woulu encouiage otheis to follow suit anu
think twice befoie using aichaic teims oi outuateu concepts. By biinging the
phenomena out of the shauows of metapsychology anu by fashioning a set of
contiasting uefinitions, Schafei is able to finu many oveilaps between the
unusual anu the commonplace. In so uoing, he is able to sensitize his ieaueis
to aspects of inteinalization that they may expeiience all the time but aie
piobably not able to label as such. In this bianch of psychoanalysis
paiticulaily, the uata of obseivation aie uifficult to iuentify because they
tenu to lie on the euges of awaieness anu aie highly uepenuent on paitially
iegiesseu stages of consciousness. It follows that to ask a patient uiiectly
about the piesence of an inteinalizeu object is to often cause it to uisappeai,
because the veiy fact of asking encouiages anu ieinfoices seconuaiy-
piocess moues of function. In contiast to the tiansitional object of the
nuiseiy, which we see the infant fonule, talk to, anu take to beu, the felt
piesence of a ueau fathei is nevei seen, iaiely hallucinateu, anu only
iefeiieu to inuiiectly anu by implication. It thus becomes uoubly significant,
in mapping out this shauowy teiiain, that the language of obseivation be
useu piecisely anu consistently, anu it is in this iegaiu that 1%2&3*% !/
5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" stanus heau anu shoulueis above most of its competitois.
Bespite its cleai clinical examples anu caieful use of language, howevei,
1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" faileu to biing about a much-neeueu ievision in
the style anu teims of psychoanalytic exposition. The attempt faileu in pait
because the ciitique of metapsychology was ielatively polite anu low-key;
moie specific ciiticisms weie neeueu, anu they woulu not appeai until
Schafei's next book, 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)% (1976). In auuition,
the neeueu stylistic changes weie easily oveilookeu. uoou exposition
becomes tianspaient piecisely because it offeis no pioblem foi
compiehension; theiefoie, the lesson being leaineu, although uoubtless
appieciateu at some level, may not be pait of the ieauei's conscious
expeiience anu is thus quickly foigotten. Thiee yeais aftei Schafei hau
calleu attention to the uemonology of tiauitional theoiy, we weie again
offeieu such phiases as: "the phase-appiopiiate inteinalization of those
aspects of the oeuipal objects that weie cathecteu with object libiuo"
(Kohut, 1971, p. 41), anu "the inteinalization of the naicissistically investeu
aspects of the oeuipal anu pie-oeuipal object takes place accoiuing to the
same piinciple" (p. 48). Wheie is the patient in these uesciiptions. Wheie
aie the uata. What countiy is being uesciibeu anu who aie its inhabitants.
Netalanguage hau so scieeneu off the uata of inteiest fiom the ieauei that
once again it hau taken on a ieality in its own iight. Fai fiom being the
tempoiaiy scaffoluing of Fieuu, ieauy to be uismantleu when bettei mouels
came along, it hau acquiieu peimanent status anu seemeu bent on euging
out the clinical phenomena.
As language became less piecise anu moie abstiact, it moie than evei
began to coiiupt obseivation anu uiminish the significance of the uata. If we
aie on the lookout foi "naicissistically investeu aspects of the oeuipal
object," we will be seeing anu unueistanuing much less of the clinical
encountei than if we aie on the lookout foi luiking piesences of the absent
fathei oi othei conciete manifestations of the uiffeient aspects of
inteinalization. uiven the fleeting natuie of the uata in the fiist place, theii
iecognition is just about uoomeu by fuzzy language anu pietentious
concepts. The moie iaiefieu the language, the gieatei ioom foi aigument
anu contioveisy.
It may be impossible to speak knowingly of cause anu effect, but I
suggest that the wiitings of Kohut anu the auvent of Kohutian foims of
uiscouise piompteu Schafei to be even moie specific about the uata of
obseivation anu to shift his focus fiom insiue to outsiue the heau. If the
subtleties of the inteinalizeu object weie lost in the new language of object
ielations, then the time seemeu iipe to shift the aigument to what coulu be
seennamely, actionsanu to iecast psychoanalytic theoiy in teims of
what coulu be #!!=&- at anu 2!)"*&- tonamely, action language. If the
outlines of the intioject aie always shifting anu its location uebatable, then
we can biing it outsiue the heau by calling thinking an instance of action
(Schafei, 1976, p. 1S). With action language fiimly in chaige, in Schafei's
(1976) woius, we "shall neithei engage in speculation about what is
ultimately unutteiable in any foim noi builu elaboiate theoiies on the basis
of unfalsifiable piopositions" (p. 1u). (Schafei is talking about theoiies of
mental activity at the beginning of infancy, but the same aigument coulu be
applieu to a wiue iange of elusive phenomena, incluuing the majoiity of the
examples uiscusseu in 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!".) Actions have the viitue of
being moie cleaily visible anu moie cleaily "out theie" than feelings oi
thoughts, anu theie is a ceitain appeal to biinging all psychoanalytic
phenomena out of the peison anu into the cleai light of uay. If we cannot
speak with ceitainty about "wheie" we feel angiy oi know exactly what is
meant by such expiessions as "I am angiy up to heie," then theie is a
temptation to ieuefine emotion as action anu simply say "he acteu angiily."
But a close ieauing of 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" makes it cleai that the
pieces of clinical iepoiting that iing so tiue anu that caiiy so much clinical
appeal in Schafei's eailiei books aie the veiy pieces that will be uismantleu
by a systematic tianslation into action language. In ietuin foi consensus anu
agieement, we seem to be in uangei of tiauing away the veiy stuff of
psychoanalysis. If psychic ieality must be iecast into action language to
make it knowable, then we may have given away the veiy stuff of gieatest
inteiest to the piacticing analyst. uone foieveioi at least iauically
tiansfoimeuwoulu be the luiking piesences, the vague uemonic feelings,
fleeting ueja vus, the sense of enthiallment to the past, anu the awaieness of
the uncannythe full iange of subjective iepoits we have been heaiing
fiom patients ovei the past 1uu yeais.
A positivistic baigain is being stiuck. If the vague sense of a luiking
piesence oi a sauistic mothei cannot be ieliably uefineu anu accounteu foi
in teims of metapsychologyanu the failuie of metapsychology on this
scoie seems obviousanu if attempts at clinical uesciiption that uo justice
to the uata aie moie poetiy than science, out of ieach of all but the few, then
it might still be possible to impiove communication by 3(##)": the
phenomena something else. If oui teims aie bettei chosen, peihaps some of
oui uesciiptive pioblems might be solveu. What we lose with iespect to the
nuance anu subtlety of obseivation may be moie than offset by an inciease
in consensus anu ieliability. This appioach seems lauuable; but it betiays a
concein foi uesciiption anu contiol that poses seiious obstacles to its being
accomplisheu, anu its positivistic position may iepiesent a fatal flaw. We
have seen how asking questions of ceitain kinus of fleeting phenomena will
cause them to uisappeai; it woulu seem to follow that the tiauitional
subject-object sepaiation cannot be applieu to ceitain kinus of uata anu that
othei methous of stuuy must be ueviseu.
The pioblem is that the object to be uesciibeufoi example, the
longeu-foi absent fathei, the memoiy of an eaily giil fiienu, oi the sense of
the analyst as secietly sauistic anu vengefulis not the tiauitional object of
stuuy that can be set apait fiom the obseivei anu stuuieu in isolation. It is
not an action that can be pointeu at, not a thing that can be photogiapheu;
iathei, it must necessaiily be stuuieu in context when anu wheie we finu it.
It is this sensitivity to context anu to the stieam of expeiience that Schafei
illustiateu so well in 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!", anu to which he ietuins in
his most iecent woik on the concept of naiiative (Schafei, 198S). But foi a
vaiiety of ieasons, he piefeiieu to set it asiue in 1 7&8 9(":,(:& anu shift
his focus to obseivable behavioi.
The cential theme is sounueu in the fiist chaptei (Schafei, 1976). Aftei
stating that "it is high time we stoppeu using this mixeu physiocochemical
anu evolutionaiy biological language" (p. S) of metapsychology, Schafei
pioposes the alteinative of action language:
We shall iegaiu each psychological piocess, event, expeiience, oi
behavioi as some kinu of activity, hencefoith to be calleu action,
anu shall uesignate each action by an active veib stating its natuie
anu by an auveib (oi auveibial locution), when applicable, stating
the moue of this action. Auopting this iule entails that... we shall not
use nouns anu aujectives to iefei to psychological piocesses,
events, etc..
.We must unueistanu the woiu action to incluue all piivate
psychological activity that can be maue public thiough gestuie anu
speech, such as uieaming anu the unspoken thinking of eveiyuay
life, as well as all initially public activity, such as oiuinaiy speech
anu motoiic behavioi, that has some goal-uiiecteu oi symbolic
piopeities..When speaking of any aspect of psychological activity
oi action, we shall no longei iefei to location, movement, uiiection,
sheei quantity, anu the like, foi these teims aie suitable only foi
things anu thinglike entities..In oiuei to state obseivations in a
foim suitable foi systematic geneial piopositions.we shall use
only the active voice anu constiuctions that claiify activity anu
moues of activity |pp. 9-11j.
Beie aie some of Schafei's (1976) examples: Rathei than say "What
comes to minu." the analyst using action language might say, "What uo you
think of in this connection." (p. 148). Rathei than say, "Bis iepiession of this
uangeious impulse was too weak to pievent it fiom gaining consciousness,"
the action analyst might say, "By failing to be sufficiently on guaiu about not
uoing so, he thought consciously of the action he wisheu to peifoim anu
woulu have peifoimeu hau he not ueemeu it too uangeious to uo so" (p.
2u6). Insteau of saying, "Be can't contiol his sexual uiive," the action analyst
might say, "Be continues to act sexually even though he also wishes he uiu
not uo so (oi iebukes himself foi uoing so)" (pp. 2u7-2u8).
Speaking somewhat latei in the book in a moie geneial vein, Schafei
(1976) aigues that his aim is to eliminate the
unsuitable, confusing, unnecessaiy anu meaningless metaphois anu
metaphoiical pieconceptions that aie inheient in Fieuu's eclectic
metapsychological language. In this enueavoi I shall be builuing a
technical language using plain English locutions. It is one that
shoulu make it possible to specify in a ielatively unambiguous,
consistent, paisimonious, anu enlightening way the psychological
facts anu ielations that aie of special inteiest to psychoanalysts anu
theii analysanus" |p. 12Sj.
1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)% is uiviueu into thiee main sections.
In the fiist, "Piepaiatoiy Stuuies," Schafei piesents some of the
philosophical uifficulties with tiauitional metapsychology anu Fieuu's
unsatisfactoiy solutions to what Ryle has calleu the "ghost in the machine."
Schafei focuses in paiticulai on the pioblem of the uisappeaiing peison anu
on the fact that metapsychology has no place foi the "I" oi agent. A biief
uiscussion of some alteinatives (Baitmann's auaptive ego, Eiikson's concept
of iuentity, anu Kohut's naicissistic self) finus them each unsuccessful to
some uegiee; what Schafei calls the "movei of the mental appaiatus"
iemains clouueu behinu a scieen of theoiy. Action language is piesenteu as
a possible solution to a long-stanuing theoietical gap. By using what Schafei
calls the "native tongue of psychoanalysis," we shoulu be able to catch sight
of the uisappeaiing peison.
The seconu section uesciibes action language, illustiating how it might
be applieu to a numbei of clinical situations anu how it claiifies such
pioblems as inteinalization anu iesistance anu the unueistanuing of such
uisclaimeu actions as slips of the tongue, motivateu foigetting, anu so foith.
The thiiu section applies action language to emotion by tianslating noun
into veib oi auveib. (Insteau of saying, "I am happy about my iecent
piomotion" I might bettei say, "I view my iecent piomotion happily".) This
section piesents many examples of how common language is heavily
uepenuent on metaphoi anu how metaphoi can be misleauing anu leau to
bau theoiy. Schafei makes cleai how it has invaueu metapsychology.
0ne pioblem is appaient fiom the outset. In an effoit to uivoice himself
fiom the tiauitional Fieuuian metaphoi, Schafei must also cut himself off
fiom populai speech anu fiom the way we have giown up thinking about
oui bouy anu oui feelings. Foi example, the use of location to expiess
alteieu states (as in, "I must have been out of my minu") is a tiauition
beginning long befoie Fieuu. In an effoit to speak unambiguously about
impoitant issues, action language may uo quite the opposite anu make them
seem stiange anu foieign because they aie being uesciibeu in unfamiliai
language. This uislocation becomes most appaient when uealing with the
luiking piesences anu othei vague expeiiences so well uesciibeu in 1%2&3*%
!/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!", because these iepiesent actions only in the weakest sense
of the woiu; to uesciibe them in action language iisks tuining them into
unfamiliai specimens.
As Neissnei (1979) has aigueu in his iecent ciitique, metaphoi is
meant to be taken metaphoiically: "I woulu have to wonuei whethei
Schafei's appioach to such language is entiiely too liteial anu fails to take
into account the significance of figuies of speech..I am not aiguing heie
that such piopositions cannot be inteipieteu in the sense that Schafei gives
to them..The issue that I am auuiessing.is that such expiessions uo not
necessaiily connote that |liteialj meaning" (p. 29S). Netaphoi can be
misleauing if taken liteially; on the othei hanu, if taken poetically it can
captuie an impoitant tiuth about ways of thinking anu feeling that we all
shaie anu on which theoiy must builu. Netaphoi may be paiticulaily useful
in at least two contexts: in the geneiation of new theoiy wheie we neeu
tentative foimulation (Fieuu's comments on tempoiaiy conventions come
to minu), anu in the uialogue with the patient, wheie we aie attempting to
captuie a vague expeiience foi the fiist time. To insist on action language
when the patient is fumbling foi the best expiession may often inhibit the
uiscoveiy piocess that psychoanalysis tiies so haiu to fostei. To insist on
action language while builuing theoiy may unnecessaiily iestiict the scope
of the enteipiise by limiting oui attention to phenomena that can be cleaily
uesciibeu.
Schafei was paiticulaily impiesseu by the way in which language in
geneial anu the passive voice in paiticulai can be useu in the seivice of
iesistance, anu one of the most oiiginal chapteis in 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!'
;%$3<!("(#$%)% is titleu "Claimeu anu Bisclaimeu Action." Language is easily
useu to pioject iueas of helplessness anu uisclaimeu iesponsibility, as in
"the impulse seizeu me," "my conscience toiments me," "this houi just
iusheu by," anu "uoubts cieep into my minu." In each of these cases,
metaphoi becomes uefense because the patient is acting (% )/ things just
happeneu to him oi hei iathei than the patient causing them to happen. But
the metaphoi can be heaiu on two levels. To heai it as a metaphoi is to give
the patient cieuit foi using it in a figuiative sense, saying something like,
"my conscience toiments meso to speak," which opens the way to
analyzing the uefense. To heai it as a liteial statement of the patient's view
of life, on the othei hanu, is to iun the iisk of challenging the patient who is
following the basic iule anu saying what comes to minu. Thus, to tieat
speech in the liteial way that Schafei suggests is to seiiously complicate the
analytic ielationship by saying to the patient, in effect, "You must say
whatevei comes to minu but you will be helu iesponsible foi each anu eveiy
woiu." As I have wiitten elsewheie (Spence, 1982): "To call attention to
instances of uisclaimeu action woulu seem to imply to the patient that he is
ieally not fiee to say whatevei comes to minu but that, in a subtle anu all-
embiacing way, he is being helu iesponsible foi his thoughts anuwhat is
moiebeing helu iesponsible by the analyst. Thus one coulu aigue that the
auoption of action language may seiiously jeopaiuize the analytic contiact"
(p. 171).
Now, it is ceitainly basic to psychoanalysis to assume as Schafei (1976)
uoes, that the patient "actively biings about that fiom which he oi she
neuiotically suffeis" (p. 14S), anu some of Schafei's most telling anecuotes
uesciibe ways in which passive victims aie leu to see that they have been all
the while secietly aiianging theii misfoitune. But shoulu these accounts of
uisclaimeu iesponsibility be analyzeu in the tiauitional mannei of giauual
inteipietation anu woiking thiough, oi by a specific focus on the patient's
woius guiueu by the belief that each psychological event, piocess,
expeiience, oi behavioi is some kinu of action. The emphasis on the iight
anu wiong way of saying things (what Anscombe, 1981, calls "linguistic
legislation") woulu seem to iaise seiious questions as to whethei
associations can tiuly be fiee, whethei tentative foimulations aie open to
uispassionate stuuy, anu whethei the patient anu analyst aie collaboiating
in a mutual enteipiise of tiust anu uiscoveiy oi one in which the patient is
always put in an auveisaiy position. Even though Schafei has intenueu his
new language to be a ieplacement foi metapsychology anu not a iecipe foi
how to piactice psychoanalysis, it is inevitable that sensitivity to issues of
avoiuing anu claiming iesponsibility woulu necessaiily have an effect on
tieatment (see Spence, 1982).
By focusing on action anu activity, on visible ovei invisible, anu on
cleaily stateu iathei than ioughly appioximateu, Schafei inevitably tuins
fiom iu to ego anu, in so uoing, iaises seiious questions about the cential
stanuing of the unconscious. Anu yet, heie is wheie psychoanalysis begins
its quest anu acquiies its uistinctive chaiactei. As Neissnei (1979) wiites:
If the patient comes to the analysis beaiing a buiuen of unconscious
conflicts anu iesistances, hiuuen motives anu significances
embeuueu in his cuiient anu past life expeiience, it is that with
which the analyst must woik. If these aspects of the patient's
expeiience aie expeiienceu somehow passivelygianteu that they
may involve the uisclaiming action that Schafei uesciibesthe
analyst must begin by accepting that passivity anu that conuition of
uisclaimeu action anu engage the patient in a piocess which uiaws
him towaius a lessening of iesistance, an incieasing availability to
conscious exploiation of unconscious motives, meanings, anu
conflicts, anu thus giauually leau the analysanu in the uiiection of a
moie action-baseu oiientation. In othei woius, psychoanalytic
theoiy neeus to be ( *<&!'$ !/ "!">(3*)!". |p. Su6; italics auueuj.
If we follow Neissnei anu claim that psychoanalysis is a theoiy (anu
even moie, a piactice) of nonaction, we begin to see why Schafei's pioposals
seem to geneiate such contioveisy. Anu it may also offei a clue to one of the
tioubling chaiacteiistics of metapsychologythe fact that the peison
uisappeais in a fielu of foice anu a netwoik of hypothetical stiuctuies. We
have seen that one of the main goals of 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)%
was to make the patient visible again, anu it was this concein that leu to the
stiess on action anu iesponsibility anu the concept of human agency. But it
may be that only by making the peison inactive anu not iesponsible (as in
the classic tieatment situation) can we evei uiscovei the ueepei ieasons foi
that inuiviuual's hopes anu feais. Anu it may be that only by cieating a
theoiy which is explicitly not about the peison as conscious agent can we
begin to geneiate a suitable context of explanation.
By putting the stiess on the patient as agent, Schafei has necessaiily
weakeneu oui sense of psychic ieality anu its fleeting phenomena. 0ne
sense of the loss comes out in compaiing 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" with the
chaptei on inteinalization in 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)%. In the
foimei, psychic ieality was uesciibeu with a uiamatic iichness of language
that seems almost poetic; in the lattei, the uesciiptions aie moie piosaic
anu less familiai. "It is oui custom," wiites Schafei in 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!'
;%$3<!("(#$%)% (1976), "to speak of intiojects as though they weie angels
anu uemons with minus anu poweis of theii own. We speak of them not as
an analysanu's constiuction anu uesciiption of expeiience but as
unqualifieu facts..We foiget.that the intioject can have no poweis oi
motives of its own, anu no peiceptual anu juugmental functions, except as,
like a uieam figuie, it has these piopeities aichaically asciibeu to it by the
imagining subject" (p. 16S). In othei woius, the asciibing shoulu be taken as
a foim of action, anu its piouucts become the iesponsibility of the patient.
But this ienaming tenus to ueciease the extent to which the analyst can
empathize with the patient's expeiience, making the analyst less sensitive to
just how haunting the piesence may feel. Anu to say that the patient is only
asciibing these piopeities uoes not lessen theii impact, just as calling
tiansfeience ieaction unieal uoes not make it uisappeai. Beie is an instance
in which the sense of an intioject as angel oi uemon captuies an impoitant
pait of the expeiience; it iepiesents a piece of clinical uata that we lose by
tuining to action language. Anu to the extent that the tianslation uoes not
match the patient's expeiience, we iun the iisk of incieaseu
misunueistanuing anu losing touch with the uata.
Schafei hopeu that action language woulu ieplace metapsychology; we
now begin to see ieasons why this will not happen. Not only uoes it fail to
captuie the iichness of the clinical uata; it also fails as an explanation.
Although, as we have seen, it is not close enough to innei expeiience to give
a sense of familiaiity anu iecognition, it is iionically too close to pioviue a
suitable explanation. This failuie comes about because the peison as agent
iepiesents only the conscious pait of the psychoanalytic uomain. To use
action teims to geneiate a geneial theoiy is something like tiying to explain
what happens insiue the atom by stuuying the psychology of the nucleai
fieeze movement. The failuie of Schafei's alteinative makes us iealize the
neeu foi some kinu of abstiact system that uesciibes expeiience but is not
cast in the teims of expeiience, much as the theoiy of coloi vision uesciibes
a common happening but is fiameu in teims of fiequencies iathei than
peiceiveu hues.
1
What neeus to be kept in minu is Fieuu's obseivation that the
explanatoiy system is only tempoiaiy anu will unuoubteuly be ieviseu as
new facts aie uiscoveieu. As a piovisional mouel, it is cleaily not meant to
be taken liteially; it is only the metaphoi foi the moment anu useful only as
it seems to pioviue explanation. But it must also pieseive a ceitain uistance
fiom the phenomena to be explaineu, anu we now begin to see that the
pioblem of the uisappeaiing patient may have been a sign that Fieuu was on
the iight tiack. Although teims like "foice" anu "uiiection" may seem too
ciuuely mechanistic, they have the auvantage of being psychologically
neutiala key iequiiement foi any geneial theoiy. To fiame the mouel in
teims of subjective impiessions (as in self psychology) is to iule out the
possibility of making any kinu of meaningful uiscoveiy about the minu,
because it iules out any investigation in the unconscious.
Bow then can we summaiize the impact of Schafei's ievisionaiy
piogiam. Beginning with the uistaste foi metapsychology anu its ciuue
physics of foice anu mechanism, 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)% helu
out the hope of ietuining to the uata of behavioi anu to the "native tongue of
psychoanalysis"action language. Although at times cumbeisome to apply
anu not suiteu to eveiyone's tastes, in othei contexts it helpeu us think moie
caiefully about clinical facts, sensitizing us to ceitain locutions anu letting us
see faithei into the eveiyuay language of the analytic houi. Ceitain kinus of
expiessions (in paiticulai, the iefeiences to uisclaimeu action) weie being
heaiu foi almost the fiist time anu in a iathei new way. By showing us what
new meanings coulu be uncoveieu that weie not anticipateu by Fieuu,
Schafei paveu the way foi new ways of ieauing the text of the houi anu
openeu the uooi to new ways of listening.
But theie weie uifficulties with the new language as well, anu in many
ways, it uiu not behave like a long-lost native tongue (see Schafei, 1976, p.
S62). To tianslate angei into "acting angiily" oi iesistance into "engaging in
actions contiaiy to analysis while also engaging in analysis itself" (p. 224) is
to complicate iathei than claiify, anu some woulu aigue that the meaning
lost in going to action language is eveiy bit as gieat as the meaning lost in
going to metapsychology. Anu the tianslations aie not always tianspaient. 1
7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)% tenus to ieau as if obseivations weie theie
foi the making; we now iealize that all obseivation is theoiy lauen anu that
Schafei's native tongue is no exception. Action language, because it
ueemphasizes unconscious anu passive expeiience anu emphasizes
iesponsibility anu conscious choice, caiiies significant implications foi the
piocess of tieatment. Nany of these implications aie not explicit, anu some
of the ciiticisms of Schafei may stem fiom piivate ieauings of the woius
"active" anu "passive," ieauings that he nevei intenueu but that his piogiam
must accommouate.
In ceitain iespects, the most significant impact of 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!'
;%$3<!("(#$%)% has been to whet oui appetite foi a geneial theoiy. The
uifficulties in uealing with the unconscious anu with affect in action
language woulu seem to suggest that some kinu of abstiact metatheoiy is a
necessaiy next step. It is also cleai that this metatheoiy cannot be wiitten in
the units of eveiyuay expeiience. Since action belongs to a ielatively
iestiicteu uomain of behavioi, a goou pait of oui emotional anu
unconscious life simply cannot be expiesseu piopeily in these teims (the
chapteis on emotions aie the least convincing of the book). The giounu
wheie we choose to builu oui theoiy must be equiuistant fiom both ego anu
iu, fiom conscious anu pieconscious, fiom past anu piesent; anu the units of
this theoiy must lenu themselves to tianslation into clinical concepts (anu
vice veisa) with no significant loss of meaning.
Even though action language has been founu wanting, the uiscussions
aiounu it have openeu up cential issues that aie basic to the futuie of
psychoanalysis. By iuentifying ceitain kinus of expiessions that appeai in
the patient's language anu by showing how they may caiiy ceitain
implications foi the tieatment, 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)% has
significantly incieaseu what might be calleu oui sensitivity to suifaces. By
calling attention to the way in which patients use anu hiue behinu language
anu by heaiing liteially (anu often foi the fiist time) ceitain stock
expiessions of the tiaue, action language has incieaseu oui ability to listen
caiefully. In this iespect, it belongs to a well-founueu analytic tiauition.
Schafei's attention to the uata of the consulting ioom is consistent with his
eailiei books on testing anu theii emphasis on veibatim piotocols. The
emphasis on language anu the text of the analytic houi puts the focus on
units that can be stuuieu, measuieu, anu stoieu. Even though they aie
cleaily not the whole stoiy (see Spence, 1981), they aie cleaily uata that
cannot be ignoieu.
What, finally, is the status of Schafei's "linguistic legislation". The
cuiient inteiest in how patients anu analysts ieally speak may have
piouuceu a significant anu humbling change in oui attituue towaiu the
actual uata. Schafei took the position that sloppy language leaus to sloppy
thinking (a uiiect outgiowth of the Wittgenstein school) anu that by
cleaning up the way we (patients anu analysts) speak about ouiselves anu
oui feelings, we can gain gieatei piecision anu builu bettei theoiy. But it is
now becoming appaient that the language contains its own wisuom anu that
caieful attention to the native tongue of metaphoi anu common speech may
teach us impoitant things about the clinical encountei, things we can leain
in no othei way. The close look taken by Bahl anu his colleagues (Bahl,
Tellei, Noss, & Tiujillo, 1978) at the way analysts ieally speak anu the
couing scheme uevelopeu by uill anu Boffman (1982) to analyze the
appeaiance anu inteipietation of pieces of the tiansfeience aie effoits in
this uiiection. As computei pioceuuies come into play anu allow us to stoie
anu ietiieve vast files of patients' speech, we may uiscovei iegulaiities that
we nevei knew existeu. Thus, metaphoi may not only be useu in the seivice
of iesistance, as Schafei has pointeu out, but subtle shifts in woiuing may
signal subtle shifts in uefense. If analysts aie euucateu about such shifts,
they will be able to ueepen theii awaieness of the meaning of the houi anu
impiove the timing of theii inteipietations.
In Schafei's most iecent book, ?<& 1"(#$*)3 1**)*,-& (198S), he has
tuineu back to moie classical times. Although theie aie occasional pieces on
action language, the oveiall tone seems moie conseivative anu closei to
Fieuu. Even the chapteis on naiiation anu the uiscussion of the patient as a
tellei of stoiies seem to be making manifest what was latent in Fieuu's
appioach. In one section, foi example, Schafei tells us that "Fieuu useu two
piimaiy naiiative stiuctuies, anu he often uigeu that they be taken as
piovisional iathei than as final tiuths" (p. 21S).
The analytic attituue as seen by Schafei can be chaiacteiizeu as one of
empathy anu tiust, which geneiates an atmospheie of safety. Theie aie
many technical ways of achieving this atmospheie, some of which Schafei
uiscusses at length, but the theoietical auvantages aie also emphasizeu anu
claiifieu. 0nly by fosteiing an atmospheie of safety (see Schafei, 198S,
chaptei 2) can the analyst cieate the conuitions foi both the iuentification of
iesistance anu its uissolution; foi unueistanuing the patient's stoiy in all of
its complexity; anu foi seeing cleaily the tiansfeience anu how it changes
ovei time. Safety peimits the patient to show himself oi heiself in all
aspectsnakeu anu clotheu, piesent anu past, angiy anu happy. Safety is
cential because uiscoveiy is seen as the key to tieatment: "The appiopiiate
analytic attituue is one of /)"-)": !,*.what the analysis itself will be oi be
conceineu with; wheie the piincipal woik will be uone;.how this woik will
best be uone;.anu how to establish a teimination of the analysis" (Schafei,
198S, p. 21).
Neutiality becomes a cential pait of the atmospheie of safety. The iueal
analyst shoulu be cuiious anu open to suipiise. Schafei (198S) says the
analyst shoulu take "nothing foi gianteu (without being cynical about it)
anu |iemainj ieauy to ievise conjectuies oi conclusions alieauy aiiiveu at
|anuj toleiate ambiguity oi incomplete closuie ovei extenueu peiious of
time ." (p. 7). The avoiuance of eithei-oi thinking is anothei aspect of this
neutiality anu has an obvious ielation to the constiuction of multiple
histoiies (Schafei, 198S, chaptei 1S) anu to the toleiance of uiffeient
schools of tieatment (see chaptei 17, "0n Becoming a Psychoanalyst of 0ne
Peisuasion oi Anothei").
What is less emphasizeu in this pictuie is the influence of what might be
calleu the analyst's woilu view. Analysts come to theii task fiom a special
backgiounu of tiaining anu expeiience; as a iesult, they heai the mateiial
fiom within a ceitain context. Nany uesciiptive teims have alieauy acquiieu
specific meanings, anu as a iesult, the analyst will inevitably foim images of
the significant figuies in the patient's lifeimages ueteimineu by a tuin of
phiase that the analyst finus familiai oi influenceu by iefeience to a
paiticulai piece of histoiy with which the analyst has peisonal associations.
0nce foimeu, these images tenu to peisist, anu though they may be senseu
as incomplete, they aie less often senseu as wiong, waiting to be coiiecteu.
Noieovei, coiiection can nevei be fully iealizeu because one of the moie
effective coiiectionsa face-to-face meeting with the peison in question
will piobably nevei happen. Although it is ceitainly tiue that analysts
shoulu iemain always ieauy to ievise theii conclusions, Schafei seems to
unueiestimate the uifficulties of this task. No one woulu uisagiee with the
impoitance of neutiality anu empathy anu open-minueuness, but moie
attention coulu be paiu to the technical anu philosophical pioblems entaileu
in this quest.
Schafei's pictuie of the neutial analyst tenus to oveilook the fact that all
obseivations aie theoiy lauen anu that ceitain kinus of mateiial can !"#$ be
unueistoou by fiist foiming a piovisional mouel. Theie seems to be a
contiauiction between neutiality anu foiming a piovisional hypothesis.
Tiue enough, as Schafei says (198S) the "simplistic, paitisan analyst,
woiking in teims of saints anu sinneis, victims anu victimizeis, oi goou anu
bau ways to live" (p. S) is cleaily shoitchanging the patient; on the othei
hanu, piovisional mouels aie always neeueu to pioviue a context foi
isolateu impiessions anu to suggest aieas that still wait to be uiscoveieu.
The ueteimining iole of the piimal scene is one such mouel; the possibility
of such exposuie anu its impact on the patient, both immeuiate anu uelayeu,
is a constant concein of many analysts. In similai fashion, when woiking
with a patient who is the oluest chilu they will be sensitizeu to such events
as the biith of the seconu chilu anu be constantly on the aleit foi its
ueiivatives.
The use of piovisional mouels can be witting oi unwitting. If it is too
much of the seconu we may speak of counteitiansfeience; If too much of the
fiist, of failuie of empathy (as in the cool, uetacheu analyst who is always
foiming hypotheses anu "testing" them against the "uata"). What is less well
unueistoou is that much of psychoanalytic theoiy is still piovisional; that
assumptions about piimal scene exposuie oi sibling iivaliy iepiesent one
class of hypotheses that may not be confiimeu anu neeu to be ieplaceu by
otheis. Thus, one of the common violations of neutiality stems fiom an
oveicommitment to theoiy anu an emphasis on ceitain paits of the ieceiveu
wisuom.
The issue of alteinative explanations is taken up at length in ?<&
1"(#$*)3 1**)*,-& chaptei on multiple histoiies, anu a numbei of uiffeient
mouels aie uevelopeu anu uiscusseu in the subsequent chapteis on
"Naiiation in the Psychoanalytic Bialogue," "Action anu Naiiation in
Psychoanalysis," anu "The Impiisoneu Analysanu." Analysis as jouiney is
one example, as Schafei (198S) makes cleai (with iefeiences to the @-$%%&$,
the A).)"& B!0&-$, C,3=#&+&''$ D)"", anu E#$%%&%): "The jouiney is one of the
woilu's gieat stoiylines..We know that in the uieams of analysanus all
jouineys aie, among othei things, tiips thiough tiansfeience countiy" (p.
2S9). 0sing this mouel helps the analyst to uecoue ceitain kinus of uieam
mateiial anu to unueistanu the emeigence of ceitain kinus of chiluhoou
memoiiestiavel *<&" may be ielateu in subtle ways to tiavel "!8. Anothei
mouel, uevelopeu at length in Chaptei 16, is the mouel of analysis as piison.
Schafei uevelops with gieat sensitivity the positive anu negative aspects of
this stoiyline. The happy piison anu the safety of closeu places may be seen
as an iionic extension of Schafei's eailiei emphasis on the impoitance of
safety in the analytic attituue; unuei ceitain ciicumstances, the analysis
becomes too safe anu thieatens to become inteiminable. The piison mouel
has obvious links with the use of passivity as uefense anu iesistance, two of
the majoi themes in 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)%. Anu fiom anothei
point of view, the mouel of the happy piison (safe, but going nowheie) is the
complement of the jouiney of uiscoveiy in which each uay biings new
auventuie anu a new outlook.
2

Wheie uoes the naiiative come fiom. In the last pait of the chaptei on
"The Impiisoneu Analysanu," Schafei (198S) begins to exploie this question
with the piovisional suggestion that the stoiy is uevelopeu jointly by both
paities: "By this I uo not mean that they have uevelopeu it in a happy
collaboiation; I mean iathei that each has maue a contiibution, often of
uiffeient soits, at uiffeient times, anu with uiffeient uegiees of awaieness,
ieflectiveness, anu conflicteuness" (p. 278). Bow uoes this mesh with
neutiality. It is becoming cleai, as Schafei goes on to point out, that the
stoiy is not simply being uncoveieu. This follows fiom the fact that multiple
naiiatives can be constiucteu anu that seveial uiffeient mouels can account
foi the same pieces of clinical mateiial. uoou analysts seem to woik within
the heimeneutic ciicle, using a piovisional mouel (what the Euiopean
philosophei Bans-ueoig uauamei woulu call "foie-unueistanuing") to builu
a scaffoluing to suppoit the eaily uata, taking subsequent uata to iefiame
anu extenu (oi uismantle) the scaffoluing, anu using the ieviseu fiamewoik
to see fuithei into the patient's stoiy anu to uiscovei new pieces of
infoimation.
Thus, neutiality woulu seem to consist in the ability to be sensitive to
new naiiatives (new scaffoluings) as they emeige in the mateiial anu as
they suggest themselves uuiing the analysis, "!* in the absence of mouels.
The analytic attituue becomes a ueepeneu awaieness of possible stoiylines.
We can no longei go back to the myth of the analyst as blank scieen who
evenly iegisteis all infoimation by giving equal weight to each new item; if
this is neutiality, it is as outmoueu as the Nonioe Boctiine. At the same
time, as the analyst appeais less neutial than we once assumeu, it becomess
incieasingly uigent that we uevelop a neutial metatheoiya theoiy that
can hanule all possible naiiatives anu pioviue a fiamewoik foi all clinical
obseivations. Thus, the focus shifts fiom the neutial analyst (an
impossibility) to a neutial theoiy, anu it is in this uomain that we may look
foi Schafei's contiibutions in the yeais to come.
In coming back to the complexities of the analytic attituue anu in tiying
to go beneath the suiface of the expeiience, Schafei has ietuineu to the
poetic stiains of 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!" anu its iespect foi the clinical
phenomena. Bis tone seems moie mellow anu less uiuactic. uone aie the
legislative tuins of phiase that maiieu many poitions of 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!'
;%$3<!("(#$%)%, anu the ieauei feels a gieatei familiaiity with the people anu
the lanuscape being uesciibeu. Ambiguity seems less an obstacle to
unueistanuing (iecall the ciiticism of metaphoi in 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!'
;%$3<!("(#$%)%) anu moie a potential souice of wisuom (as in the iuea of
multiple histoiies). Schafei seems moie willing to take the patient's stoiy at
its own woius anu to tieat it with the same kinu of iespect we show a text.
The impatience with bau usage oi faulty obseivation that ian thiough much
of 1 7&8 9(":,(:& /!' ;%$3<!("(#$%)% has been ieplaceu by the iespect foi
the clinical happening that came out so cleaily in 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!".
In ueveloping the impoitance of psychoanalysis as naiiative, Schafei
(198S) unueilines the impoitance of the tale anu of how it is tolu; the
impoitance of context anu stiuctuie ovei isolateu fact; anu the vaiiety of
ways in which a life can be piesenteu anu unueistoou. "The tiuth of a
psychoanalytic fact," he wiites, "iesiues ultimately in the way it fits into the
system of inteipietation within which it anu its significance have been
uefineu" (p. 277). To emphasize the ielational natuie of tiuth is to push back
the Ice Age of Positivism anu to aigue against the tiauitional subject-object
sepaiation of Big Science. The patient's histoiy is no longei an object of
stuuy like a bluebiiu oi a molecule, but a constantly changing stoiy that the
patient is wiiting anu iewiiting, togethei with the analyst, insiue anu
outsiue the analytic houi. We aie just beginning to listen.
!"#"!"$%"&
Anscombe, R. (1981). Refeiiing to the unconscious: A philosophical ciitique
of Schafei's action language. 5"*&'"(*)!"(# F!,'"(# !/ ;%$3<!>1"(#$%)%,
62, 22S-241.
Bahl, B., Tellei, v., Noss, B., & Tiujillo, N. (1978). Counteitiansfeience
examples of the syntactic expiession of waiueu-off contents.
;%$3<!("(#$*)3 G,('*&'#$, 1,7, SS9-S6S.
Fieuu, S. (1912). Recommenuations to physicians piacticing psychoanalysis.
H*("-('- I-)*)!", 12, 111-12u.
Fieuu, S. (191S). Instincts anu theii vicissituues. H*("-('- I-)*)!", 14, 117-
14u.
uill, N. N., & Boffman, I. Z. (1982). A methou foi stuuying the analysis of
aspects of the patient's expeiience of the ielationship in
psychoanalysis anu psychotheiapy. F!,'"(# !/ *<& 10&')3("
;%$3<!("(#$*)3 1%%!3)(*)!", Su, 1S7-167.
}acobsen, P. E., & Steele, R. S. (1979). Fiom piesent to past: Fieuuian
aicheology. 5"*&'"(*)!"(# J&.)&8 !/ ;%$3<!("(#$%)%, 6, S49-S62.
Kohut, B. (1971). ?<& ("(#$%)% !/ *<& %&#/. New Yoik: Inteinational
0niveisities Piess.
Kohut, B. (1979). The two analyses of Ni. Z. 5"*&'"(*)!"(# F!,'"(# !/ ;%$3<!>
1"(#$%)%, 6u, S-27.
Neissnei, W. W. (1979). Ciitique of concepts anu theiapy in the action
language appioach to psychoanalysis. 5"*&'"(*)!"(# F!,'"(# !/ ;%$3<!>
1"(#$%)%, 6u, 291-S1u.
Rapapoit, B., uill, N. N., & Schafei, R. (194S-46). A)(:"!%*)3 2%$3<!#!:)3(#
*&%*)": (2 vols.). Chicago: Yeai Book Publisheis.
Schafei, R. (1948). ?<& 3#)")3(# (22#)3(*)!" !/ 2%$3<!#!:)3(# *&%*%. New Yoik:
Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Schafei, R. (19S4). ;%$3<!("(#$*)3 )"*&'2'&*(*)!" )" J!'%3<(3< *&%*)":. New
Yoik: uiune & Stiatton.
Schafei, R. (1968). 1%2&3*% !/ 5"*&'"(#)6(*)!". New Yoik: Inteinational
0niveisities Piess.
Schafei, R. (1976). 1 "&8 #(":,(:& /!' 2%$3<!("(#$%)%. New Baven: Yale
0niveisity Piess.
Schafei, R. (198S). ?<& ("(#$*)3 (**)*,-&. New Yoik: Basic Books.
Spence, B. P. (1981). Psychoanalytic competence. 5"*&'"(*)!"(# F!,'"(# !/
;%$3<!>1"(#$%)%, 62, 11S-124.
Spence, B. P. (1982). 0n some clinical implications of action language.
F!,'"(# !/ *<& 10&')3(" ;%$3<!("(#$*)3 1%%!3)(*)!", Su, 169-184.

$()*+

1 The pioblems of focusing on the peison as agent aie fuithei uemonstiateu by a
look at the object school of Kohut anu his associates. Bepenuing on
subjective iepoits to geneiate the units of oui theoiy puts us at the meicy
of unieliable witnesses anu invisible uata; once we move insiue the heau,
we have given up any hope of consensus oi exteinal valiuation.
2 Not to be oveilookeu is the mouel that assumes that the naiiative lies in the
clinical mateiial, waiting only to be "uiscoveieu." Fieuu took some pains to
emphasize this mouel of analyst as aichaeologist in oiuei to countei
chaiges of suggestion anu influence, anu it has come uown to us as pait of

the ieceiveu wisuom. 0ne of the implicit themes of The Analytic Attituue is
that this mouel is piobably wiong.
!
#$%&'()% #* +,#)%-.$)%/ 01%.+)#,.)1%- .1 .2$ -.+,0.,+$ 13
4-5021'%'65.)0 .2$1+5
!"##$% '( )*+,)- ./(0(
Nost of the analysts anu theoiists incluueu in this volume have
attempteu to auu to psychoanalytic theoiy by ueveloping theii own clinical
anu theoietical foimulations. This soit of enueavoi is visible anu often even
piouuces auheients anu uisciples. A few theoiists contiibute by attempting
to claiify the basic stiuctuie of psychoanalytic theoiy. Because they woik
quietly anu uo not often geneiate the kinu of stii that cieates followeis, it is
all too easy to oveilook theii contiibutions. A stiength of this volume is that
it iecognizes the impoitant contiibutions of one such theoiist, Benjamin B.
Rubinstein.
In his wiitings, Rubinstein is essentially a philosophei of
psychoanalysis. But this simple statement uoes not ieally captuie the natuie
anu quality of his woik. Rubinstein is an analyst with many yeais of clinical
expeiience, anu his woik on the conceptual status of psychoanalysis is
wiitten, so to speak, fiom the insiue. The basic questions he poses aie
questions that aiise in the couise of clinical woik (anu that most of us
slough ovei anu ignoie). But what he biings to this piobing is a iemaikable
anu sophisticateu philosophical knowleuge anu style of thinking. Aftei
coming to the 0niteu States fiom Finlanu, thiough the effoits of Baviu
Rapapoit, Rubinstein, as Bolt (1967) notes, "maue himself into one of the
few peisons who know as well as Rapapoit uiu the uiveigent liteiatuies of
psychoanalysis anu the philosophy of science" (p. 18). Be also biings to his
task an intellectual honesty anu conceptual claiity that is unsuipasseu by
any woik in this aiea. In this papei I will uiscuss both Rubinstein's specific
iueas anu some geneial issues which these iueas geneiate, beginning with a
biief attempt to place Rubinstein's woik in a wiuei histoiical anu
intellectual context.
Bioauly speaking, mouem effoits to explain human behavioi anu
uistinctively human featuies (such as consciousness anu mentation) have
taken one of two philosophical uiiections. 0ne appioach is to view human
beings as nothing but mechanism, as essentially sophisticateu machines. A
cleai anu classical expiession of this position is La Nettiie's (1912) !"# "
!"%&'#(. A moie sophisticateu anu biological veision of this view is Buxley's
epiphenomenalistic view of consciousness, as expiesseu in the title of his
1874 papei, "0n the Bypothesis that Animals aie Automata." Accoiuing to
this conception, states of consciousness anu piesumably othei psychological
phenomena aie no moie than effects of bouily piocesses. As Buxley stateu
it: "The minu stanus ielateu to the bouy as the bell of the clock to the
woiks..." (see Euwaius, p. 1uS). What follows fiom La Nettiie's anu Buxley's
geneial philosophical position is that explanations of human behavioi aie, in
piinciple, not essentially uiffeient fiom explanations of physical anu
chemical phenomena.
An alteinative appioach is that accounts of human behavioi iequiie
special explanatoiy methous anu piinciples. The neo-Kantian uistinction
between )('**+(*,'**(#*%&"-+(# anu ."+/0,'**(#*%&"-+(# anu the emphasis
associateu with Bilthey (1961) on 1(0*+(&(# as the appiopiiate methou foi
the stuuy of human phenomena aie the piime histoiical examples of this
appioach. Recent emphasis on empathy as the uistinctive uata-gatheiing
methou foi psychoanalysis (e.g., Kohut, 19S9,1977) anu on the so-calleu
clinical theoiy of psychoanalysis (e.g., Klein, 1976) as well as iecent
attempts to conceptualize psychoanalysis as a heimeneutic uiscipline (e.g.,
Babeimas, 1971, 1979; Ricoeui, 197u, 1977; Schafei, 1976; see also
uinbaum, 198S, foi a supeib ciitique of this point of view) can be seen as
contempoiaiy expiessions of Bilthey's neo-Kantian piogiam.
1

In contiast to the above views in which human beings aie seen as ('+&(0
nothing but mechanism 20 immune fiom laws of natuie is iecognition that
we aie fiom one peispective peisons anu fiom anothei, oiganisms. This
ontological insight peimits Rubinstein to ieject a uichotomous eithei-oi
appioach to explanations of human behavioi. Insteau, it leaus him to accept
the complementaiity of explanation by way of meanings anu causes (which
paiallels the basic complementaiity of peison anu oiganism) anu to
iecognize the complex intei uepenuence between the so-calleu clinical
theoiy anu metapsychology of psychoanalysis. In iecognizing this uuality,
Rubinstein has pieseiveu one of Fieuu's coie insights anu one of the
piimaiy souices of cieative tensions within psychoanalysis (see Bolt, 1972,
foi a uiscussion of Fieuu's two images of humankinu).
Rubinstein's wiitings anu contiibutions covei a wiue iange. They
incluue a conceptual analysis of psychoanalytic iueas such as unconscious
mental events anu uefense; an eluciuation of the natuie of clinical infeiences
in psychoanalysis; the uevelopment of a mouel of mental functioning that is
compatible with both psychoanalytic accounts anu neuiophysiology; luciu
uiscussions of the minu-bouy pioblem anu how it ielates to psychoanalytic
theoiy; anu a beautiful explication of the natuie of metaphoi anu ielateu
phenomena anu theii ielationship to ceitain psychoanalytic issues.
(Rubinstein's 1972 papei on metaphoi in paiticulai is a wonueiful
combination of claiity of analysis anu exquisite sensitivity to poetic anu
liteiaiy nuances.) In all these aieas, Rubinstein substitutes foi casual use of
psychoanalytic concepts caieful anu uetaileu examination. Foi example, the
notion of unconscious mental events is utilizeu in a casual fashion in the
psychoanalytic liteiatuie without any appaient iecognition of its ambiguity
oi the conceptual uifficulties it entails. Similaily, psychoanlytic
inteipietations anu infeiences aie typically maue in the couise of clinical
woik anu in case histoiy uesciiptions without any systematic attention to
the natuie of the eviuence on which they iest oi to theii epistemic anu
explanatoiy status. Rubinstein's iaie aimamentaiium of extensive
psychoanalytic clinical expeiience, a thoiough anu ueep knowleuge of the
psychoanalytic liteiatuie, anu a high uegiee of philosophical sophistication
peimits him to subject such psychoanalytic concepts anu methouology to
caieful conceptual analysis.
Since Rubinstein's woik is so iich anu complex, I can ueal only with
limiteu aspects of his woik heie. I will begin with a biief uiscussion of his
uemonstiation of the uepenuence of the clinical theoiy foi its valiuation on
some foim of metapsychology, oi extiaclinical theoiy (a teim Rubinstein
piefeis because it avoius confusion with Fieuu's metapsychology).
Rubinstein (1967) has shown that what he iefeis to as "geneial clinical
hypotheses"the hypotheses of "paitial functional equivalence" oi of "the
peisistent manifestation potential of unconscious motives" (Rubinstein,
197S, p. 1S), foi examplefunction as axiomatic assumptions in the
foimulation of specific inteipietations anu clinical hypotheses in a
paiticulai case. Thus, although we may infei unconscious motives in
paiticulai cases, we can "confiim theii piesence 2#34 if we piesuppose the
actual occuiience of piocesses by which the unconscious motives in
question, if in fact piesent, have been ienueieu unconscious anu being
unconscious, aie expiesseu in vaiious, mostly inuiiect ways"(Rubinstein,
198ub, p. 1S). But, Rubinstein also (198ua) notes, "the occuiience of these
piocesses cannot be confiimeu clinically" (p. 4SS). It is the "**/56+'2# of
theii occuiience that peimits the paiticulai clinical infeience. To confiim
the existence of these piocesses iequiies the analyst to step out of the
clinical context anu look to nonclinical, incluuing neuiophysiological,
eviuence.
Consiuei anothei example of the uepenuence of clinical foimulations on
some foim of metapsychology. We aie justifieu, Rubinstein obseives, in
consiueiing paiapiaxes anu symptoms as motivateu anu in consiueiing
ceitain behaviois as substitute fulfillments because of the assumptions of
peisistent manifestation potential anu of paitial functional equivalence
(incluuing symbolic equivalence) among uiffeient behaviois. Now, theie is
simply no way one coulu evei confiim the hypothesis of peisistent
manifestation potential of unconscious motives solely on the basis of clinical
uata. Such a geneial assumption cleaily iequiies nonclinical eviuence foi its
confiimation.
This uemonstiation of the uepenuence of the clinical infeiences anu
foimulations on extiaclinical theoiy inuicates quite cleaily the limitations,
even the futility, of iecent ielateu attempts to uefine psychoanalysis solely
in teims of its so-calleu clinical theoiy (e.g., Bome, Klein, 1976; 1966; Shafei,
1976) anu to conceptualize it as a heimeneutic uiscipline conceineu only
with inteipietation anu meaning.
Befining psychoanalysis as a heimeneutic uiscipline seems to iepiesent,
in pait, an attempt to avoiu the challenge of how to test anu confiim the
clinical infeiences anu inteipietations the analyst iegulaily employs in
clinical woik. If psychoanalysis is only a heimeneutic activity, one neeu
meiely view clinical inteipietations as "naiiatives" anu "stoiies." What
Rubinstein has shown, howevei, is that these inteipietations aie not
"meiely" stoiies, but aie baseu on extiaclinical axiomatic assumptions. If
follows that the valiuity of these infeiences anu inteipietations ultimately
can be testeu only if one steps outsiue the clinical context. The only self-
sufficient clinical theoiy that can be uevelopeu is one which accepts that its
clinical infeiences anu inteipietations will iemain untesteu anu
unconfiimeu. The conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a heimeneutic
uiscipline, limiteu only to "naiiatives," "stoiies," anu othei constiuctions
seems to ieflect an acceptance of this fate, insofai as it fails to come to giips
with anu biushes asiue the question of the valiuity of clinical infeiences.
0ne can attempt to uispense altogethei with issues of valiuity anu
veiuicality by limiting one's conceins to theiapeutic effectiveness, taking
the position that all that one claims foi one's inteipietations is that they
pioviue the patient with a new, moie helpful, anu moie constiuctive
peispective on life. This position, stateu explicitly oi implicitly, is
incieasingly fiequent these uays. In its extieme ielativism anu uttei
uismissal of issues of valiuity anu tiuth value, this position seems to iun
countei to the cential values anu outlook that infoim Rubinstein's woik. It
also iuns countei to the cential psychoanalytic tenet that in the final
analysis (no uouble entenuie intenueu), the tiuth is libeiating. Fieuu (1917)
explicitly stateu his belief that only inteipietations that "tally with what is
ieal" will be theiapeutic. Although this may oi may not be tiue, the question
is cential in the psychoanalytic outlook. When psychoanalysis is uefineu as a
heimeneutic uiscipline, the question is, so to speak, legislateu out of
existence. As I have aigueu elsewheie (Eagle, 198u), most, if not all, patients
who come foi psychoanalytic tieatment implicitly anu explicitly expect, that
they will leain the tiuth about themselves, not that they will be pioviueu
with "naiiatives" anu "stoiies," howevei helpful they may be. Anu I stiongly
suspect that most psychoanalytically oiienteu theiapists, whatevei theii
philosophical position, believe that while they aie uoing clinical woik they
aie helping theii patients leain impoitant tiuths about themselves iathei
than simply piesenting helpful "stoiies." Inueeu, I uoubt that theiapists who
believe in piesenting "stoiies" can be maximally effective.
Whatevei patients anu theiapists believe, howevei, the claim that
psychoanalytically inspiieu "stoiies" oi "naiiatives" aie theiapeutic is (1)
simply an assumption, anu (2) itself a tiuth claimit asseits that the
pioposition, "Stoiies oi naiiatives constiucteu in the couise of
psychoanalytic theiapy aie theiapeutic in such anu such ways," is tiue.
Attempts to valiuate oi confiim this tiuth claim take one outsiue the
bounuaiies of heimeneutics, just as, Rubinstein has shown, attempts to
valiuate oi confiim clinical infeiences anu inteipietations take one outsiue
the clinical theoiy as commonly unueistoou. Fuitheimoie, talk about new
peispectives anu libeiating "naiiatives" takes place without any iefeience
to systematic anu contiolleu outcome stuuies that woulu give substance to
at least the theiapeutic claims maue foi these inteipietive naiiatives.
Common to iecent attempts to uefine psychoanalysis as a heimeneutic
uiscipline, to the claimeu inuepenuence of the clinical fiom the extiaclinical
theoiy, anu to the failuie to seiiously consiuei, let alone implement, moie
systematic effoits to gauge outcome of tieatment, is an implicit insistence
on the self-sufficiency anu autonomy of the clinical enteipiiseas if this
enteipiise coulu somehow escape oi is immune to issues of accountability
on both the epistemological level of valiuation of clinical hypotheses anu the
piagmatic level of effects of tieatment. These aie uistuibing uevelopments,
isolating anu solipsistic in theii effects. It is as if the iesponse to the uifficult
anu seemingly insoluble pioblems of valiuation of inteipietations anu cleai
ueteimination of outcome is to ueclaie them iiielevant anu to aggiessively
hail the inuepenuent legitimacy of the clinical enteipiise itself. This uefiant
pioclamation of self-sufficiency seems to mask an unueilying uespaii of
being able to ueal effectively with the complex pioblems geneiateu by the
clinical enteipiise. In contiast to this position, Rubinstein has thiough the
yeais uoggeuly attempteu to uniavel anu ieveal to us the inheient logic of
clinical infeiences anu clinical hypotheses anu the eviuence anu
assumptions on which they iest (see, foi example, Rubinstein, 197S).
Iionically enough, Rubinstein's (197S) uesciiption anu uefense of the
clinical theoiy in psychoanalysis is moie systematic anu complete than that
of those who aigue foi the self-sufficiency of the clinical theoiy. Be
uemonstiates that it is at least possible to lenu auuitional cieuence to both
the geneial anu the specific clinical hypotheses of psychoanalytic theoiy. In
auuition, his uiscussion of Poppei's falsifiability in the context of
confiimation of clinical hypotheses is a gem of luciuity anu simple ingenuity,
woith uesciibing biiefly. Poppei (1962) aigues against the scientific
iespectability of psychoanalytic theoiy by maintaining that it is "simply non-
testable, iiiefutable" (p. S7). Accoiuing to Poppei, only iefutability iathei
than confiimation aie tests of scientificity because "it is easy to obtain
confiimations, oi veiifications, foi neaily eveiy theoiyif we look foi
confiimations" (p. S6). Rubinstein shows that this aigument can be tuineu
into a uefense of confiimation in the following simple anu elegant way: The
hypothesis (c) "Be has an unconscious wish foi A," although not falsifieu by
the hypothesis (u) "Be has an unconscious wish foi non-A," is falsifieu by the
hypothesis (e) "Be uoes not have an unconscious wish foi A." It seems cleai
that to falsify hypothesis (c) one woulu have to confiim hypothesis (e). But,
Rubinstein (197S) notes: "Bypothesis (e) can only be confiimeu by an
"7*(#%( of uata confiiming hypothesis (c). Accoiuingly, uata confiiming
hypothesis (c) must be taken as valiu in favoi of this hypothesis. Poppei's
falsifiability ciiteiion is fulfilleu since, as is eviuent fiom the compatibility of
hypotheses (c) anu (u), the only conuition foi falsifying hypothesis (c) is the
absence of uata confiiming it" (p. 46).
2

It seems to me that an all too fiequent iecent iesponse to ciiticisms of
the scientific status of psychoanalytic theoiy is to ueclaie that
psychoanalysis is to be juugeu by ciiteiia othei than the iules of eviuence
anu infeience chaiacteiizing the sciences. Bowlby (1981) sees this iesponse
as a ieaction of uespaii at uealing even auequately with these ciiticisms.
Rubinstein's iesponse, as the examples given heie uemonstiate, is to ueal
caiefully anu systematically with such ciiticisms anu to tiy to make explicit
the kinus of eviuence anu infeience that aie ciitical in the testing of clinical
hypotheses.
I will now tuin to a concein that, in gieatei oi lessei uegiee, peimeates
a goou ueal of Rubinstein's woikthe minu-bouy pioblem. This pioblem
seems nevei fai fiom the centei of Rubinstein's thoughts on psychoanalysis.
Consiuei the themes anu issues that have been uetaileu: peisons anu
oiganisms, meanings anu causes; clinical anu extiaclinical theoiy. All these
ielate in ielatively cleai fashion to the minu-bouy pioblem. I noteu eailiei
Rubinstein's peivasive iecognition of the uuality of human existence. This
shoulu not be misieau to mean that Rubinstein takes a uualistic position on
the minu-bouy pioblem. 0n the contiaiy, he foicefully (anu in my view,
coiiectly) iejects any philosophical position oi option which ignoies the
cential fact that we aie (5728'(8 beings, anu whatevei it means to be a
peison cannot be entiiely sepaiateu fiom that embouieu status. Rubinstein
iejects not only a metaphysical uualism, which tieats mental events as if
theii ultimate natuie weie maue up of mental "stuff," sepaiate anu apait
fiom physical mattei, but also what can be calleu a methouological uualism,
which claims autonomy foi psychological explanation, whatevei its ielation
(incluuing one of contiauiction) to explanation at the level of
neuiophysiological functioning. In eithei case, Rubinstein iejects the self-
sufficiency of minu.
S
In his view, a psychological explanation oi account,
howevei clevei anu ingenious it may be, howevei intuitively oi
empathically coiiect it may seem, cannot be valiu if it contiauicts what is
known about the piinciples of neuiophysiological functioning. This will
seem self-eviuent to many, but it is obviously not self-eviuent to those who
take the position that the foimulations anu hypotheses of psychoanalytic
theoiy aie anu shoulu be entiiely ueiiveu fiom the psychoanalytic situation,
whatevei the logical ielationship of these foimulations to othei bouies of
knowleuge.
In iejecting a psychology that implicitly auvocates the self-sufficiency of
minu anu ignoies oui embouiment, Rubinstein is being faithful to a coie anu
ciitically valuable aspect of psychoanalytic theoiy. It is Fieuu's iecognition
of the cential fact of oui embouiment, as expiesseu in his instinct theoiy,
that foims the founuation foi psychoanalytic theoiy. Although many of the
specifics of Fieuuian instinct theoiy may be ueficient oi mistaken, what
iemains valiu is Fieuu's insistence that oui basic motives anu uesiies as
well as oui moues of behavioi ueiive fiom biological impeiatives anu aie
intimately linkeu to oui neuiophysiological stiuctuie. In iejecting uualism
anu in keeping in the foiefiont the fact of oui embouiment, Rubinstein is
ieminuing us of that geneial insight.
It may seem stiange to link Rubinstein to instinct theoiy. But what I am
pointing to is Rubinstein's emphasis on oui neuiophysiological stiuctuie as
the souice of both oui motives anu the mannei in which we go about
uealing with these motives. In this sense Rubinstein pieseives the insights
that iemain valiu in Fieuuian instinct theoiy; anu the iejection of these
cential insights chaiacteiizes attempts to sepaiate psychoanalysiseithei
methouologically oi substantivelyfiom the facts of embouiment.
4

Rubinstein's philosophical position on the minu-bouy pioblem is
expiesseu in his uiscussion of the natuie of unconscious mental events.
What can it possibly mean, he asks, to speak of unconscious wishing,
wanting, thinking, etc.. Accoiuing to Rubinstein, unconscious mental events
aie theoietical teims that can be uesciibeu in (1) the language of
psychological obseivables; (2) the language of neuiophysiology oi
"piotoneuiophysiology" (as in a 8'*62*'+'2# foi conscious wishing);
S
anu (S)
"as-if " mental oi phenomenal teims. With iegaiu to the thiiu uesciiption,
by piefixing the teim "unconscious" to oiuinaiy mental teims such as
"wishing," "uesiiing," anu "thinking," we intenu to convey the iuea that the
peison is behaving anu acting "* '- he oi she weie wishing, uesiiing, anu
thinking such anu such, when in fact, in the oiuinaiy sense of these teims,
which incluues the element of conscious expeiience, the peison is not so
behaving.
A fuithei consiueiation of how teims such as "uesiiing" anu "thinking"
aie useu in oiuinaiy uiscouise helps us make the tiansition to talking about
unconscious uesiiing anu thinking. In oiuinaiy uiscouise, to say that one is
uesiiing oi thinking X uoes not necessaiily mean that eithei content X oi the
activities of uesiiing oi thinking continually occupy all of one's conscious
expeiience. Theie is a uispositional element to many such psychological
teims, by which I mean that someone consciously uesiiing X both behaves
anu is pieuisposeu to behave in ceitain ways, whethei oi not, at any given
moment, that peison is consciously awaie of X oi of expeiiencing uesiie foi
X. In thinking, similaily, when we focus on a pioblem, foi example, we aie
not necessaiily awaie of a continual stieam of thoughts oi of the
uninteiiupteu expeiience of thinking. As is well known, one may aiiive at a
solution following a peiiou in which one neithei consciously expeiienceu
any ielevant thoughts noi was awaie of thinking. As Rubinstein (1977) anu,
moie iecently, Bennett (1978) note, uuiing this peiiou we, as peisons, uiu
not uo anything. Rathei, oui biains uiu. I woulu auu that we can get some
iuea of the stiuctuie of these biain events by noting the natuie of the
solution. In uesciibing the solution anu the stiuctuie it implies, we often
allow ouiselves to say that it is "* '- we engageu in conscious thinking of
such anu such a kinu.
The point of all this is that even in oiuinaiy uiscouise, mental teims
such as "uesiiing" anu "thinking" piesuppose a moie continual neuial
activity unueilying the stochastic anu spoiauic natuie of conscious
expeiience. This obseivation was maue by Fieuu anu was ceitainly involveu
in his geneial conclusion that the majoi pait of mental life goes on without
awaieness. Now, if the oiuinaiy use of teims such as "uesiiing" anu
"thinking" imply neuial activity plus a piocess in which aspects anu poitions
of that activity aie iepiesenteu in conscious expeiience, it seems ieasonable
that /#%2#*%'2/* uesiiing anu thinking, which by uefinition uo not incluue
the element of conscious expeiience, woulu iefei to neuial activity.
0nce having iecognizeu that statements iefeiiing to unconscious
mental events can be vieweu as "as-if" statements that ultimately iefei to
neuial events, a numbei of questions immeuiately aiise. 0ne basic question
is whethei the conception of unconscious mental events ietains the
intentionality (both in Bientano's |196uj sense anu in the oiuinaiy sense of
the teim) we have in minu when we speak about 5(#+"3 events. Let me
comment heie that philosopheis aie not necessaiily entiiely in agieement
iegaiuing what is meant by intentionality oi the ciiteiia by which a system
is juugeu to be an intentional one. But foi oui puiposes, we can agiee that
intentionality iefeis to such conscious piopeities as having puiposes anu
goals, planning, anu thinking. Fieuu's appioach to this issue, which is
entiiely consistent with Rubinstein's, is that the essence of the mental is
somatic (neuial) piocesses. Bowevei, Fieuu (191Sb) saiu, these
unconscious mental piocesses "have abunuant points of contact with
conscious mental piocess..They can be tiansfoimeu into, oi ieplaceu by,
conscious mental piocesses, anu all the categoiies which we employ to
uesciibe conscious mental acts, such as iueas, puiposes, iesolutions anu so
on, can be applieu to them" (p. 168). Bence, Rubinstein (196S) concluues,
foi Fieuu, unconscious mental events aie neuiophysiological events which
aie classifieu as mental on the two assumptions
(a) that obseiveu phenomena iesembling the effects of such
phenomenal events as wishing, intenuing, fantasizing, etc.,
aie in fact the effects of these neuiophysiological events,
anu
(b) that the lattei aie in some ways tiansfeiable to the
paiticulai neuiophysiological events that aie coiielateu
with the phenomenal events, the effects of which theii
effects iesemble |p. 4Sj.
Bence, when we say "0nconsciously, Baiiy wants to uo X," although
stiictly speaking we aie iefeiiing to a neuial event, we geneially mean that
although Baiiy uoes not expeiience wanting to uo X anu will ueny wanting
to uo X, he behaves (heie behavioi is wiuely uefineu to incluue thoughts,
uieams, slips, anu symptoms) "* '- he wants to uo X. Such talk of
unconscious mental events is seiviceable anu not simply an abeiiation oi
anomaly of language, as some philosopheis have claimeu (e.g., Fielu,
Aveling, & Laiiu, 1922), because, as Fieuu noteu, these events have points of
contact with anu aie uesciibable in teims of conscious mental piocesses.
We iecognize that we can say little iegaiuing the neuial events
unueilying what we uesciibe in the language of unconscious mental events.
What we can uo, howevei, is uevelop mouels in a #(/+0"3 language that is
compatible with both conscious expeiience anu neuiophysiological
functioning. As we shall see, Rubinstein attempts to piesent just such a
mouel. The challenge foi any such mouel is to accomplish the necessaiy
uepeisonification of oiuinaiy psychoanalytic statements iequiieu by a
scientific ienueiing anu, at the same time, ietain the intentionality
containeu by the oiuinaiy statements. Foi example, in an incieasingly
scientific ienueiing, a statement such as "0nconsciously, Baiiy wants to uo
X" must be uepeisonifieu, but in a mannei that will not lose the
intentionality that the oiiginal statement contains anu that peimits the use
of "as-if" uesciiptions. Any uepeisonifieu scheme must ieflect, as Rubinstein
(198ua) puts it, "not the expeiience, but what we may iegaiu as the
phenomenological stiuctuie of wishing" (p. 4S8).
In a uifficult but piovocative papei, Rubinstein (1974) has piesenteu a
psychoanalytic theoietical mouel of mental functioning which, by viitue of
being theoietical, is uepeisonifieu, but which neveitheless is intenueu to be
consistent with the phenomenological stiuctuie of the activities of peisons.
It is also intenueu to be consistent with, oi at least not contiauict, what is
known about neuiophysiology. The mouel is piesenteu in teims of
classificatoiy piocesses anu in a neutial language that is neithei
neuiophysiological noi mentalistic.
0ne of Rubinstein's basic intentions is to constiuct a mouel in which the
kinus of phenomena that psychoanalysts aie inteiesteu in, such as
motivateu behavioi anu uieam symbolism, aie geneiateu anu eluciuateu by
the 8(*'9# -("+/0(* of the system. Think of tiying to builu a machine that is
so uesigneu that it can peiceive, iecognize, engage in goal-uiiecteu behavioi,
anu so on. Such a machine might yielu some insight conceining the foimal
chaiacteiistics necessaiy to uo such things as peiceive, iecognize, anu so on.
In this iegaiu, Rubinstein's mouel is in the geneial tiauition of aitificial
intelligence anu computei simulation. Let me biiefly uesciibe the outlines of
the mouel in oiuei to give some iuea of Rubinstein's attempt to link the
psychoanalytic conception of mental functioning to cuiient scientific
thinking.
The mouel is mainly of motivational piocesses anu the ielateu
piocesses involveu in motivateu activity, incluuing peiception, iecognition,
anu imageiy. Rubinstein's mouel of peiception is baseu on the now
commonly accepteu cential iuea that peiception is not a passive iegistiation
of exteinal objects, but an active piocessing of input. This active piocessing
is baseu on a hieiaichically oiganizeu analysis of featuies. Accoiuing to this
view (e.g., Neissei, 1967), a peicept is the iesult of an active synthesizing of
analyzeu featuies. Thus, the peicept 20"#9( is achieveu by synthesizing the
featuies of its size, coloi, textuie, smell, etc. Anu we iecognize an oiange by
classifying it in accoiu with these vaiious featuies. (It can be seen that in
this view peiception anu iecognition aie closely ielateu piocesses). Baseu
on the iuea of analyzeu featuies, Rubinstein intiouuces the concept 2- 27:(%+
%3"**'-'(0. A classifiei is maue up of */7%3"**'-'(0*, each subclassifiei
coiiesponuing to a uiffeient attiibute oi featuie of the object. Subclassifieis
aie geneial piopeities oi featuies such as "elongateu object," "two
syllables," "iounu," oi "begins with the lettei s." Bence, it can be seen that
most subclassifieis will be common to many uiffeient object classifieis. It
can also be seen that a peicept is "constiucteu" out of subclassifieis oi
featuies, much like the title of a book oi play is constiucteu in a game of
chaiaues.
It shoulu be appaient that the notion of a classifiei coiiesponus to the
psychoanalytic concept of 27:(%+ 0(60(*(#+"+'2#. 0bviously, a human object
classifiei will consist of many subclassifiei featuies, incluuing physical,
aesthetic, psychological, anu moial attiibutes. Looking at it this way, one can
imagine the possibility that of a total set of subclassifieis that noimally
combine in a single peicept oi image, paiticulai subsets can become
functionally oiganizeu, yieluing such iepiesentations as "goou mothei" anu
"bau mothei". As Rubinstein notes, just as theie aie object classifications,
theie aie also self-classifications, which piobably inteiact in vaiious ways
with self-stanuaius that we set.
Baving eluciuateu the concept of object classifiei, Rubinstein then tuins
to motivational piocesses anu intiouuces the concepts of 92"3;*'+/"+'2#
%3"**'-'(0 anu -/3-'335(#+;*'+/"+'2# %3"**'-'(0 (which aie combineu into 92"3;
-/3-'335(#+; 20 )<;*'+/"+'2# %3"**'-'(0*) anu 92"3;"%+ 8'*62*'+'2#. A uF-
situation classifiei can be activateu fiom within, which is analogous to the
activation of an object classifiei when we think about an object in its
absence; fiom without, as is the case with situations we iefei to as
temptations; oi spontaneously, as in the case of peiiouic fluctuations of
sexual uesiie. A uF-situation classifiei is activateu by an existing goal
situation much the way an object classifiei is activateu by the piesence of
the coiiesponuing object. In both cases, the input is subjecteu to featuie
analysis, which then paitly ueteimines whethei oi not the classifiei will be
activateu.
Rubinstein makes the assumption that once activateu, a uF-situation
classifiei iemains active at least until the motive is fulfilleu. What activates a
motive is a 5'*5"+%& between uF-situation classifiei anu a paiticulai
peiception of a situation. Noimally, a mismatch will iesult in instiumental
activity until " 5"+%& is achieveu (which will occui when, uuiing the
consummatoiy act, the situation is classifieu as a fulfillment situation).
Bowevei, a )<;*'+/"+'2# -"#+"*4 may be activateu, paiticulaily if
instiumental action is "juugeu" not to be feasible. We may note the
coiiesponuence between this kinu of fantasy anu mental imageiy (that is
not ielateu to a wish) of an object. In the case of mental imageiy, the
classifiei activates featuies in the -("+/0( *+20"9( (iathei than featuies of
peiceptual input); while in fantasy, the uF-situation classifiei activates
coiiesponuing stoieu uF-situation featuies.
It shoulu be noteu that in this mouel, although a goal-situation peicept
can match a goal-situation classifiei, it will #2+ match the goal-fulfillment
classifiei. The lattei is activateu by the activation of the 92"3;"%+ 8'*62*'+'2#
anu the ielease of the goal act. In oiuinaiy teims, this is tantamount to
saying that although one can expeiience a situation as an appiopiiate goal
foi one's motive, one will not expeiience fulfillment of that motive until the
goal act is peifoimeu (unless one posits something like hallucinatoiy wish
fulfillment). Such fulfillment is associateu with pleasuie anu with a
uisintegiation of the motive stiuctuie anu its ieveision to a meie
uisposition. Theie aie motives that uo not involve a consummatoiy act
(Rubinstein's example is a motive such as the uesiie to be unueistoou). In
such cases, "fulfillment" of the motive is ueteimineu entiiely by the goal-
situation classifiei.
I have given only the biiefest sketch of Rubinstein's mouel anu have
omitteu quite a numbei of uetails. We can obtain auuitional insights into the
mouel by seeing how it accounts foi ceitain phenomena of inteiest to
psychoanalysis. Consiuei uieam symbolism. The basic iuea is that goal-
situation (anu object) classifieis bieak up into subclassifieis, with one oi
moie opeiating inuepenuently to oiganize an image. Foi example, if a penis
classifiei is pait of an active goal-situation classifiei, the subclassifiei oi
featuie "elongateu object" may opeiate inuepenuently anu oiganize an
image of a snake oi baseball bat.
Bow uoes the mouel ueal with iepiession. Biiefly, ceitain active goal-
anu fulfillment-situation classifieis oi a paiticulai set of subclassifieis may
match a supeiego classifiei (that is, a classification of what must not be
uone, thought about, felt, etc.), which then pievents awaieness of the motive
as a motive anu also, theiefoie, of all the subsequent steps that noimally
accompany awaieness of a motive (such as instiumental action).
I want to ieminu the ieauei once again of Rubinstein's intention to
constiuct a mouel in which the uesign featuies of the system can yielu anu
account foi the kinu of motivational anu intentional phenomena that aie of
gieatest inteiest to psychoanalytic theoiy. Also to be stiesseu is that the
teims of the mouel aie in a #(/+0"3 language that is neithei mentalistic noi
physiological but hopefully compatible with both. Finally, it is of utmost
impoitance to Rubinstein that the mouel be not just veibal uesciiption, but
falsifiable anu uiscaiuable if it is not heuiistic oi is contiauicteu by the facts.
Retuining to the issue of uepeisonification of explanatoiy schemes anu
theoietical mouels, Rubinstein (1976b) tells us that in talking about
unconscious mental events we extenu oiuinaiy language applicable to
peisons oi, moie specifically, to "a sense-of-being-peison-uoing something"
(p. 24S). Theie is no haim in this, as long as we know that we aie speaking
in this "as-if," extenueu language. Stiictly speaking, howevei, the
unobseivable anu /#(=6(0'(#%(8 activities iefeiieu to by unconscious
mental events "aie pait of oui eveiyuay human woilu '# #"5( 2#34" (p.
2S4). In fact, they iefei to the uepeisonifieu natuial science woilu of
oiganisms. This fact tenus to aiouse in many ueep-seateu feais anu
suspicions towaiu a scientific enteipiise which, in the piocess of conceining
itself with human behavioi, uepeisonifies it. Bowevei, it is impoitant to
keep in minu that, as noteu eailiei, such uepeisonification neeu not anu
must not eliminate such chaiacteiistically human featuies as intentionality
(in the geneial sense of the teim). Theoietical mouels neeu to uesciibe anu
explain these featuies iathei than eliminate oi ignoie them.
6
Baving saiu
that, howevei, it is impoitant to note that theoietical mouels neeu not
themselves employ the peisonal language of wants, wishes, anu uesiies
.7
As
I have aigueu elsewheie (Eagle, 198u) although wants, wishes, anu uesiies
seive an explanatoiy function in oiuinaiy uiscouise, they aie themselves
phenomena to be explaineu in a scientific conception of humankinu. 0ne
woulu haiuly expect a scientific explanation to limit itself to the concepts
that uesciibe the veiy phenomena it aims to explain. This is something of
what Rubinstein has in minu when he infoims us in a highly conuenseu
fashion that the scientific ienueiing of "0nconsciouly, Baiiy wants to uo X"
will necessaiily involve the uepeisonification of that statement. Peihaps the
most conuenseu uesciiption of why this is so is Rubinstein's (1977)
ieminuei that "fiom a ciitical point of view it is illusoiy to iegaiu a peison
as the subject-in the sense of being the agent-of an unconscious activity" (p.
1S).
8

Implicit in Rubinstein's insistence that the existential iefeients foi
unconscious mental piocesses aie neuial events anu implicit in Fieuu's
belief that the essence of the mental is somatic piocesses is the seemingly
stiange iuea that neuial events themselves (oi iathei systems of neuial
events) possess at least some of the featuies we noimally attiibute to anu
by which we chaiacteiize conscious mental piocesses. I am not at all ceitain
that one can justifiably speak of, let us say, the intelligence of neuial events,
except peihaps in a metaphoiical sense. But, at least in a ceitain sense, they
aie intelligent-peihaps in the same sense that computeis aie intelligent. It
has been customaiy to think of all physical piocesses as inheiently "blinu,"
that is, without intelligence oi intentionality, anu to locate these lattei
qualities in the minu anuoi the peison. Bowevei, theie aie ceitain
peiceptual anu cognitive phenomena that imply often elegantly intelligent
piocesses which aie not anu often cannot be iepiesenteu in conscious
expeiience. I will pioviue some examples.
Consiuei as the fiist example the uichotic listening situation in which
subjects aie piesenteu with messages simultaneously on two uiffeient
channels anu aie instiucteu to attenu to anu ieau alouu a message on one of
these channels. Typically, they can iepoit only gioss physical featuies (foi
example, a male voice) fiom the unattenueu channel anu cannot iepoit the
content. Bowevei, Lacknei anu uaiiett (197S) have shown that messages in
the unattenueu channel influence the paiticulai inteipietation given to
ambiguous sentences piesenteu in the attenueu anu shauoweu channel,
even though subjects %2/38 #2+ 0(620+ what they heaiu in the foimei. As
Bennett (1978) notes, "the influence of the unattenueu channel on the
inteipietation of the attenueu signal can be explaineu only on the
hypothesis that the unattenueu input is piocesseu all the way to a semantic
level, even though the subjects have no awaieness of thisthat is, cannot
iepoit it." (p. 211).
As anothei example, consiuei an expeiiment by Lazaius anu NcCleaiy
(19S1) in which subjects aie piesenteu a seiies of woius exposeu
tachistoscopically foi a biief uuiation anu aie askeu to iepoit what they see.
When the stimulus woiu is "iapeu," many subjects iepoit seeing "iapiu."
Theii galvanic skin iesponse (uSR) measuiements, howevei, aie of a
magnituue associateu with emotionally lauen woius such as "iapeu" iathei
than neutial woius such as "iapiu." As in the fiist example, some aspects of
the subject's iesponse inuicate that the stimulus has been piocesseu
accuiately, even though the subject is not awaie of it anu uoes not iepoit
piocessing the stimulus.
The next two examples aie somewhat uiffeient fiom the fiist two. They
focus on phenomena that ieflect the pioblem-solving natuie of peiceptual
piocesses which aie not anu cannot be iepiesenteu in conscious expeiience.
The fiist example is the well-known Ames ioom, in which the ceiling anu
flooi aie slopeu in a mannei unobseivable to the viewei. A chilu stanuing in
the coinei of the ioom wheie ceiling anu flooi conveige will look maikeuly
tallei than an auult stanuing in a comei wheie ceiling anu flooi uiveige. This
illusion is iiiesistible anu peisists even if the onlookei is tolu how the ioom
is constiucteu. What is peiceiveu seems baseu on a tacit infeience that
someone whose heau is veiy close to the ceiling is obviously tallei than
someone whose heau is not so close. Noimally, ceilings anu floois aie
paiallel to each othei, anu this tacit infeience oi "iule" will be highly
accuiate anu seiviceable. In the context of the Ames box, that what is
immeuiately peiceiveu anu expeiienceu follows that tacit "iule" iathei than
what is consciously known. In fact, the immeuiate expeiience is, as noteu,
iiiesistible anu not changeu by one's conscious knowleuge.
The seconu example in this aiea has to uo with stioboscopic movement.
If, let us say, the image of a tiiangle flashes at point A anu then, aftei an
appiopiiate inteival, at point B, one will expeiience the tiiangle moving
fiom A to B. As Rock (197u) notes, this peiceptual expeiience is baseu on
the tacit infeience "that if an object is now heie in this fielu anu, a moment
latei, it is not theie but elsewheie, then it must have moveu" (p. 9). Inueeu,
Rock iepoits that the expeiience of movement can be eliminateu "if,
simultaneous with the flashing on of B, A ieappeais in its oiiginal location as
well; in othei woius, if you flash A then A-B, then B then A-B anu so foith, A
neeu not be 'ueuuceu' to have moveu to B if it is still wheie it was a moment
ago" (p. 9). The expeiience of movement can also be uestioyeu if " anu 7
appeai as two objects being successively uncoveieu anu coveieu. As Rock
notes, the expeiience follows the "impeccable logic" that "if the fiist object is
coveieu ovei, it has not moveu to location but iemaineu wheie it is" (p. 9).
Eviuence such as this leaus Rock to concluue that "peiception tuins out to
be shot thiough with intelligence" (p. 1u) anu to suppoit Belmholtz's (1962)
iule that ".objects aie always imagineu as being piesent in the fielu of
vision as woulu have to be theie in oiuei to piouuce the same impiession
on the neivous mechanism." (p. S).
Finally, consiuei the seemingly simple phenomenon of expeiiencing
veitigo aftei getting on an escalatoi that is not moving. 0ne infeis that the
peison expeiiencing such veitigo hau unconsciously "expecteu" the metal
staiis to move. That such unconscious expectations aie uiffeient fiom
oiuinaiy, conscious expectations is eviuenceu by the fact that knowing
befoiehanu that the metal staiis aie not anu will not be moving uoes not
eliminate the veitigo. As Polanyi anu Piosch (197S) note with iegaiu to
"tacit infeiences" in geneial, such phenomena seem to be ielatively immune
to auveise eviuence. To say that one unconsciously expecteu the metal
staiis to move is, to Rubinstein's way of thinking, an "as-if" use of
"expectation," which uoes no haim anu is ceitainly useful insofai as it is
stiuctuially analogous with both conscious expeiience anu the neuial
events foi which it is an appioximate uesciiption. Bowevei, as Rubinstein
wains us, to give (='*+(#+'"3 implications to unconscious expectations is
eiioneous. In a ceitain sense, theie is no such thing as an unconscious
expectation. It pioviues only a veiy appioximately anu vague linguistic
winuow on ceitain neuial events that inteivene between getting on the
stationaiy metal staiis anu expeiiencing veitigo.
The ontological status of the piocesses involveu in the phenomena
uesciibeu in these examples is uifficult to pinpoint. At least since Belmholtz
auvanceu his concept of "unconscious infeience," theie has been uebate
iegaiuing the status of such piocesses. Belmholtz iecognizeu that these
piocesses have a cognitive, infeiencelike piopeity anu yet aie immeuiate
anu automatic anu aie not iepiesenteu in conscious expeiience. The teim
"unconscious infeience" was intenueu to captuie both aspects of the
piocess. Belmholtz's concept fell into uisiepute, mainly as a iesult of the
ciiticism that, by uefinition, infeiences coulu not be unconscious anu,
theiefoie, the notion of an /#%2#*%'2/* infeience was an absuiuity.
Bowevei, the phenomena in oui examples, attesting as they uo to the
infeiencelike piocesses involveu in peiception, have leu to a ievival of the
concept of unconscious infeience.
It is instiuctive in this iegaiu to consiuei the situation in so-calleu
cognitive science. In that aiea, uesciiptions aie given of infeiieu anu
hypothetical cognitive piocesses that aie neithei iepiesenteu in conscious
expeiience noi tieu to specific biain events. Rathei, the emphasis is on the
*+0/%+/0( of these cognitive piocesses. Similaily, one can say of the
piocesses iepiesenteu by Belmholtz's "unconscious infeience" that they aie
not in conscious expeiience, noi can one specify the neuial events to which
they iefei. What the concept uoes, howevei, is to infoim us that leauing up
to some peiceptual expeiiences aie ceitain infeiencelike piocessesthat is,
they function "* '- they weie making a conscious, logical infeience of an if-
then kinu. Bence, Belmholtz's concept essentially ieveals the (infeiieu)
*+0/%+/0( of ceitain piocesses that, at this point, cannot be fuithei specifieu.
0ne can inteipiet them as ontologically neutial. Similaily, Chomsky's
(196S) concept of "ueep stiuctuies" is also a stiuctuial uesciiption that is
neithei iepiesenteu in conscious expeiience noi tieu to specific neuial
events. It is meant to ieveal some impoitant things about the stiuctuie of
the minu; howevei, it is embouieu. It seems to me that in Rubinstein's way
of looking at the concept of unconscious activity, an inteipietation cast in
the language of unconscious wishes oi wants is a stiuctuial uesciiption that,
uespite theii uiffeiences,
9
functions much like Belmholtz's "unconscious
infeience" anu Chomsky's "ueep stiuctuies."
It says something like: "Youi behavioi anu associations aie patteineu "*
'- you wish oi want such anu such," much like a statement of unconscious
expectations says that one's veitigo is "* '- one expecteu the escalatoi to
move. Casting statements about unconscious activity in the oiuinaiy
language of "naiiatives" about wishes anu wants has the uual auvantage of
not only being potentially theiapeutic, but also peimitting one the fieeuom
to uesciibe patteins of behavioi with as few constiaints as possible. But
Rubinstein's conceptualization of unconscious activity makes cleai that
these "naiiatives" ultimately have to answei to what is actually the case.
That is, they must be consistent with what we know about the stiuctuie of
neuial piocesses. This single consiueiation seems to me to be a sufficient
ieason that a psychoanalytic theoiy that makes use of the concept of
unconscious activity cannot be entiiely constiueu as a heimeneutic
uiscipline. As Rubinstein (1974) obseives, ".no mattei how apt an
inteipietation of a symbol in teims of its meaning, if the piocesses by which
symbol foimation is explaineu aie impiobable, we have no alteinative but to
uiscaiu the inteipietation" (p. 1uS).
Keeping Rubinstein's claiifying comments iegaiuing unconscious
activities in minu, it woulu seem that the peiceptual expeiiences in oui
examples aie "* '- we weie engaging in logical infeiences. But such
infeiences oi, moie accuiately, infeiencelike piocesses, cannot be asciibeu
to a peison insofai as the peison is not awaie of such activities. Bence, it
seems to me that such intelligent, infeiencelike piocesses must be asciibeu
to neuial events anu biain piocesses.
1u
To state it geneially, intelligence
iesiues in subpeisonal neuial piocesses. I uo not pietenu to be able to
explicate this notion much fuithei, except to say that such neuial piocesses
must have been selecteu out in the couise of evolution anu to point to the
woik of otheis who have attempteu to uevelop fuithei this iuea of
subpeisonal intelligence anu intentionality (e.g., Bennett, 1969, 1978).
11

It seems to me that the notion of subpeisonal intelligence anu
intentionality is also implicit in some of Fieuu's basic foimulations. This is
seen in a numbei of ways. The veiy basic scheme of paititioning the
peisonality into iu, ego, anu supeiego can be seen as implying subpeisonal
intelligence anu intentionality. Stiictly speaking, insofai as iu, ego, anu
supeiego aie unconscious piocesses, they aie, ontologically, biain piocesses
asciibable to an oiganism. Bowevei, as we have seen eailiei, Fieuu (191Sb)
tells us that unconscious mental piocesses "have abunuant points of contact
with conscious mental piocesses" anu can be uesciibeu by the categoiies
applicable to conscious piocesses. Bence, iu, ego, anu supeiego aie not
simply metaphois of what peisons uo, as is claimeu, foi example, by Schafei
(1976) in his "action language," but aie both (1) labels foi paiticulai
constellations of neuial events anu biain piocesses anu, (2) names foi
classes of wishes anu uispositions to behave in ceitain ways anu to have
expeiiences of ceitain kinus. In othei woius, as with Rubinstein's
classification mouel uiscusseu eailiei, one can think of iu, ego, anu supeiego
as a #(/+0"3 language uesciiption that will iueally captuie something of the
stiuctuie of both neuiophysiological functioning on the one hanu anu
behavioi anu conscious expeiience on the othei.
If unconscious piocesses aie, ontologically speaking, neuial in natuie
anu if, as Fieuu maintaineu, such piocesses constitute the basic psychic
ieality, then the seemingly peculiai conclusion one is leu to is that psychic
ieality is neuial! (See Nagel, 1974, foi a fuithei elaboiation of this
aigument.) This conclusion is not as peculiai as it may seem. Foi what else
can unconscious activities be but neuial events. But they aie at the same
time 5(#+"3, insofai as they aie chaiacteiizeu by intelligence anu
intentionality. Foi Fieuu, it shoulu be noteu, what uefineu "mental" was not
phenomenal expeiience but what I am iefeiiing to heie as intelligence anu
intentionality. Foi Fieuu, conscious expeiience was not the essence of the
mental but only a suiface anu spoiauic iepiesentation of an ongoing
unueilying activity. Bence, when Fieuu wiites that the ultimate anu
unueilying psychic ieality is unconscious, he is essentially saying that the
unueilying psychic ieality is neuial. Although Fieuu abanuoneu his attempt
to implement in uetail this point of view (in the >02:(%+ -20 " ?%'(#+'-'%
>*4%&23294, 189S), this geneial conception of psychic ieality was nevei
abanuoneu.
A ciitical question iaiseu by the psychoanalytic conception of
unconscious activity is how an unconscious want oi iuea becomes
tiansfoimeu into a conscious want oi iuea. If, as Rubinstein maintains, an
unconscious want iefeis essentially a kinu of neuial activity, how uoes it
evei get iepiesenteu in conscious expeiience. This question has always
been cential to psychoanalysis. Bow uoes the unconscious become
conscious, anu how uoes it get to be iepiesenteu in peisonal expeiience. I
uo not pietenu to have even the beginnings of an answei to this question.
But implicit in psychoanalytic theoiy anu in some cuiient conceptions is the
iuea that much of oui behavioi is guiueu by subpeisonal intelligent anu
intentional piocesses anu that only the piouucts of some of these piocesses
aie iepiesenteu, with vaiying uegiees of uistoition, in conscious expeiience.
Conscious expeiience can be conceptualizeu as a selective anu
constiuctional ienueiing of piouucts of unueilying subpeisonal piocesses.
If, as Bennett (1978) suggests, theie is a subpeisonal system that piocesses
"innei events," it is the piouucts of such piocessing that aie selectively
iepiesenteu in consciousness (just as it is the piouucts of visual piocessing
that aie selectively iepiesenteu in peiceptual visual expeiience). Suiely this
is implieu by Fieuu's belief that the majoi pait of mental life goes on outsiue
awaieness.
The oppoitunities foi uefense anu uissimulation aiise in the
iepiesentation anu ienueiing of these subpeisonal piouucts. In stiictly
psychoanalytic language, this woulu be stateu laigely in teims of the uegiee
to which conscious expeiience anu the ego accuiately iepiesent
unconscious instinctual aims.
12
If unconscious aims aie only metaphoiical
uesciiptions of neuial activity, the issue becomes the uegiee to which
conscious expeiience anu the ego accuiately iepiesent the subpeisonal
neuial activity we aie ieally iefeiiing to when we talk about unconscious
aims.
Anothei issue that has been cential to psychoanalysis is the uegiee to
which subpeisonal aims aie '#+(90"+(8 into those stiuctuies we think of as
consciousness anu selfhoou. 0bviously, that which is not iepiesenteu in
these stiuctuies cannot be integiateu into them. But it is possible foi ceitain
subpeisonal aims to be iepiesenteu in but not integiateu into
consciousness, as in the case of an ego-alien obsessive thought. Inueeu, what
we mean by a paitial failuie of iepiession is that the aim linkeu to the
obsessive thought is iathei cleaily iepiesenteu in consciousness, but in an
unintegiateu, ego-alien statein contiast to a moie complex iepiession in
which the aim is only veiy inuiiectly iepiesenteu oi haiuly iepiesenteu at
all.
In any case, the point heie is that in psychoanalytic theoiy, a cential
aspect of peisonality integiity conceins not only iepiesentation but the
successful integiation of subpeisonal tenuencies anu aims into a
supeioiuinate, highei-oiuei stiuctuie iuentifieu as one's (laigely conscious)
self. This cential iuea is conveyeu by the uictum "wheie iu was, theie shall
ego be," which can also be tianslateu as "wheie the impeisonal 'it' was,
theie shall the peisonal 'I' be." Although the impeisonal "it" has been
equateu with instinctual aims, it can also be inteipieteu as iefeiiing to all
those unconscious subpeisonal tenuencies that aie not but can become pait
of the "I," the peisonal self. If, howevei, the impeisonal "it" is essentially
neuial activity (anu it is uifficult to see what else it can be), then Fieuu's
uictum is tantamount to the asseition that one can claim oi ieclaim, so to
speak, bits of neuiology anu tiansfoim them into psychology. 0i, to put it
somewhat uiffeiently, the self assimilates bits of the impeisonal anu
tiansfoims as well as integiates them into the peisonal, theieby expanuing
the iealm anu uomain of the lattei.
No wonuei the minu-bouy issue is at the centei of both Rubinstein's
wiitings anu of psychoanalytic theoiy! It may seem less stiange to speak of
tiansfoiming anu integiating bits of neuiology into psychology if one takes
the peispective that eveiy bit of conscious expeiience iepiesents such a
tiansfoimation. Accoiuing to the logic of Fieuu's conception of psychic
activity, eveiy bit of conscious expeiience entails making the unconscious
conscious. What is uistinctive about the piocess when it is uiscusseu in the
theiapeutic context is that active foices (i.e., iepiession) have both ienueieu
ceitain contents unconscious (hence, the concept of the uynamic
unconscious) anu inteifeieu with the smooth tiansfoimation of unconscious
(neuial) activity into conscious expeiience.
The pictuie of psychoanalysis that emeiges fiom Rubinstein's (as well
as Fieuu's) conception of unconscious mental events is iauically uiffeient
fiom the cuiient conception of psychoanalysis as heimeneutics anu fiom
the cuiient emphasis on "stoiies," "naiiatives," anu ielateu constiuctions.
As I have alieauy noteu, foi Rubinstein these "stoiies" anu "naiiatives"
ultimately uepenu foi theii valiuity on confiiming thiough nonclinical
means geneial hypotheses iegaiuing oui basic stiuctuie. Now, fiom the
point of view of unconscious activity as neuial events, to asciibe to the
inuiviuual unconscious wishes, wants, anu so foith is, in an appioximate anu
metaphoiic way, to uesciibe the stiuctuie of that peison's minu, with minu
iuentifieu as an intentional but neveitheless neuial system. Bence, it is not
meiely a mattei of a "stoiy" oi "naiiative" that makes sense, but of an
account that cannot contiauict what we uo know about the stiuctuie of
minu in geneial. In othei woius, implicit in Rubinstein's view is the iuea that
psychoanalytic inteipietations iegaiuing unconscious mental events,
although cast in the oiuinaiy language of uesiies, wants, anu actions, aie, in
some cases, gioping uesciiptions of biain piocesses anu hence, not only
must not contiauict what we know about biain piocesses, but must actually
ieflect something about the stiuctuie of the lattei.
The final issues I want to ueal with in this uiscussion of Rubinstein's
woik emeige fiom contiasting his foimulation with Schafei's (1976) "action
language." By iefeiiing to all mental events, incluuing unconscious activity,
as action, Schafei makes it cleai that in his view all the phenomena with
which psychoanalysis ueals aie to be asciibeu to the peison. 0nconscious
motives aie to be seen as uisclaimeu actions. 0ne consequence of asciibing
unconscious activity to the peison (iathei than asciibing such activity to the
oiganism) is Schafei's conclusion that we aie all iesponsible foi such
activity. (Thus, Schafei's cites with appioval Fieuu's |192Sj comment that
we aie iesponsible foi oui uieams). Schafei's conclusion uoes, inueeu,
logically follow fiom his piemise. Foi, if unconscious activities aie things we
82 to accomplish paiticulai enus, then they fit the mouel of action anu the
piactical syllogism that uesciibes action; anu, if these activities aie actions,
we aie iesponsible foi them. But Rubinstein's analysis of unconscious
activities sensitizes us to such questions as how an activity, the goal oi aim
of which we aie not consciously awaie, can be an action. Be points out that
ceitain motives, paiticulaily unconscious motives, function moie as causes
piopelling activity than as ieasons foi action. Schafei uoes not ueal with
these issues, but iathei attempts to iesolve the conceptual uifficulties
inheient in the notion of unconscious activity meiely thiough the veibal
uevice of labeling such activity "action." As foi oui iesponsibility foi
unconsciously motivateu behavioi, Rubinstein's analysis suggests that this
whole issue iepiesents confusion between uiffeient univeises of uiscouise.
That is to say, the whole question of iesponsibility applies to the eveiyuay
woilu of peisons anu actions (anu the social-legal-ethical contexts it
geneiates), wheieas talk about unconscious wants anu uesiies, insofai as it
is a metaphoiic uesciiption of neuial activity, belongs to the woilu of
oiganisms.
Theie is a goou ueal of Rubinstein's woik that has not been coveieu
heie, anu what has been uiscusseu has not hau the iigoi anu uetails that
chaiacteiizes Rubinstein's own woik. That, of couise, is inevitable in a
chaptei of this kinu, but I believe that what I have uiscusseu iepiesents
some of the moie impoitant anu cential themes of Rubinstein's woik.
In summaiizing some of the main ielateu themes in Rubinstein's
wiitings, fiist anu foiemost is Rubinstein's awaieness of the uual
peispective one can auopt towaiu human existencethat is, we aie both
peisons in an eveiyuay human woilu anu oiganisms in a natuial science
woilu. This awaienesswhich, I believe, is also cential to psychoanalytic
theoiypeimeates much of Rubinstein's woik. It peimits him, foi example,
to unueistanu the complementaiity of meanings anu causes iathei than
pitting one against the othei.
A seconu theme is Rubinstein's ielentless quest to unueistanu the
0(3"+'2#*&'6 between the woilu of peisons anu the woilu of oiganisms anu
to avoiu confusion between the two woilus anu contexts. This quest is
ieflecteu in his analysis anu claiification of psychoanalytic concepts such as
unconscious mental events anu in his wiiting on the minu-bouy pioblem. It
is also ieflecteu in Rubinstein's attempt to uevelop a "neutial language"
mouel of mental functioning that will be faithful to the woilus of both
peisons anu oiganisms.
A thiiu theme in Rubinstein's woik is his eluciuation of the logic anu
natuie of clinical infeience in psychoanalysis. Noie than any othei
psychoanalytic theoiist, Rubinstein attempts to explicate cleaily anu, as I
uesciibeu it eailiei, "uoggeuly" the natuie of the eviuence anu infeience
iules that legitimate clinical infeiences. Bis uesciiption of how paiticulai
clinical hypotheses aie confiimeu iepiesents one of the few systematic
attempts in this aiea. Also, his uemonstiation of the logical uepenuence of
paiticulai clinical foimulations on geneial clinical hypotheses anu the
uepenuence of the lattei on extiaclinical souices of eviuence iepiesents the
most effective aigument against an oveily naiiow conception of
psychoanalysis.
As impoitant as such specific themes anu contents, howevei, is the
unielenting intellectual honesty, claiity, anu iigoi of Rubinstein's thinking. I
hope I have given the ieauei some iuea of these qualities.
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$()*+

1. Within philosophy, ceitain foimulations conceining the natuie of human action
anu its claimeu lack of susceptibility to causal explanation also seem to me
to be contempoiaiy expiessions of this piogiam (see foi example, the woik
of Abelson, 1977; Louch, 1966; Tayloi, 1964). 0ne also sees in Schafei's

