Mind Association

Bernard Williams' Relativism

Author(s): Jack W. Meiland
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 88, No. 350 (Apr., 1979), pp. 258-262
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252966 .
Accessed: 25/06/2014 06:39
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Oxford University Press and Mind Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Mind.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 147.162.43.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 06:39:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DISCUSSIONS
Bernard Williams' Relativism
JACK W. MEILAND
Many writers on relativism point out the alleged inconsistencies of that
position and move immediately on to other subjects, even though rela-
tivism is admitted on all sides to be widely held today in one form or
another and would thus seem to merit more extended consideration.
Bernard Williams has taken a much more serious attitude than this, by
first making the usual criticisms and then trying to find 'the truth in
relativism'. In this paper, I want to clarify and criticize Williams' views
on the truth in relativism as a way of bringing out what I take to be the
truth about relativism.
Williams' version of the usual charges of self-contradiction is set forth
in his book Morality, where he attacks what he calls 'vulgar relativism'
in the following way. Vulgar relativism holds 'that "right" means (can
only be coherently understood as meaning) "right for a given society";
that "right for a given society" is to be understood in a functionalist
sense; and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to con-
demn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society." This is 'the
anthropologist's heresy' in its most distinctive and most influential
form, according to Williams, but it is absurd. 'Whatever its results, the
view is clearly inconsistent, since it makes a claim in its third proposition,
about what is right and wrong in one's dealings with other societies,
which uses a nonrelative sense of "right" not allowed for in the first
proposition' (ibid. p. 2I).
In his later paper, 'The Truth in Relativism', Williams says of this
vulgar relativism: 'This view is not hard to refute; it was perhaps worth
discussing, since it is widely held, but to dispose of it certainly does not
take us very far.'2 In particular, it does not show us whether all forms of
relativism are self-refuting. Some forms of relativism might be not only
consistent but also might even be plausible. And in this later paper
Williams sets out to find such a form. This is done in a generalized way
by letting 'S' stand for 'a system of belief' and then distinguishing
between 'real confrontations' and 'notional confrontations' between such
systems. 'There is a real confrontation between
SI
and S2 at a given time
if there is a group at that time for whom each of
SI
and S2 is a real
option ... S2 is a real option for a group if either it is their S or it is possible
for them to go over to S2; where going over to S2 involves, first, that it is
possible for them to live within, or hold, S2 and retain their hold on reality,
and, second, to the extent that rational comparison between S2 and their
I Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, I972), p. 20.
2 Bernard Williams, 'The Truth in Relativism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 75 (I974-5),
p. 226.
258
This content downloaded from 147.162.43.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 06:39:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BERNARD WILLIAMS' RELATIVISM 259
present outlook is possible, they could acknowledge their transition to S2
in the light of such comparison' (ibid. pp. 22I-222). Then he sets forth
as follows the variety of relativism which he finds coherent and, at least
for ethical systems of belief, correct: for one whose own S does not stand
in real confrontation with another S, questions of appraisal of that other
S 'do not genuinely arise' (ibid. p. z26). Let us call this position 'appraisal
relativism'.
Exactly what is the advantage which appraisal relativism has over
vulgar relativism? It might seem that the advantage lies in this: vulgar
relativism makes appraisals and thereby contradicts itself, while appraisal
relativism avoids such contradiction by avoiding making any appraisals.
This can be filled out in the following way.
Vulgar relativism holds that to condemn the system of belief of another
society is wrong. And in thus saying that this condemnation is wrong,
vulgar relativism is appraising-for 'wrong' is an appraisal word. This is
where vulgar relativism runs into difficulty. For it uses this appraisal
word in an absolute way and hence contradicts itself. But if relativism
were instead a doctrine about the conditions under which appraisal can
or should take place, its actually making appraisals would be avoided
and therefore so would the charge of self-refutation. To say that genuine
questions of appraisal arise only in cases of real options is to talk about
the conditions of appraisal of an S but not to appraise that S in any way.
