DECISIONS Judicial review keeps the admin agency within its jurisdiction and protects substantial rights of the parties affected by its decisions. Judicial review is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion, or in case the admin decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious
A. Factors Affecting Finality of Administrative Decisions Switchmens Union of North America v National Mediation Board: Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the following become highly relevant in determining whether judicial review may nonetheless be supplied (1) the type of problem involved (2) history of the statute in question. Fortich v. Corona: Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
Antique v. Zayco: Even administrative decisions must and sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy
Sotto v. Ruiz: If it is a question of law, then it is within the ambit of judicial review.
Uy v. Palomar: The Postmaster General here asserts that his decision is beyond judicial review of the courts the same not having been given in the Postal Law. The SC here ruled that although the allegation of the Postmaster General is correct (GENERAL RULE), the absence of statutory provisions for judicial review does not necessarily mean that access to the courts is barred the exception being decisions of such agencies that exceed its authority or are palpably wrong. Manuel v. Villena: When there is grave abuse of discretion, judicial review is available. San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor: The issue was w/n an administrative decision may be reviewed by the court. The SC here again held the GENERAL RULE is NO, since the administrative agencies possess the necessary technical expertise to make the determinations on their own. However the EXCEPTION lies when there is: (1)Lack/excess of jurisdiction (2) Grave abuse of discretion (3) Error of law (4) Collusion (5) A Decision Illegal for violating or failing to comply with a mandatory provision of law (6) A decision that is corrupt, arbitrary, or capricious.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Requisites: (1) Administrative agency is performing a quasi judicial function (2) Judicial review is available (3) The court acts in its appellate jurisdiction Reasons/Purposes: Legal: the law prescribes procedures for exhaustion. Practical: to give an agency the chance to correct itself and for purposes of expediency Remedy: Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Cause of Action. The same must be seasonably raised or deemed waived Pascual v. Provincial Board: The SC here held that the circumstances of the case were an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as what the case pertained to was a legal question (w/n an officials acts during his first term may be subject of disciplinary charges during his 2nd term.) Alzate v. Aldana: A mandamus was filed by the principal of the school violating the rule on Exhaustion of Administrative remedies there being the need to have dispensation of the teachers salaries before the end of the fiscal year to avoid the reversion of the funds. The SC here held it as another EXCEPTION to the rule since appeal to the administrative hierarchy would be unavailing considering the urgency of the situation and the damage impending. Cipriano v. Marcelino: It is altogether too obvious that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the small total P949, would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent. Corpuz v. Cuaderno: The Court held that appeals to the CSC and President are merely permissive and not mandatory as there are no laws requiring appeals exclusively to the President. Hence exception De Lara v. Clorivel: rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be prevented except by taking the opportune appropriate action Paredes v. CA: The SC held that the exhaustion of remedies rule is applicable as the enabling law tasked the Cabinet to review and approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and charges. Petitioners should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately resorting to the judicial process as the courts. Quasha v. SEC: The SC held that with just 6 days before the deadline there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies and that they properly filed the petition with the SC without going through the prescribed procedure of filing before the SEC en banc Republic v. Sandiganbayan: this case falls under 2 exceptions on the application of the doctrine: 1) estoppel on the part of the agency by laches; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction as it was beyond the power of the PCGG to issue the search and seizure orders. PAAT v. CA: Exceptions to exhaustion: 1. There is violation of due process; 2. Issue involved is a purely legal question; 3. The admin action is patently illegal amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction; 4. Estoppel on the agency's part; 5. There is irreparable injury; 6. Respondent is a dept. secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the Pres bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7. To require exhaustion of admin remedies would be unreasonable; 8. It would amount to nullification of the claim; 9. Subject matter is private land in land case proceeding; 10. Rule does not provide a plain, speedy & adequate remedy; 11. Circumstances indicate the urgency of judicial intervention 12. Where the claim involved is small 13. Quo Warranto (Lopez v. City of Manila) DAR v. Apex Investment: Exception in this case: circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction Smart v. NTC: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need no exhaust administrative remedies before going to court as this principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The scope of judicial power includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges: The CHED does not have the power to award damages. She could not have commenced her case before the CHED. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. CSC v. Dept of Budget and Management: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. CSC is not mandated by law to seek clarification from the DBM Secretary prior to filing this action. A direct invocation of the SC's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition
C. Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort There is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the administrative agency such that there is a choice as to which body the relief shall be sought. This doctrine does not apply where the law grants exclusive jurisdiction to a body. Requisites: (1)Admin body and regular court have concurrent and original jurisdiction (2) Question to be resolved requires expertise of administrative agency (3) Legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in rulings (4) Administrative agency is performing a quasi- judicial function not rule making or quasi- legislative function. Doctrine is inapplicable: (1) Agency has exclusive jurisdiction (2) Issue is not within the competence of the admin body to act on (3) Issue involved is clearly a factual question. Effect: Case is not suspended but merely suspended. Grule: Courts will not intervene if the question to be resolved is one which requires the expertise of administrative agencies and the legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in the rulings. It can only occur where there is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the admin agency. Texas v. Abilene: Courts will not intervene if the question to be resolved is one which requires the expertise of administrative agencies and the legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in the rulings. It can only occur where there is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the administrative agency. It is a question of the court yielding to the agency because of the latters expertise, and does not amount to ouster of the court. Phil Global Communications v. Relova: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction does not apply since NTC had no competence to act on questions which were purely legal. The doctrine calls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Industrial Enterprises v. CA: However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. D. Standing to Challenge Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged The technical rules on standing comes from the general doctrine of separation of powers as there is a need for an actual case or controversy before judicial review becomes available Standing as opposed to real party-in-interest: the former is a constitutional law concept which only concerns the petitioner, while the latter is a concept in procedural law which concerns both the petitioner/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant. Note: Standing issue should be resolved in its own. No standing. No case. It is irrelevant whether or not the case is meritorious. The merits of the case should not be a factor in the consideration of locus standi. (Association of Data Processing) Ursal v. CTA: The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" the city assessor. At most it was the City of Cebu that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the abovementioned property owners. Acting Collector v. CTA: Only persons, associations or corporations whose pecuniary and proprietary interests are adversely affected by a decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, or provincial or city Board of Assessments Appeals may appeal to the CTA. Lozada v. v. COMELEC: Taxpayer's suit is proper only when the act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public funds. Taxpayer's suits cannot lie upon the mere generalized interest of all the citizens because such kind of interest is so abstract in nature. Concreteness of an injury, may it be actual or threatened, makes a dispute capable of judicial resolution. As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under the constitutional provision cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds. Oposa v. Factoran: As to the propriety of generations yet unborn, it is valid under the concept of intergenerational responsibility with respect to the right to a balanced and healthy ecology. Joya v. PCGG: The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. Kilosbayan v. Guingona: As a general rule, a person impugning validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. An EXCEPTION to this is transcendental importance to the public in which case the Court wants to settle the issue definitively as soon as possible. Kilosbayan v. Morato: Questions of constitutionality: legal standing. Otherwise: real party in interest (because this is a civil case) Domingo v. Carague: Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. Association of Data Processing v. Camp: Petitioner satisfied the test for standing. This case rejected the "legal interest" test and established that a plaintiff may sue provided he is "injured in fact. 1. Legal interest test Old test used in prior cases; CA used this test and found petitioner without standing; Court, however, held here that this test was not fit to determine standing since it already involved the merits of the case which should not be. (See above, separate issue ang standing) 2. Public interest test Another test used by the CA to find petitioner without standing; Court ruled, however, that this was inapplicable since the test only applied to plaintiffs who were significantly involved to have standing to represent the public 3. Case or controversy test Introduced in Flast v. Cohen; capacity of dispute to be presented in an adversary context and in a form capable of judicial resolution. However, Court qualified that Flast was a taxpayer's suit whereas case at bar was a competitior's suit. (see Simon v Eastern Kentucky below) 4. Injury in fact test Whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. Petitioner alleged probably profit loss from the new competitor. 5. Zone of interest test Whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question; a measure of self- restraint for the Court.
Sierra v. Morton: No injury-in-fact showed because the Petitioner asserted no individualized harm to itself or its members. Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club, in its corporate capacity, lacked standing. Lujan v. National Wildlife: Respondent failed to show 2 requisites to claim right to judicial review: 1) person must specify a final agency action that affects him; 2) person must prove that he is adversely affected by the final agency action within the meaning of regular statute. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing requires a concrete, discernible injuryactual or imminent and not a "conjectural or hypothetical one"injury in fact this is the first of 3 elements of constitutional minimum for standing: 2) causal connection between injury and act complained of; 3.) it is likely as opposed to speculative that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision E. Ripeness Fitness of issues for judicial determination. Abbot v Gardner: The basic rationale of ripeness is (1) to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also (2) to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. TWO-FOLD ASPECT/TEST: 1. FITNESS for judicial decision: Purely legal questions agreed upon by both parties (only questions of law; should NOT involve policy making function) 2. HARDSHIP OF PARTIES of withholding Court consideration: (1) Must be a final agency action There is no hint that this regulation is informal or only the ruling of a subordinate official, or tentative. (2) Consider: added cost to parties, possibility of instituting a criminal action against disobedient party, etc. National Automatic Laundry v. Schultz: Ripeness involves an inquiry to; 1) the finality; but also to 2) the presumption of reviewability of issues. General Ripeness Considerations are; 1) WON there is a congressional intent to negative judicial review, 2) the possibility of courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreement over administrative policies due to premature adjudication; and 3) the fitness of issues for judicial determination and hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
VI. MODES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1987 CONSTITUTION: Article IX Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of is submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. BP 129 Sec 9. (See Rule 43 also) The Court of Appeals shall exercise: Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decision, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of sub- paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. B. Certiorari Requisites: (1) Lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (2) No plain, adequate or speedy remedy. (3) Administrative agency performing a quasi-judicial function. It cannot be invoked if it is a ministerial function. Purpose: To set aside and nullify proceedings. St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC: In the case of NLRC decisions, the intent of the legislature was to make a special civil action for certiorari as the proper vehicle for review. Thus, all references in the law to appeals from the NLRC to the SC must be interpreted to mean petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions must initially be filed in the CA following the hierarchy of courts. Police Commission v. Bello: While findings of facts of administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and should not generally be disturbed, there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. Purefoods v. NLRC: It must emphatically be reiterated, since so often is it overlooked, that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Villaruel v. NLRC: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. Hadji Sirad v. CSC: Doctrine of case is that a special civil action for certiorari can only be taken when there is no other plain and speedy remedy. Here there was one as instead of going directly to the SC, an appeal from the CSC decision finding her guilty of grave misconduct could have been taken to the CA by appeal.
C. Prohibition It is preventive and not for acts already performed. Issues on the same grounds as certiorari. Not only quasi-judicial but also ministerial. (1) Grave Abuse and (2) No other speedy remedy. Purpose: To prohibit or stop proceedings. Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board: . If the alienage of the Chua Hiong is not denied, the Board's jurisdiction and its proceedings are unassailable; if the respondent is admittedly a citizen, or conclusively shown to be such, the Board lacks jurisdiction and its proceedings are null and void ab initio and may be summarily enjoined in the courts. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. However, it is neither expedient nor wise that the right to a judicial determination should be allowed in all cases; it should be granted only in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding.\ Co v. Deportation Board: While doctrine of primary jurisdiction wherein the administrative agency, such as the Deportation Board in this case, must be given the opportunity to decide the matter before it before the courts could intervene, the doctrine is not applied in proper cases where right to immediate judicial review should be recognized such as in this case as recognized in Calacday v Vivo where it stated that the Chua Hiong decision is an exception to the rule. Paredes v. CA: SC said that prohibition is granted only where no other remedy which is sufficient to afford redress is available. Here, the law itself provided that increases of rates would still have to be approved by the cabinet, since the approval was not yet given, prohibition is premature.
D. Mandamus Mandamus is an order compelling a party to perform an act arising out of a positive duty imposed by law. It will only lie against a ministerial duty when the official/agency refuses to exercise it. It will not lie to enforce a contractual obligation. Specific performance is the remedy. Requisites: (1) Duty is ministerial (2) Petitioner has a clear and controlling right (3) No other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Blanco v. Board of Examiners: SC said that mandamus does not lie, duty of the Secretary was discretionary to confirm or not confirm the results, he had to determine w/n the results were credible. Act of confirming is NOT a ministerial duty. Ng Gioc Lu v. DFA: act of issuing a visa is discretionary, particularly because the consular office in China is in the best position to determine w/n the return of Ng Gioc Lu to the Philippines is a threat to public safety. Policarpio v. Phil. Veterans Board: Mandamus does not lie when the action calls for the review of an action or decision of a Board granted with discretion, and when such action or decision involves the construction of the law and the application of the facts thereto. Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission: Mandamus lies because after proving that Tan was a member of a guerilla organization recognized by the US army, it becomes ministerial to approve the release of backpay. Pangasinan v. Reparation Commission: Reparations goods were not transferred to Pangasinan because respondent did not yet sign the contract to convey the goods to the province. SC said mandamus will not lie to enforce contractual obligations. Mandamus is based on the ministerial duty imposed by law, while specific performance is based on contract. Cruz v. CA: Mandamus will not issue to (1) compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do (2) give the applicxnt anything to which he is not entitled to law. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. PRC v. De Guzman: Filed petition for mandamus to compel the PRC to register them as licensed physicians, but SC said that mandamus will not lie as such registration is discretionary because licenses shall be issued only to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board, the operative word is satisfactorily, the determination of satisfactory compliance is discretionary.
E. Declaratory Relief May be brought by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or by a person whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation or ordinance before breach or violation of his right. The power to grant declaratory relief is discretionary with the courts and they may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in cases where; 1. A decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action; and 2. In any case where the declaration of construction not necessary and proper at the time and under all circumstances.
Requisites: (1) Subject matter must be a deed, will contract or written instrument in which the petitioner is legally interested, or governmental regulation which affects his rights. (2) Terms of the written instrument are doubtful and requires construction (3) Filed before breach. (4) Actual justiciable controversy (5) ripe for adjudication (6) administrative remedies have been exhausted, adequate means are still available through other forms of action or proceeding Azajar v. Ardalles: Azajar brought an action for declaratory relief to declare his citizenship. SC said declaratory relief is the improper remedy, there is a proper administrative procedure for the declaration of citizenship, it must be what must be resorted to. De Borja v. Villadolid: SC said declaratory relief would not lie since it should be filed before the breach of law, here there has already been a breach, he proceeded to catch fish without a license, he should have sought declaratory relief first before proceeding without a license. NDSC v. Meer: SC said that the removal of the proviso was to make the application discretionary, the law would allow the taxpayer the remedy of declaratory relief when the tax is not yet due, but not when it is due. DR is no proper when a taxpayer questions his tax liability. Remedy is to pay first then sue afterwards for recovery so that there is no delay in collection of taxes./ Mirando v. Wellington: Requisites for the applicability of DR: 1) Justiciable controversy; 2) Adverse interests between parties 3) petitioner has Legal Interest in the controversy; 4) Ripeness. Not all are present thus it must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action. F. Habeas Corpus The great writ of liberty is intended as a speedy remedy to secure the release of a person deprived of his liberty. Requisites: (1) There is illegal confinement or detention (2) Illegal restrain of liberty (3) Rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Mejoff v. Director of Prison: . 2 Habeas Corpus cases 1st, denied because his detention was necessary for the process of his deportation, 2nd was granted because it was for an unreasonable length of time (2 years), the government could have adequately found ways to repatriate him to Russia. Here, it was shown that the writ does not apply to Philippine citizens alone. Co v. Deportation Board: Habeas corpus may issue in deportation cases "in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct, In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. Lucien Tran v. Liwag: Habeas corpus petition mooted by the fact that he posted bail and hence is already granted liberty. Also, other events have supervened, deportation proceedings have actually taken place and hence his arrest, although initially illegal, is now legal as it is for the purpose of the proceedings.
G. Injunction as a Provisional Remedy It is an ancillary remedy provided to preserve the petitioners rights while the main action is pending. It may be used (1) to prevent the commission of certain acts complained of (2) Order the continued performance of some act for the purpose of preventing injury. Grounds: (1) Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded (2) Commission or continuance of act would probably work injustice to him (3) Defendant is doing, threatens or about to do an act in violation of petitioners right which may rended the judgment ineffective. If plaintiff wins, injunction is permanent. If he loses, dissolved. Types: i. Preliminary Mandatory Injunction Plaintiff wants to compel defendant to do something ii. Preliminary Injunction To prevent or to stop defendant from doing something iii. Restraining Order Life span is 20 days then hearing is held to decide propriety of injunction iv. Permanent injunction If plaintiff wins the case, injunction becomes permanent. Collector v Reyes: Injunction cannot be had when a taxpayer questions his tax liability. However, SC saw an exception (Sec. 11 of RA 1125): When in the CTAs opinion, the collection by BIR may jeopardize the Governments and/or the taxpayers interest, the court may at any stage suspend the old collection Pineda v. Lantin: CFI has no jurisdiction to grant the prohibition. Orders of the SEC commissioner may be reviewed only by the SC. Lemi v. Valencia: When the law requires a hearing before the denial of an application to operate a radio station, the seizure of the stations radio equipment is illegal. The preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the return of the confiscated transmitter is proper. Courts should exercise great care in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction bec it requires one of the parties to perform a positive act, as opposed to merely maintaining the status quo. *Preliminary Mandatory Injunction will be granted in the following cases: (1) Cases of extreme urgency (2) Where petitioners right is clear (3) Relative inconvenience are strongly in his favor (4) There is a willful invasion of petitioners right, injury being a continuous one (5) Restore the status quo. Honda v. San Diego: Writ of injunction/prohibition may be issued against a court only by a superior court. Nocnoc v. Vera: Maranang filed in the CFI a complaint for injunction to enjoin execution. CFI granted, saying that it could take cognizance of the complaint as it was a court of general jurisdiction, despite the fact that it had no appellate jurisdiction. CFI may not enjoin the WCU. The proper forum to question the validity of WCUs award is the Workmens Compensation Commission, then to the SC if appealed further. Court of general jurisdiction is merely descriptive and does not confer jurisdiction.
VII. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW A. Law and Fact Distinction The distinction between law and fact is important to make because reviewing courts can look into determinations of fact by the lower courts (bodies) only if the same are unsupported by substantial evidence. If they are so supported, then the appellate courts are bound to such findings of fact. Questions of law, however, are always reviewable by the higher courts. The distinction, for practical purposes seem empty. Lawyers can validly argue that a question of fact is in fact a question of law because when the interpretation of the law is necessarily related to the determination of the facts, then they form part of the review and are too questions of law which the appellate court may look into. Dauan v. Secretary: The records of the Bureau of Lands had been destroyed so circumstantial evidence had to be introduced, and the rule now is that the conclusion drawn from these facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review. Reyes v. Reyes: The law presumes that the worker had died in the ordinary course of his employment. The employer must present substantial evidence to overcome this presumption, which the employer failed to do. (Sufficiency of evidence to overcome a presumption of law is a question of law) Aboitiz v. Pepito: The claim only stated that the crew member was missing; thus when the petitioner failed to controvert the claim, it only admitted that the crew member was missing, not that he was dead. Non-controversion in compensation cases (and ordinary civil cases) simply means admissions of facts, not conclusions of law. (The question of law herein is the question of whether the crew member is dead or not.)
B. Question of Law A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. What may be questioned? (1)Constitutionality of the Statute creating the agency and granting its powers; (2) Validity of the agency action if this transcends the limit established by law; (3) Correctness of the agencys interpretation and application of the law.
Ortua v Singson Encarnacion: However, any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the courts. The question of law herein is Ortuas citizenship Mejia v. Mapa: SC is not unmindful of the doctrine that a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts. But this does not apply herein, because here the decision of the Director was NOT approved, but was revoked by the Secretary Ysmael v. Santos: The argument against majority is contrary to the findings of fact of the lower court, which was based on a list of the salesmen or agents affiliated to the Union. Hence, said findings may not be disturbed in this proceeding for review by certiorari. OLeary v. Brown Pacific Maxon: The determination of W/N the accident arose out of, or in the course of Valeks employment is a question of law that is cognizable by the courts. The question of W/N an employer-employee relationship existed between Valak and BPMI is also a question of law All that is required is that the "obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone of special danger" out of which the injury arose. OKeefe v. Smith: Inferences drawn by the DC are to be accorded great weight, unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence. SC held that the DC was correct in finding that the conditions of employment created the zone of special danger out of which the injury arose.
C. Question of Fact A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. Reviewing courts can look into determinations of fact by lower courts ONLY if the same are unsupported by substantial evidence. Questions of law, however, are always reviewable by higher courts. General Rule: Finality is attached o findings of fact of some agencies when these findings are supported by substantial evidence and as long as there is no grave abuse of discretion. A question of fact is raised when the issue involved is: 1. W/N a certain thing exists; or 2. W/N an event has taken place; or 3. Which version of events, among 2 or more, are correct. Gonzales v. Victory Labor Union: Employees were dismissed for pilferage. Substantial evidence rule is that findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Acting Commissioner v. Meralco: The SC is bound by the finding of facts of the CTA, which enjoys wide discretion in construing tax statutes. The CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. The CTAs determination of insulating oil as within the meaning of insulators is thus accorded respect Meralco v. NLRC: SC has ruled that the ground for an employer's dismissal of an employee needs to be established only by substantial evidence. Lameyra v. Pangilinan: Held: No substantial Evidence. SC was not convinced that the certification of the personnel officer that petitioner did not report for work from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995 constitutes such substantial evidence in light of the petitioners submission that said personnel officer precisely prevented him from signing the log book. Under these circumstances, petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove his contention that the termination of his services was illegal. German Marine Agencies v. NLRC: Award of sickness wages case. Whether or not petitioners actually paid the balance of the sickness wages to private respondent is a factual question. In the absence of proof that the labor arbiter or the NLRC had gravely abused their discretion, the Court shall deem conclusive and cannot be compelled to overturn this particular factual finding Velasquez v. Hernandez: Held: There was substantial evidence. SC says that 20 sworn statements of teachers are sufficient. Only 3 desisted but it is of no moment because administrative actions cannot be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. CSC v. Cayobit: Person who said that 84% siya sa CSC exam but in truth 40% lang! Quantum of evidence required is only substantial in administrative proceedings. Hence the masterlist, being the primary record of the passers, is sufficient evidence to dismiss the employee. Office of the Ombudsman v.Santos: Case of the principal who stole Yeros (galvanized iron sheets) Since the decision of the Ombudsman was supported by substantial evidence, the SC sustained saying: We affirm all the other findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. The testimonial and documentary evidence contained in the records constitutes substantial evidence to prove the administrative liability of respondent, Universal Camera v. NLRB: Dean says that this is the leading case in substantial evidence. Doctrine: The evidence supporting the agency's conclusion must be substantial in consideration of the record as a whole, even including the evidence that is not consistent with the agency's conclusion. Notes: Sir says you must look at the evidence at a whole, the CA (penned by Learned Hand ) ignored the examiners report. D. Questions of Discretion DISCRETIONARY MINISTERIAL Power or right conferred upon agencies to act officially under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment of others A response to a duty which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions specifically designated. Not dependent upon the officers judgment or discretion Power to make a choice among permissive action or policies. Person or persons exercising it may choose which of several courses of action should be followed Nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist
GRule: Courts have no power to substitute their own judgments with that of the administrative official. Because it is a recognition of the expertise of the agency. Except: When there is grave abuse of discretion. Laguna Tayabas Bus v. PSC: Provisional permit for buses case. Super Memory Jolter: This is the case where Sir made the historic speech about being PRECISE and CUTTING EDGE! Doctrine: Just because there was a difference or erroneous appreciation of the competing facts presented before the officer, the court will not substitute its judgment with that of the PSC. No grave abuse of discretion is present. The only time when it could be reversed (1) such order is without reasonable support in evidence (2) such was rendered in violation of the law Manila Trading v. Zulueta: CIR ordered the ER to just suspend an EE who was found guilty to breach his duty. SC says: An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests. Hence, there was grave abuse of discretion in this case. Kapisanan v. Noriel and Federation of Free Workers v. Noriel: Sir says these labor cases should be studied in tandem. Basic doctrine: When the 30% requirement in the certification election has been met, then BLR is divested of the discretion to decide WON a certification election must be held. It is duty bound to grant it. If 30% is NOT met, then BLR has the discretion WON a certification election must be held when the circumstances dictate. PLDT v. NTC: NTC, as the governmental agency charged with passing upon applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity in the field of telecommunications, is authorized to determine what the specific operating and technical requirements of "public convenience and necessity" are in the field of telecommunications.
VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY ACTION The General Rule is that the manner in which administrative decisions are enforced are to be found in the enabling statute. Legislature does this by providing mechanisms (i.e. contempt, cease and desist) in the statute governing the agency in order to put teeth into admin actions.
A. Res Judicata; Finality of Judgment Requisites:1. Former final judgment; 2. Rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3. Judgment on the merits; 4. there being, between the first and second action:[a) identity of parties, b)subject matter and c) cause of action. It only applies to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of purely administrative functions. Administrative proceedings are non-litigous and summary in nature. Ipekdjian v. CTA: Board of Tax Appeals decisions have judicial character if they were not subsequently brought before the CFI or Court of Tax Appeals. They were in a sense judicially confirmed hence it attained the character of finality. Nasipit v. NLRC: The principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the IRR of the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are "non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law Dulay v. Minister of Natural Resources: The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi- judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction. The decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata Note: Res Judicata is a judicial doctrine hence it only applies to quasi-judicial agencies. Phil American General Insurance Company v. CA: The cause of action in the marine protest was to enforce the administrative liability of the shipmaster/captain of M/V "Crazy Horse", its officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking of the subject vessel. The cause of action in the 2nd is to enforce the civil liability the common carrier, for its failure to unload the subject cargo within a period of time considered unreasonably long by the petitioner. No identity of CoA hence Res judicata not present.
Manila Electric Co. V. Phil Consumers: Requisites for res judicata to apply (1) There must be a final judgment or order (2) Court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter (3) Must be a judgment on the merits (4) Identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
B. Writ of Execution; Mandamus GRule: Administrative agencies performing quasi- judicial functions have the implied power to issue writs of execution. When the law is silent, presume that the agency has the power to enforce its decisions emanating from its QJ powers. Exception: When the enabling law expressly provides otherwise. Apolega v. Hizon: As the law now stands, the power to enforce awards under the Workmen's Compensation Act is expressly vested in the Commission or the duly deputized officials in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (previously it was the regular courts of justice which could enforce awards) Vda de Corpuz v. Commanding General Phil Army: Petition for mandamus by petitioner was granted because a final and executory award entities petitioner to its enforcement according to its letter. It is not susceptible of any change or alteration by the officer charged with its implementation as the latter's duty on the matter constitutes only a ministerial act that does not call for the exercise of discretion Note: Sir says, what if the writ of execution is ignored? Look at Vda. De Corpuz,you must file a petition for mandamus Ambrosio v. Salvador: The Court of First Instance cannot issue a writ of injunction or prohibition against the Court of Industrial Relations because the CIR is equal in rank with the Court of First Instance. Thus, the Injunction was an Unwarranted Interference of the Writ of Execution of the NLRC. Merano v. Tutaan: Labor Arbiter refused to enforce NLRC decision. His remedy against the refusal or inaction the LA to enforce NLRC awards/decision, is to call the NLRCs attention to the alleged nonfeasance and NOT to file a mandamus action in CFI which has no jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC. (Again because NLRC is equal with CFI) GSIS v. CSC: The grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments. (As sir says: if it doesnt have the power to execute, inutile agency) Clavano v. HLURB: Case where the HLURB modified its FINAL decision by ordering the petitioners to also pay the registration fees. Since, The decision has long become final and, has also been completely satisfied. HLURB is thus left with no other authority but to enforce the dispositive part of its Decision which it can no longer amend, modify or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment.
Chapter 6 Judicial Review
General Rules An administrative decision may be appealed to the courts of justice only if the Constitution or the law permits it or if the question to be reviewed is a question of law. However, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Supreme Court has applied the exceptions rather than the rule. In the case of the constitutional commission, i.e., the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Audit, and the Civil Service Commission, it is provided that any decision order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. On the basis of Sec. 16 of the Interim Rules and Guideline implementing Sec. 9 (3) of BP Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals may review final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions or regional trial courts and of all quasi-judicial bodies, except the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Audit, the Sandiganbayan, and decisions issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Other appeals are prescribed by special laws, such as RA No. 1125, providing for appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals of any decision rendered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, or any provincial or city board of assessment appeals. Methods of review The methods of judicial review are prescribed by the Constitution, statutes or the Rules of the Court. These methods may be specific or general. It is provided in RA No. 5434 that an appeal from a final award, order or decisions of the Patent Office shall be taken by filing with said body and with the Court of Appeals a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of such award, order or ruling, copies being served on all interested parties. The Administrative Code generally provides that an appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from, together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. The Supreme Court instructed certain universally accepted axioms governing judicial review through the extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of administrative officers or agencies: First, before said actions may be entertained, it must be shown that all the administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and, Second, that the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with a grave abuse of discretion.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort
There are two doctrines that must be considered in connection with the judicial review of administrative decisions:(1) doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort; and (2) the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply calls for the determination of administrative questions, which ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather courts of justice.
If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superior up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A. Reasons
(1) The administrative superiors, if given the opportunity, can correct the errors committed by their subordinates;
(2) Courts should as much as possible refrain from disturbing the findings of administrative bodies in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers;
(3) On practical grounds, it is best that the courts should not be saddled with the review of administrative cases;
(4) Judicial review of administrative cases is usually effected through the special civil actions of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, which are available only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
B. Exceptions
(1) When the question raised is purely legal (question of law is involved);
(2) When the administrative body is estoppel;
(3) When the act complained of is patently illegal;
(4) When there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
(5) When the claim involved is small;
(6) When irreparable damage will be suffered;
(7) When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(8) When strong public interest is involved;
(9) When the subject of the controversy is private land;
(10) In quo warranto proceedings
C. Appeal to the President
Of special interest is the question of whether or not a decision of the cabinet member has to be appealed first to the President before it may be brought to a court of justice. Jurisprudence on this matter is rather indecisive. In the early case of demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that appeal to the President was not necessary because the Cabinet member was after all his alter ego and, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, the acts of the secretary were the acts of the President. This view was abandoned in Calo vs. Fuertes, where it was held that appeal to the President was the final step in the administrative process and therefore a condition precedent to appeal to the courts.
In Bartulata vs. Peralta, however, the court reinstated the Demaisip doctrine, again on the basis of alter ego justification.
Tan vs. Director of Forestry, thereafter revived Calo andagain required appeal to the President as a prerequisite to an appeal of a Cabinet member's decision to the courts of Justice.
D. Effect of Non-compliance
The failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court and merely results in the lack of a cause of action which may be invoked in a motion to dismiss. If this ground to dismiss the court action is not properly or reasonably invoked, the court may proceed to hear the case. As previously noted, the court has the discretion to require the observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and may, if it sees fit, dispense with it and proceed with the disposition of the case.
Questions Reviewable
Two kinds of questions are reviewable by the courts of justice, to wit: the question of fact and the question of law.
On the question of fact, review of the administrative decision lies in the discretion of the legislature, which may or may not permit it as it sees fit.
But when it comes to the question of law, the administrative decision may be appealed to the courts of justice independently of legislative permission or even against legislative prohibition. The reason is that the judiciary cannot be deprived of its inherent power to review all decisions on questions of law, whether made initially by lower courts and more so by an administrative body.
A. Questions of fact
Even if allowed to review administrative decisions on questions of fact, courts of justice generally defer to such decisions and will decline to disturb them except only where there is a clear showing of arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court ruled in Osias Academy vs. DOLE that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but finality.
B. Questions of Law
Administrative bodies may be allowed to resolve questions of law in the exercise of their quasi- judicial function as an incident of their primary power of regulation.
However as a rule, it is only the judicial tribunal that can interpret and decide the question of law with finality.
The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company, Petitioner, V. The Secretary of Finance and The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondents. Full Text