(1976) woik-in the veiy notion of "action language"-the influence of these
philosopheis of action on a conception of psychoanalysis.
2 The letteis of Rubinstein's passage have been changeu to confoim to my example.
S It seems to me that the iecent clustei of foimulations incluuing the heimeneutic
vision of psychoanalysis, the autonomy of the clinical theoiy, anu the
exclusive emphasis on the psychoanalytic situation ieveals an unueilying
attituue that implicitly pioclaims the autonomy of the mental anu that
uenies oui embouieu, mateiial natuie. This attituue, in pait piopelleu by a
ieaction against the puipoiteu uehumanizing influence of the scientific
Weltanschauung, chaiacteiizes many iecent intellectual uevelopments,
paiticulaily in the social sciences. Iionically, although the failuie to incluue
anu uo justice to such essential psychological consiueiations as subjective
expeiience anu intentionality in an explanatoiy system may be
uehumanizing, it is equally uehumanizing, though peihaps in a less obvious
way, to fail to incluue anu uo justice to oui embouieu status. We ceitainly
iecognize in oui clinical thinking that the isolation anu sepaiation of minu
fiom bouy is alienating anu uehumanizing. Foi example, Winnicottt (19S4)
points to the iole of excessive mentation anu the sepaiation of minu fiom
what he iefeis to as the psycho-soma in schizoiu conuitions.
4 I am not suggesting, as uo some uefenueis of Fieuuian instinct theoiy, that all
uiveigences fiom anu ciiticisms of that theoiy aie baseu on a iejection of
the biologicalof oui embouiment. Inueeu, some of these ciiticisms entail
an expansion of the instinctual. Foi example, Bow toy's (1969) iejection of
what he calls Fieuu's "seconuaiy uiive" theoiy of the infant-mothei
ielationship is baseu on the positing of an inuepenuent instinctual
attachment system. Anu Faiibaim's (19S2) uictum that "libiuo" is object

seeking" can be constiueu as positing an inboin iesponse to objects. (See
Eagle, 1981, foi a fuithei uiscussion of these iueas.)
S A uisposition to behave (oi think oi feel) in a paiticulai set of ways can be taken
as the manifestation of a neuial stiuctuie.
6 As Sellais (196S) puts it, ".to complete the scientific image we neeu to eniich it
not with moie ways of saying what is the case, but with the language of
community anu inuiviuual intentions, so that by constiuing the actions we
intenu to uo anu ciicumstances in which we intenu to uo them in scientific
teims, we uiiectly ielate the woilu as conceiveu by scientific inquiiy to oui
puiposes anu make it oui woilu anu no longei an alien appenuage to the
woilu in which we uo oui living" (p. 4u).
7 Inueeu, even if such teims aie useu in a theoietical mouel, they will have
meanings uiffeient fiom the ones they oiuinaiily have, as Rubinstein has
shown is the case with unconscious wants, wishes, anu uesiies. It is also
possible, as Chomsky (196S) notes, that in giving a physical, uepeisonifieu
explanation foi such mental phenomena as wants, wishes, anu uesiies "the
veiy concept of "physical explanation' will no uoubt be extenueu to
incoipoiate whatevei is uiscoveieu in this |mentalj uomain, exactly as it
was extenueu to accommouate giavitational anu electiomagnetic foice,
massless paiticles, anu numeious othei entities anu piocesses that woulu
have offenueu the common sense of eailiei geneiations" (pp. 8S-84).
8 That one is not the agent of an unconscious activity oi, moie accuiately, some
vaiiation of this insight, is unuoubteuly one of the impoitant consiueiations
that lies behinu Fieuu's uivision of the peisonality into iu anu ego. If one
goes back to the oiiginal ueiman teims this becomes cleaiei (see
Bettelheim, 1982; Bianut, 1966). Thus, Bas Es oi "the it" (iathei than the

iu) obviously iepiesents those aspects of the peisonality that aie not
expeiienceu as agent but iathei as impeisonal happenings; Bas Ich oi "the
I" (iathei than the ego) cleaily is meant to incluue those aspects of the
peisonality that one expeiiences as peisonal agent. Although the concept of
ego came to incluue moie than this-unconscious uefensive activities, foi
examplethe fact iemains that in Fieuu's tiipaitite uivision of the
peisonality, that which is expeiienceu as peisonal agent belongs to the ego.
Fieuu's equation of iu with instinct anu his uifficulty in ueciuing whethei it
was to be uefineu psychologically, biologically, oi somewheie between the
two (see Fieuu, 191Sb, pp. 111-116) ieflects the fact that Fieuu's iu-ego
uivision is, in pait, bouy-minu uistinction (see Eagle, 1984). As is the case
with the concept of unconscious activity, in the concept of iu, one is not the
subjectin the sense of being the agentof iu stiivings. Anu yet, also as in
the case of unconscious activity, iu stiivings aie neveitheless intentional
anu puiposive. Because they aie intentional, we want to attiibute them to
an agent. As Flew (1949) points out, in oui habitual style of thinking we aie
accustomeu to iuentify intentional anu puiposive with conscious anu
voluntaiy, not with unconscious, impeisonal, anu peiemptoiily
involuntaiy. We aie useu to thinking of intentional activity as uoings
caiiieu out by peisonal agents. Bowevei, as Bennett (1978) notes,
subpeisonal systems can be intentional systems. It seems to me that this
point is implieu in Fieuu's attiibution of motivational aims to subpeisonal
stiuctuial components of the peisonality.
9 An essential uiffeience is that wheieas unconscious wishes oi wants can become
conscious, Belmholtz's "unconscious infeience" anu Chomsky's "ueep
stiuctuies" cannot, almost by uefinition.
1u It shoulu be cleai that not all the implications I uiaw fiom Rubinstein's
foimulations woulu necessaiily be shaieu by Rubinstein himself.
11 In the examples of peiceptual phenomena, a subpeisonal system such as the
visual system has what Bennett (1978), boiiowing fiom computei
language, calls "computational access" to ceitain stimuli. What the peison
has access to, continuing with computei language, is some of the
computational piouucts of the visual system's piocessing. The lattei aie
iepiesenteu in conscious expeiience, wheieas neithei the stimuli to which
the visual system has "computational access" noi the visual system's
piocessing aie so iepiesenteu. 0ne may also speculate, as Bennett uoes,
that just as the visual system has access to ceitain stimuli, theie is veiy
likely an "affect" system within the peison that has access to ceitain "innei"
events (foi example, hoimonal secietion anu hypothalamic stimulation).
Continuing with the analogy, just as the piouucts of the piocessing by the
visual system aie consciously expeiienceu peicepts, so the piouucts of the
hypothetical "affect" system aie expeiienceu as wants anu uesiies. Finally,
just as the inuiviuual "constiucts" peicepts when the piouuct of visual
piocessing is uncleai, so one "constiucts" ieasons, uesiies, motives when
the piouuct of the "affects" system piocessing is uncleai.
It shoulu be noteu that although I mention subpeisonal intelligence anu
intentionality, the pioblems piesenteu by each aie not necessaiily
equivalent. Thus, the essence of ceitain machines is that they aie
intelligent, as the veiy teim "aitificial intelligence" inuicates.
12 It is inteiesting anu consistent with what I have been pioposing that ueuo
(1979) states as an impoitant goal of psychoanalytic tieatment the iaising
of biological aims anu neeus to the level of conscious awaieness.
!
#$%&'#( )#*#+,+#'&-. */# 0&,1+$%*01& +#21('*01&
S1AnLL? 8. ALCM8C, M.u.
When Emanuel Peteifieunu's !"#$%&'()$"* ,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.).
appeaieu in 1971, it poseu a new anu unusual challenge to tiauitional
psychoanalytic beliefs. Peteifieunu's woik was not simply a uevelopment of
iueas that weie alieauy competing within the iueological aiena maikeu out
by Fieuu's uiscoveiy of unconscious mental activity. Noie significantly, it
piesenteu a new fiamewoik of iueas within which the unique achievements
of tiauitional psychoanalysis coulu be integiateu with the piofounu
conceptual changes cuiiently taking place thioughout the natuial anu
biological sciences.
The effects of these changes aie still only beginning to be felt, but they
have alieauy piouuceu a pictuie of the univeise quite uiffeient fiom that of
Fieuu's time, a pictuie in which infoimation has ieplaceu eneigy as the
cential unifying concept. Ny piimaiy objective in this essay will be to tiace
the significance of this changing woilu pictuie foi psychoanalysis.
!"#$%&'()$"* ,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.). has a cential iole in this inquiiy. It
iaiseu many of the basic questions that must be answeieu if psychoanalysis
is to maintain its position at the foiefiont of scientific thought.
Rubinstein (197S, 198u), whose investigations of psychoanalysis as a
ievolutionaiy episoue in the histoiy of science have cast a biight light on the
conceptual pioblems inheiiteu by psychoanalytic theoiy fiom the
piepsychoanalytic past (197S,198u), says in his pieface to !"#$%&'()$"*
,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.).: "We aie heie on an auventuious jouiney, into
what, fiom the viewpoint of most analysts, must appeai as stiange anu
exotic teiiitoiy. But it is a jouiney that must be unueitaken. The alteinative
is a stanustill, as a consequence of which cuiient metapsychology will most
likely become incieasingly alienateu fiom science geneially anu hence
scientifically iiielevant" (p. 6). Anu, in a iecent symposium on the
significance of Peteifieunu's woik, Bowlby (1981) notes:
The mateiial of psychoanalysis, it is sometimes contenueu, is not a
kinu that can be uealt with by means of conventional scientific
pioceuuies: it neeus special pioceuuies of its own. An alteinative
ieaction is to seaich the cuiient scientific scene to uiscovei
whethei any of the moie iecent concepts anu theoiies that have
been uevelopeu can be hainesseu to pioviue a mouel foi
psychoanalysis bettei fitteu to its subject mattei. This is what
Emanuel Peteifieunu has uone. (p. 187)
Reppen (1981), in his intiouuction to the same symposium, iemaiks: "It
is cuiious that Peteifieunu in his upuating of Fieuu ueliveis anothei
naicissistic blow to man's olu view of himself as cential in the univeise. To
Fieuu's eailiei obseivation that man is not mastei in his own house must
now be auueu the notion that man may be meiely an automaton-one must
hasten to auu, peihaps to soften the injuiy, an incieuibly complicateu one"
(p. 1S9). Reppen seems to be suggesting that this naicissistic injuiy was
iesponsible in laige pait foi the "consiueiable neglect" fiom which
Peteifieunu's woik has suffeieu. This neglect has taken place, as Reppen
notes, uespite Peteifieunu's tiaining anu oiigins in the mainstieam of
psychoanalysis. Peteifieunu, who attenueu the City College of New Yoik anu
the 0niveisity of Chicago Neuical School, tiaineu at the New Yoik
Psychoanalytic Institute. Be is an associate clinical piofessoi of psychiatiy at
Nount Sinai Neuical School as well as a membei of the Ameiican
Psychoanalytic Association.
The iesistance to Peteifieunu's ievolutionaiy contiibution to
psychoanalytic theoiy illustiates the uifficulties encounteieu by a scientific
community when its investment in the past becomes an obstacle to fuithei
auvancement. !"#$%&'()$"* ,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.). goes uiiectly to the
heait of the pioblem in the oluei theoiy. It pioviues a point of view, fiist of
all, fiom which the conceptual inconsistencies of tiauitional metapsychology
can be cleaily inspecteu. It makes the cumbeisome impiovisations iequiieu
to ciicumvent these inconsistencies visible foi what they aie.
As in the psychoanalytic piocess itself, the uiagnosis is the beginning of
the cuie. A uiffeient kinu of theoiy was neeueu, a theoiy at once simplei in
its essentials anu moie auvanceu in its poweis of implication, the kinu of
theoiy Copeinicus offeieu to the tiauition-miieu astionomeis. While many
analysts weie wonueiing whethei the uespeiate iemeuy to the pioblem of
theoietical obsolescence was to cut the iemaining ties between
psychoanalysis anu the iest of the science, Peteifieunu was showing that
bettei science was the only ieal choice.
!"#$%"$ '%( )!*"+,'%'-*!#!
Fieuu was fascinateu by the emotional shock effects piouuceu by
suuuen, iauical changes in the scientific woilu view. Be saw the massive
iesistance to Copeinicus anu Baiwin as eviuence that theii uiscoveiies hau
unueimineu a collective fantasy of human centiality anu masteiy. Be
believeu that psychoanalysis was meeting the same massive iesistance
because his uiscoveiy of the unconscious hau unueimineu that fantasy even
fuithei (Fieuu, 1914).
Fieuu showeu how tentative is oui contiol ovei oui own minus anu
how much of what we oiuinaiily consiuei to be within oui conscious contiol
is bettei thought of as belonging to something exteinal to oui self-
awaieness, a "psychic appaiatus" functioning outsiue oui consciousness anu
oui capabilities foi iational uecision making. But his imageiy foi
iepiesenting the psychological opposition between what he calleu the "I"
anu the "it" was little moie than a metaphoiical letting loose in the human
minu of the puiely physical foices that hau been tameu uuiing the
nineteenth centuiy in the factoiy anu the laboiatoiy.
Natuial science in Fieuu's time was uominateu by the notion of eneigy.
The conceptual vocabulaiy fiom which Fieuu cieateu his metapsychology
was foimeu by the gieat auvances in the physical sciences uuiing his own
lifetime. The uiscoveiy of the vaiious foims anu manifestations of physical
eneigy, theii inteichangeability, anu the conseivation of quantities thiough
tiansfoimations fiom one foim of eneigy to anothei, maue it appeai that
the physical univeise hau been completely unueistoou. The human minu
seemeu to stanu outsiue this iush of physical tiansfoimations, as an
inteiesteu but uninvolveu obseivei.
Pait of the shock effect of psychoanalysis iesulteu fiom its iefutation of
the myth of piogiess engenueieu by the auvances in the physical sciences.
This iuea hau been giaspeu by many as a ieplacement foi the outmoueu
ieligious mythology that put humankinu at the centei of cieation. But
anothei aspect of the shock was its appiopiiation of the vocabulaiy of the
physical sciences to ieach its pessimistic conclusions about the powei of the
human minu. Fieuu's success in tuining the myth of scientific piogiess
against itself seemeu to finish off whatevei was left of collective human
naicissism.
Neveitheless, the psychoanalysts who followeu Fieuu uevelopeu a myth
of theii own, a myth that became an obstacle to fuithei theoietical changes.
If the uiscoveiy of the unconscious meant the ultimate ueflation of human
vanity anu self-ueception, then no fuithei suipiises about the natuie of the
minu coulu come fiom the othei sciences. Any claim to that effect woulu
have to be tieateu as a uenial of the impoitance of the unconscious. The
psychoanalysis of Fieuu's time woulu become the peimanent basis foi "a
geneial psychology," even though its conceptual scheme hau been inheiiteu
fiom nineteenth-centuiy physics.
But, as !"#$%&'()$"* ,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.). iepeateuly points out,
science in oui own time has moveu in a uiiection that makes nineteenth-
centuiy physics incieasingly iiielevant to psychology. Contempoiaiy
science is piimaiily conceineu not with foices but with stiuctuies anu
pioceuuies. Its subject mattei is the accumulation of patteineu infoimation
in complex systems, biological anu otheiwise. An oiganism is no longei
thought of by biologists as a collection of chemical ieactions, but as a
hieiaichy of oiganizational stiuctuies. Within this conceptual fiamewoik,
the human minu takes its place as a system like otheis, uiffeiing in the
uegiee of its complexity but not in its possession of unique attiibutes oi
qualities.
Bespite Fieuu's iepeateu minimizing of the iole of iational thought in
ueteimining human behavioi, his mouel of the minu in conflict iequiies the
piesence of a iational human agencythe egostiiving thiough intelligent
pioceuuies to uominate the natuially occuiiing chaos of instinctual foices
(Fieuu, 192S). Fieuu's attempt to ueiive the stiuctuie of the ego fiom an
evolutionaiy piocess guiueu only by the clashing of these unstiuctuieu
natuial foices was biilliantly conceiveu but uoomeu to failuie fiom the
beginning. Without a scientific conception that incluueu infoimation anu
stiuctuie as essential featuies of all natuial piocess, it coulu not succeeu.
To complete Fieuu's pioject foi unueistanuing the oiigin anu
uevelopment of the ego as a sequence of natuial events, it is necessaiy to
see that the natuial woilu incluues not only the clash of unstiuctuieu foices
but, even moie impoitant, a hieiaichy of pioceuuies foi conseiving anu
tiansfoiming infoimation as well. Taking this appioach, we aie uiawn
inevitably to the iuea that the laige-scale intelligent pioceuuies useu by the
human minu to uo its woik in the ieal woilu must be integiateu systems of
smallei anu smallei intelligent subpioceuuies. These subpioceuuies, in
tuin, must exist inuepenuently in ielatively simple nonhuman systemsin
the genetic mechanisms of the living cell, foi instance, anu in intelligent
computei piogiams.
Although psychoanalysis seems in ietiospect to have been the fiist of
the infoimation sciences (Piibiam & uill, 1976), Fieuu's eneigic metaphoi
foi the woilu of natuie uiu not allow him to anticipate eithei the shocking
iealization that we shaie oui sapience with miciooiganisms anu machines
oi the fieeuom fiom anthiopomoiphic misconceptions that follows fiom the
iealization. By intiouucing psychoanalysis to the highei level of
geneialization maue possible by concepts of infoimation piocessing,
Peteifieunu iestoieu the uiscoveiy of the unconscious to its piopei place in
the continuing sequence of uisillusionments that must accompany the
piogiess of science. Fieuu's momentous contiibutions weie ielieveu of the
buiuen of incieuibility assumeu by all final ievelations.
1PL 8lvlLLCLu LCC
The iealization that the executive ego is also an "it" has not yet
penetiateu veiy ueeply into the psychoanalytic consciousness. Peteifieunu
showeu that the piivilegeu ego, exempt fiom the constiaints that apply to all
othei natuial systems, has been a iefuge foi psychoanalysts fiom the
seiiousness of Fieuu's scientific goals. Nany analysts appeai to believe that
it woulu be "uehumanizing" to ventuie even a single step beyonu the limit of
Fieuu's peisonal achievement in unmasking the mechanical element in
human mental life. Some have even insisteu that subjective emotion, the
most complex of integiative expeiiences, ieceives its uue as an influence on
human life only when it is iepiesenteu with the poetic simplicity of a
thunueistoim oi a tiual wave. (The science of oui gianupaients' geneiation
always seems soothingly humanistic when compaieu with oui own.)
!"#$%&'()$"* ,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.). met this iesistance heau-on.
Pait 1, "A Ciitique of Cuiient Psychoanalytic Theoiy," maue the piivilegeu
ego the special taiget of its ciiticism. To the analyst who alieauy thinks of
the ego as an oiganizational concept iathei than as the expeiiencing self,
Peteifieunu's pioposal to iemove this familiai teim fiom the lexicon of
psychoanalytic theoiy entiiely may seem iathei bewilueiing. But, uespite
the emphasis placeu on this concept by the psychoanalytic ego
psychologists, confusion on this point is still wiuespieau in the
psychoanalytic community. (Baitmann's |19Su,19S2j attempts to integiate
oiganizational concepts into a theoietical fiamewoik ueiiveu fiom the
concept of eneigy coulu nevei be fully convincing, foi ieasons alieauy
uiscusseu heie.)
Peteifieunu's pioposal was intenueu to focus attention on the
inconsistency that iesults when the ego is exempteu fiom the chaotic
imageiy with which Fieuu uepicteu the iest of the psychic appaiatus. By
uisiegaiuing the iole of the ego as an oiganizational stiuctuie in ego
psychology, Peteifieunu was uelibeiately shaipening the contiast between
the inconsistencies of the oluei theoiy anu the iigoi piomiseu by the new.
As a tactic in the iefoim of psychoanalytic theoiy, this move may have
misleu many of the analysts he was tiying to ieach. As a statement that the
stiuctuial attiibutes of the ego aie not ueiivable fiom the eneigic axioms of
the metapsychology, howevei, it has its own inteinal logic.
.+$ #%/,01'.#,% /0'1$2,03
Pait 2 of !"#$%&'()$"* ,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.). (Peteifieunu, 1971)
"Basic Infoimation-Systems Concepts," outlineu the new fiame of iefeience
within which Peteifieunu was locating psychoanalysis. Beie, with the
collaboiation of }acob Schwaitz, a computei scientist, he piesenteu a
technically iigoious view of infoimation
|asj having to uo with.patteins of physical events oi the
ielationship between patteins of events. A pattein of one physical
foim can be tiansuuceu into a pattein of anothei physical foim, anu
the lattei in tuin can be tiansuuceu into a pattein of still anothei
physical foim. What iemains the same in this sequence is the
infoimation; it is the common factoi in the sequence of changing
patteins |p. 11Sj.
What will seem stiange to the psychoanalyst in this view is its
neutiality with iespect to the oiigin anu meaning of the patteins being
tiansuuceu oi tiansmitteu. Infoimation is not necessaiily "about" anything.
It uoesn't have to be a "message" fiom a "tiansmittei" to a "ieceivei." The
motivation, if any, of the agents conceineu, if any, is a sepaiate pioblem to
be taken up at anothei stiuctuial level. When a tiee falls in the foiest, a
pattein of compiession waves iauiates thiough the suiiounuing
atmospheie. This pattein constitutes infoimation. Whethei it falls on the eai
of an oiganism, anu whethei that oiganism can inteipiet the infoimation as
the sounu of a tiee falling, aie sepaiate questions entiiely. Peteifieunu thus
begins with the funuamental uistinction in infoimation theoiy. It sepaiates
the physical tiaces of events, the "eviuence," fiom any possible
inteipietation of theii meaning oi significance. The sounu of a tiee falling is
a function not only of the pattein of aii waves iauiating fiom the tiee, but of
the infoimation containeu in the eai anu biain of the listening oiganism as
well.
Bow can this uistinction be useful to the psychoanalyst. The analyst is
conceineu piecisely with questions about the highest levels of oiganization,
questions about motivation anu meaning. That the sounu of miuule C is
heaiu when the aii is vibiating at so many cycles pei seconu is haiuly
ielevant to the expeiience of the opeia lovei. In contiast to Peteifieunu's
position, Rosenblatt anu Thickstun (1978) woulu iestiict the use of the teim
"infoimation" to the coueu iecoiu of the physical events within the listening
anu inteipieting oiganism oi machine. This, they believe, woulu oveicome
the tiivialization that might occui if "eveiy nonianuom phenomenon in the
obseivable univeise" weie consiueieu to be infoimation. But I think
Peteifieunu's point that the moie geneial uefinition has gieatei powei is a
valiu one, especially when psychopathology is conceineu. The inteinally
coueu iecoiu of a physical event must in some essential iespect be
isomoiphic with the actual event. Foi a paiticulai listenei oi piocessoi, how
"nonianuom phenomena" aie iecognizeu as being both nonianuom anu
ielevant to the listenei's oi piocessoi's inteiests anu neeus, is still an
impoitant empiiical question.
Peteifieunu's foimulation pioviues the useful ieminuei that in eveiy
hieiaichical system, all constiaints that apply at a lowei level of the system
also apply at all highei levels. We can substitute a patient ielating a fantasy
foi the tiee falling in the foiest. What is heaiu by the listenei is a function of
the infoimation containeu in the listenei's eai anu biain as much as in the
woius anu the tone of the speakei, but the listenei must begin by
iesponuing to what is actually theie in the patient's communication.
If the analyst heais what he oi she consiueis to be eviuence of a
iepiesseu infantile wish, the analyst's juugment must be tempeieu by
specific infoimation about the patient's state of minu at the moment anu at
ciucial moments in the past, by geneial infoimation about human
uevelopment anu the psychic mechanisms of iepiession anu symptom
foimation, anu, finally, by infoimation about the analyst's own state of minu
in the piesent anu thioughout his past. This infoimation must all be
inteinally consistent anu it must all fit togethei to foim the optimal
inteipietation.
Peteifieunu points out that at any moment in a typical analysis much of
this infoimation is eithei unavailable oi unveiifiable. A majoi function of
psychoanalytic theoiy in the clinical situation is to pioviue hypotheses to fill
in tempoiaiily foi the missing infoimation. When these hypotheses aie
themselves consistent they can be helpful to the analyst in oiganizing the
infoimation actually available anu in iuentifying specific questions that still
neeu to be answeieu. But if the analyst's hypotheses contain inteinal
contiauictions, they will necessaiily piouuce uistoitions in what the analyst
heais.
Because eveiy theoietical foimulation is the piouuct of its own
histoiical uevelopment, it will always be subject to fuithei mouification as
new infoimation becomes available. Infoimation theoiy suggests a numbei
of ways to minimize the consequences of having to woik with a fallible
theoiy. 0ne is to be on the aleit foi inconsistencies between levels in the
hieiaichy of theoiies that suppoits the theoiy in question. This means that
although biological anu psychological theoiy cannot "explain" the paiticulai
phenomena with which the psychoanalyst is conceineu, no hypothesis of
psychoanalysis can be alloweu to contiauict what is known at the time
about biological anu psychological piocesses.
Peihaps the most uiamatic example of a contiauiction in the hieiaichy
of theoiies unueilying psychoanalysis is the one that iesulteu fiom the
uiscoveiy by Aseiinsky anu Kleitman (19SS) that uieaming sleep occuis in a
constantly iepeateu pattein of 1u to 2u minute peiious occuiiing at iegulai
9u-minute cycles thioughout the night, iegaiuless of the content of the
uieams. This laboiatoiy finuing ienueis untenable the tiauitional
psychoanalytic view that uieams aie 2'5./0 by the eiuption of iepiesseu
impulses fiom the unconscious (Fieuu, 19uu). It takes nothing away fiom
the clinical obseivation that iepiesseu wishes aie /67%/../0 in the content
of uieams, of couise. But it uoes unueicut the entiie theoietical stiuctuie
built on the assumption that impulses aie capable of achieving expiession
without the coopeiation of the executive appaiatus.
In the case of uieaming, the executive appaiatus is cieating anu
uelimiting the oppoitunities foi iepiesseu wishes to be expiesseu as uieam
contents. This implies that the expiession of the iepiesseu wishes is not the
iesult of a self-initiateu uiive foi uischaige but pait of an auaptive piocess
foi evaluating the uigency of the impulses being aiouseu by cuiient life
expeiience (Palombo, 1978, 198u). A consistent psychoanalytic theoiy will
have to take these nonpsychoanalytic facts into account. This example
illustiates the geneial point that eveiy highei-level theoiy has embeuueu
within it a host of lowei-level theoietical assumptions. Foi this ieason,
psychoanalytic theoiy cannot be skimmeu off the top of the human sciences
anu tieateu as if it weie completely inuepenuent.
Without an explicit awaieness of lowei-level assumptions, it is uifficult
to specify what woulu constitute ieliable eviuence foi oi against a
pieuiction maue by a highei-level theoiy. 0bseivations anu pieuictions
must each be foimulateu at the same level of piecision to be useful in testing
the valiuity of a pieuiction. Foi the psychoanalyst tiying to match global
theoietical conceptualizations with fiagmenteu samples of the patient's
intiapsychic expeiience, this can be ciitical. Infoimation theoiy can be of
consiueiable help heie, because it iequiies the theoiist to be cleai about
ielationships between hieiaichical levels anu component subsystems.
The iesult is an oppoitunity to subuiviue a pioblem as often as
necessaiy foi its components to match the scale of the phenomena being
obseiveu. }ohn Clippingei's biilliant computei simulation of a patient's
piouuction in psychoanalytic theiapy pioviues a uiamatic uemonstiation of
this methou at woik (1977). The simulation begins with a iepiesseu sexual
wish uncoveieu towaiu the enu of a session. Five inteiacting stiuctuies
tiansfoim this input by geneiating a foimal expiession foi the wish, giving it
a linguistic foim, censoiing it, ievising it to confoim to the censoiship, anu
ieintegiating the censoieu veision with aspects of the oiiginal wish.
The output of the simulation is a passage that almost exactly matches
the tiansciipt of an eailiei inteiaction uuiing the houi in which the patient's
conflict was expiesseu in what seems like a ianuom anu aimless uigiession.
0f special impoitance is the netwoik of connections among the five inteinal
stiuctuies of the simulation that Clippingei calls Leibnitz, Calvin,
Nachiavelli, Ciceio anu Fieuu. Each of these stiuctuies has the powei to
inteiiupt anu mouify the output piouuceu by some but not all of the otheis.
The oiiginal wish passes thiough each of these stiuctuies many times. By
uiviuing the piocessing among these inteiacting components, Clippingei
was able to mastei the complexity of the patient's inteinal piouuction of the
text.
Peteifieunu gives piioiity to what can be uiiectly monitoieu in the
theiapeutic situationthe feeuback loops that iegulate the inteiaction of
the patient anu the analyst. The impoitance of feeuback as an eiioi-
coiiecting pioceuuie was iecognizeu by Shannon anu Weavei (1949) as
eaily as 1942. Nonitoiing the uiffeiences between the cuiient situation anu
the uesiieu outcome was shown to be an essential featuie of any complex
pioblem-solving system by Newell, Shaw, anu Simon (19S7). Nillei,
ualantei, anu Piibiam (196u) applieu this piinciple as a geneial tool foi
analyzing the behavioi of oiganisms. They showeu that eveiy action
peifoimeu by an oiganism piesupposes a pieexisting goal anu a plan foi
ieaching that goal. Aftei an action has been completeu, its success in
ieaching the uesignateu goal is evaluateu by the oiganism. Befoie any
subsequent action is to be taken, eiiois aie iuentifieu anu the plan mouifieu
to ieuuce them. The stieam of behavioi piouuceu by the system is theiefoie
the integiation of many iepetitive cycles of planning, acting, evaluating, anu
coiiecting.
Analysts who unueistanu only a pait of what they neeu to know about a
patient can auu to theii unueistanuing by bieaking uown the patient's
stieam of behavioi, iuentifying the patient's moment-to-moment goals,
ieconstiucting the patient's plans foi achieving them, anu noting how the
patient mouifies the plans when they fail. To uo this, analysts must
continually test theii own theoietical foimulations foi (3/)% success in
helping to iuentify the 7'()/"(8. goals anu to ieconstiuct his oi hei plans.
Fiom the analysis of these feeuback loops, laigei stiuctuies can be
uiscoveieu. Foi example, it is quite likely that the patient has his oi hei own
set of moie geneial plans foi mouifying unsuccessful moment-to-moment
plans. These moie geneial plans may be eithei auaptive oi uefensive. If
auaptive, they will enhance the flow of infoimation thiough the patient-
analyst system. If uefensive, they will constiict the flow of infoimation. The
same may be saiu foi analysts' pioceuuies foi uealing with uisciepancies
between theii theoietical foimulations anu the patient's actual behavioi.
Nost of this monitoiing anu piocessing takes place outsiue the analyst's
uiiect awaieness. It is usually iefeiieu to in noncognitive teims, as intuition,
iuentification oi empathy.
Peteifieunu's aigument suggests that theie is nothing to lose anu
eveiything to be gaineu in making these pioceuuies explicit. Bis new book,
93/ 1%$2/.. $# 1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/%'7- (198S), shows how iueas ueiiveu
fiom infoimation theoiy can make a ciitical uiffeience in the technique of
psychoanalysis. This impoitant piactical issue will be consiueieu, along with
this new woik, latei in this chaptei.
1PL SLLl-lnl1lA1lnC lMuLSL
The conceptual uistinctions of infoimation theoiy leau to significant
theoietical uiffeiences with tiauitional psychoanalytic metapsychology. As I
mentioneu eailiei, the iuea of a self-initiating impulse has been iauically
unueimineu by the finuings of the sleep laboiatoiy. But this iuea is also
incompatible with the infoimation theoiy point of view on veiy geneial
giounus, as well as with the piinciple of psychic ueteiminism, emphasizeu
by Fieuu as a majoi uiscoveiy of psychoanalysis. Within the infoimation-
piocessing fiamewoik, the Fieuuian "impulse" is actually a compounu
foimeu by matching competing uemanus foi the giatification of a neeu with
competing plans foi achieving a uesiieu giatification. At any moment,
piioiities must be assigneu to cuiient neeus anu then an optimal plan
chosen fiom the many possible plans available. The choice of a plan will
uepenu on many ueteimining factois. If the uemanu is an uigent one, foi
example, the coiiesponuing action will veiy likely follow a pieplanneu
ioutine uesigneu to be set in motion on extiemely shoit notice. A
pieplanneu action of this kinu will necessaiily be simple, uiiect, nonspecific,
anu inflexible. These aie the chaiacteiistics useu in tiauitional
psychoanalytic theoiy to suppoit the notion that "impulses" aie self-
initiating, peiemptoiy, anu inuiffeient to the paiticulai channel foi
uischaige open to them at the moment. This, in tuin, is taken to justify the
iauical sepaiation of "impulses" fiom othei foims of mental activity.
That neuiotic patients see theii impulses as alien objects bieaking into
theii minus fiom outsiue is eviuence that the mechanism of iepiession is at
woik, nothing moie. Since the objective of psychoanalytic tieatment is to
oveicome patients' neeus foi such uiamatic misiepiesentation of theii own
mental contents, it is suipiising to finu many psychoanalysts feeling that a
scientific theoiy of the neuioses shoulu auopt this subjective mispeiception.
A misunueistanuing that comes up again anu again in my conveisations
with othei analysts about this issue is the belief that teims like "planning,"
"uecision making," "goal seeking" anu "pioblem solving" aie
anthiopomoiphisms inappiopiiate foi uesciibing the simplest expiessions
of biological anu emotional neeu. When I point out that these opeiations can
be caiiieu out at any level of complexity anu that veiy simple computei
piogiams act in ways that can only be uesciibeu in these teims, they tell me
that the human minu is not logical like the computei. I askeu one iathei
thoughtful senioi colleague if she believeu that the human minu is moie like
a pot of boiling watei. Aftei a moment's ieflection, she nouueu hei heau anu,
in all seiiousness, saiu yes.
We aie talking heie about piogiamming stiuctuies built up fiom
conuitional statements that take the following foim: "If X is tiue, caiiy out
the next instiuction, Y; otheiwise jump to instiuction Z." The logical iesult of
this pioceuuie woulu be exactly the same as in the case of an "impulse"
seeking uischaige thiough one (piefeiieu) channel but moving on to
anothei if it finus that the fiist one is not accessible. The stiuctuie of the
uischaige channels anu theii gates is no less a logical stiuctuie than that of
the computei piogiam. The uiffeience is not in the logic, but in the
ielationship between the logical elements anu the activity of the system as a
whole. In the computei piogiam, as in the simplest oiganism, the logical
stiuctuie is incoipoiateu into the piocess that initiates, iegulates, anu
teiminates the activity of the system. Foi example, the X in the statement, "if
X is tiue, uo Y," is not usually a value fixeu befoie the execution of the
piogiam, but iathei is the iesult of a computation ueteimineu while the
piogiam is actually iunning. Inteilocking feeuback loops give the system the
potential foi combining simple logical stiuctuies to foim moie complex
ones. The logical stiuctuie is flexible, active, anu self-mouifying.
In contiast, the logical stiuctuie that ueteimines the uischaige pathway
of the "impulse" in tiauitional psychoanalytic theoiy is iigiu, passive, anu
ineit. Because the impetus foi the act of uischaige comes entiiely fiom the
impulse, the logical stiuctuie has no motivation to iesponu to the passage of
the impulse oi to mouify itself as a iesult. It is simply not an inteiesteu paity
to the tiansaction. Foi this ieason, it is often iepiesenteu metaphoiically as
a hyuiaulic system of iigiu channels anu soliu baiiieis.
It is uifficult to imagine eithei how oi why such a system woulu evolve
into an executive ego capable of auapting itself to a complex exteinal
enviionment. "Reality" is supposeuly the agent of change heie, but, to my
knowleuge, neithei a mechanism noi a souice of motivation has evei been
pioposeu thiough which such a system might be capable of oiganizing itself
to inteiact with the outsiue woilu. This conceptual poveity is the piice
psychoanalysis has been willing to pay foi a selfinitiateu "impulse" that
opeiates outsiue the auaptive infoimation-piocessing stiuctuie of the
oiganism in which it iesiues.
+#$0'0"+#"'- !.04".40$
Pait S of Peteifieunu's (1971) !"#$%&'()$"* ,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.).,
attempts to show how complex hieiaichical stiuctuies that evolve natuially
fiom simplei infoimation-piocessing stiuctuies can give a compiehensive
account of the subject mattei of psychoanalysis with a significant gain in
coheience. A ciitical issue is whethei the systems of stiuctuies tiauitionally
classifieu as "iu" anu "ego" can be uistinguisheu thiough theii ielationship
oi lack of ielationship to the outsiue woilu.
Peteifieunu aigues peisuasively that a motivational stiuctuie, as the iu
is consiueieu to be, must be able to uiiect its activity towaiu actual
oppoitunities foi giatification anu not meiely to iigiu "uischaige channels"
(see Rosenblatt & Thickstun, 1977, 1978, foi a fullei uevelopment of this
theme). An immatuie anu vulneiable oiganism cannot affoiu the luxuiy of
self-initiating impulses lacking an auaptive function. The human infant is a
little uiffeient in this iegaiu fiom its phylogenetic ancestois. With the
piotection anu suppoit of its paients, it can affoiu, tempoiaiily, the #'"('.-
of an autonomous impulse life. But even if the infant coulu actually uispense
with an auaptively functioning psychic appaiatus in the eailiest weeks oi
months of life, theie is no possible scenaiio thiough which even a
tempoiaiily nonauaptive psychic appaiatus coulu have suiviveu the
evolutionaiy stiuggle.
Foi similai ieasons, theie is no possibility that an auaptive ego coulu
evolve ontogenetically fiom a piimitive psychic appaiatus that itself lacks
the capacity to auapt. The Fieuuian iu is a concept that iuptuies the
evolutionaiy sequence just at the point of its ciucial tiansition fiom slow-
motion infoimation piocessing in the genetic mechanisms to highspeeu
infoimation piocessing in the biain. Inteiposing a state of chaos between
these intimately inteiactive stages of evolution is mythological thinking,
suppoiteu, like all mythological thinking, by out-of-uate science. It makes
little uiffeience that the out-of-uate science in this instance is only a centuiy
olu.
Peteifieunu's pioposals foi a unifieu conceptual fiamewoik iepiesent
an impoitant auvance ovei the "continuum" of stiuctuies extenuing fiom iu
to ego suggesteu in 196S by uill. It ieplaces the one uimensional continuum
with a multiply bianching hieiaichy, in which iu functions aie uistinguisheu
fiom ego functions by theii ielative simplicity anu moie uiiect ielationship
to biological events, but not by a lack of auaptive significance.
lLLLlnC Anu lunC1lCn
The psychic appaiatus in Peteifieunu's theoiy is uiiven not by
subjective feeling states, but by auaptive uecision making. As we know,
impoitant uecisions maue in pathological states may have seiious
malauaptive effects. Peteifieunu points out that this is often uue to a
ueficiency in the quality oi appiopiiateness of the infoimation on which the
uecisions aie baseu, because of iepiession anu othei infoimation-uegiauing
uefensive opeiations. Alteinatively, it may be uue to uevelopmental uefects
causeu by failuies of feeuback at ciucial stages of stiuctuie builuing. The
subjective expeiience of an intiuuing impulse is a mental iepiesentation of
the faulty outcome of a uecision-making pioceuuie. It is not an actual
peiception of the psychic appaiatus at woik.
Since this is a point that is uifficult foi many people to giasp, I think it is
woith elaboiating. A fiequent complaint about infoimation theoiy is that it
uoes not "account foi" the subjective expeiience of feeling oi the motivating
effects of feeling states. As we noteu in the example of the falling tiee, two
veiy uiffeient kinus of theoiy aie iequiieu to unueistanu the natuie of the
infoimation geneiateu by an event anu the inteipietation of that
infoimation by a living obseivei. This is no less so when the event anu the
obseivation take place within a single peison.
Although a systematic methou of inteipietation may piouuce
substantial benefits (as Fieuu's system of uieam inteipietation uoes), it
uoes not constitute a scientific theoiy if it explains only the subjective
inteipietation of events by the human minu anu not the events themselves.
Fieuu was awaie of the impoitance of this issue when he tiieu to
supplement his methou of uieam inteipietation with a theoiy of uieam
constiuction. Now that many of the oiiginal assumptions of that theoiy have
been iefuteu in the sleep laboiatoiy, it is possible to see moie cleaily that
the inteipietive methou is laigely inuepenuent of it.
Naintaining this uistinction can be helpful. It means that (1) the
inteipietive methou will not be any less valuable if the olu theoiy of uieam
constiuction loses its peisuasiveness, but (2) the inteipietive methou is
veiy likely to be impioveu if it is suppoiteu by a moie accuiate
unueistanuing of the psychological events unueilying the subjective states
of uieaming. "Psychological" in this context iefeis to the vast amount of
infoimation piocessing that noimally takes place outsiue conscious
awaieness, even uuiing sleep.
The sensoiy impiessions expeiienceu by the uieamei aie something
quite uistinct fiom this unueilying piocess. So, too, aie the uieamei's
affective states. Fieuu's psychic eneigy theoiy was a iesponse to his
iealization that neuiotic patients acteu as if they weie "feeling" something
they weie not subjectively awaie of. The supposeu tiansfoimations of
psychic eneigy iepiesenteu the unknown events unueilying the otheiwise
inappiopiiate actions. The iuea that these actions aie the expiession of
"unconscious affects" is contiaiy to the spiiit of Fieuu's attempt to suppoit
his obseivations with a nonciiculai scientific explanation. Infoimation
theoiy is a moie iigoious appioach to the unueilying events that Fieuu was
tiying to ieach.
Peteifieunu shows that the tiauitional tieatment of feelings in
psychoanalytic uiscouise (not necessaiily Fieuu's) is uualistic anu
inconsistent. The complaint that infoimation theoiy is too complicateu to
explain the uiiectness anu simplicity of instinctual impulses is contiauicteu
by the objection that it is not complicateu enough to explain the subtlety anu
uisciiminative capacity of highei-level feeling states usually associateu with
the ego. These incluue, among many otheis, esthetic juugment, cieative
inspiiation, anu empathic iuentification.
These highei-level feeling states aie usually uesciibeu in two uiffeient
anu mutually exclusive ways, often at the same time. In the moie tiauitional
uesciiption, highei-level feeling states aie consiueieu to be cognitive
piocesses that aie simply accompanieu by painful oi pleasuiable affective
chaiges of vaiying intensity. Beie the complaint that infoimation theoiy is
inauequate to explain these states is iiielevant fiom the beginning, because
foi this mouel theie is no stiuctuial ielationship of any kinu between
thought anu feeling. Feeling is eithei painful oi pleasuiable. Any element of
uiffeientiation belongs to the cognitive iathei than the affective oiuei.
In the moie cuiient psychoanalytic appioach, highei-level feeling states
aie ueiiveu fiom lowei-level states thiough a piocess of inteinal
uiffeientiation anu matuiation, unuei the guiuance of the ueveloping ego.
This iuea is moie consistent with the uata of chilu obseivation accumulateu
ovei many uecaues. But the ciucial point is that this piocess of
uiffeientiation anu matuiation cannot be uesciibeu without the concepts of
infoimation theoiy. A simple thing cannot evolve into a complex one except
thiough a ieoiganization of its oiiginal substance. Infoimation theoiy is the
science of oiganization. A simple feeling, like the pleasuie of sex, anu a
complex feeling, like the matuie love of a sexual paitnei, aie somehow maue
of the same stuff, uiffeiently aiiangeu anu oiganizeu. That obseivation was
anu is still the unueipinning of Fieuu's theiapeutic methou.
Both these uesciiptions of highei-level feeling states leau, if thought
thiough inuepenuently, to infoimation theoiy. The failuie of one well-
known attempt to ciicumvent this conclusion can be helpful in
unueistanuing why. Baitmann (19S2) tiieu to ueiive the uevelopment of
psychic stiuctuie fiom the piocess Fieuu calleu "neutialization." Bis iuea
seems to have been that when sexual anu aggiessive eneigies aie mixeu in
the iight piopoitions, theii "active piinciples" ieact with each othei to foim
a stable piouuct. (We will oveilook foi the moment the absence of a
mechanism foi ueteimining "the iight piopoitions" oi foi iegulating the
piocess of mixing, whatevei that is taken to be.)
The analogy is cleaily with the chemistiy of acius anu bases. When
solutions of an aciu anu a base aie mixeu, theii ionic components, initially
uistiibuteu at ianuom in the solution, combine anu piecipitate out to foim a
ciystalline stiuctuie lacking the coiiosive piopeities of the oiiginal
ieagents. The salt foimeu in this way becomes the metaphoi foi the ego. But
the stiuctuie of the salt is simply an enuless iepetition of a simple geometiic
foim. It is an aiiangement with no capacity to change in iesponse to events
oi to incoipoiate any new infoimation fiom its enviionment into its own
stiuctuie. The "giowth" of the ciystal has nothing whatevei to uo with the
matuiation of the ego. As a metaphoi foi human uevelopment it is
completely lifeless.
But a toleiance foi ueau metaphoi as a substitute foi missing theoiy is
not uncommon in the psychoanalytic woilu. Foi some, a theoiy neeu not be
any moie than a iecognizable woiu pictuie. Its puipose is to iesemble the
minu, iathei than to explain it. Like my fiienu who thought that a pot of
boiling watei is a meaningful iepiesentation of the minu, they believe that a
muuuleu theoiy is neeueu to uo justice to the muuule of motivations
containeu in the unconscious.
1PL L8SlS1LnCL Cl 1PL 8lMl1lvL
This biings me to an impoitant aiea in which Peteifieunu's thinking
neeus to be supplementeu by a fuithei application of infoimation theoiy.
This is wheie he tiies, unsuccessfully in my opinion, to ueal with an
impoitant set of obseivations that motivates much of the uualism in
psychoanalytic thought. 0ne might call this issue "the peisistence of the
piimitive."
As Peteifieunu sketches the hieiaichy of psychic functions, he stiesses
the uimension of complexity almost to the exclusion of othei uiffeiences
that may exist between lowei-anu highei-level functions. The pictuie he
piesents is one in which simplei functions appeai to lose theii inuiviuual
iuentities as they aie incoipoiateu into oi evolve into the moie complex. In
infoimation-piocessing language, the levels of the hieiaichy aie "tightly
coupleu" (Pattee, 197S). An example in natuie is the multicellulai oiganism.
This is a hieiaichy in which the smallest units, the cells, combine to foim the
tissues; the tissues join to make oigans; anu, finally, the oigans inteiact to
constitute the complete oiganism. 0nly at the level of the oiganism as a
whole is theie anything that can be calleu an inuepenuent unit.
This might appeai at fiist glance to be a natuial mouel foi the psychic
appaiatus, functioning as it uoes as the contiol system foi an oiganism.
Schafei (1976), foi example, makes a point of insisting that only the
hieiaichical level of the whole peison be acknowleugeu by the
psychoanalyst. But in taking this position, Schafei uisiegaius anothei of
Fieuu's (1911) majoi uiscoveiies, that at least two levels of the psychic
appaiatusthe piimaiy anu seconuaiy piocessesaie, in functional teims,
only "loosely coupleu." Bieiaichical levels that aie loosely coupleu function
inuepenuently of one anothei. In the laige-scale oiganization of mattei, foi
example, stais anu galaxies aie veiy loosely coupleu. Emeigent piopeities
often appeai when a highei level is only loosely coupleu with those below it,
as when moleculai piopeities emeige fiom atomic inteiaction oi linguistic
behavioi fiom hominiu intelligence. Living systems aie loosely coupleu with
theii physical enviionments, although tightly coupleu within themselves.
Inteiesting questions aiise when we tiy to ueteimine the conuitions
unuei which tight couplings seem to change to loose couplings anu vice
veisa. The oiigin of life is one of these, as is the sepaiation of inuiviuual
galaxies fiom the piimoiuial mass of mattei anu eneigy. A possible
uefinition of psychoanalysis might be "the stuuy of the psychic conuitions in
which the coupling of piimaiy anu seconuaiy piocesses changes fiom tight
to loose anu back again."
Peteifieunu piepaies us foi the view of the piimaiy piocess as a loosely
coupleu level of psychic oiganization when he speaks of it as an
infoimation-piocessing activity that takes place at a lowei level of
complexity than waking thought. Foi him, the ciitical question is the
membeiship of the piimaiy piocess in the hieiaichy of auaptive functions.
Be tiies to ueiive the functional piopeities of piimaiy piocess activity fiom
the featuies it has in common with moie complex cognitive activities that
have cleai-cut infoimation-piocessing functions.
This uemonstiation is peisuasive, but it fails to answei a question that
has uiawn some public ciiticism to Peteifieunu's woik. This, once again, is
the question of the peisistence of the piimitive. Why, if the piimaiy piocess
is simply a lowei level of psychic functioning, uoes it take on a life of its own,
both in uieaming anu in othei mental states, wheie it appeais at times to
inteivene in the noimal piocesses of waking thought. Why, unuei these
conuitions, is it only loosely coupleu with the highei-level activities into
which one might expect it to be absoibeu. (We aie putting asiue foi the
moment the obseivation that the piimaiy piocess is always at woik behinu
the scene of waking consciousness, supplying memoiies anu
coiiesponuences not accessible thiough the noimal channels of logical oi
naiiative thought. 0nuei oiuinaiy ciicumstances of waking life the piimaiy
piocess uoes function as if it weie tightly coupleu to the highei levels of
mental activity.)
Bow aie we to explain those occasions, most notably uieaming, in
which the piimaiy piocess appeais to be veiy loosely coupleu, if at all, with
moie auvanceu foims of cognitive activity. Theie is a simple anu
stiaightfoiwaiu infoimation-piocessing explanation. The piimaiy piocess
has its own cognitive function that is sepaiate fiom, although necessaiy to,
the functioning of highei-level piocesses. This explanation implies that the
auaptive goals of piimaiy piocess activity can anu must be achieveu
inuepenuently of whatevei fuithei use the seconuaiy piocess may make of
them.
When we obseive the piimaiy piocess woiking to accomplish its own
auaptive goals, as in uieaming, it is only loosely coupleu to highei piocesses.
When we obseive the piouucts of the piimaiy piocess being utilizeu
uiiectly in the puisuit of goals of a highei oiuei, as they aie, foi example, in
the cieative piocess, the two levels of mental activity appeai to be tightly
coupleu. The "piouucts" of the piimaiy piocess I iefei to aie the uniquely
inuiviuual associative links that combine to foim the tieelike stiuctuie of
human long-teim memoiy. These links connect the isolateu elements of oui
expeiience acioss a iange of contexts much wiuei than theii oiiginal
histoiical ielationships. They pioviue the iaw mateiials foi all foims of
ieasoning by analogy, fiom simple pioblem solving to inspiieu acts of the
cieative imagination.
In uieaming we finu the piimaiy piocess uoing its noimal auaptive task
of matching new expeiience with ielateu expeiience of the past. The uieam
image is a composite of past anu piesent events, a test, as in ualton's
photogiaphic methou, of theii "family iesemblance." (Fieuu (19uu)
uesciibeu how ualton hau supeiimposeu photogiaphs of family membeis to
finu theii common featuies. Be suggesteu that the mechanism of
conuensation in uieaming is uoing the same with events anu expeiiences.)
The piocess of uieaming is physiologically isolateu fiom waking thought so
that the full iesouices of the sensoiy piojection mechanisms can be useu foi
this task. (Palombo, 1976, 1978).
Loose coupling of the piimaiy piocess is also chaiacteiistic of the
neuioses. But the explanation foi it in this case is not the same as it is in
uieaming. In neuiotic symptom foimation, the uncoupling of piimaiy anu
seconuaiy piocesses is an aitifact, the iesult of pathological uefensive
opeiations motivateu by anxiety. It was one of Fieuu's (1894) eailiest
uiscoveiies that this uncoupling of consciousness uoes not iesult, as
intenueu by the uefenses, in the exclusion of piimaiy piocess input fiom the
behavioial contiol mechanisms. Insteau, the piimaiy piocess input
influences behavioi uiiectly, without passing thiough the noimal soiting
anu filteiing by highei-level cognitive piocesses.
This capacity foi inuepenuent action is stiong eviuence that behavioial
contiol uiu not pass automatically fiom the lowei to the highei stiuctuies as
the cognitive hieiaichy evolveu. The highei-level stiuctuies must be
something much moie like cooiuinating mechanisms than stiuctuies of
uiiect contiol. Contiol actually iemains uistiibuteu at all levels, peihaps
most tenaciously at the lowest. It is the conscious illusion of contiol that
makes neuiotic patients vulneiable to sabotage by the piouucts of theii
iepiesseu anu unintegiateu piimaiy piocess activity.
.+$,0* #% )0'".#"$
Bow is the theoietical uiffeience between the self-initiating impulse anu
loosely coupleu lowei-level infoimation-piocessing stiuctuies applicable to
the psychoanalytic tieatment piocess. The tiauitional theoiy auuiesses
itself to two kinus of theiapeutic events, the ielease of uammeu up psychic
eneigy at the piimaiy piocess level anu the acquisition of insight at the
seconuaiy piocess level. Thiough the insight that comes fiom having the
"unconscious maue conscious," the ieleaseu eneigy is saiu to be ieuiiecteu
into moie auaptive uischaige channels.
The pioblem with this mouel is that it fails to account foi the builuing of
new psychic stiuctuie uuiing an analysis. It iests on the assumption that the
theiapeutic effect of psychoanalysis iesults exclusively fiom the iemoval of
uefensive baiiieis to the utilization of alieauy existing stiuctuie.
Bevelopmental theoiy anu object ielations theoiy have moveu fai beyonu
this view of psychoanalytic theiapy, but they have not supplieu a iigoious
theoietical alteinative to it. Bespite its enoimous piomise foi
psychoanalysis, foi example, Piaget's infoimation-piocessing appioach to
uevelopment has not yet been successfully assimilateu by object ielations
theoiy. But even without new theoiy, the empiiical eviuence gatheieu in the
analyst's office shows veiy little coiielation between patients' conscious
insight anu the theiapeutic benefit of analytic woik.
It has become the custom in the psychoanalytic woilu to speak of
analytic tieatment as an integiative piocess that may become conscious to
the patient in vaiying uegiees. Anu it is customaiy to speak of the
integiation of the moie piimitive aspects of the patient's mental life into the
laigei stiuctuie of his oi hei ego. Bow this happens in the uay-to-uay woik
of the analysis iemains a mysteiy foi the tiauitional theoietical mouel,
which uoes not pioviue the mechanisms foi this tiansfoimation. Nost
paiticulaily, it uoes not allow foi the active paiticipation of the piimaiy
piocess in the woik of integiation.
Fiom the infoimation-piocessing point of view, the tieatment piocess is
a seiies of cooiuinations oi couplings that biing lowei-level functions
isolateu by the uefenses into a moie collaboiative ielationship with highei-
level functions within the hieiaichical stiuctuie of the ego. The piimaiy
piocess is not meiely a passive paitnei in this woik, a souice of eneigy to
fuel the oiganizing activity of the ego. It supplies vital infoimation about
cuiient neeus anu about the accumulateu iecoiu of past events in which
similai neeus weie acteu on with vaiyingly successful outcomes.
As the analysis pioceeus, uefensively isolateu associative stiuctuies aie
iestoieu to functioning thiough the ieopening of blockeu connecting
pathways. At the same time, new pathways aie constiucteu anu integiateu
into a ieoiganizeu set of moie efficient highei-level stiuctuies, as iequiieu
by the paiticulai ciicumstances at each point in the patient's uevelopment.
A vital pait of eveiy analysis is the uiscoveiy of these iequiiements. Nothing
of the complexity of inteiaction among the multiple components of the
patient's psychic appaiatus is captuieu by (oi compiehensible to) a theoiy
that views all change as the simple iechanneling of impulses.
Peteifieunu's long chaptei on the tieatment piocess in !"#$%&'()$"*
,-.(/&.* '"0 1.-23$'"'4-.). (1971) appeais neai the enu of the book, but
was actually wiitten fiist. It uesciibes the tieatment piocess fiom a moie
intuitive position ueiiveu fiom an examination of the analyst's empathic
iuentification with the patient as a feeuback piocess that goveins the
piogiess of tieatment. In a seiies of latei papeis (197S,197Sa, 197Sb, 1978,
198u; Peteifieunu & Fianceschini, 197S), paiticulaily in "Bow Boes the
Analyst Listen. 0n Nouels anu Stiategies in the Psychoanalytic Piocess,"
Peteifieunu (197Sa) iefineu anu expanueu this application of infoimation
theoiy to the tieatment situation.
A PLu8lS1lC A8CACP 1C S?CPCAnAL?1lC 18LA1MLn1
These latei iueas have been biought togethei in 93/ 1%$2/.. $#
1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/%'7- (Peteifieunu, 198S). As in the eailiei woiks,
Peteifieunu's emphasis is on the iole of feeuback piocesses in the moment-
to-moment inteiaction between patient anu analyst, iathei than on the
long-teim builuup of psychic stiuctuie within the patient. This is a ietuin to
the pioblem of technique that oiiginally motivateu his inteiest in
infoimation theoiy. Be mentions his concein that his effoits to piomote the
assimilation of a compiehensive new theoietical system into psychoanalytic
thought may have uiveiteu attention fiom his moie conciete technical
pioposals.
93/ 1%$2/.. $# 1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/%'7- attempts to ciicumvent this
pioblem by sepaiating the technical issues, as fai as that is possible, fiom
the theoietical. Tiauitional iueas aie ciiticizeu in this woik not because they
aie inconsistent oi illogical, but because they impeue the flow of
infoimation between the patient anu the analyst. Although infoimation-
piocessing concepts unueilie the technical appioach, infoimation-
piocessing teiminology is ieplaceu foi the most pait by moie familiai
language. Questions of the scientific authenticity anu histoiical uevelopment
of psychoanalysis aie ielegateu to the iemote peiipheiy of the uiscussion.
Eveiything is suboiuinateu to the single issue of clinical efficacy.
The iesult is a piofounuly illuminating uemonstiation of the
applicability of infoimation theoiy to a cential pioblem of clinical
psychoanalysis. The book begins with a uiscussion of the analyst's use of
theoietical knowleuge in woiking with a patient. Peteifieunu uistinguishes
between steieotypeu anu flexible appioaches, which he compaies with the
"algoiithmic" anu "heuiistic" methous of pioblem solving useu by intelligent
computei piogiams.
In the algoiithmic methou, a fixeu sequence of pioceuuies is uesigneu
that will guaiantee the uesiieu iesult if followeu piecisely. This way of
uoing things woiks only foi veiy simple pioblems, wheie a limiteu numbei
of possible outcomes can be evaluateu within a ieasonable time. In moie
complex situations, the pioblem solvei must be able to seaich the enoimous
aiiay of possible solutions by compaiing the alteinatives at each uecision
point accoiuing to the piobable outcomes calculateu fiom its pievious
expeiience with similai situations. It must also be able to back up fiom a
uisauvantageous position when past expeiience has faileu to pioviue the
iequiieu solution foi the pioblem immeuiately at hanu anu ietuin to the
pievious uecision point to begin the seaich once again.
This methou is heuiistic because it allows the pioblem solvei to finu his
oi hei way without knowing the exact uimensions of the pioblem in
auvance. The pioblem solvei is uiscoveiing what the pioblem is in the
piocess of solving it. ("Beuiistic" comes fiom the uieek veib 3/5%/)", to finu
oi uiscovei, as in "Euieka!") This is, Peteifieunu says, what analysts aie
iequiieu to uo. When they appioach a patient's pioblem heuiistically, they
use theii own theoietical knowleuge to evaluate the piobabilities at the
many uecision points that must be tiaveiseu in the piocess of uiscoveiing
the ieal natuie of the pioblem. They must be able to juuge whethei theii
theoietical expectations have been fulfilleu as the piocess continues anu to
back up anu mouify theii expectations when they have not.
Analysts who aie woiking steieotypically uo not follow these steps.
They allow themselves to think they unueistanu the pioblem befoie having
hau the oppoitunity to investigate it. They then tiy to fit what the patient
says in the office into theii initial foimulations anu tenu to ignoie oi
misinteipiet whatevei fails to fit. Although this might seem like an easy
pitfall foi any well-meaning analyst to avoiu, Peteifieunu shows with
examples taken fiom the psychoanalytic liteiatuie anu fiom his own
expeiience that theie aie many hiuuen tiaps foi the unwaiy. Nost
impoitant, he shows that the ieuuctionistic bias of tiauitional theoiy
encouiages the tenuencies to clinical steieotyping cieateu by the paucity
anu uistoition of infoimation with which the analyst must always contenu.
0vei anu ovei again, it becomes cleai how the analytic inteichange can
be tiansfoimeu fiom a feeuback loop into a vicious ciicle if the analyst
allows theoietical expectations to inteifeie with effoits to uiscovei what
ieally happeneu in the minu of the patient uuiing uevelopment anu cuiient
life situation. Pioblems can be iesolveu if the analyst cuts thiough the
ciiculaiity of the patient's uefensive opeiations anu uiiects the patient's
attention to the fact oi feeling missing fiom the iepetitive stoiy he oi she
has been telling. Peteifieunu iepoits his successful inteiventions anu his
misseu oppoitunities with equal objectivity, using follow-up inquiiies as
well as ietiospective ieconstiuction to pinpoint the ciitical tuin in each
case.
The iuea of the self-initiateu impulse ieappeais in this context as an
obstacle to the theiapeutic piocess. Aftei Fieuu's (19uS) uisillusionment
with his mistaken iuea that hysteiical patients hau been seuuceu by theii
fatheis, he began to see the actual events of his patients' lives (intiapsychic
as well as inteipeisonal) as of only minoi significance. The ieal souices of
the patients' uifficulties weie theii uominating instinctual impulses. These
impulses coulu seize on anu contiol any fiagment of the patients' expeiience
that suiteu them as a means to theii expiession oi "uischaige."
Patients' piesentations weie valuable pictuies they pioviueu as they
hau been those expeiiences. The specific uetails of that expeiience weie
somehow ielevant to theii illness, but coulu not be iuentifieu with theii
causes. The lack of coheience in the patients' life stoiies was eviuence of
conflict in uealing with theii impulses, but the missing uetails of the stoiies
weie not expecteu to explain the natuie of the conflicts.
Few analysts (ceitainly not Fieuu himself) have tiieu to mouel theii
conuuct of analytic tieatment exclusively on this iigiu schema. But
Peteifieunu shows how the iuea of the self-initiating impulse can opeiate in
the backgiounu as a justification foi uenying the analyst's neeu to know the
specific uetails of the patient's life stoiy. The two kinus of impulse,
aggiessive anu libiuinal, aie a small but well-known quantity. It is not
unieasonable to tiy to iesolve unceitainties about the meaning of the
patient's communications by appeal to the most piimitive featuies of
instinctual life. The extensive clinical examples in 93/ 1%$2/.. $#
1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/%'7- show that these assumptions can be fatal to the
piogiess of an analysis.
WC8klnC MCuLLS
To uesciibe his technique foi biinging coheience to the patient's life
stoiy, Peteifieunu auopts Bowlby's conception of "woiking mouels." These
aie, in Bowlby's (1969) woius, "the inteinal woilus of tiauitional
psychoanalytic theoiy seen in a new peispective" (p. 82). In Peteifieunu's
thinking, these mouels aie like the stoieu piogiams useu by a computei.
They pioviue not only a iepiesentation of some limiteu aiea of expeiiences,
but also a plan of action foi opeiating within that aiea. 0nlike the vast
majoiity of computei piogiams cuiiently in opeiation, howevei, woiking
mouels aie self-mouifying in the light of fuithei expeiience.
They aie, in othei woius, component systems in the oveiall auaptive
stiuctuie that geneiates anu iegulates the expeiience anu behavioi of the
peison. Nany of these components aie actually miniatuie veisions of the
entiie system, functional iepiesentations of the system as a whole. They can
be tempoiaiily mouifieu foi the puipose of exploiation anu
expeiimentation, so that they can peifoim what Fieuu calleu "tiial actions"
with minimal iisk.
None of these miniatuie iepiesentations is complete, of couise. They
aie simulations, constiucteu fiom a vaiiety of simplifying assumptions. Foi
this ieason, a gieat many of them aie iequiieu to iepiesent the oveiall
system to itself, incluuing its vaiious moualities of inteiaction with the
outsiue woilu. Conflict between the mouels is not only possible but
inevitable. Leibnitz, Calvin, Nachiavelli, Ciceio, anu Fieuu in Clippingei's
(1977) simulation aie each woiking mouels within the laigei woiking
mouel of the main piogiam itself.
Peteifieunu lists eight majoi woiking mouels employeu by the analyst.
The fiist is the analyst's knowleuge of the woilu in geneial, as it opeiates in
noimal ciicumstances. Seconu is the analyst's mouel of his oi hei own
peisonal histoiy anu the stable elements of his oi hei own
selfiepiesentation. Thiiu is the noimal uevelopmental sequence of cognitive
anu emotional expeiience. Fouith is the phenomenology of the analytic
piocess. Fifth is the analyst's geneial clinical expeiience. Sixth is the
analyst's mouel of the paiticulai patient as a "total expeiiencing human
being." The seventh mouel incluues two theoietical metamouels, one a
theoiy that explains psychopathological mechanisms, the othei a theoiy
that accounts foi the theiapeutic effect of the analytic piocess. Finally, theie
is an eighth mouel, a highei-level metamouel that integiates the explanatoiy
concepts geneiateu by all the otheis. Theie aie obviously a gieat many
component mouels at all levels with vaiying uegiees of inuepenuence anu
inteiuepenuence. When the analyst piocesses the infoimation pioviueu by
the patient, he iefeis it to each of his own ielevant woiking mouels. The
analyst then begins the sometimes aiuuous laboi of ieconciling
inconsistencies that uevelop among the vaiious mouels as they aie upuateu
by the new infoimation.
Nost of 93/ 1%$2/.. $# 1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/%'7- is uevoteu to a uiscussion
of clinical cases in which the ieconciliation of these inconsistencies iequiieu
both flexibility anu insight fiom the analyst. Peteifieunu's illustiations aie
themselves mouels of the theiapeutic piocess at woik. It woulu be a giave
injustice to tiy to conuense them into a few woius in a biief essay such as
this one. Suffice it so say that 93/ 1%$2/.. $# 1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/%'7- is
piobably the best book of its kinu available to teacheis anu stuuents of
psychoanalytic theiapy touay.
Beyonu this majoi woik of Peteifieunu's, one can see still anothei
contiibution of infoimation theoiy to clinical psychoanalysis. This will be a
iigoious account of piimaiy piocess activity as it ielates to the theiapeutic
piocess. The patient's piimaiy piocess thought is, in fact, the piimaiy
souice of infoimation about the patient's eailiest expeiience in uealing with
his oi hei neeus anu wishes. The piimaiy piocess of the analyst functions in
the theiapeutic situation by matching his oi hei inteinal mouels of the
patient's mental life with the ueiivative iepiesentations of that eaily
expeiience communicateu to the analyst by the patient.
Peteifieunu (198S) biings us to the euge of this conception when he
says, foi example:
All woiking mouels aie changeu by the veiy infoimation ieceiveu.
They must be constantly upuateu, auapteu, ieauapteu, checkeu anu
iecheckeu foi consistencyboth foi inteinal consistency as well as
foi consistency with othei mouels. Such piocesses aie basic aspects
of leaining anu aie appaiently in laige pait associateu with the
phenomena we call "consciousness" oi "awaieness" |p. 8Sj.
The "laigei pait" not associateu with consciousness oi awaieness has
attiacteu the puzzleu attention of psychoanalysts foi a veiy long time.
Peteifieunu's tianslation of "empathy" into a system of woiking mouels is
an impoitant step towaiu the solution of the puzzle.
",%"-4!#,%
The movement of histoiy has caiiieu psychoanalysis beyonu the limits
of Fieuu's extiaoiuinaiy achievement. Peteifieunu's contiibutions maik the
entiance of psychoanalysis into a new eia of scientific thought. As with all
pioneeis, he leaves many tasks of exploiation anu consoliuation to be uone.
But he has establisheu the bioau outlines of a compiehensive new
fiamewoik within which tiauitional psychoanalysis can be safely
embeuueu.
Scientific ievolutions, no mattei how long postponeu, have an
inevitability about them. They succeeu by shelteiing the living tiauition
within a ieconceptualization of gieatei powei anu compiehensiveness.
Copeinicus' fiist concein when he tuineu the solai system insiue out was to
save the phenomena of astionomical obseivation. Peteifieunu's woik has
alieauy fulfilleu the piomise of infoimation theoiy to extenu the conceptual
univeise of psychoanalysis while making its uay-to-uay obseivations cleaiei
anu moie piecise.

0$/$0$%"$!
Aseiinsky, E., & Kleitman, N. (19SS). Regulaily occuiiing peiious of eye
motility anu concomitant phenomena uuiing sleep. ,2)/"2/, 118:27S-
274.
Bowlby, }. (1969). :(('23&/"( '"0 4$..; <$4= >= :(('23&/"(. New Yoik: Basic
Books.
Bowlby, }. (1981). |In }. Reppen (Eu.), Symposium on Emanuel Peteifieunuj.
1.-23$'"'4-()2 ?/@)/A, 68: 187-19u.
Clippingei, }. B. (1977). B/'")"C '"0 D).2$5%./; : 2$&75(/% &$0/4 $#
7.-23$'"'4-()2 .7//23 '"0 2$C")()$". Baltimoie: }ohns Bopkins
0niveisity Piess.
Fieuu, S. (1894). The neuio-psychoses of uefense. ,('"0'%0 E0)()$", S: 4S-
61.
Fieuu, S. (19uu). The inteipietation of uieams. ,('"0'%0 E0)()$", 4-S.
Fieuu, S. (19uS). Thiee essays on the theoiy of sexuality. ,('"0'%0 E0)()$",
7, 1Su-24S.
Fieuu, S. (1911). Foimulations on the two piinciples of mental functioning.
,('"0'%0 E0)()$", 12, 218-226.
Fieuu, S. (1914). 0n the histoiy of the psychoanalytic movement. ,('"0'%0
E0)()$", 14, 7.
Fieuu, S. (192S). The ego anu the iu. ,('"0'%0 E0)()$", 19, 12-66.
uill, N. (196S). 9$7$C%'73- '"0 .-.(/&. )" 7.-23$'"'4-()2 (3/$%-. New Yoik:
Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Baitmann, B. (19Su). Comments on the psychoanalytic theoiy of the ego.
93/ 1.-23$'"'4-()2 ,(50- $# (3/ F3)40, S, 74-96.
Baitmann, B. (19S2). The mutual influences in the uevelopment of ego anu
iu. 93/ 1.-23$'"'4-()2 ,(50- $# (3/ F3)40, 7, 9-Su.
Nillei, u. A., ualantei, E., & Piibiam, K. B. (196u). 14'". '"0 (3/ .(%52(5%/ $#
G/3'@)$%. New Yoik: Bolt.
Newell, A., Shaw, }. C., & Simon, B. A. (19S7). Empiiical exploiations of the
logic theoiy machine: A case stuuy of heuiistics. 1%$2//0)"C. $# (3/
H$)"( F$&75(/% F$"#/%/"2/ (pp. 218-2Su). Washington, BC: Spaitan
Books.
Palombo, S. R. (1976). The Bieam anu the Nemoiy Cycle. !"(/%"'()$"'4
?/@)/A $# 1.-23$I:"'4-.)., S:6S-8S.
Palombo, S. R. (1978). D%/'&)"C '"0 &/&$%-; : "/A )"#$%&'()$"I7%$2/..)"C
&$0/4. New Yoik: Basic Books.
Palombo, S. R. (198u). The Cognitive Act in Bieam Constiuction. H$5%"'4 $#
(3/ :&/%)2'" :2'0/&- $# 1.-23$'"'4-.)., 8, 186-2u1.
Pattee, B. B. (Eu.). (197S). J)/%'%23- (3/$%-; 93/ 23'44/"C/ $# 2$&74/6
.-.(/&., New Yoik: ueoige Biazillei.
Peteifieunu, E. (1971). Infoimation, Systems, anu Psychoanalysis.
1.-23$4$C)2'4 !..5/., 7 (12, Nonogiaph 2S26). New Yoik:
Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Peteifieunu, E. (197S). 0n infoimation-piocessing mouels foi mental
phenomena. !"(/%"'()$"'4 H$5%"'4 $# 1.-23$'"'4-.)., S4, SS1-SS7.
Peteifieunu, E. (197Sa). Bow uoes the psychoanalyst listen. 0n mouels anu
stiategies in the psychoanalytic piocess. In B. P. Spence (Eu.),
1.-23$'"'4-.). '"0 2$"(/&7$%'%- .2)/"2/, (vol. 4, pp. S9-1u1). New
Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
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psychoanalysis. 1.-23$'"'4-()2 K5'%(/%4-, 44, SS4-S49.
Peteifieunu, E. (1978). Some ciitical comments on psychoanalytic
conceptalizations of infancy. !"(/%"'()$"'4 H$5%"'4 $# 1.-23$I:"'4-.).*
S9, 427-441.
Peteifieunu, E. (198u). 0n infoimation anu systems mouels foi
psychoanalysis= !"(/%"'()$"'4 ?/@)/A $# 1.-23$I:"'4-.)., 7, S27-S44.
Peteifieunu, E. (198S). 93/ 7%$2/.. $# 7.-23$'"'4-()2 (3/%'7-. Billsuale, N}:
The Analytic Piess.
Peteifieunu, E., & Fianceschini, E. (197S). 0n infoimation, motivation anu
meaning. In B. B. Rubinstein (Eu.), 1.-23$'"'4-.). '"0 2$"(/&7$%'%-
.2)/"2/ (vol. 2). New Yoik: Nacmillan.
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Basic Books.
Reppen, }. (Eu.). (1981). Symposium on Emanuel Peteifieunu,
1.-23$'"'4-()2 ?/@)/A, 68, 1S9-161.
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motivation: A ievision of psychoanalytic theoiy. H$5%"'4 $# (3/
:&/%)2'" 1.-23$'"'4-()2 :..$2)'()$", 2S, SS7-SS8.
Rosenblatt, A. B., & Thickstun, }. T. (1978). Nouem psychoanalytic concepts
in a geneial psychology (Paits 1 & 2). 1.-23$4$C)2'4 !..5/., 11 (2S
Nonogiaph 424S), New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
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anu Psychoanalysis. 1.-23$4$C)2'4 !..5/., 7(12, Nonogiaph 2S26).
New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Rubinstein, B. B. (197S). 0n the clinical psychoanalytic theoiy anu its iole in
the infeience anu confiimation of paiticulai clinical hypotheses In B.
P. Spence (Eu.), 1.-23$'"'4-.). '"0 2$"(/&7$%'%- .2)/"2/ (vol. 4. pp.
S.S7). New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Rubinstein, B. B. (198u). The pioblem of confiimation in clinical
psychoanalysis. H$5%"'4 $# (3/ :&/%)2'" 1.-23$'"'4-()2 :..$2)'()$",
28, S97-417.
Schafei, R. (1976). : "/A 4'"C5'C/ #$% 7.-23$'"'4-.).. New Baven: Yale
0niveisity Piess.
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2$&&5")2'()$". 0ibana: 0niveisity of Illinois Piess.
3
$#+*1& $4 50((. % 6*'-7 0& */#1+7 -#2#(1)$#&* 0&
)678/1%&%(7606
l8Wln Z. PCllMAn, P.u.
Neiton Nax uill was boin in Chicago in 1914. Be was the seconu of
thiee boys. Foi business ieasons, the family soon moveu to Nilwaukee. In
high school, uill was among the top peifoimeis in an oiatoiy club. Be was
an excellent stuuent anu giauuateu fiist in his class.
uill ieceiveu his Ph.B. (Bacheloi of Philosophy) fiom the 0niveisity of
Chicago in 19S4, having majoieu in psychology. Bis inteiest in
psychoanalysis uevelopeu quite eaily, inspiieu, in pait, by a ieauing of
Fieuu's !"(%$052($%- Q/2(5%/.. By the time he enteieu meuical school at the
0niveisity of Chicago, he was ceitain that he wanteu to become not only a
psychiatiist but also a psychoanalyst. uill ieceiveu his N.B. fiom the
0niveisity of Chicago in 19S8 anu went on to uo his inteinship at Nichael
Reese Bospital fiom 19S9 to 1941.
In 1941, uill began his iesiuency at the Nenningei Clinic in Topeka,
Kansas. Beie his psychoanalytic caieei was launcheu unuei the influence of
such notable psychoanalysts as Kail anu William Nenningei anu Robeit
Knight. The most impoitant intellectual influence was that of Baviu
Rapapoit, the heau of the Bepaitment of Psychology anu subsequently of
the Bepaitment of Reseaich, with whom theie quickly uevelopeu a veiy
stiong iecipiocal bonu. uill became involveu initially, along with Roy
Schafei, in Rapapoit's woik on uiagnostic psychological testing (Rapapoit,
uill, anu Schafei, 194S-46, 1968). Latei, he collaboiateu closely with
Rapapoit on the uevelopment of psychoanalytic metapsychology. At Topeka,
uill was also intiouuceu by Naigaiet Bienman to hypnosis, a technique that
was useful in tieating the many wai-ielateu cases of tiaumatic neuiosis at
that time. This was the beginning of a 16-yeai collaboiative investigation of
hypnosis anu ielateu phenomena. uill also met ueoige Klein anu Robeit
Bolt, among otheis, at the Nenningei Clinic.
Aftei giauuating fiom the Topeka Psychoanalytic Institute in 1947, uill,
along with Rapapoit anu Bienman, moveu to Stockbiiuge, Nassachusetts, to
join Knight who hau become the uiiectoi of the Austen Riggs Centei. At
Riggs, between 1948 anu 19Su, uill continueu his woik on hypnosis anu on
metapsychology. Fiom 19Su to 19SS, uill was at Yale wheie he collaboiateu
with Newman anu Reulich in wiiting 93/ !")()'4 !"(/%@)/A )" 1.-23)'(%)2
1%'2()2/ (19S4). While at Yale, he was appointeu tiaining analyst at the
Westein New Englanu Psychoanalytic Institute.
uill moveu to Beikeley, Califoinia, in 19SS, wheie he hau a piivate
piactice anu an appointment as tiaining analyst at the San Fiancisco
Psychoanalytic Institute. Suppoiteu by a giant fiom the Founuations Funu
foi Reseaich in Psychiatiy, uill continueu his collaboiation with Bienman
(uill & Bienman, 19S9) anu with Rapapoit (Rapapoit & uill, 19S9). Be met
with Rapapoit thiee oi foui times each yeai to exchange iueas anu to go
ovei papeis anu uiafts of chapteis foi the book they weie wiiting. uill also
teameu up with Timothy Leaiy to uo ieseaich on psychotheiapy, an effoit
that leu to a couing scheme uesigneu to give a compiehensive account of the
psychotheiapeutic piocess (Leaiy & uill, 19S9). Towaiu the enu of this
peiiou in Califoinia, uill collaboiateu with the neuiopsychologist Kail
Piibiam in a stuuy of Fieuu's 1%$O/2( #$% ' ,2)/"()#)2 1.-23$4$C-. This woik
was shelveu, howevei, anu was not piepaieu foi publication until many
yeais latei (Piibiam & uill, 1976).
Rapapoit's untimely ueath in 196u was a gieat peisonal loss foi uill.
Soon aftei, uill completeu the monogiaph they hau begun togethei (uill,
196S) anu began collecting Rapapoit's papeis (Rapapoit, 1967). With
ueoige Klein, he also wiote a summaiy of Rapapoit's contiibutions (uill &
Klein, 1964). Latei he contiibuteu a papei on the piimaiy piocess to Robeit
Bolt's collection of essays in Rapapoit's honoi (uill, 1967).
In 196S, as the iecipient of a lifetime Reseaich Caieei Awaiu fiom the
National Institute of Nental Bealth, uill moveu to Biooklyn, wheie he
became Reseaich Piofessoi in Psychiatiy at the Bownstate Neuical Centei
of the State 0niveisity of New Yoik. Be also began in eainest to iecoiu
psychoanalysis foi ieseaich puiposes, although he hau uone a goou ueal of
iecoiuing pieviously in his stuuies of hypnosis anu psychotheiapy.
Fiom 1968 to 1971 uill was a Fellow at the Reseaich Centei foi Nental
Bealth at New Yoik 0niveisity. Beie, uill iejoineu Klein anu Bolt, both of
whom fuithei influenceu uill's thinking on psychoanalytic metapsychology.
In 1971, soon aftei Klein's ueath, uill ietuineu to Chicago wheie he
became piofessoi of psychiatiy at the 0niveisity of Illinois at the Neuical
Centei anu a supeivising analyst at the Chicago Institute foi Psychoanalysis.
With Leo uolubeigei, he euiteu ueoige Klein's book foi publication (Klein,
1976). In 1976, he anu Philip Bolzman euiteu a collection of papeis in
Klein's memoiy uealing with the contioveisy that suiiounueu
psychoanalytic metapsychology. In this volume, uill (1976) publisheu his
own full-scale ciitique of metapsychology, calling into question much of
what he himself hau wiitten ovei the yeais. In Chicago, changes in uill's
thinking about the psychoanalytic piocess weie fuithei stimulateu by
Samuel Lipton's iueas, paiticulaily Lipton's uistinction between the
peisonal ielationship in psychoanalysis anu technique (Lipton, 1977a) anu
his close attention to vaiious foims of iesistance to the tiansfeience (Lipton,
1977b). Beie, uill (1979,1982) ciystallizeu his own ieviseu view of
psychoanalytic technique anu the beginnings of a methou foi systematically
stuuying its application (uill anu Boffman, 1982b).
Among the most impoitant influences on uill's thinking weie his own
expeiiences as a patient with seveial analysts. These expeiiences left him
with a ueep sense of the uiffeience that the peisonality of the analyst can
make in the analytic piocess, as well as of the uiffeiences attiibutable to
vaiying points of view on technique. uill's convictions have been infoimeu
anu inspiieu by a wiue iange of expeiiences as an analyst, as an analysanu,
anu as an intimate co-woikei with many of the most seminal psychoanalytic
thinkeis of oui time.
.+$ !",)$ ,/ 5#--6! ",%.0#74.#,%!
Neiton uill's contiibutions to psychoanalytic thought encompass a wiue
iange of inteiielateu issues that aie funuamental to the uevelopment of
psychoanalysis as an intellectual anu piofessional uiscipline. 0ne of the
extiaoiuinaiy things about the coipus of uill's woik is that it embouies
some of the majoi tensions in the fielu, with uill himself stanuing among the
leauing spokespeisons on both siues of a funuamental contioveisy. Thus, it
is not unusual foi uill in 1984 to finu himself uiffeiing shaiply with someone
who cites "uill, 19S4" to buttiess his oi hei own position. Similaily, no
ciitique of the eailiei uill is moie thoioughgoing anu unspaiing than that
which is stateu oi implieu in uill's latei contiibutions.
At the heait of this movement in the histoiy of uill's iueas lies the
ienunciation of psychoanalytic metapsychology. In this iespect, uill's
intellectual histoiy is closely ielateu to those of othei stuuents anu
colleagues of Baviu Rapapoit who moveu away fiom the peispective of this
extiaoiuinaiy, chaiismatic teachei even while continuing to ieflect his
inspiiation in the eneigy, iigoi, anu imagination of theii own woik (Bolt,
196S, 1976; Klein, 1976; Schafei, 1976). Bespite the stiiking commonalities
among the membeis of this gioup, uill's intellectual metamoiphosis is
especially notewoithy because he was piobably the closest to Rapapoit of
his stuuents. It was uill who took it upon himself to collect Rapapoit's
papeis (Rapapoit, 1967). It was also uill who completeu the ambitious
theoietical pioject that began with the lanumaik papei on the
metapsychological points of view that he anu Rapapoit wiote togethei
(Rapapoit anu uill, 19S9) anu that culminateu with the publication of
9$7$C%'73- '"0 ,-.(/&. )" 1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/$%- (uill, 196S), most of which
was wiitten by uill himself aftei Rapapoit uieu. With Klein, as noteu eailiei,
uill also wiote an extiaoiuinaiy summaiy of Rapapoit's contiibutions (uill
& Klein, 1964). It is a tiibute to uill's intellectual inuepenuence anu couiage
that he, too, finally bioke with Rapapoit anu became one of the most
thoughtful anu caieful ciitics of psychoanalytic metapsychology.
In this essay, uill's contiibutions aie ievieweu in ielation to thiee
funuamental tasks oi challenges that aie ciitical foi psychoanalysis anu that
aie biought into shaipei focus in uill's woik. The fiist is the challenge of
ueteimining anu uesciibing the natuie of psychoanalysis as a uiscipline. I
incluue unuei this heauing uill's contiibutions to metapsychology as well as
his latei ciitique of metapsychology anu his aigument against the natuial
science fiamewoik that psychoanalytic metapsychology utilizes. To incluue
uill's eaily contiibutions unuei this heauing is to take a questionable libeity,
since uill was not iaising questions about psychoanalysis as a uiscipline
while he was immeiseu in elaboiating its theoietical stiuctuie within a
natuial science fiame of iefeience. 0nly with hinusight can one aigue that
seeus of the latei ciitique weie sown, paiauoxically, by the veiy
thoioughness of the eailiei woik. In this iespect I am taking my cue fiom
uill (Reppen, 1982) himself, who has saiu of Rapapoit: "It was the claiity,
biilliance, anu peisistence with which he puisueu the implications of
metapsychological theoiy that exposeu its stiuctuie anu pioblems" (p. 169).
The seconu challenge is that of uefining the natuie of the psychoanalytic
situation itself anu the optimal psychoanalytic technique. What aie the
uistinguishing featuies of psychoanalysis as compaieu with othei theiapies.
Bow uoes psychoanalytic theoiy of technique take account of the fact that
the analyst is a peison who inevitably beais a peisonal ielationship to the
patient. This concein has been cential foi uill thioughout his caieei, as has
a vaiiant of this question, one which lies on the inteiface of the
metatheoietical anu the clinical-theoietical aieas, namely, what aie the
implications of the fact that psychoanalysis is a uiscipline in which the
human minu is simultaneously the subject anu object of investigation. In his
clinical contiibutions, too, we finu a majoi shift in uill's position. 0nlike the
shift in his metatheoietical peispective, howevei, theie aie ielatively cleai
anu uiiect piecuisois of uill's latei iueas on psychoanalytic tieatment in his
eailiei woik.
Finally, we have the challenge of subjecting psychoanalysis as a moue of
theiapy to some kinu of systematic obseivation anu empiiical test, uespite
the iequiiements of confiuentiality anu the enoimous complexity of the
whole phenomenon. 0n this mattei, uill has been unwaveiing thioughout
his caieei, insisting that the piopositions of psychoanalysis must be
veiifiable accoiuing to the usual ciiteiia of science. To ieject the notion that
psychoanalysis is a natuial science, uill has insisteu, is by no means to ieject
the notion that it is inueeu a science. 0i, appioaching the mattei fiom the
othei siue, to espouse the notion that psychoanalysis is a heimeneutic
uiscipline is not to ielinquish its scientific accountability.
It is somewhat aitificial to sepaiate uill's contiibutions into these thiee
aieas because of the extent of theii inteiielationship. This is paiticulaily
tiue with iespect to uill's latei woik. 0vei the yeais, uill's iueas have
uevelopeu into an incieasingly coheient anu inteinally consistent position.
Bis metatheoiy, his clinical theoiy, anu his attituue towaiu ieseaich have
uevelopeu into a unifieu peispective on psychoanalysis. What uill now has
to say about ieseaich in the psychoanalytic situation follows logically fiom
what he has to say about the natuie of the psychoanalytic situation itself anu
about the essence of psychoanalytic technique. The lattei, in tuin, beais a
close ielationship to his ciitique of metapsychology anu his espousal of a
iigoious heimeneutic position foi psychoanalysis. This conceptual
integiation was absent in uill's eailiei woik; the contiibutions to
metapsychology weie eithei unielateu to the concuiient clinical
contiibutions oi boie a stiaineu ielationship to them. Similaily, the ieseaich
focus was only paitially ielateu to the metapsychological investigations oi
to clinical psychoanalysis.
As noteu eailiei, uill's cuiient peispective amounts to a telling ciitique
of his eailiei iueas. In this oveiview of uill's contiibutions, a bias will be
eviuent in that the eailiei woik will be consiueieu in the light of its
ielationship to latei uevelopments in uill's thinking. This appioach
automatically iisks uenigiating the intiinsic value of ceitain eailiei
positions anu contiibutions because they will appeai eithei as geiminal vis-
-vis what comes latei oi as unwoithy of fuithei uevelopment in theii own
iight. No histoiy is unbiaseu, howevei, anu this authoi woulu be haiu
piesseu to look at uill's eailiei woik in any othei way because I shaie his
latei peispective anu have hau the goou foitune to collaboiate with him on
some aspects of its uevelopment. What follows is a selective ieview of uill's
extensive wiitings, uiawing piimaiily on books anu papeis that seem to
iepiesent culminations oi ciystallizations of phases of his woik anu
thought.
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ClLL'S lMML8SlCn ln ML1AS?CPCLCC?
Rapapoit anu uill (19S9) set out to complete a piogiam that they
believeu Fieuu left unfinisheu, namely, the spelling out of "that minimal set
of assumptions upon which psychoanalytic theoiy iests" (p. 1). They gioup
these assumptions unuei five heauings that, they piopose, constitute the
basic 7$)"(. $# @)/A of psychoanalytic metapsychology. These points of view
aie at the highest level of abstiaction in the theoiy (uill, 196S, p. 1SS).
Piesumably, to be complete, a psychoanalytic explanation of any
psychological phenomenon must incluue iefeience to all five points of view.
Accoiuing to Rapapoit anu uill, these points of view aie the 0-"'&)2 (having
to uo with foice), the /2$"$&)2 (having to uo with eneigy), the .(%52(5%'4
(having to uo with "abiuing psychological configuiations"), the C/"/()2
(having to uo with oiigins anu uevelopment), anu the '0'7()@/ (having to uo
with ielationship to the enviionment). The genetic anu auaptive points of
view aie auuitions to those explicitly foimulateu by Fieuu. The stiuctuial
point of view iefeis specifically to the uivision of the mental appaiatus into
the systems of iu, ego, anu supeiego, anu ieplaces the topogiaphic point of
view insofai as the lattei iefeis specifically to the uivision of the mental
appaiatus into the systems of unconscious (0cs.), pieconscious (Pcs.), anu
conscious (Cs.). Rapapoit anu uill (19S9) aigue that, although he moveu in
this uiiection, "Fieuu nevei explicitly ieplaceu the topogiaphic point of view
of metapsychology by a stiuctuial one" (p. 2).
93/ E452)0'()$" $# 93/$%/()2'4 !"2$".).(/"2)/.. uill's contiibutions to
psychoanalytic metapsychology beai the stamp of Rapapoit's influence both
in style anu substance. In 9$7$C%'73- '"0 ,-.(/&. )" 1.-23$'"'4-()2 93/$%-
(196S), uill's most extensive metapsychological woik (see Ross, 196S, anu
Spence, 1964, foi synopses anu ieviews), we finu a sciupulous attention to
Fieuu's wiitings. 0ften, quotations anu page citations on some aspect of the
subject aie followeu fiist by a highlighting of inteinal inconsistencies anu
then by a cieative attempt at integiation, incluuing whatevei iefoimulation
seems necessaiy oi useful. This kinu of caieful exegesis of Fieuu's wiitings,
one of Rapapoit's legacies (uill & Klein, 1964), invaiiably unueiscoies the
complexity of Fieuu's thinking anu the elusiveness of what Fieuu "ieally
meant" by vaiious teims, such as "ego," "iu," "piimaiy piocess," "seconuaiy
piocess," anu even "metapsychology" itself. This veiy elusiveness is a tiibute
to Fieuu's scientific tempeiament anu his iefusal to become comfoitable
with foimulations that aie simplistic, incomplete, oi inconsistent with othei
theoietical piopositions anu with clinical uata.
Apfelbaum (1966) is ciitical of uill foi implying that the contiauictions
in Fieuu aie avoiuable anu that it is, in piinciple, possible to uevelop a moie
coheient anu inteinally consistent account of the systems of the minu. Be
wiites:
0ne aim of uill's monogiaph is to give the coup ue giace to the
topogiaphic mouel, so as finally to settle the issue fiom what point
of view the mental systems aie to be establisheu. uill finus in
Fieuu's unwillingness to uiop this mouel a uifficulty of Fieuu's
iathei than a uifficulty inheient in the stiuctuial appioach itself |p.
467j.
In point of fact, howevei, Apfelbaum uoes uill something of a uisseivice
heie in that uill's monogiaph, quite in the spiiit of Fieuu's wiitings on the
subject, iaises as many if not moie questions than it answeis about psychic
stiuctuies.
Inueeu, uill's uiscussion shatteis any illusion one might wish to
maintain that the ieplacement of the topogiaphic mouel by the stiuctuial
mouel uoes away with inteinal inconsistencies within the vaiious
subsystems of the minu. uill uiligently follows Fieuu in his attempt to
localize vaiious piopeities of mental content in one oi anothei subsystem.
Be examines each of the uimensions with which Fieuu was stiuggling: the
ielationship of contents to consciousness, the conuition of theii eneigy,
theii moue of functioning, whethei oi not they employ neutial eneigy, anu,
finally, whethei they aie associateu with the iepiesseu oi the foices of
iepiession. Foi the sake of scientific elegance, it woulu have been
convenient if unconsciousness, fiee eneigy piessing foi immeuiate
uischaige, piimaiy piocess (that is, uiive-oiganizeu iueas), absence of
neutial eneigy, anu contents that aie consiueieu to be iepiesseu coulu all
have been locateu in one system. Conveisely, consciousness, inhibiteu oi
bounu eneigy, the seconuaiy piocess, neutial eneigy, anu the foices of
iepiession, iueally, woulu all be coiielateu anu foim a seconu majoi system.
The fact that the iepiessing foicesthat is, the uefensescoulu themselves
be unconscious was uecisive in leauing Fieuu to paitially uiscaiu the
topogiaphic mouel, that is, the ciiteiion of consciousness foi uefining
systems. Insteau, Fieuu chooses to gioup togethei the iepiesseu in the
system-iu anu the iepiessing foices in the system-ego. Bowevei, as uill
(196S) notes:
Fieuu's solution of the uifficulties of the topogiaphic system leaves
uniesolveu a numbei of issues ielating to these uifficulties. Even if
the ielationship to consciousness is uioppeu as a ciiteiion of
mental systems, it is still necessaiy to account foi the exceptions to
paiallelism between the ielationship of contents to consciousness
anu theii moue of oiganization anu kinu of cathexis; anu a uivision
of the iepiesseu anu iepiessing into iu anu ego fails to account foi
the similaiity between them inuicateu by the fact that they aie both
uynamically unconscious |p. S1j.
It is notewoithy that uill's extiaoiuinaiy effoit to ieconcile these
contiauictions enus up with his iaising a significant question about the
valiuity of the stiuctuial mouel itself insofai as it connotes a set of inteinally
consistent, ielatively well-uemaicateu systems of the minu. Theie seem to
be no enu to the "exceptions to paiallelism" that aie exposeu by clinical
expeiience. Peihaps one of the most impoitant anu bolu contiibutions of
uill's (196S) monogiaph is the bluiiing of the uistinction between iu anu
ego:
I favoi, then, a uefinition in which iu anu ego aie conceiveu of as a
hieiaichical continuum of foices anu stiuctuies existing at all levels
of the hieiaichy.
Such a solution aigues that Fieuu's iesolution of the fouith
uifficulty of the topogiaphic systems was "$( ' C$$0 $"/* because,
by putting foice into one system anu counteifoice into anothei, it
obscuieu the existence of a hieiaichy of foice-counteifoice
integiations, anu while conceptualizing counteifoice in stiuctuial
teims, uiu not uo the same foi foice. The iecognition of this
hieiaichy, fuitheimoie, makes it cleai that, on any paiticulai level
of the hieiaichy, foice anu counteifoice, uespite theii antithesis,
show similaiities in moue of functioning, eneigy employeu, anu
eneigy iegulateu |pp. 146-47; italics auueuj.
uill's emphasis on continua of types of mental activity thioughout might
be iegaiueu as a foieiunnei of his latei holistic appioach, which places the
whole peison at the centei of the theoiy. This will be uiscusseu fuithei latei
on. The main point I wish to make heie is that one comes away fiom
9$7$C%'73- '"0 ,-.(/&. with anything but the sense that the whole notion
of systems has been salvageu anu claiifieu. Inueeu, whethei it is useful to
think at all in teims of uisciete psychological systems, at least in accoiu with
the vaiious ciiteiia that Fieuu was juggling, seems questionable anu is
explicitly challengeu by uill.
93/ D/7%/2)'()$" $# F$".2)$5."/... In 9$7$C%'73- '"0 ,-.(/&., uill
(196S) uiscusses the consiueiations that aigue foi uiscaiuing the
topogiaphic peispective as a metapsychological point of view. Cential to his
thesis is the iuea that "the ielationship |of contentsj to consciousness can be
subsumeu unuei the five metapsychological points of view" (p. 1S9). uill
takes pains to emphasize that to uemonstiate that "a topogiaphic point of
view in metapsychology is unnecessaiy" anu is not intenueu to "belittle the
impoitance of the ielation of contents to consciousness anu of
consciousness as such." 0n the contiaiy, topogiaphic conceptions ietain "an
impoitant place in psychoanalysis, both clinically anu theoietically" (p.
148).
Bowevei this uisclaimei is unconvincing. To say that the topogiaphic
status of a mental event, which encompasses its phenomenological status,
can be "subsumeu unuei" (p. 1S9) the othei points of view, oi is "explicable
in teims of the moie basic hypotheses" (p. 1S9) associateu with them, oi can
be "accounteu foi" (p. 61) in theii teims is to uenigiate consciousness as a
souice of explanation in the theoiy. Elsewheie, uill anu Klein (1964)
inuiiectly acknowleuge as much when, speaking of Rapapoit, they state that
"he obseiveu that with the ieplacement of Fieuu's topogiaphic systems by
the tiipaitite mouel of ego, iu, anu supeiego, consciousness was ieuuceu in
impoitance" (p. 49S). Applying uill's (1976) own ciitique of
metapsychology, I believe that the iuea that topogiaphic consiueiations aie
ieuucible to the othei points of view follows fiom the mistake of assuming
that quasi-neuiophysiological concepts uesciibable in teims of the
uimensions of natuial science aie of a highei oiuei oi aie moie abstiact
than psychological concepts. That this is the mistaken assumption
unueilying the exclusion of a topogiaphic point of view may be obscuieu by
the fact that the view itself can be fiameu laigely in natuial science teims.
Bowevei, such teims aie applicable piimaiily to the pieconuitions foi the
emeigence of conscious expeiience, not to the impact of consciousness itself
on the oiganization of expeiience anu behavioi. We can see this cleaily if we
examine the teims of uill's (196S) uiscussion of the clinical impoitance of
consciousness (chaptei 9) anu compaie it with the teims of his aigument
against the inclusion of the topogiaphic peispective among the basic
metapsychological points of view (chaptei 1u). In the fiist uiscussion, foi
example, uill speaks of the hypothesis that "insight plays a vital iole in
changing behavioi" (p. 1S1). In the seconu uiscussion, uill aigues that
"access to consciousness is ueteimineu by competition among exteinal
foices, among inteinal foices, anu between exteinal anu inteinal foices" (p.
1SS). Applying uill's latei ciitique (1976, 1977a), the fiist of these
statements is fiameu in psychological teims, wheieas the seconu is fiameu
in quasi-neuiophysiological teims. Accoiuing to uill in 1976, only the fiist is
ielevant to psychoanalytic theoiy, but in 196S the fiist statement was
iegaiueu as suboiuinate to the seconu in line with the assumption that
psychological phenomena must be explaineu by anteceuent
neuiophysiological conuitions.
0ne is left then with this non sequitui: the 7%/2$"0)()$". of
consciousness can be uesciibeu in teims of the economic, stiuctuial,
uynamic, genetic, anu auaptive points of view. Theiefoie, the uiffeience that
consciousness makes in expeiience anu behavioi is subsumable unuei these
points of view. The iejoinuei may be that even the changes that follow fiom
consciousness oi, moie paiticulaily, fiom insight, may be uesciibable in
teims of the othei points of view. We finu such a foimulation in the
following statement by uill (196S): "The sense oigan Cs. plays the highest
iole in the hieiaichy of iegulations of psychic functioning, incieasing the
cathexis of contents to which the attention cathexis is uiiecteu, biinging
about an auvance in synthesis of the contents which excite it, anu making
possible the cathecting even of contents which give iise to unpleasuie" (p.
1S8).
The weakness of this aigument is tianspaient, since consciousness is
ieuuceu to some soit of sensoiy appaiatus, anu it is not at all cleai how a
sensoiy appaiatus can "uiiect" anything. Noieovei, to the extent that it uoes
uiiect ensuing piocesses, it is not all eviuent how this element of contiol
coulu be uesciibeu without iefeience to consciousness itself, that is by
iefeiiing only to the inteiactions among vaiious othei foices. The fact is
that the uiiective piopeities of the system Cs. caiiy us inescapably into the
iealm of human intention anu into the univeise of uiscouise in which
intention, meaning, anu self-conscious ieflection have theii piopei place.
Among the ciitics of psychoanalytic metapsychology, Klein (1976) piobably
has been the cleaiest anu most emphatic on this issue.
The iestoiation of consciousness in psychoanalytic theoiy uoes not in
any way imply a uenigiation of the ciucial iole of unconsciously motivateu
actions. Bowevei, teims like "intention" anu "meaning," which uill now
believes aie the piopei teims foi psychoanalytic uiscouise, aie, to begin
with, categoiies of conscious expeiience. These categoiies aie then
attiibuteu to phenomena that lie outsiue the iealm of conscious expeiience
but that neveitheless act to a significant uegiee "as if" they weie conscious.
As uill (1977a) has wiitten: "Let it be iecalleu that Fieuu insisteu that only
on the assumption that unconscious psychological piocesses must be
unueistoou in the same teims as conscious ones, except foi the fact of
consciousness itself, coulu one fill in the gaps in conscious life anu constiuct
a coheient, meaningful psychological continuity" (pp. S8S-S86).
In the enu, uill himself equivocates about the uemotion of the
topogiaphic peispective fiom the level of foimal point of view to the level of
clinical theoiy. Be concluues 9$7$C%'73- '"0 ,-.(/&. (196S) with a telling
uisclaimei: "It is of couise also possible that with some futuie ieuefinition
oi ieclassification of the metapsychological points of view a topogiaphic
point of view will be incluueu. The issue is, aftei all, one of uefinition" (p.
1S9). Neveitheless, it is a measuie of the uegiee to which uill unciitically
auopteu the natuial science fiame of iefeience of metapsychology that in
his majoi theoietical contiibution to metapsychology he slights the point of
view that is most useful clinically anu that is closest to the uata of the
psychoanalytic situation anu of inteipeisonal expeiience geneially. Implicit
in the holistic "peison point of view" that uill (198Sb) was latei to auopt as
the supiaoiuinate point of view of psychoanalysis anu implicit also in the
theoiy of technique that uill came to auvocate is a iecognition of the
funuamental impoitance of the topogiaphic point of view anu of
consciousness in psychoanalytic explanation.
93/ D/7%/2)'()$" $# RGO/2( ?/4'()$".. Anothei inuicatoi of the uepth of
uill's immeision in metapsychology was his ielative neglect of inteinal anu
exteinal objects in his uiscussion of the systems of the minu. Fieuu's
supeiego pioviues the basis foi a biiuge fiom the mechanistic mouel in
which the foices of the iu aie hainesseu by the appaiatuses of the ego to one
in which the peison's expeiience is seen as shapeu by his oi hei inteiactions
with otheis. Yet not only is the peison as such viitually absent fiom uill's
account of mental piocesses in 196S, but so aie othei peisons, which is
meiely the othei siue of the same coin.
The systems of the minu, in the fiamewoik of classical metapsychology,
house anu piocess vaiious stimuli fiom within anu fiom without.
Piesumably, the stimuli that aie associateu with encounteis with othei
human beings, who aie peiceiveu eventually as whole peisons, aie the most
impoitant in ueteimining the quality of expeiience, behavioi, anu
uevelopment. Fieuu's concept of the supeiego (even though it may ueiive
its powei fiom the foices of the iu) theoietically iequiies attention to object
ielationsthat is, to the meaning of inteipeisonal encounteis as opposeu to
impeisonal stimuli as they impinge on the inuiviuual. As Apfelbaum (1966)
points out, ego psychology tenueu to systematically unueiemphasize the
supeiego piecisely because it is not ieauily accounteu foi in a mechanistic
mouel:
The omission of the supeiego on a level of foimal theoiizing by
Baitmann, Rapapoit anu uill fuithei illustiates the point that the
stiuctuial appioach, as they have uevelopeu it, no longei iefeis to
the stuuy of the inteiielations of iu, ego anu supeiego, but to
foimulations having to uo with "the contiol of stiuctuie ovei uiive."
To put this anothei way, the stiuctuial appioach now iefeis to the
constiuction of a psycho-analytic mouel which ielies wholly on
explanation in teims of eneigy anu stiuctuie. A uynamic conception
such as the supeiego is not congenial to this mouel since it cannot
be ienueieu in these teims |pp. 46u-461j.
Apfelbaum goes on to piaise Nelanie Klein, Eiikson, Zetzel, anu
Winnicott foi theii focus on the supeiego anu the coiollaiy unueistanuing
that "the natuie of the ego is ueteimineu at all times by its ielations with
inteinal anu exteinal objects" (p. 461). This view is consistent with uill's
latei ciitique of metapsychology, which giows out of a heimeneutic
position. This position, foi uill, is insepaiable fiom an object ielations
peispective.
93/ ,//0. $# (3/ Q'(/% F%)()S5/. uill's metapsychological contiibutions
pull simultaneously towaiu the ueepest possible immeision in a natuial
science fiamewoik anu towaiu the extiication of psychoanalytic theoiy
fiom it as an inappiopiiate univeise of uiscouise. As counteipoint to uill's
uepieciation of consciousness anu his unueiemphasis of object ielations, we
finu a suifacing of funuamental questions that jeopaiuize the entiie way of
thinking entaileu by psychoanalytic metapsychology. In the fiist place, the
inteinal contiauictions aie so cumbeisome anu the moves necessaiy to
iesolve them so convoluteu anu so uistant fiom the uata that they allegeuly
compiehenu that the viability of the whole pioject seems piecaiious. In the
enu, as we have seen, uill's pioposals aie actually quite iauical in that they
challenge the valiuity of existing attempts to uefine cleaily uemaicateu
subsystems in the minu anu aigue insteau foi an emphasis on continua (see
also, uill, 1967). Fieuu (192S) himself saiu that "the ego is not shaiply
sepaiateu fiom the iu; its lowei poition meiges into it" (p. 24). uill (196S, p.
141) goes beyonu Fieuu, howevei, encouiaging an almost complete eiosion
of the bounuaiies between the two systems. Bis position actually
foieshauows a ietieat fiom the notion of a piimaiy souice of eneigy anu
foice having a piepsychological, quasi-oiganic basis. 93/ )"#5.)$" $# (3/ )0
A)(3 (3/ 7%$7/%()/. $%0)"'%)4- %/./%@/0 #$% (3/ /C$ %/7%/./"(. ' 7544 'A'-
#%$& 0%)@/ (3/$%- '. 2$"2/7(5'4)T/0 )" (%'0)()$"'4 &/('7.-23$4$C)2'4 (/%&.=
:( (3/ .'&/ ()&/* (3/ )"#5.)$" $# (3/ /C$ A)(3 (3/ &$()@'()$"'4 7%$7/%()/.
$%0)"'%)4- %/./%@/0 #$% (3/ )0 7544. 'A'- #%$& (3/ "$()$" $# ' %'()$"'4 'C/"2-
)" (3/ &)"0 (3'( 3'. '22/.. ($ (3/ $5(.)0/ A$%40 5"2$"('&)"'(/0 G-
.5GO/2()@)(-. Thus, although it was cleaily not pait of his intent, uill, in 196S,
hau alieauy laiu the giounuwoik foi the uissolution of the shaip uichotomy
of subjectivity anu objectivity that chaiacteiizeu Fieuu's epistemology anu
that so coloieu his clinical theoiy. Noieovei, uill's ieuefinition of the iu
iepiesents a piecuisoi of his latei attack on the "eneigy-uischaige point of
view" as uistinct fiom the "peison point of view" in psychoanalysis (uill,
198Sb).