However, I do not think that this comparison between the two forms of
relativism is sound. It is true that appraisal relativism does not appraise
systems of belief, as vulgar relativism does. But appraisal relativism does
appraise. It appraises appraisals, some as genuine and others as not
genuine. The difference between the two forms of relativism lies in
another direction. Vulgar relativism seems to fail because it makes the
meanings themselves of appraisal words relative (to the needs of societies)
and then uses an appraisal word (the word 'wrong') with an absolute
rather than a relative meaning. Appraisal relativism, on the other hand,
does not allege that meanings of appraisal words are relative, and it uses
an appraisal word-the word 'genuine'-in an unabashedly absolute
sense. Thus, it does not mix absolute and relative meanings together in
one doctrine and avoids self-contradiction.
But now a new question arises. If appraisal relativism does not hold
the meanings of appraisal words to be relative, then in what way is it a
form of relativism? Well, what makes any doctrine a form of relativism?
One feature which makes a doctrine a form of relativism is that it alleges
something to be relative to something else. We have seen that this is so
in the case of vulgar relativism, where meanings are relativized to societal
needs. Appraisal relativism fulfils this requirement too. Specifically, it
makes the activity of genuinely appraising an S relative to (dependent
upon) certain conditions-the nature of one's own S, the social and
economic conditions of the time, and so on. Appraisal relativism holds
that not every S can be genuinely appraised by people holding a different
S, and that such appraisal is dependent upon these sorts of conditions.
Notice also that appraisal relativism would lead to something of the
same results as vulgar relativism. One purpose of vulgar relativism is to
This content downloaded from 147.162.43.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 06:39:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
26o JACK W. MEILAND:
serve as an argument against interfering with other societies. Appraisal
relativism has a somewhat parallel use for some cases (that is, with respect
to some S's). Suppose that Sk is a belief system which Jones cannot genu-
inely appraise. Then Sk is not a system which Jones can be justified in
judging to be defective or inferior to his own. And hence Sk is not a system
which Jones could be justified in interfering with on the basis of such judge-
ments. Of course, this is not to say that Jones couldn't interfere with that
society; it is only to say that Jones would lack any rational basis for
doing so.
Let us now evaluate appraisal relativism by turning to the crucial
concept of 'real option'. From the standpoint of a belief system SI,
another belief system S2 is a real option if it is possible for the holders of
SI
'to
go
over to'
S2.
To
get
a better
grip
on this notion of 'real
option',
let us turn
immediately
to
Williams' examples:
In this sense many Ss which have been held are not real options
now. The life of a Greek Bronze Age chief, or a medieval Samurai,
and the outlooks that go with those, are not real options for us:
there is no way of living them.... Even Utopian projects among
a small band of enthusiasts could not reproduce that life: still more,
the project of re-enacting it on a societal scale in the context of
actual modern industrial life would involve one of those social or
political mistakes, in fact a vast illusion (ibid. p. 224).
Thus, one condition of an S being a real option for someone is that it be
possible for that person to 'live' that S. Later, Williams goes on to state a
second condition:
But from the standpoint I am now considering, to raise seriously
questions in the vocabulary of appraisal about this culture con-
sidered as a concrete historical reality will not be possible for a
reflective person. In the case of such Ss, to stand in merely notional
confrontation is to lack the relation to our concerns which alone
gives any point of substance to appraisal: the only real questions of
appraisal are about real options (ibid. p. 225).
This second condition emphasizes 'relations to our concerns'.
It is certainly true that the life of a medieval Samurai is not one that
could be lived today. It can be lived only within a society having certain
institutions and values. But does it follow that we cannot legitimately
('genuinely') appraise the belief-system of a medieval Samurai? Such a
life, according to Williams lacks 'the relation to our concerns which
alone gives any point or substance to appraisal'. But imagine a business-
man whose ideal is to contribute to the economic and material develop-
ment of one's society. Thus, various inventors, explorers, and entre-
preneurs are his heroes. Upon reading James Clavell's novel Shogun,
which gives a superb
and
sympathetic portrait of Japanese Samurai
life and ideals,' our businessman condemns the Samurai for concerning
himself solely with duty, loyalty, and honour, thus making no contri-
I James Clavell, Shogun (New York: Atheneum, I975).
This content downloaded from 147.162.43.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 06:39:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BERNARD WILLIAMS' RELATIVISM 26i
bution whatsoever to the economic development of Japan. The business-
man feels that the Samurai is a parasite whose domination of Japanese
medieval society blocks efforts toward improvement of the material
situation. (This is a judgement which our businessman might well share
with a Communist.) I believe that this is a case in which the belief-system
being evaluated does have a relation to the evaluator's concerns even
though that belief-system is not a real option for the evaluator. If so,
then this is a case in which Williams' two conditions conflict. The con-
dition which talks about relation to our concerns is fulfilled while that of
the possibility of 'going over' to the form of life being evaluated is not
fulfilled.
