Hands off the internet!

How the securitization of an

internet governance approach impacted the World
Conference on International Telecommunications
Harm Hoksbergen
Thesis supervisor: Dr. Stephanie Simon
Second reader: Prof. Dr. Marieke de Goede
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
(MSc) Political Science (International Relations) at the Graduate School of Social Sciences,
University of Amsterdam.
Amsterdam, April, 2014
Of is dat het niet?
Het is gewoon een kwestie van perspectief.
Zie je rommel op de ruit of zit er stof op je oog?
Het is maar net waar je in gelooft.
Ieder zijn belevingswereld, goed of slecht
Het is maar net hoeveel waarde je eraan hecht.
- Glenn de Randamie (2007)
Three thousand miles of wilderness, overcome by the flow
A lonely restitution of pavement, pomp and show
I seek a thousand answers, I find but one or two
I maintain no discomfiture, my path again renewed.
- Greg Graffin (1990)
Abstract
The 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12), hosted by the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a United Nations specialized agency,
ended in a puzzling outcome. The aim of the conference was to revise an old
International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) treaty, the outcome was accepted by
many member states, while others rejected. The ITU mostly deals with non-
controversial technical issues, which made the conflicted outcome and failure to
reach consensus remarkable. How did his happen? This study analysis a securitization
process in the run-up, during and after WCIT-12, which aimed to securitize a hands-
off internet governance approach. A coalescence of actors used succesfull securitization
moves to secure the hands-off vision on internet regulation at WCIT-12. Resulting in an
unworkable environment to reach consensus on a new ITRs treaty. The study provides a
new perspective in understanding the outcome of WCIT-12, and gives new insight in the
employment of securitization theory and internet governance conceptions.
Keywords: WCIT-12, ITU, ITRs, internet governance, securitization theory
4
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ccTLD Country Code Top-Level Domain
CS Copenhagen School
DNS Domain Name System
EC European Commission
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
gTLD Generic Top-Level Domain
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN Internet Cooperation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IGF Internet Governance Forum
IR International Relations
ITR(s) International Telecommunication Regulation(s)
ITU International Telecommunication Union
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
SG Secretary-General
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TLD Top-Level Domain
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
US United States (of America)
WCIT/ World Conference on International Telecommunications 2012
WCIT-12
WGIG Working Group on Internet Governance
WSIS World Summit on the Information Society
5
Table of Contents
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................................... 5
Preface........................................................................................................................................ 9
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 12
Chapter 1: Conceptual framework ........................................................................................... 16
1.1 Conceptualizing internet governance ............................................................................. 16
1.1.1 Theorising the internet as technical infrastructure .................................................. 17
1.1.2 The emerging internet governance debate .............................................................. 19
1.1.3 Reformulating the IR perspective on internet governance ..................................... 23
1.2 Conceptualizing securitization theory............................................................................ 26
1.2.1 Securitization in three steps .................................................................................... 27
1.2.2 Facilitating factors in securitization theory............................................................. 29
1.2.3 Refining speech act theory ...................................................................................... 29
1.3 Reflection on the usage of securitization theory ............................................................ 33
1.3.1 Securitization theory and the handling of identities ............................................... 36
1.3.2 Discharging desecuritization as normative aim ...................................................... 38
1.3.3 Setting out the research objective ........................................................................... 40
Chapter 2: Research design ...................................................................................................... 42
2.1 Case study research design ............................................................................................ 42
2.1.1 Level of analysis ..................................................................................................... 44
2.1.2 Unit of analysis ....................................................................................................... 45
2.2 Outlining methods .......................................................................................................... 46
2.2.1 Discourse analysis as analytical tool....................................................................... 46
2.2.2 Analysing extra-linguistic forms of a speech act .................................................... 51
2.2.3 Data collection & presentation................................................................................ 52
Chapter 3: Sound the alarm, the ITU plans an internet takeover! ........................................... 56
3.1 Commencing the securitization move ............................................................................ 56
3.1.1 Leaking WCIT-12 documents ................................................................................. 57
6

3.2 Campaigning against WCIT-12 ..................................................................................... 58
3.2.1 Googles Take Action campaign .......................................................................... 59
3.2.2 Continued securitization in the media ..................................................................... 62
3.3 Parliamentary securitization contributions .................................................................... 64
3.3.1 The US Congress concurrent resolution ................................................................. 65
3.4 ITUs attempt to desecuritize WCIT-12 ........................................................................ 66
Chapter 4: Stonewalling WCIT-12 and its aftermath .............................................................. 70
4.1 Dont mention the I-word .............................................................................................. 70
4.1.1 Progress in the midst of controversies .................................................................... 71
4.1.2 Measuring the temperature in the room .................................................................. 73
4.1.3 Crumbling consensus .............................................................................................. 75
4.2 WCIT-12 a failure or a success? .................................................................................... 76
4.2.1 Pointing the blame .................................................................................................. 77
4.2.2 Controlling the hands-off approach ........................................................................ 80
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 83
6.1.1. Theoretical conclusions and future research .......................................................... 85
6.1.2 Implications of the findings for the internet governance debate ............................. 86
Appendix ................................................................................................................................ 102
Appendix 1: ITU member states and WCIT-12 attendance........................................... 102


7


List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Penrose Triangle (Wikimedia Commons, 2007) ...................................................... 11
Figure 2: On the spot signatories and non-signatories of the WCIT-12 Final Acts (ITU,
2012b). ..................................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 3: Schematic reflection of a successful securitization process in which an illocutionary
and a perlocutionary speech act are used. ................................................................................ 31
Figure 4: Fragment from the Google Take Action website (Google, 2012a). ...................... 60
Figure 5: Fragment from the Google Take Action website (Google, 2012a). ...................... 61
Figure 6: Delegates of different ITU member states show boards in support of Resolution 3 as
part of measuring the temperature in the room (ITU, 2012f). ............................................... 74

Table 1: Different element in a speech act sequence (Vuori, 2008, pp. 77-89) ....................... 49
Table 2: Four strands of securitization (Vuori, 2008, p. 76) .................................................... 50
Table 3: Top-10 of biggest ITU member state delegations in number of participants at WCIT-
12 (ITU, 2012c). ...................................................................................................................... 73

8


Preface

The past three and a half years have been an intriguing encounter with the academic field of
political science and International Relations. Past years of studying have given me a full array
of interesting new insights on the academic and the empirical level. This journey now comes
to an end with this master thesis. Before presenting my research in detail I would like to seize
this opportunity to briefly reflect on my past years as a student political science/International
Relations.
My first class political science in 2010 was quite a disorienting experience. As I
learned in class when talking about contested concepts, there is a total lack of consensus on
fundamental concepts like power in the academic field. I felt social scientific research was
flawed from the start if we were not able to settle such important definitional matters
beforehand. If we could not agree on what it is we want to study, how can we study it? I
discussed my indignation with my lecturer after class. In the discussion which followed I was
asserted the answer to this question is quite difficult, but there will be enough opportunities
in the years to come to discuss this matter my lecturer assured me. Of course in retrospect
my lecturer was right, looking back studying political science (and social sciences in general)
is all about this question; how and in what way can we explain or understand the social world
around us.
This lesson in pluriformity of academic insights, made clear to me thinking in a black
and white dichotomy is generally too simplistic. For every viewpoint there is also an
oppositional interpretation. The truth for that matter is probably grey instead of black or
white. Academic thinking also taught me the relativity of most social scientific research. As
J ackson notes referring to the so-called demarcation problem in scientific research:
Unfortunately, philosophers have come to no global consensus about what defines a field of
inquiry as a science or a practice of knowledge-production as scientific (J ackson, 2011,
p. 11). This might be interpreted as an admission of weakness but instead offers a good
learning school in life itself. How many times truth in daily life is also just a matter of
interpretation? Although this might sound like Nietzschean thinking, I would not go so far to
proclaim an anything goes mentality or be needless pessimistic about the social scientific
enterprise in general. Rather I would like to think of practicing social science as a game of
Scrabble in analogy of Friedrich Kratochwils metaphor:

9


We begin with a concept that makes certain combinations possible. In crisscrossing,
we can go on, and our additions are justified by the mutual support of the already
existing words and concepts. Sometimes, we cannot proceed as our attempts to
continue are stymied. Then we begin somewhere else and might, by circuitous route,
reach again some known terrain. Potentially where are innumerable moves, and no
two games are the same, since moves at different times will have different
consequences. On the other hand, none of them is free in the sense that anything can
happen. But none of them could have been predicted by the view from nowhere as
everything depends on the words that are put in place, the site that is chosen for
extending the game, and the time (Kratochwil, 2007, pp. 49-50).

Every student of International Relations (IR) learns about the different grand theories in the
academic field. The different ontological and epistemological debates in IR were amply dealt
with in my years of studying. As I learned every approach has its own strengths and
weaknesses. This is why I always favour academic thinkers who critically reflect on their
own work and openly admit the limits in their thinking.
1
In my opinion a good social scientist
guards against dogmatic thinking and dares to cross scientific borders so often created by
certain labels. Classifying the field of IR using different schematic labels (e.g. neorealism/
classical realism) above all is an artificial exercise which shouldnt obstruct fruitful scholarly
exchange (Knudsen, 2001, p. 356).
Because the full array of ontological/epistemological positions in the field of IR we
should be careful to attack each others work purely on the ground of these academic differ-
ences. Otherwise the academic debate easily falls flat in a game of oh yes it is - oh no it
isnt. Even anti-foundational approaches should be wary their deconstructing attempts and
critically assessments of value-free social scientific research, do not result in just endless
academic debates on unbridgeable viewpoints or paradigmatic wars as they are sometimes
characterised (Lake, 2013). Rather these approaches could render interesting new insights by
their own premises. I would not say conflicting views should not be expressed; rather I would
like to refrain from academic strives which solely end in contrasting viewpoints but do not
constitute any new insights.
Finally to give an answer to my own question; there is no need for an eclectic con-
ception of the truth, instead every academic viewpoint renders its own valuable contribution
1
See for example the work of J ohn Gerard Ruggie (1998, pp. 37-39).
10



by its own premises. I would say my present academic position is more agnostic and looks
like a Penrose Triangle (Figure 1). Unifying academic research into one exhaustive truth is
like the Penrose Triangle itself; simply impossible. Still every approach contributes its own
valuable insights into the academic discipline and should therefore be considered a welcome
contribution to the whole.