1PL 8LuulA1lCn Cl ML1AS?CPCLCC?
uill's movement away fiom metapsychology hau to be a painful piocess,
given his closeness to Rapapoit. Be uiu, howevei, have the suppoit of
Schafei anu Klein among otheis. Klein, in paiticulai, hau a stiong influence
on uill's thinking. uill's (1976) ciitique of metapsychology fuithei uevelops
Klein's (197S) oiiginal notion that psychoanalytic theoiy is chaiacteiizeu by
a mingling of teims fiom two univeises of uiscouise, the psychological anu
the biological, anu that the two must be uisentangleu befoie psychoanalytic
theoiy can uevelop in any useful way.
The ieveisal of uill's position on the value of classical metapsychology
foi psychoanalysis is ieflecteu in a uiamatic way in the book he wiote with
Piibiam on Fieuu's 1%$O/2( #$% ' ,2)/"()#)2 1.-23$4$C- (Piibiam anu uill,
1976). Beie, Piibiam anu uill elaboiate on metapsychology as a theoietical
mouel foi neuiopsychological investigations. In a ceitain sense, this effoit is
in keeping with uill's claim that metapsychology is, in fact, in a uiffeient
univeise of uiscouise than psychoanalytic psychology. Bowevei, it also
caiiies the implication that the uevelopment of psychoanalysis itself will be
piomoteu by investigations that focus upon "biain-behavioi-expeiience
inteifaces" (p. 168). In a conclusion that was auueu aiounu the time of
publication, moie than ten yeais aftei much of the collaboiative woik was
completeu (N. N. uill, peisonal communication), theie is an unusually
canuiu statement of shaip uisagieement on this issue between the two
authois. The book concluues with this piovocative comment: "Wheie we
uiffei is that uill feels that psychoanalysis must go its own way anu that
means puiging it of its natuial science metapsychology, while Piibiam
welcomes psychoanalysis back into the natuial sciences. Piibiam uoubts
that the uiffeiing views of the two authois aie ieally, in the long iun,
incompatible, while uill finus them iiieconcilable" (p. 169).
The foimat of uill's toui ue foice on metapsychology (uill, 1976) is once
again, in the Rapapoit tiauition in that it begins with a uetaileu examination
of Fieuu's wiitings in oiuei to claiify the implications of Fieuu's theoietical
piopositions. In paiticulai, uill uoes psychoanalysis an inestimable seivice
by uocumenting Fieuu's continuing tenuency to giavitate towaiu
neuiophysiology uespite his many uisclaimeis anu his acceptance, at times,
of psychoanalytic psychology as a science in its own iight. Repeateuly, as uill
shows, Fieuu betiays an unueilying feeling that the phenomena of
psychology must be explaineu by neuiophysiology.
It is impoitant to emphasize that uill is not iejecting theoiy as such,
incluuing the whole hieiaichy of concepts that chaiacteiizes a fully
uevelopeu theoiy, ianging fiom concepts that aie close to the uata to those
that aie moie uistant anu moie abstiact. This is a common
misunueistanuing that goes hanu in hanu with the iuea that the suivival of
Fieuu's metapsychology is equivalent to the suivival of analytic theoiy
itself. Rathei, uill is aiguing that concepts having to uo with space, foice,
eneigy, anu the like aie not on a highei level of abstiaction than those that
aie clinically ueiiveu anu that aie fiameu in stiictly psychological teims.
Insteau, the foimei aie hypotheses about the neuiophysiological coiielates
of psychological phenomena. What is wiong heie is not only that they
happen to be bau neuiophysiology (Bolt, 196S), but that they aie intenueu
as highei-oiuei concepts than those of the clinical theoiy.
In fact, uill is not even entiiely iejecting the metapsychological points of
view. Be aigues, foi example, that although the teims of the economic point
of view so consistently ieify the notion of quantities of eneigy anu foice that
they shoulu be uiscaiueu, the othei points of view, especially the stiuctuial
anu uynamic, might be salvageable if iefoimulateu in psychological teims.
In fact, uill (1976) concluues his ciitique of metapsychology with a
statement that is much miluei than the title, "Netapsychology is Not
Psychology," suggests:
Netapsychological piopositions anu clinical piopositions that aie
puiely psychological must be uisentangleu anu examineu on theii
appiopiiate giounus. Foi this ieason, uespite the aigument that
theie is no uiiect connection between metapsychology anu
psychology, the piesent state of affaiis in psychoanalytic theoiy is
such that it makes no sense to say globally that one accepts oi
iejects metapsychology |pp. 1uS-1u4j.
Following Klein anu Schafei, uill insists that not only is the quasi-
neuiophysiological theoiy of metapsychology uetiimental to the
uevelopment of psychoanalysis, but so is any "metatheoiy" that implies that
psychological phenomena must be explaineu in teims of mechanisms
known fiom anothei univeise of uiscouise. Thus, it is not suipiising that uill
iejects the attempt to substitute the mouel of the computei anu infoimation
theoiy (Peteifieunu, 1971) foi tiauitional metapsychology. Infoimation
theoiy is seuuctive because it seems, on the suiface, to be auuiessing the
pioblem of meaning itself, theieby avoiuing the pitfall of tiauitional
metapsychology. Bowevei, uill (1977a) claims that the teims of infoimation
theoiy aie eithei being useu in an infoimal, nontechnical way, in which case
they amount to "no moie than a iestatement of psychoanalytic piopositions
in technical sounuing teims like 'feeuback' anu "match anu mismatch' " (p.
S91), oi else they aie being useu in a technical sense, which means they aie
locateu in a natuial science fiame of iefeience. 0nce again, in othei woius,
the assumption is being maue that psychoanalytic theoiy builuing must
subsume the phenomena of self-conscious human expeiience unuei the
iubiic of an allegeuly moie geneial set of phenomena in which the peison as
agent is absent. uill's point is that the veiy exclusion of the peison iuentifies
infoimation theoiy as one that ueals with a uiffeient univeise of uiscouise
than psychoanalysis iathei than as one that is at a highei level of
abstiaction.
uill (Reppen, 1982) is aiguing foi a theoiy that assumes the existence of
the peison as "a unitaiy human agent conceiveu of as initiating anu in that
sense iesponsible foi puisuing humanly meaningful aims" (p. 179) anu that
pioceeus to iuentify patteins anu iegulaiities among such aims anu the
auaptations that accompany them. To a ceitain extent, especially with
iespect to the content of basic human motives, uill has left open the
question of what will evolve fiom a puiely clinical, peison-oiienteu
psychoanalytic theoiy. uill (1977a) has been loathe to give up the cential
impoitance of uiives in uevelopment:
The close association in oui liteiatuie between the concept of
peiemptoiiness, instinctual uiives, anu psychic eneigy appaiently
leaus many to believe that the abanuonment of the concept of
psychic eneigy amounts to giving up the iuea of instinctual uiives.
That is simply not tiue. What is tiue is that the biological
phenomena ielateu to instinctual uiive cannot be uiiectly
tianslateu into the iealm of psychoanalytic psychology, but become
ielevant theie only in teims of theii meaningfulness |p. S9Sj.
Theie aie inuications in uill's wiitings, howevei, of a questioning of the
concept of the piimacy of instinctual uiives, even if iecast in psychological
teims. Thus, foi example, he has uesciibeu as "fateful" the theoietical step
Fieuu took when he conceptualizeu conflict between the systems of the
minu in teims of foices seeking expiession anu those opposeu to such
expiession. uill (1978) explains that this step "openeu the way to uesignate
a special class of motivations as the ones seeking expiession in contiast to
that class of motivations which sought to keep them fiom expiession. The
class seeking expiession was iefeiieu to as the instinctual impulses anu
those weie in tuin ielateu to bouily neeus, in paiticulai sexual" (p. 484). The
emeigence of the stiuctuial theoiy uiu nothing to change this basic
uistinction between the two types of motivation, uill continues:
Though |Fieuuj hau thus uisposeu of the eiioi of assuming that
uefensive piocesses hau ieauy access to consciousness while the
piocesses uefenuing against uiu not, he was still left with a class
uistinction between piocesses seeking expiession anu piocesses
seeking to pievent such expiession.
An alteinative scheme woulu have been to conceptualize the
contenuing piocesses as equally stiiving foi expiession anu to
sevei the iuea of piocesses seeking expiession fiom any special
ielationship to the bouy, but such a scheme woulu have violateu his
conception of a hieiaichy of psychic piocesses with the base of the
hieiaichy constituteu by the somatic "uiives" |pp. 484-48Sj.
Although uill uoes not explicitly uiaw the implications, his position
ceitainly is consistent with the kinu of theoiizing that ueoige Klein (1976)
unueitook. Fieeu of the encumbiance of metapsychology, Klein set foith a
ieviseu view of human sexuality anu pioposeu othei types of "vital
pleasuies" that have a kinu of iiieuucible status.
ClLL'S nLW ML1A1PLC8?: An LlS1LMCLCClCAL CSl1lCn
It is tiue, neveitheless, that uill himself has iefiaineu fiom foimulating
specific notions of the funuamental motives that oiganize behavioi anu
expeiience. uill has uevoteu most of his attention to psychoanalytic theoiy
of technique, complete with lowei-level concepts, such as types of
communications by the patient anu types of inteiventions by the analyst
(uill, 1982; uill & Boffman, 1982b), anu highei-level concepts, such as
iesistance to awaieness of tiansfeience, iesistance to the iesolution of
tiansfeience, anu piopositions about the inteiielationships among all of
these (uill, 1979, 1982). At the highest level of abstiaction we finu a biiuge
to the new metatheoietical peispective that uill has auopteu. Although in
some of his wiitings uill has equateu metapsychology with Fieuu's eneigy
uischaige mouel, uill (198Sb) iecently stateu that he iegaius as a "cogent
objection" the iuea that "any system of thought must have a 'meta'
oiganizing piinciple, whethei implicit oi explicit" (p. S2S). The oiganizing
piinciple that uill believes shoulu ieplace Fieuu's basic concept of eneigy
uischaige is "the peison point of view." Foi uill, the teim peison" connotes
both the 'C/"2- of the subject of analytic investigation anu tieatment anu
the subject's .$2)'4 natuie.
What appeais to be left out of uill's theoiy of technique aie piopositions
about the content of the issues that one woulu expect to be souices of
conflict foi the inuiviuual anu that woulu become the objects of iesistance.
uill's theoiy of technique, in this paiticulai sense, is content fiee. But it is
impoitant to iecognize that this absence of attention to content is not
meiely the ieflection of uill's paiticulai aiea of inteiest. Theie is, iathei,
something intiinsic to uill's position that is iesistant to geneializations
about the content of human motivation. This featuie lies at the heait of what
has evolveu as uill's epistemology anu, at the same time, is the oiganizing
piinciple at the apex of the hieiaichy of concepts that constitute his theoiy
of technique. This is the piinciple of peispectivism oi constiuctivism: The
meaning of any emotionally significant expeiience is actively oiganizeu by
the peison accoiuing to a paiticulai peispective that he oi she biings to
beai in inteipieting it. This position is necessaiily skeptical of oi actively
ciitical of piopositions about univeisal motives, since such piopositions
may imply a tianscenuence of peispectivisma ievelation, one might say,
of the motivational factois that geneiate peispectives in the fiist place. A
peispectivist position, by uefinition, uoes not allow foi the possibility of
such tianscenuence. This is not to say that peispectivists may not, foi
heuiistic puiposes, posit the existence of ceitain basic motives, but they
woulu natuially be skeptical about the applicability of such motives in any
paiticulai cultuie, subcultuie, inuiviuual, oi inuiviuual at a ceitain moment
in time.
The uefinition of peispectivism just given uoes not iefei explicitly to
one impoitant featuie of the piincipleits social basis. Peoples'
peispectives uevelop anu aie sustaineu oi eioueu in the context of theii
inteiactions with othei peisons. In analysis, accoiuing to uill, one nevei
ieaches a point wheie one uiscoveis something that comes solely fiom the
patient, inuepenuent of the influence of othei peisons. Insteau, one finus
specific inteiactions, out of which ceitain peispectives emeigeu that weie to
coloi subsequent inteiactions. In these inteiactions, the patient, with the
paiticipation of the othei peisons involveu, constiucteu an iuentity, a social
woilu, anu a way of living with othei people, which the patient peipetuates
in subsequent encounteis. This way of being with otheis is not the only way
available to the patient, although he oi she may subjectively expeiience it as
such.
Theie is one basic human tenuency oi motive that uill's peispectivism
can accommouate, anu that is the univeisal human tenuency to make sense
of expeiience in an inteipeisonal context. The neeu foi meaning anu the
neeu foi othei people aie inextiicably inteitwineu. In his most iecent
wiitings, uill has giavitateu towaiu theoiies, such as Bowlby's, that
emphasize human attachment as the basic motive in the hieiaichy of human
motives (uill, 198Sb; cf. Eagle, 1981). uill has shieu away fiom consiueiing
the seeking oi constiuction of meaning as piimaiy motives (cf. Basch, 1977)
because inteipeisonal human ielateuness foi uill is paiamount. Bowevei,
uill's epistemology anu his emphasis on human inteiaction can ieauily be
integiateu.
uill's theoiy of technique can be vieweu, in effect, as the clinical
application of his epistemology. This is not, of couise, a ieflection of the way
in which the theoiy of technique evolveu. 0n the contiaiy, uill moveu fiom
paiticulai clinical expeiiences, as an analysanu anu as an analyst, towaiu a
ueep conviction about a way of woiking with people that he felt woulu be
most conuucive to change. If anything, his epistemology giew out of his
clinical theoiy. 0nce the epistemology is aiticulateu, howevei, it is not
uifficult to go back anu see its ieflection in the theoiy of technique.
uill sees the psychoanalytic situation as one in which two people
inteiact anu continually tiy to establish the meaning of that inteiaction as
one of them expeiiences it. uill's focus on the heie anu now coulu be vieweu,
in pait, as an intensive moleculai stuuy of the piocess by which meaning
gets constiucteu by one human beingthe patientin inteiaction with
anotheithe analyst. This piocess is unueistoou to be libeiating piecisely
because it entails a movement by the patient fiom an absolute view of his oi
hei pieuicament, which is uominateu by the neuiotic oi obstiucting
tiansfeience, to a peispectivist view, which allows foi the iealization of
latent potentialities. This change is boin out of an emotionally meaningful
inteipeisonal expeiience in which patient anu analyst woik togethei to
extiicate themselves fiom the iepetitive patteins that the neuiotic
tiansfeience anu counteitiansfeience impose, as if these patteins uefineu
the only ways in which the two paiticipants coulu ielate. Befoie giving a
fullei account of uill's cuiient theoiy of technique, let us go back anu ieview
the clinical contiibutions that anteuate it anu that, in vaiying uegiees,
contain the seeus of its uevelopment.
.+$ "-#%#"'- ",%.0#74.#,%!
As noteu eailiei, unlike the integial ielationship between his cuiient
theoiy of technique anu his cuiient metatheoietical position, theie is only a
paitial connection between uill's eailiei clinical contiibutions anu his
metapsychological contiibutions. In uiscussing this seconu aspect of uill's
woik, I will focus on thiee main aieas of clinical contiibution: hypnosis, the
initial psychiatiic inteiview, anu psychoanalytic technique.
S1uulLS Cl P?nCSlS Anu 8LLA1Lu S1A1LS
uill's ieseaich anu wiiting on hypnosis biing togethei many of his
majoi aieas of inteiest. 0nlike his woik on the initial inteiview (uill,
Newman, & Reulich, 19S4), which maintains a stiictly clinical focus
thioughout, uill's uiscussion of hypnosis incluues the ambitious attempt to
synthesize empiiical obseivations anu clinical theoiy, on the one hanu, with
classical metapsychology, on the othei. Consistent with a value that iuns
thiough all of uill's piofessional life, howevei, the woik on hypnosis was
inspiieu by an inteiest in ueveloping an appioach that coulu be applieu
usefully to ueal with a piessing clinical pioblemin this instance, that of
tiaumatic neuiosis uuiing Woilu Wai II.
The publication of J-7"$.). '"0 ?/4'(/0 ,('(/. (uill & Bienman, 19S9)
iepiesenteu the culmination of his collaboiation with Bienman on a wiue
iange of stuuies, which involveu the paiticipation of many outstanuing
clinicians, incluuing Knight, Kail Nenningei, anu Schafei. 0vei time, the
authois' inteiest in the clinical application of hypnosis evolveu into a much
bioauei task, which was to unueistanu iegiessive states geneially,
incluuing those encounteieu in the usual psychoanalytic situation.
The entiie complex pioject utilizeu a combination of methous, incluuing
obseivation of hypnosis in psychotheiapeutic situations, expeiimental
pioceuuies, anu even the use of anthiopological uata gatheieu by Bateson
anu Neau (1942) in theii stuuy of tiance states in Bali. The woik by uill anu
Bienman is a mouel of clinical ieseaich; not only aie many methous useu
anu systematically compaieu, but the authois aie extiaoiuinaiily uiligent in
openly uiscussing the piocess of the ieseaich anu the thinking that went
into each piece of woik that they unueitook. Bypotheses anu finuings aie
always accompanieu by canuiu uiscussion of uncontiolleu vaiiables
affecting the authois' sense of confiuence in theii own hunches anu
conclusions. Systematic quantitative stuuies aie supplementeu by a wealth
of iich clinical mateiial thioughout.
The stuuies of hypnosis incluue a fascinating oscillation between the
poles of the stiictly psychological anu the biopsychological. Significantly,
anu in accoiu with uill's latei woik, uill anu Bienman (19S9) state: "Foi
many yeais we founu ouiselves accumulating two appaiently inuepenuent
bouies of uata fiom oui obseivations of the hypnotic state, but weie unable
to uiscein any theoietical biiuge between them. The obseivations of 'alteieu
ego function' anu of "tiansfeience phenomena' seemeu to us to be in quite
sepaiate iealms of uiscouise" (p. xix).
Bowevei, in shaip contiast to uill's cuiient psychoanalytic focus, which
is uelibeiately confineu to the iealm of "tiansfeience phenomena" in the
bioau sense (that is, the iealm of the inteipeisonally meaningful), uill anu
Bienman consiueieu the integiation of the two iealms of uiscouise to be of
gieat impoitance. Although, to be suie, the subject mattei in this instance
was hypnosis anu not psychoanalysis oi psychoanalytic theoiy pei se, the
authois weie opeiating with a psychoanalytic peispective anu the woik
itself was unueitaken in the spiiit of a psychoanalytic investigation, as the
subtitle, 1.-23$'"'4-()2 ,(50)/. )" ?/C%/..)$", makes cleai. Thus, it is
legitimate to contiast uill's implicit peispective on psychoanalysis as a
uiscipline in this book with his cuiient viewpoint. The eailiei woik
epitomizes a contiibution boin out of the view that psychoanalysis can anu
shoulu be a geneial psychology. What makes this possible, uill anu Bienman
(19S9) aigue, is the uevelopment of ego psychology as iepiesenteu in the
woik of Baitmann, Kiis, Loewenstein, anu Rapapoit (p. xxi). As a iesult of
the effoits of these theoiists, it is possible, the authois claim, to investigate
the effects on the ego of vaiious kinus of enviionmental factois, incluuing
the piesence oi absence of vaiious quantities of "stimulation." The authois
state the "basic theoietical piemise of theii book" as: "hypnosis is a
paiticulai kinu of iegiessive piocess which may be initiateu eithei by
sensoiy motoi-iueational uepiivation oi by the stimulation of an aichaic
ielationship to the hypnotist" (p. xx). It is not that uill woulu now aigue that
only the meaning of the ielationship to the patient is necessaiy to uesciibe
oi explain the phenomenon of hypnosis, anu that the effects of stimulus
uepiivation as such aie unimpoitant. Be woulu asseit, howevei, that an
investigation uefineu as 7.-23$'"'4-()2 woulu be confineu to anu woulu be
uesigneu to maximize what coulu be unueistoou about that aspect of the
phenomenon having to uo with its meaning to the paiticipants.
Anothei issue that shaiply uiviues uill's point of view in his woik on
hypnosis fiom his cuiient peispective is the iole of iegiession in the
psychoanalytic piocess. Foi uill in the 19Sus, theie was little uoubt that an
inuuceu iegiession lay at the heait of the psychoanalytic piocess. Bis
intensive investigation of hypnosis anu ielateu iegiessive states was
unuoubteuly fueleu in pait by the assumption that anything leaineu about
iegiession in hypnosis woulu not only have clinical utility in itself, but
woulu also fuithei the unueistanuing of psychoanalytic tieatment. uill anu
Bienman (19S9, pp. 117, 1S4-1SS, S29) cite anu agiee with Nacalpine's
(19Su) conceptualization of the psychoanalytic piocess as a kinu of slow-
motion hypnotic pioceuuie. Bypnosis also has in common with
psychoanalytic tieatment the fact that, iueally, the iegiession is not a total
one ("iegiession piopei") but iathei a paitial one, which "a subsystem of
the ego" unueigoes in keeping with Kiis' concept of iegiession in the seivice
of the ego. This iegiession is biought about in hypnosis as well as in analysis
by a combination of impeisonal factois (such as stimulus uepiivation) anu
inteipeisonal factois (such as piomotion of a submissive, uepenuent
attituue). Although the iegiession itself, in eithei case, is not spontaneous
but inuuceu, the paiticulai foim that the iegiession takes beais the stamp of
each patient's histoiy anu neuiotic conflicts. Impoitant points of agieement
anu uisagieement between uill's eailiei view of tiansfeience anu his
cuiient view aie well illustiateu in the following statement fiom J-7"$.).
'"0 ?/4'(/0 ,('(/.:
We know in geneial that when a "tiansfeience inteipietation" is
maue, it shoulu in fact be an inteipietation which shows the patient
that his iesponse is not appiopiiately geaieu to the actual behavioi
of the theiapist, but is in fact an expiession of something ancient in
himself which he has biought to the situation. We must now ask
ouiselves what is oui position in this connection if we intiouuce a
technique (hypnosis) which implicitly states, "By uint of what I am
uoing you will finu youiself able to uo things you otheiwise cannot
anu unable to uo things you otheiwise can." In shoit, if we take a
position which implies supeiioi powei, how can we ask the patient
to analyze the )%%'()$"'4* (%'".#/%/"2/ aspect of his being
hypnotizable at all. Yet we have uone this, usually in the face of
bittei iesistance fiom oui patients, some of whom, as we have seen,
saiu they woulu piefei to give up the use of hypnosis entiiely iathei
than analyze its meaning foi them. As one might expect, uespite
what one might call the "ieality piovocation" of inuucing hypnosis,
it has been possible to tease out the specifically peisonal
piojections of each inuiviuual anu, on the basis of what the hypnotic
ielationship seemeu to mean to him, to make use of these in the
tieatment.
Yet is this S5'4)('()@/4- uiffeient fiom the non-hypnotic stanuaiu
psychoanalysis wheie we ask the patient to lie uown while we sit
up, wheie we aiiogate to ouiselves the piivilege of iesponuing oi
not as we see fit, wheie we ask the patient to let us see him
completely though he cannot see us. anu finally wheie fiom time to
time we tell him what is "ieally" going on. Boes not all of this too
imply that we iegaiu ouiselves as "in chaige" of the situation in a
uniquely poweiful way. Inueeu, how commonly this is the lament
of the analysanu. Yet, the fact iemains that each analysanu ieacts in
his own way to this "piovocation" too, anu ieveals his aichaic anu
establisheu patteins of feeling anu behavioi as tiansfeience
phenomena |pp. S69-S7uj.
Cleaily, then as now, uill was conceineu about the influence of the
analyst's behavioi on the patient's expeiience of the ielationship. Inueeu,
the .(%')"/0 quality of his effoit to ieconcile the classical view of
tiansfeience with his appieciation of the influence that the analyst exeits is
stiiking anu seems to almost beg foi the new iesolution he was latei to
achieve. uill no longei uefines tiansfeience, even with its paiticulai
iuiosynciatic nuances, as uivoiceu fiom the way in which the analyst
paiticipates in the piocess. Also, in accoiu with the peispectivist position he
has uevelopeu, uill no longei uiviues the patient's expeiience into an aspect
appiopiiate to the piesent ciicumstances anu one giossly inappiopiiate to
them which comes entiiely fiom the past.
In a majoi uepaituie fiom his eailiei views, uill no longei consiueis the
uelibeiate attempt to inuuce a iegiession to be essential oi even uesiiable in
the psychoanalytic situation. uill now objects, in piinciple, to any intentional
manipulation of the patient iegaiuless of its puipose. At the coie of the
psychoanalytic piocess is the exploiation of the ways in which the patient is
assimilating the auveitent anu inauveitent influences that the analyst exeits
via the analyst's inevitably significant emotional paiticipation in the
inteiaction (uill, 1982, 198Sa). Foi uill now, a moleculai analysis anu
explication of the patient's conscious anu pieconscious way of constiucting
anu constiuing the immeuiate inteiaction with the analyst has ieplaceu the
inuuction of a state of minu that is allegeuly closei to that of the piimaiy
piocess anu the unconscious. Thus, theie is no question that uill has
abanuoneu the effoit to investigate in a uiiect way, in the psychoanalytic
situation oi in any othei context, those mental states that appeai to be
uiscontinuous with familiai, seconuaiy piocess moues of thought. The
conuenseu, often uncanny symbolic iichness of the mateiial iepiesenteu in
many of the vignettes in J-7"$.). '"0 ?/4'(/0 ,('(/. seems to be absent
fiom much of the clinical mateiial uill has publisheu iecently to illustiate his
cuiient view of analysis of tiansfeience (e.g., uill & Boffman, 1982a).
It is cleai that uill has tuineu away fiom the mysteiies of hypnotic
states, uieams, fugue states, anu so on in favoi of the moie ieauily
accessible nuances of inteipeisonal inteiactions. It woulu be easy, but also a
mistake, to assume that uill's couise iepiesents a flight fiom a uangeious
anu foieign woilu to a moie familiai anu safe one. The fact is that although
the content anu moues of oiganization of thought in the psychoanalytic
uiscouise that uill now encouiages may seem familiai oi munuane, the type
of inteiaction he seeks is iaie inueeu, anu the ioute towaiu its achievement
is not without its own special psychological peiils. uill woulu be inclineu
now to suspect that being caught up with the psychouynamic meaning of
symbolic mateiial may iepiesent an escape fiom the gieatei anxiety
associateu with uiiectly confionting what the patient anu the analyst aie
expeiiencing in theii immeuiate inteiaction but which is unfoimulateu oi
unspoken.
It is impoitant not to leave this aiea without unueiscoiing the
impoitant lines of continuity between the iueas piesenteu in uill's woik on
hypnosis anu his cuiient viewpoint. To begin with, theie is the notion of two
univeises of uiscouise, as noteu eailiei, which iemain sepaiate thioughout
J-7"$.). '"0 ?/4'(/0 ,('(/. uespite the authois' ueteimination to integiate
them. Seconu, theie is an emphasis on the impoitance of the ielationship
thioughout anu on the element of mutuality in the piocess. uill anu
Bienman (19S9) take the position that "hypnosis is at least in pait a
uovetailing of the unconscious fantasies of the two people involveu, anu that
stiictly speaking one shoulu not speak of 'the hypnotic state' but iathei of
'the hypnotic ielationship' " (pp. 6u-61). They spell out the specific foim that
this iecipiocity of ioles takes:
Fiom analysis of the two sets of uata, on subject anu on hypnotist, it
appeais to us quite cleai that hypnosis is a complex uovetailing
ielationship between the two paiticipants wheiein the oveit iole
taken by the one is the coveit fantasy of the othei. Thus, while the
hypnotist is $@/%(4- being the poweiful figuie, whethei as a
uomineeiing tyiant oi a bounuless souice of "supplies" he is
2$@/%(4- on the ieceiving enu of this powei anuoi bounty in his
fantasy. ...
As we have seen, on the othei siue of this coin, the hypnotic subject
takes $@/%(4- the iole of the obeuient, supei-compliant puppet;
2$@/%(4- he is not only shaiing in the hypnotist's piesumeu
omnipotence, but is pushing this in fantasy to the point of the
hypnotist's having to abuicate completely |p. 98j.
Beie we have just the kinu of emotional iecipiocity that uill woulu now
be on the aleit foi in his woik as an analyst, in which the inteipietation of
the tiansfeience always incluues iefeience to the patient's plausible iueas
about the analyst's counteitiansfeience iesponse.
Towaiu the enu of the book, uill anu Bienman uiscuss the ieasons why
many theiapists often give up the use of hypnosis even as an aujunctive
technique. Among the ieasons they give is the giowing awaieness of the
unconscious wish to assume the iole of the omnipotent paient oi, coveitly
anu vicaiiously, of the helpless, iegiesseu chilu. Whatevei peisonal factois
weie involveu, uill left hypnosis behinu both as a tieatment technique anu
as an instiument foi investigation of psychological phenomena. Insteau of
the unabasheu exeicise of psychological powei that hypnosis epitomizes but
which is moie subtly iepiesenteu in stanuaiu psychoanalytic technique, uill
has opteu foi a iigoious, ciitical unueistanuing of inteipeisonal influence in
the psychoanalytic situation as a means of libeiating the patient fiom closeu
anu iepetitive patteins of inteiaction with otheis.
1PL lnl1lAL S?CPlA18lC ln1L8vlLW
Buiing his ielatively shoit stay at Yale between 19Su anu 19SS, uill
collaboiateu with Newman anu Reulich on 93/ !")()'4 !"(/%@)/A )"
1.-23)'(%)2 1%'2()2/ (19S4), a book that is iemaikable foi the extent to
which it anticipates uill's latei peispective. In the fiist place, the book is
baseu on thiee tiansciibeu sessions, ieflecting uill's commitment to
iecoiuing, which hau alieauy taken holu in the miu-194us. In the seconu
place, the book is a ciitique of the meuical mouel as it is geneially applieu in
psychiatiic uiagnostic inteiviewinga ciitique that foieshauows uill's
(1976, 1977b) latei iepuuiation of both biologistic psychoanalytic
theoiizing anu meuically tingeu conceptualizations of psychoanalytic
technique that emphasize the analyst's uetachment iathei than
paiticipation in the piocess.
The iejection of the meuical mouel in this eaily woik beais some special
attention. uill anu his collaboiatois object to the pievalent piactice of
gatheiing infoimation fiom the patient unuei vaiious heauings insteau of
following the patient in a ielatively open-enueu fashion. 0f special inteiest,
in view of what comes latei, is the authois' iejection of histoiy taking as the
necessaiy way to aiiive at a valiu uiagnosis. This position has continuity, of
couise, with uill's latei concein that analysts aie often inteiesteu in genetic
ieconstiuction at the expense of unueistanuing the patient's expeiience of
the ielationship in the heie anu now.
Theie aie, of couise, impoitant uiffeiences between uill's cuiient
theoiy of technique anu his appioach to inteiviewing in 19S4. Although
some of these may be explaineu by the fact that the two types of clinical
situations aie not fully compaiable, I think uill's cuiient position iegaiuing
technique uoes entail piinciples that he believes can anu shoulu be extenueu
to uiagnostic inteiviewing. Foi uill, what is of cential impoitance
uiagnostically is the way in which a peison ielates in the heie anu now,
incluuing the patient's capacity to ieflect upon the meaning of his oi hei
immeuiate expeiience with the inteiviewei. 0thei consiueiations may also
be impoitant, but they aie seconuaiy. What we uo not yet see in 93/ !")()'4
!"(/%@)/A )" 1.-23)'(%)2 1%'2()2/ is the full emeigence of the focus on the
ielationship, incluuing the technique of systematically seaiching foi anu
inteipieting uisguiseu allusions to the tiansfeience, even at the beginning of
the tieatment (uill & Nuslin, 1977).
Theie aie many examples in 93/ !")()'4 !"(/%@)/A )" 1.-23)'(%)2 1%'2()2/
of uill's eaily conviction that the immeuiate piocess shoulu take piioiity
ovei collection of content. Conceining uepaituies in inteiviewing fiom a
"psychiatiic copy of meuical scheuules" uill anu his collaboiatois (19S4)
wiote: "Piobably the most impoitant |uepaituiej was the psychiatiists'
iealization of the significance of the patient-theiapist ielationship as the
veiy fiamewoik within which the natuie anu meaning of the patient's
piouuctions must be unueistoou" (p. 19).
uill wiote in 19S4 as though the mental status exam anu othei aspects
of tiauitional, meuically oiienteu inteiviewing weie alieauy pass, but what
he hau to say then is still quite geimane consiueiing contempoiaiy zeal
about feiietting out the biological factois in mental uisoiueis.
Foieshauowing his latei shaip uistinction between a psychological iealm of
uiscouise anu a biological iealm, uill makes cleai that the assessment he is
talking about is one of psychological (that is, inteipeisonal) functioning, not
of biological factois. This is not to say that the lattei aie not ielevant to a
complete unueistanuing of the patient's functioning, but only that assessing
psychological factois is something sepaiate anu apait, something iequiiing
the auoption of an attituue that is not compatible with the type of uiagnostic
attituue associateu with assessment of oiganic factois. As uill, Newman, anu
Reulich (19S4) put it: "In the psychiatiic inteiview the inteipeisonal
ielationship is focal. The psychiatiist must ueal auequately with this
ielationship to insuie that the uesiieu communication between patient anu
theiapist shall take place. Shoulu theie be any inuication of a somatic
uisoiuei, the patient must be fuithei stuuieu G- (/23")S5/. A3)23 '%/ "$( $5%
2$"2/%" 3/%/" (p. 6S; italics auueu).
0ne of the ieasons these authois gave foi the peisistence of the "olu-
fashioneu mental status examination" was the psychological function it
seiveu foi the inteiviewei:
The seconu ieason foi the "ueaf anu uumb" quality of the oluei
examination lies in the psychiatiist's neeu to ietain his equilibiium
by uemonstiating his supeiioiity. The inquisitoiy technique is useu,
then, as an unconscious uefense against the thieatening content of
the expeiience of his uistuibeu patient, anu against an emotional
ielationship with the patientpaiticulaily against the patient's
emotional uemanus |p. 2Sj.
Beie, again, we finu a foieshauowing of uill's latei emphasis on the
inescapable fact that whatevei an analyst's oi theiapist's behavioi, it caiiies
meaning that ueiives fiom his peisonal paiticipation in the piocess. uill
might well say the same touay about the function of silence anu othei
allegeuly neutial postuies that an analyst may auopt. Similaily, uill,
Newman, anu Reulich (19S4) wiote of the inevitability of the iecipiocal
influence of patient anu inteiviewei: "Reactions of both uoctoi anu patient
will of couise change as each meets the ieactions of the othei in that
piogiessive ieuefinition which is the essence of any ueveloping
ielationship" (p. 66-67).
As a final example of this eaily conviction, consiuei the following
comment, which so cleaily anticipates uill's cuiient emphasis on the heie
anu now in psychoanalysis anu his ielative ueemphasis of histoiical
ieconstiuction if unueitaken without iefeience to a ieliving in the
tiansfeience: "It has natuially occuiieu to us that we may be tiying to push
too fai the iuea of abanuoning the collection of histoiical uata in oiuei to
emphasize cuiient inteiaction. But we aie peisuaueu that uoubts about oui
technique aie causeu by oui inability moie completely to uivest ouiselves of
long-establisheu anu anxiety-ieuucing habits of piofessional piactice" (p.
412).
It is also of inteiest to note that of the vaiious influences on the
uevelopment of theii own oiientation, uill anu his co-authois consiuei
Sullivan's to be the stiongest, although they note that Sullivan uoes not go as
fai as they uo in giving up auheience to a "ielatively foimal 'ieconnaissance'
anu 'uetaileu inquiiy' " (p. 62). Significantly, uill has iecently immeiseu
himself in Sullivanian liteiatuie anu has wiitten about the continuity of his
own iueas anu those of Sullivan as well as about impoitant uiffeiences
between them (uill, 198Sa).
Theie aie many examples in the commentaiy on the tiansciibeu
sessions, the phonogiaph iecoiuings of which weie also publisheu, in which
the authois commenu oi ciiticize the inteivieweis uepenuing on whethei
they follow the patients' leaus oi ietieat uefensively to some agenua of theii
own. Wheie the auvocateu technique anu moue of listening uepait fiom
uill's cuiient view is in the failuie to systematically inteipiet oi even
iuentify uisguiseu allusions to the tiansfeience. I believe that if uill weie to
ciiticize the inteiviews anu the authois' commentaiies on them now, he
woulu point out that although much emphasis is appaiently placeu on the
inteiaction, in piactice, the appioach fails to follow the patient's expeiience
of the ielationship in a systematic way, one that woulu iequiie constant
attention to uisguiseu allusions to the tiansfeience in the patient's
associations (uill, 1982, 198Sa, 1984a; uill & Boffman, 1982a, 1982b).
S?CPCAnAL?1lC 1LCPnlCuL
Piobably the most caiefully elaboiateu statement on psychoanalytic
technique that uill maue while he was still immeiseu in psychoanalytic
metapsychology anu wiiting on hypnosis is founu in the papei,
"Psychoanalysis anu Exploiatoiy Psychotheiapy" (uill, 19S4), publisheu in
an issue of the H$5%"'4 $# (3/ :&/%)2'" 1.-23$'"'4-()2 :..$2)'()$" uevoteu
entiiely to papeis on technique. It is useful anu illuminating to compaie
uill's views as iepiesenteu in that papei with his cuiient iueas (1979, 1982,
198Sa), keeping in minu always that uill's point of view in 19S4 is piobably
iepiesentative of much that is still in the mainstieam of classical
psychoanalytic thought. uill himself has wiitten a papei (1984a) that
unueitakes such a compaiative analysis.
uill's uefinition of psychoanalytic technique in the 19S4 papei is well
known anu often citeu: "1.-23$'"'4-.). ). (3'( (/23")S5/ A3)23* /&74$-/0 G-
' "/5(%'4 '"'4-.(* %/.54(. )" (3/ 0/@/4$7&/"( $# ' %/C%/..)@/ (%'".#/%/"2/
"/5%$.). '"0 (3/ 54()&'(/ %/.$45()$" $# (3). "/5%$.). G- (/23")S5/. $#
)"(/%7%/('()$" '4$"/" (p. 77S). The uefinition has thiee main elements,
which uill goes on to elaboiate: the neutiality of the analyst, the necessity of
iegiession, anu the impoitance of ielying on inteipietation alone to iesolve
the tiansfeience neuiosis.
uill's (1984a) iecent compaiison of the classical position as he himself
foimulateu it in 19S4 anu his cuiient view emphasizes the uiffeiences
between the two. In light of uill's own emphasis on the contiast, a ieauei of
the 19S4 papei may be somewhat suipiiseu at the points of continuity
between the iueas uill hau then anu those he has now. It is impoitant to
iecognize, howevei, that although uill may sometimes unueiestimate the
element of consistency in his iueas about technique anu, peihaps even moie
so, the element of continuity in the kinus of issues that have conceineu him,
the ways in which his iueas have changeu aie veiy impoitant anu
substantial. Even the appaient points of agieement pale when consiueieu in
theii total context. The changes aie associateu with the paiauigm shift noteu
eailiei, anu uill is justifieu in iegaiuing them as "iauical."
0ne appaient point of agieement is the iiielevance of the
aiiangementeithei the fiequency of visits oi the use of the couchto the
uefinition of the technique. 0n this mattei, uill coulu haiuly be moie
emphatic now than he was in 19S4 when he labeleu as "foolish" anu
"iiuiculous" the tenuency to iegaiu such "outwaiu tiappings" as essential
(pp. 774-77S). Bowevei, this position has a veiy uiffeient meaning in the
context of uill's cuiient oveiall point of view than it hau then. In 19S4 these
"tiappings," although uisuaineu as pait of the uefinition of technique, weie
neveitheless consistent with the attempt to "enfoice" a iegiession; an
attempt which A'. a uefining featuie of psychoanalytic tieatment (pp. 778-
779). In 1984 these tiappings have lost this connection to the essence of the
technique uill auvocates.
A seconu appaient point of agieement is the fact that neutiality uoes
not mean the absence of any emotional involvement on the pait of the
analyst. uill alieauy iecognizeu in 19S4 that the analyst was a paiticipant in
the piocess anu not just an obseivei anu that theie was ioom in the
psychoanalytic situation foi the analyst to feel anu even to show a iange of
emotional iesponses, incluuing amusement, iiiitation, anu sauness (p. 78u).
Noieovei, then as now, what sepaiateu an analysis fiom psychotheiapy was
not the absence of any inteipeisonal influence oi suggestion in the piocess,
but the attempt in the long iun to "iesolve the suggestive influence of the
theiapist on the patient" by means of inteipietation (p. 79u).
Bowevei, in 19S4 uill also wiote: "The cleaiest tiansfeience
manifestations aie those which occui when the analyst's behavioi is
constant, since unuei these ciicumstances changing manifestations in the
tiansfeience cannot be attiibuteu to an exteinal situation, to some changeu
factoi in the inteipeisonal ielationship, but the analysanu must accept
iesponsibility himself" (p. 781). uill woulu nevei make such a statement
touay since he sees the analyst as implicateu on a moment-to-moment basis
in the nuances of the tiansfeience as they emeige. 0n the othei hanu, he
woulu agiee that the aim of analysis incluues a heighteneu appieciation by
patients of theii shaie of the iesponsibility foi the quality of the inteiaction
as they expeiience it. The ielationship between these points of agieement
anu uisagieement might be claiifieu if we iealize that what was a main point
with iegaiu to technique in 19S4 becomes a qualification in 1984 anu vice
veisa. Thus, foi example, the 19S4 position on neutiality might be
paiaphiaseu as follows: Although theie is always an element of suggestion
in eveiy analysis, (3/ '"'4-.( .3$540 (%- ($ &')"(')" ' %/4'()@/4- 2$".('"(
0/&/'"$% )" $%0/% ($ G/ 'G4/ ($ 0/&$".(%'(/ ($ 7'()/"(. (3'( (3/
%/.7$".)G)4)(- #$% (3/)% /67/%)/"2/ $# (3/ %/4'()$".3)7 4)/. 7%)&'%)4- A)(3)"
(3/&./4@/..
The 1984 position woulu have the emphasis ieveiseu, so that the
attituue encouiageu is quite uiffeient, that is: Although one of the goals of
analysis is to enhance patients' appieciation of theii iesponsibility foi theii
expeiiences of themselves anu otheis, anu although it is impoitant that the
analyst avoiu being so active oi intiusive as to pievent this iealization fiom
emeiging, $" ' &$&/"(I($I&$&/"( G'.).* (3/ '"'4-.( &5.( 7'- '((/"()$" ($
(3/ A'-. )" A3)23 3/ $% .3/ ). 2$"(%)G5()"C ($ (3/ 7'()/"(M. /67/%)/"2/ '"0
.3$540 )"2450/ %/#/%/"2/ ($ (3/./ 2$"(%)G5()$".* '. (3/- '%/ 74'5.)G4-
2$".(%5/0 G- (3/ 7'()/"(* )" 3). $% 3/% )"(/%7%/('()$"..
In line with this impoitant uiffeience, uill's main iecommenuation in
19S4 to piactitioneis of "intensive psychotheiapy" is that they be less
uiiective, in oiuei to biing the piocess closei to an optimal psychoanalytic
one. Bis piinciple iecommenuation in 1984 to the same enu is that they
systematically analyze the tiansfeienceit being unueistoou, of couise,
that analyzing the tiansfeience has a uiffeient meaning foi uill in 1984 than
it hau foi him in 19S4 anu than it has foi most classical analysts.
The piincipal uiffeiences between uill's position on technique in 19S4
anu his cuiient one centei on the following issues: (1) the type of influence
that the analyst intentionally exeicises; (2) the extent to which the
tiansfeience itself is unueistoou anu inteipieteu as a plausible constiuction
on the patient's pait; anu (S) the optimal fiequency of tiansfeience
inteipietations.
With iegaiu to the fiist issue, in 19S4 uill believeu, following Nacalpine
(19Su), that inuucing a iegiessive tiansfeience neuiosis was an essential
featuie of technique. As noteu eailiei, uill has abanuoneu this view. Be no
longei consiueis the achievement of any paiticulai iegiessive state, beyonu
what the patient biings to the analysis, necessaiy oi uesiiable. The woik is
no less analytic if the issues exploieu ieflect high levels of ego functioning
than if they aie moie oveitly piimitive, anu theie is no iequiiement that
they become moie piimitive foi the piocess to be calleu an analysis.
Peihaps even moie to the point, he is opposeu to manipulating patients in a
mannei that uoes not in itself become a subject of analytic investigation.
Insteau, the analyst ought to openly encouiage patients to exploie theii
expeiience of the ielationship, unueistanuing that this encouiagement may
also have iepeicussions that iequiie exploiation.
Consistent with the cieative, uialectical natuie of uill's thinking
thioughout his caieei, even with iegaiu to the mattei of iegiession, the
19S4 uiscussion incluues a foieshauowing of his latei views. Be aigueu then
that theoietical auvances in ego psychology lent gieatei weight to the
impoitance of intiasystemic conflicts in the ego that achieve ielative
autonomy as opposeu to the inteisystemic iu-ego conflicts fiom which they
ueiiveu. Be also ieminus us that Fieuu himself (1926, p. 8S) iaiseu a
question as to whethei, in uill's (19S4) woius, "aftei iepiession the oiiginal
impulse necessaiily peisists in the unconscious" (p. 794). uill suggests that
the ueiivative conflicts may "exist in a foim which allows a ielatively fiim
iesolution," paiticulaily when psychotheiapy takes on moie of the
chaiactei of psychoanalysis by being "moie intensive anu less uiiective."
Noieovei, he aigues that "this may iesult in a quantitative shift which may
not be so completely uiffeient fiom what often happens in psychoanalysis"
(p. 79S).
With iegaiu to the seconu issue, the uiffeiences aie both subtle anu
ciitical. It is cleai that uill iecognizeu in 19S4 that the geneial phenomenon
of iegiession in analysis was not spontaneous but iathei inuuceu (e.g., pp.
778-779). Bowevei, the paiticulai foim that this iegiession took was one
that was ielatively fiee of the analyst's influence, which uill (19S4)
uesciibeu as "a nonspecific, steauy, uniemitting iegiessive piessuie" (p.
78u). The analyst, as noteu eailiei, coulu put himself oi heiself in a position
that woulu enable him oi hei to show the patient that the 7'%()254'%. of the
tiansfeience weie coming fiom the patient alone.
In contiast to this view, anu in keeping with his peispectivist
oiientation, uill now sees the analyst as implicateu in the tiansfeience in
highly specific ways, since the tiansfeience is associateu with continual
plausible speculations on the patient's pait about the analyst's innei state.
Thus, the best tiansfeience inteipietations geneially iefei to some way in
which the analyst coulu plausibly be unueistoou to have contiibuteu to the
patient's expeiience. To say this is not to abanuon leveiage foi
uemonstiating the iesponsibility of patients foi theii own expeiience.
0ltimately, the analysis leaus to patients' heighteneu awaieness of the
iepetitive patteins of )"(/%'2()$" to which they aie pione. The point is that
they iepeat patteins of inteiaction, anu patients have ieason to believe that
the analyst's innei expeiience anu outwaiu behavioi aie coloieu by the
piessuie they exeit to make the ielationship iepeat those patteins.
This shift is apt to be confuseu with the moie common emphasis on the
"ieal" influence of the analyst. This emphasis is often piesenteu as an
alteinative to the view that the analyst functions only as a scieen foi the
tiansfeience anu as a technical instiumentality. As noteu eailiei, uill has
moveu to a peispectivist view of ieality, especially of emotionally significant
inteipeisonal ieality. Fiom this point of view, the patient's iueas about the
analyst aie usually neithei simply veiiuical noi simply giounuless fantasy.
1
uill's views aie similai in some iespects to those of Rackei (1968), Levenson
(1972), anu Sanulei (1976), among otheis. What these theoiists
nominally, a Kleinian, a Sullivanian, anu a Fieuuianhave in common is the
iuea of an inevitable uegiee of inteilocking of tiansfeience anu
counteitiansfeience anu a conviction that empathic tiansfeience
inteipietations must take this inteiplay into account (Boffman, 198S).
The thiiu uiffeience noteu in uill's position on technique has to uo with
the fiequency of tiansfeience inteipietations that his cuiient theoiy seems
to encouiage. Although uill has emphasizeu that consiueiations of tact anu
timing aie exceeuingly impoitant, anu although he has iecognizeu the
impoitance of allowing the patient to have the initiative anu to uevelop his
oi hei own thoughts, the oveiall thiust of his position neveitheless
encouiages a geneially moie inteiactive stance anu ceitainly moie fiequent
inteipietations of allusions to the tiansfeience than stanuaiu technique
woulu iecommenu.
To some extent, this emphasis on iegulai inteipietation follows fiom
the fact that uill is no longei inteiesteu in facilitating a moue of expeiiencing
anu communication that is iemote fiom seconuaiy piocess thinking. The
conveisation between analyst anu patient is a special kinu, to be suie, but
theie is no technical piinciple, such as the inuuction of iegiession, that is
opposeu on a moment-to-moment basis to the piinciple of analyzing the
tiansfeience. In fact, insteau of inuucing iegiession by uepiiving the patient,
uill now feels that the tiansfeience shoulu be "encouiageu to expanu" by
continually explicating its immeuiate uiiect anu inuiiect manifestations
(1979, 1982).
A seconu consiueiation that is consistent with moie fiequent
inteipietations is uill's emphasis on the "ubiquity" of uisguiseu allusions to
the tiansfeience (1982, pp. 69-79). uill (1982, p. 8u) uiffeis with the
following statement by Fieuu, (191S) especially with the fiist pait to which
Fieuu gave special emphasis: ",$ 4$"C '. (3/ 7'()/"(M. 2$&&5")2'()$". '"0
)0/'. %5" $" A)(3$5( $G.(%52()$"* (3/ (3/&/ $# (%'".#/%/"2/ .3$540 G/ 4/#(
5"($523/0. 0ne must wait until the tiansfeience, which is the most uelicate
of all pioceuuies, has become a iesistance" (p. 1S9). uill believes that Fieuu
faileu to consistently iecognize iesistance in inuiiect iefeiences to the
tiansfeience. uill's ieview of Fieuu's iueas about tiansfeience (1982, pp.
1S9-17S) is thoiough anu illuminating, ievealing Fieuu's tenuency, uespite
some impoitant statements to the contiaiy, to see the analysis of the
neuiosis as piimaiy anu to see the tiansfeience as an obstacle that has to be
uealt with when it obstiucts the analysis of the neuiosis. uill (1982)
believes, insteau, that the neuiosis will finu its way into the tiansfeience in
one way oi anothei, eithei in tiansfeience of wish oi uefense (p. S2), anu
that the tiansfeience can be usefully inteipieteu in a ielatively moleculai
way thioughout the analysis. Noieovei, uill is not conceineu that
inteipietation of tiansfeience pei se will inteifeie with the theiapeutic
alliance (p. 84). 0n the contiaiy, tactful inteipietation of tiansfeience fiom
the fiist session on will piomote the alliance
2
since it auuiesses issues that
aie tioubling the patient in a veiy immeuiate sense but that the patient
iesists speaking of oi thinking of explicitly foi feai that they will not be
accepteu oi unueistoou. Insteau of being conceineu about managing his
own behavioi so as to piomote a nonspecific iegiession on the one hanu,
anu a spontaneous specific tiansfeience on the othei, uill's attention as a
clinician is uevoteu to iuentifying the vaiious uisguiseu expiessions of
tiansfeience, such as uisplacement anu iuentification. Citing Lipton's
(1977b) uiscussion, uill (1982, p. 17u) finus that familiaiity with
iuentification, which is less commonly iecognizeu than uisplacement (oi, I
might auu, piojection) as a vehicle foi inuiiect communication, gieatly
expanus the iange of associations in which it is compelling to infei that
theie is an implication foi the tiansfeience.
Bespite his encouiagement to the analyst to iegulaily inteipiet
uisguiseu allusions to the tiansfeience. uill ceitainly allows latituue foi a
wiue iange of fiequency, uepenuing on the patient, the type of mateiial that
is coming up, anu the style of the analyst. It is a mistake to iegaiu fiequency
of inteipietation pei se as the ciux of the uiffeience between uill's position
anu the classical one. Inueeu, it is quite compatible with uill's iueas to be
ciitical of oveizealous inteipietation of tiansfeience, a peiveision to which
uill's theoiy of technique may be pione but which ceitainly is not iequiieu
by it. Noie at the coie of uill's uepaituie fiom the classical mouel, in my
view, aie the changes associateu with the fiist anu seconu issues I have
citeu, namely, the opposition to uelibeiate manipulation anu the
unueistanuing anu inteipietation of tiansfeience as a plausible
constiuction, given the inevitability of the analyst's peisonal paiticipation in
the piocess.
All that I have saiu heie peitains to what uill (1979,1982) calls
"inteipietation of iesistance to the awaieness of tiansfeience," as uistinct
fiom "inteipietation of iesistance to the iesolution of tiansfeience." Theie
is no question that uill gives piioiity to the foimei as a mattei of technique,
feeling that a goou ueal of iesolution of tiansfeience will follow
spontaneously fiom its explication in the heie anu now. The patient will
come to iecognize that, foi example, he oi she paiu selective attention to the
featuies of the analyst's behavioi that he oi she hau pieviously uisavoweu
entiiely. Also, the patient will spontaneously iecall expeiiences fiom
chiluhoou that will help to show that his oi hei peispective has paiticulai
histoiical oiigins. uill (1982) is veiy conceineu that genetic inteipietations
may be useu as a flight fiom the heie anu now, but he also iecognizes theii
impoitance anu the impoitance of othei kinus of inteipietation foi the
iesolution of the tiansfeience:
It is impoitant that the analyst not be tieu to some iigiu iule that he
shoulu make only tiansfeience inteipietations. Not only can
extiatiansfeience inteipietations be useful, but the spontaneity of
the analyst's behavioi is essential foi the conuuct of an analysis. If
an extiatiansfeience inteipietation occuis to the analyst as a
plausible claiification, he shoulu make it. At the same time, he
shoulu be aleit to its possible iepeicussions on the tiansfeience
but then he shoulu be aleit to the iepeicussions on the tiansfeience
of a tiansfeience inteipietation too.
I concluue that while extia-tiansfeience inteipietations play a iole
in analysisanu extia-tiansfeience claiifications ceitainly must
piioiity, in both time anu impoitance, shoulu go to tiansfeience
inteipietations. This piinciple may be moie ieauily accepteu if I
emphasize that attention to iesistance to the awaieness of
tiansfeience shoulu come fiist anu that, even though piioiity in
inteipietation uesigneu to iesolve the tiansfeience shoulu go to
inteipietation within the analytic situation, woiking thiough
iequiies extia-tiansfeience, tiansfeience, '"0 genetic tiansfeience
inteipietations |pp. 12S-126j,
uill speaks of the peison paiauigm oi point of view, the inteipeisonal
paiauigm, anu peispectivism almost inteichangeably, because foi him each
implies the otheis. uill's moie specific iueas about the analytic situation
follow uiiectly fiom these supiaoiuinate concepts. In the olu
metapsychology, accoiuing to what uill (198Sb) calls the "eneigy uischaige"
point of view, the patient was encouiageu to iegiess in oiuei to aiiive at the
unueilying infantile neuiosis that woulu beai the stamp of the patient's
bouily uiges, ielatively inuepenuent of enviionmental influences. In the olu
paiauigm it was thought that "fiee association anu iegiession will in time
leau to the ielatively uiiect expiession of bouily uiges little ielateu to
inteipeisonal inteiaction, whethei with otheis in the past oi with the
theiapist in the piesent" (p. S46). These uiges aie the uecisive factois
unueilying the tiansfeience anu the uistoition of ieality the tiansfeience
entails. In othei woius, the emphasis on the past is linkeu with the iuea of a
somatic uiive that pieceues anu ueteimines inteiactions with otheis. But
foi uill, theie is nothing uneaitheu oi ieconstiucteu in psychoanalysis that
anteuates inteiactions. The piesent inteiaction, moieovei, is the best place
to look foi the peison's fixeu ways of oiganizing inteipeisonal expeiience.
Tiansfeience is ieuefineu as a way of looking at things anu as a way of being
with othei peoplenot a uistoiteu way in any simple sense, but a iigiu way
that cuts off alteinative potentials. The analyst always inteipiets in the
spiiit of acknowleuging the plausibility of the patient's peispective. Theie is
no absolute ieality to which the analyst has access but to which the patient
is blinu because of the tiansfeience. In fact, the patient's tiansfeience
peispective may sheu light on some aspect of the analyst's own
paiticipation (oveit anu coveit), which the analyst iesists. Neithei
paiticipant has a coinei on the tiuth, anu yet they tiy to hammei out an
unueistanuing that makes sense to both of them anu that has the feel of
cogency. Even as they aie uoing so, the analyst must take the leau in tuining
a ciitical eye on what they have ueciueu anu how they have ueciueu it. That
is why histoiical exploiation cannot get veiy fai without being inteiiupteu
by a question as to its puipose iight now. To iaise this question uoes not
piecluue ietuining subsequently to ieconstiuctive woik.
This continual sciutiny of the ielationship is, in the iueal, not an
intellectual exeicise, but iathei a moving, new inteipeisonal expeiience that
iepiesents anu piomotes peisonal giowth (uill, 1982, pp. 118-12u). The
new expeiience associateu with the analysis of the tiansfeience iests in pait
on the analyst's openness to the possibility that, wittingly oi unwittingly, he
oi she has been the patient's accomplice in the peipetuation of the olu, fixeu
patteins of inteiaction that the tiansfeience iepiesents. At the veiy moment
in which this openness is conveyeu to the patient, the analyst stanus a goou
chance of extiicating himself oi heiself fiom the iole of accomplice. uill is
fonu of citing Stiachey's (19S4) anu Loewalu's (196u) classic papeis on the
theiapeutic action of psychoanalysis in which both of them state that
analysis cuies because the analyst offeis himself oi heiself not only as a
technical instiumentality but as an object with whom the patient can have a
new kinu of expeiience. What Stiachey anu Loewalu omit oi
unueiemphasize is the element of mutuality in the shaping of the
tiansfeience anu the counteitiansfeience on a moment-to-moment basis.
With psychoanalytic technique ieuefineu in a mannei that encouiages
moie active engagement of the patient anu that uemanus moie systematic
exploiation of the patient's immeuiate expeiience of the inteiaction, the
whole question of analyzability is thiown open. uill's views now on
assessment of analyzability paiallel those of Fieuu in calling foi a "tiial
analysis" as the best way to begin. uill uoes not have fixeu iueas on who can
benefit fiom a iigoious psychoanalytic appioach baseu on stanuaiu types of
classification. Be feels that too many patients aie wiitten off as
"unanalyzable" because they cannot auapt well to the couch anu to a
ielatively silent anu iemote analyst who is systematically tiying to inuuce a
iegiession (1984a). Foi uill, this pioceuuie is misguiueu, anu a patient's
iefusal oi inability to comply with it coulu be a sign of stiength.
Analyzability foi uill has to uo with a patient's ability to engage in anu
ieflect upon a ielationship with an analyst who is emotionally available anu
who thinks of himself oi heiself as a co-paiticipant in the piocess. uill
(198Sa) mocks the stanuaiu view of analyzability, stating that "an
analyzable patient is a patient with whom the analyst can maintain the
illusion of neutiality" (p. 21S). In fact, theie may be ielatively healthy
patients with paiticulai tempeiaments who coulu not toleiate stanuaiu
technique but who woulu iesponu well to uill's appioach. Similaily, theie
may be some veiy sick patients who aie automatically wiitten off because of
theii inability to auapt to the stanuaiu psychoanalytic situation but who
may be able to iesponu ielatively well to the moie active focus on the heie
anu now that uill espouses.
0$!$'0"+ #% )!*"+,'%'-*!#!
As noteu eailiei, uill has been unwaveiing thioughout his caieei on the
necessity of systematic ieseaich on the psychoanalytic piocess, the thiiu
aspect of uill's woik that I will uiscuss heie. Be has nevei accepteu the
common psychoanalytic view, which Fieuu himself piomulgateu, that the
case stuuy methou, howevei much it has contiibuteu to theoiy anu piactice,
can obviate the neeu foi a moie iigoious application of scientific methous to
the gatheiing anu analysis of psychoanalytic uata. Peihaps uill's most
impoitant contiibution to the uevelopment of psychoanalysis as a science
has been his pioneeiing effoit to make the iaw uata of psychoanalysis
available foi stuuy by inuepenuent obseiveis thiough auuio-iecoiuings of
psychotheiapeutic anu psychoanalytic sessions. Inspiieu paitly by Cail
Rogeis anu otheis of the client-centeieu school, who maue iecoiuing anu
ieseaich a cential pait of theii piactice fiom the stait, uill, along with a few
otheis, began iecoiuing psychotheiapy at the Nenningei Clinic as eaily as
the miuule 194us. The auvent of tape iecoiuing gieatly facilitateu this effoit.
0vei the yeais, uill has collecteu samples fiom each of a numbei of tape
iecoiueu analyses, some conuucteu by himself anu some by the ielatively
few othei analysts who weie willing to contiibute.
Recoiuing was instiumental in uill's ieseaich on hypnosis uuiing the
194us anu 19Susfoi example, in a stuuy of spontaneous fluctuations in
the uepth of the hypnotic state uuiing sessions of psychotheiapy (Bienman,
uill, & Knight, 19S2). In this stuuy, ego functioning aiounu the time of the
fluctuation was assesseu by having inuepenuent juuges examine
associations suiiounuing statements such as "I'm going ueepei" oi "I'm
coming up lightei." The methou itself pioviueu a mouel that was latei
auapteu by Luboisky (1967) in his stuuies of momentaiy foigetting in
psychotheiapy. The mouel also evolveu into the bioauei "symptom context
methou" foi investigating the appeaiance of physical anu psychological
symptoms uuiing psychotheiapy sessions (Luboisky anu Aueibach, 1969).
In the 196us, uill anu his collaboiatois (uill, Simon, Fink, Enuicott, &
Paul, 1968) wiote a lanumaik aiticle on iecoiuing anu psychoanalysis, in
which they take up anu challenge many of the common souices of iesistance
to iecoiuing, some peisonal anu some moie clinical oi theoietical. 0n the
peisonal siue, foi example, theie is feai of exposuie anu ciiticism. uill
(Reppen, 1982) iecognizes that foi some patient-analyst paiis, iecoiuing
may pose insuimountable uifficulties (p. 171). In geneial, howevei, he feels
that the feai of exposuie anu ciiticism, both on an inuiviuual anu
institutional level, must be oveicome if analysis is to have any hope of
giowing oi even suiviving as a scientific uiscipline.
0bjections on the clinical siue to iecoiuing foi ieseaich puiposes
incluue concein about compiomising confiuentiality as well as about
intiouucing anothei puipose into the analytic situation that is extianeous to
the analytic woik itself anu to the immeuiate inteiests of the patient. Theie
is no question, of couise, that patients will ieact in vaiious ways to these
ciicumstances. Bowevei, uill (Reppen, 1982; uill et al., 1968) aigues, it uoes
not follow that they piecluue a successful analysis. Beie uill's point of view
on technique uovetails with his attituue on iecoiuing. The tiansfeience uoes
not uevelop in a vacuum. Bowevei the analytic situation is set up, its
tiansfeience iepeicussions must be exploieu in the spiiit of iecognizing the
element of plausibility in the patient's view of the situation. In the fiist
place, the ieseaich situation is not so uiffeient fiom othei analytic situations
in which confiuentiality is compiomiseu oi in which the analyst's self-
inteiest is ieauily appaient. When, foi example, an institute canuiuate sees a
patient as pait of tiaining, confiuentiality is not inviolate, anu the patient
has cause to feel useu. These ciicumstances aie geneially unueistoou to be
impoitant complications that neeu to be exploieu, but not of such a
magnituue that they piecluue a successful analysis. In the seconu place,
even when the patient has ieason to believe that confiuentiality is stiictly
maintaineu, the situation is likely to have paiticulai meanings that must be
investigateu. In what might be iegaiueu by many as the optimal analytic
setting, the piomise of stiict confiuentiality, the stiong iecommenuation
that the fiequency of sessions be foui times pei week oi moie, the use of the
couch, the analyst's fee, anu the analyst's silence aie all veiy poweiful
stimuli, which the patient constiues in plausible anu yet also peisonally
expiessive anu, in piinciple, analyzable ways (uill, 1984a).
uill's theoiy of technique is also congenial to ieseaich on the
psychoanalytic piocess in that it invites attention to each analytic houi as a
unit that has a ceitain integiity of meaning. In the classical paiauigm, in
which the intent is to fostei the unfoluing of a iegiessive tiansfeience
neuiosis ovei a long peiiou of time, it woulu be uifficult to assess the quality
of the analyst's technique as well as othei vaiiables because the context of
each event is so tempoially bioau anu so uifficult to know anu take into
account. Although uill is fully awaie of the impoitance of context anu knows
that the analyst may be in a position to take it into account moie than an
exteinal obseivei who has only a small sample of the uata, uill's moleculai
focus on the analysis of tiansfeience in the heie anu now lenus itself to
investigation of smallei anu moie manageable units of uata. 0ne of the fiuits
of uill's commitment to systematic ieseaich has been the uevelopment of a
couing scheme (uill & Boffman, 1982b), which peimits classification of
vaiious kinus of patient communications anu analyst inteiventions. The
highlight of the scheme is the uelineation of ciiteiia foi iuentifying uisguiseu
allusions to the tiansfeience in associations not manifestly about the
tiansfeience. The ieseaich juuge cannot claim that such an allusion has
occuiieu without giving a specific basis foi this infeience. The basis may
have the foim of a pievious statement by the patient that is explicitly about
the ielationship, oi it may have the foim of some ieauily iecognizable event
in the inteiaction about which neithei of the paiticipants has spoken. These
ciiteiia foi couing allusions to the tiansfeience have clinical utility as well,
because they set up at least paitial guiuelines to inuicate when a
tiansfeience inteipietation might be calleu foi anu when it might not
guiuelines that have been vague oi lacking in clinical theoiy.
uill iecognizes that the uevelopment of this couing scheme is only a
small fiist step towaiu a moie compiehensive piogiam of systematic
ieseaich on the analytic piocess as he conceives of it. In the long iun, uill
woulu want to see vaiiables uefineu anu opeiationalizeu anu methous
uevelopeu so that it woulu be possible to stuuy, on a moleculai level, the
uiffeiential effects of vaiious types of inteivention on the piocess anu, on a
molai level, the ielative efficacy of one tieatment appioach oi anothei.
uill's commitment is not to ieseaich foi the sake of ieseaich but to
clinical ieseaich that ueals with theoietically meaningful vaiiables. It is a
commitment to the scientific stuuy of human intention anu meaning,
incluuing the inteipeisonal conuitions that piomote change anu giowth. In
this sense, psychoanalysis foi uill is a heimeneutic science, a contiauiction
in teims foi some (Blight, 1981; Eagle, 198u) but foi uill a categoiy that
connotes the special combination of values he feels shoulu chaiacteiize
psychoanalysis as a uiscipline.
",%"-4!#,%
As we have seen, uill's point of view has changeu iauically ovei the
yeais. Bis iueas have continueu to evolve. Any attempt to captuie the thiust
of his position at a given time is unlikely to uo justice eithei to vaiious
impoitant qualifications that he has pioposeu oi to new iueas anu ievisions
of theoiy that aie still geiminal in his thinking. Foi example, iecently uill
(peisonal communication, Novembei, 1984) has been wiestling with
seveial questions. Aie theie, aftei all, univeisal conflicts that play a iole in
eveiy analysis, anu, if so, what aie they. As noteu eailiei, uill has been
consiueiing the conflict between attachment anu autonomy as a piimaiy
issue of this kinu. With iegaiu to theoiy of technique, uoes the elimination
of the piinciple of uelibeiately inuucing a iegiession leave a gap that invites,
insteau of excessive iestiaint, oveizealous inteipietation of tiansfeience.
What piovision is theie in the theoiy, foimally speaking, to pievent the
%/052()$ '0 'G.5%05& that woulu have the analyst foievei inteipieting the
tiansfeience iepeicussions of oveizealous inteipietation. Is it enough to
emphasize the impoitance of common sense, tact, anu timing, oi to say that
one uoes not inteipiet until one has a compelling sense of a latent
tiansfeience meaning in the patient's associations. 0i is it necessaiy to
foimulate anothei piinciple of technique to balance the piinciple of analysis
of tiansfeience. Peihaps foi uill this piinciple woulu be supiaoiuinate to
the analysis of tiansfeience anu woulu, in the most geneial teims, have to
uo with piomoting a ceitain quality of inteipeisonal expeiience. This
expeiience might be most poweifully seiveu by the analysis of the
tiansfeience but, piesumably, coulu also be unueimineu by it at times. What
this quality of expeiience woulu be, of couise, neeus to be spelleu out. It
woulu also have to be locateu in ielation to othei conceptualizations in the
liteiatuie of the inteipeisonal expeiience in analysis, such as uill's own
concept of the new expeiience that accompanies the analysis of the
tiansfeience, Zetzel's theiapeutic alliance, Winnicott's holuing enviionment,
Kohut's self-selfobject tie, anu Schafei's moie geneiic atmospheie of safety.
uill's intellectual style is to steaufastly puisue the logical implications of
a paiticulai line of thought without shiinking fiom theii consequences foi
entiencheu tiauition. At the same time, in uialectical ielationship with this
tenuency, his convictions about theoiy, ieseaich, anu piactice aie uniteu by
his ieauiness to tuin a ciitical eye on his own peispective anu to consiuei
othei points of view. Thus, uespite the vigoi with which he has auvocateu
anu uefenueu his position, uill has also actively exploieu the points of
conveigence anu uiveigence of his own views anu those of ueuo (uill, 1981),
Nelanie Klein (uill, 1982, pp. 129-1S7), Kohut (Reppen, 1982, pp. 18S-186),
Sullivan (uill, 198Sa), anu Langs (uill, 1984b), among many otheis. The veiy
fact that he is actively engageu in uialogue with exponents of these uiveise
peispectives (as ieflecteu in his publications, speaking engagements, anu
extensive coiiesponuence) testifies to the biiuge-builuing iole that uill now
occupies in the fielu. I believe that such a iole is congenial to him because of
his uisuain foi paiochialism; he has a ueep conviction that psychoanalysis
will suivive anu giow only if exponents of uiveise viewpoints engage each
othei in an ongoing piocess of iecipiocal, constiuctive ciiticism anu
ultimately submit theii uiffeiences to the aibitiating powei of systematic
clinical ieseaich.

0$/$0$%"$!
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aspects of the patient's expeiience of the ielationship in
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$# (3/ :&/%)2'" 1.-23$'"'4-()2 :..$2)'()$", 24, 779-794.
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auuioiecoiueu psychoanalysis: 1. ueneial consiueiations. H$5%"'4 $#
(3/ :&/%)2'" 1.-23$I:"'4-()2 :..$2)'()$", 16, 2Su-244.
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%89:;
1 Since uill's views have been changing, some of his iecent wiitings show iemnants
of his eailiei, moie tiauitional stance that aie inconsistent with his newei
iueas. Thus, foi example, in his iecent monogiaph on technique (1982), uill
sometimes uiviues the patient's expeiience into tiansfeiential anu iealistic
components (e.g., pp. 94-96), although beginning with chaptei 7, he auopts
a moie consistently peispectivist position.
2 Although uill sometimes uses the teim "alliance," he agiees with Lipton (1977a)
that the concept is objectionable insofai as it uenotes oi connotes
something that shoulu be uelibeiately fosteieu with special techniques anu
that is uncontaminateu by tiansfeience (see uill, 1982, pp. 96-1u6; Reppen,
1982, pp. 17S-174).
!
#$%&#' ()*+,- '.& /$001*2/)'23& )44#$)/.
!"# %&'()*+, -./.
Expounuing is piopounuing: It is not possible to expounu anothei
peison's views without, at the same time, piopounuing one's own. This has
been tiue of expositions of Fieuu anu applies to those, such as the theoiists
in this volume, who went beyonu Fieuu.
"uoing beyonu" is a spatial metaphoi, which implies being in one place
anu then going somewheie else oi towaiu something else. Psychologically,
it means an iuentification with anu a uepaituie fiom. Thus, an exposition of
thinking beyonu Fieuu iequiies a pieliminaiy exposition of Fieuu. But heie,
too, both the analytic anu the lay expositions of Fieuu aie face to face with
the evei-piesent question: Bow to ieau Fieuu. Foi Fieuu is a piotean
thinkei. Like Pioteus, the uieek gou of piophecy who, when consulteu,
iefuseu to give answeis but insteau assumeu vaiious shapes, so Fieuu
constantly eluues the attempt to give a uefinitive ieauing of his text. Be has
been claimeu by many uomains, fiom the biological (Sulloway, 1979), to the
theological (Bomans, 197u). Who can tiuly pioclaim what Fieuu !"#$$% saiu.
Nany of those who maue such a claim have cieateu the most haii-iaising
ievisions (Lothane, 198Sb). What the Italians say about tianslations applies
heie: &!#'(&&)!", &!#'*&&)!" (the tianslatoi is a tiaitoi).
Robeit Langs began as a Fieuuian analyst befoie he uevelopeu his
communicative appioach. Theiefoie, I shall piesent my ieauing of Fieuu
anu show what he took ovei fiom Fieuu anu wheie he took off.
Fieuu the methouologist, iathei than Fieuu the iueologist oi
metapsychologist, is my focus in ieauing Fieuu (Lothane, 198u, 1981a,
1981b, 1982a, 198Sa, 1984b). The methouological focus is opeiational: it
stuuies what minu uoes as against what minu is. Fiom this vantage point,
Fieuu's was fiom the outset a '"+&, psychology, which was '%-#.*/,
'*#$"/&*/#$, anu '(#$*0&*/that is, conceineu with the conflict of stiivings
anu actions both between man anu man (inteipeisonally) anu within man
himself (intiapeisonally).
Fieuu's psychology encompasses the following vaiieties of uynamics
anu uialectics:
1. The uialectics of the suiface veisus the uepth, of the conscious
veisus the pieconscious, of the manifest veisus the latent, of the
iemembeieu veisus the foigotten, of the explicit veisus the
implicit.
2. The uynamics of uefense, oiiginally iepiession but latei
incluuing othei moues of uefense (also iefeiieu to as iesistance,
both intiapeisonally anu inteipeisonally).
S. The uynamics of uieam thinking veisus waking moues of
thought.
4. The uynamics anu uialectics of tiansfeience veisus love anu self-
love.
S. The uynamics anu uialectics of emotion anu uesiie, incluuing
sexual uesiie.
Bistoiically, uuiing the fiist two uecaues of his psychoanalytic woik,
fiom 189S to 191S, Fieuu was conceineu with methou anu clinical theoiy.
Theieaftei he became incieasingly conceineu with metapsychology. The
gist of the methou is given in the 1&('*"0 )- 3%0&"!*# (189Su) anu 4,"
5-&"!+!"&#&*)- )6 7!"#.0 (19uua). Both the psychological symptom anu the
uieam aie seen as similaily constiucteu: They show the same
coiiesponuence between the way they weie causeu anu the way they weie
cuieu. The memoiy of a painful (tiaumatic) oi conflictual event in the past is
tiansfoimeu by the silent (unconscious) opeiation of uefense (iepiession)
into a symptom. The cathaitic methou (the technique of hypnosis) cieates
the conuitions of wiuening of consciousness anu the emeigence of
memoiies in pictoiial (imagic) foims anu in woius. 0veicoming uefense
(iesistance) facilitates this piocess anu thus eiases the pathogenic sting of
memoiy. To be sick is to ieminisce. To be cuieu is to iecall anu eiase the
iecoiu. Similaily, the painfully oi conflictually expeiienceu event piioi to
the uieamthe uay iesiuueevokes a psychological ieaction: the latent
uieam thoughts. 0nuei the influence of the censoi anu thiough the silent
(unconscious) opeiation of uieam woik, the latent thoughts aie
tiansfoimeu into the manifest content, oi the uieam as iemembeieu. The
cathaitic methou is now ieplaceu by the psychoanalytic methou. It is a
homologue of the hypnotic technique anu of the pieconuitions foi uieaming.
The withuiawal of attention fiom goal-uiiecteu puisuits anu ciitical
selection cieates an alteieu state oi fiame of consciousness anu fosteis the
emeigence of pictoiial moues of thought: images of memoiy, of imagination,
of uieams anu hallucinations. The combination of spontaneous fiee
association anu of uiiecteu fiee association to the sepaiate elements of the
manifest uieam content leaus to a ietiieval of the uay iesiuue anu the
anteceuent thoughts anu feelings that weie the ieaction to the uay iesiuue.
The cential conception heie is that action, whethei symptom oi uieam, is
ueteimineu by exteinal ieality (Lothane, 198Sa). Both the symptom anu the
uieam aie a peisonal iesponse to anu a commentaiy on an episoue of liveu
ieality. Rapapoit (196u) calleu this the auaptive point of view. I woulu like
to iefei to it as the action-ieaction conception of the symptom anu the
uieam.
What is being ieemphasizeu heie is that Fieuu's uepth psychology is
also a conflict psychology, anu it is meant to explain inhibitions anu
uistoitions of memoiy anu of sense peiception. Both the symptom anu the
uieam aie shapeu by uefense in all its vaiieties anu by the uieam woik in all
its vaiieties. In this sense, the symptom is a ietuin of the iepiesseu anu the
uieam a tiansfoimation of the latent content into the manifest content. Both
aie stiange anu puzzling manifestations anu iequiie a solution. To iecall the
memoiy that causeu the symptom means to analyze, oi uissolve, it; to tiace
the latent content fiom the manifest content is to inteipiet a uieam, oi solve
it. As Fieuu (19uua) wiites:
The |latentj uieam thoughts anu the |manifestj uieam content aie
given to us as two '"+*/&*)-0 |7#!0&"$$(-8"-j of the same content in
&9) '*66"!"-& $#-8(#8"0..The uieam content is expiesseu, so to
speak, in a pictuie |hieioglyphicj sciipt whose signs have to be
tianslateu, one by one, into the language of the |latentj uieam
thoughts. We woulu obviously be leu into eiioi if we weie to ieau
these signs accoiuing to theii pictuie value insteau of accoiuing to
what the signs iefei to.. |pp. 28S-284; authoi's tianslation, italics
auueu; see also Fieuu, 19uua, pp. 277-278j.
The tiansfoimation wiought by the uieam woik can be unuone by the
activity which, Fieuu (19u1) says, is "the counteipait of this |uieamj woik,
which biings a tiansfoimation in ieveise, which I alieauy know of #-#$%0*0:
9)!;" (p. 64S; authoi's tianslation, italics Fieuu's). This oiiginal text, the
fiist consciously iegisteieu ieaction to tiauma, is the cause of the seconu,
euiteu text. The fiist text is now unconscious anu ieplaceu by the now
conscious seconu text, which is a ueiivative, uisguiseu, uisplaceu,
conuenseu, uiamatizeu, pictoiial, oi "-/)'"' veision of the fiist text. To
analyze a uieam, oi a symptom, is not to ieau it cognitively oi liteially,
accoiuing to the pictuie value, but to '"/)'" it. Such uecouing can only be
accomplisheu by a iecouise to the special uynamics of the psychoanalytic
situation: unuoing of iepiession, fosteiing of images anu memoiies, anu
tiacing the associative chains of iefeience fiom the signifiei (the manifest
content) to the signifieu (the latent content). The emeigence of imagic foims
of thought pioceeus hanu in hanu with a shift in the uynamics of iepiession.
}ust as the conuitions of sleep anu uieaming ueciease waking vigilance,
unuo iepiession, anu facilitate the emeigence of the iepiesseu, so the
psychoanalytic situation also fosteis just that; to the extent that waking,
conveisational give-anu-take is uecieaseu, the iepiesseu memoiies,
attituues, anu expectations have a chance of emeiging. In this way the
psychoanalytic-theiapeutic situation pioviues the conuitions foi a uynamic
(unuoing of iepiession) anu associative (emeigence of images) unfoluing
anu uecouing of the patient's stoiy.
Both iepiession (uefense) anu the uieam woik aie unconscious, oi
silent, piocesses. The emphasis is on unconscious as an aujective qualifying
the natuie of this mental activity, -)& on the ieifieu unconscious anu its
vaiious connotations. The ieason foi this emphasis is twofolu: (1) to
unueiscoie the uynamic-ieactive natuie of this activity in iesponse to a
ieality stimulus; anu (2) to holu to the conception of a continuous
counteipoint between uiiect moues of memoiy anu peiception anu inuiiect,
oi uistoiteu, moues. Fieuu pioviues his own emphasis in these woius in a
footnote auueu in 1928 to 4," 5-&"!+!"&#&*)- )6 7!"#.0 (19uua):
I useu at one time to finu it extiaoiuinaiily uifficult to accustom
ieaueis to the uistinction between the manifest content of uieams
anu the latent uieam thoughts..But now that analysts at least have
become ieconcileu to ieplacing the manifest uieam by the meaning
ievealeu by its inteipietation, many of them have become guilty of
falling into anothei confusion..They seek to finu the essence of
uieams in theii latent content anu in so uoing they oveilook the
uistinction between the latent uieam thoughts anu the uieam woik.
At bottom uieams aie nothing othei than a paiticulai foim of
thinking maue possible by the conuitions of the state of sleep. It is
the '!"#.:9)!; which cieates that foim anu it is alone the essence
of uieamingthe explanation of its peculiai natuie |pp. Su6-Su7;
italics Fieuu'sj.
The action-ieaction paiauigm is fiom the stait opposeu by anothei line
of thought in Fieuu: the iole of sexuality. At fiist, sexuality was consiueieu
as an aspect of exteinal ieality, anu in the foim of seuuction it playeu the
iole of an exteinal tiaumatizing event, evoking its piopei iesponse. The
oveithiow of the seuuction theoiy by Fieuu went hanu in hanu with
anothei uevelopment: the concept of the uieam as wish fulfillment. These
two iueas pave the way foi the final conception of the bouy as an inteinal
souice, uistinct fiom exteinal ieality, which geneiates two kinus of moveis
of human action: the uiive anu the (uieam-) wish.
With this new emphasis on action in iesponse to innei souices of
stimulation goes a ueemphasis of the enviionment as a stimulus to action in
the seivice of auaptation.
A most impoitant coiollaiy to this new oiientation is the attituue
towaiu the uieam anu uayuieam, oi fantasy. Fantasy is no longei, via the
uieam woik, a ieaction to anu commentaiy on events in exteinal ieality but
an inteinally geneiateu action. This iefoimulation of the uichotomy of
inteinal-exteinal cieates a new appioach to uefining paiauigms of cause
(pathology) anu paiauigms of cuie (analytic technique). 0ne example is the
so-calleu stiuctuial theoiy anu the pieponueiant pieoccupation with
metapsychology. Although a fullei uiscussion of these is beyonu the scope of
the piesent essay, the cential implication of this iueological shift was a
tenuency among analysts to embiace scholastic uebates about inteinality,
the iemote infantile past, hybiiu concepts, anu theoiies iemoveu fiom the
iealities we live in.
The inteinal-exteinal uichotomy ieais its heau once again with the full
blooming of the concept tiansfeience, fiist uefineu in <!"('=0 1&('*"0 )6
3%0&"!*# (189S). Although the notion of inteinally geneiateu uiives anu
fantasies only piesupposes an object, the tiansfeience actualizes it; in the
psychoanalytic-theiapeutic situation, the othei peison is expeiienceu
simultaneously as a ieal anu an imaginaiy othei. Thus the one-peison
psychology of uiives anu wish fulfillment becomes the two-peison
psychology of the inteipeisonal iealmof uialogue, communication, anu
inteiaction. 0f the many aspects of tiansfeience, in auuition to its tiauitional
uefinition as ieenactment of the past, two otheis aie immeuiately ielevant
to the piesent aigument: (1) its ielation to uieaming (Lothane, 198Sa), anu
(2) its ielation to the uichotomies tiutheiioi anu iealityuelusion. The
one-peison psychology anu the intiapeisonal uynamics of uiives anu
inteinally ueiiveu fantasies hau this effect on the concept tiansfeience:
They tenueu to conveit it into a monauic insteau of a uyauic ieality,
uivoiceu fiom the iecipiocal peisonal influences between the paiticipants
in the psychoanalytic uialogue.
These tienus have iesulteu in a cuiious uouble stanuaiu in the analytic
piofession. Although the iuling theoiies (metapsychology) have been
foimulateu laigely in teims of a one-system, one-peison psychology anu
mechanism, the clinical piactice has been iolling along in the context of
inteipeisonal ielations, conveisation, anu inteiaction. 0n the one hanu, the
one-system oiientation cieateu its uogmatics (Baitmann) anu schismatics
(Schafei) anu bittei theological waifaie within the psychoanalytic
movement. 0n the othei hanu, the inteipeisonal appioach has iemaineu
beieft of a systematic theoiy. Against this backgiounu, we can now pioceeu
to examine the contiibution of Robeit Langs. I met Langs in 198u as a iesult
of having publisheu a ieview of his 4," >*0&"-*-8 ?!)/"00 (Langs, 1978a;
Lothane, 198u). I latei joineu the faculty of the Lenox Bill Bospital
Psychotheiapy Piogiam, of which Langs is the founuei anu uiiectoi. In the
exposition that follows, howevei, I have limiteu myself to the use of
publisheu mateiial so that my asseitions can be checkeu against veiifiable
souices anu uebateu accoiuingly.
Robeit }oseph Langs giauuateu fiom the Chicago Neuical School in
19SS. Be latei became a psychiatiist anu giauuateu fiom Bownstate
Psychoanalytic Institute (now the New Yoik 0niveisity Institute). Be joineu
the faculty theie anu was eniolleu as membei of the Ameiican
Psychoanalytic Association. By 1971 he hau become active in the piactice of
psychotheiapy anu psychoanalysis in clinical ieseaich anu was on the staff
of the Long Islanu }ewish anu Billsiue Bospitals. Be hau publisheu clinical
anu ieseaich papeis (Langs, 1978b). Bis fiist majoi psychoanalytic papei,
"Bay Resiuues, Recall Resiuues anu Bieams: Reality anu the Psyche,"
appeaieu in 1971. It contains the geim of his futuie views anu "pioveu to be
a fateful beginning" (Langs, 1978, p. 6).
In this papei Langs ieuiscoveieu exteinal ieality anu its ielevance foi
fantasy life, past anu piesent. The clinical fact that leu to this ieuiscoveiy
was that the uay iesiuuethat is, events in exteinal iealitywas ciucial to
the unueistanuing of the uieam. As shown eailiei, this was Fieuu's own
peiennial insight, which was ieplaceu by foimulations about the vaiieties of
intiapsychic moveis (the iu, "the" unconscious, anu unconscious fantasies).
Towaiu the enu of the papei, Langs(1971) aigues foi a
ieassessment of Fieuu's thinking iegaiuing infantile seuuction. In
essence, we can see that Fieuu was actually coiiect in both of his
foimulations iegaiuing the iole of ieality in the foimation of
neuiosis: ieal seuuctions uo occui on many levels, while
unconscious fantasies aie also constantly being cieateu anu ieviseu
fiom both expeiiencing anu imagining. Togethei, inteiacting,
cieating a totality, they leau to the anxieties anu conflicts out of
which neuiosis uevelops |p. S21j,
In this, Langs anticipateu the iecent suige of inteiest in seeing the
oiiginal seuuction theoiy ieinstateu (Klein & Tiibich, 1979; Lothane, 198Sa;
Nusson, 1984; Swales, 1982).
This then is Langs' funuamental iuea, the founuation on which the
Langsian appioach iests: The uay iesiuue is the stimulus to which the
uieam is a iesponse. If foi the uay iesiuue we substitute the psychoanalyst,
the analyst's actions anu conuuct, anu the way they affect the patient, we
obtain the gist of Langs' methou. Eveiy sequence of the psychoanalytic
session shows an #'#+&*@" /)-&"A&, that is, the action of the analyst, the
ieality tiiggei, anu the patient's uouble-layeieu ieaction. This ieaction has
its manifest content anu its latent content, what Langs (1978b) teimeu the
"specific unconscious fantasies anu memoiies containeu in ueiivative anu
uisguiseu foim in the manifest mateiial" (p. 1u). This seminal iuea has
subsequently leu Langs to a numbei of extiapolations, which aie both an
extension of Fieuu's methou anu a uepaituie fiom it. We shall have a closei
look at these issues latei.
The next stage in the evolution of Langs' iueas is seen in the two
volumes of 4," 4"/,-*B(" )6 ?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ ?0%/,)&,"!#+% (197S, 1974) as
well as in a clinical papei, "A Psychoanalytic Stuuy of Nateiial fiom Patients
in Psychotheiapy," (1972). The two volumes of 4," 4"/,-*B(" )6
?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ ?0%/,)&,"!#+% constitute a textbook that ieflects the best in
the classical psychoanalytic tiauition. They show Langs to be a seasoneu
psychoanalytic clinician who wiites luciuly anu peisuasively.
Continuing the line of thought about uay iesiuues anu uieams, Langs
places cential emphasis on
human auaptation in neuiotogenesis..Functioning, iesponuing,
anu auapting aie set off by enviionmental alteiations.|thej
enviionmental stimulus may, in geneial, be positive anu suppoitive
oi negative anu tiaumatic. Nost ciucial foi the uevelopment of
neuiotic uistuibance aie the intiapsychic iesponses to tiaumatic
stimuli. It is these majoi, cuiiently uisiuptive stimuli which have
the potential to set off inappiopiiate oi malauaptive (neuiotic)
iesponses that I have iuentifieu as the piimaiy auaptive task |pp.
281-282j.
This is in the spiiit of Fieuu in the 1&('*"0 )- 3%0&"!*#. The tiaumatic
ieaction is the paiauigm of uisease, anu iuentifying the tiauma is the cuie.
Such iuentification is baiieu by the patient's uefensiveness, which must be
analyzeu fiist. But the tiaumas aie not limiteu to inteicuiient ieality events
in the patient's extia-analytic life. A majoi event may be the pievious
session, "the theiapist's inteiventions oi lack of them, which may have
tiaumatizeu the patient anu evokeu iesponses in him" (p. 284).
The extension of the tiaumatizing event to incluue the actual behavioi
of the theiapist is the beginning of the specific Langsian emphasis.
Iatiogenic tiauma, injuiy causeu by the uoctoi's actions, is a meuical
commonplace. Speaking of the uangeis of hypnosis, Fieuu (189S) states:
"Wheie I causeu uamage, the ieason lay elsewheie anu ueepei." (p. 266).
Nany analysts have acknowleugeu the potential of the theiapist to cause
haim by counteitiansfeience. But no analyst befoie Langs has uefineu the
theiapist as an evei-piesent tiaumatizing agent, anu none has maue this
point of view into a system, as Langs has. This topic will be uiscusseu
fuithei.
In this textbook, Langs also uevelops the othei methouological iuea of
Fieuu's fiist two uecaues, the iuea of the manifest anu latent content.
This caiuinal concept of uieam psychology is conjoineu by Langs with
the iuea of the auaptive task. In this way, a new methouological tool has
been cieateu foi getting holu of the meaning of the patient's
communications.
To unueistanu a communication in context is uiffeient fiom
unueistanuing it in isolation. Fieuu auuiesseu this issue squaiely in 4,"
5-&"!+!"&#&*)- )6 7!"#.0, wheie he contiasteu the ieauing of a uieam
accoiuing to a univeisal symbol key with ieauing it in iefeience to a specific
uay iesiuue anu a specific uecouing oi tiacing of the manifest uieam
thoughts to theii latent anteceuents. With the giowth of the assoiteu
psychoanalytic causal uoctiines anu iueologies, analysts have uevelopeu a
fonuness foi stock foimulas anu clichs, useu in the mannei of what Fieuu
calleu the "Egyptian uieam book." Notions like castiation anxiety, penis
envy, the 0euipus complex, iuentity, anu sepaiation became the stock-in-
tiaue of what Sanuoi Feluman (19S8) calleu "blanket" inteipietations. 0tto
Isakowei (1968, 1971) waineu, similaily, against the habit of uiagnosing set
patteins anu tienus in a given sequence of an analytic session iathei than
getting the uiift of the actual mental images anu theii iole in the
communication. Like many otheis, Langs was faceu with the steiility of the
analytic cliches anu chestnuts anu went in seaich of the tiuth of the given
moment in the liveu expeiience.
Fieuu's iuea of the manifest anu latent was not limiteu, howevei, to the
tiansfoimation wiought by the uieam woik. Bis uepth psychology also
auuiesseu the issue of honesty veisus hypociisy in human communication,
the uiffeience between what is saiu anu what is *-&"-'"' oi meant. The
/)-&"-& aspect of "meaning" has hau a gieatei holu on both the populai anu
the piofessional imagination than the *-&"-& aspect. Although alive to the
impoitance of intention, Langs has followeu establisheu habit in using the
shoithanu "unconscious fantasy" to iefei to the ueepei, implieu, inuiiect,
concealeu intentions in communication. The manifest content is seen as a
hiuuen, uisguiseu, allusive iefeience to the uiiect iuea oi intention that lies
latent in the manifest mateiial anu manifests itself as a '"!*@#&*@" of the
anteceuent uiiect iuea. Thus, any piece of mateiial may be ieau not naively
anu at face value, but as a ueiivative pointing to ueepei-lying tiuths. This
seminal Fieuuian iuea unueiwent some tiansfoimations in Langs' wiitings,
which will be examineu latei.
It shoulu be sufficient to note at this point that the use of the teim
"unconscious" is liable to ceitain pitfalls ielateu to the tenuency among
analysts to ieify the concept of the unconscious. Anothei tenuency is, as in
Fieuu's caution quoteu eailiei, to saciifice the manifest content to the latent
content, as if the manifest weie seconu hanu goous to be bypasseu on the
way to the latent content. Beie Langs (197S) notes that "manifest content
scieens oi conceals, but also ieveals some of what lies beneath it" (p. 296).
To ueny the manifest woulu imply a wholesale iepuuiation of all ait. Foi
what is ait but the giving of aitful, oi ueiivative, expiession, that is, in
vaiious guises anu uisguises, to what can be moie simply anu uiiectly
expiesseu.
Two cential conclusions emeige fiom this foi Langs: (1) what to listen
foi in the mateiial of the houi; anu (2) the oiuei of piioiities in such
listening. Regaiuing the fiist, eveiy houi ievolves aiounu two contexts: the
theiapeutic context, that is, the manifestations of the patient's
psychopathology as iepoiteu, anu the auaptive context, as uefineu eailiei.
Both these aie listeneu to on both the manifest anu latent, conscious anu
unconscious levels. The highest piioiities in listening in piepaiation foi
inteivening, howevei, Langs concluues aie inueeu these "ieactions to eiiois
by the theiapist anu acute symptomatic ciises" (p. S64). The othei aspects,
in oiuei of uecieasing piioiity, aie "uistuibances in the theiapeutic alliance
aiising fiom souices othei than the theiapist's eiiois; othei iesistances;
cuiient intiapsychic conflicts anu unconscious fantasies ielateu to them; the
genetic basis foi the patient's ieactions to the theiapist anu foi his piesent
symptoms anu innei conflicts; ieality issues anu pioblems" (p. S64).
This exposition contains the essence of Langs' thought. It is on the one
hanu fiimly iooteu in the classical psychoanalytic tiauition, anu it maiks a
uepaituie fiom it, on the othei. The point of uepaituie is the tiansition fiom
a one-system, intiapeisonal conception to a two-system, inteipeisonal oi
inteiactional conception. It shoulu be noteu that Langs has not completely
given up the intiapeisonal habit of conceptualizing. Bis clinical theoiies of
symptom foimation anu the iole of memoiy anu fantasy aie tiauitionally
intiapeisonal (intiapsychic). At the same time, his inteipeisonal
foimulations uiffei in this iespect fiom those encounteieu in the classical
liteiatuie: The uelineation of the auaptive context has fiom the beginning
leu Langs to a consiueiation of the analyst, oi theiapist, as an evei-piesent
tiaumatogenic agent. This one iuea has been uiiven by him ielentlessly to
its logical limit. Let us examine this moie closely.
The auaptive context emeiges as the final common stianu that gatheis
into itself all of the following thieaus: (1) how one $*0&"-0 to the session, how
one uiscoveis the sense, the point, the /"-&!#$ ."00#8" of any given session;
(2) the !"/*+!)/#$ #/&*)- of the patient anu theiapist upon each othei, each
manifesting a iesponse to the othei; (S) the two-layeieu '"!*@#&*@" stiuctuie
of each communication: the consciousunconscious, latentmanifest,
explicitimplicit (subsequently uefineu as tiuthlie) levels of each utteiance.
A convenient miu-point in the evolution of Langs' iueas is his book, 4,"
>*0&"-*-8 ?!)/"00 (1978a), which I have uiscusseu elsewheie at some length
(Lothane, 198u). In it he spells out cleaily the inteiweaving stianus of the
auaptive context.
The classical view stiesseu the &,".#&*/ /)-&"-& of the patient's
utteiances in the psychoanalytic-theiapeutic situation. The themes in the
patient's naiiative weie ielateu to the patient's memoiies, past anu piesent-
uay iealities. Initially, in the 1&('*"0 )- 3%0&"!*#, the analyst unueistoou
that is, inteipieteuthese themes the same way a ieauei unueistanus oi
inteipiets a tolu oi piinteu stoiy: by becoming awaie of its meanings,
messages, iefeiences. But in the 1&('*"0 )- 3%0&"!*#, Fieuu hau alieauy
become awaie of a stoiy within a stoiy, a uiama within a uiama: the
emeigence of tiansfeiences, oi the effect of the patient-uoctoi inteiaction
on the stoiy as tolu. Thus, wheieas at fiist memoiy was subjecteu to the
same uispassionate sciutiny in the theiapeutic session as was the histologic
section unuei the micioscope, it soon became eviuent that such sciutiny hau
to be tempeieu by claiifying the peisonal equation. Thus, the eviuential
status of the seuuction stoiies was ieevaluateu as an attempt on the pait of
the patients to fake such stoiies in oiuei to have a peisonal effect on the
listenei. Even with the iecognition of the uistoiting potential of the heie anu
now on the theie anu then, howevei, the lattei was still vieweu as a iesult of
the *-&!#+"!0)-#$ uynamics of the patient, with the theiapist iemaining the
uispassionate obseivei anu inteipietei of the patient's innei uiama as
iemembeieu anu enacteu in the analytic situation.
As I have aigueu elsewheie (Lothane, 198Sa), Fieuu ieplaceu the
tiauma anu uieam paiauigms of the symptom with the concept of
intiapsychic uynamics of instinctual uiives anu uefenses anu intiapsychic
ueteiminism, as consistent with a one-system psychology. Bowevei, the fact
iemaineu that the analyst was not only a -#&(!#$*0&*/ )C0"!@"! fiom above of
the goings on within the patient, a uiagnostician of symptom complexes anu
mechanisms of uefense; the analyst was also a +#!&*/*+#-& )C0"!@"!. This
placeu an insoluble stiain on the one-system conception. Foi wheieas it
takes one peison to iemembei oi to uieam, it takes two to talk. Speaking
anu listening aie in theii veiy natuie inteipeisonal anu inteiactional. The
basic one-system oiientation peisisteu with the emeigence of the concept of
tiansfeience. The analyst in the tiansfeience was seen as an ineit scieen
onto which uieams anu memoiies weie piojecteu. Anu such piojecting uoes
exist. This moue of functioning of the psychoanalytic inteiaction is still valiu
as an instiument foi the claiification of the theie anu then. But it is
insufficient foi the unueistanuing of the heie anu now, the actual goings on
in the living uoctoi-patient encountei.
This emphasis on the heie anu now anu the piesent-uay ielationships
as opposeu to the theie anu then anu past ielationships fiist began with
Feienczi (see Lothane, 198Sa). It was followeu inuepenuently by Sullivan
(see Lothane, 1984), Wilhelm Reich (1949), Szasz (1961), anu now, among
otheis, by Langs. In this connection, howevei, it shoulu be appieciateu that
Fieuu's concept of the hysteiical symptom was inteipeisonal fiom the stait;
the symptom was a statement with meaning that was intenueu foi anothei
peison anu thus coulu be uecoueu by an obseivei oi listenei.
It is the &,")!*"0 that weie eithei intiapeisonal oi inteipeisonal, -)& the
phenomena in question. Similaily, the uoctoi-patient ielationship was
vieweu as a peisonal ielationship fiom the veiy stait, in the 1&('*"0 )-
3%0&"!*#. It is only the politics anu ethics of this peisonal ielationship that
weie not spelleu out till some 2u yeais latei in Fieuu's (1912-1S) papeis on
technique. Thus the often-touteu achievement of the so-calleu object
ielations theoiists is not a finuing but iefinuing of a tiuth alieauy piesent in
Fieuu.
To ietuin to the main thieau of this exposition, the gist of Langs'
communicative appioach (the latest uesignation of what was foimeily
calleu the auaptational oi inteiactional appioach) is these two iueas: the
#'#+&*@" /)-&"A& (Fieuu's tiauma paiauigm) anu '"!*@#&*@" /)..(-*/#&*)-
(Fieuu's uieam language paiauigm). Baving explaineu the iuea of the
auaptive context, let us now tuin to the concept of ueiivative
communication.
The notion of ueiivative is in Fieuu. Be uefineu ueiivative in the context
of intiapeisonal uynamics; Langs has ieuefineu it in the context of the
uialogue, in a specific way. Fieuu useu the iuea of ueiivative to iefei to
something obseivable that was seen as aiising oi foimeu fiom something
else anu piioi to it. The notion of ueiivative is basic to Fieuu's methou of
ueteimining causes anu oiigins of phenomena. In linguistics a woiu ueiives
fiom an eailiei woiu. In chemistiy one compounu is a ueiivative of anothei.
Fieuu (191S) useu the woiu DC;)..$*-8 (liteially, offspiing), to state, foi
example, that "iepiession +!)+"! conceins +0%/,*/#$ '"!*@#&*@"0 |+0%/,*0/,"
DC;)..$*-8"j of the iepiesseu |instinctual uiivej iepiesentation, oi such
tiains of thought which, aiising elsewheie, become ielateu to it thiough
association" (p. 2Su; authoi's tianslation, seconu italics auueu). Symptoms
anu uieams aie psychological ueiivatives of tiains of thought that aie
hiuuen, iepiesseu, oi waiueu off. Fieuu's psychology thus necessaiily
implies a suiface anu a uepth. Bis uepth psychology is baseu on the manifest
anu latent uichotomy.
The concept of ueiivative thus implies two basic juugments: a juugment
about cause anu oiigins, anu a juugment about what is piimaiy anu what is
seconuaiy. A foimulation about the uynamics of a case histoiy, oi of a
sequence in a session, will thus entail a uiscussion of all soits of ueiivatives.
The iuea of the ueiivative is anothei centeipiece in Langs'
communicative methou. It is lockeu into the iuea of an auaptive context anu
the two aie an inuissoluble whole. Langs (1978a) maue the following
uistinctions:
|Inj claiifying the types of communication fiom the patient anu the
ways in which the analyst coulu oiganize anu conceptualize the
mateiial...on the fiist level, a patient's associations coulu be
oiganizeu aiounu theii .#-*6"0& /)-&"-&0. This appioach, which is
essentially nonanalytic since it totally iejects all notions of
unconscious piocess anu content, confines itself to the suiface of
the patient's communications.
0n the seconu level, the analyst oiganizes mateiial fiom the patient
by attenuing to the manifest associations, isolating vaiious
segments of this mateiial anu imputing to each a specific
unconscious meaning; I teim these infeiences 4%+" E-" '"!*@#&*@"0.
Beie the manifest content is auuiesseu in ielative isolation anu the
latent contentthe unconscious communicationis ueteimineu by
the iecognition of obvious uisplacements, the use of symbols, the
intuitive unueistanuing of unueilying meanings anu a knowleuge of
a given patient's communicative iuiom.
A thiiu level of oiganizing the mateiial fiom the patient is feasible
thiough the use of an auaptive context as the uynamic oiganizei of
the patient's associations; this yielus 4%+" 49) '"!*@#&*@"0. The
mouel heie is that of the uay iesiuue anu the manifest uieam, the
latent content of which is fully compiehenueu only with the
knowleuge of the uieam's piecipitant anu the ielateu associations....
Each auaptive context itself has both manifest anu latent meanings.
... A tiue unueistanuing of the natuie of an auaptive stimulus anu of
the iesponses it evokes (associations anu behaviois) is founueu on
the self-knowleuge of the analysthis sensitivity to the conscious,
anu especially, unconscious meanings anu piojections conveyeu in
his veibal inteiventions, silences, anu effoits to manage the fiame.
Type Two ueiivatives, then, aie always vieweu uynamically anu as
iesponses to auaptive stimuli. As a iule, they imply that viitually all
of the communications fiom the patient must, on this level, be
appenueu oi ielateu to the analytic inteiactionthose iepiesenting
peiceptions anu intiojections as well as fantasies anu uistoitions. At
this level, many seemingly uiveigent anu ielatively inuecipheiable
associations acciue significance in the light of the iecognizeu
auaptive content |pp. S62-S6Sj.
"The effoits to manage the fiame" aie the most impoitant uoings anu
sayings of the theiapist anu the most telling impingements on the patient.
This is the ciux of Langs' inteiactionist emphasis. Consequently, the iealm of
the giounu iules of the theiapeutic situation is vieweu as the piime aiena of
inteiaction. It comes to this: Any action by the theiapist oi the patient
intenueu eithei to make oi bieak the "fiame," oi the giounu iules, will
cieate a most impoitant ieality stimulus. The ieaction to this stimulus is the
auaptive context, expiesseu in an encoueu foim, oi in Type Two ueiivatives.
The above uefines a mouel of uisease anu a mouel of cuie. Neuiosis is an
inteiactional oi communicative cieation, anu its tieatment, oi iesolution, is
also inteiactional anu communicative. The tieatment, is a seiies of evei-
evolving inteiactions anu communications, but all betiay a basic pattein of
action anu ieaction. At all times the stimulus emanating fiom one peison
piouuces both a conscious oi manifest level anu an unconscious oi latent
level of ieaction in the othei peison. The conscious oi uiiect message is only
the misleauing suiface of the communication. The tiue anu valiu level is the
latent, encoueu, ueiivative, embeuueu, oi hiuuen message. The manifest
message has to be uecoueu, unmaskeu, uiiven fiom its hiuing place of
uisguise anu exposeu to yielu the hiuuen message. All is in the inteiaction
anu in the heie anu now, anu theiapy means uecouing the latent meanings
of this inteiaction. All else is seconuaiy. The most matuie expiession of this
iuea is given in Langs' latest systematic exposition of the communicative
appioach, ?0%/,)&,"!#+%F D G#0*/ 4"A& (1982), anu in a iecent papei (1981).
It is essential to appieciate Langs' insistence on ueiivative, oi encoueu,
communication, anu the uistinction between manifest content, Type 0ne
ueiivatives, anu Type Two ueiivatives anu foimulations (Langs, 1981,1982).
In this uistinction, Langs iemains iooteu in the classical analytic tiauition
but uevelops a new emphasis. The tiauitional way is to view neuiosis as
confineu to one peison who ielives the memoiy of his past in the foim of
symptoms, uieams, anu uayuieams. Langs (1981), following Fieuu, iefeis to
this as the unconscious fantasy constellation. The tiauitionally oiienteu
theiapist will tieat these constellations as self-containeu piouucts anu apply
to them, in Langs' (1981) woius, to the
familiai avenues of affective cognitive insight, thiough which the
natuie anu effects of the unconscious fantasy constellations aie
inteipieteu to the patient, who then affectively unueistanus them
anu woiks thiough them. This pioceuuie, on all eviuence clinically
pievalent touay, fiees the patient's ego foi giowth anu the
uevelopment of ielatively flexible anu auaptive iesouices with
which to cope with anu iesolve intiapsychic conflicts, anu to mouify
pathological aspects of the unconscious fantasy constellations.
The one-peison emphasis is chaiacteiizeu by Langs as iesting on two
misleauing anu inteiielateu appioaches: (1) concentiating on the manifest
content of the patient's consciously expiesseu thoughts anu the manifest
themes; anu (2) foimulating Type 0ne ueiivatives. The manifest content
appioach takes the patient's statement at face value anu the analytic
ielationship is auuiesseu on its suiface only (Langs, 1981). Type 0ne
ueiivatives, ielateu to such conscious thoughts anu themes, aie the
tiauitional uynamic anu genetic foimulations applieu to such mateiial. But
this is tantamount to thiowing the book at the patient. Such Type 0ne
ueiivatives exist in a vacuum, anu they uo not become useful until activateu
in iesponse to a stimulus fiom the theiapist. The manifest content anu Type
0ne ueiivative appioach, fuitheimoie, implies that "the buiuen of
pathological inputs is placeu almost entiiely on the patient anu the souices
of his seemingly uistoiteu communications aie seen to iesiue exclusively
with his own unconscious fantasy constellations" (Langs, 1981). Langs will
not ueny that the manifest unconscious fantasy constellation is in itself a
ueiivative. But heie is the ciucial point of uepaituie: Since Langs (1981)
goes foi inteiaction, he chooses to emphasize inteiactional, oi Type two,
ueiivatives, ovei all else: "This lays the founuation foi the seconu avenue of
symptom iesolution |whichj involves the object ielationship between
patient anu analyst, the natuie of theii unconscious communicative
tiansactions anu piojective anu intiojective iuentifications of each."
0nce again, Langs invokes Fieuu's notion that the manifest content of
the uieam is a uisguiseu euition of the latent content anu of peiception in
exteinal ieality. In the context of the inteiaction, the patient's ieaction to the
theiapist's impact upon him oi hei is not expiesseu uiiectly, but in a
ueiivative, that is, uisguiseu anu allusive, mannei. In oiuinaiy social
inteicouise, hypociisy is moie common than honesty. Like the king's jestei,
the patient uisguises his oi hei tiue ieaction to the theiapist. Like Pinel,
who came to the iescue of the insane, Fieuu went out to iehabilitate the
woith of the opinions of neuiotics. Similaily, Langs makes a case foi the
patient's coiiect anu astute peiceptions of the theiapist's mistakes, foibles,
lies, evasions, anu abuses. The iigiu theiapist, like the authoiitaiian paient,
may think he oi she is above ciiticism anu be quick to attiibute the patient's
complaints to "tiansfeience," "sickness," oi "acting out." The
coiiesponuingly coweu patient might talk in allusions, oi, as Langs puts it, in
ueiivatives. Langs (1981), howevei, geneializes an inuiiectness to "@"!%
patient anu eveiy inteiaction:
In essence, eveiy association anu behavioi by the patient is
analyzeu in the light of the stimulus oi #'#+&*@" /)-&"A& that
piovokeu it. Extensive empiiical eviuence suggests that these
piecipitants aie almost without exception the silences anu
inteiventions of the analyst. ... All othei stimuli, whethei fiom
within the patient himself oi fiom tiaumatic outsiue ielationships,
aie seen as seconuaiy auaptive contexts anu aie, as a iule, linkeu to
piimaiy auaptive contexts within the theiapeutic expeiience. 0n
this level, the patient's mateiial is given specific oiganization anu
meaning in the heie-anu-now as ueiivatives that must be
unueistoou in the light of the stimulating auaptive context, a
concept mouelleu on Fieuu's conception of the uay iesiuue foi the
uieam..Listening at this level consistently auuiesses all manifest
associations as ueiivatives of unconscious contents anu piocesses, a
teim of both 6#-&#0*"0 anu +"!/"+&*)-0 |italics auueuj.|ofj the
extensive pathological communications containeu in the theiapist's
anu analyst's eiioneous inteiventions anu mismanagements of the
fiamewoik. With iemaikable consistency, patients unconsciously
peiceive anu intioject the implications of these eiiois. Similaily,
when the analyst inteivenes piopeily, iepiesentations of a positive
intioject anu Type Two ueiivative valiuation ensue..Naking use of
Bion's uiscussion of lies, liais, anu the thinkei (197u) we might
auvance the flowing postulate: tiuth as it peitains to the patient's
neuiosis within the psychoanalytic situation can be iuentifieu only
by taking into account the unconscious communicative inteiaction
between patient anu analyst as this ielates to the manifestations of
that neuiosis on the one hanu, anu to the cential auaptive contexts
foi both patient anu analyst on the othei (Langs, 198ua, b). Tiuth
must incluue a iecognition of intiojective anu piojective piocesses,
tiansfeience anu non-tiansfeience, counteitiansfeience anu non-
counteitiansfeience, anu the valiu anu uistuibeu functioning of
both paiticipants. Any foimulation which excluues any aspect of
this totality, oi which makes use of one pait of the total pictuie as a
means of uenying oi excluuing the iest, shoulu be vieweu as a
baiiiei to the tiuth. 0n this basis it becomes possible to uistinguish
tiuth theiapy fiom lie theiapy, anu to uevelop a conceptualization
of uistinctive moues of symptom alleviation.
Langs (1982) also notes: "The uistinction between Type 0ne anu Type
Two ueiivative listening shows the neeu foi a basic ievision in the natuie of
psychoanalytic listening in the uiiection of auaptive context foimulations."
This claim makes the cuiient milestone of the fiuition of a seminal iuea.
Staiting with a ieaffiimation of the impoitance of ieality, via clinical
investigations of the iole of uay iesiuues in uieams, Langs founu the
impoitance of the ieality impact of the analyst. The focus on the actions of
the analyst upon the patient, on the heie anu now inteiaction between the
paiticipants in the analytic encountei, then shapeu two majoi aieas of
concein: (1) concein with the /)-&"-& anu 6)!. of the communication,
inspiieu by uieam psychology, such that the patient's stieam of
consciousness is ieau foi coveit allusions to his oi hei thoughts anu feelings
about the theiapist, even though the patient is oveitly talking about his oi
hei piesent anu past life; anu (2) a concein with the 8!)(-' !($"0the
ethical noims goveining the theiapist's piofessional conuuct.
Langs' emphasis has biought about a tiansvaluation of the tiauitional
objects of analytic exploiation. The patient's life, past anu piesent, life's
events anu ciises, anu the time-halloweu tiansfeience aie all vieweu as
seconuaiy to the heie anu now anu as meiely a vehicle foi the patient's
ieactions to the theiapist's impact upon him oi hei.
Langs' innovation is eviuently of gieat heuiistic usefulness. It iaises oui
consciousness to the actual anu ieal inputs of the theiapist anu shakes oui
complacency about them. At the same time, in spite of Lang's iepeateu
claims, it uoes not achieve a uefinitive uegiee of ceitainty about the intent of
a given communication. In a given moment, who is the patient !"#$$% talking
aboutthe patient oi the theiapist. Enteitaining a silent hypothesis about
the intent, not meiely content, of a communication can only leau to
+!"0(.+&*@", not /)-/$(0*@", infeiences. We aie uealing with inteipieting
matteis of uegiee, intensity, accent. Such matteis aie in the iealm of
opinion. As such, they become open to uebate anu cieate uebate. Theii
ultimate valiuation is subject to uevelopments in timeHto the juugment of
histoiy.
It is useful to invoke at this point the uialectic of content anu foim. This
uialectic, anu the vaiying emphasis on now one, now the othei aspect of the
content-foim unity, has been in eviuence fiom the veiy beginning of
psychoanalysis. At fiist the iuea pieuominateuthe 9,#& (content) of the
communication; foi example, hysteiia was uefineu as iueogenic, an iuea
peisisting in time. Latei Fieuu uiscoveieu the ,)9 (foim) of the
communicationthe moou of uieaming, latent anu manifest content, anu
fiee association. As uieam psychology anu inteiest in content waneu, foim
came moie anu moie to the foie, fiist as the emphasis on .#--"!0 )6
'*08(*0" #-' "-/)'*-8I latei as tiansfeience anu especially tiansfeience-
iesistance. This focus on iesistance then leu to two fuithei uevelopments: a
shift of inteiest fiom /)..(-*/#&*)- &) /)-'(/&, fiom the what to the how,
anu fiom the how to the what-foithat is, a shift fiom /)-&"-& to *-&"-&
(Lothane, 198Sa). Consequently, theie was a gieatei stiess on the /)-&!#/&
aspect of the conuuct of the two people, on theii inteiactions in the heie anu
now iathei than on events in the theie anu then, anu on the ethical noims
goveining this conuuct. This uevelopment was tiaveiseu by Fieuu in his
movement fiom his woiks on hysteiia anu uieams to the 1912-1S papeis on
technique. Along this path Fieuu gave his attention to two basic soits of
foim: (1) the uepth-suiface, latent-manifest, stiaight-encoueu foims of
/)..(-*/#&*)- anu conuuct ievealeu by uieam psychology; anu (2) the
honest-uishonest, coopeiative-iesistant, love-hate, giatification-abstinence
foims of /)-'(/& ieflecteu in the obseivance of the analytic contiact. Langs
has tiaceu a similai couise. 0n the one hanu, he uefineu what to listen to in
the communication (iuentifying the auaptive context) anu how to listen foi
it (uecouing ueiivatives). 0n the othei hanu, he has uefineu the giounu iules
(the fiame). 0vei the uecaues, analysts have uebateu anu battleu about both
these aspects of the analytic encountei.
Baving given what is hopeu is a balanceu ciitical exposition of Langs'
views, I shall now pioceeu to quote two ieactions to Langs in the liteiatuie.
To uate, the oithouox analytic establishment has ignoieu Langs totally. To
this, the ieaction of Leo Stone, is both a unique anu instiuctive exception.
Seailes has always been a maveiick himself, vieweu with suspicion by the
oithouox.
In two uialogues of Langs with Leo Stone (Langs & Stone, 198u) anu
Baiolu Seailes (Langs & Seailes, 198u), theie aie expiesseu many
inteiesting opinions, agieements, anu uisagieements. In both uialogues the
uisagieements aie not so much in the iealm of the fiame of communication
but in the iealm of conuuct.
Stone comes acioss as a pillai of the oithouox analytic establishment, a
man both humane anu uibane, who believes that the situation is moie
impoitant than the iules. The Sabbath is maue foi human, not human foi the
Sabbath. Be aumits to having been influenceu by Feienczi (via his fiist
analyst) anu espouses an appioach to the patient maikeu by common sense,
justice, ieasonableness, flexibility, anu a mouicum of giatification in the
ielationship. In this uialogue, Langs espouses a funuamentalist position on
giounu iules anu theii iigiu application. Be takes Stone to task foi giving a
patient an extia session when the patient iequesteu pills to calm his anxiety.
The patient's subsequent uieam of the pills slightly cheweu up anu
accompanieu by an image of two woims was ieau by Langs as inuicating the
patient's view of the extia houi as "a uangeious contaminateu giatification"
(Langs & Stone, 198u, p. 17S). Stone, piesseu by Langs to conceue the point,
uefenus himself by seeing Langs' position as "Calvinist" anu piohibitionist.
This biief vignette highlights the peiennial pioblem of inteipieting a
iecoiu of a live text, especially when its authoi is not aiounu. The
inteipietei can nevei be ceitain about the exact iefeients of an authoi's
content oi intent; the inteipietei can only offei a plausible hypothesis. In
this case, fuitheimoie, the uebate is not so much about the uieam's meaning
as a pioposition as about the uieam as the patient's J('8."-& of the
usefulness oi helpfulnesss of the analyst's conuuct. As such, it is less a
mattei of logic anu moie a mattei of love. But the canon of love uiffeis
essentially fiom the canon of logic. Yes anu no, tiue anu false have uiffeient
implications in love; they mean acceptance oi iejection, like oi uislike,
pieseivation oi annihilation. In logic it is possible to achieve ceitainty a
piioii, befoie the fact; in love, in foitunate ciicumstances, ceitainty comes a
posteiioii, aftei the fact. The tiuth of love is testeu in time.
Stone feels that Langs views the fiame as saciosanct, as a beu of
Piociustes, as too iigiu. Ceitainly, an impoitant uiffeience in backgiounu
suifaces in the uialogue: Stone speaks mainly of his own expeiiences with
patients, Langs of his ieactions to accounts of cases by stuuents anu
iesiuents, who, in Langs' view, aie both pione to eiioi anu vulneiable to
counteitiansfeience. Such facts aie impoitant to iemembei in oiuei to
unueistanu the positions espouseu. Langs also makes iefeience to his
expeiience as an analytic canuiuate. Both Langs anu Stone concui about the
"conuitions of tiaining analysis |asj a uisastious fact of oui tiaining.a gioss
mouification of the analytic situation. uioss!" (pp. 18-19). Langs also
expiesses the view that "all analytic ieseaich is an effoit to complete the
unfinisheu business of one's peisonal analysis. The gift is to uo it in a
cieative way" (p. 17).
The unfinisheu business of men in analysis with men is often the fathei-
son ielationship, a pioblem foi Fieuu anu his followeis anu foi many
analysts anu theii analysanus-stuuents evei since. It is enuemic to the
piofession. The fathei-son uilemma is in eviuence heie, too. Langs' effoits to
euucate Stone to see the unconscious implications of his consciously well-
intentioneu behavioi aie met with Stone's tempeiamental queiy, "Aie you
'wilu analyzing' me." (p. 286).
Peihaps the most inteiesting exchange between Langs anu Stone is
about the ielationship of ieality to fantasy. Invoking the patient's tiue anu
valiu unconscious peiceptiveness as manifesteu by the patient's
intiouuction of a mouification in the fiame, Langs pioceeus to inteipiet
that is, to tianslatethe manifest as a ueiivative communication:
I woulu aigue that the patient has actually peiceiveu,
unconsciously, keinels of tiuth iegaiuing unconscious motives
within youiself foi ueviating. These woulu be communicateu
inuiiectly, as a iule, in what he is saying, anu his iesponse woulu
not be totally uistoiteu. uianteu that the theiapist is not
consciously involveu in homosexual fantasies about the patient,
gianteu that he uoes not have conscious sexual wishes foi his wife,
nonetheless, I think the patient woulu be entitleu to feel that theie
aie some uniesolveu, unconscious, homosexual anu seuuctive
pioblems within the theiapist anu that they weie expiesseu
thiough the acceptance of the mouification in the fiame |pp. 284-
28Sj.
Tiying such a foimulation out foi size on himself, Stone cannot holu
back his sense of outiage: "I think you aie absolutely wiong heie, uue to the
fact that unconscious fantasy is given pieeminence anu pieuominance in life
that is utteily uniealistic" (p. 28S). Stone heie anu elsewheie feels that
Langs is ignoiing ieality. Langs' suipiise is just as poignant as Stone's
outiage: "It is ouu to heai you imply that I ignoie ieality when I am actually
stiessing itiealities of which the analyst may be unawaie. You aie
auuiessing manifest ieality; I acknowleuge its piesence anu auu latent
ieality, if I may use the phiase, as well" (p. 284).
This exchange amounts to a ieveisal of ioles. The oithouox Fieuuian
analyst piofesses a commonsense faith in the exteinal, consensually
valiuateu ieality of oveit action as piioi to an inteinal, intiapsychic ieality
of a hypostatizeu unconscious fantasy. Langs the innovatoi is ultiaoithouox
in his faith in an intiapsychic ieality as a valiu ciiteiion foi juuging exteinal
ieality. This contiauicts his othei emphasis on uay iesiuues. The uieam is a
ieaction to an event, not piioi to an event. The uieam oi uayuieam is not an
unconscious fantasyit is an outciopping into consciousness of
unconsciously tiansfoimeu othei thoughts, piioi in time, which can be
iecalleu.
But who is the piopei juuge of the valiuity of memoiy oi of the valiuity
of imputeu motivesthe peison who iemembeis anu who avows motives,
oi anothei peison with a vesteu inteiest, who listens to the stoiy. Bow can
the uebate between Langs anu Stone be settleu to satisfy the iequiiements
of scientific, oi othei, pioof.
Fiom Fieuu on, analysts have been tempteu to consiuei themselves
expeits in the unconscious, implying a special peiceptiveness about othei
people's hiuuen motives. This expeitise betiays a hiuuen authoiitaiianism
stemming fiom the ieality of social, economic, oi othei status. As
authoiitaiian as Fieuu was in his politics, he was egalitaiian about "the
unconscious." In "the unconscious" we all covet, lust, anu muiuei, but in ieal
life a fathei can say to a son: "Bo as I say, uon't uo as I uo." Langs has again
cieateu a tiansvaluation. Wheieas the tiauitional analyst is an expeit on the
analysanu's unconscious, the innovation is to set up the patient as an expeit
aujuuicating the analyst's unconscious, oi hiuuen, motives. No wonuei Stone
was outiageu at such a ievolutionaiy tuining of the tables.
This is also ielateu to Langs' peivasive skepticism towaiu uiiect anu
tiuthful human communication. Be will not take a stiaight yes oi no foi an
answei. Yet, although the concept of encoueu, ueiivative communication
squaies with the human capacity to conceal tiuth anu piactice uuplicity
thiough the use of language, it uoes not follow that uiiect communication
uoes not exist. Langs has conveiteu a potentiality into an actuality, a
piobability into a ceitaintya consequence of taking the notion of "the
unconscious" too liteially. Fuitheimoie, the suspicion of uiiect
communication, if pusheu too fai, can be as uisabling as the uisiegaiu foi
inuiiect, oi ueiivative, communication. Both moues of communication neeu
to be subjecteu to the test of tiuth.
The uialogue between Langs anu Seailes (198u) cieates a uiffeient
atmospheie. Two ciicumstances make foi an immeuiate affinity between
them: Seailes' political status as a maveiick in ielation to the analytic
establishment; anu his iueological appioach (inspiieu by the teachings of
Sullivan) that psychopathology is an inteiactional piouuct, that the patient
cuies the uoctoi, anu that the uoctoi may himself be uistuibeu, oi have a
"psychotic coie." Seailes has been known foi yeais as a theiapist maikeu by
oiiginality, piobity, couiage, anu bluntness in his uealings with some of the
most seveiely uistuibeu patients at Chestnut Louge, Naiylanu, anu foi his
numeious imaginative contiibutions to the liteiatuie.
Seailes is sympathetic to Langs' position on the fiame, the concept of
the auaptive context anu ueiivative communication, anu the appioach of
monitoiing one's behavioi towaiu the patient iathei than chalking
pioblems up to the patient's tiansfeience.
The two men also shaie many piivate sentiments about the injustices of
the analytic establishment. Langs uesciibes poignantly his uissatisfaction
with his tiaining analyst: "I think I will be foievei ungiateful anu angiy
about the mouifications in the fiamewoik of my analysis anu its lasting
effects on me. Anu then I have to have a peispective. Such ueviations have
been anu still aie a ieflection of a shaieu blinu spot" (Langs & Seailes, 198u,
p. 9S). Be also uesciibeu his bieak with his institute anu society:
0ne of the veiy positive things about my alienation fiom my
colleagues anu Institute is that it helpeu me to iesolve a goou piece
ofI'll nevei iesolve it entiielybut a goou piece of my laigely
inappiopiiate neeu foi theii appioval, foi theii sanction, foi theii
love, which hau been among the conscious motives foi my
woik..These neeus aie ieflecteu in my technique books (Langs,
197S, 1974), which I wiote with my teacheis at the Institute in
minu. At the time, I believeu that what I wiote was tiue, anu I was
alieauy establishing my inuepenuence by woiking in ways
iegaiuing which they openly uisappioveu |p. 99j.
The bieak between Langs anu the gioup has been complete. (A numbei
of Langs' foimei teacheis anu peeis, whom I appioacheu iecently foi
ieactions to his woik, ueclineu to get involveu.) Langs' isolation has even leu
him to "keep asking myself, Am I tiying to be a maityi. Am I inviting all of
this conuemnation. Anu I have absolutely ueciueu that this is not
maityiuom oi masochism, but a love of tiuthyes, a ueuication to fathom
the tiuth iegaiuless of peisonal cost" (p. 86). But Langs still woiiies:
...0n one level, I ieally feel that I have fieeu myself in many ways,
but I uon't mean to imply that it's not still a gieat concein. In fact,
one of the things that uistuibs me most at this timein all
honestyis that I am still pieoccupieu with just that veiy aiea.
Bow much is my woik being accepteu. When will I have my uay.
When will they iegiet it. When anu how will it all be iesolveu.
Theie is something I haven't woikeu thiough. I know it, I am
woiking on it. Still, I think that in teims of what I am wiiting anu
cieating now, I have become fai moie fiee of those shackles than I
hau been befoie, in a veiy positive sense. I uiun't mean to imply,
though, that it uoesn't iemain a kinu of huit anu almost a uamneu
obsession |p. 1u2j.
These peisonal statements illustiate the ubiquitous connection
between the man anu his cieation in matteis belonging to the spheie of
thought anu action. The peisonal equation has even penetiateu such a
piioii, impeisonal uisciplines as physics anu astionomy. Bow much moie
impoitant is the peisonal element in a piofession like theiapy oi in a
uiscipline like psychoanalysis.
Scientific consensus, uoctiinal compliance, anu gioup loyalty aie
foievei a vexing pioblem foi analysts. It is possible to be a lonely
investigatoi in the laboiatoiy, but a psychotheiapist cannot suivive in
isolation. Be neeus a gioup anu a public. Fieuu iightly uesciibeu himself as
the leauei of the psychoanalytic .)@"."-&. Be also cieateu the paiauigm of
the uiama of the innovatoi anu futuie leaueithe initial expeiience of the
ievelation of tiuth, the ievolt against an establishment, the gatheiing of
faithful uisciples anu the appeaiance of schismatics, the spieau of the
message anu the cieation of a wiue following, the institutionalization of the
gioup as an oiganizeu bouy, anu the conveision of ievealeu tiuth into
uogma.
The stoiy of Langs' "schism" has not been publisheu. It was not a heiesy
but a manifestation of inuiviuuality anu a quest foi inuepenuence. The
pioblem is with the gioup, which cannot accommouate an iueological
vaiiant in its miust, anu with the inuiviuual, who ciaves the appioval of the
gioup but will not sell his oiiginality shoit. The uocile stay anu the naughty
go away. As Langs, inspiieu by Winnicott (1949), avows: "Whenevei an
analyst wiites, it is an effoit to complete his own analysis" (p. 48). Anu, he
shoulu have auueu, it is to iesolve the business of ielating to the gioup, to
teacheis, stuuents, anu patients as well.
uive a uog a bau name anu hang him, as the saying goes; such name-
calling is a stiategy foi maintaining gioup cohesion. The epithet "wilu"
(Chessick, 1981) is one of the miluest of those thiown at Langs in a numbei
of ieviews of his books. 0n the othei hanu, a followei of Langs qualifieu the
absence of seiious uebate on the communicative appioach in the
psychoanalytic liteiatuie as naicissistic uefensiveness (Raney, 198S).
Cuising enemies, excommunicating heietics, anu pinning psycho-
pathological labels on opponentsthe vaiieties of name-calling. In this case,
the establishment chose silence. 0bliteiation is a fate woise than
excommunication.
But we aie uealing with caieeis, not cuises. Langs has gone on to cieate
a caieei, to win fiienus anu influence people, in imitation of Fieuu's
example. Fieuu's motto in 4," 5-&"!+!"&#&*)- )6 7!"#.0 (19uub), "<$"/&"!" 0*
-"B(") 0(+"!)0I D/,"!)-&# .)@"C)" (If I cannot benu the uppei gous, I shall
move the unueiwoilu) hau a political coiielate: Since he coulu not conquei
the viennese acauemic establishment, he went uiiectly to the public anu
cieateu a woilu movement. Be unueistoou the sociopolitics of gioups anu of
iueologies (Lothane, 198Sa). Be chose to expiess it in the teiminology of the
sciences. Like Fieuu, Langs has shifteu fiom the caieei of theiapist to a
caieei of teachei, authoi, lectuiei, leauei, anu iefoimei. Fieuu anu otheis
publisheu theii cases; Langs has ueciueu to iefiain fiom wiiting about his
cases. Bis clinical examples aie fiom the caseloaus of stuuents in
supeivision. This sociopolitical fact ueseives some consiueiation, because it
has a beaiing on the evolution of his theoietical emphases. What Einstein
saiu about physicists applies even moie so to analysts: "If you want to finu
out anything fiom theoietical physicists about the methous they use, I
auvise you to stick closely to one piinciple: Bon't listen to theii woius, fix
youi attention on theii ueeus" (quoteu in Szasz, 1961, p. 2).
In Langs' case, he has laigely taught iesiuents anu young theiapists.
These aie piactitioneis in institutional settings oi beginning in piivate
piactice, theiapists who aie ielatively inexpeiienceu anu insecuie. People in
institutional, as compaieu to entiepieneuiial, settings often tieat
inuiviuuals who lack social oi economic inuepenuence. Both theiapist anu
patient aie at the meicy of the system; they aie not fiee to choose what they
want oi to ueciue policies. This situation is not unlike the fate of the tiaining
analyst anu the canuiuate in an analytic institute. 0nly the most poweiful
tiaining analysts in a system can call theii own shots. 0theis, along with
theii tiainees, aie subject to sciutiny anu piessuie. The institutional fiame
is a compiomiseu one fiom the woiu go.
It is thus unueistanuable that Langs, uealing with inteiactions in such
settings, shoulu have placeu such a gieat ueal of stiess on issues of fiame
anu uevelopeu a methou so heavily focuseu on the theiapist. To be suie,
incieaseu self-awaieness anu iesponsibility is a moial uuty of eveiy
piactitionei, institutional oi entiepieneuiial. Fiee entiepieneuis aie
beholuen only to theii conscience anu to society at laige, wheieas those
within the system aie beholuen to theii supeivisois, an obligation that
becomes a thiiu-paity infiingement in the patient-theiapist ielationship.
0ltimately, the patient beais the consequences of the supeivisoi-supeivisee
stiuggle. This stiuggle is often iiielevant to the patient in the system, it is
ielevant only to the neeus of the othei two playeis, anu the patient is useu
as a pawn in theii game. Fiom the outset, fuitheimoie, it has to be ueciueu
whose agent the supeivisoi is going to be, the patient's oi the theiapist's.
Langs (1979) uefines his position unequivocally: "The supeivisoi's
commitment must be piimaiily to the patient in theiapy anu only seconuaiy
to the tiainee; physicianly iesponsibilities pieceue all else in any type of
theiapeutic situation. Supeivisoiy inteiventions foi which the supeivisee
may be unpiepaieu aie thus at times inuicateu, in the inteiests of secuiing
foi the patient a sounu theiapy situation" (p. S24). Such an auvocacy of the
patient, a thiiu paity to the teachei-stuuent ielationship, can iesult in the
inteiests of the stuuent being saciificeu (see Lothane, 1984b).
Langs has commenteu in piint on his analyst but not on his supeivisois
at the institute oi how they affecteu him peisonally anu the analyses of his
patients. The amount of piessuie to which he may have been subjecteu can
only be suimiseu fiom its ieveibeiations in the uialogue with Seailes (Langs
& Seailes, 198u), wheie Seailes expiesses the following ieaction:
I feel you aie going to uestioy me. You aie staiting to put the
squeeze on me. It is similai to what you uiu with some of those pooi
bastaiuly theiapists in the "G*+"!0)-#$ <*"$'" (Langs, 1976a) anu,
my uou, I uieau it anu I ciinge anu I can't supply those answeis. ...I
have tolu many auuiences that, in my woik with nonschizophienic
patients, at one oi anothei junctuie, ielatively infiequently, I
expiess feelings with an explicitness which is ielatively
commonplace in my woik with schizophienic patients; but what
ueteimines my timing of my uoing so I cannot, I can't possibly say
(p. 124).
Seailes juxtaposes his fieely flowing, intuitive style with Langs', who
says of himself: "I am a sticklei on methouology" (p. 12S). Seailes is also
ciitical of Langs' stance as teachei: ".I uoubt veiy much that you iealize
how pulveiizingly ciitical anu conuemnatoiy you aie being, at least veibally,
to the theiapist..Nonveibally you'ie much less unkinu than youi woius
woulu inuicate" (p. 1S1). Speaking uoctoi to uoctoi, Seailes offeis the
following auvice: "I woulu iecommenu to you that, in youi woik with the
theiapists in youi seminai, you utilize something of the same allusive
subtlety that you iecommenu they utilize in theii woik with theii patients,
as iegaius any implieu acknowleugement of the theiapist's
psychopathology as it becomes ievealeu by theii woik with the patients" (p.
1S8). Langs conceues the point anu notes in self-uefense: "Anu I uo use
uiscietion anu mouulation..It's a uilemma. It is not me that uistuibs the
supeivisee, but the patient; I am tiying to be open anu helpful" (p. 1S9).
Langs' teacheis at the institute may have also sinceiely felt that they
weie ciitical of theii stuuent foi his own goou, oi foi the goou of the
patients they thought they weie piotecting. It is easiei to achieve consensus
in meuicine, wheie the taiget of tieatment is the uisease, not the patient. In
the fielu of psychological tieatment theie is the peiennial conflict of
peisonal vesteu inteiests. Theie is also the inflateu naicissism of minoi
uiffeiences. An inteipietation may be biilliant, but also off by a haii's
bieauth; it is a mattei of peisonal taste. But in meuicine as elsewheie the
uilemma has always been: whose inteiests come fiist, the patient's oi the
uoctoi's.
Can beggais be chooseis. The wave of consumeiism that has changeu
the natuie of the piactice of meuicine anu psychiatiy may soon sweep
thiough the schools that teach psychoanalysis anu psychotheiapy. Stuuents
will claim that the teachei shoulu be theii auvocate piimaiily anu the
patient's seconuaiily. Physicians have tiauitionally stuck togethei.
Psychoanalysts have peisecuteu peeis anu stuuents in the inteiests of theii
own powei anu in the uefense of theii own oithouoxy. The piinciple of the
auaptive context will have to be applieu to the teachei-stuuent ielationship.
What is the teachei's impact on the stuuent. What is the teachei's hiuuen
agenua. Bow tiuthful oi ueceitful is the teachei being with the stuuent, how
exploitative.
Coming fiom a uiffeient uiiection than Stone, Seailes (Langs & Seailes,
198u) uisagieeu with Langs' skepticism about the ability of patients
consciously to "tell me when something is quite off the maik" (p. 98). Be
also founu his own analyst's self-ievelations "veiy helpful, veiy helpful. It
woulu have been intoleiably impeisonal without them. A lot of it was pietty
impeisonal anyway; but theie was enough leaven of a peison theie to make
it ieassuiing. It was veiy useful" (p. 42). Foi Langs this is anathema. Yet, this
"leaven of a peison" is the leaven of love in human ielation. Without it theie
is no ielationship. Since psychological tieatment is a peisonal ielationship,
since the peison is the instiumentality of that tieatment, it cannot be anu
giow without this leaven.
Thus positeu, the pioblem of technique can be examineu in a new
peispective: what is the iight technique, what is iight love, anu how uo the
two ielate to each othei in the enteipiise calleu psychotheiapy. Fieuu
began with the phenomenon of hysteiia, stumbleu on the phenomenon of
love, anu inventeu tiansfeience in an attempt to biing law anu oiuei into
love. The analysis of tiansfeience became his uefinitive conception of the
iight technique. Be uiu not often tieat of love, but uiu on occasion tieat with
love. Feienczi, by contiast, emphasizeu love.
Fieuu's abanuonment of the seuuction theoiy hau momentous
consequences foi the uevelopment of psychoanalytic theoiy anu piactice
(Lothane, 198Sb). What woulu have happeneu if he hau not abjuieu the
seuuction theoiy. Be woulu have been like Feienczi, who iemaineu tiue to
the tiaumatic conception of neuiosis anu the neuiosogenic effect of ciuel
paients on theii chiluien. Feienczi also auvocateu, accoiuing to Szasz
(196S), the "abanuoning of tiansfeience-analysis anu, inueeu, analysis of
any kinu in favoi of uwelling sympathetically on the patient's past
uisappointments anu making heioic effoits to unuo them." Feienczi is thus
the fathei of the heie-anu-now wave: of Boiney's anu Sullivan's emphasis
on the piesent ovei the past; of Wilhelm Reich's chaiactei analysis; of Fianz
Alexanuei's coiiective emotional expeiience; of Neiton uill anu Robeit
Langs.
Langs is between Fieuu anu Feienczi. Be uoes not tieat of love uiiectly,
except, in the mannei of Fieuu, by uefault. Love comes to you inuiiectly
when you uo things iight, when you apply the iight technique, when you say
the iight woius, when you expiess the iight iueas. Biiect love is as
impossible as uiiect consciousness of it. In his stiess on the iueogenic natuie
of the symptom veisus its affective siue, on the pathogenic natuie of
unconscious fantasy, on the negative value of faileu communication, Langs is
like Fieuu. Like Fieuu, he also stiesses inteipietation. But as Fieuu (19SS)
himself saw:
The associations to the uieam aie not yet the latent uieam
thoughts..An association often comes to a stop piecisely befoie the
genuine uieam thought. At that point we inteivene on oui own; we
fill in the hints, uiaw unueniable conclusions, anu give explicit
utteiance to what the patient has only toucheu on in his
associations. This sounus as though we alloweu oui ingenuity anu
capiice to play with the mateiial put at oui uisposal by the uieamei
anu as though we misuseu it in oiuei to inteipiet *-&) his
utteiances what cannot be inteipieteu 6!). them |p. 12; italics
Fieuu'sj.
This is the peiennial pioblem of inteipietation: Bow uo we know
whethei we aie inteipieting fiom oi into. Aie we not uignifying the
analyst's thoughts, the #-#$%0&=0 associations, by the pietentious title of
inteipietations. Bow uo we know whethei patients aie alluuing to the
analyst oi talking about themselves. We uo not know foi suie. But if
inteipieting is nothing moie than enteitaining options, it is of seivice in
making fuithei uiscoveiies, subject to the juugment of histoiy. The uangei
lies in claiming piematuie valiuity foi such inteipietations. As the expeit in
the unconscious, iathei than as an obseivei of ieality, the analyst may be
tempteu to engage in a kinu of impeiialism towaiu the patient oi stuuent.
In Langs' piimaiy focus on the inteiaction, in the shoit shiift he gives to
the notion of the tiansfeience neuiosis ("foi me that is a uenial-baseu myth"
|Langs & Seailes, 198u, p. SSj) pointing to the tiaumatogenic behavioi of the
theiapist, in his views on the seuuction theoiy, Langs is moie like Feienczi
than Fieuu. Is it technique oi love. Technology oi peisonology. Iuea oi
feeling. Content oi foim. The choices between these pseuuopolaiities make
up the bouy anu soul of psychoanalysis, past anu piesent. Langs' effoit is a
challenging link in this histoiical chain.
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5
.&2*6 7$.1'- %&8$*9 '.& 4(&),1#& 4#2*/24(&: /$*'#2%1'2$*,
'$ 4,8/.$)*)(8,2,
(0-)* %. -12%#*, -./.
Beinz Kohut, the founuei of the psychology of the self, uieu on 0ctobei
8, 1981. Be hau come a long way in ueveloping a theoiy of the minu which,
staiting with a ielatively mouest auuition to the psychoanalytic stiuctuial
mouel of the minu, evolveu into a totally unique appioach to the pioblems
of mouein humanity. Kohut, like Fieuu was a conquistauoi in many aieas of
people's ieactions to theii suiiounus. In some aieas, his contiibutions weie
well woikeu out, foi example in his systematizeu woik on the ciucial
uevelopmental issues that leau to eithei a cohesive self oi a self vulneiable
to fiagmentation. Kohut's contiibutions to psychopathology have also been
neatly systematizeu. Peihaps his views on the theoiy of cuie in analysis,
incluuing his systematization of the tiansfeiences anu theii iole in analytic
cuie, iepiesent the most compelling of his contiibutions.
Kohut's insistence on piolongeu empathic immeision into the
"A+"!*"-/" of the patientaway fiom exteinal behaviois anu piefoimeu
theoiies incluuing theoiies of self psychologyis peihaps, of all his
contiibutions the cential one. 0thei aspects of the theoiy anu piactise of the
psychology of the self aie in neeu of fuithei elaboiation anu ieseaich. It
iemains a tiuism, howevei, that Kohut's uiscoveiies anu foimulations have
been a majoi foice in libeiating the fielu of psychoanalysis fiom the shackles
of insistence on attention to the vicissituues of the uiives anu theii uefenses,
especially the insistence on the oeuipal complex as the inevitable pathogenic
foice foi human beings.
Beinz Kohut came to the 0niveisity of Chicago fiom vienna as a
neuiologist aftei Woilu Wai II. Be then began his tiaining in psychiatiy anu
psychoanalysis, although he hau been analyzeu in vienna with August
Aichoin. Shoitly aftei his giauuation fiom the Chicago Institute foi
Psychoanalysis, he joineu the staff at the institute anu began his lifelong
caieei in teaching anu ieseaich in psychoanalysis. Be also continueu his
affiliation with the 0niveisity of Chicago as a piofessoi of psychiatiy anu
lectuieu theie iegulaily. Kohut's active paiticipation in the local anu
national psychoanalytic community culminateu in his election to the
piesiuency of the Ameiican Psychoanalytic Association in 1966.
Piioi to his fiist foimal papei on naicissistic issues, Kohut wiote on a
bioau iange of psychoanalytic topics, incluuing empathy anu intiospection
(19S9) anu psychological ieactions to music. In 1966, with the papei
"Foims anu Tiansfoimation of Naicissism," Kohut began his total
involvement with the unueistanuing of the self, its uevelopment, anatomy,
anu psychopathology, anu the tieatment of the uisoiueis of the self. Fiom
1966 to 1977, Kohut focuseu on the self as a stiuctuie within the egothe
self that can be iecognizeu within the classical psychoanalytic stiuctuial
mouel. Be uelineateu special psychopathological uisoiueis of the self, as
uiffeientiateu fiom the so-calleu stiuctuial neuioses in which the etiologic
vaiiables ueal with uiives anu theii conflictsthe tiansfeience neuioses
commonly baseu on the inauequate iesolution of the oeuipal complex.
Kohut emphasizeu that the self anu its chaige of eneigy, naicissism, shoulu
be iecognizeu without bias as an impoitant entity, sepaiate fiom the othei
aspects of the intiapsychic woilu. Thus, although object ielationships aie
impoitant, naicissistic inteiests aie of special value in the psyche anu, in
fact, naicissism has its own line of uevelopment. The next stage in Kohut's
thinking was to uelineate the tieatment issues of the uisoiueis of the self,
paiticulaily the special tiansfeiences he uiscoveieu in people suffeiing with
tieatable self uisoiueis.
In his 1977 woik, 4," R"0&)!#&*)- )6 &," 1"$6, Kohut uelineateu the self
as the "centei of the psychological univeise" anu the maintenance of its
cohesion as the essential ingieuient of mental health. What Kohut teims
"Tiagic Nan"the inuiviuual pieoccupieu with gaining succoi foi his oi hei
uepleteu selfheie ieplaces "uuilty Nan"the inuiviuual pieoccupieu with
the avoiuance of oeuipal guiltas the cential pioblem in Westein
civilization. The seaich foi esteem, fiom eaily life thiough ueath, thiough
the meuium of the self-selfobject uyau, ieplaces anxiety as the cential
featuie of humankinu. Auequate esteem leaus to a life of joy, not a life baseu
on the taming of uiives. In fact, as Kohut teaches, uiives anu theii
vicissituues emeige as a cential featuie of the inuiviuual only when the self
bieaks uown anu these uiives aie iecognizeu as uisintegiation piouucts.
Kohut's contiibutions to psychoanalysis weie in the aiea of the self anu
its vicissituues, what he iefeiieu to as ". the phenomena that lie within the
aiea 'beyonu the pleasuie piinciple' " (Kohut in 0instein, 1978 p. 7S2).
Staiting fiom his initial investigations peitaining to the empathic
investigation of the self (Kohut, 19S9), Kohut stakeu out his aiena of
concentiation as being centeieu on what he calleu "Tiagic Nan", the
conceptualization of the inuiviuual as blockeu in his attempt to achieve self-
iealization. This veision of man is at gieat uistance fiom Fieuu's veision of
the inuiviuual in conflict ovei his oi hei pleasuie-seeking uiives, the so-
calleu uuilty Nan (Kohut, 1971).
Kohut's investigations into the innei mental life of human beings
ultimately encompasseu a theoiy of the ueveloping self. This became his
mouel of the minu, a theoiy of psychopathology, a new appioach to the
theiapies of self uisoiueis anu neuioses, anu a new veision of the essence of
the outcome of psychoanalytic theiapies. Although Kohut's contiibutions
extenueu into eveiy facet of psychology anu offei new explanations foi the
uistiesses of the mouem inuiviuual, Kohut iepeateuly emphasizeu that he
placeu the psychology of the self in the mainstieam of psychoanalysis anu
that he wisheu to maintain "the continuity of psychoanalysis" (Kohut 1977,
p. 172). Be ceitainly auueu a new emphasis, howevei, by insisting that
"...psychoanalysis is a psychology of complex mental states which with the
aiu of the peiseiveiing intiospectiveempathic immeision of the obseivei
into the innei mental life of man, gatheis its uata in oiuei to explain them"
(Kohut 1977, p. Su2). Foi Kohut, then, it is not tiansfeience anu iesistance
but empathy that uefines the essence of psychoanalysis. Scientific empathy,
as the inuispensable tool of the investigatoi of the innei mental life of
humanity at once uefines the fielu of obseivations anu allows foi an
auaptation of theoiies anu explanations in accoiuance with the uata
obtaineu by empathic cognition.
Although an appieciation of Kohut's contiibutions to uepth psychology
must encompass his theoiies of the uevelopment of the self anu his views on
the pathologies of the self anu the psychoanalytic tieatment of these
uisoiueis, it is also impoitant to iecognize in Kohut's woik his conviction
that the psychology of the self hau impoitant ielevance to fielus outsiue of
mental illness anu health. As Kohut iemaikeu in his exchange of letteis with
Eiich Bellei (Bellei & Kohut, 1978):
Whatevei theii limitations anu shoitcomings, I know not only that
the psychology of the self explains moie meaningfully ceitain aieas
of man's psychological expeiiences in mental illness anu health
than pievious scientific appioaches but also that its foimulations
can be moie ielevantly applieu outsiue the fielu of noimal anu
abnoimal psychology. The explanations of the psychology of the self
aie in paiticulai able to encompass the significance of man's
scientific, ieligious, philosophical anu aitistic activities |p. 449-
4Suj.
It is my intention in this essay to offei a view of Kohut's notions of the
ueveloping self, the pathogenesis of self uisoiueis anu the tieatment of the
ueveloping self, emphases of self psychology. Reaueis must answei foi
themselves the question askeu by some ciitics of self psychology: Can an
appioach be calleu "psychoanalytic" if it uoes not subsciibe to the piimacy
of the uiives anu especially the 0euipus complex in neuiogenesis. Can self
psychology be iegaiueu as offeiing a psychoanalytic view if it consiueis the
outcome of psychoanalysis as essentially an impetus to the uevelopment of
a stunteu self iathei thanas classical psychoanalysis woulu saythe
iesolution of tiansfeiences centeieu on the oeuipal conflicts of incest anu
paiiiciue.
If one accepts the Kohutian uefinition of psychoanalysis as a uepth
psychology whose aieas aie limiteu only by the limitations of empathic
cognitions, self psychology is in the mainstieam of psychoanalysis. 0n the
othei hanu, if psychoanalysis is to be consiueieu as a conflict psychology of
uiives veisus the iestiaining anu taming foices, self psychology is not an
auuition to the theoiy of psychoanalysis. Its views woulu then constitute a
new school of psychology. The goals of self-psychology analyses aie ieacheu
when patients aie enableu to seek out anu invest appiopiiate self objects foi
the sustenance of theii now cohesive selves. This statement of the enu point
of an analysis conuucteu to iehabilitate the self focuses immeuiately on the
significant uiffeiences between self psychology anu classical psychoanalysis.
Classical psychoanalysis is conceineu with the iesolution of conflicts that
aie puipoiteu to be the instigatois of the symptoms of neuiotic uistiess.
0thei enu points of a classical analysis aie ieacheu when the consciousness
of ego is expanueu thiough insight, when the patient's uiives aie tameu, anu
when the 0euipus complex is iesolveu, with its attenuant featuies of
castiation anxiety anu excess guilt uiminisheu. Finally, the patient at the enu
of a classical analysis is unueistoou to have moveu fiom uepenuency to
autonomy anu fiom naicissism to object love. Thus, classical analysis holus
that an analysis is complete when the symptoms of the pathogenic conflicts
aie amelioiateu, especially the castiation anxiety anu the hypeitiophieu
guilt, anu when the pathogenic complexes have become conscious,
especially the peisisting conflicts centeiing on the 0euipus complex, which
has been ieenacteu anu become the cential focus of the tiansfeience uiama.
The analyst anu the patient, in theii constant pieoccupation with the
manifestations of the aichaic oeuipal phenomena, woik on biinging to
consciousness the buiieu pathogenic feais (Fieuu 1917a).
Self psychology holus that an analysis is complete when the self,
foimeily unueiuevelopeu thiough fixations on aichaic self-selfobject
ielationships, is pioviueu with a theiapeutic atmospheie in oiuei to
complete its uevelopment. The patient will be cuieu when his oi hei self is
cohesive, when he oi she has achieveu sufficient stiuctuie fiom the
uevelopment-enhancing psychoanalysis to ieveal the activities emanating
fiom a fiim self. As Kohut (1977) stateu: "Within the fiamewoik of the
psychology of the self, we uefine mental health not only as fieeuom fiom the
neuiotic symptoms anu inhibitions that inteifeie with the functions of a
mental appaiatus involveu in loving anu woiking, but also as the capacity of
a fiim self to avail itself of the talents anu skills at an inuiviuual's uisposal,
enabling him to love anu woik successfully" (p. 284).
Thus, fiom the outset, the classical position conceins itself with the fate
of the uiivestheii conflicts, theii iesolutions thiough iecieation in the
tiansfeience anu theii subsequent woiking thiough, especially of oeuipal
conflicts anu oeuipal tiansfeiences. Self psychology is conceineu with the
integiity of the self. If the self is healthy, uiives aie not expeiienceu as
isolateu phenomena anu no pathological conflicts involving uiives woulu
then ensue. The analyst, in this view, is occupieu with iehabilitating a self
that has become fixateu foi its sustenance on aichaic measuies that aie
unsuccessful. The iesult is an enfeebleu self, unable to engage in life with
vigoi in a goal-uiiecteu fashion. The analysis in this view is also conceineu
with the establishment of tiansfeiences anu inteipietation, but they aie
uiiecteu at piomoting the uevelopment of the self. In self-psychology
analysis, the essence of the cuie lies in the establishment anu iesolution
("ie-solution") of selfobject tiansfeiences, each of which ieplicates an
aichaic selfobject ielationship that has iesulteu in a fixation of
uevelopmental stiivings. The moual psychoanalytic iegiession ieactivates
the pathogenic selfobject tiansfeience at the point wheie the self object
functions iequiieu foi uevelopment of the self weie ueficient. As will be
uiscusseu latei in uetail, the patient's stunteu self now iesumes
uevelopment of the paiticulai functions that weie inauequately inteinalizeu
thiough the failuies of the selfobjects in the suiiounu. The tiansfeiences
that aie establisheu ieflect the analysanu's fixations on the point in
psychological time when uevelopment ceaseu, usheiing in, foi the patient,
the nevei-enuing seaich to iesuiiect that paiticulai selfobject fiom whom
the patient tiies again anu again to obtain the necessaiy miiioiing oi powei
meiging anu make it into his oi hei own. 0nce the pathognomonic
tiansfeiences aie establisheu, the miiioiing oi othei selfobject functions
aie initiateu. The patient begins to iesume the uevelopment of the missing
oi uefective self functions thiough tiansmuting inteinalizations. The
piocess of inteinalization is set in motion thiough the optimal fiustiation of
analysis which ultimately intensifies the imagos of the analyst's selfobject
functions to the point of causing a peimanent auuition of selfobject
functioning to auheie to the patient's self, thus, foi example, eventuating in a
movement fiom aumiiation of the miiioiing selfobject to self-aumiiation.
We now tuin to the significant aspect of the uevelopment of the self anu
the uevelopment anu maintenance of the self-selfobject ielationships, which
self psychology holus aie at the coie of psychological life.
()" *"+",-./"$( -# ()" &",#
In Kohut's (1977) view, the self is the centei of the psychological
univeise, by which he meant that people can only be unueistoou in teims of
theii expeiiencestheii innei mental lifenot theii behavioi (Kohut,
19S9). It follows fiom this that any genuine investigation of man must be
thiough the meuium of empathyvicaiious intiospectionwhich theiefoie
uefines anu iestiicts the obseivational fielu of psychological unueistanuing.
Kohut's last statement about empathy was that it is to be unueistoou as the
capacity to think oneself into the innei life of anothei peison (peisonal
communication, 1981).
As we will see in moie uetail, foi Kohut (1979):
The self is the coie of oui peisonality. It has vaiious constituents
which we acquiie in the inteiplay with those peisons in oui eailiest
chiluhoou enviionment whom we expeiience as selfobjects. A fiim
self, iesulting fiom optimal inteiactions between the chilu anu his
selfobjects is maue up of the thiee majoi constituents: (1) one pole
fiom which emanates the basic stiivings foi powei anu success; (2)
anothei pole that haibois the basic iuealizeu goals; anu (S) an
inteimeuiate aiea of basic talents anu skills that aie activateu by
the tension aic that establishes itself between ambitions anu iueals
|p. 11j.
Noieovei, the self expeiience has a line of uevelopment as sepaiate
fiom the expeiience of single bouy paits anu single functions. As Kohut
(1974) comments: "The chilu's self expeiience aiises sepaiately, incieasing
in impoitance as it uevelops next to anu moie anu moie above his
expeiience of bouy paits anu single functions. Anu finally, the chilu ieaches
a stage in which the piogiessively tameu expeiience of single paits anu
functions has become ielateu to the total expeiience of a cohesive selfthe
paits in othei woius uo not builu up the self, they become built into it" (p.
749).
The complete self is a supiaoiuinate stiuctuie, which functions not only
as the ieceivei of impiessions ueiiveu fiom the enviionment but as the
centei of action. It is expeiienceu as continuous in space anu time, as a
cohesive entity. The so-calleu bipolai self can be fuithei iuentifieu in teims
of its majoi constituents: the poles of iueals anu ambitions anu the
inteimeuiate aiea of talents anu skills. These poles of the self come into
theii final foim thiough inteiaction with the significant peisons in infancy
anu chiluhoou who seive as the instigatois of these self functions.
The uevelopment of the pole of ambitions is initiateu as a iesult of
special activities of the paient, who functions as an aumiiei, appiovei, oi
echoei of the unfoluing self anu thus offeis to the chilu an expeiience of
unquestioning confiimation of the chilu's woith. Fiom the point of view of
the chilu, this paient is expeiienceu as an entity ovei whom the chilu has
total contiolmuch as one contiols vaiious paits of one's bouythus the
uesignation "selfobject," oi in this case, the "miiioiing selfobject." These
eaily ielationships aie expeiienceu as fusions oi meigeisoi,
psychologically speaking, immeisionsinto the bouy anu minu of the
caietaking selfobject. Establishing the aichaic selfselfobject miiioiing uyau
is ciucial foi psychological life. Foi stiuctuie-builuing to take place,
howevei, the self-aggianuizing miiioi functions must be *-&"!*)!*T"' oi
*-&"!-#$*T"'actually auueu to the contents of the selfso that self-esteem,
an intiapsychic function, ieplaces selfobject miiioiing, an inteipeisonal
activity. In Kohut's view, inteinalization of selfobject miiioiing functions
takes place along the lines fiist aiticulateu by Fieuu (1917b) in S)(!-*-8
#-' S"$#-/,)$*#, in which the mouinei's unique ieaction to loss
inteinalization of significant aspects of the uepaiteu peisonis seen as a
ubiquitous ieaction to sepaiation.
At about the same time in an infant's uevelopment as the establishment
of the miiioiing selfselfobject, the seconu majoi influence on self
uevelopment occuisthe establishment of the iuealizing paiental imago
selfobject. Wheieas the miiioiing selfobjects iesponu to anu confiim the
infant's gianuiosity, the iuealizeu paient imago aie figuies whom the chilu
looks up to anu meiges with as an imago of calmness, soothing, peifection
anu thus a souice of stiength. 0ne othei eaily selfselfobject expeiience is
oiuinaiily piesent in the chilu's ontogeny. This is the expeiience of what
Kohut (1977) calleu the altei egoa twinship meigei in which the chilu
expeiiences the paiental self as essentially the same as the chilu's own. This
essential sameness is instiumental in enhancing the chilu's skills anu
unfoluing the chilu's talents.
The next phase of the chilu's uevelopment is significant in the foimation
of the cohesive self. This is the inteinalization of the self objects' functions of
initiating anu piomoting esteem, so that what was a featuie of the self-
selfobject ielationship now becomes a set of self functions. Kohut uesciibes
the inteiioiization of these functions as occuiiing in two steps: (1) optimal
fiustiation anu (2) tiansmuting inteinalization. 0ptimal fiustiation iefeis
to the unavoiuable uisappointments in chilu ieaiing, so that the chilu uoes
not obtain the instant feeuback that he oi she may be uemanuing. These
unavoiuable uelays, absences, anu misappieciations aie not piotiacteu oi in
any way tiaumaticthus they aie )+&*.#$ fiustiations. They piomote the
inteinalization of the miiioiing oi othei selfobject functions, so that the
miiioiing selfobject's appioval is attacheu, so to say, to the chilu's self as a
peimanent souice of nuituiance (Kohut, 1971). 0vei time, the sequence of
optimal fiustiations leauing to tiansmuting inteinalization cieates a
cohesive self. This stiuctuie is bipolai in its psychological shape, the aichaic
gianuiosity tiansfoimeu into the pole of ambition, anu the inteinalizeu
aichaic iuealizations tiansfoimeu into the pole of iueals. In this eaily self,
which can now be labeleu the nucleai self, the pole of ambitions stiives to
live up to the pole of iueals thiough the talents anu skills of the self. In fact,
in the auult, the cohesion of the self is maintaineu thiough the tension aic
cieateu by the pole of ambitions stiiving to live up to the iueals thiough the
exeitions of the talents anu skills in what Kohut (1977) calleu a piogiam of
action: "With the teim tension aic, .I am iefeiiing to the abiuing flow of
actual psychological activity that establishes itself between the two poles of
the self; i.e., a peison's basic puisuits towaius which he is uiiven by his
ambitions anu leu by his iueals" (p. 18u).
The bipolai self now expeiienceu by the chilu as continuous in time anu
uisciete in space maintains its cohesivenessits iesistance to bieakup
(fiagmentation)thiough two souices of self cement. 0ne is the pool of
enuogenous stoies of self suppoit ueiiveu fiom the inteinalizeu functions of
selfobjects to maintain self-esteem. The othei is the continuing neeu foi
selfobjects thioughout life.
Kohut founu that self-selfobject ielationships foim the essence of
psychological life fiom biith to ueath. The natuie of this ielationship,
howevei, changes ovei time anu in functioning. The eailiest self-selfobject
contacts, as pieviously noteu, aie actually meiging types of ielationships.
They instill in the chilu, aftei optimal fiustiation, the supplies of esteem.
Fiom the aichaic selfobject ielationships, theie is a uevelopmental line of
self-selfobject encounteis to what is calleu the matuie selfobject
ielationships. These offei an expeiience of empathic iesonancethe
aumiiation of a colleague thiough which the auult self can expeiience a
ievival of the memoiy tiaces of the aichaic self object's miiioiing oi
calming anu soothing, anu in this mannei iestoie uisequilibiium uue to a
tempoiaiy flagging of one's esteem. Thioughout the inuiviuual's
uevelopment, the self iequiies selfobject iefueling to maintain its integiity.
At times, these selfobject encounteis will appioach the appioving, aumiiing,
calming, meiging inteiactions of the aichaic self-selfobject fusions.
Thus, in the so-calleu anal stage of uevelopment, the chilu's neeu foi the
miiioiing iesponses of the selfobject paient aie necessaiy foi the chilu's
toilet-tiaining accomplishments to be given value. In the oeuipal phase of
uevelopment, the chilu's selfobject iequiiement of the paients aie that they
iesponu to his oi hei incieaseu asseitiveness in the sexual anu othei
spheies with aumiiation anu piiue at the vigoi anu cieativeness uisplayeu.
The selfobject encounteis in these eaily stages of uevelopment, although not
of the eailiei, aichaic types, still continue to pioviue suppoitive expeiiences
that will be inteiioiizeu anu seive to enhance the achievement of the
youngstei in his oi hei uevelopment. The auolescent's neeu foi the
miiioiing selfobject paient to give cieuence to his oi hei cieative activities
is well known, as is the intensity of the auolescent's neeu foi intimate
contact with an iuealizeu selfobject. In both these instances, inteinalization
of selfobject functioning is again affecteu. In latei life, necessaiy iefueling of
one's woith is pioviueu thiough matuie self object encounteis anu the
phenomenon of empathic iesonance. In the senium foi example, miiioiing
of one's achievements, of one's couiage in the face of ueath is necessaiy.
In sum, the self is maintaineu in a cohesive mannei thiough the stiength
of its constituents, the fiim sense of asseitiveness, the intact sense of one's
values seiving as a compass thiough life, anu the ability to exeit one's skills
anu talents in the puisuit of one's piogiams of actions, fiom wiiting a
speech to caiing foi the uisableu. Selves uiffei consiueiably in the ielative
weakness oi stiengths of theii constituents. Theie aie selves that aie fiim
oi enfeebleu, iesistant to fiagmentation (cohesive) oi highly vulneiable to
losses of woith anu thus pione to fiagmentation. Chaiismatic selves aie fiim
in the pole of asseitiveness, wheieas messianic selves aie extiemely
leaueiship oiienteu. Some selves aie miiioi hungiy, while otheis aie
chionically seaiching foi a leauei (Kohut & Wolf, 1978).
.0()-,-12 -# &",# -! &",#3*4&-!*"!&
The position of self psychology with iegaiu to psychopathology is that
all foims of psychopathology aie ultimately ueiiveu fiom uefects in the
oveiall stiuctuie of the self oi fiom uistoitions of the self. Both of these aie
uue to uistuibances of self-selfobject ielationships in chiluhoou. Self
psychology fuithei asseits, in contiast to classical analysis, that conflicts in
the object-instinctual iealmthe iealm of object love anu object hate, in
paiticulai the set of conflicts calleu the 0euipus complexaie not the cause
of psychopathology, but its iesults.
As we pieviously have seen, in auult life as well as in chiluhoou, the
cohesiveness oi haimony oi fiagmentation of the selfwhethei it is
enfeebleu, uistoiteu, oi fiimis a iesult of the success oi failuie of the
aichaic self-selfobject ielationships. A failuie in the self-selfobject
ielationships in chiluhoou oi auult life leaus to the painful expeiience of
fiagmentation. Fiagmentation, in the view of self psychology, is the cential
pathologic expeiience of bieakuown of the self. It is usheieu in by a massive
loss of self-esteem, followeu immeuiately by the auvent of the global anxiety
iefeiieu to as "uisintegiation anxiety." Biiectly aftei the auvent of
uisintegiation anxiety, the self is expeiienceu as losing its cohesiveness,
with the usual expeiience of splitting oi fiagmentation of the self functions
anu self peiception, incluuing ieality testing, memoiy, anu oiientation in
space anu time. Theie is also loss of the intact expeiience of self obseiving;
the vaiious expeiiences of the uiffeient oigans pieviously coalesceu
togethei in the intact expeiience of the total bouyself aie now expeiienceu
as sepaiate anu become focuses foi enhanceu attention anu even
pieoccupation (hypochonuiia). In auuition, the patient is in the thioes of a
sepaiation ieaction, with its attenuant featuies of loss of vigoi, esteem, anu
meaning in life. Finally, a failuie in a self-selfobject encountei will
commonly leau to a unique iage ieaction. This so-calleu naicissistic iage
ieaction iepiesents the ieaction to the loss of contiol of the selfobject. The
inuiviuual will vent uestiuctiveness on anyone in the immeuiate suiiounu
(Kohut, 1971).
A self-selfobject failuie in chiluhoou has uiffeient consequences fiom a
self-selfobject failuie in auult life. In auult life, the cohesive self has
continuing matuie selfobject encounteis, which aie of value in maintaining
continuing suppoit to the self thiough empathic iesonancethat is, by
supplying miiioiing oi fiimness to auu to the cohesiveness of the self. A
faileu self object encountei in an auult with a cohesive self will oiuinaiily
leau to a tiansitoiy fiagmentation, with hypochonuiia, loss of esteem,
tempoiaiy inteifeience in mentation, anu so foith.
In chiluhoou, a faileu self-selfobject ielationship is of a uiffeient oiuei. A
massive oi chionic failuie uuiing the phases of chiluhoou when the self is
unfoluing may iesult in a fiagmentation that will eventually be iesolveu
that is, the self will ieconstitute itself anu the fiagmentation will subsiue
but the self will now have peimanent alteiations. The oveiall expeiience of
the self will be that of a self chionically low in eneigy, a self uepleteu of
vigoi without eviuence of the expeiience of joy. This self will ieact stiongly
to ciiticism anu failuies by becoming moie withuiawn oi, at times, caught
up in the explosion of a naicissistic iage ieaction. Bepenuing on the specific
type of selfobject failuies, the iesultant self uistoition may be that of a self
weakeneu in the pole of asseitiveness, in the pole of iueals, oi in the aiea of
talents anu skills. These uefects will of couise leau to the absence of
foimulateu piogiams of action in life, foi example, of euucational, athletic,
oi musical puisuits.
The oveiall iesult of such self-selfobject failuies may be a self that
expeiiences life as empty anu that is constantly in the thioes of loneliness.
Bespite this loneliness anu a uesiie foi human encounteis, this self may be
quite iesistant to such encounteis anu may maintain a conscious attituue of
haughtiness anu isolation. At times, this self may attempt to gain suppoit foi
self-esteem thiough a vaiiety of activities uesigneu to lessen the chionic
emptiness such as compulsive homo- oi heteiosexuality, auuiction to
compounus to pioviue calming expeiiences, oi compulsive episoues of
stealing.
At othei times, selfobject failuies in chiluhoou eventuate in what
appeais to be a synuiome of neuiosis. These ieactions occui when, aftei a
faileu self object encountei in a paiticulai phase of chiluhoou, the chilu
becomes pieoccupieu with the uiive oi uevelopmental task specific to the
phase, ultimately leauing to a 6*A#&*)- on that uiive oi uevelopmental task
anu leaving the chilu peimanently pieoccupieu with the feais of that phase
in life, which weie nevei allayeu. Thus, an oeuipal fixation oi an anal fixation
iepiesents a faileu self-selfobject ielationship in the coiiesponuing
uevelopmental eia of chiluhoou. The seconuaiy elaboiations of the
bieakuown of the self uuiing those times in chiluhoou when uevelopmental
tasks neeu to be masteieu involve an exaggeiateu focus on the uiive
cuiiently of concein anu uefenses elaboiateu in an attempt to amelioiate oi
iepiess the exaggeiateu uiive fiagments. When the cohesive self bieaks
uown oi becomes fiagmenteu, in iesponse to a self-selfobject iuptuie, it
may take one of seveial pathways. The fiagmenteu self may maintain a state
of /,!)-*/ 6!#8."-&#&*)- (piotiacteu fiagmentation uisoiueis, boiueiline
peisonalities); the fiagmenteu self may iepaii itself without eviuence of the
pievious state of bieakuown (episouic fiagmentation); the fiagmenteu self
may ieequilibiate itself with newly uevelopeu uefenses against selfobject
bonus (naicissistic peisonality uisoiueis); oi the fiagmenteu self may focus
on the uiives that aie salient in the cuiient uevelopmental phase oi have
been activateu as a manifestation of a iegiessive ieaction (neuiotic
synuiomes) anu may seconuaiily uevelop uefenses against the egiess of the
specifically elaboiateu uiives (Kohut, 1971, 1977).