We must look more closely at Williams' first condition for genuine
appraisal. Given that the businessman in our society cannot live the
Samurai life, what is 'non-genuine' about his appraisal of that life?
Williams simply does not tell us, but we should consider several obvious
possibilities. Notice, first, that this condition for genuine appraisal
requires only that the S being appraised be a real option. It is not required
that the appraiser have adopted that S, even if only for a time. So we
can rule out various possibilities on this basis alone. Sometimes people
say that one cannot evaluate that which one has not experienced oneself.
They say this especially about forms of life: one can evaluate an S properly
only 'from the inside'. But clearly this is not what Williams is saying,
since he does not require that one have adopted the S being evaluated.
A more likely alternative is this: our concern in evaluating the S is
expressed by the question 'Should we adopt this other S in place of our
present S?' Such a question would be idle with respect to Ss which we
cannot adopt, that is, which are not real options. This interpretation
nicely ties together Williams' two conditions, the first about real options
and the second about our concerns. But if this is what Williams means,
then his conditions as stated are not strong enough. He must add the
further condition that an S can be genuinely appraised only if the appraiser
is actively considering adopting that S in place of his own. Yet this
strengthened condition is far too strong. For it would rule out a liberal's
condemning the Nazi belief-system. The liberal is certainly not con-
sidering becoming a Nazi, when he condemns the Nazi belief-system.
This condition would prevent the liberal's appraisal from being a 'genuine
appraisal'. And this is, to my mind, totally counterintuitive.
Perhaps when Williams specifies that the S being appraised be a real
option, he means that this S must be part of the appraiser's world and
thereby shares in some of the problems and concerns that the appraiser's
S tries to deal with. I think that this is a plausible way of construing what
Williams says, but I do not believe that the 'real option' condition then
does the job required. It is quite possible that a certain monastic way of
life in the ninth century was responding to the same concerns as, say,
those to which the present-day Zen monk's way of life responds. If so,
then the contemporary appraiser should be able to appraise in a genuine
way that ninth century way of life because he is able to appraise in a
genuine way the Zen monk's way of life. The concerns are the same in
both cases, and hence genuine appraisal
is
possible in both cases.
This content downloaded from 147.162.43.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 06:39:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
262 JACK W. MEILAND: RELATIVISM
I believe that Williams is right in saying that there is a difference
between genuine appraisal and 'notional appraisal', and in saying that
genuine appraisal takes place when and only when the S being appraised
has some relation to our concerns. These concerns provide the reason
and occasion for appraisal to take place at all; after all, we do not appraise
every conceivable S, nor even every actual (past or present) S. These
concerns also provide some of the criteria-especially criteria of
importance-on which
apprais4l
is based. But to say that there are Ss
that cannot be appraised because we cannot adopt them seems to me
incorrect for the reasons given above.
There is another, and I believe better, way of rescuing relativism from
the particular charge of self-contradiction made by Williams against
vulgar relativism. We have seen that this charge arises when the relativist
makes appraisals. Williams attempts to rescue the relativist by having
him talk instead about the conditions for making genuine appraisals. But
we can also rescue the relativist by having him talk about the impossibility
of making non-relativized appraisals of Ss. Relativists typically claim
that judgements, knowledge, even truth, are relative to conceptual and
evaluative frameworks; and they often point out that there is no way of
stepping outside every framework to make a 'non-framework-dependent'
evaluation. In order to achieve an appraisal which has absolute rather
than relative authority, one would have to step outside all frameworks
and then judge some one of these frameworks to be correct or valid.
And, the relativists say, one cannot do this. Now, my point here is not to
argue for this sort of relativism but only to show that in taking this line,
the relativist does not appraise any particular S. He thus avoids self-
contradiction of the type in question. This strategy does not rely on any
dubious conditions about genuine appraisal anid is more in line with the
kind of position that relativists have, since Kant and Hegel, tended to
take. And like the other two forms of relativism discussed here, it casts
doubt on the absolute legitimacy of appraisals of belief-systems other
than our own.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
This content downloaded from 147.162.43.146 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 06:39:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions