North Koreas Double Defectors

(Links to these essays and some of my other writing can be found on my

SinoNK.com page).


Double Defectors: Signifiers of Pyongyangs Strategic
Shift
By Brian Gleason | December 06, 2012 | 2 Comments

Re-defectors to the DPRK, Kim Kwang-hyok and Koh Jong-nam, at a Pyongyang press conference on
Nov. 8, 2012 | Image via NKNews.org
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December 2012 is set to drag a veritable cornucopia of events kicking and screaming into the
limelight, each and every one literally begging to be analyzed as it happens. However, before anyone
starts talking about rockets, the tear-drenched commemoration of the death of a Kim, the New Years
Joint Editorial or even, looming on the horizon like a virtual colossus, the January 8 birthday of
respected comrade Kim Jong-un, one needs to look back at an issue that hit the headlines earlier
this year: the mysterious world of double defectors. Are these people mostly spies, returning to North
Korea at the instruction of the KWP to offer the international media a false endorsement of the society
being built by the new Kim before our very eyes? Or are they genuine defectors, heading back to the
bosom of the motherland to escape the poverty and discrimination that is said to beset a surprising
number of North Koreans attempting to settle in South Korea? In the first of a SinoNK triple-header,
Brian Gleason investigates. Christopher Green, Assistant Editor
Double Defectors: Signifiers of Pyongyangs Strategic Shift
by Brian Gleason
In the aftermath of Kim Jong-ils death, Kim Jong-un made it clear that deterring and punishing North
Korean defectors was high on his list of priorities. Almost immediately, his regime is said to have
dispatched 20,000 additional soldiers along the border to tighten security, transferred full border
control authority to the National Security Agency (which had previously shared it with the Ministry of
the Peoples Armed Forces), reinforced the guilt-by-association system that endeavors to flip the cost-
benefit analysis of treason by incarcerating three generations of a criminals family, and may even
have ordered would-be defectors to be shot on site. Although the South Korean Ministry of Unification
still expects the total number of North Korean refugees to exceed 25,000 by the end of the year, these
efforts have thus far paid off; from January-October 2012, only 1,202 North Korean refugees arrived in
South Korea, representing a sharp decrease from the previous five-year average of 2,678 annually.
On another front in the battle for control, the Supreme Leader and his propaganda team are striving to
bring back North Korean refugees from the South to utilize them in highly publicized double
defections. These serve as valuable anti-South propaganda tools and cautionary tales for any North
Korean foolish enough to think about defecting. Until this year, the only highly publicized double
defection had been that of Yoo Tae-joon back in 2000, although the Ministry of Unification has
acknowledged that other North Korean defectors have also returned. Thus, the sudden and very public
return of four double defectors in 2012 grandmother Pak Jong-suk on June 28 and Kim Kwang-hyok,
his wife and child on November 8 signifies a strategic shift in how Pyongyang deals with the
defector problem and its legitimacy battle with the South. Instead of trying to hide the defector issue
from the North Korean public and vowing to severely punish anyone who defects to the South, the Kim
Jong-un regime is now actively pursuing double defectors, purportedly welcoming them back with
open arms while simultaneously using them to criticize the South and discourage other would-be
refugees from crossing the Tumen River.