Figure 1: Penrose Triangle (Wikimedia Commons, 2007)

At this moment I would like to briefly acknowledge (but not exclusively) the help of some
persons who made my scientific endeavour possible. First of all I would like to thank both
my parents who always supported me throughout the years in every possible way, and gave
me the opportunity to break new paths. Secondly I owe much gratitude to Maaike, who
helped me to regain sight in times I loosed track, and encouraged me to pass through by
helping in any way she could. To conclude I would like to thank Stephanie who provided me
a free reign to develop this thesis, but also provided helpful direction when I started to
wander off. And without her watchful eye the title of this thesis might have implied the
internet has hands ;-)

11


Introduction

It was with a heavy heart and a sense of missed opportunities the delegation from the
United States walked away from the World Conference on International Telecommunications
(WCIT).
2
The 2012 conference held in Dubai was organised by the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU), a specialized United Nations organization, and aimed to revise
an International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) treaty dating from 1988.
3
Back then
the internet was still in its infancy and the old ITRs treaty therefor mainly focussed on the
interconnectivity and interoperability of voice telecommunications (ITU, 2012a). Since 1988
much has changed, the telecommunications sector became a liberalized market in many
countries and a shift has taken place from fixed to mobile telephony. Another transformation
occurred in the ICT infrastructure which increasingly relies on IP-enabled (data) networks
instead of traditional voice telecommunications networks (ITU, 2013). This new reality
created a global impetus to update the ITRs treaty in order to face challenges related to global
ICT use.
4

The ITU is a typical intergovernmental organization, which entails all member-states
have one equal vote.
5
At an ITU conference it is the tradition and practice decisions are
reached by consensus, since the ITU mostly deals with non-controversial technical issues it is
usually possible to reach consensus. But a majority decision can also be casted by using a
simple majority of votes. In the closing days of WCIT-12 (or wicit-twelve as it is usually
pronounced), it became apparent consensus had made room for distrust and discord between
the different ITU member states. The newly proposed ITRs treaty was adopted by 89 ITU
member states in an unusual majority vote (ITU, 2012b). This outcome was not acceptable
for the US and other ITU member states, who refused to sign the new treaty (see Figure 2). It
marked a split between ITU member states, which seemingly is an unusual outcome of the
negotiations since most of the treaty contained a consensual package deal. And ITU member
2
This thesis is written in UK English based on the Oxford English Dictionary (2005) using APA Fifth Edition
citation style.
3
The tasks of the ITU include the allocation of the global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, developing
technical standards that ensure network interconnectivity and advancing connectivity globally especially in
deprived regions.
4
These topics include: Human right of access to communications, Security in the use of ICTs, Protection of
critical national resources, International frameworks, Charging and accounting, including taxation,
Interconnection and interoperability, Quality of service and Convergence (ITU, 2012a, p. 2).
5
The ITU is an inter-governmental body with 193 full membership countries. In addition over 700 private-
sector entities, non-governmental organizations and academic institutions are member of the ITU but these
members have no voting right.
12



states can make provisions on the new treaty, whereby a member state can decide not to
commit on unwelcoming pats of the treaty. Furthermore the ITU has no regulatory
enforcement capabilities to look after the compliance of a treaty. The member state is self-
responsible for ratification and implementation of an ITR into national legislation. In brief
one would think there is little to fear of the new ITRs treaty, but reality seems to portray a
different picture.


Figure 2: On the spot signatories and non-signatories of the WCIT-12 Final Acts (ITU, 2012b).
6


After the conference different actors stated the new treaty had put the free internet in
jeopardy (US Department of State, 2013). Already in the run-up of the conference a heated
debate had ignited in which different actors declared the ITU tried to take over the internet
(Albon, 2012). It was feared that authoritarian ITU member states would gain control over
internet regulation issues through the ITU. Adherers of a hands-off internet governance
approach argued the internet was built on a multistakeholder model which had to be
shielded of by top-down government regulation. The internet had its own unique governance
6
No political statements (e.g. on the political status of territories) are intended using this particular world map.
The map is made using Google Sheets.
: Non-signatories
: Signatories
: Non-participants
13



architecture which had to be shielded off (hands-off) by attempts of old-fashioned
international regulation bodies to control the internet.
Whether these concerns are true or false is probably a question of perspectives and
therefor difficult to answer. What remains puzzling though is how this security concerns over
the hands-off approach to internet governance dominated WCIT-12. As the ITU kept
repeating it did not seek to control the internet nor wanted to inflict with the existing
governance architecture of the internet (Tour, 2012c). Given the limited scope of the new
ITRs treaty and the impossibility to impose any regulations if a member state does not want
to, why was there so much heated debate on WCIT-12?
To understand this process this study builds on securitization theory (Buzan, Wver,
& De Wilde, 1998).
7
This theory presumes speech acts or specific rhetorical structures
present an issue as an existential threat. When an actor initiates a securitization move an issue
is lifted out of normal politics by claiming the issue needs to be treated by extraordinary
means. In the case of WCIT-12 this would signify the conference poses a threat to the
hands-off internet governance approach, therefor normal international negotiations on new
ITRs have to be exempted to protect the hands-off approach towards internet governance.
The following research question thereby leads this study:

How did securitization of the hands-off internet governance approach interfered with
the World Conference on International Telecommunications in 2012?

This study thus seeks to understand the securitization process of the hands-off internet
governance approach in the run-up, in between and in the aftermath of WCIT-12. Why is an
analysis of his empirical case relevant from an academic perspective? First of all this study
uses an adapted form of the much debated securitization theory. By delineating extensively
how securitization is applied, this study aims to give input in the academic debate on the
status of securitization theory and shows using the theory can generate interesting insights.
Secondly WCIT-12 provides a unique case to study the clash between different internet
governance approaches. Analysing this event tells something over which approach dominates
the current global internet governance architecture. Third studying the case provides
interesting empirical results which better our understanding on what happened at WCIT-12.
Most published work on WCIT-12 focusses on analysing the ITRs treaty texts, and what it
7
The use of securitization in this study has not to be confused with the use of the term in financial practice.
14



signifies for current internet regulations (Bennett, 2012) (Fidler, 2013) (Hill, 2013) (2014).
This study does not seeks to uncover whether the new ITRs treat actually impose stricter
internet regulation. This study merely aims to understand how actors in the field think about
internet governance issues and what this conveys in terms of lifting issues of the normal
decision making agenda.
The adjoining broader aim of this study is to provide an understanding of what
happened at WCIT-12. The results of this study could be used to provide input in a debate on
the expedience of the used hands-off internet governance approach by certain actors. The
findings of this study can thus provide a thinking space for the reader in order to reflect of
the outcome of WCIT-12 and how this fits with the broader current internet governance
architecture.
The study builds on a case study research design focussing on the securitization of the
hands-off internet governance approach before, during and after WCIT-12. Therefor the
timeframe of May 2012 May 2013 is chosen in which written documents and audio-visual
material is gathered and analysed. This material will be analysed using an adapted framework
by Vuori (2008) building on discourse analysis. The reader who is going through this thesis
might occasionally wonder why some parts in this study are so extensively delineated. First
of all this is not done to bully the reader, it is meant to be thorough in explaining why
certain choices are made in this study. It helps to increase the reliability and the possibility to
replicate the findings of this study. The reader is thus invited to skip certain parts in this study
when thinking for example it is not relevant to read about research choices when one is only
interested in the findings of this study.
In the following chapters first the term internet governance will be defined by
theorizing the internet as a technical infrastructure after which the programmatic debate on
internet governance is stipulated. These sections are meant to clarify what internet
governance is about. The IR perspective on internet governance is reviewed and the
definition of the internet as a global governance architecture is introduced. The next section
defines securitization theory and refines the use of the theory in this study. A reflection on the
operation of the theory in this study will clarify why and how theory is used in this study. The
research design chapter will outline the employment of the used methods in this study, by
building on a form of discourse analysis. The findings are presented in two chapters, the first
in analogy with the run-up of WCIT-12, and the subsequent chapter dealing with the
conference itself and the aftermath. The conclusion will draw on the findings and presents a
conclusive answer on the research question.
15


Chapter 1: Conceptual framework

This chapter will conceptualize the two most important concepts in this study. The first
concept which will be outlined is internet governance. The term internet governance is
mostly ill-defined and is often used as a fashionable catch-all phrase. The concept will be
therefor put under close scrutiny. The second conceptualisation this chapter addresses is the
operationalization of securitization theory. Foremost securitization is a conceptual move on
how to understand security. Both internet governance and securitization are the basic
building blocks in this study, because of the complexity of both terms they are conceptualized
in detail.
1.1 Conceptualizing internet governance
The term internet governance is inherently connected with programmatic aims or normative
ideas on the governance of the internet. Internet governance namely implies there is
governance of the internet. But as some will argue the internet has to be conceived as a
self-regulating network, which has to be shielded of from any governance attempts. This
brings a duality in meaning between the ones conceptualising internet governance as
analytical lens which concerns the empirical governance of the internet, and others using
the term as normative device to prescribe or prevent certain programmatic governance
attempts.
This study uses internet governance as an analytical device by conceptualising the
term as global governance architecture. But reference to certain opposing vision in the
practical use of the term are important to address, since these visions play an important role
in contested ideas about the future working of the internet. To give a clear understanding of
the multi-faced meaning of internet governance, the term is peeled off by defining its three
basic elements; first the internet as technical infrastructure is conceptualised. Secondly the
controversy surrounding the programmatic ideas intertwined with internet governance as a
term, are outlined. Because the term internet governance is closely related with empirical
governance issues, this section will be somewhat descriptive and empirical. The last section
will sketch the use of internet governance in the IR literature, and will conceptualise
internet governance as global governance architecture.
16


1.1.1 Theorising the internet as technical infrastructure
The internet in this study is defined by outlining its three main empirical characteristics. First
characteristic is the decentralized and non-hierarchal architecture, second the global scope of
the internet and third the use of critical internet resources. Although these characteristics are
sometimes elusive due to their multi-faced nature, they guide the broad technical
characteristics of the current internet architecture.
8

To understand the decentralised and non-hierarchal character of the internet first the
technical functioning of the internet needs further conceptualisation.
9
The internet is a global
distributed network, which consists of different autonomous networks that are interconnected
through a digital networked communication method called packet switching. Before a
message is sent it is divided into different packets. Each packet is transmitted individually
and can use different routes over the network towards its destination. To accomplish this task
a set of rules are agreed which are formulated in different technical protocols, from which the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) is the most widespread protocol
package.
The TCP/IP protocol is based on the end-to-end principle. This entails the technical
design of the internet is based on a dumb network. First the Internet Protocol addresses the
different nodes in a network; it ensures unique identifiers (IP addresses) to all the different
nodes in the network (DeNardis, 2010, p. 6).
10
Having a unique identifier the nodes in the
network are able to send packets to all other nodes in the network, without requiring the
network to maintain the status of a transmission. The network thus functions as a neutral
intermediary pushing through traffic without understanding its nature (Mueller, Mathiason, &
Klein, 2007, p. 247). The communication on this transmission takes place between the
different end points in the network. For example based on information in a received package
from another node a client can know whether there is more to come or the transmission is
complete. The network itself doesnt know or give such information. This reflects there is no
8
Formulating what the internet is brings in the danger of conceptualising the internet in relation to a certain
programmatic idea about what the internet should be. For example the internet could be conceptualised in
analogy with the telephone system which would suggest regulation of internet content is not desirable as it is not
commonly accepted to interfere with telephone conversations either. Conceptualising the internet as an
information superhighway would in contrast legitimize stricter regulation, since a safe and good highway
needs strict traffic controls (Kurbalija, 2010, pp. 22-27). Therefor this study conceptualizes the internet solely by
its main empirical characteristics.
9
Since some of these technical aspects are strongly connected with the governance issues of the internet they
need to be outlined in more detail. Although for reasons of time and space constraint only the most relevant
technical aspects will be outlined briefly. More exhaustive resources on the technical working of the internet are
given by (Mueller, 2002) and (DeNardis, 2009).
10
Although a node is a complex technical term, for the sake of convenience it is used in this study as the end-
point or redistribution point in a network. A node can be for example a computer, router or even a smartphone.
17



hierarchy in the different end-points in the network. The network acts as a simple
intermediary for all the nodes on an equal basis. Moreover the network is decentralised. All
end-points communicate directly with each other without central steering.
Related to the end-to-end architecture of the internet is its global and non-territorial
character. Nodes communicate based on an IP-address which has no geographical reference.
This makes the internet in essence geographically unbounded and global in character.
Naturally a subtle distinction on the boundless character of the internet needs to be made to
account the physical infrastructure of the internet. This physical infrastructure consisting of
power grids, routers, fiber and optic cables (etc.), obviously is geographically bounded. This
highlights the multi-faced character of the internet. Sometimes the internet is territorially
fixed when for example the internet is blacked out in a certain region due to a power
breakdown. In another instance the internet is truly global in character, for example when a
computer virus spreads throughout cyberspace it does not pay attention to geographic
boundaries.
The last important character of the internet is the existence of so-called critical
internet resources. An intrinsic feature of the technical infrastructure of the internet is the
need for some unique resources for without the internet cannot function. The first critical
resource is the management of the different IP-addresses. These addressed needs to be
allocated by some mechanism to the different nodes in the network. Without centralising the
issuing of IP-addresses it is impossible to preserve the uniqueness of every IP-address, since
nobody knows which address is used and which is free. A special institution is setup for this
task; the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) which is a department of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The ICANN is responsible for
allocating clusters of IP-addresses to Regional Internet Registries for regional assessment
(DeNardis, 2010, p. 5).
Another critical internet resource which needs central coordination is the Domain
Name System (DNS). The DNS is built merely to make it easier for humans to use the
internet. The DNS links a numerical IP-address to an alphanumeric domain name.
11
J ust as
IP-addresses these domain names need to be unique in order to function properly. If there is
no univocal addressing system, the technical infrastructure will be plagued by unresolvable
conflicting requests. The DNS serves to perform the critical function by keeping track of all
11
For example the domain name uva.nl is linked with the IP-address 145.18.12.42. The website of the UvA can
be accessed by using only the IP-address but since this is difficult to remember the domain name serves as a
useful mediator between man and machine.
18



the global distributed domain names. In simple terms the DNS is a huge database or
telephone book in which information of the different IP-addresses and domain names is
stored (Klein, 2002, p. 195). Like the allocation of IP-addresses the DNS is coordinated in a
hierarchical way. On top of the hierarchical tree is the ICANN managing the root of the DNS
(Mueller, 2002, p. 42). The DNS root dictates which generic top-level domain names (gTLD)
and country code domain names (ccTLD) can be assigned.
12

The management of the DNS and the IP-addressing inform us the internet is organised
decentralized and non-hierarchical only to some extent. For the network to function some sort
of hierarchically structured architecture is needed in order to maintain a unique addressing
system to coordinate the scarcity of available IP-addresses and domain names. This duality of
(contrasting) governance structures rooted in the technical infrastructure of the internet,
highlight once more the multi-faced character of the medium.
1.1.2 The emerging internet governance debate
In the present architecture the IANA/ICANN stand on top of the tree in managing scarce
critical internet resources. The ICANN is a private, non-profit and US-based organisation.
This signifies the most critical internet resources fall under US jurisdiction. Even more than
that, the US government retains residual authority over the DNS root zone (Mueller, 2002,
p. 186). When the ICANN was setup in 1998 it was delegated policy authority over the DNS
and IP-addressing system. But not without the US Department of Commerce having a final
unilateral oversight on the core critical internet resources the ICANN coordinates.
13
The
ICANN is a private self-governing entity based on a global operational multistakeholder
model, but the ultimate authority over the core internet resources remains in the hands of the
US government (idem, pp. 197, 211).
In a desire to avoid existing international institutions the US-government blocked off
earlier attempts to incorporate the coordination of critical internet resources into a mere
traditional intergovernmental model. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
resolves technical and financial questions related to Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) by arranging agreements between sovereign states. Since the ITU plays a
key role in the coordination of telephone networks, the ITU anticipated the internet
12
Examples of generic TLDs are .com, .net or .org. Examples of ccTLDs are .us for the United States and .nl
for the top-level domain of the Netherlands.
13
In 2009 the US Department of Commerce relaxed its supervision over the ICANN. In the so-called
Affirmation of Commitments the US government surrendered most formal and visible legal control over
ICANN, while less visible power structures remain in place. The ICANN promised to remain located in the US,
which states a commitment to remain under US jurisdiction, and thus the US shadow of hierarchy remains in
place (Froomkin, 2011).
19



infrastructure would be a new domain in need for its coordination. The organisation tried in
an early stage to establish an UN-based DNS governance structure.
14
But the US-government
effectively side-lined this initiative by creating the ICANN. The US has a long-standing
apathy towards the ITU, despising its one-country-one-vote structure and centralised
intergovernmental character which clashes with the decentralised and privatized domain of
the internet (Mueller, Mathiason, & Klein, 2007, p. 239). By creating the ICANN the US
downplayed the very need for any governance of the internet.
The unilateral creation of the ICANN and the indirect US authority over the critical
internet resources it coordinates created fierce debates over the legitimacy and expedience of
this arrangement. Some argue the US acts as a unilateral hegemon over cyberspace,
exerting their political leverage to impose a marked-based internet governance approach
based on self-regulation (Drissel, 2006, pp. 116, 118). Others are concerned with the stability
of the internet and portray the situation as a ticking time bomb, due to the danger of
political interference with the coordination of critical internet resources (Mueller, 2002, p.
223).
15
Altogether these critiques on the present ICANN regime range from questions over
accountability, legitimacy, democratic control and internet stability in general. Out of
geopolitical tensions and rising criticism on the mandate of the ICANN, the internet
governance debate emerged.
To give a better picture of how the internet governance debate was institutionalised
this section gives a brief overview on its historical development. During the World Summit
on the Information Society (WSIS), an unusual UN-hosted two-phased conference held in
Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005) aimed to bridge the global digital divide, critique on
ICANNs mandate was expressed by several governments (Mueller, Mathiason, & Klein,
2007, p. 240). Developing countries like China, Brazil and South-Africa expressed their
preference to recast internet regulation architecture into existing international frameworks
like the ITU. Other European countries also denounced the current ICANN mandate, and
endorsed the regulation of critical internet resources needed a new international treaty or
charter (idem. pp. 239-240). Although the restructuring of the DNS in the 1990s had already
led to the recognition internet governance is not primary about technical issues but includes
14
This came to be known as the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC), which came up with a Generic Top-
Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding gTLD-MoU, in which a procedure for allocating and managing
domain names was constituted. The initiative became irrelevant and soon dissolvent with the creation of he
ICANN.
15
The adoption of the .xxx TLD marked the latest tense relationship between the ICANN as independent
organisation and the US government. The new TLD was approved by the ICANN but its introduction was
delayed due to protests by the US government. See (Richards & Calvert, 2011).
20



legal and political controversies (Par, 2003, p. 1), during the WSIS the critique on the role of
the ICANN in internet governance arrangements gained formal international recognition. The
disaffection with the current regulation regime under the ICANN created the impetus to setup
a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which marked the kick start of a formal
institutionalised global internet governance debate.
The UN-based WGIG developed a broad definition of what internet governance
should entail; its recommendation was to create a new multistakeholder forum to deal with
internet issues.
16
This multistakeholder forum needed an open character in which all relevant
stakeholders, from the private sector civil society and governments from both developing as
developed countries could participate. The WSIS mandated the creation of a so-called
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which institutionalised the internet governance debate.
The IGF first held in 2006 and mandated till 2015, is held yearly and functions as a policy
dialogue on internet regulation issues based on an open multistakeholder model. The results
of the IGF remain inconclusive, as some argue there is continued deliberation without
contributing concrete change to ICANNs operationalization (Mueller, Mathiason, & Klein,
2007, p. 242).
17
But the IGF being mainly a talking shop is partly an evident outcome given
the lacking decision-making authority of the forum, on the other hand the lack of progress
marks the contesting views on internet regulation.
18

The first view on internet regulation is strongly related with the genesis of the
internet. The internet originated mainly in the realm of the academic world and the private
sector without much government interference. In this early stage the internet was solely
governed through running code based on rough consensus.
19
This means the intrinsic
technical usefulness of an adaption, decided on an ad-hoc base how the internet was
designed. The adage if it isnt broke dont fix it marks the preference of this vision, which
still dominate in standard setting organisations like the International Engineering Task Force
(IETF). In this vision the technical operationally is more important than anything else. The
US government initially remained passively letting the internet engineers do their thing
16
The WGIG created the following definition: Internet governance is the development and application by
Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules,
decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet (WGIG, 2005, p.
4).
17
Some state the UN-led internet governance debate was flawed form the start, due to the harnessing power of
some powerful actors which pushed for a neo-liberal entrepreneurial spirit (McLaughin & Packard, 2005, p.
358).
18
Some authors argue the IGF is somewhat a red herring for it is only a dialog on diverse ranging topics
without any policy-making authority (DeNardis, 2010, p. 3).
19
As claimed by Dave Clark in the early 1990s being the motto of the IETF: We reject kings, presidents and
voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code (Hofmann, 2007, p. 4).
21



(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006, p. 32). This decentralised and anarchic character of internet
operationalization led many to believe the internet was a new uncontrollable medium. This
so called cyberlibertarianism was most famously articulated by J ohn Perry Barlow in his
declaration of independence of cyberspace.
20

