Crim

Crimes Against Public Morals
1. Gambling
PD 1602, RA9287
LOI 816

2. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
PD 960 as amended by PD 969, RA9775, RA9995
People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352
People v. Aparici, 52 OG 249
People v. Padan, 101 Phil. 749
Fernando v. CA, G.R. No. 159751, Dec. 6, 2001

3. Vagrancy
PD 1563, RA10158

4. Trafficking of persons
RA9208

Crimes Committed by Public Officers Bribery and corruption of public officials

Manipon v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA267
Dacumas v. Sandiganbayan, 195 SCRA833
PD 46
PD 749

1. Graft and corruption
RA1379
Almeda v. Perez 5 SCRA970
Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA1059
Republic v. CA, 172 SCRA296
RA3019 ( see also RA6713)
Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA424
Jaravata v. Sandiganbayan, 127 SCRA363
Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA508
Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA399

3. Plunder
RA7080

4. Malversation
Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA415
Estepa v. Sandiganbayan, 182 SCRA269
Ilogon v. Sandiganbayan, 218 SCRA766
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA747

5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, 161 SCRA347

Crimes Against Chastity

1. Acts of lascviousness
Peoplev. Famularcano, 43 OG 1721

2. Qualified seduction
People v. Fontanilla, 23 SCRA1227
Babantgo v. Zosa, 120 SCRA834
Perez v. CA, 168 SCRA236

3. Abduction; forcible abduction with rape
People v. Sunpongco, 163 SCRA222
People v. Jose, 37 SCRA450
People v. Alburo, 184 SCRA655
People v. Godines, 196 SCRA765

4. Prosecution of private offenses
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA653

Crimes against Public Morals

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1602
PRESCRIBING STIFFER PENALTIES ON ILLEGAL GAMBLING
WHEREAS, Philippine Gambling Laws such as Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code (Forms of Gambling and Betting), R.A. 3063 (Horse
racing Bookies), P.D. 449 (Cockfighting), P.D. 483 (Game Fixing), P.D. 510 (Slot Machines) in relation to Opinion Nos. 33 and 97 of the Ministry of
Justice, P.D. 1306 (Jai-Alai Bookies) and other City and Municipal Ordinances or gambling all over the country prescribe penalties which are
inadequate to discourage or stamp out this pernicious activities;
WHEREAS, there is now a need to increase their penalties to make them more effective in combating this social menace which dissipate the energy
and resources of our people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and decree:
Section 1. Penalties. The following penalties are hereby imposed:
(a) The penalty of prison correccional in its medium period of a fine ranging from one thousand to six thousand pesos, and in case of recidivism, the
penalty of prision mayor in its medium period or a fine ranging from five thousand to ten thousand pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person other than those referred to in the succeeding sub-sections who in any manner, shall directly or indirectly take part in any illegal or
unauthorized activities or games of cockfighting, jueteng, jai alai or horse racing to include bookie operations and game fixing, numbers, bingo and
other forms of lotteries; cara y cruz, pompiang and the like; 7-11 and any game using dice; black jack, lucky nine, poker and its derivatives, monte,
baccarat, cuajao, pangguingue and other card games; paik que, high and low, mahjong, domino and other games using plastic tiles and the likes;
slot machines, roulette, pinball and other mechanical contraptions and devices; dog racing, boat racing, car racing and other forms of races,
basketball, boxing, volleyball, bowling, pingpong and other forms of individual or team contests to include game fixing, point shaving and other
machinations; banking or percentage game, or any other game scheme, whether upon chance or skill, wherein wagers consisting of money, articles
of value or representative of value are at stake or made;
2. Any person who shall knowingly permit any form of gambling referred to in the preceding subparagraph to be carried on in inhabited or
uninhabited place or in any building, vessel or other means of transportation owned or controlled by him. If the place where gambling is carried on
has a reputation of a gambling place or that prohibited gambling is frequently carried on therein, or the place is a public or government building or
barangay hall, the malfactor shall be punished by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of six thousand pesos.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine of six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the maintainer or conductor of
the above gambling schemes.
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period with temporary absolute disqualification or a fine of six thousand pesos shall be imposed if the
maintainer, conductor or banker of said gambling schemes is a government official, or where such government official is the player, promoter,
referee, umpire, judge or coach in case of game fixing, point shaving and machination.
(d) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period or a fine ranging from four hundred to two thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall, knowingly and without lawful purpose in any hour of any day, possess any lottery list, paper or other matter containing letters,
figures, signs or symbols pertaining to or in any manner used in the games of jueteng, jai-alai or horse racing bookies, and similar games of lotteries
and numbers which have taken place or about to take place.
(e) The penalty of temporary absolute disqualifications shall be imposed upon any barangay official who, with knowledge of the existence of a
gambling house or place in his jurisdiction fails to abate the same or take action in connection therewith.
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine ranging from five hundred pesos to two thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
any security officer, security guard, watchman, private or house detective of hotels, villages, buildings, enclosures and the like which have the
reputation of a gambling place or where gambling activities are being held.
Section 2. Informer's reward. Any person who shall disclose information that will lead to the arrest and final conviction of the malfactor shall be
rewarded twenty percent of the cash money or articles of value confiscated or forfeited in favor of the government.
Section 3. Repealing Clause. Provisions of Art. 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No. 3063, Presidential Decrees
Numbered 483, 449, 510 and 1306, letters of instructions, laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, city and municipal ordinances which are
inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed.
Section 4. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.

Republic Act No. 9287 April 2, 2004
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR ILLEGAL NUMBERS GAMES, AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1602, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. It is likewise the policy of the State that the promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Hence, the State hereby condemns the existence of illegal gambling activities such as illegal numbers games as this has become an influential factor
in an individual's disregard for the value of dignified work, perseverance and thrift since instant monetary gains from it are being equated to success,
thereby becoming a widespread social menace and a source of corruption.
Towards this end, the State shall therefore adopt more stringent measures to stop and eradicate the existence of illegal numbers games in any part
of the country.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
a) Illegal Numbers Game. - Any form illegal gambling activity which uses numbers or combinations thereof as factors in giving out jackpots.
b) Jueteng. - An illegal numbers game that involves the combination of thirty-seven (37) numbers against thirty-seven (37) numbers from number
one (1) to thirty seven (37) or the combination of thirty-eight (38) numbers in some areas, serving as a form of local lottery where bets are placed and
accepted per combination, and its variants.
c) Masiao. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from the results of the last game of Jai Alai or the Special Llave
portion or any result thereof based on any fictitious Jai Alai game consisting of ten (10) players pitted against one another, and its variants.
d) Last Two. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from the last two (2) numbers of the first prize of the winning
Sweepstakes ticket which comes out during the weekly draw of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and its variants.
e) Bettor ("Mananaya", "Tayador" or variants thereof). - Any person who places bets for himself/herself or in behalf of another person, or any person,
other than the personnel or staff of any illegal numbers game operation.
f) Personnel or Staff of Illegal Numbers Game Operation. - Any person, who acts in the interest of the maintainer, manager or operator, such as, but
not limited to, an accountant, cashier, checker, guard, runner, table manager, usher, watcher, or any other personnel performing such similar
functions in a building structure, vessel, vehicle, or any other place where an illegal numbers game is operated or conducted.
g) Collector or Agent ("Cabo", "Cobrador", "Coriador" or variants thereof). - Any person who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her
principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in possession of gambling paraphernalia.
h) Coordinator, Controller or Supervisor ("Encargado" or variants thereof). - Any person who exercises control and supervision over the collector or
agent.
i) Maintainer, Manager or Operator. - Any person who maintains, manages or operates any illegal number game in a specific area from whom the
coordinator, controller or supervisor, and collector or agent take orders.
j) Financiers or Capitalist. - Any person who finances the operations of any illegal numbers game.
k) Protector or Coddler. - Any person who lends or provides protection, or receives benefits in any manner in the operation of any illegal numbers
game.
Sec. 3. Punishable Acts. - Any person who participates in any illegal numbers game shall suffer the following penalties:
a) The penalty of imprisonment from thirty (30) days to ninety (90) days, if such person acts as a bettor;
b) The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, if such person acts as a personnel or staff of an illegal numbers
game operation;
The same penalty shall likewise be imposed to any person who allows his vehicle, house, building or land to be used in the operation of the illegal
numbers games.
c) The penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, if such person acts as a collector or agent;
d) The penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, if such person acts as a coordinator, controller or
supervisor;
e) The penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to ten (10) fourteen (14) years, if such person acts as a maintainer, manager
or operator; and
f) The penalty of imprisonment from fourteen (14) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years, if such person acts as a financier or capitalist;
g) The penalty of imprisonment from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, if such person acts as protector or coddler.
Sec. 4. Possession of Gambling Paraphernalia or Materials. - The possession of any gambling paraphernalia and other materials used in the illegal
numbers game operation shall be deemed prima facie evidence of any offense covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Liability of Government Employees and/or Public Officials. - a) If the collector, agent, coordinator, controller, supervisor, maintainer, manager,
operator, financier or capitalist of any illegal numbers game is a government employee and/or public official, whether elected or appointed shall
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) to Five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00) and perpetual absolute disqualification from public office.
In addition to the penalty provided in the immediately preceding section, the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office shall be
imposed upon any local government official who, having knowledge of the existence of the operation of any illegal numbers game in his/her
jurisdiction, fails to abate or to take action, or tolerates the same in connection therewith.
b) In the case of failure to apprehend perpetrators of any illegal numbers game, any law enforcer shall suffer an administrative penalty of suspension
or dismissal, as the case may be, to be imposed by the appropriate authority.
Sec. 6. Liability of Parents/Guardians. - The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year or fine ranging from One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) shall be imposed upon any parent, guardian or person
exercising moral authority or ascendancy over a minor, ward or incapacitated person, and not otherwise falling under any of the foregoing
subsections, who induces or causes such minor, ward or incapacitated person to commit any of the offenses punishable in this Act. Upon conviction,
the parent, guardian or person exercising moral authority or ascendancy over the minor, ward or incapacitated person shall be deprived of his/her
authority over such person in addition to the penalty imposed.
Sec. 7. Recidivism. - The penalty next higher in degree as provided for under Section 3 hereof shall be imposed upon a recidivist who commits any
of the offenses punishable in this Act.
Sec. 8. Immunity from Prosecution. - Any person who serves as a witness for the government or provides evidence in a criminal case involving any
violation of this Act, or who voluntarily or by virtue of a subpoena testificandum or duces tecum, produces, identifies, or gives testimony shall be
immune from any criminal prosecution, subject to the compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1732, otherwise known as Decree
Providing Immunity from Criminal Prosecution to Government Witnesses and the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 9. Prosecution, Judgment and Forfeiture of Property. - Any person may be charged with or convicted of the offenses covered by this Act without
prejudice to the prosecution of any act or acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code or existing laws.
During the pendency of the case, no property or income used or derived therefrom which may be confiscated and forfeited shall be disposed,
alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The trial prosecutors shall avail of provisional remedies provided for under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Upon conviction, all proceeds, gambling paraphernalia and other instruments of the crime including any real or personal property used in any illegal
numbers game operation shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State. All assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by
him/her in his/her name or in the name of another person found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income shall be prima facie
presumed to be proceeds of the offense and shall likewise be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.
Sec. 10. Witness Protection. - Any person who provides material information, whether testimonial or documentary, necessary for the investigation or
prosecution of individuals committing any of the offenses under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 herein shall be placed under the Witness Protection Program
pursuant to Republic Act. No. 6981.
Sec. 11. Informer's Reward. - Any person who, having knowledge or information of any offense committed under this Act and who shall disclose the
same which may lead to the arrest and final conviction of the offender, may be rewarded a certain percentage of the cash money or articles of value
confiscated or forfeited in favor of the government, which shall be determined through a policy guideline promulgated by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in coordination with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).
The DILG, the NAPOLCOM and the DOJ shall provide for a system of rewards and incentives for law enforcement officers and for local government
official for the effective implementation of this Act.
Sec. 12. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act, the DILG, DOJ, NAPOLCOM, and other
concerned government agencies shall jointly promulgate the implementing rules and regulations, as may be necessary to ensure the efficient and
effective implementation of the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 13. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any section or provision of this Act, or any portion thereof, or the application of such section,
provision or portion thereof to any person, group or circumstance is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of this Act shall not
be affected by such declaration and shall remain in force and effect.
Sec. 14. Amendatory Clause. - The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1602, in so far as they are inconsistent herewith, are hereby
expressly amended or modified accordingly.
Sec. 15. Repealing Clause. - The provisions of other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Sec. 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO. 816

TO : The Minister of National Defense
The minister of Local Government and
Community Development
The Chief of Staff
Armed Forces of the Philippines
The Chief Constabulary
Director-General, INP
The Chairman
Task Force Anti-Gambling

SUBJECT : To exclude certain prohibited games under Presidential Decree No. 1602

WHEREAS, it is the intent of the Presidential Decree No. 1602 to discourage and prohibit gambling not regulated or sanctioned under existing laws;

WHEREAS, there is need to exclude therefrom certain games like domino, bingo, poker when not played with five cards stud, cuajo, pangguingue
and mahjong when exclusively intended for parlor games or for home entertainment;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby order that the games of domino, bingo, poker when not
played with five cards stud, cuajo, pangguingue and mahjong, provided that they are played as parlor games or for home entertainment; and
Provided Further, That they are not played in places habitually used for gambling and the betting is not disguised to defeat the intent of Presidential
Decree No. 1602, are hereby exempted.

Done in the City of Manila, this 20th day of February, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 960 July 14, 1976
AMENDING ARTICLE 201 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, it is the obligation of the State to safeguard the morality of society, particularly the youth, against the eroding influence of immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows;

WHEREAS, in order to arrest the proliferation of such doctrines, publications, exhibitions and shows, it is necessary to amend the pertinent provision
of the Revised Penal Code;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby
order and decree as part of the law of the land, the following:

Section 1. Amendment of Article 201, Revised Penal Code. Article 201 of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and fifteen, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, is hereby amended to read as follows;

"Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

"1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

"2. The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form, the editors publishing such literature, and the owners/operators of
the book store or other establishments selling the same;

"3. Those who in theaters, fairs cinematographs or any other place, shall exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, including the
following:

"(a) Films which tend to incite subversion, insurrection or rebellion against the State;

"(b) Films which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their Government and/or duly constituted authorities;

"(c) Films which glorify criminals or condone crimes;

"(d) Films which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography;

"(e) Films which offend any race or religion;

"(f) Films which tend to abet traffic in the use of prohibited drugs;

"(g) Films contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees, edicts, and any or all films which in the
judgment of the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures or other agency established by the Government to oversee such motion pictures are
objectionable on some other legal or moral grounds.

"4. Those who shall sell, give away of exhibit prints, engravings, sculptures or literature which are offensive to morals."

Section 2. Confiscation of articles. The literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture, paintings, or other materials and articles involved in the violation
referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government to be destroyed.

Section 3. Jurisdiction. Violations of Section 1 hereof shall be subject to trial by the military tribunals and the offenders shall be subject to arrest and
detention pursuant to existing laws, decrees, orders and instructions promulgated pursuant to Proclamations No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972
and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973.

Section 4. Additional Penalties. Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows:

1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the violations of Section 1 hereof, the penalty shall be imposed in the
maximum period and in addition, the accessory penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as amended shall likewise be imposed.

2. The license or permit of the theater, cinematograph or other place or establishment where the violation has been committed shall be canceled
temporarily or permanently, depending upon the gravity of the violation as determined by the proper military tribunal.

Section 5. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication by the Department of Information in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila this 14th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six.

AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 960 WHICH AMENDED ARTICLE 201 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order:

Section 1. Sections 1 and 2 paragraph 1 of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 960 are hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 1. Amendment of Article 201, Revised Penal Code. Article 201 of Act Numbered Thirty-Eight hundred and fifteen, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, is amended to read as follows:

"Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

"1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

"2. a. The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators
of the establishment selling the same;

"b. Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood
that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3)
offend any race religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs,
established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

"3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.

"Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, painting, or other materials
involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be governed by the following rules:

"a. Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed.

"b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture,
paintings or other materials and articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the
government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted as the Chief of Constabulary.

"c. The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy of the decision,
appeal the matter to the Secretary of National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defense shall be final and unappealable.

"Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows:

"1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the violations of Section 1 hereof, the penalty as provided herein shall be
imposed in the maximum period and, in addition, the accessory penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall likewise be
imposed."

Section 2. To be inserted between Sections 4 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 960 is Section 4-A to read as follows:

"Sec. 4-A. The Chief of Constabulary shall, with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
for the implementation of this decree."

Section 3. This decree shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication by the Department of Public Information in two (2) newspapers of

Done in the City of Manila, this 24th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six.

Republic Act No. 9775
AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES


Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, emotional, psychological and social well-being. Towards this end, the State shall:

(a) Guarantee the fundamental rights of every child from all forms of neglect, cruelty and other conditions prejudicial to hi s/her development;

(b) Protect every child from all forms of exploitation and abuse including, but not limited to:

(1) the use of a child in pornographic performances and materials; and

(2) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage or be involved in pornography through whatever means; and

(c) Comply with international treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory or a State party concerning the rights of children which include, but not
limited to, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No.182 on the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labor and the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. -

(a) "Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over, but is unable to fully take care of himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also refer to:

(1) a person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child as defined herein; and

(2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a person who is represented or who is made to appear to be a child as
defined herein.

(b) "Child pornography" refers to any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means, of child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities.

(c) "Explicit Sexual Activity" includes actual or simulated -

(1) As to form:

(i) sexual intercourse or lascivious act including, but not limited to, contact involving genital to genital, oral to genital, anal to genital, or oral to anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;

(2) bestiality;

(3) masturbation;

(4) sadistic or masochistic abuse;

(5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus; or

(6) use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts

(d) "Internet address" refers to a website, bulletin board service, internet chat room or news group, or any other internet or shared network protocol
address.

(e) "Internet cafe or kiosk" refers to an establishment that offers or proposes to offer services to the public for the use of its computer/s or computer
system for the purpose of accessing the internet, computer games or related services.

(f) "Internet content host" refers to a person who hosts or who proposes to host internet content in the Philippines.

(g) "Internet service provider (ISP)" refers to a person or entity that supplies or proposes to supply, an internet carriage service to the public.

(h) "Grooming" refers to the act of preparing a child or someone who the offender believes to be a child for sexual activity or sexual relationship by
communicating any form of child pornography. It includes online enticement or enticement through any other means.

(i) "Luring" refers to the act of communicating, by means of a computer system, with a child or someone who the offender believes to be a child for
the purpose of facilitating the commission of sexual activity or production of any form of child pornography.(2) Bestiality;

(j) "Pandering" refers to the act of offering, advertising, promoting, representing or distributing through any means any material or purported material
that is intended to cause another to believe that the material or purported material contains any form of child pornography, regardless of the actual
content of the material or purported material.

(k) "Person" refers to any natural or juridical entity.

Section 4. Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person:

(a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in the creation or production of any form of child pornography;

(b) To produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of child pornography;

(c) To publish offer, transmit, sell, distribute, broadcast, advertise, promote, export or import any form of child pornography;

(d) To possess any form of child pornography with the intent to sell, distribute, publish, or broadcast: Provided. That possession of three (3) or more
articles of child pornography of the same form shall be prima facie evidence of the intent to sell, distribute, publish or broadcast;

(e) To knowingly, willfully and intentionally provide a venue for the commission of prohibited acts as, but not limited to, dens, private rooms, cubicles,
cinemas, houses or in establishments purporting to be a legitimate business;

(f) For film distributors, theaters and telecommunication companies, by themselves or in cooperation with other entities, to distribute any form of child
pornography;

(g) For a parent, legal guardian or person having custody or control of a child to knowingly permit the child to engage, participate or assist in any
form of child pornography;

(h) To engage in the luring or grooming of a child;

(i) To engage in pandering of any form of child pornography;

(j) To willfully access any form of child pornography;

(k) To conspire to commit any of the prohibited acts stated in this section. Conspiracy to commit any form of child pornography shall be committed
when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of any of the said prohibited acts and decide to commit it; and

(l) To possess any form of child pornography.

Section 5. Syndicated Child Pornography - The crime of child pornography is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another and shall be punished under Section 15(a) of this Act.

Section 6. Who May File a Complaint. - Complaints on cases of any form of child pornography and other offenses punishable under this Act may be
filed by the following:

(a) Offended party;

(b) Parents or guardians;

(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;

(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;

(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

(f) Local social welfare development officer;

(g) Barangay chairman;

(h) Any law enforcement officer;

(i) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens residing in the place where the violation occurred; or

(j) Any person who has personal knowledge of the circumstances of the commission of any offense under this Act.

Section 7. Appointment of Special Prosecutors. - The Department of Justice (DOJ) shall appoint or designate special prosecutors to prosecute cases
for the violation of this Act.

Section 8. Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction over cases for the violation of this Act shall be vested in the Family Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
the place where the offense or any of its essential elements was committed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as "Family Courts
Act of 1997".

Section 9. Duties of an Internet Service Provider (ISP). - All internet service providers (ISPs) shall notify the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) within seven (7) days from obtaining facts and circumstances that any form of child pornography is being
committed using its server or facility. Nothing in this section may be construed to require an ISP to engage in the monitoring of any user, subscriber
or customer, or the content of any communication of any such person: Provided, That no ISP shall be held civilly liable for damages on account of
any notice given in good faith in compliance with this section.

Furthermore, an ISP shall preserve such evidence for purpose of investigation and prosecution by relevant authorities.

An ISP shall, upon the request of proper authorities, furnish the particulars of users who gained or attempted to gain access to an internet address
which contains any form of child pornography.

All ISPs shall install available technology, program or software to ensure that access to or transmittal of any form of child pornography will be
blocked or filtered.

An ISP who shall knowingly, willfully and intentionally violate this provision shall be subject to the penalty provided under Section 15(k) of this Act.

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) shall promulgate within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act the necessary rules and
regulations for the implementation of this provision which shall include, among others, the installation of filtering software that will block access to or
transmission of any form of the child pornography.

Section 10. Responsibility of Mall Owners/Operators and Owners or Lessors of Other Business Establishments. - All mall owners/operators and
owners or lessors of other business establishments shall notify the PNP or the NBI within seven (7) days from obtaining facts and circumstances that
child pornography is being committed in their premises. Provided, That public display of any form of child pornography within their premises is a
conclusive presumption of the knowledge of the mall owners/operators and owners or lessors of other business establishments of the violation of this
Act: Provided, further, That a disputable presumption of knowledge by mall owners/operators and owners or lessors of other business
establishments should know or reasonably know that a violation of this Act is being committed in their premises.

Photo developers, information technology professionals, credit card companies and banks and any person who has direct knowledge of any form of
child pornography activities shall have the duty to report any suspected child pornography materials or transactions to the proper authorities within
seven (7) days from discovery thereof.

Any willful and intentional violation of this provision shall be subject to the penalty provided under Section 15(l) of this Act.

Section 11. Duties of an Internet Content Host. - An internet content host shall:

(a) Not host any form of child pornography on its internet address;

(b) Within seven (7) days, report the presence of any form of child pornography, as well as the particulars of the person maintaining, hosting,
distributing or in any manner contributing to such internet address, to the proper authorities; and

(c) Preserve such evidence for purposes of investigation and prosecution by relevant authorities.

An internet content host shall, upon the request of proper authorities, furnish the particulars of users who gained or attempted to gain access to an
internet address that contains any form of child pornography.

An internet content host who shall knowingly, willfully and intentionally violate this provision shall be subject to the penalty provided under Section
15(j) of this Act: Provided, That the failure of the internet content host to remove any form of child pornography within forty-eight (48) hours from
receiving the notice that any form of child pornography is hitting its server shall be conclusive evidence of willful and intentional violation thereof.

Section 12. Authority to Regulate Internet Caf or Kiosk. - The local government unit (LGU) of the city or municipality where an internet caf or kiosk
is located shall have the authority to monitor and regulate the establishment and operation of the same or similar establishments in order to prevent
violation of the provisions of this Act.

Section 13. Confidentiality. - The right to privacy of the child shall be ensured at any stage of the investigation, prosecution and trial of an offense
under this Act. Towards this end, the following rules shall be observed:

(a) The judge, prosecutor or any officer of the law to whom the complaint has been referred to may, whenever necessary to ensure a fair and
impartial proceeding and after considering all circumstances for the best interest of the child conduct a closed-door investigation, prosecution or trial;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the child, including the child's immediate family, or any other information tending to establish his/her
identity shall not be disclosed to the public;

(c) Any record regarding a child shall be confidential and kept under seal. Except upon written request and order of the court, a record shall be
released only to the following:

(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;

(2) The prosecuting attorney;

(3) Defense counsel;

(4) The guardian ad litem;

(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies and

(6) Other persons as determined by the court.

(d) Any form of child pornography that is part of the court records shall be subject to a protective order that provides as follows:

(1) Any form of child pornography may be viewed only by the parties, their counsel, their expert witness and guardian ad litem;

(2) Neither form of child pornography nor any portion thereof shall be divulged to any other person, except as necessary for investigation,
prosecution or trial; and

(3) No person shall be granted access to any form of child pornography or any part thereof unless he/she signs a written affirmation that he/she has
received and read a copy of the protection order; that he/she submits to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the protective order; and that, in
case of violation thereof, he/she will be subject to the contempt power of the court; and

(e) In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted behind closed doors, it shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher and reporter or columnist in case
of printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio, producer and director of a film in case of the movie industry, or any
person utilizing the tri-media facilities or information technology to publish or broadcast the names of the victims of any case of child pornography.

Any violation of this provision shall be subject to the penalty provided for under Section 15(m) of this Act.

Section 14. Care, Custody and Treatment of a Child Victim. - The DSWD shall ensure that the child who is a victim of any form of child pornography
is provided appropriate care, custody and support for their recovery and reintegration in accordance with existing laws.

The child and his family shall be entitled to protection as well as to the rights and benefits of witnesses under Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise
known as "The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act".

The child shall also be considered as a victim of a violent crime defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 7309, otherwise known as "An Act
Creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for Victims of Unjust Imprisonment or Detention and Victims of Violent Crimes and for
Other Purposes", so that the child may claim compensation therein.

Section 15. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for offenses enumerated in this Act:

(a) Any person found guilty of syndicated child pornography as defined in Section 5 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a
fine of not less than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00);

(b) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(a), (b) and (c) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period and a
fine of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million (Php2,000,000.00);

(c) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(d), (e) and (f) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period and a
fine of not less than Seven hundred fifty thousand pesos (Php750,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00);

(d) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(g) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Seven hundred thousand pesos (Php700,000.00);

(e) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(h) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00);

(f) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(I) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not less
than Three hundred thousand pesos (php300,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00);

(g) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(j) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Two hundred thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00);

(h) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(k) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not
less than One hundred thousand pesos (php100,000.00) but not more than Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (php250,000.00);

(i) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(l) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not less
than Fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00);

(j) Any person found guilty of violating Section 11 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less
than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) for the first offense. In the case of a subsequent
offense, the penalty shall be a fine not less than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but not more than Three million pesos (Php3,000,000.00) and
revocation of its license to operate and immediate closure of the establishment;

(k) Any ISP found guilty of willfully and knowingly failing to comply with the notice and installation requirements under Section 9 of this Act shall
suffer the penalty of a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00)
for the first offense. In case of subsequent offense, the penalty shall be a fine of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more
than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) and revocation of its license to operate;

(l) Any mall owner-operator and owner or lessor of other business establishments including photo developers, information technology professionals,
credit card companies and banks, found guilty of willfully and knowingly failing to comply with the notice requirements under Section 10 of this Act
shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) for the
first offense. In the case of a subsequent offense, the penalty shall be a fine of not less than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but not more than
Three million pesos (Php3,000,000.00) and revocation of its license to operate and immediate closure of the establishment; and

(m) Any person found guilty of violating Section 13 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not less
than One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00).

Section 16. Common Penal Provisions. -

(a) If the offender is a parent, ascendant, guardian, step-parent or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity or any person
having control or moral ascendancy over the child, the penalty provided herein shall be in its maximum duration; Provided, That this provision shall
not apply to Section 4(g) of this Act;

(b) If the offender is a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, manager, partner, member of the board of directors and/or any
responsible officer who participated in the commission of the crime or shall have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its commissions;

(c) If the offender is a foreigner, he/she shall be immediately deported after the complete service of his/her sentence and shall forever be barred from
entering the country; and

(d) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum duration if the offender is a public officer or employee.

Section 17. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds, Tools and Instruments Used in Child Pornography. - In addition to the penalty imposed for
the violation of this Act, the court shall order the confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government of all the proceeds, tools and instruments used
in the commission of the crime, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; Provided, however, That all awards for
damages shall be taken from the personal and separate properties of the offender; Provided, further, That if such properties are insufficient, the
deficiency shall be taken from the confiscated and forfeited proceeds, tools and instruments.

All proceeds derived from the sale of properties used for the commission of any form of child pornography shall accrue to the special account of the
DSWD which shall be used exclusively for the implementation of this Act.

When the proceeds, tools and instruments used in the commission of the offense have been destroyed diminished in value or otherwise rendered
worthless by any act or omission, directly or indirectly, of the offender, or it has been concealed, removed, converted or transferred to prevent the
same from being found or to avoid forfeiture or confiscation, the offender shall be ordered to pay the amount equal to the value of the proceeds, tools
and instruments used in the commission of the offense.1avvphi1

Section 18. Mandatory Services to Victims of Child Pornography. - To ensure recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of society
concerned government agencies and the LGUs shall make available the following services to victims of any form of child pornography:

(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;

(b) Counseling;

(c) Free legal services, which shall include information about the victim's rights and the procedure for filing of complaints, claims for compensation
and such other legal remedies available to them in a language understood by the child;

(d) Medical or psychological services;

(e) Livelihood and skills training; and

(f) Educational assistance.

Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism that will track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration of the child victims shall
adopted and carried out.

Section 19. Programs for Victims of Child Pornography. The Inter-Agency Council Against Child Pornography created under Section 20 of this Act
shall develop and implement the necessary programs that will prevent any form of child pornography, as well as protect, heal and reintegrate the
child into the mainstream of society. Such programs shall include beat but not limited to the following:

(a) Provision of mandatory services including counseling free legal services, medical or psychological services, livelihood and skills training and
educational assistance to the child pursuant to Section 18 of this Act;

(b) Sponsorship of a national research program on any form of child pornography and other acts covered by the law and the establishment of a data
collection system for monitoring and evaluation purposes;

(c) Provision of necessary technical and material support services to appropriate government agencies and nongovernmental organizations:

(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars to provide venue for consensus building amongst the public, the academe , government,
nongovernmental and international organizations and

(e) Promotion of information and education campaign.

Section 20. Inter - Agency Council against Child Pornography. - There is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council against Child Pornography to
be composed of the Secretary of the DSWD as chairperson and the following as members:

(a) Secretary of the Department of Justice:

(b) Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment

(c) Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology

(d) Chief of the Philippine National Police;

(e) Chairperson of the Commission on Information and Communications Technology;

(g) Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission;

(h) Executive Director of the Council for the Welfare of Children;

(i) Executive Director of the Philippine Center for Transnational Crimes;

(j) Executive Director of the Optical Media Board;

(k) Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; and

(l) Three (3) representatives from children's nongovernmental organizations. These representatives shall be nominated by the government agency
representatives of the Council for appointment by the President for a term of three (3) years and may be renewed upon renomination and
reappointment by the Council and the President respectively.

The members of the Council mat designate their permanent representatives, who shall have a rank not lower than assistant secretary or its
equivalent, to meetings and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting rules
and regulations.

The DSWD shall establish the necessary Secretariat for the Council.

Section 21. Functions of the Council. - The Council shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Formulate comprehensive and integrated plans and programs to prevent and suppress any form of child pornography;

(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of this Act;

(c) Monitor and oversee the strict implementation of this Act;

(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the various members agencies effectively address the issues and problems attendant to child
pornography;

(e) Conduct and coordinate massive information disseminations and campaign on the existence of the law and the various issues and problems
attendant to child pornography;

(f) Direct other agencies to immediately respond to the problems brought to their attention and report to the Council on the action taken;

(g) Assist in the filling of cases against individuals, agencies, institutions or establishments that violate the provisions of this Act;

(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of victims of child pornography;

(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the government or from NGOs and other civic organizations such
assistance as may be needed to effectively implement this Act;

(j) Complement the shared government information system relative to child abuse and exploitation and ensure that the proper agencies conduct a
continuing research and study on the patterns and schemes of any form of child pornography which form basis for policy formulation and program
direction;

(k) develop the mechanism to ensure the timely, coordinated and effective response to cases of child pornography;

(l) Recommend measures to enhance cooperative efforts and mutual assistance among foreign countries through bilateral and/or multilateral
arrangements to prevent and suppress any form of child pornography;

(m) Adopt measures and policies to protect the rights and needs of the victims of child pornography who are foreign nationals in the Philippines;

(n) maintain a database of cases of child pornography;

(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and providing the necessary intervention or assistance to victims of child pornography.

(p) Submit to the President and the Congressional Oversight committee credited herein the annual report on the policies, plans, programs and
activities of the Council relative to the implementation of this Act; and

(q) Exercise all the powers and perform such other functions necessary to attain the purposes and objectives of this Act.

Section 22. Child Pornography as a Transnational Crime. - Pursuant to the Convention on transnational Organized Crime, the DOJ may execute the
request of a foreign state for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of any form of child pornography by: (1) conducting a preliminary
investigation against the offender and, if appropriate, to file the necessary charges in court; (2) giving information needed by the foreign state; and
(3) to apply for an order of forfeiture of any proceeds or monetary instrument or properly located in the Philippines used in connection with child
pornography in the court; Provided, That if the DOJ refuses to act on the request of for delaying the execution thereof: Provided, further, That the
principles of mutuality and reciprocity shall, for this purpose, be at all times recognized.

Section 23. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), shall endeavor to include child pornography among
extraditable offenses in future treaties.

Section 24. Congressional Oversight Committee. -There is hereby created a Congressional Oversight Committee composed of five (5) members
from the Senate and five (5) members from the House of Representatives. The members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate
President based on proportional representation of the parties or coalition therein with at least one (1) member representing the Minority. The
members from the House of Representative shall be appointed by the Speaker, also based on proportional representation of the parties or coalitions
therein with the Chair of the House of Committee on Welfare of Children and at least one (1) member representing the Minority

The Committee shall be headed by the respective Chairs of the Senate Committee on Youth, Women and Family relations and the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice. The Secretariat of the Congressional Oversight Committee shall come from the existing Secretariat
personnel of the Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives concerned.

The Committee shall monitor and ensure the effective implementation of this Act, determine inherent weakness and loopholes in the law.
Recommend the necessary remedial legislator or administrative measures and perform such other duties and functions as may be necessary to
attain the objectives of this Act.

Section 25. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to implement the provisions of the Anti-Child Pornography Act and the operationalization of the
Inter-Agency Council Against Child Pornography shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 26. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Inter- Agency Council Against Child pornography shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 27. Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code. - The Revised penal Code shall be suppletorily applicable to this Act.

Section 28. Separability Clause. - If any part of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not affected thereby shall continue
to be in full force and effect.

Section 29. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified or repealed accordingly.

Section 30. Effectivity. - This Act shall effect after fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PHOTO AND VIDEO VOYEURISM, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State values the dignity and privacy of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Toward this end, the State shall penalize acts that would destroy the honor, dignity and integrity of a person.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the term:

(a) "Broadcast" means to make public, by any means, a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons.

(b) "Capture" with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph, film, record by any means, or broadcast.

(c) "Female breast" means any portion of the female breast.

(d) "Photo or video voyeurism" means the act of taking photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar
activity or of capturing an image of the private area of a person or persons without the latter's consent, under circumstances in which such person/s
has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy, or the act of selling, copying, reproducing, broadcasting, sharing, showing or exhibiting the photo or
video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or similar activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and similar means or device without
the written consent of the person/s involved, notwithstanding that consent to record or take photo or video coverage of same was given by such
person's.

(e) "Private area of a person" means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, public area, buttocks or female breast of an individual.

(f) "Under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy" means believe that he/she could disrobe in privacy, without
being concerned that an image or a private area of the person was being captured; or circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe
that a private area of the person would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or private place.

Section 4. Prohibited Acts. - It is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful for any person:

(a) To take photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar activity or to capture an image of the private
area of a person/s such as the naked or undergarment clad genitals, public area, buttocks or female breast without the consent of the person/s
involved and under circumstances in which the person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy;

(b) To copy or reproduce, or to cause to be copied or reproduced, such photo or video or recording of sexual act or any similar activity with or without
consideration;

(c) To sell or distribute, or cause to be sold or distributed, such photo or video or recording of sexual act, whether it be the original copy or
reproduction thereof; or

(d) To publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, whether in print or broadcast media, or show or exhibit the photo or video
coverage or recordings of such sexual act or any similar activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device.

The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record or take photo or video coverage of the same was
given by such person/s. Any person who violates this provision shall be liable for photo or video voyeurism as defined herein.

Section 5. Penalties. - The penalty of imprisonment of not less that three (3) years but not more than seven (7) years and a fine of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court shall
be imposed upon any person found guilty of violating Section 4 of this Act.

If the violator is a juridical person, its license or franchise shall be automatically be deemed revoked and the persons liable shall be the officers
thereof including the editor and reporter in the case of print media, and the station manager, editor and broadcaster in the case of a broadcast
media.

If the offender is a public officer or employee, or a professional, he/she shall be administratively liable.

If the offender is an alien, he/she shall be subject to deportation proceedings after serving his/her sentence and payment of fines.

Section 6. Exemption. - Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a
written order of the court, to use the record or any copy thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of the crime of photo or video
voyeurism: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation
of the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and upon showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that photo or video
voyeurism has been committed or is about to be committed, and that the evidence to be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or
to the solution or prevention of such, crime.

