Rednotes

P O L I T I C A L L A W
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

PART I : FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS IN POLITICAL LAW
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Q: X filed a case against the Republic of the Philippines for damages caused his yacht, which
was rammed by a navy vessel.
The solicitor general moved to dismiss the case invoking state immunity from suit. ecide.
A: The government cnnot !e "#e$ %or $mge" con"&$er&ng tht the genc' (h&ch c#"e$
the $mge" (" the Ph&)&**&ne Nv'+ Un$er Art+ ,-./ o% the C&v&) Co$e0 the "tte con"ent" to
!e "#e$ %or 1#"& $e)&ct on)' (hen the $mge &" c#"e$ !' &t" "*ec&) gent"+ 2ence0 the
So)&c&tor 3ener)4" mot&on "ho#)$ !e grnte$ n$ the "#&t !ro#ght !' 567 !e $&"m&""e$+
Q! " property owner filed an action directly in court against the Republic of the Philippines
seeding payment for a parcel of land which the national government utili#ed for a road widening
pro$ect.
1.) %an the government invoke the doctrine of non&suability of the state'
(.) *n connection with the preceding +uestion, can the property owner garnish public funds
to satisfy his claim for payment'
A: -+8 No0 the government cnnot &nvo9e the $octr&ne o% "tte &mm#n&t' %rom "#&t+ A"
he)$ &n Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu0 (hen the government e:*ro*r&te" *ro*ert' %or *#!)&c #"e
(&tho#t *'&ng ;#"t com*en"t&on0 &t cnnot &nvo9e &t" &mm#n&t' %rom the "#&t+ Other(&"e0 the
r&ght g#rntee$ &n Sect&on <0 Art+ III o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on tht *r&vte *ro*ert' "h)) not !e
t9en %or *#!)&c #"e (&tho#t ;#"t com*en"t&on (&)) !e ren$ere$ n#gtor'+ The $octr&ne o%
government) &mm#n&t' %rom "#&t cnnot "erve " n &n"tr#ment %or *er*etrt&ng n &n;#"t&ce
on c&t&>en+ I% there (ere com*)&nce (&th Sect&on <0 Art&c)e III n$ o!"ervnce o% *roce$#r)
reg#)r&t'0 the *ro*ert' o(ner (o#)$ not hve %&)e$ the ct&on &n co#rt+
,+8 No0 the o(ner cnnot grn&"h *#!)&c %#n$" to "t&"%' h&" c)&m %or *'ment+ Sect&on = o%
Act No+ ?/.? *roh&!&t" e:ec#t&on #*on n' ;#$gment g&n"t the government+ A" he)$ &n
Republic v. Villasor0 the #n&ver") r#)e tht (here the Stte g&ve" &t" con"ent to !e "#e$ !'
*r&vte *rt&e" e&ther !' gener) or "*ec&) )(0 &t m' )&m&t c)&mnt4" ct&on 5on)' #* the
com*)et&on o% *rocee$&ng" nter&or to the "tge o% e:ec#t&on7 n$ tht the *o(er o% co#rt"
en$" (hen the ;#$gment &" ren$ere$0 "&nce government %#n$" n$ *ro*ert&e" m' not !e
"e&>e$ #n$er (r&t" o% e:ec#t&on or grn&"hment to "t&"%' "#ch ;#$gment"0 &" !"e$ on
con"&$ert&on" o% *#!)&c *o)&c'0 the %#nct&on" n$ *#!)&c "erv&ce" ren$ere$ !' the Stte cnnot
!e ))o(e$ to !e *r)'>e$ or $&"r#*te$ !' the $&ver"&on o% *#!)&c %#n$" %rom the&r )eg&t&mte
n$ "*ec&%&c o!;ect"0 " **ro*r&te$ !' )(+
Q: The ,orthern -u#on irrigation "uthority .,-*") was established by a legislative charter to
strengthen the irrigation systems that supply water to farms and commercial growers in the area.
/hile the ,-*" is able to generate revenues through its operation, it receives an annual
appropriation from congress. The ,-*" is authori#ed to e0ercise all the powers of a corporation
under the %orporation %ode.
ue to miscalculation by some of its employees, there was a massive irrigation overflow
causing a flash flood in 1arrio 2an$era. " child drowned in the incident and his parents now file
suit against the ,-*" for damages.
3ay the ,-*" validly invoke the immunity of the 4tate from suit'
A: No0 the NLIA m' not &nvo9e the &mm#n&t' o% the Stte %rom "#&t0 !ec#"e0 " he)$ &n
Fontn&)) v"+ M)&mn0 &rr&gt&on &" *ro*r&etr' %#nct&on+ @e"&$e"0 the NLIA h" ;#r&$&c)
*er"on)&t' "e*rte n$ $&"t&nct %orm the government0 "#&t g&n"t &t &" not "#&t g&n"t the
Stte+ S&nce the (&ver o% the &mm#n&t' %rom "#&t &" (&tho#t 1#)&%&ct&on0 " he)$ &n Rayo v.
CFI of Bulacan0 the (&ver &nc)#$e" n ct&on !"e$ on quasi-delict.

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San Beda
College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
L A W
Q: *n 5ebruary 6778, the 3inistry of the "rmy, Republic of *ndonesia, awarded to 3arikina
4hoe %orporation, a Philippine %orporation, a contract for the supply of 988,888 pairs of combat
boots at :.4. ;<8 P=R P"*R =-*>=R= *, ?akarta on or before <8 @ctober 6778. 3arkina 4hoe %orp.
was able to deliver only (88,888 pairs of combat boots in ?akarta by <8 @ctober 6778 and it
received payment for 688,888 pairs or a total of :.4. ; <,888,888. The 3inistry of the "rmy
promised to pay for the other 688,888 pairs already delivered as soon as the remaining <88,888
pairs of combat boots are delivered, at which time the said <88,888 will also be paid for.
3arikina 4hoe %orporation failed to deliver any more combat boots.
@n 6 ?une 6776, the Republic of *ndonesia filed an action before the RT% of Pasig, Ri#al, to
compel 3arikina 4hoe %orp. to perform the balance of its obligations under the contract and for
damages. *n its "nswer, 3arikina 4hoe %orporation sets up a counterclaim for :.4. ;<,888,888.88
representing the payment for the 688,888 pairs of combat boots already delivered but unpaid.
*ndonesia moved to dismiss the counterclaim, asserting that it is entitled to sovereign immunity
from suit.
ecide the motion to dismiss.
A: The mot&on to $&"m&"" the co#nterc)&m "ho#)$ !e $en&e$+ The co#nterc)&m &n th&"
c"e &" com*#)"or' co#nterc)&m "&nce &t r&"e" %orm the "me contrct &nvo)ve$ &n the
com*)&nt+ A" "#ch &t m#"t !e "et #* other(&"e &t (&)) !e !rre$+ A!ove ))0 " he)$ &n Froilan
v. Pan Oriental Sippin! Co+0 !' %&)&ng com*)&nt0 the "tte o% In$one"& (&ve$ &t" &mm#n&t'
%rom "#&t+ It &" not r&ght tht &t cn "#e &n the co#rt" !#t &t cnnot !e "#e$+ The $e%en$nt
there%ore c1#&re" the r&ght to "et #* com*#)"or' co#nterc)&m g&n"t &t+
Q: *t is said that waiver of immunity by the 4tate does not mean a concession of its liability.
/hat are the implications of this phrase'
A: The *hr"e tht (&ver o% &mm#n&t' !' the Stte $oe" not men conce""&on o% )&!&)&t'
men" tht !' con"ent&ng to !e "#e$0 the Stte $oe" not nece""r&)' $m&t &t &" )&!)e+ A" "tte$
&n Pilippine Roc" Industries v. Board of #iquidators0 &n "#ch c"e the Stte &" )&!)e !#t the
Stte ret&n" the r&ght to r&"e )) )(%#) $e%en"e"+
POLICY OF TRANSPARENCY IN MATTERS OF PU@LIC INTEREST
Q: oes the 67AB %onstitution provide for a policy of transparency in matters of public
interest' =0plain.
A: Ye"0 the -<.= con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e" %or *o)&c' o% trn"*renc' &n mtter" o% *#!)&c
&ntere"t+ Sect&on ,.0 Art&c)e II o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e":
5S#!;ect to re"on!)e con$&t&on" *ro"cr&!e$ !' )(0 the Stte $o*t" n$ &m*)ement"
*o)&c' o% %#)) $&"c)o"#re o% )) &t" trn"ct&on" &nvo)v&ng *#!)&c &ntere"t+7
Sect&on =0 Art&c)e III o% the -<.= con"t&t#t&on "tte":
5The r&ght o% the *eo*)e to &n%ormt&on on mtter" o% *#!)&c concern "h)) !e
recogn&>e$+ Acce"" to o%%&c&) recor$"0 n$ to $oc#ment"0 n$ **er" *ert&n&ng to o%%&c&)
ct"0 trn"ct&on"0 or $ec&"&on"0 " (e)) " to government re"erch $t #"e$ " !"&" %or *o)&c'
$eve)o*ment0 "h)) !e %%or$e$ to c&t&>en0 "#!;ect to "#ch )&m&tt&on" " m' !e *rov&$e$ !'
)(+7
Sect&on ,/0 Art&c)e AI o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on re$":
5The recor$" n$ !oo9" o% cco#nt o% the Congre"" "h)) !e *re"erve$ n$ !e o*en to
the *#!)&c &n ccor$nce (&th )(0 n$ "#ch !oo9" "h)) !e #$&te$ !' the Comm&""&on on A#$&t
(h&ch "h)) *#!)&"h nn#))' n' &tem&>e$ )&"t o% mo#nt" *&$ to n$ e:*en"e" &nc#rre$ %or
ech mem!er+7
Un$er Sect&on -=0 Art&c)e 6I o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on0 the "(orn "ttement o% ""et"0
)&!&)&t&e" n$ net (orth o% the Pre"&$ent0 the A&ceBPre"&$ent0 the Mem!er" o% the C!&net0 the
Congre""0 the S#*reme Co#rt0 the Con"t&t#t&on) Comm&""&on n$ other con"t&t#t&on) o%%&ce"0

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n$ o%%&cer" o% the rme$ %orce" (&th gener) or %)g rn9 %&)e$ #*on the&r ""#m*t&on o%%&ce
"h)) !e $&"c)o"e$ to the *#!)&c &n the mnner *rov&$e$ !' )(+
Sect&on ,-0 Art&c)e 6II o% the Con"t&t#t&on $ec)re":
5In%ormt&on on %ore&gn )on" o!t&ne$ or g#rntee$ !' the government "h)) !e m$e
v&)!)e to the *#!)&c7
A" he)$ &n Val$onte v. Bel$onte0 the"e *rov&"&on" on *#!)&c $&"c)o"#re" re &nten$e$ to
enhnce the ro)e o% the c&t&>enr' &n government) $ec&"&onBm9&ng " (e)) " &n chec9&ng !#"e
&n government+
PROAISIONS INSTITUTIONALICIN3 PEOPLE POWER
Q: *s the concept of People Power recogni#ed in the %onstitution'
A: The conce*t o% Peo*)e Po(er &" recogn&>e$ &n the Con"t&t#t&on+ Un$er Sect&on ?,0
Art&c)e AI o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 thro#gh &n&t&t&ve n$ re%eren$#m0 the *eo*)e cn $&rect)'
*ro*o"e n$ enct )(" or **rove or re;ect n' ct or )( or *rt thereo% *""e$ !' the
Congre"" or )oc) )eg&")t&ve !o$' %ter the reg&"trt&on o% *et&t&on there%ore "&gne$ !' t )e"t
ten *er cent#m o% the tot) n#m!er o% reg&"tere$ voter"0 o% (h&ch ever' )eg&")t&ve $&"tr&ct
m#"t !e re*re"ente$ !' t )e"t three *er cent#m o% the reg&"tere$ voter" thereo%+
Un$er Sect&on -D0 Art&c)e 6III o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the r&ght o% the *eo*)e n$ the&r
orgn&>t&on" to e%%ect&ve n$ re"on!)e *rt&c&*t&on t )) )eve)" o% "oc&)0 *o)&t&c) n$
econom&c $ec&"&onBm9&ng "h)) not !e !r&$ge$+ The Stte "h))0 !' )(0 %c&)&tte the
e"t!)&"hment o% $e1#te con"#)tt&on mechn&"m"+
Un$er Sect&on ,0 Art&c)e 6AII o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the *eo*)e m' $&rect)' *ro*o"e
men$ment" to the Con"t&t#t&on thro#gh &n&t&t&ve #*on *et&t&on o% t )e"t t(e)ve *er
cent#m o% the tot) n#m!er o% reg&"tere$ voter"0 o% (h&ch ever' )eg&")t&ve $&"tr&ct m#"t !e
re*re"ente$ !' t )e"t three *er cent#m o% the reg&"tere$ voter" there&n+
LEASE OF LAND @Y FOREI3NER
Q: %an an alien be a lessee of a private agricultural land in the Philippines'
A: Ye"0 n )&en cn !e )e""ee o% *r&vte gr&c#)t#r) )n$+ A" "tte$ &n %riven"o v.
Re!ister of &eeds of Manila0 )&en" cn )e"e *r&vte gr&c#)t#r) )n$0 !ec#"e the' re
grnte$ tem*orr' r&ght" on)' n$ th&" &" not *roh&!&te$ !' the Con"t&t#t&on+
Q: "ndy -im, an ethnic %hinese, became a naturali#ed 5ilipino in 67<9. 1ut later he lost his
5ilipino citi#enship when he became a citi#en of %anada in 67B6. /anting the best of both worlds,
he bought, in 67AB, a residential lot in 5orbes Park and a commercial lot in 1inondo. "re these
sales valid'
A: No0 the"e ")e" re not v)&$+ Un$er Sect&on .0 Art&c)e 6II o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 on)'
nt#r)B!orn c&t&>en o% the Ph&)&**&ne" (ho )o"t h&" Ph&)&**&ne c&t&>en"h&* m' c1#&re *r&vte
)n$+ S&nce An$' L&m (" %ormer nt#r)&>e$ F&)&*&no c&t&>en0 he &" not 1#)&%&e$ to c1#&re
*r&vte )n$"+
Q: " and 1 leased their residential land consisting of one thousand .6,888) s+uare meters to
Peter %o, a %hinese citi#en, for a period of fifty years. *n 677(, before the term of the lease
e0pired, %o asked " and 1 to convey the land to him as the contract gave him the option to
purchase said land if he became a naturali#ed 5ilipino citi#en. %o took his oath as a 5ilipino in
6776.
/as the contract of lease for a period of fifty .98) years valid considering that the lessee
was an alien'
A: A" he)$ &n Pilippine Ban"in! Corp. v. #ui Se0 the )e"e o% *rce) o% )n$ (&th n
o*t&on to !#' to n )&en &" v&rt#) trn"%er o% o(ner"h&* to the )&en n$ %))" (&th&n the

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San Beda
College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
L A W
"co*e o% the *roh&!&t&on &n Sect&on =0 Art&c)e 6II o% the Con"t&t#t&on g&n"t the c1#&"&t&on o%
*r&vte )n$" !' )&en"+
TERRITORY0 FIS2ERIES ESec+ ,0 Art+ 6IIF Sec+ =0 Art+ 6III8
Q: /hat is the basis of the PhilippinesC claim to a part of the 4pratly *slands'
A: The !"&" o% the Ph&)&**&ne c)&m &" e%%ect&ve occ#*t&on o% terr&tor' not "#!;ect to the
"overe&gnt' o% nother "tte+ The G*ne"e %orce" occ#*&e$ the S*rt)' I")n$ gro#* $#r&ng the
Secon$ Wor)$ Wr+ 2o(ever0 #n$er the Sn Frnc&"co Pece Tret' o% -<H- G*n %orm))'
reno#nce$ )) r&ght n$ c)&m to the S*rt)'"+ The Sn Frnc&"co Tret' or n' other
&nternt&on) greement ho(ever0 $&$ not $e"&gnte n' !ene%&c&r' "tte %o))o(&ng the
G*ne"e ren#nc&t&on o% r&ght+ S#!"e1#ent)'0 the S*rt)'" !ecme terr n#))&#" n$ ("
occ#*&e$ !' the Ph&)&**&ne" &n the t&t)e o% "overe&gnt'+ Ph&)&**&ne "overe&gnt' (" $&"*)'e$ !'
o*en n$ *#!)&c occ#*t&on o% n#m!er o% &")n$" !' "tt&on&ng o% m&)&tr' %orce"0 !'
orgn&>&ng )oc) government #n&t0 n$ !' (r$&ng *etro)e#m $r&))&ng r&ght"0 mong other
*o)&t&c) n$ $m&n&"trt&ve ct"+ In -<=.0 &t con%&rme$ &t" "overe&gn t&t)e !' the *rom#)gt&on
o% Pre"&$ent&) Decree NO+ -H<D0 (h&ch $ec)re$ the K)'n I")n$ 3ro#* *rt o% the
Ph&)&**&ne"+
IMPEAC2MENT 3ROUNDS
Q: *s cronyism a legal ground for the impeachment of the President'
A: Ye"0 cron'&"m &" )eg) gro#n$ %or the &m*echment o% the Pre"&$ent+ Un$er Sect&on ,0
Art&c)e 6I o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 !etr') o% *#!)&c tr#"t &" one o% the gro#n$" %or &m*echment+
Th&" re%er" to v&o)t&on o% the oth o% o%%&ce n$ &nc)#$e" cron'&"m (h&ch &nvo)ve" #n$#)'
%vor&ng cron' to the *re;#$&ce o% *#!)&c &ntere"t+
Q: /hat is impeachment, what are the grounds therefore, and who are the high officials
removable thereby'
A: Im*echment &" metho$ !' (h&ch *er"on" ho)$&ng government *o"&t&on" o% h&gh
#thor&t'0 *re"t&ge0 n$ $&gn&t' n$ (&th $e%&n&te ten#re m' !e remove$ %rom o%%&ce %or
c#"e" c)o"e)' re)te$ to the&r con$#ct " *#!)&c o%%&c&)"+
The gro#n$" %or &m*echment re c#)*!)e v&o)t&on o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 tre"on0
!r&!er'0 gr%t n$ corr#*t&on0 other h&gh cr&me" n$ !etr') o% *#!)&c tr#"t+ The o%%&c&)"
remov!)e !' &m*echment re the Pre"&$ent0 A&ceBPre"&$ent0 the Mem!er" o% the S#*reme
Co#rt0 Mem!er" o% the Con"t&t#t&on) Comm&""&on" n$ the Om!#$"mn+
2OUSE OF REPRESENTATIAESISENATE ELECTORAL TRI@UNAL
Q: "rticle >*, 4ection 6B of the constitution declares the Douse of Representatives =lectoral
Tribunal .DR=T) to be the sole $udge of all contests relating to the election returns and
dis+ualifications of members of the Douse of Representatives. 3ay the 4upreme %ourt review
decisions of the DR=T'
A: Ye"0 the c"e &" ;#"t&c&!)e+ A" "tte$ &n #a'atin v. (ouse of Representatives )lectoral
*ribunal0 "&nce ;#$&c&) *o(er &nc)#$e" the $#t' to $eterm&ne (hether or not there h" !een
grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on mo#nt&ng to )c9 or e:ce"" o% ;#r&"$&ct&on on the *rt o% n' !rnch
or &n"tr#ment)&t' o% the 3overnment0 the S#*reme Co#rt h" the *o(er to rev&e( the
$ec&"&on" o% the 2RET &n c"e o% grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on on &t" *rt+
APPROPRIATION LAW

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Q: =0plain how the automatic appropriation of public funds for debt servicing can be
reconciled with "rticle >*, 4ection (7.6) of the %onstitution. 4aid provision says that no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury e0cept in pursuance of an appropriation made be law.
A: A" "tte$ &n +uin!ona v. Cara!ue0 the *re"&$ent&) $ecree" *rov&$&ng %or the
**ro*r&t&on o% %#n$" to *' the *#!)&c $e!t $o not v&o)te Sect&on ,<E-80 Art&c)e AI o% the
Con"t&t#t&on+ The' *rov&$e %or cont&n#&ng **ro*r&t&on0 there &" no con"t&t#t&on)
*roh&!&t&on g&n"t th&"+ The *re"&$ent&) $ecree" **ro*r&te " m#ch mone' " &" nee$e$ to
*' the *r&nc&*)0 &ntere"t0 t:e" n$ other norm) !n9&ng chrge" on the )on+ A)tho#gh no
"*ec&%&c mo#nt" re ment&one$0 the mo#nt" re cert&n !ec#"e the' cn !e com*#te$ %rom
the !oo9" o% the Nt&on) Tre"#r'+
Q: Tawi&Tawi is a predominantly 3oslem province. The Eovernor, the >ice&Eovernor, and
members of its 4angguniang Panlalawigan are all 3oslems. *ts budget provides the Eovernor with a
certain amount as his discretionary funds. Recently, however, the 4angguniang Panlalawigan
passed a resolution appropriating P688,888 as a special discretionary fund of the Eovernor, to be
spent by him in leading a pilgrimage of his provincemates to 3ecca, 4audi "rabia, *slamCs holiest
city.
Philconsa, on constitutional grounds, has filed suit to nullify the resolution of the
4angguniang Panlalawigan giving the special discretionary fund to the Eovernor for the stated
purpose. ecide.
A: The re"o)#t&on &" #ncon"t&t#t&on)+ F&r"t0 &t v&o)te" rt&c)e AI0 "ect&on ,<E,8 o% the
Con"t&t#t&on (h&ch *roh&!&t" the **ro*r&t&on o% *#!)&c mone' or *ro*ert'0 $&rect)' or
&n$&rect)'0 %or the #"e0 !ene%&t or "#**ort o% n' "'"tem o% re)&g&on0 n$ "econ$0 &t contrvene"
rt&c)e AI 0 "ec+ ,HED8 (h&ch )&m&t" the **ro*r&t&on o% $&"cret&onr' %#n$" on)' %or *#!)&c
*#r*o"e"+ The #"e o% $&"cret&onr' %#n$" %or *#re)' re)&g&o#" *#r*o"e &" th#" #ncon"t&t#t&on)0
n$ the %ct tht the $&"!#r"ement &" m$e !' re"o)#t&on o% )oc) )eg&")t&ve !o$' n$ not !'
Congre"" $oe" not m9e &t n' )e"" o%%en"&ve to the Con"t&t#t&on+ A!ove ))0 the re"o)#t&on
con"t&t#te" c)er v&o)t&on o% the Non E"t!)&"hment C)#"e EArt+ III0 Sec+ H8 o% the
Con"t&t#t&on+
T2E PRESIDENT4S POWER TO PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW
Q: eclaring a rebellion, hostile groups have opened and maintained armed conflicts on the
islands of 4ulu and 1asilan.
a.) To +uell this, can the President place under martial law the islands of 4ulu and 1asilan'
b.) /hat are the constitutional safeguards on the e0ercise of the PresidentCs power to
proclaim martial law'
A: +8 I% *#!)&c "%et' re1#&re" &t0 the Pre"&$ent cn *)ce S#)# n$ @"&)n #n$er mrt&) )(
"&nce there &" n ct#) re!e))&on+ Un$er Sect&on -.0 Art&c)e AII o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the
Pre"&$ent cn *)ce n' *rt o% the Ph&)&**&ne" #n$er mrt&) )( &n c"e o% re!e))&on0 (hen
*#!)&c "%et' re1#&re" &t+
!+8 The %o))o(&ng re the con"t&t#t&on) "%eg#r$" on the e:erc&"e o% the *o(er o%
the *re"&$ent to *roc)&m mrt&) )(:
-+8 There m#"t !e ct#) &nv"&on or re!e))&onF
,+8 The $#rt&on o% the *roc)mt&on "h)) not e:cee$ "&:t' $'"F
?+8 W&th&n %ort'Be&ght ho#r"0 the *re"&$ent "h)) re*ort h&" ct&on to Congre""+ I%
Congre"" &" not &n "e""&on0 &t m#"t convene (&th&n t(ent'B%o#r ho#r"F
J+8 Congre"" m' !' m;or&t' vote o% )) &t" mem!er" vot&ng ;o&nt)' revo9e the
*roc)mt&on0 n$ the Pre"&$ent cnnot "et "&$e the revoct&onF
H+8 @' the "me vote n$ &n the "me mnner0 #*on &n&t&t&ve o% the Pre"&$ent0
Congre"" m' e:ten$ the *roc)mt&on &% the &nv"&on or re!e))&on cont&n#e" n$
*#!)&c "%et' re1#&re" the e:ten"&onF
D+8 The S#*reme co#rt m' rev&e( the %ct#) "#%%&c&enc' o% the *roc)mt&on0 n$ the
S#*reme Co#rt m#"t $ec&$e the c"e (&th&n th&rt' $'" %rom the t&me &t (" %&)e$F
=+8 Mrt&) )( $oe" not #tomt&c))' "#"*en$ the *r&v&)ege o% the (r&t o% h!e"
cor*#" or the o*ert&on o% the Con"t&t#t&on+ It $oe" not "#**)nt the %#nct&on&ng o%

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P O L I T I C A L
L A W
the c&v&) co#rt" n$ o% Congre""+ M&)&tr' co#rt" hve no ;#r&"$&ct&on over c&v&)&n"
(here c&v&) co#rt" re !)e to %#nct&on+
PARDONIN3 POWER OF T2E PRESIDENT
Q: The 5irst Paragraph of 4ection 67 of "rticle >** of the %onstitution providing for the
pardoning power of the President, mentions reprieve, commutation, and pardon. Please define the
three of them and differentiate one from the others.
A: The term" (ere $e%&ne$ n$ $&"t&ng#&"he$ %rom one nother &n People v. Vera "
%o))o(":
Re*r&eve &" *o"t*onement o% the e:ec#t&on o% "entence to $' cert&n+
Comm#tt&on &" rem&""&on o% *rt o% the *#n&"hment0 "#!"t&t#t&on o% )e"" *en)t'
%or the one or&g&n))' &m*o"e$+
A *r$on0 on the other hn$0 &" n ct o% grce0 *rocee$&ng %rom the *o(er entr#"te$
(&th the e:ec#t&on o% the )(" (h&ch e:em*t" the &n$&v&$#) on (hom &t &" !e"to(e$ %rom the
*#n&"hment the )( &n%)&ct" %or cr&me he h" comm&tte$+
Q: -ucas, a ranking member of the ,5, was captured by the police while about to board a
passenger bus. %harged with rebellion he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. 1efore trial he was
granted absolute pardon by the president to allow him to participate in the peace talks.
6.) *s the pardon of the president valid'
(.) "ssuming that the pardon is valid, can -ucas re$ect it'
<.) *nstead of a pardon, may the President grant the accused amnesty if favorably
recommended by the ,ational "mnesty %ommission'
F.) 3ay the accused avail of the benefits of amnesty despite the fact that he continued to
profess innocence'
A: -+8 The *r$on &" not v)&$+ Un$er Sect&on -<0 Art+ AII o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 *r$on m'
!e grnte$ on)' %ter conv&ct&on !' %&n) ;#$gment+
,+8 First Alternative Answer:
Ye"0 L#c" cn re;ect the *r$on+ A" he)$ &n ,nited States v. -ilson0 cce*tnce &"
e""ent&) to com*)ete the *r$on n$ the *r$on m' !e re;ecte$ !' the *er"on to (hom &t &"
ten$ere$0 %or &t m' &n%)&ct con"e1#ence" o% greter $&"grce tht tho"e %orm (h&ch &t *#r*ort"
to re)&eve+
Second Alternative Answer:
No0 L#c" cnnot re;ect the *r$on+ Accor$&ng to Biddle v. Perovic0 cce*tnce &"
not nece""r'0 %or the grnt o% *r$on &nvo)ve" $eterm&nt&on !' the Pre"&$ent tht *#!)&c
(e)%re (&)) !e !etter "erve$ !' &n%)&ct&ng )e"" tht (ht the ;#$gment %&:e$+
?+8 The Pre"&$ent m' grnt the cc#"e$ mne"t'+ Accor$&ng to Barrioquinto v.
Fernande'0 mne"t' m' !e grnte$ !e%ore or %ter the &n"t&t#t&on o% the cr&m&n) *ro"ec#t&on0
*rov&$e$ the mne"t' *roc)mt&on &" conc#rre$ &n !' vote o% the m;or&t' o% )) the
mem!er" o% Congre""+
J+8 No0 the cc#"e$ cnnot v&) o% the !ene%&t" o% mne"t' &% he cont&n#e" to *ro%e""
h&" &nnocence+ In Vera v. People0 "&nce mne"t' *re"#**o"e" the comm&""&on o% cr&me0 &t &"
&ncon"&"tent %or n cc#"e$ to "ee9 %org&vene"" %or "ometh&ng (h&ch he c)&m" he h" not
comm&tte$+
Q: Eovernor " was charged administratively with oppression and was placed under preventive
suspension from office during the pendency of his case. 5ound guilty of the charge, the President
suspended him from office for ninety days. -ater, the President granted him clemency by reducing
the period of his suspension to the period he has already served. The >ice&Eovernor +uestioned the

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validity of the e0ercise of e0ecutive clemency on the ground that it could be granted only in
criminal, not administrative cases. Resolve.
A: The rg#ment o% the A&ceB3overnor "ho#)$ !e re;ecte$+ A" he)$ &n #la$as v. Orbos0
the *o(er o% e:ec#t&ve c)emenc' e:ten$" to $m&n&"trt&ve c"e"+ In grnt&ng the *o(er o%
e:ec#t&ve c)emenc' #*on the Pre"&$ent0 Sect&on -<0 Art&c)e AII o% the Con"t&t#t&on $oe" not
$&"t&ng#&"h !et(een cr&m&n) n$ $m&n&"trt&ve c"e"+ Sect&on -<0 Art&c)e AII e:c)#$e"
&m*echment c"e"0 (h&ch re not cr&m&n) c"e"0 %rom the "co*e o% the *o(er o% e:ec#t&ve
c)emenc'+ I% th&" *o(er m' !e e:erc&"e$ on)' &n cr&m&n) c"e"0 &t (o#)$ hve !een
#nnece""r' to e:c)#$e &m*echment c"e" %rom th&" "co*e+ I% the Pre"&$ent cn grnt *r$on"
&n cr&m&n) c"e"0 (&th more re"on he cn grnt e:ec#t&ve c)emenc' &n $m&n&"trt&ve c"e"0
(h&ch re )e"" "er&o#"+
INDEPENDENCE OF T2E GUDICIARY
Q: ,ame at least three constitutional safeguards to maintain $udicial independence.
A: The %o))o(&ng re the con"t&t#t&on) "%eg#r$" to m&nt&n ;#$&c&) &n$e*en$ence:
-+8 The S#*reme Co#rt &" con"t&t#t&on) !o$' n$ cnnot !e !o)&"he$ !' mere
)eg&")t&on+
,+8 The mem!er" o% the S#*reme co#rt cnnot !e remove$ e:ce*t !' &m*echment+
?+8 The S#*reme Co#rt cnnot !e $e*r&ve$ o% &t" m&n&m#m ;#r&"$&ct&on *re"cr&!e$ &n
Sect&on H0 Art&c)e 6 o% the Con"t&t#t&on+
J+8 The **e))te ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the S#*reme Co#rt cnnot !e &ncre"e$ !' )( (&tho#t
&t" $v&ce n$ conc#rrence+
H+8 A**o&ntee" to the G#$&c&r' re nom&nte$ !' the G#$&c&) n$ @r Co#nc&) n$ re
not "#!;ect to con%&rmt&on !' the Comm&""&on on A**o&ntment"+
D+8 The S#*reme Co#rt h" $m&n&"trt&ve "#*erv&"&on over )) )o(er co#rt" n$ the&r
*er"onne)+
=+8 The S#*reme Co#rt h" e:c)#"&ve *o(er to $&"c&*)&ne ;#$ge" o% )o(er co#rt"+
.+8 The Mem!er" o% the G#$&c&r' hve "ec#r&t' o% ten#re0 (h&ch cnnot !e #n$erm&ne$
!' )( reorgn&>&ng the G#$&c&r'+
<+8 Mem!er" o% the G#$&c&r' cnnot !e $e"&gnte$ to n' genc' *er%orm&ng 1#"&B
;#$&c&) or $m&n&"trt&ve %#nct&on"+
-/+8 The ")r&e" o% Mem!er" o% the G#$&c&r' cnnot !e $ecre"e$ $#r&ng the&r
cont&n#nce &n o%%&ce+
--+8 The G#$&c&r' h" %&"c) #tonom'+
-,+8The S#*reme Co#rt h" e:c)#"&ve *o(er to *rom#)gte r#)e" o% *)e$&ng0 *rct&ce
n$ *roce$#re+
13.) On)' the S#*reme Co#rt cn tem*orr&)' ""&gn ;#$ge" to other "tt&on"+
-J+8It &" the S#*reme Co#rt (ho **o&nt" )) o%%&c&)" n$ em*)o'ee" o% the G#$&c&r'+
Q: /hat do you understand by the mandate of the %onstitution that the $udiciary shall en$oy
fiscal autonomy' %ite constitutional provisions calculated to bring about the reali#ation of the said
constitutional mandate.
A: Un$er Sect&on ?0 Art&c)e AIII o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the %&"c) #tonom' o% the G#$&c&r'
men" tht **ro*r&t&on" %or the G#$&c&r' m' not !e re$#ce$ !' the )eg&")t#re !e)o( the
mo#nt **ro*r&te$ %or the *rev&o#" 'er n$0 %ter **rov)0 "h)) !e #tomt&c))' n$
reg#)r)' re)e"e$+
In Ben!'on v. &rilon0 the SC e:*)&ne$ tht %&"c) #tonom' contem*)te" g#rntee
o% %#)) %)e:&!&)&t' to ))octe n$ #t&)&>e re"o#rce" (&th the (&"$om n$ $&"*tch tht the nee$"
re1#&re+ It recogn&>e" the *o(er n$ #thor&t' to $en'0 ""e""0 n$ co))ect %ee"0 %&: rte" o%
com*en"t&on not e:cee$&ng the h&ghe"t rte" #thor&>e$ !' )( %or com*en"t&on n$ *'
*)n" o% the government n$ ))octe n$ $&"!#r"e "#ch "#m" " m' !e *rov&$e$ !' )( or
*re"cr&!e$ !' &t &n the co#r"e o% the $&"chrge o% &t" %#nct&on"+

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San Beda
College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
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GUDICIAL POWER
Q: %ongress is considering new measures to encourage foreign corporations to bring their
investments to the Philippines. %ongress has found that foreign investments are deterred by the
uncertain investment climate in the Philippines. @ne source of such uncertainty is the heightened
$udicial intervention in investment matters.
@ne such measure provides that no court or administrative agency shall issue any
restraining order or in$unction against the %entral 1ank! in the 1ankCs e0ercise of its regulatory
power over specific foreign e0change transactions.
/ould this be a valid measure'
A: Ye"0 the me"#re &" v)&$+ In Mantruste Syste$s v. C.0 the SC he)$ tht )(
*roh&!&t&ng the &""#nce o% n &n;#nct&on &" v)&$0 !ec#"e #n$er Sect&on ,0 Art&c)e AIII o% the
Con"t&t#t&on0 the ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the co#rt" m' !e $e%&ne$ !' )(+
.lternative .ns/er0
S&nce #n$er Sect&on" - n$ HE,80 Art&c)e AIII o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the co#rt" re g&ven the
*o(er o% ;#$&c&) rev&e(0 the me"#re &" vo&$+ S#ch *o(er m#"t !e *re"erve$+ The &""#nce
o% re"tr&n&ng or$er" n$ &n;#nct&on" &" &n &$ o% the *o(er o% ;#$&c&) rev&e(+
REQUIREMENTS OF GUDICIAL REAIEW
Q: Eive the two .() re+uisites for the $udicial review of administrative decisionGactions, that
is, when is an administrative action ripe for $udicial review'
A: The %o))o(&ng re the con$&t&on" %or r&*ene"" %or ;#$&c&) rev&e( o% n $m&n&"trt&ve
ct&on:
-+8 The $m&n&"trt&ve ct&on h" )re$' !een %#))' com*)ete$ n$0 there%ore0 &" %&n)
genc' ct&onF n$
,+8 A)) $m&n&"trt&ve reme$&e" hve !een e:h#"te$+
Q: 6.) /hat is the difference, if any, between the scope of $udicial power under the 67AB
constitution on one hand, and the 67<9 and 67B< %onstitutions on the other'
(.) "ssume that the constitutional +uestion raised in a petition before the 4upreme %ourt
is the lis mota of the case, give at least two other re+uirements before the %ourt will e0ercise its
power of $udicial review'
A: -+8 The "co*e o% ;#$&c&) *o(er #n$er the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on &" !ro$er tht &t" "co*e #n$er
the -<?H n$ -<=? Con"t&t#t&on !ec#"e o% the "econ$ *rgr*h o% Sect&on -0 Art&c)e AIII o%
the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on0 (h&ch "tte" tht &t &nc)#$e" the $#t' to $eterm&ne (hether or not there
h" !een grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on mo#nt&ng to )c9 or e:ce"" o% ;#r&"$&ct&on on the *rt o%
n' !rnch or &n"tr#ment)&t' o% the 3overnment+ A" he)$ &n the c"e o% Marcos v. Man!lapus0
th&" *rov&"&on )&m&t" re"ort to the *o)&t&c) 1#e"t&on $octr&ne n$ !ro$en" the "co*e o% ;#r&$&c)
&n1#&r' &nto re" (h&ch the co#rt" #n$er the -<?H n$ the -<=? Con"t&t#t&on" (o#)$ norm))'
hve )e%t to the *o)&t&c) $e*rtment" to $ec&$e+
,+8 Accor$&ng to Macasiano v. 1ational (ousin! .utority0 &n $$&t&on to the re1#&rement
tht the con"t&t#t&on) 1#e"t&on r&"e$ !e the )&" mot o% the c"e0 the %o))o(&ng re1#&"&te" m#"t
!e *re"ent %or the e:erc&"e o% the *o(er o% ;#$&c&) rev&e(:
+8 There m#"t !e n ct#) c"e or controver"' &nvo)v&ng con%)&ct o% )eg) r&ght"
"#"ce*t&!)e o% ;#$&c&) $eterm&nt&on+
!+8 The con"t&t#t&on) 1#e"t&on m#"t !e r&"e$ !' the *ro*er *rt'+
c+8 The con"t&t#t&on) 1#e"t&on m#"t !e r&"e$ t the er)&e"t o**ort#n&t'+
$+8 The $ec&"&on o% the con"t&t#t&on) 1#e"t&on m#"t !e nece""r' to the $eterm&nt&on
o% the c"e &t"e)%+
POLICE POWER

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Q: 1ecause of the marked increase in the incidence of labor strikes and of work stoppages in
industrial establishments, %ongress intending to help promote industrial peace, passed over the
ob$ections of militant labor unions, an amendment to the -abor %ode, providing that no person who
is or has been a member of the %ommunist Party may serve as an officer of any labor organi#ation
in the country. "n association of former ,P"s who had surrendered, availed of the amnesty, and
are presently leading +uiet and peaceful lives, comes to you asking what could be done against the
amendment. /hat would you advise the association to do'
A: In P.F#, v. Sec. of #abor0 the SC #*he)$ the v)&$&t' o% "ec+ ,? o% the In$#"tr&) Pece
Act re1#&r&ng )!or #n&on" to "#!m&t0 (&th&n D/ $'" o% the e)ect&on o% &t" o%%&cer"0 %%&$v&t" o%
the )tter tht the' re not mem!er" o% the Comm#n&"t Prt'0 g&n"t the c)&m tht the
re1#&rement #n$#)' c#rt&)e$ %ree$om o% ""em!)' n$ ""oc&t&on+ The Co#rt *o&nte$ o#t tht
the c1#&"&t&on !' )!or orgn&>t&on o% )eg) *er"on)&t' n$ the en;o'ment o% cert&n r&ght"
n$ *r&v&)ege"0 (h&ch the Con"t&t#t&on $oe" not g#rntee+ On the other hn$0 the
re1#&rement con"t&t#te" v)&$ e:erc&"e o% the Stte4" *o)&ce *o(er to *rotect the *#!)&c
g&n"t !#"e0 %r#$ n$ &m*o"tor"+
@#t the $&"1#)&%&ct&on o% mem!er" o% the CPP n$ &t" m&)&tr' rm the NPA0 %rom !e&ng
o%%&cer" o% )!or #n&on (o#)$ E-8 n#))&%' the mne"t' grnte$ !' the Pre"&$ent (&th the
conc#rrence0 &t m' !e ""#me$0 o% the m;or&t' o% the mem!er" o% Congre"" n$ E,8 *erm&t
the con$emnt&on o% the %ormer NPA mem!er" (&tho#t ;#$&c&) tr&) &n (' tht m9e" &t
contrr' to the *roh&!&t&on g&n"t the enctment o% !&)) o% tt&n$er n$ e: *o"t %cto )(+
The mne"t' grnte$ to the %ormer NPA" o!)&terte$ the&r o%%en"e n$ re)&eve$ them o% the
*#n&"hment &m*o"e$ !' )(+ The men$ment (o#)$ m9e them g#&)t' o% n ct0 tht o% hv&ng
!een %ormer mem!er" o% the NPA0 %or (h&ch the' hve )re$' !een %org&ven !' Pre"&$ent&)
mne"t'+
For the"e re"on"0 I (o#)$ $v&"e the ""oc&t&on to (or9 %or the veto o% the !&)) n$0 &%
&t &" not vetoe$ !#t !ecome" )(0 ch))enge &t &n co#rt+
Q: :ndaunted by his three failures in the ,ational 3edical "dmission Test .,3"T), %ru#
applied to take it again but he was refused because of an order of the =%4 disallowing flunkers
form taking the test a fourth time. %ru# filed suit assailing this rule raising the constitutional
grounds of accessible +uality education, academic freedom and e+ual protection. The government
opposes this, upholding the constitutionality of the rule on the ground of e0ercise of police power.
ecide.
A: A" he)$ &n &epart$ent of )ducation2 Culture and Sports v. San &ie!o0 the r#)e &" v)&$
e:erc&"e o% *o)&ce *o(er to en"#re tht tho"e $m&tte$ to the me$&c) *ro%e""&on re 1#)&%&e$+
The rg#ment" o% Cr#> re not mer&tor&o#"+ The r&ght to 1#)&t' e$#ct&on n$ c$em&c
%ree$om re not !"o)#te+ Un$er Sect&on HE?80 Art&c)e 6IA o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the r&ght to
choo"e *ro%e""&on &" "#!;ect to %&r0 re"on!)e n$ e1#&t!)e $m&""&on n$ c$em&c
re1#&rement"+ The r#)e $oe" not v&o)te e1#) *rotect&on+ There &" "#!"tnt&) $&"t&nct&on
!et(een me$&c) "t#$ent" n$ other "t#$ent"+ Un)&9e other *ro%e""&on"0 the me$&c)
*ro%e""&on $&rect)' %%ect" the )&ve" o% the *eo*)e+
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Q: The %ity of %ebu passed an ordinance proclaiming the e0propriation of a ten .68) hectare
property of % %ompany, which property is already a developed commercial center. The %ity
proposed to operate the commercial center in order to finance a housing pro$ect for city employees
in the vacant portion of the said property. The ordinance fi0ed the price of the land and the value
of the improvements to be paid % %ompany on the basis of the prevailing land value and cost of
construction.
6) "s counsel for % %ompany, give two constitutional ob$ections to the validity of the
ordinance.
() "s a $udge, rule on the said ob$ections.