+3#2&/#4 56)7-+*')'#&* /#2&6/+62
Reactions to a bieakuown in self-selfobject bonus aie, of couise,
ubiquitous, since self-selfobject bonus anu failuies aie ubiquitous. As has
been uesciibeu, selfobject involvements iange fiom aichaic self-selfobject
ties that continue ovei time to so-calleu matuie selfobject encounteis. In
auults, the neeu to entei into an aichaic self-selfobject bonu is limiteu to
instances in which the self is subjecteu to psychological tiauma iequiiing a
tempoiaiy meiging ielationship. These aie, of couise, instances in which the
self is suuuenly uevoiu of naicissistic supplies anu is in neeu of the
expeiience of the fusion with a miiioiing selfobject oi a ieveieu leauei.
Aichaic self-selfobject bonus always seive to invest the self with the
expeiience of woith, of stiength, of calming anu soothing. In chiluhoou,
these expeiiences give the self the iequisite stiength of cohesion; in
auulthoou, when enteieu into tempoiaiily in ieaction to the stiess of
uissolution, they effect a iepaii to a fiagmenting self. Natuie selfobject
encounteis aie enteieu into when the self is in neeu of a tempoiaiy
enhancement of esteem, that is, in a situation of esteem-ueficiency such as is
the innumeiable states of self-uoubt inuiviuuals expeiience. In the matuie
selfobject encountei, the self's expeiience of the self object is in actuality not
that of an object fuseu with one's self anu unuei one's contiol; iathei the
self has a ieactivation of the eaily self-selfobject meigeis anu expeiiences a
state of esteem enhancement, thus effecting a iepaii of the self's cohesion.
Seen in this way, much of auult inteiactional life consists of matuie self
object encounteis with otheis who function tempoiaiily to iepaii a flagging
self-esteem oi symbolic encounteis with music oi liteiatuie in which the
self is uplifteu oi invigoiateu.
Thus, episouic fiagmentations oi neai fiagmentations oi simple
instances of loss of esteem oi thieateneu loss of woith aie pait of one's
moual ieactions to a complex woilu of victoiies, neai misses, anu failuies. In
a moie oi less cohesive self, the iepaii in most instances will be effecteu by
enteiing into a matuie self-selfobject encountei. In those instances wheie
the uemanus foi cohesion aie intense, the pieviously cohesive self will
fiagment, albeit tempoiaiily anu seek out an aichaic self-selfobject
encountei in which a meigei will be effecteu. Foi example, in the case of a
peison who has just been infoimeu that his oi hei longstanuing state of
weakness is uue to a malignancy in the colon, the psychological ieactions
aie fiequently the self expeiience of fiagmentation. This uistiess, one hopes,
will be followeu by the self-selfobject meigei effecteu with a tiusteu
caietakei oi ielative. In such situations, if empathic caietakeis iecognize the
manifestations of the fiagmentation anu iesponu appiopiiately with a uose
of miiioiing oi allow themselves to become the taiget foi iuealization, the
fiagmentation expeiience will be shoit-liveu.
1"$6:6!#8."-&#&*)- R"0($&*-8 *- U"(!)&*/ 1%-'!)."0. In the view of self
psychology, uiives come into focus when the self is fiagmenting-thus the
statement that uiives aie uisintegiation piouucts of a fiagmenting self
(Kohut, 1977). In this light, consiuei the self of the oeuipal-phase chilu anu
the selfobject neeus of his oi hei emeiging phase-specific asseitiveness,
incluuing the chilu's sexual asseitiveness of a homoeiotic anu heteioeiotic
natuie (with hostility towaiu the paient of the opposite sex). If the
selfobject suppoits aie missing oi inauequate anu the chilu expeiiences the
paients' withuiawal oi iejection uuiing this impoitant phase in
uevelopment, the self uepletion will iesult in a fiagmenteu self. Thus, in
some instances, the iesult will be not an eiuption of unuiiecteu naicissistic
iage, but an egiess of animus unleasheu when a selfobject has faileu in its
functionsa pieoccupation with the uiives ueiaileu fiom the now-
fiagmenteu self. In the oiuinaiy functions of the self, the uiives aie a vital
pait of the self, seeking anu maintaining contact with the woilu, incluuing
the woilu of selfobjects. In a fiagmenteu self, the uiives aie now in a fiee
state anu cleaily visible since they aie not bounu up with the functions of
the cohesive self.
The unleasheu phase-specific uiives of the oeuipal chilu whose self is
now in a fiagmenteu conuition will eventuate in iepetitive expeiiences of
anxiety, centeiing on tissue uestiuctionthe so-calleu castiation anxiety,
with its attenuant featuies of anxiety uieams of mutilationanu the
builuup of iiiational guilt. If, howevei, the chilu in the oeuipal phase
becomes the iecipient of helpful selfobject suppoits, he oi she will emeige
fiom this noimal phase of uevelopment with heteioeiotic anu homoeiotic
stiivings anu a minimum of guilt anu castiation anxiety.
Thus, in contiauistinction to classical psychoanalysis, self psychology
uoes not iegaiu the oeuipal phase as "the pivotal point iegaiuing the fate of
the self that it is with iegaiu to the foimation of the psychic appaiatus"
(Kohut 1977, p. 24u). The so-calleu neuiotic synuiomes, which in classical
psychoanalysis emeige fiom the pieueteimineu unfoluing of the uiives
coming into intense conflict with ego uefenses anu supeiego, aie
conceptualizeu in self psychology as only one of the possible outcomes of a
self in fiagmentation. Self psychology holus that if the self is intact, theie
will be no pieoccupation with the uiives in an isolateu fashion. Thus, fiom
the viewpoint of the self psychologist, although an oeuipal phase of
uevelopment is ubiquitous, if theie is an auequate set of selfobjects, the
chilu emeiges with a fiiming up of asseitiveness, now moie auequately
contiolleu, anu a fiiming up of the genuei expeiience. Conveisely, if theie
has been a selfobject failuie to the moual egiess of asseitiveness in an
oeuipal youngstei, the ueiaileu (unattacheu) instinctual uiives will emeige
as nakeu lust anu hostility.
4," U#!/*00*0&*/ ?"!0)-#$*&% #-' G",#@*)! 7*0)!'"!0. When self-selfobject
failuies uuiing the phase of the eaily uevelopment of the self aie piotiacteu,
they iesult in a vaiiety of self uisoiueis. These aie the naicissistic
peisonality uisoiueis anu theii acting-out vaiieties, the naicissistic
behavioi uisoiueis. They oiuinaiily iesult fiom the failuie of the functioning
of the miiioiing selfobject anu the inability of the iuealizeu paient to
compensate foi the piimaiy selfobject failuie (Kohut 1977). The
cohesiveness of the iesultant total self is uefective, anu both poles of the self
aie inauequately filleu. This self is vulneiable to fiagmentation, especially in
ielation to fuithei losses of esteem fiom its milieu. The self expeiience is
commonly a ieflection of the uiminutive poles of asseitiveness anu iueals
that is, emptiness anuoi loneliness. Bowevei, the neeus of the self foi
miiioiing oi leaueiship aie commonly uefenueu against by attituues of
haughtiness anu supeiciliousness, ieflecting anxiety about allowing any
fuithei self object encounteis to tianspiie. Anothei common expeiience in
peisons with these uisoiueis is to become immeiseu in tiansitoiy
ielationships in which an aichaic self-selfobject uyau is foimeu anu then
iejecteu, oiuinaiily out of a mixtuie of anticipateu psychic pain anu
uisappointment because the ielationship cannot offei them the longeu-foi
chiluhoou giatification. Fiagmentation states commonly leau to intense loss
of esteemthe so-calleu empty uepiession, without piominent guilt.
0thei common featuies of the fiagmentation states aie the expeiience
of uisintegiation anxietyan anxiety state maikeu by panicky feelings,
uissociations, anu enu-of-the woilu sensationsfolloweu by mentational
uysfunctioning (memoiy loss, ieality-testing ueficits, loss of synthesizing,
anu ueiailing of associations), anu hypochonuiiasis. Bypochonuiiasis in
fiagmentation states ieflects the state of the "unglueu" self. Although the
oiuinaiy expeiience of a single oigan oi anatomical pait is minimal in a
cohesive self, when the self is fiagmentating, a paiticulai oigan peicept in
the self that is now functionally split off fiom the iest of the self may
suuuenly be expeiienceu in a highly chaigeu fashion. A patient in the miuule
of a fiagmentation ieaction may complain of unusual bouy feelings anu
localize it to an awaieness that hei oi his face, nose, oi abuomen is now
expeiienceu quite uiffeiently. It may seem too laige oi too piominent. These
expeiiences ieflect the bouy peicepts becoming split off anu, foi the fiist
time, piominent in the patient's awaieness. Patients with naicissistic
peisonality uisoiueis at times exhibit behavioi that expiesses theii
ieactions to insult oi theii neeus foi claiming anu soothing oi miiioiing.
These naicissistic behavioi uisoiueis encompass the behavioi of the
compulsive homosexual, the auuict, anu uelinquents who steal as a symbolic
expiession of the self neeu foi a gift fiom the selfobject. Those auuicts who
expeiience the compounu anu the effects of the compounu as an aiu to
calming anu soothing aie cleaily uemonstiating anu giatifying aichaic self
neeus, as aie those homosexuals who feel miiioieu in fiantically sought out
episoues of fellatio. Patients who suffei with naicissistic peisonality
uisoiueis uo not expeiience piotiacteu fiagmentation states. Theii
fiagmentation is tiansitoiy, anu they oiuinaiily seek ielief in complaining of
theii expeiience of isolation anu inability to foim anu maintain human
ielationships.
In sum, patients with these self uisoiueis have hau failuies in theii self-
selfobject ielationships eaily in life. In effect, theii self uevelopment is
fixateu, anu thus they continuealbeit, unconsciouslyto effect iepeateu
aichaic self-selfobject bonus. This is to no avail, howevei, since they will
shoitly ieject these ielationships. The failuie of auequate inteinalization of
the self in these patients leaus to theii vulneiability to fiagmentation states.
This is iesolveu in these patients by the self's capacity to eiect fiim uefenses
against the egiess of its uesiies foi empathic unueistanuing anu
giatification.
36&'6)4'+/ 56)7-+*')'#&* 2')'+2
Patients with boiueiline uisoiueis anu psychoses of all kinus,
uemonstiate not only a heighteneu vulneiability to self fiagmentation but a
piotiacteu quality to theii fiagmentation. When a so-calleu boiueiline
patient uevelops a fiagmentation state, which is followeu by ieality-testing
loss (psychosis), ueiailing, anu othei symptoms of an acute psychotic
uecompensation, these pathological states may peisist foi a long time.
Noieovei, these patients uo not have an auequate capacity to foim a
theiapeutic self-selfobject uyau baseu on an alliance of effoit to appieciate
theii innei mental life. These patients commonly expeiience an absence of
as-if tiansfeience phenomena. They commonly uevelop a tiansfeience
psychosis, insisting that the theiapist feels this oi that anu now wishes to
cause the patient haim. To iepeat, chionic, piotiacteu fiagmentation
uisoiueis iepiesent the enu point of a massive failuie in the selfobjects in
these people's lives. Bue to the faileu selfobject functioning, these people
cannot foim alliances to investigate themselves because they uo not have
auequately uevelopeu functions of self obseivation (Kohut, 1977).
In summaiy, the cential teaching of Kohut on the psychopathological
synuiomes is that all foims of psychopathology aie uue to uistuibances of
self-selfobject ielationships, which iesult in stiuctuial uefects in the self anu
ienuei that self vulneiable to fiagmentation anu its vicissituues. Wheieas
Fieuu's mouel of the minuthe mouel of stiuctuial theoiyleu to eiupting
instinctual ueiivatives coming into conflict with the supeiego anu ego anu
leauing to new uefenses (neuiotic symptoms), Kohut teaches that one must
empathize with a self that is fiagmenteu uue to a cuiient ueficit of
cohesiveness biought about by loss of esteem fiom whatevei souice. The
mouel of classical psychoanalysis holus that psychopathological synuiomes
begins with a psyche in conflict anu theiefoie in a state of anxiety. Shoulu
this conflict become piotiacteu, the initial signal anxiety will intensify to
massive anxiety anu theie will be a neuiotic bieakuown. Biiectly aftei this
event, the psyche uevelops new symptoms anu the offenuing uiive is
ieiepiesseu, the psyche becoming once again calm (Fieuu, 1926). The
Kohutian mouel, in contiast, focuses on the self in fiagmentation as the
initial manifestation of psychic uisequilibiium, which may leau to an
episouic fiagmentation; a chionic fiagmentation; the synuiome of
iepiession of the self's neeus, uefenueu by attituues of haughtiness anu
supeiciliousness; oi the neuiosis that iepiesents the psyche focuseu on the
uiives, which aie uisintegiation piouucts of the fiagmenting self.
Classical psychoanalysis holus that the 0euipus complex anu its
iesolution oi lack of same aie the cential instigatois of neuiosis anu
chaiactei uisoiueis. Kohut's view, as has been uesciibeu, is that if the
paients function as suppoiteis of theii chiluien's asseitiveness, theie will
be no castiation anxiety ovei "malignant" uiives. The oeuipal phase will enu
without castiation anxiety oi guilt if the paients function as auequate
caietakeis.
)-5 *-"& &",# .&2%)-,-12 0$0,2&4& %6!"7
Self-psychology analysis cuies by acquisition of stiuctuie in the
patient's self. Since a majoi tenet of self psychology, (one coulu say "finuing"
iathei than "tenet") is that psychopathology most often ieflects ueficits in
the self, the majoi thiust of the cuiative piocess is to be of aiu in ieinitiating
the uevelopment of the self that has been fixateu anu ietaiueu in its giowth.
As we have uiscusseu, ueficits in the self aie seen as outcome piouucts of a
faileu self-selfobject ielationship of chiluhoou, amounting to a ueficit in the
self stiuctuie (self function) that was inauequately inteinalizeu. The cuie in
self-psychology analysis is to uevelopthat is, to acquiie, auuitional
stiuctuies within the self. In classical psychoanalysis, in contiast, the cuie is
to ultimately iesolve the fixation of the oeuipal complex thiough the
meuium of the unfoluing of the tiansfeience neuiosis (Fieuu, 1917a). In the
woik of classical analysis, the mateiial of the sessions is focuseu on the
myiiau manifestations of the oeuipal fixations uiiecteu to, foi, anu against
the analyst. The iesult of the inteipietative woik is to make the patient
awaieanu thus fiee the patientof the fixations emanating fiom the
oeuipal uiama. The iesult will be the acquisition of an expanueu conflict-
fiee spheie, the expanuing of consciousness ("Wheie iu was ego shall be")
anu the ieuuction of castiation anxiety anu the symptoms (new uefenses)
evokeu by anxiety (Fieuu, 1926).
Self-psychology analysis, like all psychoanalyses, involves the
elaboiation of tiansfeience phenomena in the analytic woik focuseu on the
selfobject tiansfeiences anu the pieviously thwaiteu uevelopmental neeus
of the self. Patients who aie analyzable (those who, while possessing ueficits
in theii selves, have the capacity to foim anu uevelop stable alliances with
theii theiapists) will have a spontaneous unfoluing of theii stiivings foi
stiuctuie in the foim of a specific self-selfobject tiansfeience. These
tiansfeiences, which ieflect the stalleu uevelopment of the self in ielating to
a selfobject, encompass the specific functions that have not been
inteinalizeu in the self of the analysanu. They iepiesent the stalleu
uevelopmental neeus of the self foi confiiming, aumiiation, anu echoing
(miiioi tiansfeience) oi the self's neeus foi fiim iueals, calming, anu
guiuance (iuealizeu paient imago tiansfeience). The spontaneously
unfoluing tiansfeiences iepiesent neeus foi the uevelopment of stiuctuie
not, as in classical analysis, the ieliving (in fantasy) of the ancient oeuipal
stiivings that iequiies explication. The enu point of self-psychology analysis
is the inteinalization of the analyst anu his oi hei functions. These become
metabolizeu into self stiuctuies that peifoim the now inteinalizeu functions
of miiioiing anu othei functions of the selfobject piioi to inteinalizing.
The analysis can be saiu to begin with the establishment of the basic
self-selfobject tiansfeience in which the patient's self is sustaineu (Kohut,
1968). In the couise of the analysis, the basic selfobject tiansfeience is
uisiupteu time anu again by optimal failuies of the analyst, akin to the
optimal fiustiations of the aichaic self-selfobject ielationships of chiluhoou.
Aftei suitable awaieness anu inteipietations of the analysanu's ietieat anu
iegiession (with manifestation of the ieinstitution of aichaic selfobject
ielationships), the basic selfobject tiansfeience will be ieestablisheu.
Bowevei, the optimal fiustiation sets into motion the tiansmuting
inteinalization of the imago of the selfobject analyst anu his oi hei
miiioiing oi iuealizeu paient function, thus leauing to the acquisition of self
stiuctuie. The piocess of analysis can nevei pioceeu without expeiiences
that the analysanu peiceives as empathic failuies. In this categoiy of events
one can place unavoiuable inteiiuptions (weekenus anu vacations) anu the
analyst's incoiiect inteipietations. These fiustiations, if nontiaumatic, will
leau to inteiioiizations of the analyst's essential oi basic positively
enhancing selfobject functions, especially if the analyst, aftei giasping the
analysanu's uistiess oi ietieat into aichaic pieanalytic object-ielateu
behaviois, attempts to focus on the expeiienceu iebuff. This lattei piocess,
involving empathic unueistanuing of the analysanu's expeiience, amounts
to a tiansfeience inteipietation in which the analyst uemonstiates that the
patient's self is helu in high iegaiu in the analytic ielationship, in shaip
contiast to ielationships with the unempathic aichaic selfobjects of the
patient's past. The optimal fiustiations that the patient expeiiences extenu
to the analyst's inteipietations, since these, too, aie not miiioiing actions
but aie only woius. The analyst cannot peifoim miiioiing actions as he oi
she inteipiets, an action that seives only to claiify anu illuminate.
To summaiize, in the noimal flow of the analysis, the cuiative piocess is
a mattei of the analysanu's pieviously stunteu self acquiiing selfobject
functions thiough inteinalization of the analyst's selfobject functions. This
comes about, as uoes any builuing of self stiuctuie, thiough a hiatus in the
ielationship (optimal failuie), which seives to eneigize the imago of the
selfobject analyst anu his oi hei functions. These then become absoibeu into
the self as the self's miiioiing oi othei functions. Anothei way of
unueistanuing the stiuctuie builuing that comes out of analysis is to
iemembei that analysis implies iegiession, so that the analyst anu
analysanu aie lockeu into a iegiessive tiansfeience. In an aichaic selfobject
ielationship such as is founu in chiluhoou, the aichaic selfobject is the
souice of iegaiu. In the analytic tiansfeiences, the patient enteis into a
ieactivation of the pieviously thwaiteu neeus foi stiuctuie so as to infuse
the self with esteem anu vigoi. The analysanu's expeiience of the analyst,
the new selfobject, is as if the patient is once again in contact with a givei of
the gifts of woith anu value to the self (Kohut, 1977).
'(+ 4&162+ &5 )*)%02#2
An oveiview of the couise of a self-psychology analysis appioximates
the piocess founu in a classical psychoanalysis. Theie aie two phases of
tieatment to be consiueieu.
VM 4," 7"6"-0" 4!#-06"!"-/". This is, of couise, the unconscious position
of aujustment the analysanu takes in ieexpeiiencing the analyst as a paient
figuie. The confoiming expeiience of the analysanu, in the seivice of
maintaining the aichaic self-selfobject ties, seives seconuaiily as iesistance
to the new selfobject bonu in analysis. Its majoi puipose is to piotect the
analysanu fiom the possibility of iecuiiing uisappointment at the hanus of
unempathic selfobjects. Thus, the genuine neeus of the analysanu aie
iepuuiateu so as to avoiu psychic pain.
The uefense tiansfeience, in the view of classical analysis, is effective in
maintaining the iepiesseu instinctual ueiivatives of oeuipal pieviously
buiieu yeainings foi self-stiuctuiefoi example, the wish to expeiience self
woith thiough the confiimatoiy, aumiiing attituues anu actions of the
miiioiing selfobjectthe analyst is calleu on to expiess his oi hei
unueistanuing of what the analysanu is expeiiencing. In this mannei, the
analysanu's tiansfeience stiivings aie "accepteu" by the analyst, inuicating
that the analyst is minuful that a peiiou of time, sometimes a long peiiou,
must elapse to allow the tiansfeience to unfolu without challenge.
Piematuie challenges to these tiansfeience stiivings may be taken by the
analysanu as iejections of these veiy stiivings, thus iepeating the actual
chiluhoou milieu in which these self neeus went unueigiounu, iesulting in a
ueficient self. Some patients iequiie moie oi less piotiacteu peiious of
unueistanuing. In any case, the analyst must be minuful that to unueistanu
these selfobject stiivings without inteipietation is at times of ciucial
impoitance in the cuiative piocess of a self-psychology analysis.
0nueistanuing, which is not simply acceptance, emphasizes that the
outcome of a self-psychology analysis is the eventual giowth of the patient's
self thiough inteinalization of the analyst's selfobject ministiations.
The next phase of the analysis centeis on the explaining oi inteipieting
function of the analyst. The analytic woik uone in this phase of tieatment
ueals with inteipietations of the iepiesseu stiivings that ultimately will
biing the patient into investing the analyst with attiibutes of one oi othei of
the paiental ioles. If the inteipietations aie successful, the tiansfeience
neuiosis will now emeige. In a self-psychology analysis, howevei, the
uefense tiansfeience is in the seivice of maintaining out of the patient's
awaieness, the stiivings of the self foi miiioiing anuoi the fiim iueals,
leaueiship, oi calming of the iuealizeu paient. The analytic woik uone in
this phase is uiiecteu at pioviuing an enviionment that the analysanu
expeiiences as safe anu wheie the analyst, if necessaiy, can inteipiet the
uefense of haughtiness oi isolation against the emeigence of the feaieu
wishes foi selfobject suppoit.
WM 4," G#0*/ 1"$6)CJ"/& 4!#-06"!"-/". Kohut (1978) stateu: "The
uiscoveiy of the selfobject tiansfeiences foims the basis of my whole woik
conceining naicissism anu the self" (p. 2u). This uyau of patient anu analyst
ieactivates the self neeus of the analysanu that hau iemaineu, as a iesult of
faulty inteiactions in eaily life, uisavoweu oi in a state of iepiession. 0nce
the analysanu enteis an iuealizing oi miiioi tiansfeience, the self achieves a
state of cohesiveness. The analyst's activity in this phase consists of two sets
of attituues anu behaviois, (-'"!0&#-'*-8 anu "A+$#*-*-8 (Kohut, 1977).
0nce the patient begins to establish the analyst as the selfobject to
whom he oi she can ieveal the pieviously buiieu yeainings foi self-
stiuctuiefoi example, the wish to expeiience self woith thiough the
confiimatoiy, aumiiing attituues anu actions of the miiioiing self-object
the analyst is calleu on to expiess his oi hei unueistanuing of what the
analysanu is expeiiencing. In this mannei, the analysanu's tiansfeience
stiivings aie "accepteu" by the analyst, inuicating that the analyst is minuful
that a peiiou of time, sometimes a long peiiou, must elapse to allow the
tiansfeience to unfolu without challenge. Piematuie challenges to these
tiansfeience stiivings may be taken by the analysanu as iejections of these
veiy stiivings, thus iepeating the actual chiluhoou milieu in which these self
neeus went unueigiounu, iesulting in a ueficient self. Some patients iequiie
moie oi less piotiacteu peiious of unueistanuing. In any case, the analyst
must be minuful that to unueistanu these selfobject stiivings without
inteipietation is at times of ciucial impoitance in the cuiative piocess of a
self-psychology analysis. 0nueistanuing, which is not simply acceptance,
emphasizes that the outcome of a self psychology analysis is the eventual
giowth of the patient's self thiough inteinalization of the analyst's self
object ministiations.
The next phase of the analysis centeis on the explaining oi inteipieting
unavoiuable inteiiuption of the steauy state of the basic selfobject
tiansfeience. As the analysis pioceeus, with the analysanu now ievealing his
oi hei specific self neeus in the selfobject tiansfeience that has
spontaneously unfolueu, an equilibiium is ieacheu, a cohesive self state.
This equilibiium, of couise, is uepenuent on the piesence of the selfobject,
in the same mannei in which infants expeiience equilibiium in the piesence
of theii selfobjects. 0nly aftei inteinalization of the necessaiy miiioiing anu
othei functions peifoimeu by the selfobject is the self complete. These
functions, as alieauy uesciibeu, become inteiioiizeu in the self uiiectly aftei
a failuie of the selfobject to eithei empathically appieciate oi iesponu to a
self neeuthe notion of optimal fiustiation. Similaily, the analysanu
immeiseu in a selfobject tiansfeience onto the analyst expeiiences absences
oi unavoiuable empathic failuies by the analyst as if he oi she once again
has not been iesponueu to. The patient is once again with the aichaic
selfobjects of the past, whose failuies weie not optimal but fixating because
they weie too piotiacteu, too intensein shoit, tiaumatic failuies. The
analyst's task heie is to help the analysanu iecognize his oi hei expeiience
in tempoiaiily iuentifying the analyst with the chiluhoou uisappointeis.
Thus, the explaining (the inteipietations) of the analyst in a self psychology
analysis is necessaiy to ieveal what might be calleu the tiansfeience
uistoitions that have inteifeieu with the stiuctuie builuing in analysis.
Explaining oi inteipieting is necessaiy to illuminate not just the
uynamics of the tiansfeience inteiactions but also its genetic ioots. As the
analyst explains (inteipiets) to the patient the uynamic anu genetic
explanations of the patient's thwaiteu neeus anu the ieconstiuction of the
faileu self-selfobject uyaus in chiluhoou, the analyst is offeiing to the patient
an appieciation of the patient's past. This will be of seivice to the patient's
empathic giasp of himself oi heiself anu will be of help both in the
subsequent woiking-thiough phase of the analysis anu latei when the
analysis is teiminateu. Noieovei, when the analyst is explaining, he oi she is
becoming moie objective with the patient, in a sense, ieplacing the
expeiience of meigei with the expeiience of iesonance. This ieflects
piogiess in the uevelopment of the self, fiom ieliance on meigei to the use
of the empathic closeness of the analyst selfobject.
Aftei the tiansfeience uistoition is maue cleai, the analysanu is enableu
to expeiience the unavoiuable inteiiuptions, empathic misunueistanuings,
anu othei mistakes of the analyst as fiustiationbut optimal fiustiation.
This expeiience iesults in the phenomena of inteinalization of function, the
so-calleu tiansmuting inteinalization. As has been pieviously explaineu,
tiansmuting inteinalization iefeis to the intiapsychic piocess in which the
functions such as miiioiing that weie pieviously peifoimeu by an outsiue
agency (the selfobject) aie now expeiienceu as imbiicateu oi inteitwineu in
one's self. The imago of the self object's functions aftei an empathic failuie
takes on gieatei intensity. These functions now exeit theii specific action in
iesponse to a specific intiapsychic signalloss of self-esteem. These signals
of neeu, which foimeily weie communicateu to the selfobject oi weie
iesponueu to by the selfobject without oveit communication, now evoke the
intiapsychic functioning, so that the self is now in a cohesive state without
the minute-to-minute piesence of a selfobject that was foimeily iequiieu.
When the entiie self is filleu out, so that the poles of iueals anu ambitions
anu functioning skills anu talents aie opeiational, a nucleai self exists that
can initiate what Kohut (1977) calleu "piogiams of action" (p. 18u).
Finally, the teimination stage of a self-psychology analysis is aiiiveu at
when the patient expeiiences sufficient cohesiveness of his oi hei self as
that the patient anu analyst believe that fuithei analysis will not iesult in
fuithei auuitions to the patient's self stiuctuies anu that fuithei insights
will not be beneficial. At the teimination stage, the patient's self will, iueally,
be sufficiently stiengtheneu to have a gieatly enhanceu iesistance to
fiagmentation as well as an oveiall ueciease in the expeiience of the self as
lacking asseitiveness oi fiim iueals. Thus, whethei the analysis focuses on
the patient's +!*.#!% self tiauma anu its subsequent imbalances oi on the
patient's /).+"-0#&)!% attempts to gain self balance, the outcome of the
analysis is that the patient has now uevelopeu a cohesive self that can now
seek out anu invest in matuie selfobjects foi the necessaiy suppoit in times
of neeu (Kohut, 1977). In sum, in Kohut's view, the aim of a psychoanalytic
cuie is to fiimly establish the patient's capacity to foim matuie,
empathically uiiecteu, self-selfobject bonus so that matuie self-selfobject
encounteis take the place of the bonuage that hau pieviously enslaveu the
self to the aichaic selfobjects.


0..,4%0(4-$& -# &",# .&2%)-,-12
Kohut hopeu that self psychology woulu have applications in the fielu of
histoiy anu social sciences anu that the psychology of the self coulu
contiibute wiuei meanings than the views of classical psychoanalysis in
liteiatuie anu the aits. The cential contiibution of self psychology to an
unueistanuing of humanity, its histoiy, aits, anu place in the univeise comes
fiom the acceptance of the empathic outlook in life. As Kohut (197S)
stateu:".it (the empathic outlook) constitutes the veiy matiix of man's
psychological suivival" (p. S6u). Kohut's (197S) uesciiption of empathy was
summaiizeu in thiee piopositions:
(1) Empathy, the iecognition of the self in the othei, is an
inuispensable tool of obseivation, without which vast aieas of
human life, incluuing man's behavioi in the social fielu, iemain
unintelligible. (2) Empathy, the expansion of the self to incluue the
othei, constitutes a poweiful psychological bonu between
inuiviuuals which-moie peihaps than even love, the expiession anu
sublimation of the sexual uiive-counteiacts man's uestiuctiveness
against his fellows. Anu (S) empathy, the accepting, confiiming anu
unueistanuing human echo evokeu by the self is a psychological
nutiiment without which human life as we know anu cheiish it
coulu not be sustaineu" |p. S61j.
Thus, Kohut believeu that the contiibution of self psychology to the
unueistanuing of people thiough scientific empathy auueu to the values anu
iueals of humanity, inueeu, seiveu to suppoit the veiy suivival of
humankinu. Kohut (1971, 197S, 1977) stiesseu ovei anu ovei again that the
cential pioblem of humanity in the Westein woilu is the chilu who is
unueistimulateu, not iesponueu to, anu lacking leaueis, who becomes the
empty, isolateu auult, still in seaich of appioval oi a taiget foi iuealization
in shoit, Kohut's Tiagic Nan. Kohut pointeu to a majoi change in the
stiuctuie of families fiom Fieuu's time, when chiluien hau closei ties to
theii families anu the enviionment was expeiienceu as close anu even
sexually oveistimulating, leauing to the type of conflict anu
psychopathology that Fieuu uesciibeu. In the families of touay, in Kohut's
(1977) view, unuei stimulation is iampant, leauing to attempts at "eiotic
stimulation in oiuei to ielieve loneliness, in oiuei to fill an emotional voiu"
(p. 271). Thus, Kohut as social ciitic, as humanist, stiiving to appieciate (i.e.,
uiagnose) the essential uifficulties in humanity's quest foi suivival in the
mouein eia, uisceineu that oui gieatest neeu is to be in an enviionment in
which we can be singleu out, appieciateu, uplifteu by invigoiating leaueis,
anu not be lost as a note in the unueigiounu. In shoit, we neeu not to be
ielegateu to the state of anomie.
%#'+6)'16+ )*/ '(+ 3204(&%&70 &5 '(+ 2+%5
Kohut often pointeu out that the gieat mouein aitists weie the fiist to
iesponu to the shifting pioblems of the mouein inuiviuual. Thus, in the
woiks of Ezia Pounu, Eugene 0'Neill, anu Fianz Kafka in the liteiaiy fielu,
the emphasis on the bieakup of the self anu the stiiving to iestoie the self of
fiagmentation uocumenteu anu even anticipateu the uominant
psychological pioblem of this eia. In Kohut's view, Kafka's K is the eveiyman
of oui time, as he tiies to get close to the gieat ones in powei (4," Q#0&$") oi
uies a ueath without meaning {4," 4!*#$) oi, as uiegoi Samsa in 4,"
S"&.)!+,)0*0, lives like a cockioach without being iesponueu to by his
family. Kohut often quoteu thiee lines fiom 0'Neill's play, 4," O!"#& O)'
G!)9- as an example of man's longing to iestoie his self: "Nan is boin
bioken. Be lives by menuing. The giace of uou is glue" (see Kohut, 1977, p.
287).
The finuings of self psychology aie of gieat value to the stuuent of
applieu psychoanalysis in liteiatuie. Kohut's emphasis on the empathic
immeision into the self expeiience of the othei is especially impoitant in the
appieciation of the gieat figuies in liteiatuie. 0ne cannot begin to assess the
tiagic uownfall of the Ajax of Sophocles without immeising oneself in the
self of the gieat militaiy heio who has become a luuicious spectacle aftei
uestioying sheep whom he thought weie his enemies', Nenelaus anu
Agamemnon. Consiuei the self of the aging monaich, Shakespeaie's King
Leai, whose piizeu uaughtei has iefuseu his iequest foi self-sustenance as
he is about to pass on the baton of commanu anu ietiie. Leai's expeiience of
outiage must be expeiienceu thiough empathic immeision into his
paiticulai self neeus. Anu again, to gain a heighteneu iegaiu foi the issues
with which Bamlet stiuggles, one must be able to ieau empathically into the
self of the piince iecently sepaiateu fiom his ueau fathei, confionteu with
his newly maiiieu mothei, anu uenieu his ascension to the thione of
Benmaik. 0nce ieaueis have been enableu to sink empathically into the
liteiaiy figuies piesenteu by the authoi, they aie able to appieciate the self
state of the piotagonists.
Anothei set of iueas fiom self psychology of gieat seivice in liteiaiy
appieciation, is notion of the self-selfobject bonu anu its uisiuptions, which
may leau to the expeiience of fiagmentation anu its vicissituues, incluuing
uisintegiation anxiety, uepletion of self-esteem, hypochonuiiasis,
naicissistic iage, anu loss of mentational functions such as ieality-testing,
synthesizing, anu memoiy. Aimeu with this methouological appioach of
empathy anu the notions of self psychology, the ieauei can appioach each of
Shakespeaie's tiageuies, foi example, anu illuminate the conceins, anu
failuies of each of the piotagonists anu the iepaiative selfobject functions
that each is seeking. Thus, Bamlet can be seen as iesponuing to the losses he
incuiieu with the ieactions stemming fiom a uepleteu self anu the
inteiaction congiuent with that self state. Leai, as pieviously stateu, has hau
to suffei the loss of his majoi selfobject, Coiuelia, anu ieveals his tiagic
fiagmentation in the tempest. 0thello is unueistoou fiom the outset, in the
view of self psychology, as expeiiencing concein ovei the attiactiveness of
his black self to his young, Causasian wife, anu thus is vulneiable to Iago's
sauistic innuenuoes ovei hei loyalty. Nacbeth can be iecognizeu as a man
who has lost his selfobject, without whom he falteis, anu is compelleu to
seek suiiogate selfobjects, the witches. They too fail him in giving self-
suppoit, anu he uies. Thus, the finuings anu views of self psychology auueu a
neeueu uimension to the appieciation of liteiatuie that paiallel its
contiibution to the stuuy of the inuiviuual in the clinical encountei.
1"$6 ?0%/,)$)8% #-' S(0*/. Kohut expiesseu the conviction that the gieat
aitists, incluuing the gieat mouein composeis, ieflecteu in theii ait the
gieat psychological pioblem of oui eiathe situation emanating fiom the
enuangeieu self (Kohut, 1977). 0ne gains a unique contiibution to the
appieciations of music fiom the application of self psychology. The
expeiience of music in its function as a selfobject aie pait of almost
eveiyone's life. We may iecall the uniquely calming, soothing expeiiences of
listening to music. Foi some, these expeiiences aie pioviueu by the S*00#
1)$".-*0 of Beethoven oi the Nass in B Ninoi of Bach. Foi otheis oi at
uiffeient times, it is a mouein populai singei oi instiumentalist oi a populai
musician of an eailiei eia. Nusic, in those who iesponu to it, can be felt as an
invigoiating expeiience that may cause a quickening of the self anu leau to
piogiams of action. It is, of couise, common to seek out music in which one
finus an essential likeness"music to match one's moou," as the expiession
goesa twinship type of phenomenon. When one neeus company to shaie
one's innei mental life, one seeks a paiticulai type oi foim of music, anu one
may seek a ceitain type of music oi peifoimei to meige with in oiuei to
shoie up a flagging oi enfeebleu self.
Nusic can be saiu to peifoim selfobject functions as a iesult of its being
linkeu with memoiies of aichaic selfobjects of chiluhoou anu theii self-
sustaining qualities. The sounus of an aumiiing miiioiing selfobject aie
expeiienceu in musical expiessions by the inuiviuual self as iecaptuiing the
memoiies of that blissful union. Similaily, in those to whom music anu the
state of theii selves coexist, music can be expeiienceu as a phenomenon
akin to a twinship meigei. In its ability to calm oi evoke action, music
peifoims functions similai to those of the iuealizeu paient imago. The
expeiience of becoming immeiseu in iobust musical expiession is also pait
of the feeling of being with a leauei. Along the same lines, the expeiience of
listening to music that is spontaneously cieative, such as impioviseu jazz, oi
music that is systematically cieative, such as the compositions of Ainolu
Schoenbeig oi Alban Beig, may allow the listenei to iuentify with the
musicians' oi the composei's asseitiveness anu thus enhance the listenei's
self state.
At times, the musical message oi tenueiness oi vigoi may be uiiect,
without complex oichestiation, oi it may have complex counteipoint oi
haimony. It may be expeiienceu as too uiiect in its impacttoo simplistic
oi as totally acceptable. Thus, Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony may be
expeiienceu as mauulin, not subtle oi beautiful. Some listeneis, who lack
iesistance to uiiect communications of gentleness, may appieciate without
iestiaint the opeias of Puccini, wheieas otheis with iesistance to uiiect
miiioiing messages finu it piosaic. Thus, music may seive a vaiiety of self-
object functions in these who can iesponu to it.


'(+ 2+%5 #* (#2'&60
Kohut (1974b) believeu that "Bistoiy anu psychoanalysis shoulu be the
most impoitant sciences of the futuie. They aie impoitant because
humanity has ieacheu a point in which populations will soonei oi latei have
to become stabilizeu..If humans aie to suivive in a way that has any
similaiity to what we have piizeu up till now as being the essence of human
life, the naicissistic motivations, I believe, must come into the ascenuancy"
(p. 77S). Kohut believeu that the insights of self psychology woulu be helpful
to histoiians in unueistanuing the foimation, maintenance, anu uisiuptive
piocesses of gioups.
Kohut uesciibeu the notion of the gioup self as analogous to the
inuiviuual's self. Thus, a nucleai gioup self woulu incluue the cential
ambitions anu the iueals that chaiacteiize the gioup in its oiuinaiy
opeiations. To appieciate a gioup in opeiation, one woulu stuuy the
economic anu social ciicumstances that influenceu its foimation anu the
specific psychological conuitions that evoke fiagmentation oi cohesion,
incluuing the neeu foi a paiticulai type of leaueiship. Kohut obseiveu that
gioups aie helu togethei not only by theii shaieu ego iueal as Fieuu (1921)
maintaineu, but also by a shaieu gioup selfthat is, by shaieu asseitiveness
(Kohut, 1972). The gioup's integiity may be uistuibeu by uestiuction of the
gioup values oi uamage to the gioup outlets foi maintaining its piestige
foi example, by an economic uepiession oi militaiy losses. Such imbalances
in the gioup's esteemsimilai to an inuiviuual's loss of self esteemmay
leau to fiagmentation of the gioup. The ensuing manifestation of naicissistic
iage (acute oi chionic) may involve the entiie gioup in acts of vengeance
against outsiue foices who aie stiuctuieu as oppiessois (Kohut, 1972).
An impoitant souice foi maintaining the integiity of any paiticulai
gioup is the leauei neeueu oi chosen by the gioup in vaiious situations,
especially in situations of impenuing fiagmentation. Kohut iuentifieu two
types of leaueis. In the fiist type, the messianic leauei oi peisonality, theie
has been a fusion between the self anu the pole of iueals, so that messianic
leaueis expeiience themselves as being in possession of total iectituue.
These peisonalities set themselves up as the peifect leauei, a gou, woithy of
ieveience. Such a leauei was Auolf Bitlei, who effecteu iepaii to the ueiman
gioup self in its expeiience of ineptituue aftei Woilu Wai I. The seconu type,
the chaiismatic leauei, has become one with his oi hei pole of asseitiveness
anu thus expeiiences anu exuues ceitituue anu omnipotence. Winston
Chuichill was such a chaiismatic leauei, neeueu by the Biitish people uuiing
the ciisis of confiuence of Woilu Wai II anu abanuoneu when the neeu foi
an omnipotent selfobject was at its enu (Kohut, 1976). Thus, the messianic
oi chaiismatic leauei, who steps in to effect iepaii to the gioup self
expeiiencing a common uefect in asseitiveness oi shaiing a common neeu
foi an iuealizeu leauei, is then expeiienceu as the selfobject of the gioup
self.
&6//0!2
The centeipiece of Kohut's woik is the self anu the self-selfobject uyau
in the stuuy of histoiical chaiacteis anu liteiatuie as well as in the stuuy of
the ueveloping peison anu the uistiesseu patient petitioning foi ielief of his
oi hei loneliness. Kohut nevei lost sight of his cential finuing, his
anagnoiisis that it is the "A+"!*"-/"0 of manthe selfthat is ciucial to
appieciate, not the uiives noi the conflicts of man. Fiom his seminal papei
on empathy anu intiospection (Kohut, 19S9) to his final woiks on the
cuiative piocesses in psychoanalysis, Kohut taught that man must be
unueistoou thiough empathy, the ioyal ioau to the appieciation of the innei
life. Kohut's woiks on the uevelopment of the self, on the aichaic anu
matuie self-selfobject uyaus, on the theoiy of psychopathology anu on the
theoiies of cuie in psychoanalysis aie significant contiibutions to
psychoanalysis anu in my view will continue to exeit an impact on the fielu
of psychoanalysis. Will Kohut's views anu finuings be amalgamateu into the
mainstieam of psychoanalytic theoiy anu piactice. This is a question foi the
futuie geneiations of psychoanalysts anu one that Kohut woulu have
welcomeu, as he stateu: "A woishipful attituue towaiu establisheu
explanatoiy systemstowaiu the polisheu accuiacy of theii uefinitions anu
the flawless consistency of theii theoiiesbecomes confining in the histoiy
of scienceas uo, inueeu, man's analogous commitments in all of human
histoiy. Iueals aie guiues, not gous. If they become gous, they stifle man's
playful cieativeness; they impeue the activities of the sectoi of the human
spiiit that points most meaningfully into the futuie" (1977, p. S12).
Anu fuithei: "Ny ueepest wish, howevei, is that my woikin
amplification oi emenuation, in acceptance anu even in iejectionwill
contiibute to motivate the iising geneiation of psychoanalysts to puisue the
path openeu by the pioneeis of yesteiuay, a path that will leau us fuithei
into the immense teiiitoiy of that aspect of ieality that can be investigateu
thiough scientifically uisciplineu intiospection anu empathy" (p. S12).
In this I have a sense of ceitituue: Beinz Kohut as theoietician, as
piactitionei, as humanist anu as a man will nevei be foigotten.