Section 7. Inadmissibility of Evidence. - Any record, photo or video, or copy thereof, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.1avvphi1

Section 8. Separability Clause. - If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions not affected thereby shall
remain valid and subsisting.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction , administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

Section 10. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two(2)
newspapers of general circulation.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1563
ESTABLISHING AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM FOR THE CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF MENDICANCY, PROVIDING PENALTIES,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, the promotion of social justice and protection of life, property and dignity of the citizenry in endangered by rampant mendicancy;

WHEREAS, mendicancy breeds crime, creates traffic hazards, endangers health, and exposes mendicants to indignities and degradation; and

WHEREAS, there is an immediate need to provide appropriate services to enable mendicants to meet their basic needs and develop self-reliance;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby
order and decree:

Section 1. Title And Scope Of The Decree. This Decree shall be known as the Mendicancy Law of 1978. It shall apply to all mendicants, and
exploited infants or children who are 8 years old and below, minors found begging and covered by Presidential Decree No. 603 and parents of
exploited infants and children criminally liable under Article 59 and 60 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

Section 2. Purpose. This Decree shall be interpreted so as to, among others:

a. Prevent the commission of mendicancy;

b. Prevent the exploitation of infants and children through mendicancy and provide habilitative services for those already exploited or in immediate
danger of exploitation; and

c. Promote the rehabilitation of minors found begging and mendicants by providing an integrated developmental package of preventive, habilitative
interceptive, remedial, and/or rehabilitative services.

Section 3. Definition Of Terms. As used in this Decree, the following shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed thus:

a. "Mendicant" refers to any person, except those enumerated in Section 4 of this Decree, who has no visible and legal means of support, or lawful
employment and who is physically able to work but neglects to apply himself to some lawful calling and instead uses begging as a means of living.

b. "Exploited Infant" or "Child" refers to an infant or child 8 years and below who is used in begging or one who accompanies a habitual vagrant or
beggar.

c "Habitual Mendicant" refers to one who has been convicted of mendicancy under this Decree two or more times.

d. "Duly Licensed Child Placement Agency" or "Individual" is an institution or person licensed by the Department of Social Services and Development
to assume the care, custody, protection and maintenance of children for placement in any child-caring institution or home under the care and custody
of any person for purposes of adoption, guardianship or foster care.

e. Integrated Developmental Package of Services include the following:

1. Preventive services to measures that forestall the occurrence of situations identified as contributory to mendicancy;

2. Habilitative services refer to measures which provide environmental or socio-economic conditions for the exploited infant or child which maximize
possibilities and opportunities for the enjoyment of satisfactory equality of life before the formation of undesirable attitudes and values or the onset of
conditions most conducive to mendicancy;

3. Interceptive services are measures which channel or direct the growth potential and productive energy of the mendicant infant, child, youth or
adult to offset the effect of factors contributing to mendicancy;

4. Remedial services refer to measures intended to meet the basic needs and improve living condition of the mendicant; and

5. Rehabilitative services refer to medical, social, educational, psychological and vocational measures to develop and/or restore the mendicant to the
fullest state of well-being or economic usefulness of which he is capable, and to engage in a gainful occupation.

Section 4. Apprehension Of And Services For Persons Found Begging. Any infants or child 8 years old and below who is found begging or is being
utilized by a mendicant for purposes of begging shall be apprehended as a neglected child under Article 141 of PD 603 and shall be committed to
the custody and care of the Department of Social Services and Development or to any duly licensed child placement agency or individual.

Any minor over 9 years of age under 15 found begging or is being utilized for purposes of begging and who acted without discernment shall be
apprehended as a neglected child under Article 141 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and shall be committed to the custody and care of the
Department of Social Services and Development or to any duly licensed placement agency or individual.

Any minor over 9 years of age and under 15 who is found begging or is being utilized for the purpose of begging and who acted with discernment
shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 3, Title VIII of Presidential Decree No. 603.

Any person not otherwise covered in the preceding paragraph of this Section who is found begging and who is physically or mentally incapable of
gainful occupation shall be provided the integrated package of services by the Department of Social Services and Development, the Welfare units of
local governments and other cooperating agencies.

Section 5. Criminal Liability. A mendicant as defined in Paragraph (a) Section 3 hereof, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding
P500.00 or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2 years or both at the discretion of the court.

A habitual mendicant shall be punished by a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 4 years or both at the
discretion of the court.

Parents of exploited infants or minors under Section 4 of this Decree shall be proceeded against in accordance with Articles 59 and 60 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, unless they are themselves mendicants.

Any person who abets mendicancy by giving alms directly to mendicants, exploited infants and minors on public roads, sidewalks, parks and bridges
shall be punished by a fine nor exceeding P20.00.

Section 6. Information Program. The Department of Public Information shall conduct a nationwide educational and information program on the
Mendicancy Law and educate the public to contribute only to lawful fund raising projects and prevent the community in giving alms except through
organized agencies, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Department of Public Information may promulgate.

Section 7. Local Programs And Facilities. Local governments shall provide socio-economic programs and establish operating units including
reception and action centers, sheltered workshops, constitute homes and other facilities for mendicants, subject to such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of the Department of Local Government and Community Development may promulgate.

Section 8. Health Needs. The Department of Health shall provide the necessary measures in meeting the health needs of mendicants, subject to
such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Department of Health may promulgate.

Section 9. Law Enforcement. The Department of National Defense shall provide the necessary law enforcement and other related services for the
implementation of this Decree, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Department of National Defense may promulgate.

Section 10. Integrated Network Of Services. The Department of Social Services and Development shall provide an integrated network of appropriate
services to exploited infants and children 8 years old and below as well as mendicant minors and adult mendicants and shall coordinate the services
related to the implementation of this Decree, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Department of Social Services and
Development may promulgate.

Section 11. Appropriations. The sum of two million pesos (P2,000,000) is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of any funds in the National
Treasury that are not otherwise appropriated, in order to support the activities under this Decree.

Section 12. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Section 13. Separability Of Provisions. If for any reason any section of provision of this Decree is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other
sections or provisions thereof which are not affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect.

Section 14. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10158 ]
AN ACT DECRIMINALIZING VAGRANCY, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLE 202 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE


SECTION 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby, amended to read as follows:

Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in
case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correctional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or
both, in the discretion of the court.

SEC. 2. Effect on Pending Cases. All pending cases under the provisions of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its
amendment by this Act shall be dismissed upon effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 3. Immediate Release of Convicted Persons. All persons serving sentence for violation of the provisions of Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be immediately released upon effectivity of this Act: Provided, That they are not serving
sentence or detained for any other offense or felony.

SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other issuances, or any part thereof,
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of

Republic Act No. 9208 May 26, 2003
AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE
NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR ITS VIOLATIONS, AND FOR OTHER

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees the respect of
individual rights. In pursuit of this policy, the State shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures and development of programs that will
promote human dignity, protect the people from any threat of violence and exploitation, eliminate trafficking in persons, and mitigate pressures for
involuntary migration and servitude of persons, not only to support trafficked persons but more importantly, to ensure their recovery, rehabilitation
and reintegration into the mainstream of society.

It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal rights and inherent human dignity of women and men as enshrined in the United Nations Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant
Workers and their Families. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime Including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and all other relevant and universally accepted human rights instruments and other
international conventions to which the Philippines is a signatory.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of
a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in
persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.

(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct in exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.

(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat,
use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.

(e) Sex Tourism - refers to a program organized by travel and tourism-related establishments and individuals which consists of tourism packages or
activities, utilizing and offering escort and sexual services as enticement for tourists. This includes sexual services and practices offered during rest
and recreation periods for members of the military.

(f) Sexual Exploitation - refers to participation by a person in prostitution or the production of pornographic materials as a result of being subjected to
a threat, deception, coercion, abduction, force, abuse of authority, debt bondage, fraud or through abuse of a victim's vulnerability.

(g) Debt Bondage - refers to the pledging by the debtor of his/her personal services or labor or those of a person under his/her control as security or
payment for a debt, when the length and nature of services is not clearly defined or when the value of the services as reasonably assessed is not
applied toward the liquidation of the debt.

(h) Pornography - refers to any representation, through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent shows, information technology, or by
whatever means, of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily
sexual purposes.

(i) Council - shall mean the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking created under Section 20 of this Act.

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;

(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other consideration, any person or, as provided for under Republic Act No.
6955, any Filipino woman to a foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading him/her to engage in
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism packages or activities for the purpose of utilizing and offering persons for
prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;

(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;

(f) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;

(g) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport or abduct a person, by means of threat or use of force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or intimidation for the
purpose of removal or sale of organs of said person; and

(h) To recruit, transport or adopt a child to engage in armed activities in the Philippines or abroad.

Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:

(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;

(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute unissued, tampered or fake counseling certificates, registration stickers and certificates of any
government agency which issues these certificates and stickers as proof of compliance with government regulatory and pre-departure requirements
for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;

(c) To advertise, publish, print, broadcast or distribute, or cause the advertisement, publication, printing, broadcasting or distribution by any means,
including the use of information technology and the internet, of any brochure, flyer, or any propaganda material that promotes trafficking in persons;

(d) To assist in the conduct of misrepresentation or fraud for purposes of facilitating the acquisition of clearances and necessary exit documents from
government agencies that are mandated to provide pre-departure registration and services for departing persons for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;

(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the country at international and local airports, territorial boundaries and
seaports who are in possession of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;

(f) To confiscate, conceal, or destroy the passport, travel documents, or personal documents or belongings of trafficked persons in furtherance of
trafficking or to prevent them from leaving the country or seeking redress from the government or appropriate agencies; and

(g) To knowingly benefit from, financial or otherwise, or make use of, the labor or services of a person held to a condition of involuntary servitude,
forced labor, or slavery.

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

(b) When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group;

(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense
is committed by a public officer or employee;

(e) When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law enforcement agencies;

(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and

(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).

Section 6. Confidentiality. - At any stage of the investigation, prosecution and trial of an offense under this Act, law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges, court personnel and medical practitioners, as well as parties to the case, shall recognize the right to privacy of the trafficked person and the
accused. Towards this end, law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges to whom the complaint has been referred may, whenever necessary to
ensure a fair and impartial proceeding, and after considering all circumstances for the best interest of the parties, order a closed-door investigation,
prosecution or trial. The name and personal circumstances of the trafficked person or of the accused, or any other information tending to establish
their identities and such circumstances or information shall not be disclosed to the public.

In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted behind closed-doors, it shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio, producer and director of a film in case of the movie industry, or any person
utilizing tri-media facilities or information technology to cause publicity of any case of trafficking in persons.

Section 8. Prosecution of Cases. - Any person who has personal knowledge of the commission of any offense under this Act, the trafficked person,
the parents, spouse, siblings, children or legal guardian may file a complaint for trafficking.

Section 9. Venue. - A criminal action arising from violation of this Act shall be filed where the offense was committed, or where any of its elements
occurred, or where the trafficked person actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal
action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:

(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a
fine of not less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00);

(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million
pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);

(d) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

(e) If the offender is a corporation, partnership, association, club, establishment or any juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, partner, manager, and/or any responsible officer who participated in the commission of the crime or who shall have knowingly permitted or
failed to prevent its commission;

(f) The registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and license to operate of the erring agency, corporation, association,
religious group, tour or travel agent, club or establishment, or any place of entertainment shall be cancelled and revoked permanently. The owner,
president, partner or manager thereof shall not be allowed to operate similar establishments in a different name;

(g) If the offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately deported after serving his sentence and be barred permanently from entering the country;

(h) Any employee or official of government agencies who shall issue or approve the issuance of travel exit clearances, passports, registration
certificates, counseling certificates, marriage license, and other similar documents to persons, whether juridical or natural, recruitment agencies,
establishments or other individuals or groups, who fail to observe the prescribed procedures and the requirement as provided for by laws, rules and
regulations, shall be held administratively liable, without prejudice to criminal liability under this Act. The concerned government official or employee
shall, upon conviction, be dismissed from the service and be barred permanently to hold public office. His/her retirement and other benefits shall
likewise be forfeited; and

(i) Conviction by final judgment of the adopter for any offense under this Act shall result in the immediate rescission of the decree of adoption.

Section 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. - Any person who buys or engages the services of trafficked persons for prostitution shall be penalized as
follows:

(a) First offense - six (6) months of community service as may be determined by the court and a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); and

(b) Second and subsequent offenses - imprisonment of one (1) year and a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).

Section 12. Prescriptive Period. - Trafficking cases under this Act shall prescribe in ten (10) years: Provided, however, That trafficking cases
committed by a syndicate or in a large scale as defined under Section 6 shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.

The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the day on which the trafficked person is delivered or released from the conditions of bondage
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to the accused.

Section 13. Exemption from Filing Fees. - When the trafficked person institutes a separate civil action for the recovery of civil damages, he/she shall
be exempt from the payment of filing fees.

Section 14. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds and Instruments Derived from Trafficking in Persons. - In addition to the penalty imposed for
the violation of this Act, the court shall order the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds and properties derived
from the commission of the crime, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; Provided, however, That all awards for
damages shall be taken from the personal and separate properties of the offender; Provided, further, That if such properties are insufficient, the
balance shall be taken from the confiscated and forfeited properties.

When the proceeds, properties and instruments of the offense have been destroyed, diminished in value or otherwise rendered worthless by any act
or omission, directly or indirectly, of the offender, or it has been concealed, removed, converted or transferred to prevent the same from being found
or to avoid forfeiture or confiscation, the offender shall be ordered to pay the amount equal to the value of the proceeds, property or instruments of
the offense.

Section 15. Trust Fund. - All fines imposed under this Act and the proceeds and properties forfeited and confiscated pursuant to Section 14 hereof
shall accrue to a Trust Fund to be administered and managed by the Council to be used exclusively for programs that will prevent acts of trafficking
and protect, rehabilitate, reintegrate trafficked persons into the mainstream of society. Such programs shall include, but not limited to, the following:

(a) Provision for mandatory services set forth in Section 23 of this Act;

(b) Sponsorship of a national research program on trafficking and establishment of a data collection system for monitoring and evaluation purposes;

(c) Provision of necessary technical and material support services to appropriate government agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs);

(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars to provide venue for consensus building amongst the public, the academe, government, NGOs and
international organizations; and

(e) Promotion of information and education campaign on trafficking.

Section 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in Persons. - The government shall establish and implement preventive, protective and rehabilitative
programs for trafficked persons. For this purpose, the following agencies are hereby mandated to implement the following programs;

(a) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) - shall make available its resources and facilities overseas for trafficked persons regardless of their manner
of entry to the receiving country, and explore means to further enhance its assistance in eliminating trafficking activities through closer networking
with government agencies in the country and overseas, particularly in the formulation of policies and implementation of relevant programs.

The DFA shall take necessary measures for the efficient implementation of the Machine Readable Passports to protect the integrity of Philippine
passports, visas and other travel documents to reduce the incidence of trafficking through the use of fraudulent identification documents.

It shall establish and implement a pre-marriage, on-site and pre-departure counseling program on intermarriages.

(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) - shall implement rehabilitative and protective programs for trafficked persons. It shall
provide counseling and temporary shelter to trafficked persons and develop a system for accreditation among NGOs for purposes of establishing
centers and programs for intervention in various levels of the community.

(c) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) - shall ensure the strict implementation and compliance with the rules and guidelines relative to
the employment of persons locally and overseas. It shall likewise monitor, document and report cases of trafficking in persons involving employers
and labor recruiters.

(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) - shall ensure the prosecution of persons accused of trafficking and designate and train special prosecutors who
shall handle and prosecute cases of trafficking. It shall also establish a mechanism for free legal assistance for trafficked persons, in coordination
with the DSWD, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and other NGOs and volunteer groups.

(e) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) - shall actively participate and coordinate in the formulation and monitoring of
policies addressing the issue of trafficking in persons in coordination with relevant government agencies. It shall likewise advocate for the inclusion of
the issue of trafficking in persons in both its local and international advocacy for women's issues.

(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) - shall strictly administer and enforce immigration and alien administration laws. It shall adopt measures for the
apprehension of suspected traffickers both at the place of arrival and departure and shall ensure compliance by the Filipino fiancs/fiances and
spouses of foreign nationals with the guidance and counseling requirement as provided for in this Act.

(g) Philippine National Police (PNP) - shall be the primary law enforcement agency to undertake surveillance, investigation and arrest of individuals
or persons suspected to be engaged in trafficking. It shall closely coordinate with various law enforcement agencies to secure concerted efforts for
effective investigation and apprehension of suspected traffickers. It shall also establish a system to receive complaints and calls to assist trafficked
persons and conduct rescue operations.

(h) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) - shall implement an effective pre-employment orientation seminars and pre-departure
counseling programs to applicants for overseas employment. It shall likewise formulate a system of providing free legal assistance to trafficked
persons.

(i) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) - shall institute a systematic information and prevention campaign and likewise maintain
a databank for the effective monitoring, documentation and prosecution of cases on trafficking in persons.

(j) Local government units (LGUs) - shall monitor and document cases of trafficking in persons in their areas of jurisdiction, effect the cancellation of
licenses of establishments which violate the provisions of this Act and ensure effective prosecution of such cases. They shall also undertake an
information campaign against trafficking in persons through the establishment of the Migrants Advisory and Information Network (MAIN) desks in
municipalities or provinces in coordination with DILG, Philippine Information Agency (PIA), Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), NGOs and
other concerned agencies. They shall encourage and support community based initiatives which address the trafficking in persons.

In implementing this Act, the agencies concerned may seek and enlist the assistance of NGOs, people's organizations (Pos), civic organizations and
other volunteer groups.

Section 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked Persons. - Trafficked persons shall be recognized as victims of the act or acts of trafficking and as such
shall not be penalized for crimes directly related to the acts of trafficking enumerated in this Act or in obedience to the order made by the trafficker in
relation thereto. In this regard, the consent of a trafficked person to the intended exploitation set forth in this Act shall be irrelevant.

Section 18. Preferential Entitlement Under the Witness Protection Program. - Any provision of Republic Act No. 6981 to the contrary notwithstanding,
any trafficked person shall be entitled to the witness protection program provided therein.

Section 19. Trafficked Persons Who are Foreign Nationals. - Subject to the guidelines issued by the Council, trafficked persons in the Philippines
who are nationals of a foreign country shall also be entitled to appropriate protection, assistance and services available to trafficked persons under
this Act: Provided, That they shall be permitted continued presence in the Philippines for a length of time prescribed by the Council as necessary to
effect the prosecution of offenders.

Section 20. Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. - There is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking, to be composed of
the Secretary of the Department of Justice as Chairperson and the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development as Co-
Chairperson and shall have the following as members:

(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs;

(b) Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment;

(c) Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration;

(d) Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration;

(e) Director-General, Philippine National Police;

(f) Chairperson, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women; and

(g) Three (3) representatives from NGOs, who shall be composed of one (1) representative each from among the sectors representing women,
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and children, with a proven record of involvement in the prevention and suppression of trafficking in persons.
These representatives shall be nominated by the government agency representatives of the Council, for appointment by the President for a term of
three (3) years.

The members of the Council may designate their permanent representatives who shall have a rank not lower than an assistant secretary or its
equivalent to meetings, and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting,
rules and regulations.

Section 21. Functions of the Council. - The Council shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Formulate a comprehensive and integrated program to prevent and suppress the trafficking in persons;

(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of this Act;

(c) Monitor and oversee the strict implementation of this Act;

(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the various member agencies to effectively address the issues and problems attendant to trafficking in
persons;

(e) Coordinate the conduct of massive information dissemination and campaign on the existence of the law and the various issues and problems
attendant to trafficking through the LGUs, concerned agencies, and NGOs;

(f) Direct other agencies to immediately respond to the problems brought to their attention and report to the Council on action taken;

(g) Assist in filing of cases against individuals, agencies, institutions or establishments that violate the provisions of this Act;

(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of trafficked persons in cooperation with DOLE, DSWD, Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), LGUs and NGOs;

(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government or from NGOs and other civic organizations such
assistance as may be needed to effectively implement this Act;

(j) Complement the shared government information system for migration established under Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" with data on cases of trafficking in persons, and ensure that the proper agencies conduct a continuing
research and study on the patterns and scheme of trafficking in persons which shall form the basis for policy formulation and program direction;

(k) Develop the mechanism to ensure the timely, coordinated, and effective response to cases of trafficking in persons;

(l) Recommend measures to enhance cooperative efforts and mutual assistance among foreign countries through bilateral and/or multilateral
arrangements to prevent and suppress international trafficking in persons;

(m) Coordinate with the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and other NGOs in
monitoring the promotion of advertisement of trafficking in the internet;

(n) Adopt measures and policies to protect the rights and needs of trafficked persons who are foreign nationals in the Philippines;

(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and providing the necessary intervention or assistance to trafficked persons; and

(p) Exercise all the powers and perform such other functions necessary to attain the purposes and objectives of this Act.

Section 22. Secretariat to the Council. - The Department of Justice shall establish the necessary Secretariat for the Council.

Section 23. Mandatory Services to Trafficked Persons. - To ensure recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of society,
concerned government agencies shall make available the following services to trafficked persons:

(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;

(b) Counseling;

(c) Free legal services which shall include information about the victims' rights and the procedure for filing complaints, claiming compensation and
such other legal remedies available to them, in a language understood by the trafficked person;

(d) Medical or psychological services;

(e) Livelihood and skills training; and

(f) Educational assistance to a trafficked child.

Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism that will track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration of the trafficked persons
shall be adopted and carried out.

Section 24. Other Services for Trafficked Persons. -

(a) Legal Assistance. - Trafficked persons shall be considered under the category "Overseas Filipino in Distress" and may avail of the legal
assistance created by Republic Act No. 8042, subject to the guidelines as provided by law.

(b) Overseas Filipino Resource Centers. - The services available to overseas Filipinos as provided for by Republic Act No. 8042 shall also be
extended to trafficked persons regardless of their immigration status in the host country.

(c) The Country Team Approach. - The country team approach under Executive Order No. 74 of 1993, shall be the operational scheme under which
Philippine embassies abroad shall provide protection to trafficked persons insofar as the promotion of their welfare, dignity and fundamental rights
are concerned.

Section 25. Repatriation of Trafficked Persons. - The DFA, in coordination with DOLE and other appropriate agencies, shall have the primary
responsibility for the repatriation of trafficked persons, regardless of whether they are documented or undocumented.

If, however, the repatriation of the trafficked persons shall expose the victims to greater risks, the DFA shall make representation with the host
government for the extension of appropriate residency permits and protection, as may be legally permissible in the host country.

Section 26. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with DFA, shall endeavor to include offenses of trafficking in persons among extraditable offenses.

Section 27. Reporting Requirements. - The Council shall submit to the President of the Philippines and to Congress an annual report of the policies,
programs and activities relative to the implementation of this Act.

Section 28. Funding. - The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall immediately include in their programs and issue such rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of this Act, the funding of which shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 29. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Council shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 30. Non-restriction of Freedom of Speech and of Association, Religion and the Right to Travel. - Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a
restriction of the freedom of speech and of association, religion and the right to travel for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Section 31. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or
provisions hereof shall not be affected thereby.

Section 32. Repealing clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That this Act shall not in any way amend or repeal the provision of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act".

Section 33. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20569 October 29, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant-appellant.
Fisher, Dewitt, Perkins and Brady for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be here decided is whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can
be seen in the regions in which they live, are absence or indecent. Surprising as it may seem, the question is one of first impression not alone in the
Philippine Islands, but in the United States, Great Britain, and elsewhere. This will explain why a case which otherwise would be heard and voted in
Division has been submitted to the court in banc for decision.
On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He found and
confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger, the manager of the company.
Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The information filed in court
charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No.
277. To this information, the defendant interposed a demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense and
were not contrary to law; but trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant duly excepted thereto. Following the presentation of evidence by
the Government and the defense, judgment was rendered finding the defendant guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to pay a fine of
P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
The five errors assigned by defendant-appellant in this court divide themselves into two general issues. The first point sustained by counsel for
the appellant is in nature a technical objection, growing out of the defendant's demurrer. The second point, in reality the decesive issue, is as
suggested in the beginning of the decision. We will take upon the assignments of errors as thus classified in order.
Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. But included therein is a section, No. 12, making obscene or indecent publications misdemeanors.
Said section 12 which, it is contended by the Government, has here been violated, and which, appellant argues, does not apply to the information
and the facts, reads as follow:
Any person who writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for sale, distributes, or exhibits any obscene or
indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, or who designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any obscene picture
or print, or who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any obscene or indecent figure, or who writes, composes, or prints any notice or
advertisement of any such writing, paper, book, print, or figure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not exceeding
one thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.
Counsel has gone to the trouble to make a careful analysis of section 12 of the Libel Law which is intended to bear out his thesis, first, that
section 12 does not prohibit the taking, selling, and publishing of alleged obscene and indecent pictures and prints, and second, that the information
in this case charges no offense prohibited by section 12. Recall, however, that the law provides punishment, among other things, for any person who
keeps for sale or exhibits any absence or indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, and that the information charges the defendant, among other
things, with having wilfully and feloniously kept for sale, distribution, or exhibition, obscene and indecent pictures.
The phrase in the law "or other matter", was apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." While limited to that which is of the same kind as its
antecedent, it is intended to cover kindred subjects. The rule of ejusdem generisinvoked by counsel is by no means a rule of universal application
and should be made to carry out, not to defeat, the legislative intent. Even if the phrase "or other matter" be cobstrued to mean "or other matter of
like kind," pictures and postcards are not so far unrelated to writings, papers, and books, as not to be covered by the general words (Commonwealth
vs. Dejardin [1878], 126 Mass., 46; 30 Am. Rep., 652; Brown vs. Corbin [1889], 40 Minn., 508).
The line of argumentation is more refined that practical. Once conceded that section 12 of Act No. 277 does not cover the present case, there
yet remain for application article 571, No. 2, of the penal code, and section 730 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. The section of the
Revised Ordinances cited is most specific when it provides in part that no person shall "exhibit, circulate, distribute, sell, offer or expose for sale, or
give or deliver to another, or cause the same to be done, any lewd, indecent, or absence book, picture, pamphlet, card, print, paper, writing, mould,
cast, figure, or any other thing."
While admittedly the information is lacking in precision and while the content of section 12 of the Libel Law is not as inclusive as it might be,
we yet conclude that the information is not fatally defective, and that said section 12 covers the alleged facts.
We come now to decide the main issue. We repeat that our own researches have confirmed the statement of counsel that no one parrallel
case be found. We must perforce reason from the general to the specific and from universal principle to actual fact.
The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of non-
Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines, Bontoc Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young boys and
carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3
has the legend "Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Exhibit A-5 has the legend "Moros
Philippines."
The prosecution produced no evidence proving the postcards obscene and indecent because it thought the post-cards themselves the best
evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open court "that those pictures represented the natives (non-Christians) in their native dress." The
defendant, on the other hand, attempted to show that the pictures as true to life. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor in the University of the Philippines,
corroborated by other witnesses, testified from his studies in various parts of the Islands, such as the Mountain Province, Abra, Palawan, and
Mindanao and Sulu, that none of the pictures represented poses which he had not observed on various occasions, and that the costumes worn by
the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them. Are such pictures obscene or indecent?
The word "obscene" ands the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastify, decency, or delicacy. "Indeceny" is
an act against behavior and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular publication or other thing is
obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of
obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency, (29 Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L., 312.)
The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers, or books. But the words "obscene or
indecent" are themselves descriptive. They are words in common used and every person of average intelligence understand their meaning. Indeed,
beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether
a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case. (People vs. Muller [1884], 96 N. Y., 408; 48 Am. Rep., 635.)
Considerable light can be thrown on the subject by turning to the Federal Laws prohibiting the use of the mails for obscene matter and
prohibiting the importation into the Philippine Islands of articles, etc., of obscene or indecent character. (U. S. Rev. Stat., art. 3893; 36 stat. at L., 135;
7 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1194, sec. 3[b].)
"Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication,
according to the united States Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and
has the same meaning as is given at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel. (Swearingen vs. U. S. [1896], 161 U. S., 446; U. S. vs. Males
[1892], 51 Fed., 41; 6 Words and Phrases, 4888, 4889.)
The case of United States vs. Harmon ([189], 45 Fed., 414), grew out of an indictment for despositing an obscene publication in a United
States post-office in violator of the Postal Law. Judge Philips said:
The statute does not undertake to define the meaning of the terms "obscene," etc., further than may be implied by the succeeding phrase, "or
other publication of an indecent character." On the well-organized canon of construction these words are presumed to have been employed by the
law-maker in their ordinary acceptation and use.
As they cannot be said to have acquired any technical significance as applied to some particular matter, calling, or profession, but
are terms of popular use, the court might perhaps with propriety leave their import to the presumed intelligence of the jury. A standard
dictionary says that "obscene" mean "offensive to chastity and decency; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something which
delicacy, purity, and decency forbid to be exposed." This mere dictionary definition may be extended or amplified by the courts in actual
practice, preserving, however, its essential though, and having always due regard to the popular and proper sense in which the legislature
employed the term. Chief Justice Cockburn, in Rex vs. Hicklin (L. R. 3 Q. B., 360), said: "The test of obscenity is this: Where the tendency
of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall;" and where "it who suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more
advanced years, thoughts of the most impure and libidinous character." So, also, it has been held that a book is obscene which is offensive
to decency or chastity, which is immodest, which is indelicate, impure, causing lewd thoughts of an immoral tendency." U. S. vs. Bennet,
16 Blatchf., 338. Judge Thayer, in U. S. vs. Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed:
"The word "obscene" ordinarily means something which is offensive to chastity; something that is foul or filthy, and for that
reason is offensive to pure-minded persons. That is the meaning of the word in the concrete; but when used, as in the statute, to
describe the character of a book, pamphlet, or paper, it means containing immodest and indecent matter, the reading whereof
would have a tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those into whose hands the publication might fall whose minds are
open to such immoral influences."
Laws of this character are made for society in the aggregate, and not in particular. So, while there may be individuals and societies
of men and women of peculiar motions are idiosyncrasies, whose moral sense would neither be depraved nor offended by the publication
now under consideration, yet the exceptional sensibility, or want of sensibility, of such cannot be allowed as a standard by which its
obscenity or indecency is to be tested. Rather is the test, what is the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it?
What is its probable, reasonable effect on the sense of decency, purity, and chastity of society, extending to the family, made up of men
and women, young boys and girls, the family, which is the common nursery of mankind, the foundation rock upon which the state
reposes?
. . . To the pure all things are pure, is too poetical for the actualities of practical life. There is in the popular conception and heart
such a thing as modesty. It was born in the Garden of Eden. After Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge they passed from
the condition of perfectibility which some people nowadays aspire to, and, their eyes being opened, they discerned that there was both
good and evil; "and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." From that day to
this civilized man has carried with him the sense of shame, the feeling that there were some things on which the eye the mind
should not look; and where men and women become so depraved by the use, or so insensate from perverted education, that they will not
evil their eyes, nor hold their tongues, the government should perform the office for them in protection of the social compact and the body
politic.
As above intimated, the Federal statue prohibits the importation or shipment into the Philippine Islands of the following: "Articles, books,
pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts, typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations, figures or objects of obscene or indecent character or subversive
of public order." There are, however, in the record, copies of reputable magazines which circulate freely thruout the United States and other
countries, and which are admitted into Philippines without question, containing illustrations identical in nature to those forming the basis of the
prosecution at bar. Publications of the Philippine Government have also been offered in evidence such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine
Journal of Science" for October, 1906, and the Reports of the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, and 1913, in which are found illustrations either
exactly the same or nearly akin to those which are now impugned.
It appears therefore that a national standard has been set up by the Congress of the United States. Tested by that standard, it would be
extremely doubtful if the pictures here challenged would be held obscene or indecent by any state of Federal court. It would be particularly unwise to
sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippines that in the United States, or for that matter in the rest of the world.
The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress.
The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of
this type. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
We readily understand the laudable motives which moved the Government to initiate this prosecution. We fully appreciate the sentiments of
colleagues who take a different view of the case. We would be the last to offend the sensibilities of the Filipino people and the sanction anything
which would hold them up to ridicule in the eyes of mankind. But we emphasize that we are not deciding a question in political theory or in social
ethics. We are dealing with a legal question predicated on a legal fact, and on this question and fact, we reach the conclusion that there has not
been proved a violation of section 12 of the Libel Law. When other cases predicated on other states of facts are brought to our attention, we will
decide them as they arise.
We seem to recall the statement of counsel that the proprietor of the photographic concern whom he represents would on his own initiative
place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the pictures so that no one may be misled as to them. Indeed, he might even go further and out of
consideration for the natural sensibilities of his customers, withdraw from sale certain pictures which can be pointed out to him.
We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they
live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. Disagreeing therefore with the appellant on his technical argument but
agreeing with him on his main contention, it becomes our duty to order the dismissal of the information. 1awph!l.net
Judgment is reversed, the information is dismissed, and the defendant-appellant is acquitted with all costs de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor and Johns, JJ., concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo was present at the time this case was voted and then voted with Mr. Justice Romualdez. (Sgd.) E. FINLEY
JOHNSON.