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A: -8 A" co#n"e) %or C Com*n'0 I (&)) rg#e tht the t9&ng o% the *ro*ert' &" not %or
*#!)&c #"e n$ tht the or$&nnce cnnot %&: the com*en"t&on to !e *&$ C Com*n'0
!ec#"e th&" &" ;#$&c&) 1#e"t&on tht &" %or the co#rt" to $ec&$e+
,8 A" ;#$ge0 I (&)) "#"t&n the content&on tht the t9&ng o% the *ro*ert' o% C Com*n' to
o*erte the commerc&) center e"t!)&"he$ (&th&n &t to %&nnce ho#"&ng *ro;ect %or c&t'
em*)o'ee" &" not %or *#!)&c #"e !#t %or *r&vte *#r*o"e+ A" the Co#rt &n$&cte$ &n $&ct#m
&n Manoto" v. 1ational (ousin! .utority0 the e:*ro*r&t&on o% commerc&) center "o tht
the *ro%&t" $er&ve$ %rom &t" o*ert&on cn !e #"e$ %or ho#"&ng *ro;ect" &" t9&ng %or *r&vte
*#r*o"e+
I (&)) )"o "#"t&n the content&on tht the or$&nnce0 even tho#gh &t %&:e" the
com*en"t&on %or the )n$ on the !"&" o% the *rev&)&ng )n$ v)#e cnnot re))' $&"*)ce
;#$&c&) $eterm&nt&on o% the *r&ce %or the "&m*)e re"on tht mn' %ctor"0 "ome o% them
"#*erven&ng0 cnnot *o""&!)' !e con"&$ere$ !' the )eg&")t#re t the t&me o% enct&ng the
or$&nnce+ There &" greter re"on %or n#))&%'&ng the #"e o% the co"t o% con"tr#ct&on &n the
or$&nnce " !"&" %or com*en"t&on %or the &m*rovement"+ The %&r mr9et v)#e o% the
&m*rovement" m' not !e e1#) to the co"t o% con"tr#ct&on+ The or&g&n) co"t o% con"tr#ct&on
m' !e )o(er thn the %&r mr9et v)#e0 "&nce the co"t o% con"tr#ct&on t the t&me o%
e:*ro*r&t&on m' hve &ncre"e$+
Q: 3adlangbayan is the owner of a 988 s+uare meter lot which was the birthplace of the
founder of a religious sect who admittedly played an important role in Philippine history and
culture. The ,ational Distorical %ommission .,D%) passed a resolution declaring it a national
landmark and on its recommendation the lot was sub$ected to e0propriation proceedings. This was
opposed by 3adlangbayan on the following grounds! a) that the lot is not a vast tractH b) that
those to be benefited by the e0propriation would only be the members of the religious sect of its
founder, and c) that the ,D% has not initiated the e0propriation of birthplaces of other more
deserving historical personalities. Resolve the opposition.
A: The rg#ment" o% M$)ng!'n re not mer&tor&o#"+ Accor$&ng to Manosca v. C.0 the
*o(er o% em&nent $om&n &" not con%&ne$ to e:*ro*r&t&on o% v"t trct" o% the )n$+ The
e:*ro*r&t&on o% the )ot to *re"erve &t " the !&rth*)ce o% the %o#n$er o% the re)&g&o#" "ect
!ec#"e o% h&" ro)e &n Ph&)&**&ne h&"tor' n$ c#)t#re &" %or *#!)&c *#r*o"e0 !ec#"e *#!)&c #"e
&" no )onger re"tr&cte$ to the tr$&t&on) conce*t+ The %ct tht the e:*ro*r&t&on (&)) !ene%&t
the mem!er" o% the re)&g&o#" "ect &" mere)' &nc&$ent)+ The %ct tht other !&rth*)ce" hve
not !een e:*ro*r&te$ &" )&9e(&"e not v)&$ !"&" %or o**o"&ng the e:*ro*r&t&on+ A" he)$ &n
3.M. *uason v. #and *enure .d$in.0 the e:*ro*r&t&ng #thor&t' &" not re1#&re$ to $here to
the *o)&c' o% 5)) or none7+
GUST COMPENSATION
Q: *n ?anuary 67AF, Pasay %ity filed e0propriation proceedings against several landowners for
the construction of an a+ueduct for flood control in a barangay. %learly, only the residents of that
barangay would be benefited by the pro$ect.
"s compensation, the city offered to pay only the amount declared by the owners in their
ta0 declarations which amount was lower than the assessed value as determined by the assessor.
The landowners oppose the e0propriation on the grounds that!
a) the same is not for public useH and
b) assuming it is for public use, the compensation must be based on the evidence
presented in court and not, as provided in presidential decrees prescribing payment of
the value stated in the ownerCs ta0 declarations or the value determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower.
*f you were the $udge, how would you rule on the issue'
A: 8 The content&on tht the t9&ng o% *r&vte *ro*ert' %or the *#r*o"e o%
con"tr#ct&ng n 1#e$#ct %or %)oo$ contro) &" not %or 5*#!)&c #"e7 &" #nten!)e+ The &$e tht
5*#!)&c #"e7 men" e:c)#"&ve)' #"e !' the *#!)&c h" !een $&"cr$e$+ A" )ong " the *#r*o"e o%

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the t9&ng &" *#!)&c0 the e:erc&"e o% *o(er o% em&nent $om&n &" ;#"t&%&!)e+ Whtever m' !e
!ene%&c&))' em*)o'e$ %or the gener) (e)%re "t&"%&e" the re1#&rement o% *#!)&c #"e+ E(eirs of
3uanco .rdona v. Reyes8
!8 @#t the content&on tht the Pre"&$ent&) Decree" *rov&$&ng tht &n $eterm&n&ng ;#"t
com*en"t&on the v)#e "tte$ !' the o(ner &n h&" t: $ec)rt&on or tht $eterm&ne$ !' the
""e""or0 (h&chever &" )o(er0 &n #ncon"t&t#t&on) &" correct+ In )P4. v. &ulay0 &t (" he)$ tht
th&" metho$ *re"cr&!e$ %or "cert&n&ng ;#"t com*en"t&on con"t&t#te" n &m*erm&""&!)e
encrochment on the *rerogt&ve" o% the co#rt"+ It ten$" to ren$er co#rt" &n#t&)e &n mtter
(h&ch0 #n$er the Con"t&t#t&on0 &" re"erve$ to them %or %&n) $eterm&nt&on+ For )tho#gh #n$er
the $ecree" the co#rt" "t&)) hve the *o(er to $eterm&ne ;#"t com*en"t&on0 the&r t"9 &"
re$#ce$ to "&m*)' $eterm&n&ng the )o(er v)#e o% the *ro*ert' " $ec)re$ e&ther !' the o(ner
or !' the ""e""or+ 5G#"t com*en"t&on7 men" the v)#e o% the *ro*ert' t the t&me o% the
t9&ng+ It" $eterm&nt&on re1#&re" tht )) %ct" " to the con$&t&on o% the *ro*ert' n$ &t"
"#rro#n$&ng" n$ &t" &m*rovement" n$ c*!&)&t&e" m#"t !e con"&$ere$0 n$ th&" cn on)' !e
$one &n ;#$&c&) *rocee$&ng+
Q: The %ity of %ebu e0propriated the property of %arlos Topico for use as a municipal parking
lot. The 4angguniang Panlungsod appropriated P68 million for this purpose but the Regional Trial
%ourt fi0ed the compensation for the taking of the land at P69 million.
/hat legal remedy, if any, does %arlos Topico have to recover the balance of P9 million for
the taking of his land.
A: The reme$' o% To*&co &" the )ev' on the *tr&mon&) *ro*ert&e" o% the C&t' o% Ce!#+ In
M#n&c&*)&t' o% Paoay v. Manaois0 the SC he)$:
5Pro*ert'0 ho(ever0 (h&ch &" *tr&mon&) n$ (h&ch &" he)$ !' m#n&c&*)&t' &n &t"
*ro*r&etr' c*c&t' " trete$ !' the gret (e&ght o% #thor&t' " the *r&vte ""et o% the to(n
n$ m' !e )ev&e$ #*on n$ "o)$ #n$er n or$&nr' e:ec#t&on+7
I% the C&t' o% Ce!# $oe" not hve *tr&mon&) *ro*ert&e"0 the reme$' o% To*&co &" to %&)e
*et&t&on %or mn$m#" to com*e) &t to **ro*r&te mone' to "t&"%' the ;#$gment+ In
M#n&c&*)&t' o% Ma"ati v. C.0 the SC "&$:
5Where m#n&c&*)&t' %&)" or re%#"e" (&tho#t ;#"t&%&!)e re"on to e%%ect *'ment o%
%&n) mone' ;#$gment ren$ere$ g&n"t &t0 the c)&mnt m' v&) o% the reme$' o% mn$m#"
&n or$er to com*e) the enctment **rov) o% the nece""r' **ro*r&t&on or$&nnce0 n$ the
corre"*on$&ng $&"!#r"ement o% m#n&c&*) %#n$" there%ore+7
DUE PROCESS
Q: 3acabebe, Pampanga has several barrios along the Pampanga river. To service the needs
of their residents, the municipality has been operating a ferry service at the same river, for a
number of years already.
4ometime in 67AB, the municipality was served a copy of an order from the -and
Transportation 5ranchising and Regulatory 1oard .-T5R1), granting a certificate of public
convenience to 3r. 3acapinlac, a resident of 3acabebe, to operate ferry service across the same
river and between the same barrios being serviced presently by the municipalityCs ferry boats. "
check of the records of the application of 3acapinlac shows that the application was filed some
months before, set for hearing, and notices of such hearing were published in two newspapers of
general circulation in the town of 3acabebe, and in the province of Pampanga. The municipality
had never been directly served a copy of that notice of hearing nor had the 4angguniang 1ayan
been re+uested by 3acapinlac for any operation. The municipality immediately filed a motion for
reconsideration with the -T5R1 which was denied. *t went to the 4% on a petition for certiorari to
nullify the order granting a certificate of convenience to 3acapinlac on the basis of denial of due
process to the municipality. Resolve.
A: The *et&t&on "ho#)$ !e grnte$+ A" *rt' $&rect)' %%ecte$ !' the o*ert&on o% the
%err' "erv&ce0 the M#n&c&*)&t' o% Mc!e!e (" ent&t)e$ to !e $&rect)' not&%&e$ !' the LTFR@ o%
&t" *rocee$&ng" re)t&ve to Mc*&n)c4" **)&ct&on0 even &% the M#n&c&*)&t' h$ not not&%&e$

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the LTFR@ o% the e:&"tence o% the m#n&c&*) %err' "erv&ce+ Not&ce !' *#!)&ct&on (" not
eno#gh+ EMunicipality of )ca!ue v. .bellera8
Q: "n ordinance of the %ity of 3anila re+uires every alien desiring to obtain employment of
whatever kind, including casual and part&time employment, in the city to secure an employment
permit from the %ity 3ayor and to pay a work permit fee of P988. *s the ordinance valid'
A: No0 the or$&nnce &" not v)&$+ In Ville!as v. (iu Cion! *sai Pao (o0 &t (" he)$ tht
"#ch n or$&nnce v&o)te" e1#) *rotect&on+ It %&)e$ to con"&$er the v)&$ "#!"tnt&)
$&%%erence" mong )&en" re1#&re$ to *' the %ee+ The "me mo#nt &" !e&ng co))ecte$ %rom
ever' em*)o'e$ )&en0 (hether he &" c"#) or *ermnent0 *rtBt&me or %#)) t&me+ The
or$&nnce )"o v&o)te" $#e *roce""0 !ec#"e &t $oe" not cont&n n' "tn$r$ to g#&$e the
m'or &n the e:erc&"e o% the *o(er grnte$ to h&m !' the or$&nnce+ Th#"0 &t con%er" #*on h&m
#nre"tr&cte$ *o(er to ))o( or *revent n ct&v&t' (h&ch &" )(%#) *er "e+
Q: @n ?uly (7, 6776, the =nergy Regulatory 1oard .=R1), in response to the public clamor,
issued a resolution approving and adopting a schedule for bringing down the prices of petroleum
products over a period of one .6) year starting "ugust 69, 6776, over the ob$ection of the oil
companies which claim that the period covered is too long to pre$udge and foresee. *s the
resolution valid'
A: No0 the re"o)#t&on &" &nv)&$ "&nce the ER@ &""#e$ the re"o)#t&on (&tho#t her&ng+ The
re"o)#t&on here &" not *rov&"&on) or$er n$ there%ore &t cn on)' !e &""#e$ %ter **ro*r&te
not&ce n$ her&ng to %%ecte$ *rt&e"+ The r#)&ng &n Pilippine Co$$unications Satellite
Corp. v. .lcua'0 to the e%%ect tht n or$er *rov&"&on))' re$#c&ng the rte" (h&ch *#!)&c
#t&)&t' co#)$ chrge0 co#)$ !e &""#e$ (&tho#t *rev&o#" not&ce n$ her&ng0 cnnot **)'+
Q: The Philippine Ports "uthority .PP") Eeneral 3anager issued an administrative order to the
effect that all e0isting regular appointments to harbor pilot positions shall remain valid only up to
ecember <6 of the current year and that henceforth all appointments to harbor pilot positions
shall be only for a term of one year from date of effectivity, sub$ect to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the PP" after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. Pilotage as a
profession may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals, who have to pass five govCt
professional e0aminations.
The Darbor Pilot "ssociation challenged the validity of the said administrative order arguing
that it violated the pilotCs right to e0ercise their profession and their right to due process of law
and that the said administrative order was issued without prior notice and hearing. The PP"
countered that the administrative order was valid as it was issued in the e0ercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under PP"Cs legislative charterH and that
in issuing the order as a rule or regulation, it was performing its e0ecutive or legislative, and not a
+uasi&$udicial function. /as there or was there no violation of the harbor pilotsC right to e0ercise
their profession and their right to due process'
A: The r&ght o% the hr!or *&)ot" to $#e *roce"" (" v&o)te$+ A" he)$ &n Corona v. ,nited
(arbor Pilots .ssoc. of te Pil.0 *&)otge " *ro%e""&on &" *ro*ert' r&ght *rotecte$ !' the
g#rntee o% $#e *roce""+ The *reBev)#t&on cnce))t&on o% the )&cen"e" o% the hr!or *&)ot"
ever' 'er &" #nre"on!)e n$ v&o)te$ the&r r&ght to "#!"tnt&ve $#e *roce""+ The rene() &"
$e*en$ent on the ev)#t&on %ter the )&cen"e" hve !een cnce))e$+ The &""#nce o% the
$m&n&"trt&ve or$er )"o v&o)te$ *roce$#r) $#e *roce""0 "&nce no *r&or *#!)&c her&ng ("
con$#cte$+ A" he)$ &n CIR v. C.0 (hen reg#)t&on &" !e&ng &""#e$ #n$er the 1#"&B)eg&")t&ve
#thor&t' o% n $m&n&"trt&ve genc'0 the re1#&rement" o% not&ce0 her&ng n$ *#!)&ct&on
m#"t !e o!"erve$+
EQUAL PROTECTION

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Q: 3arina ,eptunia, daughter of a sea captain and sister to four marine officers, applied to
take e0amination for marine officers but her application was re$ected for the reason that the law
regulating the practice of marine profession in the Philippines specifically prescribes that ,o
person shall be +ualified for e0amination as marine officer unless he is male.
3arina feels very aggrieved over the denial and has come to you for advice. 4he wants to
know whether the 1oard of =0aminers had any plausible or legal basis for re$ecting her application.
=0plain.
A: The $&"1#)&%&ct&on o% %em)e" %rom the *rct&ce o% mr&ne *ro%e""&on con"t&t#te" n
&nv&$&o#" $&"cr&m&nt&on con$emne$ !' the E1#) Protect&on C)#"e o% the Con"t&t#t&on EArt+ IA0
Sec+-8+ In the Un&te$ Stte"0 #n$er "&m&)r *rov&"&on0 (h&)e er)&er $ec&"&on" o% the SC #*he)$
the v)&$&t' o% "tt#te *roh&!&t&ng (omen %rom !rten$&ng #n)e"" "he (" the (&%e or
$#ghter o% m)e o(ner n$ $en'&ng (omen the r&ght to *rct&ce )(0 recent $ec&"&on" hve
&nv)&$te$ "tt#te" or reg#)t&on" *rov&$&ng %or $&%%erent&) tretment o% %em)e" !"e$ on
"tereot'*&c) n$ &ncc#rte gener)&>t&on"+ The Co#rt he)$ tht 5c)""&%&ct&on !"e$ on "e:0
)&9e c)""&%&ct&on" !"e$ on rce0 )&enge or nt&on) or&g&n0 re &nherent)' "#"*ect0 n$ m#"t
there%ore !e "#!;ecte$ to "tr&ct ;#$&c&) "cr#t&n'+ F#rthermore0 &t v&o)te" Sec+ -J Art II0 (h&ch
#n$er"core" the %#n$ment) e1#)&t' o% men n$ (omen !e%ore the )(+
Q: X was sentenced to a penalty of 6 year and 9 months of prision correccional and to pay a
fine of PA,888 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. "fter serving his prison term,
X asked the irector of Prisions whether he could already be released. X was asked to pay the
fine of PA,888 and he said he could not afford it, being an indigent. The irector informed him he
has to serve an additional prison term at the rate of one day per eight pesos in accordance with
"rticle <7 of the Revised Penal %ode. The lawyer of X filed a petition for habeas corpus
contending that the further detention of his client for unpaid fines violates the e+ual protection
clause of the %onstitution. ecide.
A: The *et&t&on "ho#)$ !e grnte$0 !ec#"e Art&c)e ?< o% the Rev&"e$ Pen) Co$e &"
#ncon"t&t#t&on)+ In Tte v+ Short0 the US S#*reme Co#rt he)$ tht the &m*o"&t&on o% "#!"&$&r'
&m*r&"onment #*on conv&ct (ho &" *oor to *' %&ne v&o)te" e1#) *rotect&on0 !ec#"e
econom&c "tt#" cnnot "erve " v)&$ !"&" %or $&"t&ng#&"h&ng the $#rt&on o% the
&m*r&"onment !et(een conv&ct (ho &" !)e to *' the %&ne n$ conv&ct (ho &" #n!)e to *'
&t+
Q: "n ordinance of the %ity of 3anila re+uires every alien desiring to obtain employment of
whatever kind, including casual and part&time employment, in the city to secure an employment
permit from the %ity 3ayor and to pay a work permit fee of P988. *s the ordinance valid'
A: No0 the or$&nnce &" not v)&$+ In Ville!as v. (iu Cion! *sai Pao (o0 &t (" he)$ tht
"#ch n or$&nnce v&o)te" e1#) *rotect&on+ It %&)e$ to con"&$er the v)&$ "#!"tnt&)
$&%%erence" mong )&en" re1#&re$ to *' the %ee+ The "me mo#nt &" !e&ng co))ecte$ %rom
ever' em*)o'e$ )&en0 (hether he &" c"#) or *ermnent0 *rtBt&me or %#)) t&me+ The
or$&nnce )"o v&o)te" $#e *roce""0 !ec#"e &t $oe" not cont&n n' "tn$r$ to g#&$e the
m'or &n the e:erc&"e o% the *o(er grnte$ to h&m !' the or$&nnce+ Th#"0 &t con%er" #*on h&m
#nre"tr&cte$ *o(er to ))o( or *revent n ct&v&t' (h&ch &" )(%#) *er "e+
SEARC2 AND SEICURE
Q: X a constabulary @fficer, was arrested pursuant to a lawful court order in 1aguio %ity for
murder. De was brought to 3anila where a warrantless search was conducted in his official
+uarters at %amp %rame. The search team found and sei#ed the murder weapon in a drawer of
X. %an X claim that the search and sei#ure were illegal and move for e0clusion from evidence
of the weapon sei#ed'
A: Ye"0 567 cn $o "o+ The (rrnt)e"" "erch cnnot !e ;#"t&%&e$ " n &nc&$ent o% v)&$
rre"t0 !ec#"e con"&$er!)e t&me h$ e)*"e$ %ter &" rre"t &n @g#&o !e%ore the "erch o% h&"
1#rter" &n Cm* Crme0 Q#e>on C&t' (" m$e0 n$ !ec#"e the $&"tnce !et(een the *)ce
o% rre"t n$ the *)ce o% "erch negte" n' c)&m tht the *)ce "erche$ &" (&th&n h&"

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5&mme$&te contro)7 "o " to ;#"t&%' the **rehen"&on tht he m&ght $e"tro' or conce)
ev&$ence o% cr&me !e%ore (rrnt cn !e o!t&ne$+ In 1olasco v. Cru' Pano0 the SC "&$ tht
(rrnt)e"" "erch m$e %ter ?/ m&n#te" %rom the t&me o% rre"t n$0 &n *)ce "ever)
!)oc9" (' %rom the *)ce o% rre"t &" &nv)&$+ It he)$ tht (rrnt)e"" "erch &" )&m&te$ to
the "erch o% the *er"on o% the rre"tee t the t&me n$ &nc&$ent to h&" rre"t n$ %or
$ngero#" (e*on" or n'th&ng (h&ch m' !e #"e$ " *roo% o% the o%%en"e+
Q: Pursuing reports that great +uantities of prohibited drugs are being smuggled at nighttime
through the shores of %avite, the 4outhern -u#on %ommand set up checkpoints at the end of the
%avite coastal road to search passing motor vehicles. " 67&year old boy, who finished fifth grade,
while driving, was stopped by the authorities at the checkpoint. /ithout any ob$ection from him,
his car was inspected, and the search yielded mari$uana leaves hidden in the trunk compartment of
the car. The prohibited drug was promptly sei#ed, and the boy was brought to the police station
for +uestioning. /as the search without warrant legal'
A: No0 the "erch (" not v)&$0 !ec#"e there (" no *ro!!)e c#"e %or con$#ct&ng the
"erch+ A" he)$ &n .l$eda v. ,S0 (h&)e mov&ng veh&c)e cn !e "erche$ (&tho#t (rrnt0
there m#"t "t&)) !e *ro!!)e c#"e+ In the c"e &n 1#e"t&on0 there (" noth&ng to &n$&cte tht
mr&;#n )eve" (ere h&$$en &n the tr#n9 o% the cr+ The mere %ct tht the !o' $&$ not
o!;ect to the &n"*ect&on o% the cr $oe" not con"t&t#te con"ent to the "erch+ A" r#)e$ &n
People v. Barros0 the %&)#re to o!;ect to (rrnt)e"" "erch $oe" not con"t&t#te con"ent+
A)ternt&ve An"(er:
YES0 the re1#&rement o% *ro!!)e c#"e $&%%er" %rom c"e to c"e+ In th&" one0 "&nce the
*o)&ce gent" re con%ronte$ (&th )rgeB"c)e "m#gg)&ng o% *roh&!&te$ $r#g"0 e:&"tence o% (h&ch
&" o% *#!)&c 9no()e$ge0 the' cn "et #* chec9*o&nt" t "trteg&c *)ce"0 &n the "me (' tht &n
ne&gh!orhoo$ (here ch&)$ &" 9&$n**e$0 &t &" )(%#) %o "erch cr" n$ veh&c)e" )ev&ng the
ne&gh!orhoo$+ Th&" "&t#t&on &" )"o "&m&)r to (rrnt)e"" "erche" o% mov&ng veh&c)e" &n
c#"tom" re"0 (h&ch hve !een #*he)$+
Q: 4ome police operatives, acting under a lawfully issued warrant for the purose of searching
for firearms in the house of X located at ,o. 68 4haw 1lvd, Pasig 33, found instead of firearms, ten
kg of cocaine.
6.) 3ay the said police operatives lawfully sei#e the cocaine'
(.) 3ay X successfully challenge the legality of the search on the ground that the peace
officers did not inform him about his right to remain silent and his right to counsel'
<.) 4uppose the peace officers were able to find unlicensed firearms in the house in an
ad$acent lot, that is, ,o. 6( 4haw 1lvd., which is also owned by X. 3ay they lawfully
sei#e the said unlicensed firearms'
A: -+8 YES0 the *o)&ce o*ert&ve" m' )(%#))' "e&>e the coc&ne0 !ec#"e &t &" n &tem (ho"e
*o""e""&on &" *roh&!&te$ !' )(0 &t (" &n *)&nv&e( n$ &t (" on)' &n$vertent)' $&"covere$ &n
the co#r"e o% )(%#) "erch+ The *o""e""&on o% coc&ne &" *roh&!&te$ !' the Dngero#" Dr#g"
Act+ A" he)$ &n Ma!oncia v. Palacio0 n rt&c)e (ho"e *o""e""&on &" *roh&!&te$ !' )( m' !e
"e&>e$ (&tho#t the nee$ o% n' "erch (rrnt &% &t (" $&"covere$ $#r&ng )(%#) "erch+ The
$$&t&on) re1#&rement )&$ $o(n &n Roan v. +on'ales0 tht the $&"cover' o% the rt&c)e m#"t
hve !een m$e &n$vertent)' (" )"o "t&"%&e$ &n th&" c"e+
,+8 NO0 6 cnnot "#cce""%#))' ch))enge the )eg)&t' o% the "erch "&m*)' !ec#"e the *ece
o%%&cer" $&$ not &n%orm h&m !o#t h&" r&ght to rem&n "&)ent n$ h&" r&ght to co#n"e)+ Sect&on
-,E-80 Art&c)e III o% the Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e":
5An' *er"on #n$er &nve"t&gt&on %or the comm&""&on o% n o%%en"e "h)) hve the r&ght to
!e &n%orme$ o% h&" r&ght to rem&n "&)ent n$ to hve com*etent n$ &n$e*en$ent co#n"e)
*re%er!)' o% h&" o(n cho&ce+7
For th&" *rov&"&on to **)'0 "#"*ect m#"t !e #n$er c#"to$&) &nve"t&gt&on+ There ("
no &nve"t&gt&on &nvo)ve$ &n th&" c"e+

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?+8 The #n)&cen"e$ %&rerm" "tore$ t -, Sh( @)v$+ m' )(%#))' !e "e&>e$ "&nce the&r
*o""e""&on &" &))eg)+ A" he)$ &n Ma!oncia v. Palacio0 (hen n &n$&v&$#) *o""e""e" contr!n$0
he &" comm&tt&ng cr&me n$ he cn !e rre"te$ (&tho#t (rrnt n$ the contr!n$ cn !e
"e&>e$+
A)ternt&ve An"(er:
NO+ The "erch (rrnt (" "*ec&%&c " to the *)ce to !e "erche$+ There (" no
!"&" to "erch the $;cent ho#"e+
Q: uring the recent elections, checkpoints were set up to enforce the election period ban on
firearms. uring one such routine search one night, while looking though an open window with a
flashlight, the police saw firearms at the backseat of a car, partially covered by papers and clothes.
a.) "ntonio, owner and driver of the car in +uestion, was charged for violation of the
firearms ban. "re the firearms admissible in evidence against him'
b.) *f, upon further inspection by the police, prohibited drugs were found inside the
various compartments of "ntonioCs car, can the drugs be used in evidence against
"ntonio if he is prosecuted for possession of prohibited drugs'
A: +8 Ye"0 the %&rerm" re $m&""&!)e &n ev&$ence0 !ec#"e the' (ere v)&$)' "e&>e$+ In
Val$onte v. &e Villa0 the SC he)$ tht chec9*o&nt" m' !e "et #* to m&nt&n *ece n$ or$er
%or the !ene%&t o% the *#!)&c n$ chec9*o&nt" re "ec#r&t' me"#re g&n"t #n#thor&>e$
%&rerm"+ S&nce the "erch (h&ch re"#)te$ &n the $&"cover' o% the %&rerm" (" )&m&te$ to
v&"#) "erch o% the cr0 &t (" re"on!)e+ @ec#"e o% the !n on %&rerm"0 the *o""e""&on o%
the %&rerm" (" *roh&!&te$+ S&nce the' (ere %o#n$ &n *)&n v&e( &n the co#r"e o% )(%#)
"erch0 &n ccor$nce (&th Ma!oncia v. Palacio0 the' re $m&""&!)e &n ev&$ence+
!+8 No0 the $r#g" cnnot !e #"e$ &n ev&$ence g&n"t Anton&o &% he &" *ro"ec#te$ %or
*o""e""&on o% *roh&!&te$ $r#g"+ The $r#g" (ere %o#n$ %ter more e:ten"&ve "erch o% the
vr&o#" com*rtment" o% the cr+ A" he)$ &n Val$onte v. &e Villa0 %or "#ch "erch to !e v)&$0
there m#"t !e *ro!!)e c#"e+ In th&" c"e0 there (" no *ro!!)e c#"e0 " there ("
noth&ng to &n$&cte tht Anton&o h$ *roh&!&te$ $r#g" &n"&$e the com*rtment" o% h&" cr+
Q: a.) %rack officers of the "nti I ,arcotics :nit were assigned on surveillance of the environs
of a cemetery where the sale and use of dangerous drugs are rampant. " man with reddish and
glassy eyes was walking unsteadily moving towards them but veered away when he sensed the
presence of policemen. They approached him, introduced themselves as police officers and asked
him what he had clenched in his hand. "s he kept mum, the policemen pried his hand open and
found a sachet of shabu, a dangerous drug. "ccordingly charged in court, the accused ob$ected to
the admission in evidence of the dangerous drug because it was the result of an illegal search and
sei#ure. Rule on the ob$ection.
b.) /hat are the instances when warrantless searches may be effected'
A: +8 The o!;ect&on &" #nten!)e+ In ccor$nce (&th Manalili v. C.0 "&nce the cc#"e$ h$
re$ e'e" n$ (" ()9&ng #n"te$&)' n$ the *)ce &" 9no(n hngBo#t o% $r#g $$&ct"0 the
*o)&ce o%%&cer" h$ "#%%&c&ent re"on to "to* the cc#"e$ n$ to %r&"9 h&m+ S&nce "h!# ("
ct#))' %o#n$ $#r&ng the &nve"t&gt&on0 &t co#)$ !e "e&>e$ (&tho#t the nee$ %or "erch
(rrnt+
!+8 A (rrnt)e"" "erch m' !e e%%ecte$ &n the %o))o(&ng c"e":
-+8 Serche" &nc&$ent) to )(%#) rre"tF
,+8 Serche" o% mov&ng veh&c)e"F
?+8 Serche" o% *roh&!&te$ rt&c)e" &n *)&n v&e(F
J+8 En%orcement o% c#"tom" )(F
H+8 Con"ente$ "erche"F
D+8 Sto* n$ %r&"9
=+8 Ro#t&ng "erche" t !or$er" n$ *ort" o% entr'F
.+8 Serche" o% !#"&ne""e" &n the e:erc&"e o% v&"&tor&) *o(er" to en%orce *o)&ce
reg#)t&on"+

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San Beda
College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
L A W
Q: " is an alien. 4tate whether in the Philippines he is entitled to the right against illegal
searches and sei#ures and against illegal arrests.
A: A)&en" re ent&t)e$ to the r&ght g&n"t &))eg) "erche" n$ "e&>#re" n$ &))eg) rre"t"+
A" **)&e$ &n People v. Cua (o San0 the"e r&ght" re v&)!)e to )) *er"on"0 &nc)#$&ng )&en"+
Q: "rmed with a search warrant, a team of policemen led by *nspector Trias entered a compound
and searched the house described therein as ,o. 6B 4peaker Pere# 4t., 4ta. 3esa Deights J%,
owned by =rnani Pelets, for a reported cache of firearms and ammunition. Dowever, upon
thorough search of the house, they found nothing.
Then, acting on a hunch, the police proceeded to a smaller house inside the same
compound with address at ,o. 6B&" 4peaker Pere# 4t., entered it, and conducted a search therein
over the ob$ection of 3r. Pelets who happened to be the same owner of the first house. There, the
police found the unlicensed firearms and ammunition they were looking for. "s a result, 3r. Pelets
was criminally charged in court with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. "t the trial, he
vehemently ob$ected the presentation of the evidence against him for being inadmissible. Resolve.
A: The content&on o% Ernn& Pe)et" &" v)&$+ A" he)$ &n People v. C.0 &% the *)ce "erche$
&" $&%%erent %rom tht "tte$ &n the "erch (rrnt0 the ev&$ence "e&>e$ &n$m&""&!)e+ The
*o)&ce cnnot mo$&%' the *)ce to !e "erche$ " "et o#t &n the "erch (rrnt+
FREEDOM OF E6PRESSION
Q: The 4ecretary of Transportation and %ommunications has warned radio station operators
against selling blocked time, on the claim that the time covered thereby are often used by those
buying them to attack the present administration. "ssume that the department implements this
warning and orders owners and operators of radio stations not to sell blocked time to interested
parties without prior clearance from the department. Kou are approached by an interested party
affected adversely by that order of the 4ecretary. /hat would you do regarding that ban on the
sale of blocked time.
A: I (o#)$ ch))enge &t" v)&$&t' &n co#rt on the gro#n$ tht &t con"t&t#te" *r&or re"tr&nt
o% %ree$om o% e:*re""&on+ S#ch )&m&tt&on &" v)&$ on)' &n e:ce*t&on) c"e"0 "#ch " (here
the *#r*o"e &" to *revent ct#) o!"tr#ct&on to recr#&tment o% "erv&ce or the "&)&ng $te" o%
trn"*ort" or the n#m!er n$ )oct&on o% troo*"0 or %or the *#r*o"e o% en%orc&ng the *r&mr'
re1#&rement" o% $ecenc' or the "ec#r&t' o% comm#n&t' )&%e+ Attc9" on the gov4t0 on the other
hn$0 cnnot ;#"t&%' *r&or re"tr&nt"+ For " h" !een *o&nte$ o#t0 5the &ntere"t o% "oc&et' n$
the m&ntennce o% goo$ government $emn$ %#)) $&"c#""&on o% *#!)&c %%&r"+ Com*)ete
)&!ert' to comment on the con$#ct o% *#!)&c men &" "c)*e) &n the c"e o% %ree "*eech+ The
"hr* &nc&"&on o% &t" *ro!e re)&eve" the !"ce""e" o% o%%&c&)$om+ Men &n *#!)&c )&%e m' "#%%er
#n$er ho"t&)e n$ n #n;#"t cc#"t&onF the (o#n$ cn !e ""#ge$ (&th !)m o% c)er
con"c&ence+7
LI@ERTY OF A@ODE
Q: ?uan %asanova contracted DansenCs disease .leprosy) with open lesions. " law re+uires that
lepers be isolated upon petition of the %ity Dealth @fficer. The wife of ?uan wrote a letter to the
%ity Dealth @fficer to have her formerly philandering husband confined in some isolated
leprosarium. ?uan challenged the constitutionality of the law as violating his liberty of abode. /ill
the suit prosper'
A: No0 the "#&t (&)) not *ro"*er+ Sect&on D0 Art&c)e III o% the Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e":
5The )&!ert' o% !o$e n$ o% chng&ng the "me (&th&n the )&m&t" *re"cr&!e$ !' )(
"h)) not !e &m*&re$ e:ce*t #*on )(%#) or$er o% the co#rt+7
The )&!ert' o% !o$e &" "#!;ect to the *o)&ce *o(er o% the Stte+ Re1#&r&ng the
"egregt&on o% )e*er" &" v)&$ e:erc&"e o% *o)&ce *o(er+ In #oren'o v. &ir. Of (ealt0 the SC
he)$:

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5G#$&c&) not&ce (&)) !e t9en o% the %ct tht )e*ro"' &" common)' !e)&eve$ to !e n
&n%ect&o#" $&"e"e ten$&ng to c#"e one %%)&cte$ (&th &t to !e "h#nne$ n$ e:c)#$e$
%rom "oc&et'0 n$ tht com*#)"or' "egregt&on o% )e*er" " men" o% *revent&ng the
"*re$ o% the $&"e"e &" "#**orte$ !' h&gh "c&ent&%&c #thor&t'+7
Q: The military commander&in&charge of the operation against rebel groups directed the
inhabitants of the island which would be the target of attack by govCt forces to evacuate the area
and offered the residents temporary military hamlet. %an the military commander force the
residents to transfer their places of abode without court order'
A: No0 the m&)&tr' commn$er cnnot com*e) the re"&$ent" to trn"%er the&r *)ce" o%
!o$e (&tho#t co#rt or$er+ Un$er Sect&on D0 Art&c)e III o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 )(%#) or$er o%
the co#rt &" re1#&re$ !e%ore the )&!ert' o% !o$e n$ o% chng&ng the "me cn !e &m*&re$+
PRIAACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
Q: /hile serving sentence in 3untinlupa for the crime of theft, X stabbed dead one of his
guards. X was charged with murder. uring trial, the prosecution introduced as evidence a letter
written in prison by X to his wife tending to establish that the crime of murder was the result of
premeditation. The letter was written voluntarily. *n the course of inspection, it was opened and
read by a warden pursuant to the rules of discipline of the 1ureau of Prisons and considering its
contents, the letter was turned over to the prosecutor. The lawyer of X ob$ected to the
presentation of the letter and moved for its return on the ground that it violates the right of X
against unlawful search and sei#ure. ecide.
A: The o!;ect&on o% the )('er m#"t !e "#"t&ne$+ Sect&on ?E-80 Art&c)e IA o% the -<.=
Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e":
5The *r&vc' o% comm#n&ct&on n$ corre"*on$ence "h)) !e &nv&o)!)e e:ce*t #*on
)(%#) or$er o% the co#rt0 or (hen *#!)&c "%et' or or$er re1#&re" other(&"e "
*re"cr&!e$ !' )(+7
There (" no co#rt or$er (h&ch #thor&>e$ the (r$en to re$ the )etter o% 6+ ne&ther
&" there n' )( "*ec&%&c))' #thor&>&ng the @#re# o% Pr&"on" to re$ the )etter o% 6+ Un$er
Sect&on ?E-80 Art+ III0 to &nter%ere (&th n' corre"*on$ence (hen there &" no co#rt or$er0 there
m#"t !e )( #thor&>&ng &t &n the &ntere"t o% *#!)&c "%et' or or$er+ 2ence the )etter &"
&n$m&""&!)e+
Q: The police had suspicions that ?uan 4amson, member of the subversive ,ew Proletarian
"rmy, was using the mail for propaganda purposes in gaining new adherents to its cause. The %hief
of Police of 1antolan, -anao del 4ur ordered the Postmaster of the town to intercept and open all
mail addressed to and coming from ?uan 4amson in the interest of the national security. /as the
order of the %hief of Police valid'
A: NO0 the or$er (" not v)&$ !ec#"e there &" no )( (h&ch #thor&>e" h&m to or$er the
Po"tm"ter to o*en the )etter" $$re""e$ to n$ com&ng %rom G#n Sm"on+ An o%%&c&) &n the
E:ec#t&ve De*rtment cnnot &nter%ere (&th the *r&vc' o% corre"*on$ence n$ comm#n&ct&on
&n the !"ence o% )( #thor&>&ng h&m to $o "o or )(%#) or$er o% the co#rt+
Q: " has a telephone line with an e0tension. @ne day, " was talking to 1 over the phone. "
conspired with his friend %, who was at the end of the e0tension line listening to "Cs conversation
with 1 in order to overhear and tape&record the conversation wherein 1 confidentially admitted
that with evident premeditation, he .1) killed for having cheated him in their business
partnership. 1 was not aware that the phone conversation was being tape&recorded.
*n the criminal case against 1 for murder, is the tape&recorded conversation containing his
admission admissible in evidence'

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San Beda
College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
L A W
A: The t*eBrecor$e$ $m&""&on &" not $m&""&!)e &n ev&$ence+ A" he)$ &n Salcedo-Orta5e'
v. C.0 Re*#!)&c Act No+ J,// m9e" the t*eBrecor$&ng o% te)e*hone conver"t&on $one
(&tho#t the #thor&>t&on o% )) the *rt&e" to the conver"t&on0 &n$m&""&!)e &n ev&$ence+ In
$$&t&on0 the t*&ng o% the conver"t&on v&o)te$ the g#rntee o% *r&vc' o% comm#n&ct&on"
en#nc&te$ &n Sect&on ?0 Art+ III o% the Con"t&t#t&on+
MIRANDA RI32TS0 RI32T TO COUNSEL
Q: @n @ctober 6, 67A9, Ramos was arrested by a security guard because he appeared to be
suspicious and brought to a police precinct where in the course of the investigation he admitted
he was the killer of an unsolved homicide committed a week earlier. The proceedings of his
investigation were put in writing and dated @ctober 6, 67A9, and the only participation of counsel
assigned to him was his mere presence and signature on the statement. The admissibility of the
statement of Ramos was placed in issue but the prosecution claims that the confession was taken
on @ctober 6, 67A9 and the 67AB %onstitution providing for the right to counsel of choice and
opportunity to retain, took effect only on 5ebruary (, 67AB and cannot be given retroactive effect.
Rule on this.
A: The con%e""&on o% Rmo" &" not $m&""&!)e0 "&nce the co#n"e) ""&gne$ to h&m $&$ not
$v&"e h&m o% h&" r&ght"+ The %ct tht h&" con%e""&on (" t9en !e%ore the e%%ect&v&t' o% the
-<.= Con"t&t#t&on &" o% no moment+ Even *r&or to the e%%ect&v&t' o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on0 the
SC h" )re$' )&$ $o(n "tr&ct r#)e" on (&ver o% the r&ght" $#r&ng &nve"t&gt&on &n the c"e o%
Mor)e" v+ Ponce Enr&)e EA*r&) ,D0 ,//?8
CITICENS2IP
Q: " was born in 6796 in the :nited 4tates of a %hinese father and a 5ilipina mother. :nder
%hinese laws, "Cs mother automatically became a %hinese national by her marriage. *n 67B<, upon
reaching the age of ma$ority, " elected Philippine citi#enship. Dowever, " continued to reside in
%alifornia and to carry an "merican passport. De also paid allegiance to the Taipei government. *n
the 67AB Philippine national elections, he was elected 4enator. Dis opponent moved to dis+ualify
him on the grounds!
6) That he was not a natural born citi#enH and
() That he had dual allegiance not only to the :4 but also to the Rep. of %hina.
A: The E)ector) conte"t m#"t !e $&"m&""e$+
-8 A &" nt#r) !orn c&t&>en+ Art+ IA0 Sec+ , o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e" tht
5tho"e (ho e)ect Ph&)&**&ne c&t&>en"h&* &n ccor$nce (&th *r+ ?0 "ec+ - hereo%
"h)) !e $eeme$ nt#r) !orn c&t&>en"+7 The *#r*o"e o% th&" *rov&"&on &" to e1#)&>e
the "tt#" o% tho"e (ho e)ecte$ Ph&)&**&ne c&t&>en"h&* !e%ore n$ tho"e (ho $&$ "o
%ter Gn#r' -=0 -<=? (hen the *rev&o#" Con"t&t#t&on too9 e%%ect+
,8 The 5$#) ))eg&nce7 $ec)re$ &n&m&c) to nt&on) &ntere"t &n Art+ AI0 Sec+ H re%er"
to the $#) ))eg&nce o% "ome "#ch " nt#r)&>e$ F&)&*&no c&t&>en" (ho m&nt&n
))eg&nce to the Nt&on)&"t Ch&n " "ho(n &n "ome c"e" !' the&r mem!er"h&* &n
the )eg&")t&ve Y#n %ter the&r nt#r)&>t&on " c&t&>en" o% the Ph&)&**&ne"+ The
*roh&!&t&on $oe" not **)' &n "&t#t&on" !ro#ght !o#t !' $#) c&t&>en"h&* "#ch "
the one &nvo)ve$ &n the *ro!)em+ Wht con"t&t#te" 5$#) ))eg&nce7 &n&m&c) to
nt&on) &ntere"t &" n$ (ht the "nct&on" %or "#ch $#) ))eg&nce (&)) !e0 "&)) "t&))
hve to !e $e%&ne$ !' )( *en$&ng $o*t&on o% "#ch )eg&")t&on0 o!;ect&on !"e$ on
$#) ))eg&nce (&)) !e *remt#re+
Q: =dwin ,icasio, born in the Philippines of 5ilipino parents and raised in the province of
,ueva =ci$a, ran for Eovernor of his home province. De won and he was sworn into office. *t was
recently revealed however, that ,icasio is a naturali#ed "merican citi#en.
6) oes he still possess Philippine citi#enship'

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() *f, instead, ,icasio had been born .of the same set or parents) in the :nited 4ates and
he thereby ac+uired "merican citi#enship by birth, would your answer be different'
A:
1) NO0 N&c"&o no )onger *o""e""e" Ph&)&**&ne c&t&>en"h&*+ A" he)$ &n Frivaldo v.
Co$elec0 !' !ecom&ng nt#r)&>e$ Amer&cn c&t&>en0 N&c"&o )o"t h&" Ph&)&**&ne
c&t&>en"h&*+ Un$er Sect&on -E-8 o% Common(e)th Act No+ D?0 Ph&)&**&ne c&t&>en"h&*
&" )o"t !' nt#r)&>t&on &n %ore&gn co#ntr'+
2) I% he (" !orn &n the US0 he (o#)$ "t&)) !e c&t&>en o% the Ph&)&**&ne"0 "&nce h&"
*rent" re F&)&*&no"+ Un$er "ect&on -E,80 tho"e (ho"e %ther" or mother" re
c&t&>en" o% the Ph&)&**&ne" re c&t&>en" o% the Ph&)&**&ne"+ A" he)$ &n .'nar v.
Co$elec0 *er"on (ho *o""e""e" !oth Ph&)&**&ne n$ Amer&cn c&t&>en"h&* &" "t&))
F&)&*&no n$ $oe" not )o"e &t #n)e"" he reno#nce" the "me+
Q: 5erdie immigrated to the :nited 4tates in the 67A8Cs. thereafter, he visited his hometown,
3akahoy, every other year during town fiestas. *n ?anuary 677<, 5erdie came home and filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of 3akahoy. De won the elections. ?oe, the defeated
candidate, learned that 5erdie is a greencard holder which on its face identifies 5erdie as a
resident alien and on the back thereof is clearly printed!
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the :nited
4tates. ?oe filed a case to dis+ualify 5erdie from assuming the mayorship of 3akahoy.
6) /hether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the :4.
() /hether or not 5erdieCs act of filing his certificate of candidacy constitutes waiver of
his status as a permanent resident of the :4.
A: -8 Accor$&ng to the r#)&ng &n Caasi v. C.0 green cr$ &" *roo% tht the ho)$er &"
*ermnent re"&$ent o% the US0 %or &t &$ent&t&e" the ho)$er " re"&$ent o% the US n$ "tte" tht
the ho)$er &" ent&t)e$ to re"&$e *ermnent)' n$ (or9 &n the US+
,8 The %&)&ng o% cert&%&cte o% cn$&$c' $oe" not con"t&t#te (&ver o% the "tt#" o% the
ho)$er o% green cr$ " *ermnent re"&$ent o% the US+ A" he)$ &n Caasi v. C.0 the (&ver
"ho#)$ !e mn&%e"te$ !' n ct &n$e*en$ent o% n$ *r&or to the %&)&ng o% h&" cert&%&cte o%
cn$&$c'+
PREBPROCLAMATION CONTROAERSY
Q: *n election law, what is a pre&proclamation controversy' /here may it be litigated with
finality' "fter the ultimate winner has been duly proclaimed, does the loser still have any remedy
to the end that he may finally obtain the position he aspired for in the election'
A: A *reB*roc)mt&on controver"' re%er" to n' 1#e"t&on *ert&n&ng to or %%ect&ng the
*rocee$&ng" o% the !or$ o% cnv""er" (h&ch m' !e r&"e$ !' n' cn$&$te or !' n'
reg&"tere$ *o)&t&c) *rt' or co)&t&on o% *o)&t&c) *rt&e" !e%ore the !or$ or $&rect)' (&th the
COMELEC0 or n' mtter r&"e$ #n$er Sec"+ ,??B,?D o% the Omn&!#" E)ect&on Co$e &n re)t&on
to the *re*rt&on0 trn"m&""&on0 rece&*t0 c#"to$' or **rec&t&on o% the e)ect&on ret#rn"+
The COMELEC h" e:c)#"&ve ;#r&"$&ct&on o% )) *reB*roc)mt&on controver"&e"+ It"
$ec&"&on" !ecome e:ec#tor' %ter the )*"e o% H $'" %rom rece&*t !' the )o"&ng *rt' o% the
$ec&"&on0 #n)e"" re"tr&ne$ !' the SC+
A )o"er m' "t&)) !r&ng n e)ect&on conte"t concern&ng the e)ect&on0 ret#rn"0 n$
1#)&%&ct&on" o% the cn$&$te *roc)&me$+ In the c"e o% e)ect&ve baran!ay o%%&c&)"0 &t m' !e
%&)e$ &n the MTCF &n the c"e o% m#n&c&*) o%%&c&)"0 &n the RTCF &n the c"e o% e)ect&ve *rov&nc&)
n$ c&t' o%%&c&)"0 &n the COMELECF &n the c"e o% Sentor" or Congre""men0 &n the 2o#"e or
Sente E)ector) Tr&!#n)F n$ &n the c"e o% the Pre"&$ent n$ A&ce *re"&$ent0 &n the
Pre"&$ent&) E)ector) Tr&!#n)+
ADMINISTRATIAE DUE PROCESS
Q: 4tate whether the following city ordinances are valid and give reasons in support of your
answers!

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a) "n ordinance prescribing the use of the local dialect as medium of instruction
in the primary grades.
b) "n ordinance on business establishments to raise funds for the construction and
maintenance of roads in private subdivisions, which roads are open for use by segments
of the public who may have business inside the subdivision.
c) "n ordinance prohibiting barbershop operators from rendering massage service
to their customers in a separate room.
A:
8 The or$&nnce &" &nv)&$+ The Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e" &n Art+ 6IA0 Sec+ = %or the #"e o%
reg&on) $&)ect " #:&)&r' me$&#m o% &n"tr#ct&on+ I% the or$&nnce *re"cr&!e" the
#"e o% )oc) $&)ect not " #:&)&r' !#t " e:c)#"&ve )ng#ge o% &n"tr#ct&on0 then &t
&" v&o)t&ve o% the Con"t&t#t&on+
b) The or$&nnce &" v)&$+ The chrge on the !#"&ne"" e"t!)&"hment" &" not t: !#t
"*ec&) ""e""ment+ 2ence0 the ho)$&ng &n Pascual v. Sec. of Public -or"s tht
*#!)&c %#n$" cnnot !e **ro*r&te$ %or the con"tr#ct&on o% ro$" &n *r&vte
"#!$&v&"&on $oe" not **)'+ A" he)$ &n .postolic Prefect v. City *reas. Of Ba!uio0
"*ec&) ""e""ment" m' !e chrge$ to *ro*ert' o(ner" !ene%&te$ !' *#!)&c (or9"0
!ec#"e the e""ent&) $&%%erence !et(een t: n$ "#ch ""e""ment &" *rec&"e)'
tht the )tter &" !"e$ (ho))' on !ene%&t" rece&ve$+
c8 The or$&nnce &" v)&$+ In Ae)"co v+ A&))eg"0 "#ch or$&nnce (" #*he)$ on the
gro#n$ tht &t &" men" o% en!)&ng the C&t' o% Mn&) to co))ect %ee %or o*ert&ng
m""ge c)&n&c" n$ o% *revent&ng &mmor)&t'+
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY GURISDICTION AND E62AUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIAE
REMEDIES
Q:
6) istinguish the doctrine of primary $urisdiction from the doctrine of e0haustion of
administrative remedies.
() oes the failure to e0haust administrative remedies before filing a case in court oust said
court of $urisdiction to hear the case'
A:
-8 The $octr&ne o% *r&mr' ;#r&"$&ct&on n$ the $octr&ne o% e:h#"t&on o% $m&n&"trt&ve
reme$&e" !oth $e) (&th the *ro*er re)t&on"h&*" !et(een the co#rt" n$
$m&n&"trt&ve genc&e"+ The $octr&ne o% e:h#"t&on o% $m&n&"trt&ve reme$&e" **)&e"
(here c)&m &" cogn&>!)e &n the %&r"t &n"tnce !' n $m&n&"trt&ve genc' )one+
G#$&c&) &nter%erence &" (&thhe)$ #nt&) the $m&n&"trt&ve *roce"" h" !een com*)ete A"
"tte$ &n In$#"tr&) Enter*r&"e" v+ CA0 the $octr&ne o% *r&mr' ;#r&"$&ct&on **)&e" (here
c"e &" (&th&n the conc#rrent ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the co#rt n$ n $m&n&"trt&ve genc'
!#t the $eterm&nt&on o% the c"e re1#&re" the techn&c) e:*ert&"e o% the $m&n&"trt&ve
genc'+ In "#ch c"e0 )tho#gh the mtter &" (&th&n the ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the co#rt0 &t
m#"t '&e)$ to the ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the $m&n&"trt&ve genc'+
,8 No0 the %&)#re to e:h#"t $m&n&"trt&ve reme$&e" !e%ore %&)&ng c"e &n co#rt $oe" not
o#"t the co#rt o% ;#r&"$&ct&on to her the c"e+ A" he)$ &n Ro"r&o v+ CA0 the %&)#re to
e:h#"t $m&n&"trt&ve reme$&e" $oe" not %%ect the ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the co#rt !#t re"#)t"
&n the )c9 o% c#"e o% ct&on0 !ec#"e the con$&t&on *rece$ent tht m#"t !e "t&"%&e$
!e%ore the ct&on cn !e %&)e$ (" not %#)%&))e$+
PART II: SU33ESTED ANSWERS TO T2E ,//J POLITICAL LAW
@AR E6AM

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". The 67<9,67B< and 67AB %onstitutions commonly provide that! The $udicial power shall be
vested in one 4upreme %ourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
/hat is the effect of the addition in the 67BA %onstitution of the ff. provision! ?udicial power
includes the duty of the courts of $ustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or e0cess of $urisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government'
The e%%ect o% the $$&t&on !ro$ene$ the ;#$&c&) *o(er to en!)e the co#rt" o% ;#"t&ce to
rev&e( (ht (" !e%ore %or!&$$en terr&tor'0 the $&"cret&on o% the *o)&t&c) $e*rtment" o% the
government+ The e:ten$e$ *o(er o% the Co#rt &nc)#$e" the *o(er to rev&e( even the *o)&t&c)
$ec&"&on" o% the e:ec#t&ve n$ )eg&")t#re n$ to $ec)re the&r ct" &nv)&$ %or )c9 or e:ce"" o%
;#r&"$&ct&on %or !e&ng t&nte$ (&th grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on+
In the &))#"trt&ve c"e o% *anada vs. .n!ara0 (h&ch (" *et&t&on to nn#) the Sente
conc#rrence to the Wor)$ Tr$e Orgn&>t&on Agreement0 the S#*reme Co#rt $ec)re$ thro#gh
G#"t&ce Pngn&!n: 5In "ee9&ng to n#))&%' n ct o% the Sente0 on the gro#n$ tht &t
contrvene" the Con"t&t#t&on0 the *et&t&on no $o#!t r&"e" ;#"t&c&!)e controver"'+ Where n
ct&on o% the )eg&")t&ve !rnch &" "er&o#")' ))ege$ to hve &n%r&nge$ the Con"t&t#t&on0 &t
!ecome" not on)' the r&ght !#t &n %ct the $#t' o% the ;#$&c&r' to "ett)e the $&"*#te+ The
1#e"t&on th#" &nter*o"e$ &" ;#$&c&) rther thn *o)&t&c)+ The $#t' o% the Con"t&t#t&on &"
#*he)$7Kth&" Co#rt (&)) not "h&r90 $&gre"" %rom or !n$on &t" "cre$ $#t' n$ #thor&t' to
#*ho)$ the Con"t&t#t&on &n mtter" tht &nvo)ve grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on !ro#ght !e%ore &t
**ro*r&te c"e"K
1. 4@ was elected %ongressman. 1efore the end of his first year in office, he inflicted physical
in$uries on a colleague, =T*, in the course of a heated debate. %harges were filed in court against
him as well as in the Douse =thics %ommittee. -ater, the Douse of Representatives, dividing along
party lines, voted to e0pel him. %laiming that his e0pulsion was railroaded and tainted by bribery,
he filed a petition seeking a declaration by the 4upreme %ourt that the Douse gravely abused its
discretion and violated the %onstitution. De prayed that his e0pulsion be annulled and that he
should be restored by the 4peaker to his position as %ongressman. *s 4@Cs petition before the
4upreme %ourt $usticiable' %ite pertinent issues for consideration.
The n"(er m#"t !e 1#)&%&e$+ The *et&t&on o% SDO &" gener))' *o)&t&c) one %or &t $e)" (&th
n ct&on !' the "e*rte !rnch o% the government0 (h&ch &" the )eg&")t&ve chrcter+
2o(ever0 !ec#"e o% the e:ten$e$ *o(er o% the S#*reme Co#rt o% ver&%'&ng &% there h" !een
n' grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on mo#nt&ng to )c9 or e:ce"" o% ;#r&"$&ct&on on the *rt o% the
o%%&cer0 genc' or !rnch o% the government then n &""#e or&g&n))' *o)&t&c) !ecome"
;#"t&c&!)e+ In the c"e t !r0 &% there &" n' tr#th to the ))egt&on tht the e:*#)"&on o% SDO
h" !een r&)ro$e$ n$ there%ore h" not !een con$#cte$ (&th the re1#&"&te $#e *roce""0 then
&t !ecome" ;#"t&c&!)e &""#e cogn&>!)e !' the Co#rt+ A" "tte$ &n the c"e o% D> v"+ S&ng"on0
(here the &""#e *re"ente$ to the S#*reme Co#rt &" 6usticiable rther thn *o)&t&c) (here &t
&nvo)ve" the le!ality n$ not the (&"$om o% the ct com*)&ne$ o% K+7 5Even &% the 1#e"t&on
(ere *o)&t&c) &n nt#re0 &t (o#)$ "t&)) come (&th&n the Co#rt4" *o(er" o% rev&e( #n$er the
e:*n$e$ ;#r&"$&ct&on con%erre$ #*on &t !' Art&c)e AIII0 Sec+ - o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 (h&ch
&nc)#$e" the #thor&t' to $eterm&ne (hether grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on mo#nt&ng to )c9 or
e:ce"" o% ;#r&"$&ct&onK7
II
". istinguish briefly but clearly between!
6)The territorial sea and the internal waters of the Philippines.
() The contiguous #one and e0clusive economic #one.
<) The flag state and the flag of convenience.

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F) The constitutive theory and the declaratory theory concerning recognition of states.
9) The /ilson doctrine and the =strada doctrine regarding recognition of governments.
-+ Terr&tor&) (ter &" $e%&ne$ !' h&"tor&c r&ght or tret' )&m&t" (h&)e &ntern) (ter &"
$e%&ne$ !' the rch&*e)go $octr&ne+ The terr&tor&) (ter"0 " $e%&ne$ &n the
Convent&on on the L( o% the Se0 h" #n&%orm !re$th o% -, m&)e" me"#re$
%rom the )o(er (ter mr9 o% the co"tF (h&)e the o#termo"t *o&nt" o% o#r
rch&*e)go (h&ch re connecte$ (&th !"e)&ne" n$ )) (ter" com*r&"e$ there&n
re regr$e$ " &ntern) (ter"+
2. The cont&g#o#" >one &" the re (h&ch &" 9no(n " the *rotect&ve ;#r&"$&ct&on n$
"trt" %rom ,Jth n#t&c) m&)e %rom )o( (ter mr90 (h&)e the EEC &" the re (h&ch
"trt" %rom ,//th n#t&c) m&)e %rom the )o( (ter mr9+ In the )tter0 no "tte
re))' h" e:c)#"&ve o(ner"h&* o% &t !#t the "tte (h&ch h" v)&$ c)&m on &t
ccor$&ng to the UN Convent&on on the L( o% the Se" greement h" the r&ght to
e:*)ore n$ e:*)o&t &t" nt#r) re"o#rce"F (h&)e &n the %ormer the co"t) "tte m'
e:erc&"e the contro) nece""r' to 8 *revent &n%r&ngement o% &t" c#"tom"0 %&"c)
&mm&grt&on or "n&tr' reg#)t&on" (&th&n &t" terr&tor' !8 *#n&"h &n%r&ngement o% the
!ove reg#)t&on" (&th&n &t" terr&tor' or terr&tor&) "e+
?+ F)g "tte men" "h&* h" the nt&on)&t' o% the %)g "tte &t %)&e"0 !#t there m#"t !e
gen#&ne )&n9 !et(een the "tte n$ the "h&*+ 7.rticle 89 of te Convention of te #a/ of te
Sea.: F)g o% conven&ence re%er" to "tte (&th (h&ch ve""e) &" reg&"tere$ %or vr&o#" re"on"
"#ch " )o( or nonBe:&"tent t:t&on or )o( o*ert&ng co"t" )tho#gh the "h&* h" no gen#&ne
)&n9 (&th tht "tte+ 7(arris2 Cases and Materilas on International #a/2 ;
t
ed.2 988<2 p. =>;.:
J+ The con"t&t#t&ve theor' &" the m&nor&t' v&e( (h&ch ho)$" tht recogn&t&on &" the )"t e)ement
tht convert" or con"t&t#te" the ent&t' !e&ng recogn&>e$ &nto n &nternt&on) *er"onF (h&)e the
$ec)rtor' theor' &" the m;or&t' v&e( tht recogn&t&on %%&rm" the *reBe:&"t&ng %ct tht the
ent&t' !e&ng recogn&>e$ )re$' *o""e""e" the "tt#" o% n &nternt&on) *er"on+ In the %ormer
recogn&t&on &" regr$e$ " mn$tor' n$ )eg) n$ m' !e $emn$e$ " mtter o% r&ght !'
n' ent&t' tht cn e"t!)&"h &t" *o""e""&on o% the %o#r e""ent&) e)ement" o% "tteF (h&)e the
)tter recogn&t&on &" h&gh)' *o)&t&c) n$ $&"cret&onr'+
H+ In the W&)"on or To!r $octr&ne0 government e"t!)&"he$ !' men" revo)#t&on0 c&v&) (r0
co#* $4 ett or other %orm" o% &ntern) v&o)ence (&)) not !e recogn&>e$ #nt&) the %ree)' e)ecte$
re*re"entt&ve" o% the *eo*)e hve orgn&>e$ con"t&t#t&on) government0 (h&)e &n the E"tr$
$octr&ne n' $&*)omt&c re*re"entt&ve" &n co#ntr' (here n #*hev) h" t9en *)ce (&))
$e) or not $e) (&th (htever government &" &n contro) there&n t the t&me n$ e&ther ct&on
"h)) not !e t9en " ;#$gment on the )eg&t&mc' o% the "&$ government+
1. =n route to the tuna fishing grounds in the Pacific @cean, a vessel registered in %ountry T/
entered the 1alintang %hannel north of 1abuyan *sland and with special hooks and nets dragged up
red corrals found near 1atanes. 1y *nternational %onvention certain corals are protected species.
?ust before the vessel reached the high seas, the %oast Euard patrol intercepted the vessel and
sei#ed its cargo including tuna. The master of the vessel and the owner of the cargo protested,
claiming the rights of transit passage and innocent passage, and sought recovery of the cargo and
the release of the ship. *s the claim meritorious or not' Reason briefly.
The c)&m o% the m"ter o% the ve""e) n$ the o(ner o% the crgo &" not mer&tor&o#"+ A)tho#gh
the&r c)&m o% trn"&t *""ge n$ &nnocent *""ge thro#gh the @)&ntng Chnne) &" ten!)e
#n$er the -<., Convent&on on the L( o% the Se0 the %ct tht the' ttche$ "*ec&) hoo9"
n$ net" to the&r ve""e) (h&ch $rgge$ #* re$ corr)" &" re*rehen"&!)e+ The @)&ntng Chnne) &"
con"&$ere$ *rt o% o#r &ntern) (ter" n$ th#" &" (&th&n the !"o)#te ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the
Ph&)&**&ne government+ @e&ng "o0 no %ore&gn ve""e)0 merchnt or other(&"e0 co#)$ e:*)o&t or
e:*)ore n' o% o#r nt#r) re"o#rce" &n n' mnner o% $o&ng "o (&tho#t the con"ent o% o#r
government.
III

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". ?"R faces a dilemma! should he accept a %abinet appointment now or run later for 4enator'
Daving succeeded in law practice as well as prospered in private business where he and his wife
have substantial investments, he now contemplates public service but without losing the fle0ibility
to engage in corporate affairs or participate in professional activities within ethical bounds.
Taking into account the prohibitions and inhibitions of public office whether 4enator or
4ecretary, he turns to you for advice to resolve his dilemma. /hat is your advice' =0plain briefly.
I "h)) $v&ce GAR to r#n %or Sentor+ A" "entor0 he cn ret&n h&" &nve"tment" &n h&"
!#"&ne""0 )tho#gh he m#"t m9e %#)) $&"c)o"#re o% h&" !#"&ne"" n$ %&nnc&) &ntere"t" n$
not&%' the Sente o% *otent&) con%)&ct o% &ntere"t &% he #thor" !&))+ 7Section 9>2 .rticle VI of
te 98<? Constitution.: 2e cn cont&n#e *rct&c&ng )(0 !#t he cnnot *er"on))' **er "
co#n"e) !e%ore n' co#rt o% ;#"t&ce0 the E)ector) Tr&!#n)"0 or 1#"&B;#$&c&) or other
$m&n&"trt&ve !o$&e"+ 7Section 9=2 .rticle VI of te 98<? Constitution.:
A" mem!er o% the C!&net0 GAR cnnot $&rect)' or &n$&rect)' *rct&ce or *rt&c&*te &n n'
!#"&ne""+ 2e (&)) hve to $&ve"t h&m"e)% o% h&" &nve"tment" &n h&" !#"&ne"". 7Section 9@2 .rticle
VII of te 98<? Constitution.: In %ct0 the Con"t&t#t&on) *roh&!&t&on &m*o"e$ on mem!er" o%
the C!&net cover" !oth *#!)&c n$ *r&vte o%%&ce or em*)o'ment+ 7Civil #iberties ,nion v.
)Aecutive Secretary2 98= SCR. @9? B9889C:.
1. %T, a %ommissioner of the ,-R% sports a ,o. 68 car plate. " disgruntled litigant filed a
complaint against him for violation of the "nti&Eraft and %orrupt Practices "ct before the
@mbudsman. %T now seeks to en$oin the @mbudsman in a petition for prohibition, alleging that he
could be investigated only by the 4upreme %ourt under its power supervision granted by the
%onstitution. De contends that under the law creating the ,-R%, he has the rank of a ?ustice of the
court of "ppeals, and entitled to the corresponding privileges. Dence, the @mbudsman has no
$urisdiction over the complaint against him.
4hould %TCs petition be granted or dismissed' Reason briefly.
CTD4" *et&t&on "ho#)$ !e $&"m&""e$+ Sect&on ,- o% the Om!#$"mn Act ve"t" the O%%&ce o% the
Om!#$"mn (&th $&"c&*)&nr' #thor&t' over )) e)ect&ve n$ **o&nt&ve o%%&c&)" o% the
government0 e:ce*t o%%&c&)" (ho m' !e remove$ on)' !' &m*echment0 Mem!er" o% Congre""0
n$ the G#$&c&r'+ Wh&)e CTD h" the rn9 o% G#"t&ce o% the Co#rt o% A**e)"0 he $oe" not
!e)ong to the G#$&c&r' !#t to the E:ec#t&ve De*rtment+ Th&" "&m*)' men" tht he h" the
"me com*en"t&on n$ *r&v&)ege" " G#"t&ce o% the Co#rt o% A**e)"+ I% the S#*reme Co#rt
(ere to &nve"t&gte CTD0 &t (o#)$ !e *er%orm&ng nonB;#$&c&) %#nct&on+ Th&" (&)) v&o)te the
*r&nc&*)e o% "e*rt&on o% *o(er. 71oble6as v. *eean"ee2 >@ SCR. =D; B98E<C:.
IA
". T%", a 5ilipina medical technologist, left in 67B9 to work in 2@2 4tate. *n 67AA she married @D,
a citi#en of 2@2. Pursuant to 2@2Cs law, by taking an oath of allegiance, she ac+uired her husbandCs
citi#enship.
@D died in (886, leaving her financially secure. 4he returned home in (88(, and sought
elective office in (88F by running as 3ayor of "PP, her hometown. Der opponent sought to have her
dis+ualified because of her 2@2 citi#enship. 4he replied that although she ac+uired 2@2Cs
citi#enship because of her marriage, she did not lose her 5ilipino citi#enship. 1oth her parents, she
said, are 5ilipino citi#ens.
*s T%" +ualified to run as 3ayor'
TCA &" NOT 1#)&%&e$ to r#n " M'or+ A)tho#gh "he (" nt#r)B!orn F&)&*&no0 her mrr&ge to
OD2 n$ her ct o% t9&ng n oth o% ))eg&nce to COC Stte m$e her )o"e her F&)&*&no
c&t&>en"h&* EC+A+ No D?8+ There%ore0 "he &" not F&)&*&no c&t&>en n$ &" $&"1#)&%&e$ %rom r#nn&ng
%or M'or+
1+ "n amendment or revision of the present %onstitution may be proposed by a %onstitutional
%onvention or by %ongress upon a vote of three&fourths of all its members.
*s there third way of proposing revisions of or amendments to the %onstitution' *f so, how'

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L A W
There &" no th&r$ (' o% *ro*o"&ng rev&"&on" to the *re"ent Con"t&t#t&on+ A" %or men$ment"0
ccor$&ng to ART 6AII0 Sec , o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on0 men$ment" to the Con"t&t#t&on m' !e
$&rect)' *ro*o"e$ !' the *eo*)e thro#gh &n&t&t&ve #*on *et&t&on o% t )e"t t(e)ve E-,8 per
centu$ o% the tot) n#m!er reg&"tere$ voter"0 o% (h&ch ever' )eg&")t&ve $&"tr&ct m#"t !e
re*re"ente$ !' t )e"t three E?8 per centu$ o% the reg&"tere$ voter" there&n+ 2o(ever0 n
ttem*t to #"e th&" metho$ (" "tr#c9 $o(n !' the S#*reme Co#rt &n the c"e o% Santia!o vs.
COM)#)C %or )c9 o% the nece""r' &m*)ement&ng )(+

A
A. The 4T"R, a national daily newspaper, carried an e0clusive report stating that 4enator XX
received a house and lot located at KK 4treet, 3akati, in consideration for his vote cutting
cigarette ta0es by 98L. The 4enator sued the 4T"R, its reporter, editor and publisher for
libel, claiming the report was completely false and malicious. "ccording to the 4enator,
there is no KK 4treet in 3akati, and the ta0 cut was only (8L. De claimed one million in
damages.
The defendants denied actual malice, claiming privileged communication and absolute freedom
of the press to report on public officials and matters of public concern. *f there was any error, the
4T"R said it would publish the correction promptly.
*s there actual malice in 4T"RCs reportage' Dow is actual malice defined' "re the defendants
liable for damages'
FIRS* .#*)R1.*IV) .1S-)R
S&nce Sentor 66 &" *#!)&c *er"on n$ the 1#e"t&one$ &m*#tt&on &" $&recte$ g&n"t h&m &n h&"
*#!)&c c*c&t'0 &n th&" c"e ct#) m)&ce men" the "ttement (" m$e (&th 9no()e$ge tht
&t (" %)"e or (&th rec9)e"" $&"regr$ o% (hether &t (" %)"e or not E@or;) v+ Co#rt o% A**e)"0
?/- SCRA - L-<<-M8+ S&nce there &" no *roo% tht the re*ort (" *#!)&"he$ (&th 9no()e$ge tht
&t &" %)"e or (&th rec9)e"" $&"regr$ o% (hether &t (" %)"e or not0 the $e%en$nt" re not
)&!)e %or $mge"+
S)CO1& .#*)R1.*IV) .1S-)R
S&nce Sentor 66 &" *#!)&c *er"on n$ the 1#e"t&one$ &m*#tt&on &" $&recte$ g&n"t h&m &n h&"
*#!)&c c*c&t'0 &n th&" c"e ct#) m)&ce men" the "ttement" (" m$e (&th 9no()e$ge tht
&t (" %)"e or (&th rec9)e"" $&"regr$ o% (hether &t (" %)"e or not 7Bor6al v. Court of
.ppeals2 @D9 SCR. 9 B9889F:. S&nce &t &" mtter o%% *#!)&c 9no()e$ge tht there &" no YY
Street &n M9t&0 the *#!)&ct&on (" m$e (&th rec9)e"" $&"regr$ o% (hether or not &t ("
%)"e+ The $e%en$nt" m' !e he)$ )&!)e %or $mge"+
1. @2 lost five head of cattle which he reported to the police as stolen from his barn. De re+uested
several neighbors, including RR, for help in looking for the missing animals. "fter an e0tensive
search, the police found two head in RRCs farm. RR could not e0plain to the police how they got
hidden in a remote area of his farm.
*nsisting on his innocence, RR consulted a lawyer who told him he has a right to be presumed
innocent under the 1ill of Rights. 1ut there is another presumption I of theft arising from his
une0plained possession of stolen cattle I under the penal law.
"re the two presumptions capable of reconciliation in this case' *f so, how can they be reconciled'
*f not, which should prevail'
The t(o *re"#m*t&on" cn !e reconc&)e$+ The *re"#m*t&on o% &nnocence "tn$" #nt&) the
contrr' &" *rove$+ It m' !e overcome !' contrr' *re"#m*t&on %o#n$e$ on h#mn
e:*er&ence+ The *re"#m*t&on tht RR &" the one (ho "to)e the ctt)e o% OC &" )og&c)0 "&nce he
(" %o#n$ &n *o""e""&on o% the "to)en ctt)e+ RR cn *rove h&" &nnocence !' *re"ent&ng
ev&$ence to re!#t the *re"#m*t&on+ The !#r$en o% ev&$ence &" "h&%te$ to RR0 !ec#"e ho( he
cme &nto *o""e""&on o% the ctt)e &" *ec#)&r)' (&th&n h&" 9no()e$ge+ 7&i'on-Pa$intuan v.
People2 >@= SCR. E@ B988=C:.
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irector /@/ failed a lifestyle check conducted by the @mbudsmanCs @ffice because /@/Cs assets
were grossly disproportionate to his salary and allowances. 3oreover, some assets were not
included in his 4tatement of "ssets and -iabilities. De was charged of graft and corrupt practices
and pending the completion of investigations, he was suspended from office for si0 months.
". "ggrieved, /@/ petitioned the %ourt of the "ppeals to annul the preventive suspension
order on the ground that the @mbudsman could only recommend but not impose the
suspension. 3oreover, according to /@/, the suspension was imposed without any notice
and hearing, in violation of due process.
*s the petitionerCs contention meritorious' iscuss briefly.
The content&on o% D&rector WOW &" not mer&tor&o#"+ The "#"*en"&on mete$ o#t to h&m &"
*revent&ve n$ not *#n&t&ve+ Sect&on ,J o% Re*#!)&c Act No+ D==/ grnt" the Om!#$"mn the
*o(er to &m*o"e *revent&ve "#"*en"&on #* to "&: month"+ Prevent&ve "#"*en"&on m' !e
&m*o"e$ (&tho#t n' not&ce n$ her&ng+ It &" mere)' *re)&m&nr' "te* &n n $m&n&"trt&ve
&nve"t&gt&on n$ &" not the %&n) $eterm&nt&on o% the g#&)t o% the o%%&cer concerne$+ E3rc& v+
Mo;&c0 ?-J SCRA ,/= L-<<<N8+
1. 5or his part, the @mbudsman moved to dismiss /@/Cs petition. "ccording to the @mbudsman
the evidence of guilt is strong, and petitioner failed to e0haust administrative remedies. /@/
admitted he filed no motion for reconsideration, but only because the order suspending him
immediately e0ecutory.
4hould the motion to dismiss be granted or not' iscuss briefly.
The mot&on to $&"m&"" "ho#)$ !e $en&e$+ S&nce the "#"*en"&on o% D&rector WOW ("
&mme$&te)' e:ec#tor'0 he (o#)$ hve "#%%ere$ &rre*r!)e &n;#r' h$ he tr&e$ to e:h#"t
$m&n&"trt&ve reme$&e" !e%ore %&)&ng *et&t&on &n Co#rt EUn&ver"&t' o% the Ph&)&**&ne" @or$ o%
Regent" v+ R")0 ,// SCRA D.H L-<<-N8+ @e"&$e"0 the 1#e"t&on &nvo)ve$ (" *#re)' )eg)+
EA>r:on v+ @#ngn0 ?<< SCRA ?DH L,//?N8+
AII
3""M@ is a municipality composed of A8 barangays, <8 west of 3adako River and 98 east thereof.
The <8 western barangays, feeling left out of economic initiatives, wish to constitute themselves
into a new and separate town to be called 3asigla.
". Eranting 3asiglaCs proponents succeed to secure a law in their favor, would a plebiscite be
necessary or not' *t is necessary, who should vote or participate in the plebiscite' iscuss
briefly.
A *)e!&"c&te &" nece""r'0 !ec#"e &t &" re1#&re$ %or the cret&on o% ne( m#n&c&*)&t'+ 7Section
9D2 .rticle G of te 98<? Constitution.:
The voter" o% !oth M$9o n$ M"&g) "ho#)$ *rt&c&*te &n the *)e!&"c&te0 !ec#"e !oth re
$&rect)' %%ecte$ !' the cret&on o% M"&g)+ The terr&tor' o% M$9o (&)) !e re$#ce$+ 7*an v.
Co$$ission on )ections2 9=> SCR. ?>? B98<EC:.
B. 4uppose that one year after 3asigla was constituted as a municipality, the law creating it
was voided because of defects. /ould that invalidate the acts of the municipality andGor
its municipal officers' =0plain briefly.
A)tho#gh the m#n&c&*)&t' cnnot !e con"&$ere$ $e %cto cor*ort&on0 !ec#"e there &" no
v)&$ )( #n$er (h&ch &t (" crete$0 the ct" o% the m#n&c&*)&t' n$ o% &t" o%%&cer" (&)) not !e
&nv)&$te$0 !ec#"e the e:&"tence o% the )( cret&ng &" n o*ert&ve %ct !e%ore &t ("
$ec)re$ #ncon"t&t#t&on)+ 2ence0 the *rev&o#" ct" o% the m#n&c&*)&t' n$ &t" o%%&cer" "ho#)$
!e g&ven e%%ect " mtter o% %&rne"" n$ ;#"t&ce+ 7Municipality of Malaban! v. Benito2 >?
SCR. H98E8F:.
AIII

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P O L I T I C A L
L A W
". 31%, an alien businessman dealing in carpets and caviar, filed a suit against policemen and K2,
an attache of XX =mbassy, for damage because of malicious prosecution. 31% alleged that K2
concocted false and malicious charges that he was engaged in drug trafficking, whereupon
narcotics policemen conducted a buy&bust operation and without a warrant arrested him,
searched his house, and sei#ed his money $ewelry, then detained and tortured him in violation of
his civil and human rights as well as causing him, his family and business serious damages
amounting to two million pesos. 31% added that the trial court ac+uitted him of the drug him of
the drug charges.
"ssailing the courtCs $urisdiction! K2 now moves to dismiss the complaint, on the ground
that .6) he is an embassy officers entitled to diplomatic immunityH and that .() the suit is really
against his home state without its consent. De presents diplomatic notes from XX =mbassy
certifying that he is an accredited embassy officer recogni#ed by the Philippine Eovernment. De
performs official duties, he says, on a mission to conduct surveillance on drug e0porters and then
inform local police officers who make the actual arrest of the suspects.
"re the two grounds cited by K2 to dismiss the suit tenable'
Wh&)e the note" *re"ente$ !' YC re not eno#gh to e"t!)&"h h&" $&*)omt&c "tt#" n$
$&*)omt&c &mm#n&t'0 the "#&t g&n"t h&m &" "#&t g&n"t 66 (&tho#t &t" con"ent+ In M#n&cher
v+ Co#rt o% A**e)" E3+R+ No+ -J,?D<0 Fe!r#r' --0 ,//?8 &t (" he)$ tht &% the ct" g&v&ng r&"e
to "#&t re tho"e o% %ore&gn government $one !' &t" %ore&gn gent0 )tho#gh not nece""r&)'
$&*)omt&c *er"onge0 !#t ct&ng &n h&" o%%&c&) c*c&t'0 the com*)&nt co#)$ !e !rre$ !' the
&mm#n&t' o% the %ore&gn "overe&gn %rom "#&t (&tho#t &t" con"ent+ In the c"e t !r0 YC ("
*er%orm&ng h&" o%%&c&) %#nct&on (hen he con$#cte$ "#rve&))nce on $r#g e:*orter" n$
&n%orme$ the )oc) *o)&ce (ho rre"te$ M@C+ 2e (" %#rther *er%orm&ng h&" $#t&e" (&th the
con"ent o% the Ph&)&**&ne government there%ore the "#&t g&n"t YC &" &n$ee$ g&n"t 66 (&tho#t
&t" con"ent+

1. ="P is a government corporation created for the purpose of reclaiming lands, including foreshore
and submerged areas, as well as to develop, improve, ac+uire, lease and sell any and al kinds of
lands. " law was passed transferring title to ="P of lands already reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore areas of 33 1ay, particularly the so&called -iberty *slands, as alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. Titles were duly issued in ="PCs name.
4ubse+uently, ="P entered into a $oint venture agreement .?>") with "R*, a private foreign
corporation, to develop -iberty *slands. "dditionally, the ?>" provided for the reclamation of (98
hectares of submerged land in the area surrounding -iberty *slands and a portion of the area to be
reclaimed as the consideration for "R*4 role and participation in the $oint venture, upon the
approval by the @ffice of the President.
*n there any constitutional obstacle to the sale and transfer by ="P to "R* of both portions as
provided for in the ?>"'
ARI cnnot c1#&re *ort&on o% the L&!ert' I")n$" !ec#"e0 )tho#gh EAP h" t&t)e to L&!ert'
I")n$" n$ th#" )n$" re )&en!)e n$ $&"*o"!)e )n$0 the' cnnot !e "o)$0 on)' )e"e$0 to
*r&vte cor*ort&on"+ The *ort&on o% the re to !e rec)&me$ cnnot !e "o)$ n$ trn"%erre$ to
ARI !ec#"e the "e!e$ &" &n)&en!)e )n$ o% the *#!)&c $om&n+ 7Section @2 .rticle GII of te
98<? ConstitutionI Cave' v. Public )states .utority2 @<= SR. 9;> B>DD>C:.
I6
". 5ormer Eovernor PP of "4 province had dismissed several employees to scale down the
operations of his office. The employees complained to the 3erit 4ystems Protection 1oard, which
ruled that the %ivil 4ervice rules were violated when the employees were dismissed. The %ivil
4ervice %ommission affirmed the 3P41 decision. "4 did not appeal and the order became final.
*nstead of complying immediately, 1@P, the incumbent Eovernor of "4, referred the matter to the
%ommission on "udit, which ruled that the amounts due are the personal liabilities of the former
Eovernor who dismissed the employees in bad faith. Thus, "4 refused to pay. The final %4%
decision, however, did not find the former Eovernor in bad faith. The former Eovernor was likewise
not heard on the +uestion of his liability.

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*s "4C refusal $ustified' %an the %@" disallow the payment of backwages by "4 to the dismissed
employees due under a final %4% decision' ecide.
NO0 the re%#") o% ADS &" not ;#"t&%&e$0 n$ the Comm&""&on on A#$&t cnnot $&"))o( the
*'ment o% !c9(ge" !' ADS to the $&"m&""e$ em*)o'ee"+ The COA cnnot m9e r#)&ng tht
&t &" the %ormer governor (ho "ho#)$ !e *er"on))' )&!)e "&nce the %ormer (" not g&ven the
o**ort#n&t' to !e her$+ In $$&t&on0 the COA cnnot "et "&$e %&n) $ec&"&on o% the C&v&)
Serv&ce Comm&""&on+ The *'ment o% !c9(ge" to &))eg))' $&"m&""e$ government em*)o'ee &"
not n &rreg#)r0 #nnece""r'0 e:ce""&ve0 e:trvgnt0 or #ncon"c&on!)e e:*en$&t#re+ E,J V.
COMMISSIO1 O1 .,&I*2 @>< SCR. ED?:
1. The city of 4an Rafael passed an ordinance authori#ing the %ity mayor, assisted by the police, to
remove all advertising signs displayed or e0posed to public view in the main city street, for being
offensive to sight or otherwise a nuisance. "3, whose advertising agency owns and rents out many
of the billboards ordered removed by the %ity 3ayor, claims that the %ity should pay for the
destroyed billboards at their current market value since the %ity has appropriated them for the
public purpose of city beautification. The 3ayor refuses to pay, so "3 is suing the %ity and the
3ayor for damages arising from the taking of his property without due process nor $ust
compensation. /ill "3Cs suit prosper'
NO+ The remov) o% the !&))!or$" &" not n e:erc&"e o% the *o(er o% em&nent $om&n !#t o%
*o)&ce *o(er+ A" en#nc&te$ &n the c"e o% C(,R(I### K *.I* V. R.FF)R*J2 @@ Pil ;<D2
!&))!or$" o%%en"&ve to "&ght or $&"trct&ng the ttent&on o% motor&"t" m' !e *roh&!&te$+
Moreover0 the !tement o% n#&"nce *#r"#nt to the e:erc&"e o% *o)&ce *o(er $oe" not
con"t&t#te t9&ng o% *ro*ert' n$ $oe" not ent&t)e the o(ner o% the *ro*ert' to com*en"t&on+
E.SSOCI.*IO1 OF SM.## #.1&O-1)RS I1 *() P(I#IPPI1)S2 I1C. V. S)CR)*.RJ OF .+R.RI.1
R)FORM2 9?; SCR. @=@ B98<8C:
6
". 1,, Republic has a defense treaty with =>" 5ederation. "ccording to the RepublicCs 4ecretary of
efense, the treaty allows e0ercises for the war on terrorism. The 3a$ority -eader of the 4enate
contends that whether temporary or not, the basing of foreign troops however friendly is prohibited
by the %onstitution of 1,, which provides that, ,o foreign bases shall be allowed in 1,,
territory. *n case there is indeed an irreconcilable conflict between a provision of the treaty and a
provision of the %onstitution, in a $urisdiction and legal system like our, which should prevail! the
provision of the treaty or the %onstitution' /hy'
T2E CONSTITUTION+ In the c"e o% +on'ales v. (ecanova 8 SCR. >@D0 m#n&c&*) )( ("
#*he)$ " g&n"t &nternt&on) )( &n v&e( o% the "e*rt&on o% *o(er"+ Moreover0 Sect&on H<,8
E80 Art&c)e AIII o% the -<.= Con"t&t#t&on #thor&>e" the n#))&%&ct&on o% tret' (hen &t con%)&ct"
(&th the Con"t&t#t&on+
1. ">= ran for %ongressman of J: province. Dowever, his opponent, 1"RT, was the one proclaimed
and seated as the winner of the election by the %@3=-=%. ">= filed seasonably a protest before
DR=T. "fter two years, D=T reversed the %@3=-=%Cs decision and ">= was proclaimed finally as the
duly elected %ongressman. Thus he had only one year to serve in %ongress.
6. %an ">= collect salaries and allowances from the government for the first two ears of his term
as %ongressman'
(. 4hould 1"RT refund the government the salaries and allowances he had received as
%ongressman'
<. /hat will happen to the bills that the de facto officer alone authored and were approved by the
Douse of the Representative while he was seated as %ongressman'
-+ NO+ The r&ght to ")r' &" !"e$ on the r&ght to the o%%&ce &t"e)% n$ ccr#e" %rom the $te o%
ct#) commencement+ S&nce AAE h$ not occ#*&e$ the *o"&t&on *r&or to h&" *roc)mt&on "
the re) (&nner o% the e)ect&on0 the ")r'0 ))o(nce"0 n$ other emo)#ment" m#"t go to the
*er"on (ho occ#*&e$ the "me+ ERO&RI+,)4 V. *.12 89 Pil ?>=:

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P O L I T I C A L
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,+ NO+ There &" no 1#e"t&on tht @ART cte$ " de facto o%%&cer $#r&ng the t&me he he)$ the
o%%&ce o% Congre""mnF hv&ng th#" $#)' *roc)&me$ " Congre""mn0 n$ hv&ng ""#me$ o%%&ce
" re1#&re$ !' )(0 &t cnnot !e $&"*#te$ tht @ART &" ent&t)e$ to com*en"t&on0 emo)#ment"
n$ ))o(nce" (h&ch o#r Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e" %or the *o"&t&on+ ERO&RI+,)4 V. *.12 89 Pil
?>=:
?+L(%#) ct" o% n o%%&cer $e %cto0 "o %r " the r&ght" o% th&r$ *er"on" re concerne$0 re0 &%
$one (&th&n the "co*e O !' the **rent #thor&t' o% the o%%&ce0 con"&$ere$ " v)&$ n$
!&n$&ng " &% he (ere the o%%&cer )eg))' e)ecte$ n$ 1#)&%&e$ %or the o%%&ce n$ %#)) *o""e""&on
thereo%+ There%ore0 the !&))" (h&ch @ART )one #thore$ n$ (ere **rove$ !' the 2o#"e o%
Re*re"entt&ve" re v)&$+ E*.J%O V. C.PIS*R.1O2 ;@ Pil <EEI P)OP#) V. +.RCI.2 @9@ SCR.
>?8 B9888C:
PART III : @AR TYPE QUESTIONS
@ILL OF RI32TS
6. The 3igrant /orkers and @verseas 5ilipinos "ct of 6779, took effect on ?uly 69, 6779. The
@mnibus Rules and Regulations *mplementing the 3igrant /orkers and @verseas 5ilipino "ct of 6779
was, thereafter, published in the 3anila 1ulletin. Dowever, even before the law took effect, the
"sian Recruitment %ouncil Philippine %hapter, *nc. ."R%@&Phil.) filed, a petition for declaratory
relief under Rule N< of the Rules of %ourt with the Regional Trial %ourt to declare as
unconstitutional 4ection N.g) and .i).
"ccording to the respondent, 4ection N.g) and .i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their
families and, as such, violated the e+ual protection clause, as well as "rticle **, 4ection 6( and
"rticle X>, 4ections 6 and <.<) of the %onstitution. "s the law encouraged the deployment of skilled
5ilipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that
unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. *s the assailed order
unconstitutional as it violated the e+ual protection clause'
NO+ Re"*on$ent "#gge"t" tht the "&ng)&ng o#t o% entert&ner" n$ *er%orm&ng rt&"t" #n$er the
""&)e$ $e*rtment or$er" con"t&t#te" c)"" )eg&")t&on (h&ch v&o)te" the e1#) *rotect&on
c)#"e o% the Con"t&t#t&on+ We $o not gree+
The e1#) *rotect&on c)#"e &" $&recte$ *r&nc&*))' g&n"t #n$#e %vor n$ &n$&v&$#) or
c)"" *r&v&)ege+ It &" not &nten$e$ to *roh&!&t )eg&")t&on (h&ch &" )&m&te$ to the o!;ect to (h&ch
&t &" $&recte$ or !' the terr&tor' &n (h&ch &t &" to o*erte+ It $oe" not re1#&re !"o)#te e1#)&t'0
!#t mere)' tht )) *er"on" !e trete$ )&9e #n$er )&9e con$&t&on" !oth " to *r&v&)ege"
con%erre$ n$ )&!&)&t&e" &m*o"e$+ We hve he)$0 t&me n$ g&n0 tht the e1#) *rotect&on
c)#"e o% the Con"t&t#t&on $oe" not %or!&$ c)""&%&ct&on %or "o )ong " "#ch c)""&%&ct&on &"
!"e$ on re) n$ "#!"tnt&) $&%%erence" hv&ng re"on!)e re)t&on to the "#!;ect o% the
*rt&c#)r )eg&")t&on+ I% c)""&%&ct&on &" germne to the *#r*o"e o% the )(0 concern" ))
mem!er" o% the c)""0 n$ **)&e" e1#))' to *re"ent n$ %#t#re con$&t&on"0 the c)""&%&ct&on
$oe" not v&o)te the e1#) *rotect&on g#rntee+ 7)G)C,*IV) S)CR)*.RJ vs. CO,R* OF
.PP).#S and .RCO-P(I#.:2 I1C2 +.R. 1o. 9@9?982 May >;2 >DD=8
(. " 4ummary eportation @rder was issued against respondent Derbert 3arkus =mil 4cheer, a
Eerman citi#en holding a permanent resident status in the Philippines, on the basis of ,ote >erbale
,o. <N7G79 sent by the Eerman =mbassy to the epartment of 5oreign "ffairs, informing the latter
that 4cheer was wanted by the Eerman 5ederal PoliceH that a warrant of arrest had been issued
against himH and that the respondent will be served with an official document re+uesting him to
turn over his Eerman passport to the =mbassy which was invalidated. 4cheer filed an :rgent 3otion
for Reconsideration of the @rder of the 1@% but the latter did not resolve 4cheerCs motion and he
was neither arrested nor deported. 3eanwhile, the criminal case against the respondent for
physical in$uries was dismissed by the Eerman court and subse+uently, the Eerman =mbassy issued
to the respondent a regular passport. The 1@% still failed to resolve the respondentCs 3otion and he
remained and maintained his business in Palawan, Philippines. Petitioner %ommissioner "ndrea