With the growth of the internet the amount of different actors stepping into the
internet governance debate has grown correspondingly. Particularly the eagerness of
governments to interfere with internet regulation issues, created tension with the visions of
cyberlibertarians. However the US government holds an exclusive position.
21
By prioritised
self-regulation, the US government in general favours privatised and marked-based internet
regulation over strong centralised public steering. This view is upheld by arguing internet
governance is about technical issues, which are best coordinated by technicians. Internet
governance in this sense is thus a bottom-up and pragmatic matter, which has to be free from
suffocating government restrictions. Although self-regulation has to leave room for
political oversight and dispute resolution, in order to facilitate the self-governing framework
(Holitscher, 2004, p. 7). It marks a complex public-private partnership which favours the
present status quo situation on internet governance, and can be best summarised as the
hands-off approach.
The antithetical view of the hands-off approach is a stew of different views on internet
governance issues. The only base-line all these visions share is a general dissatisfaction with
the current internet regulation framework. The reason there is not one antithetical vision
contrasting the hands-off approach, is a coalescence of actors involved in the internet
governance debate. For example civil society organisations argue the current ICANN regime
is undemocratic and illegitimate, they push for a true multistakeholder model. Another
position in this spectrum is the stance of some nation-states, arguing internet regulation issues
should have a stronger intergovernmental mandate.
A second cause of the cacophony of contesting vision in the internet governance
debate is a difference in perception of which issues have to be addressed. So far the focus has
20
In this pamphlet the cyberspace is declared a sovereign space, which should be shielded of from government
interference. The following much quoted part illustrates this vision: Governments of the Industrial World, you
weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
[] Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor
received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie
within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You
cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions (Barlow, 1996).
21
This exclusive position derives from early critical internet innovations and early adoptions of these
innovations which took place in the US. For an analysis on why the US provided the perfect breeding ground for
the development of the internet see (Mowery & Simcoe, 2002).
22



been on the narrow technical issues of internet regulation, but there are extensive other
issues which can be incorporated into the governance debate. This broader governance
mosaic is multi-layered, fragmented, complex and generally highly distributed (Dutton &
Peltu, 2005, p. 5). Centrally three types of internet governance issues can be distinguished.
22

The first type of issues is internet centric, and focuses for example on the management of
core internet resources, web standards, and the functionality of the internet in general. The
second category is internet-user centric. These issues deal with what is legal and illegal
behaviour on the internet and whether or how this behaviour should be regulated, for example
cybercrime, fraud or malicious internet attacks. The third category of governance issues are
non-internet centric. These issues originate on the intersection between local and international
policy contexts, for example issues of censorship, political expression, intellectual property
rights, trademarks or hate speech (Dutton & Peltu, 2005, p. 7).
This broader vision of what internet governance should encompass only has one
thing in common; a willingness to change the current governance architecture. This study
therefor summarises this vision as the hands-on approach, being the opposite of the hands-
off approach. This vision tries to open up by the internet governance debate and proposes a
reconfiguration of the current status quo in internet architecture. It can be understood as an
open-ended, collective process of searching which aims to fill a global regulatory void both
conceptually and institutionally in a legitimate way (Hofmann, 2007, p. 2). Although the
broad goal of this quest overlaps (namely changing the current status quo), this vision
harbours a range of diverse stances towards internet governance issues (narrows versus
broad) and governance arrangements (centralized versus decentralized).
1.1.3 Reformulating the IR perspective on internet governance
The concept of internet governance picked up current in the academic literature, merely as a
result of new academic collaborations and funding initiatives which were a spin-off of the
WSIS and the IGF.
23
The programmatic debate on internet governance is thus closely
intertwined with the academic literature, which makes it sometimes difficult to distinct
22
Some categorize the issues by empirical themes into different baskets; see (Kurbalija, 2010). Others map the
different empirical issues on two axes. The Y-axe differentiates types of international governance tools ranging
from soft to hard, and the X-axe differentiates the scope of international governance arrangements, ranging
from narrow to broad (MacLean, 2004, p. 88).
23
In 2006 in conjunction with the first IGF the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) has
been set up. This scholarly community tries to promote the development of internet governance as
interdisciplinary field of study, stimulate dialogue and support different theoretical and applied research on
internet governance issues (GigaNet, 2014).
23



theoretical discussions from programmatic aims.
24
Different authors quarrel over how to
interpret the term internet governance (see for example (Drake, 2004) (MacLean, 2004) (Van
Eeten & Mueller, 2012)). An important puzzling factor on how to use the term is the
interdisciplinary nature of the concept internet governance. Computer scientists who focus on
technical operationally for example take a different approach on the term than some IR
scholars focussing on international power structures. This study operationalizes internet
governance as an analytical device by building on the definition of a global governance
architecture (Biermann, Pattberg, Van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009, p. 16). To comprehend this
operationalization the place in the existing literate will be shortly outlined.
The classical question often asked in the IR literature when it comes to internet
governance issues is who controls the internet?. Some authors depart from a classic realist
stance examining the role of the state in internet governance issues. This perspective claims
state authority has not declined with the growth of new global networks like the internet.
Instead these authors claim nation-states still, or have regained, autonomy over internet
governance issues (Drezner, 2004) (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006) (Rundle, 2005). Other studies
take a more diffuse point of departure. Rooted in the governance literature these studies focus
on the changing role of the state in the governance order; a role that changes from top-down
steering towards post-regulatory gardening (Christou & Simpson, 2009, pp. 601-602).
The opposite vision to the realist stance can be found in what is usually labelled the
governance literature. This branch of literature expands the focus on new centralised and
formalised institutions which are not based on government but on governance. Departing
from concepts like networked governance these studies try to grasp the working of new
modes of steering in which institutions like the ICANN, WSIS and the IGF are involved. See
for example (Klein, 2002) (Kleinwchter, 2004) (Malcolm, 2008) (Mueller & Schmidt, 2013)
and (Wilson, 2005). Other base their studies on regime-theory analysing the process of
formation of these new institutions by analysing certain governance regimes (Franda, 2001)
(Mathiason, 2009) (Mueller, 2002) (Mueller, Mathiason, & Klein, 2007).
25

A third group of authors take up this lagoon in the literature by departing from a
techno-governmentality perspective. This stance of literature is mainly concerned with the
analysis of implicit power structures which are rooted in the internet governance architecture
24
A good example of more applied studies on internet governance which try to develop a coherent strategic
vision for internet governance are the internet governance paper series, published by the think tank Centre for
International Governance Innovation (CIGI, 2014).
25
These studies build on the work of Krasner who defines regimes as: [] a composed of sets of explicit or
implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a
given area of international relations and which may help to coordinate their behavior (Krasner, 1983, p. 275).
24



(Brown & Marsden, 2013) (DeNardis, 2009) (2012) (Elmer, 2010) (Galloway, 2004) (Shah,
2013). Technological structures are not perceived as neutral artefacts, but inextricably inhibit
all kind of implicit political choices and preferences. These authors analyse the technical
infrastructure underlying the working of the internet. By analysing for example how the
technical protocols of the internet are designed, these authors expose the political preferences
which are ingrained in the technical infrastructure of the internet. Internet governance in these
studies is thus understood as a technological form of governmentality through code.
The different approaches towards internet governance can be grasped in an eclectic
approach which captures all different explicit and implicit notions of governance. First has to
be noted this study perceives the binary between non-regulation versus regulation artificial
and unhelpful, because for the internet to function some sort of steering or ordering
inherently has to be present.
26
Whether these governance arrangements are loosely
decentralized organised, steered from the top-down, or implicitly organised by a coalescence
of actors cannot be determined a-priori. Internet governance arrangements are complex and
often a mix of different arrangements and therefor better captured by a broader definition. To
capture all different forms of steering into one approach this study uses the term global
governance architecture, which can be defined as an:

[] overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in a
given issue area of world politics. This system compromises organizations, regimes,
and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures
(Biermann, Pattberg, Van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009, p. 15).

A global governance architecture is located between two concepts of governance often used
in IR literature; namely regimes and orders. First of all the concept is broader than regimes
capturing more than distinct institutional elements, by including the larger governance
architecture. On the other hand the concept is narrower than the notion of order which
focuses the entire organisation of the entire system of international relations (Biermann,
Pattberg, Van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009, p. 16). A global governance architecture is more than
single regimes but does not reach beyond the global order.
A second advantage of using global governance architecture is the possibility to
analyse conflict over different norms, principles, responsibilities and capabilities inside
26
Evidently this does not entail a normative statement on the preferability of a certain governance arrangement.
25



distinct governance architecture. This is exactly what this study aims to do, namely analysing
a securitization process in the global internet governance architecture. A third advantage of
the concept is its more nuanced character.
27
The concept of international order often
implies an optimistic bias regarding the coherence and international coordination of the
international system (Biermann, Pattberg, Van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009, p. 16). While
architecture accounts for the whole order which includes non-intended or adverse effects as
well.
From now on this study will use the term internet governance as global governance
architecture. It signifies this study reformulated internet governance to use it as an analytical
device in order to escape from the strict programmatic vision connected with the term.
28

Conceptualising internet governance as a broad architecture on the contrary helps to
understand the clash of different governance approaches within this governance architecture,
namely the hands-off versus the open-up approach. This study tries to illuminate how these
contradicting governance approaches are conflicting with each other. This is done specifically
by analysing the WCIT-12 conference in which a hands-off approach internet governance
approach dominated the negotiations. To understand how this approach stonewalled the
conference securitization theory is used in this study.
1.2 Conceptualizing securitization theory
At the end of the Cold War new conceptions of security beyond the traditional political-
military outlook mushroomed in the security literature.
29
The securitization theory used in
this study is an offshoot of this widening-deepening debate in security studies.
30
A circle of
European scholars widely labelled as the Copenhagen School (CS) coined the idea of
securitization in the 1990s.
31
The core theorists of the CS are Barry Buzan and Ole Wver
27
Albeit a more nuanced conceptualisation of internet governance is a trade-off between adding more
complexity and running the risk of disorder or being more inclusive which helps to be nuanced. Because this
study deals with internet governance as a controversial phenomenon, nuance is considered more important than
conceptual rigidity. Therefor interne governance is conceptualised as a governance architecture.
28
E.g. internet governance is more than what happens at the IGF, it is about the complete global governance
architecture.
29
The field of security studies is notably influenced by the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War security
studies were set in a nation state framework oriented towards problem-solving theories and strategic thinking.
The concept of security was woolly, commonly underdeveloped and unproblematized (Buzan B. , 1983, pp. 1-
9). The end of the Cold War saw an influx of new approaches to security in which the conception of security
was broadened and widened (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 13).
30
For a comprehensive overview of the widening and deepening debate in security studies see the work of
Buzan & Hansen (2009).
31
Two works by CS theorists Buzan and Wver are acclaimed to be the founding texts of securitization
theory. First the article of Wver (1995) Securitization and desecuritization and second the book by Buzan,
Wver & De Wilde (1998) Security a New Framework for Analysis.
26



bounded to the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) (Wver, 1995) (Buzan,
Wver, & De Wilde, 1998) (Buzan & Wver, 2003) (Buzan & Wver, 2009).
1.2.1 Securitization in three steps
A securitization process consists of three main components or steps. First there is a speech
act or specific rhetorical structure in which an actor presents an issue as an existential threat.
The focus is on explicit expression of speech which present an issue as a matter of survival
upon we must act or otherwise it will be too late. The second step is lifting the issue above
politics by claiming the issue needs a treatment by extraordinary means. The securitizing
actor claims the right to secure and defend the issue at stake and therefor it is legitimized for
the securitizing actor to break the normal rules of the political game. But a securitization
move is only successful when the audience accepts it as such. This third step focused on the
intersubjective social constitution of a security issue. The CS emphasizes acceptance by an
audience does not mean forms of coercion or dominance are ruled out, rather securitization is
only successful when emergency measures taken would not be legitimized or accepted when
not being securitized. So if there are signs of a securitization process but a securitizing actor
fails to convince an audience an issue is an existential threat it becomes an unsuccessful
securitization move (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 23-26). Out of this
conceptualization of the securitization theory the CS defines the following research agenda;

Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain an
increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for
whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions
(.i.e., what explains when securitization is successful) (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde,
1998, p. 32).

Securitization theory therefor fits in the discursive, socially constituted and intersubjective
realm. Security rests neither on the object of security or the subjects but among the subjects.
But the CS does not descend into a phenomenological approach towards linguistics. A speech
act according to the CS is not rendered to be about linguistics alone; it is situated in a context.
This makes the internal features of a speech act (e.g. the quality of the rhetoric structure) are
not completely determining a successful acceptance, it is the social magic some speech acts
draw on some base of authority and get accepted while others would not (Buzan, Wver, &
De Wilde, 1998, p. 46).
27


The understanding of a speech act by the CS draws heavily on the work of J ohn
Austin (1962). Other influential theorists of the CS theorists are Carl Schmidt (2007), Pierre
Bourdieu (1991), J acques Derrida (1982) (1988) and J udith Butler (1996) (1997). Without
elaborating too much in the legacy of these theorists, for a good understanding of the CS
towards what a speech act is and more importantly how a speech act operates, key aspects of
a speech act will be examined more thoroughly.
32

A speech act consists of an utterance (or sentence) which can be constative (simply
describing something) and or performative (doing something) (Austin, 1962, pp. 3-6). A
performative utterance performs or does something instead of simply describing or reporting
something. For example when saying I do before an alter or registrar one is not simply
reporting on a marriage but actually indulging in it (idem. pp. 6). Other examples of
performative utterances are naming a ship, declaring a war or betting money. The action of
such an utterance comes forward in or by saying it. It is useful to analyse the performative
power of a speech because it goes beyond the question whether a statement is true or false. In
analysing what a speech act does one prevents burning ones fingers on interpreting the truth
condition of a speech act (as this is always contestable).
According to Austin a performative speech act can contain three elements; the
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary act. The locutionary is the actual meaning in
the sense of the verbal, syntactic and semantic meaning. The illocutionary act is the act
performed in saying it (e.g. I declare war). The power in the performative act is thus self-
referential; in saying it something is done. The perlocutionary act is performing the act by
saying it (for example please open the window). This kind of performatives are mere
relational and build on persuasion. Something is done by saying it were the hearer performs
the action (Austin, 1962, p. 108). The CS takes no notice of the terminology of different
elements in a speech act as defined by Austin and mainly focuses on the illocutionary speech
act, while elements of the locutionary speech act are used to formulate the facilitating
condition for a securitization move to succeed (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 32).
The central element in securitization theory is to analyse how an illocutionary speech
act transforms an issues into a security issues. The main focus of analysis is therefor on the
performative power of a speech act. In line with Austin the CS distinguishes the meaning and
the force of a speech act (Austin, 1962, p. 100). The meaning of a sentence is referential or
32
Much of the misinterpretation and misunderstanding (as well as misuse) of securitization theory can be
ascribed to the often ill-defined and ill-explained theoretical roots of the CS. For example most of the
information on the theoretical use of a speech act is hidden in a footnote in the most prominent book on
securitization theory (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 46-47).
28



situated and therefore not universal, while the performative power of a sentence or what it
does is more univocal and therefore a useful point of reference.
1.2.2 Facilitating factors in securitization theory
In a speech act there is a performativity force but the magic happens in the intersubjective
interpretation of the speech act or in the extra-linguistic domain (Butler, 1996, p. 124).
Anybody can shout in the public square, "I decree a general mobilization,'' and as it cannot
be an act because the requisite authority is lacking, such an utterance is no more than words;
it reduces itself to futile clamour, childishness, or lunacy (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 74). To include
this aspect of the role of the social order in securitization theory the CS introduces
facilitating conditions which are made up of three elements.
The first element focuses on feasibleness of the internal aspect of a security argument.
Security threats are always about the future, they are hypothetical and counterfactual. A
security argument consists of an observation of the threat and a proposed security action. This
makes a security argument to be interpreted as a matter of degree on how threatening an issue
is. And a qualitative question whether labelling something as a security issue and take the
proposed course of action is the attainable way to deal with the threat (Buzan, Wver, & De
Wilde, 1998, pp. 32-33). The second facilitating factor regards the position of authority for
the securitizing actor. This factor examines the relationship between different actors
including formal position and resources.
33
The third element is whether the alleged threat is
held to be threatening in general. This external factor of a security argument can either
facilitate or impede securitization (ibid. p. 33). When for example a certain issue is not
considered to be a threat in a certain discourse, the chances are slim this issue can be
securitized. In general securitization theory studies the social and intersubjective process of
securitization. For a good understanding of a securitization process both the utterances of
speech act as the facilitating conditions which make them possible need to be taken into
account.
1.2.3 Refining speech act theory
When considering securitization an intersubjective process between a securitizing actor and
an audience it seems the acceptance of a securitization move is an essential element in a
33
While the conception of security draws from a state-centric conception, the focus is in whose name the
security operation is conducted. Asking in whose name a securitization operation is conducted is a fundamental
different question than asking for whom security is provided. The first focuses solely on the process of
securitization as a practice, while the latter suggests we can determine objectively for whom security is
provided. The referent object in securitization theory is simply in whose name a securitization move is made
(Wver, 1996, p. 107).
29



successful securitization strategy. Indeed securitization theory takes into account the
capabilities of the securitizing actor like position and power resources. But this is not
considered to work as a mechanism of persuading power targeted at an audience. The reason
that the role of the audience in securitization theory is ill-defined stems from the one-sided
focus by the CS on the illocutionary speech act, resulting in an insufficiently theorised role
of the audience in securitization theory (Taureck, 2006, p. 19).
Including the perlocutionary speech acts in this study gives the ability to study both
forms of a speech act are part of a securitization process. Especially in an empirical field with
multiple actors possessing different power positions and resources it is more likely no single
actor can individual push for securitization. Securitization in this study therefor can be better
staged as a collaboration between different actors in which different forms of speech acts can
play an important role. An interesting contribution of this study is the focus on the interplay
between these different types of speech acts. Including different types of speech acts gives a
new perspective of a multi-phased view of speech act theory, in which different speech acts
complement or reinforce each other in a mere organic process.
Thierry Balzacq proposes a complete recast of the speech act model in order to
integrate the perlocutionary form of a speech act into securitization theory (Balzacq, 2005, p.
173). This endorsement to completely reformulate securitization theory stems from two
different views on securitization theory. The original CS idea of illocutionary speech acts that
possessing their own performative power is often labelled the internalist view. The so-called
externalists or sociological view adhered by Balzacq and Stritzel argue securitization is about
perlocutionary speech acts in which securitization takes place in a intersubjective process (see
Figure 3) (Roe, 2012, p. 254). But to include both types of speech acts doesnt necessarily
entail a hard either-or choice. The original framework can be preserved while integrating the
perlocutionary speech act. This incremental path prevents throwing out the baby with the
bathwater.

30




Figure 3: Schematic reflection of a successful securitization process in which an illocutionary and a perlocutionary
speech act are used.

To include the perlocutionary speech act the role of the audience in securitization theory
becomes more relevant, because a perlocutionary act is all about persuasion. Balzacq
describes it as a discursive technique to induce or increase the public minds to swing the
audiences support toward a policy or course of action (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 172-173). But who
has to be convinced in a securitization process or what is the audience? This question cannot
be answered beforehand because the audience varies according to the political system or
Successful
Securitization

Illocutionary
Speech act
Referent object
Securitizing move
(Self-referential)
Constraint by
facilitating
conditions
Securitizing
actor
Securitizing
actor
Audience accepts
securitization

Perlocutionary
Speech act
Audience
Securitizing move
(Persuasion)
Constraint by
facilitating
conditions
Referent object
Successful
Securitization
31


nature of the issue (Taureck, 2006, p. 20). It can be the general public, a particular
constituency or even small political elite. More specific securitization takes place within
embedded power relations. Certain actors hold privileges to initiate a securitization process
but face limitations when an audience doesnt accept such a securitization move (Watson,
2012, p. 286). Or more specifically securitization theorists accepts that speakers and
audiences exist in sedimented social and political structures that put actors in positions of
power to influence the process (idem). This formulation alleviates more clearly the political
agency in a speech act theory. Studying securitization thus also highlights the different power
position in a field.
How to include this duo-directional intersubjective relationship in the original
securitization framework which does not focus so much on the meaning of a speech act but
on what it does? In fact both an illocutionary and a perlocutionary speech act can be studied
using the same theoretical framework as defined by the CS. Because the ontological status or
exact meaning of a perlocutionary speech act doesnt have to be known in order to study what
it does. More specifically the success of a securitizing move drawing on a perlocutionary
speech act can be studied without knowing the exact meaning of a specific speech act.
Because the outcome of a successful securitizing move tells us which socially constructed
meaning has prevailed in an intersubjective interplay. For example after a successful
securitization move the perceived threat to a referent object as understood by the securitizing
actor and the audience can be approximately be known, because both parties have to draw on
the same conception of a threat in order for a securitization move to be successful.
34

J uha Vuori (2008) proposes to explicate the conceptualization of speech act into
elementary speech act types which serve to capture different illocutionary points or
perlocutionary aims of a speech act. Capturing these different actions of a speech act can
broaden the understanding of what a speech act does. Of course as outlined before this study
does not seek to capture the exact meaning of a speech act. But studying the securitization
process in hindsight gives us an indication which meaning is intersubjectively constructed in
a securitization process. Moreover Vuoris framework gives the ability to structurally
examine the internal feasibleness of a speech act as the first facilitating condition of
34
Clearly a securitization process drawing on a perlocutionary speech act diverts from an illocutionary speech
act in the sense that it is not self-referential. A perlocutionary speech act works on the basis of persuasion, it
does not do something by itself. But examining in hindsight the same framework by the CS can be used to study
what this kind of perlocutionary speech act has done. In this sense not the exact meaning used in a
perlocutionary has to be known in order to study what it has done. At the same time it gives the possibility to
include the relevance of the intersubjective meaning construction in a securitization process.
32



securitization theory. This is outlined in more detail in the method section of this study (see
2.2.1).

1.3 Reflection on the usage of securitization theory
An important source of critique on securitization theory stems from its complex ontological
and epistemological articulations. Securitization theory has to be understood as a balancing
act between the edges of realism and post-structuralism (Taureck, 2006, p. 26), or as Weaver
puts it securitization theory is a post-structural reading of realism (Wver, 1989, p. 38).
Others label the CS more simply as a moderate form of constructivism or mix and match
approach between two extremes (Taureck, 2006, p. 26). Because of this duality in starting
points securitization theory is often mislabelled and criticised for its contradictory theoretical
foundations.
35
This study will use securitization theory based on its original starting point.
For the sake of clarity and in order to prevent misconceptions in this study, it is therefore vital
to examine the theoretical foundations of securitization theory in more detail. This section
will examine how securitization theory departs from a neorealist conception of security to use
it in a post-structural understanding.
Securitization first of all has to be understood as a broad conceptual move
proclaiming to understand security as a social practice, but where does there
conceptualisation of securitization originate from? The CS departs from the neorealist
Waltzian idea of security being an interaction between three different levels of the individual,
state and the international system (Waltz, 1954).
36
The CS justifies this starting point by
claiming security in the field of IR has an historical connotation of states which threaten each
other and challenge each other sovereignty in a zero-sum game. Because security is relative
and it is not possible to develop a generic conception of security the CS at first accepts the
military-political conception of security which is about state survival and power politics,
simply because their agenda of security studies is rooted in international security (Buzan,
Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 21). Security in other words has to be read through the lens of
35
In the 1990s the theory of securitization chiefly gained momentum in the literature of security studies. The CS
received a wave of criticism both on its conceptual formulations and general feasibleness of its theoretical
framework. This seems also to be the result of naturalisation of the term in the policy field and the academic
discourse.
36
The book People States, and Fear by Barry Buzan (1983) weights as the basis of the CS. While Buzan lacks
to give a clear definition of security he widens the security debate by exploring the contradictions of security
between different levels of analysis (individual, state, international system). He concludes security is relative
and can only be studied in a holistic manner by exploring the interaction between the different levels (p. 247).
33



the nation sate, because the very meaning of the concept is marked by it (Wver, 1995, p. 49)
(Wver, 1996, p. 104).
Why does the Copenhagen School take this traditional military-political outlook as an
intellectual starting point in their conception of security? It stems from a more pragmatic and
empirical argument that the state functions as a sort of gatekeeper or sovereign when it
comes to security issues (Williams, 2003, p. 516).
37
Especially in international relations the
state possesses juridical self-control and self-limitation which are immune to legal challenges
and gives the state the ability to impose executive power (Buzan & Wver, 2003, p. 46). This
gives the state the ability to designate an existential threat which legitimizes the use of force
or mobilisation of special powers to ward off a threat, and inherently creates an inside/
outside or friend/ enemy dichotomy. In sum the starting point of the CS towards security fits
in a more traditional conception of security which is about the state of exception.
Different scholars critique this conceptual focus on exceptionalism by the CS and the
linguistic turn of securitization theory in general. It is not the exceptional but more day-to-
day practices in which securitization takes place authors like Bigo (2002) (2008), Huysmans
(2006) (2011) McDonald (2008) and Salter (2008) suggests. For these scholars security is
rooted in more banal routinized practices rather than specific exceptional speech act
events (McDonald, 2008, p. 570). Drawing on Bourdieus habitus or Foucaults dispositif
these authors take a strong post-structural position towards securitization which pushes the
securitization research agenda into new interesting directions.
38
However this does not imply
this new research agenda is mutually exclusive with the original one by the CS.
39
Actually
both research agendas overlap to some extent. While securitization is rooted in a more state
central focus on the exceptional, post-structural elements are already incorporated in the
original formulation of securitization theory.
The CS conception of security is nation-state related but they use is to examine a
practice of security (Wver, 1995, p. 55). The conception of security thus refers to the nation
37
The CS view on state power stems from the 20
th
century legal theorist Carl Schmitt. In Schmitts political
thinking the state could not be regulated by law alone (jus ad bellum) because laws are human made and fall
short when it comes to interpretation, besides law can never grasp every eventuality (Schmitt, 2007, pp. 50-51).
Therefor in Schmittian thinking the political will always be relevant because it goes above and beyond law. In
this context security is about survival. Security is presented as an issue which poses an existential threat to a
designated referent object (which is the state in this case). See also the work of Taureck and Williams on the
relation between Schmitt and the CS (Taureck, 2006, pp. 13-17) (Williams, 2003).
38
In the securitization literature the CS approach is often referred to as the philosophical approach.
Approaches that take a new direction talking about securitization primarily in terms of context, practices and
power relations are often referred to as the sociological approaches (Balzacq, 2011, pp. 1-2).
39
Studying securitization as a day-to-day practice does not rule out securitization could also exist as an
exceptional phenomenon and vice versa.
34



state, but the meaning of the concept is in its usage (Wver, 1996, p. 106). By this move the
CS incorporates traditional position on security with mere post-structuralist conceptions of
security. The CS argues it is not the state as a referent object that designated the security
agenda but the logic of security itself that differentiates security from what is merely political.
Essentially the CS focuses on threats to referent object and the securitization of those threats,
that are non-military as well as military (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 4). This
means securitization theory does not limit itself to a state-centric level of analysis as the
following fragment illustrates:

There is no necessity for levels to privilege states the unit level can encompass
much more than states. Since in this project we are trying to open up a greater
diversity of security units, and since one can argue that by necessity any unit has an
inside and an outside [] (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 7).

The Copenhagen School thus defines security in relation to normal politics. Security is
framed as the exception. When an issue becomes a security issue it becomes a special kind
of politics that goes beyond or above politics. When an issue is designated an existential
threat is becomes a question of survival requiring emergency measures and justifying action
outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 24).
By doing this a securitizing actor can claim a special right to use whatever means to block the
pending threat (Wver, 1995, p. 55). Intrinsically the CS does not analyse the ontological
existence of an existential threat, rather is analyses how an issue is presented as an existential
threat. Security is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the
issue becomes a security issue
40
(Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 24). The general
logic of securitization therefor focuses on how discursive practices transform an issue into a
security issue.
The focus on how an issue becomes securitized informs us the CS also takes a
deepening perspective in the security studies. According to the CS it is not helpful to try to
define real security because it is mostly a matter of political perspectives (ibid., p. 31).
Securitization is therefore understood as intersubjectively socially constructed. The
securitization perspective suggests there is a choice in treating an issue as a security issue.
(Wver, 1996, p. 107). The referent object is securitized in an intersubjective social process
40
Emphasizes added.
35



where an issue is defined as an existential threat. Consequently to understand how security is
socially constituted we have to turn to the process of securitization.
Securitization theory takes a kind of middle position in the agency-structure debate.
On the one hand facilitating factors are reckoned to determine the success of a securitization
move, on the other hand actors still have agency to perform a securitization move if they
manage to perform a speech act which is intersubjectively accepted to be a security issue. As
the CS concludes; The field is structured or biased, but no one conclusively holds the
power of securitization (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 31). Moreover this middle
ground position gives way to incorporate the benefits from different scientific positions into
one approach. Or as the CS argues on the choice between different scientific positions why
does this choice have to be a hard either/or? (Buzan & Wver, 1997, p. 242).
1.3.1 Securitization theory and the handling of identities
The middle position of the CS towards security designates from their aim to widen the
concept of security beyond the traditional state-centric focus without diluting a more
traditional military-political conception of security (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p.
322). In essence the CS encompasses anything or anyone can be counted as a referent object
which is in need for security in order to survive (Buzan & Wver, 2009, p. 253). Though it
has to be noted the CS does not favour an all-the-way down ontology towards the individual
level. Instead the CS favours a focus on collectivities, because in practice security action is
usually taken on behalf of; or with reference to a collectivity (Buzan & Wver, 2009, p. 255).
By reason of individuals or small groups seldom establish successful security claims due to a
lack of successful facilitating conditions like authority and power resources (Idem.). But the
feasibleness of this focus on group identities is not shared by everyone as McSweeney, an
acclaimed critic of the CS, argues.
According to McSweeney (1996) (1999) the CS takes a slippery path in
securitization theory. His critique namely focusses on how the CS handles the securitization
of identities. McSweeney takes the position identities have to be treated as a social
construction. Collective identities are not waiting out there to be discovered; they are
constructed, negotiated and affirmed in an intersubjective process (McSweeney, 1996, p. 90).
According to McSweeney the CS wrongfully treat collective identities as social facts
(McSweeney, 1996, p. 90). In reply the CS actually agrees on this point with McSweeney, the
only difference is they draw a different conclusion (Buzan & Wver, 1997, p. 244).
36


As McSweeney puts it identities are permanently mutable and unstable which make it
unable to objectively analyse these identities, instead identities have to be deconstructed in
order to analyse the process of identity formation (McSweeney, 1999, pp. 73, 78). The CS
refuses to take this poststructuralist position, arguing while identities are socially constructed
they are often solidly sedimented (Buzan & Wver, 1997, p. 244). This does not imply
identities do not change but they do not change all the time, which make them a legitimate
reference for analysis (Buzan & Wver, 1997, p. 243). Identities are thus more or less
considered a given focus of analysis. A collective identity like the French or the Haitians
for example can possess social power in itself. This marks the sum of individuals is argued to
be more than just an aggregation of individual parts. By this move the CS demerits calls for
methodological individualism (Buzan & Wver, 1997, p. 245).
In the discussion with McSweeney it becomes clear the Copenhagen School takes a
partial Wendtian outlook in perceiving social identities as observable. According to
Alexander Wendt (1999), by many the proclaimed father of constructivism in IR, ideas
constitute the material world around us. If we think of ideas all the way down it becomes
impossible to know for sure whether something exists without us observing it. This could
compromise the whole scientific endeavour to make sense of the social world around us if
all can be simply reduced to intersubjective interpretations as post-positivists would proclaim.
Wendt refuses to go this far. He sticks to a mere positivist epistemology while recognising
ideas constitute the social world around us (Wendt, 1999, pp. 38-39). The CS even takes a
milder stance towards social constructions than Wendt by recognising social facts as
sedimented and observable.
In short security is considered an intersubjectively socially constructed idea (anti-
essentialist ontology); while at the same time it is possible to study securitization through
examining what speech act do (constructivist epistemology). In addition the CS also takes
into account material factors or brute facts which prescribe the power position and authority
of a securitizing actor. Although this position is unconventional it is not necessarily
uncomfortable or problematic as Thierry Balzacq suggests (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 59, 68).
Building on the work of J ohn Searle scholars like Balzacq (2005) (2010) and Stritzel (2007)
(2011) proclaim to take a more interpretive approach towards securitization in order to
understand the meaning of a security utterance. This would imply a post-positivist
epistemology, why is this path rejected by the CS?
A speech act is nothing in itself but comes into force in its intersubjective interplay of
social and facilitating conditions. But there are limits in our ability to understand the exact
37


meaning of a performative utterance itself. Drawing on the work of Derrida and Butler the CS
claims; the meaning of security is what it does (Wver, 2004, p. 56). So we are unable to
understand the exact meaning of security, we can only understand how this meaning is
sociology constructed. This is because the context of how we interpreted a performative
utterance is never given but always in flux (Derrida, 1982, pp. 321-327). Or it is impossible
to understand the meaning of a security issue by the fact that every context subjects a
diffusion of meanings. So while security cannot be understood by its substance, security has
to be understood by its performance or what is does.
But focusing solely on what a speech act does makes it thoroughly interesting;
exactly because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning
that is not already within the context it reworks or produces a context by the performative
success of the act (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 46). Social conditions thus to some
extent structure the success of a speech act but they can never a priori determine how
successful a speech act will be. An act that previously succeeded may fail a second time with
all formal positions and resources in the same place. Therefore securitization theory can only
examine in hindsight whether a securitization move has been successful (ibid. p. 47).
This original position of the CS which rejects the ability to interpret the meaning of a
speech act is preserved but softened in this study. The reason the original position by the CS
is preserved while calls to adhere to an interpretive stance towards a speech act utterance are
ignored, stems from the research question in this study which seeks to understand an
empirical phenomenon. Still as outlined earlier in this study the action or intersubjectively
given meaning to a speech act will be studied. As the original framework of the CS allows us
to learn in hindsight how a certain meaning is constructed in a securitization process. In this
sense the focus remains on the outcome of a securitization process or what it does while
taking into account the intersubjectively constructed meaning of a speech act.
1.3.2 Discharging desecuritization as normative aim
An aspect of securitization theory is its specific normative agenda. Securitization is not
regarded as an unambiguously positive value. The CS argues in most cases securitization is
something to be avoided. In a normal political process there is choice, responsibility and
accountability. A securitization process sets these elements aside; it silences opposition and
gives power holder many opportunities to exploit a threat (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998,
p. 29). Therefor the CS claims securitization in most cases has to be avoided, because it is a
perceived a failure if an issue cannot be dealt with in the normal political realm. While the CS
38


acknowledges in some cases securitization is unavoidable (e.g. when faced with a barbarian
aggressor), in most cases a desecuritization strategy is the optimal long-range aspiration
(ibid.).
41
Moreover securitization is a political choice; it is no innocent reflection of an issue
being a security threat.
The normative element in securitization theory is disputable. The CS renders whether
something is a security threat is not pre-given but merely a choice. In this line of thought we
will never be able to judge how threatening an issue really is, so on what basis can we claim a
securitization process is fundamentally wrong? By labelling securitization prima facie as
fundamentally undesirable, securitization theory runs risk to acquire schizophrenic
characteristics. Normative claims are made on a process which at the same time is rendered to
be impossible to normatively judge because of its lacking ontological status. To be more
precise, claiming for example securitization is legit in case of an aggressor is meaningless,
when claiming simultaneously we cannot know whether we are dealing with an aggressor or
a non-belligerent Therefor it is futile to say securitization is mostly better to avoid when we
are not able to know whether a threat is real. As Ken Booth argues; preferring ordinary
politics above exceptional politics might be problematic if an issue asks for extraordinary
circumstances (Booth, 2007, p. 168).
Post-modernist researcher rooted in critical security studies take a different more
radical position. The focus of securitization theory should be more emancipatory in an ethical
agenda of opening up and freeing (Taureck, 2006, p. 25). Lene Hansen touches a sore spot
of securitization theory when mentioning the silent security dilemma or exclusion of gender
in securitization theory (Hansen, 2000, pp. 286-287). This has to be reckoned as valid critique
but the aim of this study is not to challenge emancipatory problems. First because it is
difficult to formulate a normative position in an international field with contesting truth
claims. Second because the aim of this study is not programmatic but merely contemplative.
By recognising this study is conducted in a particular discourse with all kind of im- and
explicit power relations others can decide on the basis of the outcome of this study to make
normative claims.
42
In this sense there might be a more implicit or light emancipatory aim in
this study which seeks to analyse and understand a process for others to judge whether this is
41
While claiming security is a conservative mechanism and an agenda of minimizing security and maximizing
politics is promoted, the CS seems to lack a clear perspective for academics on how to engage in a
desecuritization process (Wver, 1995, pp. 55-57).
42
Rita Floyd developed a comprehensive framework for analysing securitization practices from a normative
standpoint (Floyd, 2011).
39



a favourable development. Yet, because it is very contestable to judge whether an issue is
securitized legitimately, the ambition to desecuritize is left out in this study.
Contrary to using desecuritization as aim for the theory is can be used as a helpful part
of securitization theory. In the same sense the working of securitization can be analysed
attempts to desecuritize an issues can be analysed by the same framework. This broader
perspective helps to understand a process of securitization in which other actors might
attempt to debunk a securitization move by claiming there is no pending threat to a certain
referent object.
1.3.3 Setting out the research objective
By abandoning the normative element in securitization theory for what reason is
securitization theory used in this study? Examining a securitization case is always
idiosyncratic. Due to the fact that the success of a securitization process depends on
endogenous facilitating conditions which are always context depended. Therefor the theory
can never work as a universal law which can explain social behaviour. But using
securitization is neither a form of empiricism which simply describes the things in this world
ad infinitum without ever being able to explain what is described (Neal, 2013, p. 43).
Securitization theory in this study is used as a spotlight, purely to illuminate a relationship
that might otherwise go unnoticed or be misunderstood (Maxwell, 2005, p. 43).
Stefano Guzzini argues securitization theory can best be seen as a causal mechanism.
Securitization theory is not a positivist understanding of explanation but a form of
causality in terms of efficient regularities (Guzzini, 2011, p. 333). He builds on a definition
by J on Elster who repudiates a mechanism as a covering law model or simple correlation.
Instead Elster defines a mechanism as; frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal
patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate
consequences (Elster, 1998, p. 45).
So a mechanism is not intended to uncover or explain general social laws, but meant
to understand ex-post why something happened under specific circumstances. Securitization
in this sense can be understood as a causal pattern which is triggered by something else or
itself triggers certain effects (Guzzini, 2011, p. 337). This study is driven by an empirical
question which searches to explain a single event (the securitization of the hands-off internet
governance approach at WCIT-12). Therefor the focus lies on understanding the triggering
moment by different intersubjective and material factors. In this regard securitization theory
40


is not simply used a deductive device but merely as a heuristic device applied to an
observation in order to make sense of it (Guzzini, 2011, p. 337).
To be more explicit securitization theory in this study is merely used as an instrument,
framework or device in order to better the understanding of an empirical phenomenon.
43
This
drive for understanding or verstehen is an effort to create a thinking space on an empirical
phenomenon. This study aims to provide the reader an opportunity to (normatively) reflect on
these findings. This study is scientific in its approach towards understanding this empirical
case. Furthermore this study aims to prosper the application of securitization theory in IR
literature.

43
To speak with Cox terms, securitization theory is not employed as a problem-solving theory aimed as
programmatic device to fix an empirical problem. Nor securitization is employed as a critical theory to
question a prevailing social order (Cox, 1981, pp. 128-129).
41



Chapter 2: Research design
This study is set in a case study research design or more specific a single-case or N=1
analysis, namely the securitization process of the hands-off internet governance approach at
WCIT-12. To understand why it is relevant to study this single case the research design in
this study will be highlighted in the next section. Subsequently the choice of using a form of
discourse analysis is postulated by building on the work of Vuori (2008). Finally this section
informs the reader explicitly on the data collection method used in this study.
2.1 Case study research design
Choosing a single-case research design carries implications for this study which will be
outlined in more detail. As a single-case design conditions or guides a research process
inheriting a distinct rationale. But first a definition is needed of what a case-study design
entails: A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when, the boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not clearly evident (Yin, 2008, p. 13).
This definition indicates a case-study research design is foremost interested in
exploring an empirical phenomenon. Or as Gerring notes; the product of a good case study is
insight (Gerring, 2007, p. 7). Notably these goals of a case study design fits with the research
question this study aims to answer. A single-case study design is particular suitable in this
study because it aims to improve our understanding of a particular case. A single-case study
works as a within-case observations reflecting patterns of interaction, organizational
practices, social relations, routines, actions, and so on (Mills, Eurepos, & Wiebe, 2010, p.
110). But there are some caveats in choosing a case study design. Some argue case-study
designs are permeated with inferential felonies as the design fails to generalise findings,
harbours a selection bias and faces internal validly and non-replicability problems (Gerring,
2007, p. 6). Evidently these issues need consideration before using a case-study design.
The typical or unique case design doesnt fit in these deductive/ inductive
theoretical driven traditions. Rather the intrinsic value of the case itself is the primary reason
for scrutiny.
44
The logic of a typical case design is to be informative about the processes
analyzed (Balzacq, 2011, p. 34). Or the uniqueness of the case itself makes it interesting to
understand the particular case. As outlined earlier this study might still generate findings or
44
A single case-study design can be distinguished by three typologies: the typical case, the critical case and
the exploratory case (Balzacq, 2011, p. 34). Where critical case designs aim to test a theory, exploratory case
designs are used to build a theory. These designs fit in a more conventional scientific strategy of theory testing
and building.
42