The number of North Korean refugees in the South has fallen dramatically in 2012, although not quite
as dramatically as the graphic claims. | Image via Daily Kos
Stop the Bus: Catalysts for Pyongyangs Strategic Shift | In 2012, several defections from the North
Korean security-defense apparatus, including two separate murder-defection incidents, became sources
of serious concern for the regime. The first notable defections followed April 23 murders in Hyesan,
which sparked a manhunt leading members of North Koreas 10
th
Corps, which is responsible for
security in the Yangkang Province region, across the border into China.[1] After a North Korean
soldier defected in August, two more followed in separate incidents in October, including the double
murder-defection of a 17-year-old elite conscript on October 17. The young man reportedly saw no
hope in the North after learning of the huge gap between the two Koreas while working as a frontline
guard near the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
In the wake of this defection, news of which reportedly traveled north to Pyongyang in a proverbial
heartbeat, it is important to note the date of the most recent re-defection and the timing of the press
conference. Even though KCNA reported that Kim Kwang-hyok and his wife Koh Jong-nam returned
to North Korea on September 12, the press conference did not occur until November 8. Evidently,
Pyongyang was waiting for a politically perspicacious moment to roll out the couple and their child.
The murder-defection in mid-October may have been the catalyst, leading Pyongyang to counter with
the press conference in early November.
Although many North Korean soldiers have defected down the years, the defections in 2012 have
further elevated concerns about decaying morale within the North Korean ranks, and highlighted the
risks of unwanted information spreading among the people.
In this regard, another driver of Pyongyangs strategic decision to heavily publicize double defections
is the Norths increasing permeability to outside information. A May 2012 report by InterMedia
confirmed what many already knew; that significant shifts in North Koreas media landscape are
happening, as growing access to a range of media and communication technologies is undermining
the states monopoly on what its citizens see, hear, know and think. Pyongyang thus faces the
daunting task of attempting to prevent, refute, criticize or manipulate a burgeoning array of information
and other media spreading throughout the North Korean populace that can potentially inspire
defections or delegitimize the regime. Some communications technologies, like cell phones, are even
being officially encouraged. At the same time, a variety of troubling developments in 2012 an
upsurge in food prices and unemployment, chronic shortages of fuel, electricity and raw materials, the
diffusion of popular South Korean dramas and pop music, the increasing publicity of North Korean
defectors in the South,[2] the aforementioned murders and defections, the April 2012 rocket launch
failure[3] and the overall dismal state of the North Korean economy have all been sources of great
concern for the new regime.
Pyongyang is a masterful manipulator of hearts and minds, and is attempting multiple solutions to
these mounting challenges. One is in the form of double defector press conferences; their goal being to
emphasize that no matter how bad it gets in the North, or how appealing life in the South may seem,
the life of a North Korean defector in the South will not resemble a glamorous South Korean drama;
North Koreans will be cleaning dirty toilets, washing dishes [and] serving the elderly which south
Korean people never do, according to double defector Pak Jong-suks testimony. I didnt have any
specific jobs, doing only volunteer work or manual labor, paid with lower salaries, she said. Notice
the latest shift in Pyongyangs portrayal of life in the South. Instead of attempting to refute the opulent
lifestyles depicted in South Korean dramas (which North Koreans may increasingly believe as they
watch more and more of them), part of the Norths new strategy is to utilize double defectors like Pak
to accentuate class division between wealthier South Koreans (who may be capable of living such
lives) and the underclass of North Korean defectors (who are not). Thus, even though the South may be
relatively wealthier, they admit, the North Koreans living there are relatively poorer (and more
miserable) than they were in the motherland.

According to the re-defector press conference pictured above, Kim Jong-un and Ri Sol-jus (left)
beneficient appearance at a Pyongyang familys home in early September was the psychological
catalyst for their return. | Photo via CCTV
Treachery and Luring: Motives for the Double Defections | In each of the highly publicized re-
defection press conferences this year, the returning North Koreans conveyed very similar scenarios for
their defections to the South and their decisions to subsequently return to the North: treacherous South
Korean intelligence agents lured them to defect via subterfuge and manipulation (Pak Jong-suk claimed
she was actually drugged), they endured a miserable life within the Souths capitalist system, they
longed to return to life in the North, and ultimately the Supreme Leader generously welcomed them
back home despite their betrayal.
Conversely, several reports have alleged that the double defectors were either coerced to return to the
North via threats or lured back by North Korean agents. After conducting interviews with South
Korean government officials and Pak Jong-suks friends living in the South, the Washington Post
reported that Paks statements during her redefection press conference in the North were largely false
and probably state-fed, and it exposes North Koreas willingness to manipulate a citizen who returned
not because she yearned for her homeland but because she feared for the safety of the son she left
behind. North Koreas National Security Agency seems to be at the coal face of a policy of luring
defectors back to the North. Quoting a confidential source, Daily NK reported that Kim Kwang-hyok
and Koh Jong-nam were lured back to the North by Musan NSA. The source explained that the NSAs
strategy is to target defection brokers, since they often relay information between North Korean
refugees in the South and their friends and acquaintances inside the North. The NSA utilizes the
information to pinpoint the location of the North Koreans in the South, and then attempts to use a
mixture of conciliatory words and threats of violence to get the family to try and lure the defectors
back.

DPRK comics glorify the undercover agent who just might also be a grandmother. | Image from
collection of Adam Cathcart
In addition to the NSAs apparent strategy, it is widely believed that some of these double defectors
may have been North Korean spies. Indeed, a source from Hoiryeong in North Hamkyung told Daily
NK that double defector Koh Jong-nam was actually a National Security Agency operative who
entered South Korea in 2008 on the orders of the organization, married her husband Kim in 2009, then
returned with him in 2012. Allegedly, NSA operatives similar to Koh work with ethnic Koreans in
China to obtain information about North Korean refugees and attempt to lure them back. Successful,
and thus demonstrably loyal, ones are then sent to South Korea for further espionage activities. A
second source in the same article corroborated Koh Jong-nams status as an NSA operative, stating that
she had little choice but to comply with the NSAs demands and that she was recalled by the NSA
this year because she had lost her value as an agent due to her pregnancy.
It Aint Like the Movies: North Koreans are Struggling in the South | There is some truth to the
portrayal of the hard life for North Koreans in the South. Despite efforts by the South Korean
government to help North Koreans succeed in school including scholarships, stipends, government
paid housing and free university tuition North Koreans university dropout rates are
disproportionately high, and other North Korean students struggle with bullying, an education gap with
South Korean students and emotional problems caused by depression, anger and other symptoms of
post-traumatic stress.
The South Korean government also endeavors to help North Koreans attain employment by offering
job training and providing subsidies to companies that hire North Koreans, but many North Korean
refugees have difficulty finding employment beyond low-level, low-paying jobs, and they can also
experience prejudice in the workplace. Furthermore, some North Koreans endure economic hardship in
the South after they are tricked or scammed financially, and according to the Korean Institute of
Criminology, the crime rate for North Korean refugees in the South between 1998-2007 was over 10%,
more than double the 4.3% national average. Various NGOs, charities, church groups and other
organizations continue to support North Koreans in a variety of ways, but defectors still need more
assistance to overcome the wide array of challenges they face.
Thinly Concealed Disgust: Conclusion | Although the North Korean government has ramped up its
efforts to portray a life of hardship for North Koreans in the South, theres ample evidence that life
has not improved since Kim Jong-un. Four North Koreans on government-sanctioned stays in
Dandong told the New York Times that their lives have gotten harder, despite Mr. Kims tantalizing
pronouncements about boosting peoples livelihoods. The interviewees underscored a growing sense
of disillusionment and cynicism within the North Korean populace, and most notably, a thinly
concealed disgust over inequality that has risen in recent years. They went on to describe a situation in
which Emaciated beggars haunt train stations, while well-connected businessmen continue to grow
rich from trading with China and government officials flourish by collecting fines and bribes.
Accordingly, it appears that the North Korean regime is attempting to counter this growing sense of
inequality within the disenchanted underclass of its purportedly socialist system by emphasizing how
North Koreans suffer from inequality and class division in the South. The effectiveness of this strategy
remains to be seen, but as more and more information seeps into North Korea, Kim Jong-uns regime
will have to continue developing new ways of convincing the people of the Norths supremacy over the
South.

[1] The two men responsible for the murders were border security agents working for the Hyesan City
Defense Security Command. Although they attempted to escape, they were caught in China and
repatriated on April 27.
[2] For example, a South Korean variety show called Now on My Way to Meet You featured
numerous female North Korean refugees living in the South. Overall, an increasing number of North
Korean refugees are being featured in books, newspaper articles, documentaries, radio and television
shows, which all have the potential to impact the North Korean people by demonstrating that life
outside of North Korea is quite different from the way it is portrayed by the Norths propagandists.
[3] The North Korean governments decision to publicly admit the failure to the North Korean people
reinforces the notion that the regime is increasingly unable to prevent the truth from reaching the
populace.


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Overwhelmed by Guilt: Pyongyangs Evolving
Double Defector Propaganda
By Brian Gleason | May 25, 2013 | No Comments

Double defectors atoning for their sins. | Image: Rodong Sinmun, May 18, 2013
At a recent conference hosted by the Seoul-based North Korea Strategy Center ()
entitled North Koreans Contact with Outside Information and Changes in Human Rights
Consciousness [ ], a panel of defectors and
North Korean specialists spoke on the effects that the increase in flow of outside information is having
on North Korean society. All panelists agreed that an increasing number of North Koreans are able to
learn more about the world through foreign media sources, including TV shows, dramas, radio
broadcasts, and DVDs. They also agreed that the influx of outside information into the country is
significant impacting daily life: everything from fashion styles to perceptions of South Korea is
changing. Others agree.
The InterMedia report published last year on the changing media environment in North Korea came to
similar conclusions. The report found that the North Korean government no longer maintains a total
monopoly over the information available to the population and, as a result, North Koreans
understanding of the world is changing. Not covered in the report or at the conference though is that
the North Korean regimes propaganda strategy is also changing. Instances of double defections are
being slyly used by the regime for propagandistic effect. Brian Gleason, writing from Seoul, tells of
Pyongyangs Evolving Double Defector Propaganda in part one of a two part series. Steven
Denney, Managing Editor
Overwhelmed by Guilt: Pyongyangs Evolving Double Defector Propaganda
by Brian Gleason
In the past year, the sharp increase in the number of double defector press conferences is clearly an
indication of Pyongyangs strategy to thwart nefarious outside influences and create a defector
deterrent via an evolving narrative about the horrible life in the South for a North Korean refugee.
After analyzing the 2012 redefections of Pak Jong-suk on June 28 and Kim Kwang-hyok, his wife and
child on November 8, I wrote about North Koreas strategic shift in attempting to stem the tide of
North Korean refugees escaping to South Korea. In addition to Kim Jong-uns orders to beef up border
security and intensify the punishments inflicted on those trying to escape, Pyongyangs propagandists
also began to utilize highly publicized double defections to warn North Koreans that they would
merely become part of a North Korean refugee underclass in the South, doing humble work,
cleaning dirty toilets, washing dishes, serving the elderlywhich Southern people never do,
according to Pak Jong-suks testimony.
This kind of anti-South propaganda represented a significant shift in Pyongyangs strategy; in the past,
the regime always told its people that the centrally planned North Korean economy was superior to the
South Korean economic system, which was actually true (in terms of GNP) until 1976, when the South
surpassed the North for good. Pyongyang continued to leverage friendship prices and other aid from
its Soviet and Chinese alliesas well as its iron grip on people and information flowing into or out of
the countryin order to maintain the myth of North Koreas superiority.
However, since the North Koreans growing access to a range of media and communication
technologies is undermining the states monopoly on what its citizens see, hear, know and think, the
regime can no longer perpetuate the myth of Northern superiority. Experts like Andrei Lankov have
also highlighted Pyongyangs need for a new line of propaganda, stating, [T]hanks to Choco Pies,
DVDs and large-scale labour migration to China, people dont buy the old story [that the South is even
poorer] and the government does not sell it any more. Thus, in the Kim Jong-un era, Pyongyang has
not only developed new forms of propaganda[1]like the double defector press conferencesit has
also crafted new messages and themes to persuade an increasingly skeptical populace and warn against
meddlesome outside influences.
Echoes of the 2012 Redefection Press Conferences | In 2013, several additional redefections have
reaffirmed Pyongyangs commitment to its new strategy. In late January at the Peoples Palace, Kim
Kwang-ho, Ko Kyung-hee and other redefectors gave testimonials that reinforced some familiar
themes emphasized in the 2012 press conferences: Kim Kwang-ho alleged that he and his wife were
forcibly taken to the South, while Ko Kyung-hee described South Korean society as deceptive (even
Machiavellian) and claimed that due to her status as a North Korean defector, she was unable to find
employment. Not long after their regrettable decision to defect to the South, they longed to return to the
North and were fortunately welcomed back due to the generosity of the Supreme Leader.[2]
In each press conference, the North not only welcomes back the defectors with open arms (thanks to
the generosity of Kim Jong-un), it also provides other North Korean refugees in the South with
concrete reassurances of why the North will not punish them. North Korean defectors are portrayed not
only as victims of South Korean deception, but also as mere mortals who can understandably make
stupid mistakes from time to time. Kim Kwang-ho and Kim Ok-shil merely had a silly/stupid
() idea about becoming rich in the South, which of course ended in utter failure. Similarly,
Pak Jong-suk was simply pursuing an ill-fated and foolish idea to meet with my father in the South
and ask him for money. Thus, according to the Norths sympathetic interpretation, these North Korean
defectors werent inherently treacherous; they merely had a foolish lapse in judgment that led them
to fall into the Souths treacherous trap.[3]
In this context, the regime is not only warning its people against making any similarly foolish or silly
decisions, it is also extending an olive branch to other North Korean refugees who may be
contemplating a return to North Korea by literally offering them rationalizations for defecting that can
subsequently be forgiven by the Supreme Leader.[4] With conspicuous parallels to the biblical story of
Adam and Eve, the North Korean defectors have sinned not only because they are mortals, but also
because they have been deluded by a nefarious force; ultimately, they can only be forgiven and
redeemed if they return to the Supreme Leader to beg for forgiveness.
Divided Families, Guilty Consciences | Just as in the 2012 redefections, the January 2013 press
conference also aimed to exploit the guilt and emotional hardships that many North Korean refugees
experience by leaving their families and hometowns behind. The guilt is multifaceted, since many
North Korean refugees often feel guilty for leaving family and friends behind, enjoying a better
standard of living in the South[5] and jeopardizing the safety and status of family members back in
North Korea.[6]
Pak Jong-suks 2012 testimony is especially relevant here, since although her foolish and selfish
decision separated her from her family and destroyed her sons career, My son is now able to continue
teaching at the college [where he used to work], and Kim Jong-un has graciously allowed her to live
with her son and daughter-in-law in Pyongyang. Building on Paks sentiments, Kim Kwang-ho and
Kim Ok-shil testified in January 2013 that they were worried about their childs life, so they decided to
go back to North Korea after hearing Pak Jong-suks press conference. Ko Kyung-hee said she
longed for my children [that I left behind in the North], and yearned for the embrace of my
homeland. These kinds of statements are obviously intended to exploit the guilt felt by many North
Korean refugees, who could conceivably become so overwhelmed by guilt and emotion that they
would risk returning to the North.
Tug of War: Pulling the Chain Northward | In Park Kyung-aes detailed, multifaceted analysis
of North Korean refugee issues, she highlights the increasing rates of chain defections in the
21st century:
Another noteworthy trend is the increase of the so-called chain defection. Unlike in the 1990s, many
refugees today stay in touch with their families back home or in China and pave the way for their exit
for smugglers or brokers, who charge the refugees for facilitating passage of the family members
.Those who arrived in South Korea as chain refugees accounted for 20% of the total refugee population
as of 2004.[7]
Throughout the rest of the Kim Jong-il era, the growing flood of North Korean refugees in the South
only served to heighten fears in the North about an increasing number of chain defections. In the Kim
Jong-un era, the North has been making concrete efforts to break or reverse these chains, especially by
targeting defection brokers, threatening the families of North Korean refugees, and through propaganda
in the double defector press conferences. Pak Jong-suk, Ko Kyung-hee, Kim Kwang-ho and Kim Ok-
shil were all pulled back by considerations and concerns for their family members, which represents
a reversal of the southward pull of the chain defections noted above. Ko Jong-nam is a case in point,
since she reportedly went back to the SinoNorth Korean border to bring her children to South Korea,
but may have been captured and turned by a North Korean agent, which subsequently led her to bring
her husband out of the South and back to the DPRK. As North Korean agents continue to collect
information on defection brokers and North Korean refugees, the tug-of-war over chain defectors is
tragically likely to continue.
Further Readings
Brian Gleason, Double Defectors: Signifiers of Pyongyangs Strategic Shift, Sino-NK, December 6,
2012.
Gianluca Spezza, What Double-Defection Tells us About the Prospects For Korean Unification, NK
News, August 9, 2012.