!"#"!"$%"&
Fieuu, S. (1917a). Intiouuctoiy lectuies on psychoanalysis. 1&#-'#!'
N'*&*)-, 16, 24S-496.
Fieuu, S. (1917b). Nouining anu melanchoia. 1&#-'#!' N'*&*)-, 14, 2S7-2S9.
Fieuu, S. (1921). uioup psychology anu the analysis of the ego. 1&#-'#!'
N'*&*)-, 18, 6S-144.
Fieuu, S. (1926). Inhibitions, symptoms anu anxiety. 1&#-'#!' N'*&*)-, 2u,
7S-174.
Bellei, E., & Kohut, B. (1978). Psychoanalysis anu liteiatuie. Q!*&*/#$ 5-B(*!%,
1,449-4Su.
Kohut, B. (19S9). Intiospection, empathy anu psychoanalysis. K)(!-#$ )6 &,"
D."!*/#- ?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ D00)/*#&*)-, 7, 4S9-48S.
Kohut, B. (1966). Foims anu tiansfoimations of naicissism. K)(!-#$ )6 &,"
D."!*/#- ?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ D00)/*#&*)-, 14, 24S-27S.
Kohut, B. (1968). The psychoanalytic tieatment of naicissistic peisonality
uisoiueis: 0utline of a systematic appioach. 4," ?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ 1&('%
)6 &," Q,*$', 28, 86-114.
Kohut, B. (1971). D-#$%0*0 )6 &," 0"$6. New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities
Piess.
Kohut, B. (1972). Thoughts on naicissism anu naicissistic iage. 4,"
?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ 1&('% )6 &," Q,*$', 27, S6u-4uu.
Kohut, B. (1974a). Remaiks about the foimation of the self. In P. 0instein
(Eu.), 4," 0"#!/, 6)! &," 0"$6 (pp. 7S7-771). New Yoik: Inteinational
0niveisities Piess, 1978.
Kohut, B. (1974b). The self in histoiy. In P. 0instein (Eu.), 4," 0"#!/, 6)! &,"
0"$6 (pp. 771-78S). New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess, 1978.
Kohut, B. (1976). Cieativeness, chaiisma anu gioup psychology. In }. E. ueuo
& u. B. Pollock (Eus.), Fieuu: The fusion of science anu humanism
(pp. S79-42S). ?0%/,)$)8*/#$ 500("0, 9, (2S, Nonogiaph S4SS).
Kohut, B. (1977). 4," !"0&)!#&*)- )6 &," 0"$6. New Yoik: Inteinational
0niveisities Piess.
Kohut, B. (1979, }une). "Foui basic uefinitions of self psychology." Papei
piesenteu to the Woikshop on Self Psychology. Chicago, IL.
Kohut, B., & Levaiie, S. (19Su). 0n the enjoyment of listening to music.
?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ L(#!&"!$%, 19, 64-87.
Kohut, B., & Wolf, E. (1978). The uisoiueis of the self anu theii tieatment.
5-&"!-#&*)-#$ K)(!-#$ )6 ?0%/,)#-#$%0*0, S9, 41S-42S.
;
0)#+)#&' ,< 0).(&#- ,80%2$,2, )*9 ,&4)#)'2$*=
2*923291)'2$*
)**# 8+67-)*, 3(./.
2'+"+* +%%-)*, 3(./.
In this chaptei we will tiace the uevelopment of Naigaiet Nahlei's
ieseaich, clinical woiks anu theoietical conceptualizations. Although
Nahlei's concepts have always been fiimly giounueu in eithei clinical oi
natuialistic obseivations, it is inteiesting anu in keeping with a book whose
theme tiaces uevelopments beyonu Fieuu, to fiist look biiefly at Fieuu's
concepts of eaily uevelopment anu to compaie these concepts with Nahlei's
pioneeiing woik. Although Fieuu uiu not uo obseivational stuuies, he at
times wiote about eaily uevelopment, anu in oui opinion this aspect of his
woik has been somewhat neglecteu.
It woulu also be of some impoitance anu inteiest to compaie the
theoietical statements of vaiious wiiteis about eaily uevelopment.
Ceitainly such a compaiison might incluue }acobson, Baitmann, Winnicott
anu peihaps othei authois fiom the Biitish object ielations school. Nahlei's
woik woulu make this compaiison paiticulaily inteiesting since she anu hei
co-woikeis have pioviueu both theoietical conceptions anu empiiical
obseivations about eaily uevelopment.
Fieuu was fiequently conceineu with how the infant began to leain
about the exteinal woilu. In 4," 5-&"!+!"&#&*)- )6 7!"#.0 (19uu), he
piesents his well-known views of the infant, at fiist piimaiily oi only
conceineu with pleasuie anu latei, thiough uepiivation, coming to know
about the exteinal woilu. This conception of how the infant tuins fiom its
piimaiy concein (pleasuie oi tension ieuuction) to seconuaiy conceins (the
outsiue woilu) is baseu heavily on a tension-iegulation mouel. Fieuu's latei
views, which aie containeu in laige pait in his papeis on naicissism anu his
metapsychological papeis (1914, 191S), aie less centeieu on a tension-
iegulation oi ieuuction mouel. In these anu othei papeis, Fieuu put foith
the guiuelines of an inteiesting theoiy of eaily uevelopment, but in this
chaptei we can only sketch out some of his iueas. Fieuu sees the eaily
mental uevelopment of the infant anu chilu as taking place along thiee
polaiitiespleasuie-pain, subject-object, anu active-passivean iuea that
has a uevelopmental unfoluing. In eaily life, pleasuie anu pain pieuominate,
anu Fieuu maintains that foi the infant oi chilu (we uo not know the age
iange to which Fieuu iefeiieu), the exteinal woilu is at fiist piimaiily a
mattei of inuiffeience. This coiiesponus to Fieuu's notion of piimaiy
naicissism, in which satisfaction oi pleasuie, fiom the infant's peispective,
is autoeiotic. At this time, the exteinal woilu is not cathecteu with inteiest
(in a geneial sense) anu is inuiffeient foi puiposes of satisfaction (Fieuu,
1914). Inteiestingly, although Nahlei uses uiffeient teiminology, hei
autistic phase beais stiiking iesemblance to this Fieuuian phase.
At Fieuu's next step in uevelopment, we iun into something of a
paiauox. Fieuu (191S) postulates that as the infant continues to expeiience
the exteinal woilu, "it acquiies objects fiom the exteinal woilu, anu, in spite
of eveiything, it cannot avoiu feeling inteinal instinctual stimuli foi a time as
unpleasuiable" (p. 1SS). As the infant builus up peiceptions of (piimaiily
inteinal) stimuli as unpleasuiable anu (piimaiily exteinal) stimuli as
pleasuiable, it takes into itself (oi intiojects) the pleasuiable stimuli anu
casts out (oi piojects) the unpleasuiable stimuli. At this point, Fieuu (191S)
maintains that "the )!*8*-#$ 'ieality-ego' which uistinguisheu inteinal anu
exteinal by means of sounu object ciiteiion changes into a puiifieu
pleasuie-ego" (p. 1S6). This pleasuie ego has uiviueu the woilu into all that
is pleasuiable, which is equateu with itself ("ego subject," in Fieuu's teims),
anu all that is unpleasuiable, which is equateu with the exteinal woilu. 0ne
can attempt to equate this iuea of the puiifieu pleasuie ego with some of
Nahlei's finuings anu foimulations, but foi the puiposes of this chaptei we
wish to make seveial ielateu points about the concepts Fieuu puts foith.
Fiist, Fieuu pointeu out that uevelopment of ceitain ieality-ego
functions may be nonmonotic. Thus, the infant at an age piioi to the puiifieu
pleasuie ego is consiueieu by Fieuu to be, in some ways, in bettei contact
with ieality than when the pleasuie ego is foimeu. We believe this line of
ieasoning is consistent with seveial of Fieuu's concepts at this time (Fieuu,
191S), but the main point we wish to uwell on is that at a time when the
infant, accoiuing to Fieuu, is inuiffeient to the exteinal woilu, it can still
uevelop a iuuimentaiy ieality ego. Thus, Fieuu saw nothing incompatible
with postulating a stage of piimaiy naicissism in which pleasuie is seen as
passive, inteinal, anu autoeiotic, anu yet at the same time ceitain types of
"leaining" can take place. The question foi Fieuu was not whethei the infant
coulu coiiectly peiceive ceitain aspects of ieality but, iathei, whethei oi
how the object was vieweu in teims of the infant's pleasuiable anu
unpleasuiable expeiiences. This is quite a uiffeient question than whethei
the infant can leain to iesponu uuiing its fiist weeks oi uays of life.
As a seconu geneial point, Fieuu (1914, 191S) begins at about this time
to make use of what touay aie fiequently calleu piojective-intiojective
mechanisms. These concepts aie, of couise, useu fiequently by Nahlei as
well as many otheis, but it is of inteiest to see the way she has both
expanueu anu paiticulaiizeu the use of these concepts.
As a thiiu ielateu point, we wish to emphasize how uuiing this eia
Fieuu stiesses both the giauual natuie of being able to know the pleasuie-
giving object as a sepaiate entity anu, even moie impoitant, the veiy
giauual natuie of the uevelopment of object love. Fieuu (191S, 1917)
uiscusses aspects of the uevelopment of object love, but of couise Nahlei is
able to uelineate with much gieatei piecision concepts such as libiuinal
object constancy on the pathway to object love. As we will see, Nahlei's
concepts anu obseivations in many ways begin to fulfill the piomissoiy
notes that Fieuu left us in his many biilliant papeis.
In this biief intiouuction we have toucheu on a few of the concepts that
Fieuu intiouuceu that beai some ielationship to Nahlei's woik. We coulu,
of couise, make a much fullei compaiison, but oui intention is only to point
out the ielationship anu set the stage to show how Nahlei has built on anu
yet gone beyonu what Fieuu coulu have even anticipateu. In a chaptei
uevoteu to a histoiical iecounting of the theoiists who beai some impoitant
ielation to Nahlei's woik, one woulu also have to incluue at least aspects of
the woik of Baitmann, Kiis, anu Lowenstein anu laige paits of }acobson's
woik. Both Nahlei (1979) anu Keinbeig (198u) have emphasizeu in
uiffeient ways the impoitance of }acobson's uevelopmental concepts. Nany
othei influential authois coulu be nameu, of couise, but in oui opinion, Spitz
anu Anna Fieuu's pioneeiing empiiical stuuies weie, in geneial, an
inspiiation to psychoanalytic ieseaicheis in many ways, paiticulaily in
uemonstiating that theoietical concepts coulu be shown to have impoitant
empiiical consequences.
Although all the authois mentioneu have a vaiiety of similaiities (anu
uiffeiences) with iespect to Nahlei's woik, in Loewalu's (1979) woius: "Bei
cleai emphasis on the funuamental impoitance in eaily uevelopment anu
continuing thioughout life, of uiffeientiation anu sepaiation fiom an
encompassing psychical matiix.have hau a iemaikable impact on cuiient
analytic unueistanuing of chiluien anu auults." Although Fieuu implieu the
"uual unit" oi uyau, Nahlei makes it the beginning anu most impoitant pait
of hei obseivational anu theoietical fielu.
We shall uiscuss the woik of Naigaiet Nahlei in thiee paits: (1) hei
eaily papeis, incluuing hei woik on infantile psychosis; (2) hei ieseaich
pioject on sepaiation-inuiviuuation anu hei theoiy of subphases iesulting
in beginning self anu object constancy; anu (S) applications of sepaiation-
inuiviuuation theoiy to psychoanalytic theoiy anu tieatment.
"0!,2 .0."!&
Nahlei began hei caieei as a peuiatiician anu uiiectoi of a well-baby
clinic in vienna. The inteiests she uevelopeu at the outset of hei
piofessional life have iemaineu impoitant thioughout hei caieei. Piobably
the most impoitant of these has been hei inteiest in the mothei anu baby as
a uyau, oi, as she latei iefeiieu to it, as a uual unity within one common
bounuaiy, a symbiotic paii. Beginning with hei fiist papei ueliveieu in this
countiy, entitleu "Pseuuoimbecility: A Nagic Cap of Invisibility" (Nahlei,
1942), piesenteu in 194u to the Psychoanalytic Institute of New Yoik, she
uemonstiateu hei inteiest in the pie-oeuipal eia, in motility, anu in the
affecto-motoi communication between mothei anu chilu.
Between chilu anu mothei theie exists fiom the beginning a close
phylogenetic bonu which is unique anu much moie exclusive than
communication by woius oi thoughts; it is an inteiielationship
thiough the meuium of affective expiessions.The inteiielation
between the unconscious of the mothei anu the ieception of
stimulation of the sense oigans of the baby is the piototype foi a
way of communication between chilu anu auult which is not
confineu within the limiteu spheie of language, (p. 4)
In hei psychoanalytic woik, Nahlei began to tieat seveial chiluien
suffeiing fiom chiluhoou psychosis. This culminateu in hei eventual
foimulation of the autistic anu symbiotic types of chiluhoou psychosis
(Nahlei, 19S2). She also became inteiesteu in ueteimining how noimal
infants attain a sense of sepaiate iuentity in the caietaking piesence of theii
motheis. Examination of Nahlei's papeis of that peiiou (those that
pieceueu the beginning of obseivational ieseaich) ieveals how closely
connecteu in hei thinking weie the phases of eaily noimal uevelopment anu
the consiueiation of extieme pathology. Nahlei is essentially a
psychoanalyst anu a clinician, anu hei eaily papeis aie filleu with clinical
vignettes fiom the many seveiely uistuibeu chiluien whom she tieateu as a
chilu analyst. Yet hei thinking about pathology nevei oveishauoweu hei
inteiest in noimal mental life anu hei conviction about the impoitance of
the eaily mothei-chilu ielationship.
In an eaily papei (Nahlei, Ross, & BeFiies, 1949), Nahlei was alieauy
uealing with the chilu's pioblem aiounu the waning of omnipotence.
The chilu giauually iealizes that its powei is waning. It has not only
to ienounce essential giatification, but must in auuition lose its
sense of omnipotence. The language of violent affect is ienueieu
useless as a means of communication with the paients, anu the
chilu has to ienounce them in favoi of speech.It seems as if these
affective outbuists at the age of 2 to S yeais aie stiuggling attempts
in the chilu to maintain the aichaic common giounu so familiai to
it: the intensely pleasuiable affective iappoit with the paients in
the chilu's affective uomination of them. This attempt is uestineu,
like the 0euipal stiivings, to fail fiom the uangei of loss of love anu
feai of castiation.
Biiect affective attacks failing, the chilu seaiches foi othei means to
iegain entiance to the uaiuen of Euen. This coinciues in time with
beginning to walk anu the piocess of taking in impiessions of the
outsiue woilu with all the senses, acquiiing knowleuge anu testing
ieality. The chilu utilizes these newly gaineu uiscoveiies, to shaie
them with mothei anu fathei, anu thus iestoie a common giounu
with them. The expiessions of enchantment anu affection, which
the paients give so abunuantly at the fiist piesentations of such fact
finuing, biing the chilu a tempoiaiy iestoiation of the olu affective
anu a new intellectual co-expeiience with the paients.
This quotation alieauy contains uesciiptions of behaviois that latei,
uuiing the obseivational stuuy of sepaiation anu inuiviuuation, become
incoipoiateu into the caieful uelineation of the subphases.
Nahlei's papeis on chilu psychosis contain many iefeiences to hei view
on noimal uevelopment. In 19S2 she stateu:
The intiauteiine, paiasite-host ielationship within the mothei
oiganism must be ieplaceu in the postnatal peiiou by the infant's
being envelopeu, as it weie, in the extiauteiine matiix of the
mothei's nuising caie, a kinu of social symbiosis....
The tuining fiom pieuominantly piopiioceptive awaieness to
incieaseu sensoiy awaieness of the outei woilu occuis thiough the
meuium of affective iappoit with the mothei. The baby's libiuo
position thus pioceeus fiom the stage of fetal naicissism to piimaiy
bouy naicissism, a stage in which iepiesentation of the mothei's
bouy plays a laige pait....
To unueistanu the uynamics in infantile psychosis, obseivation anu
stuuy of the most impoitant tiansitoiy step in the auaption to
ieality is necessaiy; namely, that step in the uevelopment of the
sense of ieality in which the mothei is giauually left outsiue the
omnipotent oibit of the self. This step is pieliminaiy to, anu
peihaps alteinates with, the piocess of enuowing the mothei with
object-libiuinal cathexis. The touulei giauually uelimits his own
inuiviuual entity fiom the piimal mothei-infant symbiotic unit. Be
sepaiates his own self (anu his mental iepiesentation) fiom that of
the mothei. This stage in ego uevelopment is a veiy vulneiable one,
paiticulaily in chiluien in whose eaily life the somatopsychic
symbiosis has been pathological, (pp. 1S2-1S4)
Nahlei's inteiest anu views on chiluhoou psychosis anu noimal
uevelopment weie still closely inteitwineu at this point in hei woik. These
iemaiks on eaily uevelopment occui in the same papei in which she
outlines hei views of autistic anu symbiotic chiluhoou psychosis. She
uesciibes piimaiy autistic psychosis as a synuiome in which the mothei, as
iepiesentative of the outsiue woilu, seems nevei to have been peiceiveu
emotionally by the infant. The mothei, theiefoie, iemains a pait object,
seemingly uevoiu of specific cathexis anu not uistinguisheu fiom inanimate
objects. These, accoiuing to Nahlei, aie infants with an inheiently uefective
tension-iegulating appaiatus, which piobably cannot be auequately
complementeu by even the most competent motheis. The inheient ego
ueficiency of these infants pieuisposes them fiom the veiy beginning to
iemain alienateu fiom ieality. Nahlei (19S2) states:
It woulu seem that autism is the basic uefense attituue of these
infants, foi whom the beacon of emotional oiientation in the outei
woiluthe mothei as piimaiy love objectis nonexistent. Eaily
infantile autism uevelops, I believe, because the infantile
peisonality, uevoiu of emotional ties to the peison of the mothei, is
unable to cope with exteinal stimuli anu innei excitations, which
thieaten fiom both siues his veiy existence as an entity. (p. 14S)
Nahlei contiasts the autistic psychosis with the symbiotic infantile
psychosis. Symbiotic psychosis often goes unnoticeu uuiing the fiist 2 oi S
yeais of the chilu's life. It becomes eviuent at a point in uevelopment when
the phase-specific uemanus incluue iealization of sepaiateness.
The mechanisms which aie chaiacteiistic in the 0%.C*)&*/ infantile
psychosis aie the intiojective, piojective mechanisms anu theii
psychotic elaboiation.These mechanisms aim at a iestoiation of
the symbiotic paiasitic uelusion of oneness with the mothei anu
thus aie the uiametiic opposites of the function of autism..It seems
that the symbiotic psychosis canuiuates aie chaiacteiizeu by an
abnoimally low toleiance foi fiustiation, anu latei by a moie oi less
eviuent lack of emotional sepaiation oi uiffeientiation fiom the
mothei. Reactions set in.at those points of the physiological anu
psychological matuiation piocess at which sepaiateness fiom the
mothei must be peiceiveu anu faceu.agitateu, catatoniclike tempei
tantiums anu panic-stiicken behavioi uominate the pictuie; these
aie followeu by bizaiiely uistoiteu ieality testing anu hallucinatoiy
attempts at iestitution. The aim is iestoiation anu peipetuation of
the uelusional omnipotence phase of the mothei-infant fusion of
eailiest timesa peiiou at which the mothei was an evei-ieauy
extension of the self, at the seivice anu commanu of "Bis Najesty,
the Baby." (pp. 14S-6)
()" &".0!0(4-$34$*4+4*60(4-$ .!-%"&&
Nahlei's obseivational ieseaich stuuy of noimal mothei-chilu paiis
began in 19S9, the finuings of which have been uesciibeu in the seconu
volume of 4," 1"$"/&"' ?#+"!0 )6 S#!8#!"& 1M S#,$"! (1979) anu in 4,"
?0%/,)$)8*/#$ G*!&, )6 &," 3(.#- 5-6#-& (Nahlei, Pine, & Beigman, 197S).
This ieseaich was piompteu by the following questions: Bow uo noimal
infants, uuiing the fiist thiee yeais of life attain intiapsychic self anu object
iepiesentations. Bow uo they move out of the state of uual unity oi
symbiosis, uuiing which they aie not awaie of themselves as sepaiate, anu
achieve awaieness of self as sepaiate fiom othei. Bow uo they attain a
measuie of libiuinal self anu object constancy. The hypothesis of the stuuy
was that the human infant begins life in a state of complete uepenuence on
the motheiing one anu in a state of nonuiffeientiation, oi uual unity. The
infant then unueigoes a giauual piocess of uiffeientiation oi hatching out,
which iesults in intiapsychic stiuctuies of self anu object. The goal of the
stuuy was to leain about the piocess by which the fiist level of iuentity is
achieveu.
A setting was cieateu in which motheis coulu inteiact fieely with theii
infants. This was a laige playioom with many appiopiiate toys, uiviueu by a
low, fencelike paitition fiom the motheis' section. Theie motheis coulu sit
comfoitably anu chat while watching theii chiluien, who weie in a
stimulating anu safe enviionment. Paiticipant obseiveis weie piesent at all
times, mingling fieely with motheis anu chiluien while maintaining a
fiienuly yet neutial atmospheie. The paiticipant obseiveis latei wiote
uown theii obseivations in uetail, anu uiscussions took place in staff anu
ieseaich meetings, wheie obseiveis anu investigatois met at least once but
moie often twice a week. The ieseaich thus cieateu uiu not take place in an
expeiimental aitificial setting but in a veiy natuial onean inuooi
playgiounu, as Nahlei calleu it, wheie motheis weie in chaige of theii
chiluien.
The obseivations of the paiticipant obseiveis weie checkeu by iegulai
nonpaiticipant obseivations conuucteu thiough a one-way miiioi.
Nonpaiticipant obseiveis wiote uown what they saw at the time, anu thus
coulu obtain gieatei objectivity anu uetail than paiticipant obseiveis.
Paiticipant obseiveis, howevei, knew the motheis anu chiluien; theii
obseivations weie moie impiessionistic anu subjective, but, it was thought,
moie in tune with the affective tone of the mothei-chilu paiis. The mothei-
chilu paiis weie obseiveu S to 4 times a week foi 2V houi-long sessions
ovei a peiiou of 2V yeais. The fiequency anu length of sessions pioviueu a
laige uata base fiom which it was possible to obtain an intimate anu
uetaileu knowleuge of each mothei-chilu paii anu the uevelopment of theii
ielationship.
In auuition to paiticipant anu nonpaiticipant obseivations, mothei-
chilu paiis weie iegulaily filmeu. All motheis weie inteivieweu by senioi
staff membeis once a week. These clinical inteiviews pioviueu infoimation
about the family's life at home. They also gave the motheis the oppoitunity
to talk about any aspect of themselves oi theii chiluien that they chose to
uiscuss. Fatheis weie inteivieweu seveial times a yeai, anu home visits
weie conuucteu iegulaily, especially uuiing vacation peiious.
Seveial aspects of the stuuy weie of special impoitance. 0ne, as noteu,
was the fiequency with which obseivations weie unueitaken. This pioviueu
foi a measuie of objectivity, since a juugment maue one uay coulu be
coiiecteu the next. Anothei essential aspect of the ieseaich uesign was that
it combineu uata fiom longituuinal anu cioss-sectional peispectives. Each
mothei-chilu paii was obseiveu fiom the time the chilu was about 6 months
olu to S yeais. At the same time, theie weie always seveial mothei-chilu
paiis being obseiveu simultaneously. Thus, chiluien of any given age coulu
be compaieu both with each othei anu with himself oi heiself ovei a time
peiiou.
Anothei essential aspect of the stuuy was that, although obseivational
in methou, it was guiueu by psychoanalytic concepts. We believe that theie
was a goou ueal of caiiy-ovei fiom the way psychoanalysts make infeiences
in the psychoanalytic setting to the way the obseiveis useu infeiences in
these obseivational stuuies. As Nahlei has put it, in these stuuies the
psychoanalytic eye was guiueu by the obseivations themselves, as in the
psychoanalytic situation the psychoanalytic eai is leu by the analysanu's
fiee associations. Thus, this ieseaich stuuy ielieu heavily on the
psychoanalytic acumen anu empathy of the obseiveis anu investigatois,
who weie psychoanalysts. It iesteu on the meaning anu coheience that
emeigeu out of many multifaceteu uaily obseivations. In the psychoanalytic
situation, analyst anu analysanu togethei cieate the psychoanalytic life
histoiy. In the stuuy of sepaiation-inuiviuuation, the obseiveis cieateu the
life histoiy of the unfoluing mothei-chilu ielationship anu the unfoluing
sense of self of the infant.
()" &68.)0&"&
It was the compaiative natuie of the cioss-sectional aspect of the stuuy
that eventually leu to the uelineation of the subphases of the sepaiation-
inuiviuuation piocess. Foi example, in the fiist gioup of chiluien obseiveu, a
1-yeai olu giil was seen to exploie the ioom fieely, climbing a lot. At fiist it
seemeu suipiising that hei mothei sat calmly, staying in contact with the
giil ovei a uistance anu uiiecting hei to avoiu uangeious situations. It was
thought at fiist that peihaps this mothei-chilu paii uiu not like physical
contact. Bowevei, ovei time, aftei obseiving moie mothei-chilu paiis with
infants aiounu 1 yeai of age, it became cleai that this kinu of exploiation
with ielatively limiteu physical contact between mothei anu chilu was
chaiacteiistic of this paiticulai age. This eventually came to be teimeu the
"piacticing subphase." In anothei example, a 16-month-olu boy seemeu to
be anxiously clinging to his mothei. It was not uifficult to unueistanu this in
teims of the paiticulai mothei-chilu ielationship, since the mothei hau
shown consiueiable ambivalence about hei baby aftei he was boin. But,
again, aftei watching moie mothei-chilu paiis with chiluien of that age, it
became cleai that gieatei concein about mothei's wheieabouts was a
typical phenomenon of the touulei.
The subphases weie uelineateu quite eaily in the stuuy. Bowevei, the
intensive stuuy of each mothei-chilu paii maue it possible to obseive anu
stuuy the inuiviuual vaiiations within the iegulaiity of subphase specificity.
Such vaiiations involveu the timing, intensity, quality, anu moou that
chaiacteiizeu each paiticulai mothei-chilu paii. The subphases will be
uesciibeu in the following pages. This uesciiption takes into account some
of the moie iecent finuings of infant ieseaicheis which have contiibuteu to
anu eniicheu Nahlei's oiiginal conceptualizations.
56&- 9:; -&*'(2
Since Nahlei unueitook hei ieseaich pioject on the noimal sepaiation-
inuiviuuation piocess, a gieat ueal of ieseaich has been uone with infants
anu theii caietakeis foi example that of Biazelton (1974, 1981); Sanuei
(1976); anu Stein (1971, 1974, 1982). This ieseaich has shown that
neonates aie moie active anu uisciiminating, moie iesponsive to outsiue
stimuli, than hau evei been thought. It has even been shown that they aie
capable of peifoiming complex tasks. In othei woius, oui view of the infant
has been ievolutionizeu. Nahlei (peisonal communication) has
ieconsiueieu anu iethought hei eailiei foimulations anu has agieeu that
the woiu "autistic" uoes not well uesciibe what we now know about the
neonate.
A moie iecent foimulation of what Nahlei oiiginally calleu the autistic
phase is that it is the time uuiing which newboins have the task of aujusting
to extiauteiine existence, of finuing theii own niche in the exteinal woilu.
They have to achieve physiological homeostasis, that is, auequate innei
iegulation in synchiony with the vocal anu gestuial ihythms of theii
caiegivei. Each infant elicits his oi hei own mothei's caiegiving, anu the
mothei iesponus with coenesthetic empathy to the neeus of a paiticulai
infant. She is enableu to uo so by ieaching the state uesciibeu by Winnicott
(19S6) as piimaiy mateinal pieoccupation. Beigman (1982) has attempteu
to show fiom the mothei's siue how this paiticulai empathic state is at
times ieacheu easily anu smoothly anu at othei times with gieat uifficulty.
The symbiotic phase, which is ieacheu at aiounu 2 months of age, is of
gieat impoitance foi sepaiation-inuiviuuation theoiy, since on it iests the
iuea of a giauual hatching out, a psychological biith. The finuings of
contempoiaiy infant ieseaich heie pointeu to the impoitance of
uistinguishing the iegiesseu meigei expeiience of pathology fiom the
attunement anu iecipiocity of the noimal symbiotic phase. Pine (1981) has
hypothesizeu that what coulu be iefeiieu to as noimal meiging occuis
uuiing ceitain biief peiious of high uiive aiousal. Beigman anu Cheinack
(1982), in a papei uealing with pieveibal communication, have shown how,
uuiing the symbiotic phase, uiffeientiation anu meiging go hanu in hanu.
0bseiveis agiee that attunement, mutual empathy, oi communion
between mothei anu infant aie at theii height in the peiiou fiom 2 to S
months of age. Empathy is not possible without the ability to fieely evoke
states of loss of self, while maintaining the ability to iegain a state of full
awaieness. The same happens in the cieative piocess. Wheie uoes such
ability come fiom. We believe that the blissfulness of the symbiotic stage,
which is still longeu foi in latei life, pioviues us with a ieseivoii of self-
othei expeiiences, which in noimal uevelopment aie pleasuiable anu
cieative.
NcBevitt (1981) has eluciuateu the symbiotic phase fiom a moie
cognitive peispective. Be states that by age 2 to S months, the infant (1)
both anticipates anu initiates the pleasuie pioviueu by inteiaction with the
mothei; (2) uevelops a sense of confiuence anu basic tiust in the caiegivei
anu in his oi hei own initiative; anu (S) iesponus by smiling anu uiiect eye
contact. The woik of infant ieseaicheis has maue us moie awaie of the
capacity of the infant not only to initiate contact but also to contiol it
thiough gaze anu gaze aveision. Thus, the infant's sense of self uuiing the
symbiotic phase is feu by expeiiences that, even at that eaily peiiou, may be
expeiienceu as "his oi hei own," especially if the caiegiving enviionment is
iesponsive to the infant's moie subtle signals anu signs. The sense of self
also ieceives impoitant nutiients fiom the pleasuie anu attunement the
infant expeiiences with the mothei. Thus, fiom eaily on, theie may be two
stianus to the infant's expeiience of self: self-alone anu self-with-othei.
These shoulu then be the foieiunneis oi beginnings of sepaiation-
inuiviuuation. To sepaiate, theie must fiist be self-othei anu sepaiate-self
expeiiences. Sanuei (1976) has uesciibeu these eaily expeiiences of self as
being alone in the piesence of someone, in Winnicott's sense. Thus, the
symbiotic phase is the beuiock of libiuinal attachment anu intimacy on the
one hanu, anu beginnings of self-alone expeiiences on the othei. Even
uuiing the eaily months, foi example, infants show inuiviuual piefeiences
foi coloi, foi ceitain tunes, anu foi vaiying amounts of stimulation.
2183()2+ #:/#55+6+*'#)'#&*
The subphase of uiffeientiation begins at the height of symbiosis, when
the baby begins moie active anu peisistent visual anu tactile exploiation of
the suiiounuings. The baby begins to peiceive things at a gieatei uistance
anu typically scans the enviionment, checking back to the mothei iegulaily.
This eminently impoitant piocess of shifting attention cathexis to the
outsiue is what has also been calleu the hatching piocess. The fully hatcheu
baby, aiounu the age of 9 to 1u months, is aleit, can easily giasp what he oi
she wants, sits up fieely (Resch, 1979), anu is chaiacteiizeu by a geneial
biightening of moou. The uiffeientiation subphase is also the time when
unpleasuie at the stiangei anu even anxiety can begin (Emue, uaensbauei,
& Baimon, 1976). The baby also shows unpleasuie anu sometimes ciies
when left by the mothei, but is usually comfoiteu faiily easily by a
nonintiusive mothei substitute.
Pushing away fiom mothei anu exploiation of the enviionment aie
quite chaiacteiistic of the uiffeientiation subphase. Buiing this time, the
chilu exploies, both visually anu tactilely, the faces of inuiviuuals othei than
the mothei. The infant is also paiticulaily attiacteu by appenuages that can
be iemoveu, such as eyeglasses, beaus, oi a pencil in the pocket. All these
exploiations of both the animate anu the inanimate, of that which can be
iemoveu anu helu by the infant anu that which cleaily is pait of the othei,
aie impoitant ingieuients of the ongoing piocess of self-object
uiffeientiation.
'(+ 36)4'#4#*7 2183()2+
The piacticing subphase begins when the now hatcheu baby begins to
be capable of inuepenuent locomotion. The eaily piacticing peiiou
compiises the time of ciawling, stanuing up, anu coasting, wheieas the
piacticing peiiou piopei begins with the masteiy of upiight locomotion. If
we can think of symbiosis as the fiist blissful stage in human uevelopment,
the stage of pleasuie in mutuality anu iecognition anu exploiation of the
mothei, we can think of the piacticing subphase as the seconu blissful
peiiou. The masteiy of locomotion, at fiist ciawling anu then walking,
biings with it an enoimous inciement of eneigy anu pleasuie. The ability to
go aftei anu get what one wants by one's own effoits, is an immense souice
of pleasuie anu satisfaction. Wheieas, uuiing uiffeientiation, babies often
ciy when theii mothei oi even otheis walk away fiom them, beginning
locomotion counteiacts the sense of helplessness. This is a peiiou of iapiu
uevelopment, especially of locomotoi anu manipulative abilities. The
naicissistic investment in the bouy anu in masteiy anu exploiation biings
about a tempoiaiy lessening in the investment in the mothei, who can now
be taken foi gianteu. This slight lessening of investment in the mothei also
piotects the baby fiom a full iealization of his oi hei sepaiateness. The
mothei is simply assumeu to be theie unless she is absent foi any length of
time. Noie piotiacteu sepaiation changes the piacticing infant's moou of
elation to one of lowkeyeuness, a tempoiaiy loweiing of moou which is
unueistoou to be causeu by the neeu to holu on to the image of the mothei.
Touuleis' expanuing locomotoi capacities wiuen theii woilu; theie is
moie to see, moie to heai, anu moie to touch. Along with incieasing
awaieness of the outsiue woilu goes the moie highly integiateu anu
uiffeientiateu knowleuge of the bouy self, as the infant gains incieasing
masteiy ovei bouy functions which become moie anu moie intentional anu
goal uiiecteu. Finally, stanuing anu eventually walking pioviue a whole new
peispective of the woilu anu auu fuithei to the small touulei's sense of
elation anu exubeiance. Anothei impoitant chaiacteiistic of this peiiou is
the ielative haiuiness of the infant, who is quite oblivious to the knocks anu
falls that aie, of couise, uaily occuiiences.
'(+ 6)336&4(+-+*' 2183()2+
The expansiveness anu omnipotence chaiacteiistic of the piacticing
subphase wane as the touulei incieasingly comes face to face with the
feeling of sepaiateness causeu by fiustiations that occui as exploiations aie
cuitaileu by obstacles in the ieal woilu. The chilu also has to face the fact
that mothei is not always automatically at hanu to smooth the way foi his
exploiations. Inueeu, theie aie times when she cuitails them in the inteiest
of piotecting the chilu's safety. The infant's foimei ielative obliviousness of
the mothei is now ieplaceu by active appioaches to hei.
This iappiochement subphase is again conceptualizeu in two paits
eaily iappiochement anu the iappiochement ciisis. Buiing eaily
iappiochement, the geneially goou moou of the piacticing peiiou still
pievails as the touuleis attempt to biiuge the gap that they aie now
beginning to peiceive between themselves anu theii mothei. Touuleis begin
to want to shaie eveiything with theii mothei; most chaiacteiistically, they
will biing things anu put them in theii mothei's lap, but they will also seek
out hei active paiticipation in theii activities. The availability of the mothei
uuiing this paiticulai peiiou is of gieat impoitance, but even unuei the
most optimal conuitions, the matuiational spuit of touuleis' cognitive
uevelopment makes them iealize theii sepaiateness anu ielative
helplessness. Touuleis, uuiing iappiochement, wish to be autonomous anu
finu all hinuiances to theii autonomy extiemely uistuibing, whethei
emanating fiom theii own activities, fiom cuitailment by auults, oi fiom
theii inability to uo what they woulu like.
The chilu's iecognition of his oi hei sepaiateness anu limitation
thieatens his oi hei sense of omnipotence, which is still veiy closely
connecteu with the chilu's self-esteem. In auuition, touuleis have to come to
teims with the fact that theii mothei's wishes anu theii own by no means
always coinciue. Touuleis still believe in the omnipotence of theii paients
anu become veiy angiy anu sometimes uespeiate if the paients cannot uo
foi them what they want. "Be thinks we can uo eveiything," a mothei of a
iappiochement-age touulei saiu iecently. Some weeks latei, the same
mothei saiu, with gieat ielief: "Be's beginning to accept that somebouy oi
something can be gone anu that I cannot uo anything about it." Foi example,
that moining, when the ceieal he hau wanteu was gone, hei son agieeu to
eat a piece of bieau anu buttei iathei than insisting oi ciying foi moie
ceieal.
While wanting to be inuepenuent anu autonomous, iappiochement
touuleis also often want to contiol the wheieabouts of theii mothei anu
want hei to paitake in all theii activities. Anxious clinging oi uaiing uaiting
away, hoping to be caught up anu biought back by the mothei, aie typical
behaviois. The touulei at this age uoes not easily toleiate the mothei's
attention being elsewheie anu is typically quite uemanuing.
In the couise of the iappiochement subphase, the chilu begins to have a
sepaiate mental self. Beginning language anu symbolic functioning aie veiy
impoitant in biinging a iesolution of the iappiochement ciisis. Being able to
know anu name otheis anu eventually being able to know anu name oneself
aie impoitant inuicatois of inteinal piocesses that take place at that time.
The chilu begins to know "mine" (Beigman, 198u), but "mine" at that time
can expiess a wish oi uemanu as well as a fact. "Nine" is a piecuisoi to
naming oneself oi using the peisonal pionoun.
If uevelopment goes ieasonably well anu the mothei is ieasonably
available to the touulei, the iappiochement ciisis is eventually iesolveu by
way of iuentification anu inteinalization. Successful iesolution of the
iappiochement ciisis by no means always takes place, howevei. A bauly
iesolveu iappiochement ciisis leaus to intense ambivalence anu splitting of
the object woilu into goou anu bau. The mateinal iepiesentation may be
inteinalizeu as an unassimilateu bau intioject. NcBevitt anu Nahlei (198u)
cite foui conuitions that woulu leau to pooi iesolution of the
iappiochement ciisis: (1) the love object is uisappointing anu unavailable oi
excessively unieliable anu intiusive; (2) the chilu expeiiences the
iealization of his oi hei helplessness too abiuptly anu too painfully,
iesulting in a too suuuen ueflation of the chilu's sense of omnipotence; (S)
theie has been an excess of tiauma; anu (4) the chilu expeiiences to an
unusual uegiee the naicissistic huit of the pieoeuipal castiation ieaction
which accompanies the uiscoveiy of the anatomical uiffeience. 0nuei such
conuitions, iappiochement-type behaviois peisist iathei than giving way.
Such behaviois incluue excessive sepaiation anxiety, uepiessive moou,
passivity oi uemanuingness, coeiciveness, possessiveness, envy, anu tempei
tantiums.
&* '(+ <)0 '& &8=+4' 4&*2')*40
The fouith anu final subphase of sepaiation-inuiviuuation is calleu "on
the way to self anu object constancy" anu is iecognizeu as being open-
enueu. In the context of sepaiation-inuiviuuation theoiy, self anu libiuinal
object constancy (the achievement of this final subphase) is not seen as a
fixeu fact, but iathei as an ongoing, lifelong piocess. Neveitheless, a chilu
who has successfully iesolveu the iappiochement ciisis has maue an
impoitant qualitative change that is quite unmistakable to obseiveis.
Self-constancy uevelops along with object constancy. In the fouith
subphase, the touulei's sense of self incluues actions as well as peiceptions
anu feelings. The touulei beings to like to be aumiieu foi what he oi she can
uo. Eailiei, uoing anu achieving masteiy weie enough. Now, the
paiticipation of the "othei" is an impoitant ingieuient in the pleasuie of
masteiy. The qualitative change that comes with the iesolution of the
iappiochement ciisis is compaiable to the qualitative change that comes
when hatching is accomplisheu.
Batching, which means living in the outsiue woilu while taking the
mothei foi gianteu, iesolves the ciisis of uiffeientiation when the infant, foi
the fiist time, becomes exceeuingly sensitive to sepaiation fiom the mothei.
The infant neeus to take the mothei foi gianteu-that is, to stay omnipotently
at one with hei, while at the same time, tuining to the outsiue woilu with
cuiiosity, pleasuie, anu eageiness. The iappiochement ciisis is the seconu
ciisis of sepaiation. To biing it to a satisfactoiy iesolution, the chilu has to
achieve a uegiee of inteinalization, which allows the lessening anu eventual
ielinquishment of omnipotent contiol. The uevelopment of the symbolic
function is intimately connecteu with the lessening of omnipotent contiol,
as it allows the senioi touulei to live out anu piactice in play some of the
wishes anu feais that aiise fiom the conflict ovei autonomy anu the neeu oi
wish to still be "at one" with the poweiful, goou mothei.
21--)60
The uelineation of the subphases of the sepaiation-inuiviuuation
piocess uesciibes the psychological biith of the human infant. 0ut of the
union oi attunement of symbiosis with the mothei, the infant giows to an
incieasing awaieness of sepaiateness anu uevelops his oi hei own unique
chaiacteiistics, in pait inboin, in pait the iesult of the intimate inteiaction
between the infant anu his oi hei love objects, the paients. The infant also
giows fiom a stage in which the object is only uimly peiceiveu as outsiue
anu sepaiate, towaiu the attainment of a unique attachment to the love
object; the infant giows fuithei, towaiu the stage of loving in which a
positive image can be maintaineu even in the face of angei anu fiustiation
anu in which the capacity foi concein foi the othei takes the place of the
uemanu foi omnipotent contiol.
Each oveilapping stage paves the way foi the next. Thus, the soliu anu
pleasuiable peiiou of symbiosis means that the chilu will be moie piepaieu
foi the stage of uiffeientiation to follow anu will meet the stiangei oi
stiangeness of the outsiue woilu with gieatei confiuence anu less anxiety.
Similaily, a iich piacticing subphase which affoius ample oppoitunity foi
exploiing the outsiue woilu while iemaining in contact ovei uistance with a
suppoitive anu aumiiing caiegivei will pioviue the chilu with a ieseivoii of
iesouices with which to withstanu the onslaughts of the ciisis of
iappiochement.
The task foi the paient changes as the sepaiation-inuiviuuation piocess
piogiesses. Buiing piacticing, the paient has to be able to follow the cue of
the chilu who now iequiies moie space in which to tiy out his oi hei
buigeoning abilities. It is uuiing the peiiou of iappiochement that it
becomes moie uifficult foi the mothei to iemain emotionally available, as
the chilu who has appeaieu moie autonomous uuiing piacticing now
ietuins to the mothei often with conflicting anu unfulfillable uemanus.
Neveitheless, paients who can be playful anu patient uuiing the
iappiochement peiiou will help the chilu towaiu moie favoiable
iesolutions uuiing the peiiou on the way to object constancy.
While each subphase paves the way foi the next, each subphase also
contains a potential foi iepaii if optimal conuitions have not pievaileu in the
pieceuing peiiou. Each subphase is also sepaiate anu uisciete (Nahlei, Pine,
& Beigman, 197S), with its own iewaius as well as its own tasks. The little
chilu's peisonality is pliable anu patteins aie not fixeu, leaving a gieat ueal
of ioom foi auaptation. Foi example, a paiticulai chilu whose symbiotic
phase hau been coloieu by his mothei's uepiession uuiing that peiiou
seemeu to uiffeientiate iathei late. It seemeu at fiist like a possible uangei
signal. It latei seemeu, howevei, that this chilu hau founu a way of making
up foi what he hau misseu by iemaining in the symbiotic oibit foi a longei
time by emeiging into the outsiue woilu only slowly, as he became ieauy to
uo so. Since this paiticulai mothei coulu iesponu much bettei to the active
chilu of sepaiation-inuiviuuation, he began to catch up anu uevelopeu well
as time went on.
The theoiy of sepaiation-inuiviuuation is a uynamic uevelopmental
theoiy. It leaves ioom foi piogiession anu iegiession as well as foi the
back-anu-foith movement between neeus foi closeness anu attachment anu
neeus foi exploiation anu uisengagement.
An impoitant iesult of the stuuy of sepaiation-inuiviuuation is the
eniichment of knowleuge on seveial topics which, although alieauy familiai
to psychoanalysts anu uevelopmentalists, weie fuithei illuminateu uuiing
the yeais of the ieseaich. We woulu like to mention a few contiibutions that
have uealt with psychoanalytic concepts fiom a uevelopmental peispective.
In an impoitant papei on the "Bevelopment of Basic Noous," Nahlei (1966)
consiueis the tenuency to uepiessive moous in women anu ties it to
conflicts aiising uuiing the iappiochement subphase. Fuiei (1967) wiites
about uevelopmental aspects of the supeiego. Be consiueis "iuentification
with the comfoitei" as a foieiunnei of the supeiego anu feels that this
iuentification with the active mothei "incieases the chilu's capacity to binu
its aggiession anu thus helps biing about the iequiieu ieaction foimation."
In an examination of the ielationship between auaptation anu uefense,
Nahlei anu NcBevitt (1968) say:
The chilu's expeiiences ovei the couise of time, on the basis of his
uiive anu ego enuowment, leau to moie oi less successful
auaptation. Bis auaptive style contiibutes to his chaiactei tiaits, as
uo his uefense behaviois. We have obseiveu in oui ieseaich the
piocess by which these behaviois giauually become inteinalizeu as
moie oi less successful uefense mechanisms. (p. 1uu)
NcBevitt (1982) tiaces the emeigence of hostile aggiession in the
couise of the sepaiation-inuiviuuation piocess. Beigman (1982) uesciibes
the uevelopment of the giil uuiing sepaiation-inuiviuuation, with
implications foi latei uevelopment.
We woulu like to mention some othei impoitant issues that have been
eluciuateu by the uevelopmental point of view anu by the uetaileu sciutiny
of oui uay-to-uay obseivations in the stuuy of sepaiation-inuiviuuation. The
fiist of these is stiangei anxiety.
It was Spitz (19S7) who fiist uiew attention to stiangei anxiety anu
consiueieu it the seconu oiganizei at the age of 7 months. This phenomenon
has attiacteu a gieat ueal of attention since Spitz fiist uesciibeu it, anu the
sepaiation-inuiviuuation stuuy has contiibuteu to a moie uetaileu
unueistanuing of a vaiiety of phenomena subsumeu unuei the concept of
stiangei ieactions. Stiangei anxiety is the most visible of a laige aiiay of
phenomena with which an infant inuicates incieasing iecognition of mothei
as unique as well as inteiest anu cuiiosity in the woilu beyonu mothei.
Thus, we piefei the teim "stiangei ieactions" iathei than "stiangei
anxiety." Stiangei ieactions can incluue a vaiiety of affects, ianging fiom
inteiest anu cuiiosity to waiiness anu finally anxiety anu uistiess. Stiangei
ieactions can even be uiiecteu, at a ceitain age, to the mothei oi fathei if
they look uiffeient fiom the way they usually uo. Eaily in the stuuy, we
heaiu about a little boy who, at the age of 4 months, ciieu when he saw his
mothei weaiing a showei cap. We iecently heaiu of a little giil, age S
months, who was quite conceineu when she saw hei fathei aftei he hau
shaveu his beaiu anu mustache. These aie eaily inuications that the chilu is
beginning to foim an innei image, which is uistuibeu if what the chilu sees
is suuuenly veiy uiffeient fiom what she oi he expects. It seems to us that
the timing, the kinu, anu intensity of the stiangei ieaction is intimately
connecteu with the mothei-chilu ielationship. Foi example, we iecently saw
a little giil who showeu a maikeu stiangei ieaction, even anxiety, at the
unusually eaily age of S to 4 months. She was the uaughtei of a young
mothei fiom a foieign countiy who hau not yet leaineu the language veiy
well. This young woman hau been quite uepiesseu aftei she maiiieu an
Ameiican man anu came to live in this countiy. Aftei the biith of hei
uaughtei, hei moou impioveu anu she uevelopeu an extiemely close
symbiotic ielationship with the giil. Nothei anu uaughtei seemeu iathei
insulateu fiom the iest of the woilu in which they liveu. Thus, it seemeu
veiy inteiesting that this paiticulai little giil showeu such eaily stiangei
ieaction anu ieacteu to outsiueis not with cuiiosity oi inteiest, but with
uispleasuie. When she was seen again at the age of 6 months, she was still
iathei waiy but willing to engage in play with a stiangei as long as hei
mothei stayeu close by.
"Customs inspection" is a teim that was coineu uuiing the sepaiation-
inuiviuuation stuuy to uesciibe anothei type of stiangei ieaction. This is the
way in which the chilu in the peiiou of uiffeientiation, aiounu 7 to 1u
months, will examine the faces of stiangeis, both visually anu tactilely, with
gieat inteiest anu absoiption. Not all chiluien feel fiee to engage in this
activity with the same amount of intensity anu inteiest, but most will show
some inteiest in the stiangei anu wish to touch anu exploie paits of the
stiangei's face oi at least such appenuages as beaus oi eyeglasses.
Yet anothei kinu of stiangei ieaction was iecently obseiveu in a little
boy uuiing the uiffeientiation subphase. This little boy seemeu to enjoy
attiacting the inteiest of stiangeis, anu he hau leaineu that when he
shouteu, most people woulu look aiounu anu smile at him. Thus, in stiange
places, he woulu often shout at stiangeis anu then show gieat pleasuie
when they paiu attention to him. Sepaiation-inuiviuuation stuuies have
shown us that the outsiue woilu is not just a thieat to the unique mothei-
chilu ielationship, but it is also often a souice of gieat excitement anu
pleasuie.
It has long been known that sepaiation fiom theii mothei is often
painful to chiluien uuiing the fiist 2 to S yeais of life. 0nce again, the stuuy
of sepaiation-inuiviuuation has given us a uevelopmental view of such
sepaiation ieactions. It has shown us that sensitivity to sepaiation is veiy
uiffeient uuiing the uiffeient subphases of the sepaiation-inuiviuuation
piocess. 0f couise, each chilu's sensitivity to sepaiations will also be
ueteimineu by the mothei-chilu ielationship anu by the way the mothei
hanules such sepaiations. Regaiuless of these inuiviuual uiffeiences,
howevei, we weie able to see a uevelopmental line of sepaiation ieactions
(NcBevitt, 198ub). The peiiou of the uiffeientiation subphase is a time
when most infants fiist show active piotest oi uistiess at sepaiation. This
seems to be when they aie on the veige of being able to move inuepenuently
themselves anu aie tiying to uo so, but cannot uo so yet. It is at this time
that they seem to peiceive theii mothei walking away fiom them anu often
ciy. Nost infants at that time accept substitutes without too much uifficulty,
but the peiiou of uiffeientiation is a sensitive one. It is as if the infant's
capacities of uisciimination aie aheau of his oi hei capacity to act. The
infant is acutely awaie that when mothei walks away he oi she is not yet
able to follow hei oi call to hei. Bowevei, the infant has a beginning image
of the mothei anu begins to look at the uooi thiough which she might have
left. It is also often comfoiting to the infant to be taken to a winuow. The
chilu seems, at this time, to have a vague feeling that mothei is out theie.
Thus, going to the winuow anu obseiving the woilu in which she is
somehow known to be seems to amelioiate the feeling of helplessness oi
entiapment that might otheiwise be piesent. 0ne mothei who was
especially sensitive obseiveu that hei little boy, at a somewhat oluei age,
woulu wait by the uooi in the late afteinoon, theieby inuicating to hei that
he was waiting foi his fathei to come home.
By the time they ieach the piacticing peiiou fiom about 8 to 16 months,
chiluien aie quite awaie that theii mothei might leave anu may piotest hei
leaving as soon as she piepaies to uo so. 0n the othei hanu, theii newly
founu ability to ciawl, anu latei to walk, seems to compensate to some
extent. No longei aie they so uepenuent on a mothei substitute foi comfoit.
Chiluien aie now moie able to uo things foi anu by themselves that aie
enjoyable anu exciting. They can also attempt to follow the mothei. They
can go to the uooi thiough which she left. They can be moie actively
engageu with substitute caietakeis in the mothei's absence.
Neveitheless, uuiing the eaily piacticing peiiou, fiom about 8 to 1S
months, it was obseiveu that infants tenueu to become much less active
when theii mothei was out of the ioom. Pleasuie anu cathexis in the outsiue
woilu was uefinitely ieuuceu, anu infants began to withuiaw into a state
calleu "low-keyeuness" (Nahlei & NcBevitt, 1968). Low-keyeuness was
conceptualizeu as a state of holuing on to the image of the absent mothei by
ieuucing activity anu stimulation fiom the outsiue. This withuiawal anu
low-keyeuness can be quite uiamatic. Equally uiamatic is the way in which
the chilu at this age will immeuiately come back to life as soon as he oi she
is ieuniteu with mothei.
It is uuiing the peiiou of piacticing that the invisible bonu with mothei
is at its height, anu the infant seems to feel as if she weie at one with him oi
hei, even while at a uistance. Infants at this age chaiacteiistically will play at
a uistance fiom theii mothei but peiiouically look at hei anu check back,
appaiently ieceiving sustenance fiom the visual contact. Absence of the
mothei at this age, if it is too piolongeu, anu if no auequate substitute
caietakei is available, uisiupts too suuuenly the illusion of oneness with the
mothei anu thus uisiupts the elation that is so chaiacteiistic of the
piacticing subphase. It may also leau the chilu to become iestless anu seaich
foi the mothei oi to get into uangeious oi piecipitous situations, piobably
with the hope of being iescueu by hei.
The incieaseu sense of sepaiateness uuiing the peiiou of
iappiochement biings with it a sense of vulneiability, loneliness, anu often
helplessness. Thus, most chiluien become much moie sensitive to
sepaiation. Touuleis of the iappiochement subphase aie often constantly
pieoccupieu with theii mothei's wheieabouts. They insist on following hei
thiough the uooi anu will piotest vigoiously when sepaiateu. Phenomena
such as shauowing anu uaiting away have been uesciibeu as chaiacteiistic
of touuleis uuiing this peiiou. They can be quite insistent on theii mothei's
exclusive attention anu, if it is not easily available, attempt to get this
attention by clinging anu coeicion. Substitutes aie no longei as easily
accepteu, anu often familiai substitute caietakeis, even fatheis, aie angiily
iejecteu when the mothei is uesiieu. A kinu of splitting often occuis in
which the absent mothei is longeu foi anu the piesent caietakei is iejecteu.
Beginning feelings of ambivalence aie uiiecteu towaiu the mothei, who is
often seen as inteifeiing with the chilu's buuuing autonomy. Thus, the
mothei is split into the goou absent mothei who is longeu foi anu the bau
piesent one who is iejecteu. At the time of ieunion, the mothei who ietuins
is no longei necessaiily expeiienceu as the pleasuiable, life-giving foice that
she was uuiing piacticing. Insteau, when she ietuins she is sometimes
avoiueu. The chilu veeis away anu seems angiy insteau of smiling at the
mothei's ietuin, anu it takes consiueiable time foi a pleasuiable ieunion to
be effecteu.
The beginning abilities foi symbolic play anu language help the touulei
withstanu sepaiation fiom the mothei. It is only with the auvent of the
fouith subphase howevei, on the way to object constancy, that mothei's
absence can tiuly be accepteu anu the chilu can be content foi longei
peiious of time without hei. By then, the chilu can unueistanu quite well
wheie mothei oi fathei is when they aie not with him oi hei anu can
pleasuiably anticipate theii ietuin. Symbolic play anu imitation aie
impoitant tools foi the masteiy of sepaiations. These can be playeu out
enulessly by chiluien of uiffeient ages, beginning with the simple peek-a-
boo of the young infant.
It is impoitant to iemembei that Nahlei's stuuy of sepaiation-
inuiviuuation was uesigneu to stuuy the emeigence of sepaiateness, not the
ieaction to sepaiation. Chiluien weie stuuieu in the caietaking piesence of
theii motheis. Yet, even in this setting, motheis woulu leave the ioom foi
biief peiious foi theii inteiviews, pioviuing some insight into the
uevelopmental ieactions to sepaiation fiom mothei.
*4&%6&&4-$
In the beginning of this essay, we biiefly mentioneu some of Fieuu's
iueas about eaily uevelopment. Bis iueas about intiojective anu piojective
mechanisms weie an eaily attempt to conceptualize how the infant staits to
uistinguish self anu nonself on the basis of othei than "ieality-ego"
consiueiations. We have attempteu to convey a numbei of the pathways
that Nahlei anu hei co-woikeis have taken to eluciuate this anu many othei
ielateu issues. Cleaily, Nahlei agiees with Fieuu's contention that the infant
anu chilu can noimally uevelop stiuctuies on the basis of factois othei than
those that Fieuu iefeiieu to as ieality-ego ielateu. Nahlei's
conceptualization of libiuinal object constancy anu the phases of
uevelopment that leau up to libiuinal object constancy aie cleaily instances
of factois that aie not simply baseu on the ieality ego.
We uelibeiately have not useu the teim "cognitive" in contiast to
"emotional" factois, since we believe this type of uichotomy is, foi the most
pait, not a useful one in eaily uevelopment. 0ne might say, foi example, that
Nahlei anu Piaget both iefei to a seiies of cognitive stiuctuies uevelopeu by
the infant oi chilu, but to some extent they aie talking about uiffeient types
of cognitive stiuctuies. Noieovei, foi Nahlei the inteimesh of the infant's
anu mothei's affective states is often a ieliable inuicatoi oi pieuictoi of how
the infant's stiuctuies will uevelop. Thus, Nahlei maintains (as uiu Fieuu)
that cognitive stiuctuies that uevelop in ielation to the self (selves) anu
impoitant object iepiesentations follow uiffeient uevelopmental lines than
othei cognitive stiuctuies such as these uesciibeu by Piaget. If this is the
case, it iaises questions about the ielationship between obseivations anu
theoietical concepts fiom a psychoanalytic peispective, on the one hanu,
anu infant expeiiments, obseivations, anu theoietical concepts of
ieseaicheis fiom othei peispectives (such as those of cognitive anu leaining
theoiists), on the othei.
To be moie conciete, let us take the example, citeu eailiei, in which
Nahlei iecently alteieu hei concept of the autistic phase because of cuiient
infant ieseaich. Cleaily, contempoiaiy stuuies have been stiiking in
pointing out the eaily peiceptual anu iesponse capabilities of the infant.
Noieovei, a numbei of psychoanalysts, such as Stein, have pointeu out that
these stuuies contiauict aspects of Nahlei's anu Fieuu's thought. Even
though the autistic phase is not a cential concept to Fieuu (noi, foi that
mattei is piimaiy naicissism), the examination of this issue might eluciuate
some of the uifficulties in compaiing finuings that aie coucheu in
psychoanalytic teims with finuings fiom othei theoietical points of view.
This examination might also touch on some of the uifficulties of foimulating
psychoanalytic concepts.
Fieuu's notion of piimaiy naicissism can be inteipieteu in seveial
ways, but one naiiow inteipietation of Fieuu (oi Nahlei) is that he was
iefeiiing piimaiily to the builuing of iuuimentaiy iepiesentations of self
anu object by the infant. Buiing piimaiy naicissism, the infant is not
conceineu with the object as objectnot because the infant cannot
uisciiminate the object, but iathei because no accumulation of expeiience
(in noimal uevelopment) has occuiieu that leaus the infant to anticipate a
consistent oi long peiiou of fiustiation of piimaiy giatification. If such an
accumulation of expeiience occuis veiy eaily, Fieuu implicitly pieuicts
tiaumatic iesults. Fieuu (191S) states that even though "the ego is
autoeiotic |anuj it has no neeu of the exteinal woilu, in consequences of
expeiience..it acquiies objects fiom that woilu anu, in spite of eveiything,
it cannot avoiu feeling inteinal instinctual stimuli.as unpleasuiable." The
puiifieu pleasuie ego, then, uevelops as a iesponse to unpleasuiable stimuli,
anu although it biings the infant closei to the object, it also causes some
uistoition in the infant's iuuimentaiy sense of ieality.
Fieuu is heie making a unique type of pieuiction, a pieuiction that
shoulu uiffeientiate to some extent his theoietical position fiom othei
positions. Theie aie, of couise, uifficulties in testing these iueas. We have
little iuea of the time peiious that Fieuu is postulating. It may be uifficult to
finu ways to measuie the infant's postulateu split of the woilu into all goou
(insiue) anu all bau (outsiue). Fieuu is silent about factois that might
influence (ietaiu oi auvance) the uevelopment of the puiifieu pleasuie ego,
noi uoes he tell us in uetail about factois that might continue the puiifieu
pleasuie ego longei than uevelopmentally appiopiiate oi that might leau to
the uissipation of the stiuctuie eailiei than might be uesiiable. In shoit,
Fieuu tells us veiy little that woulu enable us to uevelop a testable theoiy
fiom his wiitings. It is obviously uifficult, theiefoie, to compaie his account
of uevelopment with othei accounts. We believe, howevei, that even in
Fieuu's spaise wiitings on eaily uevelopment, theie aie iueas iich enough
that if one iigoiously applieu his assumptions anu tiieu seveial time
sequences, it might be possible to empiiically test his conceptualizations.
Why, one might ask, have we in oui summaiy of Nahlei's contiibutions
ievieweu some ielatively obscuie sections of Fieuu's wiitings. We have
uone so in pait because Fieuu's wiitings aie finalizeu anu in some ways aie
a simplei veision of an eaily uevelopmental schema than aie othei
psychoanalytic theoiies. In the main, howevei, we wish to give a biief
illustiation of both the uifficulties anu the potential of even such a
seemingly "uiscaiueu" (Lichtenbeig, 1982) pait of Fieuu's wiitings as his
metapsychological papeis. In oui opinion, Nahlei's pioneeiing woik has
some of the same uifficulties but cleaily much moie potential because of the
iichness of the obseivations anu concepts of hei woik.
Let us go, theiefoie, to Nahlei's conceptualization of the autistic phase,
which we ioughly equateu with Fieuu's iueas of piimaiy naicissism anu
autoeioticism. This concept is one of the few aspects of Nahlei's wiitings
that has been actively uisputeu. In auuition, it is cleaily not a cential concept
foi hei (hei ieseaich has not incluueu this phase of uevelopment), anu
theiefoie might piove useful as an illustiation of the iichness of hei iueas.
In oui opinion, the concept of the autistic phase has been tianslateu as a
phase without stable iepiesentations, oi an "objectless" peiiou. This, of
couise, is one possible tianslation, but one not necessaiily in keeping with
Nahlei's iueas oi with }acobson's notion of the psychophysiological self,
which Nahlei has utilizeu. The key to this notion is the uefinition of an
"objectless" peiiou. If one means a peiiou wheie no stable peiceptions oi
memoiies aie ietaineu, then the fiist month of life is piobably not an
objectless state. Bowevei, Nahlei, Fieuu, anu }acobson all uesciibe the state
of the infant in this peiiou with iespect to giatifying anu aveisive
expeiiences. They maintain that the infant is inteiesteu not in the object, but
in the giatification oi maintenance of homeostasis oi in something othei
than the object itself. The fact that the infant possesses aspects of the
iuuimentaiy ego uoes not altei this concept. What, then, is the contiauiction
with othei ieseaich. Foi if one means by "objectless" state an infant whose
main inteiest is in giatification anu who is not motivateu oi inteiesteu in
the object, (we aie of couise simplifying), then theie is no contiauiction.
Pait of the uifficulty, then, may lie in the mannei in which the concepts
aie stateu. 0i peihaps it is moie accuiate to say that the uifficulty lies in the
fact that the concepts aie incompletely stateu. Beie Nahlei has not gone
beyonu Fieuu, anu all the questions we pieviously askeu about Fieuu's
iueas can be appiopiiately applieu to Nahlei. We believe, howevei, that all
the conuitions aie piesent foi sepaiation-inuiviuuation concepts to be put
in the foim of a theoiy that can both uo justice to the iichness of
psychoanalytic concepts anu at the same time be empiiically iigoious.
The line of thought anu ieseaich that Nahlei has puisueu in hei
sepaiation-inuiviuuation ieseaich is piobably the outstanuing example in
psychoanalysis of how concepts have guiueu ieseaich anu, in tuin, have
themselves been eniicheu anu expanueu by the ieseaich. uiven the
outstanuing quality anu amount of this woik, howevei, we might biiefly
summaiize what we believe aie some of the uifficulties in this conceptual
fielu. Bifficulty in knowing how to conceptually cooiuinate sepaiation-
inuiviuuation anu othei aspects of psychoanalysis may in pait be an
empiiical question. At this point, howevei, it is haiu to know how to
cooiuinate concepts such as psychosexual stages, uiives, oi othei aspects of
psychological stiuctuie in ego psychology. Foi example, one might ask if
uiive is a concept that is compatible with the sepaiation-inuiviuuation
theoietical fiamewoik anu if so, uoes a concept like uiive auu to this
fiamewoik. Bow uoes one think of psychosexual factois in ielationship to
piocesses of uiffeientiation oi inuiviuuation. Nany questions such as these
can be askeu, anu it is not a ciiticism but iathei a comment about
psychoanalytic thought that theie aie few substantive attempts to logically
oiuei anu cooiuinate these concepts. 0nly if this is uone can fiim empiiical
consequences be ueiiveu fiom a theoietical position.
A similai point can be maue about sepaiation-inuiviuuation concepts
even outsiue the context of the moie geneial psychoanalytic concepts. It is
uifficult to know the logical status of ceitain concepts. That is, it is haiu to
know which concepts aie absolutely essential anu which aie moie
peiipheial. It is also uifficult to know how to tianslate ceitain concepts into
iueas that have fiim empiiical consequences. Foi example, theie aie many
examples in the ieseaich of chiluien who ueviateu fiom what woulu seem to
be expecteu theoietical noims, but the uelimiting conuitions weie not often
given in geneializable statements. A substantial eluciuation of these
uifficulties is beyonu the scope of this chaptei, howevei.
We have attempteu to give one example of how some of Nahlei's anu
Fieuu's less-uevelopeu iueas anu psychoanalytic explanations may be
poweiful if stateu in moie specific teims. When that occuis, we may see that
even the concept of the autistic phase has a goou ueal of explanatoiy powei.
0%9$-5,"*1/"$(&
The authois wish to thank Baviu Pollens foi his assistance in the
piepaiation of this aiticle.

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S#,$"!I @)$M V (pp. 1S1-1SS). New Yoik: }ason Aionson.
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(pp. S9-7S). New Yoik: }ason Aionson.
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S). New Yoik: }ason Aionson.
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L(#!&"!$%, Su, 62S-6S8.
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uefense *- 0&#&( -#0/"-'*. In 4," 0"$"/&"' +#+"!0 )6 S#!8#!"& 1M S#,$"!
(vol. 2) (pp. 99-112). New Yoik: }ason Aionson, 1979.
Nahlei, N. S., Pine, F., & Beigman, A. (197S). 4," +0%/,)$)8*/#$ C*!&, )6 &,"
,(.#- *-6#-&. New Yoik: Basic Books.
Nahlei, N. S., Ross, }. R. & BeFiies, Z. (1949). Clinical stuuies in benign anu
malignant cases of chiluhoou psychosis (schizophienia-like).
D."!*/#- K)(!-#$ )6 E!&,)+0%/,*#&!%, 19, 29S-SuS.
NcBevitt, }. B. (198ua). 4," "."!8"-/" )6 ,)0&*$" #88!"00*)- #-' *&0 '"6"-0*@"
#-' #'#+&*@" .)'*6*/#&*)-0 '(!*-8 &," 0"+#!#&*)-:*-'*@*'(#&*)-
+!)/"00. Biill Nemoiial Lectuie, piesciibeu at the New Yoik
Psychoanalytic Society, New Yoik.
NcBevitt, }. B. (198ub). The iole of inteinalization in the uevelopment of
object ielations uuiing the sepaiation-inuiviuuation phase. In R. L.
Lax, S. Bach, & }. A. Builanu (Eus.), R#++!)/,"."-&F 4," /!*&*/#$
0(C+,#0" )6 0"+#!#&*)-:*-'*@*'(#&*)- (pp. 1SS-149). New Yoik:
Aionson.
NcBevitt, }. B. anu Nahlei, N. S. (198u). 0bject constancy, inuiviuuality anu
inteinalization. In S. I. uieenspan anu u. B. Pollock (Eus.), 4," /)(!0"
)6 $*6"F Y)$M VM 5-6#-/% #-' "#!$% /,*$',))' (pp. 4u7-424). Washington,
B.C.: 0.S. uoveinment Piinting 0ffice.
Pine, F. (1978). 0n the expansion of the affect aiiay: A uevelopmental
uesciiption. In R. F. Lax, S. Bach, anu }. A. Builanu (Eus.),
R#++!)/,"."-& (pp. 217-2SS). New Yoik: Aionson, 198u.
Pine, F. (1981). In the beginning: Contiibutions to a psychoanalytic
uevelopmental psychology. 5-&"!-#&*)-#$ R"@*"9 )6 ?0%/,)#-#$%0*0, 8,
1S-SS.
Resch, R. C. (1979). Batching in the human infant as the beginning of
sepaiation-inuiviuuation: What it is anu what it looks like. 4,"
?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ 1&('% )6 &," Q,*$', S4, 421-441.
Sanuei, L. W. (1976). Issues in eaily mothei-chilu inteiactions. In E. N.
Rexfoiu, L. W. Sanuei, & T. Shapiio (Eus.), 5-6#-& +0%/,*#&!%F D -"9
0%-&,"0*0 (pp. 127-147). New Baven: Yale 0niveisity Piess.
Settlage, C. F. (1974). Bangei signals in the sepaiation-inuiviuuation
piocess. In B. Beigsma (Eu.), 4," *-6#-& #& !*0;. (Naich of Bimes
National Floiiua Symposium, vol. 1u). unpaginateu
Spitz, R. (19S7). U) #-' %"0F E- &," 8"-"0*0 )6 ,(.#- /)..(-*/#&*)-. New
Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Stein, B. (1971). A micio-analysis of mothei-infant inteiaction. K)(!-#$ )6
&," D."!*/#- D/#'".% )6 Q,*$' ?0%/,*#&!%, 1S, Su1-S17.
Stein, B. (1974). The goal anu stiuctuie of mothei-infant play. K)(!-#$ )6
D."!*/#- D/#'".% )6 Q,*$' ?0%/,*#&!%, 1S, 4u2-421.
Stein, B. (1982). Implications of infancy ieseaich foi clinical theoiy anu
piactice. Papei piesenteu at the 1Sth Annual Naigaiet S. Nahlei
Symposium, Philauelphia.
Winnicott, B. (19S6). Piimaiy mateinal pieoccupation. In Q)$$"/&"' +#+"!0F
4,!)(8, ?"'*#&!*/0 &) ?0%/,):#-#$%0*0 (19S8, pp. Suu-SuS). Lonuon:
Tavistock Publications.
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$''$ 7&#*%&#+- 4,8/.$)*)(8,2, )*9 $%@&/' #&()'2$*,
'.&$#8A '.& %&+2**2*+, $B )* 2*'&+#)'23& )44#$)/.
-&*#4) 4)62>0, 3(./.
2'+"+* +%%-)*, 3(./.
It is a uifficult task to attempt to summaiize anu ciitique 0tto
Keinbeig's psychoanalytic contiibutions, foi he has piesenteu the most
systematic anu wiue-sweeping clinical anu theoietical statements of the last
uecaue, peihaps even since Fieuu. Bis woik touches on many if not most of
the topics that have been of inteiest to contempoiaiy analysts. In auuition,
he has been instiumental in intiouucing many topics to the Ameiican
psychoanalytic community. Even ievieweis who have been shaiply ciitical
of Keinbeig, such as Calef anu Weinshel (1979), have stateu that "no othei
single colleague has been so instiumental in confionting Ameiican
psychoanalysts with Kleinian concepts anu theoiies" (pp. 47u-471). Cleaily,
this is uamning Keinbeig with faint piaise, since much of the Ameiican
psychoanalytic community is in opposition to many aspects of Nelanie
Klein's theoietical contiibutions. Although theie is no question that
Keinbeig has been stiongly influenceu by Kleinian concepts, howevei, theie
is also no question that he is attempting to integiate many uiffeient paits of
what is calleu the Biitish object ielations school, as well as aspects of
Fieuuian thought, ego psychology, anu uiffeient stianus of ieseaich in
neuiophysiology anu physiological psychology. This list is by no means
complete. Keinbeig is stiongly inteiesteu in ieseaich in affect, foi example,
whethei fiom psychoanalysis, physiology, oi acauemic psychology.
uiven that we aie uealing with a theoietical integiation of such laige
piopoitions, one that blenus the familiai anu unfamiliai, it is not suipiising
that a numbei of ciitics have pointeu out vaiious uifficulties in Keinbeig's
theoietical attempts. Befoie we tiy to evaluate Keinbeig's wiitings, it is
impoitant to put oui ciitical stance into an appiopiiate histoiical
peispective. In oui opinion, theie is no psychoanalytic theoiist whose
theoiy woulu stanu up to some of the ciiticism that has been uiiecteu at
Keinbeig. Psychoanalysis has yet to piouuce a full theoiy as uefineu by
philosopheis of science such as Nagel (1961) oi Poppei (1962). Leaving
asiue philosophical conceptions of theoiy, it is cleai to most stuuents of
Fieuu's oi Baitmann's wiitings that many concepts iemain without cleai
uefinition anu aie not well integiateu into a theoietical stiuctuie. If we aie
to evaluate Keinbeig ieasonably, it must be within contempoiaiy
psychoanalytic stanuaius. In auuition, much of contempoiaiy ciiticism in
psychoanalysis is not baseu on eithei logical oi empiiical giounus but
iathei is often simply oi mostly a ieflection of the ciitics' values. We will
attempt to evaluate Keinbeig's contiibutions in teims of both his stateu
aims anu oui view of the state of contempoiaiy psychoanalytic theoiy.
Some of oui views of contempoiaiy theoiy have been stateu elsewheie
(Ellman & Noskowitz, 198u; Noskowitz & Ellman, unpublisheu manusciipt),
but foi this intiouuction we will biiefly iestate them. We believe that in
many of the social sciences it is uifficult to state cleaily how the uiffeient
aspects of a theoiy aie oiganizeu. Thus, at times, it may not be cleai what
aie the cential assumptions of a given theoiy, as opposeu to assumptions oi
statements that aie moie peiipheial. Fiequently, the cooiuinating logic (see
Nagel, 1961) of a theoiy is also uncleai, so that it is haiu to know what
assumptions shoulu be combineu to pieuict oi to explain a given event.
Nost often, howevei, the phenomena to be explaineu aie ielatively cleai anu
aie at least somewhat sepaiateu fiom the theoiy itself. Psychoanalytic
theoiy shaies some of these uifficulties, anu it is not cleai at times what
phenomena some psychoanalytic theoiies aie auuiessing.
Foitunately, Keinbeig usually inuicates cleaily what phenomena he is
tiying to explain. In oui uiscussion, we will initially intiouuce the clinical
phenomena that have been the main impetus foi Keinbeig's theoiizing, anu
fiom that point on will go back anu foith between Keinbeig's theoiizing anu
the clinical phenomena oi obseivations he wishes to explain. It will be cleai
as we pioceeu that the obseivations anu the theoiy become moie anu moie
inteitwineu. Neveitheless, we think that Keinbeig is attempting to explain
impoitant clinical phenomena. In fact, this is a majoi ieason foi his piesent
impoitance in psychoanalysis. We uo not believe that Keinbeig's clinical
obseivations aie simply oi mainly an aitifact of his theoiizing.
It may be haiu to see in the piesent context why it woulu be necessaiy
to mention any of Fieuu's wiitings. Fiom oui point of view, howevei, theie
is a somewhat neglecteu aspect of Fieuu's woik that is paiticulaily geimane
to most object ielations theoiists. (We aie obviously incluuing Keinbeig as
an object ielations theoiist.) This is most cleaily seen in Fieuu's
metapsychological papeis, wheie he fiequently piesents his views on eaily
uevelopment. Ceitainly Fieuu's (191S) view of the uevelopmental phase
that he teimeu the puiifieu pleasuie ego has been incluueu in one foim oi
anothei in the woik of a numbei of contempoiaiy authois (Kohut, 1966,
1971; Nahlei, 1968; Nahlei, Pine, & Beigman, 197S). In these wiitings,
Fieuu ueals with what he teimeu the oiigins of the thiee polaiities of the
minu anu sets the stage foi the uiffeientiation of types of iuentification
piocesses. That is, Fieuu (1914, 1917) began to conceptualize the piocess of
intiojection oi eaily iuentifications with moie specific anu uevelopmentally
latei types of iuentifications. Nelanie Klein, in many ways, expanueu on this
phase of Fieuu's woik, as well as Fieuu's theoiy of instinct
1
as stateu in
G"%)-' &," ?$"#0(!" ?!*-/*+$" (192u). To gieatly oveisimplify Klein's woik,
one may say that she was the fiist psychoanalytic theoiist to attempt to
integiate object ielations anu instinctual points of view. Keinbeig has
cleaily stateu that he is also attempting to unite uiive anu object ielations
points of view. In auuition, he is attempting to stay within a geneial ego
psychological fiamewoik, so that the psychoanalytic conception of uiive
that Keinbeig is utilizing aiises fiom Baitmann's emenuations anu
claiifications of Fieuuian theoiy. Thus, in a latei eia, Keinbeig is attempting
to integiate impoitant aspects of the Biitish object ielations anu ego
psychological points of view. uiven this bioau statement, we shoulu point
out that many uiffeient anu at times uiveigent points of view aie
encompasseu both between anu within these two so-calleu points of view.
Keinbeig is both eclectic anu selective, but he is tiying to utilize the
concepts that he iegaius as essential to each position.
Keinbeig has attempteu to combine at least foui elements fiom eithei
an ego psychological oi object ielations peispective. These aie the
following:
1. 1&!(/&(!". Although Keinbeig has moveu the concepts such as self-
iepiesentation, self-image, anu so foith into a moie cential focus, he has
ietaineu Fieuu's tiipaitite stiuctuie of ego, iu, anu supeiego. As we will see,
with most of these concepts Keinbeig utilizes object ielations theoiizing to
a gieatei extent when uealing with questions of stiuctuialization eaily in
chiluhoou uevelopment anu utilizes the tiipaitite mouel in latei chiluhoou
uevelopment, paiticulaily in the oeuipal peiiou.
2. 7"6"-0". Although uefense is ceitainly a pait of stiuctuie, the concept
of uefense is impoitant enough in Keinbeig's wiitings to waiiant special
notice. By anu laige, what Keinbeig calls low-level uefenses aie those that
have been uiscusseu by object ielation theoiists (such as splitting anu
piojective iuentification), wheieas most of Keinbeig's high-level uefenses
(such as iepiession anu isolation) stem fiom Fieuuian anu ego
psychological theoiists. In Keinbeig's conceptualizations, the main uefenses
utilizeu aie thus an impoitant inuication of the geneial state of an
inuiviuual's psychological stiuctuie.
S. 7"@"$)+."-&. Keinbeig has attempteu to integiate the concept of
object ielations phases (schizoiu, uepiessive phase) with the concept of
psychosexual uevelopment anu Nahlei's (1968; Nahlei, Pine, & Beigman,
197S) uevelopmental finuings. Beie again, one may see the viewpoint of
Nahlei anu object ielations being useu moie extensively in consiueiing
pieoeuipal uevelopment, while Keinbeig utilizes ego psychological concepts
in consiueiing oeuipal uevelopment.
4. 5-0&*-/& )! '!*@". This is a concept that Keinbeig has consistently
maintaineu in his theoiizing. Since some object ielations theoiists, such as
Faiibaiin oi uuntiip, have explicitly iejecteu Fieuu's, Baitmann's, oi Klein's
concept of uiive, Keinbeig is not combining two points of view but iathei
incluuing this aspect of Fieuuian ego psychological theoiizing in his
theoietical fiamewoik. In fact, with iespect to the concept of uiive,
Keinbeig attempts to integiate segments of mouem neuiophysiology anu
neuiopsychology with a psychoanalytic concept of uiive. It shoulu be
pointeu out that Keinbeig's conceptualization of emotion anu affect aie
paiticulaily impoitant in his theoiizing, anu foi Keinbeig (1976, 198uc,
1982h) these concepts to some extent ieplace uiive as a motivational
concept.
The main focus of Keinbeig's theoiizing is the type of patients that the
Biitish school (Balint, 1968; Faiibaiin, 19S2; uuntiip, 1968, 1971;
Winnicott, 196S,197S; anu otheis) has been uesciibing foi the last Su to 4u
yeais. Keinbeig has gioupeu these patients anu maintains that many of
these othei theoiists wiote about people who manifest boiueiline
pathology.
In uesciibing Keinbeig's woik, we will fiist note the clinical
obseivations which Keinbeig's theoiy seeks to explain. Then we will
piesent summaiies of his contiibutions in five aieas: (1) uevelopment; (2)
psychoanalytic classification of chaiactei pathology, incluuing the
boiueiline uiagnosis; (S) tieatment implications, ueiiveu fiom the
uevelopmental theoiy anu uiagnostic system, incluuing the iationale foi
vaiious tieatment iecommenuations as well as Keinbeig's view of
counteitiansfeience anu the theiapeutic stance; (4) gioups anu institutions,
incluuing issues in hospital tieatment; anu (S) a theoiy of uiives anu affects.
Finally, we will comment on Keinbeig's ciitics anu will ouiselves ciitically
ieview what we consiuei to be majoi elements in Keinbeig's contiibutions
to psychoanalytic theoiy.
&6//0!2 -# 9"!$8"!1:& 5-!9
'(+ 4%#*#4)% &82+6")'#&*2
Keinbeig's clinical obseivation of "boiueiline auults" has been one of
the factois that has leu him to expanu "tiauitional" psychoanalytic theoiy.
Be obseives that this type of peison can often maintain iapiuly fluctuating,
contiauictoiy ego states. These ego states can be manifesteu as iapiuly
changing, intense tiansfeience ieactions (fiom iuealization anu love to
intense hatieu anu iage) anu can also be seen in initial clinical contacts.
Keinbeig (1967, 197Sa, 198uc) has infeiieu that these contiauictoiy ego
states aie actively sepaiateu oi split anu that a peison who shows splitting
cannot ieconcile these contiauictoiy states. In fact, if someone else points
out the peison's contiauictoiy attituues, states, oi actions, the peison woulu
always manifest anxiety. A peison's ieaction to such an inteivention is an
impoitant uiagnostic inuicatoi to Keinbeig (1976, 1981f).
Keinbeig feels that when analysts anu theiapists uo not iecognize that
splitting is taking place they may fail to unueistanu what is happening in a
theiapeutic situation. Be notes a tenuency foi alteinating tiansfeience
states to iemain static when theiapy is vieweu ovei a long peiiou of time.
The analyst sometimes takes one of the positive states to be the
manifestation of a goou woiking alliance oi, alteinately, might feel that a
patient's iageful attacks may iepiesent an impoitant bieakthiough, in
which the patient may become awaie of anu begin to unueistanu these
"piimitive impulses." Keinbeig believes that often no intiapsychic change is
taking place. Insteau, the patient simply alteinates piesentation of these
states. 0ften, the patient uses the toleiant atmospheie of theiapy to ueiive
gieatei giatification of (in paiticulai) his oi hei aggiessive impulses than
woulu be alloweu elsewheie. 0i, as in the Nenningei stuuy of the effects of
suppoitive psychotheiapy (wheie theie was little tiansfeience
inteipietation, anu signs of latent negative tiansfeience, especially, weie
unacknowleugeu), the patient-theiapist ielationship is shallow oi
mechanical (Keinbeig et al, 1972).
Keinbeig points out that accoiuing to tiauitional obseivations of this
patient population (Feuein, 1947; Fiosch, 196u; Knight, 19S4; Schmiuebeig,
1947; Zetzel, 1971) they tenu to lose the ability to test ieality auequately in
the context of the psychotheiapy (tiansfeience psychoses), to act out
seveiely, anu to consciously expeiience piimaiy piocess mateiial while
appaiently lacking a capacity foi intiospection anu insight.
The piimitive, eaily ieactions of boiueiline patients to theii theiapists
seem to be not only pieoeuipal in content, but also less oiganizeu than
neuiotic tiansfeience. Keinbeig (1976) concluues that the woik of vaiious
object ielations theoiists (Klein, Faiibaiin, uuntiip, etc.) uesciibeu these
ieactions most accuiately as iecieations of eaily actual oi fantasieu object
ielationshipsas "the pathologically fixeu iemnants of the noimal
piocesses of eaily intiojection" (p. 2S).
These obseivations anu conclusions leu Keinbeig to piopose both a
uevelopmental mouel to account foi boiueiline pathology anu technical
innovations foi the psychotheiapy of boiueiline conuitions.
'(+ /+"+%&3-+*')% -&/+%
Keinbeig's (1966, 197Sa, 1976) uevelopmental mouel is oiganizeu
aiounu the inteinalization of object ielationships, a piocess he takes to be
ciucial in the foimation of psychic stiuctuies. Be posits thiee types of
inteinalization oi, in his teims, thiee uiffeient iuentification systems. Each
piocess iesults in a psychic stiuctuie, which is nameu accoiuingly
(intiojects, iuentifications, anu ego iuentity). Thus, the piocess of
intiojection iesults in an intioject, anu so foith. As Keinbeig (1976)
uesciibeu it: "All piocesses of inteinalization consist of thiee basic
components: (a) object-images oi object-iepiesentations; (b) self-images oi
self-iepiesentations; anu (c) uiive ueiivatives oi uispositions to specific
affective states" (p. 26). Psychic oiganization takes place at two levels. In the
eailiei anu moie basic oiganization, splitting is the main uefense
mechanism; uuiing these peiious, self-object-affect (S-0-A) units with
opposite affective tones aie unintegiateu, eithei as a passive consequence of
lack of matuiity oi as active piocess (splitting). In the moie auvanceu level
of oiganization, iepiession is the main uefense utilizeu. Ego anu supeiego
uevelopment anu integiation can be assesseu by the uegiee to which
iepiession anu its associateu highei-level uefenses have succeeueu the
moie piimitive conuition (Keinbeig, 1976).
Keinbeig follows Nelanie Klein (1946) in taking intiojection to play an
impoitant iole in the eaily uevelopment of the ego. Bowevei, he suggests
that it is a mechanism baseu on piimaiy autonomous functions of
peiception anu memoiy, iejecting Klein's views of the impoitance of veiy
eaily oial incoipoiative 6#-&#0*"0. We will, at a latei point, uesciibe
Keinbeig's moie uetaileu account of the ielationship between his mouel anu
finuings in cognition, peiception, anu neuiophysiological piocesses.
Keinbeig (1976) uefines intiojection as "the iepiouuction anu fixation
of an inteiaction with the enviionment by means of an oiganizeu clustei of
memoiy tiaces" (p. 29) with the S-0-A components. Foi him those
components aie "(i) the image of an object, (ii) the image of the self in
inteiaction with the object, anu (iii) the affective coloiing of both the object-
image anu the self-image unuei the influence of the uiive iepiesentative
piesent at the time of the inteiaction" (p. 29). Intiojection goes beyonu the
piimaiy appaiatuses because it entails complex oiganization of the iesults
of peiception anu of memoiy tiaces, in which peiception of the exteinal
woilu is linkeu to peiception of subjective expeiience. Although the eailiest
intiojections uo not cleaily uiffeientiate self anu object images, a uyauic
element is piesent.
The affective tone of the intiojection is impoitant because the vaiious S-
0-A intiojections aie giauually soiteu anu oiganizeu by affective valence.
Keinbeig (1976) wiites "Intiojections taking place unuei the +)0*&*@"
@#$"-/" of libiuinal instinctual giatification, as in loving mothei-chilu
contact, tenu to fuse anu become oiganizeu in what has been fiequently
calleu 'the goou inteinal object.' Intiojections taking place unuei the
-"8#&*@" @#$"-/" of aggiessive uiive ueiivatives tenu to fuse with similai
negative valence intiojections anu become oiganizeu in 'the bau inteinal
objects" (p. Su).
Keinbeig sees affect in the fiist months of life as paiticulaily impoitant.
Its "iiiauiating" effect on intiojects (which may incluue peiceiveu self anu
object iepiesentations) is such that the iesulting peiceptual constellations
uiffei most accoiuing to theii associateu affective states. Affect states, then,
aie the mannei in which intiojects of opposite valence aie kept apait, since
the immatuie psyche is unable to integiate uiffeient tempoial expeiiences
anu opposite affective expeiiences.
Although Keinbeig stiesses the impoitance of affect in builuing up
sepaiateu S-0-A units, his account of uevelopmental stages paiallels that of
Nahlei (1968; Nahlei, Pine, & Beigman, 197S). Bis stages may be
summaiizeu as follows:
1&#8" V. This is the stage of noimal autism, oi piimaiy unuiffeientiation
in the fiist month of life, befoie the "goou," combineu selfobject
constellation uevelops thiough positive expeiiences. Pathology at this stage
woulu mean that this unuiffeientiateu image woulu not uevelop, anu a
noimal symbiotic ielationship with the mothei woulu not take place, being
ieplaceu by autistic psychosis.
1&#8" W. This stage, noimal "symbiosis," fiom the thiiu oi fouith to the
sixth oi ninth month, consists of the consoliuation of an unuiffeientiateu,
"goou" self-object iepiesentation, anu coiiesponus to the peiious of
Nahlei's symbiotic phase anu uiffeientiation subphase. Even when self- anu
object images begin to be sepaiateu-still within the umbiella of libiuinally
oiganizeu S-0-A units-they aie weakly uelineateu, anu, Keinbeig (1976)
says, theie is a "peisisting tenuency foi uefensive iegiessive iefusion of
'goou' self anu object images when seveie tiauma oi fiustiation ueteimine
pathological uevelopment of this stage" (p. 6u). Fixation at, oi iegiession to,
this self-object ueuiffeientiation anu loss of ego bounuaiies is typical of
chiluhoou symbiotic psychosis (Nahlei, 1968), most types of auult
schizophienia (}acobson, 19S4), anu uepiessive psychoses (}acobson,
1966).
1&#8" Z. In this stage, self- anu object iepiesentations aie cleaily
uiffeientiateu, within both the coie "goou" self-object anu coie "bau" self-
object. Self-images fiom one positively expeiienceu S-0-A unit aie linkeu
with those fiom othei positively valenceu S-0-A units, with paiallel joining
of object iepiesentations. With the incieasing complexity of the iesulting
iepiesentations, this piocess "contiibutes to the uiffeientiation of self anu
othei anu to uefinition of ego bounuaiies" (Keinbeig, 1976, p. Su). This
stage coiiesponus to Nahlei's sepaiation-inuiviuuation phase (excluuing
the uiffeientiation subphase), anu lasts fiom 6 to 9 months of age thiough
18 to S6 months. 0bject constancy (Baitmann, 1964) anu stable ego
bounuaiies shoulu be achieveu, but ielationships aie still with pait objects.
Integiation of self- anu object iepiesentations occuis only at the close of
this stage. Keinbeig follows Nahlei in suggesting that boiueiline pathology
follows fiom fixation anuoi iegiession to this phase of inteinalizeu object
ielationships.
This is the stage in which active sepaiation (the uefense of splitting)
between goou self-images anu bau self-images anu between goou object anu
bau object images occuis. In patients with boiueiline pathology, the
combineu S-0-A units of opposing valence peisist in an unintegiateu
fashion, anu aie not ieplaceu oi accompanieu by highei-level uevelopments.
Keinbeig (1976) maintains that when opposing S-0-A units aie initially
intiojecteu, they aie kept apait to avoiu the anxiety associateu with the
negative valences "fiom being geneializeu thioughout the ego," anu to
"piotect the integiation of positive intiojections into a positive ego coie" (p.
S6). Bowevei, uefensive splitting iepiesents a latei uevelopment, in which
the opposing S-0-A units aie actively sepaiateu.
Keinbeig suggests that the ego comes into being at the point when
intiojections aie useu uefensively. This is a state in which the "goou inteinal
objects" (mostly unuiffeientiateu self- anu object iepiesentations with a
positive valence) along with the "goou exteinal objects" (positively
expeiienceu aspects of ieality), foim the puiifieu pleasuie ego, while the
negative S-0-A units aie vieweu as outsiue. "uoou" self-images anu "goou"
object images begin to be sepaiateu. Slightly latei, all these "units" become
moie elaboiate, anu the uiffeientiation between "goou inteinal objects" anu
"goou exteinal objects" occuis. Now the uefense of piojection can be utilizeu
acioss a ielatively cleai bounuaiy, so that the aiiay of "bau exteinal objects"
incluues some that aie "bau" via piojection of intiojections that hau a
negative valence. This cleai utilization of piojection is an impoitant
uevelopment of Stage S. Coiiesponuingly, the uefensive use of active
splitting uecieases ovei time, anu the inuiviuual successfully tiaveises to
Stage 4.
Although we have been focusing on the builuing up of S-0-A units anu
the unfoluing of uefensive piocesses, the seconu inteinalization piocess,
iuentification, also begins to be useu in Stage S. This is a highei-level foim of
intiojection, which incluues the iole aspects of the inteipeisonal
inteiactions anu hence iequiies some uevelopment of peiceptual anu
cognitive abilities so that socially iecognizeu functions can be
conceptualizeu by the chilu (Keinbeig, 1976, p. S1). The affective
components of such inteinalizations aie also moie auvanceu anu
uiffeientiateu than those associateu with intiojections. The view of the self
is likewise moie uiffeientiateu, so that it is possible to view the object taking
a iole with iespect to the self. Iuentifications, like intiojection, contiibute to
the foimation of psychic stiuctuie anu yet may also be useu foi uefensive
puiposes. Iuentification continues as a piocess thioughout life at uiffeient
levels of ego integiation, anu its iesults aie moie subtle anu bettei
integiateu when the ego is moie integiateu anu splitting mechanisms aie
not useu (Keinbeig, 1976, p. 77). In psychotic iuentifications, wheie self-
anu object images aie pathologically iefuseu,
2
iuentifications aie uistoiteu
by the piojection of piimitive supeiego foieiunneis oi iepiesseu uiive
ueiivatives onto the object, so that the inteinalizeu object ielation is alteieu
in the uiiection of "all goou" oi "all bau" intiojections. When pathological
iuentifications occui at a moie integiateu level, they iesult in pathological
chaiactei tiaits.
1&#8" [. In Stage 4, contiauictoiy self- anu othei iepiesentations aie
integiateu into peicepts of the self anu otheis that moie accuiately ieflect
complex expeiiences of the self anu othei peisons. Failuie to achieve this
integiation iesults in "iuentity uiffusion." In this stage, iepiession appeais
as a uefense, anu ego, supeiego, anu iu aie also uiffeientiateu. This peiiou
begins towaiu the enu of the thiiu yeai of life anu continues thiough the
oeuipal peiiou. Pathology fiom this stage is that of patients with neuioses oi
"highei-level" chaiactei pathology (hysteiical, obsessive-compulsive, anu
uepiessive-masochistic chaiacteis).
Naicissistic peisonality uisoiueis may also iesult fiom abnoimal
uevelopment uuiing this stage, when insteau of integiation of self anu
object, theie is, in Keinbeig's (1976) woius, "(1) a pathological
conuensation of ieal self, iueal self, anu iueal object stiuctuies; (2)
iepiession anuoi uissociation of 'bau' self-iepiesentations; (S) geneializeu
uevaluation of object iepiesentations; anu (4) bluiiing of noimal ego-
supeiego bounuaiies" (p. 68; see also Keinbeig, 1982f). This iesults in a
gianuiose self, which is sepaiateu fiom negatively valenceu S-0-A
expeiiences in a splitting piocess moie typical of Stage S.
Keinbeig inteipiets Stage 4 as iepiesenting the achievement of what
Klein (1948a,b) teimeu the "uepiessive position," in which, because of the
new, moie complex view of otheis as the objects of both hatieu anu love,
both guilt anu concein begin to appeai. Repiesentations of an iueal self anu
iueal object uevelop as wishes to counteiact the incieasingly accuiate
awaieness of ieality. Repiession, which pievents the iiiuption into
consciousness of vaiious uiive ueiivatives, sepaiates iu fiom ego uuiing this
stage, anu the iu becomes moie oiganizeu. Bence, in neuiotic oi othei
highei-level psychopathology, one uoes not ieauily see piimaiy piocess oi
uiiect expiession of uiives.
Integiation of the supeiego as an inuepenuent intiapsychic stiuctuie
takes place in Stage 4. This has two aspects: the conuensation of iueal self-
anu object images into the basis of the ego iueal, anu the integiation of this
with the sauistically ueteimineu supeiego foieiunneis. These supeiego
foieiunneis aie what Keinbeig (1976) teims the "fantastically hostile,
highly uniealistic object images ieflecting 'expelleu,' piojecteu anu
ieintiojecteu 'bau' self-object iepiesentations.anu ieflecting piimitive
effoits of the infant to piotect the goou ielationship with the iuealizeu
mothei by tuining the aggiessively investeu images of hei (fuseu with the
iespective self-images) against himself" (p. 71). With integiation come
uecieases in piojection anu in the fantastically hostile anu unieal natuie of
the supeiego elements.
Ego iuentity, the thiiu piocess in the inteinalization of object ielations,
begins to occui in Stage 4. Ego iuentity is "the oveiall oiganization of
iuentifications anu intiojections unuei the guiuing piinciple of the synthetic
function of the ego" (Keinbeig, 1976, p. 72). This iefeis to the oiganization
of a self-concept anu of ueepei, moie iealistic concepts of otheis.
1&#8" \. Consoliuation of supeiego anu ego integiation takes place in
Stage S, anu ego iuentity continues to evolve. The inuiviuual is able to leain
fiom expeiience, anu "an integiateu self, a stable woilu of integiateu,
inteinalizeu object iepiesentations, anu a iealistic self-knowleuge ieinfoice
one anothei^ (Keinbeig, 1976, p. 7S). Repiesentations of a social anu
cultuial woilu aie incluueu. The inteinal woilu gives incieasing meaning to
piesent inteiactions anu pioviues suppoit foi the inuiviuual in times of
ciisis. The inuiviuual has the capacity to uisciiminate subtle aspects of him-
oi heiself anu of otheis anu uevelops "uepeisonifieu" attituues anu values
with incieasing capacity to communicate views anu expeiiences in a way
that otheis can unueistanu. These capacities aie absent in pathological
conuitions oiganizeu at eailiei stages; the most stiiking example is the
naicissistic peisonality, who cannot convey moie than a shallow sense of
who he oi she is oi who the othei is in an inteiaction (Keinbeig, 1976, p.
7S). Although intimate connections among uiives, affects, object ielations,
anu cognitive anu othei ego functions aie implieu thioughout Keinbeig's
mouel, these foim a paiticulaily complex anu uense matiix in the successful
outcome of Stage Sthe healthy peisonality.
()" .&2%)-0$0,2(4% %,0&&4#4%0(4-$ -# %)0!0%("!
.0()-,-12
Keinbeig's (198ua) mouel of psychopathology is piimaiily a conflict
mouel; constitutional ueficits may contiibute to the intensity of ceitain
conflicts anu hence ienuei the uevelopment of pathological ego stiuctuies
oi chaiactei tiaits moie likely. Foi example, an infant constitutionally
enuoweu with an intense aggiessive uiive may pioject moie aggiessively
tingeu S-0-A units onto exteinal figuies anu may uevelop pathologically
intense feais of castiation uiiecteu at abnoimal images of uangeious
paients (Keinbeig, 197Sa). 0i, chiluien with oiganically baseu peiceptual
oi othei leaining pioblems may have intiojections anu iuentifications
uistoiteu by theii faulty appaiatuses of piimaiy autonomy. Bowevei, when
consiueiing auolescent anu auult patients, Keinbeig's position is that
chaiactei pathology is best unueistoou anu inteipieteu as the iesult of
uynamic conflicts. Even if a leaining uisability is piesent in a boiueiline
patient, only aftei consiueiable tieatment can its effect be uiffeientiateu
fiom the iesults of pathological splitting anu associateu piimitive uefenses
(Keinbeig, peisonal communication).
%+"+%2 &5 4()6)4'+6 3)'(&%&70
The uevelopmental mouel pieviously outlineu is the basis foi a highly
specific classification of highei-level, inteimeuiate, anu lowei-level
(boiueiline) chaiactei pathology. This classification is baseu on
ueteimining the level of instinctual uevelopment, supeiego uevelopment,
uefensive opeiations, anu inteinalizeu object ielations (Keinbeig, 1976).
Keinbeig (198u,1981c) has been a vocal ciitic of the BSN-III (Ameiican
Psychiatiic Association, 198u) categoiization of peisonality uisoiueis,
because it fails to consiuei these psychoanalytic peispectives anu theieby
omits ceitain impoitant uiagnostic entities. In Keinbeig's system, highei-
level chaiactei pathology is maikeu by the achievement of genital piimacy
in the instinctual spheie; a well-integiateu but excessively seveie supeiego;
uefense mechanisms oiganizeu aiounu iepiession (incluuing
intellectualization, iationalization, unuoing, anu highei foims of piojection);
anu a stable, well-integiateu concept of self anu otheis. Nost hysteiical,
obsessive-compulsive, anu uepiessive-masochistic peisonalities aie in this
gioupthe classical neuiotic patients.
At the inteimeuiate level, piegenital fixation points aie piesent, the
supeiego is less well integiateu than in highei-level pathology, anu sauistic
supeiego piecuisois play an impoitant iole. Befenses aie oiganizeu aiounu
iepiession, but some moie piimitive uefenses aie piesent, with moie
infiltiation of instinctual impulses than is piesent in the moie sublimatoiy
oi ieactive tiaits chaiacteiistic of highei-level pathology. Ego iuentity is
establisheu, anu theie is a stable concept of self anu otheis, but object
ielations aie quite conflicteu. Nany oial, passive-aggiessive,
sauomasochistic, anu bettei-functioning infantile peisonalities anu some
naicissistic peisonalities aie at this level.
Lowei-level chaiactei pathology is chaiacteiizeu by boiueiline
peisonality oiganization with, in the instinctual iealm, "pathological
conuensation of genital anu piegenital instinctual stiivings.with a
pieuominance of piegenital aggiession" (Keinbeig, 1976, p. 141). Lack of
supeiego integiation anu the continuing influence of sauistic supeiego
foieiunneis aie moie maikeu than in the inteimeuiate gioup. Befenses aie
oiganizeu aiounu splitting, with piimitive foims of piojection, uenial, anu
othei mechanisms, which allow paitial expiession of the iejecteu impulse to
a gieatei uegiee than in the othei levels of pathology. 0bject constancy is
not fiimly establisheu, iuentity uiffusion is piesent, anu object ielationships
aie conceptualizeu in teims of pait objects.
'(+ 8&6/+6%#*+ 4&*4+3'
Keinbeig is one of a veiy small numbei of investigatois who have
actually given a uetaileu uefinition of the teim "boiueiline peisonality." Be
pioviues a uesciiption of the intiapsychic stiuctuies anu othei concepts he
consiueis ielevant to this uiagnosis along with a sophisticateu
phenomenological uesciiption of the patients. Keinbeig piefeis the teim
"boiueiline peisonality oiganization" to "boiueiline state" oi "boiueiline
peisonality uisoiuei," unueilining his belief that such patients have a
specific anu stable peisonality oiganization chaiacteiizeu by ego pathology,
which uiffeis fiom neuioses anu less seveie chaiactei uisoiueis on the one
hanu, anu the psychoses on the othei. These patients suffei fiom a
paiticulai type of psychic oiganization, which has a ceitain type of histoiy
anu iesistance to iapiu change. They aie not in a tiansitoiy "state,"
fluctuating between neuiosis anu psychosis, noi aie they uefineu solely by
theii obvious symptoms, as in psychiatiic use of the teim "uisoiuei."
Keinbeig (1967, 197Sa) stiesses that similai symptomatology may occui as
a iesult of uiffeient intiapsychic configuiations anu conflicts, so that veiy
uetaileu uiagnostic stuuy is necessaiy.
Keinbeig's uelineations of boiueiline anu naicissistic patient gioups
iely on uesciiption of symptoms anu complaints piesenteu by these
patients, but also, just as impoitant, on infeiences about types of psychic
stiuctuie, uefenses, anu pieuominant conflicts. In his concein with
"inteinalizeu object ielations," he has uevoteu consiueiable woik to
explicating the methou by which one makes infeiences about this anu othei
hypothetical constiucts, such as uefenses oi stiuctuies, on the basis of a
patient's inteiview behavioi, foi example.
0n a uesciiptive level, patients suffeiing fiom boiueiline peisonality
oiganization piesent symptoms that, if occuiiing in combination, suggest
pathological ego stiuctuie: chionic, uiffuse anxiety; poly-symptomatic
neuioses (seveie phobias, iationalizeu obsessive-compulsive symptoms,
multiple, elaboiate, oi bizaiie conveision symptoms, uissociative ieactions,
hypochonuiiasis with chionic iituals anu withuiawal, anu paianoiu tienus
with othei symptoms); polymoiphous peiveise sexual tienus; impulse
neuiosis; anu auuictions (Keinbeig, 197Sa). Ceitain lowei-level chaiactei
uisoiueis (infantile, naicissistic, antisocial, anu "as-if" peisonalities) anu
paianoiu, schizoiu, hypomanic, oi cyclothymic peisonalities also usually
have boiueiline stiuctuie.
Infeiences about the patient's psychological oiganization aie baseu on
othei obseivations. "Nonspecific manifestations of ego weakness" aie noteu
by assessing lack of anxiety toleiance, as when auuitional anxiety iesults in
fuithei symptom foimation oi iegiessive behavioi; lack of impulse contiol,
wheie any inciease in anxiety oi uiive piessuie iesults in unpieuictable
impulsivity; the lack of uevelopeu sublimatoiy channels (heie the patient's
talents anu oppoitunities must be consiueieu). A seconu sign is the
appeaiance of piimaiy piocess thinking, paiticulaily in unstiuctuieu
situations such as piojective psychological testing (Caii, uolustein, Bunt, &
Keinbeig, 1979; Keinbeig, 197Sa). The piesence of the piimitive uefensive
opeiations of splitting, piojective iuentification, uenial, piimitive
iuealization, anu uevaluation aie impoitant signs of boiueiline pathology.
These may iequiie subtle infeiences fiom inteiview behavioi oi
inteiactions with the inteiviewei ovei a peiiou of time to establish theii
piesence.


'(+ 2'614'16)% #*'+6"#+<
Asiue fiom the piesumptive uiagnostic elements that may be inuicateu
by a patient's histoiy oi piesenting complaints, eviuence foi stiuctuial
oiganization is founu in the patient's ieactions to being inteivieweu in a
way that focuses on the ego functions anu featuies chaiacteiizing neuiotic,
boiueiline, anu psychotic stiuctuies (Keinbeig, 1981f).
In paiticulai, the inteiviewei wishes to unueistanu (1) the uegiee of
iuentity integiation, (2) types of uefenses, anu (S) the capacity to test
ieality, incluuing the subtle ability to "evaluate the self anu otheis
iealistically anu in uepth" (Keinbeig, 1981f, p. 171). Boiueiline uisoiueis
may be uiffeientiateu fiom psychoses by the boiueiline patient's ability to
test ieality in the sense that uistinctions between inteinal anu exteinal anu
self anu object iepiesentations iemain. In contiast to neuiotic patients,
howevei, peisons with boiueiline stiuctuie will show iuentity uiffusion,
lowei-level uefenses similai to those useu by psychotic patients, anu subtle
alteiations in the ielationship to ieality anu feelings of ieality. Because theii
capacity to appieciate oiuinaiy social ieality is intact, howevei, anu because
theii uefenses piotect against the anxiety of intiapsychic conflict (iathei
than the anxiety of ueuiffeientiation, as in the psychoses), they iesponu to
inteipietations in the inteiview with bettei functioning oi, at least, without
iegiession.
Thus, the inteiviewei seeks to assess the patient's view of his oi hei
pioblems, unueistanuing of self anu otheis, anu ability to make use of the
inteiviewei's questions anu tentative inteipietations. The inteiviewei
focuses on aieas that seem ouu, contiauictoiy, oi uncleai to see if the
patient can also obseive such contiauictions anu appieciate the possible
explanations foi these offeieu by the inteiviewei.
The "pathology of inteinalizeu object ielationships," which contiibutes
to the boiueiline uiagnosis, also ielies on complex infeiences fiom
chaiactei tiaits anu the patient's behavioi with the inteiviewei. Keinbeig
(1976) states: "These patients have little capacity foi a iealistic evaluation
of otheis anu foi iealistic empathy with otheis; they expeiience othei
people as uistant objects, to whom they auapt 'iealistically' only as long as
theie is no emotional involvement with them" (pp. S6-S7). They uo not
empathize well with otheis, anu aie "ignoiant of the highei, moie matuie
anu uiffeientiateu aspects of othei people's peisonalities" (p. S7). Bence
theii ielationships aie shallow, they aie unable to expeiience guilt anu
concein, anu they give eviuence of exploitiveness anu unieasonable
uemanus without signs of tact oi consiueiation. In tiying to contiol his oi
hei enviionment, the patient manipulates otheis. When they begin
psychotheiapy, these patients immeuiately piesent chaotic anu piimitive
object ielations in the tiansfeience, as opposeu to the giauual unfoluing of
moie matuie anu then less matuie tiansfeiences founu in neuiotic patients
(Keinbeig, 1976).
23+4#)% /#)7*&2'#4 #221+2
Seveial examples exemplify Keinbeig's contention that similai
symptomatology may stem fiom uiffeient types of unueilying pathology anu
stiuctuie.
3%0&"!*/#$ @"!0(0 5-6#-&*$" ?"!0)-#$*&%. Bysteiical patients, while
showing supeificial similaiities to infantile patients, have some conflict-fiee
aieas wheie theii functioning is stable anu appiopiiate. They aie impulsive
oi clinging only in ceitain ielationships oi aieas of conflict. Theii neeu to be
loveu anu aumiieu, although it has oial, uepenuent components, is closei to
an expiession of genital neeus. 0euipal uynamics contiibute to uiffeiential
ielationships with men anu women, anu the piovocativeness of these
patients is usually not accompanieu by piomiscuity. Stable, if neuiotic,
heteiosexual ielationships aie piesent.
In contiast, infantile patients aie moie socially inappiopiiate anu
impulsive acioss all aieas of life. 0ial, uemanuing elements aie moie
piominent, so that the neeu to be loveu is "moie helpless" in quality, anu
exhibitionistic tienus have a piimitive, naicissistic, exploitive quality.
Piomiscuity may be piesent in conjunction with unstable, changing
ielationships (Keinbeig, 197Sa). Such patients fiequently aie oiganizeu at a
boiueiline level (Keinbeig, 1981c).
7"+!"00*)-. Keinbeig stiesses the impoitance of uiffeientiating
uepiession as a symptom fiom uepiessive-masochistic chaiactei tiaits. The
highei-level uepiessive peisonality, foi example, may expeiience
uepiession in connection with guilt ovei oeuipal stiivings oi with tiue
concein foi the self anu otheis, because of the piesence of supeiego
integiation. Bepiession that iepiesents helpless iage oi uisappointment in
an iueal suggests less supeiego integiation. Seveie uepiession that causes
bieakuown in ego functioning also suggests the piesence of a sauistic
supeiego, piobably associateu with boiueiline oiganization. Bowevei, both
the quantity anu quality of uepiession must be consiueieu when making a
stiuctuial uiagnosis, as the absence of any uepiessive concein oi guilt foi
otheis may also be a sign of boiueiline oiganization in naicissistic anu
antisocial peisonalities (Keinbeig, 197Sa, 1977a).
D')$"0/"-/". The stiesses of iuentity consoliuation in auolescence may,
in conjunction with enviionmental piessuies (such as gang membeiship oi
cultuial noims), suggest the piesence of seveie peisonality uistuibance.
Keinbeig iecommenus assessment of the piesence oi absence of whole-
object ielationships, iueals, anu the capacity foi sublimation anu woik.
Auolescents with boiueiline peisonality stiuctuie will be fai less able to
uesciibe themselves oi theii fiienus in uepth anu uo not show eviuence that
they can invest themselves in iueals oi goals that have meaning to them
(Keinbeig, 1978, 1979b, 1982e).
G)!'"!$*-" @"!0(0 1/,*T)+,!"-*/ Q)-'*&*)-0. In the absence of cleai signs
of foimal thought uisoiuei, hallucinations, oi uelusions, the piimitive
uefenses piesent in both boiueiline anu schizophienic conuitions seive
uiffeient functions, which can be useu in inteiviewing to make this
uistinction. In patients with boiueiline stiuctuie, these uefenses piotect the
patients fiom the expeiience of ambivalence, anu "a feaieu contamination
anu ueteiioiation of all love ielationships by hatieu" (Keinbeig, 197Sa, p.
179). Schizophienic patients use splitting anu allieu mechanisms to pievent
"total loss of ego bounuaiies anu uieaueu fusion expeiiences with otheis"
(p. 179), paiticulaily unuei the stiess of stiong affects. This is because
peisons with psychotic stiuctuie uo not have cleaily uiffeientiateu self- anu
object images. Since piimitive uefense mechanisms cause ego weakness in
patients with boiueiline stiuctuie, inteipietations shoulu stiengthen the
ego anu leau to bettei functioning in the inteiviewmoie ieflectiveness
anu attempts at integiation anu bettei ieality testing. Inteipietation of the
same piimitive uefenses in schizophienic patients ieveals uifficulty with
self-object uiffeientiation anu hence leaus to iegiessionmoie oveit
piimaiy piocess oi uelusional thought, loosening of associations, oi
paianoiu uistoitions of the inteivieweiin iesponse to the inteipietations
given uuiing the inteiview. Bence, the inteiview shoulu be conuucteu with
inquiiy into iesponses which aie unusual oi subtly inappiopiiate, to test the
patient's uefensive functioning.
Tiansfeience psychosis, which may be piesent in both boiueiline anu
schizophienic conuitions, is uiffeient in each gioup because of the uiffeient
mechanisms involveu. With boiueiline patients, the tiansfeience psychosis
is limiteu to the tieatment houis anu iesponus to Keinbeig's
iecommenuations foi stiuctuiing the tieatment. With psychotic patients,
theii psychotic behavioi anu lack of ieality testing in tieatment is foi a long
time no uiffeient fiom that outsiue the tieatment. Latei on, they may feel
convinceu that they anu the theiapist aie one. This is in contiast to the
tiansfeience psychosis of boiueiline patients, who always maintain some
soit of bounuaiy, even if they feel themselves to be inteichanging aspects of
iuentity with the theiapist (Keinbeig, 197Sa, 198uc).
(!"0(/"$( 4/.,4%0(4-$&
Keinbeig goes into consiueiable uetail in his uiagnostic system because
he believes that boiueiline stiuctuie, as well as ceitain othei
chaiacteiological featuies of uiagnosis, have specific implications foi
tieatment anu piognosis. Foi example, he views uishonesty by the patient
as a paiticulaily unfavoiable piognostic sign, which might leau to a
iecommenuation foi the use of majoi enviionmental suppoits oi othei
mouifications in psychotheiapy (Keinbeig, 197Sa). 0n the othei hanu, he
wains against suppoitive psychotheiapy foi schizoiu patients. Naicissistic
patients with uiffeient types of functioning waiiant uiffeient types of
tieatment.
6+4&--+*/)'#&*2 5&6 3)'#+*' 21876&132
Keinbeig iecommenus expiessive psychoanalytic psychotheiapy,
incoipoiating his mouifications, foi patients with boiueiline peisonality
oiganization, incluuing patients with naicissistic peisonality uisoiuei who
function on an oveit boiueiline level. That is, the pathological selfstiuctuie
in some naicissistic patients is sufficiently stable to allow the patient to
function without the impulsiveness, chaotic ielationships anu geneial
manifestations of ego weakness that chaiacteiize boiueiline functioning.
0theis, especially those who piesent with naicissistic iage, function in a
mannei similai to boiueiline patients (Keinbeig, 197Sa, 198ua,c).
Foi patients with naicissistic peisonality uisoiueis, Keinbeig
iecommenus unmouifieu psychoanalysis if at all possible. Without the
analytic setting, such patients tenu to iemain shallow, empty, anu
uninvesteu in the tieatment anu uo not uevelop veiy meaningful
tiansfeience ieactions. Even if they uo unueitake analysis, howevei, they
may wish to stop the tieatment aftei amelioiation of some of theii moie
painful expeiiences of envy oi uisiuptive impulsiveness, feeling content to
iemain somewhat shallow anu unempathic. At such times, the analyst may
neeu to shift to a paitially suppoitive technique to help the patient maintain
a bettei auaptation by piotecting some of the naicissistic uefenses when
these cannot all be woikeu thiough (Keinbeig, 197Sa, 1979a).
Some cases piesent the following contiainuications foi expiessive
psychotheiapy: (1) inability to woik veibally with symbolic mateiial; (2) a
combination of low motivation anu high seconuaiy gain; (S) seveie negative
theiapeutic ieaction; (4) seveie cases of antisocial peisonality, so that the
theiapist cannot assume the patient will be honest even most of the time;
anu (S) life ciicumstances that pievent the patient fiom the fiequency of
sessions iequiieu foi expiessive tieatment (usually two oi thiee times a
week). These contiainuications can incluue patients fiom acioss the
uiagnostic spectium, although the moie uistuibeu boiueiline, naicissistic,
anu psychotic patients will fall into the fiist foui categoiies moie often. Such
patients shoulu be tieateu with a fiankly suppoitive tieatment, with
iational, conciete tieatment goals. The theiapist shoulu iepiesent a
commonsense point of view, making suggestions, consulting with family
membeis if necessaiy, anu shoulu inteipiet piimitive uefenses anu
conscious negative tiansfeience only in the context of showing how these
cieate uifficulties in the patient's life. Iuealization of the theiapist shoulu be
uiscusseu only if it inteifeies with the woik, foi example, by inhibiting the
patient's questions oi uisagieements. The majoi focus is on cleai life goals.
Theie aie some patients who simply neeu a lifelong suppoitive ielationship,
but this alteinative shoulu be chosen only aftei othei tieatments have been
iuleu out (Keinbeig, 198ue, 1982i, g). Keinbeig (1977b) has also uiscusseu
inuications anu technique foi biief psychotheiapies.
Theie aie two gioups of patients who uo not uo well with suppoitive
tieatment, accoiuing to Keinbeig. These aie well-functioning schizoiu
inuiviuuals, who woulu entei anu leave a suppoitive theiapy untoucheu by
the human inteiaction, anu ceitain naicissistic patients who aie lonely,
isolateu, anu empty. These chaiacteiistics aie unlikely to change without
exploiation in uetail of the piimitive uefenses anu iepiesentations of self
anu otheis that contiibute to the shauowy quality of peisonality conveyeu
by these patients. Patients who cannot expeiience much empathy foi otheis
cannot leain to uo so without the uevelopment of highei-oiuei, moie
complex iepiesentations of self anu otheis inteiacting. Foi these patients
naicissistic patients functioning on a boiueiline level anu most patients
with boiueiline peisonality oiganizationKeinbeig (198ue, 1982u, i, g)
iecommenus his mouifieu, expiessive psychotheiapy.
6)'#&*)%+ 5&6 '+4(*#4)% 6+4&--+*/)'#&*2
Keinbeig pioposes that the mouel of uevelopment anu
psychopathology summaiizeu eailiei explains the behavioi of seveiely
uistuibeu patients in vaiious types of tieatment as well as piocesses in the
tiauitional psychoanalysis of healthiei, neuiotic patients. The stiuctuial
uiffeiences between boiueiline anu neuiotic patients cause them to
iesponu uiffeiently to classical psychoanalytic technique. Neuiotic patients,
who have a well-foimeu tiipaitite stiuctuie, suffei fiom intiapsychic
conflict usually conceptualizeu as conflict among iu, ego, anu supeiego oi
between conflicting, highei-oiuei, ielatively well-integiateu iuentifications
that iepiesent vaiious compiomise solutions to the basic conflicts. Keinbeig
(198ub) lays paiticulai stiess on this last point, insisting that theie is no
impulse-uefense configuiation without an implieu object ielationship
within which these uefenses anu impulses aie expiesseu. Boiueiline
patients have piimitive intiapsychic stiuctuies, which have not been
consoliuateu into the tiipaitite stiuctuie but insteau have vaiious split-off
self-object-affect units, so that these patients have little awaieness that the
loveu anu hateu object is one anu the same. Theii uefenses aie piimitive anu
tenu to weaken, iathei than piotect, the ego; anu the supeiego is close to
being an inteinal peisecutoi, iathei than a uepeisonifieu souice of values
anu self-esteem. Iu mateiial may be conscious.
In the psychoanalysis of neuiotic patients, uefenses aie inteipieteu as
they aie manifesteu as iesistances, with a giauual unfoluing of a iegiessive
tiansfeience neuiosis, which ieveals the conflicts that cieate the patients'
pioblems. Such patients' uefenses may be less than optimally auaptive, but
they uo piotect the ego; hence, theii inteipietation anu unuoing iepiesents
a stiess that only patients with intact ego functions can withstanu. Iu
mateiial becomes available only aftei consiueiable woik, anu impulsive
action is biief. As infantile conflicts aie iesolveu, moie flexible anu efficient
uefenses come into being.
When boiueiline patients aie tieateu with stanuaiu psychoanalytic
technique, the absence of exteinal stiuctuie to suppoit ieality-testing
functions tenus to leau to iapiu emeigence of piimaiy piocess mateiial,
tiansfeience psychosis, oi, at least, intense eaily tiansfeience ieactions
piioi to the uevelopment of any kinu of woiking alliance. Thus, Keinbeig
(1982u, 198S) feels a neeu foi a cleai uistinction between psychoanalysis
piopei anu mouifications of technique that might be teimeu "psychoanalytic
psychotheiapy."
When patients with goou ego stiength aie tieateu with one of the
psychoanalytic psychotheiapies, the iesults aie goou in teims of behavioial
change anu alteiation in chaiactei tiaits (although not chaiactei stiuctuie).
Keinbeig believes this is a uiiect iesult of these patients' gieatei ego
stiength anu capacity to uevelop a ielationship in which they can accept
help. Bowevei, when boiueiline patients aie tieateu with a type of
psychotheiapy that seeks to inteipiet only ceitain uefenses oi to avoiu
inteipietation of the negative tiansfeience, the patients' seveie
psychological pioblems peisist, anu a chionically shallow tieatment
ielationship often uevelops, with acting out elsewheie in the patient's life.
In seveie psychopathologies, in Keinbeig's (198ub) view, "what appeai
to be inappiopiiate, piimitive, chaotic chaiactei tiaits anu inteipeisonal
inteiactions, impulsive behavioi, anu affect stoims aie actually ieflections of
the fantastic eaily object-ielations-ueiiveu stiuctuies that aie the builuing
blocks of the latei tiipaitite system" (p. 187). These aie not ieflections of
actual eaily ielationships, in most cases, but of theii uistoiteu
inteinalization anu continuation in the intiapsychic woilu without
integiation into moie accuiate, complex iepiesentations anu moie matuie
intiapsychic stiuctuies. Ego weakness iesults fiom the peisistence of the
uefenses of splitting anu of piimitive foims of piojection, uenial,
iuealization, anu uevaluation. Thus, pathology is seen as iesulting fiom
conflicts anu uefenses iathei than fiom a ueficit.
Keinbeig believes that the pooi iesults when boiueiline patients aie
tieateu with psychotheiapy aie uue to the inteiaction of theii pathological
stiuctuies with the theiapeutic techniques. Be makes the following
aigument:
1. Since patients with boiueiline pathology suffei fiom ego weakness as
a iesult of theii piimitive uefenses, systematic inteipietation of uefenses is
inuicateu to stiengthen the ego. Inteipietation of uefenses will not leau to
iegiession, but will aiu the patient's capacity to obseive anu begin to
integiate the uefensively split S-0-A units.
2. Emphasis on ueveloping a positive tiansfeience oi pioviuing the
patient with a benign mouel foi iuentification uoes not accomplish its goal
with seiiously uistuibeu patients. Boiueiline patients typically piesent
stiong negative, often paianoiu, tiansfeiences at some point in the
tieatment as the negatively expeiienceu S-0-A units aie activateu in the
theiapeutic ielationship. Noie often than not, they will be unable to iuentify
with the theiapist's healthy ego without some inteipietation anu iesolution
of theii negative tiansfeiences. Without this, oi with avoiuance of negative
tiansfeience mateiial, the theiapist-patient uyau may simply come to be a
ieenactment of one of the positively expeiienceu S-0-A units, while othei
paits of the patient's peisonality aie expiesseu outsiue the tieatment. The
tieatment is ienueieu shallow anu meaningless anu has little effect on the
patient's life.
S. Inteiventions that woulu giatify some of the patient's tiansfeience
uemanus, maue with the iuea of lessening piessuie on the weak ego, fail to
help the patient, but iathei tenu to suppoit the enactment of one siue of the
patient's conflicts as a uefense against a peiception of the theiapist as evil oi
uevalueu. Bence, such inteiventions contiibute to the patient's uistoitions
of the tieatment situation. With healthiei patients, giatification of
tiansfeience wishes is likely to have a moie benign effect, as the patient's
capacity to use what is goou anu to iuentify with a goou paiental figuie is
not so uistoiteu (Keinbeig, 198ub, p. 194).
4. Since boiueiline patients piesent conscious conflicts that may involve
piimitive uiive content, effoits to avoiu "ueep" mateiial aie misguiueu. The
theiapist's avoiuance of impulses that aie conscious anu tioubling to the
patient woulu tenu to ieinfoice the patient's feai of these impulses anu
tenuency to expiess them outsiue the tieatment.
Keinbeig theiefoie iecommenus a mouifieu foim of expiessive
psychotheiapy, not psychoanalysis piopei, foi most boiueiline patients.
Keinbeig's suggestions may be summaiizeu as follows:
5-&"!+!"&#&*)-. Inteipietation anu claiification, iathei than suggestion
anu manipulation, aie the majoi technical tools to be useu. veiy often,
howevei, the patient's inteipietation of the inteipietations oi othei
iemaiks must be exploieu, anu this may often iequiie the theiapist to
claiify what he oi she meant, as opposeu to the patient's uistoiteu
peiception of what was saiu. Keinbeig (198ub, p. 196; 1982g) believes that
with these patients, such claiifications will be moie fiequent than
inteipietations, theieby giving a uiffeient emphasis to the tieatment.
S#*-&"-#-/" )6 4"/,-*/#$ U"(&!#$*&%. To be able to use inteipietation,
suggestion anu manipulation aie contiainuicateu, anu technical neutiality
shoulu be maintaineu as fai as possible. Bowevei, seveiely uistuibeu
patients aie often unable to obseive the inappiopiiateness of theii behavioi
(foi example, iepeateu veibal attacks on the theiapist) oi may act in such a
way as to enuangei theii lives oi the tieatment. It may be necessaiy to
stiuctuie the tieatment oi the patient's life. Foi example, one might foibiu
shouting at the theiapist, beyonu a ceitain point, in a patient who uoes not
seem to be able to ieflect in any way on the meaning of this behavioi anu
who, on the contiaiy, expeiiences some uiive uischaige anu then seems
unconceineu about this aggiession. Limiting this behavioi woulu tenu to
make the patient anxious anu might auvance the tieatment. 0i patients may
be askeu to live in a halfway house oi to meet with anothei piofessional
who woulu monitoi the patient's activities anu give auvice, fieeing the
theiapist fiom the neeu to "take ovei" in this way so that an inteipietive
appioach coulu still be maintaineu. These inteiventions woulu be
intiouuceu, iueally, as paiameteis (Eisslei, 19SS), giauually eliminateu, anu
theii effect inteipieteu as the theiapist seeks to ietuin to a position of
technical neutiality. Less uiamatic ueviations will occui in eveiy session,
when the theiapist has to claiify the patient's uistoitions of ieality anu, in so
uoing, momentaiily takes ovei an ego function anu moves away fiom a
neutial position.
4!#-06"!"-/" D-#$%0*0. Tiansfeience analysis will be paitial because of
the neeu foi simultaneous consiueiation of the patient's life situation anu
tieatment goals. In auuition, genetic ieconstiuctions aie possible only veiy
late in the tieatment, if at all; eailiei tiansfeience inteipietations shoulu
have a hypothetical quality ("You aie acting as if you feel I am a ciuel fathei
figuie whom you anxiously neeu to placate"), to avoiu piematuie
assumptions about the ieality of the patient's chiluhoou expeiience. This is
necessaiy to ueal with the many shifting anu fantastic S-0-A units activateu
in the tiansfeience, not all of which will iepiesent actual paient-chilu
inteiactions. This inteifeies with actual ieconstiuction; howevei, ovei the
couise of tieatment, as these stiuctuies become moie integiateu, pait-
object ielations anu pait-object tiansfeiences shoulu be tiansfoimeu into
moie matuie ielationships anu tiansfeiences.
Keinbeig suggests a face-to-face theiapy that auheies as closely as
possible to classical analytic technique, within the constiaints imposeu by
the uiffeiences that have been noteu between psychoanalysis anu this type
of psychoanalytic psychotheiapy. In auuition, the theiapist shoulu tiy to
claiify the use of splitting anu the natuie of the vaiious S-0-A units that will
be ieenacteu iecuiiingly in the tieatment. When uoing this, it is impoitant
to focus on both the cuiient ieactivation anu the one against which it
functions as a uefense. Thus, even in the couise of uiscussing a patient's
hostile tiansfeience attituue, the theiapist shoulu note othei signs of
positive feeling (foi example, the patient abuses the theiapist, but comes
faithfully on time to uo so)the moie so because such positive attituues
may foim the basis foi a woiking alliance. The cognitive aspect of such
inteipietations is uiiecteu at the patient's capacity to uevelop an obseiving
ego anu uoes not contiibute to intellectualization oi iationalization,
accoiuing to Keinbeig. Rathei, in piimitively oiganizeu patients, cognition
is close to affect anu psychic stiuctuies anu helps to oiganize the patient's
chaotic expeiience. In auuition, such comments occui in the context of the
theiapist's attempt to ienuei a confuseu, uistant, oi fiagmentaiy patient-
theiapist inteiaction a meaningful human expeiience, even though it may be
baseu on bizaiie fantasies in the patient's minu (Keinbeig, 197Sa, 1979b,
198ub, c, 1982g).
'(+ '(+6)3+1'#4 2')*4+
In psychotheiapeutic tieatment of seiiously uistuibeu patients,
Keinbeig suggests, nonveibal aspects of the patient's communication play a
laigei iole than they uo in the tieatment of healthiei patients. Patients with
boiueiline oi schizophienic conuitions may manifest nonveibal behavioi
that is at ouus with theii iemaiks as a iesult of the use of splitting. 0i they
may expiess an S-0-A unit thiough attempts to inuuce the theiapist to play
one of the ioles in this unit, attempts that may be conveyeu thiough
nonveibal means oi thiough the use of woius foi theii emotional effect.
Keinbeig (197Sa, 1977c) iecommenus that the theiapist follow Bion's
(196S, 1967, 197u) iuea of the analyst as a "containei," to tiy to integiate
within himself oi heiself the uispaiate elements the patient piesents, in
oiuei to aiticulate the patient's cuiient expeiience anu uefenses in the
tiansfeience. The analyst's willingness to toleiate gieat confusion,
fiagmentation, anu aggiession in the patient, while actively seeking to
exploie ittheieby conveying an attituue of hope anu acceptancemakes
possible the tieatment of veiy seiiously uistuibeu patients.
In a similai vein, Keinbeig (1976a, 1981a) is a majoi pioponent of what
he teims the "totalistic" view of counteitiansfeience, in which
counteitiansfeience is uefineu as "the total emotional ieaction of the
psychoanalyst to the patient in the tieatment situation" (197Sa, p. 49).
While auvocating the iesolution of counteitiansfeience ieactions, Keinbeig
stiesses the impoitance of examining one's ieactions foi infoimation about
the patient, a view chaiacteiistic of Kleinian anu inteipeisonalist theoiies.
Keinbeig claims that with moie seiiously uistuibeu patients, the theiapist's
ieactions have moie to uo with his oi hei geneial capacity to toleiate stiess
anu anxiety than with the theiapist's neuiotic neeus. Since the patient often
piesents a veiy chaotic pictuie, the theiapist's attempt to maintain
empathic contact with the patient thiough paitial iuentifications may leau to
some iegiession in the theiapist's ability to function (Keinbeig, 197Sa,
1977c). Keinbeig (1977c, 1981a) also uesciibes veiy meaningfully the
expeiience of a theiapist in a stalemateu tieatment effoit, anu offeis
suggestions foi the iesolution of chionic impasses.

1!-6.& 0$* 4$&(4(6(4-$&
Keinbeig's iueas about hospital tieatment anu psychotheiapy anu his
cieative application of psychoanalytic thinking to psychiatiic settings aie
baseu on his views about gioup anu institutional piocesses. Although less
well known, his papeis on these topics ieflect a ueep awaieness of the
complexities of gioup life.
)*)%02#2 &5 76&13 )*/ #*2'#'1'#&*)% 36&4+22+2
Following in the tiauition of Nillei anu Rice (1967; Rice, 196S, 1967)
anu builuing on the contiibutions of Fieuu anu the Biitish object ielations
gioup theoiists such as Bion (19S9), Keinbeig has sought to apply a
psychoanalytically sophisticateu open-systems theoiy to gioup anu
institutional piocesses. Be pioposes that the tenuency foi noimal
inuiviuuals to behave anu think iegiessively in unstiuctuieu oi laige gioups
is uue to the thieat to peisonal iuentity poseu by such gioups. This thieat
aiises because such gioups activate piimitive inteinalizeu object ielations
in theii membeis, with associateu piimitive uefenses anu intense,
piegenital, aggiessive anu sexual impulses (Keinbeig, 198ub).
In oiuei to unueistanu institutional functioning, it is necessaiy to
examine the institution's task, the iesouices available to it foi this task, anu
the stiuctuie of authoiity anu iesponsibility in the institution. Keinbeig
(197S, 197Sb, 198uc) uiscusses, foi example, thiee types of pioblems that
pievent the accomplishment of an institution's task: (1) the natuie of the
task may be uncleai oi contiauictoiy, oi the task may be seen to be
impossible when it is cleaily uefineu; (2) the auministiative stiuctuie, that
is, the stiuctuie that contiols anu maintains the institution's inteinal anu
exteinal bounuaiies, may be unsuitable foi the institution's task, oi the
oiganization may be stiuctuieu to meet the emotional neeus of
auministiatois oi staff, not to peifoim the task; anu (S) psychopathology in
the leauei oi leaueis within the institution may hinuei the accomplishment
of the oiganization's task.
Keinbeig's contiibutions in this aiea have focuseu paiticulaily on the
uilemmas of leaueiship anu the inteiaction between leaueis anu gioups oi
institutions. The leauei is the inuiviuual who manages the bounuaiies of the
gioupits time, membeiship, agenua, anu utilization of iesouicesso it
can caiiy out its task. Because gioups exist within oiganizations anu consist
of inuiviuuals who themselves contain intiapsychic stiuctuies at uiffeient
levels of oiganization, leaueis must be awaie of bounuaiy issues thioughout
these levels. In contiast to Nillei's (1969) view of systems as hieiaichically
aiiangeu in, as it weie, concentiic ciicles (society, institution, uivision of the
institution, inuiviuual, intiapsychic stiuctuies, anu inteinalizeu object
ielations), Keinbeig takes the position that hieiaichies in most gioup
situations, cannot be ieuuceu to this one-uimensional mouel. 0sually the
leauei must contiol the gioup's contact with nonconcentiic sets of systems
that impinge on the gioup in uiffeient ways. In theiapeutic settings, in
auuition to auministiative anu political piessuies on task uefinition anu
iesouices, piofessional, peisonal anu technical value systems aie influential
(Keinbeig, 197Sb). Keinbeig suggests that the best way foi a leauei
paiticulaily the leauei of a theiapy gioup oi hospital communityto
unueistanu the effect of these piessuies anu iesponsibilities on the gioup, is
to obseive his oi hei own emotional anu cognitive expeiience in the gioup.
This view is similai to Keinbeig's espousal of the usefulness of
counteitiansfeience (uefineu bioauly) in inuiviuual psychotheiapy.
Regiessive piessuies on staff membeis in oiganizations leau to a
tenuency to attiibute the causes of institutional pioblems to the leauei's
incompetence oi peisonality, so that the inuiviuual may uefenu against
awaieness of pioblems with the institution's task oi stiuctuie.
0iganizational piessuies can affect the leauei's peisonality functioning,
howevei, anu some institutional pioblems aie cieateu by inuiviuuals with
paiticulai types of psychopathology who actively seek positions of
authoiity. Bence, oiganizational consultants must combine the ability to
uefine tasks anu assess institutional stiuctuies with the capacity to assess
the peisonal qualities of leaueis fiom a psychoanalytic peispective
(Keinbeig, 198ub).
(&23#')% '6+)'-+*'
Keinbeig iecommenus hospitalization to piotect the patient who might
otheiwise iiiepaiably uamage his oi hei life, caieei, oi ielationships anu to
piotect psychoanalytic psychotheiapy by allowing the theiapist to maintain
a position of technical neutiality, asiue fiom the iecommenuation foi
hospitalization. This might be necessaiy with a patient who hau the capacity
to benefit fiom an expiessive psychotheiapy but who also neeueu exteinal
guiuance anu suppoit. Bospitalization oi a peiiou of iesiuence in a halfway
house woulu then seive to piepaie the patient foi outpatient tieatment in
which the patient will take iesponsibility foi his oi hei own life anu woulu
in othei iespects maintain a theiapeutic alliance. Some patients
immeuiately thieaten the continuation of theii psychotheiapy with
impulsive behavioi, attempts to contiol the theiapist, oi attempts to foice
the theiapist to take iesponsibility foi the patient's life. In some such cases,
an initial peiiou of hospitalization may help to claiify the patient's
psychological stiengths anu weaknesses (Keinbeig, 197Sa, 1976, 1981u,
1982b).
The gioup activities, iules, anu iegulations anu the multiple, new
inteiactions in which the patient must engage in the hospital pioviue a way
to uiagnose the patient's pathological inteinal object ielations. The
combination of psychopathology in the patient anu the many gioup
situations in the hospital allows the patient to ieplicate his oi hei inteinal
conflicts in the social fielu (Keinbeig, 197S, 1976). Keinbeig (197S, 197Sb,
1981u, e, 1982a) gives an outline foi hospital auministiation which
pioviues a stiuctuie that maximizes the staff's ability to gathei anu utilize
such uata theiapeutically. The hospital psychotheiapist might then use such
uata to help patients exploie the inteinal conflicts that aie causing them to
act a ceitain way in the hospital. Foi example, boiueiline oi schizophienic
patients may quickly uevelop opposite ielationships with uiffeient
subgioups of staff, baseu on theii uefensive use of splitting, with the
tenuency to cieate in the exteinal woilu the "goou" anu "bau" inteinalizeu
object ielationships that compiise theii psychic woilus. Keinbeig (197S,
1976) has also pioviueu uetaileu, sophisticateu suggestions on the iole of
the vaiious moualities of tieatment (the milieu, gioups, nuising anu meuical
management, activities, anu hospital psychotheiapy of vaiious kinus, with
oi without a sepaiation between the theiapist anu auministiatoi) in the
psychoanalytic hospital. 0nueilying his iecommenuations is the assumption
that unmistakable eviuence of the staff's iespect anu concein foi the patient
is a ciucial element in hospitalization, since patients who aie hospitalizeu
aie those who uo not have sufficient iespect oi concein foi themselves to
manage theii lives. Iueally, thiough the hospitalization, the patient will
uevelop a theiapeutic alliance that will sustain outpatient psychotheiapy.
This change occuis, in pait, because so many aspects of hospitalization aie
cleaily anu iealistically helpful, in contiast to the patient's fantasieu,
tiansfeience uistoitions (Keinbeig, 197S).
()" ()"-!2 -# 0##"%(& 0$* *!4+"&
We will concluue this summaiy of Keinbeig's contiibutions with his
theoiy of uiives anu affects, which in many ways is his most caiefully
consiueieu theoietical statement. We have alieauy summaiizeu Keinbeig's
mouel of the uevelopmental stages of inteinalizeu object ielations, the final
phase of which is the integiation of contiauictoiy S-0-A units into complex
peiceptions of self anu othei, anu the matuiation of ego anu supeiego into
auaptive stiuctuies. We consiuei Keinbeig's theoiy of uiives anu affects
sepaiately, even though it is intenueu to fit into the uevelopmental mouel,
because it iepiesents an auuitional focus in his woik in which he inteipiets
neuiophysiological uata anu ieexamines the uual instinct theoiy (Keinbeig,
1976, 198uu, 1982u, h). Keinbeig pioposes that
the units of inteinalizeu object ielations (the S-0-A units) constitute
subsystems on the basis of which both uiives anu the oveiall
psychic stiuctuies of ego, supeiego anu iu aie oiganizeu as
integiating systems. Instincts (iepiesenteu by psychologically
oiganizeu uiive systems) anu the oveiall psychic stiuctuies (iu, ego,
supeiego) then become component systems of the peisonality at
laige, which constitutes the supiasystem. In tuin, the units of
inteinalizeu object ielations themselves constitute an integiating
system foi subsystems iepiesenteu by inboin peiceptive anu
behavioi patteins, affect uispositions, neuiovegetative uischaige
patteins, anu nonspecific aiousal mechanisms |p. 8Sj.
Keinbeig (1976) states that by conceptualizing the elements of this
theoiy as subsystems anu supiasystems, he avoius pioposing "a
neuiophysiological mouel of the minu oi a mechanical mouel of bouy-minu
equivalence" (p. 86). Thus, he speaks of hieiaichies of oiganizeu systems. At
some point, howevei, theie is a shift fiom "neuio-physiologically baseu
functions" anu "physiological units," (which woulu iefei to changes in
electiical patteins oi neuiotiansmitteis) to the integiation of these units
into a "highei system iepiesenteu by puiely intiapsychic stiuctuies,
namely, the piimitive units of inteinalizeu object ielations (self-object-affect
units)" (p. 86). These units aie themselves eventually integiateu into iu, ego,
anu supeiego.
"Affect uispositions," which aie inboin anu ueteimineu by biain
functioning, constitute piimaiy motivational systems, in that they iepiesent
uispositions to the subjective expeiience of pleasuie anu unpleasuie. These
affect uispositions "integiate the peiception of (1) cential (pleasuiable oi
unpleasuiable) states |that is, peiception in the cential neivous systemj, (2)
physiological uischaige phenomena, (S) inboin peiceptive anu behavioi
patteins, anu (4) enviionmental iesponses" (Keinbeig, 1976, p. 87). The
Fieuuian concept of instinct may be incluueu heie. Affective patteins
communicate the infant's neeus to the mothei anu theieby initiate
inteiactions, which aie stoieu as memoiy tiaces with affective anu cognitive
components. "Affects aie the piimaiy motivational system, in the sense that
they aie at the centei of each of the infinite numbei of giatifying anu
fiustiating events the infant expeiiences with his enviionment" (Keinbeig,
1982h, p. 9u7), each of which leaus to an inteinalizeu object ielation, fixeu
by memoiy.
Affect anu cognition evolve togethei at fiist because theii iespective
memoiy tiaces aie integiateu in affective memoiy (Keinbeig, 1976), but
eventually uiffeientiation of pleasuiable anu unpleasuiable expeiiences anu
of components of self anu othei takes place. At this point, Keinbeig (1982h)
asseits, the "goou" anu "bau" expeiiences geneiate the oveiall oiganization
of motivational systems, which we teim love anu hate.
Keinbeig (1982h) then suggests that love anu hate become stable
intiapsychic stiuctuies, "in genetic continuity thiough vaiious
uevelopmental stages" (p. 9u8), which can be equateu with the
psychoanalytic concepts of the two uiive systems, libiuo anu aggiession. At
this stage of oiganization, affects seive a signal function foi the two uiives,
anu incieasingly complex subjective, behavioial, anu cognitive elaboiations
of affects anu uiives uevelop. Biives will always be manifesteu by specific
wishes in the context of paiticulai object ielations, a phenomenon that is
moie piecisely aiticulateu than an affect state.
Keinbeig's (1976) theoiy ueals with economic issues as follows:
vaiiations in the intensity of uiives oi affects can be attiibuteu to eithei
constitutional vaiiations in the innate components of the system (the
hypothalamus, genetically ueteimineu behavioial patteins, etc.), oi to
vaiiations in the enviionment (the iesponses of the mothei anu so foith).
Neutialization (Baitmann, 19SS) takes place when positively anu negatively
valenceu self-object-affect units aie combineu to foim moie complex anu
iealistic self- anu object iepiesentations with the achievement of the
uepiessive position. Keinbeig (1976) wiites: "4," 0%-&,"0*0 )6 *'"-&*6*/#&*)-
0%0&".0 -"(&!#$*T"0 #88!"00*)- #-' +)00*C$% +!)@*'"0 &," .)0& *.+)!&#-&
0*-8$" "-"!8% 0)(!/" 6)! &," ,*8,"! $"@"$ )6 !"+!"00*@" ."/,#-*0.0 &) /).",
anu implicitly, foi the uevelopment of seconuaiy autonomy in geneial" (pp.
4S-46, italics in oiiginal). What Baitmann teimeu fusion of uiives is also
incluueu, accoiuing to Keinbeig, in the combination oi integiation of
opposing affects as pait of the integiation of contiauictoiy S-0-A units.
Similaily, sublimation is not simply a change in the use of uiive ueiivatives
in an economic sense; it, too, has an object ielations component:
Sublimatoiy activity iequiies the capacity foi some whole, integiateu object
ielationships, some genuine concein foi oneself anu otheis (Keinbeig,
197Sa, p. 1S4). Nonetheless, uespite the impoitance Keinbeig assigns object
ielations in his theoiy of affects anu uiives, he also aigues foi the
impoitance of aggiessive uiive manifestations anu the biologically baseu
changes in uiives, which influence object ielations (as in the genital
stiivings of the oeuipal peiiou). Thus, he claims to suppoit the pioposition
that uiives, iathei than object ielations, constitute the piimaiy motivational
system of the oiganism.
*4&%6&&4-$
We will now offei commentaiy on the contiibutions of Keinbeig that
we have attempteu to summaiize. Since we aie not heie compaiing
Keinbeig's positions with those of othei analysts, such as Kohut oi Biennei,
we will iestiict ouiselves to a ciitical uiscussion of Keinbeig's clinical anu
theoietical woik.
At the veiy least, Keinbeig has synthesizeu a goou ueal of the clinical
obseivations of the object ielations school anu helpeu to uevelop a nosology
that oiueis these obseivations. Thus, foi example, uuntiip's (1968, 1971) oi
Faiibaiin's (19S2) obseivations of the schizoiu peison fit nicely into
Keinbeig's conceptualization of one type of patient with boiueiline
peisonality stiuctuie. Keinbeig is able to show how some of the wiitings of
Winnicott (196S, 197S), Nelanie Klein (1946), Balint (1968), anu even
uieenson (19S4) can be unueistoou within his concept of the boiueiline
peisonality. Bis way of thinking about the levels of seveiity of chaiactei
pathology, baseu in pait on object ielations concepts, may piove to be
extiemely useful. In auuition, he has integiateu the Biitish object ielations
school's stiess on aggiession into his clinical anu technical wiitings in a way
that helpfully unueiscoies the impoitance of uealing with aggiession, both
in clinical situations anu in theoiy uevelopment.
We consiuei it a stiength of Keinbeig's wiitings that he fiequently
ielates his theoietical points to obseivable clinical phenomena. Foi
example, he has not only shown in his attempts at theoietical integiation
how a vaiiety of authois (Balint, 1968; Faiibaiin, 19S2; Fiosch, 196u;
uieenson, 19S4; uuntiip, 1968,1971; N. Klein, 1946; Schmiuebeig, 1947;
Winnicott, 196S, 197S) iefei to the use of piimitive uefenses such as
splitting anu piojective iuentification by boiueiline patients (using
Keinbeig's uefinition of boiueiline, not necessaiily those authois' own), but
he has also sought to uesciibe how one might infei the use of splitting oi
piojective iuentification by a patient in a clinical inteiview. Similaily, he is
willing to claim that piactical consequences follow fiom his theoietical
assumptions about uiagnosis anu paiticulaily fiom assessment of level of
uefensive functioning. This willingness to make pieuictions makes it easiei
foi othei investigatois to test his infeiences anu conclusions. As an example,
Keinbeig is iemaikably specific anu uetaileu in ielating piognosis anu
choice of psychological tieatment methou to uiagnosis baseu on his
nosology. A patient suffeiing fiom a naicissistic peisonality uisoiuei,
without oveit boiueiline-level functioning, shoulu be tieateu with
unmouifieu psychoanalysis; a patient with naicissistic peisonality uisoiuei
who functions oveitly on a boiueiline level shoulu be tieateu with
Keinbeig's mouifieu psychoanalytic psychotheiapy. The same types of
patients might iequiie a shift to a suppoitive type of psychotheiapy at some
point in the analysis oi psychotheiapy, but this woulu not iesult in the type
of change to be expecteu fiom psychoanalysis oi fiom Keinbeig's mouifieu
foim of psychoanalytic psychotheiapy. Some naicissistic patients piesent
negative piognostic featuies (seveie antisocial featuies, conscious
enjoyment of otheis' suffeiing, chionic absence of human involvement, etc.),
which inuicate a neeu foi suppoitive psychotheiapy fiom the onset
(Keinbeig, 197Sa, 1979a, 198uc, 1982g, i).
To summaiize at this point, Keinbeig's achievements in the aieas of
clinical wiiting anu obseivations seem paiticulaily impiessive:
1. Be has synthesizeu the wiitings of a numbei of authois, paiticulaily
those of the Biitish object ielations school but also incluuing }acobson anu
Nahlei, anu shown how theii clinical obseivations can be conceptualizeu in
the context of his uefinition of the boiueiline peisonality oiganization.
2. Be has auueu a numbei of his own clinical obseivations anu woikeu
out a uetaileu classificatoiy system, paiticulaily foi chaiactei pathology anu
the boiueiline peisonality, within a five-level stiuctuie foi uesciibing the
full iange of psychopathology.
S. Be has specifieu a methou of inteiviewing with stateu ciiteiia ueiiveu
fiom the inteiview, thiough which one can ieach complex uiagnostic
ueteiminations.
4. Be has ielateu his uiagnostic categoiies to choice of tieatment anu to
piognostic statements about theiapy outcomes.
Keinbeig has coveieu a vast teiiitoiy in his clinical wiitings, anu he
coveis it in a systematic fashion. We must join othei wiiteis (Calef &
Weinshel, 1979), howevei, in wonueiing how he is able to make so many
piognostic statements with such assuiance.S Bis level of specificity is iaie
in oui fielu anu it woulu be viitually impossible foi Keinbeig to have
peisonally uiagnoseu anu tieateu (anu tieateu to the point of teimination,
in oiuei to substantiate piognostic claims) all the uiffeient types anu
subtypes of patients that aie the subjects of his classification system,
tieatment iecommenuations, anu piognostic statements. Thus, his
piognostic statements, foi example, must come fiom a combination of
ieseaich finuings, consultations, supeivision, anu his expeiience of being
involveu in anu uiiecting a vaiiety of clinical facilities.
Boes Keinbeig base his piognostic statements on ieseaich finuings
(Keinbeig et al, 1972) fiom the Nenningei outcome stuuies oi on his
impiessive clinical expeiience. It is often uifficult to tell, but most often he
wiites with the assuiance anu piecision of someone who has a gieat ueal of
empiiical ieseaich to buttiess his points. Be unueistanuably uoes not give
extensive clinical examples, that is, complete case stuuies, foi if he uiu, given
the iange of categoiies anu subcategoiies he uiscusses, he woulu liteially fill
oui jouinals with clinical examples. Though it is beyonu the scope of oui
chaptei to evaluate the majoi outcome ieseaich with which he has been
involveu, we believe that Keinbeig woulu acknowleuge that his assuiance
about all his piognostic statements coulu not ieasonably be baseu on this
ieseaich. Noieovei, although this ieseaich is of gieat inteiest, it is by no
means fiee fiom seiious methouological ciiticisms, which affect the types of
piognostic statements Keinbeig has maue. It is oui assumption, then, that a
numbei of Keinbeig's statements anu iecommenuations aie baseu on his
clinical expeiience.
uiven that this is the case, it is unueistanuable that Keinbeig has been
ciiticizeu (Calef & Weinshel, 1979) foi his tone in his clinical wiitings. Be
wiites as if he has sounu eviuence foi his asseitions, but, at least up to this
point, he has not fully inuicateu the natuie anu extent of his eviuence. We
join in the ciiticism that has been leveleu at Keinbeig in this aiea, but we
wish to note what we believe aie two mitigating consiueiations. Fiist, one
can ciiticize any numbei of psychoanalytic authois foi wiiting as if
something hau been "uemonstiateu," when they weie ieally stating theii
views baseu on, peihaps veiy inteiesting, but neveitheless limiteu, clinical
obseivations. Seconu, unlike the types of statements maue by many othei
psychoanalytic authois, Keinbeig's statements aie in a foim that makes
them potentially testable (although to test his asseitions woulu iequiie a
veiy elaboiate anu uifficult ieseaich unueitaking).
A numbei of analysts have ciiticizeu Keinbeig's clinical concepts on
othei giounus than those we have noteu. Although it is beyonu the scope of
this exposition to entei into the type of uetaileu ciiticism leveleu by, foi
example, Calef anu Weinshel (1979) oi implieu by the type of ieconciliation
between Kohut anu Keinbeig attempteu by Stoloiow anu Lachman (198u),
we will comment biiefly on Calef anu Weinshel's ciitique.
We believe that Calef anu Weinshel have biought up inteiesting anu
potentially uevastating ciiticisms. They incluue the ones we have pieviously
uiscusseu, anu, most seiiously, they cast uoubt on the valiuity of Keinbeig's
contention that theie aie people with a 0&#C$" peisonality oiganization
which he has labeleu boiueiline. (A ielateu ciiticism, that Keinbeig claims
piematuie uiagnostic closuie in a veiy complex aiea, which still neeus
fuithei exploiation, is offeieu by Sugaiman anu Lemei (198u). Calef anu
Weinshel also feel that Keinbeig's concepts tenu to uilute basic
psychoanalytic concepts such as iegiession, anu the veiy iuea of
intiapsychic conflict. Bowevei, a cential point in theii ciitique is theii
attempt to question the boiueiline concept itself. They ciiticize Keinbeig
foi uiscaiuing the iuea of a continuum that woulu incluue boiueiline anu
psychotic conuitions anu foi maintaining that conventional ieality testing is
eithei piesent oi absent. Insteau, Calef anu Weinshel (1979) concluue that
"the ielativity of ieality testing.makes it a uifficult aiea to establish haiu
anu fast, categoiical, isolateu ciiteiia foi the uiagnosis of a psychosis" (p.
48S) anu, by extension, makes it uifficult to uelineate people with boiueiline
peisonality oiganization fiom people who aie psychotic.
With iespect to Calef anu Weinshel's ciiticisms, we woulu comment that
many of theii points coulu be fiameu anu testeu oi coulu at least be subject
to empiiical obseivation. We woulu hope that if they aie seiious ciitics, they
woulu enueavoi to spell out the empiiical justification foi some of theii
ciiticism. It haiuly seems enough to uoubt Keinbeig's obseivations. We aie
not asseiting that they aie necessaiily mistaken about some of theii points,
but that, they shoulu attempt, as Stone (198u), foi instance, has uone, a
moie clinically anu empiiically oiienteu appioach to some of theii ciiticism.
To ciiticize Keinbeig's categoiical foimulation of the concept of ieality
testing, they might offei uata that suppoit a continuum appioach. Stone
(198u) has pioviueu examples of inteiviews in which assessment of
stiuctuie accoiuing to Keinbeig's ciiteiia was extiemely pioblematic,
paiticulaily in patients with unusual types of affective illness oi in
iecoveiing schizophienic patients, leauing him to suggest that ieality testing
is not uichotomous in all situations. 0ui ciiticism of Calef anu Weinshel is
that at times they seem to come close to simply saying Keinbeig is wiong
because he is not "psychoanalytic."
This biings us to consiueiation of ciiticisms of Keinbeig's theoietical
enueavois. Calef anu Weinshel state that Keinbeig's theoietical position is
close to, if not actually, a paiauigm shift fiom classical Fieuuian anu ego
psychoanalytic theoiies.
4
Within the limits of theii aiticle, howevei, they uo
not piesent convincing logical aiguments foi theii asseition.
The question of Keinbeig's theoietical position is taken up moie
centially in a papei by Klein anu Tiibich (1981). In this aiticle, Klein anu
Tiibich aie not specifically conceineu with the iuea of a paiauigm shift, but
they state that fiom theii point of view, "Keinbeig's iappiochement
between Fieuuian instinct theoiy anu object-ielations theoiy obscuies the
uiffeiences between these two competing theoiies without taking any
iecognition of theii uiffeiences" (p. 41). As is the case with Calef anu
Weinshel (who ciiticize Keinbeig's moie clinical positions), Klein anu
Tiibich iaise funuamental questions conceining Keinbeig's theoietical
positions. Foi example, they maintain that Keinbeig's uismissal of "Bowlby,
Faiibaiin, uuntiip, anu Winnicott is not baseu on any scientific uiscussion of
theii theoiies but on the fact that these theoiies ieject Fieuuian
motivational theoiy" (p. 41). We will not fully exploie Klein anu Tiibich's
ciiticisms heie, but we can comment that we finu it stiange to maintain that
Keinbeig iejects all these theoiies. This in fact is not the case; Keinbeig
uoes attempt to integiate aspects of Faiibaiin, uuntiip, anu Winnicott into
his theoietical anu clinical wiitings.
Befoie uiscussing moie substantive ciiticisms of Keinbeig's theoietical
woik, howevei, we woulu like to expanu oui intiouuctoiy comments on the
state of psychoanalytic theoiy anu theoietical ciiticism. As we implieu, we
believe that much of the woik in both aieas leaves something to be uesiieu,
when consiueieu fiom the point of view of philosophy of science. Because
the stanuaius foi ciiticism typically seem to be so subjective (Ellman &
Noskowitz, 198u; Noskowitz & Ellman, 198S), any new psychoanalytic
theoietical pioposal oi integiation is vulneiable. We believe this statement
applies as we have noteu, to some of Calef anu Weinshel's comments, anu
we woulu suggest that it applies also to some, although not all, of Klein anu
Tiibich's iemaiks. It can be useful to uiscuss how one theoiist's use of a
concept uiffeis fiom anothei theoiist's, but this uoes not constitute a
ciiticism, unless one uiscoveis logical fallacies within the system oi uata
that contiauict the theoiy. To ciiticize Keinbeig foi uiffeiing with Fieuu, foi
example, is not a theoietical ciiticism, but a value juugment.
Bowevei, we must also tenuei this anu some othei geneial ciiticisms in
consiueiation of some of Keinbeig's wiitings. We think that his points
woulu be cleaiei if he woulu place gieatei emphasis on stating his
uefinitions, assumptions, anu positions anu less on cataloging theoiists with
whom he agiees oi uisagiees. The claiity of the piesentation of Keinbeig's
theoietical piopositions sometimes suffeis fiom his tenuency to give such
qualifieu anu complex statements that it becomes uifficult to use his
theoietical asseitions to make uefinite pieuictions. In auuition, the
"catalogs" of theoiists give Keinbeig's theoietical woik somewhat of an
aibitiaiy feeling, akin to what we believe is an aibitiaiiness in the wiitings
of some of his ciitics, which seems to imply, "If you uisagiee with so anu so,
then you aie not psychoanalytic anu, theiefoie, you aie wiong." This type of
comment, although all too pievalent in psychoanalytic wiitings, is not up to
Keinbeig's stanuaius. We woulu thus have to agiee with Klein anu Tiibich
(1981, p. S9) when they ciiticize Keinbeig's iejection of uuntiip foi his
"emotionally chaigeu" attacks on instinct theoiy. Fuitheimoie, we feel that
Keinbeig uoes not have a stiong position fiom which to censuie anothei
theoiist foi ueviating fiom classical psychoanalytic instinct theoiy.
A philosophical appioach to the ciitical ieview of Keinbeig's theoietical
contiibutions woulu ueal with uiffeient types of issues. We woulu wish to
examine questions such as the following: Bow well uoes Keinbeig integiate
object ielations theoiy with Fieuuian theoiy. Asiue fiom consiueiation of
vaiious psychoanalytic tiauitions, uoes Keinbeig have a well-integiateu
theoietical position. Anu, in a moie geneial sense, is Keinbeig's theoiy a
goou theoiy, accoiuing to the iequiiements of theoiy making such as logical
stiuctuie, iules of infeience, anu so foith (Nagel, 1961; Poppei, 1962). We
woulu submit that no psychoanalytic theoiist's woik coulu withstanu this
type of sciutiny. Bence, again, the haish tone of some of the ciiticism
uiiecteu at Keinbeig seems unwaiianteu.
It woulu be useful, howevei, to uiscuss biiefly some of Keinbeig's
contiibutions fiom the stanupoint of these questions to suggest uiiections
foi fuithei woik. We will comment on Keinbeig's instinct theoiy, since he
claims that in this woik he integiates classical uiive theoiy anu object
ielations concepts as well as newei uata fiom neuiophysiological stuuies. It
is thus appiopiiate to ask how well he succeeus in this theoietical
integiation. This question is sepaiate fiom comments about the valiuity,
elegance, oi heuiistic value of Keinbeig's theoiy anu fiom questions about
whethei oi not it is "psychoanalytic."
In his uiscussion of instinct theoiy, Keinbeig (1982h) goes ovei a
familiai but neveitheless impoitant point: Fieuu's teim &!*"C, which is
usually ienueieu as "instinct," may moie ieasonably be tianslateu as
"uiive." Keinbeig is pointing out, as have otheis (Bibiing, 1969; Baitmann,
1964; Boluei, 197u; Schui, 1966), that by instinct Fieuu uiu not mean a
fixeu, piewiieu, behavioial pattein (which is moie of an ethological iuea).
Rathei, in his concept of instinct oi uiive, a vaiiety of behaviois oi mental
events might emeige as a iesult of inteinal stimuli oi excitation. Keinbeig's
substantive attempt is to link oi tianslate Fieuu's iueas into mouein
neuiophysiological anu neuiobehavioial concepts. It is, again, beyonu the
scope of this chaptei to uiscuss fully this aspect of Keinbeig's wiitings, but
in summaiizing Keinbeig's iueas we hope to give a sense of his position anu
oui evaluation of this position.
Keinbeig (1976) places affect uispositions at the centei of his
statements on motivation. Be concluues:
Affect uispositions constitute the piimaiy motivational systems
which integiate the peiception of (1) cential (pleasuiable oi
unpleasuiable) states, (2) physiological uischaige phenomena, (S)
inboin peiceptive anu behavioi patteins, anu (4) enviionmental
iesponses as they impinge on specializeu anu geneial extioceptive
anu intioceptive peiceptions. The eailiest "self-object-affect" units
aie, I suggest, constellations of affectively integiateu anu
cognitively stoieu peiceptions of affective, physiological,
behavioial, anu enviionmental changespeiceptions within which
the "self" anu "nonself" components aie as yet unuiffeientiateu |p.
87j.
In this passage, Keinbeig is attempting to link what he consiueis to be
Fieuuian psychoanalytic theoietical statements with neuiophysiological
statements thiough the use of an object ielations peispective. Be goes on to
specifically incluue NacLean's (1967,1972) mouel of thiee concentiic biains
as being ielevant to the way he conceives of instinct as ueveloping in the
human being
giauually out of the assembly of these "builuing blocks," so that the
seiies of pleasuiable affect-ueteimineu units anu the seiies of
unpleasuiable affect-ueteimineu units giauually evolve into the
libiuinally investeu anu aggiessively investeu constellations of
psychic uiive systemsthat is, into libiuo anu aggiession,
iespectively, as the two majoi psychological uiives. In othei woius,
affects aie at fiist piimaiy oiganizeis of instinctive components
such as specializeu extioceptive peiception anu innate behavioi
patteins anu, latei on, constitute the "signal" activatoi of the
oiganizeu hieiaichy of "instinctually" ueteimineu behavioi |pp. 87-
88j.
These two quotes give a ieasonable flavoi of the complexity anu
uiiection of Keinbeig's iueas on instinct. We believe that, in fact, his
theoietical compilation places him substantively closei to Bowlby (1969,
197S,198u) anu peihaps even Faiibaiin anu uuntiip than to Fieuu. Cential
to Fieuu's (191S) iueas about instinct is the foimulation that it is geneiateu
inteinally anu that the instincts appeai "as a constant foice" (p. 119).
Nowheie in Keinbeig's wiitings uo we see this essential aspect of Fieuu's
concept that instincts pioviue a foim of constant inteinal stimulation that
makes substantial uemanus on the neivous system. To quote Fieuu (191S):
Instinctual stimuli, which oiiginate fiom within the oiganism,
cannot be uealt with by this mechanism. Thus they make fai highei
uemanus on the neivous system anu cause it to unueitake involveu
anu inteiconnecteu activities by which the exteinal woilu is so
changeu as to affoiu satisfaction to the inteinal souice of
stimulation. Above all, they oblige the neivous system to ienounce
its iueal intention of keeping off stimuli, foi they maintain an
incessant anu unavoiuable afflux of stimulation. We may theiefoie
well concluue that instincts anu not exteinal stimuli aie the tiue
motive foices behinu the auvances that have leu the neivous
system, with its unlimiteu capacities, to its piesent high level of
uevelopment. Theie is natuially nothing to pievent oui supposing
that the instincts themselves aie, at least in pait, piecipitates of the
effects of exteinal stimulation, which in the couise of phylogenesis
have biought about mouifications in the living substance |p. 12uj.
We have incluueu this long quote fiom Fieuu in an attempt to captuie
what we believe is a subtle but neveitheless impoitant uiffeience between
Fieuu anu Keinbeig's concept of instincts. Ceitainly fiom at least 191S on,
Fieuu stiesseu the inteinal oi enuogenous natuie of the instincts, not only
as a motivational concept but also, in highei-level oiganisms (paiticulaily
piimates), as a system that stimulateu the uevelopment of the cential
neivous itself. Thus, the infant's anu chilu's task of "masteiing" inteinal oi
enuogenous stimulation is in fact a cential task. Cleaily, enviionmental
factois can make this task easiei oi haiuei, anu cleaily the enviionment is
impoitant in uevelopment, but the "constant piessuie" of enuogenous
stimuli will be theie iegaiuless of the type of "instinctual builuing blocks"
that aie piesent in the infant's enviionment. If we take Keinbeig seiiously
in his attempteu neuiophysiological integiation, then he is moving towaiu
moie of an enviionmentalist position than Fieuu helu. By anu laige,
Keinbeig uoes not see enuogenous stimulation as a cential concein. Bence,
in this aiea of his theoiizing, he has not ieally integiateu Fieuu's position
into his own.
We woulu say that, in geneial, Keinbeig has not fully integiateu the
vaiious positions he uses; that ciitics (Calef anu Weinshel, Klein anu
Tiibich) appeai fiom both siues of the contioveisy between Fieuuian anu
object ielations theoiies is consistent with this view. At times, Keinbeig
meiely places togethei uiffeient theoietical positions iathei than
integiating these positions, foi example, by showing how a paiticulai
uefinition of a concept auus to the powei of the theoiy. Similaily, he often
piesents his selections among possible points of view without giving the
clinical oi logical justification as to why he has chosen ceitain positions anu
not otheis. It is nevei ieally cleai that auuitional explanatoiy powei is
gaineu by combining object ielations anu Fieuuian (oi ego psychological)
concepts.
This biings us to a ielateu logical ciiticism. uiven that he has selecteu
anu uefineu ceitain concepts in the foimation of his theoiy, Keinbeig
pioviues little in the way of theoietical oi logical stiuctuies (iules of
infeience) to show how his theoietical positions link togethei in an oveiall
theoietical system. Foi example, he might begin to pioviue iules that woulu
pieuict unuei what ciicumstances active splitting ieplaces passive splitting
anu uevelop ciiteiia inuepenuent of the theoietical concepts to test the
pieuictions implieu by such iules. At this stage, he uoes not claiify the
explanatoiy powei of his theoiy. To put this in anothei way, he uoes not
show what the uevelopmental, affect, oi instinctual aspects of his theoiy
ieally auu to oui unueistanuing of his clinical anu nosological obseivations
anu conceptions. In a sense, to use Rubinstein's (1967) teim, his theoiy
often seems to be "meiely uesciiptive." Although this is not necessaiily a
ciiticism, Keinbeig obviously aspiies to something moie. Yet often he uoes
not show how this theoiy is moie than a plausible iestatement of his clinical
points.
We have been ciitical of Keinbeig in the lattei pait of this ieview, but
we ieiteiate that these ciiticisms follow fiom the application of stanuaius
that, in oui opinion, no psychoanalytic theoiists coulu meet. We have
expecteu Keinbeig to piesent a full-blown theoiy of the kinu that not even
Fieuu manageu to piouuce. Noieovei, if Keinbeig has not caiiieu out the
type of theoiy builuing oi logical analysis that woulu enable him to piesent
moie convincing aiguments, neithei have his ciitics. 0ne must sympathize
with Keinbeig to some extent, since his task is the haiuei one anu since he
has, at times, attempteu to altei oi claiify his positions in iesponse to points
iaiseu by ciitics.
In conclusion, we woulu say that Keinbeig has iaiseu funuamental
issues anu, moie than any othei contempoiaiy wiitei, he has puisueu these
questions with vigoi anu insight. The answeis he pioposes aie among the
most inteiesting piesenteu by touay's psychoanalytic theoiists. Be is also
one of a ielatively small numbei of psychoanalytic thinkeis who uevote
consiueiable attention to ieseaich issues anu finuings (Caii, uolustein,
Bunt, & Keinbeig, 1979; Keinbeig, 1981b; Keinbeig et al., 1972). Bespite
oui ciitique, we aie impiesseu with Keinbeig's attempts to uevelop a
compiehensive anu systematic theoiy of uevelopment, psychopathology,
anu tieatment, anu he must be consiueieu a majoi psychoanalytic theoiist.
In many aieas, one cannot begin to foimulate appiopiiately a pioblem
without iefeiiing to Keinbeig's woik. That is, by itself, no small
achievement.
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Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Kohut, B. (1966). Foims anu tiansfoimations of naicissism. K)(!-#$ )6 &,"
D."!*/#- ?0%/,)#-#$%&*/ D00)/*#&*)-, 14, 24S-272.
Kohut, B. (1971). 4," #-#$%0*0 )6 &," 0"$6. New Yoik: Inteinational
0niveisities Piess.
NacLean, P. B. (1967). The biain in ielation to empathy anu meuical
euucation. K)(!-#$ )6 U"!@)(0 #-' S"-&#$ 7*0"#0", 144, S74-S82.
NacLean, P. B. (1972). Ceiebial evolution anu emotional piocesses: New
finuings on the stiiatal complex. D--#$0 )6 &," U"9 ^)!; D/#'".% )6
1/*"-/", 19S, 1S7-149.
Nahlei, N. S. (1968). E- ,(.#- 0%.C*)0*0 #-' &," @*/*00*&('"0 )6
*-'*@*'(#&*)-F 5-6#-&*$" +0%/,)0*0. New Yoik: Inteinational
0niveisities Piess.
Nahlei, N. S., & Pine, F., & Beigman, A. (197S). 4," +0%/,)$)8*/#$ C*!&, )6 &,"
,(.#- *-6#-&. New Yoik: Basic Books.
Nillei, u. A., & Rice, A. K. (1967). 1%0&".0 )6 )!8#-*T#&*)-. Lonuon: Tavistock.
Nillei, }. u. (1969). Living systems: Basic concepts. In W. uiay, F. }. Buhl, & N.
B. Rizzo (Eus.), O"-"!#$ 0%0&".0 &,")!% #-' +0%/,*#&!% (pp. S1-1SS).
Boston: Little, Biown.
Noskowitz, N., & Ellman, S. }. (198S). D /!*&*/#$ #-#$%0*0 )6 &," /)-/"+& )6
."&#+0%/,)$)8% *- +0%/,)#-#$%0*0. 0npublisheu manusciipt.
Nagel, E. (1961). 4," 0&!(/&(!" )6 0/*"-/". New Yoik: Baicouit, Biace &
Woilu.
Poppei, K. (1962). Q)-J"/&(!"0 #-' !"6(&#&*)-0F 4," 8!)9&, )6 0/*"-&*6*/
;-)9$"'8". New Yoik: Basic Books.
Rice, A. K. (196S). >"#!-*-8 6)! $"#'"!0,*+. Lonuon: Tavistock.
Rice, A. K. (1969). Inuiviuual, gioup anu inteigioup piocesses. 3(.#-
R"$#&*)-0, 22, S6S-S84.
Rubinstein, B. B. (1967). NA+$#-#&*)- #-' ."!" '"0/!*+&*)-F D ."&#0/*"-&*6*/
"A#.*-#&*)- )6 /"!&#*- #0+"/&0 )6 &," +0%/,)#-#$%&*/ &,")!% )6
.)&*@#&*)-. New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Schmiuebeig, N. (1947). The tieatment of psychopaths anu boiueiline
patients. D."!*/#- K)(!-#$ )6 ?0%/,)&,"!#+%, 1, 4S-SS.
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#!!"0&0. New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
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Sugaiman, A., & Lemei, B. (198u). Reflections on the cuiient state of the
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Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Winnicott, B. W. (196S). 4," .#&(!#&*)-#$ +!)/"00"0 #-' &," 6#/*$*&#&*-8
"-@*!)-."-&. New Yoik: Inteinational 0niveisities Piess.
Winnicott, B. W. (197S). 4,!)(8, +#"'*#&!*/0 &) +0%/,)#-#$%0*0. New Yoik:
Basic Books.
Zetzel, E. (1971). A uevelopmental appioach to the boiueiline patient.
D."!*/#- K)(!-#$ )6 ?0%/,*#&!%, 127, 867-871.
$;<=>
1
In this chaptei, we will use the teims "instinct" anu "uiive" inteichangeably.
Eithei teim iefeis to Fieuu's moie flexible use of the teim &!*"C, as opposeu
to the ethologist's use of "instinct" as equivalent to a physiological piocess
iesulting in a fixeu action pattein oi a steieotypeu behavioi pattein.
2
Keinbeig auopts }acobson's (19S4) uefinition of iefusion, as attempts to maintain
absolute giatification thiough fantasies that the self anu object aie meigeu,
fantasies that ignoie iealistic uiffeiences.
S
Although in one iecent papei Keinbeig (1982i) notes the necessity foi caution in
such statements anu uiges fuithei ieseaich, the pieponueiance of his
wiitings imply gieatei suiety about these matteis.
4
We aie consiueiing the psychoanalytic veision of ego psychology oi the stiuctuial
view as pait of the classical theoiy.
!!
#$%&'() '* +$,-. /- ,)011(0 -$-2, 23( )((4 /-) &,'5%(11
$-&$-$2(
!"#$% %' ()*+%+$,-. #'/'
Bion wiote less extensively than many of the othei subjects of this
volume oi than many othei significant contiibutois to psychoanalysis. Yet,
what he uiu wiite seems to have stiiieu piofounu iespect, much antipathy,
consiueiable confusion, anu even astonishment in his auuiences. Nost who
ieau him uo not unueistanu him. Nany iuealize him because of the
expeiience his wiiting gave them, to say nothing of his piesence when he
was alive"an ouyssey thiough the ueep anu foimless infinite voiu," as I
once heaiu it uesciibeu. Baving hau an analysis with Bion, I can well
empathize with this extensive spectium of feelings he inspiieu. Bion's
influence anu ieputation owe much to his capacity foi inuiiectly evoking
expeiiences in his auuience. As a paiticulai instance of this "telescopeu
effect," some time aftei I finisheu my analysis with Bion I heaiu him uelivei
a lectuie at the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institute. I iecall having been
unimpiesseu, somewhat boieu, anu a little iestless. When I went home that
evening, I founu that my minu was in a whiil, anu I coulu not sleep. I then
felt constiaineu to complete the outlines of thiee papeis befoie I coulu lie
uown to iest.
Who was Wilfieu Bion. Why anu how uiu he evoke such uispaiate
emotions in people. Be was fiist of all an Englishman (actually Anglo-
Inuian) who seems to have been able to haimonize his Inuian chiluhoou
with a magnificent euucation at an English public school anu at 0xfoiu, to
mix them fuithei with his capacity foi wonueiment anu suipiise, anu to
biing them all to psychoanalysis in a unique way. Specifically, he was able to
biing to psychoanalytic theoiy anu piactice the peispectives of Plato's
theoiy of foims anu Immanuel Kant's !"#$#%&' )* +&"' ,'-.)/, anu he
expanueu the Fieuuian theoiy of the unconscious fiom the naiiowei
limitations of its biological founuations into a bioauei scope consonant with
the long tiauition of Westeinanu even Easteinepistemology.
Among the concepts that foimeu his woik, Bion appieciateu the concept
of inheient pieconception fiom Plato's theoiy of foims anu foimulateu that
they, unuei the impact of sensoiy-emotional expeiience, link up with its
exteinal counteipait, its "'-0#1-$#)/, to become a 2)/2'3$#)/ the continuing
affiimation anu abstiaction of this conception allow it to become a
conceptlike the concept of a bieast, foi instance. Bion also calleu these
inheient pieconceptions "thoughts without a thinkei," in the sense that they
aie thoughts that aie oluei than the human iace that now thinks them. The
minu hau to be cieateu, accoiuing to Bion, in oiuei to think these piimoiuial
"thoughts." Be invokes Kant in this way: Intuition without concept is blinu;
concept without intuition is empty. The infant has the intuition of his oi hei
expeiience but is as yet empty of the powei to conceive of these expeiiences
by a notational systemto make sense of them. The task of analysis, Bion
believeu, is to allow pieconceptual expeiiences to be conceiveu so as to
"'-0#1' one's intuition. Bion (198u) states: "A 'maiiiage' is taking place
between you anu you; a maiiiage between youi thoughts anu youi feelings.
The intuition which is blinu anu the concept which is empty can get togethei
in a way which makes a complete matuie thought" (p. 27).
Bion felt that, although language is one of the supieme
accomplishments of human beings anu is essential foi communication, it is
also a vehicle foi ueception anu inaccuiacies. Language is static anu belongs
to the sensual aspects of oui uevelopment. It is theiefoie peisonal anu
ultimately misleauing oi even suspect. Bion's conception of the "suspension
of memoiy anu uesiie" ieflects this belief on his pait that language in
geneial anu &/4'".$-/4#/5 in paiticulai aie vehicles of uesiie anu theiefoie
obtiuue the ultimate expeiience of puie Tiuth. Language, anu even
knowleuge (which he mathematically symbolizeu as K), aie only tiansient
appioximations to Tiuth (u), anu we shoulu not confuse one with the othei.
This was one of the ieasons, I believe, that Bion useu mathematical
analogies anu even spent a consiueiable amount of time tiying to uevelop a
mathematical giiu on polai-cooiuinateu space with the aim of giving exact
uefinition to psychoanalytic elements. Nathematics aie fiee of the
sensuousness of memoiy anu uesiie, he believeu, anu theiefoie aie moie
suitable in theii unsatuiation to uesciibe phenomena fiom the inteinal
woilu that aie not uesciibable by a language, such as veibal language, that
belongs to the sensoiy matiix.
Although this point may seem obscuie to many, its meiit lies in Bion's
attempt to help us get beyonu (behinu, below) the language baiiiei so as to
appioximate puie expeiience befoie language. In this iegaiu, is closely in
tune with the cuiient woik of Lacan anu Beiiiua, the Fiench
ueconstiuctionists. Lacan in paiticulai has calleu attention to the alteiation
of subjectivity, as "I" uescenus into the "symbolic oiuei of language." Bion
anu Lacan seem to agiee that woius, like iuols, become static ieifications of
expeiience anu piogiessively alienate oneself fiom it. Woius seem to giasp
anu enclose the expeiience so as to squeeze the life out of it anu iob it of
meaning. In auuition to mathematics, Bion also citeu music, poetiy, anu ait
as geneially supeiioi ways of piesenting the uomain of intuition.
Bion is peihaps best known to the mental health public foi his
673'"#'/2'. #/ 8")&3. (1961), in which he ievealeu some of the most fai-
ieaching innovations in the psychoanalysis of gioup piocess since Fieuu.
Like Fieuu befoie him, Bion vieweu the gioup as a single entity, with a
psychology that is supeioiuinate to the inuiviuuals who compiise it. By
applying the piinciples of inuiviuual psychoanalysis, howevei, he localizeu
unique tiansfeiences to the gioup leauei anu special foims of iesistance
unique to the gioup situation.
Bion's vast expeiience with the psychoanalysis of psychotic patients
alloweu him to make fascinating foiays into psychotic thinking, anu his
metapsychological concepts owe much to these expeiiences. 0ne key
concept he obtaineu fiom analyzing psychotics is the notion of the 2)/$-#/'"
-/4 $9' 2)/$-#/'4: which uesignateu a mothei who was able to contain hei
infant's piojective iuentifications. Bei ability to uo so (hei ieveiie) allows
the infant to inteinalize hei as a mothei who can, thiough hei ieveiie,
contain the infant's anguish anu can thus foim the basis of a "thinking
couple." Bion's theoiy of thinking uistinguishes between thoughts anu the
minu that hau to be cieateu to think them. Thinking in the noimal inuiviuual
compiises piojective iuentifications of "thoughts without a thinkei" anu
sensoiy-emotional impiessions onto an inteinalizeu object suiface, which
enuuies the impact of these "thoughts" anu then "thinks" them.
The concept of the containei anu the containeu is often associateu with
the moie passive aspect of its actionthat is, the passive absoiption of the
infant's oi patient's mental pain. Bion meant fai moie than that. The mothei
(oi the analyst) must not only absoib the infant's (oi patient's) pain without
being $"-/.*)";'4 by itthat is, yieluing to the infant's piojections,
iuentifying with them, anu iesponuing ieactively in tumbut must also
uelay them, soit them out as a piism uoes with a beam of intense light,
iefiacting them into a coloi spectium of hieiaichic meanings, anu then,
finally, act upon them by ielating to the infant's specific neeus. By uoing this,
mothei tuins the infant's scieams into meaning, anu, iathei than
thoughtlessly iesoiting to ieflex action because of hei huit, uses the
containment expeiience foi puiposes of thoughtful $"-/.0-$#)/. Not only
uoes this become inteinalizeu by the infant as a mouel foi thinking, but it
also becomes a mouel foi peimitting the expeiiencing of the expeiience so
as to "leain fiom expeiience," which Bion believeu to be the sine qua non of
noimal uevelopment.
Befoie elaboiating some of the concepts that aie of impoitance in a
suivey of Bion's woik, I will uigiess foi a moment to give a few facts of
Bion's life. I must caution the ieauei, howevei, that these facts aie an
"exeicise in K," anu Bion woulu not foi a moment want them to be confuseu
with the tiuth (0). Be was boin in Nuttia, in the iemote 0niteu Piovinces of
Biitish Inuia, on Septembei 8,1897. Bis fathei belongeu to the Biitish Civil
Seivice anu was an engineei. Bis mothei was fiom a lowei social caste than
his fathei. Bion was iaiseu by two native women who ieau him stoiies fiom
the Nahabhaiata
1
, which maue an eveilasting impiession on him. As was
the custom with chiluien whose paients weie employeu by the Biitish Civil
Seivice, he was sent back to Englanu at age 8 to stuuy at a public school,
Bishops Stoitfoiu, which he attenueu fiom 19u6 to 191S. Shoitly aftei
Woilu Wai I bioke out, he gaineu a commission in the Royal Tank Regiment,
took pait in the Battle of Cambiai (the fiist majoi engagement in which
tanks weie ueployeu against the ueimans), anu was awaiueu the
Bistinguisheu Seivice 0iuei by King ueoige v. Be fought in eveiy
subsequent majoi battle on the Westein Fiont, poignant pictuies of which
can be ieau in his posthumously publisheu autobiogiaphy, <9' =)/5 >''?@
6/4A BCDE@BDBD (1982).
Bion was uemobilizeu late in 1918 anu then went to Queens College,
0xfoiu, in }anuaiy of 1919, wheie he stuuieu mouein histoiy. It was theie
that he met B. }. Paton, a tutoi of philosophy who intiouuceu him to the
woiks of Kant anu othei philosopheis. Following giauuation, he ietuineu to
Bishops Stoitfoiu College to teach histoiy anu Fiench. Be also hau an active
amateui caieei as a iugby football playei anu coach foi the swimming team.
In 192S oi 1924 he left to stuuy meuicine at 0niveisity College Bospital
in Lonuon anu qualifieu in 1929. While theie, he came unuei the influence of
Wilfieu Tiottei, the uistinguisheu suigeon, who was inteiesteu in the
psychology of gioups. This association was to be of gieat impoitance in
Bion's futuie yeais when he maue his impoitant contiibutions to the theoiy
of gioups. Aftei a shoit stint as a meuical officei in the Royal Aii Foice, he
went to Lonuon in 19S2 anu began to piactice psychiatiy. Be enteieu
analysis with }ohn Rickman anu began his tiaining as a canuiuate in the
Biitish Institute foi Psycho-Analysis, but was inteiiupteu by the outbieak of
Woilu Wai II in 19S9. While 0fficei-in-Chaige of the Nilitaiy Tiaining Wing
at Noithfielu Nilitaiy Bospital, Bion seems to have aiiiveu at the fiist
inklings of his conception of gioup psychology.
Aftei the wai Bion ietuineu to the Tavistock Clinic anu was appointeu
chaiiman of the Executive Committee. Aftei finishing his analysis with }ohn
Rickman, he was intiouuceu by the lattei to Nelanie Klein, with whom he
began a seconu analysis.
Be maiiieu in 194u, but the maiiiage enueu with his wife's tiagic ueath
aftei the biith of theii only chilu, Paithenope, in 194S. Some yeais latei he
maiiieu Fiancesca, whom he met at the Tavistock Institute of Buman
Relations anu with whom he hau two auuitional chiluien, }ulian, now a
piacticing physician, anu Nichola, a linguist who is cuiiently woiking in
publishing. Bion uevelopeu an excellent ieputation as an analyst in Lonuon
anu became piesiuent of the Biitish Society foi Psycho-Analysis. Be uislikeu
this piominence, howevei, anu often quippeu "I was so loaueu uown with
honois that I almost sank without a tiace!"
In 1966 he maue a lectuie toui of Los Angeles anu ietuineu the
following yeai to iemain foi 12 yeais. Buiing that time he exeiciseu a
piofounu anu extensive impact on the psychoanalytic community of that
city. Be also fiequently tiaveleu to Rio ue }aneiio anu Sao Paulo. It is
inteiesting that Bion seems to be moie populai anu his woiks aie bettei
known in the psychoanalytic community of South Ameiica than in any othei
aiea.
Bion ietiieu in 1979 anu ietuineu to Englanu to be with his chiluien. Be
uieu suuuenly of leukemia on Novembei 8 of that yeai.
!"#$%& (#)*
$01$),$-2$% ,- ()*31%
It is inteiesting to note that the mental health public knows moie about
Bion's (1961) concepts of gioup psychology than they uo about him as a
psychoanalytic theoiist. What is now known as the "Tavistock methou"
began uuiing his expeiiences at Noithfielu Baiiacks uuiing Woilu Wai II
anu was completeu aftei the wai at the Tavistock Clinic. As alieauy noteu,
Bion, like Fieuu befoie him, obseiveu that gioups behave with a psychology
that is chaiacteiistic of the gioup as a unit, above anu beyonu the
psychologies of each of its membeis. A gioup convenes in oiuei to focus on
a common pioject; in the oiiginal case at Noithfielu Baiiacks, this was a
ietuin to the battlefiont. In the couise of the gioup's piogiession,
iesistance, not unlike iesistances in inuiviuual analysis, uevelops towaiu the
piogiess of the gioup's functioning. Nembeis of the gioup seemeu to clustei
into iesistance subgioups, which Bion uesignateu as (1) fight oi flight, (2)
paiiing, anu (S) uepenuence. Bion analyzeu the expectations of the
inuiviuual anu iesistance subgioup membeis towaiu the leauei as
analogous to the tiansfeience expectations in inuiviuual analyses. The
Tavistock methou is laigely known in the 0niteu States thiough the woik of
A. K. Rice (196S) anu is useu to stuuy authoiity ielationships in institutions.
It has nevei founu its way into foimal gioup psychotheiapy to any
significant extent.
$01$),$-2$% 4,+5 1%625*+,2% "-/ +5$ *),(,-% *7 " +5$*)6 *7 +5,-8,-(
0veilapping anu succeeuing Bion's inteiest in the psychology of gioups
was his analytic woik with psychotics anu boiueiline patients. Bis fiist
contiibution stemming fiom this inteiest was "The Imaginaiy Twin" (19Su).
The patient uiscusseu in this clinical papei was suffeiing fiom peisecution
by an imaginaiy twin, which seemeu to be ueiiveu fiom an eailiei
conception of the bieast as the fiist imaginaiy twin. In "Biffeientiation of
the Psychotic fiom the Non-Psychotic Peisonalities" (19S7a), Bion offeieu
the thesis that eveiy psychotic uemonstiates a noimal oi neuiotic as well as
a psychotic peisonality, which long anteuateu Keinbeig's similai
foimulations. Bis papeis, "Notes on the Theoiy of Schizophienia" (19S4),
"Bevelopment of Schizophienic Thought" (19S6), "0n Aiiogance" (19S8a),
"0n Ballucinations" (19S8b), anu "Attacks on Linking" (19S9) all examineu
the shizophienic expeiience of attacking thoughts by attacking the links
between objects anu between object anu self, the piecuisois of thoughts.
0ltimately, Bion saw the psychotic expeiience as the iesult of a failuie
by the mothei to contain hei infant's feai of uying. This is, again, the concept
of the 2)/$-#/'" -/4 $9' 2)/$-#/'4, which was to have majoi significance not
only foi Kleinian metapsychology but also foi psychoanalytic
metapsychology geneially. Foi Kleinian metapsychology it auueu the
auaptive piinciple, the foimal enfianchisement of the impoitance of
exteinal ieality, a concept that pieviously was sauly lacking. It auueu the
concepts of "thoughts without a thinkei" anu inchoate emotional sense
impiessions that neeu a thinkei to think themoiiginally a mothei
containei whose ultimate inteinalization by the infant pioviues foi this
ueveloping function. The concept of the containei anu the containeu long
anticipateu Kohut's concept of the functions of selfobjects.
Anothei impoitant contiibution fiom Bion's woik on psychoses is his
conception of alpha function, alpha elements, anu beta elements (Bion,
1962a, 196S). Be useu letteis fiom the uieek alphabet in oiuei to avoiu
teims that weie in oiuinaiy use anu theiefoie alieauy satuiateu with
meaning. The seconu pait of his teims, "functions" anu "elements," he
boiioweu fiom mathematics foi the same ieason. Expeiience, accoiuing to
Bion, begins as a F'$- '0';'/$, which is a iaw stimulus confionting the sense
oigans in oiuei to be expeiienceu. If the sense oigan allows itself to
expeiience the beta element stimulus, it uoes so thiough -039- *&/2$#)/ anu
theiefoie $"-/.*)";. the beta element into an -039- '0';'/$. The lattei is
analogous to metabolizeu foouit is suitable foi mental uigestion, wheieas
the iaw beta element is not. The alpha element compiises not just the
impiession of the senses, howevei, but also the inheient anuoi acquiieu
pieconceptions of that expeiience, which the oiganism is piepaieu foi
befoiehanu; thus, the mating between pieconception anu beta element
foims the alpha element, the necessaiy ingieuient foi mental uigestion. The
alpha element may then be tiansfoimeu into uieam oi mythic elements foi
stoiage anuoi may be piocesseu by the minu foi immeuiate expeiience, to
be thought about anu acteu upon.
Bion stateu that alpha elements aie able to piouuce an alpha scieen,
something akin to a iepiessive baiiiei, which uiffeientiates sleep fiom
wakefulness. The psychotic, on the othei hanu, has so much feai of
expeiiencing his oi hei feelings because of being oveiwhelmeu that he oi
she piojects out not only feelings anu thoughts about these feelings, but also
the mental appaiatus that can accept, absoib, anu piocess these feelings
the psychotic's veiy ego. As a consequence, the psychotic cannot
"alphabetize" sensoiy-emotional expeiiencescannot allow them to be
iegisteieu (cannot tiansfoim them thiough alpha function into alpha
elements). These expeiiences uo not become piopeily tiansfoimeu foi
mental action; insteau, they become pathologically tiansfoimeu into alteieu
beta elements oi F#1-""' )FG'2$., which compiise uelusions anu
hallucinations. The psychotic seems to uevelop a beta scieen (iathei than an
alpha scieen) of bizaiie anu peisecuting objects which clustei aiounu him
oi hei anu alienate him oi hei fiom the piesence of anu communication
with otheis. The absence of an alpha scieen foiecloses on the psychotic's
capacity to uiffeientiate between waking anu sleep anu theiefoie between
uieaming anu ieality oi between the uelusional anu ieal woilus.
Bion began to iealize that the sense oigans of the psychotic "uo not talk
to one anothei to make common sense," anu that the psychotic uses these
sense oigans to pioject sensations onto objects, which then become
hallucinations because of theii piopensity foi abnoimal piojective
iuentification. The "aiiogance" of psychotic thinking is the uefensive
smugness of the psychotic in believing that he oi she can "think" by
evacuating thoughts anu the oigan that thinks thoughts (the minu) into an
object that is then subjecteu to the patient's cuiiositynot foi knowleuge,
but foi contiol.
Bion foimulateu the notion of an infantile mental catastiophe as the
basis foi the uevelopment of a psychotic peisonality. This catastiophe is a
iesult of the infant's hatieu of expeiience in conjunction with a uefective
mateinal containei, which can not soothe oi contain the infant's pain. Bion
invokeu the concept of catastiophe foi noimal thinking as well, anu his
iueas in this iespect seem to have been misunueistoou by many (see
Bamilton, 1982). Catastiophe is a pieiequisite foi noimal thinking, Bion
believeu, because thinking iequiies oveicoming the steauy state of
homeostasis anu theiefoie always involves pain. Thinking is in iesponse to
ients in the smooth suiface of seienity; the aujustments anu auaptations we
have to make inauguiate the neeu foi thinking. Thus, to Bion, catastiophe, in
its theoietical sense, is a noimal piopeity of change, anu thinking is oui
capacity to anticipate, aujust to, anu iegulate it. This conception of "noimal"
catastiophe uoes not obviate its counteipait, the chilu's noimal
epistemophilic tenuency, with the attenuant enthusiasm anu joy in
acquiiing knowleuge about the woilu.
Buiing the yeais in which he woikeu on these concepts, Bion
steaufastly enueavoieu to mathematize psychoanalytic concepts so as to
give them "scientific piecision." Bion's mathematical auventuies occupy his
fiist thiee majoi metapsychological woiks, ='-"/#/5 *"); 673'"#'/2'
(1962a), 60';'/$. )* +.H29)-/-0H.#. (196S), anu <"-/.*)";-$#)/. (196S).
Bion's theoiy of tiansfoimations boiiows fiom Nelanie Klein's theoiy of the
existence of the paianoiu-schizoiu anu uepiessive positions, two basic
sequential stages of uevelopment in eaily infantile mental life. The fiist
stage is chaiacteiizeu by states of peisecutoiy anxiety in the infant, the
lattei by states of uepiessive concein foi the object, along with withuiawal
of piojections fiom the object back to the self. The uepiessive position is
consiueieu a state of integiation, anu the paianoiu-schizoiu position is
consiueieu a state of potential uisintegiation.
Bion pioposeu that all emotional states anu thoughts begin in the
paianoiu-schizoiu position as uefinitoiy hypotheses. In othei woius, the
infant expeiiences as a uefinitoiy hypothesis a sense of ceitainty about its
state of pain anu feels peisecuteu by this pain. The infant thus expeiiences
itself as the innocent victim of pain supeiimposeu upon it by some outsiue
souice, the nuituiing object. The infant who is able to toleiate this pain
eventually may iealize that the pain is like a hole oi an absence wheie a
bieast belongs anu that it uevelopeu in the fiist place because the bieast
was not theie when it was neeueu. If the infant can toleiate the pain long
enough, then the concept of an empty space uevelops (like Kant's "empty
thoughts"). The infant (anu, by coiollaiy, the patient) can use this space as
an aiea of tiansfoimation in which a thought may altei fiom its oiiginal
uefinitoiy hypothesis of peisecutoiy pain to a uepiessive awaieness of the
neeu foi the bieast anu of the pain of mothei's absence. Thus, the "thought"
oi "feeling" unueigoes a tiansfoimation fiom the paianoiu-schizoiu to the
uepiessive position (P-S!B) on its way to integiation anu acceptance.
Theie aie thiee majoi types of tiansfoimations: (1) iigiu motion
tiansfoimations, (2) piojective tiansfoimations, anu (S) tiansfoimations in
hallucinosis (- K). A iigiu motion tiansfoimation, a teim boiioweu fiom
soliu geometiy, is one in which an expeiience fiom the past is expeiienceu
in the piesent viitually intact. It coiiesponus to the geneial classical notion
of tiansfeience, that is, of a uisplacement of a past object expeiience to the
analyst in the piesent. Piojective tiansfoimations is Bion's teim foi Klein's
conception of piojective iuentification; it uesignates the piojective
tianslocation of aspects of the infant anuoi patient in the piesent onto the
image of the paient-analyst, who then is believeu to be iuentifieu with the
piojection (tiansfoimeu anu contiolleu by it).
Tiansfoimations in hallucinosis uesignate a much moie extensive anu
abnoimal change. Bion believeu that the psychotic cannot beai the
expeiience of pain anu theiefoie uoes not uevelop the space in which
noimal tiansfoimations can occui. Insteau, he oi she annihilates this space
oi nevei uevelops it in the fiist place. The psychotic also piojects out not
only the intoleiable feelings anu thoughts, but also the veiy mental
appaiatus, the ego, which feels the feelings anu thinks the thoughts, along
with them. Insofai as this is expeiienceu by the "psychotic" infant as not
being able to contain, feel, oi think his oi hei thoughts, the infant
coiiesponuingly, thanks to piojective iuentification, believes the object he
oi she is piojecting the thoughts onto also cannot contain these thoughts
anu feelings oi the infant's minu, which is also being piojecteu into the
object. The consequences, accoiuing to Bion, aie as follows: The infant now
is in a state of uisoiientation anu is uenuueu of his oi hei mental capacity to
expeiience his oi hei feelings anu think his oi hei thoughts. The infant no
longei has the alpha function to uelay, soit out, anu "alphabetize" feelings.
Be oi she now luiks in the twilight of confusion between sleep anu uieams,
wheie neithei is uistinguishable fiom the othei.
The object to which the infant's minu anu feelings have meanwhile been
piojecteu has been $"-/.*)";'4 into a F#1-""' )FG'2$ (tiansfoimation of
iejecteu beta elements), which is unstable anu contiolleu by the psychotic
piojections within it. The lattei seem to "swell up" anu bizaiiely uistoit the
configuiation of the object. They then fiagment, uisintegiate, anu ieoiganize
as a F'$- .2"''/ of psychotic impeimeability, a pathological autistic shell
"piotectively" suiiounuing the uenuueu infant. This beta scieen is
expeiienceu as uelusions anu hallucinations, which ciicumsciibe the infant
oi patient as a "piotectively menacing" envelope. It is piotective in the sense
that foimei painful ielations with exteinal objects no longei occui, thanks
to the beta scieen, but menacing insofai as the infant anuoi patient is now
in a veiitible "concentiation camp."
Eventually, the patient may seemingly iecovei fiom this psychotic
catastiophe but, as in the example of the famous case of Schiebei (see
Fieuu, 1911), will ieconstitute a piivate mental woilu of his oi hei own
which is a bizaiie mock-up of the abanuoneu exteinal woilu, totally cut off
fiom anu impeivious to it. This is the uomain of - K, the final stage of a
tiansfoimation in hallucinosis, otheiwise known as a "fixeu" uelusional
system.


" 9),$7 *:$):,$4 *7 9,*-;% #$+"1%625*<*(6
Bion's metapsychology is not only an elaboiation of Fieuu's basic tenets
amalgamateu with the caitogiaphy of infantile mental life that Nelanie Klein
pioneeieu, but is also eniicheu with many unique contiibutions fiom
geneial epistemology anu some innovative speculations about mental life
even beyonu the caesuia of biith. Bion believeu that mental life may well
begin when the sense oigans fiist become opeiant, eaily in fetal life, anu he
postulateu that theie may be some uim "awaieness" of the tiansition fiom
the wateiy meuium of the womb to the gaseous meuium of postnatal life.
These eaily "expeiiences" aie "empty" in the Kantian sense anu must await
language in oiuei to become filleu as concepts. Befoie becoming "filleu,"
they may be iegisteieu as #4')5"-;.. Psychoanalysis is an attempt to help
the inuiviuual link up with his oi hei eailiest pieconceptions, giving
language to those piimoiuial expeiiences that aie still beyonu woius anu
may uate to a time befoie theie weie woius.
Bion giauually became uissatisfieu with the language of Fieuuian anu
Kleinian theoiy, because it uealt with objects that uwelleu in the thiiu
uimension of exteinal ieality (the uomain of senses). Bion's psychotic
patients uiu /)$ uwell in that thiiu uimension but iathei in uimensions alien
to it. Because the uimensionality of the inteinal woilu noimally anu of the
psychotic woilu abnoimally is fai uiffeient fiom that of the thiiu uimension
of exteinal ieality, it iequiies a language suitable to it. Touay we might call
this the uomain of the nonuominant hemispheie, which can be thought of as
the zeio uimension (see uiotstein, 1978).
Bion ieminus us that Fieuu hau postulateu that the psyche's capacity
foi consciousness uepenus on mental piocesses that aie "sensible" to the
uata of expeiience fiom exteinal stimuli. Pleasuie anu unpleasuie aie the
oiiginal "coues" of uiffeientiation of these piocesses. Even though Fieuu
hinteu that the sense oigan of consciousness was "sensible" to inteinal
stimuli as well, theie seems to be veiy little in the psychoanalytic liteiatuie
to uesignate the exact natuie of that inteinal sense oigan system. Bion came
to the iescue by ieminuing us that the sensual uomain ielates to the
exteinal woilu anu that #/$&#$#)/ is the sense oigan that is iesponsive to the
inteinal woilu. In oiuei to be intuitively "sensitive" to this innei uomain,
one must blinu oneself to the sensoiy capacities that aie iesponsive to the
exteinal woilu of sense-uominateu ieality. Following a notion of Fieuu, Bion
auvocateu abanuoning memoiy anu uesiie in oiuei to allow oneself to be
intuitively sensitive to this inteinal, uimensionless woilu. Iionically, we
associate the pleasuie piinciple with the iu anu theiefoie with the
unconscious. Pleasuie seems to be the uesignation by the sense oigans that
aie iesponsive to exteinal ieality to coue that foim of infoimation;
theiefoie, paiauoxically, we must eschew oui tenuency towaiu pleasuie anu
uesiie (suspenu them) to allow the "thoughts without a thinkei" to emeige
in the innei uomain. These "thoughts without a thinkei" uo not have a
language of theii own anu must boiiow the language of exteinal ieality via
fiee associations (uay iesiuue expeiiences) to become "visible" (sensible
thiough intuition). Nemoiy is the past tense of uesiie (of the senses), anu
uesiie uesignates the futuie (of the senses). Thus, the analytic pioceuuie
iequiies suspension of memoiy anu uesiie so that theie can be intuitive
ieceptivity to the innei woilu. The ability to uo this iequiies the "man of
achievement," a uesignation Bion boiioweu fiom Keats to connote the
capacity foi patience in a fielu of uoubts, mysteiies, anu half-tiuths while
awaiting the .'0'2$'4 *-2$. The appeaiance of this selecteu fact iewaius the
"man of achievement" with intuitive secuiity anu claiification about innei
meaning.
Fiom anothei point of view, we can see this foimulation as Bion's
concein about the uiffeience between Tiuth (0) anu knowleuge (K). 0ui
sense oigans aie "sensible" to knowleuge about Tiuth but aie limiteu to the
acquisition of knowleuge about it. Woius coiiesponu to K; 0 is woiuless anu
is the thing-in-itself, unknowable. Psychoanalysis attempts to be a
tiansfoimation in 0, not by oui unueistanuing of K, but iathei via the
expeiience of K. Thus, knowleuge itself uoes not peimit tiansfoimation in 0,
only expeiience uoes. K is impoitant only in being able, once accepteu, to be
useu to facilitate expeiience itself, the only ioute to 0.
($-,3% "-/ +5$ =#$%%,"5 +5*3(5+>
In Bion's last metapsychological book, I$$'/$#)/ -/4 J/$'"3"'$-$#)/
(197u), he ietuineu to his eailiei woik on gioup foimations anu integiateu
that woik with his eailiei conceptions of elements, expeiiences, anu
tiansfoimations. 0nce again, Bion uiew the analogy between the inuiviuual
minu anu the gioup establishment anu locateu within this gioup
establishment the function of pieseiving anu conseiving the gioup's
stability. The establishment iesists change to uefenu against anticipateu
chaos. The piotectois of the establishment neeu to anticipate iebellion oi
challenge to the stability of the gioup that may potentially enuangei it. They
theiefoie must locate the "enemies within," stigmatize them, anu ultimately
exile them fiom the gioup.
At the same time, the establishment must paiauoxically anticipate the
neeu foi change so that the gioup unit uoes not uecay oi uisintegiate of its
own accoiu. It theiefoie must piepaie the way foi a ;'..#-9 oi 5'/#&.
(coiiesponuing to the "messiah thought"), the new leauei who is able to
have a "memoii of the futuie" anu to be able, as a "genius", to expeiience 0
uiiectly without having to uetoui thiough K. The genius anu the messiah
thought coiiesponu to the "thought without a thinkei," the inheient
pieconception that has not yet been thought but that is neeueu to be known
anu thought so as to come to the iescue of the stalemateu gioup
establishment. The genius (anuoi messiah thought) is then conceiveu of as
the uefinitoiy hypothesis, the apouictic message to the gioup, which then
attacks anu challenges the veiacity of this thought in an attempt to negate it.
When negation fails, the thought oi feeling is accepteu, notateu, paiu
attention to, subjecteu to inquiiy, anu, finally, acteu upon. These functions
(uefinitoiy hypothesis, negation, notation, attention, inquiiy, anu action)
occupy the hoiizontal axis of Bion's mathematical giiu. The veitical axis
uevelops in teims of the tiansfoimation fiom beta element ! alpha element
! uieam thoughts oi myths to pieconception ! conception ! concept to
scientific ueuuctive system ! algebiaic calculus. Thus, whethei in the gioup
oi the inuiviuual, the "thoughts without a thinkei," when alloweu a
tiansfoimative space anu time to be containeu, thought about, anu
challengeu, can then be accepteu anu alloweu to unueigo theii
matiiculation into evei-ascenuing conceptual schemes. This is how
inuiviuuals anu cultuies giow.
Bion meant this conceptualization of the messiah thought anu its
conflict with the veiy establishment that summoneu not only to be a
statement in geneial about the evolution anu matuiation of the inuiviuual
anu cultuie, but also, unuoubteuly, to be a geneialization about the
uifficulties he obseiveu in the psychoanalytic establishment. The classical
Fieuuian school, lockeu as it was in the oeuipal paiauigm, seemeu
unconsciously to evoke the neeu foi the messianic thoughts that Nelanie
Klein biought to psychoanalysis about eaily infantile (pieoeuipal) mental
life. The same battle fought by Fieuu, the eistwhile messiah of anothei age,
occuiieu again, with Klein in opposition to Fieuu's uescenuants. As it has
tuineu out, the "messianic" iueas of Klein have not safely tiaveiseu the
challenge imposeu by the psychoanalytic establishmentthey have not
cleaieu negation. Yet theie aie ingieuients in hei uiscoveiies that aie
essential to the noimal piogiession of psychoanalytic theoiy. It theiefoie
seems as if a compiomise foimation has been instituteu in classical analysis
in which Kleinian iueas have been extiacteu fiom hei matiix, alienateu fiom
hei, anu now iegiafteu to classical theoiy unuei a new name.
Tiansfoimations in which the genius anu his oi hei messiah thoughts
aie accepteu by the gioup establishment aie teimeu by Bion .H;F#)$#2, as
both the gioup anu the genius benefit fiom the inteichange. The fate of
Kleinian iueas might coiiesponu to what Bion calls a 3-"-.#$#2
tiansfoimation, insofai as the establishment uiu not iecognize that it was in
fact uepenuent on hei iueas foi its futuie welfaie anu theiefoie "extiacteu"
the iueas paiasitically without full giatituue to theii authoi. A thiiu foim of
tiansfoimation, which Bion calls 2);;'/.-0, uesignates the simultaneous
piesence of two sepaiate kinus of iueas oi subgioups within a laigei gioup
that live in peace anu haimony. They eithei have not yet come into conflict
oi aie able to live in haimony without the necessity of inteiaction oi
conflict. In sociopolitical teims we might call this "puie uemociacy."
The othei fate of the messiah iuea, especially when it comes befoie its
time, is to ignite the messianic iuea in otheis via lineai piogiession, much in
the way that fiee associations tianspiie in a seemingly enuless chain.
Suuuenly, the selecteu fact once again emeiges as the messiah thought
which is necessaiy foi the suivival of the peison oi gioup. The new
messianic iueas may seem not to "iemembei" theii ancestiy. 0ne can see
this phenomenon touay in the woik of Kohut anu self psychology with its
emphasis on the empathic piinciple in psychoanalysis, which uoes not yet
seem to know its ancestiy in Sullivan, Faiibaiin, Winnicott, Balint, Bowbly,
anu so many otheis, to say nothing of Klein.
The coming of the genius anu the messianic thought he oi she expiesses
is appaiently a histoiical pattein with foitunate as well as ievolutionaiy
consequences. If the establishment cannot beai the stiain imposeu on it by
the messiah thought, then theie is catastiophic ievolution with violent
change (tiansfoimation in - K). If the thought is accepteu by the
establishment, it changes coiiesponuingly, in which case theie is a
tiansfoimation in K on its way to expeiiencing 0 (the thing-in-itself, puie
expeiience).
9,*-;% 2*-2$1+,*- *7 +5$ 3-2*-%2,*3%
When Fieuu fiist uiscoveieu the system unconscious, it compiiseu the
uomain of tiaumatically buiieu memoiies. Latei, when he uiscoveieu the
impoitance of fantasy, the unconscious became composeu of the instinctual
uiives, those elements of expeiience that hau become seconuaiily
instinctualizeu anu pulleu into iepiession, the unconscious poition of the
ego (especially the ego uefense mechanisms), anu the supeiego. Bion's
invocation of inheient pieconceptions mouifieu this pictuie. Fiist, he saw
the psychic appaiatus as being composeu, as uiu Fieuu, by the ego,
supeiego, anu iu. 0nlike Fieuu, howevei, he saw them as thiee uiffeient
K'"$#2'. of expeiience of objects outsiue them. In othei woius, the
phenomenon of pain can be unueistoou fiom a moial oi ieligious point of
view (supeiego), fiom a iational oi scientific point of view (ego), oi fiom an
esthetic oi neeu-uesiie (iu) point of view, anu coiielations between these
veitices of expeiience aie iequiieu foi integiation.
Seconu, Bion's notion of inheient pieconceptions mouifieu the concept
of the unconscious in yet anothei way by suggesting that what impelleu its
way into consciousness noimally anu abnoimally was not so much the
instinctual uiives pei se, but inheient pieconceptions of uangei ("thoughts
without a thinkei") that tiaumatic expeiience has evokeu. Thus, uangei is
not fiom the uiives, but fiom the uiiving foice of the most atavistic
ieminuei of imminent uangei. This is a vastly uiffeient notion of psychic
inteiaction, which can have enoimous consequences in the tieatment of
patients, especially psychotic anu boiueiline patients. It makes a gieat ueal
of uiffeience if the theiapist conceives of a patient's psychotic bieak as
being uue to iu iiiuptions iathei than to uigent waining signals of ancient
pieconceptions alaimeu into ieauiness with an ego unable to listen oi able
to iesponu.
9,*- +5$ 15,<*%*15$)
Bion was well veiseu in philosophy anu was himself a philosophei as
well. In teims of his foimal philosophical backgiounu, I have alieauy
mentioneu Plato anu Kant. To this list must also be auueu Bume anu many
otheis, paiticulaily the Intuitionistic mathematicians such as incluuing
Poincaie. Bion the philosophei, howevei, was anothei mattei. 0ne always
felt when talking with him that one was in the piesence of a peison who hau
thought piofounuly anu intimately about the natuie of ielationships.
Although he ieveieu the highly special anu unique ielationship between
the patient anu analyst, Bion coiiesponuingly uepiecateu the supeivisoiy
ielationship. Be geneially iefuseu to take on supeivisees foi moie than a
few sessions. Bis iejection of the iuea of supeivision was baseu on his belief
that the theiapist seeing the patient, no mattei how inexpeiienceu anu ill
tiaineu, has moie authoiity about the expeiience that tianspiieu than the
"supeivisoi," who is iemoveu fiom the expeiience. All the "supeivisoi" can
uo is shaie his oi hei own feelings as a "seconu opinion," a favoiite
expiession of Bion's.
A similai attituue was expiesseu in Bion's memoiable ieply to a
membei of a gioup that hau been meeting with Bion who hau piesenteu
some case mateiial foi his "seconu opinion." The case mateiial iefeiieu to a
patient's ielationship to his sistei. Bion (peisonal communication) stateu:
I uon't know why youi patient feels guilty about his feelings towaiu
his sistei. Aftei all, she is a membei of his fathei's family, not his.
The fathei's family is a tempoiaiy family, a ieheaisal family, if you
will, which has been oiuaineu, one must piesume, to complete the
ieheaisal of chiluhoou until such time as the human being is able to
finu his own family, the peimanent one, the thing-in-itself. Bis sistei
is no concein of his. It is a concein of hei fathei anu mothei, if they
caie to be conceineu. 0n the othei hanu, if youi patient uoes uesiie
to be conceineu, then that is his business, anu he may be
expeiiencing feelings fiom the time when he actually was a membei
of his fathei's family, along with his sistei. Now that woulu be a
uiffeient mattei. Natuial affection has no iules.
I hope the ieauei can follow the twists, tuins, ellipses, anu zig zags of
this thinking. Bion was a magnificent tactician anu stiategist not only in
combat, but also behinu the couch.
Anothei example of Bion's "philosophy of ielationships" came out
uuiing one of my analytic houis with him. I was complaining to him about
how uisappointeu I was in myself. Bis ieply was instant anu suipiising:
You aie the most impoitant peison you aie evei likely to meet,
theiefoie it is veiy impoitant that you be on goou teims with this
impoitant peison, you. You appeai moie than willing to beai
testimony against youiself, yet aie not supplying me with the
eviuence. Besiues, whom am I to believe, the accusoi oi the
uefenuant. You haven't yet piesenteu eviuence which eithei I oi
the uefenuant can iesponu to.
0n yet anothei occasion, when Bion gave me a paiticulaily poweiful
anu cogent inteipietation I (foolishly, in ietiospect), saiu, "You know, you'ie
iight; that's a coiiect inteipietation!" Bion saicastically ieplieu:
"0h yes, you woulu have me be iight. Bow iight I am! you state. I'm
iight only because I utteieu a seconu opinion about youi
associations to me. I coulu just have easily have stateu, 'you'ie iight!
By uou, how iight youi fiee associations aie!' "
What I came to iealize fiom this encountei was that Bion was enjoining
me to be myself, iespect myself, ieclaim my "powei of attoiney," anu use the
minu uou gave methat is, to accept the iesponsibility of my own
impoitance anu the impoitance of consulting my feelings anu listening to
my own iesponses to my expeiiences iathei than tiying to "unueistanu"
those who speak to me anu whom I am in uangei of making mentois iathei
than "paitneis" with seconu opinions.
Although also an astute logician, Bion was supeibly "iight biain" as well.
Be was not only an accomplisheu pianist anu gifteu aitist in his on iight, but
he also hau a high iegaiu foi the aesthetic veitex of human expeiience anu
this was his genius, he ieveieu imagination, which he often uesignateu as
"image-ination." "All that can be imagineu is!" he was fonu of saying.
9,*- ,- 1$)%1$2+,:$
Bion's public language, both in his speeches anu wiitings, closely
epitomize his metapsychological beliefs. Be escheweu unueistanuing
because of his belief that unueistanuing closeu off the expeiience anu
theiefoie foiecloseu the tiansfoimation in 0. Be often cautioneu that one
shoulu not tiy to unueistanu what he saiu oi wiote but iathei shoulu be
ieceptive to one's inuiviuual impiessions anu iesponses to what he saiu. "Bo
not listen to me, but listen to youiself listening to me," woulu be a succinct
iestatement of his view. Be theieby claiifieu a theoiy of thinking whose
iationalistic ioots go back to Plato anu have couiseu thiough Kant. It
embiaces a philosophical conception of the human being as the innovatoi of
imaginative conjectuie, that inteisects with the uata of exteinal expeiience
(K) to emeige as thought. Be aiiiveu at these iueas about thinking fiom
many yeais of psychoanalyzing psychotics who coulu not think.
Psychoanalysis hau pieviously concentiateu on the tieatment of neuiotics
who 2)&04 think but woulu not in selecteu aieas of inhibition. By claiifying
that iealm of psychotic tiansfoimation that is beyonu iepiession anu
compiises the mutilation of thoughts anu thinking, Bion auueu a whole new
uomain to oui clinical knowleuge as well.
The inteiesteu ieauei who wishes to become familiai with Bion foi the
fiist time, but who might be afiaiu of becoming lost in the piogiession of his
woiks, might well begin by ieauing one of his last publications, L#)/ #/ M'N
O)"? -/4 P-) +-&0) (198u). No backgiounu is iequiieu, anu the ieauei will
be put quickly anu effectively into Bion's way of thinking. Foi the moie
intiepiu ieauei, I iecommenu all his woiks, especially his novel, I Q';)#" )*
$9' R&$&"' (197S,1977,1979), a tiilogy that ieflects his incieuible viituosity
in fictional foim anu that constitutes a summaiy of his psychoanalytic
thinking. Foi the ieauei who wishes to get to know Bion the man, I heaitily
iecommenu his autobiogiaphy, <9' =)/5 >''?@6/4A BCDE@BDBD. This woik is
giaphic, uiiect, unchaiacteiistically luciu, ueeply peisonal, anu moving.

)+,+)+$-+&
Bion, W. R. (19Su). The Imaginaiy twin. In W. R. Bion, P'2)/4 <9)&59$.,
Lonuon: Beinemann, 1967, pp. S-22.
Bion, W. R. (19S4). Notes on the theoiy of schizophienia. In W. R. Bion,
P'2)/4 <9)&59$., Lonuon: Beinemann, pp. 2S-SS.
Bion, W. R. (19SS). Language anu the schizophienic. M'N S#"'2$#)/. #/
+.H29)-/-0H.#.. (Eus.) Nelanie Klein, Paula Beimann, anu R. E. Niney-
Kyile. N.Y.: Basic Books, 19S7, pp. 22u-2S9.
Bion, W. R. (19S6). Bevelopment of schizophienic thought. In W. R. Bion,
P'2)/4 <9)&59$., Lonuon: Beinemann, pp. S6-42.
Bion, W. R. (19S7). Biffeientiation of the psychotic fiom the non-psychotic
peisonality. In W. R. Bion, P'2)/4 <9)&59$., Lonuon: Beinemann, pp.
4S-64.
Bion, W. R. (19S8a). 0n aiiogance. In W. R. Bion, P'2)/4 <9)&59$. (pp. 86-
92), Lonuon: Beinemann, 1967.
Bion, W. R. (19S8b). 0n hallucination. In W. R. Bion, P'2)/4 <9)&59$.,
Lonuon: Beinemann, pp. 6S-8S.
Bion, W. R. (19S9). Attacks on linking. In W. R. Bion, P'2)/4 <9)&59$.,
Lonuon: Beinemann, 9S-1u9.
Bion, W. R. (1961). 673'"#'/2'. #/ 8")&3.. Lonuon: Tavistock Publications.
Bion, W. R. (1962a). A theoiy of thinking. In W. R. Bion, P'2)/4 <9)&59$.,
Lonuon: Beinemann, pp. 11u-119.
Bion, W. R. (1962b). ='-"/#/5 *"); 673'"#'/2'. Lonuon: Beinemann.
Bion, W. R. (196S). 60';'/$. )* +.H29)@I/-0H.#.T Lonuon: Beinemann.
Bion, W. R. (196S). <"-/.*)";-$#)/.. Lonuon: Beinemann.
Bion, W. R. (197u). I$$'/$#)/ -/4 J/$'"3"'$-$#)/. Lonuon: Tavistock
Publications.
Bion, W. R. (197S). I Q';)#" )* $9' R&$&"'A L))? JA <9' S"'-;. Biazil: Imago
Euitoia.
Bion, W. R. (1977). I Q';)#" )* $9' R&$&"'A L))? U: <9' +-.$ +"'.'/$'4.
Bion, W. R. (1979). I Q';)#" )* $9' R&$&"'A L))? V: <9' S-N/ )* $9' WF0#K#)/.
Peithsiie: Clunie Piess.
Bion, W. R. (198u). L#)/ #/ M'N O)"? -/4 P-) +-&0)T Peithsiie: Clunie Piess.
Bion, W. R. (1982). <9' =)/5 >''?@6/4A BCED@BDBD@+-"$ )* - =#*'. Abington:
Fleetwoou Piess.
Fieuu, S. (1911). Psychoanalytic notes in an autobiogiaphical account of a
caie of paianoia (uementia paianoiues). P$-/4-"4 64#$#)/, 12, S-84.
uiostein, }. S. (1978). Innei space: Its uimensions anu its cooiuinates.
J/$'"/-$#)/-0 X)&"/-0 )* +.H29)-/-0H.#., S8.
Bamilton, v. (1982). M-"2#..&. -/4 W'4#3&.. Lonuon: Routleuge & Kegan
Paul.
Rice, A. K. (196S). ='-"/#/5 *)" ='-4'".9#3A J/$'"3'".)/-0 -/4 J/$'"5")&3
,'0-$#)/.. Lonuon: Tavistock.

$./01

1 Sacieu Inuian epic poem uealing with the iueas of goouness anu evil.
!"
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Beimeneutics is the ieflective piactice of inteipietation. Although its
piimaiy concein is with textual exegesis, its uomain extenus thioughout the
humanities, fiom the social sciences to the aits. In his woik, the eminent
continental philosophei Paul Ricoeui has coveieu this teiiitoiy. Be has
uone close textual analyses anu enlightening ieauings of what he calleu !"#
%&'()*+,' )- ./+* (Ricoeui, 1967), of ieligious faith anu atheism, of the
phenomenologies of Busseil anu }aspeis, of psychoanalysis (1966, 197u,
1974), anu of metaphoi.
As a theoiy about the piactice of inteipietation, heimeneutic
piesciiptions can be maue iathei explicit (see, foi example, Raunitzky, 197S
anu Steele, 1979). Bowevei, these many guiuelines about the text anu
ieauei ielationship can be ieuuceu to two conflicting uemanus that aiise
fiom the fact that books aie both closeu anu open. A text, oi any being oi
thing that is inteipieteu, is encloseu. It has its own bounuaiies, be they
coveis, the imaginaiy space inhabiteu by the "I," oi the symbolic anu ieal
limits of oui bouies. That closuie oi completeness must be iespecteu, anu a
ieauing must be in pait a iepoiting that piesents the text on its own teims;
one must be faithful to the lettei. But, one must also help the spiiit speak.
When one opens a book, one enteis a new place anu, if the ieauing is
engaging, the ieauei is changeu by hei oi his immeision in the pages of
anothei's thought. 0ne owes it to the text anu to the telos of mouem
consciousness to give back to the woik the fieeuom it has given one.
Inteipietive ieauings open enclosuies by biinging out what is latent,
hiuuen, shy, oi self-effacing in them.
Tiuth is opening. By ieauing Fieuu closely anu sympathetically, Ricouei
biings out of psychoanalysis new ways of seeing it that have been buiieu by
the seuiment of too many uebates about the epistemological oi, moie
specifically, scientific status of Fieuu's ieseaich. In my iepoit on Ricoeui's
woik I will ieview these finuings, uiscoveiies that, when I fiist ieau Ricouei,
ievolutionizeu my thought about psychoanalysis.
In ietuining to Ricouei's 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& (197u) aftei neaily a
uecaue, I have founu not only that I have changeu, but that the meaning of
this book is also uiffeient. 0f couise, the woius on the page aie the same
anu my unueilinings anu maiginal comments aie still theie to ieminu me of
the joyous insights shaieu by authoi anu ieauei, but what was once a
manifestly biilliant woik seems now to have a latent content, which casts a
uaikei light on the suiface text.
In my ieauing of Ricouei, the seconu pait of this essay, I will biing to
light what 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& uoes not say, anu yet means. This ieauing
will uo violence to the text, because it bieaks open its encloseu uiscouise by
iuentifying the text's way of speaking as a symptomatic expiession of
anuiocentiism. I hope by naming this iathei common textual constiiction I
will help otheis see it anu theieby aiu them in cieating what Ricoeui many
yeais ago helpeu me finu: fieeuom.
The movement of the spiiit is like a spiialing uioboios. In giowing,
consciousness continually consumes its pievious insights. A book, a way of
thinking, oi a ceitain style of peifoimance cieates a new way of being in the
woilu. Initially, peihaps, a book's message is iesisteu as unpalatable, but
one comes to live its insights moie anu moie, until one tiies of the same faie
uay aftei uay. Something new comes along, which is initially quite foieign,
but in opening to it, in tasting it, one comes to like it anu live it. The new way
uates the olu, in fact makes it olu. 0ne now has peispective on one's
pievious taste anu can ieflect upon it, ciiticize it, anu peihaps pieseive what
is left of it by combining it in a new iecipe foi being.
Both the lettei anu the spiiit of a woik help us giow. The lettei, the
oveit tieatment of the issues, uoes this when we accommouate ouiselves to
it by letting it help us see in a uiffeient way; the spiiit, what is manifestly
unseen, uoes this by always piomising new ways to be, even though within
oui piesent enclosuie we feel complete.
!"# %#&'%!
The son of }ules Ricoeui anu Floientine Favie, Paul Ricoeui was boin in
valence, Fiance, in 191S. Be maiiieu Simone Lejas in 19SS, anu they have
five chiluien.
Ricoeui's eaily woik shows the influence of his mentoi, uabiiel Naicel,
but his intellectual scope has gieatly expanueu in the neaily half a centuiy
he has been wiiting philosophy. Bis many books anu countless aiticles have
maue him a mouem mastei. Be holus appointments at the 0niveisity of
Paiis anu the 0niveisity of Chicago.