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omingo assumed office. espite information from the Eerman =mbassy that 4cheer was not
wanted by the Eerman police, 4cheer was apprehended by the 3arine operatives and 1* agents in
his residence on orders of the petitioner. De was held in custody in the 1* 3anila @ffice, and
petitioner commissioner refused to release him. 4cheer filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in the %ourt of "ppeals against petitioner and the court ruled in his favor. Petitioner
now contests this decision claiming inter alia that OaP 1@% did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the 4ummary eportation @rder and ObP that 4cheerCs arrest and detention was not
premature, unwarranted or arbitrary. "re the contentions of petitioner correct'
NO+ LN The @OC comm&tte$ grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on &n &""#&ng the S#mmr' De*ortt&on
Or$er+ The "ett)e$ r#)e &" tht the entr' or "t' o% )&en" &n the Ph&)&**&ne" &" mere)' *r&v&)ege
n$ mtter o% grceF "#ch *r&v&)ege &" not !"o)#te nor *ermnent n$ m' !e revo9e$+
2o(ever0 )&en" m' !e e:*e))e$ or $e*orte$ %rom the Ph&)&**&ne" on)' on gro#n$" n$ &n the
mnner *rov&$e$ %or !' the Con"t&t#t&on0 the Imm&grt&on Act o% -<J/0 " men$e$0 n$
$m&n&"trt&ve &""#nce" *#r"#nt thereto+ In th&" c"e0 the @OC or$ere$ the *r&vte
re"*on$entP" $e*ortt&on on Se*tem!er ,=0 -<<H (&tho#t even con$#ct&ng "#mmr'
$e*ortt&on *rocee$&ng"+ Sect&on ?=Ec8 o% Common(e)th Act No+ D-?0 " men$e$0 *rov&$e"
tht 5no )&en "h)) !e $e*orte$ (&tho#t !e&ng &n%orme$ o% the "*ec&%&c gro#n$" %or $e*ortt&on
or (&tho#t !e&ng g&ven her&ng #n$er r#)e" o% *roce$#re to !e *re"cr&!e$ !' the
Comm&""&oner o% Imm&grt&on+7 The re"*on$ent (" not %%or$e$ n' her&ng t )) nor (" he
%%or$e$ chnce to re%#te the chrge"+ 2e cnnot0 th#"0 !e rre"te$ n$ $e*orte$ (&tho#t
$#e *roce"" o% )( " re1#&re$ !' the @&)) o% R&ght" o% the Con"t&t#t&on+
L!N The Co#rt gree" tht the Imm&grt&on Comm&""&oner &" mn$te$ to &m*)ement )eg) n$
v)&$ S#mmr' De*ortt&on Or$er (&th&n re"on!)e t&me+ @#t &n th&" c"e0 the rre"t o% the
re"*on$ent &n h&" ho#"e0 t ner m&$n&ght0 n$ h&" "#!"e1#ent $etent&on (" *remt#re0
#n(rrnte$ n$ r!&trr'+ Un$er the !"&c r#$&ment" o% %&r *)' n$ $#e *roce""0 the
*et&t&oner (" re1#&re$ to %&r"t re"o)ve the re"*on$entP" Urgent Mot&on %or Recon"&$ert&on o%
the "&$ Or$er0 (h&ch (" %&)e$ more thn "&: 'er" !e%ore or on Decem!er H0 -<<H+ The @OC
"ho#)$ hve "et the re"*on$entP" mot&on %or her&ng to %%or$ h&m chnce to !e her$ n$
$$#ce ev&$ence &n "#**ort thereon+ 7&o$in!o vs. Sceer2 +.R. 1o. 9;=?=;. 3anuary >82
>DD=:
<. 1efore the %ourt is the petitionersQ 3otion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 3ay (A,
(88(, remanding this case to the Regional Trial %ourt .RT%) of Jue#on %ity, 1ranch A6, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of 4ection A of Rule 66B of the
Revised Rules of %riminal Procedure on the dismissal of %riminal %ases ,os. J&77&A6NB7 to J&77&
A6NA7 filed against the respondent and his co&accused with the said court. *n the aforesaid criminal
cases, the respondent and his co&accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and
killing of eleven male persons bandied as members of the Muratong 1aleleng Eang. The respondent
opposed petitionersC motion for reconsideration.
The %ourt ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal
of %riminal %ases ,os. J&77&A6NB7 to J&77&A6NA7 were with the e0press consent of the respondent
as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for $udicial
determination of probable cause and for e0amination of witnesses. The %ourt also held therein
that although 4ection A, Rule 66B of the Revised Rules of %riminal Procedure could be given
retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the re+uirements for its application
are attendant.
The %ourt further held that the reckoning date of the two&year bar had to be first
determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then ?udge "gnir, ?r. dismissing the
cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of
effectivity of the new rule. Petitioners however argue that the time bar stated in the
aforementioned rule should not be applied retroactively in the present case. 3ay the time&bar in
4ection A, Rule 66B of the Revised Rules on %riminal Procedure be applied retroactively'
NO+ In th&" c"e0 the Co#rt gree" (&th the *et&t&oner" tht the t&meB!r o% t(o 'er" #n$er the
ne( r#)e "ho#)$ not !e **)&e$ retroct&ve)' g&n"t the Stte+
In the ne( r#)e &n 1#e"t&on0 " no( con"tr#e$ !' the Co#rt0 &t h" %&:e$ t&meB!r o%
one 'er or t(o 'er" %or the rev&v) o% cr&m&n) c"e" *rov&"&on))' $&"m&""e$ (&th the e:*re""
con"ent o% the cc#"e$ n$ (&th *r&or& not&ce to the o%%en$e$ *rt'+ The t&meB!r m'
**er0 on %&r"t &m*re""&on0 #nre"on!)e com*re$ to the *er&o$" #n$er Art&c)e </ o% the

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Rev&"e$ Pen) Co$e+ 2o(ever0 &n %&:&ng the t&meB!r0 the Co#rt !)nce$ the "oc&et) &ntere"t"
n$ tho"e o% the cc#"e$ %or the or$er)' n$ "*ee$' $&"*o"&t&on o% cr&m&n) c"e" (&th m&n&m#m
*re;#$&ce to the Stte n$ the cc#"e$+ It too9 &nto cco#nt the "#!"tnt&) r&ght" o% !oth the
Stte n$ o% the cc#"e$ to $#e *roce""+ The Co#rt !e)&eve$ tht the t&me )&m&t &" re"on!)e
*er&o$ %or the Stte to rev&ve *rov&"&on))' $&"m&""e$ c"e" (&th the con"ent o% the cc#"e$ n$
not&ce to the o%%en$e$ *rt&e"+
The Co#rt gree" (&th the *et&t&oner" tht to **)' the t&meB!r retroct&ve)' "o tht
the t(oB'er *er&o$ commence$ to r#n on Mrch ?-0 -<<< (hen the *#!)&c *ro"ec#tor
rece&ve$ h&" co*' o% the re"o)#t&on o% G#$ge Agn&r0 Gr+ $&"m&""&ng the cr&m&n) c"e" &"
&ncon"&"tent (&th the &nten$ment o% the ne( r#)e+ In"te$ o% g&v&ng the Stte t(o 'er" to
rev&ve *rov&"&on))' $&"m&""e$ c"e"0 the Stte h$ con"&$er!)' )e"" thn t(o 'er" to $o "o+
Th#"0 G#$ge Agn&r0 Gr+ $&"m&""e$ Cr&m&n) C"e" No"+ QB<<B.-D=< to QB<<B.-D.< on Mrch ,<0
-<<<+ The ne( r#)e too9 e%%ect on Decem!er -0 ,///+ I% the Co#rt **)&e$ the ne( t&meB!r
retroct&ve)'0 the Stte (o#)$ hve on)' one 'er n$ three month" or #nt&) Mrch ?-0 ,//-
(&th&n (h&ch to rev&ve the"e cr&m&n) c"e"+ The *er&o$ &" "hort o% the t(oB'er *er&o$ %&:e$
#n$er the ne( r#)e+ On the other hn$0 &% the t&me )&m&t &" **)&e$ *ro"*ect&ve)'0 the Stte
(o#)$ hve t(o 'er" %rom Decem!er -0 ,/// or #nt&) Decem!er -0 ,//, (&th&n (h&ch to
rev&ve the c"e"+ Th&" &" &n con"onnce (&th the &nten$ment o% the ne( r#)e &n %&:&ng the t&meB
!r n$ th#" *revent &n;#"t&ce to the Stte n$ vo&$ !"#r$0 #nre"on!)e0 o**re""&ve0
&n;#r&o#"0 n$ (rong%#) re"#)t" &n the $m&n&"trt&on o% ;#"t&ce+ 7P)OP#) vs. #.CSO12 +.R. 1o.
9=8=;@. .pril 92 >DD@.:
F. "fter being terminated from work, =lenito -ariosa Rs former employer discovered that he had
lost PF9,888.88 in cash. De suspected that -ariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former
employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the :nited Products =nterprise 4tore. *n search
of evidence for the crime of robbery with force upon things, the accuser, together with two men
who claimed to be policemen, drew out their guns and barged into the house of Paulina 3atillano,
=lenitoCs aunt. @ver her vehement protests, Paulina 3atillano consented to the accuserCs entry into
her house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of $ewelry owned by her and
her family. /as the search and sei#ure valid'
NO+ Un$er Art&c)e III0 Sect&on , o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 Qthe r&ght o% the *eo*)e to !e "ec#re &n
the&r *er"on"0 ho#"e"0 **er" n$ e%%ect" g&n"t #nre"on!)e "erche" n$ "e&>#re" o%
(htever nt#re n$ %or n' *#r*o"e "h)) !e &nv&o)!)e+Q Th&" *rov&"&on *rotect" not on)' tho"e
(ho **er to !e &nnocent !#t )"o tho"e (ho **er to !e g#&)t'0 (ho m#"t neverthe)e"" !e
*re"#me$ &nnocent #nt&) the contrr' &" *rove$+ The gener) r#)e &" tht "erch n$ "e&>#re
m#"t !e crr&e$ thro#gh or (&th ;#$&c&) (rrntF other(&"e0 "#ch "erch n$ "e&>#re
!ecome" #ncon"t&t#t&on) (&th&n the conte:t o% the con"t&t#t&on) *rov&"&on+ Pece o%%&cer" (ho
e%%ect (rrnt)e"" "erch cnnot &nvo9e reg#)r&t' &n the *er%ormnce o% o%%&c&) %#nct&on"+
The r&ght g&n"t #nre"on!)e "erche" n$ "e&>#re" &" *er"on) r&ght (h&ch m' !e
(&ve$ e:*re"")' or &m*)&e$)'+ @#t (&ver !' &m*)&ct&on cnnot !e *re"#me$+ There m#"t !e
c)er n$ conv&nc&ng ev&$ence o% n ct#) &ntent&on to re)&n1#&"h the r&ght to con"t&t#te
(&ver o% con"t&t#t&on) r&ght+ There m#"t !e *roo% o% the %o))o(&ng: E8 tht the r&ght e:&"t"F
E!8 tht the *er"on &nvo)ve$ h$ 9no()e$ge0 e&ther ct#) or con"tr#ct&ve0 o% the e:&"tence o%
"#ch r&ghtF n$0 Ec8 tht the "&$ *er"on h$ n ct#) &ntent&on to re)&n1#&"h the r&ght+ The
(&ver m#"t !e m$e vo)#ntr&)'0 9no(&ng)' n$ &nte))&gent)'+ The Co#rt &n$#)ge" ever'
re"on!)e *re"#m*t&on g&n"t n' (&ver o% %#n$ment) con"t&t#t&on) r&ght"+ The %ct tht
the ggr&eve$ *er"on $&$ not o!;ect to the entr' &nto her ho#"e !' the *o)&ce o%%&cer" $oe" not
mo#nt to *erm&""&on to m9e "erch there&n+ A *ece%#) "#!m&""&on to "erch n$ "e&>#re
&" not con"ent or n &nv&tt&on thereto0 !#t &" mere)' $emon"trt&on o% regr$ %or the
"#*remc' o% the )(+ 7)#I #,I2 )* .# vs. M.*I##.1O2 +.R. 1O. 9=99?E2 May >?2>DD=:
9. ,1* "gent 5ranklin 3. ?avier filed a sworn application for search warrant before the RT% of
*ligan, *sabela, for the purpose of sei#ing undetermined number of fake land titles, blank forms
of land titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry of eeds, and
undetermined number of land transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of
documentary stamps and capital gains ta0, all of which documents are being used or intended to

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be used in the commission of a felony that is falsification of land titles under "rticle 6B6 RP%,
"rticle (6< RP% and R.". <867. Petitioner "riel >alle$o, a lawyer in the Register of eeds of *sabela,
filed a motion to +uash the search warrant on the ground that the +uestioned search warrant was in
the form of a general warrant for failure to describe the persons or things to be sei#ed and was
violative of the %onstitution hence, null and void. *t was denied for lack of merit. >alle$o filed a
notice of appeal to the %ourt of "ppeals but such was denied on the ground that the appealed
order denying a motion to +uash the search warrant is interlocutory and not appealable. 3ay the
technical rules be rela0ed in the case at bar and if so, was the warrant issued by the RT% valid'
YES0 the techn&c) r#)e" m' !e re):e$ &n the c"e t !r+ Th&" &" &n 9ee*&ng (&th the *r&nc&*)e
tht r#)e" o% *roce$#re re mere too)" $e"&gne$ to %c&)&tte the tt&nment o% ;#"t&ce n$ tht
"tr&ct n$ r&g&$ **)&ct&on o% r#)e" (h&ch (o#)$ re"#)t &n techn&c)&t&e" tht ten$ to %r#"trte
rther thn *romote "#!"tnt&) ;#"t&ce m#"t )('" !e vo&$e$+
NO0 the (rrnt &""#e$ !' the RTC &" not v)&$+ The Con"t&t#t&on g#rntee" the r&ght to !e %ree
%rom #nre"on!)e "erche" n$ "e&>#re"+ The th&ng" to !e "e&>e$ m#"t !e $e"cr&!e$ (&th
*rt&c#)r&t'+ Techn&c) *rec&"&on o% $e"cr&*t&on &" not re1#&re$+ It &" on)' nece""r' tht there
!e re"on!)e *rt&c#)r&t' n$ cert&nt' " to the &$ent&t' o% the *ro*ert' to !e "erche$ %or
n$ "e&>e$0 "o tht the (rrnt "h)) not !e mere rov&ng comm&""&on+ The term" e:*re"")'
#"e$ &n the (rrnt (ere too )) em!rc&ng0 (&th the o!v&o#" &ntent o% "#!;ect&ng )) the
recor$" *ert&n&ng to )) the trn"ct&on" o% the *et&t&onerP" o%%&ce t the Reg&"ter o% Dee$" to
"erch n$ "e&>#re+ S#ch tenor o% "e&>#re (rrnt contrvene" the e:*)&c&t commn$ o% the
Con"t&t#t&on tht there !e *rt&c#)r $e"cr&*t&on o% the th&ng" to !e "e&>e$+ Moreover0 the
1#e"t&one$ (rrnt &n th&" c"e &" "ctterB"hot (rrnt %or hv&ng !een &""#e$ %or more thn
one o%%en"eR F)"&%&ct&on o% Ln$ T&t)e" #n$er Art&c)e -=- n$ Art&c)e ,-? o% the Rev&"e$ Pen)
Co$e0 n$ v&o)t&on o% Re*+ Act No+ ?/-<0 other(&"e 9no(n " the Ant&B3r%t n$ Corr#*t
Prct&ce" Act+ A (rrnt m#"t !e &""#e$ #*on *ro!!)e c#"e &n connect&on (&th one "*ec&%&c
o%%en"e+ EA))e;o v"+ Co#rt o% A**e)"0 et )0 3+R+ No+ -HDJ-? A*r&) -J0 ,//J8
N. 1efore the %ourt are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner =dward 4erapio, assailing the
resolutions of the Third ivision of the 4andiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to +uash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to %riminal
%ase ,o. (N99A for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former President
?oseph =. =strada, ?ose S?inggoyS P. =strada and several others.
*n the latter part of the year (888, Eov. 4ingson publicly accused then President ?oseph =.
=strada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal
numbers game known as $ueteng. This triggered the filing with the @ffice of the @mbudsman of
several criminal complaints against ?oseph =strada, ?inggoy =strada and petitioner, together with
other persons. The @ffice of the @mbudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the
complaints and on "pril F, (886, issued a $oint resolution recommending, inter alia, that ?oseph
=strada, petitioner and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder. @n "pril F,
(886, the @mbudsman filed with the 4andiganbayan several *nformations against former President
=strada, who earlier had resigned from his post as President of the Republic of the Philippines. @n
"pril 6A, (886, the @mbudsman filed an amended *nformation in said case charging =strada and
several co&accused, including petitioner, with said crime. ,o bail was recommended for the
provisional release of all the accused, including petitioner. @n ?uly (8, (886, petitioner filed with
the %ourt a Petition for %ertiorari, docketed as E.R. ,o. 6FABN7, alleging that the 4andiganbayan
acted without or in e0cess of $urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
e0cess of $urisdiction in issuing its ?uly 7, (886 Resolution denying his motion to +uash,
notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended *nformation against
him do not constitute the crime of plunderH and that he is charged, under the said amended
*nformation, for more than one offense. H Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended
information of bribery and illegal gambling and others. Petitioner claims that the 4andiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in %riminal %ase ,o. (N99AH to
conduct a determination of probable causeH and to direct the @mbudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner asseverates that the @mbudsman had totally
disregarded e0culpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in charging him with
plunder. .a) oes the amended *nformation against 4erapio constitute the crime of plunderH and
that he is charged, under the said amended *nformation, for more than one offense' .b) *s it

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proper that the 4% order the @mbudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the case' .c) 4hould
petitioner should first be arraigned before the hearings of his petition for bail may be conductedH
E8 No+ The ct" ))ege$ &n the &n%ormt&on re not chrge$ " "e*rte o%%en"e" !#t "
*re$&cte ct" o% the cr&me o% *)#n$er+ It "ho#)$ !e "tre""e$ tht the Ant&BP)#n$er )(
"*ec&%&c))' Sect&on -E$8 thereo% $oe" not m9e n' e:*re"" re%erence to n' "*ec&%&c *rov&"&on
o% )("0 other thn R+A+ No+ =/./0 " men$e$0 (h&ch co&nc&$ent))' m' *en)&>e "
"e*rte cr&me n' o% the overt or cr&m&n) ct" en#merte$ there&n+ The "&$ ct" (h&ch %orm
*rt o% the com!&nt&on or "er&e" o% ct re $e"cr&!e$ &n the&r gener&c "en"e+ Th#"0 "&$e %rom
Pm)ver"t&onP o% *#!)&c %#n$"0 the )( )"o #"e" the gener&c term" Pm&"**ro*r&t&onP0
Pconver"&onP or Pm&"#"eP o% "&$ %#n$+ The %ct tht the ct" &nvo)ve$ m' )&9e(&"e !e *en)&>e$
#n$er other )(" &" &nc&$ent)+ The "&$ ct" re ment&one$ on)' " *re$&cte ct" o% the cr&me
o% *)#n$er n$ the ))egt&on" re)t&ve thereto re not to !e t9en or to !e #n$er"too$ "
))egt&on" chrg&ng "e*rte cr&m&n) o%%en"e" *#n&"he$ #n$er the Rev&"e$ Pen) Co$e0 the
Ant&B3r%t n$ Corr#*t Prct&ce" Act n$ Co$e o% Con$#ct n$ Eth&c) Stn$r$" %or P#!)&c
O%%&c&)" n$ Em*)o'ee"+Q
Th&" Co#rt gree" (&th the Sn$&gn!'n+ It &" c)er on the %ce o% the men$e$
In%ormt&on tht *et&t&oner n$ h&" coBcc#"e$ re chrge$ on)' (&th one cr&me o% *)#n$er n$
not (&th the *re$&cte ct" or cr&me" o% *)#n$er+ It !er" "tre""&ng tht the *re$&cte ct"
mere)' con"t&t#te ct" o% *)#n$er n$ re not cr&me" "e*rte n$ &n$e*en$ent o% the cr&me o%
*)#n$er+ Re"#)tnt)' then0 the *et&t&on &" $&"m&""e$+
E!8 C"e )( h" &t tht the S#*reme Co#rt $oe" not &nter%ere (&th the Om!#$"mnP" $&"cret&on
&n the con$#ct o% *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on"+ The Co#rt r#)e$ tht &n the *er%ormnce o% h&"
t"9 to $eterm&ne *ro!!)e c#"e0 the Om!#$"mnP" $&"cret&on &" *rmo#nt+ The Co#rt h"
$o*te$ *o)&c' o% nonB&nter%erence &n the con$#ct o% *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on"0 n$ )eve" to
the &nve"t&gt&ng *ro"ec#tor "#%%&c&ent )t&t#$e o% $&"cret&on &n the e:erc&"e o% $eterm&nt&on o%
(ht con"t&t#te" "#%%&c&ent ev&$ence " (&)) e"t!)&"h P*ro!!)e c#"eP %or %&)&ng o% &n%ormt&on
g&n"t the "#**o"e$ o%%en$er+Q The Co#rt h" %#rthermore "tte$ tht the Om!#$"mn4"
%&n$&ng" re %ct#) &n nt#re+ the S#*reme Co#rt &" not tr&er o% %ct"0 more "o &n the
con"&$ert&on o% the e:tror$&nr' (r&t o% cert&orr& (here ne&ther 1#e"t&on o% %ct nor even o%
)( re entert&ne$0 !#t on)' 1#e"t&on" o% )c9 or e:ce"" o% ;#r&"$&ct&on or grve !#"e o%
$&"cret&on+ The Sn$&gn!'n *o&nte$ o#t tht *et&t&oner %&)e$ mot&on %or recon"&$ert&on o%
the Om!#$"mnP" re"o)#t&on0 !#t %&)e$ to "ho( &n h&" mot&on tht there (ere ne()' $&"covere$
ev&$ence0 or tht the *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on (" t&nte$ !' error" o% )( or &rreg#)r&t&e"0
(h&ch re the on)' gro#n$" %or (h&ch recon"&$ert&on o% the Om!#$"mnP" re"o)#t&on m' !e
grnte$+ It !er" "tre""&ng tht the r&ght to *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on &" not con"t&t#t&on)
r&ght0 !#t &" mere)' r&ght con%erre$ !' "tt#te+ The !"ence o% *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on
$oe" not &m*&r the v)&$&t' o% the In%ormt&on or other(&"e ren$er the "me $e%ect&ve n$
ne&ther $oe" &t %%ect the ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the co#rt over the c"e or con"t&t#te gro#n$ %or
1#"h&ng the In%ormt&on+ I% the )c9 o% *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on $oe" not ren$er the
In%ormt&on &nv)&$ nor %%ect the ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the co#rt over the c"e0 (&th more re"on cn
&t !e "&$ tht the $en&) o% mot&on %or re&nve"t&gt&on cnnot &nv)&$te the In%ormt&on or
o#"t the co#rt o% &t" ;#r&"$&ct&on over the c"e+ Ne&ther cn &t !e "&$ tht *et&t&oner h$ !een
$e*r&ve$ o% $#e *roce""+ 2e (" %%or$e$ the o**ort#n&t' to re%#te the chrge" g&n"t h&m
$#r&ng the *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on+ The *#r*o"e o% *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on &" mere)' to
$eterm&ne (hether cr&me h" !een comm&tte$ n$ (hether there &" *ro!!)e c#"e to
!e)&eve tht the *er"on cc#"e$ o% the cr&me &" *ro!!)' g#&)t' thereo% n$ "ho#)$ !e he)$ %or
tr&)+ES)R.PIO vs. S.1&I+.1B.J.1I +.R. 1o. 9=899E. 3anuary ><2 >DD@:
Ec8+ NO+ The rr&gnment o% n cc#"e$ &" not *rere1#&"&te to the con$#ct o% her&ng" on h&"
*et&t&on %or !&)+ A *er"on &" ))o(e$ to *et&t&on %or !&) " "oon " he &" $e*r&ve$ o% h&" )&!ert'
!' v&rt#e o% h&" rre"t or vo)#ntr' "#rren$er+ An cc#"e$ nee$ not (&t %or h&" rr&gnment
!e%ore %&)&ng *et&t&on %or !&)+ In #avides vs. Court of .ppeals0 th&" Co#rt r#)e$ on the &""#e o%
(hether n cc#"e$ m#"t %&r"t !e rr&gne$ !e%ore he m' !e grnte$ !&)+ + We he)$ there&n
tht Q&n c"e" (here &t &" #thor&>e$0 !&) "ho#)$ !e grnte$ !e%ore rr&gnment0 other(&"e the
cc#"e$ m' !e *rec)#$e$ %rom %&)&ng mot&on to 1#"h+Q 2o(ever0 the %orego&ng
*rono#ncement "ho#)$ not !e t9en to men tht the her&ng on *et&t&on %or !&) "ho#)$ t ))
t&me" *rece$e rr&gnment0 !ec#"e the r#)e &" tht *er"on $e*r&ve$ o% h&" )&!ert' !' v&rt#e
o% h&" rre"t or vo)#ntr' "#rren$er m' **)' %or !&) " "oon " he &" $e*r&ve$ o% h&" )&!ert'0

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even !e%ore com*)&nt or &n%ormt&on &" %&)e$ g&n"t h&m+ 7S)R.PIO vs. S.1&I+.1B.J.1I
+.R. 1o. 9=<?E8. 3anuary ><2 >DD@.:
B. *nformation charging ?uan Eon#ales =scote, ?r. and >ictor "cuyan with robbery with homicide
which took place on a passenger bus was filed with the Regional Trial %ourt. The trial court
rendered its ecision $udgment finding ?uan and >ictor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and meted on each of them the penalty of death. ?uan and >ictor contend that the trial
court committed a reversible error in relying on the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for
convicting them of the crime charged. They aver that although their counsel was able to initially
cross&e0amine Rodolfo, the former failed to continue with and terminate his cross&e0amination of
the said witness through no fault of his as the witness failed to appear in subse+uent proceedings.
*s petitionersC contention correct'
NO+ There &" no %ct#) n$ )eg) !"&" %or the&r c)&m tht the' (ere &))eg))' $e*r&ve$ o% the&r
con"t&t#t&on) n$ "tt#tor' r&ght to %#))' cro""Be:m&ne Ro$o)%o+ The Co#rt gree" tht the
r&ght to cro""Be:m&ne &" con"t&t#t&on) r&ght nchore$ on $#e *roce""+ 2o(ever0 the r&ght h"
)('" !een #n$er"too$ " re1#&r&ng not nece""r&)' n ct#) cro""Be:m&nt&on !#t mere)' n
o**ort#n&t' to e:erc&"e the r&ght to cro""Be:m&ne &% $e"&re$+ Wht &" *ro"cr&!e$ !' "tt#tor'
norm n$ ;#r&"*r#$ent&) *rece*t &" the !"ence o% the o**ort#n&t' to cro""Be:m&ne+ The
r&ght &" *er"on) one n$ m' !e (&ve$ e:*re"")' or &m*)&e$)'+ There &" n &m*)&e$ (&ver
(hen the *rt' (" g&ven the o**ort#n&t' to con%ront n$ cro""Be:m&ne n o**o"&ng (&tne""
!#t %&)e$ to t9e $vntge o% &t %or re"on" ttr&!#t!)e to h&m"e)% )one+ I% !' h&" ct#t&on"0
the cc#"e$ )o"t h&" o**ort#n&t' to cro""Be:m&ne (ho))' or &n *rt the (&tne""e" g&n"t h&m0
h&" r&ght to cro""Be:m&ne &" &m*)&e$)' (&ve$+ The te"t&mon' g&ven on $&rect e:m&nt&on o%
the (&tne"" (&)) !e rece&ve$ or ))o(e$ to rem&n &n the recor$+ 7P)OP#) vs. )SCO*)2 +.R.
1o. 9=D?;E2 .pril =2 >DD@:
A. Juirico agpin was accused of murder in killing ,ilo %aemare using a homemade shotgun. The
lower court found the accused guilty of murder and was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. agpin
now +uestions the decision of the trial court and averred that the trial court erred in convicting
him of the crime charged on the basis mainly of his having been identified by Randy, Rona and Rena
at the police station on 3arch (B, 677N. De was not assisted by counsel when the three pointed to
him as the culprit in the police station. Dence, according to the appellant, such identification is
inadmissible in evidence. /as the accused agpinCs contention meritorious'
NO+ The **e))nt (" not $e*r&ve$ o% h&" r&ght #n$er the Con"t&t#t&on to !e ""&"te$ !'
co#n"e) !ec#"e the **e))nt (" not "#!;ecte$ to c#"to$&) &nve"t&gt&on (here he ("
&$ent&%&e$ !' the *ro"ec#t&on4" (&tne""e" &n *o)&ce )&neB#*+ In$ee$0 the **e))nt even
$en&e$ tht there (" no *o)&ce )&neB#* n$ tht he (" mere)' (&th the *o)&ce o%%&cer" (hen
the *ro"ec#t&on4" (&tne""e" rr&ve$ &n the *o)&ce "tt&on+ 7P)OP#) OF *() P(I#. vs. L,IRICO ).
&.+PI12 +.R. 1o. 9=8;ED. 3une 9D2 >DD=:
CITICENS2IP
7. Petitioners Dubert Tan %o and "rlene Tan %o filed with the RT% of 3anila a petition for
correction of entries in their certificates of birth, to correct and change the entries in their
respective birth certificates as to the citi#enship of their father %o 1oon Peng, from S%hineseS to
S5ilipino.S The court dismissed the petition outright on the ground that the petition was
insufficient, solely because the petitionersQ father %o 1oon Peng applied for naturali#ation under
-@* ,o. (B8 and was conferred Philippine citi#enship by naturali#ation under P ,o. 6899 and not
under %ommonwealth "ct .%") ,o. FB<, reasoning out that the application of the so&called Spari
materiaS rule of construction made by the petitioners is misplaced, as what should be applied in the
instant case is the rule on strict construction of legislative grants or franchise. The court stressed
that legislative grants, whether they be of property, rights or privileges, whether granted to
corporations or individuals, must be strictly construed against the grantee and in favor of the
grantor. /as the court correct in dismissing the petition'

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College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
L A W
NO+ The r#)e on "tt#tor' con"tr#ct&on *rov&$e" tht0 5Stt#te" &n pari $ateria "ho#)$ !e re$
n$ con"tr#e$ together !ec#"e enctment" o% the "me )eg&")t#re on the "me "#!;ect re
"#**o"e$ to %orm *rt o% one #n&%orm "'"temF )ter "tt#te" re "#**)ementr' or
com*)ementr' to the er)&er enctment" n$ &n the *""ge o% &t" ct" the )eg&")t#re &"
"#**o"e$ to hve &n m&n$ the e:&"t&ng )eg&")t&on" on the "#!;ect n$ to hve encte$ &t" ne(
ct (&th re%erence thereto+7 Stt#te" &n pari $ateria "ho#)$ !e con"tr#e$ together to tt&n
the *#r*o"e o% n e:*re""e$ nt&on) *o)&c'+ Wh&)e the' *rov&$e %or $&%%erent *roce$#re"0 !oth
"tt#te" hve the "me *#r*o"e n$ o!;ect&ve: to en!)e )&en" *ermnent)' re"&$&ng &n the
Ph&)&**&ne"0 (ho0 hv&ng $emon"trte$ n$ $eve)o*e$ )ove %or n$ )o')t' to the Ph&)&**&ne"0 "
(e)) " %%&n&t' to the c#)t#re0 tr$&t&on n$ &$e)" o% the F&)&*&no *eo*)e0 n$ contr&!#te$ to
the econom&c0 "oc&) n$ c#)t#r) $eve)o*ment o% o#r co#ntr'0 to !e &ntegrte$ &nto the
nt&on) %!r&c !' !e&ng grnte$ F&)&*&no c&t&>en"h&*+ C)er)'0 LOI No+ ,=/ n$ CA No+ J=? re0
" the *et&t&oner" correct)' *o"&t0 "tt#te" &n pari $ateria+ A!"ent n' e:*re"" re*e) o%
Sect&on -H o% CA No+ J=? &n LOI No+ ,=/0 the "&$ *rov&"&on "ho#)$ !e re$ &nto the )tter )( "
n &ntegr) *rt thereo%0 not !e&ng &ncon"&"tent (&th &t" *#r*o"e+ 7Co et al. vs. Civil Re!ister of
Manila2 +.R. 1o. 9@<=8E. February >@2 >DD=:
LE3ISLATIAE DEPARTMENT
68. %ongress enacted R" 788N, entitled "n "ct to =nhance the Dolding of 5ree, @rderly, Donest,
Peaceful and %redible =lections through 5air =lection Practices, with section 6F thereof repealing
4ection NB of 1P AA6 or the @mnibus =lection %ode, which provides for the ipso facto resignation of
an elective official upon filing of a %ertificate of %andidacy. R" 788N was duly signed by then
4enate President "+uilino Pimentel, ?r. and then 4peaker of the Douse of Representatives 5eliciano
R. 1elmonte, ?r. and was duly certified by the 4ecretary of the 4enate and the 4ecretary Eeneral of
the Douse of Representatives and finally passed by both Douses on 5ebruary B, (886. President
Eloria 3acapagal&"rroyo signed Rep. "ct ,o. 788N into law on 5ebruary 6(, (886.
a. *s the law unconstitutional insofar as it repeals 4ection NB of the @mnibus =lection
%odeH hence in violation of the %onstitution re+uiring every law to have only one
sub$ect which should be e0pressed in its title'
b. /as there a violation of the e+ual protection clause'
+ NO+ The *ro"cr&*t&on &" &me$ g&n"t the ev&)" o% the "oBc))e$ omn&!#" !&))" n$ )ogBro))&ng
)eg&")t&on " (e)) " "#rre*t&t&o#" n$Ior #ncon"&$ere$ encroche"+ The *rov&"&on mere)' c))"
%or )) *rt" o% n ct re)t&ng to &t" "#!;ect %&n$&ng e:*re""&on &n &t" t&t)e+ To $eterm&ne
(hether there h" !een com*)&nce (&th the con"t&t#t&on) re1#&rement tht the "#!;ect o% n
ct "h)) !e e:*re""e$ &n &t" t&t)e0 the Co#rt )&$ $o(n the r#)e tht Con"t&t#t&on) *rov&"&on"
re)t&ng to the "#!;ect mtter n$ t&t)e" o% "tt#te" "ho#)$ not !e "o nrro()' con"tr#e$ " to
cr&**)e or &m*e$e the *o(er o% )eg&")t&on+ The re1#&rement tht the "#!;ect o% n ct "h)) !e
e:*re""e$ &n &t" t&t)e "ho#)$ rece&ve re"on!)e n$ not techn&c) con"tr#ct&on+ It &"
"#%%&c&ent &% the t&t)e !e com*rehen"&ve eno#gh re"on!)' to &nc)#$e the gener) o!;ect (h&ch
"tt#te "ee9" to e%%ect0 (&tho#t e:*re""&ng ech n$ ever' en$ n$ men" nece""r' or
conven&ent %or the ccom*)&"h&ng o% tht o!;ect+ Mere $et&)" nee$ not !e "et %orth+ The t&t)e
nee$ not !e n !"trct or &n$e: o% the Act+
!+ The e1#) *rotect&on o% the )( c)#"e &" g&n"t #n$#e %vor n$ &n$&v&$#) or c)""
*r&v&)ege0 " (e)) " ho"t&)e $&"cr&m&nt&on or the o**re""&on o% &ne1#)&t'+ It &" not &nten$e$ to
*roh&!&t )eg&")t&on (h&ch &" )&m&te$ e&ther &n the o!;ect to (h&ch &t &" $&recte$ or !' terr&tor'
(&th&n (h&ch &t &" to o*erte+ It $oe" not $emn$ !"o)#te e1#)&t' mong re"&$ent"F &t mere)'
re1#&re" tht )) *er"on" "h)) !e trete$ )&9e0 #n$er )&9e c&rc#m"tnce" n$ con$&t&on" !oth "
to *r&v&)ege" con%erre$ n$ )&!&)&t&e" en%orce$+ The e1#) *rotect&on c)#"e &" not &n%r&nge$ !'
)eg&")t&on (h&ch **)&e" on)' to tho"e *er"on" %))&ng (&th&n "*ec&%&e$ c)""0 &% &t **)&e" )&9e
to )) *er"on" (&th&n "#ch c)""0 n$ re"on!)e gro#n$" e:&"t %or m9&ng $&"t&nct&on !et(een
tho"e (ho %)) (&th&n "#ch c)"" n$ tho"e (ho $o not+
S#!"tnt&) $&"t&nct&on" c)er)' e:&"t !et(een e)ect&ve o%%&c&)" n$ **o&nt&ve o%%&c&)"+
The %ormer occ#*' the&r o%%&ce !' v&rt#e o% the mn$te o% the e)ectorte+ The' re e)ecte$ to
n o%%&ce %or $e%&n&te term n$ m' !e remove$ there%rom on)' #*on "tr&ngent con$&t&on"+ On
the other hn$0 **o&nt&ve o%%&c&)" ho)$ the&r o%%&ce !' v&rt#e o% the&r $e"&gnt&on thereto !'

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n **o&nt&ng #thor&t'+ Some **o&nt&ve o%%&c&)" ho)$ the&r o%%&ce &n *ermnent c*c&t' n$
re ent&t)e$ to "ec#r&t' o% ten#re (h&)e other" "erve t the *)e"#re o% the **o&nt&ng
#thor&t'+ Another "#!"tnt&) $&"t&nct&on !et(een the t(o "et" o% o%%&c&)" &" tht #n$er
Sect&on HH0 Ch*ter .0 T&t)e I0 S#!"ect&on A+ C&v&) Serv&ce Comm&""&on0 @oo9 A o% the
A$m&n&"trt&ve Co$e o% -<.= EE:ec#t&ve Or$er No+ ,<,80 **o&nt&ve o%%&c&)"0 " o%%&cer" n$
em*)o'ee" &n the c&v&) "erv&ce0 re "tr&ct)' *roh&!&te$ %rom engg&ng &n n' *rt&"n *o)&t&c)
ct&v&t' or t9e *rt &n n' e)ect&on e:ce*t to vote+ Un$er the "me *rov&"&on0 e)ect&ve
o%%&c&)"0 or o%%&cer" or em*)o'ee" ho)$&ng *o)&t&c) o%%&ce"0 re o!v&o#")' e:*re"")' ))o(e$ to
t9e *rt &n *o)&t&c) n$ e)ector) ct&v&t&e"+ 7F.RI1.S vs. )G)C,*IV) S)CR)*.RJ2 +.R. 1O.
9=?@<?2 &ece$ber 9D2 >DD@:
CIAIL SERAICE COMMISSION
66. "cting 4ecretary ?ose 4. 1rilliantes of the @-= designated the petitioner irector 1enedicto
=rnesto R. 1itonio to be the @-= representative to the 1oard of irectors of P=2". "s
representative, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during
the years 6779 to 677B. "fter a post audit of the P=2"Cs disbursement transactions, the %@"
disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner. The uniform reason for the disallowance
was that, %abinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their
primary office and receiving compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the 4upreme
%ourt in the %ivil -iberties :nion vs. =0ecutive 4ecretary. The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration to the %@", positing that officials given the rank e+uivalent to a 4ecretary,
:ndersecretary or "ssistant 4ecretary and other appointive officials below the rank of "ssistant
4ecretary are not covered by the prohibition. id the %@" correctly disallow the per diems received
by the petitioner'
YES+ It m#"t !e note$ tht the *et&t&oner4" *re"ence &n the PECA @or$ meet&ng" &" "o)e)' !'
v&rt#e o% h&" c*c&t' " re*re"entt&ve o% the Secretr' o% L!or+ S&nce the Secretr' o% L!or
&" *roh&!&te$ %rom rece&v&ng com*en"t&on %or h&" $$&t&on) o%%&ce or em*)o'ment0 "#ch
*roh&!&t&on )&9e(&"e **)&e" to the *et&t&oner (ho "t &n the @or$ on)' &n !eh)% o% the
Secretr' o% L!or+ The e:Bo%%&c&o *o"&t&on !e&ng ct#))' n$ &n )eg) contem*)t&on *rt o% the
*r&nc&*) o%%&ce0 &t %o))o(" tht the o%%&c&) concerne$ h" no r&ght to rece&ve $$&t&on)
com*en"t&on %or h&" "erv&ce" &n the "&$ *o"&t&on+ The re"on &" tht the"e "erv&ce" re )re$'
*&$ %or n$ covere$ !' the com*en"t&on ttche$ to h&" *r&nc&*) o%%&ce+ Whtever )(" n$
r#)e" the mem!er &n the @or$ &" covere$0 "o &" the re*re"entt&veF n$ (htever *roh&!&t&on"
or re"tr&ct&on" the mem!er &" "#!;ecte$0 the re*re"entt&ve &"0 )&9e(&"e0 not e:em*te$+
7BI*O1IO VS. CO.2 +.R. 1O. 9=?@8>. M.RC( 9>2 >DD=:
6(. Petitioner 1ernando is an officer of the -and 1and of the Philippines, 1aliuag 1ranch. uring
that time he deposited P988,888 in his savings account in the said bank. Dowever on the same day
he withdrew the same amount. %oincidentally, during that time he was also an officer and one of
the alleged incorporators of 3ackay Trading and 3anpower 4ervices *nc. De likewise e0ecuted in his
capacity as treasurer in trust of the said company, falsely certifying that T at least (9L of the
authori#ed capital stock of the corporation has been subscribed and (9L of the total subscription
has been paid and received by me in cash or propertyT 1ecause of such action, -1P President
>istan filed a formal charge against 1ernardo charging him of gross neglect, grave misconduct,
conduct pre$udicial to the best interest of the bank and serious violation of %4% rules and
regulations. Petitioner was found guilty of said charges. The -1P, 34P1, %4%, %ourt of "ppeals all
affirmed the said decision. Dowever petitioner appealed to the 4% that he did not violate %4% Rules
and Regulation pertaining to the prohibition of an official of E@%% in acting as an incorporator of
another corporation which had some transaction with the same E@%% without any permit or
authori#ation from the E@%%. which in this case is -1P). De likewise argued that the constitutional
right of due process was denied in his case. oes 1ernardo fall under the above stated prohibition'
/as he denied of the right of due process'

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College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
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YES+ The ev&$ence on recor$ "ho(" tht he (" not on)' n &ncor*ortor0 !#t (" )"o
mem!er o% the @or$ o% D&rector" n$ ("0 &n %ct0 the tre"#rer o% MTMSI+ Even %ter the
&ncor*ort&on o% the MTMSI0 the *et&t&oner rem&ne$ " "toc9ho)$er n$ mem!er o% the
@or$ o% D&rector"+ 2e (" even e)ecte$ tre"#rer o% the cor*ort&on+ 2e n$ h&" (&%e
"&gne$ chec9 vo#cher" o% the cor*ort&on $#r&ng the *er&o$ o% Novem!er -D0 -<.D to
A#g#"t ,J0 -<.=+ Th#" he v&o)te$ the CSC R#)e" n$ Reg#)t&on on the "&$ *roh&!&t&on+
NO+ A" he)$ &n *. (. Valdera$a K Sons2 Inc. v. &rilon 79<9 SCR. @D<:2 $en&) o% $#e *roce""
cnnot !e "#cce""%#))' &nvo9e$ (here *rt' (" g&ven the chnce to !e her$ on h&" mot&on
%or recon"&$ert&on+ In the c"e t !r0 ""#m&ng0 in !ratia ar!u$enti0 tht the CSCP" &n&t&)
$ec&"&on (" $e%ect&ve " rg#e$ !' *et&t&oner0 "#ch $e%ect (" neverthe)e"" c#re$ (hen
*et&t&oner %&)e$ Mot&on %or Recon"&$ert&on n$ S#**)ement) Mot&on %or Recon"&$ert&on+
7B)R1.R&O V. C.2 CSC2 #BP2 +.R. 1o. 9>=>E92 May >?2 >DD=:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
6<. Resolution ,o. NB6( *nstructions for the =lectronic Transmission and %onsolidation of "dvanced
Results in the 3ay (88F =lections has been issued by respondent and which herein petitioners seek
to nullify. Petitioners, voters and ta0payers, aside from alleging that there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to a lack or e0cess of $urisdiction pray for the issuance of a TR@ and a writ
of prohibition to permanently en$oin said respondent from enforcing and implementing the said
resolution. The petitioner assails said implementation of the said resolution on the following
grounds! 5irst, that any +uick count with the use of the said automated system and conducted by
the %@3=-=% would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and >ice&President,
which not only would be pre&emptive of the authority of the %ongress, but also would be lacking of
any %onstitutional authority. 4econd, there would be constitutional violations with regard to
financing the said pro$ect and its operations including personnel. Third, the petitioner and
petitioners&in&intervention contend that the assailed resolution encroaches upon the authority of
,"35R=-, as the citi#ensQ accredited arm, to conduct the SunofficialS +uick count as provided under
pertinent election laws. "re grounds for nullification as set forth by the petitioners tenable' 1ut
preliminarily, do the petitioners have locus standi'
YES+ S&nce the &m*)ementt&on o% the ""&)e$ re"o)#t&on o!v&o#")' &nvo)ve" the e:*en$&t#re
o% %#n$"0 the *et&t&oner n$ the *et&t&oner"B&nB&ntervent&on0 " t:*'er"0 *o""e"" the re1#&"&te
"tn$&ng to 1#e"t&on &t" v)&$&t' " the' hve "#%%&c&ent &ntere"t &n *revent&ng the &))eg)
e:*en$&t#re o% mone' r&"e$ !' t:t&on+ In e""ence0 t:*'er" re ))o(e$ to "#e (here there
&" c)&m o% &))eg) $&"!#r"ement o% *#!)&c %#n$"0 or tht *#!)&c mone' &" !e&ng $e%)ecte$ to n'
&m*ro*er *#r*o"e0 or (here the *et&t&oner" "ee9 to re"tr&n the re"*on$ent %rom ("t&ng
*#!)&c %#n$" thro#gh the en%orcement o% n &nv)&$ or #ncon"t&t#t&on) )(+
YES+ S*e9&ng &n n#t"he))0 the n#))&%&ct&on o% the "&$ re"o)#t&on m#"t !e #*he)$ &n
*#r"#nce o% the *rov&"&on" o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the Omn&!#" E)ect&on Co$e n$ other
"&gn&%&ct&on "tt#te"+ F&r"t0 the ""&)e$ re"o)#t&on #"#r*"0 #n$er the g#&"e o% n Q#no%%&c&)Q
t!#)t&on o% e)ect&on re"#)t" !"e$ on co*' o% the e)ect&on ret#rn"0 the "o)e n$ e:c)#"&ve
#thor&t' o% Congre"" to cnv"" the vote" %or the e)ect&on o% Pre"&$ent n$ A&ceBPre"&$ent+
Art&c)e AII0 Sect&on J o% the Con"t&t#t&on+ Secon$0 The ""&)e$ COMELEC re"o)#t&on contrvene"
the con"t&t#t&on) *rov&"&on tht Qno mone' "h)) !e *&$ o#t o% the tre"#r' e:ce*t &n
*#r"#nce o% n **ro*r&t&on m$e !' )(+Q Th&r$0 the ""&)e$ re"o)#t&on $&"regr$" e:&"t&ng
)(" (h&ch #thor&>e "o)e)' the $#)'Bccre$&te$ c&t&>en"P rm to con$#ct the Q#no%%&c&)Q
co#nt&ng o% vote"+ Un$er Sect&on ,= o% Re*+ Act No+ =-DD0 " men$e$ !' Re*+ Act No+ .-=?0
J< n$ re&terte$ &n Sect&on -. o% Re*+ Act No+ .J?D0 H/ the ccre$&te$ c&t&>enP" rm R &n th&"
c"e0 NAMFREL R &" e:c)#"&ve)' #thor&>e$ to #"e co*' o% the e)ect&on ret#rn" &n the con$#ct
o% n Q#no%%&c&)Q co#nt&ng o% the vote"0 (hether %or the nt&on) or the )oc) e)ect&on"+ No
other ent&t'0 &nc)#$&ng the re"*on$ent COMELEC &t"e)%0 &" #thor&>e$ to #"e co*' o% the
e)ect&on ret#rn" %or *#r*o"e" o% con$#ct&ng n Q#no%%&c&)Q co#nt+ 7SIG*O S. BRI##.1*)S2 3R.2 et
al. vs. COM)#)C2 +.R. 1o. 9E@98@2 3une 9;2 >DD=:

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NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
6F. "5, an "ustralian citi#en of Eerman descent, met =%, a 5ilipina. "5 bought a building in =rmita,
3anila for P(8,888. since "5 knew that he was dis+ualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he
agreed that only the name of =% would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property as
well as in the title covering the same. The relationship began to deteriorate. 4hortly thereafter, "5
filed a complaint for recovery of real and personal properties. /ill the action prosper'
NO+ Sect&on -J0 Art&c)e 6IA o% the -<=? Con"t&t#t&on *rov&$e" tht "ve &n c"e" o% here$&tr'
"#cce""&on0 no *r&vte )n$ "h)) !e trn"%erre$ or conve'e$ e:ce*t to &n$&v&$#)"0
cor*ort&on"0 or ""oc&t&on" 1#)&%&e$ to c1#&re or ho)$ )n$" &n the *#!)&c $om&n+ Ln$" o%
the *#!)&c $om&n0 (h&ch &nc)#$e *r&vte )n$"0 m' !e trn"%erre$ or conve'e$ on)' to
&n$&v&$#)" or ent&t&e" 1#)&%&e$ to c1#&re or ho)$ *r&vte )n$" or )n$" o% the *#!)&c $om&n+
A)&en"0 (hether &n$&v&$#)" or cor*ort&on"0 hve !een $&"1#)&%&e$ %rom c1#&r&ng )n$" o% the
*#!)&c $om&n+ 2ence0 the' hve )"o !een $&"1#)&%&e$ %rom c1#&r&ng *r&vte )n$"+
Even &%0 " c)&me$ !' the *et&t&oner0 the ")e" &n 1#e"t&on (ere entere$ &nto !' h&m "
the re) ven$ee0 the "&$ trn"ct&on" re &n v&o)t&on o% the Con"t&t#t&onF hence0 re n#)) n$
void ab initio+ A contrct tht v&o)te" the Con"t&t#t&on n$ the )(0 &" n#)) n$ vo&$ n$ ve"t"
no r&ght" n$ crete" no o!)&gt&on"+ It *ro$#ce" no )eg) e%%ect t ))+ The *et&t&oner0 !e&ng
*rt' to n &))eg) contrct0 cnnot come &nto co#rt o% )( n$ "9 to hve h&" &))eg) o!;ect&ve
crr&e$ o#t+ One (ho )o"e" h&" mone' or *ro*ert' !' 9no(&ng)' engg&ng &n contrct or
trn"ct&on (h&ch &nvo)ve" h&" o(n mor) t#r*&t#$e m' not m&nt&n n ct&on %or h&" )o""e"+
To h&m (ho move" &n $e)&!ert&on n$ *reme$&tt&on0 the )( &" #n'&e)$&ng+ The )( (&)) not
&$ e&ther *rt' to n &))eg) contrct or greementF &t )eve" the *rt&e" (here &t %&n$" them+
Un$er Art&c)e -J-, o% the Ne( C&v&) Co$e0 the *et&t&oner cnnot hve the "#!;ect *ro*ert&e"
$ee$e$ to h&m or ))o( h&m to recover the mone' he h$ "*ent %or the *#rch"e thereo%+
E1#&t' " r#)e (&)) %o))o( the )( n$ (&)) not *erm&t tht to !e $one &n$&rect)' (h&ch0
!ec#"e o% *#!)&c *o)&c'0 cnnot !e $one $&rect)'+ Where the (rong o% one *rt' e1#)" tht o%
the other0 the $e%en$nt &" &n the "tronger *o"&t&on + + + &t "&gn&%&e" tht &n "#ch "&t#t&on0
ne&ther co#rt o% e1#&t' nor co#rt o% )( (&)) $m&n&"ter reme$'+ The r#)e &" e:*re""e$ &n
the m:&m": E6 DOLO ORITUR ACTIO n$ IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS+
7FR)14)# vs. C.*I*O2 +.R.1O. 9=@8;<2 3uly 992>DD@:
69. Royal %argo %orporation is a stock corporation duly organi#ed and e0isting under and by virtue
of Philippine laws, seventy percent .B8L) of which is owned by 5ilipino citi#ens and thirty percent
.<8L) by foreigners. The President of the petitioner company is a foreign. @n "pril 66, 6778, the
petitioner applied for a renewal to operate thereof for another five years. The "ir %arrier "ccounts
4ystem and 5ield "udit ivision of the respondent 1oard recommended the granting of the petition,
provided that the position of president was transferred within thirty days from notice thereof,
otherwise the permit would be cancelled. uring the pendency of the case, the petitionerQs
authority to operate as an international airfreight forwarder as applied for under the permit in
+uestion e0pired in 6779. The petitioner likewise affirmed to this %ourt that the respondent 1oard
had already renewed the petitionerQs authority to operate as an *nternational "irfreight 5orwarder
for a period of five .9) years up to "pril 6(, (889. /as the 5ilipini#ation re+uirement complied with
when the 1oard renewed the petitionerCs authority to operate in our country'
YES. C)er)'0 the &n"tnt *et&t&on h" !ecome moot n$ c$em&c+ Th&" &" ev&$ent %rom the %ct
tht the *erm&t to o*erte " n &nternt&on) &r%re&ght %or(r$er the re"*on$ent @or$ "o#ght
to (&thho)$ %rom the *et&t&oner %or %&)&ng to meet the con"t&t#t&on) F&)&*&n&>t&on re1#&rement
h$ )re$' )*"e$ &n -<<H+ A)"o0 (&th the c#rrent rene() o% the *et&t&onerP" #thor&t' to
o*erte0 &t &" to !e ""#me$ tht &t h" %&n))' $ec&$e$ to com*)' (&th the c&t&>en"h&*
re1#&rement mn$te$ !' the con"t&t#t&on %or &t" )&ne o% !#"&ne""+ Un$er the c&rc#m"tnce"0
the $&"m&"") o% the c"e &" c)er)' (rrnte$ " the *et&t&oner no )onger h" n' )eg) &ntere"t
&n the *re"ent c"e+ 7ROJ.# C.R+O CORP. vs. CIVI# .)RO1.,*ICS BO.R&2 +.R. 1os. 9D@D;;-
;E. 3anuary >E2 >DD=:
6N. Respondent %"* undertook to develop its B9&hectare property into a residential and industrial
estate. The %"* filed an application under Republic "ct ,o. <AFF with the @ffice of the 3inister of
"grarian Reform for the conversion of a portion of the B9&hectare property consisting of <9.A8

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hectares covered by T%T ,o. N(7B( from agricultural to residential. @n ?uly <, 67B7, then 3inister
of "grarian Reform %onrado 5. =strella issued an @rder granting the petition. The P15"*&M"4"3",
representing the farmers&tenants, filed a complaint for 3aintenance of Peaceful Possession and
%ultivation with amages with Prayer for the *ssuance of a Temporary Restraining @rder and
Preliminary *n$unction before the epartment of "grarian Reform "d$udication 1oard ."R"1),
against the %"*. The plaintiffs therein alleged that since 67N6, its members had been in actual
possession of the (B&hectare property. *s the property sub$ect of the suit covered by R" NN9B, the
"grarian Reform -aw .%"R-)'
NO+ The *et&t&oner" conten$ tht the *ro*ert' "#!;ect o% the "#&t &" gr&c#)t#r) )n$F hence0
covere$ !' the CARL+ The content&on o% the *et&t&oner" h" no mer&t+ Un$er the "&$ )(0
gr&c#)t#r) )n$" re%er to )n$" $evote$ to gr&c#)t#re " con%erre$ &n the "&$ )( n$ not
c)""&%&e$ " &n$#"tr&) )n$+ Agr&c#)t#r) )n$" re on)' tho"e )n$" (h&ch re r!)e or "#&t!)e
)n$" tht $o not &nc)#$e commerc&)0 &n$#"tr&) n$ re"&$ent&) )n$"F &t cover" )) *r&vte )n$"
$evote$ to or "#&t!)e %or gr&c#)t#re regr$)e"" o% the gr&c#)t#r) *ro$#ct" r&"e$ or tht cn
!e r&"e$ thereon+ @#t )ong !e%ore the )( too9 e%%ect0 the *ro*ert' "#!;ect o% the "#&t h$
)re$' !een rec)""&%&e$ n$ converte$ %rom gr&c#)t#r) to nonBgr&c#)t#r) or re"&$ent&) )n$
!' the "ever) $m&n&"trt&ve genc&e"+ Ln$" not $evote$ to gr&c#)t#r) ct&v&t' re o#t"&$e
the coverge o% CARL+ The"e &nc)#$e )n$" *rev&o#")' converte$ to nonBgr&c#)t#r) #"e" *r&or
to the e%%ect&v&t' o% CARL !' government genc&e" other thn re"*on$ent DAR+ The *o(er o%
the )oc) government to convert or rec)""&%' )n$" to re"&$ent&) )n$" to nonBgr&c#)t#r) )n$"
rec)""&%&e$ &" not "#!;ect to the **rov) o% the De*rtment o% Agrr&n Re%orm+ When
Agrr&n Re%orm M&n&"ter Conr$o F+ E"tre)) con%&rme$ the rec)""&%&ct&on o% the *ro*ert' !'
the M#n&c&*) Co#nc&) o% Crmon to nonBgr&c#)t#r) )n$ (hen he **rove$0 on G#)' ?0 -<=<0
the **)&ct&on o% the *r&vte re"*on$entILDC %or the conver"&on o% ?H+./ hectre" o% the
*ro*ert' covere$ !' TCT No+ D,<=, &nto nonBgr&c#)t#r) )n$0 he $&$ "o *#r"#nt to h&"
#thor&t' #n$er Re*+ Act No+ ?.JJ0 " men$e$0 !' P+D+ No+ .-H n$ P+D+ No+ <JD. 7P.SO1+
B.J.B.S F.RM)RS .SSOC. )* .#. VS. CO,R* OF .PP).#S )* .#.2 +R 1OS. 9=>@;8 K 9=>8<D2
M.J >;2 >DD=:
OFFICE OF T2E OM@UDSMAN
6B. "fter conducting a preliminary investigation, the Eraft *nvestigator prepared a Resolution dated
?uly (A, 677B stating that there was probable cause for violation of 4ection <.g) of Republic "ct
<867, and recommending the filing of an *nformation against the malefactors for said crime. @n
@ctober ((, 677B, the corresponding *nformation was filed against said respondents with the 41.
The 41 found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of respondents and
accordingly, arrest warrants were issued against them. @n the same day, respondents filed with the
@ffice of the @mbudsman a 3otion for Reconsideration of its resolution dated ?uly (A, 677B but the
latter denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents with the ratiocination that the
filing of an *nformation before the 41 precluded said @ffice from still taking cogni#ance of said
motion. :ndaunted, respondents filed with the 41 on ,ovember (F, 677B a S?oint 3otion for
ReconsiderationGReinvestigationS with respect to the findings of the @ffice of the @mbudsman in its
Resolution dated ?uly (A, 677B. Petitioner 4almingo opposed the said motion and contended that it
was in effect and for all intents and purposes a second motion for reconsideration of the resolution
of the @ffice of the @mbudsman dated ?uly (A, 677B. De averred that the filing of a second motion
for reconsideration was proscribed by 4ection (B of Republic "ct NBB8 and "dministrative @rder ,o.
8B issued by the @ffice of the @mbudsman implementing said law. *s petitioner 4almingoCs
contention correct'
NO+ Contrr' to the content&on o% S)m&ngo0 the S@ $&$ not v&o)te Sect&on ,= o% Re*#!)&c Act
D==/ (hen &t trete$ the Mot&on %or Recon"&$ert&onIRe&nve"t&gt&on o% re"*on$ent" "
mot&on %or recon"&$ert&on #n$er Sect&on ,= o% Re*#!)&c Act D==/+ The recor$" "ho( tht the
O%%&ce o% the Om!#$"mn **rove$ the re"o)#t&on *re*re$ !' the 3r%t Inve"t&gtor %&n$&ng
*ro!!)e c#"e g&n"t re"*on$ent" %or v&o)t&on o% Sect&on ?Ee8 o% Re*#!)&c Act ?/-< on
Octo!er -=0 -<<=+ Con"e1#ent)'0 re"*on$ent" h$ %&ve $'" %rom not&ce o% "&$ re"o)#t&on
(&th&n (h&ch to %&)e the&r mot&on %or recon"&$ert&on+ Even ""#m&ng tht re"*on$ent" rece&ve$

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the %ore"&$ re"o)#t&on on Octo!er -=0 -<<=0 the' h$ #nt&) Octo!er ,,0 -<<= (&th&n (h&ch to
%&)e the&r mot&on %or recon"&$ert&on+ 2o(ever0 the O%%&ce o% the Om!#$"mn %&)e$ the
In%ormt&on g&n"t re"*on$ent" (&th the S@ on Octo!er ,,0 -<<=0 the )"t $' %or re"*on$ent"
to %&)e the&r mot&on %or recon"&$ert&on+ Ptent)'0 the O%%&ce o% the Om!#$"mn %&)e$ the
In%ormt&on *remt#re)'0 th#" $e*r&v&ng re"*on$ent" o% the&r r&ght to %&)e the&r mot&on %or
recon"&$ert&on " *rov&$e$ %or &n Sect&on ,= o% Re*#!)&c Act D==/+ @' &t" greement0 the
O%%&ce o% the Om!#$"mn mere)' correcte$ &t"e)% (hen &t c#rt)' $en&e$ the mot&on %or
recon"&$ert&onIre&nve"t&gt&on %&)e$ !' re"*on$ent" (&th the O%%&ce o% the Om!#$"mn %ter
rece&v&ng the re"o)#t&on o% the O%%&ce o% the Om!#$"mn $te$ G#)' ,.0 -<<= on the "o)e
gro#n$ tht the In%ormt&on h$ )re$' !een %&)e$ (&th the S@+ Wh&)e the O%%&ce o% the
Om!#$"mn h" the $&"cret&on to $eterm&ne (hether n In%ormt&on "ho#)$ !e (&th$r(n n$
cr&m&n) c"e "ho#)$ !e $&"m&""e$0 n$ to move %or the (&th$r() o% "#ch In%ormt&on or
$&"m&"") o% cr&m&n) c"e0 the %&n) $&"*o"&t&on o% the "&$ mot&on n$ o% the c"e &" $$re""e$
to the "o#n$ $&"cret&on o% the S@ "#!;ect on)' to the cvet tht the ct&on o% the S@ m#"t not
&m*&r the "#!"tnt&) r&ght" o% the cc#"e$ n$ o% the r&ght o% the Peo*)e to $#e *roce"" o%
)(. 7P)OP#) OF *() P(I#IPPI1)S .1& I+1.CIO S.#MI1+O VS. V)#)4 )* .#.2+.R. 1o. 9@<D8@.
February 982 >DD@:
PU@LIC OFFICERS
6A. ,R was arrested without a warrant of arrest and charged in the @ffice of the %ity Prosecutor
with violation of P ,o. 6ANN .possession of unlicensed firearm). Public Prosecutor 2%* conducted
an in+uest investigation of the case and issued a resolution recommending that the case be
dismissed for lack of probable cause. Dowever, Regional 4tate Prosecutor " decided to assume
$urisdiction over the case and to order the conduct of a new preliminary investigation thereof. R4P
" designated the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct the new preliminary investigation.
The "ssistant Regional 4tate Prosecutor issued a subpoena notifying ,R of the preliminary
investigation not only for violation of P 6ANN but also for the crimes of S>iolation of %@3=-=%
Resolution ,o. (<(< .gun ban), possession of deadly weapon and 3alicious 3ischief.
/hen served with the subpoena barely a week before the scheduled preliminary
investigation, ,R counsel forthwith filed with the RT% a petition for prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary in$unction. ,R alleged that under the 67AB
Revised "dministrative %ode and P 6(B9, a regional state prosecutor was vested only with
administrative supervision over the city prosecutor and had no power to motu proprio review,
revise, or modify the resolution of the city prosecutor on the latterQs conduct of a preliminary or
in+uest investigation of a criminal complaint filed directly therewith. *s R4P " empowered to motu
proprio take over and conduct a preliminary investigation of a case after the in+uest investigation
thereof had already been terminated and approved by city prosecutor.
NO+ RSP A cte$ (&tho#t #thor&t' n$ (&th grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on mo#nt&ng to e:ce"" or
)c9 o% ;#r&"$&ct&on (hen he too9 over $otu proprio the *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on o% I+S+ No+ <HB
/J? n$ or$ere$ ne( *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on thereo%F hence0 h&" ct#t&on" (ere n#))&t'+
In th&" c"e0 (hen RSP A $otu proprio too9 over the *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on o% the c"e %ter
the "me h$ )re$' !een $&"m&""e$ !' the c&t' *ro"ec#tor n$ or$ere$ the ""&"tnt reg&on)
"tte *ro"ec#tor to con$#ct *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on o% the c"e0 he e:erc&"e$ not on)'
$m&n&"trt&ve "#*erv&"&on !#t contro) over the c&t' *ro"ec#tor &n the *er%ormnce o% the
)tterP" 1#"&B;#$&c&) %#nct&on"+ The o%%&ce o% the reg&on) "tte *ro"ec#tor $oe" not con$#ct
n' *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on or *ro"ec#te n' cr&m&n) c"e &n co#rt t ))+ The !#)9 o% the
(or9 o% the o%%&ce o% the reg&on) "tte *ro"ec#tor con"&"t" o% $m&n&"trt&ve "#*erv&"&on over
c&t' or *rov&nc&) or c&t' %&"c)" n$ the&r ""&"tnt"+ The #thor&t' o% the reg&on) "tte
*ro"ec#tor" to *ro"ec#te or &nve"t&gte "*ec&%&c cr&m&n) c"e" (&th&n the reg&on *#r"#nt to
DO No+ ?-. cn !e e:erc&"e on)' #*on the $&rect&ve" o% the Secretr' o% G#"t&ce+ No $&rect&ve
h"t !een &""#e$ &n th&" c"e.7.,RI##O2 3R. vs 1O)# R.BI2 +.R. 1o. 9>DD9=. 1ove$ber >E2
>DD>:.
ELECTION LAW
67. ?4 filed a petition with the %@3=-=% against 43 and the proclaimed >ice&3ayor and 3unicipal
%ouncilors, as well as the members of the 3unicipal 1oard of %anvassers, to annul the elections and
the proclamation of candidates in the 3unicipality of 4aguiaran. ?4 alleged that there was a

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massive substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures in
Precincts ,os. 67, (8, (A and (7, and a failure of the 1oard of =lection *nspectors .1=*) to comply
with 4ections (A and (7 of %@3=-=% Resolution ,o. <BF< and 4ection 67< of the @mnibus =lection
%ode, thus rendering the election process in those precincts a sham and a mockery and the
proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity. *n his answer, 43 denied the truth of the
material allegations in the petition and averred that it raised a pre&proclamation controversy. 43
further alleged that the grounds relied upon by ?4 would be proper in an election protest but not in
a pre&proclamation controversy. The %@3=-=% =n 1anc took cogni#ance of the petition and issued
an order directing the =lection @fficer of 4aguiran, to bring to and produce before the %@3=-=%
@ffice in 3anila the original >RRs of the +uestioned precincts for technical e0amination. *n the
same order, the %@3=-=% declared that contrary to petitionerQs claims, the petition did not allege
a pre&proclamation controversy. The %ommission characteri#ed the petition as one for the
annulment of the election or declaration of failure of election in the municipality, a special action
covered by Rule (N of the %@3=-=% Rules of Procedure. "ccordingly, the %@3=-=% set aside the
docketing of the petition as a 4pecial %ase .4P%) and ordered the re&docketing thereof as a 4pecial
"ction .4P"). "fter its e0amination of the evidence submitted by ?4, the %@3=-=% concluded that
there was convincing proof of massive fraud in the conduct of the elections in the four .F) precincts
that necessitated a technical e0amination of the original copies of the >RRs and their comparison
with the votersQ signatures and fingerprints. 43 filed with the 4% the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule N9 of the 677B Rules of %ivil Procedure, as amended, praying for the reversal
of the order of the %@3=-=% =n 1anc. .a) whether or not 43Cs recourse to 4% under Rule N9 is in
orderH and .b) whether or not the petition filed by ?4 with the %@3=-=% is a pre&proclamation
controversy or a petition for the declaration of failure of election.
.8 YES+ The ""&)e$ or$er o% the COMELEC $ec)r&ng GS4" *et&t&on to !e one %or nn#)ment o%
the e)ect&on" or %or $ec)rt&on o% %&)#re o% e)ect&on" &n the m#n&c&*)&t' n$ or$er&ng the
*ro$#ct&on o% the or&g&n) co*&e" o% the ARR" %or the techn&c) e:m&nt&on &" $m&n&"trt&ve &n
nt#re+ R#)e DJ0 *roce$#r) $ev&ce %or the rev&e( o% %&n) or$er"0 re"o)#t&on" or $ec&"&on o%
the COMELEC0 $oe" not %orec)o"e reco#r"e to th&" Co#rt #n$er R#)e DH %rom $m&n&"trt&ve
or$er" o% "&$ Comm&""&on &""#e$ &n the e:erc&"e o% &t" $m&n&"trt&ve %#nct&on+
A" gener) r#)e0 n $m&n&"trt&ve or$er o% the COMELEC &" not *ro*er "#!;ect o% "*ec&)
c&v&) ct&on %or cert&orr&+ @#t (hen the COMELEC ct" c*r&c&o#")' or (h&m"&c))'0 (&th grve
!#"e o% $&"cret&on mo#nt&ng to )c9 or e:ce"" o% ;#r&"$&ct&on &n &""#&ng "#ch n or$er0 the
ggr&eve$ *rt' m' "ee9 re$re"" %rom th&" Co#rt v& "*ec&) c&v&) ct&on %or cert&orr& #n$er
R#)e DH o% the R#)e"+
E!8 NO+ The *et&t&on !e%ore the COMELEC $oe" not *o"e *reB*roc)mt&on controver"'+ PreB
*roc)mt&on controver"&e" re *ro*er)' )&m&te$ to ch))enge" $&recte$ g&n"t the @or$ o%
Cnv""er" n$ *rocee$&ng" !e%ore "&$ @or$ re)t&ng to *rt&c#)r e)ect&on ret#rn" to (h&ch
*r&vte re"*on$ent "ho#)$ hve m$e "*ec&%&c ver!) o!;ect&on" "#!"e1#ent)' re$#ce$ to
(r&t&ng+ The *rocee$&ng" re "#mmr' &n nt#reF th#"0 the rece*t&on o% ev&$ence aliunde2 e+g+
the or&g&n) co*&e" o% the ARR"0 &" *ro"cr&!e$+ In %&ne0 &n *reB*roc)mt&on *rocee$&ng"0 the
COMELEC &" not to )oo9 !e'on$ or !eh&n$ e)ect&on ret#rn" (h&ch re on the&r %ce reg#)r n$
#thent&c ret#rn"+ I""#e" "#ch " %r#$ or terror&"m tten$nt to the e)ect&on *roce""0 the
re"o)#t&on o% (h&ch (o#)$ com*e) or nece""&tte the COMELEC to *&erce the ve&) o% e)ect&on
ret#rn" (h&ch **er to !e *r&m %c&e reg#)r0 on the&r %ce0 re nthem to *reB
*roc)mt&on controver"'+ S#ch &""#e" "ho#)$ !e *o"e$ n$ re"o)ve$ &n reg#)r e)ect&on
*rote"t (&th&n the or&g&n) ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the Reg&on) Tr&) Co#rt+ For0 (henever
&rreg#)r&t&e"0 "#ch " %r#$0 re ""erte$0 the *ro*er co#r"e o% ct&on &" n e)ect&on *rote"t+
Ne&ther &" *r&vte re"*on$entP" *et&t&on !e%ore the COMELEC one %or $ec)rt&on o% %&)#re o%
e)ect&on"+ Wh&)e %r#$ &" gro#n$ to $ec)re %&)#re o% e)ect&on0 "#ch %r#$ m#"t !e one tht
*revent" or "#"*en$" the ho)$&ng o% n e)ect&on0 &nc)#$&ng the *re*rt&on n$ trn"m&""&on o%
the e)ect&on ret#rn"+ QF&)#re to e)ectQ m#"t !e #n$er"too$ &n &t" )&ter) "en"e R (h&ch &"0
no!o$' emerge" " (&nner+ EM.C.B.+O vs. COM)#)C2 +.R. 1o. 9;>9E@. 1ove$ber 9<2 >DD>:
(8. @n 3ay 7, 677N, 1 filed an election protest with the 6<th 3%T% -oay, 1ohol. Dowever, 1 failed
to append to her election protest a certification of non&forum shopping as mandated by 4upreme
%ourt "dministrative %ircular ,o. 8F&7F. @n 3ay (8, 677N, petitioner submitted to the court the
re+uisite %ertification of ,on&5orum 4hopping and filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss filed

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by % claiming that her failure to comply with 4upreme %ourt "dministrative %ircular ,o. 8F&7F was
merely a technical deficiency. The 3%T% granted the motion to dismiss of % and dismiss the
election protest of 1. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, insisting that the
failure to submit the re+uisite certification on non&forum shopping had already been cured when
the re+uisite certification was filed on 3ay (8, 677N but the 3%T% denied the motion. 1 filed with
the RT% a Petition for %ertiorari, Prohibition and 3andamus, for the nullification of the aforesaid
orders of the 3%T%. RT% dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. 6) id
3%T% err in dismissing the election protest because it has substantially comply with the
re+uirements of "dministrative %ircular 8F&87. () /as the proper remedy from the assailed orders
of the 3%T% a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule N9 of the Rules of %ourt
instead of an appeal to the %@3=-=%.
-+ NO+ Pet&t&onerP" re)&nce o% the *rono#ncement o% th&" Co#rt &n Lo'o) v"+ Co#rt o% A**e)"0
et )+0 &" m&"*)ce$+ In "&$ c"e0 the *rote"tnt "#!m&tte$ the re1#&"&te cert&%&ct&on (&th&n the
tenB$' *er&o$ %or the %&)&ng o% n e)ect&on *rote"t+ In th&" c"e0 *et&t&oner "#!m&tte$ to the
MCTC the re1#&"&te cert&%&ct&on on)' on M' ,/0 -<<D0 )ong %ter the )*"e o% the tenB$'
*er&o$ %or her to %&)e n e)ect&on *rote"t+ The "#!m&""&on !' *et&t&oner o% the re1#&"&te
cert&%&cte %ter the reg)ementr' tenB$' *er&o$ %or the %&)&ng o% n e)ect&on *rote"t $&$ not
o*erte " "#!"tnt&) com*)&nce (&th the C&rc#)r+
,+ NO+ The RTC correct)' $&"m&""e$ the *et&t&on %or cert&orr& %or the $$e$ re"on tht &t h$
no **e))te ;#r&"$&ct&on over "&$ *et&t&on+ Sect&on J< o% Re"o)#t&on No+ ,.,J o% the COMELEC
govern&ng the !rng' e)ect&on" on M' D0 -<<D0 *rom#)gte$ on Fe!r#r' D0 -<<D0 *rov&$e"
tht the COMELEC h" **e))te ;#r&"$&ct&on over $ec&"&on" o% the MCTC or MTC on e)ect&on
*rote"t"+ MCTC $&$ not comm&t grve !#"e o% $&"cret&on mo#nt&ng to )c9 or e:ce"" o%
;#r&"$&ct&on &n $&"m&""&ng the *rote"t %or her %&)#re to com*)' (&th A$m&n&"trt&ve C&rc#)r /JB
/<+ EB.*OJ vs R*C2 +.R. 1o. 9>E<@@. February 9?2 >DD@8+
(6. " criminal complaint for violation of 4ection (N6 .a) of the @mnibus =lection %ode .vote selling)
was filed against the witnesses of 5lorentino ". 1autista. The @ffice of the %avite Provincial
Prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaint, in his capacity as a deputy of
the petitioner. @n "pril 68, (888, the @ffice of the %avite Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution
finding probable cause against the respondents for violations of 4ection (N6 .a) and .b) of the
@mnibus =lection %ode, and filed separate *nformations against them with the RT% of %avite.
%@3=-=%, after due deliberation, resolved to defer the action and referred the same to the -aw
epartment for comment and recommendation. Dowever, the Provincial Prosecutor refused to give
way to the -egal @fficer of the petitioner and even opposed the said motion. /as the action of the
Provincial Prosecutor correct'
NO+ Un$er Art&c)e I60 Sect&on ,E!8 o% the Con"t&t#t&on0 the *et&t&oner &" em*o(ere$ to
&nve"t&gte n$0 (hen **ro*r&te0 *ro"ec#te e)ect&on o%%en"e"+ The grnt !' the Con"t&t#t&on
to the *et&t&oner o% the e:*re"" *o(er to &nve"t&gte n$ *ro"ec#te e)ect&on o%%en"e" &"
&nten$e$ to en!)e the *et&t&oner to ""#re the *eo*)e o% %&ne0 or$er)'0 hone"t0 *ece%#) n$
cre$&!)e e)ect&on+ Un$er Sect&on ,DH o% the Omn&!#" E)ect&on Co$e0 the *et&t&oner0 thro#gh &t"
$#)' #thor&>e$ )eg) o%%&cer"0 h" the e:c)#"&ve *o(er to con$#ct *re)&m&nr' &nve"t&gt&on o%
)) e)ect&on o%%en"e" *#n&"h!)e #n$er the Omn&!#" E)ect&on Co$e0 n$ to *ro"ec#te the "me+
The *et&t&oner m' v&) o% the ""&"tnce o% the *ro"ec#t&ng rm" o% the government+
The *ro"ec#tor" $e*#t&>e$ !' the *et&t&oner re "#!;ect to &t" #thor&t'0 contro) n$
"#*erv&"&on &n re"*ect o% the *rt&c#)r %#nct&on" covere$ !' "#ch $e*#tt&on+ The ct" o% "#ch
$e*#t&e" (&th&n the )(%#) "co*e o% the&r $e)egte$ #thor&t' re0 &n )eg) contem*)t&on0 the
ct" o% the *et&t&oner &t"e)%+ S#ch #thor&t' m' !e revo9e$ or (&th$r(n n' t&me !' the
*et&t&oner0 e&ther e:*re"")' or &m*)&e$)'0 (hen &n &t" ;#$gment "#ch revoct&on or (&th$r() &"
nece""r' to *rotect the &ntegr&t' o% the *roce"" to *romote the common goo$0 or (here &t
!e)&eve" tht "#cce""%#) *ro"ec#t&on o% the c"e cn !e $one !' the *et&t&oner+ Moreover0 !e&ng
mere $e*#t&e" or gent" o% the *et&t&oner0 *rov&nc&) or c&t' *ro"ec#tor" $e*#t&>e$ !' the
*et&t&oner re e:*ecte$ to ct &n ccor$ (&th n$ not contrr' to or &n $erogt&on o% the
re"o)#t&on"0 $&rect&ve" or or$er" o% the *et&t&oner &n re)t&on to e)ect&on c"e" "#ch *ro"ec#tor"
re $e*#t&>e$ to &nve"t&gte n$ *ro"ec#te+ Other(&"e0 the on)' o*t&on o% "#ch *rov&nc&) or
c&t' *ro"ec#tor &" to "ee9 re)&e% %rom the *et&t&oner " &t" $e*#t'+ 7COM)#)C vs. (O1.
)SP.1O#2 +.R. 1O. 9=89E=-?@2 &ece$ber 9D2 >DD@:

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San Beda
College of Law
P O L I T I C A L
L A W
((. "rsenio -atasa was elected mayor of the 3unicipality of igos, avao del 4ur in the elections of
677(, 6779 and 677A. uring his third term, the 3unicipality of igos was declared a component
city, to be known as the %ity of igos. This event also marked the end of petitionerQs tenure as
mayor of the 3unicipality of igos. Dowever, under 4ection 9<, "rticle *X of the %harter, petitioner
was mandated to serve in a hold&over capacity as mayor of the new %ity of igos. Dence, he took
his oath as the city mayor.
@n 5ebruary (A, (886, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the
3ay 6F, (886 elections. De stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the 3unicipality of igos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor. Private respondent Romeo 3. 4unga, also a
candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the %@3=-=% a Petition to eny ue
%ourse, %ancel %ertificate of %andidacy andGor 5or is+ualification against petitioner -atasa 4unga
alleging therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to run as mayor of igos %ity since petitioner had already been elected and served for three
consecutive terms as mayor from 677( to (886.
a. *s petitioner -atasa dis+ualified from running as %ity 3ayor'
b. /ho must be proclaimed %ity 3ayor'

+ YES+ A)tho#gh the ne( c&t' c1#&re$ ne( cor*orte e:&"tence "e*rte n$ $&"t&nct %rom
tht o% the m#n&c&*)&t'+ Th&" $oe" not men0 ho(ever0 tht %or the *#r*o"e o% **)'&ng the
"#!;ect Con"t&t#t&on) *rov&"&on0 the o%%&ce o% the m#n&c&*) m'or (o#)$ no( !e con"tr#e$ "
$&%%erent )oc) government *o"t " tht o% the o%%&ce o% the c&t' m'or+ A" "tte$ er)&er0 the
terr&tor&) ;#r&"$&ct&on o% the C&t' o% D&go" &" the "me " tht o% the m#n&c&*)&t'+
Con"e1#ent)'0 the &nh!&tnt" o% the m#n&c&*)&t' re the "me " tho"e &n the c&t'+ The"e
&nh!&tnt" re the "me gro#* o% voter" (ho e)ecte$ *et&t&oner Lt" to !e the&r m#n&c&*)
m'or %or three con"ec#t&ve term"+ The"e re )"o the "me &nh!&tnt" over (hom he he)$
*o(er n$ #thor&t' " the&r ch&e% e:ec#t&ve %or n&ne 'er"+
!+ Th&" Co#rt h" con"&"tent)' r#)e$ tht the %ct tht *)#r)&t' or m;or&t' o% the vote" re
c"t %or n &ne)&g&!)e cn$&$te t *o*#)r e)ect&on0 or tht cn$&$te &" )ter $ec)re$ to !e
$&"1#)&%&e$ to ho)$ o%%&ce0 $oe" not ent&t)e the cn$&$te (ho grnere$ the "econ$ h&ghe"t
n#m!er o% vote" to !e $ec)re$ e)ecte$+ The "me mere)' re"#)t" &n m9&ng the (&nn&ng
cn$&$teP" e)ect&on n#))&t'+ In the *re"ent c"e0 moreover0 -?0DH/ vote" (ere c"t %or
*r&vte re"*on$ent S#ng " g&n"t the ,H0??H vote" c"t %or *et&t&oner Lt"+ The "econ$
*)cer &" o!v&o#")' not the cho&ce o% the *eo*)e &n tht *rt&c#)r e)ect&on+ In n' event0
*ermnent vcnc' &n the conte"te$ o%%&ce &" there!' crete$ (h&ch "ho#)$ !e %&))e$ !'
"#cce""&on+ 7#.*.S. vs. COM)#)C2 +.R. 1O. 9;=<>82 &ece$ber 9D2 >DD@:
(<. "T filed a petition to declare failure of elections in all the precincts in the 3unicipality of -uuk,
Province of 4ulu. "cting on said motion, %@3=-=% issued an order suspending the proclamation of
the winning candidates. Dowever, the Provincial 1oard of %anvassers was not served with a copy of
the order. %onse+uently, the respondents were proclaimed as the winning candidates for the
position of Eovernor, >ice&Eovernor and 1oard 3embers. *s there a basis for filing an action for
failure of elections'
NO+ In the&r men$e$ *et&t&on" !e%ore the *#!)&c re"*on$ent0 &t (" "#!"tnt&))' ))ege$ tht
the re"*on$ent" (ere the $#)' *roc)&me$ (&nn&ng cn$&$te"F tht the e)ect&on" &n the
M#n&c&*)&t&e" o% L##90 Prng n$ In$nn0 Prov&nce o% S#)#0 (ere mrre$ !' m""&ve
"#!"t&t#t&on o% voter"0 %r#$0 terror&"m n$ other nom)&e"0 &m*e))&ng them to %&)e the&r
*et&t&on" *#r"#nt to Sect&on J o% Re*+ Act No+ =-DD &n re)t&on to Sect&on D0 Omn&!#" E)ect&on
Co$e0 n$ re&terte$ &n Sect&on ,0 R#)e ,D ,D o% the -<<? COMELEC R#)e" o% Proce$#re0 "
men$e$+ @#t Sect&on D o% the Omn&!#" E)ect&on Co$e )'" $o(n three &n"tnce" (here
%&)#re o% e)ect&on m' !e $ec)re$0 nme)'0 E-8 the e)ect&on &n n' *o))&ng *)ce h" not !een
he)$ on the $te %&:e$ on cco#nt o% force $a6eure0 v&o)ence0 terror&"m0 %r#$ or other
n)ogo#" c#"e"F E,8 the e)ect&on &n n' *o))&ng *)ce h" !een "#"*en$e$ !e%ore the ho#r
%&:e$ !' )( %or the c)o"&ng o% the vot&ng on cco#nt o% %orce m;e#re0 v&o)ence0 terror&"m0
%r#$ or other n)ogo#" c#"e"F or E?8 %ter the vot&ng n$ $#r&ng the *re*rt&on n$
trn"m&""&on o% the e)ect&on ret#rn" or &n the c#"to$' or cnv"" thereo%0 "#ch e)ect&on re"#)t"
&n %&)#re to e)ect on cco#nt o% force $a6eure0 v&o)ence0 terror&"m0 %r#$ or other n)ogo#"

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c"e"+ In )) &n"tnce" there m#"t hve !een %&)#re to e)ect+ Th&" &" o!v&o#" &n the %&r"t t(o
"cenr&o"0 (here the e)ect&on (" not he)$ n$ (here the e)ect&on (" "#"*en$e$+ A" to the
th&r$ "cenr&o0 the *re*rt&on n$ the trn"m&""&on o% the e)ect&on ret#rn"0 (h&ch g&ve r&"e to
the con"e1#ence o% %&)#re to e)ect0 m#"t " %ore"&$ !e )&ter))' &nter*rete$ to men tht
Qno!o$' emerge$ " (&nner+Q
2ence0 !e%ore the COMELEC cn ct on ver&%&e$ *et&t&on "ee9&ng to $ec)re %&)#re o%
e)ect&on"0 t(o con$&t&on" m#"t conc#r0 nme)'0 E-8 no vot&ng too9 *)ce &n the *rec&nct or
*rec&nct" on the $te %&:e$ !' )(0 or even &% there (" vot&ng0 the e)ect&on re"#)te$ &n
%&)#re to e)ectF n$ E,8 the vote" not c"t (o#)$ hve %%ecte$ the re"#)t o% the e)ect&on+ Note
tht the c#"e o% "#ch %&)#re o% e)ect&on co#)$ on)' !e n' o% the %o))o(&ng: %orce m;e#re0
v&o)ence0 terror&"m0 %r#$ or other n)ogo#" c#"e"+ 7*.1 vs. COM)#)C2 +.R. 1O. 9=<;?;-?E2
&ece$ber 9D2 >DD@:
(F. uring the 3ay 6F, (886 elections, 1ai 4usan ". 4amad, 4alipongan *. agloc and Mennedy
ilangalen were among the mayoralty candidates in the 3unicipality of Mabuntalan, Province of
3aguindanao. uring the canvassing of the election returns for the 3unicipality of Mabuntalan,
4amad, agloc and ilangalen filed their respective ob$ections and oppositions to the inclusion or
e0clusion from the canvass of certain election returns from several precincts. 4amad contested the
inclusion of the election returns from all of 1rgy. 1agumbayan, on the grounds that! .a) the returns
were tampered and falsified, and .b) the returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion
and intimidation. %@3=-=% in its resolution invalidated the %ertificate of %anvass. *s the action of
%@3-=-=% proper'
NO+ The *o)&c' con"&$ert&on #n$er)'&ng the $e)&m&tt&on o% !oth "#!"tnt&ve gro#n$ n$ )eg)
*roce$#re &" the *o)&c' to $eterm&ne " 1#&c9)' " *o""&!)e the re"#)t o% the e)ect&on on the
!"&" o% the cnv""+ The *rev&)&ng $octr&ne &n th&" ;#r&"$&ct&on0 there%ore0 &" tht " )ong "
the ret#rn" **er to !e #thent&c0 n$ $#)' ccom*)&"he$ on the&r %ce0 the @or$ o%
Cnv""er" cnnot )oo9 !e'on$ or !eh&n$ them to ver&%' ))egt&on" o% &rreg#)r&t&e" &n the
c"t&ng n$ co#nt&ng o% the vote"+
O#tr&ght e:c)#"&on o% e)ect&on ret#rn" on the gro#n$ tht the' (ere %r#$#)ent)'
*re*re$ !' "ome mem!er" or nonBmem!er" o% the @EI $&"en%rnch&"e" the voter"+ 2ence0
(hen e)ect&on ret#rn" re %o#n$ to !e "*#r&o#" or %)"&%&e$0 Sect&on ,?H o% the Omn&!#"
E)ect&on Co$e *rov&$e" the *roce$#re (h&ch en!)e" the COMELEC to "cert&n the (&)) o% the
e)ectorte+
The COMELEC0 there%ore0 grve)' !#"e$ &t" $&"cret&on (hen &t e:c)#$e$ o#tr&ght the
"#!;ect e)ect&on ret#rn" %ter %&n$&ng tht the' (ere %r#$#)ent ret#rn"+ In"te$0 the COMELEC
"ho#)$ hve %o))o(e$ the *roce$#re )&$ $o(n &n Sect&on ,?H o% the Omn&!#" E)ect&on Co$e: Q+ +
+ The Comm&""&on "h)) then0 %ter g&v&ng not&ce to )) cn$&$te" concerne$ n$ %ter "t&"%'&ng
&t"e)% tht noth&ng &n the !))ot !o: &n$&cte tht &t" &$ent&t' n$ &ntegr&t' hve !een v&o)te$0
or$er the o*en&ng o% the !))ot !o: n$0 )&9e(&"e %ter "t&"%'&ng &t"e)% tht the &ntegr&t' o% the
!))ot" there&n h" !een $#)' *re"erve$ "h)) or$er the !or$ o% e)ect&on &n"*ector" to reco#nt
the vote" o% the cn$&$te" %%ecte$ n$ *re*re ne( ret#rn (h&ch "h)) then !e #"e$ !' the
!or$ o% cnv""er" " !"&" o% the cnv""+Q 7&.+#OC vs. COM)#)C2 +R 1O 9;===>-=?2
&ece$ber 9D2 >DD@:
(9. The petitioners and the private respondents in the case are candidates for the members of the
4angguniang ng 1ayan elections in Palimbang, 4ultan, Mudarat. @n 3ay (8, (886, the 3unicipal
1oard of %anvasser of Palimbang issued %ertificate of %anvass of >otes and Proclamation .%@%>P)
,o. A8<668A which contained, inter alia, the petitioners as winners. The said candidates took their
oath, and assumed their offices on ?une <8, (886 F as members of the 4angguniang 1ayan of
Palimbang.
The ne0t day, 3ay (6, (886, the 3unicipal 1oard of %anvassers of Palimbang issued %@%>P
,o. A8<6687 which listed the private respondents as winners. The matter was then investigated
and resolved the issue finding that the private respondents were the winning candidates. The
%@3=-=% approved it. PetitionersC +uestioned this contending that they were not afforded due
process. %@3=-=% on the other hand asserted that the twin re+uirement of notice and hearing in
annulment of proclamation is not applicable since the proclamation is null and void, citing :tto vs.
%ommission on =lections. /as the %@3=-=% correct in dispensing notice and hearing since the
proclamation was null and void'

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NO+ Wh&)e &t &" tr#e tht the COMELEC &" ve"te$ (&th !ro$ *o(er to en%orce )) e)ect&on
)("0 the "me &" "#!;ect to the r&ght o% the *rt&e" to $#e *roce""+ In th&" c"e0 the *et&t&oner"
h$ !een *roc)&me$ " the (&nn&ng cn$&$te" n$ h$ ""#me$ the&r o%%&ce+ S&nce then0 the'
h$ !een e:erc&"&ng the&r r&ght" n$ *er%orm&ng the&r $#t&e" " mem!er" o% the Sngg#n&ng
@'n o% P)&m!ng0 S#)tn K#$rt+ The&r *roc)mt&on on M' ,/0 ,//- en;o'" the
*re"#m*t&on o% reg#)r&t' n$ v)&$&t' "&nce no conte"t or *rote"t (" even %&)e$ ""&)&ng the
"me+ The *et&t&oner" cnnot !e remove$ %rom o%%&ce (&tho#t $#e *roce"" o% )(+ D#e *roce""
&n the *rocee$&ng" !e%ore the *#!)&c re"*on$ent e:erc&"&ng &t" 1#"&B;#$&c&) %#nct&on"0 re1#&re"
$#e not&ce n$ her&ng0 mong other"+ Th#"0 )tho#gh the COMELEC *o""e""e"0 &n **ro*r&te
c"e"0 the *o(er to nn#) or "#"*en$ the *roc)mt&on o% n' cn$&$te0 (e )"o r#)e$ &n
Fari5as vs. Co$$ission on )lections2 Reyes vs. Co$$ission on )lections and +allardo vs.
Co$$ission on )lections tht the COMELEC &" (&tho#t *o(er to *rt&))' or tot))' nn#)
*roc)mt&on or "#"*en$ the e%%ect" o% *roc)mt&on (&tho#t not&ce n$ her&ng+ 71.MI#2
et.al. vs. COM)#)C2 et.al. +.R. 1o. 9;D;=D. October ><2 >DD@:
PART IA : @ARBTYPE QUESTIONS: @ASED ON LOWER COURT
POLITICAL LAW DECISIONS T2AT 2AAE @EEN AFFIRMED
@Y T2E SC
RE3IONAL TRIAL COURT:
-+ 3r. 3arti, a foreigner, delivered a package to the cargo forwarding business of 3r. Reyes so that
it can be sent to the formerCs friend in 4wit#erland. 3r. Reyes sought to inspect the package but
3r. 3arti refused. Dowever before the package was delivered to the 1ureau of %ustoms, 3r. Reyes
conducted a final inspection of the packages in his possession, and he found mari$uana in the
package of 3r. 3arti. De then informed the ,1* of what he found and invited them to his place of
business. :pon the ,1* agents arrival he open in their presence 3r. 3artiCs package and it was
confirmed that it contained mari$uana leaves. 3r. 3arti was charged of a violation of the
angerous rugs "ct. De was later convicted by then ?udge %alle$o, 4r..now 4upreme %ourt
?ustice). 3r. 3arti contends that he was wrongfully convicted of the crime, because the
contraband was obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
sei#ure.
". /as the search conducted by 3r. Reyes, a private person, a violation of 3r. 3artiCs right'
1. /as the search conducted converted into an illegal search by the mere presence of ,1* agents
when the bo0 was opened'
%. oes the 1ill of Rights govern the relationships between individuals'
A+ NO+ The con"t&t#t&on) *ro"cr&*t&on g&n"t #n)(%#) "erche" n$ "e&>#re" co#)$ on)' !e
&nvo9e$ g&n"t the Stte to (hom the re"tr&nt g&n"t r!&trr' n$ #nre"on!)e e:erc&"e o%
*o(er &" &m*o"e$+
I% the "erch &" m$e #*on the re1#e"t o% )( en%orcer"0 (rrnt m#"t gener))' !e
%&r"t "ec#re$ &% &t &" to *"" the te"t o% con"t&t#t&on)&t'+ 2o(ever0 &% the "erch &" m$e t the
!ehe"t or &n&t&t&ve o% the *ro*r&etor o% *r&vte e"t!)&"hment %or &t" o(n n$ *r&vte
*#r*o"e"0 " &n the c"e t !r0 n$ (&tho#t the &ntervent&on o% *o)&ce #thor&t&e"0 the r&ght
g&n"t #nre"on!)e "erch n$ "e&>#re cnnot !e &nvo9e$ %or on)' the ct o% *r&vte
&n$&v&$#)0 not the )( en%orcer"0 &" &nvo)ve$+ In "#m0 the *rotect&on g&n"t #nre"on!)e
"erche" n$ "e&>#re" cnnot !e e:ten$e$ to ct" comm&tte$ !' *r&vte &n$&v&$#)" "o " to
!r&ng &t (&th&n the m!&t o% ))ege$ #n)(%#) &ntr#"&on !' the government+
@+ NO+ The mere *re"ence o% the N@I gent" $&$ not convert the re"on!)e "erch e%%ecte$ !'
Re'e" &nto (rrnt)e"" "erch n$ "e&>#re *ro"cr&!e$ !' the Con"t&t#t&on+ Mere)' to o!"erve
n$ )oo9 t tht (h&ch &" &n *)&n "&ght &" not "erch+ 2v&ng o!"erve$ tht (h&ch &" o*en0
(here no tre"*"" h" !een comm&tte$ &n &$ thereo%0 &" not "erch+ Where the contr!n$
rt&c)e" re &$ent&%&e$ (&tho#t tre"*"" on the *rt o% the rre"t&ng o%%&cer0 there &" not the
"erch tht &" *roh&!&te$ !' the Con"t&t#t&on+

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C+ NO+ The @&)) o% R&ght" govern" the re)t&on"h&* !et(een the &n$&v&$#) n$ the "tte+ It"
concern &" not the re)t&on !et(een &n$&v&$#)"0 !et(een *r&vte &n$&v&$#) n$ other
&n$&v&$#)"+ Wht the @&)) o% R&ght" $oe" &" to $ec)re "ome %or!&$$en >one" &n the *r&vte
"*here &ncce""&!)e to n' *o(er ho)$er+ 7P)OP#) VS. M.R*I2 +.R. 1o. <9;E9. 3anuary 9<2
9889:
,: 3arlo was immediately sub$ected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of his friend in
Tayabas, Jue#on. De was then brought to the Tayabas Police 4tation where he was further
+uestioned. "nd while on their way to 3anila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating
information. *n all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his
participation therein. *n all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel. De now +uestions the
admissibility of his e0tra$udicial confession contending that he was not appraised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel. @n the other hand the prosecution contends
that the constitutional infirmity was cured by the fact that the 3arloCs lawyer was there when the
e0tra $udicial confession was signed.
". /ould the failure to inform 3arlo of his constitutional rights and absence of his lawyer render
the e0tra $udicial confession inadmissible'
1. "re the constitutional infirmities cured by the belated arrival of 3arloCs lawyer'
A+ Ye"+ At the t&me *er"on &" rre"te$0 &t "h)) !e the $#t' o% the rre"t&ng o%%&cer to &n%orm
h&m o% the re"on %or the rre"t n$ he m#"t !e "ho(n the (rrnt o% rre"t0 &% n'+ 2e "h)) !e
&n%orme$ o% h&" con"t&t#t&on) r&ght" to rem&n "&)ent n$ to co#n"e)0 n$ tht n' "ttement he
m&ght m9e co#)$ !e #"e$ g&n"t h&m+ The *er"on rre"te$ "h)) hve the r&ght to
comm#n&cte (&th h&" )('er0 re)t&ve0 or n'one he choo"e" !' the mo"t e:*e$&ent men" R
!' te)e*hone &% *o""&!)e R or !' )etter or me""enger+ It "h)) !e the re"*on"&!&)&t' o% the
rre"t&ng o%%&cer to "ee to &t tht th&" &" ccom*)&"he$+ No c#"to$&) &nve"t&gt&on "h)) !e
con$#cte$ #n)e"" &t !e &n the *re"ence o% co#n"e) engge$ !' the *er"on rre"te$0 !' n'
*er"on on h&" !eh)%0 or **o&nte$ !' the co#rt #*on *et&t&on e&ther o% the $et&nee h&m"e)% or
!' n'one on h&" !eh)% + + + An' "ttement o!t&ne$ &n v&o)t&on o% the *roce$#re here&n )&$
$o(n0 (hether e:c#)*tor' or &nc#)*tor'0 &n (ho)e or &n *rt0 "h)) !e &n$m&""&!)e &n
ev&$ence+
@+ NO+ The !e)te$ rr&v) o% the Mr)o4" )('er the %o))o(&ng $' even &% *r&or to the ct#)
"&gn&ng o% the #nco#n"e)e$ con%e""&on $oe" not c#re the $e%ect %or the &nve"t&gtor" (ere
)re$' !)e to e:trct &ncr&m&ntor' "ttement" %rom cc#"e$B**e))nt+ The o*ert&ve ct0 &t
h" !een "tre""e$0 &" (hen the *o)&ce &nve"t&gt&on &" no )onger gener) &n1#&r' &nto n
#n"o)ve$ cr&me !#t h" !eg#n to %oc#" on *rt&c#)r "#"*ect (ho h" !een t9en &nto c#"to$'
!' the *o)&ce to crr' o#t *roce"" o% &nterrogt&on tht )en$" &t"e)% to e)&c&t&ng &ncr&m&ntor'
"ttement"0 n$ not the "&gn&ng !' the "#"*ect o% h&" "#**o"e$ e:tr;#$&c&) con%e""&on+
A$m&""&on" o!t&ne$ $#r&ng c#"to$&) &nterrogt&on" (&tho#t the !ene%&t o% co#n"e) )tho#gh
)ter re$#ce$ to (r&t&ng n$ "&gne$ &n the *re"ence o% co#n"e) re "t&)) %)(e$ #n$er the
Con"t&t#t&on+ 7P)OP#) VS. COMPI#2 +.R. 1o. 8;D><. May 9;2 988;:
?+ 1ased on a confidential information that Pedro is engaged in selling shabu, and in possession of
firearms and ammunitions without the necessary license ,1* "gent Tim, conducted a surveillance
on the vicinity of PedroQs residence. "fter confirming said confidential information, "gent Tim
applied for the issuance of search warrants before the Regional Trial %ourt of 3anila. The court
issued the search warrant applied for and the same was served. *llegal drugs and unlicensed
firearms were sei#ed from PedroCs house. De now +uestions the legality of the search warrant,
claiming that the applicant, "gent Tim, does not have personal knowledge of his alleged illegal
activities and hence his testimony is not sufficient for the issuance of the said warrants. %an it be
said that "gent Tim has personal knowledge sufficient to $ustify the issuance of the search warrant'
YES+ In $eterm&n&ng *ro!!)e c#"e &n the &""#nce o% "erch (rrnt0 the oth re1#&re$
m#"t re%er to the tr#th o% the %ct" (&th&n the *er"on) 9no()e$ge o% the **)&cnt or h&"
(&tne""e"0 !ec#"e the *#r*o"e thereo% &" to conv&nce the comm&tt&ng mg&"trte0 not the
&n$&v&$#)0 m9&ng the %%&$v&t n$ "ee9&ng the &""#nce o% the (rrnt0 o% the e:&"tence o%
*ro!!)e c#"e+
In the c"e t !r0 N@I Agent T&m (ho **)&e$ %or the &""#nce o% Serch Wrrnt0 h$
*er"on) 9no()e$ge o% the c&rc#m"tnce" on (h&ch the (rrnt" (ere !"e$+ A$m&tte$)'0

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Re;noP" 9no()e$ge o% *et&t&onerP" &))eg) *o""e""&on o% %&rerm" n$ *roh&!&te$ $r#g" cme
%rom con%&$ent&) &n%ormnt0 n$ there%ore0 &n&t&))' her"'+ Neverthe)e""0 the "#rve&))nce
n$ &nve"t&gt&on he con$#cte$ on the !"&" o% "&$ con%&$ent&) &n%ormt&on en!)e$ h&m to
g&n *er"on) 9no()e$ge o% the &))eg) ct&v&t&e" o% Pe$ro+ 2ence0 h&" te"t&mon' (" "#%%&c&ent
;#"t&%&ct&on %or the e:m&n&ng ;#$ge to conc)#$e tht there (" *ro!!)e c#"e %or the
&""#nce o% "erch (rrnt+ 7C,PC,PI1 VS. P)OP#)2 +.R. 1o. 9@>@<8. 1ove$ber 982 >DD>:
COURT OF APPEALS
J+ The ,D" sought to e0propriate the land owned by *sidro and the trial court found that it has the
right to e0propriate the land. 4ociali#ed housing has been recogni#ed as public use for purposes of
e0ercising the power of eminent domain. The trial court fi0ed in an order that the $ust
compensation for the sub$ect property to be P66,(88.88 per s+uare meter. Dowever after
sometime ,D" moved that the e0propriation proceedings be dismissed citing that the
implementation of its sociali#ed housing pro$ect was rendered impossible by the unconscionable
value of the land sought to be e0propriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not afford.
". /hat are the stages in e0propriation proceedings'
1. %an the 4tate be compelled or coerced by the courts to e0ercise the power of eminent
domain in the case at bar'
%. "re the funds of the ,D" sub$ect to garnishment'
A+ =0propriation proceedings consists of two stages! first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its ac+uisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of $ust compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
@+ Ye"+ The right of the plaintiff to dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally
recogni#ed with certain well&defined e0ceptions. The dismissal of an action for eminent domain at
the instance of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case is permissible. Dowever the rule is
different where the case had been decided and the $udgment had already become final and
e0ecutory.
Respondent landowners had already been pre$udiced by the e0propriation case. Petitioner
,D" cannot be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to
abandon it later when it finds the amount of $ust compensation unacceptable. *t is arbitrary and
capricious for a government agency to initiate e0propriation proceedings, sei#e a personQs property,
allow the $udgment of the court to become final and e0ecutory and then refuse to pay on the
ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. /e
condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt
such a despotic and irresponsible stance.
C+ Ye"+ The universal rule that where the 4tate gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimantQs action Sonly up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of e0ecutionS and that the power of the %ourts ends when the
$udgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be sei#ed under writs of
e0ecution or garnishment to satisfy such $udgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. isbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
re+uired by law.
Dowever, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government&owned or controlled
corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the
government, then its funds are not e0empt from garnishment. This is so because when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
treated like any other corporation.
The ,D" having a $uridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the
funds of such government&owned and controlled corporations and non&corporate agency, although
considered public in character, are not e0empt from garnishment. 71(. VS. ()IRS OF
+,IV)#O1&O K C.2 +.R. 1O. 9;==99. 3,1) 982 >DD@:

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PART A : DOCTRINES OF LANDMARK CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTION OF T2E P2ILIPPINES
The grant to %ongress as a %onstituent "ssembly of such plenary authority to call a
constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other
powers essential to the effective e0ercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fi0
the +ualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates, as well as
appropriation of funds to meet e0penses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the
%onstitutional %onvention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful
convention.
/hile the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present %onstitution
solely and e0clusively in %ongress acting as a %onstituent "ssembly, the power to enact the
implementing details does not e0clusively pertain to %ongress acting as a %onstituent "ssembly.
4uch implementing details are matters within the competence of %ongress in the e0ercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not e0pressly or be
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the %onstitution from the ambit of legislative
action.
%onse+uently, when %ongress, acting as a %onstituent "ssembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, %ongress, acting as a legislative
body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps. (IMBO1+ V. COM)#)C
7@; SCR. >< B98?DC:
CONCEPT OF T2E STATE
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant, it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government. The sovereignty vested in the titular government .which is
the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be
distinguished from the e0ercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed or severed
and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended without putting it out of e0istence or
divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so&called period of suspension. /hat may be
suspended is the e0ercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. "s a corollary of the
conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation,
the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and
therefore, there is no such thing as suspended allegiance. #.,R)# V. MIS. 7?? Pil <;E B98=?C:
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a
misconception that the two terms are synonymous. 4uability depends on the consent of the state to
be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liableH on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it
does not first consent to be sued. -iability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. /hen the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The said article ."rticle (6A8, ,%%) establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The
government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of
the accepted forms of consent. ,S. V. +,I1*O 79<> SCR. E== B988DC:
The traditional rule of 4tate immunity e0empts a 4tate from being sued in the courts of
another 4tate without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary conse+uence of the principles
of independence and e+uality of 4tates. Dowever, the rules of *nternational, -aw are not petrifiedH

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they are constantly developing and evolving. "nd because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been, necessary to distinguish them&between sovereign and governmental acts .jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The restrictive application of 4tate immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
4tated differently, a 4tate may be said to have descended the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts *t
does not apply where the contract relates to the e0ercise of its sovereign functions. 7,S. V. R,I4
79@E SCR. =<? B98<;C:
The -abor %ode, in relation to "ct ,o. <8A<, provides the legal basis for the 4tate liability
but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with
the rules and procedures laid down in %.". <(B, as amended by P.. 6FF9. E&)P.R*M)1* OF
.+RIC,#*,R) V. 1#RC 7>>? SCR. E8@ B988@C:
3unicipal corporations, for e0ample, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the 4tate
when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should en$oy the sovereign
immunity from suit. ,evertheless, they are sub$ect to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
" distinction should first be made between suability and liability. S4uability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liableH on the other hand. it
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. -iability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. /hen the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.S
.:nited 4tates of "merica v. Euinto, supra, p. N97&NN8) 7M,1ICIP.#I*J OF S.1 F)R1.1&O2 #.
,1IO1 V. FIRM) 798; SCR. E8> B9889C:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
"s regards the +uestion whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the %onstitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in 4ection ( of "rticle >*** thereof, that the 4upreme %ourt may not be
deprived Sof its $urisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or
writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final $udgments and decrees of inferior
courts in & .6) "ll cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
e0ecutive order or regulation is in +uestionS. *n other words, our %onstitution authori#es the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of %ongress. E+O14.#)S V. ()C(.1OV. 78 SCR. >@D B98E@C:
4ocial $ustice is Sneither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,S but the
humani#ation of laws and the e+uali#ation of social and economic forces by the 4tate so that
$ustice in its rational and ob$ectively secular conception may at least be appro0imated. 4ocial
$ustice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Eovernment of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social e+uilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally $ustifiable, or e0tra&
constitutionally, through the e0ercise of powers underlying the e0istence of all governments on the
time&honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
4ocial $ustice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
e+ually and evenly e0tended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount ob$ective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and +uiet of all persons, and of bringing about Sthe greatest good to the greatest number.
EC.#.#.1+ V. -I##.MS 7?D Pil ?>E B98=DC:
Petitioners minors assist that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. /e find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, the others of generation and

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for proceedings class sum of their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to and healthful
ecology is concerned. 4uch a right, as hereinafter e0pounded, considers the Srhythm and harmony
of nature.S ,ature means the created world in its entirety. 4uch rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the $udicious disposition, utili#ation, management, renewal and conservation of
the countryQs forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off&shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their e0ploration, development and utili#ation be e+uitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. ,eedless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the ne0t to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full en$oyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minorsQ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come. EOPOS. V. F.C*OR.1 7>>= SCR. ?8> B988@C:
,ow, autonomy is either decentrali#ation of administration or decentrali#ation of power.
There is decentrali#ation of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments Smore responsive and accountable,S and Sensure their fullest
development as self&reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.S "t the same time, it relieves the central government of
the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President e0ercises Sgeneral supervisionS over them, but only to Sensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.S De has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their $udgments with his own.
ecentrali#ation of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. *n that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. "ccording to a constitutional author, decentrali#ation of power amounts to
Sself&immolation,S since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency. #IMBO1.S V. M.1+)#I1 79?D SCR. ?<E B98<8C:
The authority to regulate the manner of e0amining public records does not carry with it the
power to prohibit. " distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the
disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in
which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitstion upon the availability of access to the
information sought, which only the -egislature may impose ."rt. ***, 4ec. N, 67AB %onstitution). The
second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. *ts authority
to regulate access is to be e0ercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records
may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more
importantly, that the e0ercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.
7#)+.SPI V. CIVI# S)RVIC) COMMISSIO1 79;D SCR. ;@D B98<?C:
SEPARATION OF POWERS
/hile the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with
pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it
cannot $ustify a member of the $udiciary being re+uired to assume a position or perform a duty
non$udicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. @therwise there is a plain departure from
its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. @nly a higher court, as was
emphasi#ed by ?ustice 1arredo, can pass on his actuation. De is not a subordinate of an e0ecutive
or legislative official, however eminent *t is indispensable that there be no e0ception to the rigidity
of such a norm if he is, as e0pected, to be confined to the task of ad$udication. 5idelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the $udiciary can be satisfied with
nothing less. 7I1 R) M.14.1O 79EE SCR. >=< B98<<C:
The term Spolitical +uestionS connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a +uestion of policy. *n other words, . . . it refers Sto those +uestions which,
under the %onstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the -egislature or e0ecutive branch of the
Eovernment.S *t is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. 7*.1.&. V. C,)1CO 79D@ Pil 9D;9 B98E;C:

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DELE3ATION OF POWERS
"lthough %ongress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in
the details in the e0ecution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law! .a) be complete in itself & it must
set forth therein the policy to be e0ecuted, carried out or implemented by the delegate & and .b)
fi0 a standard & the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable & to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. *ndeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every lawH and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority. Dence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also & and this is worse & to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the "ct of %ongress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances, and, conse+uently undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system. 7P)#.)4 V. .,&I*OR +)1)R.# 79; SCR. ;E8 B98E;C:
LE3ISLATIAE DEPARTMENT
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. *t is the physical presence of a person *n a given area, community or country, The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. @ne may seek a place
for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. *f a personQs intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicileH if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. *t is thus,
+uite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. Dowever, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. *n :ytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction
+uite clearly.
SThere is a difference between domicile and residence. QResidence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporaryH QdomicileQ denotes a fi0ed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. " man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. " man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. Dis place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.S
5or political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. "s these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
une+uivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile. 7ROM,.#&)4-M.RCOS V. COM)#)C 7>=< SCR. @DD B988;C:
*n case of vacancy in the 4enate or in the Douse of Representatives, a special election may
be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the 4enator or 3ember of the
Douse of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the une0pired term.
*n case a vacancy arises in %ongress at least one year before the e0piration of the term,
4ection ( of R.". ,o. NNF9, as amended, re+uires %@3=-=%! .6) to call a special election by fi0ing
the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than si0ty .N8) days nor later than ninety
.78) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the 4enate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the ne0t succeeding regular electionH and .() to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
"n election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give
notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of the special election. *f the lack of official notice

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misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to
fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. 7.R*,RO *O#)1*I1O VS.
COMMISSIO1 O1 )#)C*IO1S2 +.R. 1o.9=@@=2 3anuary >92 >DD=:
The %onstitution e0pressly grants to the Douse of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party&list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the Douse in the DR=T and the %". 4ection 6A, "rticle
>* of the %onstitution e0plicitly confers on the 4enate and on the Douse the authority to elect
among their members those who would fill the 6( seats for 4enators and 6( seats for Douse
members in the %ommission on "ppointments. :nder 4ection 6B, "rticle >* of the %onstitution,
each chamber of %ongress e0ercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits,
who among their members would occupy the allotted N seats of each chamberCs respective
electoral tribunal. Thus, even assuming that party&list representatives comprise a sufficient number
and have agreed to designate common nominees to the DR=T and the %", their primary recourse
clearly rests with the Douse of Representatives and not with this %ourt. :nder 4ections 6B and 6A,
"rticle >* of the %onstitution, party&list representatives must first show to the Douse that they
possess the re+uired numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the DR=T and the %". @nly if the
Douse fails to comply with the directive of the %onstitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the DR=T and the %" can the party&list representatives seek recourse to this
%ourt under its power of $udicial review.
The discretion of the Douse to choose its members to the DR=T and the %" is not absolute,
being sub$ect to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

Dowever, under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the %ourt may not interfere with the e0ercise by the Douse of
this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the %onstitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or e0cess of $urisdiction. @therwise, Rthe doctrine of separation of
powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.
,either can the %ourt speculate on what action the Douse may take if party&list representatives are
duly nominated for membership in the DR=T and the %". 7S)1.*OR .L,I#I1O L. PIM)1*)#2 3R.2
et al. V. (O,S) OF R)PR)S)1*.*IV)S )#)C*OR.# *RIB,1.#2 et al. 7+.R. 1o. 9=9=<82
1ove$ber >82 >DD>:
That the framers of the 67AB %onstitution intended to restore fully to the =lectoral
Tribunals e0clusive $urisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and +ualifications
of its 3embers, consonant with the return to the separation of powers of the three branches of
government under the presidential system, is too evident to escape attention. The new
%onstitution has substantially retained the %@3=-=%Qs purely administrative powers, namely, the
e0clusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recallH to decide, e0cept those involving the right
to vote, all +uestions affecting electionsH to deputi#e law enforcement agencies and government
instrumentalities for election purposesH to register political parties and accredit citi#ensQ armsH to
file in court petitions for inclusion and e0clusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate,
violations of election laws O"rt. *X.%), 4ec. (.l), .<)&.N)P, as well as its rule&making power. *n this
sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the @mnibus =lection %ode
are fully applicable, e0cept where specific legislation provides otherwise. 1ut the same cannot be
said with regard to the $urisdiction of the %@3=-=% to hear and decide election contests. This has
been trimmed down under the 67AB %onstitution. /hereas the 67B< %onstitution vested the
%@3=-=% with $urisdiction to be the sole $udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
+ualifications of all 3embers of the 1atasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials
O"rt. X**.%), 4ec. (.()P, the 67AB %onstitution, while lodging in the %@3=-=% e0clusive original
$urisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and +ualifications of all elective
regional, provincial and city officials and appellate $urisdiction over contests relating to the
election of municipal and barangay officials O"rt. *X.%), 4ec. (.()P, e0pressly makes the =lectoral
Tribunals of the 4enate and the Douse of Representatives the sole $udge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and +ualifications of their respective 3embers O"rt. >*, 4ec. 6BP.7#.4.*I1 V.
(R)* 79E< SCR. @89 B98<<C:
/hile "rticle >*, 4ection (F provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authori#ing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must Soriginate
e0clusively in the Douse of Representatives,S it also adds, Sbut the 4enate may propose or concur
with amendments.S *n the e0ercise of this power, the 4enate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure.

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"s to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already e0plained in the main
decision that the phrase e0cept when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc.S in "rticle >*, 4ection (N .() +ualifies not only the re+uirement that Sprinted copies
Oof a billP in its final form Omust beP distributed to the members three days before its passageS but
also the re+uirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed Sthree readings on
separate days.S
"pparently, the members of the 4enate believed that there was an urgent need for
consideration of 4. ,o. 6N<8, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the
bill on second and third readings on the same day. /hile the $udicial department is not bound by
the 4enateQs acceptance of the PresidentQs certification, the respect due coe+ual departments of
the government in matters committed to them by the %onstitution and the absence of a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the ?udicial hand.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is re+uired is said to be two&fold& .6)
to inform the members of %ongress of what. they must vote on and .() to give them notice that a
measure is progressing through the enacting process& thus enabling them and others interested in
the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it.
To re+uire every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
ob$ectives of the statute to be e0pressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would
actually render legislation impossible. "s has been correctly e0plained in Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado (22 S!"A #$ %&''$()!
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to
the sub$ect as e0pressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the ob$ect in view, may
properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which
the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the
way of its e0ecution. *f such matters are properly connected with the sub$ect as e0pressed in the
title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title, .4outhern Pac. %o. v.
1artine, 6B8 5ed, B(9) 7*O#)1*I1O V. S)CR)*.RJ OF FI1.1C) 7>@; SCR. E@D B988=C:
=nshrined in the 67AB Philippine %onstitution is the mandate that no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury e0cept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Thus, in the e0ecution
of government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to re+uire the
various agencies to limit their e0penditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal
year.
%omplementary to the foregoing constitutional in$unction are pertinent provisions of law
and administrative issuances that are designed to effectuate the above provision in a detailed
manner .4ections FN and FB, %hapter A, 4ubtitle 1, Title *, 1ook >, "dministrative %ode of 67AB).
*t is +uite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the e0istence of
appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre&re+uisites to or conditions sine
+ua non for the e0ecution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such
conditions as a priori re+uisites to the validity of the proposed contract. :sing this as our premise,
we cannot accede to PD@TM*,"Cs contention that there is already a perfected contract. /hile we
held in 3etropolitan 3anila evelopment "uthority vs. ?ancom =nvironmental %orporation that the
effect of an un+ualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract,
upon notice of the award to the bidder, however, such statement would be inconse+uential in a
government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise
is to allow a public officer to e0ecute a binding contract that would obligate the government in an
amount in e0cess of the appropriations made for the purpose for which the contract was attempted
to be made. This is a dangerous precedent. 7COMMISSIO1 O1 )#)C*IO1S vs. L,I3.1O-P.&I##.
7+.R. 1o. 9;988>2 Septe$ber 9<2 >DD>:
%onsulting the records of the %onstitutional %onvention, according to 5r. 1ernas 4.?. ,
under "rt. X* 4ec < .9), the proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the %ommittee on ?ustice for further action. This is the interpretation adopted by the
framers of the fundamental law. :nder sections 6N and 6B of Rule > of the Douse *mpeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated .6) if there is a finding by the Douse
%ommittee on ?ustice that the verified complaint andGor resolution is sufficient in substance, or
.() once the Douse itself affirms or overturns the finding of the %ommittee on ?ustice that the
verified complaint andGor resolution is not sufficient in substance .<) by the filing or endorsement

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before the 4ecretary Eeneral of the Douse of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 6G< of the members of the Douse. These rules clearly
contravene 4ection <.9) of "rticle X* since the rules give the term initiate a different meaning.
Daving concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the Douse %ommittee on ?ustice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of 4ection <.9) of "rticle X* becomes clear. @nce an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one&
year period following "rticle X*, 4ection <.9) of the %onstitution.
*n fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
=strada against %hief ?ustice Dilario E. avide ?r., along with seven associate $ustices of this court
on ?une (88< and referred to the Douse %ommittee on ?ustice on "ugust 9,(88<, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representative Eilberto %. Teodoro, ?r. and 5eli0 /illiam
5uentabella against the %hief ?ustice on @ctober (<, (88< violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within one
year. 7FR.1CISCO 3R.2 )* .#. VS. (O,S) OF R)PR)S)1*.*IV)S )* .#. 7+.R. 1o. 9E9E@=2
Marc @2 >DD=:
E6ECUTIAE DEPARTMENT
4ince the evident purpose of the framers of the 67AB%onstitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, >ice&President, members of the %abinet, their deputies and assistants
with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the
e0ception to this prohibition must be read with e+ual severity. @n its face, the language of 4ection
6<, "rticle >** is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
une+uivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.
>erily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as in
tended to be a positive and une+uivocal negation. The phrase Sunless otherwise provided in this
%onstitutionS must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular in stances cited
in the %onstitution itself, to wit! the >ice&President being appointed as a member of the %abinet
under 4ection <, par. .(), "rticle >**H or acting as President in those instances provided under
4ection B, pars. .() and .<), "rticle >**H and, the 4ecretary of ?ustice being e0&officio member of
the ?udicial and 1ar %ouncil by virtue of 4ection A .6), "rticle >***.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under 4ection 6<,
"rticle >** of the %onstitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
=0ecutive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an e0&officio capacity as
provided by law and as re+uired by the primary functions of said officialsQ office. The reason is that
these posts do no comprise Sany other office within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. To
characteri#e these posts otherwise would lead to absurd conse+uences.
The term e0&officio means Sfrom officeH by virtue of office.S *t refers to an Sauthority
derived from official character merely, not e0pressly conferred upon the individual character, but
rather anne0ed to the official position.S =0&officio likewise denotes an Sact done in an official
character, or as a conse+uence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office.S "n e0&officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his
title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. 7CIVI# #IB)R*I)S ,1IO1 V.
)G)C,*IV) S)CR)*.RJ 798= SCR. @9? B9889C:
*n the 67AB %onstitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and e0pressed intent
of its framers was to e0clude presidential appointments from confirmation by the %ommission on
"ppointments, e0cept appointments to offices e0pressly mentioned in the first sentence of 4ec. 6N,
"rticle >**. %onse+uently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of 4ec, 6N, "rticle >**
the word SaloneS after the word SPresidentS in providing that %ongress may by law vest the
appointment of lower&ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he .the President) may be authori#ed by
law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the %ommission
on "ppointments, in the second sentence of the same 4ec. 6N, "rticle >**.
Therefore, the third sentence of 4ec. 6N, "rticle >** could have stated merely that, in the
case of lower&ranked officers, the %ongress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in
the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. *n short, the word SaloneS in
the third sentence of 4ec. 6N, "rticle&>** of the 67AB %onstitution, as a literal import from the last

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part of par. <, section 68, "rticle >** of the 67<9 %onstitution, appears to be redundant in the light
of the second sentence of 4ec. 6N, "rticle >**. "nd, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear
and positive intent of the framers of the 67AB %onstitution that presidential appointments, e0cept
those mentioned in the first sentence of 4ec. 6N, "rticle >**, are not sub$ect to confirmation by the
%ommission on "ppointments.
%oming now to the immediate +uestion before the %ourt, it is evident that the position of
%ommissioner of the 1ureau of %ustoms .a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the %ommission on "ppointments is re+uired. "s a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 67<9 %onstitution includes Sheads of bureausS among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the %ommission on "ppointments, the 67AB
%onstitution, on the other hand, deliberately e0cluded the position of Sheads of bureausS from
appointments that need the consent .confirmation) of the %ommission on "ppointments.
7S.RMI)1*O V. MISO1 79;E SCR. ;=8 B98<?C:
"n ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has +ualified
into office. The fact that it is sub$ect to confirmation by the %ommission on "ppointments does not
alter its permanent character. The term Sad interim appointmentS, as used in letters of
appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in
the meantime that !ongress is in recess. *t does not mean a temporary appointment that can be
withdrawn or revoked at any time. *n other words, he also en$oys the constitutional protection that
SOnPo officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended e0cept for cause
provided by law.S
:nder the second paragraph of 4ection 6N, "rticle >** of the %onstitution, the President can
choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are sub$ect to confirmation by the
%ommission on "ppointments. 5irst, while %ongress is in session, the President may nominate the
prospective appointee, and pending consent of the %ommission on "ppointments, the nominee
cannot +ualify and assume office. 4econd, during the recess of %ongress, the President may e0tend
an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately +ualify and assume office.
/hether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or e0tend an ad interim
appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the %onstitution grants
her that power. This %ourt cannot in+uire into the propriety of the choice made by the President
in the e0ercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
e0cess of $urisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee $&"**rove$ by the %ommission on
"ppointments can no longer be e0tended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of
the %ommission on "ppointments in the e0ercise of its checking power on the appointing authority
of the President. Dowever, an ad interim appointment that is !'B*""e$ because of lack of time or
failure of the %ommission on "ppointments to organi#e is another matter. " by&passed appointment
is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the %ommission on "ppointments at
the close of the session of %ongress. There is no final decision by the %ommission on "ppointments
to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as re+uired by the %onstitution.
"n ad interim appointment that h" )*"e$ !' &nct&on of the %ommission on "ppointments
does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made
to the time it lapses is neither a fi0ed term nor an une0pired term. To hold otherwise would mean
that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office
in the %@3=-=% without the consent of the %ommission on "ppointments. This interpretation
renders inutile the confirming power of the %ommission on "ppointments. 7M.. 3. .1+)#I1. +.
M.*IB.+2 vs. .#FR)&O #. B)1IP.JO2 et al. 7+.R. 1o. 9=8D@E2 .pril >2 >DD>:
"n officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. *f they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re&done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. 4upervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rates, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. *f the rules are not observed, he may order the work
done or re&done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. De may not prescribe his own manner
for the doing of the act. De has no $udgment on this matter e0cept to see to it that he rules are
followed. 7&RI#O1 V. #IM 7>@; SCR. 9@; B988=C:

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ue process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions .where the accused stands to
lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.<B The
trial contemplated by the due process clause of the %onstitution, in relation to the %harter as a
whole, is a trial by $udicial process, not by e0ecutive or military process. 3ilitary commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine $udicial system.
"s e0plained by ?ustice Teehankee in his separate dissenting opinion S0 0 0 %ivilians like .the)
petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by $udicial
process, not by e0ecutive or military process.
S?udicial power is vested by the %onstitution e0clusively in the 4upreme %ourt and in such inferior
courts as are duly established by law. ?udicial power e0ists only in the courts, which have Qe0clusive
power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citi#en.Q
S4ince we are not enemy&occupied territory nor are we under a military government and even on the
premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and e0ercise $urisdiction
over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cogni#able by the civil courts
that have remained open and have been regularly functioning.
3oreover, military tribunals pertain to the =0ecutive epartment of the Eovernment and
are simply instrumentalities of the e0ecutive power, provided by the legislature for the President
as %ommander&in&%hief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utili#ed under his orders or those of his authori#ed military representatives.
5ollowing the principle of separation of powers underlying the e0isting constitutional organi#ation
of the Eovernment of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws .as when an
individual should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the $udiciary. *t
is not, and it cannot be the function of the =0ecutive epartment, through the military authorities.
"nd as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try
and e0ercise $urisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly
cogni#able by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right
to due process of the civilian concerned. 7O#.+,)R V. MI#I*.RJ COMMISSIO1 1O. @= 79;D SCR.
9== B98<?C:
The modern trend of authorities now re$ects the unduly broad language of the Earland case
.reputed to be perhaps the most e0treme statement which has been made on the effects of a
pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. /hile a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the e0istence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. *t does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. *t does not wash out the moral
stain. *t involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
The better considered cases regard full pardon .at least one not based on the offenderQs
innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive conse+uences of his criminal act, including
the dis+ualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. 1ut it relieves him from nothing
more. STo say, how. ever, that the offender is a Qnew mare, andQ as innocent as if he had never
committed the offenseHQ is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. " person
ad$udged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardonedH he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunishedH and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society
than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his
conviction.S
" pardon looks to the future. *t is not retrospective. *t makes no amends for the past. *t
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. *t does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. S4ince the offense has
been established by $udicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in
force is presumed to have been rightfully done and $ustly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
re+uired.S 7MO1S.1*O V. F.C*OR.1 79?D SCR. 98D B98<8C:
4ection 6A, "rticle >** does not e0pressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion. ,ote that the %onstitution vests the President not only with %ommander&in&%hief powers
but, first and foremost, with =0ecutive powers.
4ection 6, "rticle >** of the 67AB Philippine %onstitution states!

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The e0ecutive power shall be vested in the PresidentT. "s if by e0position, 4ection 6B of
the same "rticle provides! De shall ensure that the laws be faithfully e0ecuted.
Thus, the PresidentCs authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief e0ecutive and, at the same time, draws strength from her %ommander&in&%hief
powers.
*t is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the e0ercise of such power. /hile the %ourt may
e0amine whether the power was e0ercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of
martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report re+uirement, is a leap of logic. There
is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that
military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of
curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has e0ercised
$udicial and legislative powers. *n short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted
to e0ercise or has e0ercised martial law powers.
,or by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect e0ercise of
emergency powers, which e0ercise depends upon a grant of %ongress pursuant to 4ection (< .(),
"rticle >* of the %onstitution!
4ec. (<. .6) T.
.() *n times of war or other national emergency, the %ongress may, by law, authori#e the President,
for a limited period and sub$ect to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to e0ercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. :nless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
%ongress, such powers shall cease upon the ne0t ad$ournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has
e0ercised powers beyond her powers as %hief =0ecutive or as %ommander&in&%hief. The President,
in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely e0ercising a
(e$$&ng o% her Ch&e% E:ec#t&ve n$ Commn$erB&nBCh&e% *o(er". These are purely e0ecutive
powers, vested on the President by 4ections 6 and 6A, "rticle >**, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by 4ection (< .(), "rticle >*. 7S.1#.%.S vs. )G)C,*IV)
S)CR)*.RJ .1+)#O R)J)S )*. .# 7+.R. 1o. 9;8D<;. February @2 >DD=:
GUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
@ur finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the Douse of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. /hat is involved
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
%ommission on "ppointments. That is not a political +uestion because, as %hief ?ustice %oncepcion
e0plained in TaUada v. %uenco!
. . . the term Spolitical +uestionS connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a +uestion of policy. *n other words, . . . it refers Sto those +uestions which, under the
%onstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the -egislature or e0ecutive branch of the
Eovernment.S *t is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
=ven if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the e0panded $urisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political +uestion. "rticle >**, 4ection 6, of the
%onstitution clearly provides!
4ection 6. The $udicial power shall be vested in one 4upreme %ourt and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
?udicial power includes the duty of the courts of $ustice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e0cess of $urisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Eovernment. 7&.4. V. SI1+SO1 79<D SCR. =8E B98<8C:
*n line with the liberal policy of this %ourt on locus standi, ordinary ta0payers, members of
%ongress, and even association of planters, and non&profit civic organi#ations were allowed to

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initiate and prosecute actions before this %ourt to +uestion the constitutionality or validity of laws,
acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
/e find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many
of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic,
and moral wellbeing of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter&
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on&line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is e0pected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition and, in the e0ercise of its sound discretion, this %ourt hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. 7%I#OSB.J.12 I1C. V.
+,I1+O1.2 3R. 7>@> SCR. 99D B988=C:
The rule is settled that no +uestion involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal
re+uisites for $udicial in+uiry, namely! that the +uestion must be raised by the proper partyH that
there must be an actual case or controversyH that the +uestion must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunityH and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal +uestion must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself. 1ut the most important are the first two .()
re+uisites.
@n the first re+uisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protest cannot
invoke the $urisdiction of the court as party&plaintiff in an action. This is premised on 4ec. (, Rule
<, of the Rules of %ourt which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party&in&interest, and that all persons having interest in the sub$ect of the action
and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be $oined as plaintiffs. The %ourt will e0ercise its power
of $udicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who, has the legal standing to
raise the constitutional or legal +uestion. S-egal standingS means a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct in$ury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term SinterestS is material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the +uestion
involved, or a mere incidental interest. 3oreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party.
There are certain instances however when this %ourt has allowed e0ceptions to the rule on
legal standing, as when a citi#en brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a
public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recogni#ed by the %onstitution, and when a
ta0payer +uestions the validity of a governmental act authori#ing the disbursement of public funds.
,ot every action filed by a ta0payer can +ualify to challenge the legality of official acts
done by the government. " ta0payerQs suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
+uestioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the e0penditure of public
funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds, which may be, en$oined at the re+uest of a ta0payer. 73OJ. V.
PC++ 7>>; SCR. ;8E B988@C:
CIAIL SERAICE COMMISSION
"ppointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the +ualifications re+uired by law. *f he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better +ualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political +uestion involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. 7#,)+O V. CIVI# S)RVIC) COMMISSIO1 79=@ SCR. @>? B98<EC:
*t is well&settled that when the appointee is +ualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal re+uirements are satisfied, the %ommission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the %ivil 4ervice -aw. The %ommission has no authority to revoke
an appointment on the ground that another person is more +ualified for a particular position. *t
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. "n appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, sub$ect to the only condition

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that the appointee should possess the +ualifications re+uired by law. 7C)1*R.# B.1% V. CIVI#
S)RVIC) COMMISSIO1 79?9 SCR. ?==:
The view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear&cut difference in the wording of the two .()
paragraphs of 4ec. B, "rt. *X&1, of the %onstitution. /hile the second paragraph authori#es holding
of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any e0ception to the
rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts, e0cept as
are particularly recogni#ed in the %onstitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic
and planning agencyH the >ice&President, who may be appointed 3ember of the %abinetH and, a
member of %ongress who may be designated e0 officio member of the ?udicial and 1ar %ouncil.
The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of 4ec. B, "rt. *X&1, was not
accidental when drawn, and not without reason. *t was purposely sought by the drafters of the
%onstitution as shown in their deliberation. The distinction being clear, the e0emption allowed to
appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be e0tended to elective officials who are
governed by the first paragraph.
This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. %ongress did not contemplate
making the sub$ect 413" posts as e0 officio or automatically attached to the @ffice of the 3ayor of
@longapo %ity without need of appointment. The phrase Sshah be appointedS un+uestionably shows
the intent to make the 413" posts appointive and not merely ad$unct to the post of 3ayor of
@longapo %ity. Dad it been the legislative intent to make the sub$ect positions e0 officio, %ongress
would have, at least, avoided the word SappointedS and, instead, Se0 officioS would have been used.
7F#OR)S V. &RI#O1 7>>@ SCR. ;E< B988@C:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
/e now hold that the last paragraph of 4ection 98 of 1. P. 1lg. N7B providing as follows!
The %ommission is vested with e0clusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases, remains in full force and effect but only in
such cases where, under paragraph .(), 4ection 6, "rticle *X&% of the %onstitution, it has e0clusive
appellate $urisdiction. 4imply put, the %@3=-=% has the authority to issue the e0traordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate $urisdiction. 7R)#.MP.+OS V.
C,MB. 7>=@ SCR. E8D B988;C:
The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the %ommission on =lections in contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, e0ecutory and not appealable, O"rticle
*X, .%), 4ection (.(), paragraph ( of the %onstitutionP does not preclude a recourse to this %ourt by
way of a special civil action of certiorari. 7+.#I&O V. COM)#)C B9889C:
*t is clear from 4ection <, "rticle *X&% of the 67AB %onstitution that election cases include
pre&proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a ivision of
the %ommission. The %ommission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same at the first instance. *n the %@3=-=% R:-=4 @5 PR@%=:R=, pre&proclamation cases are
classified as 4pecial %ases and, in compliance with the above provision of the %onstitution, the two
.() ivisions of the %ommission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these 4pecial
%ases.( Rule (B thereof governs 4pecial %asesH specifically, 4ection 7 of the said Rule provides that
appeals from rulings of the 1oard of %anvassers are cogni#able by any of the ivisions to which they
are assigned and not by the %ommission en banc. 7S.RMI)1*O V. COM)#)C 7>9> SCR. @D?
B988>C:
%onformably to those provisions of the %onstitution O"rt. *X&%, 4ec. ( .() and "rt. *X&", 4ec.
BP all election cases, including pre&proclamation controversies, must be decided by the %@3=-=% in
division. 4hould a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration
before the %@3=-=% en banc. *t is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the %@3=-=% en banc
that, in accordance with "rt. *X, ", 4ec. B, Smay be brought to the 4upreme %ourt on certiorari.S
7R)J)S V. R*C OF ORI)1*.# MI1&ORO 7>== SCR. =9 B988;C:

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The %@3=-=% has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce and
administer election laws. This power includes the determination, within the parameters fi0ed by
law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain pre&election acts like filing petitions
for registration under the party&list system. This is e0actly what the %@3=-=% did when it issued its
Resolution ,o. N<(8 declaring 4eptember <8, (88<, as the deadline for filing petitions for
registration under the party&list system. %onsidering these, as well as the multifarious pre&election
activities that the %omelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance of its Resolution ,o. N<(8
cannot be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 7.%#.* vs. COM)#)C 7+.R. 1o.
9E>>D@ .pril 9=2 >DD=:
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
1oth the 67B< and 67AB %onstitutions conferred upon the %@" a more active role and
invested it with broader and more e0tensive powers. These were not meant to make it a toothless
tiger, but a dynamic, effective, efficient and independent watch dog of the Eovernment.
*n determining whether an e0penditure of a Eovernment agency or instrumentality such as
the ,P% is irregular, unnecessary, e0cessive, e0travagant or unconscionable, the %@" should not be
bound by the opinion of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been
the basis for the +uestioned disbursementH otherwise, it would indeed be. come a toothless tiger
and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile e0ercise. *ts beacon lights then should
be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.
The %@", both under the 67B< and 67AB %onstitutions, is a collegial body. *t must resolve
cases presented to it as such. *ts Eeneral %ounsel cannot act for the %ommission for he is not even
a %ommissioner thereof. De can only offer legal advice or render an opinion in order to aid the %@"
in the resolution of a case or a legal +uestion. 7OROCIO V. COMMISSIO1 O1 .,&I* 7>9@ SCR. 9D8
B988>C:
The %@" is clothed under 4ection (.(), "rticle *X& of the 67AB %onstitution with the
Se0clusive authority, sub$ect to the limitations in this "rticle, to define the scope of its audit and
e0amination, establish the techni+ues and methods re+uired therefore, and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, e0cessive, e0travagant or unconscionable e0penditures, or uses of government funds
and properties.S The authority granted under this constitutional provision, being broad and
comprehensive enough, enables %@" to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference,
without the necessity of re&promulgation, already e0isting rules and regulations. *t may also e0pand
the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit $urisdiction. 7P(I#IPPI1) .IR
#I1)S V. CO. 7>=; SCR. @8 B988;C:
LO3AL 3OAERNMENT
,ot only historical e0amination but te0tual analysis as well supports the ruling of the
%@3=-=% that "rt. X, 4ection A contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms
as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of Sthe term of office of elective local officialsS
and bars Ssuch officialOsPS from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in e0plaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term
of office, states that Svoluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.S The term served must therefore be one Sfor which Othe official concernedP was elected.S
The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective local official may serve. %onversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot
be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its e0piration. 7BOR3.2 3R. V. COM)#)C 7>8; SCR. 9;? B988<C:
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
The Philippine 3ining "ct of 6779 is %onstitutional. 5rom the deliberations of the
%onstitutional %onvention, the %ourt concluded that agreements involving either technical or

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financial assistance are in fact service contracts, but unlike those of the 67B< variety, the new ones
are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one handH and the on the other, the
government as the principal or owner of the works. "s written by the framers and ratified and
adopted by the people, the %onstitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporationsVas contractors who would invest in and operate and manage e0tractive enterprises,
sub$ect to full control and supervision of the 4tate.
The concept of control adopted in 4ection ( of "rticle X** must be taken to mean less than
dictatorial, all&encompassing controlH but nevertheless, sufficient to give the 4tate the power to
direct, restrain, regulate and govern the affairs of the e0tractive enterprises. %ontrol by the 4tate
must be on the macro&level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry
standards and similar measures that would enable the government to control the conduct of affairs
in various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.
The end in view is ensuring that these enterprises contribute to the economic development
and general welfare of the country, conserve, the environment, and uplift the well&being of the
affected local communities. 4uch concept would be compatible with permitting the foreign
contractor sufficient and reasonable management authority over the enterprise it invested in.
The %ourt has weighed carefully the rights and interests of all concerned, and decided for
the greater good of the greatest number. ?ustice for all, not $ust for some. ?ustice for the present
and the future, not $ust for the here and now. 7#. B,+.# M BN#..1 *RIB.# .SSOCI.*IO12 I1C. VS.
R.MOS (+.R. 1o. 9>?<<>. &ece$ber 92 >DD=:
POLICE POWER
*t has been said the police power is so far & reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. "s it derives its e0istence from the very e0istence of the 4tate itself,
it does not need to be e0pressed or defined in its scopeH it is said to be co&e0tensive with self&
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. =specially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportionsH the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, $ust
as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all&embracing and have
transcended human foresight. @therwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the e0tent or scope of police power by which and through which the 4tate seeks to
attain or achieve interest or welfare. 4o it is that %onstitutions do not define the scope or e0tent of
the police power of the 4tateH what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most
important of these are the due process clause and the e+ual protection clause. These constitutional
guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not
limited to citi#ens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality. .Kick /o vs. Dopkins, <8, -. ed. ((8, ((N.)
:pon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, the disputed law is not the product
of racial hostility, pre$udice or discrimination, but the e0pression of the legitimate desire and
determination of the people, thru their authori#ed representatives, to free the nation from the
economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the 4tate insures its
e0istence and security and the supreme welfare of its citi#ens. 7IC(O1+ V. ()R1.1&)4 79D9 Pil
99;; B98;?C:
P*"T%@ is not entitled to any compensation. 4ection 9.68.c), "rticle > of the "R%" clearly
obligates the government in the e0ercise of its police power to compensate respondent P*"T%@ and
this obligation is offensive to the %onstitution. Police power cannot be diminished, let alone
defeated by any contract for its paramount consideration is public welfare and interest.
4ection 6B, "rticle X** of the 67AB %onstitution grants the 4tate in times of national
emergency the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public
interest. This right is an e0ercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the 4tate.
Police power has been defined as the Sstate authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.S *t consists of two essential

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elements. 5irst, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property. 4econd, the power is
e0ercised for the benefit of the common good. *ts definition in elastic terms underscores its all&
encompassing and comprehensive embrace. *t is and still is the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of the 4tateCs powers. *t is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of eminent
domain, police power is e0ercised without provision for $ust compensation for its paramount
consideration is public welfare. *t is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national
emergency is the primary consideration when the government decides to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of a public utility or a business affected with public interest. The nature and
e0tent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms
thereof. *t is the 4tate that prescribes such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation
of the temporary takeover as dictated by the e0igencies of the time. This power of the 4tate
cannot be negated by any party nor should its e0ercise be a source of obligation for the 4tate.
7.+.1 vs. P(I#IPPI1) I1*)R1.*IO1.# .IR *)RMI1.#S CO (+.R. 1o. 9;;DD9. 3anuary >92
>DD=:
The concept of police power is well&established in this $urisdiction. *t has been defined as
the Sstate authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.S "s defined, it consists of .6) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, .() in order to foster the common good. *t is not capable of an e0act definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all&comprehensive embrace.
S*ts scope, ever&e0panding to meet the e0igencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and fle0ible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.S
*t finds no specific %onstitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin
to the %harter. "long with the ta0ing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. *t is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. 3arshall, to whom the e0pression has been
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the 4tate Sto govern its citi#ens.S
SThe police power of the 4tate ... is a power coe0tensive with self&protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the Qlaw of over&whelming necessity.Q *t may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the 4tate which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society.S
*t constitutes an implied limitation on the 1ill of Rights. "ccording to 5ernando, it is Srooted
in the conception that men in organi#ing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citi#en or a group of
citi#ens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.S 4ignificantly, the 1ill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties S=ven liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to oneQs will.S *t is sub$ect to the
far more overriding demands and re+uirements of the greater number.
,otwithstanding its e0tensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. 5or all
its awesome conse+uences, it may not be e0ercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. @therwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is e0ercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the e0pense of the citi#enry, there is a
clear misuse of the power. 7P(I#IPPI1) .SSOCI.*IO1 OF S)RVIC) )GPOR*)RS2 I1C. V. &RI#O1
79E@ SCR. @<E B98<<C:
=very restriction upon the use of property imposed in the e0ercise of the police power
deprives the owner of some right theretofore en$oyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the
4tate of rights in property without making compensation. 1ut restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in
+uestion is merely the prohibition of a no0ious use. The property so restricted remains in the
possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
/henever the use prohibited ceases to be no0ious&as it may because of further changes in local or
social conditions&the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to en$oy
his property as heretofore. 7.SSOCI.*IO1 OF SM.## #.1&O-1)RS OF *() P(I#IPPI1)S V.
S)CR)*.RJ OF &.R 79?; SCR. @=@ B98<8C:
To $ustify the 4tate in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,

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re+uire such interferenceH and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
n the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio %ase that the carabao,
as the poor manQs tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a
lawful sub$ect of =0ecutive @rder ,o. N(N. The method chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals, again following the above&cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals e0cept where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years
old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the e0ecutive order will be conserving those
still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
1ut while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful sub$ect as the
original e0ecutive order, we cannot say with e+ual certainty that it complies with the second
re+uirement, vi#., that there be a lawful method. /e note that to strengthen the original measure,
=0ecutive @rder ,o. N(N&" imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that Sno carabao, regardless of age, se0, physical condition or purpose
.sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.S The ob$ect of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the +uestioned measure is missing.
/e do not see how the prohibition of the inter&provincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty
in one province than in another. @bviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them them "s for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
e0ecutive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so, however,
if the movement of the live animal for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
flippant, dead meat. 7J1O* V. I1*)RM)&I.*) .PP)##.*) CO,R* 79=< SCR. E;8 B98<?C:
"rticle X**, section 6B of the 67AB %onstitution envisions a situation wherein the e0igencies
of the times necessitate the government to Stemporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.S *t is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to
temporarily take over a particular business. %learly, the 4tate in effecting the temporary takeover
is e0ercising its police power. Police power is the Smost essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers.S *ts e0ercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its e0ercise be a source of
obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its e0ercise. Thus,
re+uiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property
pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the %onstitution. 7&)MOS*()1)S P. .+.12
3R.2 et al. vs. P(I#IPPI1) I1*)R1.*IO1.# .IR *)RMI1.#S CO.2 I1C.2 et al. 7+.R. 1o. 9;;DD92
May ;2 >DD@:
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
To the e0tent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an e0ercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the %onstitution. 1ut where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in e0cess of the ma0imum area allowedH
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which Payment of $ust
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. /hat is re+uired is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said e0cess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer&beneficiary. This is definitely
an e0ercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot
compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or re+uire the
condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and
in the manner prescribed by the %onstitution and the statutes. /hen the power of eminent domain
is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the
law has fi0ed that standard as money in cash.

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/hat we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of e0propriation. The e0propriation before
us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in
e0cess of the ma0imum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of e0propriation is intended
for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of
the entire 5ilipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land&
glutted owner. *ts purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond
in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of 5ilipinos. Eenerations yet to come are as involved in this
program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life
we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. "nd, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the %onstitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the
farms, calling for Sa $ust distributionS among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
4uch a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
%onsidering the vast areas of land sub$ect to e0propriation under the laws before us, we estimate
that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P98 billion
initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. 4uch amount is
in fact not even fully available at this time. 7.SSOCI.*IO1 OF SM.## #.1&O-1)RS OF *()
P(I#IPPI1)S V. S)CR)*.RJ OF &.R2 supra.
The method of ascertaining $ust compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on $udicial prerogatives. *t tends to render this %ourt inutile in a
matter which under this %onstitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an e0propriation proceeding the court technically would still have the
power to determine the $ust compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its
task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor. "s a necessary conse+uence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule NB of the Rules of %ourt. 3oreover, the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a $udicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. Dowever, the strict application of the decrees
during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only
to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot e0ercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is $ust or fair. =ven a grade school pupil could substitute for the $udge insofar as
the determination of constitutional $ust compensation is concerned. 7)P4. V. &,#.J 79=8 SCR.
@D; B98<?C:
The Spublic useS re+uirement for a valid e0ercise of the power of eminent domain is a
fle0ible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. *n this $urisdiction, the statutory
and $udicial trend has been summari#ed as follows! The taking to be valid must be for public use.
There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a re+uirement.
/hatever pro$ect is undertaken must be for the public to en$oy, as in the case of streets or parks.
@therwise, e0propriation is not allowable. *t is not anymore. "s long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play, "s $ust noted, the constitution in at
least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. @ne is the e0propriation of
land to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer,
through the e0ercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. *t is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the re+uirement of public use. 7S,M,#O1+ V +,)RR)RO 79;= SCR. 9E9 B98<?C:
POWER OF TA6ATION
@nce it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a
matter of public concern, it follows that the -egislature may determine within reasonable bounds
what is necessary for its protection and e0pedient for its promotion. Dere, the legislative discretion
must be allowed full play, sub$ect only to the test of reasonablenessH and it is not contended that
the means provided in section N of the law .above +uoted) bear no relation to the ob$ective
pursued or are oppressive in character. *f ob$ective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no
reason is seen why the state may not levy ta0es to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Ta0ation may be made the implement of the stateQs police power.

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That the ta0 to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a
ground of complaintH indeed, it appears rational that the ta0 be obtained precisely from those who
are to be benefited from the e0penditure of the funds derived from it. "t any rate, it is inherent in
the power to ta0 that a state be free to select the sub$ects of ta0ation, and it has been repeatedly
held that Sine+ualities which result from a singling out of one particular class for ta0ation, or
e0emption infringe no constitutional limitation. 7#,*4 V. .R.1)*. 78< Pil 9=< B98;;C:
The phrase Se0clusively used for educational purposesS was further clarified by this %ourt in
the cases of Derrera vs. Jue#on %ity 1oard of "ssessment "ppeals, < 4%R" 6AN O67N66 and
%ommissioner of *nternal Revenue vs. 1ishop of the 3issionary istrict, 6F 4%R" 776 O67N9P, thus
S3oreover, the e0emption in favor of property used e0clusively for charitable or educational
purposes is Qnot limited to property actually indispensableQ therefore .%ooley on Ta0ation, >ol. (, p.
6F<8), but e0tends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, Qa school for training nurses, a
nursesQ home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff and recreational facilities for student
nurses, interns, and residentsQ .AF %?4 NN(6), such as Q"thletic fieldsQ including Qa firm used for the
inmates of the institution.QS .%ooley on Ta0ation, >ol. (, p. 6F<8).
The test of e0emption from ta0ation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in
the %onstitution ."postolic Prefect v. %ity Treasurer of 1aguio, B6 Phil. 9FB O67F6P).
*t must be stressed however, that while this %ourt allows a more liberal and non&restrictive
interpretation of the phrase Se0clusively used for educational purposesS as provided for in "rticle
>*, 4ection ((, paragraph < of the 67<9 Philippine %onstitution, reasonable emphasis has always
been made that e0emption e0tends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the main purposes. @therwise stated, the use of the school building or
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by $urisprudence. Thus, while the
use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the
irector and his family, may find $ustification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary educational purpose, the lease of the first floor thereof to
the ,orthern 3arketing %orporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education. 7.BR. V.##)J CO##)+) V. .L,I1O 79E> SCR. 9DE
B98<<C:
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The meaning of Sdue process of lawS is, that Severy citi#en shall hold his life, liberty,
property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.S To
constitute Sdue process of law,S as has been often held, a $udicial proceeding is not always
necessary. *n some instances, even a hearing and notice are not re+uisite, a rule which is especially
true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases. (See )c*ehee+ ,ue Process o- .aw+ p. $&.) ,either is due process a stationary
and blind sentinel of liberty. S"ny legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in
furtherance of the public good which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and $ustice
must be held to be due process of law.S (/urtado vs. !ali-ornia %&00$(+ &&# 1. S.+ 2&3.) Sue
process of lawS means simply W W W Sfirst, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the EovernmentH second, that this law shall be
reasonable in its operationH third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribedH and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citi#ens of the state or
to all of a class.S (1. S. vs. .ing Su Fan %&'#0(+ &# Phil.+ &#4)+ affirmed on appeal to the :nited
4tates 4upreme %ourt.6) S/hat is due process of law depends on circumstances it varies with the
sub$ect&matter and necessities of the situation.S .3oyer vs. Peabody O6787P, (6( :. 4., A(.) 7R,BI
V. PROVI1CI.# BO.R& OF MI1&ORO 7@8 Pil EED B9898C:
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. *s there public interest, a public purposeH is public welfare
involved' *s the "ct reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatureQs purposeH is it
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive' *s there sufficient foundation or reason in connection

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with the matter involvedH or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power' %an the
aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an un$ustified interference with
private interest' These are the +uestions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
To $ustify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
re+uire such interferenceH and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The law in +uestion is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
ob$ective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. *t is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges .&& Am. Jur. pp. &#0#5&#0&.) The test
of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or ade+uacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect .6d.) ?udged by this test, disputed legislation, which is
not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness. 7IC(O1+ V. ()R1.1&)42 supra.:
The fact, however, that the %ourt of *ndustrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural re+uirements does not mean that it can, in $usticiable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential re+uirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character!
.6) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. *n the
language of %hief ?ustice Dughes, Sthe liberty and property of the citi#en shall be protected by the
rudimentary re+uirements of fair play.S
.() ,ot only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. *n the language of this %ourt in =dwards vs. 3c%oy, (( Phil., 97A, Sthe right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain.
4uch right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration.S
.<) S/hile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. " decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.S This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. -aw is both a
grant and a limitation upon power.
.F) ,ot only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be Ssubstantial. S4ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. *t means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade+uate to support a conclusion.S
The statute provides that Qthe rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and e+uity shall
not be controlling.Q The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent in $udicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. 1ut this
assurance of a desirable fle0ibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to $ustify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. 3ere uncorroborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
.9) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. @nly by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know
and meet the case against them. *t should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see
that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authori#ed legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. 1oards of in+uiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but
their report and decision are only advisory. .4ection 7, %ommonwealth "ct ,o. 68<.) The %ourt of
*ndustrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of in+uiry, a provincial fiscal, a $ustice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said %ourt of
*ndustrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the e0ercise of the
%ourt itself of any of its powers. .4ection 68, ibid.)

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.N) The %ourt of *ndustrial Relations or any of its $udges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. *t may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally impossible for the titular heads of the %ourt of *ndustrial Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. *n the :nited 4tates the difficulty is solved with the enactment
of statutory authority authori#ing e0aminers or other subordinates to render final decision, with
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
.B) The %ourt of *ndustrial Relations should, in all controversial +uestions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it. 7.1+ *IB.J2 et al. V. CO,R* OF I1&,S*RI.# R)#.*IO1S2 et al. 7E8
Pil E@; B98=DC:
The minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, are as follows! .6) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusations against themH .() that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desiredH .<) they shall be informed of the evidence
against themH .F) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalfH and .9) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case. 7.*)1)O &) M.1I#. ,1IV)RSI*J V. C.P,#O1+
7>>> SCR. E== B988@C:
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
*t is clear that in section 66 of the Probation "ct creates a situation in which discrimination
and ine+uality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities re+uiring
actual denial of the e+ual protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting
aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the
opinion that section 66 of "ct ,o. F((6 permits of the denial of the e+ual protection of the law and
is on that account bad. /e see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. " law
may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of un$ust and
illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. *n other words, statutes may be
ad$udged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. *f the law has the effect of denying
the e+ual protection of the law it is unconstitutional. :nder section 66 of the Probation "ct, not
only may said "ct be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but
one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year V and have
probation during that year V and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no
probation is subse+uent years. /hile this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which
delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation "ct sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the "ct, to make the
guaranty of the e+uality clause but Sa rope of sandS. 7P)OP#) V. V)R. 7E; Pil ;E B98@?C
The e+ual protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of ine+uality. *t is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the ob$ect to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. *t does not demand absolute e+uality among residentsH it merely
re+uires that all persons shall be treated alike, under li7e circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The e+ual protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to
all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds e0ists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.
"liens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise $ustified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality.
That would be re+uiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
than for similar classes of "merican citi#ens. 1roadly speaking, the difference in status between
citi#ens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the e0ercise of police power.
"liens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers
with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nationQs

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economy, e0cept in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on the +ualifications of the aliens have been shown on
many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. 7IC(O1+ V.
()R1.1&)42 supra.:
The e+ual protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or
class privilege. *t is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the ob$ect to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. *t does not re+uire absolute e+uality, but
merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed.
/e have held, time and again, that the e+ual protection clause of the %onstitution does not
forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the sub$ect of the particular legislation. *f classification is germane
to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies e+ually to present and
future conditions, the classification does not violate the e+ual protection guarantee. 73MM
PROMO*IO1 .1& M.1.+)M)1*2 I1C.2 et al. V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S2 et al. >ED SCR. @98
B988EC:
SEARC2ES AND SEICURES
The addition of the word SpersonallyS after the word SdeterminedS and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 67B< %onstitution to issue warrants to Sother responsible officers as may
be authori#ed by lawS, has apparently convinced petitioner 1eltran that the %onstitution now
re+uires the $udge to personally e0amine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
/hat the %onstitution underscores is the e0clusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
$udge to satisfy himself of the e0istence of probable cause. *n satisfying himself of the e0istence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the $udge is not re+uired to personally
e0amine the complainant and his witnesses. 5ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall!
.6) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the e0istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrestH or .() if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscalQs report and re+uire the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
e0istence of probable cause.
4ound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise $udges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary e0amination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. 7SO#IV)1 V. M.%.SI.R 79E? SCR. @8@
B98<<C:
That petitioners were not Scaught in the actS does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners
were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with ?ohn 4herman being naked,
:nder those circumstances the %* agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had
committed SpedophiliaS defined as Spsycho&se0ual perversion involving childrenS .Mraft&=bbing
Psychopatia 4e0ualis, p. 999H SParaphilia .or unusual se0ual activity) in which children are the
preferred se0ual ob$ectS ./ebsterQs Third ,ew *nternational ictionary, 67B6 ed., p. 6NN9) O4olicitor
EeneralQs Return of the /rit, on p. 68P. /hile not a crime under the Revised Penal %ode, it is
behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the 4tate to promote and
protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well&being of our youth ."rticle **, 4ection 6<,
67AB %onstitution).
"t any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be
considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from +uestioning
its validity. 7(.RV)J V. S.1*I.+O 79E> SCR. <=D B98<<C:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation ,o. (8F9, are all in
the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.

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The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non&violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to +uell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which re+uires the determination by a
$udge of the e0istence of probable cause before the issuance of a $udicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. @bviously, the absence of a $udicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but e+ually in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the e0igencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society
and its government and duly constituted authorities. *f killing and other acts of violence against the
rebels find $ustification in the e0igencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely sei#ing their persons and
detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less $ustified. 7,MI# V.
R.MOS 79<? SCR. @99 B988DC:
"ccused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs .hashish). " crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in-lagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls s+uarely under paragraph .6) of the foregoing provisions
of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
/hile it is true that the ,"R%@3 officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the
case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and
there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
ob$ects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The re+uired
probable cause that will &$ustify a warrantless search and sei#ure is not determined by any fi0ed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
/arrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this %ourt as
valid, because of e0istence of probable cause, where the smell of mari$uana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to
flee. 7P)OP#) V. M.#MS*)&* 798< SCR. =D9 B9889C:
/e do not believe that the warrantless SarrestS or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of 4ection 9 of Rule 66< of the 67A9 Rules on %riminal Procedure.
PetitionerQs SarrestQ took place si0 .N) days after the shooting of 3aguan. The SarrestingS officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of 4ection 9.a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot 3aguan. ,either could the SarrestS effected si0 .N) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected . when Othe shooting hadP in fact $ust been committedS within the
meaning of 4ection 9.b). 3oreover, none of the SarrestingS officers had any Spersonal knowledgeS of
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot 3aguan. The information upon which
the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting&
one stated that Petitioner was the gunmanH another was able to take down the alleged gunmanQs
carQs plate number which turned out to be registered in petitionerQs wifeQs name. That information
did not, however, constitute Spersonal knowledge.S 7+O V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S 7>DE SCR. 9@<
B988>C:
The setting up of the +uestioned checkpoints in >alen#uela .and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the ,%R% to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
%heckpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabili#e the government, in
the interest of public security. *n this connection, the %ourt may take $udicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by ,P" Ssparrow units,S not to mention the abundance of
9 4ection A, B7 %.?.4. BAN. unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in
such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions&which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very

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least, as abnormal times. 1etween the inherent right of the state to protect its e0istence and
promote public welfare and an individualQs right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. 1ut, at the cost
of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citi#en, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community. 7V.#MO1*) V &) VI##. 79<; SCR. EE; B98<8C:
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause.

4till and all, the important thing is that there was
probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
"lthough the term eludes e0act definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious manQs
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is chargedH or the e0istence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or ob$ects sought in connection
with said offense or sub$ect to sei#ure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The
re+uired probable cause that will $ustify a warrantless search and sei#ure is not determined by a
fi0ed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
@ne such form of search of moving vehicles is the Sstop&and&searchS without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is
warranted by the e0igencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. "
checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an e0tensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individualQs right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the
following instances! .6) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair groundsH .() simply looks into a vehicleH .<) flashes a light therein
without opening the carQs doorsH .F) where the occupants are not sub$ected to a physical or body
searchH .9) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspectionH
and .N) where the routine check is conducted in a fi0ed area.
,one of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did
not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitionerQs vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the 7a7awati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to
see the cable wires. *t cannot be considered a simple routine check.
The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with 7a7awati leaves does not constitute Sprobable causeS as would $ustify the conduct of a
search without a warrant.
?urisprudence is to the effect that an ob$ect is in plain view if the ob$ect itself is plainly
e0posed to sight. /here the ob$ect sei#ed was inside a closed package, the ob$ect itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be sei#ed without a warrant. Dowever, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to
an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be sei#ed. *n other words, if the package
is such that an e0perienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited
article, then the article is deemed in plain view. *t must be immediately apparent to the police
that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise sub$ect to
sei#ure.
*t is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not e0posed to sight
because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent
nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden
underneath the leaves and branches. "s a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was
loaded in his vehicle. *n such a case, it has been held that the ob$ect is not in plain view which
could have $ustified mere sei#ure of the articles without further search.
oubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and sei#ures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is une+uivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Dence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The +uestion whether a consent to a
search was in fact voluntary is a +uestion of fact to be determined from the totality of all the

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circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given! .6) the age of the defendantH .() whether
he was in a public or secluded locationH .<) whether he ob$ected to the search or passively looked
onH .F) the education and intelligence of the defendantH .9) the presence of coercive police
proceduresH .N) the defendantQs belief that no incriminating evidence will be foundH .B) the nature
of the police +uestioningH .A) the environment in which the +uestioning took placeH and .7) the
possibly vulnerable sub$ective state of the person consenting. *t is the 4tate which has the burden
of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given. 7R,&J C.B.##)S V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S and P)OP#) OF *()
P(I#IPPI1)S 7+.R. 1o. 9@E>8> 3anuary 9;2 >DD>:
PRIAACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
PetitionerQs contention that the phrase Sprivate communicationS in 4ection * of R. ". F(88
does not include private conversationsS narrows the ordinary meaning of the word ScommunicationS
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
Sto share or to *mpart.S *n its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the Sprocess by which meanings or thoughts are shared
between individuals through a common system of symbols .as language signs or gestures).S These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non&verbal, written or e0pressive communications
of Smeanings or thoughtsS which are likely to include the emotionally&charged e0change, on
5ebruary ((,67AA, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latterQs office.
"ny doubts about the legislative bodyQs meaning of the phrase Sprivate communicationS are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms SconversationS and communicationS were
interchangeably used by 4enator TaUada in his =0planatory ,ote to the bill.
"t has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. 1ut this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well as the undeniable
fact that most, if not all. %ivili#ed people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
e0pose. 5ree conversations are often characteri#ed by e0aggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the e0pression of anti&social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of %ommunication, among others, has e0pressly been assured by our
%onstitution, ,eedless to state here, the framers of our %onstitution must have recogni#ed the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of manQs spiritual nature. of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of
life are to be found in the un&audited and free e0change of communication between individuals&&&&&
free from every $ustifiable intrusion by whatever means.S 7R.MIR)4 V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S 7>=<
SCR. ;8D B988;C:
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the %onstitution hence, it is the
burden of government to show that ".@. ,o. <8A is $ustified by some compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn. ".@. ,o. <8A is predicated on two considerations! .6) the need to provide
our citi#ens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities and .() the need to reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
*t is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of ".@. ,o.
<8A. 1ut what is not arguable is the broadness, the vaguenessH the overbreadth of ".@. ,o. <8A
which if implemented will put our peopleQs right to privacy in clear and present danger.
*t is plain and we hold that ".@. ,o. <8A falls short of assuring that personal information
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for une+uivocally specified
purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of ".@. ,o. <8A may interfere with the
individualQs liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movementH it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self&incriminationH it may pave the way for Sfishing e0peditionsS by government authorities
and evade the right against unreasonable searches and sei#ures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the PR,, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his *, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the 1ill of Rights seeks to
prevent.

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The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle&to&grave
dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats
of the computer revolution. The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on
individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. *t can continue
adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored data is
simple. /hen information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be
e0tracted together with other data on the sub$ect. @nce e0tracted, the information is putty in the
hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.
The threats emanate from various sources & governments, $ournalists, employers, social scientists,
etc. *n the case at bar, the threat comes from the e0ecutive branch of government which by
issuing ".@. ,o. <8A pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about
themselves on the prete0t that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Eiven the record&keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that ".@. ,o. <8A gives
the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citi#ens. *t is
timely to take note of the well&worded warning of Malvin, ?r., Sthe disturbing result could be that
everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. *n a way, the
threat is that because of its record&keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget.S 7OP#) V. *ORR)S 7>8@ SCR. 9=9 B988<C:
FREEDOM OF E6PRESSION
5reedom of speech and of e0pression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of e0pression needs on occasion to be ad$usted and to and accommodated with the
re+uirements of e+ually important public interests. @ne of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of $ustice. There is
no antimony between free e0pression and the integrity of the system of administering $ustice. 5or
the protection and maintenance of freedom of e0pression itself can be secured only within the
conte0t of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing $ustice, within the conte0t, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of $ustice which are accepted by the general
community. "s 3r. ?ustice 5rankfurter put it!
" free press is not to be preferred to an independent $udiciary, nor an independent $udiciary to a
free press. ,either has primacy over the otherH both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom
of the press in itself presupposes an independent $udiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary, be vindicated. "nd one of the potent means for assuring $udges their independence is a
free press.
3r. ?ustice 3alcolm of this %ourt e0pressed the same thought in the following terms!
The @rganic "ct wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest e0tent. The %ourt has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under the -ibel -aw which come dangerously close to its violation. /e shall continue in this
chosen path. The liberty of the citi#ens must be preserved in all of its completeness. 1ut license or
abuse of liberty of the press and of the citi#ens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense.
"s important as is the maintenance of an unmu##led press and the free e0ercise o the rights of the of
citi#ens is the maintenance of the independence of the ?udiciary. Respect for the ?udiciary cannot be
had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the court. 7I1 R)0 )MI# P. 3,R.&O 7>=@
SCR. >88 B988;C:
" Spublic figureS is a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs
and his character, has become a Qpublic personage.Q De is, in other words, a celebrity. @bviously, to
be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing
before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. *t includes public officers, famous inventors
and e0plorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than
the Ereat =0alted Ruler of the lodge. *t includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position
where the public attention is focused upon him as a person. 7.J)RS PRO&,C*IO1S P*J.2 #*&. V.
C.P,#O1+ 79ED SCR. <E9 B98<<C:

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5air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every, discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is $udicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. *n order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must, either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. *f the comment is an e0pression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts. 7BOR3. V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S 7@D9 SCR. 9 B9888C:
5ree speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no
previous restraint on the communication of views or subse+uent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a Sclear
and present danger of a substantive evil that Othe 4tateP has a right to prevent.S 5reedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. *t is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. *t is not
to be limited, much less denied, e0cept on a showing, as is the case with freedom of e0pression, of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. =ven prior to
the 67<9 %onstitution, ?ustice 3alcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary conse+uence of
our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of
?ustice Rutledge, speaking for the ma$ority of the "merican 4upreme %ourt in Thomas v. %ollins, it
was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the government for redress of grievances. "ll these rights, while not identical, are inseparable.
The sole $ustification for a limitation on the e0ercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
,owhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of e0pression and peaceable assembly
better e0pressed than in this e0cerpt from an opinion of ?ustice 5rankfurter! S*t must never be
forgotten, however, that the 1ill of Rights was the child of the =nlightenment. 1ack of the guaranty
of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining
access to the mind. *t was in order to avert force and e0plosions due to restrictions upon rational
modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. 1ut
utterance in a conte0t of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part
of an instrument of force. 4uch utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the %onstitution.S
/hat was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal
or printed being in a conte0t of violence. *t must always be remembered that this right likewise
provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if
contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. 5or if the peaceful means of communication cannot
be availed of, resort to non&peaceful means may he the only alternative. ,or is this the sole reason
for the e0pression of dissent. *t means more than $ust the right to be heard of the person who feels
aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. *ts value may lie in the fact that there may
be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There
are, of course, well&defined limits. /hat is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. @ne may not
advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
The %onstitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled
out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though, is not re+uired. "s pointed
out in an early Philippine case, penned in 678B to be precise, :nited 4tates v. "purado! S*t is rather
to be e0pected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest
against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought
to a high pitch of e0citement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the
less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers.S *t bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, in$ury
to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to oneQs destructive urges is
to call for condemnation. *t is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty
in our scheme of values. 7R)J)S V. B.+.*SI1+ 79>; SCR. ;;@ B98<@C:

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ASSEM@LY AND PETITION
*n the case of 8illis !ox vs. State o- 9ew /ampshire+ $&2 1.S.+ 23', the statute of ,ew
Dampshire P.-. %hap. 6F9, section (, providing that Sno parade or procession upon any ground
abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefore shall first be obtained from
the select men of the town or from licensing committee,S was construed by the 4upreme %ourt of
,ew Dampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant
the license, and held valid. "nd the 4upreme %ourt of the :nited 4tates in its decision .67F6)
penned by %hief ?ustice Dughes firming the $udgment of the 4tate 4upreme %ourt, held that S a
statute re+uiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special
license therefore from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts,
the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the
time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... .S
/e can not construe the ordinance under consideration as conferring upon the 3ayor power
to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authori#ing him to prohibit
the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions,
because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the
constitutional limitations. "s the 3unicipal 1oards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets,
parks, and the other public places, and the word Sregulate,S as used in section (FFF of the Revised
"dministrative %ode, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can
not be construed a synonymous with construed SsuppressedS or SprohibitS .Mwong 4ing vs. %ity of
3anila, F6 Phil., 68<), the 3unicipal 1oard can not grant the 3ayor a power that it does not have.
1esides, the powers and duties of the 3ayor as the %hief =0ecutive of the %ity are e0ecutive and
one of them is Sto comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful
performance and e0ecution of laws and ordinancesS .section (F<F O:P of the Revised "dministrative
%ode), the legislative police power of the 3unicipal 1oard to enact ordinances regulating
reasonably the e0ercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citi#ens in the streets and other
public places, can not be delegated to the 3ayor or any other officer by conferring upon him
unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its
impartial e0ecution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented. 7PRIMICI.S V. F,+OSO
7<D Pil ?9 B98=<C:
*t is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is
freedom of access. ,or is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group, *f it were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving
rise to an e+ual protection +uestion. The principle under "merican doctrines was given utterance
by %hief ?ustice Dughes in these words! SThe +uestion, if the Tights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its
put poseH not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the %onstitution protects.S There could be danger to public
peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its
peaceful character. =ven then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. *t is true that
the licensing official, here respondent 3ayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or
not a permit would be granted. *t is not, however, unfettered discretion. /hile prudence re+uires
that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur,
given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is
scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there.
The e0ercise of such a right, in the language of ?ustice Roberts, speaking for the "merican 4upreme
%ourt, is not to be Sabridged on the plea that it may be e0ercised in some other place.S
The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. *f it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is re+uired. 4uch application
should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid ob$ections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
*t is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. *f he is of the view that there is such an imminent

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and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper $udicial authority. 5ree speech and
peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values. *t cannot be too strongly stressed that on the $udiciary, & even more so than
on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and
deference to such preferred rights. ,o verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course,
dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by ?ustice Dolmes Sas the sovereign prerogative
of $udgment.S ,onetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of $ustice
on the side of such rights, en$oying as they do precedence and primacy. 7R)J)S V. B.+.*SI1+2
supra.:
FREEDOM OF RELI3ION
Respondent should not be found guilty of gross and immoral conduct without considering
her right to religious freedom. *n a catena of cases, the %ourt has ruled that government employees
engaged in illicit relations are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conductS for which heGshe may be
held administratively liable. Dowever, there is a distinguishing factor that sets the case at bar
apart from precedents, i.e., as a defense, respondent involves religious freedom since her religion,
the ?ehovahQs /itnesses, has, after thorough investigation, allowed her con$ugal arrangement with
Juilapio based on the churchQs religious beliefs and practices. This distinguishing factor compels the
%ourt to apply the religious clauses to the case at bar. The public morality e0pressed in the law is
necessarily secular for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. The morality referred to in the law is
public and necessarily secular, not religious. =0pansive religious freedom therefore re+uires that
government be neutral in matters of religionH governmental reliance upon religious $ustification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. *n other words, government action, including its
proscription of immorality as e0pressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular
purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is Sdetrimental .or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the e0istence and progress of human societyS and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Recogni#ing the
religious nature of the 5ilipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitutionQs religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a :enevolent neutralit;.
1enevolent neutrality recogni#es that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest e0tent possible within fle0ible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
@nly one conduct is in +uestion before this %ourt, i.e., the con$ugal arrangement of a
government employee whose partner is legally married to another which Philippine law and
$urisprudence consider both immoral and illegal. /hether an act is immoral within the meaning of
the statute is not to be determined by respondentQs concept of morality. The law provides the
standard. The foregoing discussion on the doctrine of religious freedom, however, shows that with
benevolent neutrality as a framework, the %ourt cannot simply re$ect respondentQs plea of religious
freedom without even sub$ecting it to the Scompelling state interestS test that would balance her
freedom with the paramount interests of the state. <he case at :ar :eing one o- -irst impression+
we now sub$ect the respondentQs claim of religious freedom to the Scompelling state interestS test
from a benevolent neutrality stance V i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondentQs claim to
religious freedom Qwould warrant carving out an e0ception from the %ivil 4ervice -awH necessarily,
her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest. 6n appl;ing the test+ the -irst in=uir; is whether
respondent>s right to religious -reedom has :een :urdened. There is no doubt that choosing
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on
the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the
other hand, puts a burden on her free e0ercise of religion. <he second step is to ascertain
respondent>s sincerit; in her religious :elie-. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious
belief and practice and is not merely using the Seclaration of Pledging 5aithfulnessS to avoid
punishment for immorality. The eclaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years

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of living together with her partner, Juilapio, and ten years before she entered the $udiciary.
3inisters from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the ?ehovahQs /itnessesQ practice of
securing a eclaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. 7)S*R.&. vs.
)SCRI*OR (..M. 1o. P-D>-9E;9. .u!ust =2 >DD@:
5reedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental laws, past and present. /e have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is
Sdesigned to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good.S /e have also laboriously defined in our
$urisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and
worship. To +uote the summation of 3r. ?ustice *sagani %ru#, our well&known constitutionalist!
Religious Profession and /orship. The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect,
vi#., freedom to believe and freedom to act on oneQs beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief
is confined within the realm of thought. The second is sub$ect to regulation where the belief is
translated into e0ternal acts that affect the public welfare.
.6) 5reedom to 1elieve. The individual is free to believe .or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the
hereafter. De may indulge his own theories about life and death, worship any god he chooses, or
none at allH embrace or re$ect any religion! acknowledge the divinity of Eod or of any being that
appeals to his reverenceH recogni#e or deny the immortality of his soul & in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. Dowever absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be
hostile and heretical to the ma$ority. he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. De may not be
re+uired to prove his beliefs. De may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a
matter of faith. 3en may believe what they cannot prove.Q =very one has a right to his beliefs and he
may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
.() 5reedom to "ct on @neQs 1eliefs. 1ut where the individual e0ternali#es his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes sub$ect to the authority of the 4tate.
"s great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the
%onstitution, can be en$oyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. *t is error to think
that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the 4tate and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be e0ercised to prevent religious
practices inimical to society. "nd this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere
religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable re+uirements or
prohibitions of the law.
The %ourt iterates the rule that the e0ercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
4tate when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the
4tate is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public
health, public morals, or public welfare, " laisse# faire policy on the e0ercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the %ourt against its blind adoption as religion is
and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today.
:nder our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the 4tate to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war
and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of
freedom of religion prohibits the 4tate from leaning towards any religion. >is&a&vis religious
differences, the 4tate en$oys no ban+uet of options. ,eutrality alone is its fi0ed and immovable
stance. *n fine, respondent board cannot s+uelch the speech of petitioner *glesia ni %risto simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in
our country. *n a 4tate where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the
reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of
freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
dueling ideas. /hen the lu0ury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech
should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that
can fan the embers of truth. 7I+#)SI. 1I CRIS*O V. C. 7>;8 SCR. ;>8 B988EC:
The constitutional guaranty of free e0ercise and en$oyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. "ny restraint of such right can
be $ustified like other restraints on freedom of e0pression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the 4tate has the right to prevent. 7.M)RIC.1 BIB#)
SOCI)*J V. CI*J OF M.1I#. 79D9 Pil @<; B98;?C:

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The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from oneQs $ob or of
being e0pelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of 5ilipinos who cut
their teeth on the 1ill of Right which guarantees their rights to free speechWWand the free e0ercise
of religious profession and worship .4ec. 9, "rticle ***, 67AB %onstitutionH "rticle *>, 4ection A, 67B<
%onstitution "rticle ***, 4ection 6OBP, 67<9 %onstitution). 7)BR.#I1.+ V. &IVISIO1
S,P)RI1*)1&)1* OF C)B, 7>98 SCR. >;E B988@C:
LI@ERTY OF A@ODE AND TRAAEL
"rticle ***, 4ection N of the 67AB %onstitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without %ourt @rder, the appropriate e0ecutive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of Snational security, public safety, or public healthS and Sas may be
provided by law,S a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 67B< te0t. "pparently, the
phraseology in the 67AB %onstitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed
under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing %enter, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party.
"rticle ***, 4ection N of the 67AB %onstitution should by no means be construed as delimiting
the inherent power of the %ourts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in
criminal cases pending before them. /hen by law $urisdiction is conferred on a %ourt or $udicial
officer, all au0iliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such %ourt or officer .Rule 6<9, 4ection N, Rules of %ourt). 7SI#V)RIO V. CO,R* OF
.PP).#S 7+.R 1o. 8=><=2 .pril <2 9889:
RI32T TO INFORMATION
The incorporation in the %onstitution of a guarantee of access to information of public
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy .1aldo#a v. imaano, "dm. 3atter ,o. 66(8&3?, 3ay 9, 67BN, 6B 4%R" 6F). *n the same
way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the e0igencies of their time
.Thornhill vs. "labama, <68 :.4. AA, 68( 667<76), access to information of general interest aids the
people in democratic decision&making .AB Darvard -aw Review 6989 O67BFP by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
1ut the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. *t does not open every door to any and all information. :nder the %onstitution, access to
official records, papers, etc., are Ssub$ect to limitations as may be provided by lawS ."rt. 666, 4ec.
B, second sentence). The law may therefore e0empt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security .?ournal ,o. 78, 4eptember (<, 67AN, p. 68H and
?ournal ,o. 76, 4eptember (F, 67AN, p. <(, 67AN %onstitutional %ommission). *t follows that, in
every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the
nature of the information sought, i.e., .a) being of public concern or one that involves public
interest, and, .b) not being e0empted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The threshold +uestion is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
public concern.
*n determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid
test which can be applied. SPublic concernS like Spublic interestS is a term that eludes e0act
definition. 1oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub$ects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citi#en. *n the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
the public. 7#)+.SPI V. CIVI# S)RVIC) COMMISSIO1 79;D SCR. ;@D B98<?C:
/ith the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the

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basis of a $ust and dispassionate $udgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation
of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether
open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to
ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a $udge with an unpre$udiced
mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
ue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an ob$ect of publicQs
attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but
only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
/itnesses and $udges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy
climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also
be conceded that Stelevision can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses
on. =ven while it may be difficult to +uantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to
bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that,
indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect
that such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of $udges cannot be
evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to
yield to it. *t might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of
the most powerful media of public opinion.
To say that actual pre$udice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle
threats to $ustice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate
dispensation of $ustice can create. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of
proof, but it is not far&fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we
know it now.
"n accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. " public trial aims to ensure
that he is fairly dealt with and would not be un$ustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. " public trial is not synonymous with publici#ed
trialH it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. *n the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too
large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free
to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
The courts recogni#e the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. *t also approves of mediaQs e0alted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in ac+uainting the public with
the $udicial process in actionH nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is
still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions. ?ustice %lark thusly pronounced, Swhile a ma0imum
freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in
a democratic society, its e0ercise must necessarily be sub$ect to the maintenance of absolute
fairness in the $udicial process.S 7R)0 R)L,)S* R.&IO-*V COV)R.+) OF *() *RI.# I1 *()
S.1&I+.1B.J.1 OF *() P#,1&)R C.S)S .+.I1S* *() FORM)R PR)SI&)1* 3OS)P( ).
)S*R.&. S)CR)*.RJ OF 3,S*IC) ()R1.1&O P)R)42 et2 al. vs. 3OS)P( ). )S*R.&. and
I1*)+R.*)& B.R OF *() P(I#IPPI1)S 7..M. 1o. D9-=-D@-SC2 3une >82 >DD9:
The constitutional right to information includes information on on&going negotiations before
final $udgment as stated in "rticle ***, 4ec. B and in "rticle **, 4ec (A of the %onstitution. These
twin provisions of the %onstitution seek to promote transparency in policy making and in operations
of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to e0ercise effectively
other constitutional rights. This is because a consummated contract is not a re+uirement for the
e0ercise of the right to information. @therwise, the people can never e0ercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to e0pose
its defects. 7FR.1CISCO I. C(.V)4 V. P,B#IC )S*.*)S .,*(ORI*J and .M.RI CO.S*.# B.J
&)V)#OPM)1* CO. 7+.R. 1o. 9@@>;D2 3uly 82 >DD>:
RI32T TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS

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%onsidering that under the 67AB %onstitution SOtPhe civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Eovernment, including government&owned or
controlled corporations with original chartersS O"rt. *X.1), 4ec. (.6)H see also 4ec. 6 of =.@. ,o. 6A8
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as Sgovernment employeesSP and that the
444 is one such government&controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created
under R.". ,o. 66N6, its employees are part of the civil service O,"4=%@ v. ,-R%, E.R. ,os. N7AB8
X B8(79, ,ovember (F, 67AAP and are covered by the %ivil 4ervice %ommissionQs memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
The statement of the %ourt in "lliance of Eovernment /orkers v. 3inister of -abor and
=mployment OE.R. ,o. N8F8<, "ugust <, 6!7A<, 6(F 4%R" 6P is relevant as it furnishes the rationale
for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and government employees with regard to
the right to strike!
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that Sthe terms and conditions of
employment in the Eovernment, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are
governed by lawS .4ection 66, the *ndustrial Peace "ct, R". ,o. ABN, as amended and "rticle (BB,
the -abor %ode, P.. ,o. FF(, as amended). 4ince the terms and conditions of government
employment are fi0ed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. 4ub$ect to the minimum re+uirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation,
the terms and conditions of employment in the unioni#ed private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. *n government employment, however, it is the legislature and,
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fi0 the terms
and conditions of employment. "nd this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars,
rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. 7SSS )MP#OJ))SN
.SSOCI.*IO1 V. C. 79?; SCR. E<E B98<8C:
NONBIMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
/hile non&impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute
since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate e0ercise of police power, i.e., Sthe power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.
The need for reconciling the non&impairment clause of the %onstitution and the valid
e0ercise of police power may also be gleaned from Delvering v. avis wherein 3r. ?ustice %ardo#o,
speaking for the %ourt, resolved the conflict Sbetween one welfare and another, between particular
and general,S thus&
S,or is the concept of the general welfare static. ,eeds that were narrow or parochial a century ago
may be interwoven in our day with the well&being of the nation. /hat is critical or urgent changes
with the times.S
The motives behind the passage of the +uestioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a
Slegitimate response to a felt public need,S not whimsical or oppressive, the non&impairment of
contracts clause of the %onstitution will not bar the municipalityQs proper e0ercise of the power. ,ow
%hief ?ustice 5ernando puts it aptly when he declared! SPolice power legislation then is not likely to
succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory.S
5urthermore, /e restated in Philippine "merican -ife *ns. %o. v. "uditor Eeneral that laws and
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the
parties. Thus
S,ot only are e0isting laws read into contracts in order to fi0 obligations as between the parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contacts as a postulate of
the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance
of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile&a government which retains
ade+uate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.S
7OR*I+.S K CO. V. F).*I B.1% 78= SCR. ;@@ B98?8C:
CUSTODIAL INAESTI3ATION

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"n out&of&court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. *n a show&up, the
accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line&up,
the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose.

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custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recogni#ed as Scritical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecutionS which necessitate the presence of counsel for the
accused. This is because the results of these pre&trial proceedings Smight well settle the accusedQs
fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.S /e have thus ruled that any identification of
an uncounseled accused made in a police line&up, or in a show&up for that matter, after the start of
the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.
The inadmissibility of these out&of&court identifications does not render the in&court
identification of accused&appellant inadmissible for being the Sfruits of the poisonous tree.S
7P)OP#) OF *() P(I#IPPI1)S vs. .1*(O1J )SCOR&I.# 7+.R. 1o. 9@<8@;-@;2 3anuary 9E2 >DD>:
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
This %ourt has acknowledged the right of a trial $udge to +uestion witnesses with a view to
satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over
which he presides.S 1ut not only should his e0amination be limited to asking SclarificatoryS
+uestions, the right should be sparingly and $udiciously usedH for the rule is that the court should
stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial.Q
Dere, these limitations were not observed. Dardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the
4andiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the
prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the ?ustices cross&e0amined the
witnesses, their cross&e0aminations supplementing those made by Prosecutor >iernes and far
e0ceeding the latterQs +uestions in length. The Scold neutrality of an impartial $udgeS re+uirement
of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its over#ealousness,
assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. *n this connection, the observation made in the
issenting @pinion to the effect that the ma$ority of this %ourt was Sunduly disturbedS with the
number of court +uestions alone, is +uite inaccurate. " substantial portion of the T4, was
incorporated in the ma$ority opinion not to focus on SnumbersS alone, but more importantly to show
that the court +uestions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that
common standard of fairness and impartiality. *n fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the
records, confronted with SnumbersS without necessarily reali#ing the partiality of the %ourt. 7#,IS
.. *.B,)1. VS. (O1OR.B#) S.1&I+.1B.J.12 and *() P)OP#) OF *() P(I#IPPI1)S 7+.R. 1o.
9D@;D9-D@2 February 9?2 988?:
RI32T TO @E INFORMED OF T2E NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
The procedural due process mandate of the %onstitution re+uires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why be was indicted and what penal offense he has to
face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. 3oreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a
case is to be in accordance with a valid law. This %ourt, in People v. %astillo, speaking through
?ustice e ?oya and following the language of the "merican 4upreme %ourt, identified due process
with the accused having Sbeen heard in a court of competent $urisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after in+uiry., and investigation, upon notice
to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a $udgment awarded with the authority of a
constitutional law, W W W.S "n arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means Sfor bringing
the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is re+uired to meet W W WS *ts importance
was stressed by ?ustice 3oreland as early as 676N in the leading case of :nited 4tates v. 1inayoh.
De pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, Qthere is a duty laid by the %ode Onow the
Rules of %ourtP upon the court to inform OhimP of certain rights and to e0tend to him, on his
demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must
perform, unless waived.S To emphasi#e its importance, he added! S,o such duty, however, is laid
on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to e0ercise during
the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must
demand. *n other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own violation, W W W.Q *n the
terse and apt language of the 4olicitor Eeneral! S"rraignment is an indispensable re+uirement in
any criminal prosecutionS Procedural due process demands no less.
,or is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. "s
noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner re+uired by the Rules, an accused, for the

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first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. *t is
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending
on the nature of the crime imputed to him. "t the very least then, he must be, fully informed of
why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobili#ed against him. "n arraignment serves that purpose.
Thereafter, he is no longer in the dark. *t is true, the complaint or information may not be worded
with sufficient clarity. De would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have such
an opportunity to plead to the charge. /ith his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter
his plea with full knowledge of the conse+uences. De is not even re+uired to do so immediately. De
may move to +uash. /hat is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he be fully ac+uainted
with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly
committed. *t is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. *t is not useless
formality, much less an idle ceremony. 7BOR3. V M)1&O4. 7?? SCR. =>> B98??C:
SUSPENSION OF T2E PRIAILE3E OF T2E WRIT OF 2A@EAS CORPUS
The members of the %ourt are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to
in+uire into the e0istence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency
thereof .the suspension of the privilege of the writ).
*ndeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor un+ualified. The
authority conferred by the %onstitution, both under the 1ill of Rights and under the =0ecutive
epartment, is limited and conditional. The precept in the 1ill of Rights establishes a general rule,
as well as an e0ception thereto. /hat is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently
to stress its importance, by providing that S.t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended 0 0 0.S *t is only by way of e0ception that it permits the suspension of the privilege Sin
cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellionS & or, under "rt. >** of the %onstitution, Simminent
danger thereofQ & Swhen the public safety re+uires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall e0ist.S 5ar from
being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed,
confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
e0istence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be e0ercised. These
factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the e0tent, the
confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not e0ist. "nd, like the limitations and
restrictions imposed by the 5undamental -aw upon the legislative department, adherence thereto
and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be in+uired into by courts of $ustice.
@therwise, the e0plicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. 4urely, the framers
of our %onstitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful e0ercise in futility.
7#.1S.1+ V. +.RIC. 7=> SCR. ==< B98?9C:
RI32T A3AINST SELFBINCRIMINATION
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of
crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their
rela0ation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that it is the
duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to
permit any steps, tending toward their invasion. Dence, there is the well&established doctrine that
the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as wall
the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any
fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.
/e say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between
one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is re+uired to furnish evidence against himself.
"nd we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the
act of writing, evidence which does not e0ist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.
7B)#*R.1 V. S.MSO1 7;@ Pil ;?D B98>8C:
*n the language of ?ustice ouglas! S/e conclude... that the 4elf&*ncrimination %lause of
the 5ifth "mendment has been absorbed in the 5ourteenth, that it e0tends its protection to lawyers

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as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of
disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it.S /e reiterate that such a
principle is e+ually applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege
to practice the medical profession.
The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent 1oard and
intervenors&appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self&incrimination should be
limited to allowing a witness to ob$ect to +uestions the answers to which could lead to a penal
liability being subse+uently incurred. *t is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the
language of another "merican decision, is the protection against Sany disclosures which the witness
may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other
evidence that might be so used.S *f that were all there is then it becomes diluted.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. "s far back as 6789, we
had occasion to declare! SThe accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be
used as a presumption of his guilt.S @nly last year, in %have# v. %ourt of "ppeals, speaking through
?ustice 4anche#, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant Sto forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand&with undiluted, unfettered
e0ercise of his own free genuine will.S
/hy it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and
that the truth must be revealed, such desirable ob$ectives should not be accomplished according to
means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. 3ore and
more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected
of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To +uote from %hief ?ustice /arren, Sthe
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . . . must accord to
the dignity and integrity of its citi#ens.S 7P.SC,.# V M)&IC.# BO.R& OF )G.MI1)RS 7>< SCR.
@=; B98E8C:
," is an organic substance found in a personQs cells which contains his or her genetic code.
=0cept for identical twins, each personQs ," profile is distinct and uni+ue.
/hen a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victimQs body for the suspectQs ,". This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then
matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of ," testing is to ascertain whether an association e0ists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are sub$ected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results!
6) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
.e0clusion). This conclusion is absolute and re+uires no further analysis or discussionH
() *t is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar ," types .inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. >arious parts of
the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a
more conclusive resultH or
<) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source .inclusion).

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such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the similarity.
n assessing the probative value of ," evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data! how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analy#ing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
+ualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. 7P)OP#) OF *() P(I#IPPI1)S vs. +)RRICO
V.##)3O 7+.R. 1o. 9==E;E2 May 82 >DD>:
INAOLUNTARY SERAITUDE
This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good
order of his community is still recogni#ed in all well&organi#ed governments in the ?posse
comitatusS .power of the county, poder del condado). .1ook 6 %ooleyQs 1lackstoneQs %ommentaries,
<F<H 1ook F, 6((.) :nder this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged
with the maintenance of peace and good order were bound, e0 officio, to pursue and to take all
persons who had violated the law. 5or that purpose they might command all the male inhabitants
of a certain age to assist them. This power is called ?posse comitatusS .power of the county). This

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was a right well recogni#ed at common law. "ct ,o. 6<87 is a statutory recognition of such
common&law right. 4aid "ct attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and by
which the people of the town .pueblo) may be called upon to render assistance for the protection
of the public and the preservation of peace and good order. *t is an e0ercise of the police power of
the state. 7*() ,1I*)& S*.*)S V. SI#V)S*R) POMP)J. 7+.R. 1o. 9D>;;2 .u!ust E2 989;:
PRO2I@ITED PUNIS2MENT
/hat is cruel and unusual Sis not fastened to the obsolete but may ac+uire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane $usticeS and Smust draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.S *ndeed, SOoPther
.:.4.) courts have focused on Qstandards of decencyQ finding that the widespread use of lethal
in$ections indicates that it comports with contemporary norms.S The primary indicator of societyQs
standard of decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the countryQs legislatures
to the sanction. Dence, for as long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets
the most stringent re+uirements provided by the %onstitution, we must confine our in+uiry to the
legality of R.". ,o. A6BB, whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitionerQs
challenge. /e find that the legislatureQs substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal in$ection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein.
7)C()+.R.J V. S)CR)*.RJ OF 3,S*IC) 7>8? SCR. ?;= B988<C:
NONBIMPRISONMENT FOR DE@T
" trust receipt arrangement does not involve a simple loan transaction between a creditor
and a debtor& importer. "part from a loan feature, the trust receipt arrangement has a security
feature that is covered by the trust receipt itself. (@intola v. 6nsular Aan7 o- Asia and America+ &2&
S!"A 20 %&'0() That second feature is what provides the much needed financial assistance to our
traders in the importation or purchase of goods or merchandise through the use of those goods or
merchandise as collateral for the advancements made by a bank. (Same v. People+ supra). The title
of the bank to the security is the one sought to be protected and not the loan which is a separate
and distinct agreement.
The Trust Receipts -aw punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of
money or goods to the pre$udice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not.
The law does not seek to enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no violation of a right
against imprisonment for non&payment of a debt.
Trust receipts are indispensable contracts in international and domestic business
transactions. The prevalent use of trust receipts, the danger of their misuse andGor
misappropriation of the goods or proceeds reali#ed from the sale of goods, documents or
instruments held in trust for entruster&banks, and the need for regulation of trust receipt
transactions to safeguard the rights and enforce the obligations of the parties involved are the
main thrusts of P.. 669. "s correctly observed by the 4olicitor Eeneral, P., 669, like 1atas
Pambansa 1lg. ((, punishes the act Snot as an offense against property, but as an offense against
public order.0 0 0 The misuse of trust receipts therefore should be deterred to prevent any possible
havoc in trade circles and the banking community .citing -o#ano v. 3artine#, 6FN 4%R" <(< O67ANPH
Rollo, p. 9B) *t is in the conte0t of upholding public interest that the law now specifically
designates a breach of a trust receipt agreement to be an act that SshallS make one liable for
estafa.
The offense is punished as a malum prohi:itum regardless of the e0istence. of intent or
malice. " mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a
criminal offense that causes pre$udice not only to another, but more to the public interest.
7P)OP#) V. 1I*.F.1 7+.R. 1o. <9;;82 .pril E2988>:
DOU@LE GEOPARDY
*n People of the Philippines versus Don. 3a0imiano %. "suncion, et al., E.R. ,os. A<A<B&F(,
"pril ((, 677(, ?ustice ,ocon said that!
S . . . according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant nay successfully allege former
$eopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been .6) convicted or .() ac+uitted, or .<) in $eopardy

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of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same
offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his e0press consent, by a court of
competent $urisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendent had pleaded
to the charge. S
/ithal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an
appropriate basis for the invocation of double $eopardy since the first $eopardy has not yet set in
by a previous conviction, ac+uittal or termination of the case without the consent the accused
.People vs. 3iraflores, 669 4%R" 9AN O67A(PH ,ierras vs. acuycuy,6A6 4%R" A O6778P).
3oreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned in the
previous case for estafa. Thus, there is that other missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar which
was precisely the same reason utili#ed by ?ustice avide, ?r. in -amera vs. %ourt of "ppeals .67A
4%R" 6AN O6776P) when he brushed aside the claim of double $eopardy of the accused therein who
was arraigned in the previous case only after the $udgment of conviction was promulgated in the
other case. The ponente cited a plethora of cases in support of the proposition that arraignment of
the accused in the previous case is a condition sine +ua non for double $eopardy to attach .at page
6<H People vs. Klagan, 9A Phil. A96H People vs. %onsulta, B8 4%R" (BBH "ndres v. %acdac, 66< 4%R"
(6NH People vs. 1ocar, at al., 6<( 4%R" 6NNH Easpar vs. 4andiganbayan, 6FF 4%R" F69) and echoed
the re+uisites of legal $eopardy as announced in People vs. 1ocar thus!
S-egal $eopardy attaches only .a) upon a valid indictment, .b) before a competent court, .c) after
arraignment, .d) a valid plea having been entered, and .e) the ease was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the e0press consent of the accused.S 7P)OP#) V. 3,&+) PI1)&. 7+.R. 1o.
==>D;2 February 992 988@:
@ur 1ill of Rights deals with two .() kinds of double $eopardy. The first sentence of clause
(8, section 6, "rticle *** of the %onstitution, ordains that Sno person shall be twice put in $eopardy
of punishment for the same offenseS The second sentence of said clause provides that Sif an act is
punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or ac+uittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.S Thus, the first sentence prohibits double $eopardy of
punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double $eopardy of punishment
for the same act. :nder the first sentence, one may be twice put in $eopardy of punishment of the
same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is
not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence
applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. *f the two charges are based on one
and the same act, conviction or ac+uittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. *ncidentally, such conviction or ac+uittal is not indispensable to
sustain the plea of double $eopardy of punishment for the same offense. 4o long as $eopardy has
attached under one of the information charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the
other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor ac+uittal in
either case.
/here the offenses charged are penali#ed either by different sections of the same statute
or by different statutes, the important in+uiry relates to the identity of offenses charged& the
constitutional protection against double $eopardy is available only where an identity is shown to
e0ist between the earlier and the subse+uent offenses charged. *n contrast, where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penali#ed by a statute, the critical in+uiry
is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed. and which are alleged to
have given rise to the two offenses! the constitutional protection against double $eopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a
municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged
under a statute.
The +uestion may be raised why one rule should e0ist where two offenses under two
different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for
the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under
a national statute. *f the second sentence of the double $eopardy provision had not been written
into the %onstitution, conviction or ac+uittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. "n offense penali#ed by
municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses
would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule&making
authorities&though one be subordinate to the other&and the plea of double $eopardy would never
lie. The discussions during the 67<F&67<9 %onstitutional %onvention show that the second sentence

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was inserted precisely for the purpose of e0tending the constitutional protection against double
$eopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence.
The +uestion of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by e0amining the
essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the
respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The +uestion of identity of the acts
which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by e0amining the location of such acts in time and
space. /hen the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other
in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and
where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design
or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characteri#ed as an integral whole capable of giving
rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments .a municipal ordinance and a
national statute).
*t is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against
double $eopardy to a subse+uent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with
absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity! the
first and second offenses may be regarded as the Ssame offenseS where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.6F Thus, for the
constitutional plea of double $eopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting
the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here
seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements. "s "ssociate ?ustice and later %hief ?ustice Ricardo Paras
cautioned in People vs. del %armen, et al., AA Phil. 96 .6796)!
S/hile the rule against double $eopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems
elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made
out from a single act. @themise, an unlawful act or omission may give rise to several prosecutions
depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can
be $ustified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. 7P)OP#) V.
3,&+) R)#OV. 79=< SCR. >8> B98<?C:
4ection A, Rule 66B of the Revised Rules of %riminal Procedure reads!
4ec. A. Provisional dismissal. I " case shall not be provisionally dismissed e0cept with the e0press
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not e0ceeding si0 .N) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one .6) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. /ith respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than si0 .N) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two .() years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived.
Daving invoked said rule before the petitioners&panel of prosecutors and before the %ourt
of "ppeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential re+uisites of the first paragraph
thereof, namely!
6.the prosecution with the e0press conformity of the accused or the accused moves for
a provisional .sin perjuicio) dismissal of the caseH or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the caseH
(.the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the caseH
<.the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionallyH
F.the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.
The foregoing re+uirements are conditions sine =ua non to the application of the time&bar
in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison dB etre for the re+uirement of the e0press
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subse+uently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double $eopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
"lthough the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year
after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution

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without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be e0pected to
comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
=0press consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. *t is a
positive, direct, une+uivocal consent re+uiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.
/here the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case 9o
o:jectionC or 8ith m; con-ormit;, the writing amounts to e0press consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to ob$ect to a provisional dismissal does not amount
to e0press consent.
" motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an e0press consent to such
provisional dismissal. *f a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the e0press consent of the
accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. @n the other
hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the e0press consent of the accused or
over his ob$ection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or re&filed even beyond
the prescribed periods sub$ect to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of
double $eopardy or that such revival or re&filing is barred by the statute of limitations. 7P)OP#) OF
*() P(I#IPPI1)S2 et al. vs. P.1FI#O M. #.CSO1 7+.R. 1o. 9=8=;@2 .pril 92 >DD@:
E6 POST FACTO LAW AND @ILLOF ATTAINDER
*n %alder v. 1ull, an e0 post facto law is one & .a) which makes an act done criminal before
the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such actionH or .b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committedH or .c) which changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law anne0ed to the crime when it was
committedH or .d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony
than the law re+uired at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendantH or .e) =very law which, in relation to the offense or its conse+uences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage. This %ourt added two more to the list, namely! .f) that
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawfulH or .g) deprives a person accused of crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or ac+uittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
=0 post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws.FN R.". A(F7 is not a
penal law. *t is a substantive law on $urisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the -egislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violationsH
or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.". B7B9,
which amended P.. 6N8N as regards the 4andiganbayanQs $urisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the %ourt as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer $ustice. ,ot being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.". A(F7 cannot
be challenged as unconstitutional.
PetitionerQs and intervenorsQ contention that their right to a two&tiered appeal which they
ac+uired under R.". B7B9 has been diluted by the enactment of R.". A(F7, is incorrect. The same
contention has already been re$ected by the, court several times considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against e0
post facto laws. R.". A(F7 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory
statute it does not partake the nature of an e0 post facto law. *t does not mete out a penalty and,
therefore, does not come within the prohibition.
3oreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. *t has been ruled
that ad$ective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their passage. 7#.CSO1 V. )G)C,*IV) S)CR)*.RJ2 et al. 7@D9 SCR. >8< B9888C:
CITICENS2IP
There are two ways of ac+uiring citi#enship! .6) by birth, and .() by naturali#ation. These
ways of ac+uiring citi#enship correspond to the two kinds of citi#ens! the natural&born citi#en, and
the naturali#ed citi#en. " person who at the time of his birth is a citi#en of a particular country, is
a natural&born citi#en thereof.

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"s defined in the same %onstitution, natural&born citi#ens Sare those citi#ens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac+uire or perfect his Philippine
citi#enship.S
@n the other hand, naturali#ed citi#ens are those who have become 5ilipino citi#ens
through naturali#ation, generally under %ommonwealth "ct ,o. FB<, otherwise known as the
Revised ,aturali#ation -aw, which repealed the former ,aturali#ation -aw ."ct ,o. (7(B), and by
Republic "ct ,o. 9<8. To be naturali#ed, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
+ualifications and none of the dis+ualification provided by law to become a 5ilipino citi#en. The
decision granting Philippine citi#enship becomes e0ecutory only after two .() years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has .6)
not left the PhilippinesH .() has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or professionH .<) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Eovernment promulgated rulesH or .F) committed any act
pre$udicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Eovernment announced policies.
5ilipino citi#ens who have lost their citi#enship may however reac+uire the same in the
manner provided by law. %ommonwealth "ct. ,o. .%.". ,o. N<), enumerates the three modes by
which Philippine citi#enship may be reac+uired by a former citi#en! .6) by naturali#ation, .() by
repatriation, and .<) by direct act of %ongress.
,aturali#ation is mode for both ac+uisition and reac+uisition of Philippine citi#enship. "s a
mode of initially ac+uiring Philippine citi#enship, naturali#ation is governed by %ommonwealth "ct
,o. FB<, as amended. @n the other hand, naturali#ation as a mode for reac+uiring Philippine
citi#enship is governed by %ommonwealth "ct ,o. N<. :nder this law, a former 5ilipino citi#en who
wishes to reac+uire Philippine citi#enship must possess certain +ualifications
6B
and none of the
dis+ualification mentioned in 4ection F of %.". FB<.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citi#enship due to! .6) desertion of the armed forcesH services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in /orld /ar **H .<) service in the "rmed 5orces of the :nited 4tates at any other time, .F)
marriage of a 5ilipino woman to an alienH and .9) political economic necessity.
"s distinguished from the lengthy process of naturali#ation, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
-ocal %ivil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
*n Angat v. "epu:lic+ we held!
000. Parenthetically, under these statutes Oreferring to R" ,os. 7N9 and (N<8P, the person desiring to
reac+uire Philippine citi#enship would not even be re+uired to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that
fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines.
3oreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturali#ed 5ilipino who lost his citi#enship will be restored to his prior status as a naturali#ed
5ilipino citi#en. @n the other hand, if he was originally a natural&born citi#en before he lost his
Philippine citi#enship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural&born 5ilipino.
"s correctly e0plained by the DR=T in its decision, the term Snatural&born citi#enS was first
defined in "rticle ***, 4ection F of the 67B< %onstitution as follows!
4ec. F. " natural&born citi#en is one who is a citi#en of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to ac+uire or perfect his Philippine citi#enship.
Two re+uisites must concur for a person to be considered as such! .6) a person must be a
5ilipino citi#en birth and .() he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citi#enship.
:nder the 67B< %onstitution definition, there were two categories of 5ilipino citi#ens which
were not considered natural&born! .6) those who were naturali#ed and .() those born before
?anuary 6B, 67B<, of 5ilipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of ma$ority, elected Philippine
citi#enship. Those Snaturali#ed citi#ensS were not considered natural&born obviously because they
were not 5ilipino at birth and had to perform an act to ac+uire Philippine citi#enship. Those born of
5ilipino mothers before the effectively of the 67B< %onstitution were likewise not considered
natural&born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citi#enship.
The present %onstitution, however, now consider those born of 5ilipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 67B< %onstitution and who elected Philippine citi#enship upon reaching the
ma$ority age as natural&born. "fter defining who re natural&born citi#ens, 4ection ( of "rticle *>
adds a sentence! SThose who elect Philippine citi#enship in accordance with paragraph .<), 4ection

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6 hereof shall be deemed natural&born citi#ens.S %onse+uently, only naturali#ed 5ilipinos are
considered not natural&born citi#ens. *t is apparent from the enumeration of who are citi#ens under
the present %onstitution that there are only two classes of citi#ens! .6) those who are natural&born
and .() those who are naturali#ed in accordance with law. " citi#en who is not a naturali#ed
5ilipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturali#ation to obtain Philippine citi#enship,
necessarily is natural&born 5ilipino. ,oteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citi#enship, subse+uently reac+uire it. The reason
therefor is clear! as to such persons, they would either be natural&born or naturali#ed depending on
the reasons for the loss of their citi#enship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reac+uisition thereof. 7B)1+4O1 V. (R)* and CR,4 7@;? SCR. ;=; B>DD9C:
The +uestion whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the %@3=-=%, it is
necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent 5P? is a natural&born citi#en, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, "llan 5. Poe, would have himself
been a 5ilipino citi#en and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the 5ilipino citi#enship of his putative father. "ny
conclusion on the 5ilipino citi#enship of -oren#o Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 679F at AF years old, -oren#o would have been born sometime in the year 6AB8,
when the Philippines was under 4panish rule, and that 4an %arlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 679F, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that -oren#o Pou would have benefited from the en masse
5ilipini#ation that the Philippine 1ill had effected in 678(. That citi#enship .of -oren#o Pou), if
ac+uired, would thereby e0tend to his son, "llan 5. Poe, father of respondent 5P?. The 67<9
%onstitution, during which regime respondent 5P? has seen first light, confers citi#enship to all
persons whose fathers are 5ilipino citi#ens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
1ut while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent 5P? is
a natural&born citi#en of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of 4ection BA, in relation to 4ection BF, of the @mnibus
=lection %ode. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the %ourt,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualde#&3arcos vs. %@3=-=% (FA 4%R" <88 .6779) must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful. *)CSO1 v. COM)#)C2 RO1.#& .##.1 %)##J PO) and VIC*ORI1O G. FOR1I)R (+.R.
1o. 9E9E@=. Marc @2 >DD=:
ADMINISTRATIAE LAW
*t should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in
nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
conse+uence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. /hen, upon the other hand,
the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden
of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to
be heard, and thereafter, to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given force and effect
of law. 7COMMISSIO1)R OF I1*)R1.# R)V)1,) V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S 7>E9 SCR. >@E:
*n recent years, it has been the $urisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary
$urisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies. *t may occur that the %ourt has $urisdiction to take cogni#ance of a particular case, which
means that the matter involved is also $udicial in character. Dowever, if the case is such that its
determination re+uires the e0pertise, speciali#ed skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate +uestions of facts are involved, then relief must first
be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper $urisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
$urisdiction. *t applies Swhere a claim is originally cogni#able in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim re+uires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative bodyH in such case
the $udicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
viewS .:nited 4tates v. /estern Pacific Railroad %o., <9( :.4. 97).

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%learly, the doctrine of primary $urisdiction finds application in this case since the +uestion
of what coal areas should be e0ploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal
operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the 1= as the
administrative agency in possession of the speciali#ed e0pertise to act on the matter. The Trial
%ourt does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the
e0ploration, e0ploitation, development and e0traction of mineral resources like coal. These issues
preclude an initial $udicial determination. *t behooves the courts to stand aside even when
apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary $urisdiction of an
administrative agency. 7I1&,S*RI.# )1*)RPRIS)S2 I1C. V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S 79<= SCR. =>E
B988DC:
This %ourt in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Dence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his $urisdiction then such remedy should be e0hausted first before courtQs
$udicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courtQs intervention is fatal to oneQs
cause of action. "ccordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of e0haustion of administrative remedies was not
without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser e0penses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. it is no less true to state
that the courts of $ustice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
Dowever, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of e0haustion of administrative remedies
as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
fle0ibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uni+ueness of the factual and circumstantial settings
of a case. Dence, it is disregarded .6) when there is a violation of due process, .() when the issue
involved is purely a legal +uestion, .<) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or e0cess of $urisdiction, .F) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned, .9) when there is irreparable in$ury, .N) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
.B) when to re+uire e0haustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, .A) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim(8 .7) when the sub$ect matter is a private land in land
case proceedings, .68) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and ade+uate remedy, and
.66) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of $udicial intervention. 7P..* V.
CO,R* OF .PP).#S 7>EE SCR. 9E? B988?C:
=+ually well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
octrine of Jualified Political "gency. "s the President cannot be e0pected to e0ercise his
control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
%abinet members. :nder this doctrine, which recogni#es the establishment of a single e0ecutive,
all e0ecutive and administrative organi#ations are ad$uncts of the =0ecutive epartment, the
heads of the various e0ecutive departments are assistants and agents of the %hief =0ecutive, and,
e0cept in cases where the %hief =0ecutive is re+uired by the %onstitution or law to act in person or
the e0igencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious e0ecutive and
administrative functions of the %hief =0ecutive are performed by and through the e0ecutive
departments, and the acts of the 4ecretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the %hief =0ecutive,
presumptively the acts of the %hief =0ecutive. 7CARPIO V. )G)C,*IV) S)CR)*.RJ 7>DE SCR.
>8D:
LAW ON PU@LIC OFFICERS
The %ivil 4ervice %ommission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment e0tended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the re+uirements of the %ivil 4ervice -aw. /hen the

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appointee is +ualified and all other legal re+uirements were satisfied, the %ommission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with %ivil 4ervice -aws.
"ppointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the +ualifications re+uired by law. *f he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better +ualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political +uestion involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. 7#,)+O V. CIVI# S)RVIC) COMMISSIO1 79=@ SCR. @>?:
The appointment to a government post like that of a provincial fiscal to be complete
involves several steps. 5irst, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that
nomination valid and permanent, the %ommission on "ppointments has to confirm said nomination.
The last step thereof is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The
first ( steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the
=0ecutive and -egislative departments of the Eovernment. 1ut the last necessary step to make the
appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. De may or may not
accept the appointment or nomination. "s held in the case of 1orromeo v. 3ariano, there is no
power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office. 7#.CSO1 V. ROM)RO 7<= Pil
?=D:
*t is the general rule Sthat the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from all
officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even
though he entered into the office in good faith and. under color of title.S The resulting hardship
occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is recogni#edH
but it is far more, cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated not for
the for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public
and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office
without being lawful officers. The +uestion of compensation involves different principles and
concepts however. Dere, *t *s possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive, " de facto
officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de
lure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention
of the public office. 7MO1ROJ V. CO,R* OF .PP).#S 7>D SCR. E>D:
" public office is the right authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fi0ed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign function of government, to be e0ercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
"dmittedly, the act of %ongress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions
and fi0ing the StermS or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right
and the StenureS or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and
constitutional e0ercise of legislative power ."rticle >*, section 6, %onstitution of the PhilippinesH
?over vs. 1orra, E. R. ,o. -NBA(, ?uly (9, 679<H ,ueno vs. "ngeles, BN Phil., 6(H 5rancia vs. Pecson
and 4ubido, FB @ff. Ea#., 6( 4upp. p. (7N). *n the e0ercise of that power, %ongress enacted
Republic "ct ,o. N8< on "pril 66, 6796, creating the %ity of Ro0as and providing, among others for
the position of >ice&3ayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent >ice&3ayor holds
office at the pleasure of the President .sectionX, article **, Republic "ct ,o. N8<).
4o, the logical inference from the above +uoted e0cerpt of the decision of, this %ourt
promulgated long after the decision rendered in the case of e los 4antos vs. 3allare, supra, is that
%ongress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent. upon the
pleasure of the President.
The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the act of the
President in designating petitioner "lba in the place of respondent "la$ar as one of removal. The
replacement of respondent "la$ar is not removal, but an e0piration of its tenure, which is one of
the ordinary modes of terminating official relations. @n this score, section (9F9 of the Revised
"dministrative %ode which was declared inoperative in the 4antos vs. 3allare case, is different
from section A of Republic "ct ,o. N8<, 4ection (9F9 refers to removal at pleasure while section A
of Republic "ct ,o. N8< refers to holding office at the pleasure of the President.
%learly, what is involved here is not the +uestion of removal, or whether legal cause should
precede or not that removal. /hat is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure of
such office, which has been made e0pressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President.

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=ven assuming&for the moment that the act of replacing "la$ar constitutes removal, the act
itself is valid and lawful, for under section A of Republic "ct ,o. N8<, no fi0ity of tenure has been
provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been e0ercised in accordance with the policy
laid down by %ongress therein. 7.#B.2 et al. V. )V.1+)#IS*. et al. 79DD Pil E<@:
Resignation as the Sact of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office
and renounces the further right to use it. *t is an e0pression of the incumbent in some form,
e0press or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relin+uish the office and the
acceptance by competence and lawful authority.S To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, the officer must show a clear intention to relin+uish or surrender his
position accompanied by the act of relin+uishment. Resignation implies an e0pression of the
incumbent in some form, e0press or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relin+uish
the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
>erily, a courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal
sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public officialCs intention to surrender his position.
Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the appointing authority and the appointing
power. 7OR*I4 V. COM)#)C 79E> SCR. <9>:
,othing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. *n %ru# v.
Primicias, ?r., it was held that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. . . . "nd, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office. The preliminary +uestion laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. "s
well&settled as the rule that. the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.S
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non&e0istent office. "fter the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. *n case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. *t is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the +uestion of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. ,onetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. "s to its effect, no distinction e0ists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. De ceases to be a member of the
$udiciary. *n the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent $ustices and $udges
are concerned, this %ourt be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration.
.&) #. ##.1. V. .#B. 799> SCR. >8= B98<>C:
ELECTION LAW
4ound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a ma$ority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. .(8 %orpus ?uris (nd, 4 (F<, p. NBN.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be dis+ualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle
the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, dis+ualified, or non&eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. Dowever, in the absence of a statute which
dearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, +ualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless. 7#.BO V. COM)#)C 7+.R. 1o. <E;E=2 .u!ust 92 98<8:
*t must be noted that this is not an instance wherein one return gives to one candidate all
the votes in the precinct, even as it gives e0actly #ero to the other. This is not a case where some
senatorial candidates obtain #ero e0actly, while some others receive a few scattered votes. Dere,
all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving e0actly the
same numberH whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.

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The main point to remember is that there is no blockvoting nowadays.
/hat happened to the vote of the ,acionalista inspector' There was one in every precinct.
=vidently, either he became a traitor to his party, or was made to sign a false return by force or
other illegal means. *f he signed voluntarily, but in breach of faith, the ,acionalista inspector
betrayed his partyH and, any voting or counting of ballots therein, was a sham and a mockery of the
national suffrage.
Dence, denying prima facie recognition to such returns on the ground that they are
manifestly fabricated or falsified, would constitute a practical approach to the %ommissionQs
mission to insure free and honest elections.
*n 3itchell vs. 4tevens, the returns showed a noticeable e0cess of votes over the number of
registered voters, and the court re$ected the returns as obviously SmanufacturedS. /hy' The e0cess
could have been due to the fact that, disregarding all pertinent data, the election officers wrote
the number of votes their fancy dictatedH and so the return was literally a SmanufacturedS,
SfabricatedS return. @r maybe because persons other than voters, were permitted to take part and
voteH or because registered voters cast more than one ballot each, or because those in charge of
the tally sheet falsified their counts.
Dence, as the 3itchell decision concluded, the returns were Snot true returns . . . but
simply manufactured evidences of an attempt to defeat the popular will.S "ll these possibilities
andGor probabilities were plain fraudulent practices, resulting in misrepresentation of the election
outcome. S3anufacturedS was the word used. S5abricatedS or SfalseS could as well have been
employed.
The same ratio decidendi applies to the situation in the precincts herein mentioned. These
returns were obviously false or fabricated&prima facie. -et us take for e0ample, precinct ,o. < of
"ndong, -anao del 4ur. There were NFA registered voters. "ccording to such return all the eight
candidates of the -iberal Party got NFA each, and the eight ,acionalista candidates got e0actly
#ero. /e hold such return to be evidently fraudulent or false because of the inherent improbability
of such a result&against statistical probabilities&specially because at least one vote should have
been received by the ,acionalista candidates, i. e., the vote of the ,acionalista inspector. *t is, of
course, SpossibleS that such inspector did not like his partyQs senatorial line&upH but it is not
probable that he disliked all of such candidates, and it is not likely that he favored all the eight
candidates of the -iberal Party. Therefore, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false
return. or else he betrayed his party, in which case, the election therein& if any&was no more than
a barefaced fraud and a bra#en contempt of the Popular polls.
*t is strongly urged that the results reported in these returns are +uite SpossibleS, bearing in
mind the religious or political control of some leaders in the localities affected.
/e say possible, not probable. *t is possible to win the sweepstakes ten timesH but not
probable. "nyway, $udges are not disposed to believe that such ScontrolS has proved so powerful as
to convert the electors into mere sheep or robots voting as ordered. Their reason and conscience to
believe that 688L, of the voters in such precincts ob$ectly yet lawfully surrendered their precious
freedom to choose the senators of this Republic. 7#.+,MB.J V. COM)#)C 79E SCR. 9?; B98EEC:
:nder the present state of our election laws, the %@3=-=% has been granted precisely the
power to annul elections. 4ection F of Republic "ct ,o. B6NN, otherwise known as, SThe
4ynchroni#ed =lections -aw of 6776,S provides that the %@3=-=% sitting, =n 1anc by a ma$ority vote
of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of
special elections as provided in 4ection N of the @mnibus =lection %ode.
The %@3=-=% may e0ercise such power motu proprio or upon a verified petition. The
hearing of the case shall be summary in nature, and the %@3=-=% may delegate to its lawyers the
power to hear the case and to receive evidence. *n the case o- )itmug vs. !ommission on
Dlections+ we held that before %@3=-=% can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure
of election, two .() conditions must concur! first, no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fi0ed by law or, even if there were voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in a failure to electH and second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the
election.<6 /e must add, however, that the cause of such failure of election should have been any
of the following! force ma$eure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. This is an
important consideration for, where the propriety of a pre&proclamation controversy ends, there
may begin the realm of a special action for declaration of failure of elections.
*t was held in the case of 4anche# v. %omelec .69< 4%R" NA), it was held that!
The enumeration therein .4ection (F<, @mnibus =lection %ode) of the issues that may be raised in
pre&proclamation controversy, is restrictive and e0clusive. *n the absence of any clear showing or

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proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects .4ec. (<F),
appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress .4ec. (<9) andGor contain
discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the
election .4ec. (<N), which are the only instances where a pre&proclamation recount may be resorted
to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot bo0 and its contents 0 0 0. The complete
election returns whose authenticity is not in +uestion, must be prima facie considered valid for the
purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
0 0 0 To e0pand the issues beyond those enumerated under 4ec. (F< and allow a
recountGreappreciation of votes in every instance where a claim of misdeclaration of stray votes is
made would open the floodgates to such claims and paraly#e canvass and proclamation proceedings,
given the propensity of the loser to demand a recount. The law and public policy mandate that all
pre&proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the %ommission after due notice and
hearing and $ust as summarily decided 0 0 0.S
The policy consideration underlying the delimitation both of substantive ground and
procedure is the policy to determine as +uickly as possible the result of the election on the basis of
canvass. Thus, in the case of ipatuan vs. %ommission on =lections, we categorically ruled that in a
pre&proclamation controversy, %@3=-=% is not to look beyond or behind election returns which are
on their face regular and authentic returns. " party seeking to raise issues resolution of which
would compel or necessitate %@3=-=% to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie
regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest. 1y their nature, and
given the obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the results of elections, pre&
proclamation controversies are to be resolved in summary proceedings without the need to present
evidence aliunde and certainly without having to go through voluminous documents and sub$ecting
them to meticulous technical e0aminations which take up considerable time.
The prevailing doctrine in this $urisdiction, therefore, is that as long as the returns appear
to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the 1oard of %anvassers cannot look beyond
or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes.
%orollarily, technical e0amination of voting paraphernalia involving analysis and comparison of
votersQ signatures and thumbprints thereon is prohibited in pre&proclamation cases which are
mandated by law to be e0peditiously resolved without involving evidence aliunde and e0amination
of voluminous documents which take up much time and cause delay in defeat of the public policy
underlying the summary nature of pre&proclamation controversies.
/hile, however, the %@3=-=% is restricted, in pre&proclamation cases, to an e0amination
of the election returns on their face and is without $urisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities, the %@3=-=% is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for
declaration of failure of elections, as the @mnibus =lection %ode denominates the same. Thus, the
%@3=-=%, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections, may conduct technical e0amination of election documents and compare and analy#e
votersQ signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed
been free, honest and clean. ,eedless to say, a pre &proclamation controversy is not the same as an
action for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections. 7#OO1+ V. COM)#)C
7>;? SCR. >:
LAW ON PU@LIC CORPORATIONS
"fter three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the ne0t regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. "ny subse+uent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. 5irst, a subse+uent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. 4econd, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
*n the case of Dagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election is not an immediate reelection after
his third consecutive term. The immediate reelection that the %onstitution barred Dagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections. 7VIC*ORI1O &)11IS M. SOCR.*)S vs. COM)#)C2 et al.
(+.R. 1o. 9;=;9>2 1ove$ber 9>2 >DD>:
*t can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that
there be first obtained Sthe approval of a ma$ority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units

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affectedS whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of
the boundaries. *t is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the e0isting province of
,egros @ccidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its e0isting
boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of ,egros del ,orte. Plain
and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would
be the parent province of ,egros @ccidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered.
The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of ,egros del ,orte.
/e find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said
constitutional re+uirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component
political units. ,o amount of rhetorical flourishes can $ustify e0clusion of the parent province in the
plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the
challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote
autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the
cardinal precept that what our %onstitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a
re+uirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. ,o one should be allowed to pay
homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local
government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the %onstitution
commands in "rticle X* 4ection < thereof. 7*.1 V. COM)#)C 79=> SCR. ?>?:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. " long line of decisionsQ has held that to
be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive re+uirements! 6) *t must not
contravene the constitution or any statuteH () *t must not be unfair or oppressiveH <) *t must not be
partial or discriminatoryH F) *t must not prohibit but may regulate tradeH 9) *t must be general and
consistent with public policyH N) *t must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the re+uirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. 3unicipal governments are only agents of the national government. -ocal councils e0ercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by %ongress ,is the national lawmaking body.
The delegate cannot he superior to the principal or e0ercise powers higher than those of the latter.
*t is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of %ongress, from which
they have derived their power in the first place, arid negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
3unicipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from
the legislature. *t breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot e0ist. "s it
creates, so it may destroy. "s it may destroy, it may abridge and control. :nless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose
it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from e0istence all of the municipal
corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. /e know of no limitation on the
right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere
tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has
not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the %onstitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. /ithout meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that %ongress retains
control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous %onstitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant
still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
%onstitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to ta0,6(
which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. 1y and large, however, the national legislature is
still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
7M.+*.3.S V. PRJC) PROP)R*I)S CORPOR.*IO1 7+.R. 1o. 999D8?2 3uly >D2 988=:
There is no denying that 4ections A9 and AN of P.. 6FF9 ."uditing %ode of the Philippines)
provide that contracts involving e0penditure of public funds! 6) can be entered into only when
there is an appropriation thereforeH and () must be certified by the proper accounting
officialGagency that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose, which certification shall be
attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contact.
Dowever, the very same Presidential ecree ,o. 6FF9, which is the cornerstone of
petitionerCs arguments, does not provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes
a contract entered into by a local government unit null and void. 4ection AF of the statute
specifically provides!

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Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository e0cept in pursuance of an
appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.
%onse+uently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law, but
also in pursuance of other specific statutory authority, i.e., 4ection AF of P 6FF9. Thus, when a
contract is entered into by a city mayor pursuant to specific statutory authority, the law, i.e., P
6FF9 allows the disbursement of funds from any public treasury or depository therefore. *t can thus
be plainly seen that the law invoked by petitioner Jue#on %ity itself provides that an appropriation
law is not the only authority upon which public funds shall be disbursed.
5urthermore, then 3ayor 1rigido 4imon, ?r. did not enter into the sub$ect contract without
legal authority. The -ocal Eovernment %ode of 67A<, or 1.P. 1lg. <<B, which was then in force,
specifically and e0clusively empowered the city mayor to represent the city in its business
transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury and all bonds, contracts and
obligations of the city. 4uch power granted to the city mayor by 1.P. 1lg. <<B was not +ualified
nor restricted by any prior action or authority of the city council. /e note that while the
subse+uent -ocal Eovernment %ode of 6776, which took effect after the e0ecution of the sub$ect
contracts, provides that the mayorCs representation must be upon authority of the sangguniang
panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance, there was no such +ualification under the old code.
7L,)4O1 CI*J V. #)GB)R I1CORPOR.*)& 7+.R. 1o. 9=9E9E2 Marc 9;2 >DD9:
"nent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its
employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. "s emphasi#ed in
the case of <orio v. Pontanilla (*.". 9o. .52'''$+ Ecto:er 2$+ &'0. 02 S!"A 2''+ 3#3), the
distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the sets of its agents which result in an in$ury to third persons.
*t has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. ,evertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. *n permitting such entities
to be sued, the 4tate merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting
in its governmental capacity when the in$ury was committed or that the case comes under the
e0ceptions recogni#ed by law. 5ailing this, the claimant cannot recover. .%ru#, supra, p. FF.)
*n the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that She was on
his way to the ,aguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of 4an 5ernandoQs
municipal streets.S .Rollo, p. (7.)
*n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to 4ection <.m) of Rule 6<6 of the Revised Rules of %ourt. Dence,
/e rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
/e already stressed in the case of Palafo0, at. al. v. Province of *locos ,orte, the istrict
=ngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer .68( Phil 66AN) that Sthe construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities.S 7M,1ICIP.#I*J OF S.1 F)R1.1&O2 #. ,1IO1 V. FIRM)2 supra.
PU@LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The precept that a 4tate cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long&standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not $ust to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. *f the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. 4uing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the 4tate, in whose service he
is, under the ma0im V par in parem+ non ha:et imperium V that all states are sovereign e+uals and
cannot assert $urisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the
$udgment against an official would re+uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against

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him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.
" foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The
consent of the host state is an indispensable re+uirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns. 7%(OSRO- MI1,C()R vs. (O1. CO,R* OF .PP).#S2 et. al. 7+.R. 1o. 9=>@8E2
February 992 >DD@:
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign 4tate with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. 4uch act
is only the start of the in+uiry. *s the foreign 4tate engaged in the regular conduct of business' *f
the foreign 4tate is not engaged regularly in business or commercial activity, and in this case it has
not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. *f the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii.
Dence, the e0istence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising
out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified
court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid
provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. @n the other
hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign partly elects to sue in the
local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subse+uent act. The applicability of the
Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle
recogni#ing sovereign immunity.
4ubmission by the foreign 4tate to local $urisdiction must be clear and une+uivocal. *t must
be given e0plicitly or by necessary implication. 7R)P,B#IC OF I1&O1)SI. vs. VI14O1 7+.R. 1o.
9;=?D;2 3une >E2 >DD@:

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