[1] There was one other highly publicized redefector press conference in 2000, but the strategic
objectives and frequency of the press conferences after the death of Kim Jong-il does signal a new era.
[2] In the highly publicized re-defection press conferences in 2012, the returning North Koreans
conveyed very similar scenarios for their defections to the South and their decisions to subsequently
return to the North.
[3] Another important part of her testimony was that her father didnt even leave her a will, so her plan
in South Korea was not only portrayed as foolish, but also as an utter failure. This can also be
interpreted as a terrible example of a father tainted by the capitalist South could be so greedy as to not
leave his daughter a will.
[4] Many North Korean refugees have said that they can never trust the North Korean authorities
again, but a few have stated in private conversations that due to the emotional turmoil of being
separated from their family and friends, they might eventually be willing to take the risk of returning.
They figure that they can sneak back in undetected or lie to the authorities by claiming that they only
went to China to earn money, wherein they believe the authorities will grant them leniency.
[5] This kind of guilt is sometimes manifested by the large remittances sent by North Korean refugees
to their families. Although most North Korean refugees have a low to medium level of income in the
South, some have acknowledged that they send a disproportionate amount of their savings to family
members in the North, mostly for financial support, but sometimes to assuage their own guilt.
[6] In 2012, Kim Jong-un also reinforced the guilt-by-association system that endeavors to flip the
cost-benefit analysis of treason by incarcerating three generations of a defectors family.
[7] Kyung-Ae Park, Peoples Exit, Regime Stability and North Korean Foreign Policy, Kyung-Ae
Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: McMillan, 2010), 46.