Separate Opinions

ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting:
I do not agree with the view taken by the majority as to the nature of the photographic pictures in question. While said pictures cannot, strictly,
be termed obscene, they must, however, be regarded as indecent, for they are so.
Such pictures offend modesty and refinement, and for this reason, they are indecent. This is shown by common sense. No woman claiming to
be decent would dare to stand before the public in Manila, where said pictures were exhibited, in the same fashion as these pictures are.
It is alleged that these pictures were taken from nature in non-Christian regions. We agree that in said regions they are not, perhaps, regarded
as offensive to modesty, and, therefore, are accidentally not indecent there. But in the City of Manila where they were exhibited, no doubt they are.
And the law prohibits the exhibition not only of obscene pictures, but of indecent as well. (Sec. 12, Act No. 277.)
I understand that the judgment appealed from should have been affirmed.
Araullo, C.J., concurs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7295 June 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARINA PADAN Y ALOVA, COSME ESPINOSA, ERNESTO REYES and JOSE FAJARDO, defendants.
MARINA PADAN Y ALOVA and JOSE FAJARDO, defendants-appellants.
Augusto Revilla for appellant Jose Fajardo.
W. M. Bayhon for appellant Marina Padan y Alova.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Manila, Marina Padan, Jose Fajardo y Garcia, Cosme Espinosa, and Ernesto Reyes were charged with a violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of September, 1953, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously exhibit or cause to be exhibited inside a
building at the corner of Camba Ext. and Morga Ext., Tondo, this City, immoral scenes and acts, to wit: the said accused Jose Fajador y
Garcia, being then the manager and Ernesto Reyes y Yabut, as ticket collector and or exhibitor, willfully ,unlawfully and feloniously hired
their co-accused Marina Palan y Alova and Cosme Espinosa y Abordo to act as performers or exhibitionists to perform and in fact
performed sexual intercourse in the presence of many spectators, thereby exhibiting or performing highly immoral and indecent acts or
shows thereat.
Upon arraignment, all pleaded not guilty. Later, however, Marina Padan, with the assistance of her counsel de parte and counsel de oficio, asked for
permission to withdraw her former plea of not guilty, which was granted, and upon rearraignment, she pleaded guilty to the charge. In a decision
dated October 12, 1953, Marina Padan was found guilty as charged and sentenced to six months and one day of prision correccional and a fine of
P200, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
the law, and to pay the proportionate costs. After trial of the three remaining accused, they were all found guilty; Cosme Espinosa and Ernesto
Reyes were sentenced each to not less than six months and one day of prision correccional and not more than one year, one month and eleven
days of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to pay the proportionate costs. Jose Fajardo was sentenced to not less than one year, one month and ten days of prision
correccional and not more than one year eight months and twenty days, also of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty and to pay the proportionate costs. The army steel bed, the army
woolen blanket, the pillow, the ladies' panties, and the men's underwear, described in Exhibit C, were declared confiscated.
The four accused appealed in the decision, the appeal having been sent to us. Appellants Espinosa and Reyes failed to file their briefs within the
period prescribed by law and their appeal was dismissed by resolution of this Court of November 25, 1955, and the decision as to them became final
and executory on January 7, 1956, as appears from the entry of judgment.
Because of her plea of guilty in the lower court, appellant Marina in her appeal do not question her conviction; she merely urges the reduction of the
penalty by eliminating the prison sentence. We do not feel warranted in interfering with the exercise of discretion in this matter, made by the lower
court presided by Judge Magno S. Gatmaitan. According to his decision of October 12, 1953, in imposing the sentence, he already considered
Marina's plea of leniency, and so despite the recommendation of the fiscal that she be fined P600.00 in addition to the prison sentence of six months
and one day, his honor reduced the fine to only P200.
We believe that the penalty imposed fits the crime, considering its seriousness. As far as we know, this is the first time that the courts in this
jurisdiction, at least this Tribunal, have been called upon to take cognizance of an offense against morals and decency of this kind. We have had
occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as
offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and
sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux
vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art.
One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing
but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. We repeat that because of all this, the penalty imposed
by the trial court on Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
Going to the appeal of Jose Fajardo y Garcia, while he does not deny the fact of the commission of the offense charged, he in its that he was not the
manager or the person incharge of the show or proceedings on the night of September 13, 1953; that his participation, if he participate at all, was to
play the role of an innocent bystander, but that because of his popularity in the neighborhood, being popularly known as a "siga-siga" character, he
was requested by the spectators to select the man and the woman to engage or indulge in the actual act of coitus before the spectators; that after
making the selection, he did not even care to witness the act but left the scene and returned to it only when he heard a commotion produced by the
raid conducted by the police.
The evidence on his active participation and that he was the manager and one in charge of the show is however ample, even conclusive. We have
carefully examined such evidence, and we are satisfied that they fully support the findings of the trial court. Such facts may be briefly stated as
follows: At the corner of Morga Extension and Camba Extension, Tondo, Manila, was a one story building which judging from the picture exhibited is
nothing but a shed, with a floor space of eight by fifteen meters which was mainly used for playing ping-pong. A ping-pong table must have been
placed in the center and on two sides were built benches in tiers, so that the spectators seated on them could look down and see the game. On
September 13, 1953, however, the building was used for a different purpose. It was to be the scene of what was said to be an exhibition of human
"fighting fish", the actual act of coitus or copulation. It must have been advertised by word of mouth; tickets therefor were sold at P3 each, and the
show was supposed to begin at 8:00 o'clock in the evening. About that time of the night, there was already a crowd around the building, but the
people were not admitted into it until about an hour later, and the show did not begin until about 9:15. The Manila Police Department must have
gotten wind of the affair; it bought tickets and provided several of its members who later attended the show, but in plain clothes, and after the show
conducted a raid and made arrests. At the trial, said policemen testified as to what actually took place inside the building. About two civilians who
attended the affair gave testimony as to what they saw.
The customers not provided with tickets actually paid P3 at the entrance to defendant Ernesto Reyes. He also collected tickets. In all, there were
about ninety paying customers, while about sixteen were allowed to enter free, presumably friends of the management. Jose Fajardo y Garcia was
clearly the manager of the show. He was at the door to see to it that the customers either were provided with tickets or paid P3.00 entrance fee. He
even asked them from whom they had bought the tickets. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the floor, covered with an
army blanket and provided with a pillow. Once the spectators, about 106 in number, were crowded inside that small building, the show started.
Fajardo evidently to arouse more interest among the customers, asked them to select among two girls presented who was to be one of the principal
actors. By pointing to or holding his hand over the head of each of the two women one after the other, and judging by the shouts of approval emitted
by the spectators, he decided that defendant Marina Padan was the subject of popular approval, and he selected her. After her selection, the other
woman named Concha, left. Without much ado, Fajardo selected Cosme Espinosa to be Marina's partner. Thereafter, Cosme and Marina proceeded
to disrobe while standing around the bed. When completely naked, they turned around to exhibit their bodies to the spectators. Then they indulged in
lascivious acts, consisting of petting, kissing, and touching the private parts of each other. When sufficiently aroused, they lay on the bed and
proceeded to consummate the act of coitus in three different positions which we deem unnecessary to describe. The four or five witnesses who
testified for the Government when asked about their reaction to what they saw, frankly admitted that they were excited beyond description. Then the
police who were among the spectators and who were previously provided with a search warrant made the raid, arrested the four defendants herein,
and took pictures of Marina and Cosme still naked and of the army bed, which pictures were presented as exhibits during the trial. From all this,
there can be no doubt that Jose Fajardo y Garcia contrary to what he claims, was the person in charge of the show. Besides, as found by the trial
court and as shown by some of the tickets collected from the spectators, submitted as exhibits, said tickets while bearing on one side printed matter
regarding an excursion to Balara to be held on August 30, 1953 from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., sponsored by a certain club, on the other side appears
the following typewritten form, reading:
P3.00 Admit one
PLEASURE SHOW
Place: P. Morga Ext. and Camba Ext.
Time : 8:00 o'clock sharp,
and superimposed on the same is the rubber stamped name "Pepe Fajardo," which defendant Fajardo admits to be his name. Considering all the
above circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Jose Fajardo is the most guilty of the four, for he was the one who conducted the show and
presumably derived the most profit or gain from the same.
As regards the penalty imposed by the trial court on appellant Fajardo, we agree with the Solicitor General that the same is correct, except the
minimum thereof which is beyond the legal range, and which should be reduced from one year, one month, and ten days of prision correccional to
only six months of arresto mayor.
With the modification above-mentioned, the decision appealed from by Marina Padan and Jose Fajardo are hereby affirmed, with costs against both.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006
GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision
1
dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25796, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-
176582.
The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for violation of Article 201
2
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969, and sentenced each to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional, and to pay the fine of P6,000 and cost of suit.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows.
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando
Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-
1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy. The warrant
ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564 Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the seizure of the following
items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
3

On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced
himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different
magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
On September 13, 1999, petitioners with Warren Tingchuy, were charged in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 5, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously,
publicly and jointly exhibit indecent or immoral acts, scenes or shows at Music Fair, located at 564 Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay [S]t.,
Quiapo[,] this City[,] by then and there selling and exhibiting obscene copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films depicting men and women
having sexual intercourse[,] lewd photographs of nude men and women in explicating (sic) positions which acts serve no other purpose but
to satisfy the market for lust or pornography to public view.
Contrary to law.
4

When arraigned, petitioners and Tingchuy pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution offered the confiscated materials in evidence and presented the following witnesses: Police Inspector Rodolfo L. Tababan, SPO4
Rolando Buenaventura and Barangay Chairperson Socorro Lipana, who were all present during the raid. After the prosecution presented its
evidence, the counsel for the accused moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which the court granted. On October 5, 2000, the RTC
however denied the demurrer to evidence and scheduled the reception of evidence for the accused. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
Thereafter, the accused waived their right to present evidence and instead submitted the case for decision.
5

The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused GAUDENCIO FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum, to pay fine of P6,000.00 each and to pay the cost.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused WARREN TINGCHUY beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.
The VHS tapes and the nine (9) magazines utilized as evidence in this case are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
6

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. But the appellate courtlatter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, as follows,
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error on the part of the trial court, the decision appealed from isAFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
7

Hence the instant petition assigning the following errors:
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not present at the time of the raid
II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing anything illegal at the time of the raid.
8

Simply, the issue in this case is whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners conviction.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends
that since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present during
the raid and that he was selling the said materials. Moreover, he contends that the appellate courts reason for convicting him, on a presumption of
continuing ownership shown by an expired mayors permit, has no sufficient basis since the prosecution failed to prove his ownership of the
establishment. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.
9

The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications are expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner
Fernandos ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, according to the Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the prohibited
materials and liable under the Information. The Solicitor General also maintains that Estorninos was identified by Barangay Chairperson Socorro
Lipana as the store attendant, thus he was likewise liable.
10

At the outset, we note that the trial court gave petitionersthem the opportunity to adduce present their evidence to disprove refute the prosecutions
evidence.
11
. Instead, they waived their right to present evidence and opted to submitted the case for decision.
a1

12
The trial court therefore resolved
the case on the basis of prosecutions evidence against the petitioners.
As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the
public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication,
picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials.
13
Necessarily, that the confiscated
materials are obscene must be proved.
Almost a century has passed since the Court first attempted to define obscenity in People v. Kottinger.
14
There the Court defined obscenity as
something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other
article charged as being obscene may fall.
15
Another test according to Kottinger is "that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency."
16
But, Kottinger hastened to say that whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and
that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.
17

Thereafter, the Court in People v. Go Pin
18
and People v. Padan y Alova, et al.,
19
involving a prosecution under Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, laid the tests which did little to clearly draw the fine lines of obscenity.
In People v. Go Pin, the Court said:
If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by
people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake
but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the
cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration
in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of
doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve
their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including
the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
pictures.
20

People v. Padan y Alova, et al. in a way reaffirmed the standards set in Go Pin but with its own test of "redeeming feature." The Court therein said
that:
[A]n actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art.
One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does,
nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land.
21

Notably, the Court in the later case of Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,
22
involving motion pictures, still applied the "contemporary community standards"
of Kottinger but departed from the rulings of Kottinger, Go Pin and Padan y Alova in that the Court measures obscenity in terms of the "dominant
theme" of the material taken as a "whole" rather than in isolated passages.
Later, in Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the Court recognized thatKottinger failed to afford a conclusive
definition of obscenity, and that both Go Pin and Padan y Alova raised more questions than answers such as, whether the absence or presence of
artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, determine what
art is; or that if they find inspiration in the exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be obscene.
23
Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave too much
latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad lib of ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as to what is obscene or what is art.
24

The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed out how hazy jurisprudence is on obscenity and how jurisprudence
actually failed to settle questions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of human civilization does not help at all. It is evident that individual
tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization.
25
It seems futile at this point to formulate a
perfect definition of obscenity that shall apply in all cases.
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to
the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
26
But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has
the unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently offensive."
27
No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct.
28
Examples included (a) patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
29
What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for
judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound discretion.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. The trial court in ruling that the
confiscated materials are obscene, reasoned as follows:
Are the magazines and VHS tapes confiscated by the raiding team obscene or offensive to morals? . . .
Pictures of men and women in the nude doing the sexual act appearing in the nine (9) confiscated magazines namely Dalaga, Penthouse,
Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery and two (2) issues of QUI are offensive to morals and are made and shown not for the sake of art
but rather for commercial purposes, that is gain and profit as the exclusive consideration in their exhibition. The pictures in the magazine
exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and actsThe exhibition of the sexual act in their magazines is but a clear and unmitigated
obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals, inspiringlust and lewdness, exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth.
(Citations omitted)
The VHS tapes also [exhibit] nude men and women doing the sexual intercourse. The tape entitled "Kahit sa Pangarap Lang" with Myra
Manibog as the actress shows the naked body of the actress. The tape exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and acts. Her dancing
movements excited the sexual instinct of her male audience. The motive may be innocent, but the performance was revolting and shocking
to good minds...
In one (1) case the Supreme Court ruled:
Since the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees were usually not artists or persons interested in art to
satisfy and inspire their artistic tastes but persons who are desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity, taste and lust and for
[love] of excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves
from the ill and perverting effects of the pictures, the display of such pictures for commercial purposes is a violation of Art. 201. If
those pictures were shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested
in art, there would be no offense committed (People vs. Go Pin, 97 Phil 418).
[B]ut this is not so in this case.
30

Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings are
patently unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.
31
In this case, petitioners neither
presented contrary evidence nor questioned the trial courts findings. There is also no showing that the trial court, in finding the materials obscene,
was arbitrary.
Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials?
We emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201,
considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article
201 is committed only when there is publicity.
32
The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting
obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find
that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair, named after petitioner Fernando.
33
The mayors
permit was under his name. Even his bail bond shows that Hhe lives in the same place.
34
Moreover, the mayors permit dated August 8, 1996, shows
that he is the owner/operator of the store.
35
While the mayors permit had already expired, it does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and
operated the establishment. It would be absurd to make his failure to renew his business permit and illegal operation a shield from prosecution of an
unlawful act. Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary evidence, the things which he possessed were presumptively his.
36

Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness
Police Inspector Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search
warrant was served.
37
Tababan had no motive for testifying falsely against Estorninos and we uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties. Lastly, this Court accords great respect to and treats with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of
witnesses, absent any palpable error or arbitrariness in their findings.
38
In our view, no reversible error was committed by the appellate court as well
as the trial court in finding the herein petitioners guilty as charged.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Crimes Committed by Public Officers Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials

G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986
NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of HON. BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ as Acting Presiding Justice and HON.
BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C. KALLOS, as Associate Justices, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
This is a case of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery, sentenced him to
four months and twenty days of arresto mayor with temporary special disqualification for eight years and one day and a fine of P2,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed the petition,
"the question raised being factual and for lack of merit."
1
However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave
due course to the petition.
2

The facts of this case are as follows:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of
the Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979 directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC
Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and to make a return within thirty (30) days from said date.
3
The
labor arbiter's decision ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and the other
judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of their work contract.
4

Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust branch [Comtrust] in Baguio City
garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez.
5
The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor
arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.
On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money
could not be withdrawn.
However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence and Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio City,
Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year."
6
Dominguez interpreted this to mean
that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the
afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to
entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills
which were then authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder.
7

Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned. Manipon showed up with two
companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and Baltazar Pacis. Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment.
8
Then
Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip for P2,500.00.
9
As soon as Dominguez received the money from the teller, he took out P300.00 therefrom
added it to the P 700.00 in marked bills and handed the total amount of P l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over to
his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized
the P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and thereafter brought them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was subjected to an
ultraviolet light test and found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification relative to the money recovered, he refused to
give any statement.
10
He filed his sheriff's return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days.
11

Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 for having demanded and received P l,000.00 from Dominguez, a
private individual, for a favor extended by him to the latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to Comtrust which was his official duty.
However, in an amended information dated February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct bribery under the Revised Penal Code.
12

Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.
13

In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving credence to the defense theory that
there was novation of the money judgment and in admitting illegally-obtained evidence.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public
officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to
do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
14
The promise of a public officer to perform an act or to
refrain from doing it may be express or implied.
15

It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio
assigned to implement the execution order issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed that Manipon garnished the bank
accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust and that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after which he received P l,000.00 from Dominguez.
It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez on December 28, 1979 was not a bribe but a payment in partial
satisfaction of the judgment under execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Longog Tabek had agreed.
Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA office on December 27, 1979, Dominguez requested Manipon to convey to
the creditors that he was only willing to pay for the time being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P 1,720. 00 to be paid after the New
Year.
16
So he visited Longog Tabek who was the "lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to the lesser amount because he needed money badly.
17
His arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all verbal. At that time he found no reason to have some written memorandum for his own
protection.
At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand him a temporary receipt but Dominguez brushed it aside
and said he was in a
hurry.
18

Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution against several
vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented.
19

The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.
It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final judgment, no one took the bother of putting it down on paper.
Of course Manipon would have us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that
Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor
arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations
because there was no such agreement in the first place.
The temporary receipt
20
adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the
alleged agreement for the trial payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested in
getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.
The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help either to the defense. Flora is Manipon's co-sheriff and is therefore biased. On
the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on the witness stand, answered with obvious hesitation, betraying himself to be a rehearsed witness.
While he claimed that he was the supposed headman of the other creditors, he could not present any authority that would allow him to speak for
them, let alone agree to receive a lesser amount in their behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their names.
21

Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the
bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the
garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was
very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not informing
the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He returned
the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979.
22
Clearly,
Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.
Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation.
23
That affidavit contained two annexes but the
temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on December 28, 1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found it only
several weeks after he had made the affidavit.
24
This leads us to strongly suspect there was actually no temporary receipt at all at the time of
payment on December 28 and that it was concocted by the defense as a last-ditch effort to make the authorities believe that what had transpired was
not a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of a judgment debt.
In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the prosecution witnesses have acquitted themselves welt The Sandiganbayan did
not err in giving weight and credence to their version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no valid March warrant and therefore
inadmissible.
The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least
three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure
of evidence in plain view.
25

In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on December 28,1979, NISA Sub-Station Commander Colonel Luisito Sanchez held a
final briefing among his men and some operatives from the Benguet Philippine Constabulary concerning the planned entrapment. He had earlier
received word from Dominguez that the lifting of the garnishment would be effected that afternoon and he informed them that Manipon was asking
money from Dominguez.
26
As Colonel Sanchez earlier testified, part of the money to be withdrawn after lifting the garnishment was to be given to
the accused
27
for agreeing to lift the order of garnishment. After the briefing which lasted from ten to fifteen minutes, they an headed for the
Comtrust bank.
NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the bank so that he could observe what transpired inside the bank.
28
He testified that
he saw Dominguez give the marked money to Manipon which the latter accepted and counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the money from
Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of the agents positioned nearby by placing his right hand on his head to indicate that the money had
changed hands. Immediately thereafter, Dominguez left the bank, Manipon placed the money in his left breast pocket and followed suit. As Manipon
walked past Murla on his way out, the latter gave another signal by putting his hand on his left breast to indicate that Manipon had placed the money
in his left breast pocket.
29

Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC operatives approached Manipon and his two companions. After Identifying themselves
as peace officers, they retrieved the P l,000.00 from Manipon. Through it all, Manipon remained amazingly silent and voiced no protest.
30

The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would therefore fall within the first exception. The search was made as an incident to a lawful
arrest, in accordance with our pronouncement in Moreno v. Ago Chi 12 Phil. 439, reiterated in Alvero v. Dizon 76 Phil. 637, to wit:
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be
armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying evidence within his
reach.
31

Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual they need not be discuss here.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner-accused Nathaniel Manipon, Jr.
The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 30, 1981 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 95000, April 16, 1991 ]
ALFONSO C. DACUMOS, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
CRUZ, J.:

The Court has carefully considered the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings and finds no reason for reversing the decision of the
Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner of direct bribery.

As found by the respondent court, the petitioner, a revenue examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stationed at San Pablo City, offered to settle
the tax liability of R. Revilla Interiors, in the amount of P73,307.31 by pulling out its assessment papers from the office of the BIR Commissioner and
procuring a tax clearance. For such service, he would require a fee of P35,000.00 (later reduced to P30,000.00). Gregorio Samia, the manager of
the firm, pretended to go along with him but reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation, which arranged an entrapment. This was
effected on October 28, 1986, near the Rizal Cafe in Makati. Samia, meeting with the petitioner there, told him he had only P1,000.00 then but
would deliver P9,000.00 to him that same evening at his residence and pay the balance of P20,000.00 in November. The petitioner wrote his
address on the back of a receipt, which he gave Samia. Samia tendered the white envelope containing P1,000.00 previously dusted with fluorescent
powder, but the petitioner accepted it only when they had left the eatery and he was nearing his car outside. He put the envelope in his pocket. The
NBI agents closed in, identified themselves, and placed him under arrest. The petitioner's reaction was to draw out the envelope and throw it on the
ground. One of the agents retrieved it. At the NBI headquarters, the petitioner's hands were found positive for fluorescent powder, as so were the
envelope itself and the bills inside.

The petitioner claims the charges against him were fabricated. He argues inter alia that he could not have promised to remove the assessment
papers from the Commissioner's office as he had no access to that place; that at the time of his supposed offer the tax liability of the firm had not yet
been ascertained and that in any case the percentage tax imposed on it was mandatory and not subject to adjustment. He stresses that as a tax
examiner with 29 years service he would not have been "so crude and so rash" as to demand money from Samia whom he barely knew. He said he
had met Samia at the Rizal Cafe only because the latter was "irritatingly insistent" on securing his help regarding the firm's tax amnesty. It was
Samia who had urged the envelope on him but he had rejected it twice, first when they were at the restaurant and later when they were outside. He
also faults the respondent court for misappreciating the evidence and for obvious bias in favor of the prosecution.

The issues he raises are mainly factual. The petitioner has not shown that the findings thereon of the respondent court are tainted with arbitrariness
or are not supported by substantial evidence. His charge that he was "framed" because Samia resented his refusal to be bribed is not convincing. It
is belied by his proven acts. The implausibility of his promises does not mean they were not made or that they did not appear to be credible, coming
as they did from one with his long experience in the BIR and appeared to know his way around. The Court finds it especially remarkable that he met
Samia at a private place instead of his office at the BIR, considering that they were supposed to be discussing official business and it was Samia
who he says was requesting his assistance.

It was within the discretion of the respondent court to weigh the evidence of the parties and to admit such of it as it regarded as credible and reject
those that it considered perjurious or fabricated. Every trial court must have that leeway. If the Sandiganbayan chose to believe Samia and not the
petitioner or Exhibit F-1, the NBI report, rather than Exhibit 5, the petitioner's alleged assessment report, this would not necessarily prove that its
decision was biased and arbitrary.

The Court is not inclined to believe that Samia would be so vindictive as to falsely incriminate the petitioner with the serious charge of bribery simply
because the petitioner refused to reduce the tax assessment of R. Revilla Interiors. Samia was not even directly involved in that assessment. As for
Exhibit 5, the respondent court cannot be faulted for not accepting it in the absence of corroboration that the petitioner actually filed it only on
October 17, 1986 (to show that he could not have offered to reduce the assessment of the taxpayer company earlier in September, as alleged). On
the other hand, the technical report on the test conducted by the NBI for fluorescent powder on the petitioner's hands invited easy acceptance.

While protesting his innocence, the petitioner has failed to rebut the evidence of the prosecution that has sufficiently established his guilt and shifted
the burden of proof to him. He has not discharged that burden by just contending that the decision is based on "speculations, conjectures and
assumptions" and that the conclusions drawn therefrom are "mistaken, absurd and fallacious." The thrust of his defense is that the respondent court
should have believed him instead of the People, but he has not convinced us that the trial court has erred. In short, he has failed to prove, in this
petition for certiorari where only questions of law may be raised, that he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.

The petitioner seems to be suggesting in the conclusion to his petition that judgment was rendered against him because he happens to be a tax
collector, whom he says "history, even from Biblical times, depicts ... as the most unpopular and vilified adjunct of any society." The plea does not
persuade. It suffices to observe that he was convicted not because he is a tax collector but because he accepted a bribe.

We find, on the basis of the evidence of record, that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome and that the guilt of the
petitioner has been established beyond reasonable doubt. ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED and the petition DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 46 November 10, 1972
MAKING IT PUNISHABLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO RECEIVE, AND FOR PRIVATE PERSONS TO GIVE, GIFTS ON
ANY OCCASION, INCLUDING CHRISTMAS

WHEREAS, under existing laws and the civil service rules, it is prohibited to receive, directly or indirectly, any gift, present or any other form of
benefit in the course of official duties;

WHEREAS, it is believed necessary to put more teeth to existing laws and regulations to wipe out all conceivable forms of graft and corruption in the
public service, the members of which should not only be honest but above suspicion and reproach; and

WHEREAS, the stoppage of the practice of gift-giving to government men is a concrete step in the administration's program of reforms for the
development of new moral values in the social structure of the country, one of the main objectives of the New Society;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General
Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it punishable for any public official or employee, whether of the national or local
governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other valuable thing to any
occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not
the same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or
employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainments in honor of
the official or employees or his immediate relatives.

For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and perpetual disqualification
from public office shall be imposed. The official or employee concerned shall likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action and, if found
guilty, shall be meted out the penalty of suspension or removal, depending on the seriousness of the offense.

Any provision of law, executive order, rule or regulation or circular inconsistent with this Decree is hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

This Decree shall take effect immediately after its publication.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO GIVERS OF BRIBES AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR ACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND
OTHER GRAFT CASES AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

WHEREAS, public office is a public trust: public officers are but servants of the people, whom they must serve with utmost fidelity and integrity;

WHEREAS, it has heretofore been virtually impossible to secure the conviction and removal of dishonest public servants owing to the lack of
witnesses: the bribe or gift-givers being always reluctant to testify against the corrupt public officials and employees concerned for fear of being
indicted and convicted themselves of bribery and corruption;

WHEREAS, it is better by far and more socially desirable, as well as just, that the bribe or gift giver be granted immunity from prosecution so that he
may freely testify as to the official corruption, than that the official who receives the bribe or gift should be allowed to go free, insolently remaining in
public office, and continuing with his nefarious and corrupt practices, to the great detriment of the public service and the public interest.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby
decree and order that:

Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the Revised Penal Code; Republic Act
Numbered Three Thousand Nineteen, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code
and other provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and
regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testifies against any public official or employee for
such violation shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and
may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided; that this immunity may be enjoyed even in
cases where the information and testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal, or accomplice, or accessory
in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, that this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness
notwithstanding that he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the public official or his accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; and Provided, finally, that
the following conditions concur:

1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;

2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer;

3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;

4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and

5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach should it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false and
malicious or made only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the public officer denounced. In such a case, the public
officer so denounced shall be entitled to any action, civil or criminal, against said informant or witness.

Section 3. All preliminary investigations conducted by a prosecuting fiscal, judge or committee, and all proceedings undertaken in connection
therewith, shall be strictly confidential or private in order to protect the reputation of the official under investigation in the event that the report proves
to be unfounded or no prima facie case is established.

Section 4. All acts, decrees and rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.

1. Graft and Corruption

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1379
AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY
ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR.

Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or employee" means any person holding any public office or employment by
virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any office or employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or
controlled corporation or enterprise.

(b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities which the respondent has at any time acquired
by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof)
already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's
spouse. It shall not include:

1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's
spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.

2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.

3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the donation is lawful.

Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or
provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General
that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall
file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where said public officer or
employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part
thereof, should not be declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election or
within three months before any special election.

The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or employment in the Government or in the Government-owned or
controlled corporation shall not be a bar to the filing of the petition: Provided, however, That the right to file such petition shall prescribe after four
years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except as to those who
have ceased to hold office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings shall prescribe after four years from the
approval hereof.

Section 3. The petition. The petition shall contain the following information:

(a) The name and address of the respondent.

(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has previously held.

(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.

(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and

(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his
incumbency.

Section 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days within which to present his answer.

Section 5. Hearing. The Court shall set a date for a hearing, which may be open to the public, and during which the respondent shall be given ample
opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.

Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then
the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of
the State: Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any special
election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.

Section 7. Appeal. The parties may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance as provided in the Rules of Court for appeals in civil
cases.

Section 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from
producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false
testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative proceedings.

Section 9. Immunity. The Solicitor General may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who testifies to the unlawful manner in which
the respondent has acquired any of the property in question in cases where such testimony is necessary to prove violations of this Act.

Section 10. Effect of record of title. The fact that any real property has been recorded in the Registry of Property or office of the Register of Deeds in
the name of the respondent or of any person mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the
rendering of the judgment referred to in section six of this Act.

Section 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit
the respondent, in respect of any property unlawfully acquired by him.

Section 12. Penalties. Any public officer or employee who shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or convey any unlawfully acquired
property shall be repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine. The same repression shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.

Section 13. Separability of provisions. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Section 14. Effective date. This Act shall take effect on its approval, and shall apply not only to property thereafter unlawfully acquired but also to
property unlawfully acquired before the effective date of this Act.

Approved: June 18, 1955

G.R. No. L-18428 August 30, 1962
MARIANO G. ALMEDA, SR., and VALERIANA F. ALMEDA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JESUS Y. PEREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction, filed by petitioners seeking to set aside and declare null and void the
orders, dated March 15, 1961 and May 8, 1961, of the respondent Judge Jesus Y. Perez of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No.
44693 of said court. The first order allowed the filing of an amended petition for forfeiture against petitioners; the second denied a motion for the
reconsideration thereof and for the dismissal of the amended petition for forfeiture.

In October, 1961, Epifanio T. Villegas and Jesus A. Mendoza, filed a complaint with the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. with
having acquired, during his incumbency as government employee, cash and properties from unknown sources in the total amount of P121,407.98
which acquisitions, according to the complaint, were manifestly out of proportion to the salary and other lawful income of said Mariano G. Almeda,
Sr., and, therefore, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law. Pursuant to the provisions of said
Act, a preliminary investigation was conducted by a committee of investigators designated by the Secretary of Justice. In a resolution of said
investigators, dated November 4, 1960, it was certified that there is reasonable ground to believe that from 1950 to 1959, Mariano G. Almeda, Sr.
acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as Assistant Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and to his other lawful
income.

On the basis of the findings of the investigators, the Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines as petitioner, filed on November
12, 1960, with, Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for forfeiture against Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., docketed as Civil Case No. 44693. It
charges him with having committed while engaged in the performance of his official and, in consequence of said graft, had acquired properties and
made cash disbursements from 1950 to 1959 grossly disproportionate to his lawful income. His wife was included as a co-respondent in her capacity
as wife of Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. and as co-owner of their conjugal properties.

Petitioners herein filed their answer on December 1960 and thereafter the case was set for hearing, but February 15, 1961, the Solicitor General filed
a "Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture". The judge granted the motion but rejected the inclusion of Mariano F. Almeda, Jr. as party
respondent. On March 25, 196 the Solicitor General filed the amended petition for forfeiture, adding other counts and items of alleged unlawful
acquisitions and disbursements thus increasing the alleged cash from unexplained sources received by the respondent from the years 1950-59 to
P208,682.45, as against respondent's salary and other lawful income of only P59,860.97. Respondents, petitioners herein, objected to the
amendment on the ground that the new counts or charges already been investigated and dismissed after investigation, and respondents had not
been given a new preliminary investigation with respect to the new counts or charges that the proceeding under Republic Act No. 1379 being
criminal in nature, the petition may not be amended as substance without respondents' consent. It is also claim that the amendments were presented
only to delay the proceedings to the prejudice of the respondents, and that the new counts or charges could not be included because one year had
already elapsed after a general election in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379. After the filing of memoranda by the parties the
respondent judge issued the order sought to be reviewed, authorizing the presentation of the second amended petition but without including therein
Mariano F. Almeda, Jr. as a party respondent. The court ruled as follows:

The Court finds no merit to the contention that the amended petition seeks to include new counts which were previously dismissed by the
investigating Fiscals because no such dismissal appears in the resolution of said investigating fiscal and moreover, the only function of the
investigating fiscals in the preliminary investigation was to determine whether or not there is probable cause that respondents have acquired
properties beyond their means. The items of receipts and disbursements or acquisitions referred to as new counts by the respondents are but
allegations in detail respecting the main allegation that respondents unlawfully acquired the properties described in the amended petition. The new
allegations of receipts and disbursements embodied in the amended petition objected to by the respondents merely supplement or amplify the facts
of unlawful acquisition originally alleged in the original petition. These amendments hence relate back to the date of the filing of the original petition
so that the prohibition contained in Rep. Act 1379 that no petition shall be filed within one year before a general election cannot apply with respect to
the new items of receipts and disbursements. The Court finds no merit in the respondents' contention that the amended petition should not be
admitted on the allegation that this proceeding is penal in nature and no amendment as to matters of substance can be admitted after the
respondents have filed their answer because this is a civil case and the rules respecting amendments in civil cases and not of informations in
criminal cases should govern the admission of amendments in this case. The mere fact that a preliminary investigation is required to be held in a
proceeding of this nature does not make the same a criminal proceeding. Hence, the rule that amendments of pleadings are favored and should be
liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice should be applied.

With reference to the objection that no preliminary investigation was conducted insofar as the new respondent Mariano P. Almeda is concerned, the
Court finds said objection to be well-founded because no preliminary investigation was in fact conducted insofar as said new respondent is
concerned in violation of Sec. 2 of Rep. Act 1379.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the petitioner to file, within ten days, a second amended petition without including therein, Mariano F.
Almeda as party respondent or make reference therein with respect to said person.

SO ORDERED.

The principal contention of the petitioners herein, respondents in the court below, is that Republic Act No. 1379 is penal in substance and effect,
hence the presentation of the amended petition without the benefit of a previous preliminary investigation under the Act cannot be allowed; that the
amendment would have the effect of presenting charge (under Republic Act No. 1379) within one year from the date of a general election; and lastly
that amendment may not be made on a matter of substance after the defendants had pleaded.

A study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379 readily discloses that the proceeding for forfeiture is in nature and not criminal, as claimed by the
petitioners. A test has been suggested to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil or criminal, thus:

. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they are in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If however, the proceeding does not
involve the conviction of wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provision
where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for recovered in a civil action.
(37 CJS, Forfeitures, Sec. 5, pp. 15-16).

In the first place a proceedings under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does, not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided
for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is require
prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a
criminal in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but other steps in the proceedings are those for civil
proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. Had it been a criminal proceeding there would been, after a preliminary
investigation, a reading of information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, and a trial thereafter, with the publication of the judgement in the presence of the
defendant. But these proceedings as above set forth, are not provided for in the law.1wph1.t

Section 12 of the law provides a penalty to the public officer, but said penalty is against the employee or officer for the transfer or conveyance of any
unlawfully acquired properties. The law therefore penalizes an officer for transferring or conveying properties unlawfully acquired but does not do so
for making the unlawful acquisition; it merely imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired.

As the proceeding for forfeiture, as pointed out and as provided for in the law, is not a penal proceeding but a civil one for the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired, and as the procedure outlined in the law is that which is followed in civil actions, amendment of the charges or the
petition for forfeiture may be made as in ordinary civil actions; i.e., the amendments may be made before trial or in the course of trial without need of
another investigation. It also follows that amendments setting forth newly discovered acquisitions may be in the petition without obtaining the consent
of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-19052 December 29, 1962
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, and to set aside an order of said respondent, as well as
the whole proceedings in said criminal case. .

On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging
petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct
unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his as sets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally
reprehensible acts". On September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of five (5) members, consisting of former Justice
Marceliana R. Montemayor, as Chairman, former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and Generals Basilio J. Valdez and
Guillermo B. Francisco, to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and
recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation, on September 15, 1961, the Committee, upon request of complainant
Col. Maristela, or considered petitioner herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned
charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon, petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela and to the
aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the
witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner
respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand. Hence, in a communication dated September 18, 1961, the Committee
referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. On September 28, 1961, the City Fiscal filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" reading as follows:

The undersigned hereby charges Manuel F. Cabal with contempt under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code in relation to sections I and
7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, committed as follows:

That on or about September 15, 1961, in the investigation conducted at the U.P. Little Theater:, Padre Faura, Manila, by the Presidential Committee,
which was created by the President of the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with law to investigate the charges of alleged acquisition by
respondent of unexplained wealth and composed of Justice Marceliano Montemayor, as Chairman, and Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero
Cabahug and Generals Basilio Valdez and Guillermo Francisco, as members, with the power, among others, to compel the attendance of witnesses
and take their testimony under oath, respondent who was personally present at the time before the Committee in compliance with a subpoena duly
issued to him, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and contumaciously, without any justifiable cause or reason refusal and fail and still refuses and
fails to obey the lawful order of the Committee to take the witness stand, be sworn and testify as witness in said investigation, in utter disregard of
the lawful authority of the Committee and thereby obstructing and degrading the proceedings before said body.

Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the Presidential Committee and accordingly
disciplined as in contempt of court imprisonment until such time as he shall obey the subject order of said committee.

This charge, docketed as Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, was assigned to Branch XVIII thereof, presided over by respondent Judge. On
October 2, 1961, the latter issued an order requiring petitioner to show cause and/or answer the charge filed against him within ten (10) days. Soon
thereafter, or on October 4, 1961, petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the charge and/or order to show cause, upon the ground:
(1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to file said char and the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the charge has been filed
without a preliminary investigation, and, civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of civil cases being limited to representing the City
of Manila; (2) that the facts charged constitute no offense for section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is based,
violates due process, in that it is vague and uncertain as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable therefor and that it fail to specify
whether said offense shall be treated also contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court (3) that more than one offense is charged, for the
contempt imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of an inferior court, as contempt of a superior court an as contempt under
section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4) that the Committee had no power to order an require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn
to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

By resolution dated October 14, 1961. respondent Judge denied said motion to quash. Thereupon, or on October 20, 1961, petitioner began the
present action for the purpose adverted to above, alleging that, unless restrained by this court, respondent Judge may summarily punish him for
contempt, and that such action would not be appealable.

In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not
criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary investigations (Section '08-C, Republic Act No. 409, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1201) is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. contempt
against an administrative officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that petitioner herein is charged with only one offense; and that,
tinder the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory
questions.

At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the
witness stand (3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the
proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.

In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth,
there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to
apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of
property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.

In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture property without compensation, in consequence of a default an offense, and the term is used in
such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the
lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an
offense and to aid in the prevention of such a offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the
sovereign power (23 Am. Jur. 599) (Emphasis ours.)

In Black's Law Dictionary a "forfeiture" is defined to be "the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the
provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law." It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of
duty. (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)

As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from
the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.

Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil
proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful
possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature criminal proceedings that a
general verdict on several count in an information is upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of
the property appears, are so far considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and to prevent
the compulsory production of his books and papers. ... (23 Am. Jur. 612; emphasis ours.)

Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the late decisions are to the effect that suits for forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses
against the law are so far of quasi-criminal nature as to be within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth
Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .... It has frequently been held
upon constitutional grounds under the various State Constitution, that a witness or party called as witness cannot be made to testify against himself
as to matters which would subject his property to forfeiture. At early common law no person could be compelled to testify against himself or to
answer any question which would have had a tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture or to form a link in a chain of evidence for that purpose,
as well as to incriminate him. Under this common-law doctrine of protection against compulsory disclosures which would tend to subject the witness
to forfeiture, such protection was claimed and availed of in some early American cases without placing the basis of the protection upon constitutional
grounds. (23 Am. Jur., 616; emphasis ours.)

Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or
other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for
penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth
Amendment which declares, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against
the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to
be forfeited. (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368; emphasis ours.)lawphil.net

The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally to
prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would tend to expose him to a ... forfeiture .... (58 Am. Jur., See. 43, p. 48; emphasis ours.)

As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This
prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applied only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which
the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature, .... (58 Am. Jur., Sec. 44, p. 49: emphasis ours.)

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The
privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to
incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to
answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer
questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. (C.J.S., p. 252; emphasis ours.)

A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer any question as a witness which would subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or forfeiture is imposed as a vindication of the public justice of the state.

In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against compulsory self-incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer
any question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or testify in action against him for a penalty.

The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of the public justice the state as a statutory fine or
penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a
criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure applicable to ordinary civil remedy. (98 C. J. S., pp. 275-6.)

Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that the information, in a proceeding to declaration a forfeiture of certain property
because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though technically a civil proceeding is in substance and effect a criminal one", and that suits for
penalties and forfeitures are within the reason criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of
an officer was held, in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment
applies "to all cases in which the action prosecution is not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons
charged with the commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is a action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction the criminal laws,
and, with this object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case ...". This view was, in effect confirmed in Lees
vs. U.S. (37 L. ed. 1150-1151). Hence, the Lawyer Reports Annotated (Vol. 29, p. 8), after an extensive examination of pertinent cases, concludes
that said constitutional provision applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely remedial", or intended "as a redress for a private grievance", but
primarily to punish "a violation of duty or a public wrong and to deter others from offending in likewise manner. ...".

We are unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962) in which the theory that, after the filing of respondents'
answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal
procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding in civil in nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the purely
procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing the substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly their constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No.
60111 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 74225 April 17, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SIMPLICIO BERDON, GAUDIOSA BERDON and LUIS BERDON, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

The Republic assails as erroneous the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming that of the Court of First Instance which dismissed the
petition for forfeiture of unexplained wealth under Republic Act No. 1379 filed against private respondents herein.

The dismissed petition charged Simplicio Berdon, an Assistant Staff Civil Engineer assigned to Regional Office No. VII of the Bureau of Public
Highways in Cebu City, with having acquired unexplained wealth in violation of Republic Act No. 1379. It alleged that during the period from 1963 to
1969 he and his wife Gaudiosa Mangubat Berdon purchased parcels of land and constructed a house, the purchase prices and costs of which were
not commensurate to their incomes, savings or declared assets. Pleaded as defendants in the petition were Berdon, his wife, and Luis Berdon, his
father. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, which valued the unexplained wealth at P124,495.82, thus sought the forfeiture of the properties and
the issuance of a writ of attachment. Upon orders of the trial court, the properties enumerated in the petition were attached.

During the course of the trial, the following evidence was adduced by the parties:

xxx xxx xxx

The evidence for the petitioner as testified to by Joselito Magno and Atty. David Macayayong may be summarized as follows:

That on the basis of a letter complaint sent to the Office of the President by a certain George Valde against Simplicio Berdon, the Complaint and
Investigation Office, Malacaang, Manila, sent Joselito Magno and Atty. David Macayayong to conduct an actual field investigation on Mr. Simplicio
Berdon. Both investigators went to Cebu City, Danao City and the Northern Towns of Bogo and Borbon, Cebu and secured pertinent documents
relative to the case such as the service record of the respondent Simplicio Berdon (Exh. 'B') copies of sworn statement of financial condition, assets,
income and liabilities of respondent-spouses Berdon, Exhibit "C" for the year 1962; Exhibit "D" for 1963; Exhibit "E" for 1965; Exhibit "F" for 1967 and
Exhibit "G" for 1969. Copies of documents regarding the acquisition of respondent Simplicio Berdon were also obtained, to wit: Exhibit 'H' which is a
Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land in favor of respondents-spouses Berdon for a consideration of P3,700.00 executed on July 19,1967; Exh.
"I" is a contract to sell by installments of a parcel of land of the Singson Village Subdivision, Cebu City, in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon for a
monthly installment of P107.00, more or less, and with a total consideration of P9,000.00; Exh. "J" is a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of
agricultural land dated September 6,1967 also in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon for a consideration of P3,000.00; Exh. "K" is another Deed of
Absolute Sale of a parcel of land situated in Cebu City, containing an area of 623 square meters in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon for the sum
of P15,825.00 executed on November 9, 1967; Exh. "L" is a Deed of Sale With Right to Repurchase within a period of 5 years of a parcel of
agricultural land situated at Managasa, Borbon, Cebu executed by Fidel Sepulveda in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon on November 27, 1967
for a consideration of P5,000.00; Exh. 'M' is another Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase within the period of three (3) years of a parcel of
agricultural land also situated at Managasa, Borbon, Cebu, executed by Felicidad S. Guiachon on December 7, 1967 in favor of respondent
Simplicio Berdon for a consideration of P3,000.00; Exh. "N-1" is a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Managasa,
Borbon, Cebu, executed by Elias M. Dosdos on December 17, 1967 in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon for the sum of P25,000.00; Exh. "Y" is a
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by Felicidad S. Guiachon on July 4, 1968 in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon for a sum of
P5,000.00; Exh. "P" is another Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by Fidel Sepulveda on November 8, 1968 in favor of Simplicio
Berdon for the sum of P10,000. 00 and Exh. "O" refer to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 18, 1969 of a parcel of land situated at Bogo,
Cebu in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon; Exh. "S" refer to a Deed of Extrajudicial partition of a parcel of land acquired by respondent Luis
Berdon for a consideration of P1,000.00. This parcel of land is included since the respondent Luis Berdon had no known source of income and this
land must have been purchased by the respondent Simplicio Berdon but under the name of respondent Berdon; and Exh. "R" is a Declaration of
Real Property, a residential house of strong materials owned by respondent Simplicio Berdon with an assessed value of P34,480.00. An analysis
and evaluation of respondent Simplicio Berdon's financial condition, income, assets and liabilities reflected in Exhs. "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G" from
1962 to 1969 show an unexplained total income of P105,495.92. Not included in the computation is the sum of P1,000.00 which was the
consideration of the parcel of land purchased in the name of respondent Luis Berdon so that the total unexplained income of respondent Simplicio
Berdon for the years 1962 to 1969 is P109,495.92. The total amounts paid by respondents spouses in the several real properties purchased and/or
constructed by them amounts to P101,305.00 as shown in Exhs. "H", "I" , "J" , "K", "L", "M", "N-1", "O" and "P", "Q" and "R" plus the aforementioned
sum of P1,000.00 purchased for a parcel of land in the name of Luis Berdon (Exh. 'S'). Since the money used to purchase those real properties
came from an unexplained income these properties should be forfeited in favor of the state.

The evidence for the respondents as testified to by respondents spouses Simplicio Berdon and Gaudiosa Mangubat Berdon is as follows:

Respondent Mrs. Berdon is employed as a pharmacist at the Danao General Hospital (Exh. '4'). Her parents who have several landholdings in the
municipality of Borbon, Cebu (Exh. '9') extended to respondents spouses a loan in the sum of P5,000.00 (Exh. '10-A') to buy the house and lot in
Danao City. Aside from this amount respondents spouses were given by Mrs. Berdon's mother the sum of P3,000.00 to repair said house which was
already very dilapidated. Respondents deny having owned a moviehouse in Bogo, Cebu. Moreover, Mrs. Romualda Mangubat, respondent Mrs.
Berdon's mother, owns the moviehouse.

Respondent Simplicio Berdon testified that he started in the government service as construction foreman in the year 1955. Since then he has been in
the government service and rose from the ranks when he was promoted to the position of Assistant Staff Civil Engineer in the Ministry of Public
Highways, Region 7. Aside from respondents spouses' income as government employees they have also other income, and for which they have paid
taxes thereon under Presidential Decree 370 (Exhs. '12' and '12- A') and Presidential Decree 631 (Exhs. '13' & '13-A'). In respondents-spouses'
statement of assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1967, the P20,000.00 disbursed as insurance premiums was erroneous. This amount
represents the face value of the insurance policy of respondent Simplicio Berdon (Exh.'15'). Insurance premiums should have been only P427.66
semi-annually (Exh. '15-A'). The respondent Simplicio Berdon also denied petitioner's allegation that the purchase price of the parcel of land he
bought from a certain Elias Dosdos was P45,000.00. The truth is that he paid only P25,000.00 as shown in Exhs. "16" & "16-A". The residential
house of respondents spouses situated in Lahug, Cebu City, actually costs about P25,000.00 as shown in the building permit of said house (Exhs.
'17' and '17-A') and respondents spouses were able to obtain a real estate loan of P14,000.00 from the GSIS to finance the construction of said
building (Exhs. '18' & '19'). Sometime on November 7, 1967, the respondent Simplicio Berdon obtained a personal loan from former Congressman
Ramon Durano in the sum of P100,000.00 under a Memorandum of Agreement (Exhs. '20') which amount he used to purchase the several parcels
of agricultural lands in 1967 and 1968. The marriage contract of the respondents spouses marked Exh. "21" showed that Congressman and Mrs.
Durano stood as sponsors of the wedding of respondents spouses. Defendants spouses had also obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (Exh. '22') which they used to purchase the lot in Bogo, Cebu containing an area of 359 sq. m. (Exh. '23') mentioned in petitioner's Exh.
"O".

Respondent Luis Berdon was not presented. However, Exhibit "11" which is a medical certificate issued by the municipal health officer of Bordon,
Cebu was presented to show that the general physical condition of the respondent Luis Berdon cannot sustain long distance land travel. Exhs. "5"
and "9" were also presented showing that the respondent Luis Berdon is a retired school teacher and a declared owner of several parcels of land
situated in Bordon, Cebu, respectively. (pp. 67-76, Record on Appeal). [IAC Decision, pp. 3-7; Rollo, pp. 34-38.]

On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the trial court dismissed the petition, holding that respondents have no unexplained wealth.

The Republic appealed the trial court's decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The appellate court, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, affirmed said decision. Said court found that, on the basis of the evidence presented, "the assets acquired by the respondent-
spouses in excess of their income and receipts from their employment in the Government were satisfactorily explained, thus justifying the conclusion
of the trial court that respondent-spouses do not have unexplained wealth subject to forfeiture under Republic Act 1379." [IAC Decision, p. 7; Rollo,
p. 38.]

Hence, the instant recourse by the Republic to this Court through a petition to review the appellate court's decision.

Republic Act No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Thereof," provides inter alia:

Sec. 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income from legitimately acquired property, said property
shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired....

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then
the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of
the State: Provided, That no judgment shall be released within six months before any general election or within three months before any special
election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.

xxx xxx xxx

Clear from these provisions is that the law creates a presumption against the public officer or employee who acquires property grossly
disproportionate to his income, i.e. that the property was unlawfully acquired. However, this presumption is juris tantum. It may be rebutted by the
public officer or employee by showing to the satisfaction of the court that his acquisition of the property was lawful.

In the instant case, both the trial and the appellate courts had found satisfactory the private respondents' explanation of their acquisition of the
properties and consequently held that they do not have any unexplained wealth as contemplated by the law.

The Solicitor General contends that the findings of the appellate court are not supported by the evidence and, hence, should not bind the Court. The
Court finds the contention unmeritorious, as the evidence indeed obviates a finding of unexplained wealth.

The Court has carefully gone over the evidence presented by private respondents, and like the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court, finds
the acquisition of the subject properties satisfactorily explained.

While respondent spouses had acquired properties and constructed a house the costs of which were disproportionate to their combined incomes
from their employment in the government it had been proved that such were financed through a donation and loans, to wit:

(1) a P3,000.00 donation and a P5,000.00 loan from the parents of Mrs. Berdon who owned several parcels of land and a moviehouse [TSN,
October 3,1979, pp. 11-17; Exh. "9"];

(2) a P14,000.00 loan from the Government Service Insurance System [Exhs. "18" and "19"];

(3) a P6,000.00 loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines [TSN, November 21, 1979, pp. 21-22; Exhs. "22" and "23"]; and,

(4) a P100,000.00 loan from Congressman Ramon Durano, a wedding sponsor of respondent spouses [TSN, November 20, 1979, pp. 18-19; Exh.
"21"], for the purchase of agricultural land to be planted with sugarcane (although only a total amount of approximately P60,000.00 was actually
released) [TSN, November 21, 1979, pp. 17-19; Exh. "20"].

The Solicitor General also makes much of the fact that the statements of assets and liabilities filed by private respondent Simplicio Berdon covering
the years material to the case did not accurately reflect the donation and the loans granted to private respondent spouses and that Simplicio's
testimony in effect contradicts the entries in said statements. It must be emphasized, however, that in determining whether or not there is
unexplained wealth within the purview of R.A. No. 1379 the courts are not bound by the statements of assets and liabilities filed by the respondent. **
On the contrary, this statute affords the respondent every opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he had acquired the property in
question [Sec. 5, R.A. No. 1379.]

In sum, the presumption under See. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 that the subject properties were unlawfully acquired had been successfully rebutted by
private respondents through competent evidence. Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court did not err in affirming the trial court's decision dismissing
the Republic's petition.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and its
decision dated March 31, 1986 is AFFIRMED.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term

(a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all
other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches.

(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph.

(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate
family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the
occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive.

(d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates otherwise.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for
whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in
consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the
pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before
him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or
for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a
board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular
transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized
persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the
employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k)
of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily
disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or
material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in
which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree.
The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving
rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil
degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already
dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of
such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials
concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.

Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been
elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or
benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term.

The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any
law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency.

It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or
resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest.

Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within
the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from
office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent
office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the
Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year:
Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following
months of January.

Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred
seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an
amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or
removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition
through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.

Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3,
4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and other lawful income.

Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in
the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or
the value of such thing.

(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more
than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.

The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if
no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper
Court of First Instance.

Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.

Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending
a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship
according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by
any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice
of such profession, trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this
Act.

Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the
remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained wealth, all property acquired by a
public officer since he assumed office shall be taken into consideration.

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO
UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR
EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and employees
shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with
patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

(a) "Government" includes the National Government, the local governments, and all other instrumentalities, agencies or branches of the Republic
of the Philippines including government-owned or controlled corporations, and their subsidiaries.

(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career
service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.

(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or any act or liberality, in favor of another who accepts it, and shall include a
simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not include an unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in
anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor from a public official or employee.

(d) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly, a gift from a person other than a member of his family or relative as
defined in this Act, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is neither nominal nor
insignificant, or the gift is given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.

(e) "Loan" covers both simple loan and commodatum as well as guarantees, financing arrangements or accommodations intended to ensure its
approval.

(f) "Substantial stockholder" means any person who owns, directly or indirectly, shares of stock sufficient to elect a director of a corporation. This
term shall also apply to the parties to a voting trust.

(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age.

(h) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise.

(i) "Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a substantial stockholder of a private
corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a business, and the interest of such corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein, may
be opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of official duty.

(j) "Divestment" is the transfer of title or disposal of interest in property by voluntarily, completely and actually depriving or dispossessing oneself of
his right or title to it in favor of a person or persons other than his spouse and relatives as defined in this Act.

(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
including bilas, inso and balae.

Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of
personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All
government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity
and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not
dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments
of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party
affiliation or preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless
otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide information of their policies and
procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate,
encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of the
socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the
use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the
principle of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the
Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall
not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these standards including the dissemination of
information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by
their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on measures
which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.

Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to:

(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to
letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.

(b) Submit annual performance reports. - All heads or other responsible officers of offices and agencies of the government and of government-
owned or controlled corporations shall, within forty-five (45) working days from the end of the year, render a performance report of the agency or
office or corporation concerned. Such report shall be open and available to the public within regular office hours.

(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. - All official papers and documents must be processed and completed within a reasonable time
from the preparation thereof and must contain, as far as practicable, not more than three (3) signatories therein. In the absence of duly authorized
signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer in charge shall sign for and in their behalf.

(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. - All public officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of
the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.

(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the
public within reasonable working hours.

Section 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. - A system of annual incentives and rewards is hereby established in order to motivate and inspire
public servants to uphold the highest standards of ethics. For this purpose, a Committee on Awards to Outstanding Public Officials and Employees is
hereby created composed of the following: the Ombudsman and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as Co-Chairmen, and the Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, and two government employees to be appointed by the President, as members.

It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a periodic, continuing review of the performance of public officials and employees, in all the
branches and agencies of Government and establish a system of annual incentives and rewards to the end that due recognition is given to public
officials and employees of outstanding merit on the basis of the standards set forth in this Act.

The conferment of awards shall take into account, among other things, the following: the years of service and the quality and consistency of
performance, the obscurity of the position, the level of salary, the unique and exemplary quality of a certain achievement, and the risks or
temptations inherent in the work. Incentives and rewards to government officials and employees of the year to be announced in public ceremonies
honoring them may take the form of bonuses, citations, directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations, local and foreign scholarship
grants, paid vacations and the like. They shall likewise be automatically promoted to the next higher position with the commensurate salary suitable
to their qualifications. In case there is no next higher position or it is not vacant, said position shall be included in the budget of the office in the next
General Appropriations Act. The Committee on Awards shall adopt its own rules to govern the conduct of its activities.

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office.

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private
enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; or

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official transaction with their office.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the
case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either:

(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or

(2) To prejudice the public interest.

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:

(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of
courtesy;

(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or

(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippine (such as
allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests of the
Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to which he belongs.

The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection, including pertinent reporting
and disclosure requirements.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural exchange programs subject to national security
requirements.

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and
the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary
capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.

The two documents shall contain information on the following:

(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;

(b) personal property and acquisition cost;

(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;

(d) liabilities, and;

(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:

(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;

(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the
date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial
connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government.

Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or separately.

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:

(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;

(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President.

(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;

(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the
Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and

(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his
knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.

(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed as required by
law.

(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such
statement, as well as the cost of certification.

(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period,
the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act for:

(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or

(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.

Section 9. Divestment. - A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign
from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or
interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption.

The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a partnership.

The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who serve the Government in an honorary capacity nor to laborers and casual or temporary
workers.

Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for the
review of statements to determine whether said statements which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a
determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the
necessary corrective action.

(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of both Houses of Congress shall have the power within
their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the
approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House concerned.

The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the
opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in this Act.

(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as their respective offices are concerned,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case
of the Judicial Department.

Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary,
holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6)
months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the
appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute.
Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or
employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with public officials or employees, in violation of
this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and shall be tried jointly with them.

(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited by Section
8 (D) of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against such person a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five
thousand pesos (P25,000). If another sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.

Section 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations, Administration and Enforcement of this Act. - The Civil Service Commission shall have the
primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this Act. It shall transmit all cases for prosecution arising from violations of this Act to
the proper authorities for appropriate action: Provided, however, That it may institute such administrative actions and disciplinary measures as may
be warranted in accordance with law. Nothing in this provision shall be construed as a deprivation of the right of each House of Congress to
discipline its Members for disorderly behavior.

The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, including
guidelines for individuals who render free voluntary service to the Government. The Ombudsman shall likewise take steps to protect citizens who
denounce acts or omissions of public officials and employees which are in violation of this Act.

Section 13. Provisions for More Stringent Standards. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to derogate from any law, or any regulation prescribed
by any body or agency, which provides for more stringent standards for its official and employees.

Section 14. Appropriations. - The sum necessary for the effective implementation of this Act shall be taken from the appropriations of the Civil
Service Commission. Thereafter, such sum as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.

Section 15. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid,
the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 16. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent herewith, are deemed repealed or modified accordingly,
unless the same provide for a heavier penalty.

Section 17. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after thirty (30) days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.

G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees from committing acts of
dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a
public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2
Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-
war era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee. 3

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after
its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his
position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including
a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for
the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4

In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for
being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision
appealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such requirement of periodical submission
of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause.

We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.

1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. For in this action for declaratory relief filed
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a reasonable requirement for
employment that a public officer make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby make it possible thereafter to
determine whether, after assuming his position in the public service, he accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, the
herein plaintiff [having] filed within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the prescribed sworn statement of financial
condition, assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision on the "periodical filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets,
income and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive and
unconstitutional." 6

As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy of the individual as may be inferred from the prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon. There was also the allegation that the above requirement amounts
to "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that
they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of the statements of "their financial condition, income, and
expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices defined. . . ." 7 It was further asserted that there was no need for
such a provision as "the income tax law and the tax census law also require statements which can serve to determine whether an officer or
employee in this Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported income." 8

Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after
practically admitting the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth: "1. That
when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about
his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a violation of his constitutional rights against
self-incrimination as well as unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground
that it impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of
insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power." 10

On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his material allegations were admitted. Then
on March 10, 1962, an order was issued giving the parties thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with or without them, the case was
deemed submitted for decision the lower court being of the belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all the
material allegations of the complaint." 11

The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No.
3019, insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the
government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office; . . . ." 12

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the holding of this Court that in the absence of a
factual foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail."
In the present case likewise there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute could be based. Hence as noted
the decision of the lower court could be reversed on that ground.

A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made clear in the above Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot
be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure
is wider."

Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly affirmed: "This is not to discount the
possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights,
especially those involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should not be a rigid insistence on
the requirement that evidence be presented." Also, in the same Resolution, Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the mind
is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands
respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a
hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 15

2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause.

Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an enumeration of corrupt practices
declared unlawful in addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. They include persuading, inducing, or
influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself, or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity, has to intervene under
the law; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any
person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in
consideration for the help given or to be given; accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has
pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination; causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due
demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby; having
directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interests; becoming interested directly or indirectly, for
personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and
which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in such action; approving or granting
knowingly any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled and divulging valuable information of a confidential
character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date. 18

After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and prohibition on Members of Congress. 21
Then there is this requirement of a statement of assets and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission being challenged here. 22 The
other sections of the Act deal with dismissal due to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the previous statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24
the vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance as the competent court, 25 the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any
resignation or retirement pending investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27 suspension and loss of benefits, 28 exception
of unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value as well as recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession or trade or occupation,
29 the separability clause, 30 and its effectivity. 31

Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing
the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all.
The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and explicit to make clear to all and sundry
what practices were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions
and plug loopholes. One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their
positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical,
and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only question raised, is that portion of the
statute requiring periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an officer or employee had previously done so upon assuming office, so infected
with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?

Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there
is a reaffirmation of its nature and scope as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary power in the state
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." 34

Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and public interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation
to persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; 36 to preserve public
order and to prevent offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was first used by Chief
Justice Marshall. 39

As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power legislation usually has reference to regulatory measures
restraining either the rights to property or liberty of private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions, valid then as well as
now, given by Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of private
individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice,
or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to
say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were of a
similar mind. 41

What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in public service necessarily limited in
scope to officialdom. May a public official claiming to be adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or any portion
thereof? The answer must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone
with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed.

While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be
denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of
protection afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent
statutory provisions 43 that procedural due process in the form of an investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to
defend himself must be observed before a civil service officer or employee may be removed. There was a reaffirmation of the view in even stronger
language when this Court through Justice Tuason in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even without express provision of law, "it is established by
the great weight of authority that the power of removal or suspension for cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised without
notice and hearing." Such is likewise the import of a statement from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in
Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from does not bar such appropriate administrative action as
the behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon compliance with the requirements of due process."

To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of tenure provision to employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations entrusted with governmental functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That
safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that they would hold their office or employment during good behavior and would not be dismissed without
justifiable cause to be determined in an investigation, where an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded
them, would bring about such a desirable condition." Reference was there made to promoting honesty and efficiency through an assurance of
stability in their employment relation. It was to be expected then that through Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could
categorically affirm: "As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void. . . ."

It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due process guaranty to be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v.
Via, 48 where the opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court contained the following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having these facts in view, it
cannot be pretended that the constitutional provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has not been complied with."

Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus compelled to conclude that the positions
formerly held by appellees were not primarily confidential in nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence reposed in
them. The inevitable corollary is that respondents-appellees, Leon Piero, et al., were not subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause specified
by law and within due process. . . ." 49 In a still later decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality
of the constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal
from service without hearing upon a doubtful assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service rules." Equally
emphatic is this observation from the same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this
rule with such unrelenting grasp that by now it would appear trite to make citations thereof."

If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which
in that limited sense is analogous to property, could he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike down what he considers to
be an infringement of his liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must be in the affirmative. Even a public official has certain
rights to freedom the government must respect. To the extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due process
mandate is not disregarded.

Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception, the question raised cannot just be brushed aside. In a
leading Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of
the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed
embraced in the concept of liberty. This Court in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is not license.
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good, the peace and order of society and the general well-
being. No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm,
"liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual."

The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social organization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary
restraint not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It was Linton's view that "to belong
to a society is to sacrifice some measure of individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which the society consciously imposes." 54 The
above statement from Linton however, should be understood in the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of
general welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated. The individual thought, as Justice Cardozo
pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity that cannot be touched by government or law at all, whether the command is specially against him
or generally against him and others." 55

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of office beyond
the power of government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the
extent then that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however that under the Constitution, such a
restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.

The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process. That leads us to an inquiry into its significance. "There
is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient
to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom
of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is
not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring a
'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrases." 56

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present
temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due process clause
is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.

4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections
raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." 58

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His
separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He
cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be
master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master of himself is in any real sense free." 59

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy, specifically that of communication and correspondence which
"shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or when public safety and order" 60 may otherwise require, and implicitly in the search and
seizure clause, 61 and the liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further periodical submission of a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities deserves to be further looked into.

In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having been rendered by this Court. It is not so in the United States
where, in the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment
in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to
an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its
own.1wph1.t

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always
included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from
the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization,
urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 66

Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a
valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he
holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.

5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that insofar as the challenged provision requires the periodical filing of a sworn statement of
financial condition, it would be violative of the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and against self-incrimination?

His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convicted under an information charging him with
unlawfully having in his possession a number of gasoline ration coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an offense penalized under a
1940 statute. 68 He was convicted both in the lower court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the objection that there was an unlawful search
which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and that their use at the trial was in violation of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there
was a finding that he consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that finding although expressed doubt
concerning it, affirming however under the view that such seized coupons were properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure being
incidental to an arrest, and therefore reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.

In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized that the Court was dealing in this case "not
with private papers or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which never became the private property of the holder but remained at all times
the property of the government and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as
suggesting "that officers seeking to reclaim government property may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the
right to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general search of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he has any coupons
subject to inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons is important here merely as indicating that the officers did not exceed the permissible
limits of persuasion in obtaining them." 71

True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined, critical of what it considered "a process of
devitalizing interpretation" which in this particular case gave approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and expressing the regret that the
Court might be "in danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects experience with police excesses."

Even this opinion, however, concerned that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure "does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony. But that obligation can be exacted only
under judicial sanctions which are deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely because there may be the duty to make documents
available for litigation does not mean that police officers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone except
under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant to express and to safeguard." 72

It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory provision offends against the unreasonable search and
seizure clause would be futile and unavailing. This is the more so in the light of the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this
Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with, and that it would be "a
legal heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes without reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited
its scope as "one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw
the so-called general warrants.

It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement
of further periodical submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.

Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-incrimination clause.
According to the Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional provision gives the accused
immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He
may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent, and the
prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither then could the
accused be ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or
seizure of his house, papers or effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78

In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against self-incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to note
what Justice Tuason stated: "What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then, the
protection it affords will have to await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or
administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement
of the non-incrimination clause. What was said in an American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a statutory provision requiring any person
operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a person or property, to stop and give his name, residence, and his license
number to the injured party or to a police officer was sustained against the contention that the information thus exacted may be used as evidence to
establish his connection with the injury and therefore compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law which exacts this
information is invalid, because such information, although in itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant,
then all police regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision
designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a constitutional right be involved, it is not
necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this particular case, the constitutional privilege justified the refusal to give the
information exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the defense to the pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called
upon to decide in this proceeding." 81

6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public
officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice
Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of
the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional
provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice
Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85

It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 86 that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation
of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would
then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its
own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019,
insofar as it requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the
government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.

G.R. No. L-56170 January 31, 1984
HILARIO JARAVATA petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 873.

Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, said to have been committed in the following manner:

That on or about the period from April 30, 1979 to May 25, 1979, in the Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay High
School and with the use of his influence as such public official and taking advantage of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroom
teachers, with deliberate intent did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually received payments from other
classroom teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ, MARCELA BAUTISTA, and FRANCISCO DULAY various sums of money, namely:
P118.00, P100.00, P50.00 and P70.00 out of their salary differentials, in consideration of accused having officially intervened in the release of the
salary differentials of the six classroom teachers, to the prejudice and damage of the said classroom teachers, in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT (P338.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency. (Decision, p.1-2.)

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from ONE (1) YEAR, is minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, as maximum, to further
suffer perpetual special disqualification from public office and to pay the costs.

No pronouncement as to the civil liability it appearing that the money given to the accused was already refunded by him. (Id. pp, 16-17.)

The petition raises factual and legal issues but for obvious reasons Our decision shall deal with the legal issue only.

The Sandiganbayan states in its decision the following:

A perusal of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense shows that there is no dispute that [complainants] Ramos, Lloren, Lopez,
Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista are classroom teachers of the Leones Barangay High School with accused as their assistant principal and [Conrado
Baltazar as the administrator; that on January 5, 1979, accused informed the classroom teachers of the approval of the release of their salary
differentials for 1978 and to facilitate its payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the
obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses; that accused incurred expenses in the total amount of
P220.00 and there being six classroom teachers, he divided said amount by six or at the rate of P36.00 each; that the classroom teachers actually
received their salary differentials and pursuant to said agreement, they, with the exception of Lloren and Ramos, gave the accused varying amounts
but as Baltazar did not approve it, he ordered the accused to return the money given to him by Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista, and accused
complied (Pp. 7-8.)

The decision also recites that "the evidence is overwhelming to show that accused received more than the rightful contribution of P36.00 from four
classroom teachers, namely: Lopez, Dulay, Dacayanan and Bautista. Lopez categorically declared that he gave the accused P100.00 (TSN, p. 5,
August 21, 1980 hearing) after he received his salary differential or an excess of P64.00. So with Dulay, that he gave P70.00 to the accused (TSN, p.
16, supra) or an excess of P34.00; Dacayanan, that he gave to the accused P118.00 (TSN, p. 26, supra) or an excess of P82.00, and Bautista, that
he gave to the accused P50.00 (TSN, p. 38, supra) or an excess of P14.00. In short, the total amount received by the accused in excess of the share
of the classroom teachers in the reimbursement of his expenses is P194.00. " (P. 9.)

Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides, inter alia the following:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.

xxx xxx xxx

The legal issue is whether or not, under the facts stated, petitioner Jaravata violated the above-quoted provision of the statute.

A simple reading of the provision has to yield a negative answer.

There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer" as defined by Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation,
even normal from the government." It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants
was in the concept of a gift or benefit. The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks of
Tubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the payment of the salary differentials for 1978 of the complainants. It
should be noted that the arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary differential] payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused
follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses.

In Our opinion, Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction.

There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the complainants or anyone for
that matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the
salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials.
Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the judgment of the Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is set aside. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986
GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent.

ALAMPAY, J.:

The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6, 1984, by the Sandiganbayan
convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856-6867 of said Court. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11, 1985.

The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all
similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:

That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Numancia, Aklan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the
Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the
disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction
in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to
wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which
the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-174 in the amount of
P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving
payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act.

except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and amounts involved.

Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and 6862 were allegedly committed in July, 1980; Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864, in
August, 1980; and Criminal Cases Nos. C-865, 6866 and 6867 in October, 1980. The separate vouchers involved in the twelve (12) cases are said
to be the following:

Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80

Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60

Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00

Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30

Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00

Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00

Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80

Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00

Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00

Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00

Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00

Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00

T o t a l - - - - P7,730.50

(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal
cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced,"...to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer perpetual disqualification from the
public office, and to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40, Decision; Rollo, 322).

After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition, herein petitioner
presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12, 1983, suspending him from
Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the
suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly, and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985,
petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take effect immediately.

A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on record of
petitioner. In this supplemental pleading, it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the
Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against
herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass.

Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4, 1984, to the original petition filed in this
case dated April 30, 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg. 20; Rollo, 341). The submission made by the Office
of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:

xxx xxx xxx

The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as
follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:

a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction;

b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.

Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. (Rollo, pp. 338-339).

The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen 'Corporation, which is said to
have been effected on February 25, 1980, before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest opportunity
before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against petitioner should
be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been
recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort, was presented. The consolidated comment also played up the
advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo, Aklan, showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-
Manager of the said corporation. (Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)

Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General.

After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Sandiganbayan, as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel, the Court in its resolution of
January 16, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs.

Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14, 1986, raised the following legal questions.

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions arise:

1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously
ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by
the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h)
of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of
the above-mentioned law?

3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law, caused to the Government or the Municipality of
Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation?

4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long before the
questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief, page 15)

It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the offense, and more
particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or
transactions.

Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however, be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General, after
seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar, filed on October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of
the People's Brief). Rollo, 293).

The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General's Office
moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon acknowledging and concluding that:

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen

Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs.
Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and
transfer book of the corporation.

Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. SEC records, as the prosecution evidence
show, do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President.

The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. Anyway, Trigen has not updated its reports to the
SEC since 1976. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the
sale did not take place. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement.

Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC

In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141, Corporation Code of the
Philippines).

Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the
municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. (Rollo, pp. 299-300).

In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the
following observations:

Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award

The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were
made by direct purchases from Trigen.

Q. In other words, in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding?

A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.

Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen?

A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)

In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct
purchases from Trigen, how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen as
specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself.

Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award, which of course is a false assumption
because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Respondent Court said:

. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award, but his liability may also come in when he took part in said
transactions such as signing the vouchers under certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear that the transactions were regular and proper.
(Resolution dated March 11, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial, page 7).

No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment

Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention after payment.

Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment of construction materials. It
was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision
of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, 1984). The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the
twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega
signed and paid them., (Rello, pp. 301-303)

xxx xxx xxx

Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment

Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted
testimony of Josue Maravilla:

Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer, as you said, and then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature,
were the purchases in question already paid?

A. They had already been paid for, sir.

Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?

A. Yes, sir.

A.J. ESCAREAL:

Q. Under what authority were they paid?

A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.

Q. Who authorized the payment?

A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.

ATTY. CONSULTA:

Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were
signed by Mayor Trieste, the materials had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen?

xxx xxx xxx

A. Yes, sir

Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued
by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste?

A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing payments long before the municipal vouchers were
prepared, what can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality?

ESCAREAL:

Payment made by Trigen?

ATTY. CONSULTA:

I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?

A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E, B, C, D, F, G, H, I were prepared, they had
already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal treasurer.

Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the municipal treasurer?

A. Already paid.

Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts?

A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.

Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts
had already been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen?

A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the mayor. (Tsn., Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 19-49).

Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is
not, we submit the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

xxx xxx xxx

What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest
in order that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need not
dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the
don-tenant use of influence, authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. 11, page 603).

There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in having the transactions
given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen.

Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction

Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it even before petitioner had
assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and
advantageous to the municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).

It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions.

Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that Office
of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be
rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its
consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just
as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision
and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a
judgment of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the herein
petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set aside and
reversing the appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said offenses charged against him with
costs de oficio.

G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 June 30, 1987
ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979 decision of the Sandiganbayan finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada in Criminal
Cases Nos. 002-009 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan. The eight informations
substantially allege the same set of circumstances constituting the offense charged, Criminal Case No. 002 reads as follows:

That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from October 1977 to February 1978, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being employed in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig,
Metro Manila, as Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring and confederating together with two (2) other John Does whose true Identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown, with evident bad faith, and for personal gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, directly intervene,
work for, and facilitate the approval of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the payment in the removal and reconstruction of his house and a part of his
land expropriated by the government having been affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal,
while the accused, Arturo A. Mejorada is in the discharge of his official and/or administrative functions and after said claim was approved and the
corresponding PNB Check No. SN 5625748 was issued and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00 given only P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de
Leon), appropriating, applying and converting to themselves the amount of P6,200.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to Isagani de Leon
and the government in the aforementioned amount of P6,200.00.

Contrary to law.

Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the aggrieved private party, the PNB Check number, the amount involved and the
number or John Does, the seven other informations are verbatim repetitions of the above.

The facts are found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as follows:

Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March 16, 1947, and
then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to December 31, 1978. As a
right-of-way agent, his main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of
compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.

Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project, at
Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S.
Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.

Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons and informed them that he could work out their claims for
payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada required the claimants to
sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and
Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the documents were all about as they
were only interested in the payment of damages.

In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very much
higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as per assessor"
which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per assessor was, in
turn, supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed value exactly the same as that stated in
the Agreements to Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only a difference of P400.00 and P200.00,
respectively. It turned out, however, that said Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names
of other persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.

A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer at the provincial capitol
of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive payments and personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks by certifying as
to their Identities and guaranteeing payment.

Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby where they
were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to
them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused
and his armed companion.

The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints with the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, narrating in their
supporting sworn statements what they later testified to in court.

Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan:

I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution;

II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent jurisdiction duly constituted in accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606;

III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary to the three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code;

IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved;

V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the Sandiganbayan in arriving at a verdict of conviction of petitioner is correct is a
question of law which this Honorable Court is authorized to pass upon.

I. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against him before the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it failed to allege the
essential ingredients or elements constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.

The section under which the accused-petitioner was charged provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion, constitute a violation of Section 3(e).

First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions. Petitioner contends that
inasmuch as he is not charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he is not the officer contemplated by Section 3
(e).

Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public
officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that
the last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which,
under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.

The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must be a public officer. This, the informations did not fail to allege.

Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions.

Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the payments were allegedly made on the basis of a document
solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that the government suffered undue
injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the Highway
District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually became the basis of payment. His contention that he
had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by
highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.

On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large proportion of their claims and receiving payment
in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to which they are entitled.

Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was done through manifest, partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to the complainants and the government must have been
caused by the public officer in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as when the damage was caused to the
complainants, he was no longer discharging his official administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense charged.

The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by
making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of
the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he
divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.

In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to the allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation of
the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery. Contrary to the
petitioner averment. We find no variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to
establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants
and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme
which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of
their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly
establish a violation of Section 3(e).

II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide this case. He argues that before the Sandiganbayan could
legally function as a judicial body, at least two (2) divisions, or majority of the justices shall have been duly constituted and appointed.

We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 54288, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337). In that case, the
petitioner De Guzman questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case on the same ground that herein petitioner assails
its jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of the Sandiganbayan saying that:

Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and eight Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot validly function
without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that the "Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices each"
while Section 5 thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.

Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each Division functions independently of the other. As long as a division
has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan.

The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the
pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.

III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of
imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed
forty (40) years.

Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into
account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]).
Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the
"imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the
maximum of which is forty years.

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed against the accused-petitioner. As
We pointed out in the case of People v. Peralta, (No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 783-784):

... Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed,
since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which
the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.

In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and unusual (See Veniegas v. People, G.R.
No. 57601-06 July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 790, 792).

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in view of the foregoing discussion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

2. Plunder

Republic Act No. 7080 July 12, 1991
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term -

a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment,
election or contract.

b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates otherwise.

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

See Section 2 As amended by Section 12 of RA No.7659
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five
million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute
disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be
punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment,
he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and other
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. However, the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches,
or estoppel.

Section 7. Separability of Provisions - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Section 8. Scope - This Act shall not apply to or affect pending prosecutions or proceedings, or those which may be instituted under Executive Order
No. 1, issued and promulgated on February 28, 1986.

Section 9. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation.

4. Malversation

G.R. No. 71581 March 21, 1990
CARMEN LABATAGOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) * in Criminal Case No. 4799, finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of malversation of public funds defined and penalized under Article 217, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.

From January 1978 to December 1980, petitioner Carmen Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao State University MSU
General Santos City. She filed a leave of absence for the months of March, April and May 1978 and did not discharge her duties for the said period.

On 1 October 1980, Francisco T. Rivera, under Commission on Audit (COA) General Order No. 8022-117 (Exh. C) was designated leader of a team
to conduct the examination of the cash and accounts of the petitioner. When the team conducted the examination, the petitioner did not have any
cash in her posssession, so she was asked to produce all her records, books of collection, copies of official receipts and remittance advices and her
monthly reports of collections.

Based on the official receipts and the record of remittances for the period from January to August 1978, the audit examination disclosed that the
petitioner collected the total amount of P113,205.58 (Exhs. A-1 and A-2) and made a total remittance to the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the depository bank of the university, in the amount of P78,868.69, leaving an unremitted amount of P34,336.19.

On the basis of similar official receipts and record of remittances, the audit examination further disclosed that for the period from January 1979 to
June 6, 1980, the petitioner made a total collection of P327,982.00 (Exhs. B, B-1, and B-1-a) and remitted to the DBP the total amount of
P256,606.25 (Exhs. B-2 and B-2-a) incurring a shortage of P71,365.75.

The petitioner signed without exception both Reports of Examination (Exhs. A and B) as well as their supporting summaries.

Thereafter, Francisco T. Rivera submitted his report on the examination to the Chairman, Commission on Audit, through the Regional Director, COA,
Region IX (Exhs. A-4 and B-4).

Subsequently, Rivera prepared the letters of demand corresponding to the two (2) audit reports (Exhs. A-3 and B-3) and served them personally on
the petitioner who signed both letters. Despite the demand letters, the petitioner did not submit any explanation of her shortages.

Hence, on 27 October 1981, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging petitioner with the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds, committed as follows:

That between the periods January 1978 to August 17, 1978, and January 1, 1979 to June 6, 1980, in General Santos City, Philippines, the said
accused a public officer being then the Cashier and Collecting Officer of the Mindanao State University, General Santos Unit, General Santos City,
who, by reason of the duties of her office was charged with the duty of collecting school dues and tuition fees of the students of said school, and of
remitting to, or depositing with, the school's depository bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines, General Santos City branch, all money
collections by way of school dues and tuition fees she collected as Cashier and Collecting Officer, was responsible and accountable for the funds
collected and received by her, by reason of her position as Collecting Officer, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, and with grave
abuse of confidence, misappropriate, and embezzle the total sum of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ELEVEN AND 94/100
P105,711.94), Philippine Currency, out of her collection of P441,187.58, during the aforesaid period, which sum of P105,711.94 she appropriated
and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines in said amount. 1

During the trial, petitioner in her defense claimed that she signed the audit reports on the understanding that her shortage would amount to only
P2,000.00; that she could not be held accountable for the collections for March, April and May 1978 because she was on maternity leave; and that
several disbursements in the total amount of P49,417.12 were not credited in her favor by the auditors. She claimed further that she should not be
held accountable for the alleged misappropriations between the months of January 1978 and August 1978 in the amount of P34,336.19 because
those who appropriated the amounts were her superiors and that the amounts taken were properly receipted but that the receipts were lost.

Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, did not give weight nor credence to her defense. Hence, as previously stated, petitioner was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds.

The petitioner then filed the instant petition, and alleged the following reasons why the petition should be granted; (1) that respondent court made
manifestly mistaken inferences and misapprehended the significance of the evidence which resulted in the erroneous decision rendered in the case;
and (2) that respondent court erred in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged when there is ample evidence submitted showing that she did
not put the missing funds to her personal use.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the guilt of the petitioner has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The established facts show that respondent court did not err in convicting petitioner for the crime of malversation. As held by said court:

There is no merit in the accused's defense. Her claim that she signed the audit report and statement of collections and deposits prepared by the
audit team of Francisco Rivera on the understanding that her shortage was only P2,000.00 is belied by the figures clearly reflected on the said
documents. Exhibit A, the audit report which she signed without exception, shows that she incurred a shortage of P34,336.19 for the period from
January to August 1978; while Exhibit A-1, the statement of her collections and deposits for the same period which she certified as correct, indicates
the same amount of P34,336.19 as her shortage.

Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecution's rebuttal witness, confirmed that she assisted the accused in the collection of fees; that the accused filed
application for maternity leave in March 1978 but continued reporting for work during that month; that the accused did not report for work in April
1978; and that she (Guanzon) was the one assigned to collect the fees in her stead. Miss Guanzon, however, explained that she turned over all her
collections to the accused during all the times that she was assisting her in collecting the fees; and that even in April 1978 when the accused was
physically absent from office, she also turned over her collections to the accused ill the latters house with the duplicate copies of the receipts she
issued which the accused signed after satisfying herself that the amounts I turned over tallied with the receipts.

There is color of truth to Mrs. Guanzon's explanation. All the collections for the months of March and April 1978 are fully accounted for they are
itemized in the reports of collection, (Exhs. F and G) and shown to have been duly remitted in the remittance advices for those months. (Exhs. F-1 to
F-5; G-1 and G-2).

The auditor was correct in refusing to credit the accused with the three (3) different amounts mentioned in her letter of October 22, 1980. (Exh. 5)
The first sum, P7,140.20, purporting to be refunds of tuition fees to students granted tuition privilages is hot supported by any official authorization for
such refunds by the University authorities. Besides, the supposed list of students who were recipients of the refunds (Exh. 10) is incompetent
evidence being a mere xerox copy uncertified as a true copy of an existing original.

The second sum, P4,494.80 was purportedly spent for the cost of uniforms of the school and basketball balls. P2,100.00 in all (Exhs. 6 and 6-A), and
the balance taken by Alikhan Marohombsar and Auditor Casan, (Exh. 6-B). The third amount, P6,702.12, was supposedly covered by vouchers
submitted to the Auditor's office through Rosa Cabiguin. (Exh. 12-K) Again, the auditor did not err in not crediting the aforesaid sums to the
accused's accountability. The P2,100.00 cost of uniforms and balls, unsupported by a duly accomplished and approved voucher, was not a valid
disbursement. And since the alleged vouchers for P6,792.12 were not presented in evidence nor was any effort exerted to compel their production in
court by subpoena duces tecum, the same was properly refused to be deduced from the incurred shortage of the accused.

All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by Director Osop, Alikhan Marohombsar and Auditor Casan totalling P31,070.00. (Exhs. 12, 12-
A, etc., 13-A and 14-A), supported as they are by mere pieces of paper, despite the admission by Director Osop of having signed some of them
(Exhs. 12-A, 12-D, 12-E and 12-I) were not valid disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in the chits were really secured by the persons
who signed them, the responsibility to account for them still rests in the accused accountable officer. Malversation consists not only ill
misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one's personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate
them. 2

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the questioned decision of respondent court and the issues raised in this petition being essentially
factual, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-59670
LEONARDO N. ESTEPA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Feliciano, J.:

Petitioner Leonardo N. Estepa seeks to set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Case No. 3658 convicting him of the crime of malversation of
public funds through negligence and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Petitioner Leonardo N. Estepa was charged in an information which read:

That on or about January 24, 1980, in the City of Manila, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, being then
Senior Paymaster, Treasurers Office, City Hall, Manila, and as such is a public officer accountable for the funds received by him by reason of his
said position and charged with the duty of diligently safeguarding or looking after the funds placed under his custody, did then and there with great
carelessness and unjustifiable negligence, fail to exercise that duty without counting the money during the individual distribution and segregation of
said funds at the General Cashiers Room, before assuming total physical control thereof thereby allowing and permitting an unknown man to take,
steal, misappropriate and embezzle to his personal use and benefit the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
from the said cashiers room, as in fact that unknown person did take, steal, misappropriate, and embezzle the said amount to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Upon arraignment, Estepa pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting Estepa of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Leonardo N. Estepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of malversation, defined and penalized under
paragraph 4, Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum; to Eighteen (18) Years,
Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, to indemnify the City of Manila/National Government
the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and to pay the costs.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Estepa filed the present Petition for Review. The Petition was given due course and the parties
required to file briefs. In his brief, 2 petitioner Estepa assigns the following errors:

I. Respondent court gravely erred in convicting petitioner of the came of malversation through negligence although the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense or crime.

II. Respondent court gravely erred in convicting petitioner to the crime of malversation through negligence although the prosecution has never
proven beyond doubt that he possessed the allegedly lost money of P50,000.00 which is the material ingredient of the crime charged.

III. Respondent court gravely erred in convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation through negligence by citing his other alleged negligent acts
which were not alleged in the information, contrary to the due process clause of the 1973 Constitution.

IV. Respondent court gravely erred in convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation instead of filing malversation charges against his superiors
whose gross negligence really caused the loss of that amount.

V. Respondent court gravely erred in convicting petitioner, because Justice Guerrero decided the criminal case against him contrary to Section 2 of
Rule V of the Rules of Sandiganbayan, which prohibits the preparation of a decision by a court member who has never attended any session thereof
as long as the other members are still with said court.

From the record, the facts of the case may be collated as follows:

In the morning of 24 January 1980, Leonardo N. Estepa, then a senior paymaster of the Cash Division of the City Treasurers Office of the City of
Manila, together with nine (9) other paymasters and Cesar R. Marcelo, their Supervising Paymaster, went to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to
encash checks amounting to P7,640,000.00 representing the cash advances then being requisitioned by the ten (10) Paymasters. It turned out,
however, that the cash value of those checks was not available at the PNB. Hence, the personnel from the City Treasurers Office, among them
Estepa, accompanied by some officials of the PNB, proceeded to the Central Bank. In the presence of Marcelo, and the ten (10) paymasters,
P7,640,000.00 in cash was counted out 3 and placed inside two (2) duffel bags which, after being properly sealed, were loaded inside an armored
car and immediately transported to and deposited in the central vault of the City Treasurers Office of the City of Manila.

Mr. Marcelo testified that there was a power brownout at about 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. on that day and the central vault, where they customarily distribute
the cash advances was dark; that he decided with the concurrence of Atty. Kempis, the head of the Cash Division, to distribute the cash to the
paymasters at the latters Kempis room which was well-lighted by the rays of the sun coming in through a side window. 4 Marcelo stated that in order
to deter third persons from entering that room during the distribution, the door was closed and a guard was posted outside the room by the door. 5 In
the presence of Atty. Kempis and the ten (10) paymasters, Marcelo opened the two (2) duffel bags and again counted out the amount of
P7,640,000.00. 6 The bills were segregated and bundled in denominations of P100.00s, P50.00s, P20.00s and P10.00s up to the last coin, and
placed on a big chaise lounge and on a table inside Atty. Kempis room. Some of the paymasters were assigned to take charge of the bundles of
money, one paymaster for each denomination; however, Estepa was not one of those so assigned. As each paymaster was called, each paymaster
in charge of a denomination handed to the requisitioner the number of bundles of that denomination corresponding to the amount being
requisitioned.

Thus, one at a time, the paymasters were called and given the amounts they had requisitioned. When Estepas turn came, Mr. Marcelo asked the
paymasters in charge of the bundles of differing denominations to hand to Estepa the amount of P850,000.00. After all the ten (10) paymasters had
gotten their money and while all of them were still inside that room, Mr. Marcelo, as was his usual practice, in a loud voice asked them in Pilipino if
everything was fine. No complaint or protest was made by anyone of them, including Estepa, and all left the room uneventfully. 7 However, ten (10)
minutes later, Estepa reported to Mr. Marcelo that the amount of P50,000.00 was missing from his cash advance. The latter immediately summoned
back all ten (10) paymasters and with the help of the Assistant Cashier, counted once again the money just delivered to each of the ten (1)
paymasters. It turned out that the amount received by each of them, except Estepa, was correct.

Pacita Sison, an examiner from the Commission on Audit testified that on 25 January 1980? she had examined Estepas cash and accounts which
showed that the latters account was short by P50,000.00. Thereupon, she reduced her finding into writing which document was signed by Estepa. 8

Estepa, upon receipt of a formal letter from the City of Manila demanding the amount of P50,000.00, submitted a written explanation denying his
liability therefor. He alleged that he had only received the total amount of P800,000.00 and that the loss of the amount of P50,000.00 occurred
before that sum was delivered to him. Estepa also executed on 5 February 1980 a sworn statement to that effect.

Unconvinced, the Legal Office of the City of Manila filed a complaint against Estepa with the Tanodbayan. In turn, the Tanodbayan, after conducting
a preliminary investigation, filed an information in the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner with the crime of malversation through negligence.

Petitioners first contention is that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense since there can be no crime of malversation of
public funds through mere failure to count the money. His second contention is that the prosecution had not established that he had in fact received
the total amount of P850,000.00 and that therefore he should not be answerable for the loss of the P50,000.00. Lastly, he claims that he had not
been negligent.

We consider petitioners first argument to be without merit. We think that petitioners view of the information is a very narrow and carping one. It will
be seen that the information charged him with having carelessly and negligently allowed an unknown person to steal or misappropriate the amount of
P50,000.00; that he had failed to exercise his duty as a public officer accountable for public funds received by him and that he had failed to count the
money turned over to him at the General Cashiers Room. The crime of malversation of public funds is defined under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code in the following terms:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand
pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceed the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060.)

Turning to the second contention of Estepa, we consider that it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P850,000.00 had in fact
been distributed to petitioner Estepa. The total amount of P7,640,000.00 was counted out by Mr. Marcelo, Supervising Paymaster, before the actual
distribution to the ten (10) paymasters of the amounts respectively requisitioned by them. After petitioner Estepa had reported that P50,000.00 was
lost or missing from the cash advance, Mr. Marcelo rounded up all the ten (10) paymasters and counted once again the money distributed to and
held by each of the ten (10) paymasters. This recount showed that none of the nine (9) other paymasters had received an amount in excess of the
amount requisitioned by each. In other words, in the recount after Estapa had reported his loss, the total amount of P7,590,000.00 was accounted for
(P7,640,000 P50,000.00). The loss reported by Estepa occurred after turnover to him of the entire amount of P850,000.00.

The explanation offered by Estepa of the loss of P50,000.00 was summarized by the Sandiganbayan in the following terms:

In exculpation, accused narrated, inter alia, what transpired inside the room of Atty. Kempis during the partitioning of the money to the ten
paymasters. According to him, the room of Atty. Kempis was closed to the public. Together with the other paymasters, accused witnessed the
opening of the two duffel bags and counting of the money by Mr. Marcelo. There was no complaint of shortage. He placed them on one side of a
sofa which was three meters away. Because some of the paymasters were already going out and accused was afraid that the public might enter the
office of Atty. Kempis, accused decided to bring the money with smaller denominations to the table of Pangilinan which was three to four meters
away leaving the bigger denomination at the sofa. He did this because accused could not carry the whole amount. By then, there were some people
inside the office of Atty. Kempis and the latter was seated at his table. Thereupon, he brought the bundles of bigger denominations (P100s and
P50s) directly to his cage and then returned for the bundles of smaller denominations. After counting the money inside his cage, he discovered that
one bundle of P50.00 bills worth P50,000.00 was missing. He searched inside his cage looking at the floor where the bundle could have dropped
because it was dark. After about ten minutes of futile search he reported the loss to Atty. Kempis.

The Sandiganbayan, addressing the question of whether or not petitioner Estepa had been negligent in the handling of the money that he, along with
the other nine (9) paymasters had received from the Supervising Paymaster, analyzed the foregoing explanation of petitioner Estepa in the following
manner:

There is no gainsaying that accused was present when the money which were to be withdrawn from the depository bank, was counted at the Central
Bank. There was no shortage. Before his eyes, the entire amount was placed inside two duffel bags which were sealed and subsequently deposited
in the central vault of the City Treasurers Office, Manila. When these two duffel bags were opened, accused as well as the other requisitioning
paymasters were present. Again, Mr. Marcelo counted the money. No shortage. Thereupon, each paymaster received the amount he requisitioned.
In the case of the accused, the total sum corresponding to his name was P850,000.00. It was at this moment when Mr. Marcelo asked the
paymasters if they had received the correct amount by directing the question, Ayos na ba kayo diyan? No one answered including accused. This is
one phase of his negligence. If he had not yet fully counted the money he received, accused should have voiced himself out. Instead, he let the
occasion pass in silence giving the impression that the money he had received was in accordance with the amount due him.

His fault is not only limited to such inaction. By his own account, people were starting to enter the room of Atty. Kempis. Yet, he left the bundles of
bigger denominations at the sofa without even asking somebody to watch for them and proceeded to the table of Mr. Pangilinan where he left the
money of smaller denominations.

From the sketch (see Exh. E) of the City Treasurers Office submitted by the accused, it is clear that the table of Mr. Pangilinan was outside the room
of Atty. Kempis. The danger to the money left at the sofa was real. Again, he left the same bundles this time at Ms cage with nobody to watch them
when he returned for the bundles of smaller denominations at the table of Mr. Pangilinan. Accused admitted that at that time, Eufrocinio Mendoza
who shared the same cage with him, was not inside the cage. Prudence should have cautioned accused to wait for Mendoza before returning for the
smaller denominations. Certainly, it was foolhardy to leave bundles of money of high denominations of Pl00 or P50 with no one to guard for them
even only for a fleeting moment. In short, accuseds inexcusable negligence consisted of the following: (1) failure to check-and re-check the
denominations by him before the paymasters dispersed, (2) not sounding off that he was not absolutely certain of the amount received when Mr.
Marcelo asked the paymasters, Ayos na ba kayo diyan? (3) failure to ask Atty. Kempis or any other person to watch over the money of bigger
denominations at his cage before he returned to the table of Mr. Pangilinan for the smaller denominations. Had he not been remiss on these, there
would have been no opportunity for an unknown hand to surreptitiously get hold of the money. (Emphasis supplied)

After careful examination of the records of this case, including the detailed testimony of the witnesses, we find no reason to depart from the
conclusion reached by the Sandiganbayan that petitioner had indeed been negligent in the handling of the funds which had been turned over to him.

In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he did not
have them in his possession when demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An accountable
public officer may be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal misappropriation, where he has not been able to
explain satisfactorily the absence of the public funds involved. 9

Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation where the accountable public officer fails to have duly
forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by duly authorized officer. As this Court has pointed out, this presumption
juris tantum is founded upon human experience. 10

In the present case, petitioner was neither able to produce the missing amount of P50,000.00 nor adequately to explain his failure to produce that
amount. Petitioners explanation leaves one thoroughly dissatisfied. If one took petitioners explanation seriously and literally, the mysterious, unseen
third person could have picked up the missing bundle of P50.00 bills either (1) from the sofa inside the room of Atty. Kempis where he had left the
bundles of large denomination bills, without asking anyone to keep an eye on them while he left the room; or (2) from petitioners cage outside Atty.
Kempis room where he left the bundles of large denomination bills, again without anyone being left in charge thereof, while he went back to Mr.
Pangilinans desk (also outside Atty. Kempis room) to retrieve the bundles of small denomination bills he had previously deposited on top of said
desk without, once more, getting some one to watch those bundles. Petitioners self-confessed coming and going from sofa to Pangilinans desk;
back to sofa and then to his cage; and back to Pangilinans desk and finally to his cage created at least two (2) clear opportunities for the invisible
third person to pick up the missing P50,000.00. Clearly, petitioner was very relaxed and casual in the handling of the bundles of money entrusted to
him.

Petitioner in fact tried to exculpate himself by suggesting that it was his superiors Atty. Kempis and Mr. Marcelo who had been negligent and
whose negligence had really caused the loss of P50,000.00. We are unable to take seriously petitioners claim that because the superiors had not
waited for restoration of electric power in the office of the City Treasurer of Manila before proceeding with the distribution of the P7,640,000.00, his
superiors should be held responsible for the loss. Concededly, it had not been customary to distribute funds in a room other than the central vault.
However, the distribution was done in the room of Atty. Kempis which, petitioner Estepa had admitted, was sufficiently lighted by sunlight coming
through one of the windows. Moreover, as already pointed out, except for Mr. Marcelo, Atty. Kempis, and the ten (10) paymasters and the person
guarding the entrance of the room, no other persons had been allowed to enter the room until after all the ten (10) paymasters had received the
correct amount requisitioned by them. Finally, since no one had asserted otherwise when Mr. Marcelo had asked the group if everyone had been
served, as it were, he had no reason to suppose that petitioner then had not yet ascertained (as he now claims) whether he had received the frill
P850,000.00.

Finally, petitioner argues that the ponente, Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero had no authority to write the decision in Case No. 3658
because he was not a member of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan when that case was heard.

Section 3, Rule V of the Sandiganbayan reads:

Sec. 3. Assignment of Cases Permanent. Cases assigned to a division of the Sandiganbayan in accordance with these rules shall remain with said
division notwithstanding changes in the composition thereof and all matters raised therein shall be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division aforesaid at the time said matters are taken up, irrespective of whether
they were or were not members of the division at the time the case was first assigned thereto; Provided, however, that only such Justices who are
members of the division at the time a case is submitted for decision shall take part in the consideration and adjudication of said case, unless any
such member thereafter ceases to be a member of the Sandiganbayan for any reason whatsoever in which case any Justice chosen to fill the
vacancy in accordance with the manner provided in Section 2, Rule III, of these Rules shall participate in the consideration and adjudication of said
case; Provided, lastly that the Sandiganbayan en banc may, for special or compelling reasons, transfer cases from one division thereof to another.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Under the foregoing Section, any member of a Division of the Sandiganbayan who is such at the time a case is submitted for decision may take part
in the consideration and adjudication of that case.

In the instant case, we therefore agree with the Solicitor General that since Justice Guerrero was a member of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan at the time the case was submitted for decision, there was no legal objection to his writing the decision for the Division.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan dated 15 December
1981 is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 102356 February 9, 1993
CALINICO B. ILOGON, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision * of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 9776 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Calinico B. Ilogon", dated May 14, 1991 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to the indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law; to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; and
to pay a fine in the sum of P118,003.10, an amount equal to the amount malversed, with costs.

Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from July, 1978 to January, 1986. He likewise
performed the task of accepting payments, making collections and effecting disbursement as there was no cashier employed during the period of his
incumbency. He was adept at this work because, before his designation as Acting Postmaster he was, as a matter of fact, a duly-appointed cashier.

On September 19, 1983, Commission on Audit Auditors Robin S. Aban and Alfonso A. Gala conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of
petitioner covering the period from September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The examination showed that the petitioner incurred a shortage in his
accounts amounting to P118,871.29 itemized in the following manner:

Accountability:

Balance shown by your
cashbook on September 12, 1983
certified correct by you
and verified by us P171,999.42

Credits to Accountability:

Deduct:

Cash, checks, and treasury
warrants P 40,116.13
cash items
allowed 13,012.00 P 53,128.13

Shortage P 118,871.29 1

=========

The amount of shortage was later reduced to P118,003.10. This shortage represents the following:

1. Vales P 8,846.00

2. Cash shortage (paid vouchers)
already reimbursed and/or paid and
received by you P 48,028.58

3. Cash items disallowed (paid
vouchers) already reimbursed and/or
paid and received by individual
creditors P 5,787.97

vouchers) amount disallowed by the
Regional Office P 31,036.85

vouchers) amount still payable
non-budgetry expenses as
certified by the accountant P 19,555.84

6. Actual shortage P 4,747.86

P 118,003.10 2

=========

On November 27, 1984, petitioner was charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code in an Information 3 which reads as follows:

That on or about September 13, 1983 or prior and subsequent thereto, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Tribunal, the said accused, a public officer, being the Acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts of the said City, and as such accountable
for the public funds collected and received by reason of his position, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with grave abuse of
confidence misappropriate, misapply and embezzle for his own personal use and benefit from the said funds, the total sum of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS AND TEN CENTAVOS (P118,003.10) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Before the Sandiganbayan, herein petitioner put up the following defense:

1. In respect to the shortage of P8,846.00, Item 1 in the auditor's letter of demand, the amount represents vales (cash advances) granted to postal
employees of Cagayan de Oro City in payment of salaries or wages which the accused paid out to them, even before the period for which they were
supposed to be paid. He received reimbursement checks on the 20th or 25th September, 1983 in payment thereof, but he remitted these payments
to the Land Bank of the Philippines only on October 17, 1983, per Official Receipt Number 312164. . . .

2. As regards that category of shortage amounting to P48,028.58, the accused claims that this amount represents the aggregate of the cash
advances to salaries of the Regional Director, Postal Inspector, and postal employees of Davao, Iloilo and other places who were assigned in
Cagayan de Oro City. The accused did not have these amounts on hand when his cash and account were audited on September 13, 1983, because
the reimbursements for the said cash advances were not yet in his possession. If they were, the amounts given were less than the amounts stated in
the voucher, consisting, therefore, of partial liquidations. In case of a partial liquidation, he would simply annotate the partial payment in the voucher.
He would not enter partial payments in the cash book.

3. Respecting that category of shortage amounting to P5,787.97, the accused explained that this shortage constituted cash advances to postal
employees. While reimbursement checks had already been paid to the employees involved by the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts, these
employees had negotiated or encashed their reimbursement checks without turning over the proceeds thereof to the accused Acting Postmaster.

The accused claims that the shortage had later been paid through a remittance he made in the Sum of P20,438.60, Exhibit "14", and in the amount
of P65,000.00, Exhibit "10"

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, as regards the cash shortage of P4,747.86, the accused admitted the fact that he did not actually have this amount of cash when, during the
audit, he was told to present all his cash on hand. It is his claim that all the while, this amount had in fact been in the possession of his teller. While
he forgot to tell the auditors that the cash was actually with the teller, he remitted this amount to the Land Bank on September 19, 1983, as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 31176, Exhibit "11". 4

After trial, the respondent Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner would try to evade the application of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code by arguing that he never misappropriated the amount of
P118,003.10 for his own personal use as the bulk of it was given as cash advances to his co-employees. He pleads:

. . . the act of petitioner in giving out vales and/or cash advances should not be condemned or be considered as a criminal act but should instead be
lauded not only because the same was done purely for humanitarian reasons and that is to alleviate the plight of his co-employees during those hard
times when the salaries of lowly government employees were very much below the ordinary level of subsistence and his desire to see to it that the
public interest will not be jeopardized, . . ., but also because this has been the undisturbed practice in their office since time immemorial, even before
the accused's incumbency . . . . 5

Petitioner's argument fails to persuade Us.

In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did not
have them in his possession when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as
there is a shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same. 6

In this case, petitioner was the official custodian of the missing funds. He himself admitted the shortage of P118,003.10 in his cash and accounts as
Acting Postmaster but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the same. he would invoke what he calls "humanitarian reasons" as the
justification for the said shortage. But, like the accused Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, 7 petitioner herein knows that his granting of "chits" and "vales"
which constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of the postal rules and regulations. Such practice, it was held in Cabello, is also prohibited
by Memoramdum Circular No. 570, dated June 29, 1968, of the General Auditing Office. This Court went further to state that "giving vales" is
proscribed under Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, specifically Section 69
thereof, which provides that postmasters are only allowed to use their collections to pay money orders, telegraphic transfers and withdrawals from
the proper depository bank whenever their cash advances for the purpose are exhausted." 8

The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as
aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice
of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements".

The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of P188,003.10 later is of no moment. The return of funds malversed is not a defense. It is
neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the accused's criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance. 9

In the light of the above finding and under the plain language of the applicable laws, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict
finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The judgment of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with malversation of public funds as a principal after the said
individual had been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained property? Did such accused become a public officer
and therefore subject to the graft court's jurisdiction as a consequence of such designation by the BIR?

These are the main questions in the instant petition for review of Respondent Sandiganbayan's Decision 1 in Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated
on March 8, 1994, convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds and property, and Resolution 2 dated June 20, 1994, denying his motion for
new trial or reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and ore." 3 His services were contracted by the Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-
contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former's premises. 4 From this set of circumstances arose the present controversy.

. . . It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter
to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent
taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985. 5

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the "Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue," assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt the contents of which are reproduced as follows:

(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have received from Amadeo V. San Diego, an Internal Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of
the Philippines, the following described goods, articles, and things:

Kind of property Isuzu dump truck
Motor number E120-229598
Chassis No. SPZU50-1772440
Number of CXL 6
Color Blue
Owned By Mr. Jaime Ancla

the same having been this day seized and left in (my) possession pending investigation by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly
authorized representative. (I) further promise that (I) will faithfully keep, preserve, and, to the best of (my) ability, protect said goods, articles, and
things seized from defacement, demarcation, leakage, loss, or destruction in any manner; that (I) will neither alter nor remove, nor permit others to
alter or remove or dispose of the same in any manner without the express authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that (I) will
produce and deliver all of said goods, articles, and things upon the order of any court of the Philippines, or upon demand of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue or any authorized officer or agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 6

Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985 to the BIR's Regional Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating
that

. . . while I have made representations to retain possession of the property and signed a receipt of the same, it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla
intends to cease his operations with us. This is evidenced by the fact that sometime in August, 1985 he surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from
my custody. . . . In this connection, may I therefore formally inform you that it is my desire to immediately relinquish whatever responsibilities I have
over the above-mentioned property by virtue of the receipt I have signed. This cancellation shall take effect immediately. . . . 7

Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of PICOP, Mr. Delfin Panelo, and requested him to prevent this
truck from being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time the order to bar the truck's exit was given, however, it was too late. 8

Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter dated May 27, 1986, to wit:

An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals that while you are (sic) in possession of the dump truck owned by JAIME ANCLA, you
voluntarily assumed the liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is clearly indicated in the
provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment which you have signed, obliged and committed to surrender and transfer to this office. Your failure
therefore, to observe said provisions does not relieve you of your responsibility. 9

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that

On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Document Processor of Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City, sent a progress report to the Chief of
the Collection Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain contractor by the name of
Oscar Cueva at PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, the same company which engaged petitioner's earth moving services),
Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. She also suggested that if the report were true, a warrant of garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva for whatever
amount of rental is due from Ancla until such time as the latter's tax liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. . . However, instead of doing so, Director
Batausa filed a letter-complaint against the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla on 22 January 1988, or after more than one year had elapsed from the time
of Mrs. Calo's report. 10

Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro "forwarded the records of the complaint . . . to the Office of the Tanodbayan" on May 18, 1988. He was
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor and granted authority to conduct preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by Special Prosecutor
Raul Gonzales approved by Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez. 11

Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or
property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in the following Information 12 filed on January 12, 1990, by
Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:

That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual but who, in his capacity as depository/administrator of property seized or deposited by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, having voluntarily offered himself to act as custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-22958, Chasis
No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number CXL-6 and was authorized to be such under the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has become a
responsible and accountable officer and said motor vehicle having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum
of EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS and 59/100 (P80,831.59) became a public property and the value thereof as
public fund, with grave abuse of confidence and conspiring and confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned motor vehicle
or the value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then and there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow away the
said Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and knowledge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage and prejudice
of the government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991, alleging that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the
preliminary investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged with malversation
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. 13 The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991. 14 After the
reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Roger Berbano, Sr., recommended the "withdrawal of the information" 15 but was "overruled by the
Ombudsman." 16

A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March 25, 1992 on the ground that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner since he was not a public officer. 17 On May 18, 1992; the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. 18

When the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence which was denied on
November 16, 1992, "for being without merit." 19 The petitioner then commenced and finished presenting his evidence on February 15, 1993.

The Respondent Court's Decision

On March 8, 1994, Respondent Sandiganbayan 20 rendered a Decision, 21 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon y Leva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of Malversation of Public Funds
defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of Reclusion Temporal. To indemnify the Bureau of Internal Revenue the amount of P80,831.59; to pay a fine in the same amount without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual disqualification; and, to pay the costs.

Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the jurisdiction of this Court up to this date, let this case be archived as
against him without prejudice to its revival in the event of his arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through new counsel, 22 filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration on March 23, 1994, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution 23 dated December 2, 1994.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The petitioner submits the following reasons for the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's assailed Decision and Resolution:

I. The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by private individuals.

II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a private individual as a custodian or a depositary of distrained property is
sufficient to convert such individual into a public officer, the petitioner cannot still be considered a public officer because:

[A]

There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which authorizes the Bureau of Internal Revenue to constitute private individuals as
depositaries of distrained properties.

[B]

His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a direct provision of law, or by election or by appointment by a competent authority.

III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the distrained vehicle was actually owned by the accused Jaime Ancla; consequently, the
government's right to the subject property has not been established.

IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code concerning the disposition of distrained property was not followed by the
B.I.R., hence the distraint of personal property belonging to Jaime C. Ancla and found allegedly to be in the possession of the petitioner is therefore
invalid.

V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly selling the distrained property of accused Jaime C. Ancla in order to realize the amount of back
taxes owed by Jaime C. Ancla to the Bureau. 24

In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is the
question of whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a
depositary of distrained property.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

It is hornbook doctrine that in order "(to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into." 25
Furthermore, "the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied." 26
And for this purpose in criminal cases, "the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law at the time of commencement of the action." 27

In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of this information on January 12, 1990; hence, the applicable statutory provisions are those of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior to their amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16, 1995. At that time,
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 provided that:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when
the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged
with a crime within its jurisdiction.

Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?

The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime
charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers:

Who are public officers. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision
of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Thus,

(to) be a public officer, one must be

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or

Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be

a. by direct provision of the law, or

b. by popular election, or

c. by appointment by competent authority. 28

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity
constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. The next logical query is whether petitioner's
designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority. 29 We
answer in the negative.

The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively "designated" petitioner a depositary and,
hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, 30 a public officer. 31 This is based on the theory that

(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a distrained property as a depository of distrained property is necessarily
implied in the BIR's power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer (sic) in distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly
Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) . . . . 32

We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the facts therein are not identical, similar or
analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of
the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIR's administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in
relation to his back taxes, property which was received by Petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that court's
jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the judicial deposit and give "the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public official." 33 However,
in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require Petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power
to appoint Azarcon a public officer.

It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its branches and administrative agencies exercise only
that power delegated to them as "defined either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both." 34 Thus, although the "appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President, . . ." 35 the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive branch
will still be limited to that "conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication" in its enabling act. Hence, "(a)n administrative officer, it has been
held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof." 36 Corollarily, implied powers
"are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not
embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto." 37 For to so extend the statutory grant of power "would be an encroachment on powers expressly
lodged in Congress by our Constitution." 38 It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a
constructive distraint by requiring "any person" to preserve a distrained property, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or any person having possession or control of such
property to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not to dispose of the
same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the Commissioner.

xxx xxx xxx

However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution argues that
"Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code . . . defines the individuals covered by the term 'officers' under Article 217 39 . . ." of the same Code. 40 And
accordingly, since Azarcon became "a depository of the truck seized by the BIR" he also became a public officer who can be prosecuted under
Article 217 . . . ." 41

The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads:

Officers included in the preceding provisions. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have
charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached,
seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.

"Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd
or would lead to an injustice." 42 This is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as
to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . . ." 43 The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge
any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of
the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that
a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private
individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan's
taking cognizance of this case is of no moment since "(j)urisdiction cannot be conferred by . . . erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction."
44 As aptly and correctly stated by the petitioner in his memorandum:

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the
garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or
property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision
rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. 45

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and Decision of the Sandiganbayan are hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of
jurisdiction. No costs.

5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988
ALFREDO RODILLAS Y BONDOC, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition brought by Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc asking for the reversal of a decision of the Sandiganbayan which found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence (Art. 224, RPC). The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime
of Evasion through Negligence, as defined and penalized under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance
to consider, hereby sentences him to suffer the straight penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, to suffer eight (8) years
and one (1) day of temporary special disqualification and to pay the costs of this action.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)

Petitioner Rodillas was charged with having committed the said crime in an information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 1980, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused,
being then a policeman duly appointed and qualified as such, hence a public officer, specially charged with the duty of keeping under his custody
and vigilance and of conducting and delivery from the City Jail, Caloocan City to the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and
return, one Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner being tried for violation of Section 4, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, under Crim. Case No. C-12888, did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence, allow and permit said
Zenaida Sacris Andres to have snacks and enter the comfort room at the second floor of the Genato Building, Rizal Avenue, Caloocan City after the
hearing of said case, v,,ithout first ascertaining for himself whether said comfort room is safe and without any egress by which the said detention
prisoner could escape, thereby enabling said Zenaida Sacris Andres, to run away and escape thru the window inside the comfort room, as in fact
she did run away and escape from the custody of said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 6)

The prosecution's evidence upon which the court based its finding of guilt is summarized as follows:

... accused herein is a Patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of Caloocan City and assigned with the jail section thereof. On March 27,
1980, when he reported for work, he was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor Victoriano, officer-in-charge in assigning police officers to escort
prisoners, to escort Zenaida Sacris deadline Andres, a detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo Pardo of the Court of First Instance,
Br.XXXIV, located at the Genato Building, Caloocan City, to face trial for an alleged Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as the
policewoman officer who was supposed to escort the said detainee was then sick. He and the detainee proceeded to the court building and arrived
thereat between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock in the morning. while waiting for the arrival of the judge at the courtroom, Pat. Orlando Andres, who happened
to be in the court and a relative of the husband of said detention prisoner Zenaida, approached the accused and requested the latter if he could
permit Zenaida to talk to her husband. The accused consented and Zenaida Andres had a short talk with her husband. After a short while, the
presiding judge deferred the decision against her because of a new Presidential Decree revising some provisions regarding violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida requested the accused to allow them to have lunch as they were already very hungry.
He consented to the request and they proceeded to the canteen located at the mezzanine floor of the court building (Exhibit 1).<re||an1w> He
took a seat beside Zenaida and Pat. Andres while the relatives of said detainee were seated at a separate table. While eating, the husband of
Zenaida asked him if he could accompany his wife to the comfort room as she was not feeling well and felt like defecating. The accused
accompanied Zenaida and a lady companion to the ladies' comfort room located at the second floor of the building (Exibit 2). Zenaida and her lady
companion entered the comfort room, while he stood guard along the alley near the ladies' comfort room facing the door thereof (Exhibit 5). Not long
after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out of the comfort room and told him that she was going to buy sanitary napkins for Zenaida as the latter
was then bleeding and had a menstruation and could not go out of the comfort room.

After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida coming back, the accused became suspicious and entered the comfort room. To
his surprise, he found Zenaida no longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the window of said comfort room was not provided with window
grills. He tried to peep out of the window by stepping on the flush tank which is just about 3 feet from the window and noticed that outside of the
window there was a concrete eave extending down to the ground floor of the building which he presumed that Zenaida might have used as a
passage in escaping (Exhibits 2-A, 3 and 4 to 4-C). He immediately went out to look for the escapee inside the building with the help of Pat. Andres
but they were not able to see her. Pat. Andres advised him to go to Zenaida's house as she might be there, which home is located at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. Pat. Andres having told him that the husband of the escapee is from Rizal, Nueva Ecija, the accused borrowed the car of his brother-
in-law and proceeded to said town. Upon arrival thereat, they contacted the relatives of Zenaida and asked for information as to her whereabouts,
but they answered in the negative. They went back to Caloocan City and went again directly to Bagong Barrio to the house of Zenaida, arriving
thereat at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening. While at the residence of Zenaida, Cpl. Victoriano arrived and the accused related to him about the
escape of Zenaida. He formally reported the matter of his superior officer at the City Jail Capt. Leonardo Zamora. The accused declared further that
as a jailer, he never had any training nor lecture by his superiors regarding the manner of delivering prisoners. However, he admitted that he did not
inspect first the comfort room before he allowed Zenaida to enter because there were many females going in and out of said comfort room, and that
he did not promptly report the escape earlier because they were then pressed for time to intercept Zenaida at the highway. (Rollo, pp. 18-21).

The petitioner assigns the following errors:

I

WHETHER PETITIONER'S CONVICTION BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN BASED ONLY ON HIS ADMISSIONS WITHOUT THE PROSECUTION
HAVING PRESENTED EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS NEGLIGENCE WILL LIE.

II

WHETHER THE ACTS OF PETITIONER COULD BE QUALIFIED AS DEFINITE LAXITY AMOUNTING TO DELIBERATE NON-PERFORMANCE
OF DUTY TO SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION. (Brief for the petitioner, p. 5)

In essence, the sole question to be resolved in the case at bar is whether, under the foregoing facts and circumstances, the respondent
Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in holding the petitioner guilty of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner through negligence penalized
under Art. 224 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner specifically alleges that his conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based merely on his admissions without the prosecution presenting
evidence to prove his negligence.

Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him. The admissions and declarations in open court of a person charged with a crime are admissible against him. (See U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil.
578).

The records show that the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted are present. Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the
conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification.

The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that he is charged with the conveyance or
custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and c) that such prisoner escapes through his negligence (See Reyes,
L.B., Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1977 ed., p. 407).

There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any dispute as to the fact that he was charged with the custody of a
prisoner who was being tried for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of detention prisoner Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the
Revised Penal Code is such definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the guard (Id., p. 408).

It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his authority when he permitted his charge to create the
situation which led to her escape. The petitioner contends that human considerations compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres requests to take lunch
and to go to the comfort room to relieve herself.

As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the
regulations.

In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail.
He even allowed the prisoner and her husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer.

It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A
failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His
tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a
person of ordinary prudence.

The request for lunch and the consequent delay was an opportunity for the prisoner to learn of a plan or to carry out an earlier plan by which she
could escape. The plan was in fact carried out with the help of the lady who accompanied his prisoner inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is
one of the most familiar and common place methods of escape. It is inconceivable that a police officer should fall for this trick. The arrangement with
a lady friend should have aroused the petitioner's suspicion because the only pretext given by the petitioner was that she was going to answer the
call of nature. It was, therefore, unnecessary for her to be accompanied by anyone especially by someone who was not urgently in need of a toilet if
the purpose was merely to relieve herself. Despite this, the petitioner allowed the two to enter the comfort room without first establishing for himself
that there was no window or door allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed the prisoner's companion to leave the premises with the excuse
that the prisoner was having her monthly period and that there was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he patiently waited for more than ten
minutes for the companion to return. This was patent negligence and incredible naivette on the part of the police officer.

Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a confluence of facts and,circumstances which were not foreseen and were not unnatural
in the course of things. Not only should they have been foreseen but they should have been guarded against.

Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away and it was only 11:30 a.m., it would not have been inhuman for the petitioner to deny the
prisoner's request to first take lunch. Neither would it have been inhuman if he cleared the toilet of female occupants and checked all possible exists
first and if he did not allow the lady companion to go with Zenaida Andres to the comfort room. These human considerations, however, are
immaterial because the fact remains that as a police officer, he should have exercised utmost diligence in the performance of his duty.

The supposed confluence of facts does not alter his liability. That he was not trained in escorting women prisoners is likewise unacceptable as there
are no hard and fast rules of conduct under all conceivable situations for police officers acting as guards. However, they are expected to use
prudence, diligence, and common sense. That Judge Pardo did not immediately pronounce judgment so the petitioner could have immediately
brought Zenaida back to jail is inconsequential. In the first place, the escape would not have materialized had he immediately escorted her back to
jail after the hearing. That he cannot follow the prisoner inside the comfort room because it would create a commotion, he being a male, is a lame
excuse. There is nothing wrong in asking the ladies for permission so he could check the comfort room first to insure that the prisoner cannot
escape. The fact that the building is made of concrete and the outside windows covered with grills should not make a police officer complacent
especially because well-planned escapes are not uncommon. Escapes are, in fact, even presumed so much so that two (2) guards are usually
assigned to a prisoner. (Tsn, August 4, 1981, p. 40)

There appears to have been no genuine effort on the part of the petitioner to recapture the escapee. Instead of promptly reporting the matter so that
an alarm could immediately be sent out to all police agencies and expert procedures followed, he allegedly tried to look for her in the latter's house in
Caloocan and failing in this, proceeded to Nueva Ecija. It was only later in the evening that he formally reported the matter to his superior. This even
gave the escapee greater opportunity to make good her escape because the chances of her being recaptured became much less. Such action
requires concerted police effort, not a one-man job which petitioner should have been or was probably aware of.

The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted because there was no connivance between him and the prisoner. In support of his claim,
he cites the case of Alberto v. dela Cruz, (98 SCRA 406). The citation, however, is erroneous. It creates the impression that for one to be held liable
under Art. 224, there must be a showing that he first connived with the prisoner. This was not the ruling in said case. Conniving or consenting to
evasion is a distinct crime under Art. 223 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under Art. 223 but for evasion through negligence under Art. 224 of the same Code. It is,
therefore, not necessary that connivance be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners.

We quote the Solicitor General that the Sandiganbayan's observation regarding escaped prisoners is relevant and timely. The Court stated:

It is high time that the courts should take strict measures against law officers to whom have been entrusted the custody and detention of prisoners,
whether detention prisoners or prisoners serving sentence. Laxity and negligence in the performance of their duties resulting in the mysterious
escapes of notorious criminals have become common news items, involving as it does the suspicion that monetary considerations may have entered
into the arrangements which led to the successful escape of such notorious criminals even from military custody. No quarters should be extended to
such kind of law officers who, deliberately or otherwise, fail to live up to the standard required of their duties, thus directly contributing not only to the
clogging of judicial dockets but also to the inevitable deterioration of peace and order. (Brief for Respondents, pp. 17-18)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

Crimes Against Chastity
1. Acts of Lascviousness
**People v. Famularcano, 43 OG 1721

2. Qualified seduction

G.R. No. L-25354 June 28, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIANO FONTANILLA, defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
The appellant Mariano Fontanilla was prosecuted in the justice of the peace court (now municipal court) of San Fernando, La Union for qualified
seduction. The criminal complaint, signed by the offended woman Fe Castro and filed on February 28, 1961, charged.
That on or about the month of September, 1960, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Juan, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
grave abuse of confidence and authority, seduce and have sexual intercourse with the offended party Fe Castro, a domestic in the house of the said
accused, located at Allangigan, San Juan, La Union, the offended party being then a virgin over 12 years but under 18 years of age.
After trial, the court, on November 27, 1962, found that "the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt," and accordingly
sentenced him to "an indeterminate prison term from four (4) months of arresto mayor as maximum to two (2) years and four (4) months of prison
correccional and to pay the costs." The accused was further ordered "to pay the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as moral damages to the
offended party or to her parents."
Fontanilla forthwith appealed to the Court of Appeals which subsequently certified the case to us in a resolution dated September 25, 1965, on the
ground that the jurisdiction of the court a quo, inter alia, is in issue.
The following, in paraphrase, are the assigned errors:
1. The justice of the peace court of San Fernando, La Union had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case because the alleged offense was
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and at the same time does not fall within the compass of its original jurisdiction;
2. The lower court erred in finding that the accused had sexual intercourse with Fe Castro repeatedly and that he had told her a number of times that
he will separate from his wife Magdalena Copio and will marry her, which was the reason why Fe Castro consented to the sexual intercourse;
3. The lower court erred in relying heavily on the testimony of Fe Castro, considering that her testimony is hazy and self-contradictory;
4. The lower court erred in totally disregarding the evidence adduced by the appellant;
5. The lower court erred in failing to consider in favor of the accused the delay in the filing of the complaint, which delay is not convincingly explained
and which renders the accusation suspicious; and
6. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 in moral damages to the offended party or to her parents.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that in September, 1960 Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin, was brought by her mother to the house of
the appellant and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a sister of the complaining witness' mother, to serve as a helper. The Fontanilla spouses had
been married for two years but were childless, although the appellant had grown-up children by his first marriage who were domiciled elsewhere.
Fe Castro testified that during her stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three months from September to shortly before Christmas of December,
1960, the accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her repeatedly, the total number of times she could not recall. She was certain,
however, that the accused consummated the first sexual intercourse with her one night in September, about a week after her arrival, when the
accused intruded into her bedroom, placed himself on top of her and fondled her nipples. She added that he was able to gain access to her room
because the wooden bar used to lock the door did not prevent the said door from being opened when pushed from the outside. She also declared
that prior to this incident, the accused had made amorous overtures and advances toward her. Aside from giving her money, the accused repeatedly
promised to abandon his wife to live with her.
Q. You told us that Mariano Fontanilla had been giving you money. Are there other circumstances that led you to the sexual intercourse?
A. He told me, "Come now let us play. I am going to separate your aunt because I love you more than my wife."
Q. For how many times had Mariano Fontanilla been promising you this?
A. He was telling me all the time.
Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently repeatedly yielded to the carnal desires of the accused, as she was induced by his promises of
marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation. The accused made love to her during the day when his wife was away and at night when the
latter was already asleep. Their intimacies lasted for almost three months until her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in flagrante on the
kitchen floor. The following day she returned to her parents, and revealed everything to her mother two days later.
Mariano Fontanilla, testifying in his defense, admitted that Fe Castro actually lived in his house from September to December, 1960, not as a helper,
however, but in consideration of her being a niece of his wife, and was treated as their own child. He vehemently denied having had carnal
knowledge of her, as there was never an occasion during which he could have taken advantage of the chastity of his ward, because at night her
room was locked and during the day he was out in the farm.
Q. When the offended party testified before the Court she stated that the first time you had sexual intercourse with her was a certain night in
September and you said to her, "You are very beautiful. Come let us play." What do you say to this allegation?
A. I did not do that, sir.
Q. How is it possible or will circumstances afford you of getting inside her room and take advantage of her being a woman?
A. No, sir. It cannot be.
Q. Why could it not be that you could enter the room and take advantage of her womanhood?
A. Because the room is locked.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. The offended party further testified in Court that you did the sexual intercourse daily, one in the day time and one in the nighttime. Will you
mention before this Honorable Court if you can commit sexual intercourse in the day time?
A. That cannot be, sir.
Q. Why could you not possibly do the sexual intercourse in the day time?
A. Because I am in the farm, sir.
Q. Sometimes when you are in the farm, during lunch time Fe Castro would bring your food in the farm?
A. No, sir.
Q. And when you go home to your house in the day time for example you take your lunch. So it is possible for you to have sexual intercourse with
the offended party?
A. No, sir. It is not possible during day time.
Q. Who are your companions in your house in the day time?
A. My wife and also our neighbor who used to come.
Fontanilla declared that another reason why it was not possible for him to seduce Fe Castro was that his sexual capabilities had waned considerably
because of old age, as he was already 52 years old at the time of the supposed commission of the crime charged. He admitted that despite the fact
that he had been married for only two years to his second wife, he made love to her only once a week. Under these circumstances, it was impossible
for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with Fe Castro twice daily.
The accused advances the theory that the instant case was filed against him upon the malevolent instigation of one Avelino Gapasin, an uncle of Fe
Castro, who wielded strong influence over her, adding that the complainant herself was envious of his (Fontanilla's) children of the first marriage who
received some salary from their employment. This allegation was indirectly corroborated by a witness for the defense, Mayor Antonio Aquino of San
Juan, La Union, who testified that he endeavored to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay P50 which was due to Fe Castro as her share
in the cultivation of tobacco, but the complaining witness through Avelino Gapasin refused the offer and the latter then insinuated that the amount of
P2,000 should be paid, which sum he believed would be sufficient reparation for "the honor destroyed."
Magdalena Copio 51-year old wife of the accuse, corroborated her husband's statement that they indulged in sexual intercourse only once a week.
She also stated that during the three months that Fe Castro stayed with them, there was no unusual incident or sexual relation between her husband
and her niece. She denied having caught the accused in a compromising situation with the offended party. She also testified that she slept regularly
from 7:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, after which she seldom could go back to sleep, and that she was easily awakened by the slightest noise. She
categorically declared that her husband slept with her in the same bed every night.
For the first time on appeal, Fontanilla challenges the jurisdiction of the court a quo the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, the capital of
La Union - alleging that it had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case, for two reasons: (1) the crime charged according to the indictment was
committed in San Juan, a municipality outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court a quo; and (2) original jurisdiction over the crime of qualified
seduction belongs exclusively to the court of first instance, and not to the justice of the peace court of the provincial capital.
The appellant's theory finds no basis in the then governing provisions of the Judiciary Act when the instant action was commenced on February 28,
1961. It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
1
The
pertinent statutory provision then in force was section 87(c), paragraph 3, of Republic Act 296, as amended by Republic Act 2613, which
unequivocably provided that "Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and Judges of Municipal Courts shall have like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within the province in which the penalty provided by law do not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both ..." (Emphasis supplied.) It is
therefore beyond dispute that under the then existing law all offenses committed within the province, provided that the penalty prescribed did not
exceed prision correccional or a fine not exceeding P3,000 or both, were triable by the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals. Since the
penalty prescribed for qualified seduction under article 337 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
the instant case was clearly within the periphery of the concurrent jurisdiction of the court a quo.
It was only on June 22, 1963, more than two years after the institution of the case at bar, that the above-cited provision of the Judiciary Act was
amended by Republic Act 3828. The pertinent provision is now section 87(c), paragraph 4, which, as amended, reads:
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and subprovinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to
try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correcional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both....
Republic Act 3828 introduced two significant changes: (1) the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts in the capitals of provinces and sub-
provinces and of city courts with the courts of first instance has been territorially localized and limited to the proper offenses committed "within their
respective jurisdictions," while previously said courts could take cognizance of the proper offense committed "within the province;" and (2) the proper
offenses cognizable include those where the pecuniary penalty (fine) does not exceed P6,000, an increase over the previous P3,000 limit.
The first of the above-mentioned changes unmasks the fallacy of the appellant's theory that even under the then existing provision, the concurrent
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals with the courts of first instance was already confined to their respective territorial
limits. If this were true, then Congress would have had no reason to enact the foregoing amendment which eliminated the phrase "within the
province" and in its place substituted the delimiting phrase "within their respective jurisdictions."
The foregoing notwithstanding, the appellant insists that justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals, like the court a quo, have no jurisdiction
over the crime of qualified seduction because of the provisions of article 345 of the Revised Penal Code by virtue of which the court must, in addition
to the imposition of a prison term ( prision correccional minimum to medium in case of qualified seduction) which the accused must suffer, require
him to indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the offspring unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and in every case to support
the offspring. The theory of the appellant is that the imposition of the enumerated civil liabilities increases the punishment, thereby divesting the
justice of the peace courts of the capitals of provinces of jurisdiction and consequently confining original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense to
courts of first instance.
This contention is obviously untenable because section 37(c), paragraph 3 [now sec. 87(c), paragraph 4] of the Judiciary Act grants the justice of the
peace courts (now municipal courts) of provincial capitals concurrent jurisdiction with courts of first instance over offenses for which the penalty
provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding P3,000 (now P6,000). This
concurrence of jurisdiction is based upon the duration of the imprisonment and/or the amount of the fine imposable, irrespective of the civil incidents
or obligations which may attach to the offense charged. So that any civil liability attaching to the offense concurrently cognizable by the courts of first
instance and the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals can also be imposed by the latter because these have been conferred jurisdictional
parity.
The appellant cites as authority for his theory the case of U.S. vs. Bernardo,
2
a seduction case in which this Court, with a slim majority of four justices
(three justices dissented), said:
These obligations imposed upon the culprit ordinarily exceed the amount of the penalty fixed by the law as being within the jurisdiction of the justice
of the peace court and compromise, moreover, by virtue of the forced recognition imposed by article 135 of the Civil Code, the special determination
of offspring which resulted from the crime, consequently, although the said crime of seduction is only punished by the penalty of arresto mayor, a
judgement of conviction cannot be pronounced by a justice of the peace, on account of his lack of jurisdiction..
But disregarding the amount of the indemnity, whatever it be, according to the conditions and circumstances of the offended party and of the one
obliged to furnish the same, which amount might be greater than that fixed by law as within the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts, the
acknowledgement of the resulting offspring, one of the findings which the sentence must contain, establishes by force of law the civil status of the
child whose acknowledgment is necessarily upon the guilty party; so with much less reason could the crime fall within the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace court, inasmuch as, in accordance with specific legal provisions, only the judge of the Court of First Instance can make such
pronouncements.
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, however, "there is a big difference between the case of U.S. vs. Bernardo, supra, and the present
case, in that while the Bernardo case involved the original exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts, the present case touches a
concurrent jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts in the capitals of the provinces and Courts of First Instance." Furthermore, "It would be going
a long way to say that an indemnification or a restitution or a reparation is a fine or an imprisonment under any definition found in the criminal law of
any country. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount of the fine and imprisonment. An indemnification or a reparation or a restitution
is merely an incident of the crime. The jurisdiction of the court is not fixed by the incident but by the nature of the crime itself. Legally speaking, the
nature of the crime is determined by the punishment imposed... The jurisdiction of courts of justice of the peace over crimes being determined
exclusively by the amount of the fine and imprisonment imposed by law, that is by the legal nature of the crime, and in no manner and to no extent
whatever by the civil incidents which accrue to the person injured by the commission of said crime, such courts have jurisdiction of the crime
presented in the case at bar, the punishment prescribed by law for such crime being (then) simply arresto mayor."
3

We now proceed to the merits of the case.
The atmosphere of secrecy and privacy which pervades the commission of crimes against chastity, coupled with the consequent dearth or even
absence of witnesses, constrains the courts to rely in no small measure upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining woman whose
testimonial and personal credibility assumes pivotal importance. It is against this situational backdrop that we proceed to discuss the issues of fact
posed by the appellant.
Fontanilla contends, among others, that the court a quo erred in finding there that there is evidence to show that he had sexual intercourse many
times with the complainant Fe Castro. We disagree. After a thorough study of the record, we find that the complainant's testimony, in direct as well
as in cross-examination, is entitled to essential credence. She declared that Fontanilla had carnal knowledge of her one night in September, 1960 in
the house of the former where she was staying as a maid, and that since then up to December of the same year, Fontanilla had sexual intercourse
with her repeatedly, sometimes at night. sometimes in the daytime, but always when his wife was asleep or away. Significantly, convincing proof of
the first sexual intercourse would suffice to affirm the conviction of the appellant without necessity of proving the subsequent instances of carnal
liaison. The following frank and revealing testimony of the offended woman appears on record:
Q. When you were with the Fontanillas, do you know if there was anything unusual that took place?
A. He fooled me.
Q. Who fooled you?
A. Mariano Fontanilla.
Q. What do you mean by fooled you?
A. He had sexual intercourse with me.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. When did Mariano Fontanilla start having sexual intercourse with you?
A. One week after my arrival in their house.
Q. For how many times did Mariano Fontanilla have sexual intercourse with you?
A. Very often when I was in their house.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. For how many times after September?
A. I could not count anymore, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Do you mean to tell us that he had been having sexual intercourse with you during the three (3) months you stayed with them?
A. Always.
COURT:
Q. Now, usually what time did you have that sexual intercourse?
A. Day and night.
Q. And where did you do sexual intercourse during the day time?
A. When I iron their clothes in their house.
Q. Was there no other person in that house during the day when you have been ironing clothes?
A. The wife is not there.
Q. Do they have any children?
A. They have no children.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. When you left the house of Mariano Fontanilla and returned to your house in barrio Allangigan, was it with the consent of Mr. and Mrs. Mariano
Fontanilla?
A. They allowed me to go home.
Q. Why did you go home?
A. I left sir, because the wife of Mariano Fontanilla discovered what we have been doing.
When asked upon cross-examination to narrate the circumstances surrounding the first intercourse, Fe Castro testified thus:
Q. Now, what were you doing in your room when Mariano Fontanilla first came in?
A. I was already sleeping.
Q. And how were you awakened from your sleep?
A. When I woke up, he was on top of me holding my nipples.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Can you remember the date of the week when Mariano Fontanilla consummated his first sexual intercourse with you?
A. I don't remember the date.
Q. Do you remember what time? In the morning or afternoon?
A. Night time.
Q. Do you remember what were the actual words of Mariano Fontanilla when he consummated his first sexual intercourse with you?
A. "How beautiful you are, my daughter! I wish I could marry one as beautiful as you. Come let us play.
Q. After he uttered those words, what did he do to you?
A. He was placing his private parts in mine.
Q. Do you mean to say he did not remove your panties first?
A. He removed it.
Q. Did you offer any objection when he made those acts to you?
A. He told that "If you are going to move, I am going to club you."
Q. And you never uttered a word of what he is doing?
A. I did not complain anymore because I was afraid."
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Now, it was in the evening of that day when he started caressing you in the kitchen when he had that first sexual intercourse with you, is that
right?
A. Yes, sir, the same night he came to the room.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. This room where you had your intercourse with the accused was there a lock in the door?
A. There is a piece of wood that is used as a bar but if you push it, it will be opened.
The foregoing testimony of the aggrieved woman belies the contention of Fontanilla that there is no evidence showing that he had carnal knowledge
of Fe Castro. Of course no other witness was presented by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of the victim with respect to the actual act of
seduction, nor to the amorous overtures of the accused before the first sexual intercourse, nor to their subsequent carnal acts. But this is quite
understandable because aside from Fontanilla and Fe Castro, there was only one other person in the house of the accused his wife, who was
either asleep or away when the two indulged in their illicit love-making. As previously intimated, the final verdict would principally hinge on the
testimonial and personal credibility of the complaining witness.
Assailing the credibility of the complainant, Fontanilla contends that Fe Castro has malevolent and ulterior motives for filing this case against him. He
alleged that Fe Castro was envious of his children by his first marriage who had some income. In our view, this is a flimsy rationalization which the
accused, significantly, did not even attempt to substantiate.
Fontanilla also argues that Fe Castro was induced and pressured by her uncle Avelino Gapasin to file the criminal complaint. Testifying on this point,
Mayor Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union, stated that he tried to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay the complainant P50 as the
latter's alleged share in the tobacco harvest; and that this proposal was refused, however, by Fe Castro, thru Gapasin, on the ground that the
amount offered would not even be sufficient to defray the expenses for the delivery of the child which the victim mistakenly thought she was
conceiving as a result of Fontanilla's carnal knowledge of her. Aquino also claimed that Gapasin insinuated that any compromise amount must be
equal to the "honor destroyed" and he, Gapasin, suggested P2,000.
The foregoing testimony was presented by the defense to prove its allegation that Fe Castro was pressured into filing the case at bar. Standing
alone, Gapasin's objection to the proposed compromise does not prove that he induced the victim to denounce Fontanilla in court. On the contrary,
from the actuations of Gapasin it can be inferred that he was just trying to protect the interest of his niece who was offered so meager an amount as
settlement for an offense which caused the latter the irredeemable loss of her virginity. Furthermore, it is on record that prior to the overtures at
settlement, the complaining witness had already gone to the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union to file charges against Fontanilla. Aquino
himself admitted upon cross-examination that he had requested Fiscal Crisogono Bautista to postpone the filing of the complaint to enable him to
settle the case, and that the proposed compromise was his idea and made upon his own initiative. This admission shows that the filing of the instant
case preceded, and was not due to, the failure of the alleged proposed compromise.
The appellant further contends that the complainant's testimony does not merit credence because it is hazy and self-contradictory. He argues that if it
is true that he repeatedly promised to marry Fe Castro in order to deceive her into submitting to his carnal designs, why did the latter allegedly
consent to the continuance of their illicit liaison even after it was evident that he would not fulfill his promise to marry her? A situation like this, says
the appellant, borders on the incredible and suggests that there was actually no promise of marriage and consequently there was no resultant carnal
relation between him and the complaining woman.
This "unthinkable" situation pointed out by the appellant was quite reasonably explained by the complainant in a frank, albeit embarrassing, reply
contained in her sworn statement (exh. A-1) taken in the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union on January 31, 1961. Upon interrogation, Fe
Castro declared:
Q. Despite his many promises which he never fulfilled, why did you still continue to have relationship with him?
A. Because I was beginning to like him and enjoy this sexual intercourse.
Underscoring the above statement of Fe Castro, Fontanilla claims that it exposes in fact the fabricated nature of the case against him, because for a
woman to continue having sexual relations with a man even after a patent breach of the latter's promise of marriage, is unthinkable and alien to
human experience. We believe, on the contrary, however, that the said statement of the aggrieved woman does not make her testimony incredible
for it evinces basic honesty and sincerity on her part, even to the extent of admitting something which could conceivably put her to shame and
ridicule.
Anent the said marital promise, Fontanilla also claims that there is no evidence on record supporting its veracity. Granting this to be correct, it is
nevertheless settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a
charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic,
tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable
although fraud or deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved.
4
The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen
years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in art. 337 "is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit
intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the
existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction ... taking into
account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud."
5

It is likewise contended for the appellant that the testimony of the complainant is unbelievable because while she denounced the perverse and
criminal conduct of the accused, in the same breath she described the relation between the accused and his wife as harmonious and cordial. The
alleged inconsistency in this regard is more apparent than real. A man could hide his evil motives and immoral conduct behind a deceptive facade.
And it stands to reason that a husband who has illicit relations with a woman who resides in the same house where he dwells with his wife would
even be over-solicitous with the latter to camouflage his infidelity.
Fontanilla also challenges the credibility of Fe Castro's account regarding his having been discovered by his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with
the complainant on the kitchen floor. He argues that had such a discovery actually been made, the natural reaction of his wife would have been to
lay hands on both of them (Fe Castro and himself), with the complainant taking the most punishment since women are inherently possessive and are
merciless upon those who attempt to take away their loved ones. Fe Castro did not testify on such a hostile reaction.
We are inclined to believe, however, that women are bound to react differently to the same or similar situations. There is no sufficient reason to
discredit Fe Castro's testimony that when they were discovered in flagrante by Magdalena Copio, the appellant's wife and her aunt, the latter verbally
chastised Fontanilla for having "fool(ed) this little girl."
The appellant's wife, then 51 years old and twice married, most probably knew that it was her 52-year old second husband, the herein appellant, who
was at fault and thus spared her 15-year old niece from any punishment.
It is conceded that the testimony of Fe Castro suffers from some inconsistencies; these, however, could be attributed to her minority (she was barely
16 years old at the time of the trial), lack of education (she had reached only grade III), perceptibly low intelligence, and to the understandable
partiality of a litigant to her cause. On the whole, we find that the complainant's testimony is credible and convincing. Furthermore, we believe that no
other reason impelled Fe Castro in instituting this case against her very kin, and exposing thereby her sordid experience to public scrutiny and
suffering as a consequence the travail of trial, than to seek justice for herself.
The appellant further claims that the court a quo erred in failing to consider the unexplained delay in the filing of the complaint, which delay renders
the accusation suspicious. It is relevant to note that the accused did not raise this issue before the court a quo. Anent the alleged delay, the Solicitor
General states that it can easily be explained "by the fact that the complainant was not accusing a person who was a total stranger to her but the
husband of her mother's sister. The attempt of the older people to thresh out their differences and to settle the case amicably had brought about the
said delay." It appears on record that Fe Castro left the house of Fontanilla on December 18, 1960, and two days thereafter she informed her parents
of what Fontanilla had done. Forthwith she and her parents decided to bring the case to court, and on January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had herself
examined in the La Union Provincial Hospital, with the name of Fiscal Bautista appearing in the medical certificate as the requesting officer, which
means that prior to January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had already gone to the office of the provincial fiscal presumably to complain against Fontanilla. The
criminal complaint was filed only on February 28, 1961 because as previously stated, Mayor Aquino had requested Fiscal Bautista to postpone the
filing of the indictment to give the former sufficient time to attempt at an amicable settlement of the case.
We now come to the basic defense set up by Fontanilla, which is a denial of his having had carnal knowledge of Fe Castro whom he admits was
once his ward. His denial is anchored on two grounds: (1) there was no occasion during which he could have violated the chastity of the complainant
because during the night the room of the latter was locked and during the day he was always out in the fields; and (2) at the age of 52, his sexual
potency had considerably waned as proved by the fact that he had sexual intercourse with his own wife only once a week. The court a quo did not
accord credence to this defense, and we are of the view that in this regard the court did not err.
The complainant testified that the wooden bar which she used to lock the door of her room did not prevent the said door from being opened when
pushed from the outside. Thus, Fontanilla had easy access at night to Fe Castro's sleeping quarters. Considering the general make-up of residential
houses in the barrios, we believe that the complainant's statement is essentially true.
With respect to the appellant's argument that during the day he had no opportunity of being alone with the complainant, he himself admitted upon
cross-examination that there were times when he would be home earlier than his wife and would ask Fe Castro to serve him food. As there was no
other person in the house during such occasions Fe Castro and Fontanilla naturally would be alone together. The appellant also admitted that
whenever his wife went to market she would be away for two or three hours. He hastened to add, however, that each time his wife left for the market
she advised Fe Castro to stay with their neighbor. Granting that Fe Castro would really go to their neighbor's place which was only five meters away
from their house, it is not improbable that Fontanilla would call her back once his wife had left. Thus, the very record of the case belies the defense of
the appellant that there was no occasion when he could have violated the chastity of his ward.
The appellant also contends that it was impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with the complainant twice a day, because even
with his wife he made love only once a week. Fontanilla attributed his diminished virility to old age as he was already 52 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime. This declaration was corroborated by his wife, Magdalena Copio who went to the extent of vouching that two years
after their marriage they did not indulge anymore in sexual relations. We believe, nonetheless, that the appellant's claim is untenable. In the first
place, the complainant did not say that Fontanilla had her twice a day during the three months that she stayed with him and his wife. When asked
what time they indulged in sexual intercourse, she replied "Day and night." (t.s.n., p. 6) This answer of the complainant cannot be interpreted to
mean that they had sexual intercourse twice daily (one in the daytime and another at night), for said statement was in reply to a question with respect
to the time when they engaged in carnal intercourse and not the frequency of their illicit love making. In the second place, there is a presumption that
an adult male has normal powers of virility and the burden of proving the contrary rests on the party asserting it.
6
We believe that the declarations of
Fontanilla and his wife on the former's alleged weakening potency are not sufficient to rebut this presumption. Alfred W. Herzog has cautioned that
"one must be very careful not to express the opinion that a man on account of his age is either sterile or impotent."
7
Hence, a party who claims loss
of virility, or waning potency for that matter, must bolster his assertion clinically with the aid of a competent and expert witness.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented Dr. Magno K. Guerrero, the physician at the La Union Provincial Hospital who examined the victim. Dr.
Guerrero testified that the hymen of Fe Castro showed "incomplete healed lacerations at 9 & 3 o'clock positions on the face of a watch, edges of
which are sharp and easily coaptable." He explained that healed lacerations would suggest that the injury happened six months, more or less, prior
to the date of examination. In the case at bar, since per medical findings the hymen of the complainant showed "incomplete healed lacerations," then
this fact would indicate that the injury occurred less than six months before February 12, 1961, the date of the medical examination of Fe Castro.
Significantly, said period corresponds to the time when Fe Castro stayed as a helper in the house of the Fontanilla spouses. Upon cross-
examination, Dr. Guerrero testified:
Q. Dr. Guerrero, you stated that it (the laceration) should last less than six (6) months counting from?
A. From the time I examined.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Disregarding the history of the patient, from your observation of the patient, how many sexual intercourses could have caused the lacerations
taking into consideration the condition of the hymen?
A. Several intercourse because of the laxity of the vaginal canal and it admits three (3), fingers.
Q. How many intercourses could have caused that?
A. Several. More than ten (10) times.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. And those lacerations could be caused ten (10) times or more?
A. Ten times or more.
Q. How many more?
A. Another ten (10) times more.
It is clear from the above testimony that Fe Castro had experienced numerous distinct acts of sexual intercourse, a fact which affirms her claim that
the appellant had carnal knowledge of her repeatedly during her three-month stay in his house. There is no evidence on record that Fe Castro, then
a 15-year old single girl, was unchaste prior to her living with the Fontanilla spouses. Such being the case, her virginity before she was seduced by
the appellant must be presumed. Presumption of a woman's virginity arises whenever it is shown that she is single, and continues until overthrown
by proof to the contrary.
8
This is in accord with the presumption of innocence which "includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a
consequence, of chastity."
9

We are of the considered opinion that the findings of fact reached by the court a quo are substantially correct. This, apart from the rule that "as far as
credibility and veracity of witnesses are concerned, the conclusions of the lower court command great weight and respect, on the ground that the
trustworthiness of witnesses and the merit of the defenses by the accused, are in the peculiar domain of the trial court."
10
In the case at bar, we see
no reason for departing from this doctrine, there being no showing that "some fact or circumstance of great importance to the case has been
overlooked in the records or misapplied or its significance misunderstood by the lower court."
11

The appellant finally contends that the lower court erred in ordering him to pay P500 in moral damages to the offended party or to her parents.
Ironically, this contention is correct in two respects. The first is that the award of P500 in moral damages is inadequate. We have heretofore stated
that the complainant was a virgin, there being no proof to the contrary, and that she was deflowered by the appellant. The loss of her virginity, at the
hands of the appellant, together with the attendant shame and scandal, entitles her, in the view of this Court, to the sum of P2,500 in moral
damages. Her future as a woman is definitely impaired, and the resultant prejudice against her engendered in the male population of the barrio
where she resides cannot be blinked away. The second error of the lower court is in making the award payable to the offended party or to her
parents, which award is, by the very wording of the judgment, in the alternative. Article 2219 of the New Civil Code provides that moral damages are
recoverable by the offended party in the cases of "seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts" and that the "parents of the female seduced,
abducted, raped, or abused ... may also recover moral damages." (Emphasis supplied). The conviction of the accused suffices as a basis to adjudge
him, in the same action, liable for an award of moral damages, without independent proof thereof, to the victim and her parents, because the law
presumes that not only the woman who was seduced, abducted, raped or abused, but as well her parents, naturally suffer besmirched reputation,
social humiliation, mental anguish, and wounded feelings. In the case at bar, moral damages must be awarded to the offended woman and her
parents, not to either of them, as ordered by the court a quo.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the modification that the appellant is ordered to pay the sum of P2,500 in moral
damages to the offended party and her parents. Costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-32895 February 28, 1983
EUSEBIO BABANTO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MARIANO A. ZOSA, Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
et al., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner who had been charged with the offense of rape punishable under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code questions the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental convicting him of the lesser offense of qualified seduction.

The complaint states:

The undersigned complainant after being duly sworn to in accordance with law, accused Eusebio Babanto of the crime of Rape, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 24th day of October, 1969, in the town of Oroquieta, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused abusing his position as a policeman of Oroquieta and taking advantage of the night time and of the feeble
minded (sic) condition of the complainant who is of tender age of 13, with the use of his service firearm and by means of violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Leonida Dagohoy, against her will
inside the ABC Hall which happen to be dark. (sic)

Contrary to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 4111, with the aggravating circumstances of (a) night time and (b)
abuse of public position. " (Original Records, p. 1).

The trial court did not find the accused guilty of the rape charged. Instead, it found him guilty of the lesser offense of qualified seduction. The trial
court opined that considering the evidence on record, accused Babanto actually had sexual intercourse with complainant Leonida Dagohoy but that
such sexual intercourse was not committed through the use of any violence or intimidation. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

... the Court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Seduction, he is hereby punished to suffer imprisonment of
from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods; to
indemnify the offended girl in the amount of P3,000.00; to recognize the offspring which may be born out of the crime committed, there being no
positive proof that he was castrated, and if castrated the castration was successful, his uncorroborated statement was not enough; to suffer the other
accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the costs. His dismissal from the service is strongly recommended. (Original Records, p. 94).

A motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-petitioner was denied by the trial court. Hence, this petition.

The Solicitor General in a manifestation filed on February 6, 1971 before this Court shares the petitioner's view that under the complaint, quoted
earlier, the petitioner could not be legally convicted of the lesser offense of qualified seduction.

We agree with this statement of Justice Felix Q. Antonio, the then Solicitor General.

Under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of qualified seduction are: (1) the offended party is a virgin; (2) she must be over 12 and
under 18 years of age; (3) the offender has sexual intercourse with her; and (4) the offender is a person in public authority, priest, house servant,
domestic, guardian, teacher, one entrusted with the education or custody of the offended party, or a brother or ascendant of the latter.

The complaint alleged that the accused abused his position as a policeman, that Leonida Dagohoy was of the tender age of 13, and that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the complainant. However, there is no allegation that the complainant was a "virgin". It is true that virginity is presumed if
the girl is over 12 and under 18 years of age, is unmarried and of good reputation. The presumption notwithstanding, virginity is still an essential
element of the crime of qualified seduction and must be alleged in the complaint.

A conviction for the crime of qualified seduction without the allegation of virginity would violate the petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. (Sec. 1 (c), Rule 115, Rules of Court; Sec. 1(17), Art. III, 1935 Constitution; Section 1 (19), Art. IV, Constitution;
People v. Castro, 58 SCRA 473; People v. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144).

In the same manifestation, the Solicitor General however recommends " ... that the merits of the case be certified to the proper appellate court for
review as the evidence may sustain a finding of guilt of the crime of RAPE."

As a matter of correct procedure, this case should have been raised to the Court of Appeals in a regular appeal, instead of the accused coming to
the Supreme Court directly.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the manifestation filed on February 6, 1971, "after all, by this Petition for Review, petitioner in effect is
appealing from the judgment of conviction." The then Solicitor General, Justice Felix Q. Antonio quoted the court's impressions of the testimonies of
witnesses as follows:

(a) Antonia Simbajon Dagohoy

... On further investigation, she was able to pry from her that she was sexually abused by a man, a certain policeman by the name of Eusebio
Babanto.

(b) Sida Ranudo

Sometime after January 15, 1970, Eusebio Babanto passed by her house and dropped in and asked her what the girl (Leonida told her. She told
Babanto that Leonida said that he brought her to the ABC Hall and had her sit while he (Babanto) placed his gun on the second tier of the
grandstand; spread papers on the cement floor and let her lie on the paper, while he (Eusebio Babanto) took off his trousers. When the penis of
Babanto stood errect, Babanto mounted her and she exclaimed ouch! ouch!

Babanto admitted this narration to be true. In fact she told Babanto if it is true; why did he not surrender and confess. Babanto in turn told her that he
will not. It would be shameful as he is a police officer,

(c) Leonida Dagohoy (victim)

At dawn of October 24, 1969 she was in the market of Oroquieta sitting leisurely. While thus sitting, Eusebio Babanto, a policeman, came and held
her by the right hand at the same time saying: I will bring you to the municipal building. 'She accompanied and went along with him because she was
being held. But they did not reach the municipal building because Eusebio Babanto brought her to the ABC Hall. The hall was empty and there was
nobody in. It was dark. In the ABC Hall, Eusebio Babanto made her lie down face upward. Then he lifted her dress and pulled down her pantie. She
felt pain in her vagina when his penis penetrated her sexual organ. She cried. He completed the act, stood up and left her; told her that if she tells
her parents, he will shoot her. Eusebio Babanto was in uniform and with a side arm.

She did not shout because he held her mouth. After Babanto left her, she put on her pantie back and felt her vagina was bleeding. She was then
wearing a blue dress. When morning came, she took a bath and washed her pantie.

When Babanto left her that dawn in the ABC Hall, she went to the seashore. She did not report to her parents because she was afraid of Eusebio
Babanto when he said that he will kill her if she tells her parents. But eventually her parents came to know of what happened to her that she was
abused because they investigated her. Ultimately, she confessed to them. So, they brought her to the hospital and had her examined by a doctor.

When the accused filed his brief on April 2, 1971, he ignored the factual considerations raised by the Solicitor General and insisted on an acquittal
based on the error in his conviction for qualified seduction.

Considering that the penalty for rape is reclusion perpetua which is within our appellate jurisdiction and that no useful purpose would be served by
referring this case to the Court of Appeals only to have it return to us from that court, we decided to fully review the entire records, which we ordered
transmitted from the trial court, and to go into all aspects of the case.

On June 4, 1971, the Solicitor General repeated his earlier stand that the petitioner cannot be convicted for the crime of qualified seduction under the
information filed against him, however under the circumstances of the case, he can be convicted of rape. The Solicitor General recommended "that
the merits of the criminal case be certified for review by the proper appellate court and petitioner-accused be not discharged and instead be made to
pursue his Petition for Review in the form of an ordinary appeal. "

On June 22, 1971, we issued a Resolution informing the petitioner that "he may file a reply to the said memoranda (of the Solicitor General) within 10
days from notice hereof, if he so desires. "

The petitioner opted to be silent.

The records show that complainant Leonida Dagohoy was a thirteen year old girl at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. Leonida was not
a normal 13 year old girl because, while she was able to reach Grade One, she was of considerably low mentality. She also had a peculiar trait of
going out during nighttime without her parents' consent. As a child, her mother said that "she used to go out during night just to pick up some fruits
falling from our neighbors. When she is already matured she used to go with me to the public market alleging that she will help me watch my store.
(TSN, March 10, 1970, p. 4) She would escape from their house from 2:00 o'clock AM until dawn. (TSN, March 10, 1970, p. 5) Because of this
peculiarity, her mother built a cage for Leonida to prevent her from going out. (TSN, March 10, 1970, p. 5.)

Leonida narrated the incident of October 24, 1969 wherein accused petitioner allegedly raped her as follows: At dawn of October 24, 1969, she was
seated in the market located at Oroquieta City, when the accused petitioner Babanto, a policeman approached her and held her right hand. Babanto
told her that they will go to the municipal building and she went with him because he held her. However, she was not brought to the municipal hall.
Instead Babanto brought her to the ABC Hall. There was no one in the ABC Hall and it was dark. When they arrived at the ABC Hall, Babanto made
her lie down with her face upward. While she was in this position, Babanto lifted up her dress and took away her panty. While Babanto was lifting her
dress and removing her panty, she kicked him but he held her down. Then Babanto exposed his penis, laid down on top of her and commenced the
sexual act. She felt pain in her vagina as his penis penetrated. She could not shout when she was being abuse because Babanto covered her
mouth, Leonida then cried. After the sexual act Babanto told her that if she was going to tell her parents he was going to shoot her. Thereafter,
Babanto left her. While putting back her panty, she noticed her vagina "bloodbleeding. " The following morning she took a bath and washed her
panty smeared with blood. She did not report the incident to her parents because of the threat on her life by Babanto. At the time of the incident,
Babanto was in uniform with a sidearm. Leonida knew him well. She said that Babanto's daughter was her friend. (TSN, April 1, 1970, pp. 63-70).

Leonida's mother who, after observing her to be weak and quite feverish while in the cage where she was placed, asked her "if she was not abused
by any man." According to her mother, she had to ask her for the second time before Leonida admitted that she was abused sexually by a man
whom she identified as a certain policeman, Eusebio Babanto. (TSN, March 1970, pp. 5-6)

Leonida's mother then informed her husband about Leonida's story. They decided to have Leonida medically examined. Leonida was examined on
October 27, 1969 by Dr. German Garcia, Chief of the Provincial Hospital who issued a medical certificate, (Exh. "B ") with the following findings:

old healed lacerations of Hymen at nine and three o'clock. Vaginal opening easily admit one finger but admit two fingers with ease.

The accused-petitioner denied the rape charge. His own version of the incident of March 24, 1969 is as follows: On the night of March 24, 1969, he
together with Patrolman Apos was assigned to patrol Washington Street from 12:00 to 6:00." While on patrol, at about 1:00 o'clock a.m., he and
Apos noticed a girl and a boy going to the public market coming from the Filipino bakery. They followed the said boy and girl to find out those
persons were. They reached up to the police station where they saw the girl sitting there alone without the boy. The girl turned out to be Leonida
Dagohoy, the complainant. They investigated the girl asked her name and her address. The girl however, did not answer but instead she lowered
her hand. They decided to bring Leonida to the municipal building because she is only roaming and in order that she can be protected. While they
were walking side by side, Babanto asked her again as regards her name, residence name of her parents, but she did not answer and instead she
would only lower her hand. At this time they were within the premises of the Southern Capital Colleges with Patrolman Apos behind them, about "five
fathoms (sic) from them." While walking towards the municipal building, they met a patrol car. In the patrol car were Patrolman Tabamo and Sgt.
Bongabong of the police force of Oroquieta City. The patrol car stopped in front of Patrolman Tabamo (sic) and they "were conversing and I who was
a bit ahead stopped with the intention to listen to what they were conversing." Leonida proceeded to walk and he followed her. At this time Babanto
was four fathoms more or less behind Leonida. Leonida proceeded to the ABC Hall. Since the accused was not able to overtake her, he proceeded
to the municipal building. Upon reaching the municipal building Babanto verified from the guard, a certain Saniel if a girl passed by there. Saniel told
him there was none. Patrolman Apos who arrived later asked also about the girl. He then, recorded the event in the police blotter, after which he
together with Apos went back on patrol. They never saw Leonida during, the duration of their assignment. Babanto said that before this incident he
never knew complainant Leonida (TSN, April 27, 1970, pp. 96-102).

Babanto's foregoing testimony was corroborated by Patrolman Apos. Patrolman Saniel, the guard at that time in the municipal building and Ricardo
Sambo, a detained prisoner at the municipal building confirmed that at about 1:00 o'clock dawn of October 24, 1969, Babanto, arrived at the
municipal building and reported about a girl (Leonida) whom he arrested in the public market with Patrolman Apos but who was able to run away.

Given the two versions of the incident, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution's version. The trial court held:

From the declaration of the girl the Court can not conceive of any probability that the intercourse took place with violence or intimidation although the
Court believes that the accused had sexual relation with the complaining witness at the ABC Hall of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental. The testimony of
the girl herself who declared on the abuse is very clear that the accused at the public market on the pretext to protect her ordered her to come along
with him to the municipal building but instead to the ABC Hall near the municipal building, By the way, the ABC Hall is an annex to the municipal
building. In the ABC Hall the accused had sexual intercourse with her. The only intimidation that can be gathered from the declaration of the
complaining witness is what the accused hurled at her that he will kill her if she tells her parents after the act.

It was very well said by Pacheco 'that rape is not to be presumed, Consent, not force, is the common origin of the act between man and woman.
Strong evidence must be produced to prove rape' In this instant case, the elements of rape were not proved although as stated above, the Court is
positive that the accused had sexual intercourse with Leonida Dagohoy, a 13 year-old, feeble minded, illiterate girt as cooperative and willing, who
submitted herself to the desires of the accused as a police officer.

The Court does not give any credit whatsoever to the claim of the accussed that he did not touch the girl, much less raped her. The fact is fully
established that the accused brought the girl to the municipal building, or was on their way to the municipal building as testified to by Apos, a co-
policeman, and witnessed by Sergeant Bongabong and Patrolman Tabamo. This collaborates in fact the claim of the complaining girl that she was
ordered to come along to the municipal building but they turned to the ABC Hall where the accused consummated sexual intercourse with her.

Considering the circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence of the prosecution and defense, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that
the accused had sexual intercourse with the comlaining girl although there was no violence nor intimidation which preceded the sexual intercourse.
The Court, however, takes into consideration the observation it made on the complaining witness that she was 13 years old, a moron, who answers
questions in monosyllables as truly reflected in the manifestation of the private prosecutor:

Before we proceed. with the examination of the complaining witness, we beg the kind indulgence of this Honorable Court to be patient and
understanding in her demeanor. In her, we find her sometimes difficult to communicate. While she answers intelligently, she uses one, two or three
words and she does not look at the examiner. If she is advised to speak louder, she will just continue which could tax the patience of the examining
counsel. oftentimes she does not answer questions at all and we have no way of knowing whether she understands the question at all. According to
the mother this is the usual behavior of the complainant in their house.

In this connection, we pray that in some instance we be permitted to ask leading questions to this witness as she sometimes answer only by yes or
no.

Although the complaining witness was, at the time of the alleged rape of the mentality she was then, that is moron and deeply unintelligent, the Court
can not consider this as an element to define the act committed by the accused on the complaining witness within the purview of rape. At most, the
accused is guilty, as the Court finds him, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Seduction punished under Article 337 which provides
that the seduction of a virgin over 12. years and under 18 years of age, committed by any person in public authority, etc. etc., and the accused taking
advantage of and having the girl in his custody, succeeded in having sexual commerce with her; ... (Original Records, pp. 92-94)

We agree with the trial court's findings that sexual intercourse took place between the accused-petitioner and complainant Leonida Dagohoy in the
manner that Leonida narrated in court. It is inconceivable that a 13 year old mentally deficient girl could create such a story and implicate the
accused- petitioner who at that time was a police officer and the father of a friend. There is no evidence on record which could show evil motive on
her part that she could, despite her mental incapacity, accuse the petitioner of such a heinous crime as rape. The record shows that the two of them,
were really together just about the time the incident happened and that the ABC Hall, where the crime was committed was an annex of the municipal
building. Hence, accused-petitioner could have easily gone to the municipal building after the incident, earlier than Patrolman Apos, who admittedly
was behind Leonida and the accused-petitioner on their way to the municipal building.

Except for Babanto's holding down the girl when she kicked him and covering her mouth when she was in pain there was no violence which
accompanied the sexual intercourse. However, we find as erroneous the trial court's conclusion that under the circumstances, where no physical
intimidation preceded the sexual intercourse an essential element which could qualify accused-petitioner's crime to rape is missing. In the case of
People v. Franco, (114 SCRA 737) we interpreted intimidation for purposes of the crime of rape as follows:

... And, at this juncture it is well to remember that a father exercises such strong moral and physical influence and control over his daughter that the
force or violence, threat or intimidation upon her need not be of such nature and degree as would be required in other cases (People vs. Rinion, CA
61 OG 4422, cited in Revised Edition, Reyes, The Revised Penal Code). It is not necessary that there be sins from Leonora that she put up a
resistence, for a sexual act between. father and daughter is so revolting that it would have submitted thereto if her will to resist had not been
overpowered (People vs. Alienea, C.A. 45 OG Sept. 5, 1950). The force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the
age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other (People v. Savellano supra.)

xxx xxx xxx

It is a doctrine well settled by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the rape it is not necessary that the force and/or intimidation
employed in accomplishing it to be so great or of such character; it is only necessary that the force and intimidation used by the culprit be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in mind. ...

In the instant case, considering the age, mental abnormality, and deficiency of the complainant plus the fact that the accused-petitioner was at the
time of the incident in uniform and with a side arm, there was sufficient intimidation to convict for rape. The fact that the complainant kicked the
accused- petitioner while the latter was lifting her dress and removing her panty and that she cried afterwards negate any consent on her part to the
sexual intercourse. Thus, we ruled in People v. Burgos (115 SCRA 767) a case involving the rape of a deafmute and demented girl:

Because of the physical and mental condition of Dolores, she could not have given rational consent to the carnal intercourse - as correctly ruled by
the trial court. It would have required a great deal of effort for a 13-year old deafmute to resist the sexual assault of the 5'8" market vendor especially
so since the same was unexpected considering the place and time of its perpetration. And only a mind fully aware of the moral and social
consequences of the consummation of such sexual assault could have given intelligent consent to gather the courage to put up the resistance
necessary to repel such aggression. A rational consent to an act could only be given by one who has the ability to discern the consequences of said
act. And Dolores certainly did not have such mental ability not only because of lack of formal education, but also because of her physical and mental
deficiencies. (Emphasis supplied)

The evidence also shows that as a result of the sexual intercourse, complainant Leonida became pregnant as can be shown by a medical certificate
(Exh. "C", Original Record, p. 112) issued by Dr. German Garcia. It should be noted that complainant Leonida had her first menstruation period on
September 29, 1969, barely a month before the incident. In a last ditch effort to save himself, accused-petitioner testified that he was "caponized" or
"castrated" sometime in 1958 at the clinic of Dr. Gedeon Quijano. According to Babanto, Dr. Quijano was then in Canada so he tried to secure a
medical certificate attesting to the surgical operation from the doctor's clinic but he was refused ... because according to them it is already quite a
long time and the records could not be found." (TSN, June 3, 1970, p. 118) He further testified that during the operation he was attended to by a
certain Mrs. Berenguel who told him that she could remember that I was being operated but that I could not remember the year." (TSN, June 3,
1970, p. 118) As a result of this operation Babanto said he never begot any child by his wife up to the present.

We do not give credence to the accused-petitioner's testimony as regards his surgical operation. There was no positive proof that he was castrated
and if so, that the castration was successful other than his uncorroborated statement.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. Petitioner is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape as defined in Article 335 (1) as amended, of the Revised Penal Code and (1) is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; (2) to
recognize the child which may have been born to Leonida Dagohoy as a result of the crime; (3) to indemnify Leonida in the sum of P12,000.00 as
moral damages, and (4) to pay the costs.

G.R. No. L-80838 November 29, 1988
ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CORTES, J.:

Petitioner Eleuterio Perez raises both procedural and substantive issues in this petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 04789 dated October 8, 1987 and its resolution of November 12, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case are undisputed.

On October 21, 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction docketed as Criminal Case No.
618 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VI. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. On June 28, 1980 a
judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. In said decision, promulgated on October 29,
1982, the Court of Appeals made the following statement:

xxx xxx xxx

This is not to say that the appellant did nothing wrong. With promises of marriage, appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, twice,
that night before they returned. She was seduced by appellant, as it turned out that he made those promises just to accomplish his lewd designs
That was "seduction and not abduction," as explained by Justice Ramon Aquino. (Rollo, p. 40.)

xxx xxx xxx

Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 1983, this time for
Qualified Seduction, docketed as Criminal Case No. 83-8228 of the Municipal Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch VI. * Petitioner Perez filed a motion
to quash invoking double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of the complainant. However, this motion and petitioner's motion for
reconsideration were denied.

Whereupon, petitioner Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 68122 questioning the denial
of his motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case No.
83-8228. In a resolution of the Second Division dated August 8, 1984, the Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On December 16, 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court.
Said the Intermediate Appellate Court:

As the order sought to be annulled is that of an inferior court, the petition in this case should have been filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court
in accordance with Rule 65, Sec. 4. We have already ruled in several cases that BP 129, See. 9, in giving this court jurisdiction over applications for
writs of certiorari and prohibition "whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," was never meant to authorize the filing of petitions which,
conformably to Rule 65, Sec. 4, should be filed with the Regional Trial Courts because they relate to acts of inferior courts. The purpose of BP 129 is
to enable this Court to take cognizance of petitions which, because of the limitation imposed by the requirement that the petition must be "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction" could or only be filed before with the Supreme Court (Diocese of Cabanatuan v. Delizo, AC-G.R. SP No. 06410, Oct. 28, 1985;
Uy v. Antonio, AC G.R R. SP No. 05568, March 7, 1985; De Guzman v. Andres, AC-G.R. SP No. 04494, Oct. 25, 1984). [Rollo p. 70.]

Complying with this, Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga docketed as Special Civil Case No.
7623. Upon evaluation of the case, the court dismissed this petition and Perez' motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Perez thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated October 8, 1987 this petition was denied, being
inappropriate, aside from the fact that the decision sought to be reviewed had become final and executory. As explained by the Court of Appeals:

xxx xxx xxx

... it is to be observed that what petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court was an original petition for certiorari and prohibition which was dismissed
by the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. The appropriate remedy for such dismissal is an appeal from said decision (by filing a
notice of appeal with the RTC concerned), and not a petition for review. Under the 1983 Interim Rules of Court, all appeals, except in habeas corpus
cases and in the cases where a record on appeal is required, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or
award appealed from. (par. 19).<re||an1w> An appeal from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals in actions or proceedings originally
filed in the former shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order appealed from (par. 20, 1983 Interim
Rules of Court) ...

For not having filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, the decision of said court in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition ... has become final and executory (CIR v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 696, 698) on July 12, 1987, fifteen (15) days after
receipt by petitioner of the decision of said court on May 18, 1987, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration of said decision
was pending resolution before said court. ... Petitioner might plead liberality in the interpretation of the rules of procedure, but this plea cannot be
conceded because it involves the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. It has been repeatedly held that compliance with the manner and period for
perfecting an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional Garganta vs. Cabangon, 109 Phil. 150 [1960]; Bilbao vs. Republic, 80 SCRA, 177 [1977];
Volkschen Labor Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 98 SCRA 314, 322 [1980]) [Rollo, pp. 93-94.]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

I. Petitioner claims that what he filed with the Regional Trial Court was not an original petition for certiorari and prohibition but an appeal from the
resolutions of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 83-8228 denying his motions to quash and for reconsideration. Hence, when the
Regional Trial Court dismissed his certiorari and prohibition case, he invoked the proper remedy which is a petition for review.

There is no merit in petitioner's claim.

Well-established is the rule that appeal is not the proper remedy from a denial of a motion to quash [People v. Macandog, G.R. Nos. 18601-2,
January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 195; Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 63559, May 30, 1986,142 SCRA 171; Milo v. Salanga,
G.R. No. 37007, July 20, 1987, 152 SCRA 113.] This is so because an order denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and does not finally
dispose of a case. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure prior to its amendment in 1985, ** after the denial of defendant's motion to quash, he
should immediately enter his plea and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same question covered by his motion to quash [See Sec. 1 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and Chuatoco v. Aragon, G.R. No. 20316, January 30, 1 968, 22 SCRA 346.]

Further, the record shows that what petitioner actually filed was a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as evidenced by his prayer for (1)
the annulment and setting aside of the municipal trial judge's resolutions of April 11, 1984 and June 11, 1984 denying his motions to quash and for
reconsideration, respectively, and, (2) the prohibition of the same judge from further taking cognizance of the criminal case for Qualified Seduction
[Annexes "K" and "L".]

A special civil action for certiorari is an original or independent action and not a continuation or a part of the trial resulting in the rendition of the
judgment complained of [Palomares v. Jimenez, 90 Phil. 773, 776 (1952).] The same holds true in case of a special civil action for prohibition. These
writs may be issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court [Art. X, Sec. 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution and Secs. 9
(1) and 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.]

In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner seeks to annul or modify the proceedings of any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions that has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion [Rule 65, sec. 1.] On the other hand, in a petition for
prohibition directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person whether exercising judicial or ministerial functions who has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition [Rule 65, Sec. 2]

From a denial of a petition for certiorari and prohibition by the trial court, as in this case, the losing party's remedy is an ordinary appeal to the Court
of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order appealed from [Sec. 20, Interim Rules of Court.] Failure to
appeal within fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment renders the appealed decision final and executory.

A petition for review of a judgment of the regional trial court is proper only when the judgment sought to be reviewed is an appeal from the final
judgment or order of a municipal, metropolitan or municipal circuit trial court [Sec. 22 (b), Interim Rules of Court].

Petitioner likewise faults the respondent Court of Appeals for dismissing his petition for certiorari which "gave rise to the confusion caused by the
case being tossed around from one court to another ending in its dismissal on mere technicality, thereby depriving [him] of his right to constitutional
due process" [Rollo, p. 133.]

Petitioner's assertion that he was consequently denied due process in unfounded. Respondent court did not foreclose his right to seek his remedy
elsewhere as it is clear from its decision that "the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper
Regional Trial Court" [Rollo. p. 70.] Thus, petitioner was never denied recourse to the appropriate court. On the contrary, the Intermediate Appellate
Court pointed the direction for petitioner to take.

II. Petitioner invokes double jeopardy to question the filing against him of an information for Qualified Seduction after he was acquitted for Consented
Abduction.

The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973
Constitution, Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same offense" means Identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy under the Rules of Court is explicit:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. [Sec. 9, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court Procedure, now Sec. 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.]

xxx xxx xxx

There is no question that petitioner was validly charged with the crime of Consented Abduction before a court of competent jurisdiction. That he had
been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge for which he was subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed. In the case at bar, the only
issue posed by petitioner relates to the Identity of the two offenses of Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

In support of his argument that the filing of the subsequent information for Qualified Seduction is barred by his acquittal in the case for Consented
Abduction, petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would support charges for both offenses a trial and conviction for one, after he was
acquitted for the other, would constitute double jeopardy. Stated otherwise, petitioner would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his claim
of double jeopardy.

It is true that the two offenses for which petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This, however, does not preclude the filing of another
information against him if from those facts, two distinct offenses, each requiring different elements, arose. As this Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction under the other. [U.S. v. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24, 34
(9106) citing In re Hans Neilsen (131 U.S. 176); Emphasis supplied.]

xxx xxx xxx

The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they
may appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or
Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of
an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution
under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. [People v. Doriquez, G.R. Nos. 24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 163, 171-172; Emphasis supplied.]

xxx xxx xxx

An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not
Identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy.

There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she
must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in
addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery
from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an information for Qualified
Seduction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual
intercourse with the woman.

Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity between them. As this Court has stated:

xxx xxx xxx

... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, who is still under the control of her parents or guardians is "the
alarm and perturbance to the parents and family" of the abducted person, and the infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But-in cases of
seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is seduced. ... [U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90, 94 (1913).]

xxx xxx xxx

III. Finally, petitioner avers that the complaint for Qualified Seduction is barred by waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Yolanda Mendoza, the latter
having opted to consider the case as Consented Abduction. He also alleges that her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing the second case
against him is tantamount to pardon by the offended party.

Petitioner's stance is unmeritorious. The complainant's filing of a subsequent case against him belies his allegation that she has waived or is
estopped from filing the second charge against petitioner. Neither could she be deemed to have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective, must be expressly given [Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the
Rules of Court, Ruled 110, Sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] Moreover the length of time it took her to file the second case is of no
moment considering that she filed it within the ten (10)-year prescriptive period provided by Article 90 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for crimes
punishable by a correctional penalty such as Qualified Seduction [See Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code.]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

3. Abduction; forcible abduction with rape
G.R. No. L-42665 June 30, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.SILVESTRE SUNPONGCO, HERMINIGILDO SUNPONGCO and ARSENIO CALAYAG,
defendants-appellants.
CORTES, J.:

Defendants appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting them of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
The appeal was elevated by the Court of Appeals to this Tribunal in view of the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court.

Juanita Angeles is the complainant in this complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. At the time the alleged crime was committed she was 43
years of age, single, a registered pharmacist by profession and a rice merchant doing business in Hagonoy, Bulacan.

In her complaint she pointed to the three accused-appellants together with one Benjamin Gabriel as the perpetrators of the crime. On March 4, 1965
an information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal accusing the four men of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of October, 1964, in the municipality of Guiguinto province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Silvestre Sunpongco, Benjamin Gabriel, Herminigildo Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of violence, force, intimidation and
trickery and with lewd designs, abduct the complaining witness Juanita F. Angeles, single, by then and there taking and carrying her out of a jeep
while she was in Guiguinto and then forcibly loaded in an automobile and thereafter brought to the Hill Top Hotel in Tagaytay City against her will,
and once there by means of violence, threats and intimidation, the said accused Silvestre Sunpongco have carnal knowledge of the said Juanita F.
Angeles against her will.

That in the commission of this crime the following aggravating circumstances were present, to wit: conspiracy, use of motor vehicle and superior
strength. [Records, pp. 61-621.

On June 9, 1965, the accused were arraigned and without the assistance of counsel, they all pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, on joint motion of the fiscal and the private prosecutors and over the objection of the defense, accused Benjamin Gabriel was
discharged by the court to become a state witness.

The prosecution's version of what transpired on the date when said crime was committed is summarized by the trial court, to wit:

... that on October 23, 1964, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Juanita Angeles, the offended party, left her residence at Hagonoy, Bulacan to
get rice from the RCA warehouse of Dr. Lansan at Guiguinto Bulacan. She was with one Benita Fabian and they rode a passenger jeep driven by
Virgilio Gan. As they reached the south approach of Tabang Bridge, Guiguinto Bulacan, a car overtook them and stopped right in front of their jeep,
thus forcing them to stop. The car was being driven by accused Arsenio Calayag, and the passengers were the accused Silvestre Sunpongco,
Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel. Thereafter, the three passengers just mentioned . ..., alighted from the car and boarded the jeep,
after which Silvestre Sunpongco co ordered its driver to proceed to the old road. Silvestre Sunpongco sat at the back of Juanita Angeles, Benjamin
Gabriel sat behind the driver, and Herminigildo Sunpongco forced himself at the left side of the driver, while Arsenio Calayag followed in the Car he
was driving.

Upon reaching an uninhabited place on the old road, Silvestre Sunpongco ordered the jeep to stop and the three accused got out. Silvestre tried to
pull the offended party out of the jeep, but she struggled and fought back so he ordered Benjamin Gabriel to help him. Benita Fabian, meanwhile,
embraced Juanita on the waist and pleaded with the three accused to leave Juanita alone, but Herminigildo Sunpongco separated them by force.
Despite her struggling and resisting, the accused were able to pull the offended party out of the jeep, and although Juanita embraced Benita Fabian
and asked the latter not to leave her, Silvestre kept on pulling her as Benjamin Gabriel continued pushing her until they were finally able to force her
into the car with the aid of a drawn gun. Then Benita Fabian, who was able to free herself from Herminigildo Sunpongco, ran towards the car but
Silvestre closed its doors at once. Then Herminigildo pushed Benita and she fell to the ground, after which the former got into the car and it sped
away.

They proceeded towards Manila, then to the Hilltop Hotel in Tagaytay City, which is owned by Federico Suntay, a first cousin of accused Silvestre
Sunpongco. Upon reaching the hotel, Benjamin Gabriel, Herrninigildo Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag alighted and went inside, while Silvestre and
Juanita were left in the car. Then Silvestre tried to pull her out of the car but she resisted, so he drew out his gun again and told her that while he did
not like to do it, that was the only way to bring her out. Finally, Silvestre was able to pull her out of the car. He brought her inside the hotel, with one
of his arms around her shoulders and the other arm poking the gun at her side, pushed her into a room and locked the door.

Once inside the room, Silvestre Sunpongco pushed Juanita Angeles and she fell on a chair. Then he embraced and kissed her, and continued taking
liberties, as she cried and fought back. Afterwards he removed his pants, pushed her and forced her to lie down on the bed. Although she kicked and
rolled on the bed, Silvestre was able to overcome her when he hit her on the stomach, as a result of which she lost consciousness. It was then that
Silvestre Sunpongco succeeded in having his first sexual intercourse with her. After that, he went out and locked the room. Due to hunger and
physical exhaustion, she must have dozed off, and when she woke up, Silvestre Sunpongco was on top of her again. She struggled and tried to
resist him, but to no avail. Silvestre Sunpongco consummated the second sexual intercourse.

Then somebody called for Silvestre and he left the room. Suddenly, she heard the voice of her brother calling her name, so she rushed out to him.
Dr. Jose Angeles was there with some CIS agents. She was physically examined the next day by Dr. Ramon Pascual, captain in the Medical Corps
of the Philippine Constabulary, who submitted his medicolegal report marked Exhibit "A" containing his findings as follows: lacerations in the
complainant's vagina at 9 and 11 o'clock positions, which must be due to the insertion of a penis; vaginal smears are positive for spermatozoa;
contusions at the posterior cervical and anterolateral aspect middle third of the right hip, all of which are compatible with recent sexual contact.

Benita Fabian corroborated the testimony of Juanita Angeles up to when she was left behind at Tabang, after the car carrying all the accused and
the offended party sped towards Tagaytay City. [Records, pp. 523-527].

xxx xxx xxx

During the time material to this case Silvestre Sunpongco was 34 years old, a widower with six children, and a La Mallorca bus driver whose highest
educational attainment is only grade four. The other accused-appellant Arsenio Calayag was then 36 years of age, married and the regular driver of
the car borrowed by Silvestre Sunpongco and used by them. Herminigildo Sunpongco, the third accused-appellant, was then 27 years old, married
and is a nephew of Silvestre Sunpongco.

During the trial of the criminal case, specifically, after the defense had started presenting its evidence but before Silvestre Sunpongco took the
witness stand, said accused jumped bail and it was not until six years thereafter that he was arrested and the trial resumed.

The principal accused-appellant Silvestre Sunpongco adduced in evidence his own version of the case before the trial court as follows:

He started courting the complainant a few weeks after the death of his first wife, and the complainant accepted and they agreed to get married. On
October 23, 1964 he went to Malolos, on previous agreement with her, for the express purpose of eloping with her. That morning, he rode the car of
his sister driven by Arsenio Calayag. On the way, he gave a lift to Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel. Upon arriving at Malolos, Juanita
Angeles was not there, but they saw her in a jeep going to Guiguinto So, they followed. At Tabang, he alighted from the car and complainant alighted
from the jeep and they talked. Accused Silvestre told her: "If you really love me, You will come with me and we will get married." They agreed to go
to Manila to get married, but they later changed their minds and instead proceeded to Cavite. On the way they stopped at the Aristocrat Restaurant
to eat, stayed there for more than an hour, then proceeded to Hilltop Hotel at Tagaytay. Later that evening, while in the hotel, Pepito Mangahas, Dr.
Jose Angeles and some CIS agents arrived. Pepito asked Silvestre why they were there, and said accused replied that he and complainant had
eloped. Then he gave to Pepito the letters which complainant wrote to him. Thereafter, he was brought to Camp Crame.

He did not forcibly abduct complainant, he said. Complainant filed this case against him because she was threatened and forced to do so by her
brother. He also added that he did not know why Benjamin Gabriel, his boyhood friend, testified for the prosecution. He jumped bail because Dr.
Angeles told him: "I am ready to spend even how much just to put you in jail". [Records, pp. 529- 531].

The two other accused-appellants Arsenio Calayag and Herminigildo Sunpongco gave similar testimonies in the trial court as follows:

Between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M. on October 23, 1964 Arsenio Calayag was driving the car owned by Nena de Marucot Silvestre Sunpongco's sister,
which was borrowed by accused Silvestre, towards Manila. Silvestre had Benjamin Gabriel as companion. On the way, they stopped to give
Herminigildo Sunpongco a lift. Thereupon, Silvestre requested Herminigildo to go with them because he was going to elope with Juanita Angeles, to
which he consented. After crossing Tabang Bridge, they overtook the jeep on which Juanita Angeles and her companion Benita Fabian were riding
and which was being driven by Virgilio Gan, and blocked its way so it had to stop. Thereupon, Silvestre, Herminigildo and Benjamin Gabriel alighted
from the car and boarded the jeep. Silvestre Sunpongco pulled the complainant by the hand to the car as Benjamin Gabriel simultaneously pushed
her from the back. At the same time, Benita Fabian was holding on to the complainant and embracing her, so Herminigildo held Benita to prevent her
from going into the car as instructed by Silvestre. From Tabang, they proceeded to Hilltop Hotel, Tagaytay City, stopping only once to buy gasoline.
Upon reaching the hotel, Silvestre Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel led Juanita Angeles inside, while Arsenio Calayag and Herminigildo Sunpongco
left for Hagonoy, but were apprehended on the way by CIS agents. [Records, pp. 528-529].

On October 2, 1975, after due trial, the Bulacan Court of First Instance rendered a decision convicting the three accused-appellants, to wit:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused SILVESTRE SUNPONGCO, HERMINIGILDO SUNPONGCO and ARSENIO CALAYAG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, as defined and penalized under Articles 335 and 342 in relation
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, with the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally the complainant Juanita Angeles in the slim of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as moral
damages, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. [Records, p. 539].

They now interpose this present appeal. Silvestre Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag filed a joint brief and assigned two errors. Herminigildo
Sunpongco likewise filed his own appellant's brief and assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court.

Consolidating the assignments of errors made by herein accused-appellants, they raise the following points:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT HAD ACQUIRED JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE WAS COMMITTED AND THAT THE
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY THEREOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED HEREIN TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

I. The alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court is assailed by accused-appellants Silvestre Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag on the ground that the
sworn complaint of Juanita Angeles was not formally offered in evidence by the prosecution during the trial of the case.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 110 section 5 (formerly section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure require that the offenses of abduction and rape and other offenses which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall not be prosecuted except
upon complaint filed by the Offended party. Compliance with this is a jurisdictional and not merely a formal requirement.

The Rules of Court further provides that evidence which has not been formally offered shall not be considered by the court. [Rule 132, section 35].

Applying these rules to the case at bar it is admitted that the sworn complaint of Juanita Angeles was not formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution, This failure to adhere to the rules however is not fatal and did not oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Jurisprudence reveals that if the complaint in a case which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is forwarded to the trial court as part of the records of the
preliminary investigation of the case, the court can take judicial notice of the same without the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence for the
prosecution [People v. Savellano, G.R. No. L-31227, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 320, 324; People v. Tampus G.R. No. L-42608, February 6, 1979, 88
SCRA 217, 221; and People v. Rondina G.R. No. L-47895, April 8, 1987, 149 SCRA 128, 132-133].

The records of this case forwarded to the Court of First Instance include the complaint filed by Juanita Angeles in the municipal court of Guiguinto
Bulacan which conducted the preliminary investigation [Records, page 31. Likewise the minutes of the September 3, 1965 hearing shows that the
subject complaint was marked as Exhibit "X" by the court as disclosed by the records on page 91.

II. Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of forcible abduction. The elements of forcible abduction are (1) that the
person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is against her will and (3) that the abduction is
with lewd designs.

On the other hand article 335 of the same Code defines the crime of rape and provides for its penalty. The elements of rape pertinent to this case
are: (1,) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.

Silvestre Sunpongco would insist that he and complainant were sweethearts who agreed to elope on that fateful day in October, This defense
however is belied by the manner in which the so-called "elopement" was carried out. Juanita Angeles' version that the abduction was carried out
against her will is borne out by the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution as well as by two of the accused-appellants, Arsenio
Calayag and Herminigildo Sunpongco. These two admitted during the trial having seen the complainant resisting as she was forced to board the car.
On cross-examination, Arsenio Calayag testified thus:

ATTY. OCAMPO:

Q You said while Juanita Angeles was sitting inside the jeep Silvestre Sunpongco was holding her hands, is it not also a fact he was at the same
time pulling Juanita Angeles out of the jeep?

A Yes, sir.

Q You also stated that when Juanita Angeles was already on the ground ... Silvestre Sunpongco, Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel led
her to the car. Will you please tell the Honorable Court how the three of them led her to the car?

A They were holding her.

Q The three of them?

A The two of them.

Q Who?

A Benjamin Gabriel and Silvestre Sunpongco-

xxx xxx xxx

Q On what part of the body Silvestre Sunpongco holding Juanita Angeles?

A Hands only.

Q How about Benjamin Gabriel?

A Waist sir.

Q While Silvestre Sunpongco was holding Juanita Angeles on the hands and Benjamin Gabriel by the waist they were pushing her to the car?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Silvestre Sunpongco was pulling her by the arm Benjamin Gabriel was pushing her?

A Benjamin Gabriel was pushing her.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Is it not a fact that while Silvestre Sunpongco was pulling her and Benjamin Gabriel was pushing her Juanita Angeles was struggling?

xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir. [TSN, June 23, 1967, pp. 90-92, 94-951. (Emphasis supplied).

Herminigildo Sunpongco likewise admitted having witnessed the vain struggles of Juanita Angeles and at the same time her tears when he stated on
cross- examination that:

ATTY. OCAMPO:

Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court how Silvestre A Sunpongco was leading Juanita Angeles after she alighted from the jeep in that old road?

A I noticed that he (sic) was being pulled by the hands of Silvestre Sunpongco while her other hand was holding the jeep.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And Juanita Angeles was crying at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q And she was finally led into the car by Silvestre Sunpongco because Silvestre Sunpongco was pulling her while Benjamin Gabriel was pushing her
at the back?

A Yes, sir.

Q All along Juanita Angeles was crying?

A Yes, sir. [TSN, July 21, 1967, pp. 123-1241. (Emphasis supplied).

The three accused-appellants would further negate the probability of carrying on the abduction considering the incident took place in broad daylight
and the group had to travel from Guiguinto Bulacan to Tagaytay City. They aver that in view of these circumstances complainant could have
screamed or raised an outcry to summon assistance. Juanita Angeles' conduct however can be explained by her fear at that time when four men
suddenly confronted them and positioned themselves in such a way that resistance would be impossible. Further during their travel to Tagaytay City
Juanita Angeles was rendered practically helpless. She was forced to sit between Silvestre Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel while Arsenio Calayag
and Herminigildo Sunpongco sat in front of the car.

The presence of the lewd design is manifested by the subsequent rape that occurred.

At this point, it is noteworthy to mention that the crime of rape is difficult both to prove and to disprove considering the very nature of the offense
involving as it does in most cases only two persons. Consequently, the final resolution of the trial court would hinge on whose version is more
credible, more plausible and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding its commission.

The case at bar is no different. To prove that the crime of rape was committed the court has to examine carefully the evidence presented by the
parties. In this instance the circumstance of force and intimidation attending the crime of rape is manifested not only by the testimony of the
complainant but the medicolegal report filed by Capt. Ramon Pascual as well.

His findings are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Extragenital:

xxx xxx xxx

Contusion at the posterior cervical region, measuring 6 cm. by 4 cm., at the posterior midline, 143 cm. above the heel. Contusion at the anterolateral
aspect middle third of the right leg, measuring 7 cm. by 5 cm., 3 cm. from its anterior midline, 27 cm. above the heel.

Genital:

There is moderate amount of pubic hair, evenly distributed. The labia majora and minora are in coaptation There is moderate amount of leucorrheal
discharge. On separating the lips are revealed abrasions at perineum and at both sides of the vulva. The hymen disclosed lacerations at 9 and 11
o'clock positions. The external vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance upon introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin-sized
speculum. The cervix is normal in color and consistency, with an abraded area at its lower lip. The uterus is not enlarged.

MICROSCOPIC FINDINGS:

Vaginal smears are positive for spermatozoa and negative for gram-negative diplococci.

REMARKS:

Findings are compatible with recent sexual contact. [Records, pp- 23-24].

As stated by the Supreme Court, "(P)hysical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesse, ..."
[People v. Sacabin, G.R. No. L-36638, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 707, 713].

Moreover the conduct of the complainant after the incident took place further strengthens her case. After the forcible abduction and the rape took
place and her rescue that same night, she lost no time the following day to have herself examined at the Philippine Constabulary Central Laboratory
Office at 8:30 in the morning, she went to the Criminal Investigation Service office at Camp Crame to give her testimony, and she filed her complaint
before the fiscal's office. Compare this to the conduct of accused-appellants particularly Silvestre Sunpongco who jumped bail in the course of the
trial and was not arrested until after six years.

It also behooves this Court to look into the possible motive Juanita Angeles could have had in filing the criminal complaint against accused-
appellants had she not been wronged, considering her age, status, reputation and educational attainment, for on this point, accused-appellants
argue that the complainant was merely threatened and forced by her brother, Dr. Jose Angeles, to file the complaint against them. Considering the
evidence presented this Court finds the appellants' stance as implausible.

III. Anent the last error assigned by the accused-appellants, they would refute the testimony given by accused-turned state witness Benjamin Gabriel
summarized by the trial court, as:

Sometime in the second week of October, 1964, between 8:00 and 9:00 P.M., he met the accused Silvestre Sunpongco, Herminigildo Sunpongco
and Arsenio Calayag by previous appointment at the "glorietta" in Hagonoy, Bulacan, at which time Silvestre told them to wait for Juanita Angeles on
her way to church the next day, a Sunday, and then take her by force, place her inside the car, and bring her to Tagaytay where Silvestre would rape
her so that she would be his, because somebody from Pulilan was courting her. They waited for Juanita as planned, but she failed to appear.
Saturday night of the succeeding week, they met again and agreed to consummate their plan to abduct Juanita Angeles the day after, also a
Sunday, but again she did not appear. Silvestre Sunpongco told them to wait for another occasion.

On October 20, 1964 they met again in the same place. This time, Silvestre told them that on Friday, October 23,1964 Juanita Angeles would get
rice from the RCA at Guiguinto and they will wait for her at the crossing at Malolos to snatch her and take her to Tagaytay in order that he would rape
her. On October 23,1964, between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M., they all met in front of the municipal building of Hagonoy, Bulacan, rode a car belonging to
Nena Marucot the sister of Silvestre Sunpongco, which was being driven by Arsenio Calayag, and proceeded to the appointed police at Malolos,
where they stopped and waited for Juanita Angeles. After a while, they saw her coming in a jeep driven by Virgilio Gan. They followed the jeep and
on reaching Tabang Bridge, they blocked its way and forced it to stop.

The rest of his story is a corroboration of those of the other prosecution witnesses, although he ended it by saying that once Juanita Angeles was
placed inside a room at the Hilltop Hotel by Silvestre Sunpongco, the latter ordered this witness to stay on guard outside while he ordered
Herminigilo Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag to return to Hagonoy; that at 5:00 P.M. he entered one of the rooms because he had fever, and that at
about 9:00 P.M. a hotel boy woke him up and told him to tell Silvestre Sunpongco that somebody was looking for him. [Records, pp. 523-528].

The accused-appellants in denying the existence of conspiracy would question the discharge of Benjamin Gabriel to become a state witness.
Particularly they aver that Benjamin Gabriel's testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points.

An indicium of conspiracy is ". ... when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing
another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. ... (People v. Geronimo,
G.R. No. L-35700 October 15, 1973, 53 SCRA 246, 2541.

This Court agrees with the prosecution contention that coupled with the testimonies of Juanita Angeles and Benita Fabian, the following are sufficient
corroboration of Benjamin Gabriel's testimony on conspiracy:

(1) After the jeep where Juanita Angeles and Benita Fabian were riding and forced to stop by a car occupied by appellants, the appellants and
Benjamin Gabriel all got off from said car and approached the jeep.

(2) Herminigildo Sunpongco, Benjamin Gabriel and Silvestre SunPori9co boarded the jeep used by the complainant and Benita Fabian. Thereafter,
Silvestre ordered the driver of the jeep to proceed to an old road.

(3) Arsenio Calayag, in the meantime drove the car and followed the jeep that carried complainant and the other appellants.

(4) Upon reaching an isolated place, Silvestre Sunpongco ordered the driver of the jeep to stop. The car also stopped. Whereupon, the appellants
riding in the jeep alighted.

(5) To force Juanita Angeles into the car, Silvestre Sunpongco pulled Juanita by the hand, Benjamin Gabriel pushed her at the back, while Arsenio
Calayag positioned himself behind the wheel of the car, ready to drive the moment Juanita was successfully brought into it. As this was going on,
Herminigildo Sunpongco was holding Benita to prevent her from giving the complainant a helping hand. (6) From the time the car finally drove off
with Juanita Angeles, up to the time it reached Tagaytay City, appellants Herminigildo Sunpongco, Benjamin Gabriel, Silvestre Sunpongco and
Arsenio Calayag were inside the vehicle. [Appellee's Brief, pp. 12-131.

The discharge of Benjamin Gabriel to become a state witness is likewise questioned by Herminigildo Sunpongco who avers that on the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution it is he who appears to be the least guilty. On this point suffice it to state that, " .... (A)ll that the law requires,
in order to discharge an accused and to use him as a state witness is that the defendant whose exclusion is required does not appear to be the most
guilty, not necessarily that he is the least guilty, ... [People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55533, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 107, 112].

Considering the testimonies and evidence presented this Court is of the belief that the trial court did not err in convicting herein appellants of the
crime charged.

However, the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneously designated "life imprisonment". The correct term is reclusion perpetua [People v.
Abletes G.R. No. L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 248].

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the indemnity awarded by the
trial court is raised to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:

The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:

The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias
"EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE
GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design,
forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the civil code.

That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of
the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal
accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.

That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:

1. Use of a motor vehicle.

2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery difficult;

3. Abuse of superior strength;

4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and

5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for the commission.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July
11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not
guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Caal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them
to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount
of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng,
Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case
dismissed against the aforementioned accused.

Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of
which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of
the Revised Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its
confiscation.

This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as
regards Rogelio Caal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.

The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958
at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00
per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in permanent
shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.

So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay
City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as
the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and
swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.)
also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask:
"Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.

The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De
la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream.
Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid
jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag
Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.

When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men inside started to assist their friend: one of
them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was
completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind.

The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio
Caal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite
language that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet.
In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant
and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored
her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at home and needed her
company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was
much better than he thought since no one could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas.
She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand up and
talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with Caal and Jose.

The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue,
Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his
pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a
Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms
on the second floor of the hotel.

Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and
Jose and Caal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three
expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested putting
off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more
pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more
exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her
again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another
unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with
her brassiere, fell on the floor.

The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This
ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda
picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she
could not find one.

Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with
her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss
De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several
times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.

The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on
different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others
into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the
complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant
went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her
several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then
left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him,
he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.

Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three
were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all, escape
what with their presence.

After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her
stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she
was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being
harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and
disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was
stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the
trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.

Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free
Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come
from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as
requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had
happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside
the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each
time the driver answered her in the negative.

It was 6:30 o'clock or some two hours after the abduction when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as
well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said,
"Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the
complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a
strong solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical
injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the
desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva
arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until
she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.

On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a
decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss
De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police Department
Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who
abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief
Medico-Legal Officer.

During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a
telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat.
Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of
the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she
made a formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.

At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Vias. In his statement, which was
duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions.
Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio;
that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the
complainant.

After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss
De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture
was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.

After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Caal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino
on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Caal as among the four
persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in
the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from
among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Caal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the
identification, one of the policemen took appellant Caal downstairs and undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the
words "Bahala na Gang."

Appellant Caal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Caal
confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they
had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Caal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it
appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a
statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there,
they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He
would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.

In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as well
as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his
supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the
complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was
examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical
injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion,
could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was
being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination,
the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by sexual intercourse committed on June 26,
1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of
three days from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.

The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal) took the witness stand. We quote hereunder the portions of the decision under
review relative to the theory of the defense:

Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed
time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had
listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino
became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to
go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door
convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered
the car to Espaa Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in Espaa Extension before the Rotonda a small car
whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted,
"Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her
and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door
and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to
get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red convertible.
All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him.

Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to
let her be and return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino
heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at
the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you
do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the performance as
long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the four of them.

Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one
of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the
three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she. undressed in front
of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Caal stripped
to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her
that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and
forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and
Rogelio Caal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of the
balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is
testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come
from her work.

Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a
problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would
have her goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money. Aquino
readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Caal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they
had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In
the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall
building. They later moved to another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be
apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of
Batangas.

The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract the
evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able
dissertion of the trial judge on this point:

As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease
exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this
connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment
(which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not
even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There
is no fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money, and her revenge much more keen. The
Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation
and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a weapon of
revenge by denying them their pleasure.

Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman
whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to
perform first and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act for a measly
down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment basis? By the
very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could
demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who these man were, where they lived,
whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court
about the complaint, it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that, could have been
persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.

Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police
interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong
suspicion that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and
projects all the more clearly their guilt.

Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an
explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Caal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly
incident story that the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men were these
who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them,
but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic
blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than
the exception!

All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense has not been able to explain away a very vital
piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal)
examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision,
establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.

The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy
Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these
two persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl
and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon
herself just to make out a case against the accused. The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much
stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that
much self-torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had
not been raped would she have gone thru all of these tribulation?

A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her
family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito,
L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with
Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the location in
which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save
by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.

In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any credence at all as against the
concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated she has for
corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her
statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence
has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the
declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-
GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the
testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses
would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a position of
having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530).

We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.

1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a
plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the
complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element
of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in
the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging
her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated,
toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances
were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony,
whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended
complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual
basis.

2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal
contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who
testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has
douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had
douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the
important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the
abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of
rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries
on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay
her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not
result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.

3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la
Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them
raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by the complainant to her
mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital
of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is
understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her
family, and her career, was not then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not
immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of
course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested,
could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were
left in the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the
complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have come from a studio?
Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of
future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.

4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them
by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the
statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence
of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use
of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the
authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation.
While in their statements Jose and Canal admitted having waited together with the two other appellants for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio,
each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the
complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the
statements been prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It
is significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by
the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his statement, found no
trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned
with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied on
the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the
affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given.
However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will
suffice to secure the conviction of the two.

The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during
the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs.
Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).

The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution
of the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in
connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial
court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every
stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled to
counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest
(Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding
effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be
considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of
the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.

5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because
the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved,
would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While
a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances
qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and
People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court
to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to
prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs.
Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a
new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the
aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the proceedings
during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .

I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the
penalty he would get, and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him for three times and his decision was still the
same.

Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I
know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his
client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any
such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.

6. Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite
of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7)
original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and
unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."

We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted
at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was
a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting,
however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of
the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction in other words, they should
be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.

What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3,
Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:

ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall
be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more serious;
hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently,
the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.

Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other
three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was
attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the
commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another
(Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete
nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating;
and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca__al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by
any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor
which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating
circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes
of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)

In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the length
of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the
opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just
as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.

We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be
imposed because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil.,
260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him
two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of
Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only
one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore,
no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba
this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October
29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that
"since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held
liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties
prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to
discuss at length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:

The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a
death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the
imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death
penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws:
(1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of
sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing
multiple death penalties.

The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties
is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and
character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the possibility
or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict,
grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the
nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show
that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties
shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions
does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several
capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death
sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real
dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict,
the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.

Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is
almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict
has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as regards the nature and number of the
crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises.

Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the
court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac
sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody
of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.

On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and
simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24
monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17,
1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the
chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration
certificate.

Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil
Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an
order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the
same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as
a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the
sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.

During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention.
The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's
confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for
reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over
the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also
denied.

On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel
mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from
July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment
against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present
petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others,
that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.

Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must
be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the
latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a
claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of
establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on
the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which
circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the replevin case can
only be executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person
not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and
that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.

Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that
Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as
to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are
pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other
crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally,
indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the
costs.

Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever
is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

G.R. No. 85822 April 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONILO ALBURO, ZALDY RODRIGUEZ, AND JOHN DOE, accused, RONILO ALBURO,
accused-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

We affirm the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch XIX, 1 finding Ronilo Alburo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify Evelyn
Cantina in the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

On 3 February 1986, Evelyn Cantina filed a complaint for Forcible Abduction with Rape against Ronilo Alburo, Zaldy Rodriguez and John Doe. The
complaint reads:

That on or about the 27th day of January, 1986 at about 6:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Ronilo Alburo, who was armed with a butcher's knife, conniving and confederating together with Zaldy Rodriguez and John Doe and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, by the accused, Zaldy Rodriguez and John Doe holding one Evelyn Cantina and preventing the
latter from disembarking from the jeep driven by accused Ronilo Alburo took her to Beverly Hills against her will and once there, said accused Ronilo
Alburo, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said Evelyn Cantina without the consent and against the will
of the latter. (p. 1, Original Record)

Accused John Doe was subsequently identified as Dionisio Sumalinog.

Upon being arraigned, the accused individually entered pleas of not guilty. Towards the end of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, the
prosecution moved for the dismissal of the complaint against Zaldy Rodriguez and Dionisio Sumalinog. The motion was granted and trial proceeded
against Ronilo Alburo.

The prosecution evidence upon which the Trial Court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is summarized in the People's Brief as
follows:

At or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1986, Evelyn Cantina was already dismissed from her classes at the Abellana National High
School, located at Jones Avenue, Cebu City. From there, her classmates, Priscilla Atillo and Aniceta Bringuila, accompanied her in walking towards
Colon Street, Cebu City, to buy some medicine. Not long after, a passenger jeepney plying the Guadalupe. Carbon market route stopped by the side
of the road. The driver, Ronilo Alburo, invited the three girls to board his jeepney. As Colon Street is very near, Evelyn Cantina declined the invitation
at first. Alburo was however, insistent in giving the three girls a lift. Finally, the latter accepted the invitation by taking the front seat, with Evelyn
sitting right beside the driver. At that time however', Zaldy Rodriguez and Dionisio Sumalinog were already seated at the passengers' area at the
back (t.s.n., pp. 18-21, April 24, 1986, Priscilla Atillo).

Upon reaching the corner of Jones Avenue and Colon Street, the jeepney driven by Alburo stopped at the red traffic light. At this juncture, Bringuila
and Atillo disembarked. Evelyn was also about to alight but she was prevented by Alburo who threatened to raise her skirt if she insists on alighting
and following her two companions. Bringuila and Atillo tried to help Evelyn by pulling her out but meanwhile, the green light turned on and the
jeepney sped off towards Juan Luna Street (t.s.n., pp. 17-26, April 24, 1986, Priscilla Atillo).

Reaching Juan Luna, the jeepney then made a U-turn on its return trip to Guadalupe. Meanwhile, Zaldy Rodriguez transferred to the front seat
beside Evelyn (t.s.n., p. 20, August 6, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

Anticipating that the jeepney driven by Alburo would make a return trip to Guadalupe, Atillo and Bringuila posted themselves beside the corner of
Colon and Juan Luna Streets near the Cebu City Savings Bank, where vehicles would stop at the red light signal (t.s.n., p. 34, April 24, 1986,
Priscilla Atillo).

Indeed, on its way to Guadalupe, the jeepney driven by Alburo stopped at the corner of Colon and Juan Luna Streets when the red light signaled.
Evelyn attempted to go down from the jeepney but, she was prevented by Zaldy Rodriguez who placed his leg as barricade. Realizing that Evelyn
was being prevented from disembarking, Atillo and Bringuila who stood by the roadside, close to the jeepney, attempted to pull Evelyn from the
vehicle. However, they did not succeed. Then the jeepney again sped off and headed towards Jones Avenue when the green light turned on (t.s.n.,
p. 22, August 6, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

On the way to the Capitol and upon reaching the Fuente Osmea Police Station, the jeepney turned left along B. Rodriguez Street. When it was
already near the Southern Medical Center, Zaldy Rodriguez and Dionisio Sumalinog got off from the jeepney, leaving only Alburo and Evelyn on
board. Alburo then drove off, turning right at V. Rama Avenue, passing thru Englis, he place where Evelyn resides. The latter then begged Alburo
that she be allowed to disembark. Alburo did not heed Evelyn's plea. Instead, he pulled a knife and threatened to slash her side if she would
disembark. The jeepney then proceeded to Beverly Hills (t.s.n., pp. 27-30, August 16, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

Thinking that Evelyn might have been dropped by Alburo at her residence in Englis Atillo and Bringuila boarded another jeep. They were hoping that
Evelyn was already home and that they could get the notebook which one of them left with her. However, only Evelyn's mother was there. They then
realized that Evelyn was really in trouble and so they related to her mother what happened. Alarmed by such information, the latter sought the help
of Ester Dakay, a neighbor and close friend (t.s.n., pp. 5-10, May 13, 1986, Priscilla Atillo).

The husband of Ester Dakay, a jeepney driver who fully knew Ronilo Alburo and the latter's route from Guadalupe to downtown, Cebu City, called up
by phone Evelyn's father, who came home not long after (t.s.n., p. 26, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay). Together, they then formed search teams to look
for Evelyn. Lourdes Cantina and Ester Dakay went as search team No. 1. Riding on a taxi, they searched the reclamation area and made inquiries
from the motels. On the other hand, Evelyn's father as well as her uncle, rode on two separate motorcycles, making up search teams 2 and 3, and
scoured the streets of the city. However, the search proved futile (t.s.n., pp. 2932, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

In an isolated area at barangay OPPRA (Capitol Hills), Alburo stopped the jeepney. Holding the knife, he went down from the jeepney and
threateningly came close to Evelyn. He then pointed the knife at her and told her that at something would happen to her if she would shout. Then he
pushed Evelyn's head against the steering wheel which rendered the latter unconscious.

When Evelyn regained her senses she found herself without her panty anymore. Blood was on her vagina and she felt pain on her stomach. She
saw Ronilo Alburo with his face close to hers, getting up from her then raising his pants. She cried and asked Alburo what he had done to her. He did
not answer her inquiries. Instead, he made her walk for a while, outside of the jeepney, accordingly, to ease the pain she felt. Then he made her sit
back on the front seat with him, still under threat of death (t.s.n., pp. 11-19, August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

It was already dark when Alburo drove back to the City. Still under threat of death, Evelyn remained seated beside him. To make it appear that
nothing really happened, Alburo even picked up some passengers along the way (t.s.n., p. 33, August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

At about seven o'clock in the evening, while Lourdes and Ester were standing near Power Foods Restaurant at Jones Avenue, Ester spotted the
jeepney coming from the Capitol heading towards downtown. Ester signaled the jeepney to stop. As the jeepney slowed down, she saw Evelyn
seated between Alburo and a male passenger (t.s.n., pp. 40-41, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

Evelyn who appeared very weak and who was in tears, alighted from the vehicle upon order from her mother Lourdes Cantina. As she was
embraced by Ester, she whispered to Ester that Alburo should not be allowed to abscond because he had raped her (t.s.n., pp. 42-43, May 13, 1986,
Ester Dakay). A commotion followed as an altercation between Lourdes and Alburo started. The passengers at the back area disembarked. Ester
and Evelyn then sat down at the passenger's area with a certain Boyet Junio a Barangay Tanod (t.s.n., p. 48, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

During the confrontation, Lourdes demanded that Alburo should bring Evelyn and Ester to the Fuente Osmea Police Station. At first, Alburo refused
claiming that nothing wrong had happened between him and Evelyn. When Ester told him he had nothing to be afraid of if he was telling the truth he
however, relented and drove the jeepney towards Fuente Osmea (t.s.n., pp. 43-45, August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

Lourdes did not board the jeepney as she decided to look for her husband in order to inform him that they had already found Evelyn. While the
jeepney was proceeding towards Fuente Osmea, Alburo changed his mind. He made a left turn at Visitacion Street on the pretext that he would
pick up a friend who could accompany him to the police station. At Visitation Street, Alburo parked the jeepney. He took out the engine key and the
cash collections, then left the vehicle. As Alburo had gone, Evelyn narrated to Ester how she was raped by Alburo. She even gave to Ester the knife
which was left in the jeepney by Alburo (t.s.n., pp. D-4-57, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

After about 15 minutes, Ester realized that Alburo would not return anymore. She then called by phone the jeepney owner who came later and drove
them to Fuente Osmena Police Station (t.s.n., p. 60, p. 65, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

When Ester and Evelyn arrived at the Fuente Osmea Police Station, Lourdes was already there. The two women then reported to the police the
abduction of Evelyn by Rodriguez, Sumalinog and Alburo. Ester also submitted the knife (Exhibit "A") to the police. Thereafter, Lourdes and Ester
accompanied Evelyn to the Southern Islands Medical Center for the latter's medical examination. As they could not be accommodated there
immediately, they went to the Cebu City Medical Center (t.s.n., pp. 52-53, August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina). At the Cebu City Medical Center where
Evelyn was examined by Dra. Juliet Lastimosa and was found to have fresh lacerations on her vagina with positive presence of spermatozoa (t.s.n.,
pp. 52-53, August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina). The medical certification (Exhibit "B") was issued by Dra. Lastimosa on the following morning.

On that same evening, Ester, Lourdes and Evelyn made a second appearance at the police station and the complaint for abduction with rape was
formally lodged by Evelyn. Her affidavit was initially taken by the Investigator. The knife. (Exhibit "A") which was submitted earlier that night remained
in the possession of the police. As the panty (Exhibit "E") and the skirt (Exhibit "D" were still worn by Evelyn, they were submitted only the following
day. The skirt was torn on the right side (Exhibit "D-2") and had some blood stains (Exhibit "D-1"). The panty also had some blood stains (Exhibit "E-
1"). (pp. 3-1 1, Brief for the Appellee)

Appellant, on the other hand, presented five (5) witnesses and offered several documentary exhibits in his defense. His theory runs thus:

Accused Alburo's theory or main line of defense is that he and Evelyn Cantina were sweethearts, thus, if ever there was sexual intercourse between
Ronilo and Evelyn on 27 January 1986, it was with the free and voluntary consent of complainant Evelyn Cantina. The defense witnesses testified to
the fact that on several occasions they saw Evelyn riding the jeepney driven by Ronilo and the former was seating beside the accused at the front
seat of the motor vehicle.

One of the witnesses even testified to the effect that she saw Evelyn visiting Ronilo at the latter's rented room for a number of times. In short, the
accused tried to convey before the trial court that it is of public knowledge in the neighborhood of Ronilo that the accused and Evelyn were lovers."
(pp. 5-6, Brief for the Accused-Appellant)

The Trial Court gave no credence to the defense version and, as heretofore stated, sentenced Appellant to reclusion perpetua. Before us now,
Appellant maintains:

I. The lower court erred in giving credit to the claim of the prosecution that the alleged offended victim Evelyn Cantina was forcibly raped by the
accused-appellant Ronilo Alburo.

II. The trial court erred in giving credit to the testimony of the offended party which lacks candor or credibility and probability, and in not considering
that her testimony was due to fear of her parents that they would castigate and punish her if found that she and Ronilo were lovers.

III. The trial court erred in considering that the facts and circumstances presented as evidence by the prosecution militates against a finding of rape.

IV. The trial court erred in not believing that the accused-appellant Ronilo Alburo and Evelyn Cantina were sweethearts and lovers, and that the
carnal act done by them on 27 January 1986 was motivated by mutual passion and love and therefore voluntary.

V. The trial court erred in not believing the testimonies of the appellant Ronilo Alburo and of Dina Lopez, Placido Alegrado Manuel Rama and
Corazon Gabato defense witnesses, who declared that on several occasions they saw Evelyn riding the jeepney.

VI. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant at least on the ground of reasonable doubt. (pp. 7-8, Ibid.)

After evaluation of the evidence in its totality, we are not persuaded by the theory that Appellant and Evelyn were sweethearts. If they were, surely,
Evelyn would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having deflowered her and, on top of it all, filing a criminal charge against
him. Evelyn's picture, allegedly given to Appellant as a remembrance of their romantic relationship, was actually given to Ruel Sipi her former
boyfriend. She emphatically denies having given Appellant any such token. Neither was Appellant able to present any convincing evidence to
substantiate his claim like love letters, notes and other symbols of affection.

Moreover, if, in fact, they had been lovers, Evelyn would have boarded Appellant's jeep voluntarily and alone unaccompanied by her two classmates.
If the latter had any inkling that Evelyn did want to go with Appellant, they would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety like
following the passenger jeepney driven by Appellant to the traffic lights, trying to pull Evelyn down from the jeepney, failing in which, they eventually
reported the incident to Evelyn's mother.

Appellant's argument that Evelyn charged him with the crime out of fear of her parents who did not approve of their relationship is unconvincing
because, if it had been so, Evelyn could have easily told her mother after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing untoward
had happened between her and Appellant. Her normal reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she loved and had a clandestine affair with.
But, on the contrary, Evelyn lost no time in denouncing Appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the disgrace that had befallen her.

Appellant's other assigned errors focus on the issue of credibility of witnesses in respect of which it is well settled that Appellate Courts will not
generally disturb the factual findings of Trial Courts which are in a better position to weigh the conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless it is found that the Trial Courts have plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case (People vs. Cruz, Sr., G.R. No. L-71462, June 30, 1987,
151 SCRA 609, citing other cases).

In reviewing the evidence adduced by the prosecution for this crime of Rape, we have likewise been guided by three well-known principles, namely,
(1) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility, is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weaknesses of the evidence for the defense (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 850).

The factual milieu of this criminal charge before us gives us no reason to depart from these established rules. On the contrary, we find that Appellant
had taken Evelyn away against her will, with lewd designs, subsequently forced her to submit to his lust and rendering her unconscious in the
process, thereby justifying his conviction for the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape under Article 48 in relation to Articles 335 and 342 of
the Revised Penal Code, with which he has herein been charged.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification of the amount of indemnity to be paid the offended party,
which is hereby increased to P20,000.00, in line with decisional jurisprudence. Costs against accused-appellant Ronilo Alburo.

G.R. No. 93410 May 7, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO GODINES and DANNY MORENO, defendants-appellants.
GANCAYCO, J.:p

The herein defendants-appellants were convicted of the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate and, accordingly, sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay P20,000.00 moral damages to the offended party. They appealed their case to this Court
seeking an acquittal. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, and considering the evidence on record, their acquittal is well-nigh beyond
realization.

In an information filed with the trial court on September 28, 1988, the provincial prosecutor of Masbate accused the defendants-appellants Rolando
Godines and Danny Moreno of having conspired in the commission of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. 1 Thereafter, the appellants were arraigned accordingly and they pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. In due time, a trial ensued.

Esther Ancajas, the private complainant, testified as follows: In the evening of March 17, 1988, she was sleeping in the house of one Alejandro
Vilaksi at Sitio Sincamas, Sta. Cruz, San Pascual, Masbate. She was awakened by a commotion emanating from an adjacent room occupied by
Vilaksi and his wife Milagros. She lit a kerosone lamp to ascertain what was going on. Thereafter, she saw the defendants-appellants talking to the
couple. Godines eventually hacked Milagros. Moreno stood by the window to serve as a lookout person. The couple's son Vicente ran away from the
house after seeing Godines hack Milagros. Godines got some money from the couple. Thereafter, the appellants prepared to leave the house. In the
meantime, Ancajas tried to escape from the house with her small child. The appellants, however, saw her and grabbed her. The two men dragged
Ancajas and the child out of the house and forcibly brought them to a nearby vacant lot with tall grasses, about 600 meters away from the Vilaksi
residence. Both men were apparently armed; Godines had a pistol and Moreno had a knife. They threatened to kill Ancajas if she resisted their
advances. As they were dragging her to the vacant lot, they fondled her private parts. Upon their arrival at the vacant lot, the appellants took turns in
having carnal knowledge of Ancajas. Godines did it first. While one was raping the girl, the other was holding on to the child. All the while, the
appellants threatened to kill Ancajas if she put up any resistance. Ancajas tried to resist but the appellants simply overpowered her. After the
appellants had finished satisfying their carnal desires, they threatened her anew with death because they suspected that Ancajas recognized them.
Ancajas knew who they were but for fear of losing her life, she denied knowing any of them. Thus, the appellants warned her not to report the
incident to the authorities if she valued her life. Ancajas took refuge in the house of a neighbor, Elpidio Aballe. She fell unconscious there. She
eventually regained her consciousness after which she narrated to Aballe the ordeal she went through. Ancajas later informed her parents and the
authorities about the incident.

Ancajas submitted herself to a medical examination. Rizaliano Deliarte, the municipal health officer of San Pascual, Masbate prepared the following
report

(1) Scant pubic hair;

(2) Labia Majora partially coaptate, which means that outer lip of sexual organ of the woman is partially opened;

(3) Vagina easily admits two fingers, the forefinger and the middle finger; and

(4) Physical ExaminationAbrasion multi-linear or lateral aspect of left shoulder joint, which means that the abrasions were located on the lateral
aspect and run across the chest, left shoulder joint, and this could have been caused by a hard object hitting the skin of the persons, such as stone,
tip of wood, sand and even finger nails. 2

Deliarte later on testified that on account of these manifestations, it is possible that Ancajas had been raped.

The defense, however, had a different version of the story. The witness for the defense testified as follows: Sometime in the afternoon of March 17,
1988, the two accused attended a religious service at the local Iglesia Ni Cristo church with a number of friends and relatives. They were together
with a certain Felomino Moreno, the wife of Godines, and two children. When the religious service was over, they proceeded to the house of
Felomino Moreno. They passed for a certain Generoso Umpad along the way. Before they reached their destination, Godines declared that he was
feeling ill. Upon their arrival at the house of Felomino Moreno, everyone in the household attended to Godines. Umpad gathered some medicinal
herbs for him. Godines and his wife spent the night in the said house. They went home at 7 o'clock the following morning. Danny Moreno stayed up
to 10 o'clock in the evening. He slept in the house of Generoso Umpad from 11 o'clock p.m. The next day, Vicente Vilaksi went to see Godines at the
latter's house in order to borrow a hammock. Godines then accompanied Vicente to the Vilaksi residence. There, he saw Ancajas and Elpidio Aballe.
Later on in the afternoon of the same day, police authorities arrested the accused.

Godines asserted that he could not have committed the crime because he had to stay in the house of Felomino Moreno to recuperate from his illness
and that he was able to go home the next day. He also asserted that the house of Felomino Moreno is about two kilometers away from the house of
Alejandro Vilaksi where the incident in question took place. Godines likewise intimated that he knew Esther Ancajas since they were small children
and that they never had a misunderstanding. For his part, Danny Moreno maintained that the house of Generoso Umpad is about three kilometers
away from the house of Vilaksi. He also admitted that, like Danny Moreno, he knew Ancajas and that there was never any unpleasant relationship
between them in the past. Both accused related that Ancajas knew the two of them as well.

The trial court did not sustain the version of the defense. The trial court observed that there were serious inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense and that a distance of a few kilometers from the scene of the crime is not a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that it
was impossible for the accused to have committed the crime. Moreover, the trial court invited attention to the fact that alibi is a defense which is
easily concocted and that the same cannot prevail against positive identification by credible witnesses. The trial court also found the version of the
prosecution credible in that no Filipino woman will publicly admit that she has been raped unless the same is true because her natural disposition is
to protect her honor. In addition, the trial court held that the crime of forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main purpose of the
accused is to rape the victim.

As stated earlier, the trial court found both accused guilty of rape.

Both accused filed a motion for reconsideration on March 5, 1990. The trial court denied the motion on March 7, 1990.

The case was elevated to this Court by way of this appeal. The appellants raise the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS COMMITTED ON THE VICTIM.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND THEIR WITNESSES WERE INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRADICTED EACH OTHER.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES WERE INSUFFICIENT
AND INCREDIBLE.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS A DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESS HAS (SIC) A MOTIVE IN FILING THE CHARGE
OF RAPE.

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPREHENDING THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WERE (SIC) NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 3

After a careful evaluation of the entire record of the case, the Court finds no reason to reverse the decision appealed from.

Inasmuch as the assigned errors are interrelated, the Court will consider them altogether.

The appellants insist that there are no conclusive medical findings that the complainant had indeed been raped. This assertion is untenable. A
medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution for rape. 4 At any rate, the medical evidence discloses that the private
complainant suffered abrasions on her body thereby confirming that she had been physically violated through the use of force.

The appellants contend that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent and as such do not serve as valid grounds for their
conviction.

The contention is untenable.

It is true that an accusation for rape can easily be fabricated because the nature of the crime is that it is difficult to prove. More often than not, only
the victim and the accused are in a position to testify on the matter so much so that the conviction or acquittal of the accused hinges solely upon the
credibility of the witnesses. 5 In the case at bar, the private complainant categorically identified the authors of the crime. She had no motive to
conjure up a serious charge against the appellants. The appellants themselves admit that before the incident in question took place, there was no
unpleasant relationship between the accused on the one hand and the private complainant on the other. The record, as a matter of fact, is devoid of
inconsistencies on the part of the prosecution witnesses. The actuations of the private complainant after the commission of the rape upon her are
consistent with that of a rape victim. What remains as the decisive factor is the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the rape.

The Court reiterates its oft-mentioned observation that it is very difficult to believe that a woman would be willing to undergo the expense, trouble,
inconvenience and scandal of a public prosecution for rape, as well as an examination of the private parts of her anatomy, if her intention is not to
bring her rapists to justice. 6 Besides, the trial court had the opportunity of a first hand assessment of the testimonies of the witnesses, an
opportunity that is not available to this Court. Thus, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses in a prosecution of a crime against
chastity commands the highest respect from the Supreme Court, 7 in the absence of valid reasons for holding otherwise. No valid reasons have
been presented by the appellants to merit a deviation from this principle.

The defense of alibi raised by the appellants is of no value in the case at bar. In order for the appellants to establish alibi, they must show that it was
impossible for them to have been present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of the commission of the same. 8 Alibi must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. 9 In the case at bar, the defense of alibi relied upon by the appellants does not preclude the possibility
that they were present at the scene of the crime and at the time the same was committed. The distance between the alleged whereabouts of the
appellants at the time of the commission of the crime and the scene of the crime itself may be easily negotiated by ordinary means. The defense
witnesses themselves testified that Godines was not too ill to preclude his moving about the premises. As stated earlier, the material factor is that
there is positive identification of the accused as the authors of the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. 10 Needless to say, alibi is
an issue of fact which is best resolved by the trial court. 11

In view of these observations, the Court does not find it necessary to pass upon the assigned error as to the alleged delay in the filing of the
complaint.

As to the crime committed by the appellants, the trial court correctly held that forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective
of the appellant is to rape the victim.

The appellants are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other in the commission of the offense charged. No doubt the evidence show
the appellants through force and intimidation and conspiring with each other successfully raped the victim by taking turns in raping her while the
other held the child of the victim and threatened her against resisting. Obviously two (2) rapes were committed by the appellants. In a conspiracy the
act of one is the act of all. 12

Under Section 3 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, it is provided:

Sec. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each
and every one of them setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each case.

In this case the appellants failed to object to the information filed and the evidence presented against them. Consequently the Court may convict
them of as many offenses as has been charged and proven and may impose on them the penalty for the offenses committed.

An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty, indemnity and damages. 13 It may also
include the nature and number of the offenses committed. Each of the appellants is guilty as principal of two (2) rapes, namely the rape he himself
committed and the rape which his co-accused committed with his active and indispensable cooperation.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby modifies the appealed judgment by finding each of the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) rapes,
so each of them is hereby imposed the penalty of life imprisonment for each rape and each to indemnify the offended party P50,000.00 with costs
against defendants-appellants.

4. Prosecution of private offenses
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the
latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional
question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national,
were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by
the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with
yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed
and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case,
"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and
the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of
Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of
Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records
of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the
date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then
pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion
was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein,
that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner
being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September
8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez
acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move
for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested
in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the
State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased
or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or
guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of
legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not
apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or
those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as
already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring
the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as
an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband
of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as
well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on
the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja
Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no
legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs
into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal
Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though
it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning,
any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination
of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory
reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised
as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the
husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in
case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual
relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his
American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he
calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid,
still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or
injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before
the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and
the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino
wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons

1. Simulation of births
People v. Sangalang, 74 OG 5977
2. Bigamy
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033

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