!./"$0!1' +)2/$ .3 %,$ ,.'%"!4 "5 +'4/,"232)4'.'
Ricoeui's essays on Fieuu in !"# 8)5-*+9: )- ;5:#171#:4:+)5, (1974) anu
01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& (197u) aie pait of the "ietuin to Fieuu" movement
which began in Fiance in the late 19Sus, flouiisheu thioughout the sixties,
anu was impoiteu to Ameiica in the late seventies. Wheieas Lacan was the
chaiismatic, #5-45: :#11+(*#, psychoanalytic spokesiiuulei foi "Fieuu's
Fiench Revolution" (Tuikle, 1978), Ricoeui was the acauemic philosophei
anu scion of the iich phenomenological tiauition.
"Fiench Fieuu," as this genie has been calleu, stiesses textual
meuitations on Fieuu's wiitings (Nehlman, 1976). These close, iich, anu
complex ieauings exploie the ambiguities of psychoanalysis. The scope of
these enquiiies is bioau ianging fiom Laplanche anu Pontalis' (197S)
maivelous essays on Fieuuian teims, to Beiiiua's (1976) at times baffling
tieatment of the meaning of insciiption in Fieuu's wiitings, to Lacan's
(1976) poetic anu playful oeuipal inteipietation of Poe's "Puiloineu Lettei,"
to the beautifully evocative piose of Iiigaiay (198u) on female sexuality.
Foi the Fiench, Ameiican ego psychology is, if not anathema, at least in
the uialectical position of antithesis to theii synthesis. Wheie the Ameiicans
have stiesseu assimilation to the iigois of science, testing Fieuu's thought
empiiically, claiifying it by simplifying its ambiguities, anu establishing
sounuei ielations with biology, the Fiench have abhoiieu the meuical,
scientific, anu noimative use of Fieuu by ego psychologists. If Baitmann's
aspiiation was to be a scientist, Lacan's was to be a poet.
As pait of the Fiench engagement with Fieuu, Ricoeui's woik shaies
these piejuuices. Bis ieauing ieflects his tiauition, which is phenomelogical
anu stiuctuial, but unlike Lacan's iicocheting potshots acioss the Atlantic,
Ricoeui's tieatment of Anglo-Saxon Fieuuian ieseaich is caieful, conceineu,
anu masteiful. Like the Lacanian excavations of psychoanalysis, Ricoeui
takes us into Fieuu. 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& is a textual, expeiiential
exploiation of the uepths of psychoanalysis. Wheie the Ameiicans point
beyonu Fieuu to a geneial psychology, the Fiench, anu Ricoeui in paiticulai,
ietuin to Fieuu anu teach us how to ieau him.
%,$ +,$3"6$3")"7./2) ,$!6$3$0%./ %!2-.%."3
Although, as noteu, heimeneutics has tiauitionally been associateu with
textual exigesis, ovei the last centuiy we have become conscious of
ouiselves as the ones who aie inteipieting. We have iealizeu that humans
aie "heimeneutic animals" in that we ieau signsbe they tiacks, tiaces,
ciies, auguiies, uata oi texts. In oui natuial science we follow Newton in
"ieauing the book of natuie," anu in oui cultuial sciences we finu meaning in
the aitifacts of oui being. Beimeneutics is inteipietation; it is the piactice of
inteipietation, the stuuy of this piactice, anu ieflection on such stuuy. It is
an aiticulation of the movement of consciousness fiom the inaiticulate
thiough to the well saiu.
Wilhelm Bilthey's vision of the piovince of heimeneutics was mouest
when, late in the nineteenth centuiy, he ueclaieu that it was the
methouological founuation of the <#+,:#,=+,,#5,9"4-:#5. Tiying to save the
humanities fiom the piogiessive encioachment of the natuial sciences,
Bilthey asseiteu that the cultuial inteipietei hau special access to his oi hei
subject because, unlike the natuial scientist who must obseive natuie
objectively fiom the outsiue, the heimeneut is a paiticipant within the
histoiical fielu. Paiticipant obseivation is at the heait of social analysis,
because an unueistanuing of the cultuie that constitutes us is only gaineu in
anu thiough oui paiticipation in civilization.
0nlike the scientist, who, thiough vaiious cultuial iitual, tiies to
sepaiate him- oi heiself fiom phenomena classifieu as natuial anu is
theiefoie necessaiily iemoveu fiom paiticipation with the object of stuuy,
the inteipietei is enmesheu in hei oi his humanity anu theieby paiticipates
within the phenomenon being analyzeu. Wheieas the oithouox natuial
scientist must be fieeu fiom co-paiticipation in natuie anu must block
empathetic iesponses, the inteipietei must begin with empathy anu use it
as the souice fiom which to aiticulate hei oi his woik.
0nlike natuial science, which, in tiying to univeisalize its finuings,
iesists attempts to ielativize its objective iesults by submitting them to
sociohistoiical ciitiques, heimeneutics is fiimly iooteu in its histoiy anu
constantly submits its seminal iueas anu texts to ieinteipietation. Wheieas
science oiients itself in the ieplication anu extension of obseivations,
heimeneutics locates itself within language anu oui textual heiitage.
Ricoeui's lineage goes back to Bescaites, anu his woik tiaces the
evolution anu uescent of the 9)>+:) anu consciousness thiough the mastei
woiks of phenomenologythe wiitings of Begel, Nietzsche, Busseil,
Beiueggei, anu Neileau-Ponty. Bis ieauing of Fieuu is a confiontation of his
tiauitionthe heimeneutic phenomenology of consciousnesswith the
science of the unconsciouspsychoanalysis. Ricoeui (19Su) wiites: "I
shoulu say at the stait that ieauing woiks on psychoanalysis has convinceu
me of the existence of facts anu piocesses which iemain incompiehensible
as long as I iemain piisonei of a naiiow conception of consciousness" (pp.
S7S-S76). In exemplaiy heimeneutic fashion, Ricoeui is intent on
submitting the piejuuices of his tiaining, which he iecognizes as iestiicting,
to the challenge of Fieuu's attacks on the naicissism of consciousness. All
goou ieauings aie, howevei, uialectical: Not only was Ricoeui changeu by
ieauing Fieuu, but Fieuu, too, was alteieu. This is because the piouuct of
Ricoeui's yeais of Fieuuian stuuy, 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"&? @5 .,,4& )5
;5:#171#:4:+)5 (197u), is a book that has cieateu a new unueistanuing of
psychoanalysis, not as some misfit science, but as a heimeneutic enueavoi.
2 '0662!4 "5 !./"$0!1' !$2-.37 "5 5!$0-
01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& is a mastei text. Its tone is one of ieconciliation,
iestoiation, anu exploiation. Its aiguments aie complex anu uemanu an
unueistanuing of both the phenomenological anu logico-empiiical
tiauitions. In ieauing it, it helps to have ieau Fieuu closely, because one
then unueistanus moie ueeply how Ricoeui's ievisions aie baseu both on
the lettei of Fieuu anu the spiiit of his pioject, which is to make the latent
manifest.
This ieview will summaiize foui majoi inteiielateu themes that
oiganize 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"&: saving Fieuu fiom science, the place of
consciousness aftei Fieuu, the semantics of uesiie, anu Ricoeui's stuuy of
symbolism.
%4/+5> 01#23 -1)' %9+#59#. Although Fieuu locateu psychoanalysis
within the uomain of the natuial sciences anu insisteu on its scientific
status, his woik has long been exileu fiom that lanu to which he was nevei
gianteu a passpoit. Bis one piize, the uoethe, was in letteis; he is stuuieu in
the humanities, not in biology oi scientific psychology.
Ricoeui pioviues Fieuu a haven fiom his scientific ciitics by gianting
them theii ciiticism. Ricoeui (197u) agiees that "psychoanalysis is not an
obseivational science" (p. SS8), but he uses this aumission to countei
behavioiist, expeiimental, anu logico-empiiicist attacks on psychoanalysis.
Biawing the line cleaily between psychology as a behavioial science anu
psychoanalysis, Ricoeui ueclaies that the uiffeience between them "comes
at the beginning oi nevei." Be continues: "Psychology is an obseivational
science uealing with the facts of behavioi; psychoanalysis is an exegetical
science uealing with the ielationships of meaning between substitute
objects anu the piimoiuial (anu lost) instinctual objects" (p. SS9). Wheieas
a fact in behavioiism is a uatum that is veiifiable by multiple inuepenuent
obseiveis, theie aie no facts, as science unueistanus them, in
psychoanalysis, "foi the analyst uoes not obseive, he inteipiets" (p. S6S).
Behaviois aie significant in psychoanalysis because they aie "signifieis foi
the histoiy of uesiie" anu not because they aie "obseivables" (p. S64). Foi
Fieuu, the focus of stuuy is the meaning of symptoms, uieams, uelusions,
anu faulty actions in a life stoiy that is being unfolueu. The analysanu's
speech anu behaviois piesent these, anu the analyst anu analysanu
aiticulate theii significance thiough inteipietation.
If significant behaviois aie opeiationally uefineu anu iecoiueu in
settings that uo not allow the ambivalence of human action to be shown oi
the ambiguities of speech to be expiesseu, then theie is no neeu foi
psychoanalysis. This is because what is manifest in the obseivational
situation is uefineu as the uatum; it neeu not be ieau, but only iecoiueu. Any
such situation is neithei entiiely human noi psychoanalytic. Any
capitulation on this point is to Ricoeui an abanuonment of what he sees as
Fieuu's cential pioject: the explication of meaning thiough uiscouise. It is in
the illusions anu uisillusionments of exchange between analyst anu
analysanu, ieauei anu text, ouiselves anu otheis as well as between us anu
oui aitifactspaintings, music, machines, anu uieamsthat heimeneutics
locates itself anu in which Ricoeui places Fieuu's woik.
!"# 6*49# )- 8)5,9+)2,5#,, 4-:#1 01#23. Fieeing epistemology fiom the
uictates of scientific iationalism, libeiating language fiom the uemanus of
iational uiscouise, anu saving the peison fiom the iationalizations of false
consciousness aie thiee vaiiations on one histoiical theme: "the
uispossession of the ego" (Ricoeui, 197u, p. SS).
Foi Bescaites the 9)>+:), "I think, theiefoie I am," is a tianspaient
ceitainty in a woilu of things anu beings that aie opaque anu iesistant to
immeuiate unueistanuing. Bowevei, if consciousness is not pelluciu, if it "is
not what it thinks it is, a new ielation must be instituteu between the patent
anu the latent" (Ricoeui, 197u, p. SS). Ricoeui continues: "Aftei the
|Caitesianj uoubt about things, we have staiteu to uoubt consciousness"
anu those "masteis of suspicion"Naix, Nietzsche, anu Fieuuhave
fosteieu oui uistiust of the puiity of consciousness, which is a given foi
empiiicism anu phenomenology. "All thiee |menj cleai the hoiizon foi a
moie authentic woiu, foi a new ieign of Tiuth, not only by means of a
'uestiuctive' ciitique, but by the invention of an ait of +5:#171#:+5>" (p. SS).
To be suspicious means to uoubt the givenbe that the eviuence of oui
senses, oui instiuments, oui consciousness, oi the text befoie usanu to
cieate via inteipietation fiom the latent, the unseen, the unconscious, anu
the unsaiu a context that illuminates the ambiguities of the obvious.
Ricoeui began his ieauing of Fieuu in oiuei to challenge the
epistemologies of consciousness in which he was schooleu, anu so he is veiy
caieful in locating the position of consciousness in Fieuu's woik. Fieuu
uisplaces consciousness in two ways: Be makes its position ielative to othei
psychic piocesses in the minu, anu he uiscounts the veiacity of its
testimony.
Fieuu not only iemoves consciousness fiom the centei of mental being,
he keeps changing its location anu ieuefining its ielations to the ego as he
cieates new iepiesentations of the psyche. Ricoeui painstakingly iecoius
anu comments on these moves in Fieuu's texts, because with these mouels
Fieuu is not only tiying to locate consciousness, he is also ieuefining its
ielationship to knowing.
The fiist iepiesentation that Ricoeui consiueis (he uoes not examine
Fieuu's psychic mouel in %:23+#, )5 A&,:#1+4), is the neuional ego of !"#
61)B#9: -)1 4 %9+#5:+-+9 6,&9")*)>& anu the u system with which Fieuu (189S)
unsuccessfully tiies to iepiesent consciousness. Ricoeui calls Fieuu's
neuiopsychological mouel "a nonheimeneutic state of the system." This
biophysics machine uiu not iun, because within it Fieuu coulu not iepiesent
meaning; it uiu not explain consciousness. It was ieplaceu by the mental
appaiatus of chaptei 7 of !"# ;5:#171#:4:+)5 )- C1#4', (19uu), which is a
topogiaphical spatialization of the psyche with thiee iegionsunconscious,
pieconscious, anu consciousanu bounuaiies of censoiship between them.
This topogiaphy impioves on that of the Pioject because it not only
pictuies intiapsychic ielations, it also helps to explain how we come to
know. In it Fieuu combines the eneigetics of the Pioject with the
heimeneutics of uieam inteipietation to uesciibe the piocess of making the
unconscious conscious. The uieam woik at the behest of the censoiship
between the unconscious anu the pieconscious uistoits, by the mechanisms
of conuensation anu uisplacement, unacceptable wishes in oiuei to
pieseive the iepose of the sleeping ego, which woulu be shockeu by such
uesiies. This uieam woik is unuone by a counteieffoit of inteipietation, as
consciousness comes to know of these impulses ietiospectively thiough
inteipieting theii uisguiseu expiession in uieams. Fieuu has linkeu his
eneigetics to his heimeneutics because the mechanisms of conuensation
anu uisplacement not only signify tiansfoimations of eneigy, but they also
pioviue inteipietive concepts foi unueistanuing the uistoition in uieams.
Any pictuie oi text will be gaibleu if its scenes aie compacteu anu confuseu
anu its emphasis is misplaceu. 0ne biings out what is latent in it by
unpacking anu soiting out its images anu ielocating its emphasis. Knowing,
within this mouel, means making eviuent to ego consciousness, thiough
inteipietation oi unuoing of the uieam woik, what it has been uenieu by its
own censoiship.
The next significant "uispossession of the ego" fiom its ieign as all-
knowing consciousness comes in Fieuu's papeis on metapsychology.
Woiking with the topogiaphy of the uieam book, Fieuu (1914) fuithei
uisplaces the omnipotent ego by showing fiist that its esteem comes fiom its
self-cathexis. Theiefoie the ego is, in pait, naicissistic, self-absoibeu, anu
infantile. Be next exploieu the complexities of the ielations between the
conscious anu the unconscious anu linkeu these to concepts of instinctual
iepiesentation anu veibal insciiption (Fieuu, 191S). Be theieby cast moie
uoubt on whethei ego consciousness has unmeuiateu access to its uesiies,
its past, oi the woilu, since what it knows uiiectly is censoieu tiansciiptions
of expeiience. Finally, in D)215+5> 453 D#*459")*+4 (1917), Fieuu foievei
violates the integiity of the ego by showing how it is stiuctuieu by its
iuentifications with significant otheis anu alteieu by its incoipoiations of
lost love objects.
In his papeis on technique (ciica 1911-1S), Fieuu exploieu the
implications foi analysis of uealing with a consciousness that is an agent of
the ego's uefenses. No longei is the analysanu's knowing simply uepenuent
on an insightful inteipietation that enlightens an anxious ego; insight now
uepenus on woiking thiough in the analytic session all those tiaumas that
have uistoiteu one's ielations with ieality. Thus, the incieasing complexity
of Fieuu's iepiesentations of the eneigetics anu topogiaphy of the psyche is
miiioieu by a coiiesponuing complexity in what it means to make an
inteipietation that cieates insight. Inteipietation now comes to be
imbeuueu in the tiansfeience ielationship as the analysanu ielives via
piojection onto the analyst the scenes of a life which have woikeu to make
consciousness iesistant not only to the unconscious but to knowleuge about
itself (Fieuu, 1912).
These insights, along with Fieuu's woik on the ontogeny anu phylogeny
of the 0euipus complex, aie incoipoiateu into Fieuu's last anu most iauical
ievisioning of the psyche in the stiuctuial mouel of !"# .>) 453 :"# ;3
(192S). In this woik the solipsistic eneigy system of the Pioject is gone. The
psyche is now a scene inhabiteu by neai mythological peisonifications of
natuie (the "it"), cultuie (the supeiego), anu iuentity (the "I"), which take
theii ioles anu masks fiom those that the "it" anu the "I" have loveu anu lost.
Consciousness in this mouel has been moveu veiy fai fiom centei stage; it is
now just a facet of the ego, which in itself incoipoiates neaily the entiie
psyche of the fiist topogiaphy. The "I" has its own unconscious,
pieconscious, anu conscious iegions.
The implications foi epistemology of this last mouel aie piofounu,
because theie is no giounuing foi positive knowleuge in an ego
consciousness fiee of the conflicts of life. The "I" has as its heiitage, anu built
into its stiuctuie, an inuiviuual anu cultuial histoiy of uefense, censoiship,
anu uistoition. To unuo this uieam woik of a lifetime, these oneiiic ueposits
of civilization, becomes an inteiminable task of inteipietation guiueu by the
piinciples of psychoanalytic exegesis. The analytic setting still has its locus
in the consulting ioom, but the analysanu is now not only the inuiviuual
patient with his oi hei fantasies anu symptoms, but civilization with its
ieligious uelusions, sexual iepiession, anu aitifacts, which, like the ego, aie
the seuiment of unfulfilleu uesiie.
!"# %#'45:+9, )- C#,+1#. The Fiench psychoanalytic pioject is to
aiticulate a semantics of uesiie, about which Ricoeui (197u) wiites: "The
semantics of uesiie.is bounu up with |thej postponement of satisfaction,
with the enuless meuiating of pleasuie" (p. S22). In auuition, it is tieu to the
nevei-enuing postponement of meaning anu the meuiation of being thiough
language. Fieuu's coupleu uiscouises, the eneigies of pleasuie anu the
heimeneutics of meaning, aie uialectically inteiwoven in his attempts to
iepiesent the vicissituues of longing. The eneigy metaphoisanu they
became metaphois when the psychic appaiatus ieplaceu the neuional
machineaie useu to give an accounting of the uisjunction between one
meaning anu anothei. The heimeneutics of uesiie involves the ieplacement
of one meaning (the manifest) with anothei, moie funuamental anu
authentic aiticulation of the wish (the latent). The eneigetics oi economics
of uesiie uses a system of inteiielateu concepts like cathexis, uisplacement,
anu conuensation to account foi the movement of foices fiom one place to
anothei, movements that uisplace anu uisguise meaning. Foice, place, anu
meaning, then, aie the teims of Fieuu's thought, anu eveiy concept is
ueteimineu by its cooiuinates in his topogiaphical eneigic system of
ieauing signs.
Besiie aiises fiom a lack, a voiu. In its geneiation it is alieauy a
substitute, which coveis ovei with longing what cannot be saiu: the place of
nothing, of mute ueath. Bisplacement anu ieplacement aie the two teims
that aie joineu in the semantics of uesiie anu in the homeopathic tieatment
of psychoanalysis. If neuiosis aiises fiom the uisplacement of psychic
conflict into symptoms, anu the symptoms ieplace the conflict with a
symbiotic iepiesentation in the speech of the bouy oi behavioi, then
analysis ieplaces the oiiginal conflict, iestoies the latent, by uisplacing the
manifest symptoms via inteipietation. This iestoiation, howevei, uoes not
occui in the oiiginal context, the tiaumatic scene, but in its iepiouuction in
the tiansfeience ielationship. The analyst takes the place of significant
otheis, as scenes of fiustiation aie iestageu in a situation wheie insight
intellectual pleasuietakes the place of uesiie. The uesiie to know, to have
a life histoiy without lacunae in its naiiation, is the substitute satisfaction
offeieu by psychoanalytic inteipietation foi those cainal pleasuies that can
nevei be iealizeu. The aiticulation of uesiie thiough inteipietation is a
sublimation of an unnameable longing.
!"# %:23& )- %&'()*+,'. This longing is, peihaps, to become an "I," to be
an iuentity that is not haunteu by imagoes fiom long ago anu is not a fabiic
of fantasies that seive as a gloss foi the past. Bowevei, this veiy task
iemains the unnameu pioject in Fieuu's woik, anu "the empty concept of
sublimation is the final symbol of this unspoken factoi" (Ricoeui, 197u, p.
492). Fieuu coulu nevei give a satisfactoiy economic oi eneigic account of
sublimation, foi it aiises not fiom uefense but fiom ieflection. It is a
tiansmutation of the natuial into the cultuial, of the cainal into the spiiitual.
Sublimation is a heimeneutic teim which stanus foi a tianscenuental
movement of the spiiit towaiu the iealization of consciousness. Fieuu, who
uiu not speak of the self oi things tianscenuental, coulu not, of couise, say
this. Ricoeui in his wiiting on symbolism, tiies to name what is missing in
Fieuu, to say what Fieuu cannot.
Symbols aie piouucts of uesiie; in fact, Ricoeui (197u) asseits, "If man
coulu be satisfieu.he woulu be uepiiveu of symbolization" (p. S22). The
symbol stanus foi uesiie, but unlike the symptom, which is but a uisguiseu
signifiei foi the iepetitive insistence of uesiie to be signifieu, the symbol
captuies, contains, anu tiansfoims uesiie into a living sign in which signifiei
anu signifieu aie helu togethei in a sublime icon.
Religion is a collective neuiosis because its expiession is a symptomatic
iepetition of the longing foi the fathei. Its iconogiaphy iequiies belief,
theieby blocking the piocess of inuiviuual paiticipation anu ieflection
essential to sublimation. Ait uoes not iepetitively iecapitulate a man's oi
mens' past, because the woik of ait is not simply a piojection of the aitist's
oi the cultuie's conflicts; it is "the sketch of theii solution." Bieams,
symptoms, anu ieligion "look backwaiu towaiu infancy, the past; the woik
of ait goes aheau of the aitist; it is a piospective symbol of his peisonal
synthesis anu of man's futuie, iathei than a iegiessive symbol of his
uniesolveu conflicts" (Ricoeui, 197u, p. 17S).
That "piogiession anu iegiession aie caiiieu by the same symbols" is
the Ricoeuiian insight which meuiates his heimeneutic phenomenology
with Fieuu's psychoanalysis. The symbol aiises fiom unfilleu uesiie, anu,
theiefoie, points to the past; but it also takes one foiwaiu into the futuie,
pioviuing a guiue foi the movement of ieflection. That Fieuu only ieaus
symbols backwaiu to theii ontogenetic anu phylogentic oiigins was pointeu
out long ago by }ung (191S) anu has been elaboiately ciitiqueu by him
(1916), by Ricoeui (197u), anu by Steele (1982). The past Fieuu theieby
cieates, howevei, is itself symbolic, because Fieuu uses all his piimal events
anu piimaiy piocesses to uelimit the bounuaiies of the imaginaiy anu to
pioviue naiiative guiuelines by which to oiganize his analyses of the
piesent (Laplanche anu Pontalis, 1968).
Ricoeui (197u) insists, as uiu }ung, that symbols must also be ieau
piogiessively, because "the emeigence of the self is insepaiable fiom its
piouuction thiough a piogiessive synthesis." This is because "the tiuth of a
given moment lies in the subsequent moment" (p. 464) anu the significance
of a symbol always lies in the futuie uevelopments of its meanings, in the
tiajectoiy of inteipietations anu in the iealization of the spiiit. Bowevei,
ieflection on all of this always pioceeus ietiogiessively. The pastthe
aichaeology of the subjectanu the futuiethe teleology of the spiiit
meet in symbols whose inteipietation engenueis the uevelopment of self-
consciousness, which aiises by making the past piesent thiough
ietiospective analysis anu the futuie imminent in the piesent thiough
imagining the meanings of the symbols.
It is in this tempoial uuality of the symbol that Ricoeui finus hope not
only foi the synthesis of the self thiough the uevelopment of self-
consciousness, but foi a joining of the two styles of heimeneutics that have
been at ouus foi yeais: the heimeneutics of suspicion anu of iestoiation.
The two come togethei in what seives as Ricoeui's epigiam foi 01#23 453
6"+*),)7"& (197u): "Thus the iuols must uieso that symbols may live" (p.
SS1).
Why psychoanalysis is necessaiy to phenomenology is that analytic
suspicion is neeueu to bieak the thiall that makes us the slave of the iuols of
the past, be they paiental imagoes, castiation anxieties, oi simple
naicissistic egocentiism. Why psychoanalysis neeus a heimeneutics of the
spiiit is to fiee it fiom its bonuage to the past anu to aiu it in ieconstiucting
a past, which seives as a giounu foi the piesent on which to builu a futuie
a futuie that is not an illusion, because it comes fiom a less-uistoiteu past.
!"# %#()*+,
Consciousness giows by cannibalistic ciiticism of its giounus, its
piejuuices, anu its embeuueu, unseen ways of being. Foi anyone with a
histoiy who giows, that which was once libeiating becomes constiicting,
anu that which was once a ciiticism of oithouoxies becomes an oithouoxy to
be ciiticizeu. 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& helpeu fiee me fiom the piohibitions
against thought that aie fosteieu by an Ameiican scientific euucation anu
that make it haiu to appieciate what is tiuly ievolutionaiy in Fieuu's
science: its puisuit of knowleuge thiough uialogue, its concein with
meanings ovei obseivables, anu its uevotion to the uevelopment of ciitical
self-consciousness. Bowevei, in ietuining to Ricoeui aftei wiiting my own
"conflicts of inteipietation" (Steele, 1982), aftei teaching many biilliant anu
iauical stuuents, anu aftei becoming a feminist, I feel that 01#23 453
6"+*),)7"& piomulgates many of the same oppiessive values that aie ueai to
both science anu psychoanalysis. The common peispective of these becomes
visible when one steps outsiue of it anu sees that psychoanalysis, science,
anu heimeneutics shaie a masculinist woilu view, a Weltanschauung, in
which most of us weie ieaieu. 0ne of the joys of feminist heimeneutics is
stanuing apait fiom this veiy olu tiauition anu showing how this embeuueu
way of uoing things is iestiictive, antilibeitaiian, anu often just plain wiong.
The masculine voice, which is shaieu by Ricoeui, Fieuu, anu most
scientists anu acauemics, is iigoious, objective, conceineu with authoiity,
ueteimineu to uebate the issues, mute oi opinionateu on the subject of
women, anu utteily positive about what is natuial. In what follows I will
show how Ricoeui's immeision in this way of speaking cieates seveial
inteiielateu pioblems in 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& anu is iesponsible foi vaiious
eiiois in it. None of the foui topics I will consiuei aie manifestly cential to
Ricoeui's text. Theii position is latent, so theii impoitance will only be
establisheu thiough an inteipietive ieauing in which I shall show that
Ricouei's uismissal of }ung, his oveiweening concein with authoiity, his
uisiegaiu foi women, anu his ieuuctive, uemeaning conceptualization of
natuie aie all aspects of the anuiocentiic bias that uominates his book.
%,$ !$8$/%."3 "5 8037
To anyone who has ieau }ung, Ricoeui's mouifications of the
psychoanalytic theoiy of symbolism will be iepetitive, not innovative. }ung's
%&'()*, )- !145,-)1'4:+)5 (1911-12), which helpeu speeu the bieak with
Fieuu, was about the iegiessive anu piogiessive function of symbols anu
about theii function of tiansfoiming cainal into spiiitual fantasies. In his
"0n the Psychology of 0nconscious" (194S), }ung uoes both analytic-
ieuuctive (Fieuuian) anu synthetic-piospective (}ungian) inteipietations of
the same case; anu his stuuies of the inteiielations of tiansfeience,
sublimation anu symbolism (}ung, 1946) woulu have aiueu Ricoeui in his
uiscussion of these.
Theie aie no citations to }ung's woiks in 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"&. Ricoeui
uismisses }ung because he is confusing anu not a iigoious thinkei like
Fieuu. Ricoeui (197u) says: "With Fieuu I know wheie I am going; with
}ung eveiything iisks being confuseu: the psychism, the soul, the aithetypes,
the sacieu" (p. 176). Foi Ricoeui, Fieuu is a stiong, suie leauei, wheieas
with }ung he feais being lost. This ciaving to always know wheie one is is
typical of thinkeis who aie conceineu with masteiy anu with following a
mastei. It uoesn't huit to be lost oi confuseu; one might just finu something
new. }ung exploieu the female symbolism of the unconscious anu the
impoitance of gouuesses. This is something neithei Ricoeui noi Fieuu, both
of whom weie unwilling to iisk being lost in fantasy, in the "iealm of the
motheis," coulu finu.
Although }ung's wiiting is associative, symbolic, suggestive, anu often
mythopoeic, it is usually only confusing to those who expect causal,
aigumentative piose anu aie uncomfoitable with loose thinking. Foi the
confuseu, howevei, }ung even pioviues a uictionaiy (1921).
I uoubt if Ricouei evei ieally tiieu to ieau }ung. If he hau, he woulu have
soon uiscoveieu that his iueas on symbols weie thoioughly }ungian. Theie
has been, evei since Fieuu exileu }ung, a compulsive quality to
psychoanalysis' uismissal of }ung's woik. Ricoeui meiely iepeats Fieuu's
actions, but he seems to have ieau even less }ung than uiu Fieuu.
This uiviuing into camps, schools, teams, anu uisciplines who woiship a
totemic founuei is so obviously a piimitive male bonuing iitual that one
woulu think that men of ieason, like Ricoeui anu Fieuu, woulu have
ienounceu its piactice. In mouein times, howevei, the iite has meiely been
tiansfoimeu thiough the cunning of ieason into a piopei anu ieasonable
iespect foi authoiity.
.''0$' "5 20%,"!.%4
Fieuu makes iules anu leaus. This makes him an authoiity to Ricoeui.
Citing anothei gieat authoiity in oiuei to justify his own feelings on what
legitimates psychoanalysis, Ricoeui auopts Kant's view that a system is
limiteu by what justifies it. Fieuu's ueteimination to explain the most
complex phenomena fiom the topogiaphic-economic point of view is,
accoiuing to Ricoeui (197u), a iestiiction "which gives psychoanalysis its
iights" (p. 1SS). Such limits seive to facilitate Ricoeui's pioject, which is to
conuuct "a iigoious uebate with the tiue founuei of psychoanalysis" (p. xi).
If the bounuaiy lines of knowleuge claims aie not cleaily uiawn, then
uebate about iueas, which aie an intellectual's piopeity, cannot be
juuiciously conuucteu, anu the lineage of a thought cannot be
unambiguously tiaceu back to the fathei. In a shoit space it is uifficult to
ciitique the notion that iueas aie uiscoveieu, owneu, claimeu, anu
aujuuicateu, except to suggest that if the outlines of such a ciitique aie not
obvious, then the ieauei is not awaie of how much his oi hei thought is
uominateu by the tiopes anu piactices of capitalism. That iueas come fiom a
founuei anu aie passeu on to his followeis is so obviously totemic, anu so
geimane to both Fieuu's anu Ricoeui's woik, that I will take time to uevelop
its connections with the biases of the masculinist peispective.
Nuch of 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& is about the significance of the 0euipus
complex anu the symbolism of the fathei. The fathei, foi Ricoeui (197u), is
"the name-givei anu the lawgivei," with the institution of the fathei
patiiaichyseiving the son by uiiecting his euucation in the cultuie. Fieuu
seives these puiposes foi Ricoeui: Be nameu psychoanalysis anu
establisheu the iules of its piactice. Noie than this, howevei, psychoanalysis
is an euucation in cultuie. Ricoeui (197u) says Fieuu's woik is "a monument
of oui cultuie" anu a place "in which oui cultuie is expiesseu anu
unueistoou" (p. xi).
To acquiie cultuie then, one must be euucateu by Fieuu, anu Ricoeui
(197u) opens his woik with the simple ueclaiation that, "This woik is a
uiscussion oi uebate with Fieuu" (p. S). This single line is a cleai expiession
of the symbolism of the fathei in mouein acauemic totemism. Foi "Fieuu,"
heie, is a tiope, the name "Fieuu" being a metonymy foi the mastei's woik.
Bebates with ueau men aie only possible in societies that ieveie theii elueis
anu have a set of cultuial piactices that pieseive theii ueeus aftei theii
ueaths. 0ui ieveience foi the immoital woiks of genius is just such a
mechanism, anu the iuea that we can uebate with these men is an obvious
illusion. While Sigmunu Fieuu was alive, few people helu successful uebates
with him. }ung, with iueas veiy similai to Ricoeui's, tiieu anu faileu. But
Ricoeui's metonymic Fieuu is much moie the iueal oi totemic fathei. Be is
not the piimal tyiant that Wittels (1924) uesciibes, but the embouiment of
iigoi, suspicion, anu closely ieasoneu uebate.
It is not some anomaly in Ricoeui's chaiactei that makes 01#23 453
6"+*),)7"& an extenueu intellectual oeuipal uiama. It is that authoiity in oui
cultuie is pateinal, anu a man, to be a scholai, must make his place among
the fatheis. Ricoeui's scholaiship is impeccable in this iegaiu; he cites,
ciitiques, mouifies, anu expanus on the iueas of one mastei aftei anothei
(Begel, Kant, Naix, Nietzsche, Beiueggei, etc.) in exemplaiy acauemic
fashion, theieby uisplaying his expeitise anu ensuiing that his woik will be
commenteu on by futuie geneiations. Inueeu, 01#23 453 6"+*),)7"& has
become a mastei text upon which an ambitious son, uisplaying all his
scholaily expeitise, is commenting. This must stop, because iuentification
with the masteis means an acceptance of theii uiscouise anu theii iules of
uebate.
%,$ "6.''."3 "5 9"6$3
Theie aie almost no iefeiences to women in Ricoeui's woik; in fact, the
few places they aie piesent in the text they aie iuentifieu with the absent oi
the lost. Wheieas the fathei is a stiong piesence thioughout, anu Ricoeui
has much to say about him, he accepts Fieuu's poitiait of the mothei as an
"aichaic object.who boie us, nuiseu us anu caieu foi us" (Ricoeui, 197u, p.
44S). That is all he says, anu he is speaking Fieuu's woius.
The only othei significant iefeience to women is in a uiscussion of
Fieuu's (191u) analysis of Leonaiuo ua vinci's ielationship with his mothei.
In this instance, Ricoeui's contact with females is meuiateu not by one man,
but by two, anu Ricoeui's theme is that symbols signify absence boin of
uesiie. The "unieal smile" of Nona Lisa is a symbol foi "the smile of the *),:
mothei" of Leonaiuo (Ricoeui, 197u, p. 177). If women aie aichaic, lost, anu
symbols of absence, this is not so much a uesciiption of them as it is a
comment on theii place in Ricoeui's uiscouise. They aie simply absent fiom
his text, anu he seems to know about them only thiough theii
iepiesentation in the woiks of othei men.
This omission of women, howevei, is no simple oveisight; it is a neai
blinuness boin of masculine myopia. Ricoeui ietuins to Fieuu's analysis of
Leonaiuo when he takes up the topics of ieligion anu the 0euipus complex.
Following Fieuu, Ricoeui (197u) wiites,
If ieligious illusion stems fiom the fathei complex, the "uissolution"
of the 0euipus complex is attaineu only with the notion of an oiuei
stiippeu of any pateinal coefficient, an oiuei that is anonymous anu
impeisonal. Ananke is theiefoie the symbol of uisillusion.Ananke
is the name of a nameless ieality, foi those who have "ienounceu
theii fathei." It is chance, the absence of ielationship between the
laws of natuie anu oui uesiies oi illusions..Ananke, it seems to me,
is a symbol of a woilu view...in it is summeu up a wisuom that uaies
to face the haishness of life |pp. S27-S28j.
In this passage the omission of women is oppiessive. Fiist, "an oiuei of
things stiippeu of any pateinal coefficient" is not anonymous anu
impeisonal. Women exist. As motheis they pioviue one of the most complex
anu peisonal ielationships we will evei have. They lay uown the law, anu
they aie usually the peison who gives us oui fiist name anu who we name
fiist. As lesbians, feminist sepaiatists, anu as people whose iuentities come
neithei fiom theii fatheis noi husbanus, women also exist.
Women aie maue invisible, anonymous, anu impeisonal by uenying
theii existence oi tiansfoiming them into things, into "its." Ananke is a
female gouuess, a she, not an it. But Ricoeui, twice calls hei "it," thus
ensuiing hei anonymity.
-$32%0!$- 32%0!$
Ricoeui, like most othei heimeneuts, has accepteu science's giossly
unnatuial iepiesentation of natuie. Be speaks of "the laws of natuie" anu
iefeis to "the conuitions of objectivity of natuie" (197u, p. 48). Be
chaiacteiizes Fieuu's eneigic tiopes as nonheimeneutic, because such
language uesciibes the tiansfoimations of the natuial oiuei. Ricoeui
nowheie sees that science inteipiets natuie in some ouu ways. Science has
tuineu natuie into a thing in oiuei to investigate anu exploit hei (uiiffin,
1978). Theie aie no laws of natuie, only laws of men, which aie useu to
tame natuie's uniuly ways. Science uses natuie as a stage on which to stiut
its piowess, but feminist ciitics have shown what is being uone. A subset of
existence has been set apait by us as an othei, a mothei, a "she" anu an "it"
anu uesignateu as natuial (Binneistein, 1977). The "objectivity of natuie" is
puie piojection onto this othei, anu science sees ieflecteu back fiom this
miiioi its own piojections onto hei. Finally, natuie is no moie a system of
eneigic tiansfoimations than it is uou's cieation oi a giant tuitle. The
iepiesentation of the natuial as eneigic is of iecent oiigin anu is the
animism of a mateiialist, mechanistic cultuie (Neichant, 198u).
I think Ricoeui accepts the natuial scientists' iepiesentation of natuie
because of the geneial acquiescence of authoiities in one fielu to expeits in
anothei. The ueal stiuck by Bilthey with science, "You take natuie, we'll take
cultuie," is still honoieu by his uescenuant, Ricoeui. Ricoeui follows othei
twentieth centuiy covenants of iationality: Be is iespectful of genius anu
waiy of mystics, anu he believes what othei men say about women.

%#-#%#+.#/
Beiiiua, }. (1976). Fieuu anu the scene of wiiting. In }. Nehlman (Eu.),
01#59" 01#23? %:129:214* ,:23+#, +5 7,&9")454*&+,:s (pp. 7S-117).
Nillwoou, NY: Kiaus Repiint Co.
Binneistein, B. (1977). !"# '#1'4+3 453 :"# '+5):421? %#E24* 41145>#'#5:,
453 "2'45 '4*4+,#. New Yoik: Baipei.
Fieuu, S. (189S). Pioject foi a scientific psychology. %:453413 .3+:+)5, 1, 29S-
S97.
Fieuu, S. (19uu). The inteipietation of uieams. %:453413 .3+:+)5, 4.
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(E. Kohak, Tians.). Evanston, IL: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess,
1966.
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Baipei.
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Savage, Tians.). New Baven: Yale 0niveisity Piess.
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Ihue, Eu.). Evanston, IL: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess.
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6,&9")I@54*&,+,, 6, S89-411.
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Cambiiuge, NA: NIT Piess.
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!3
4%*5&,6 '%*%/- $67*8+%/%'76.1 6&((,%')6.1 %/2 976.)*
8$23.3$ +2!.'.$! +)"%%$)* +,(-(
}acques Lacan's contiibution to psychoanalytic theoiy anu piactice is
anu has been the subject of intense contioveisy. The quaiiels between
vaiious factions of both enemies anu uisciples, the counteicultuie quality of
his teaching, anu the political implications of some of his positions have cast
shauows on a coiiect appiaisal of his woik. The notoiiety that came to
Lacan in olu age, his links with linguistics anu stiuctuialism, anu his iole as
tienu settei of the Paiis intelligentsia have obscuieu his significant legacy to
Fiench psychoanalysis, psychiatiy, anu neuiology. Although many facets of
Lacan's appioach to psychoanalysis may seem heietical, in fact, its
aichaeology, in the sense of Nichel Foucault, leaus to the nineteenth centuiy
Fiench tiauition of psychiatiy anu neuiologyto }ean-Naitin Chaicot anu
othei Fiench masteis of Fieuu. Inueeu, when consiueiing Lacan's evolution,
it is impoitant to iemembei that this veiy same tiauition was one of the
catalysts in Fieuu's uevelopment that leu to the cieation of psychoanalysis.
A biief ieview of how the viennese uisciple vieweu Chaicot, his Fiench
teachei, will pioviue the fiist key to Lacan's texts.
It is common knowleuge that Fieuu's stuuies with Chaicot at the
Salptiieie in Paiis fiom 0ctobei 188S to the enu of Febiuaiy 1886 maikeu
a tuining point in the uiiection of his inteiests. What may not be so well
iemembeieu is how much Fieuu aumiieu Chaicot's clinical piesentations of
patients. We cannot asseit that Fieuu went so fai as to give up the
tiauitional ueiman way in favoi of Fiench clinical technique, but this
technique was suiely integiateu in his methou. Bis uesciiption of how
Chaicot piesenteu his patients (Fieuu, 1887-88) emphasizes the "concepts
of the 'entit moibiue', of the seiies, of the 'type' anu of the 'foimes fiustes' "
(p. 1SS). Such concepts aie impoitant in Fiench clinical methou anu weie
quite foieign to the ueiman peispective.
What especially stiuck Fieuu, howeveianu I am ceitain that the
psychoanalytic infiastiuctuies beai tiaces of this to this uaywas Chaicot's
fiienuliness anu openness, his iesponsiveness to stuuents, whom he
consiueieu his peeis. Fieuu (189S) asciibes "the intellectual significance" of
this man
to the magic that emanateu fiom his looks anu fiom his voice, to the
kinuly openness which chaiacteiizeu his mannei as soon as his
ielations with someone hau oveicome the stage of initial
stiangeness, to the willingness with which he put eveiything at the
uisposal of his pupils, anu to his lifelong loyalty to them. The houis
he spent in his waius weie houis of companionship anu of an
exchange of iueas with the whole of his meuical staff |p. 16j...
Fieuu went on to elaboiate:
As a teachei, Chaicot was positively fascinating. Each of his lectuies
was a little woik of ait in constiuction anu composition; it was
peifect in foim anu maue such an impiession that foi the iest of the
uay one coulu not get the sounu of what he hau saiu out of one's
eais oi the thought of what he hau uemonstiateu out of one's minu
|p. 17j.
I am not going to uelve into the substance of Chaicot's science anu aita
iecent histoiy of psychoanalysis in Fiance, M4 (4:4+**# 3# 9#5: 45,, by
Elisabeth Rouuinesco (1982) has alieauy uone thisbut I want to stiess the
oial aspect of his legacy. Theie is an analogy between knowleuge
tiansmitteu in such a way anu the tiansfeience that takes place in the
couise of an analysis. Spectacle anu encountei captivateu Fieuu, just as they
hau many othei scientists anu laymen. It can also be aigueu that the
significance of Lacan's mannei shoulu be sought in the tiauitional meuiums
of Chaicot anu othei Fiench alienists that hau stiuck Fieuu: oial
piesentation of clinical cases, lectuies, anu teaching in an asylum setting.
That Lacan wiote veiy little anu publisheu even lessin fact, only his
thesis anu a few aiticleshas been pointeu out by seveial ciitics. In hei
iecent book, N+#, #: *O>#53#, 3# H49P2#, M4945, Catheiine Clment (1981), a
philosophei tuineu jouinalist, obseives that most of the essays incluueu in
Lacan's .91+:, (1966) aie papeis anu communications that weie fiist ieau at
meetings anu congiesses. The six volumes publisheu to uate in the
%O'+54+1# seiies (Lacan, 19SS-S4, 19S4-SS, 19SS-S6, 1964, 1972-7S),
tiansciipts of Lacan's so-calleu seminai ("lectuie" is the Ameiican teim),
weie euiteu not by Lacan himself but by }acques-Alain Nillei, his son-in-law.
This %O'+54+1# that is Lacan's majoi achievement, anu we must always beai
in minu that its essence is essentially oial. Although these lectuies weie
veiy caiefully piepaieu, iueas came to Lacan as he spoke befoie an
auuience, anu some of the best paits weie impioviseu. These
impiovisations weie chaiismatic, even inspiieu, in the liteial sense of the
woiu. Theii effect on the auuience was compaiable to the fienzy of an
extiaoiuinaiy bullfight, to the ecstasy of the mystics, anu to the passion of
absolute love. Then, little by little, as the yeai went by, the language miiacle
faileu anu the spell looseneu. Inspiiation ceaseu; the magician on the
pouium lost his powei anu tuineu into an olu, hollow man.
In olu age, Lacan became a Paiisian celebiity, a householu woiu in
householus wheie nobouy hau ieau a single one of his paiagiaphs. With his
fiienu Clauue Lvi-Stiauss, he was the iepiesentative of the new
stiuctuialism, the "ism" that hau followeu }ean-Paul Saitie's existentialism.
Foi moie than 2u yeais, attenuance at Lacan's Sminaiie was ue iigueui foi
anyone who wanteu to be in the mainstieam of Fiench thoughtBaithes,
Beiiiua, Leiiis, }akobson, Kiisteva, anu Solleis (Schneiueiman, 198S), foi
example, anu not meiely out-of-town intellectuals. If Lacan happeneu to
uine at Naxim's oi some such place, his piesence was noteu. Foi instance,
Stuait Schneiueiman (198S) tells a stoiy in which Lacan manageu to
upstage Roman Polanski, who was shaiing his table. But I believe that
Lacan's seiious achievements belongeu to the foitieth, fiftieth, anu sixtieth
uecaues of his life, befoie he actually attaineu notoiiety anu an inteinational
ieputation.
It is obvious that the texts of Lacan's olu age aie as elusive as those of
many ceitifieu psychotics. Aie they poetiy. Cieations of a psychoanalytic
Zen mastei. Bo they signal a ievolution in psychoanalytic foim. 0i have
these texts been euiteu in such a way that they take on the stamp of the
meanueiings of the unconscious. The clich, "0nly time will tell," is in oiuei
heie. Bowevei, although Lacan is inueeu a uifficult anu piecious wiitei,
most of us finu that, ieau in chionological oiuei, he is quite accessible. Nost
of his wiitings aie no moie aicane than those of Nelanie Klein oi Beinz
Baitmann. Anu most of Lacan's significant iueas weie piesent at a time
when he still wiote in an easily intelligible way. To my minu, the
complicateu mathematical knots, the abstiuse foimulas, the complex foimal
symbolism auueu little if anything to the substance of the most impoitant
psychoanalytical theoiist since Fieuu.
What explanation can be offeieu. Clement (1981) puts it well when she
states that foi a long time, the authoi was }acques-Naiie Lacan, anu when he
was }acques-Naiie Lacan, he was compiehensible. We can apply to him his
offhanu iemaik about Napoleon (Lacan, 19Su, p. S9; 1966, p. 171). "What is
the uiffeience between a mauman who takes himself foi Napoleon anu
Napoleon himself." he askeu. The obvious answei is that unlike the
mauman, Napoleon nevei believeu he was Napoleon, but knew he was
Bonapaite, anu iemembeieu veiy well what he hau uone in oiuei to tuin
Bonapaite into Napoleon. So peihaps }acques-Naiie Lacan knew how he
hau become Lacan, the guiu of Fiench psychoanalysis. Peihaps only his
uisciples, those who call themselves Lacanians, take the legenu seiiously. It
is likely that hau the Inteinational Psycho-Analytical Association not cast
him out, he woulu have iemaineu an oithouox piofessional, but that is
anothei stoiy. I suspect that his exclusion fiom tiauitional psychoanalytic
societies causeu him enoimous pain anu anguish. Bis attempts to be
ieinstateu by the IPA, his pleas with his foimei fiienus anu colleaguesfoi
example his letteis to Loewenstein anu Baitmann
1
make this abunuantly
cleai.
}acques-Naiie Lacan was boin in Paiis on Apiil 1S, 19u1, anu his caieei
ian the usual obstacle couise of a Fiench uoctoi of meuicine, psychiatiist,
anu psychoanalyst. Bis psychiatiic cuiiiculum vitae, piinteu in his thesis
(19S2), inuicates that he hau impeccable clinical cieuentials anu the highest
possible peuigiee in the fielu. Be woikeu with Benii Clauue, an expeit on
schizophienia anu one of the foiemost Fiench psychiatiists of the eaily
centuiy, at the Clinique ues Nalauies Nentales et ue l'Encphale (Clinic foi
Nental Illnesses anu Illnesses of the Encephalus) in 1927-28. In 1928-29, he
was attacheu to the Infiimeiie Spciale Pies ue la Piefectuie ue Police
(Special Police Beauquaiteis Infiimaiy) anu tiaineu with ueoiges ue
Cliambault, whose theoiy of mental automatism was a uecisive influence.
"0ui only mastei in psychiatiy" is Lacan's appiaisal of his iole. Fiom 1929
to 19S1 he continueu his tiaining at the Benii Rousselle Bospital anu spent
the summeis in Zuiich at the Buigholzi, Eugen Bleulei's anu Cail }ung's
clinic. Be obtaineu a uiploma in foiensic meuicine, anu in 19S1-S2, he
ietuineu to the Clinique ues Nalauies Nentales et ue l'Encephale.
Lacan co-authoieu his fiist aiticles with leauing senioi psychiatiists anu
neuiologists, anu he publisheu in psychiatiic jouinals, foi example,
MQ#/)*2:+)5 7,&9"+4:1+P2#, whose contiibutois became eaily ieciuits of
psychoanalysis. Bis uoctoial thesis (Lacan, 19S2), which we shall examine in
moie uetail piesently, was a tiauitional woik, with meticulous iefeiences,
caieful ieseaich, anu uetaileu clinical obseivations, wiitten in a cleai anu
stiaightfoiwaiu style. The young uoctoi was well on his way to a successful
psychiatiic caieei. At this time theie appeai to be at least two uevelopments
in Lacan's piofessional vitae that must be taken into account to explain his
ueviations fiom the psychiatiic anu meuical mainstieam.
2
I am iefeiiing to
his connections with suiiealism anu his contacts with psychoanalysis.
Fuithei ieseaich is neeueu about actual ielations between Lacan anu
suiiealism. We uo know that he publisheu seveial fascinating aiticles
(Lacan, 19SSa,b) in M# '+5):421#, a suiiealist jouinal, anu that it was
Lacan's iueas that piompteu Salvauoi Bali's famous ciitical paianoia theoiy.
Be hau contacts with Ren Cievel, the poet who shot himself playing
Russian ioulette with a loaueu pistol (Lacan, 1966, p. 6S) anu he was a goou
fiienu of Anui Bieton. Bis seconu wife, Sylvia Nakles, the stai of }ean
Renoii's film R5# 741:+# 3# 94'74>5#, attenueu the same school as the
sisteis Simone anu }eanine Kahn, who iespectively maiiieu Anui Bieton
anu Raymonu Queneau. Sylvia's own fiist husbanu was ueoiges Bataille, a
wiitei whose style Lacan imitateu (Rouuinesco, 1982).
The stamp of this movement is uisceinible in Lacan's own texts in
seveial ways. Fiist, many chaiacteiistics of automatic wiitingfoi example,
the use of puns, anu aibitiaiy anu stiiking compaiisons anu making veibal
associations the oiganizing stiuctuie of an expositoiy pieceaie also
chaiacteiistics of Lacan's own mannei. A sentence such as "@ 94,,#1 ;Q)#2-
,#-4+: *LA)''#J '4+, 42,,+ ;QA)''#*#::#"(ioughly tianslateu, "In bieaking an
egg ")''# (man) is maue, but also an |hjomelet") anu the allusion to "a
laige ciepe moving about like an amoeba" in the sentence that follows
(Lacan, 1966, p. 84S) aie puie suiiealism.
Seconu, Lacan's contacts with poets leu him to inteipiet the utteiances
of his psychotic patients just as he might inteipiet a suiiealist poem, oi foi
that mattei any poem at all. Foi example, he analyzeu (Levy-valensi,
Nigault, & Lacan, 19S1, p. S76) the following appaiently senseless sentence
fiom the wiiting of Naicelle C., a paianoiac patient: "@ *)53)&#1 ,45, '#21,
)5 -4+: 3# *4 (#94,,#" ("Lonuoning without moials one makes wooucocks").
D#21, is a kinu of poitemanteau woiu composeu of ')#21, (customs,
moials) anu '#21# (fiom the veib mouiii, to uie). Lacan showeu that
unueilying this ponueious foimula is the ihythm of a famous line of poetiy
by the seventeenth centuiy uiamatist Pieiie Coineille that is known by
eveiy Fiench schoolchilu: "@ /4+591# ,45, 7S1+* )5 :1+)'7"# ,45, >*)+1#" ("In
conqueiing without peiil one tiiumphs without gloiy"). What appeais to be
an oiiginal veise is in fact geneiateu by a steieotypical automatic auuitoiy
mechanism. Familiaiity with poets such as Robeit Besnos, Philippe
Soupault, anu Anui Bieton leu Lacan to notice that patients gave uiffeient
giaphic ienuitions of the same phonic mateiial in uiffeient places anu
poems: "*4 '4+, *Q4,J N4'# #,: *4,,#J #: *4 'O*4,,#"("the but, the ace, the soul
is tiieu, anu molasses"). 0i, "*# '#1*# T -)2+5#J *4 'S1#J *4 -)2+5#"("The
weaseleu blackbiiu, the pitchfoikeu mothei"). We can give an English
appioximation of this mechanism by playing on the woiu molasses to
piouuce "Noe's lassies, moie losses, my asses." The iesult of Lacan's
juxtapositions of such phiases is an awaieness that psychotic piouuctions
may oi may not have poetic value anu that the substiatum of a poem is often
mateiial that may be given the label "psychotic" in a clinical context anu
peispective. (Foi a fullei uiscussion, see Lacan, 19SSa.)
Likewise, Lacan might have leaineu fiom suiiealism anu not necessaiily
fiom Fieuu how to inteipiet a liteiaiy woik as though it weie a living being.
The seminai comes to minu that ueals with Eugai Allen Poe's "The
Puiloineu Lettei" (Lacan, 1966), in which the lettei stolen fiom the Queen
by the ministei is iestoieu to hei by Bupin, but many othei instances can be
given. Foi example, in his lectuie of Naich 2, 196u, Lacan (19S9-6u) quoteu
a stanza by Ainaut Baniel, a gieat tioubauoui that Bante iankeu with viigil.
Bis point was that this poem about couitly love embouieu "the cential voiu
aiounu which is oiganizeu anu aiticulateu whatevei it is that sublimates
uesiie" (p. 29). The same voiu anu sense of nothingness is ievealeu in his
appiaisal of Anui uiue. When uiue's wife Naueleine took ievenge on hei
husbanu by buining all the letteis he hau evei wiitten to hei, she knew
what she was uoing. The letteis hau been uiue's way of filling up his own
sense of emptiness, the liteial hole that he stuffeu with all kinus of games,
which alloweu him to watch himself pietenuing to be himself. In .: URU8
D45#: +5 !# (Lacan, 1966), wiitten aftei the ueath of Naueleine, his wife,
uiue confesseu that aftei the letteis' uestiuction, his ielationship with hei,
"5Q)--1# 7*2,J T *4 7*49# 413#5:# 32 9)#21J P2Q25 :1)2"("left but a hole in the
aiuent pait of his heait") (p. 762). The loss of this coiiesponuence, of which
uiue hau no copy meant that wheieas pieviously his miiioi hau been the
substance of woius, phiases, sentences, anu paiagiaphs, it hau tuineu into
the veitigo of a uitch, a gap, nothing, anu nothingness.
Lacan's sense of play anu games woulu of couise have uelighteu the
suiiealists. Be likeu using eveiyuay imageiy, slang, anu oiuinaiy woius of
oui chiluhoou anu auolescence, anything fiom mustaiu pots to Picasso's
ostiich cabbages, to illustiate philosophical anu psychoanalytic concepts. Be
himself iefeiieu to "this seiiousness that I always uevelop fuithei anu
fuithei to its punchline," ("9# ,1+#2E P2#B# 3/#*)77# :)2B)21, 7*2, #5
7)+5:#"). Elsewheie he says that he is the uongoia of psychoanalysis. When
he spells the Fiench woiu 14+,)5, (ieason) i-e-s-o-n, following the example
of Fiancis Ponge, to show how the sounu itself suggests something that
iesonates; when he puns on the Fiench woiu 7)2(#**# (gaibage can),
iefeiiing to psychoanalytic publicationshis own incluueuas
6)2(#**+94:+)5,; when he uismisses the "Lacanians" by ieminuing them that
he himself is a Fieuuian, Lacan is playing. But he is also playing when he
iiuicules his opponents anu his uisciples, when he applies linguistic anu
mathematical concepts to psychoanalysis. A suiiealist is nevei moie seiious
than when he is playing, of couise, so in that sense Lacan iemaineu a
suiiealist to the enu.
Finally, Lacan is a suiiealist because his own foimulas aie themselves
shoit poems, oi so they woulu have been uefineu by his fiienus Paul Eluaiu
anu Anui Bieton. I am thinking of aphoiisms such as "!)5 3,+1 9L#,: *#
3,+1 3# *Q@2:1#" ("Youi uesiie is the uesiie of the 0thei"); "MQ;59)5,9+#5: #,:
,:129:21 9)''# 25 *45>4>#"(''The 0nconscious is stiuctuieu like a
language"); anu "D)+J *4 /1+: B# 741*#"("Ne, I speak the tiuth").
To stiess Lacan's suiiealism is to iemain tiue to Fiench intellectual
histoiy. The so-calleu suiiealist ievolution coinciueu with the intiouuction
of psychoanalysis. Anui Bieton was one of the fiist Fiench wiiteis to ieau
anu wiite about !"# ;5:#171#:4:+)5 )- C1#4',. Public opinion often attackeu
both suiiealism anu psychoanalysis foi being foieign anu hostile to "*4
9*41: -145V4+,#,"Fiench claiity. Inueeu, just as suiiealists weie uiawn to
the stuuy of uieams anu the exploiation of the unconscious, so
psychoanalysts weie uiawn to the suiiealists. Lacan was not alone in being
close to them. Foi example, Auiien Boiel, one of the founueis of the Socit
Psychanalytique ue Paiis (SPP) in 1926, analyzeu ueoiges Bataille anu
Nichel Leiiis (Rouuinesco, 1982, pp. SS8-S6u). Ren Allenuy, authoi of 2uu
aiticles on vaiious occult subjects was one of Antonin Aitauu's psychiatiists
anu was also Anas Nin's analyst. In a geneial way, many of the fiist- anu
seconu-geneiation Fiench analysts weie wiiteis anu hau contacts with the
woilu of aits anu letteis. Naiie Bonapaite was a piolific authoi, anu hei
book on Eugai Allen Poe was wiuely ieau. Eugnie Sokolnicka was Anui
uiue's mouel foi the chaiactei of Nauame Sophioniska, the analyst who
unsuccessfully tieateu Boiis in M#, -42EI')554&#21, (!"# 8)25:#1-#+:#1,).
Euouaiu Pichon, the piesiuent of SPP, was co-authoi with his uncle, }acques
Bamouiette, of a monumental seven-volume stuuy of Fiench giammai, C# *4
*45>2# T *4 7#5,#, a book that Lacan often cites.
Buiing Lacan's foimative yeais, in the Paiis of the 192us anu eaily
19Sus, many young psychiatiists weie uiawn to the stuuy of Fieuu anu
became psychoanalysts. These same psychoanalysts weie inteiesteu in
language, liteiatuie, anu the aits; anu aitists anu wiiteis, in tuin, took up
psychoanalysis. The fact that Lacan hau contacts with Bieton, Cievel, Eluaiu,
anu Bali uiu not make him an isolateu figuie, but iathei one who was veiy
much in the mainstieam of his avant-gaiue milieu. Psychoanalysis was itself
a maiginal uiscipline, but within it, Lacan was a membei of the ieigning
establishment anu a veiy classical, oithouox Fieuuian analyst. Be was
analyzeu by Ruuolph Loewenstein, anu the analysis seems to have lasteu a
long time, fiom about 19S2 to 19S9. The two men iemaineu on veiy coiuial
teims. As noteu eailiei, when Lacan left the Socit Psychanalytique ue
Paiis anu began to have uifficulties with the IPA, he wiote "Loew" a long
lettei justifying his position anu asking him to inteivene on his behalf with
Baitmann, who was then piesiuent of the IPA.
An examination of Lacan's fiist book, C# *4 7,&9"),# 74145)W4P2# 345,
,#, 1477)1:, 4/#9 *4 7#1,)554*+: (19S2), his uoctoial thesis, completeu
befoie his own analysis, will show the synthesis of these vaiious themes in a
clinical case histoiy, the case of Aime.
2.6E$
At eight o'clock one evening, a well-known Paiisian actiess aiiiveu at
the theatei wheie she was scheuuleu to peifoim anu was gieeteu by a
nicely uiesseu woman whom she mistook foi one of hei many fans. This
woman askeu the actiess whethei she was Nauame Z., anu when the
answei was yes, the woman pulleu out a knife out of hei hanubag anu
tuineu the blaue towaiu the stai. Nauame Z. manageu to giab it, cutting two
tenuons in hei fingeis in the couise of the scuffle. The woman, hencefoith
calleu Aime A., was uuly iestiaineu anu caiteu off to jail. Nauame Z. uiu not
piess chaiges, anu hei assailant was moveu to Ste. Anne Asylum, wheie
Lacan obseiveu hei foi a yeai anu a half. At fiist, Aime continueu to have
hallucinations, obsessions, anu to heap abuse on hei intenueu victim. But
suuuenly, 2u uays aftei the inciuent, at seven o'clock in the evening, she
began to weep as she iealizeu that the actiess was totally innocent of any
wionguoing. Bei ueliiium uissipateu completely anu the vanity of hei
megalomanic intentions anu the inaness of hei feais stiuck hei all at once.
She hau iecoveieu.
This S8-yeai-olu woman was oiiginally fiom Boiuogne, boin into a
laige peasant family, with thiee biotheis anu two sisteis. She hau a tenuieu
job with a iail tianspoit company; hei iecoiu was outstanuing, anu hei
supeiiois weie pleaseu with hei peifoimance anu toleiateu some of hei
iuyosinciasies. She was maiiieu to anothei employee of the same company,
but the couple liveu in uiffeient towns. Bei husbanu took caie of theii 8-
yeai-olu son, anu she visiteu them moie oi less iegulaily. The patient
heiself hau oiganizeu this life-style at the enu of a pievious voluntaiy
commitment to a mental institution a yeai anu a half eailiei. At that time she
hau believeu that a numbei of highly placeu celebiities, incluuing seveial
wiiteis, weie going to have hei son killeu, anu she hau wiitten a lettei of
iesignation on behalf of hei husbanu to theii mutual employei. Then,
foiging his signatuie, she hau applieu foi a passpoit to the 0niteu States.
The fixation on Nauame Z. was not an isolateu episoue. Aime hau set
hei sights on celebiities befoie. Foi example, she hau tiieu to establish
contact with a well-known novelist, Ni. P. B., the initials of Paul Bouiget,
anu with the Piince of Wales. She sent them letteis anu miscellaneous
wiitings, incluuing a weekly sonnet anu a novel calleu M# CS:149:#21; in tuin,
she collecteu newspapei anu magazine clippings iepoiting theii activities.
Bei initial infatuation foi P. B. hau tuineu to hatieu, anu she was now
convinceu that he was plotting to kill hei son.
The changing of love into hate was anothei pattein of hei ielationships.
Bei fiist love, foi example, was chaiacteiistic in this iespect. She hau
become infatuateu with the local Bon }uan a month befoie she was
tiansfeiieu to anothei town. Foi thiee yeais she wiote him iegulaily anu
spent most of hei leisuie uayuieaming about him, hiuing hei passion fiom
eveiyone. She nevei saw him again, anu one uay hei love changeu to hatieu
anu scoin: "I went fiom love to hate abiuptly," she aumitteu spontaneously
to Lacan (19S2, p. 22S). The same mechanism playeu in hei fiienuship foi
Nauemoiselle C. ue la N., a fellow woikei fiom an impoveiisheu aiistociatic
family who influenceu hei ueeply. It was this woman, in fact, who
intiouuceu Nauame Z., a neighboi of one of hei ielatives, into Aime's life.
"You aie not like the othei giils," Nlle. C. ue la N. is iepoiteu to have saiu. "I
feel that I am masculine," was Aime's iesponse. "You aie masculine,"
agieeu hei fiienu. Lacan chaiacteiizeu the mannei in this book as '+3+1#
(liteially, to "miusay"to speak in half tones). The suggestion that Aime's
attiaction foi hei own sex may be a factoi heie woulu be ieauily accepteu
touay, but in the eaily 19Sus an obseivei might have neglecteu to note that
at the time of hei attempteu ciime Aime hau bioken all contacts with hei
olu fiienu. The ciicumstances of hei change of heait went back ten yeais,
when Aime hau given biith to a stillboin baby giil, stiangleu by the
umbilical coiu. Bei fiienu hau telephoneu foi news. The patient
immeuiately felt that Nlle. C. ue la N. was iesponsible foi this calamity anu
that she hau conspiieu to kill the little giil.
Thioughout his account, Lacan took caie to incluue long exceipts fiom
Aime's wiiting anu to piesent hei aspiiations foi the impiovement of the
social anu human conuition in such a way that his ieaueis come to esteem
iathei than belittle this patient. Be avoiueu the pationizing tone of the
supeiioi juuge, the meuical boss, oi even the aveiage Fienchman oi
Fienchwoman. The uiagnosis was that she suffeieu fiom self-punitive
paianoia (74145)+4 42:)I725+:+/#). Nauame Z. iepiesenteu an iuealizeu
veision of heiself, a miiioi of hei iueal ego. Like Aime, Nauame Z. hau a
caieei, anu being a wife, mothei, anu homemakei was not the focus of hei
uaily life. Bei activites weie coveieu by iepoiteis, so that theie was a
connection between hei life anu piint. Aime heiself aspiieu to liteiaiy
ienown, to a place in the newspapei. In many ciicles, the moiality of
actiesses is questionable; anu it seems likely that Aime's own coue of
ethics woulu classify hei in the categoiy of fallen woman anu sinnei. That is
just what Aime felt heiself to be; in hei family's mythology she was the
biightest chilu, the intellectual stai, but also the one who was always late
anu kept eveiyone waiting, the one who coulu not pull hei act togethei, the
one who was uisoiganizeu anu unuepenuable. The feeling was that she
shoulu nevei have gotten maiiieu at all. Aime incoipoiateu Nauame Z. into
this image, anu the stab wounu that punisheu hei was but a punishment
inflicteu upon heiself. When Aime came to iealize the senselessness of hei
attempteu aggiession, she was in a sense cuieu. She hau been punisheu, anu
now she hau no moie use foi hei uelusions.
The ioot of this illness was founu in hei ielationship with hei oluei
sistei. Aime iecognizeu the viitues of this sistei but neveitheless hateu hei
anu felt heiself the victim of this woman, who hau achieveu hei equilibiium
at Aime's expense. A chiluless wiuow, this sistei now hau an eisatz
husbanu anu chilu, that is to say, she liveu with Aime's husbanu anu chilu.
When Lacan inteivieweu the sistei, she maue it cleai that hei youngei
sibling's illness anu incaiceiation suiteu hei well, anu she feaieu that a
paiuon woulu jeopaiuize hei life. Aime unueistoou this, yet although hei
feelings coulu haiuly have been moie ambivalent, she iejecteu all ciiticism
leveleu against hei iival. Lacan was especially stiuck by the shaip contiast
between hei woius expiessing hypeibolic piaise anu the icy tone in which
she utteieu them. Lacan (19S2, pp. 2S2-2SS) chaiacteiizeu hei attituue as a
N#15#+525> (uenial) ieaction of the puiest kinu.
The inteipietation heie follows Fieuu's in !"# 94,# )- %9"1#(#1, quoteu
by Lacan. We can shape the famous paiauigm of uenial in paianoia so that it
applies to females iathei than males, anu we can see how apt it is foi Aime:
"I love hei" may be uenieu to piouuce "I uo not love hei." This is equivalent
to "I hate hei" anu leaus to the piojection, "She hates me," which is a
leitmotif of the peisecution theme heie. A seconu type of uenial, "I uo not
love hei, but I love him," can be tuineu into "Be loves me." We can thus
inteipiet Aime's infatuation with the male figments of hei imagination
the Piince of Wales, the wiitei P. B., anu hei fiist love. In othei woius, she
was able to mask hei attachment to hei own sex by uenying it anu
substituting a "him" foi a "hei." The thiiu uenial stiuctuie, "It is not I who
love the women"# loves them" (Fieuu (1911), p. 64 leaus to the theme of
jealousy, whethei theie is piojection oi not. "Belusions of jealousy, auueu
Fieuu, contiauict the subject, uelusions of peisecution, contiauict the veib,
anu eiotomania contiauicts the object" (Fieuu (1911), p. 64-S. Recall that
Aime believeu that the objects of hei attention want to kill hei son. Bei
unfounueu feais weie meant to hiue the fact that it is not hei chilu she
loveu, but the woman she connecteu with him. Finally, the fouith type of
uenial is an absolute uenial: "I uo not love hei. I uo not love anyone at all. I
love only myself." This leaus to megalomania anu to a iegiesseu naicissistic
stage (Lacan, 19S2, pp. 261-262).
The symptoms of Aime's illness weie but uenials, uisplacements, anu
substitutes of a piototype, the sistei peisona. Bowevei, hei actual choices of
love-hate objects weie ueteimineu by the conjunction of ianuom
coinciuences anu ueep analogies of affect (Lacan, 19S2, p. 2S4). The sistei
was the miiioi that ieflecteu an image that eiaseu anu uisplaceu any othei
image of heiself. Killing the sistei meant wiping out the image that was but a
ieflection of hei own self. The actiess embouieu Aime's iueal ego insofai as
she was a piojection of hei aitistic enueavois, of hei uesiie to bettei heiself,
to be in the public limelight, anu to gain fame anu gloiy. Nauame Z. was only
a shell, an image, an object. Aime uenieu hei otheiness anu peiceiveu hei
only as an extension of Aimee's own imagination.
Lacan's (19S7) looking-glass theoiy pioviues the tool foi fuithei
elaboiation of these mechanisms. At the heait of this theoiy is the
obseivation that the human chilu goes thiough a miiioi phase fiom 6 to 18
months. 0nlike the chimpanzee, a human baby who sees himself oi heiself
in a miiioi is able to peiceive that the baby in the miiioi is inueeu himself
oi heiself, anu the sight of his oi hei image fills the baby with joy. The baby
will begin to laugh, to move with glee, anu to expiess elation in eveiy
possible way. To uesciibe this as jubilation is haiuly an oveistatement.
What has happeneu is that the chilu has put himself oi heiself on: The chilu
has fit himself oi heiself into the image in the miiioi, anu that stiuctuie
becomes the iuentificationin the psychoanalytic senseof the chilu's self.
The "I" shapes itself befoie objectifying itself as an ego in the uialectic of
iuentification with the imago of the uouble anu befoie language assigns it
the function of subject in the iealm of the univeisal (Lacan, 1966, p. 94). In
Fiench, this fact becomes obvious when we consiuei the uistinction
giammai makes between B# anu ')+, a uistinction that ioughly
appioximates the uiffeience between "I" anu "me" in English. When the
baby iecognizes his oi hei image in the miiioi, the baby has a notion that he
oi she is an "I." The awaieness of being an 'I" means that the image of a
whole bouy, a bouy that is a totality ieplaces the image of a bouy in pieces in
the Kleinian sense, in which the baby is pait an oigan of his oi hei own bouy
anu pait an oigan of anothei bouy. Inueeu, when a patient's sense of self has
utteily uisintegiateu, he oi she will often uieam that his oi hei bouy is cut
up anu its oigans sepaiateu anu uisjointeu with the wings anu limbs like
those iepiesenteu in paintings by Bieionymous Bosch. When the "I"
attempts to builu itself up, howevei, uieams iepiesent the iu as foitifieu
builuings, castles with elaboiate walls, moats, toweis, anu othei metaphois
of inveision, isolation, uuplication, annulment, anu uisplacement
chaiacteiistic of obsessional neuiosis.
At the enu of this miiioi phase, anothei uialectical mechanism
inauguiates the inseition of the "I" into the "me," anu this takes place in
situations that aie elaboiateu by social ielationships. Buman knowleuge is
meuiateu thiough iuentification with the imago of the uesiie of the othei.
Peihaps the miiioi also ieflecteu anothei image; someone else may have
been holuing the infanta mothei anuoi a fathei. The constiucts that
follow will be socially ueteimineu, anu language will be the meuiatoi.
The looking-glass phase pioviues an inkling of why Lacan iejecteu the
positions of Ameiican ego psychology piomoteu by Ruuolph Loewenstein,
Einst Kiis, anu Beinz Baitmann. It is uoubtful that one of the ieasons foi his
ciiticism of the "New Yoik tioika," as he often calleu it, was his sense of
abanuonment when Loewenstein set up iesiuence in the 0niteu States
uuiing the wai. In fact, Lacan's iejection of ego psychology lies at the veiy
ioot of his thinking.
In Ameiica, Lacan claimeu, psychoanalysis was a theiapy whose goal
was to make the citizen aujust to the enviionment. Put in a political
peispective, membeis of society shoulu behave anu leau theii lives
accoiuing to the values of that society. But if we substitute the teim
"uominant iueology" foi the teim "values," then whethei abiuing by this
iueology is a sign of equilibiium is highly uebatable. Lacan helu that this was
not the goal of psychoanalysis. Bis position towaiu the use of
psychoanalysis in the 0niteu States was similai to the position many
Ameiicans take about the use of psychiatiy in the Soviet 0nion. It is possible
that fiom a Soviet peispective, the meie fact of being a uissiuent is a sign
that one is not "iight in the heau," that one is unhingeu, anu that tieatment
is neeueu. But it also seems quite cleai that the puipose of psychiatiy oi of
psychoanalysis is not to aujust these uissiuents to the society in which they
live. Touay, it is uifficult to aigue with Lacan's position that the puipose of
psychoanalysis is psychoanalysisoi, in othei woius, a quest foi tiuth
iathei than making patients aujust to the cultuial mainstieam.
Nany of Lacan's most moving pages make this point ovei anu ovei. In a
sense, his most uebatable technical innovation, the vaiiable analytic houi, is
a consequence of this quest foi tiuth. Be himself explaineu that closing off a
session meant that an obsessional patient woulu not go on foi months on
enu making small talk about Bostoevski's novels while his oi hei life wasteu
away. Foicing such a patient to pay moie foi less can be an effective tiuth
seium! Be that as it may, the ultimate goals of analysis foi Lacan is the
moment of tiuth, an ineffable sense of unity anu plenituue of one's being.
Lacan took gieat caie to sepaiate the vaiious planes anu ielations that
he expiesseu with the woius "imaginaiy," "symbolic," anu "ieal." These
teims become intelligible when we examine the peiception we have of
ouiselves. 0n a veiy liteial level, since I have nevei seen myself, anu since
the only "me" I can actually "see" is an image of "me" in a miiioi, this "me,"
this "ego" is an imaginaiy function. It is the uiscoveiy of an expeiience, anu
not an a piioii categoiy (Lacan, 19S4-SS, p. Su). Fuitheimoie, this
imaginaiy function will inteivene in psychic life as if it weie a symbol. "0ne
uses the NE the way the Boioio uses a paiiot. The Boioio says I AN A
PARR0T; we say, I AN NE" p. S2). (The Boioio aie South Ameiican Inuians
founu along the uppei Paiaguay Rivei.)
The imaginaiy uiffeis fiom the symbolic. Lacan's symbolic function is a
tianscenuental function, beyonu any image, anu it is insciibeu in memoiy.
That is, one of its chaiacteiistics is that it is a piesence in absence anu an
absence in piesence. Foi example, when the baby takes a ball, hiues, it, anu
takes it back again, all the while saying "heie," "gone," "heie," the baby is
leaining that the ball is piesent even though he oi she cannot see it. When
the baby uoes see it, when it is piesent, he oi she knows that it may
uisappeai anu that its absence is a possibility. In Fieuu, of couise, the
uisappeaiance of the object is linkeu to the uisappeaiance of the mothei.
The paiauox as Lacan sees it, is that the baby misses his oi hei mothei when
he oi she notices she is not piesent. The mothei's piesence is acknowleugeu
when she has gone. Anu when the mothei is absent, the chilu leains that he
oi she can keep hei image piesent in his oi hei minu symbolically. Naking
the ball appeai anu uisappeai is a symbolic expiession of leaining to cope
with the mothei as othei.
In life, we cannot see the symbolic, of couise, but it is piesent
neveitheless. We builu it anu we leain how to builu it just as, in oiuei to
play ball, we have to leain how to uo so. Foi example, the baby boy sees
himself in the miiioi, anu he also sees his fathei anu mothei. When he
peiceives his paients as images of his own piojections, he functions in the
iealm of the imaginaiy. But his paients also exist as the othei (*Q42:1#)
beyonu theii images in the miiioi. They aie paients, but they aie also
chiluien anu gianuchiluien of theii paients anu ancestois. In a sense, siiing
a chilu uoes not make a man a "fathei." A fathei becomes a "fathei" only
when he takes on foi himself the symbolic function of the "fathei" anu is
able to pass this 0thei on to his chilu. The chilu integiates the 0thei,
(*Q@2:1#), with an initial capital lettei. Bis past, that is to say his histoiy, is
inseiteu into the piesent as well as the futuienot only his own histoiy, the
histoiy he knows, such as the chiluhoou he iemembeis, but also the histoiy
he has foigotten anu the histoiy that his ancestois iepiesseu but that he
himself continues to peipetuate. When I claim that my cat }effiey is a
uevoteu anu caiing fathei, I am guilty of anthiopomoiphism that attiibutes
to the cat the feelings of a human fathei. Ny statement is aiticulateu on
Lacan's imaginaiy level in which my woius ieflect what I see in '& miiioi.
When I wiite that the hoise Piince William v may win the famous X ueiby
because Piince William Iv, an X ueiby winneihimself siieu by Piince
William III, also a winneiwas his fathei, I am speaking on a level Lacan
woulu call symbolic. Ny example may be imaginaiyaftei all, I have maue
up the names of the iacehoisesbut because the iacing woilu itself is a
symbolic iealm anu because its customs anu conventions make sense in a
histoiical anu human peispective, the iacehoise as fathei is a symbolic
entity.
Lacan's "ieal," the thiiu element in the tiyptich, is not ieality. It is likely
that Lacan uses this teim in the same sense as }eiemy Bentham uiu when he
meant that the "ieal" was the opposite of the "fictitious" (see Lacan, 19S9-
6u, p. 6u). The concept incluues what is neithei symbolic noi imaginaiy. It
iefeis to veiy stuff that is stiuctuieu by the symbolic. Applieu to the concept
of fatheihoou, foi example, the ieal woulu be the physiological act of
piocieating without any inteipietation whatsoevei. Anything at all that we
say about the act, the veiy woius I use to convey the infoimation,
immeuiately uiaw the ieauei anu me onto the symbolic plane. The woiu
"fathei" itself is a sublimation anu a spiiitual act. As Lacan (19S9-6u, p. 14),
explaineu many times, the king is nakeu. The unconscious itself is stiuctuieu
aiounu the symbolic function.
We aie now in a position to unueistanu why anu how the unconscious
is stiuctuieu like a language. The ieal cannot be appiehenueu at all except
thiough a symbolic opeiation. If theie is no symbolic level, the ieal iemains
oiganic anu ueau, as it weie. The initial peiception is in a sign, anu this sign
is itself both a signifiei anu a signifieu, that is, an element of language.
A lot of ink has been spilleu about Lacan's uebt to Feiuinanu ue
Saussuie's (191S) 8)21, 3# *+5>2+,:+P2# >514*#. In fact, the iueas of the
8)21, aie anu weie quite familiai to all Fiench-speaking linguists anu
psychoanalysts of the eaily twentieth centuiy. Feiuinanu's own son,
Raymonu ue Saussuie, was a psychoanalyst, a membei of the Sociacete
Psychanalytique ue Paiis, anu he knew Lacan well. It has been claimeu
(Rouuinesco, 1982) that Raymonu was totally ignoiant of his fathei's
contiibution to linguistics, but I cannot believe this at all. When Lacan takes
up Saussuie's uistinction between the "signifiei" (,+>5+-+45:)the acoustic
image, the sounu of an utteianceanu the "signifieu (,+>5+-+O)the concept
oi concepts expiesseu by the utteiance, he is using a linguistic shoithanu
that was wiuely useu. Likewise, he is using appiopiiate mouem teiminology
when he iefeis to the paiauigmatic chain of thoughtthe piinciple of
"clang" associations wheieby "big" leaus to "uig," anu "uig" leaus to "iig" oi
anothei such sounuanu to syntagmatic associations, in which "big" may
leau to "gieat," "Alexanuei," "Philip," anu "Naceuonia." In this peispective,
the conclusion that the unconscious is stiuctuieu like a language means
simply that theie aie no innate iueas, anu that the unconscious is a cultuial
iathei than an oiganic entity.
The same point can be maue about othei applications of linguistics to
psychoanalysis. Fieuu's analysis of uieams, his mechanisms of
uisplacement, uenial, anu similaiity, aie themselves tiopes. An attempt to
ueteimine whethei a given symptom is expiesseu linguistically by, foi
example, a synecuoche (the tiope that suggests a pait foi the whole, less foi
moie, oi moie foi less) oi by a metalepsis (the phiase wheieby an inuiiect
expiession is substituteu foi a uiiect expiession
S
) may leau to an accuiate
uesciiptions of given speech pattein coiiesponuing to given clinical
configuiations. Peihaps that is the significance of Lacan's coinage of the
woiu M4*45>2#, a linking in one woiu of the aiticle la anu the noun langue,
meaning tongue, in the sense of speech oi language. The woiu also suggests
Anui Lalanue, the authoi of a famous Fiench uictionaiy of philosophy, a
book philosophy stuuents iefei to with the metonymy oi synecuoche,
M4*453#. The ieasoning goes something like this: I speak English just as you
speak English, but my speech is uiffeient fiom youis, although it is also the
same, so that my Lalangue is like youi Lalangue, yet the two aie not the
same. }ust like Bumpty Bumpty, I make my woius mean something uiffeient
than you make youi woius mean, but we have to use the same woius. Even
when the unconscious coins new woiusLacan's Lalangueit auapts
signifieis of the linguistic anu puts them to its own use. This new sign may
iemain a piivate teim, oi it may entei the linguistic mainstieam. When it
uoes, it mouifies the Lalangue of eveiyone anu in some way it changes the
cultuial unconscious, that is, the linguistic substiatum of oui cultuie.
Peihaps heiein lies the explanation foi Lacan's uelibeiate use of a
language that baies his own linguistic associations. As a stuuent of Saussuie
anu a ieauei of Begel anu Beiueggei, he knew that in a sense, each one of
oui utteiances changes the total language of oui linguistic community anu
that some utteiances change it moie than otheis. Foi example, his theoiy of
the "Nom uu Peie" ceitainly mouifieu the theoietical assumptions Fiench
psychiatiists anu psychoanalysts have about psychosis. Beie, in a sense,
Lacan's Lalangue has begun to change not only clinical theoiy, but also its
piactice. veiy simply put, the "Nom uu Peie" means not only the fathei's
name, but also the fathei's "no," that is to say, the act wheieby the fathei
seveis the symbiotic bonu between mothei anu chilu. This "no" must take
place if the chilu is to uevelop into an autonomous being. The name of the
fathei cannot be tiansfeiieu to the chilu unless the chilu ieceives it anu
accepts it on the symbolic level. In Lacan's teiminology, the image in the
miiioi, my othei, must have achieveu a link with the 0thei, who is not
myself, but who is constituteu by my iecognition of how my histoiy can be
integiateu in the woilu in which I livethat is, the Name-of-the-Fathei.
Why aie the N in "Nom" anu the P in Peie capitalizeu. These capital letteis
suggest a symbolic level, anu they aie allusion to the Fathei in the
Sciiptuies. The signifiei goes beyonu the actual uauuy, anu suggests that the
Name-of-the-Fathei is sacieu insofai as it gives a meaning to oui lives anu
sustains the iueas anu iueals of society, cultuie, anu civilization.
"What makes a psychosis come about." was the question Lacan askeu
himself. Yeais of clinical expeiience (it must always be kept in minu that
Lacan's theoiy anu his ieauing of Fieuu took place in the context of his
extensive clinical expeiience with psychotics) leu him to peiceive that in
eveiy case theie was a N#1=#1-25>. Lacan tianslates N#1=#1-25> into Fiench
as foieclusion, a teim he boiioweu fiom Bamouiette & Pichon's
monumental giammai book, C#, '):, T *4 7#5,S#.
4
I woulu tianslate this
into English as "shut out, foicloseu, anu excluueu," suggesting something
that might have openeu, but iemaineu closeu. Pichon useu -)1#9*2,+)5 to
uesciibe chaiacteiistics of the seconu teim in the Fiench negative, foi
example, the woius 74, (not), 7*2, (not), 1+#5 (nothing), B4'4+, (nevei),
42925 (none), anu 7#1,)55# (nobouy) in such phiases as H# 5# ,4+, 74, (I
uon't know), H# 5# ,4+, 7*2, (I no longei know), 8#*4 5# '# 3+: 1+#5 (That
uoesn't mean anything to me), .**# 5# ,4+: 1+#5 (She knows nothing), ;* 5# /4
B4'4+, 42 9+5S'4 (Be nevei goes to the movies), ;* 5Q4 42925 3#/)+1 (Be has
no homewoik), anu 6#1,)55# 5Q#,: /#52 (Nobouy came). In each of these
sentences, anu in this type of Fiench sentence geneially, the seconu negative
casts out uefinitively something that might have been. Likewise, in
psychosis, the 'Nom uu Peie' signifiei is itself excluueu.
In oiuei foi psychosis to manifest itself, the Name-of-the-Fathei, must
be /#1=)1-#5, excluueu, foiecloseu; it must have faileu to ieach the 0thei's
place, anu must now be calleu theie in a symbolic opposition with the
subject. The failuie of the Name-of-the-Fathei at that place, by the hole that
it opens in the signifieu, begins the cascaue of signifieis wheieby pioceeus
the giowing uisastei of the imaginaiy, until the level is ieacheu wheie
signifiei anu signifieu stabilize in a metaphoi of ueliiium.
Lacan's theoiy, then, is that in psychosis the cential signifiei, that is, the
Name-of-the-Fathei, has faileu to insciibe itself in the subject's language
iegistei. At the place wheie it shoulu have been incoipoiateu, theie is a gap,
a hole, a voiu. When the occasion piesents itselffoi example, when an
eisatz signifiei happens to make its way into the appiopiiate chainthis
vacuum will suck up any signifiei at all that happens to come along, anu an
elaboiate uelusional system will come to occupy the place of the missing
Name-of-the-Fathei. Foi example, in the case of Schiebei, ueheimiat
Piofessoi Flechsig, iemaineu foi him the chief instigatoi uuiing the entiie
couise of his illness. Fieuu (1911) quotes Schiebei: "Even now the voices
that talk with me call out youi name to me hunuieus of times each uay. They
name you in ceitain constantly iecuiiing connections, anu especially as
being the fiist authoi of the injuiies I have suffeieu" (p. S8). uou Almighty
comes to play a pait as Flechsig's accessoiy, as uoes the soul of the chief
attenuant of Pieison's asylum, the clinic to which Schiebei moves. They aie
but substitutes foi the Name-of-the-Fathei; anu the uivine iays, the special
biius, the neives of uou, anu Schiebei's own tiansfoimation into a woman
aie geneiateu to fill the emptiness cieateu by the absence of the
tianscenuental signifiei.
Lacan's theoiy of the unconscious is a mateiialistic theoiy: The
unconscious is stiuctuieu like a languagethat is, a concept, a signifieu, is
linkeu to a signifiei, an acoustic image, anu in tuin this signifiei suggests
anothei signifieu, so that an iuea is immeuiately tuineu into mattei. It is
paiauoxical, theiefoie, that Lacan speaks like a theologian. The psychotic
anu Schiebei is an excellent examplemakes uou Almighty into the image
of the fathei, but in fact, the coiiect stance anu the conuition of sanity is that
the fathei be cieateu in the image of uou Almighty. The unconscious may be
stiuctuieu like a language, but if this language is to sustain inteihuman
ielations, cultuie, anu civilization, then it must itself iest on a
tianscenuental signifiei in the image of the uieat 0thei (*# <1453 @2:1#),
Lacan often saiu.
The ueuication of Lacan's uoctoial thesis to his biothei, Reveienu
Fathei Naic-Fianois Lacan, Beneuictine monk of the Congiegation of
Fiance, makes us wonuei whethei both biotheis uiu not follow a similai
path. Lacan was not a man of the chuich, but neveitheless he pieacheu a
gospel. In his gospel the tiopes of psychoanalysis incoipoiateu tiopes of
othei uisciplinesphilosophy, theology, liteiatuie, ait, linguistics, anu
anthiopologychaiacteiistic of the cultuie of a given time anu place: the
miuule of the twentieth centuiy in Fiance, an anticleiical countiy with a
stiong Catholic tiauition. Lacan's Chiistian Paiisian cosmopolitanism may
be the counteipait of Fieuu's }ewish miuule Euiopean univeisalism.

(.0+'12#),3#+!
The authoi gives giateful thanks to the Reseaich Founuation of the City
0niveisity of New Yoik foi a Faculty Reseaich Fellowship.
%#-#%#+.#/
Beitin, C. (1982). M4 3#15+S1# X)54741:#. Paiis: Libiaiiie Acaumique Peiiin.
Clement, C. (1981). N+# #: *O>#53#, 3# H49P2#, M4945. Paiis: uiasset.
Bamouiette, }., & Pichon, E. (1911-19Su). C#, '):, T *4 7#5,+#Y .,,4+ 3#
<14''4+1# 3# *4 *45>2# -1459V4+,#. 7 vol. Paiis: u'Aitiey.
Fieuu, S. (1887-88). Pieface to Chaicot. %:453413 .3+:+)5, 1.
Fieuu, S. (189S). Chaicot. %:453413 .3+:+)5, S.
Fieuu, S. (1911). Psycho-Analytic Notes on An Autobiogiaphical Account of
a Case of Paianoia. %:453413 .3+:+)5, 12.
uiue, A. (192S). M#, -42EI')554&#21,. Paiis: uallimaiu.
Lacan, }. (19S2). Be la psychose paianoaque uans ses iappoits avec la
peisonnalit. These poui le uoctoiat en muecine, uiplome u'tat. In
}. Lacan, C# *4 7,&9"),# 74145)+4P2# 345, ,#, 1477)1:, 4/#9 *4
7#1,)554*+:J ,2+/+ 3# 61#'+#14 91+:, ,21 *4 74145)W4. Paiis: Seuil,
197S.
Lacan, }. (19SSa). Le piobleme uu style et la conception psychiatiique ues
foimes paianoaques ue l'expiience. In }. Lacan, C# *4 7,&9"),#
74145)+4P2# 345, ,#, 1477)1:, 4/#9 *4 7#1,)554*+:J ,2+/+ 3# 61#'+#14
91+:, ,21 *4 74145)W4. Paiis: Seuil, 197S.
Lacan, }. (19SSb). Notifs uu ciime paianoque. In }. Lacan, C# *4 7,&9"),#
74145)+4P2# 345, ,#, 1477)1:, 4/#9 *4 7#1,)554*+:J ,2+/+ 3# 61#'+#14
91+:, ,21 *4 74145)W4. Paiis: Seuil, 197S.
Lacan, }. (19S6, }uly). The looking-glass phase. Papei piesenteu at the 14th
Inteinational Psychoanalytic Congiess, }uly S1 Naiienbau. (1947)
16th Inteinational Congiess, }uly 17; Zuiich . (1966) .91+:,, Paiis:
Seuil.
Lacan, }. (19Su). Piopos sui la causalit psychique. In L. Bonnafe, B. Ey, S.
Follin, }. Lacan, }. Rouait Le Piobleme ue la psychogenese ues
nvioses et ues psychoses. Paiis: Bescle ue Biouvei, (1966). .91+:,.
Lacan. }. (19SS-S4). M# ,'+54+1#? M+/1# ;Y M#, O91+:, :#9"5+P2#, 3# 01#23 (}.-A.
Nillei, Eu.). Paiis: Euitions uu Seuil, 197S.
Lacan, }. (19S4-SS). M# ,O'+54+1#? M+/1# ZY M# ')+ 345, *4 :"O)1+# 3# 01#23 #:
345, *4 :#9"5+P2# 3# *4 7,&9"454*&,# (}.-A. Nillei, Eu.). Paiis: Euitions
uu Seuil, 1978.
Lacan, }. (19SS-S6). M# ,O'+54+1#? M+/1# [Y M#, 7,&9"),#, (}.-A. Nillei, Eu.).
Paiis: Seuil, 1981.
Lacan, }. (19S7). Le sminaiie sui "La lettie vole," Apiil 26,19SS. In .91+:,.
Paiis: Seuil, 1966.
Lacan, }. (19S8). }eunesse ue uiua ou la lettie et le usii. 81+:+P2# (Apiil,
19S8), 1S1, pp. 291-S1S. (1966, .91+:,), Paiis: Seuil.
Lacan, }. (19S9-6u). MQO:"+P2#. Paiis: Euitions uu Piianha. 0nauthoiizeu
tiansciipt.
Lacan, }. (1964). M# ,O'+54+1#? M+/1# \\Y M#, P24:1# 9)59#7:, -)534'#5:42E 3#
*4 7,&9"454*&,## (}.-A. Nillei, Eu.). Paiis: Seuil, 197S.
Lacan, }. (1966). .91+:,. Paiis: Euition, uu Seuil.
Lacan, }. (1966). Position ue l'inconsicent au congies ue Bonneval iepiis ue
196u en 1964. In .91+:,. Paiis: Seuil.
Lacan, }. (1972-7S). M# ,O'+54+1#] M+/1# Z^Y .59)1# (}.-A. Nillei, Eu.). Paiis:
Seuil, 197S.
Lacan, }. (198u). Le Sminaiie ue 198u: Bissolution. _15+941. No. 2u-21.
LaScisson ue (19SS, }uly 14). _15+941.. 19S6, p. 1S6.
Levy-valensi, }., Nigault, P., & Lacan, }. (19S1). Eciits "inspiis:
Schizogiaphie. In }. Lacan, C# *4 7,&9"),# 74145)+4P2# 345, ,#,
1477)1:, 4/#9 *4 7#1,)554*+:J ,2+/+ 3# 61#'+#14 91+:, ,21 *4 74145)W4.
Paiis: Euitions uu Seuil, 197S.
Nillei, }.-A. (Eu.). (1976). La Scission ue 19SS |Special supplementj, _15+941.
7.
Rouuinesco, E. (1982). M4 X4:4+**# 3# 9#5: 45,? A+,:)+1# 3# *4 7,&9"454*&,# #5
01459#. Paiis: Ramsay.
Saussuie, F. ue (191S). 8)21, 3# *+5>2+,:+P2# >514*#. Eu. Bally, C.,
Sechehaye, A. ueneva.
Schneiueiman, S. (198S). H49P2#, M4945Y !"# C#4:" )- 45 ;5:#**#9:24* A#1).
Cambiiuge, Nass. anu Lonuon, Englanu: Baivaiu 0niveisity Piess.

+4567

1 The lettei to Lowenstein, uateu }uly 14, 19SS, contains the following:
I want you to feel how bittei this expeiience has been foi us, anu also
how uecisive.
I give you authoiity to communicate this |letteijin spite of the tone of
the confessional that is founu anu in spite of oui special ielationshipto
Beinz Baitmann whose peison I have always helu in the highest esteem |p.
1SSj.
The enu of his lettei to Baitmann on }uly 21, 19SS, ieaus as follows:
Beai Beinz Baitmann, I iegiet that the chaotic events of past yeais, as
well as the extieme isolation that is conuitioneu by oui piofessional life
pieventeu me fiom making myself bettei known to you.
But I count on youi authoiity to make it possible foi the authentic anu
ueeply caiing effoit that is the founuation of my woik in biinging Fieuu's
teaching alive to be iespecteu; to biing back the tone of ieason to a fight
that is as steiile in its foims as it is base in its motives, anu to take the
equitable measuies necessaiy to pieseive the auuience that psychoanalysis
is piesently conqueiing in Fiance anu that this fight can only hinuei, (p.
1S6)
Eviuence that Naiie Bonapaite might have been behinu Lacan's exclusion fiom
the IPA is appaient fiom exceipts of hei own letteis to Lowenstein
publisheu in the biogiaphy, La ueinieie Bonapaite (Beitin, 1982).
2 It is likely that moie infoimation will become available in the neai futuie,
paiticulaily with the publication of the seconu volume of Rouuinesco's
histoiy of psychoanalysis in Fiance.
S Foi example, in the Fiench play Pheuie, by }ean Racine, the heioine in love with
hei stepson, Bippolytus, expiesses hei uesiie by pietenuing that she loves
hei husbanu Theseus, Bippolytus' fathei, not the way he is now, but the
way he was when he was his son's age (Rouuinesco, 1982, p. 1S8).
4 Rouuinesco (1982, pp. S92-S9S) points out that although Lacan is usually given
cieuit foi this teim in psychoanalysis, in fact, he boiioweu it fiom his
colleague.
!"
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Auolf uinbaum was boin on Nay 1S,192S in Cologne, ueimany. Be
ieceiveu his B.A. fiom Wesleyan 0niveisity in 194S with high uistinction in
mathematics anu philosophy, his N.S. in physics fiom Yale 0niveisity in
1948, anu his Ph.B. in philosophy fiom Yale 0niveisity in 19S1. Be began his
teaching caieei at Lehigh 0niveisity in 19Su. Five yeais latei he was
appointeu William Wilson Selfiiuge Piofessoi of Philosophy. In 196u he
accepteu a position at the 0niveisity of Pittsbuigh as Anuiew Nellon
Piofessoi of Philosophy, wheie he has been evei since. In 1979 he was also
appointeu Reseaich Piofessoi of Psychiatiy at the same univeisity on the
basis of his woik on psychoanalytic epistemology.
uinbaum is cuiiently one of the leauing figuies in contempoiaiy
philosophy of science. Be has been piesiuent of the Philosophy of Science
Association foi two teims, 196S-67 anu 1968-7u, anu was electeu piesiuent
of the Ameiican Philosophical Association (Eastein Bivision) foi 1982-8S. In
auuition, he has ieceiveu numeious honois anu awaius foi his woik, the
most iecent of which is a festschiift in his honoi (Cohen & Lauuan, 198S)
containing essays by 14 of touay's piincipal ieseaicheis in philosophy of
science as well as two leauing psychoanalysts.
uinbaum's inteiest in psychoanalysis is ielatively iecent. Bis past
woik piimaiily conceineu philosophical pioblems of space anu time anu the
theoiy of scientific iationality (see Cohen & Lauuan, 198S foi a complete
bibliogiaphy). Since 1976, howevei, when his fiist papei on psychoanalytic
epistemology appeaieu (uinbaum, 1976), he has piouuceu at least 1u
papeis as well as a book on the subject, which have succeeueu in completely
changing the state of the ait. The puipose of this essay, then, is to pioviue a
summaiy anu ciitique of this woik.
The two funuamental questions that uinbaum's woik on
psychoanalysis auuiesses aie these:
1. What soit of stanuaius of assessment ought we to invoke in evaluating
psychoanalysis. That is, ought we to iegaiu it as making knowleuge
claims, anu, if so, what kinu.
2. uiven that we have chosen ceitain stanuaius of assessment, how uoes
psychoanalysis measuie up to those stanuaius.
With iespect to the fiist question, uinbaum has aigueu emphatically
that (a) the most appiopiiate stanuaius of assessment foi psychoanalysis
aie those ueiiveu fiom empiiical science, contiaiy to the claims of the
heimeneuts, }uigen Babeimas, Paul Ricoeui, anu ueoige Klein (uinbaum,
198Sc, 1984); anu (b) psychoanalysis meets the minimal conuitions
necessaiy foi applying those stanuaius, contiaiy to the claims of Kail
Poppei (196S) (who accepts uinbaum's fiist statement but uenies the
seconu on the giounus that psychoanalysis is unfalsifiable) (uinbaum,
1976, 1977, 1979). With iespect to the seconu question, howevei, his stance
has been seveiely ciitical. In his view, theie aie seiious uifficulties in the
way of iegaiuing psychoanalysis as goou science. These stem not only fiom
seiious liabilities involveu in the use of clinical uata but also fiom the moues
of ieasoning that Fieuu useu to pioviue eviuential suppoit foi his theoiy
(uinbaum, 198Sb, 1984).
It shoulu be cleai that any attempt to aigue convincingly eithei foi oi
against the scientific status of psychoanalysis ought to be infoimeu by botb a
thoiough unueistanuing of the psychoanalytic liteiatuie anu a sophisticateu
conception of the natuie of science. The liteiatuie piioi to uinbaum's
iecent outpouiing on the subject suffeis, in my view, in both of these
iespects. That is, eithei it exhibits a veiy supeificial unueistanuing of
psychoanalysis oi it is naive about the natuie of science. The impoitance of
uinbaum's contiibution in the aiea of psychoanalytic epistemology iests
on the fact that his woik is unpaialleleu on both counts. Not only uoes he
biing to beai a veiy gieat sophistication in the philosophy of science but, in
auuition, he has uone his psychoanalytic homewoik.
In 19S9, the philosophei }ohn Bospeis summeu up the iesults of one of
the fiist majoi confeiences on philosophy anu psychoanalysis as follows:
As I tiy to get a composite pictuie of the iesults of the confeience,
the thing that stanus out most in my minu is the lack of genuine
communication between the psychoanalysts anu the philosopheis.
Psychoanalysts aie, quite unueistanuably, too busy tieating
patients to have acquainteu themselves with the latest guns in the
aisenal of epistemology anu philosophy of science, anu aie
theiefoie at a loss to ieply to the chaiges leveleu at them by the
philosopheis in the way the philosopheis want. The philosopheis,
foi theii pait, aieequally unueistanuablyignoiant of the vast
amount of empiiical uetail gaineieu by psychoanalysts in the last
half-centuiy as well as the complexity of many of the theoietical
concepts employeu in psychoanalysis. The inevitable iesult is that
each paity to the uispute only feels confiimeu in his pievious
suspicion, namely that the othei paity's iemaiks aie eithei
incompetent oi iiielevant, given to making eithei scanualously
oveiblown claims oi excessively uemanuing systematic
iequiiements |p. SS6j.
I believe that uinbaum has gone moie than halfway towaiu closing
this communication gap fiom the philosophical siue. Not only is his woik
impiessively leaineu with iespect to the psychoanalytic liteiatuie, as
alieauy mentioneu, but he has also woikeu veiy haiu at establishing lines of
communication with the psychoanalytic community. Foi all of this, howevei,
his wiiting may not be easily accessible to psychoanalysts anu stuuents of
psychoanalysis, foi it uoes piesuppose a consiueiable sophistication in the
philosophy of science anu the techniques of philosophical aigumentation. It
is chiefly this consiueiation that has uictateu the style of the piesent essay.
uinbaum's woik meiits seiious attention fiom anyone inteiesteu in the
cognitive status of psychoanalysis. Ny piincipal concein, theiefoie, has been
to make the most impoitant of his iueas anu aiguments accessible to the
ieauei. This appioach has hau seveial consequences. Fiist, I have uevoteu a
ceitain amount of space to pioviuing backgiounu that seemeu to me
essential to unueistanuing eithei the content of uinbaum's wiiting oi its
impoitance. Seconu, I have hau to stiike a compiomise between the
uemanus of uepth anu bieauth in the uiscussion of uinbaum's woik itself.
uinbaum's wiiting is exceeuingly iich. In attempting to piesent cleaily the
cential lines of aigumentation, much of this iichness has necessaiily been
lost. I thus uige the ieauei inteiesteu in his woik to consult the oiiginal. In
auuition, ceitain topics have simply not been toucheu on at all. Wheie this is
the case, I have tiieu to inuicate what has been omitteu in the appiopiiate
place in my uiscussion.
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uinbaum's appioach to this question has been twofolu. Fiist, he has
iepeateuly emphasizeu that Fieuu himself iegaiueu psychoanalysis as
scientific. In suppoit of this claim, he cites passages such as the one in which
Fieuu states that the explanatoiy gains fiom positing unconscious mental
piocesses "enableu psychology to take its place as a natuial science like any
othei" (Fieuu, 194ua, p. 1S8, see also 192S, p. S8; 19SS, p. 1S9; 194ub, p.
282). Seconu, uinbaum has uevoteu consiueiable effoit to pioviuing
counteiaiguments to those who have suggesteu that, foi one ieason oi
anothei, Fieuuian theoiy ought not be iegaiueu as scientific on the giounus
that it fails to satisfy ceitain minimal iequiiements foi scientific canuiuacy.
These aiguments have been uiiecteu, in paiticulai, against Kail Poppei,
}uigen Babeimas, Paul Ricoeui, anu ueoige Klein.
Although it might appeai that uinbaum has simply auopteu the
stiategy of shifting the buiuen of pioof to those who wish to ueny scientific
status to Fieuuian theoiy, it is possible to view his uiscussion as pait of an
oveiall implicit positive aigument as follows:
1. A bouy of woik shoulu be juugeu by the stanuaius of auequacy
subsciibeu to by the authoi oi cieatoi unless theie is compelling ieason
not to.
2. Fieuu took himself to be uoing science.
S. The ieasons that have been offeieu in the liteiatuie against assessing
psychoanalytic theoiy in teims of the stanuaius of science aie
unifoimly uncompelling.
4. Theiefoie, Fieuuian psychoanalytic theoiy ought to be assesseu as
science.
Since the seconu piemise is not uifficult to establish, the bulk of
uinbaum's uiscussion on this mattei has been uevoteu to justifying the
thiiu piemise. In the uiscussion that follows, we shall focus on his
consiueiation of the aiguments of Poppei anu Babeimas. Reaueis
inteiesteu in his uiscussion of Ricoeui anu Klein shoulu consult uinbaum,
1984, pp. 4S-9S.
.12)/&"'"32141 "1 .1(5+&61)4(')(
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In 19SS, in a papei ieviewing his philosophical woik of the past Su oi
moie yeais, Kail Poppei challengeu the scientific status of psychoanalysis,
claiming that it was nothing moie than a pseuuoscience. Bis ieasoning was
this: To be scientific, a theoiy must be falsifiable; howevei, psychoanalytic
theoiy is not falsifiable. Theiefoie, psychoanalytic theoiy is not scientific.
Inteiestingly enough, it was in pait the case of psychoanalysis that leu
Poppei to see the impoitance of falsifiability in the scientific piocess in the
fiist place.
When the pioblematic natuie of psychoanalysis fiist occuiieu to him,
Poppei's piincipal concein was the so-calleu "pioblem of uemaication."
This is the pioblem of uistinguishing theoiies that can leqitimotely be
consiueieu canuiuates foi scientific evaluation fiom those that cannot, in
paiticulai, fiom those "pseuuoscientific" theoiies such as astiology that
shaie ceitain supeificial chaiacteiistics with genuine scientific theoiies but
that lack some essential featuie. The accepteu uemaication piinciple at the
time was an inuuctivist one: A theoiy is scientific just in case it is inuuctively
well confiimeu on the basis of empiiical eviuence. It was in pait the contiast
between Fieuu's psychoanalytic theoiy anu Einstein's theoiy of giavitation
that leu Poppei to believe that this was an incoiiect view. 0n intuitive
giounus, something seemeu to be wiong with psychoanalysis, but the
pioblem coulu not be its lack of "veiifications" because these seemeu to be
iampant. Poppei began to suspect that the uifficulty was piecisely that
psychoanalytic theoiy coulu always be veiifieu no motter wbot. In contiast,
a genuine scientific theoiy like Einstein's was uistinguisheu by the fact that,
if it weie false, it coulu be falsifieu so easily, because potentially falsifying
test outcomes weie ieauily imagineu. Poppei (196S) wiote:
I founu that those of my fiienus who weie aumiieis of Naix, Fieuu,
anu Aulei, weie impiesseu by a numbei of points common to these
theoiies, anu especially by theii appaient explonotory power. These
theoiies appeaieu to be able to explain piactically eveiything that
happeneu within the fielus to which they iefeiieu. The stuuy of any
of them seemeu to have the effect of an intellectual conveision oi
ievelation, opening youi eyes to a new tiuth hiuuen fiom those not
yet initiateu. 0nce youi eyes weie thus openeu you saw confiiming
instances eveiywheie: the woilu was full of verificotions of the
theoiy. Whatevei happeneu always confiimeu it. Thus its tiuth
appeaieu manifest; anu unbelieveis weie cleaily people who uiu
not want to see the manifest tiuth; who iefuseu to see it, eithei
because it was against theii class inteiest, oi because of theii
iepiessions which weie still 'un-analyzeu' anu ciying alouu foi
tieatment.
The most chaiacteiistic element in this situation seemeu to me the
incessant stieam of confiimations, of obseivations which "veiifieu"
the theoiies in question. ...It began to uawn on me that this
appaient stiength was in fact theii weakness |p. S4j.
In contiast, the situation with Einstein's theoiy was "stiikingly
uiffeient." 0n the basis of his theoiy of giavitation, Einstein hau pieuicteu
that light fiom a uistant stai woulu be bent neai the sun. What was
impiessive about this case, accoiuing to Poppei (196S), was the risk
involveu in a pieuiction of this kinu. Foi
if obseivation shows that the pieuicteu effect is uefinitely absent,
then the theoiy is simply iefuteu. The theoiy is incompotible witb
certoin possible results of observotionin fact with iesults which
eveiybouy befoie Einstein woulu have expecteu. This is quite
uiffeient fiom the situation I have pieviously uesciibeu, when it
tuineu out that the theoiies in question weie compatible with the
most uiveigent human behavioui, so that it was piactically
impossible to uesciibe any human behavioui that might not be
claimeu to be a veiification of these theoiies |p. S6j.
It was this puipoiteu insight that leu Poppei to his well-known
piinciple of falsifiability. In auuition, he pioposeu that tbe methou of science
is essentially one of bolu conjectuies anu attempteu iefutations whose
iationality lies in the facts that fiist, scientists aie always seeking to falsify
theii theoiies anu, seconu, they accept theii theoiies only (anu always only
tentatively) when they have successfully iesisteu numeious attempts at
falsification.
/*$ 0$'#"-'$ 1" !"##$%&' )*+,,$-.$
The philosophical iesponse to Poppei's challenge ovei the past 2u yeais
has taken a vaiiety of foims. In oiuei to unueistanu uinbaum's
contiibution to this uiscussion, it will be useful to inuicate biiefly the majoi
positions that have been taken.
It was noteu quite eaily on that theie is an impoitant ambiguity in the
claim that psychoanalysis is not falsifiable. Kenneuy (19S9), foi example,
pointeu out that psychoanalysis can be consiueieu unfalsifiable foi two veiy
uiffeient ieasons: fiist, because of the attituue of its pioponents in the face
of allegeuly unfavoiable eviuence; anu, seconu, because of the logical
stiuctuie of the theoiy. Naitin (1964b) iefineu this uistinction fuithei by
intiouucing foui possible senses of the notion of iefutability, two of which
conceineu the attituues of pioponents of the theoiy, anu two of which
conceineu its logical stiuctuie. Be wiote:
When we ask whethei a theoiy T is a iefutable theoiy, we may be
asking any of the following questions:
1. Aie people who aie auvocates of theoiy T willing to specify
what eviuence coulu count against theoiy T.
2. Aie people who believe in theoiy T willing to accept some of
the eviuence biought foith to iefute theoiy T insteau of
explaining it all away.
S. Is the ielation between the theoietical language anu the
obseivational language of theoiy T cleai anu unambiguous.
4. Is it possible to give theoiy T, in which the ielation between
the theoietical anu obseivational language is extiemely
vague anu ambiguous, cleai anu unambiguous foimulation
|p. 81j.
Naitin claimeu, howevei, that the fouith question is not an inteiesting
sense of 'iefutable,' since ony theoiy can be consiueieu iefutable in that
sense, incluuing those that we consiuei paiauigm cases of uniefutable
theoiies (such as that the absolute is peifect anu ueveloping in histoiy).
If we subuiviue Poppei's challenge into two paits, one uiiecteu at the
attituues of its pioponents anu one at the logical stiuctuie of psychoanalytic
theoiy, we finu enuoisements of both positions in the liteiatuie. Foi
example, a numbei of people have aigueu that the pioponents of
psychoanalytic theoiy typically exhibit a veiy unscientific attituue with
iespect to putative uisconfiiming uata. Aftei pioposing the foui senses of
'iefutability,' Naitin (1964b) claimeu that the answei to the fiist two
questions is no. Typically, psychoanalysts aie unwilling to specify what
eviuence will count against theii theoiy. Fuitheimoie, they tenu to uiscount
any allegeuly uisconfiiming eviuence. A similai view hau been voiceu eailiei
by Book (19S9a).
Cioffi (197u) took the chaige much fuithei. Psychoanalysis is a
pseuuoscience, he wiote, piincipally because it uses methouologically
uefective pioceuuies:
Foi an activity to be scientific it is not enough that theie shoulu be
states of affaiis which woulu constitute uisconfiimation of the
theses it puipoits to investigate; it must also be the case that its
pioceuuie shoulu be such that it is calculateu to uiscovei whethei
such states of affaiis exist. I use the woiu "calculateu" auviseuly. Foi
to establish that an enteipiise is pseuuo-scientific it is not sufficient
to show that the pioceuuies it employs woulu in foct pievent oi
obstiuct the uiscoveiy of uisconfiimatoiy states of affaiis but that it
is theii function to obstiuct such uiscoveiy. To claim that an
enteipiise is pseuuo-scientific is to claim that it involves the
habitual anu willful employment of methouologically uefective
pioceuuies (in a sense of willful which encompasses iefineu self-
ueception) |p. 472j.
Cioffi goes on to aigue that Fieuuian psychoanalysis is pseuuoscientific
in piecisely this sense. Foi it is chaiacteiizeu by a "host of
peculiaiities.which aie appaiently giatuitous anu unielateu, but which can
be unueistoou when once they aie seen as manifestations of the same
impulse: the neeu to avoiu iefutation" (p. 47S). The piincipal uevices that
Fieuu uses to accomplish this enu, accoiuing to Cioffi, aie these: Fiist,
hypotheses piesenteu piioi to the uiscoveiy of appaiently uisconfiiming
eviuence aie, typically, foimulateu in a naiiow anu ueteiminate sense;
afteiwaius, howevei, they aie constiueu in a "bioauei anu haziei" way so as
to avoiu the uisconfiimation. Seconu, piioi to the uiscoveiy of appaiently
uisconfiiming eviuence, Fieuu allows foi the ielevance of eviuence fiom a
numbei of inteisubjective souices, incluuing obseivation of the behavioi of
chiluien, inquiiy into the uistinctive featuies of the cuiient sexual lives oi
actual infantile sexual histoiy of neuiotics, oi ueteimination of the outcome
of theiapy baseu on his theoiy. In the face of appaiently uisconfiiming
eviuence, howevei, he typically ietieats to the claim that the only ieliable
souice of eviuence is mateiial obtaineu uuiing the psychoanalytic session
anu subjecteu to inteipietation by a tiaineu analyst. Thiiu, his theoiy
contains such a vaiiety of mechanisms anu inteipietative piinciples that it is
possible foi him to inteipiet any phenomenon in a way consistent with his
theoiy. Thus, "he typically pioceeus by beginning with whatevei content his
theoietical pieconceptions compel him to maintain unueilies the symptoms,
anu then, by woiking back anu foith between it anu the explananuum,
constiucting peisuasive but spuiious links between them" (Cioffi, 197u, p.
497). Finally, his inteipietations aie not even constiaineu by consiueiations
of logic; foi it is not even necessaiy foi the vaiious meanings of a symptom
to be compatible with one anothei.
The piincipal eaily suppoitei of Poppei's position with iespect to the
nonfalsifiability of Fieuuian theoiy in the logical sense was Nagel. In a
classic papei (Nagel, 19S9) he offeis us an analysis of piecisely wby
psychoanalytic theoiy is pioblematic:
The theoiy uoes not seem to me to satisfy two iequiiements which
any theoiy must satisfy if it is to be capable of empiiical
valiuation..In the fiist place, it must be possible to ueuuce
ueteiminate consequences fiom the assumptions of the theoiy, so
that one can ueciue on the basis of logical consiueiations, anu piioi
to the examination of any empiiical uata, whethei oi not an allegeu
consequence of the theoiy is inueeu implieu by the lattei. Foi
unless this iequiiement is fulfilleu, the theoiy has no uefinite
content, anu questions as to what the theoiy asseits cannot be
settleu except by iecouise to some piivilegeu authoiity oi aibitiaiy
capiice. In the seconu place, even though the theoietical notions aie
not explicitly uefineu by way of oveit empiiical pioceuuies anu
obseivable tiaits of things, neveitheless at least some theoietical
notions must be tieJ Jown to foirly Jefinite onJ unombiquously
specifieJ obseivable mateiials, by way of iules of pioceuuie
vaiiously calleu "coiiesponuence iules," "cooiuinating uefinitions,"
anu "opeiational uefinitions." Foi if this conuition is not satisfieu,
the theoiy can have no ueteiminate consequences about empiricol
subject mattei |p. 4uj.
Nagel aigueu that Fieuuian theoiy faileu both of these conuitions
piimaiily because of its vagueness anu metaphoiical chaiactei.
Fieuuian foimulations seem to me to have so much "open textuie,"
to be so loose in statement, that while they aie unquestionably
suggestive, it is well-nigh impossible to ueciue whethei what is thus
suggesteu is genuinely implieu by the theoiy oi whethei it is
ielateu to the lattei only by the ciicumstance that someone boppens
to associate one with the othei |p. 41j.
Naitin (1964b) pioviueu fuithei suppoit foi Nagel's view. As the quote
fiom Nagel makes cleai, the accepteu view at the time was that the
empiiical impoit of a genuinely scientific theoiy (i.e., the link to its
obseivation base) is meuiateu by so-calleu coiiesponuence iules, consisting
eithei of explicit oi paitial uefinitions of the theoietical vocabulaiy in teims
of an obseivational vocabulaiy. Since the existence of such coiiesponuence
iules is a necessaiy conuition of a theoiy being falsifiable, one way to
asceitain the scientific status of psychoanalytic theoiy, accoiuing to Naitin
(1964b), is to tiy one's best "to sepaiate the obseivational basis of the
theoiy fiom the theoietical stiuctuie, anu to extiact iules of
coiiesponuence fiom the context of the uses of the two languages" (p. 8S).
When Nauison (1961) useu this stiategy, he concluueu that foi some
aspects of psychoanalysis, theie was no associateu obseivational language
anu iules of coiiesponuence, wheieas foi otheis, theie was. Naitin,
howevei, aigues that Nauison's allegeuly positive iesults aie incoiiect.
What Nauison actually founu, accoiuing to Naitin (1964b), aie "the
iuuiments of an obseivational language anu iules of coiiesponuence" (p.
86). Nauison takes these iuuiments anu iefoimulates them into a cleaiei
anu moie piecise foim, but he fails to uistinguish his foimulations fiom
Fieuu's. Thus, he only shows that Fieuuian theoiy is falsifiable in Naitin's
fouith anu, piesumably, uninteiesting sense.
Theie have been, howevei, a few uissenting voices. Salmon (19S9)
aigueu that psychoanalytic theoiy appeais to be unfalsifiable only if one
assumes that "a few iestiicteu items of behavioi can constitute eviuence foi
oi against the hypothesis" (p. 262). It is tiue, accoiuing to Salmon, that any
single item of behavioi may be compatible with a hypothesis, foi example,
that the patient suffeis fiom unconscious hostility towaiu his fathei, foi
accoiuing to psychoanalytic theoiy, unconscious hostility can be expiesseu
in a vaiiety of ways anu is seiveu by a vaiiety of mechanisms. This uoes not
mean, howevei, "that eveiy total behavioi pattein is compatible with the
hypothesis of unconscious hostility" (p. 262). A similai point was maue by
Bospeis (19S9). Theie aie no "ciucial expeiiments" foi psychoanalysis, but
neithei uo they exist foi physics. What valiuates oi invaliuates
psychoanalytic hypotheses aie potterns of behavioi. Coiiesponuence iules
uo not take the foim of "If p, then q"; iathei they look like "If p, then q oi r oi
s oi. " followeu by a finite uisjunction of piopositions. Anu since the
uisjunction is finite, Bospeis (19S9) aigues, "it is emphatically not tiue that
the 0euipus complex woulu be believeu in no mattei wbot the empiiical
facts aie: if none of the items q, r, s... occuiieu, it woulu have to be concluueu
(anu woulu be) that the inuiviuual in question hau no 0euipus complex" (p.
S4S). Noie iecently, ulymoui (1974, 198u) has aigueu that theie is a
iational stiategy foi testing impoitant paits of psychoanalysis anu that this
stiategy was immanent in at least one of Fieuu's (19u9) case stuuies, that of
the Rat Nan. In paiticulai, the best available eviuence conceining the actual
life histoiy of the Rat Nan, Paul Loienz, hau iefuteu the hypothesis Fieuu
helu at the time conceining the sexual etiology of auult obsessional
neuiosis.
A numbei of philosopheis came to Fieuu's uefense in a quite uiffeient
way. They agieeu that if the falsifiability of a theoiy iequiies that the theoiy
alone (meuiateu only be coiiesponuence iules) entails a falsifiable
obseivation statement, then Fieuuian psychoanalytic theoiy is, stiictly
speaking, unfalsifiable. Bowevei, this uoes not necessaiily make it a
pseuuoscience. Why not. Faiiell (196S, 1964) suggesteu that theie was
anothei option available. Psychoanalysis is, on his view, a protoscience. That
is, it is an "empiiical anu speculative synthesis, which is piematuie in that it
iuns fai aheau of the eviuence that can upset oi suppoit it with ieasonable
ceitainty" (Faiiell, 196S, p. 24). Neveitheless, theie is ieason, he claims, to
take it seiiously as a tentative basis foi futuie ieseaich. The psychoanalytic
methou has piouuceu an enoimous amount of factual mateiial, which the
theoiy has to some uegiee succeeueu in oiueiing, uesciibing, anu
explaining. In auuition, a lot of expeiimental woik by psychologists
attempting to test psychoanalytic theoiy seems to show that in places, at
least, Fieuuian theoiy is "on to something."
Anothei, fai moie uamaging ieason foi iejecting Poppei's claim that
psychoanalytic theoiy is pseuuoscientific becouse it is unfalsifiable was
offeieu by Lakatos (197u, 1971). Be suggesteu that Poppei's uemaication
ciiteiion can be assesseu in teims of the following metaciiteiion: "If a
uemaication ciiteiion is inconsistent with the "basic' appiaisals of the
scientific elite, it shoulu be iejecteu" (Lakatos, 1971, p. 12S). uiven this
metaciiteiion, Poppei's uemaication piinciple is cleaily pioblematic. Foi
"exactly the most aumiieu scientific theoiies simply fail to foibiu any
obseivable state of affaiis" (Lakatos, 197u, p. 1uu). The piincipal ieason foi
this is that most scientific theoiies aie noimally inteipieteu as containing a
so-calleu ceteris poribus clause. That is, they "forbiJ on event occurrinq in
some specifieJ finite spotio-temporol reqion.only on tbe conJition tbot no
otber foctor.bos ony influence on it" (p. 1u1). But then if a pieuiction of the
theoiy is not boine out, the theoiy is not automatically falsifieu because "by
ieplacing the ceteris poribus clause by a uiffeient one the specific theoiy can
always be ietaineu whatevei the tests say" (p. 1u1-1u2). In the philosophy
of science liteiatuie of iecent yeais, a moie geneial veision of this point has
become commonplace. As we noteu, in the eaily iesponses to Poppei's
challenge, it was geneially assumeu that theoiy anu obseivation aie
meuiateu by coiiesponuence iules. In iecent yeais, howevei, it has been
aigueu that the so-calleu "ieceiveu view" of coiiesponuence iules vastly
oveisimplifies the ielationship between a theoietical hypothesis unueigoing
test anu the obseivable eviuence auuuceu in its behalf. Caieful examination
of scientific case stuuies has ievealeu that theoiy anu uata aie often
meuiateu by a complex aiiay of auxiliaiy piopositions: hypotheses fiom
ielateu theoiies, theoiies of measuiement anu theoiies of the uata,
assumptions about the expeiimental situation, anu assumptions about the
ways in which the putative theoietical states causally influence the
obseivable states of affaiis (see Schaffnei, 1969; Suppes, 1962, 1967; anu
moie iecently, Bempel, 197u, 197S).
That theoiies aie connecteu with obseivable iesults only via a
meuiating link of auxiliaiy hypotheses has impoitant implications foi the
testing of theoiies. Foi if theoiies confiont uata only in conjunction with
othei theoiies oi hypotheses, then if a theoiy's pieuiction is not boine out,
the most one can concluue is that eitber the theoiy or one of the auxiliaiy
hypotheses is wiong. As the nineteenth centuiy philosophei anu physicist,
Pieiie Buhem (19u6) wiote:
The physicist can nevei subject an isolateu hypothesis to
expeiimental test but only a whole gioup of hypotheses; when the
expeiiment is in uisagieement with is pieuictions, what he leains is
that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this gioup is
unacceptable anu ought to be mouifieu; but the expeiiment uoes
not uesignate which one shoulu be changeu |p. 187j.
The point again is that if one takes Poppeiian falsifiability to iequiie
that the theoiy whose status is being ueteimineu can in itself make
falsifiable pieuictions, then veiy few legitimate scientific theoiies, if any,
will be falsifiable by themselves. Benceso the aigument goes
falsifiability ought to be iejecteu as a uemaication ciiteiion.
Whethei a ieviseu veision of falsifiability can be foimulateu that will be
seiviceable as a uemaication ciiteiion is still a mattei of contioveisy.
Poppei (196S, p. 112) himself biiefly consiueis the mattei (see uinbaum,
1976 foi a uiscussion of this passage). I have maue some positive
suggestions in this aiea (von Eckaiut, 1982) as has Lakatos (197u). In
contiast, Lauuan (198S) has iecently aigueu that no satisfactoiy
uemaication piinciple will be foithcoming, especially not one foimulateu
along Poppeiian lines. Bowevei this issue is iesolveu, it is impoitant to keep
in minu that even if falsifiability cannot function as a Jemorcotion piinciple
(which iequiies it to be both necessaiy anu sufficient foi a theoiy's being
scientifically enteitainable), it may well constitute simply a necessaiy
conuition. In any case, it ceitainly behooves us to appiaise Poppei's
iejection of psychoanalysis as pseuuoscience on the allegeu giounu of
unfalsifiability. Thus, if we aie inteiesteu in the scientific status of Fieuuian
psychoanalytic theoiy, it iemains a woithwhile pioject to inquiie into its
falsifiability.
2%3-4+56&' )"-1%74517"-
uinbaum has hau something to say on viitually eveiy aspect of the
issue of the falsifiability of Fieuuian theoiy. What makes his uiscussion so
notewoithy is that it takes place against a backgiounu of seiious
consiueiation of the impoitance anu ielevance of the iequiiement of
falsifiability in the scientific enteipiise in geneial. Thus, befoie we tuin to a
uiscussion of his iesponse to the pseuuoscience challenge, I shall biiefly
summaiize his woik in philosophy of science that peitains to falsifiability.
As the pievious uiscussion shoulu have maue cleai, theie aie two
extieme positions that someone can take on the impoitance of falsifiability
in science. 0n the one hanu, it can be aigueu, as Poppei has uone, that
falsifiability is tbe "touchstone of scientific iationality." 0n the othei hanu,
theie is the view, inspiieu by Buhem, that falsifiability is completely
unimpoitant in science because no scientific theoiy is evei, stiictly
speaking, falsifiable. In a seiies of impoitant papeis in the 196us anu 197us,
uinbaum took on both of these extieme positions, auvocating insteau a
moie ieasonable, miuule-of-the-ioau view.
uinbaum (1969) consiueieu what he calls the "B-thesis," a view, that if
not histoiically attiibuteu to Buhem, iepiesents the Buhemian
philosophical legacy in contempoiaiy philosophy of science. The B-thesis
consists of the following two claims.
Bl. No constitutent hypothesis B of a wiuei theoiy can ever be
sufficiently isolateu fiom some set oi othei of auxiliaiy assumptions
so as to be sepaiately falsifiable obseivationally. B is heie
unueistoou to be a constituent of a wiuei theoiy in the sense that
no obseivational consequence can be ueuuceu fiom B alone.
It is a coiollaiy of this subthesis that no such hypothesis B ever
lenus itself to a ciucially falsifying expeiiment any moie than it
uoes to a ciucially veiifying one.
B2. In oiuei to state the seconu subthesis B2, we let T be a theoiy of
ony uomain of empiiical knowleuge, anu we let B be ony of its
component subhypotheses, while A is the collection of the
iemainuei of its subhypotheses. Also, we assume that the
obseivationally testable consequence 0 entaileu by the conjunction
B & A is taken to be empiiically false, because the obseiveu finuings
aie taken to have yielueu a iesult 0' incompotible with 0. Then B2
asseits the following: Foi all potential empiiical finuings u' of this
kinu, theie exists at least one suitably ieviseu set of auxiliaiy
assumptions A' such that the conjunction of B with A' con be belJ to
be true onJ exploins 0'. Thus B2 claims that B can be helu to be tiue
anu can be useu to explain 0' no mattei what 0' tuins ought to be,
i.e., come wbot moy |p. 1u7u-1u71j.
uinbaum (1966) aigueu the following thiee points with iespect to the
B-thesis: (1) Theie aie quite tiivial senses in which B1 anu B2 aie
uninteiestingly tiue anu in which no one woulu wish to contest them (see
pp. 276-28u); (2) In its nontiivial foim, B2 has not been uemonstiateu (see
pp. 28u-281); anu (S) B1 is false, as shown by counteiexamples fiom
physical geometiy (see pp. 28S-29S; uinbaum, 1968, 1969). uinbaum
(1969) uiscusses this fuithei anu, in iesponse to ciiticism, intiouuces a
qualification with iespect to the thiiu point (S). uiiinbam conceues to Besse
(1968) that if the falsification of B uenieu by B1 is constiueu as irrevocoble,
then his geometiical example uoes not succeeu as a counteiexample.
Bowevei, he insists that it uoes succeeu if falsification is constiueu in a
scientifically iealistic sense, that is, if one iequiies "only falsification to all
intents anu puiposes of the scientific enteipiise" (p. 1u92). In sum, then, in
uinbaum's view, falsifiability is a meaningful notion in science.
Falsifiability is not, howevei, the only possible basis foi a uemaication
piinciple oi the only possible giounu foi a theoiy of scientific iationality, as
Poppei has claimeu. In uinbaum's view, the alteinativeinuuctivism
which Poppei summaiily uismisses, meiits seiious consiueiation as well.
uinbaum (1976, 1977, 1979) aigues that Poppei's iejection of inuuctivism
iests on a seiious mispoitiayal.
Inuuctivism offeis the following uemaication piinciple: A theoiy is
scientific ("I-scientific") if anu only if it qualifies as empiiically well
suppoiteu by neo-Baconian stanuaius of contiolleu inquiiy. Note that this is
quite uiffeient fiom a uemaication piinciple baseu on falsifiability, in that
the focus is on the creJibility of the theoiy iathei than simply its
entertoinobility. Thus, a speculative theoiy in physics, foi example, foi
whom eviuence has not yet been gatheieu, woulu not count as actually I-
scientific, but only as potentiolly so, although the lattei woulu qualify it as
scientifically enteitainable.
uinbaum's uispute with Poppei conceins what soits of theoiies
inuuctivism woulu count as being empiiically well suppoiteu. Accoiuing to
uinbaum (1977), Poppei attiibutes the following to inuuctivism: "If a
theoiy T can explain a sufficiently laige number of obseivational iesults oi
has a suitably laige numbei of so-calleu positive instance, then T
outomoticolly qualifies as well-supporteJ by the eviuence" (p. 224). The
uistinction between being a positive instance anu being a suppoitive one is
ciucial heie. Accoiuing to uinbaum (1976), "an instance is a "positive' one
with iespect to a non-statistical theoiy T, if its occuiience oi being the case
can be ueuuceu fiom T in conjunction with suitable initial conuitions. But an
instance is suppoitive of T, if it is positive onJ has the piobative significance
of confeiiing a stiongei tiuth piesumption on T than T has without that
instance" (p. 217). Thus, Poppei woulu claim that inuuctivism iequiies a
positive instance to be sufficient foi being a suppoitive one. This claim
oveilooks two impoitant featuies of the inuuctivist position, in uinbaum's
view:
1. Tbe "JecloreJ consequence restriction." uinbaum (1979) states: "If,
at a paiticulai time, S is JecloreJ to be a logical consequence of T unuei the
assumption of stateu initial conuitions, oi is ueclaieu not to be such a
consequence, then neitber ueclaiation is alloweu to uepenu on knowinq at
the time whethei S is tiue" (p. 1SS). The point is that what counts as a
consequence of a theoiy T (anu, hence, as a positive instance) is a function
solely of the logical ielations between T anu this consequence; whethei it is
tiue oi false is completely iiielevant. Accoiuing to uinbaum (1977) this
iequiiement is "at least implicitly imposeu by inuuctivists to piecluue
'ietioactive' tampeiing with the constiual of T as follows: S is only ex post
focto helu to have followeu fiom T aftei having been founu to be tiue" (p.
227).
2. Tbe neeJ for controls witb respect to cousol bypotbeses. Accoiuing to
uinbaum, this neeu has been emphasizeu by inuuctivists evei since Fiancis
Bacon wiote thiee centuiies ago. Consiuei a causal hypothesis of the foim,
"Events of kinu X aie causally ielevant to (eithei causally necessaiy foi,
causally sufficient foi, oi stochastically ielevant to) events of kinu Y." A
meiely positive instance foi such a hypothesis will be an event of kinu X
coupleu with an event of kinu Y. Foi example, if the hypothesis (B) in
question is "Ceteris poribus, uaily consumption of at least one-fifth pounu of
coffee foi two weeks |Xj is causally sufficient as well as causally necessaiy
foi the iemission of colus |Yj," then a positive instance of B woulu be one
case of a peison with a colu uiinking at least one-fifth pounu of coffee foi
two weeks onJ getting iiu of his oi hei colu at the enu of that peiiou. Such a
positive instance woulu not, howevei, count as supportive, in the inuuctivist
view, unless it is conjoineu with finuings fiom an appiopiiate contiol gioup.
Foi, as uinbaum (1977) states "Even a laige numbei of cases of X which
aie also cases of Y uoes not piecluue that an equally laige numbei of cases
of non-X aie also cases of Y. But being an X shoulu make a uiffeience with
iespect to being a Y," (p. 2S2) given the claim of causally sufficiency. In
auuition, "if theie is to be inuuctive waiiant foi ueeming coffee to be
iemeuially necessaiy, every known case of non-X woulu have to be a case of
non-Y" (p. 2S2). In sum, uinbaum concluues, "only the combinotion of
positive instances with instances of non-X anu non-Y coulu constitute
inuuctively suppoitive instances of oui stiong causal hypothesis B" (p. 2S2).
Note that given this moie accuiate poitiayal of inuuctivism, any theoiy
containing causal hypotheses that is I-scientific will necessaiily be falsifiable
as well, although, of couise, the conveise will not be tiue. Thus, in
uinbaum's view, Poppei was completely wiong in claiming that, in
contiast to falsifiability, inuuctivism is poweiless to impugn the scientific
cieuentials of a theoiy like psychoanalysis. In fact, as we shall uiscuss latei,
one of uinbaum's piincipal theses is that the weakness of Fieuuian theoiy
lies not in its unfalsifiability but in the fact that it fails to satisfy neo-
Baconian stanuaius of inuuctive cieuibility.
Let us tuin now to uinbaum's iesponse to the challenge of
unfalsifiability. Bis piincipal points aie the following: Fiist, the orquments
that have been offeieu by Poppei anu otheis to show that psychoanalytic
theoiy is unfalsifiable aie inauequate. Seconu, although theie is some meiit
to the chaige that the majoiity of Fieuu's uefenueis, anu even sometimes
Fieuu himself, have exhibiteu a "tenacious unwillingness.to accept auveise
eviuence" (uinbaum, 1979, p. 1S8), Cioffi's qlobol inuictment of Fieuu's
methouology as pseuuoscientific cannot be sustaineu. Anu, thiiu, given any
ieasonable scientific sense of falsifiable (that is, moJulo ievocable auxiliaiy
assumptions anu initial conuitions), theie aie cleai counteiexamples to the
thesis of unfalsifiability.
The thesis of unfalsifiability says that theie uoes not exist even one way
in which Fieuuian theoiy coulu, in piinciple, be falsifieu. As uinbaum
(198Sb) points out, since a negative claim is heie being maue about an
infinite class of consequences of the theoiy, it is not even cleai what a goou
aigument foi this claim woulu look like. Ceitainly, what Poppei offeis us is
not satisfactoiy. Foi insteau of pioviuing a qenerol aigument to suppoit his
geneial claim, he simply gives us a single allegeu example of how Fieuuian
theoiy coulu explain the facts no mattei how they tuin out. Poppei (196S)
uesciibes two cases: that of a man who pushes a chilu into the watei with
the intention of uiowning it; anu that of a man who saciifices his life in an
attempt to save the chilu. Be wiites: "Each of these two cases can be
explaineu with equal ease in Fieuuian.teims. Accoiuing to Fieuu the fiist
man suffeieu fiom iepiession (say, of some component of his 0euipus
complex), while the seconu man hau achieveu sublimation" (p. SS).
As an aigument foi the unfalsifiability thesis, this example fails
miseiably, accoiuing to uinbaum (1979). Fiist, "why woulu it necessaiily
be a liability of psychoanalysis, if it octuolly coulu exploin the two cases of
behavioi with equal ease. Piesumably theie actually aie such instances of
self-saciificing chilu-rescuinq behavioi no less than such cases of infonticiJol
conuuct. Anu a fruitful psychological theoiy might well succeeu in actually
explaining each of them" (pp. 1S4-1SS). Seconu, even if this case weie
cogent, it is ceitainly not cleai how it is supposeu to qenerolize to covei the
infinite class of cases which fall unuei the thesis. Poppei seems to be ielying
on the methou of "inuuction by enumeiation," which he himself has iejecteu
as inauequate. Thiiu, the example is totally contiiveu. Poppei shoulu, at
least, have chosen an example baseu on the Fieuuian text. Finally, Poppei
claims that Fieuuian theoiy coulu exploin both of these cases. Bowevei,
such explanations aie foithcoming only if the psychoanalytic theoiist is at
libeity to posit initial conuitions ot will. But, asks uinbaum (1979): "Is it
cleai that the postulation of initial conuitions oJ libitum without any
inJepenJent eviuence of theii fulfillment is quite geneially countenanceu by
that theoiy to a fai gieatei extent than in, say, physics, which Poppei ueems
to be a bona fiue science." (p. 1SS). Ceitainly, Poppei gives us no aigument
to that effect. Eysenck (Eysenck & Wilson, 197S) puts foith anothei similai
aigument, which uinbaum (1979, pp. 1S8-1S9) uiscusses anu uismisses as
inauequate.
uinbaum consiueis Cioffi's (197u) claim that Fieuu's methouology
was piompteu chiefly by the neeu to avoiu iefutation. Aftei caiefully
ieexamining the textual passages on which Cioffi builus his case, uinbaum
(198ub) concluues that Cioffi "mishanuleu" his examination of Fieuu's
ieasoning anu "was theieby uiiven to the giatuitous oi mistaken conclusion
that concein with peitinent eviuence hau playeu no essential iole in Fieuu's
iationale foi espousing psychoanalysis" (p. 84). Fieuu was willing to
acknowleuge both the possibility anu, on seveial occasions, the fact of
falsification, accoiuing to uinbaum. In suppoit of this contention, he cites
the following cases:
1. In his "Reply to Ciiticisms of Ny Papei on Anxiety Neuiosis" Fieuu
(189S) stateu explicitly what soit of finuing he woulu acknowleuge to be a
refutinq instance foi his hypothesis conceining the etiology of anxiety
neuiosis.
2. In 1897 Fieuu abanuoneu his hypothesis that actual episoues of
tiaumatic seuuction in chiluhoou weie iesponsible foi the occuiience of
hysteiia in auulthoou. Among the ieasons that he explicitly cites (see Fieuu,
19S4, pp. 21S-216) is the fact that the hypothesis hau extiemely implausible
consequences; in paiticulai, the iequiieu inciuence of peiveiteu acts against
chiluien woulu have hau to have been pieposteiously high (uinbaum,
1979, p. 1SS).
S. In 19u9 Fieuu iecognizeu that the best available eviuence conceining
the actual life histoiy of his "Rat Nan," Paul Loienz, iefuteu his piioi
hypothesis conceining the etiology of auult obsessional neuiosis
(uinbaum, 1979, p. 1S7).
4. In "A Case of Paianoia Running Countei to the Psychoanalytic Theoiy
of the Bisease" Fieuu (191S) consiueieu the case of a young woman who
appeaieu to be paianoiu but who initially faileu to give any inuication of the
unueilying homosexual attachment that Fieuu hau hypothesizeu to be
causally necessaiy foi paianoia. At this point, he ieasoneu: "Eithei the
theoiy must be given up oi else, in view of this uepaituie fiom oui
|theoieticalj expectations, we must siue with the lawyei anu assume that
this was no paianoic combination but an actual expeiience which hau been
coiiectly inteipieteu" (p. 266; uinbaum, 198Sb, p. 1SS).
S. Fieuu's (19SS) "Revision of the Theoiy of Bieams" piesents an
acknowleugeu falsification on the basis of the iecuiient uieams of wai
neuiotics.
These cases not only suffice to unueimine Cioffi's pseuuoscience chaige,
they also function as counteiexamples to the claim that, fiom a logical point
of view, Fieuuian theoiy is unfalsifiable. To fuithei emphasize the
incoiiectness of the logical unfalsifiability thesis, uinbaum mentions a
numbei of auuitional cases of eithei possible oi actual (ievocable)
falsification:
1. In Fieuu's theoiy of peisonality types, both peisonality tiaits anu a
specific chiluhoou etiology aie associateu with each chaiactei type. Thus,
foi example, Fieuu claims that the "oial" chaiactei is associateu with
uepenuency, submissiveness, neeu foi appioval, anu pessimism anu
oiiginates in such unfavoiable chiluhoou expeiiences as piematuie
weaning. uinbaum (1979, p. 1S7) suggests that this coupling of ceitain
peisonality tiaits with ceitain chiluhoou expeiiences is at least primo focie
falsifiable.
2. uinbaum (1979, p. 1S7) notes that expeiimental woik has pioviueu
eviuence countei to both Fieuu's uoctiine of iepiession (see Bolmes, 1974)
anu his theoiy of uieams (see Fishei & uieenbeig, 1977).
S. Ceitain of Fieuu's hypotheses entail "statistical" pieuictions that
might be testeu. Foi example, uinbaum (198Sb) wiites, Fieuu's hypothesis
that iepiesseu homosexuality is the specific etiologic factoi foi paianoia
entails that
the uecline of the taboo on homosexuality in oui society shoulu be
accompanieu by a uecieaseu inciuence of male paianoia. Anu by the
same token, theie ought to have been ielatively less paianoia in
those ancient societies in which male homosexuality was conuoneu
oi even sanctioneu, foi the ieuuction of massive anxiety anu
iepiession with iespect to homosexual feelings woulu contiibute to
the iemoval of Fieuu's conJitio sine quo non foi this synuiome |p.
1S7j.
.12)/&"'"32141 "1 )#4,4)"3 ,/(&#2
8+4$%6+'& 0$+97-. ": ;%$59
Like Poppei, Babeimas wants to holu that psychoanalysis cannot
appiopiiately be iegaiueu as natuial science. Bowevei, his attituue towaiu
psychoanalysis is quite uiffeient. Contiaiy to Poppei who, as we have seen,
wants to ielegate Fieuuian theoiy to the epistemological uustbin of
pseuuoscience, Babeimas seeks to make it an object of piofounu stuuy. Be
believes that Fieuuian theoiy anu piactice iepiesent a piototype (along
with Naixian theoiy anu piactice) of a completely new foim of
knowleugeone he has chosen to uesignate "ciitical theoiy." Babeimas'
inteiest in Fieuu is pait of a much laigei concein with the natuie of
knowleuge in geneial. Although I cannot heie uo justice to his views, it will
be useful foi oui puiposes to attempt a iough chaiacteiization of some of
his basic uoctiines. Fiist, Babeimas assumes theie to be thiee
funuamentally uiffeient kinus of knowleuge (Wissenscboft): (1) empiricol-
onolytic sciences, of which the natuial sciences aie the paiauigm; (2)
bistoricol-bermeneutic sciences, incluuing the humanities
(6eisteswissenscboften) anu the histoiical anu social sciences insofai as they
aim at inteipietive unueistanuing of theii subject mattei; anu (S) criticolly
orienteJ sciences, in which he incluues psychoanalysis as well as the ciitique
of iueology (ciitical social theoiy).
1
Each kinu of knowleuge is uistinguisheu,
in his view, by both the cognitive stiuctuie of its theoiies anu the moue of
"testing" appiopiiate to it. Note that in taking this position, Babeimas is
consciously going countei to one of the piincipal theses of the logical
positivist unity of science movement, namely, that the logic of inquiiy of ony
science (Wissenscboft) is the same.
Seconu, Babeimas has emphasizeu the impoitance of locating
knowleuge in the couise of human life. Accoiuing to NcCaithy (1978),
Babeimas' cential thesis is that "the specific view points fiom which we
appiehenu ieality," the "geneial cognitive stiategies" that guiue systematic
inquiiy, have theii "basis in the natuial histoiy of the human species" (p.
SS). In paiticulai, Babeimas believes that any seaich foi knowleuge is
guiueu by ceitain cognitive inteiests anu that uistinct foims of knowleuge
aie associateu with uistinct cognitive inteiests. Thus, Babeimas (1971)
assumes that each of the thiee kinus of knowleuge he uistinguishes is
associateu with its own kinu of cognitive inteiest: "The appioach of the
empiiical-analytic sciences incoipoiates a tecbnicol cognitive inteiest; that
of the histoiical-heimeneutic sciences incoipoiates a procticol one; anu the
appioach of ciitically oiienteu sciences incoipoiates the emoncipotory
cognitive inteiest" (p. Su8). Roughly speaking, the technical inteiest is an
inteiest in making use of causal knowleuge of natuie foi the puiposes of
pieuiction anu contiol; the piactical inteiest is an inteiest in establishing
ieliable inteisubjective unueistanuing in oiuinaiy language communication;
anu the emancipatoiy inteiest is an inteiest in fieeing oneself fiom
iueological uelusion anu establishing social oi intiapsychic ielations
"oiganizeu on the basis of communication fiee fiom uomination" (NcCaithy,
1978, p. 9S). Fuitheimoie, Babeimas says that the specific kinu of cognitive
inteiest associateu with a specific kinu of theoiy shapes the cognitive
stiuctuie of that theoiy to a laige extent.
Nuch of Babeimas' intellectual effoit ovei the past 1S yeais has been
uevoteu to eluciuating anu aiguing foi the existence of the thiiu categoiy of
knowleuge, ciitical theoiy. Bis fiist attempt to aiticulate the logic,
methouology, anu stiuctuie of a ciitical theoiy weie publisheu in 1967 anu
1971. Bis moie iecent views on the topic aie to be founu in Communicotion
onJ tbe Fvolution of Society (1979). But it is the eailiei KnowleJqe onJ
Eumon lnterests (1971) which is of most concein to us, foi it is heie that
Babeimas' most extenueu tieatment of Fieuu is to be founu.
Babeimas' (1971) two piincipal claims about Fieuuian psychoanalysis
aie stateu in the opening passage of his uiscussion of Fieuu:
The enu of the 19th centuiy saw a uiscipline emeige, piimaiily as
the woik of a single man, that fiom the beginning moveu in the
element of self-ieflection anu at the same time coulu cieuibly claim
legitimation as a scientific pioceuuie in a iigoious
sense..Psychoanalysis is ielevant to us as the only tangible
example of a science incoipoiating methouological self-ieflection.
The biith of psychoanalysis opens up the possibility of aiiiving at
the uimension that positivism closeu off..This possibility has
iemaineu uniealizeu. Foi the scientific self-misunueistanuing of
psychoanalysis inauguiateu by Fieuu himself, as the physiologist
that he oiiginally was, sealeu off this possibility |p. 214j.
Babeimas' claim that psychoanalysis involves self-ieflection is, as we
shall see shoitly, essential to his constiuing it as a ciitical theoiy. "The
uimension that positivism closeu off" I take to be a iefeience to the
possibility of a science existing (Wissenscboft) that uiffeis in impoitant ways
fiom the natuial sciences. Thus, Babeimas is making two claims: (1)
psychoanalysis is a "tangible example" of a ciitical theoiy; anu (2) this fact
has not been iecognizeu because Fieuu himself was guilty of peipetuating a
misunueistanuing of his own enteipiise, namely, the mistaken view that
what he was uoing was empiiical-analytic science iathei than ciitical theoiy
anu piactice.
Babeimas attempts to aigue foi his fiist claim by pioviuing us with a
uesciiption of Fieuuian uoctiine that makes salient its "ciitical" featuies. To
unueistanu his ieauing of Fieuu, we neeu to say a bit moie about the aims
of a ciitical theoiy. We have alieauy noteu that, foi Babeimas, a ciitical
theoiy is essentially tieu to the emancipatoiy inteiest. Noie specifically, it
has as its aim the emancipation of the agents that make use of it by means of
theii self-enlightenment. We can gain a cleaiei pictuie of what this
emancipation anu enlightenment is supposeu to come to by viewing it as a
tiansition fiom an initial to a final state. ueuss (1981) chaiacteiizes these
states as follows:
(a) The initial state is one botb of false consciousness anu eiioi,
onJ of 'unfiee existence.'...
(b) In the initial state false consciousness anu unfiee existence
aie inheiently connecteu so that agents can be libeiateu
fiom one only if they aie also at the same time fieeu fiom
the othei..
(c) The "unfiee existence' fiom which the agents in the initial
state suffei is a foim of self-imposeu coeicion; theii false
consciousness is a kinu of self-uelusion..
(u) The coeicion fiom which the agents suffei in the initial state
is one whose 'powei'...oi 'objectivity'.ueiives only fiom the
fact that the agents uo not iealize it is self-imposeu.
(e) The final state is one in which the agents aie fiee of false
consciousnessthey have been enlighteneuanu fiee of
self-imposeu coeicionthey have been emancipateu |p.
S8j.
A ciitical theoiy is supposeu to achieve such enlightenment anu
emancipation by inuucing what Babeimas calls "self-ieflection." It is by
ieflecting, ueuss (1981) says, that the agents in question "come to iealize
that theii foim of consciousness is iueologically false anu that the coeicion
fiom which they suffei is self-imposeu. But, by (u) above, once they have
iealizeu this, the coeicion loses its 'powei' oi 'objectivity' anu the agents aie
emancipateu" (p. 61).
It is not uifficult to see how Fieuuian psychoanalysis can fit in with
ueuss' schema. The fiist foui statements constitute a quite stiaightfoiwaiu
(if abstiact) uesciiption of ceitain of the cential featuies of psychoanalytic
tberopy. Thus, we finu Babeimas aiguing his thesis "that psychoanalytic
knowleuge belongs to the categoiy of self-ieflection" by iefeience to Fieuu's
papeis on analytic technique (see Babeimas, 1971, pp. 228-2S6). The
impoitant point, howevei, is this: Because of his uoctiine of cognitive
inteiests, Babeimas' view of psychoanalytic theiapy as emancipatoiy self-
ieflection has ceitain consequences foi his ieauing of the psychoanalytic
theoiy of peisonality. That is, because he, in effect, suboiuinates the theoiy
to the theiapy, he enus up iepiesenting Fieuu's theoietical claims in a
ceitain iuiosynciatic way. It is not only this iuiosynciatic ieauing of
Fieuuian theoiy but also his funuamentally mistaken views about the
natuie of (natuial) science that become the taiget of uinbaum's ciiticisms.
/*$ 8+4$%6+'<2%3-4+56 =7'#51$
Like most inteipieteis of Fieuu, Babeimas uiviues Fieuu's theoietical
claims into two paits: the metapsychology anu the clinical theoiy. As I ieau
him (which is not always a stiaightfoiwaiu mattei), in aiguing that Fieuu
was guilty of misunueistanuing his own enteipiise, Babeimas pioviues us
with two sets of aiguments to the effect that Fieuuian psychoanalysis
cannot coiiectly be iegaiueu as an empiiical-analytic science. The fiist of
these consiueis the ielationship of the clinical theoiy to the
metapsychology; the seconu consiueis the scientific chaiacteis of the
clinical theoiy itself.
Babeimas begins by aiguing that Fieuu took psychoanalysis to be
scientific because psychoanalytic assumptions coulu be "iefoimulate|uj.in
the categoiical fiamewoik of a stiictly empiiical science" (p. 2S2), namely,
the eneigy mouel of the metapsychology. That is, he attiibutes to Fieuu two
beliefs: fiist, that the clinical theoiy coulu be "ieuuceu" to the
metapsychology, anu, seconu, that the metapsychology was a "stiictly
empiiical science." With iespect to the seconu point, Babeimas (1971)
wiites: "Fieuu suiely assumeu tacitly that his metapsychology, which seveis
the stiuctuial mouel fiom the basis of communication between uoctoi anu
patient anu insteau attaches it to the eneigy-uistiibution mouel by means of
uefinitions, iepiesenteu an empiiically iigoious scientific foimulation of
this soit" (p. 2SS). Bowevei, in Babeimas' view, Fieuu "eiieu" in auopting
this ieuuctionistic appioach, because "psychology, insofai as it unueistanus
itself as a stiict empiiical science, cannot content itself with a mouel that
keeps to a physicalistic use of language without seiiously leauing to
opeiationalizable assumptions" (p. 2SS). That is, the metapsychology is not
genuinely scientific unless its unueilying eneigy mouel is opeiationalizable.
But, Babeimas continues, this is not the case:
The eneigy-uistiibution mouel only cieates the semblance that
psychoanalytic statements aie about measuiable tiansfoimations
of eneigy. Not a single statement about quantitative ielations
ueiiveu fiom the conception of instinctual economics has evei been
testeu expeiimentally. The mouel of the psychic appaiatus is so
constiucteu that metapsychological statements imply the
obseivability of the events they aie about. But these events aie
nevei obseiveunor con tbey be observeJ |p. 2SS; italics auueuj.
uinbaum's fiist point against Babeimas effectively unueicuts this
whole line of aigumentation. Foi, accoiuing to uinbaum (1984), caieful
examination of the Fieuuian text (Fieuu, 1914, p. 77; 191Sa, p. 117, 192S, p.
S2) ieveals cleaily
that when Fieuu unsweivingly claimeu natuial science status foi
his theoietical constiuctions thioughout his life, he uiu so fiist anu
foiemost foi his evolving clinical theoiy of peisonality anu theiapy,
iathei than foi the metapsychology. Foi he hau been chasteneu in
his eaily ieuuctionistic exubeiance by the speeuy uemise of his
Pioject. Anu, once he hau iepuuiateu his ephemeial neuiobiological
mouel of the psyche aftei 1896, he peienially saw himself entitleu
to pioclaim the scientificity of his clinical theoiy entirely on tbe
strenqtb of o secure onJ Jirect epistemic worront from tbe
observotions be moJe on bis potients onJ on bimself. In biief, uuiing
all but the fiist few yeais of his caieei Fieuu's ciiteiion of
scientificity was metboJoloqicol anu not ontologically ieuuctive, (p.
6)
The consequence of uinbaum's exegetical position heie is that he
simply passes ovei Babeimas' fiist set of aiguments, piesumably on the
giounus that they aie simply iiielevant to the issue at hanu. Implicitly,
uinbaum's ieasoning seems to be something like this: When Fieuu claimeu
that psychoanalysis was scientific, what he chiefly hau in minu was that the
clinical theoiy was scientific. Anu since the status of the clinical theoiy uoes
not uepenu in any essential way on the status of the metapsychology, any
aigument that assumes that the scientificity of the clinical theoiy JepenJs on
that of the metapsychology is iiielevant to the question of whethei the
theoiy in geneial is scientific. uinbaum theiefoie tuins his attention to
Babeimas' seconu set of aiguments.
To be in a position to unueistanu this seconu set of aiguments anu to
appieciate uinbaum's ieplies, we must biiefly consiuei Babeimas'
conception of the clinical theoiy. The stanuaiu ieauing of Fieuu is that the
clinical theoiy consists of a laige numbei of univeisal geneializations about
the human psyche. Babeimas' view is somewhat uiffeient. Rathei than
viewing the theoiy of psychosexual uevelopment, say as a set of univeisal
claims about the ontogenesis of human peisonality, Babeimas (1971) takes
it to consist of a set of norrotive scbemoto. Be wiites:
A geneial inteipietation.has the foim of a naiiative, because it is
to aiu subjects in ieconstiucting theii own life histoiy in naiiative
foim. But it can seive as the backgiounu of mony such naiiations
only because it uoes not holu meiely foi an inuiviuual case. It is a
systemoticolly qenerolizeJ bistory, because it pioviues a scheme foi
many histoiies with foieseeable alteinative couises |p. 26Sj,
Fuitheimoie, in keeping with his (misplaceu) emphasis on the
centiality of the theiapy to the psychoanalytic enteipiise as a whole,
Babeimas takes the piimaiy function of Fieuu's geneial inteipietations to
be theii iole in self-ieflection. Foi it is by the application of such geneial
inteipietations to the inuiviuual case that patient anu physician togethei
cieate the inteipietative constructions, by means of which the self-ieflective
piocess takes place. Babeimas (1971) states:
0nly the.systemoticolly qenerolizeJ bistory of infantile
uevelopment with its typical uevelopmental vaiiants puts the
physician in the position of so combining the fiagmentaiy
infoimation obtaineu in analytic uialogue that he can ieconstiuct
the gaps of memoiy anu hypothetically anticipate the expeiience of
ieflection of which the patient is at fiist incapable |p. 26uj.
0n the basis of this iathei one-siueu conception of Fieuu's clinical
theoiy, Babeimas offeis us a numbei of aiguments that the clinical theoiy
ought not to be iegaiueu as science of the empiiical-analytic soit. I label
these "the aigument fiom theiapeutic application," "the aigument fiom
explanation," anu "the aigument fiom valiuation."
1. Tbe Arqument from Tberopeutic Applicotion. I pointeu out eailiei that,
in Babeimas' view, empiiical-analytic theoiies aie always associateu with a
technical inteiest in manipulating natuie. The aigument fiom theiapeutic
application ielies heavily on the fuithei assumption that such manipulation
always occuis by means of the exploitation of causal laws. We can
ieconstiuct the aigument as follows:
1. If psychoanalytic theoiy weie scientific (empiiical-analytic),
its application woulu consist in the manipulation of its uomain
by the exploitation of causal laws.
2. The application of psychoanalytic theoiy consists in the uoing
of psychoanalytic theiapy.
S. Bowevei, psychoanalytic theiapy uoes not woik by the
exploitation of causal laws; iathei "it owes its efficacy to
oveicoming causal connections themselves" (Babeimas, 1971,
p. 271).
4. Thus, psychoanalytic theoiy cannot be scientific.
Babeimas (1971) uefenus the key thiiu piemise as follows:
Psychoanalysis uoes not giant us a powei of technical contiol ovei
the sick psyche compaiable to that of biochemistiy ovei a sick
oiganism. Anu yet it achieves moie than a meie tieatment of
symptoms, because it ceitainly uoes giasp causal connections,
although not at the level of physical eventsat a point "which has
been maue accessible to us by some veiy iemaikable
ciicumstances" |Fieuu, 1971, p. 4S6j, This is piecisely the point
wheie language anu behavioi aie pathologically uefoimeu by the
causality of split-off symbols anu iepiesseu motives. Following
Begel we can call this the causality of fate, in contiast to the
causality of natuie. Foi the causal connection between the oiiginal
scene, uefense, anu symptom is not anchoieu in the invaiiance of
natuie accoiuing to natuial laws but only in the spontaneously
geneiateu invaiiance of life histoiy, iepiesenteu by the iepetition
compulsion, which can neveitheless be uissolveu by the powei of
ieflection |p. 271j.
Babeimas' point seems to be that the powei of ieflection can
"oveicome" the causal connections iesponsible foi the patient's neuiosis,
because these causal connections aie of a uiffeient soit than those positeu
by the empiiical-analytic sciences. They constitute the "causality of fate"
iathei than the "causality of natuie." What Babeimas has in minu by this
teim is fai fiom cleai, although I suspect that it is, in some way, a
consequence of his ieauing of the clinical theoiy as consisting of naiiative
schemata. Whatevei it is, howevei, it is iiielevant. Foi, as uinbaum aigues,
the kinu of causality avoweu by psychoanalytic etiologic anu theiapeutic
theoiy uoes not peimit this kinu of "uissolution." In auuition, caieful
examination of the causal asseitions maue by the theoiy exhibits the
complete folly of this soit of talk of uissolution. In othei woius, Babeimas
has a case only by blatantly misconceptualizing psychoanalytic theoiy.
To be moie piecise, Babeimas' account, in uinbaum's view, "flotly
repuJiotes the psychoanalytic explonotion foi the patient's theiapeutic
tiansition fiom unconsciously uiiven behavioi to moie consciously
goveineu conuuct" (uinbaum, 1984, p. 1u). This psychoanalytic
explanation, fiist aiticulateu in Bieuei anu Fieuu's (189S, pp. 6-7)
"Pieliminaiy Communication," iests on the etiological piinciple that
iepiession is cousolly necessory not only foi the initial uevelopment of a
neuiotic uisoiuei, but also foi its maintenance. The explanation of why
theiapy is efficacious then is as follows:
1. Repiession of type R is the causal sine qua non of a neuiosis of kinu N.
2. Theiapy laigely consists of iiuuing the patient of R.
S. Theiefoie, theiapy has the effect of obliteiating N.
uinbaum points out that, in this explanation, tberopy involves tbe
instontiotion or exemplificotion of the etiologic causal ielationship iathei
than its uissolution. Foi it is piecisely because aftei the fulfillment of the
seconu conuition the patient no longei satisfies the sine qua non state that
the symptoms aie claimeu (pieuicteu) to uisappeai. Paiauoxically,
Babeimas appeais to accept both the etiological piinciple anu the
explanation; thus, he is guilty not only of contiauicting the founuational
postulate of Fieuuian theoiy but also of confusing the uissolution of the
neuiosis with the uissolution of its causal link to its oiiginal pathogen.
To fuithei biing home his objection, uinbaum (1984, p. 14) offeis us a
reJuctio oJ obsurJum aigument to show that if Babeimas' ieasoning weie
legitimate, then theimal elongation in physics coulu also be shown to iest
on the uissolution iathei than the instantiation of a causal law:
Foi consiuei a metal bai that is isolateu against all but theimal
influences. It is subject to the law AL = uATL
u
, wheie L
u
is its length
at the fixeu stanuaiu tempeiatuie, AT the length inciease oi
ueciease uue to this tempeiatuie change, anu a the coefficient of
lineai theimal expansion chaiacteiistic of the paiticulai mateiial
composing the metal bai. Now suppose that the bai, initially at the
stanuaiu tempeiatuie, is subjecteu to a "pathogenic" tempeiatuie
inciease AT, which piouuces the elongation AT as its "pathological"
effect. In auuition to supplying this "aetiology," the law of lineai
theimal elongation also pioviues a basis foi a coiiesponuing
"theiapy": It tells us that if the bai's tempeiatuie is ieuuceu to its
"healthy" stanuaiu value, the "pathological" effect BL will be wipeu
out. Thus, we can coiielate the "theiapeutic inteivention" of
tempeiatuie ieuuction with the patient's iemeuial lifting of his own
iepiessions. Similaily, we coiielate the bai's "neuiotic symptom"
AL with the patient's iepetition compulsion.
By paiity with Babeimas' ieasoning, we coulu then uiaw the
following luuicious conclusion: When the tempeiatuie ieuuction
"theiapeutically" wipeu out the enuuiance of the "pathological"
effect AL geneiateu by the "pathogenic" tempeiatuie inciease, this
theimal teimination also "uissolveu" the stateu law of theimal
elongation.
What is oveicome heie is cleaily the "pathological" effect, not the causal
connection itself. Anu the same is tiue, accoiuing to uinbaum, in the
psychoanalytic case (that is, assuming the Fieuuian stoiy is coiiect, as
Babeimas uoes). In sum, Babeimas' claim that psychoanalytic theiapy owes
its efficacy to "oveicoming causal connections" iathei than "making use" of
them is totally unsubstantiateu.
2. Tbe Arqument from Fxplonotion. Babeimas' (1971) seconu aigument
conceins the kinu of explanation that iesults fiom the application of Fieuu's
clinical theoiy to a specific case:
In its logical foim.explanatoiy unueistanuing uiffeis in one
uecisive way fiom explanation iigoiously foimulateu in teims of
the empiiical sciences. Both of them have iecouise to causal
statements that can be ueiiveu fiom univeisal piopositions by
means of supplementaiy conuitions: that is, fiom ueiivative
inteipietations (conuitional vaiiants) oi lawlike hypotheses. Now
the content of theoietical piopositions iemains unaffecteu by
opeiational application to ieality. In this ease we can base
explanations on context-fiee laws. In the case of heimeneutic
application, howevei, theoietical piopositions aie tianslateu into
the naiiative piesentation of an inuiviuual histoiy in such a way
that a causal statement uoes not come into being without this
context....Naiiative explanations uiffei fiom stiictly ueuuctive ones
in that the events oi states of which they asseit a causal ielation is
|sicj fuithei uefineu by theii application. Theiefoie geneial
inteipietations uo not make possible context-fiee explanations |pp.
272-27Sj.
The passage is somewhat confusing because Babeimas uses the teim
'theoietical piopositions' in both a naiiow anu bioau sense. I assume that
the fiist iefeience to such theoietical piopositions is meant to iefei to the
theoietical piopositions of empiiical-analytic science, wheieas the seconu
iefeience incluues also those that can have a "heimeneutic application."
uiven this ieauing, the basic stiuctuie of the aigument seems to be the
following:
1. The explanation of a paiticulai phenomenon by means of the causal
laws of an empiiical-analytic science always iesults in a "context-fiee"
explanation.
2. Bowevei, this is not the case foi the application of the geneial
inteipietations of psychoanalytic theoiy; "geneial inteipietations uo
not make possible context-fiee explanations."
S. Theiefoie, these geneial inteipietations cannot be pait of an empiiical-
analytic science.
Recall that, in iesponuing to Babeimas' fiist aigument, uinbaum took
issue with Babeimas' giasp of Fieuuian theoiy, in paiticulai, his failuie to
see that the theiapeutic conquest of a neuiosis instontiotes iathei than
uissolves its etiologic linkage to its pathogen. In this case, he objects that
Babeimas ielies on a false view of natuial science. In paiticulai, uinbaum
offeis an aiiay of counteiexamples fiom physics to the fiist piemise of oui
ieconstiuction of Babeimas' aigument. In uinbaum's view, Babeimas is
simply wiong that explanations in the natuial science aie nevei context
uepenuent; thus, this cannot be useu as a ieason foi uistinguishing the
Fieuuian enteipiise fiom that of natuial science. In aiguing his point,
uinbaum (1984) again uiaws on his knowleuge of physics, specifically, the
physical theoiy of classical electiouynamics. Be wiites: "Foi that majoi
physical theoiy featuies laws that embouy a fai moie funuamental
uepenuence on the histoiy anuoi context of the object of knowleuge than
was evei contemplateu in even the most exhaustive of psychoanalytic
explanatoiy naiiatives." (p. 17; foi a biiefei veision of this aigument, see
uinbaum, 198Sc). uinbaum's (1984) specific counteiexample is the
following:
Consiuei an electiically chaigeu paiticle having an aibitiaiy
velocity anu acceleiation. We aie conceineu with the laws
goveining the electiic anu magnetic fielus piouuceu by this point
chaige thioughout space at any one fixeu time t. In this theoiy, the
influence of the chaige on any othei test chaige in space is
postulateu to be piopagateu with the finite velocity of light iathei
than instantaneously, as in Newton's action-at-a-uistance theoiy of
giavitation. But this non-instantaneous featuie of the piopagation
of the electiouynamic influence contiibutes to an impoitant
consequence as follows: At any space point P, the electiic anu
magnetic fielus at a given time t uepenu on the position, velocity
anu acceleiation that the chaige hau at an eailiei time t
0
. That
eailiei time has the value t-r,c, wheie r is the uistance tiaveiseu by
the influence aiiiving at P at time t aftei having tiaveleu fiom the
chaige to P with the velocity c of light.
Cleaily, the gieatei the uistance r that was tiaveiseu by the
influence by the time t of its aiiival at point P, the eailiei its
oiigination time t
0
. Thus, foi space points at evei laigei such
uistances r in infinite space, the oiigination time t
0
= t-r,c will be
evei moie iemotely past. In shoit, as the uistance r becomes
infinitely laige, the oiigination time goes to past infinity.
It follows that at ANY 0NE INSTANT t the electiic anu magnetic
fielus piouuceu thioughout infinite space by a chaige moving with
aibitiaiy acceleiation uepenu on its own PARTIC0LAR ENTIRE
INFINITE PAST KINENATIC BIST0RY! (p. 17).
This is not at all a unique case, accoiuing to uinbaum. Theie aie othei
cases that exhibit "hysteiesis" in the sense that "a piopeity of a physical
system inuuceu by a given piesent influence upon it uepenus not only on
that piesent influence, but also on the post bistory of vaiiation of that
influence" (uinbaum, 1984, p. 18; see also 198Sc foi a biiefei uiscussion).
These cases incluue the hysteiesis behavioi of highly magnetizable metals
(e.g., iion, cobalt, nickel, etc.), the elostic hysteiesis of ceitain solius, the
electiic hysteiesis exhibiteu by uielectiic substances in electiic fielus, anu
the hysteiesis of a iauiation countei tube. Even iubbei banus exhibit like
behavioi, anu metal fatigue in aiiplanes is a similai phenomenon. These
cases cleaily show, in uinbaum's view, that some of the impoitant laws of
natuie, anu, hence, any explanation that makes use of them, exhibit context
uepenuence. 0n the basis of these consiueiations, uinbaum's (198Sc)
summaiy juugment of Babeimas' seconu aigument is a haish one:
Babeimas (as well as uauamei (197S) who echoes Babeimas' view) have
simply succeeueu in "pailay|ingj the seveie limitations of theii own
peisonal scientific hoiizons into a pseuJo-contiast between the humanistic
uisciplines anu the natuial sciences" (p. 11).
S. Tbe Arqument from voliJotion. What I call "the aigument fiom
valiuation" consists of two subaigumentsone conceining supposeu
uiffeiences between how psychoanalytic theoiy anu empiiical-analytic
theoiies aie confiimeu; the othei conceining how they aie uisconfiimeu.
The fiist subaigument iests on the fact that, accoiuing to Babeimas, theie is
the following "specific uiffeience" between empiiical-analytic theoiies anu
the geneial inteipietations of psychoanalysis (that is, Fieuu's clinical
theoiy):
In the case of testing theoiies thiough obseivation.the application
of assumptions to ieality is a mattei foi the inquiiing subject. In the
case of testing geneial inteipietations thiough self-ieflection...this
application becomes self-opplicotion by the object of inquiiy, who
paiticipates in the piocess of inquiiy. The piocess of inquiiy can
leau to valiu infoimation only via a tiansfoimation in the patient's
self-inquiiy. When valiu, geneial inteipietations holu foi the
inquiiing subject anu all who can auopt its position only to the
uegiee that those who aie maue the object of inuiviuual
inteipietations know onJ recoqnize tbemselves in these
inteipietations. The subject cannot obtain knowleuge of the object
unless it becomes knowleuge foi the objectanu unless the lattei
theieby emancipates itself by becoming a subject |pp. 261-262j.
I take it that Babeimas is heie assuming that the geneial inteipietative
schemata of the clinical theoiy aie confiimeu only to the extent that they aie
inuuctively suppoiteu by valiu inuiviuual constiuctions. The claim, then, is
that the lattei aie confiimeu, in tuin, only if they become a pait of the self-
ieflection of the analysanu. That is, the analysanu has, as uinbaum puts it,
complete "epistemic piivilege" with iespect to these constiuctions, even as
against the analyst him- oi heiself. In contiast, accoiuing to Babeimas, the
objects of stanuaiu empiiical-analytic inquiiy uo not have this kinu of
epistemic piivilege. Beie confiimation occuis on the basis of obseivations of
the object by the scientist (the so-calleu subject of inquiiy). We can
ieconstiuct the aigument thus:
1. Statements ielevant to the confiimation of clinical psychoanalytic
theoiy (foi example, inuiviuual constiuctions) can be accepteu by the
ieseaichei only if they have fiist been accepteu as valiu by the subject.
2. No such iequiiement holus foi statements ielevant to the confiimation
of empiiical-analytic theoiies, which aie typically accepteu on the basis
of obseivation by the ieseaichei.
S. Theiefoie, clinical psychoanalytic theoiy is not an empiiical-analytic
theoiy.
In ieplying to this aigument, uinbaum again attacks Babeimas'
conception of psychoanalysis, this time on the giounus that the thesis of
piivilegeu epistemic access expiesseu in Babeimas' fiist piemise is ill-
founueu. Bis fiist point is that the only aigument Babeimas supplies foi his
fiist piemise is a question-begging one. Foi in the above quote, Babeimas
constiues the "otheiwise innocuous phiase 'testing thiough self-ieflection'
so as to stipulote that only the patient's own appiaisal can caiiy out the
application of geneial inteipietations to his paiticulai life situation."
(uinbaum, 1984, p. 2S) Seconu, the epistemic piivilege that Babeimas
assigns to the analysanu uoes not accoiu with Fieuu's own views
conceining when an inuiviuual constiuction ought to be iegaiueu as tiue. In
paiticulai, Fieuu (19S7) explicitly iejects iecollection by the patient as
essential.
Quite often we uo not succeeu in biinging the patient to iecollect
what has been iepiesseu. Insteau of that if the analysis is caiiieu
out coiiectly, we piouuce in |the patientj an assuieu conviction of
the tiuth of the constiuction which achieves the same theiapeutic
iesult as a iecaptuieu memoiy |pp. 26S-266j.
Babeimas might ieply at this point that peihaps he was wiong about
the neeu foi iecollection; howevei, this quote fiom Fieuu shows that the
patient's conviction is necessaiy, which is enough to maintain some foim of
an epistemic piivilege uoctiine. This ieply is inauequate, howevei. Foi, as
uinbaum also points out, in Fieuu's papei on "Constiuctions in Analysis"
(19S7), he aigues (fiom the confluence of clinical inuuction) that the analyst
coulu justify an inuiviuual constiuction on the basis of the totality of the
patient's piouuctions, even in the face of the patient's uenial. (See also
Fieuu, 192u, on the tieatment of a young lesbian as a case in point.) Finally,
uinbaum points out that Babeimas' attiibution of epistemic piivilege to
the analysanu has also been impugneu by the contempoiaiy psychoanalysts
Thom anu Kchele (197S, pp. S1S-S16) anu Eagle (197S) as being untiue
to the psychoanalytic situation (tieatment setting).
0ne might expect the subaigument fiom uisconfiimation to iun exactly
paiallel to that fiom confiimation. That is, one might expect Babeimas to
aigue that the uiffeience between the uisconfiimation of psychoanalytic
theoiy anu empiiical-analytic theoiy is that the foimei ielies on the failuie
of self-ieflection wheieas the lattei ielies on the failuie of obseivable
pieuiction. But this is not the case foi the following ieason: Although
Babeimas iegaius the acceptance of a constiuction C by the analysanu
uuiing self-ieflection to be sufficient foi the coiiectness of C, the obsence of
self-ieflection in the face of C uoes not falsify it. The patient's iesistances
might simply be too stiong. Thus, Babeimas focuses insteau on the logic of
uisconfiimation in the two cases anu claims that theie is a funuamental
contiast between them on the puipoiteu giounus that an unsuccessful
pieuiction in the natuial sciences automatically iefutes the hypothesis useu
to make it. In fact, Babeimas (1971) takes the existence of an alteinative to
uisconfiimation in the face of appaiently uisconfiiming eviuence to be the
uistinguishing featuie of the psychoanalytic case. Be aigues as follows:
ueneial inteipietations uo not obey the same ciiteiia of iefutation
as geneial theoiies. If a conuitional pieuiction ueuuceu fiom a
lawlike hypothesis anu initial conuitions is falsifieu, then the
hypothesis may be consiueieu iefuteu. A geneial inteipietation can
be testeu analogously if we ueiive a constiuction fiom one of its
implications anu the communications of the patient. We can give
this constiuction the foim of a conuitional pieuiction. If it is coiiect,
the patient will be moveu to piouuce ceitain memoiies, ieflect on a
specific poition of foigotten life histoiy, anu oveicome uistuibances
of both communication anu behavioi. But heie the methou of
falsification is not the same as foi geneial theoiies. Foi if the patient
iejects a constiuction, the inteipietation fiom which it has been
ueiiveu cannot yet be consiueieu iefuteu at all....|Tjheie is still an
alteinative: eithei the inteipietation is false (that is, the theoiy oi
its application to a given case) oi, to the contiaiy, the iesistances,
which have been coiiectly uiagnoseu, aie too stiong |p. 266j.
But, as uinbaum points out, it has become a commonplace of the
philosophy of science, evei since Pieiie Buhem's woik befoie Woilu Wai I,
that piecisely the same ambiguity of iefutation holus foi science in geneial.
By anu laige, it is not theoiies alone that aie at issue in pieuiction but
theoiies in conjunction with a statement of initial conuitions onJ vaiious
collateial hypotheses. This means that if a pieuiction is not boine out, the
blame cannot be pinneu on the theoiy with ceitainty. Thus, again, the
allegeu uiffeience between psychoanalysis anu empiiical-analytic science
iests on a false view of the lattei.
+! ()*$&+,- .!/0"#,-,%/!+! 3##& !0+*-0*2
In consiueiing the meiits of psychoanalytic theoiy as a scientific theoiy,
uinbaum has been conceineu with the extent to which Fieuu's theoietical
claims aie suppoiteu by the available eviuence. Be has focuseu, in
paiticulai, on the soit of eviuence that Fieuu invokeu, namely, eviuence
obtaineu "fiom the couch." In making his assessment, uinbaum has ielieu
both on logical consiueiations anu on vaiious canons of inuuctive suppoit
that have become stanuaiu since the time of Bacon. Be makes thiee basic
claims:
1. The theiapeutic effectiveness of the chaiacteiistic constituent factois of
Fieuuian psychoanalytic theiapy is in seiious question.
2. Clinical uata aie subject to so many epistemological liabilities as to
ienuei them viitually useless in suppoiting the caiuinal hypotheses as
Fieuuian theoiy.
S. Even if clinical uata weie not epistemologically contaminateu anu coulu
be taken at face value, they woulu fail to sustain any of the cential
postulates of Fieuu's clinical theoiy as well as the investigative utility of
the methou of fiee association.
Let us consiuei each of these claims in tuin.
,/( 75(1,4&' &8 ,/(#".(5,4) (88(),4%('(11
The effectiveness of Fieuuian theiapy has been unuei attack at least
since Eysenck (19S2, 1966) publisheu his classic challenge. Contenuing that
available eviuence uoes not auequately suppoit the claim that
psychoanalysis is theiapeutically effective, Eysenck claimeu to have telling
eviuence that psychoanalysis uiu no bettei than simply having people go on
about theii lives without theiapy. Eiwin (198u) has ieconstiucteu
Eysenck's aigument as follows:
1. If theie is no auequate stuuy of psychoanalytic theiapy showing an
impiovement iate of bettei than two thiius oi bettei than that of a
suitable no-tieatment contiol gioup, then theie is no fiim eviuence that
the theiapy is theiapeutically effective.
2. Theie is no auequate stuuy showing eithei iate of impiovement.
S. Theiefoie, theie is no fiim eviuence that the theiapy is theiapeutically
effective.
0iiginally, Eysenck maue use of an oveiall spontaneous iemission iate
acioss all vaiieties of neuiotic uisoiuei. In iesponse to ciiticism, howevei,
Eysenck (1977) has iecently emphasizeu that uiffeient types of neuiotic
uisoiuei have uiffeient inciuences anuoi time couises of spontaneous
iemission. Be now claims that any compaiative evaluation must focus on a
paiticulai uiagnostic giouping anu a uiagnostically matcheu untieateu
contiol gioup.
In the light of much subsequent liteiatuie, uinbaum pioceeus on the
assumption that the supeiioiity of the outcome of analytic tieatment ovei
that of iival tieatment moualities has not been uemonstiateu. Bowevei, in
his essay, "Bow Scientific is Psychoanalysis." (uinbaum, 1977), he stiesses
the following auuitional fact which is fiequently oveilookeu: lf
psychoanalytic tieatment outcomes uo exceeu the spontaneous iemission
iate, this alone uoes not suffice to establish that psychoanalytic tieatment
gains aie uue to meuiation of analytic insight. It woulu not iule out an
impoitant iival hypothesis, namely, that such tieatment gains aie uue to an
inoJvertent plocebo effect. In uefining this teim, uinbaum (1981, 198Sa)
notes that of the vaiious constituent factois that make up a tieatment
piocess, we can uistinguish those that aie chaiacteiistic, that is, claimeu by
the theoiy to be iemeuial, fiom otheis it iegaius as inciuental. uinbaum
(198u) continues:
A tieatment piocess t chaiacteiizeu by having constituents F, will
be saiu to be an inoJvertont plocebo with iespect to taiget uisoiuei
B anu uispensing physician P just in case each of the following
conuitions is satisfieu: (a) none of the chaiacteiistic tieatment
factois F aie iemeuial foi B, but (b) P cieuits these veiy factois F
with being theiapeutic foi B anu inueeu he ueems at least some of
them to be causally essentiol to tbe remeJiol efficocy of t, anu (c) the
patient believes that t ueiives iemeuial efficacy foi B fiom
constituents belonging to t's cborocteristic foctors |p. SSuj.
The point is that in assessing the effectiveness of psychoanalytic
theiapy oi of any of its iivals, "one must tiy to uisentangle fiom one anothei
(i) the effects, if any, inueeu uue to those factois that the ielevant
theiapeutic theoiy postulates as being genuinely iemeuial, anu (ii)
puipoiteuly lessei changes uue to the expectations aiouseu in both patients
anu physicians by theii belief in the theiapeuticity of the tieatment"
(uinbaum, 1977, p. 2S8). As uinbaum ieaus the ielevant liteiatuie on
tieatment effectiveness (in paiticulai, Fishei & uieenbeig, 1977; Luboisky,
Singei, & Luboisky, 197S; Neltzoff & Komieich, 197u; Sloan et al., 197S),
theie is goou ieason to suspect that insofai as Fieuuian theiapy is effective,
it is, in fact, "placebogenic." The stuuies seem to point to two conclusions;
(1) psychotheiapy of a wiue vaiiety of types anu foi a bioau iange of
uisoiueis is bettei than nothing, but (2) theie is eithei no uiffeience
between uiffeient tieatment moualities oi the behavioial tieatment is
bettei.
(.41,(9&3&:4)"3 34"!434,4(1 &8 )34'4)"3 +","
Eysenck (196S) not only impugneu the effectiveness of Fieuuian
theiapy, he also iaiseu seiious questions about the epistemic valiuity of
clinical uata as hau Wilhelm Fliess (see Fieuu, 19S4) befoie him. In contiast,
Fieuu himself, as well as most of his auvocates (see Luboisky & Spence,
1978, foi a iecent statement) have iegaiueu clinical eviuence as tbe basis
foi the claims of psychoanalytic theoiy to tiuth.
In consiueiing how clinical mateiial is supposeu to beai eviuentially on
Fieuuian theoiy, it is impoitant to uistinguish thiee levels of clinical
mateiial. At the lowest level, we have what we can call the patient's
proJuctions. These incluue theii uieam iepoits, slips of the tongue, memoiy
iepoits, anu fiee associations as well as assents oi uissents to
inteipietations offeieu by the analyst. In auuition, we have facts conceining
the piesence oi absence of behaviois oi bouily states that aie iegaiueu as
symptoms. At the seconu level, we have the interpretotions pioviueu eithei
by the analyst oi by patients themselves of these piouuctions anu
symptoms as expiessions of unconscious wishes, iesistance, anu so foith.
Finally, we have what Fieuu (19S7) latei calleu a construction, a whole
psychoanalytic stoiy about the patient's psyche fiom the patient's eaily
infantile histoiy to the piesent state, incluuing, of couise, an etiological
account of the symptoms. Although it is possible to maintain that the
patient's piouuctions beai uiiectly on Fieuu's univeisal theoietical claims, a
moie plausible epistemological ieconstiuction is ioughly as follows: Nost
piouuctions, such as uieam iepoits, slips of the tongue, fiee associations,
anu expiessions of feeling towaiu the analyst uuiing tiansfeience aie taken
to be ielevant insofai as they pioviue the iaw mateiial foi inteipietations,
which, in tuin, pioviue the builuing blocks foi the ultimate constiuction.
Some piouuctions may also be taken to attest to theiapeutic success. In
contiast, otheis, such as the patient's assent to oi piotest against a pioposeu
constiuction, aie often taken as uiiect eviuence foi the tiuth of that
constiuction. The constiuctions themselves, cleaily, aie supposeu to beai on
the theoiy in the way that a paiticulai instantiation of a univeisal claim
beais on the univeisal claim.
The piincipal epistemological liability to which clinical uata aie subject
is that the analyst, who piesumably is committeu to the tiuth of Fieuuian
theoiy, unwittingly influences both patients' piouuctions anu the couise of
the analysis. This point has been iecognizeu foi some time (by Fliess, as is
cleai fiom Fieuu, 19S4; as well as Chiistiansen, 1964; ulovei, 19S2; Naitin,
1964a; Nagel, 19S9). What appeais not to have been iecognizeu, as
uinbaum (198Sb) points out, is that Fieuu himself was awaie of this
pioblem anu, in auuition, hau a veiy sophisticateu, albeit unsuccessful,
stiategy foi uealing with it. Fieuu (1917) acknowleuges the so-calleu
pioblem of suggestion in his lntroJuctory lectures:
It must uawn on us that in oui technique we have abanuoneu
hypnosis only to ieuiscovei suggestion in the shape of tiansfeience.
But heie I will pause, anu let you have a woiu; foi I see an objection
boiling up in you so fieicely that it woulu make you incapable of
listening if it weie not put into woius: "Ah! so you've aumitteu it at
last! You woik with the help of suggestion, just like the hypnotists!
That is what we've thought foi a long time. But, if so, why the
iounuabout ioau by way of memoiies of the past, uiscoveiing the
unconscious, inteipieting anu tianslating back uistoitionsthis
immense expenuituie of laboui, time anu moneywhen the one
effective thing is aftei all only suggestion. Why uo you not make
uiiect suggestions against the symptoms, as the otheis uothe
honest hypnotists. Noieovei, if you tiy to excuse youiself foi youi
long uetoui on the giounu that you have maue a numbei of
impoitant psychological uiscoveiies which aie hiuuen by uiiect
suggestionwhat about the ceitainty of these uiscoveiies now. Aie
not they a iesult of suggestion too, of unintentional suggestion. Is it
not possible that you aie foicing on the patient what you want anu
what seems to you coiiect in this fielu as well." |pp. 446-447j.
By this time in his caieei, Fieuu hau cleaily iecognizeu the impoitance
of tiansfeience as a motive foice in theiapy. Thus, the challenge was that, as
Fieuu (1917) so nicely put it, "what is auvantageous to oui theiapy is
uamaging to oui ieseaiches" foi "the influencing of oui patient may make
the objective ceitainty of oui finuings uoubtful" (p. 4S2). Bis ieply was as
follows:
Anyone who has himself caiiieu out psycho-analyses will have been
able to convince himself on countless occasions that it is impossible
to make suggestions to a patient in that way. The uoctoi has no
uifficulty, of couise, in making him a suppoitei of some paiticulai
theoiy anu in thus making him shaie some possible eiioi of his
own. In this iespect the patient is behaving like anyone elselike a
pupilbut this only affects his intelligence, not his illness. After oll,
bis conflicts will only be successfully solveJ onJ bis resistonce
overcome if tbe onticipotory iJeos be is qiven tolly witb wbot is reol in
bim |italics auueuj. Whatevei in the uoctoi's conjectuies is
inaccuiate uiops out in the couise of the analysis; it has to be
withuiawn anu ieplaceu by something moie coiiect (p. 4S2).
uinbaum has uubbeu the unueilineu statement the "necessaiy
conuition thesis," NCT foi shoit. (Elsewheie, uinbaum, 198Sc, calls it
moie honoiifically"Fieuu's mastei pioposition".) This asseition plays the
key iole in Fieuu's attempteu solution to the pioblem of suggestion. What
he is claiming, accoiuing to uinbaum (198Sc), is tantamount to the
following: "(1) only the psychoanalytic methou of inteipietation anu
tieatment can yielu oi meuiate to the patient coiiect insight into the
unconscious pathogens of his psychoneuiosis, anu (2) the analysanu's
coiiect insight into the etiology of his affliction anu into the unconscious
uynamics of his chaiactei is, in tuin, cousolly necessory foi the theiapeutic
conquest of this neuiosis" (p. 184). NCT can then be useu to vinuicate the
valiuity of the clinical uata fuinisheu by patients in analysis by means of
what uinbaum uubs the "tally aigument" (iefeiiing to Fieuu's assumption
that iueas given patients tolly with what is ieal in them). The aigument iuns
as follows:
1. The analysis of patient P was theiapeutically successful.
2. NCT.
S. Theiefoie, the psychoanalytic inteipietations of the hiuuen causes of Ps
behavioi given to him by his analyst aie inueeu coiiect.
Fieuu's stiategy was biilliant, accoiuing to uinbaum. But was it
successful. It shoulu be cleai fiom oui uiscussion of the theiapeutic efficacy
question, that uinbaum uoes not think so. Foi, although the tally aigument
is logically valiu, theie is a seiious question conceining the tiuth of its
piemises, in paiticulai, the ciucial NCT. NCT claims that theiapeutic success
is meuiateu only by psychoanalytic insight. Insofai as theie is eithei
spontaneous iemission of symptoms oi theie exist iival successful
tieatment moualities, NCT is false. As uinbaum (198ua) aiguesaftei
extensive ieview of the ielevant liteiatuietheie appeais to be stiong
eviuence foi both. (Inteiestingly enough, Fieuu himself explicitly conceueu
the existence of spontaneous iemission |uinbaum, 198Scj). uinbaum
(198Sb) concluues: "Since the Tally Aigument is thus giavely unueicut, any
theiapeutic successes scoieu by analysts, even if spectaculai, have become
probotively unavailing to the valiuation of psychoanalytic theoiy via that
aigument" (p. 2u8).
uinbaum (198ua) consiueis one possible alteinative to the use of the
tally aigument. This is to make use of a patient's intiospections once be or
sbe bos been successfully onolyzeJ. It might be thought that, if ieliable, such
intiospections coulu pioviue the neeueu valiuation foi two soits of claims:
(1) claims conceining the etiology of the patient's affliction, anu (2) claims
conceining the necessaiy iole of the analyst's constiuctions in the
theiapeutic piocess. The valiuation of such claims coulu, in tuin, pioviue
uiiect eviuence foi Fieuu's psychogenetic theoiy as well as help to uiscieuit
the iival theiapeutic hypothesis of placebogenesis. 0nfoitunately, howevei,
these "hopeful speculations" aie "funuamentally impugneu" in uinbaum's
view by the finuings iepoiteu by Nisbett anu Wilson (1977) on the extent to
which we have intiospective access to the uynamics of oui mental life.
Nisbett anu Wilson uo not apply the iesults of theii finuings to the case of
psychoanalysis. uinbaum (198ua) believes, howevei, that they aie uiiectly
ielevant anu that "they maishal telling empiiical suppoit" foi the following
conclusions:
1. Fai fiom justifying the pievalent belief in piivilegeu access
to the uynamics of oui psychic iesponses, the finuings
stiongly inuicate the following: Puipoiteuly intiospective
self-peiception of causal connections between one's own
mental states is just as liable to tbeory-inJuceJ eiiois as is
uiawing causal infeiences about connections between
puiely exteinal events fiom appaient covaiiations among
theii piopeities..
2. When askeu how, if at all, a paiticulai stimulus influenceu a
given iesponse, the peisons in the expeiimental stuuies,
anu oiuinaiy people in theii uaily lives uiu not anu uo not
even attempt to inteiiogate theii memoiies of the
meuiating causal piocess. Although it may feel like
intiospection, what they actually uo is uiaw on the causal
tbeories pioviueu by theii cultuie oi peitinent intellectual
subcultuie foi a veiuict as to the effect, if any, of that kinu of
stimulus on that kinu of iesponse....
S. As N & W iemaik: "Subjective iepoits about highei mental
piocesses aie sometimes coiiect, but even the instances of
coiiect iepoit aie not uue to uiiect intiospective
awaieness. Insteau, they aie uue to the inciuentally coiiect
employment of a piioii causal theoiies" |Nisbett & Wilson,
1977, p. 2SSj |p. S6S-S64j.
(See Rothstein, 198u, foi some ciiticisms of uinbaum's uiscussion of
the epistemological liabilities of patient intiospection anu uinbaum, 1981,
foi a ieply.)
uinbaum's point, then, is that neithei the tally aigument noi the use of
patients' intiospective juugments subsequent to successful analysis can be
useu to guaiu against the veiy ieal possibility that both patients'
piouuctions anu theiapeutic outcomes aie uue moie to the suggestive
influence of the analyst than to the causal mechanisms anu states of affaiis
positeu by Fieuuian theoiy. uinbaum (198Sb) consiueis the suggestion
hypothesis to be moie than a meie logical possibility. Be uiscusses in uetail
thiee of the majoi kinus of clinical finuings that Fieuu ueemeu eithei
initially exempt fiom contamination oi, at least, unmaiieu when gatheieu
with piopei piecautions. These aie the piouucts of "fiee" association, the
patient's assent to analytic inteipietations that weie initially iesisteu, anu
memoiies iecoveieu fiom eaily life. uinbaum finus "soliu" eviuence in the
psychological liteiatuie that each of these instances is subject to
"consiueiable epistemic contamination." uinbaum (198Sb) concluues:
Thus, geneially speaking, clinical finuingsin anu of themselves
foifeit the piobative value that Fieuu claimeu foi them, although
theii potential heuiistic meiits may be quite substantial. To asseit
that the contamination of intiaclinical uata is ineroJicoble without
extensive anu essential iecouise to extroclinical finuings is not, of
couise, to ueclaie the automatic falsity of any anu eveiy analytic
inteipietation that gaineu the patient's assent by means of
piouuing fiom the analyst. But it is to maintainto the gieat
uetiiment of intiaclinical testability!that, in geneial, the
epistemic uevices confineu to the analytic setting cannot ieliably
sift oi uecontaminate the clinical uata so as to iJentify those that
qualify as piobative |p. 27uj.
,/( 3&:4)"3 8&5'+",4&'1 &8 ,/( ,/(&#2 &8 #(.#(114&'
The pioblem of the contamination of clinical eviuence is not the only
epistemic pioblem to which Fieuuian theoiy is subject. In his most iecent
woik, uinbaum (198Sb, 1984) has chaiteu a numbei of fuithei, even moie
seiious, uifficulties, the upshot of which is that even if clinicol Joto coulJ be
token ot foce volue, tbey woulJ not support tbe bosic tenets of IreuJ's
tbeoreticol structure.
uinbaum aigues foi this conclusion by consiueiing the ieasoning that
Fieuu useu at vaiious stages of his caieei to suppoit "the coineistone" of
his theoietical euifice. This is the hypothesis that it is represseJ moteriol that
initially causes anu continues to maintain psychoneuiotic symptoms as well
as othei psychic phenomena such as uieams anu paiapiaxes. uinbaum
begins by consiueiing the ieasoning useu by Fieuu anu Bieuei to suppoit
the oiiginal veision of this "iepiession hypothesis" foi psychoneuiosis.
Although the eviuence they auuuceu to suppoit theii theoiy was not
completely unflaweu, it uiu come up to a ielatively high stanuaiu, accoiuing
to uinbaum. As it tuineu out, Fieuu himself uiscoveieu that this eviuence
was spuiious. Rathei than abanuoning the iepiession hypothesis at this
point, howevei, Fieuu substituteu a new veision. The uifficulty with this
anu the basis of uinbaum's complaintis that Fieuu nevei succeeueu in
pioviuing new eviuence that was anywheie neai as cogent as his oiiginal
obseivations with Bieuei. In auuition, he pioceeueu to extiapolate fiom his
iepiession hypothesis of the psychoneuioses to a moie geneial iepiession
hypothesis coveiing both paiapiaxes anu uieams. But in neithei case was
theie any new, compelling, eviuence that woulu waiiant the extiapolation.
The oiiginal Fieuu-Bieuei hypothesis was that (1) the theiapeutic
conquest of hysteiical symptoms is effecteu by the abieactive lifting of the
iepiession of a tiaumatic memoiy, anu (2) this positeu theiapeutic efficacy
can be explaineu ueuuctively by the etiologic hypothesis that the iepiession
of the tiaumatic event was causally necessaiy foi the foimation anu
maintenance of the given hysteiical symptom. Fieuu anu Bieuei's (189S)
eviuence foi these claims was that "each inuiviuual hysteiical symptom
immeuiately anu peimanently uisappeaieu when we hau succeeueu in
biinging cleaily to light the memoiy of the event by which it was piovokeu
anu in aiousing its accompanying affect" (p. 6; emphasis in oiiginal).
uinbaum (198Sb) ieconstiucts theii ieasoning as follows:
Fiist, they attiibuteu theii positive theiapeutic iesults to the lifting
of iepiessions. Baving assumeu such a tberopeutic connection, they
wisheu to exploin it. Then they saw it woulu inueeu be explaineu
ueuuctively by the following etiological hypothesis: the paiticulai
iepiession whose unuoing iemoveu a given symptom S is cousolly
necessory foi the initial foimation onJ maintenance of S. Thus, the
nub of theii inuuctive aigument foi infeiiing a iepiession etiology
can be foimulateu as follows: the iemoval of a hysteiical symptom S
by meons of liftinq a iepiession R is coqent eviJence that the
iepiession R was cousolly necessory foi the foimation of the
symptom S |p. 218j.
The beauty of theii appeal to sepaiate symptom iemoval was this. To
suppoit theii hypothesis, Fieuu anu Bieuei hau to show that iemoval of the
iepiession was sufficient foi the iemoval of the symptom. This woulu count
as cogent inuuctive giounus foi the claim that the iepiession was a causally
necessory conJition of the symptom. The uifficulty was that given meiely the
conjunction of iemoval of the iepiession with iemoval of the symptom,
theie was a iival explanationnamely, that the theiapeutic efficacy of the
cathaitic methou was placebogenic. But, they aigueu, if the symptom
iemoval weie a placebo effect wiought by suggestion, one woulu expect all
the symptoms to be iemoveu at once. Thus, in theii view, the fact that they
weie iemoveu one by one was eviuence against the iival placebo hypothesis
anu in suppoit of theii own view.
Although Fieuu anu Bieuei ueseive consiueiable cieuit foi iealizing the
impoitance of the alteinative iival placebo hypothesis anu attempting to
iule it out, theii line of ieasoning was not totally successful, in uinbaum's
(198Sa) view. Piecisely because of the analyst's eviuent focus on a specific
memoiy foi eocb symptom, the patient's conquest of the given symptom
might be affecteu by suggestion. That is, on the basis of the analyst's
behavioi, the patient might come to believe that uncoveiing a memoiy
associateu with a given symptom woulu cause that symptom to uisappeai.
Thus, os o consequence of tbis belief, iathei than the state of affaiis positeu
by the Fieuu-Bieuei hypothesis, the symptom might then actually
uisappeai.
As it tuineu out, the Fieuu-Bieuei hypothesis hau a fai moie seiious
pioblem to contenu withnamely, that the ciucial eviuence conceining
theiapeutic success was spuiious. As Fieuu (192S) put it:
Even the most biilliant |theiapeuticj iesults weie liable to be
suuuenly wipeu away if my peisonal ielation with the patient
became uistuibeu. It was tiue that they woulu be ieestablisheu if a
ieconciliation coulu be effecteu; but such an occuiience pioveu that
the peisonal emotional ielation between uoctoi anu patient was
aftei all stiongei than the whole cathaitic piocess |p. 27j.
Fieuu, howevei, continueu to maintain a veision of the iepiession
hypothesis, substituting iepiession of infantile sexual wishes foi the Fieuu-
Bieuei iepiession of a tiaumatic event in auulthoou anu calling on the full
aiiay of clinical mateiial in suppoit of his claims.
We have alieauy seen that, accoiuing to uinbaum, this clinical
mateiial is piobatively hopeless because of the failuie of the tally aigument
to piotect against the evei-piesent pioblem of suggestion anu because of
the unavailability of any othei vinuication of the piobity of clinical uata. Let
us suppose, howevei, that this is not the case. In the face of the uemise of the
tberopeutic vinuication of the tally aigument, can clinical uata neveitheless
pioviue the suppoit that Fieuuian theoiy so bauly neeus witbout ielying on
tberopeutic success. Accoiuing to uinbaum, the answei is no; Fieuu's
clinical uata suffei fiom seiious epistemic limitations as suppoit foi causal
hypotheses, even if they aie iegaiueu as uncontaminateu. Consiuei, foi
example, piouucts of the methou of fiee association. Accoiuing to
uinbaum (198Sb), the epistemic legitimation of fiee association as a
ieliable means of iuentifying anu ceitifying pathogenic causes as such
collapseu with the uemise of the Bieuei-Fieuu cathaitic methou. Thus, the
most that the methou of fiee association can come up with is the expiession
of a thought oi wish that was pieviously iepiesseu. But this is a fai ciy fiom
the etiologic claim that the peitinent iepiession hau been the potboqen P of
the patient's neuiosis N on the stiength of its emeigence as an association to
the symptom. Foi, uinbaum (198Sb) aigues:
to suppoit Fieuu's etiologic hypothesis that P is causally necessaiy
foi N, eviuence must be piouuceu to show that being a P mokes o
Jifference to being an N. But such causal ielevance is not attesteu by
meie instances of Ns that weie Ps, i.e., by patients who aie both Ps
anu Ns. Foi a laige numbei of such cases uoes not piecluue that just
as many non-Ps woulu also become Ns, if followeu in a hoiizontal
stuuy fiom chiluhoou onwaiu! Thus, instances of Ns that weie Ps
may just boppen to have been Ps. Then being a P has no etiologic
iole at all in becoming an N..Thus, to pioviue eviuence foi the
causal ielevance claimeu by Fieuu, we neeu to combine instances of
Ns that weie Ps with instances of non-Ps who aie non-Ns. Inueeu,
since he ueemeu P to be causally necessaiy foi Niathei than just
causally ielevanthis etiology iequiies that the class of non-Ps
shoulu not contain ony Ns whatevei, anu the class of Ps is to have a
positive (though numeiically unspecifieu) inciuence of Ns |p. 277j.
Fuitheimoie, foi the puipose of suppoiting etioloqic (causal)
hypotheses, the absence of such contiols unueimines the piobative value of
not only uata collecteu by the methou of fiee association, but also eviuence
baseu on memoiies such as those uiscusseu by ulymoui (1974) in Fieuu's
Rat Nan case.
Fieuu's causal explanations of uieams anu paiapiaxes faie no bettei, as
it tuins out (see uinbaum, 198Sb, pp. 222-26S). Theie aie two basic
uifficulties. Fiist, Fieuu's claim that uieams anu paiapiaxes aie like neuiotic
symptoms in the sense of being compiomises between the uemanus of oui
unconscious anu conscious life is simply an extiapolation fiom his theoiy of
psychoneuiosis. In fact, uinbaum (198Sb) aigues that it is a
misextropolotion because theie is nothing akin to the theiapeutic base of the
lattei. With iespect to paiapiaxes, foi example, "Fieuu uiu not auuuce any
eviuence that the peimanent lifting of a iepiession to which he hau
attiibuteu a paiapiaxis will be 'theiapeutic' in the sense of enabling the
peison himself to coiiect the paiapiaxis onJ to avoiu its iepetition in the
futuie" (uinbaum, 198Sb, p. 22S). Seconu, the methou Fieuu useu to
iuentify the paiticulai unconscious ueteiminants of uieams anu paiapiaxes
is simply the methou of fiee association. Bence, even assuming that it is fiee
fiom epistemic contamination, the methou is poweiless to pioviue suppoit
foi any cousol hypothesis, incluuing those peitinent to uieams anu
paiapiaxes.


(;"94'",4&' &8 " #"+4)"3 )#4,475( &8 :#<'!"59=1 %4(>1
Because most of uinbaum's woik on psychoanalysis is so iecent, theie
has, as yet, been little time foi ciitical ieply. 0ne exception is the stiongly
negative ieaction of Flax (1981), who aigues that "neithei Poppei noi
uinbaum offeis an auequate philosophy of science by which
psychoanalysis may be juugeu" (p. S61). Fuitheimoie, she chastises
uinbaum foi iestiicting his uiscussion to Fieuu, contenuing that "this is
like confining a uiscussion of physics to Newton because contempoiaiy
physics is in such uisaiiay anu then thiowing out physics because theie aie
uniesolveu pioblems in Newton's theoiy" (p. S64). Noie specifically, she
seems to believe that the moie contempoiaiy veision of psychoanalysis
embouieu in object ielations theoiy is immune fiom the epistemic
uifficulties uinbaum attiibutes to Fieuu. In fact, she makes the astounuing
claim that "all the phenomena that uinbaum counts as the clinical
liabilities of psychoanalysis on empiiicist giounusepistemic
contamination (i.e., inteisubjectivity), suggestion, the placebo effect, etc....
aie eviuence that object-ielations theoiy is coiiect" (p. S67). Since these
points woulu, if coiiect, stiike at the heait of uinbaum's woik, I will
concluue my uiscussion of uinbaum with a consiueiation of Flax's
piincipal contentions.
Flax's stiategy of attack involves isolating a numbei of assumptions
"suppiesseu within this uebate" that she takes to be pioblematic. To make
hei case, then, she must show both that these assumptions aie pioblematic
anu that they aie, in fact, essentiol to uinbaum's aiguments. I suggest that
she uoes neithei, with the failuie on the seconu count the moie seiious. It is
to this point that I will uiiect my iemaiks, foi it suggests that she has
seiiously misunueistoou the chaiactei of uinbaum's aiguments. Let me
give a few examples.
"Empiiicism," Flax (1981) claims, "is simply untenable as a
methouology of philosophy of science. A uatum is nevei obseiveu as it is in
itself..Thus fact anu theoiy cannot be totally uistinct. Empiiical expeiience
loses its special status as the most piivilegeu anu unpioblematic eviuence....
All uata aie 'epistemically contaminateu' " (p. S6S). I take it that the
assumption of concein heie is that uata gatheieu on the basis of obseivation
aie somehow epistemically piivilegeu anu inuepenuent of theoiy. Suppose,
howevei, we take this to be false. Suppose we agiee that obseivation is
always "theoiy lauen" in the sense that it always involves inteipietation,
anu such inteipietation is ielative to a peison's conceptual appaiatus,
beliefs, expectations, anu so foith. Fuitheimoie, we take it that
obseivational claims, like any othei, aie subject to contioveisy anu ievision
anu must be suppoiteu if contesteu. Boes it then follow that uinbaum's
epistemological liabilities aiguments fail. Flax's ieasoning seems to be that
if all obseivation is theoiy lauen, then all uata aie "epistemically
contaminateu," incluuing the uata of oui most esteemeu scientific theoiies.
Bence, any aigument baseu on the implicit assumption that a theoiy cannot
be scientific if it is baseu on contaminateu uata will be an aigument baseu
on a totally unieasonable uemaication piinciple.
The uifficulty with this line of ieasoning is that it is peifectly possible to
agiee that all obseivation is theoiy lauen anu still maintain a uistinction
between uata that aie bioseJ in a uamagingly ielevant sense anu those that
aie not so biaseu. The iueal of objective uata is possible at least to the extent
that uata ielevant to a given theoiy T can be collecteu by someone whethei
he oi she believes in Toi even, in fact, whethei he oi she has knowleuge of T.
Scientists have become incieasingly awaie of the ways in which
expeiimenteis' bias towaiu theii pet hypotheses can affect the outcome of
expeiiments. With animal subjects, bias often opeiates in the iecoiuing of
obseivations; with human subjects, it can be unintentionally conveyeu in
the communication of expeiimental instiuctions. But is it impoitant to note
that the iesult of this incieasing knowleuge about the potential pitfalls of
expeiimentei bias has not been uespaii ovei the inevitable iiiationality anu
aibitiaiiness of scientific theoiizing. Rathei, it has been the auoption of new
anu moie stiingent controls to minimize oi eliminate such bias. Foi
example, the use of so-calleu "uouble blinu" expeiimental pioceuuie has
become stanuaiu foi expeiimentation with human subjects in uiug anu
othei meuical ieseaich.
uinbaum's quaiiel with the use of clinical eviuence as suppoit foi
psychoanalytic theoiy is piecisely that it consists of uata subject to the
chaige of investigatoi bias. Not only aie the uata being gatheieu in the
clinical setting obtaineu by someone fiimly committeu to the tiuth of the
theoiy, but they aie gatheieu in such a wayuuiing the couise of a
theiapeutic piocess in which tiansfeience plays a majoi iolethat even
Fieuu (1917, pp. 446-447) woiiieu about the chaige of suggestion.
Fuitheimoie, as uinbaum (198Su) points out, Flax fails to uistinguish
between uata that is meiely theoiy-lauen anu uata geneiateu by the self-
fulfilling use of the theoiy in theii piouuction. As Neiton's (1949) stuuies of
self-fulfilling anu self-uefeating pieuictions in the social sciences have
shown, "iJentifioble olterotions of the piesumeu initial conuitions, iathei
than mere theoiy-lauenness, geneiate phenomena that fuinish
uemonstiably spuiious confiimations anu uisconfiimations" (p. Su). Again,
it's not meie theoiy lauenness but the occuiience of piecisely such
alteiations of the piesumeu initial conuitions that is the object of
uinbaum's concein. In uinbaum's (198Su) view, this occuiience "has
been tellingly uemonstiateu experimentolly in stuuies |iepoiteu in Naimoi,
197uj of the puipoiteuly "fiee" associations piouuceu by patients in
analysis" (p. Su). uinbaum can peifectly well giant that all uata aie theoiy
lauen anu still maintain that certoin foims of theoiy-lauenness aie
epistemically unacceptable.
Anothei one of Flax's (1981) objections is that "a puiely inteinal
philosophical analysis of theoiies anu theoiy shifts is not auequate.|toj
explain why a theoiy is accepteu as "cieuible" oi when this acceptance
occuis" (p. S6S). The pioblematic assumption she has in minu is obviously
that such a puiely inteinal philosophical analysis of theoiies anu theoiy
shifts is auequate foi such puiposes. What Flax means by such a "puiely
inteinal philosophical analysis" can be gleaneu fiom the soits of
consiueiations she thinks aie left out of account. She wiites: "At least
equally impoitant anu unuei uispute is what counts as a fact, how uata aie
to be inteipieteu anu which uata must be explaineu" (p. S6S). I take it then
that such a puiely inteinal analysis, then, is one that focuses solely on the
ielationship of theoiy to eviuence as the basis of theoiy choice. Anu the
putatively pioblematic assumption woulu be that it is possible to give a
complete account of why scientists in fact accept theoiies as cieuible at
paiticulai moments in the histoiy of science solely in teims of the logical
ielations between theoiy anu eviuence. Now, I have giave uoubts as to
whethei most noimative philosopheis of science, incluuing uinbaum,
woulu accept this assumption. But the main point again is: What of it.
Suppose we agiee that the assumption is wiong. It seems to me that
uinbaum's uiscussion of the pioblems inheient in the use of clinical uata
iests on no assumptions whatsoevei conceining the soits of consiueiations
that must be invokeu to explain paiticulai histoiical occuiiences of
accepting paiticulai theoiies. Someone inteiesteu in the ossessment of the
eviuential giounus claimeu to pioviue suppoit foi a theoiy is simply
inteiesteu in a uiffeient question than someone inteiesteu in explaining
why those who have accepteu the theoiy uiu so. The foimei is a question
about epistemic meiit, the seconu about human psychology. Comments by
Flax (1981) such as "Neithei uinbaum's noi Poppei's philosophy, can
pioviue an auequate account of the scientific piocess" (p. S6S) inuicate that
she has no ieal unueistanuing of the noimative pioject. Ceitainly one can
aigue that the facts of scientific piactice beai on one's choice of noimative
piinciples. Anu given ceitain views about what uown-to-eaith noimative
philosophy of science shoulu be like, one can fault a paiticulai exeicise in
appiaisal foi using utopian stanuaius. Bowevei, all this in no way affects the
point that noimative philosophy of science is not conceineu with giving a
psychological oi political oi sociological oi histoiical explanation of why
paiticulai episoues in the histoiy of science occuiieu as they uiu, anu,
theiefoie, ought not be ciiticizeu if it uoes not uo so.
Peihaps Flax in some sense iealizes this, foi hei last ciiticism
conceining the putatively pioblematic natuie of uinbaum's giounus goes
foi the jugulai. Flax (1981) wiites:
Some of the gieatest weaknesses of both Poppei's anu uinbaum's
accounts of science stem fiom the attempt iationally anu aibitiaiily
to ieconstiuct the natuie of scientific piactice. Integially connecteu
with iationalization is theii claim to legitimately legislate what
counts as science anu to evaluate how well it is uone. Neithei
Poppei noi uinbaum give a scientific oi philosophic justification
foi this claim, anu theie aie goou philosophical giounus foi
questioning its valiuity |p. S64j.
Flax uoes not tell us heie what those giounus aie but simply iefeis us to
Roity (1979).
Suiely, one might think, I cannot chaige Flax with iiielevance heie. Foi
ceitainly, uinbaum's ciiticism of Fieuuian theoiy uoes at least piesuppose
that noimative philosophy of science is a legitimate enteipiise. Ny ieply is,
yes anu no. Noimative philosophy of science is not just one soit of thing, but
many. I believe that what Flax is attacking is a fai moie ambitious foim of
the enteipiise than the one uinbaum unueitakes in his iecent wiitings.
The ambitious foim aims at a global iational ieconstiuction of at least those
paits of scientific piactice that seem to be goveineu by ieason. This involves
an attempt to finu a set of piinciples that seive to rotionolize the uecisions,
acts, anu heuiistic iules that belong to actual scientific piactice.
This ambitious foim of noimative philosophy may well not be possible.
But the enteipiise can be maue moie mouest in a numbei of ways. Fiist,
iational ieconstiuction can be uone in a piecemeal iathei than a global way.
Seconu, the philosophei of science can engage in the appiaisal of specific
scientific contiibutions not as an exteinal ciitic, invoking, as Schefflei
(1967) puts it, noims baseu on "an abstiact epistemological iueal" but
iathei as a porticipont whose noims aie "an iueal which, iegulating the
chaiacteiistic activities of science, may entei into its veiy uesciiption" (p.
7S). Flax fails to unueistanu that in uinbaum's vaiious epistemological
liabilities aiguments, he is playing it veiy close to the giounu. The
noimative piinciples he invokes uo not stem fiom any philosophical
iational ieconstiuction of scientific piactice. They aie pait of that piactice
itself. This is paiticulaily tiue of the inuuctivist piinciples he maishals in his
ciiticism of Fieuu's attempts to establish his causal claims. Fuitheimoie,
uinbaum mounts a peisuasive case that these noimative piinciples aie
ones Fieuu himself explicitly avoweu. Thus, it seems quite tiue, as
uinbaum (198Sc) himself says, that the veiuict he ieaches conceining the
scientific meiit of psychoanalysis "is haiuly pieuicateu on the imposition of
some extianeous methouological puiism" (p. 1S). The point, then, is this.
Even if Flax weie to convince us that a global iational ieconstiuction of
science weie impossible, I uo not see how this woulu unueicut uinbaum's
ciitique in any way.
uinbaum (198Su) himself has ieplieu to Flax's othei chaiges. Be is
paiticulaily insistent that the ciitique he has offeieu of Fieuu's claims is
equally applicable to moie contempoiaiy psychoanalytic theoiists such as
Beinz Kohut anu the object ielations school. These lattei-uay theoiists
all claim clinical sanction foi the geneiic iepiession-aetiology of
neuioses. Anu they holu that fiee association has the epistemic
copobility of iuentifying the unconscious couses of all kinus of
thought anu behavioi, such as uieam content anu paiapiaxes.
Noieovei, qua being psychoanalytic, the post-Fieuuian veisions
also ueem the successful lifting of iepiessions to be the uecisive
agency in the postulateu insight uynamics of the theiapy |p. 47j.
Eagle, a psychoanalytically oiienteu clinical psychologist, has iecently
voiceu full suppoit foi these claims of uinbaum's. Aftei examining iecent
foimulations in psychoanalytic object ielations theoiy anu self psychology,
Eagle (198S) concluues:
Contiaiy claims notwithstanuing, uinbaum's ciiticisms of
Fieuuian theoiy aie neithei vitiateu noi unuone by these iecent
uevelopments. In no way uo cuiient foimulations somehow
manage to weaken oi even constitute a iesponse to these ciiticisms.
The clinical uata geneiateu by an object ielations theoiy oi self
psychology appioach aie as epistemologically contaminateu as uata
geneiateu by the moie tiauitional appioach. Theie is a little, oi
peihaps even less, eviuence available on theiapeutic piocess anu
theiapeutic outcome. Anu finally, the etiological claims maue in
moie cuiient foimulations aie peihaps even moie logically anu
empiiically flaweu than Fieuu's etiological foimulations |pp. 49-
Suj.
Thus, Flax's analogy to the case of physics completely misfiies,
uinbaum (198Su) asseits, "if only because the much vaunteu post-
Fieuuian veisions have not iemeuieu a single one of the methouological
uefects" (p. 48) that uinbaum chaiges against the psychoanalytic methou
of clinical investigation.
!$44,)/
In his iecent woik on psychoanalytic epistemology, uinbaum has
exhibiteu an extiemely impiessive commanu of both the psychoanalytic
liteiatuie anu the philosophy of science. Bis views thus ought to be taken
veiy seiiously by anyone inteiesteu in the epistemic status of
psychoanalytic theoiy. I have attempteu heie to extiact the piincipal points
anu aiguments containeu in that bouy of woik.
uinbaum auuiesses himself to two funuamental questions: (1) What
soits of stanuaius of assessment ought we to invoke in evaluating
psychoanalysis. anu (2) Bow uoes psychoanalysis measuie up ielative to
those stanuaius. Because Fieuu himself insisteu that psychoanalysis was a
natuial science, anu because, in uinbaum's view, theie aie no goou
aiguments to the contiaiy, uinbaum has insisteu that psychoanalysis
ought to be assesseu as an empiiical science. To suppoit his position, he has
engageu in uebate with Poppei, Babeimas, Ricoeui, anu ueoige Klein,
although we have iestiicteu oui attention heie to his consiueiation of the
views of Poppei anu Babeimas.
Poppei's famous contention that psychoanalysis is not scientific
because it is unfalsifiable was histoiically impoitant not only because it
iaiseu inteiesting questions about the epistemic status of psychoanalysis
but also because it iaiseu funuamental issues about what makes something
scientific. In the context of ieplying to Poppei's challenge, uinbaum has
aigueu that (1) falsifiability is a meaningful notion in science, although it is
not the touchstone of scientific iationality as Poppei maintains; (2) in
paiticulai, Poppei is completely wiong in claiming that inuuctivism is
poweiless to impugn the scientific cieuentials of a theoiy like
psychoanalysis; (S) Poppei has no goou aiguments foi his claim that
psychoanalysis is unfalsifiable; anu (4) in fact, psychoanalysis is falsifiable, if
one applies a scientifically ieasonable notion of falsifiability.
Babeimas has aigueu that psychoanalysis ought to be iegaiueu as a
criticol science iathei than as an empiiical-analytic one. Babeimas iests his
case on two sets of aiguments. The fiist conceins the ielationship of the
clinical theoiy to the metapsychology. The seconu conceins the epistemic
piopeities of the clinical theoiy itself. uinbaum has auuiesseu these
aiguments as follows: Fiist, Fieuu iightly saw that the scientific status of the
clinical theoiy is not uepenuent on that of the metapsychology; hence, any
aigument which assumes that theie is such a uepenuence is iiielevant to
the question of whethei the clinical theoiy is scientific. Seconu, the specific
aiguments that Babeimas auvances to show that the clinical theoiy is not
appiopiiately iegaiueu as an empiiical science fail, eithei because
Babeimas uoes not coiiectly unueistanu psychoanalysis oi because he is
ignoiant of ceitain featuies of the natuial sciences.
In consiueiing the merits of psychoanalysis as a scientific theoiythat
is, in ieply to the seconu of the questions he sets himselfuinbaum has
aigueu foi thiee points: (1) the theiapeutic effectiveness of the
chaiacteiistic constituent factois of psychoanalytic tieatment is seiiously in
question; (2) all known attempts to save clinical uata fiom the chaige of
contamination fiom suggestion fail, so that such uata aie viitually useless in
pioviuing suppoit foi the caiuinal hypotheses of Fieuuian theoiy; anu (S)
even if clinical uata weie not epistemologically contaminateu, they woulu
not suppoit the basic tenets of Fieuu's theoietical stiuctuie, becouse IreuJ's
mojor clinicol orquments ore bosicolly floweJ.
The most explicit ciitique of uinbaum's views to uate is to be founu in
the woik of Flax (1981). Flax aigues that uinbaum's uiscussion of
psychoanalysis makes use of a numbei of implicit assumptions iegaiuing
the natuie of science which, in hei view, aie seiiously questionable. To
make hei case, she must show both that these assumptions aie pioblematic
anu that they aie essential to uinbaum's aiguments. I have aigueu that, in
fact, she uoes neithei. The seconu failing is the moie seiious because it
inuicates that Flax uoes not cleaily unueistanu the soit of noimative
philosophy of science in which uinbaum is engageu.
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129). Baltimoie: }ohns Bopkins Piess, 1971.
uinbaum, A. (1976). Is falsifiability the touchstone of scientific iationality.
Kail Poppei veisus inuuctivism. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyeiabenu, & N.
W. Waitofsky (Eus.), Fssoys in memory of lmre lokotos (Boston
Stuuies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. S8 (pp. 21S-2S2).
Boiuiecht; Bollanu: B. Reiuel, 1976.
uinbaum, A. (1977). Bow scientific is psychoanalysis. In R. Stein, L.
Boiowitz, & }. Lynes (Eus.), Science onJ psycbotberopy (pp. 219-2S4).
New Yoik: Baven Piess.
uinbaum, A. (1979). Is Fieuuian psychoanalytic theoiy pseuuoscientific by
Kail Poppei's ciiteiion of uemaication. Americon Pbilosopbicol
uorterly, 16, 1S1-141.
uinbaum, A. (198ua). Epistemological liabilities of the clinical appiaisal of
psychoanalytic theoiy. Nous, 14, Su7-S8S.
uinbaum, A. (198ub). The iole of psychological explanations of the
iejection oi acceptance of scientific theoiies. In Tronsoctions of tbe
New York AcoJemy of Sciences: vol. S9 A Iestscbrift for Robert Herton,
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uinbaum, A. (1981, Naich S). Bow valiu is psychoanalysis. An exchange.
New York Review of Books, 28, 4u-41.
uinbaum, A. (198Sa). Logical founuations of psychoanalytic theoiy.
Festschiift fui Wolfgang Stegmullei, Frkenntnis, 198S,19,1u9-1S2. In
}. Reppen (Eu.), Iuture Jirections of psycboonolysis. Billsuale, N}:
Lawience Eilbaum Associates. (Also iepiinteu in T. Nillon, Eu.,
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uinbaum, A. (198Sb). The founuations of psychoanalysis. In L. Lauuan
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uinbaum, A. (198Sc). Fieuu's theoiy: the peispective of a philosophei of
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Americon Pbilosopbicol Associotion, S7, S-S1.
uinbaum, A. (198Su). Is object ielations theoiy bettei founueu than
oithouox psychoanalysis. A ieply to }ane Flax. }ournol of Pbilosopby,
8u, 46-S1.
uinbaum, A. (1984). Tbe founJotions of psycboonolysis: A pbilosopbicol
critique. Beikeley: 0niveisity of Califoinia Piess.
uinbaum, A. (198S). Explication anu implications of the placebo concept.
In L. White, B. Tuisky, & u. F. Schwaitz (Eus.), Plocebo: clinicol
pbenomeno onJ new insiqbts. New Yoik: uuilfoiu Piess.
Babeimas, }. (1967). Zur loqik Jer Soziolwissenscboflen. (Philosophische
Runuschau, Belheft S). Tubingen, West ueimany: Siebeck & Nohi,
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Babeimas, }. (1971). KnowleJqe onJ Eumon lnterests. (}. }. Shapiio, Tians.).
Lonuon: Beinemann.
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NcCaithy, Tians.). Boston: Beacon Piess.
Bempel, C. u. (197u). 0n the stanuaiu conception of scientific theoiies. In N.
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bonor of AJolf 6rnboum. Boiuiecht, Bollanu: B. Reiuel.
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BiunneiNazel.

-5678
1
We aie confionteu, unfoitunately, with a teiminological uifficulty conceining the
woiu "science." English ienuitions of Babeimas use the woiu 'science' as
the tianslation of the ueiman 'Wissenschaft.' Bence, it is useu in the moie
inclusive sense, which encompasses not only the natuial sciences but also
the heimeneutic anu ciitical sciences. In contiast, when we ask uinbaum
whethei psychoanalysis is a science, we aie using the teim to iefei
paiauigmatically to what physicists, chemists, anu biologists uo, anu it
becomes an open question whethei the so-calleu cultuial anu ciitical
"sciences" in fact count as science. I aleit the ieauei to this fact so as to
minimize possible confusion. I will tiy to make it cleai in context which
sense is intenueu.
!"#$% "! '"!#()*+#"(%
ANNI BERuNAN, Ph.B. is a ieseaich scientist foi the Naigaiet S. Nahlei
Psychiatiic Reseaich Founuation anu a faculty membei of the Clinical
Psychology Bepaitment of the City 0niveisity of New Yoik. She is coauthoi
of !"# %&'(")*)+,(-* .,/0" )1 0"# 234-5 651-50 as well as two films anu has
wiitten seveial papeis on aspects of the sepaiation-inuiviuuation piocess.
N0NICA CARSKY, Ph.B., is Instiuctoi of Psychology in Psychiatiy,
Coinell 0niveisity Neuical College, anu Staff Psychologist at the New Yoik
Bospital-Coinell Neuical Centei, Westchestei Bivision. A giauuate of
Swaithmoie College, she ieceiveu hei Ph.B. in clinical psychology fiom the
City 0niveisity of New Yoik. She completeu an inteinship at Bionx
Psychiatiic Centei, Albeit Einstein College of Neuicine, anu a postuoctoial
fellowship at the New Yoik Bospital-Coinell Neuical Centei, Westchestei
Bivision, anu is cuiiently a stuuent at the New Yoik Centei foi
Psychoanalytic Tiaining.
N0RRIS N. EAuLE, Ph.B., is Piofessoi anu Chaiiman of the Bepaitment
of Psychology at Yoik 0niveisity, Toionto. Be iecently completeu six
months as visiting Piofessoi of Psychiatiy at Westein Psychiatiic Institute
anu Clinic anu Fellow at the Centei foi the Bistoiy anu Philosophy of
Science. In piivate piactice of psychotheiapy anu a consultant at the Claiice
Institute of Psychiatiy in Toionto, he is authoi of 7#(#50 8#9#*):4#50& ,5
%&'(")-5-*'&,&; < =/,0,(-* >9-*3-0,)5. Bi. Eagle ieceiveu his Ph.B. in 19S8 at
New Yoik 0niveisity with ueoige Klein anu woikeu at the New Yoik
0niveisity Reseaich Centei foi Nental Bealth, followeu by a uiiectoiship of
the Clinical Piogiam anu chaiimanship of the Psychology Bepaitment at
Yeshiva 0niveisity.
STEvEN ELLNAN, Ph.B., is Piofessoi anu Biiectoi, Clinical Psychology
Boctoial Tiaining Piogiam of the City 0niveisity of New Yoik.
}ANES S. uR0TSTEIN, N.B., is Associate Clinical Piofessoi of Psychiatiy
at the 0niveisity of Califoinia, Los Angeles; Attenuing Staff Physician at
Ceuais-Sinai Neuical Centei; anu Biiectoi of the Inteiuisciplinaiy uioup foi
Auvanceu Stuuies in Psychotic, Boiueiline, anu Naicissistic Bisoiueis.
vICT0RIA BANILT0N was boin in Abeiueenshiie, Scotlanu in 1941,
stuuieu at ulasgow School of Ait, anu giauuateu in philosophy at 0niveisity
College, Lonuon. Bei psychoanalytic tiaining was unueitaken at the
Tavistock Clinic, Lonuon, uuiing which time she attenueu }ohn Bowlby's
seminais on ethology, chilu uevelopment, anu attachment. She has woikeu
as a chilu psychotheiapist foi the National Bealth Seivice anu the Chilu
uuiuance Seivice in Lonuon anu in piivate piactice in Los Angeles. She
cuiiently lives in Lonuon.
IRWIN Z. B0FFNAN, Ph.B., is Assistant Piofessoi, Bepaitment of
Psychiatiy, 0niveisity of Illinois College of Neuicine, Chicago; Consultant,
Illinois State Psychiatiic Institute; faculty membei at the Chicago School foi
Piofessional Psychology; anu canuiuate at the Chicago Institute foi
Psychoanalysis. Be is the authoi of seveial aiticles on auaptation to loss,
psychotheiapy, anu the psychoanalytic piocess. Be was awaiueu the
Chicago Institute's Euwin Eislei Piize in 198u.
FREBERIC }. LEvINE, Ph.B., is Associate Piofessoi anu Cooiuinatoi of
the Inteinship Tiaining in Psychology in the Bepaitment of Nental Bealth
Sciences at Bahnemann 0niveisity. Be is a Biplomate in Clinical Psychology
(ABPP), an Associate Nembei of the Ameiican Psychoanalytic Association,
anu a membei of the Bivision of Psychoanalysis of the Ameiican
Psychological Association.
ZvI L0TBANE, N.B., is in piivate piactice of psychoanalysis in New
Yoik; an Assistant Piofessoi of Psychiatiy at Nount Sinai School of
Neuicine, City 0niveisity of New Yoik; anu Tiaining Analyst at the Institute
foi Psychoanalytic Tiaining anu Reseaich anu the National Psychological
Association foi Psychoanalysis. Be has wiitten papeis on psychoanalytic
methouology, listening as an instiument in psychoanalysis, anu
hallucinations.
BYNAN L. N0SLIN, N.B., is a Piofessoi of Psychiatiy at the 0niveisity of
Illinois, College of Neuicine at Chicago anu a piacticing psychoanalyst. Bis
inteiests have become focuseu on the application of self psychology to the
tiansfoimation of the self in patients with cancei; the application of self
psychology in liteiatuie anu histoiy; anu the leaining anu teaching of self
psychology.
STANLEY R. PAL0NB0, N.B., piactices psychoanalysis in Chevy Chase,
Naiylanu. Be is Associate Clinical Piofessoi of Psychiatiy at ueoige
Washington 0niveisity anu a faculty membei of the Washington School of
Psychiatiy. Bis book, 8/#-4,5+ -5? @#4)/'; < A#B 651)/4-0,)5C%/)(#&&,5+
@)?#*, ieuefines the piocess of uieam constiuction thiough the application
of infoimation theoiy.
}EANINE PARISIER PL0TTEL, Ph.B., is Piofessoi at Buntei College anu
the uiauuate Centei, City 0niveisity of New Yoik, wheie she is uiiectoi of
the Twentieth Centuiy Confeience. She wiites about liteiatuie anu
psychoanalysis, is on the euitoiial auvisoiy boaius of the 7#9,#B )1
%&'(")-5-*'0,( .))D& anu 8-?-EF3//#-*,&4, anu is publishei of A#B G)/D
H,0#/-/' I)/34.
}0SEPB W. SLAP, N.B., is Tiaining anu Supeivising Analyst at the
Institute of the Philauelphia Association foi Psychoanalysis, anu Clinical
Piofessoi in the Bepaitment of Nental Bealth Sciences at Bahnemann
0niveisity wheie he paiticipates in the tiaining of psychiatiic iesiuents anu
uoctoial canuiuates in clinical psychology. Be is in piivate piactice in
Philauelphia.
B0NALB P. SPENCE, Ph.B., is Piofessoi of Psychiatiy at Rutgeis Neuical
School, 0niveisity of Neuicine anu Bentistiy of New }eisey, anu visiting
Lectuiei at Piinceton 0niveisity. Be ieceiveu his Ph.B. fiom Teacheis
College, Columbia 0niveisity, was ceitifieu in psychoanalysis at the New
Yoik Psychoanalytic Institute, anu was foimeily a piofessoi of psychology
at New Yoik 0niveisity.
R0BERT S. STEELE, Ph.B., teaches at Wesleyan 0niveisity, wheie he is
co-cooiuinatoi of the Women's Stuuies Piogiam anu an Associate Piofessoi
of Psychology. Be gaiuens, iaises cats, anu has wiitten seveial pieces on
psychoanalysis, incluuing I/#3? -5? J35+; =)51*,(0& )1 650#/:/#0-0,)5. Bis
iecent woik has been in feminist ciiticism.
BARBARA v0N ECKARBT, Ph.B., is Assistant Piofessoi in Philosophy at
Yale 0niveisity. She ieceiveu hei Ph.B. fiom Case Westein Reseive
0niveisity in 1974, anu subsequently spent thiee yeais at the
Nassachusetts Institute of Technology as a postuoctoial fellow in the
Bepaitment of Psychology. Bei majoi ieseaich inteiests aie in philosophy
of psychology anu philosophy of science.
,*"+# )-) $*"".%
IPI eBooks is a pioject of the Inteinational Psychotheiapy Institute. IPI
is a non-piofit oiganization ueuicateu to quality tiaining in psychouynamic
psychotheiapy anu psychoanalysis. Thiough the iesouices of IPI, along with
voluntaiy contiibutions fiom inuiviuuals like you, we aie able to pioviue
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anu psychiatiy that have woik we woulu like to publish. We offei no
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0thei books by this publishei:
By Rosemaiy Balsam N.B.
Sons of Passionate Notheiing
By Richaiu B. Chessick N.B., Ph.B.
Fieuu Teaches Psychotheiapy Seconu Euition
By Lawience Beuges
Making Love Last: Creating and Maintaining Intimacy in
Long-teim Relationships
0veicoming 0ui Relationship Feais
0veicoming 0ui Relationship Feais Woikbook
Cioss Cultuial Encounteis: Biiuging Woilus of Biffeience
The Relationship in Psychotheiapy anu Supeivision
By }eiome Levin Ph.B.
Alcoholism in a Shot ulass: What you neeu to know to 0nueistanu
anu Tieat Alcohol Abuse
The Self anu Theiapy
uianumoo uoes to Rehab
Finuing the Cow Within: 0sing Fantasy to Eniich Youi Life
Chilulessness: Bow Not Baving Chiluien Plays 0ut 0vei a
Lifetime
Tieating Paients of Tioubleu Auult Chiluien
Living with Chionic Bepiession
By Fieu Pine Ph.B.
Beyonu Pluialism: Psychoanalysis anu the Woikings of Ninu
By Kent Ravenscioft N.B.
Bisastei Psychiatiy in Baiti: Tiaining Baitian Neuical
Piofessionals
By }oseph Reppen Ph.B. (Euitoi)
Beyonu Fieuu: A Stuuy of Nouein Psychoanalytic Theoiists
Relational Interventions
By Baviu B. Sachai N.B.
Achieving Success with ABBB: Seciets fiom an Afflicteu Piofessoi
of Neuicine
By Fieu Sanuei N.B.
Inuiviuual anu Family Theiapy
By Chailes A. Sainoff N.B.
Theoiies of Symbolism
Symbols in Psychotheiapy
Symbols in Cultuie, Ait, anu Nyth
By }ill Savege Schaiff N.B. (Euitoi)
Clinical Supeivision of Psychoanalytic Psychotheiapy
By }ill Savege Schaiff N.B. anu Baviu E. Schaiff N.B.
Boctoi in the Bouse Seat: Psychoanalysis at the Theatie
By ueialu Schoenewolf Ph.B.
Psychoanalytic Centiism
By Samuel Slipp N.B.
Anti-Semitism: Its Effect on Fieuu anu Psychoanalysis
By Imie Szecsouy N.B., Ph.B.
Supeivision anu the Naking of the Psychoanalyst
By vamik volkan N.B.
A Psychoanalytic Piocess fiom Beginning to its Teimination
Six Steps in the Tieatment of Boiueiline Peisonality 0iganization
By }uuith Waiien Ph.B.
Reauing anu Theiapy: Biush 0p Youi Shakespeaie (anu Pioust
anu Baiuy)

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