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Press Conference as Discursive Battleground:
Pyongyangs Evolving Double Defector
Propaganda
By Brian Gleason | June 09, 2013 | No Comments

The spacious living room where all is revealed as per the script. | Image: Korean Central Television
screen capture
With the recent repatriation of nine young North Koreans from Laos, the defector issue is once again
highly politicized. Human rights groups go on the legal (and discursive) offensive to have defectors in
China recognized as refugees rather than economic migrants. In California, it seemed likely that
Chinese leader Xi Jinping was pressured by the US to revisit Chinas policy on refoulement of North
Korean refugees. Refugee policy is bound to be a key agenda item on South Korean President Park
Geun-hyes trip to Beijing on June 27-30. Against this encirclement, Pyongyang has mounted its own
counter-offensive in an effort to redefine the defector narrative completely. By using press conferences
by redefectors to the DPRK as domestic propaganda, the North portrays life in the capitalist South
as Thomas Hobbes would the state of nature: solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. In the first
installment of Pyongyangs Evolving Double Defector Propaganda, Brian Gleason outlined the
emergence of the double defector propaganda trope. In this second and final installment, Gleason
deconstructs the motivations, symbolism, and significance of double defector press conferences.
Steven Denney, Managing Editor
Press Conference as Discursive Battleground: Pyongyangs Evolving Double Defector
Propaganda
by Brian Gleason
Double Defectors and Press Conferences: Pyongyangs Evolving Strategy | In addition to the
consistent themes emphasized in each successive redefection, Pyongyangs propaganda department has
recently expanded the scope of its press conference strategy to incorporate other nefarious influences
and threats. The most recent double defector press conference (North Korean television coverage here
) featured Kang Kyong-suk (60), Kim Kyong-ok (41), and serial redefector Lee Hyeok-chul
(26), who reportedly returned to North Korea for the fourth time on April 3 by stealing a fishing boat
on Yeonpyeong Island and somehow slipping past the Souths radar. Notwithstanding that Lee visibly
forgets his lines multiple times during the press conference, his testimony is full of symbolism.
Supposedly, Lees rich elder brother, Lee Sang-cholwho runs a car company in South Korea and
owns several cars himselfconvinced Lee to defect to the South, only to quickly betray him. The older
brother supposedly left Lee Hyeok-chul to sleep in a measly church dormitory while greedily
demanding part of his government welfare check as compensation for helping to bring him to South
Korea. Here, the elder brother, who should have put family first and look out for his younger sibling,
selfishly betrayed his brother in the Machiavellian South.
Covering All Bases: North Koreas Propaganda Strategy | The themes implicit in this tale of family
betrayal are neither unique nor new: No storyreal or contrivedor corner of Korean culture is safe
from utilization for Pyongyangs propaganda purposes. Notably, though no explicit reference is made,
Lee Hyeok-chuls story resembles the popular Chosun-era fairy tale () of two brothers, Heungbu
and Nolbu ( ). The younger brother, Heungbu, is kind, obedient and filially pious, never
betraying the Confucian family hierarchy. Nolbu, the older brother, is selfish and cruel; instead of
showing empathy and care for his younger brother, he abuses him. After the death of their parents,
Nolbu kicks Heungbu and his family out of the house, greedily keeping the fathers assets for himself
and ignoring the younger brothers pleas for help. However, though the younger brother struggles to
get by at first, it is the older brother who ends up begging the younger brother for forgiveness and
assistance after finally falling victim to his own greed. Heungbu, being the noble and respectful
younger brother, forgives his elder brother of his selfish and cruel behavior and takes him into his
home.

Heungbus family out in the dark and broken, like many families in a cutthroat capitalist society,
according to Pyongyang. | Screenshot from Hangul Animations retelling of Heungbu and Nolbu.
Pyongyangs evolving strategy involves vilifying North Korean refugees in the South as Heungbu-like
figures: selfish, greedy, untrustworthy, and thoroughly corrupted by South Korean society. As in the
story, though, Pyongyangs propaganda artists leave the door to redemption open: If you redefect, you
will be well received, press conference and all.
Meanwhile, whether Heungbu or Nolbu, another key message is that all North Koreans must beware of
evil South Koreans seeking to influence familial destinies. Lee Hyeok-chuls brother was supposedly
lured to the South with the help of pastor Chon Ki-won from Durihana ( ), a Seoul-
based Christian organization that seeks to help North Korean escapees resettle in a safe place.
In light of Kenneth Baes arrest and recent imprisonment as an alleged Christian missionary spy who
planned to carry out a destabilization operation codenamed Operation Jericho, the fact that Lee
specifically identified the Durihana Mission pastor as a deceptive agent is a clear message to the North
Korean people: Christian missionaries in particular cannot be trusted. It is also a clear warning to
Christian missionaries that they are now firmly in Pyongyangs crosshairs.
Even as heavy-handed warnings about missionaries continue, North Koreas propagandists have
demonstrated a keen ability to tailor their criticisms and propaganda to correspond with actual news
and events in the South. In Lee Hyeok-chuls testimony, he claimed that North Korean refugees
questioned by the South Korean authorities at the Joint Interrogation Center were insulted and tortured.
Though this seems highly unlikely, the timing was perfect: The story gained credence from the fact that
the South Korean media reported on a April 27 press conference featuring the sister of the alleged
North Korean spy (surnamed Yoo), who was arrested for espionage in January. Yoos sister claimed
that while she was being questioned at the Joint Interrogation Center, she was subjected to physical
abuse, sleep deprivation, and other violations of South Korean law.
Furthermore, as I mentioned in my previous post, the Norths characterizations of a hard knock life for
North Korean refugees in the South can have some truth, since many North Korean refugees struggle
with education gaps, prejudice, a lack of employment opportunities, financial scams, and emotional
trauma, among other problems.[1] Evidently, Pyongyang is increasingly keen on using real information
from the outside world so that North Koreans at home and abroad might begin to corroborate its
propaganda (however vaguely) and subsequently accept its skewed version of reality.
NK News has picked up on this shift, highlighting a three-minute video clip published by
Uriminzokkiri of former President Lee Myung-bak talking with South Korean citizens about domestic
problems such as unemployment, high suicide rates, and a stagnant economy. The NK News article
goes on to explain how the video provides a logical presentation and a carefully phrased selection of
slides that portray a convincing argument when compared with North Koreas propaganda of the past.
Comfortable Settings and Information Warfare: Elements of the Press Conference | The setting of
the most recent press conference is also a key indication of Pyongyangs evolving strategy. In obvious
contrast to the previous conferenceswhich showcased a big room full of people, bright lights,
reporters, cameras and microphones that almost seemed to portray the double defectors confessing their
crimes in a courtroom settingthe latest press conference had a marginally more relaxed atmosphere,
as if a small group were sitting in an (implausibly spacious) living room having an intimate (if
rehearsed) chat.
Interestingly, the chat included pointed criticism of young female defectors such as those who appear
on the Channel-A variety () show Now On My Way to Meet You ( ), which
features female North Korean refugees in a relaxed studio atmosphere where they share (often
heartbreaking) stories and partake in various activities like singing and dancing. The double defectors
claimed the stories in the show are completely fake and scripted by South Korean propagandists, who
pay the North Korean refugees on the show to spew their slanderous lies against the North. Once again,
Pyongyangs message disparages as greedy, duplicitous, and thoroughly corrupted these North Korean
refugees who are willing to accept money to slander their country.
The broad range of nefarious influences and enemy agents assailed in the double defector press
conferences reinforces the notion that Pyongyang views the defector/redefector issue as a prime
opportunity to intensify its information warfare on multiple fronts. Kim Kyong-ok recalled that she was
taken to South Korea due to threat and appeasement made by Kim Kwang-chol, specialist in buying
and tempting people wandering about Chinas border area, via refugee camps in China and Thailand.
Here, Pyongyangs propagandists essentially brand a defection broker/guide as an exploitative human
trafficker, which serves to bolster the redefectors description of South Korea as the worst tundra of
human rights.
Furthermore, although the influx of information into North Korea may cause the North Korean people
to question human rights abuses and view North Korean refugees empathetically, the recent press
conference and subsequent KCNA article aimed to convince the North Korean people that North
Korean refugees are actually criminals who fled to the South[2] and were subsequently paid to
participate in a smear campaign against the DPRK by trumpeting about the human rights record.
Both women at the press conference claimed that the South has been conducting a coordinated
campaign to bring more North Koreans to South Korea. Kang Kyong-suk quoted a man who was in
charge of her case at the Joint Center for Interrogation of Defectors from the North as saying: We are
trying to increase the ranks of defectors from the north, even spending [a lot of] money in order to win
back even a person of the north to our side.
However, just in case the North Korean people might take away the wrong message that the South
must have a lot of money in order to pay all these defectors and conduct so many anti-North
operationsKim Kyong-ok was there to clarify, quoting a South Korean agent who had questioned
her: We keep bringing people like you to the south not because money is in surplus. It is aimed to
disturb the mindset of the north and spread liberal democracy to it.
In Need of Protection and Support: Societal Divisions Exacerbated by Double Defector Press
Conferences | For decades, part of North Koreas strategy in the battle for legitimacy over the Korean
Peninsula has been to garner pro-North support among South Korean citizens, whom Pyongyang
counts on to support favorable policies in South Koreas domestic political debates. South Koreas
foreign-policy towards the DPRK has long been a wedge issue in the South, but in recent years a new
debate has begun to emerge over how the South Korean government, and society as a whole, should
treat North Korean refugees.
Many North Korean refugees are acutely aware of how they are perceived in the South, and feel a
palpable tension with certain members of South Korean society, particularly in the older generations,
who may view them suspiciously, criticize them for being a drain on South Koreas budget (especially
the pension system), or treat them with ambivalence or indifference. In one (extreme) example of how
the North Korean refugee issue can divide South Korean society, South Korean politician Lim Su-
kyung reportedly told a North Korean defector who happened to be dining in the same restaurant as her
that he was a son of a bitch, a senseless North Korean defector, and a bastard betrayer, sparking
a heated debate among South Korean netizens about North Korea and North Korean refugee issues.
Although the South Korean media coverage of North Korean refugees is generally supportive and
sympathetic, Pyongyangs double defector strategy aims to further inflame tensions by making South
Koreans view North Korean refugees as ungrateful freeloaders or seditious spies. Many South Koreans
see through Pyongyangs double defector strategy, but the increasing amount of redefector press
conferences will certainly add to the exasperation and outrage felt by some in the South.[3] As the
North Korean refugees continue to face a variety of problems on numerous fronts, increasing
protection and support from South Koreans and concerned members of the international community is
clearly essential.
Further Readings
Brian Gleason, Overwhelmed by Guilt: Pyongyangs Evolving Double Defector Propaganda, Sino-
NK, May 25, 2013.
Brian Gleason, Double Defectors: Signifiers of Pyongyangs Strategic Shift, Sino-NK, December 6,
2012.
Gianluca Spezza, What Double-Defection Tells us About the Prospects For Korean Unification, NK
News, August 9, 2012.

[1] Nevertheless, my post also highlights the numerous efforts from South Korea and the international
community to help North Korean refugees. Some North Korean refugees are doing well and South
Korean society and many more are determined to overcome their present challenges in order to find
success and happiness. Furthermore, I also covered the disillusionment that many North Korean people
feel toward their leadership, as well as their desire for change.
[2] This raises very important questions about how South Korea and other countries who accept North
Korean refugees should deal with the North Korean refugees who may have committed crimes in the
North. For example, should the young North Korean soldier who killed two fellow soldiers before
defecting to the South be charged with a crime or in any way disciplined? Do the countries that grant
asylum to North Korean refugees have a duty to screen for fleeing North Korean criminals? If so, how
should these issues be addressed?
[3] Some, if not all of the translated user comments provided by the koreaBANG articles could have
potentially been posted by North Korean agents or other subversive pro-North elements, but based on
my conversations with North Korean refugees and South Korean citizens, some are likely genuine.
Moreover, if North Korean agents are making disparaging comments about North Korean refugees on
popular South Korean websites and blogs, this only reinforces the notion that the North intends to
divide the South Korean citizenry on the North Korean refugee issue.