stimulate ideas which can be generalised to other cases but this is not the general aim of
study. The key-question remains why study this specific case, what is so unique about the
case to legitimize this choice?
The first legitimation for studying securitization in the case of WCIT-12 is the unique
outcome. Instead of reaching consensus the negotiations lead to a split in member states in
favour and opposed to the new ITRs treaty. Studying this case increasing the understanding
on how internet governance issues are managed. Second the case carries a social importance
(or ecological validity). The internet as infrastructure is used daily by million people around
the world.
45
How this infrastructure is managed and operated is thus of importance for
millions of people their daily lives. Even people who dont use the internet or cant access it
are affected by how the infrastructure is managed, because how the infrastructure is managed
dictates who can access it. For social reasons it is therefore important to improve our general
understanding on how the internet is managed.
A shortcoming of a single-case design is the omnipresent selection-bias of the
researcher. Some authors argue the position of a researcher using securitization theory is
specifically controversial. Because the analyst is never neutral but rather co-constitutes reality
as it is (re)produced in a study (Villumsen Berling, 2011, p. 386). This means securitization
becomes securitization because the researcher perceives it as such. This is not the place to
ignite a philosophic debate on the position of the analyst in social scientific research. But an
indispensable aspect of social scientific research is its connection with the surrounding social
world. Social science in short is deemed less autonomous than natural science. This means all
social scientific research is a matter of esse est percipi.
46
But this does not imply social
scientific research is slippery by definition, that would be a rather defeatist stance (Taureck,
2006b, p. 4). Keeping Bourdieusian reflexivity in mind this study is as explicit and
exhaustive as possible on its method of working. By this existing bias of the researcher is
reducible or accounted for.
47
Moreover leaving normative aims out of this research helps to
take a more objectivist stance.
45
There are more than 2.4 billion registered internet users, which accounts for one third of the world population
with the highest penetration of internet users in North America and Europe (Internet World Stats, 2012).
46
Latin for to be is to be perceived
47
To whom it may concern my personal interest in the internet governance debate stems from a curiosity to
understand how the internet functions. The way the internet is organised is a unique and interesting
phenomenon. It is interesting to observe how these governance arrangements are put under increased pressure in
the internet governance debate. Important decisions are currently made which will have a profound effect on the
future architecture of the internet. In my opinion it is essential to have a good understanding of his process in
order to create an informed opinion on this process.
43



The last concern of a single-case design is its low internal validly and difficult to
replicate nature. To prevent this empirical enquire becoming tentative and partial this study is
setup in a scholarly fashion. By delineating clearly articulating all the research steps taken in
this study including the motivation for these choices, the reader can agree or disagree on
certain assumptions, definitions or research methods etc. This way the internal validity of this
study can be intersubjectively determined by the reader. The other advantage of this explicit
and detailed delineation of the research process is the possibility to replicate this study if in
doubt. Acquainted by the research process, anyone can replicate the results of the study using
the public available sources it is based on.
2.1.1 Level of analysis
A single-case study uses a more holistic approach to generate an in-depth understanding of an
empirical case but this can be done at different levels of analysis (for example the
micro/meso or macro level). The primary level of analysis in this study is at the meta-level,
namely the global governance architecture of the internet at WCIT-12. But this starting point
does not imply it is impossible to zoom-in into other levels of analysis. Analysing the
securitization process in the internet governance architecture will dictate the level of analysis
used in this study. This approach is a useful refinement of the original conceptualisation of
securitization theory which focuses primarily on sectors.
48

Another advantage of taking the global governance architecture as level of analysis is
to illustrate this approach can help to refine securitization theory. Different academics have
debated the ability of securitization theory to travel across non-democratic and non-liberal
political orders (Bilgin, 2011) (Touzari Greenwood & Wver, 2013) (Vuori, 2008)
(Wilkinson, 2007). This study adds to this debate a new perspective, namely whether
securitization is applicable in a governance architecture which inhibit a coalescence of
different actors. This viewpoint helps to broaden the framework of securitization theory
beyond fixed political orders.
48
In the original formulation of securitization theory the CS takes a sectorial approach. While securitization
theory suggests it can be applied at any level, distinctive patterns can be best identified in a sector while
remaining an inseparable part of a complex whole (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 7-8). The CS defines
five different sectors; the political, economic, military, societal and environmental sector.This functional
differentiation between different sectors of society is debatable. In later publications the CS acknowledges the
sectorial approach is merely used as empirical analytical lens. But this is complicated due to the fact that these
different sectors often have no ontological status and in reality or overlap (Albert & Buzan, 2011, p. 422). For
example the economic sector is often political and vice versa.
44



2.1.2 Unit of analysis
As outlined earlier the securitization framework by the CS makes it possible to include a
broad variety of different units of analysis (e.g. both state as non-state actors). A unit of
analysis has to be considered as the focal points in this study. It dictates the focus in this
research which is on a securitization process steered by agents in the field. Of course this
study also discerns the broader framework in which a securitization process takes place
structures its success. But foremost agents are considered the basic units of analysis in this
study as they are propelling the securitization process. The securitization process is steered by
three types of actors; the referent object, the securitization actor, and the functional actor.
These different actors prescribe the analytical focus of the securitization process and will be
amplified in more detail.
The first unit of analysis in a securitization process is the referent object itself. Clearly
the referent object in this study is the internet as such, and more specifically the hands-off
governance approach of the internet. How the hands-off approach to internet governance is
existentially threatened by WCIT-12 and for what reason protecting the hands-off approach is
a legitimate claim for survival, will be the main focus in analysing the securitizing process in
this study.
The second unit of analysis is the securitizing actor or actors. This unit of analysis is
not defined beforehand since the internet governance framework consists of a coalescence of
different actors ranging from nation states to NGOs and even individuals. For this reason
who is the securitizing actor cannot be determined a-priori by picking one single actor. This
study will add a new element to securitization theory by contemplating a securitization
process can be driven by multiple securitizing actors. The starting point to determine the
securitizing actor initially is thus the broad coalescence of actors in the field of internet
governance. Out of which during the analysis the relevant securitizing actor(s) will rise to
the surface.
The third and last unit of analysis are the functional actors. This type of actors are
not participating in the securitizing process itself but still play an important factor. The CS
defines functional actors as the actors who affect the dynamics of a sector but are not the
referent actor or the actor calling for security (Buzan, Wver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 36).
This type of actors can thus include an audience or actors which try to hinder a
securitization process. This group of functional actors is quite broad, but again difficult to
determine beforehand since the internet governance network consists of countless different
actors.
45


2.2 Outlining methods
The method used in this study to collect and analyse the data is foremost guided by the
research question, and with it the complete research design and theoretical/ conceptual
underpinnings. A method in this study is there for solely considered as a technique or
procedure used to gather and analyse data related to some research question (Crotty, 1998, p.
3). The difficulty is to choose a certain method as Balzacq remarks; It is generally assumed
that the way in which securitization occurs is essentially an empirical question, but,
paradoxically, there has been little discussion on methods (Balzacq, 2011, p. 33).
49
This
lacking reflection on methods in securitization literature seems to originate from an intuitive
approach in which many IR scholars operate (idem. p. 38). In defence of methodological
awareness it is useful to reflect on a method used even if it doesnt fit perfectly in a
conventional scientific method. This study uses a form of discourse analysis to study
securitization and builds on the analytical framework of Vuori (2008).
2.2.1 Discourse analysis as analytical tool
The employment of a discourse analysis in this study has to be considered as a tool which
originates from, and it is closely connected with securitization theory. The main objects of
analysis in this securitization theory are speech acts which foremost are discursive practices.
A method capturing the discursive dimension is thus the most plausible option for this study.
A discourse analysis has good credentials to carry out this task, as it can be used to analyse
the language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the texts occur
(Paltridge, 2006, p. 1). There are many forms and types of discourse analysis, and as expected
there if not even a generic definition of discourse itself.
50
This study uses a mere holistic
type of discourse analysis using the following definition of what a discourse encompasses:

In the end a Discourse is a dance that exists in the abstract as a coordinated pattern
of words, deeds, values, beliefs, symbols, tools, objects, times, and places and in the
here and now as a performance that is recognizable as just such a coordination. Like a
dance, the performance here and now is never exactly the same. It all comes down,
often, to what the master of the dance will allow to be recognized or will be forced
to recognize as a possible instantiation of the dance (Gee, 2005, p. 19).
49
Most popular method in securitization literature is discourse analysis, but forms of content analysis and
process tracing have also been employed in combination with securitization theory (Balzacq, 2011, pp. 38-53).
50
There are many textbooks which give an overview of the differences between different types of discourse
analysis. See for example (Keller, 2013) and (Paltridge, 2006).
46




A discourse is thus conceptualised as an all-encompassing domain of coordinated patterns
which possess coordinative power. This study predominantly focussing on the performative
force of speech acts. The context in which these speech acts can perform there power are
recognised as important facilitating conditions. A holistic type of discourse analysis in
which the broader context in which speech acts do their dance is thus well-suited for this
study. In analogy of the three facilitating three aspects of a securitization process will be
highlighted. First the internal composition of the speech act(s) used will be analysed. This is
the pure linguistic element. Second the facilitating conditions of the power resource and
position will be analysed. And third the context in which a speech act operates will be taken
into account; this includes the extra-linguistic domain.
Vuori (2008) designed a useful framework to study the internal composition of a
speech act. Speech acts have to be regarded as complex manifestations consisting of several
sentences which constitute one single speech act or a single utterance containing several
speech acts (Vuori, 2008, p. 74). Moreover speech acts are organised within certain variable
discourse patterns which make it hard to designate precisely a single speech act. Keeping
this in mind for analysing purposes it is useful to identify a number of ideal type speech acts
which are designated by their objective. 1) the assertive speech act seeks to present a
proposition as an actual state of affairs, 2) the directive speech act attempts to get the hearer
carrying out a course of action, 3) the commissive speech act does something committed to
some future course of action, 4) the expressive speech act expresses the feelings and
attitudes of a speaker towards some state of affair, and finally 5) the declarative speech act
in which changes in the world are realised through the utterance itself (idem.).
To analyse the internal logic of a speech act Vuori designates several stages
performed in a sequence. In Austins framework these are called the felicity conditions of a
speech act (Praka, 2008, p. 208). The felicity conditions tell something over the utterance
in question and are the sequence in which a speech act takes place. First there is the
propositional content which consists of the actual statement. Second is the preparatory
element in which the objection of the speech act materializes. And last is the essential
element which tells what the speech act eventually does. This is worked out more orderly in
the following table in which five common speech act stages (claim, warn, suggest, declare,
explain and require) are outlined in more detail (Table 1).

47


Claim Speech Act
Propositional content Any Claim (C)
Preparatory 1) Speaker (S) has proof (reasons, etc.) for the truth of C
2) It is not obvious to both S and Hearer (H) that H knows
(doesnt need to be reminded, etc.) of C
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that C represents an actual
state of affairs

Warning Speech Act
Propositional content Future events, state, etc. (E)
Preparatory 1) H has reason to believe that E will occur and that it is not in Hs
interest
2) It is not obvious to both S and H that E will occur in any case
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is not in Hs best
interest

Suggest/ Request Speech Act
Propositional content Future act (A) of H
Preparatory 1) H is able to do A and S believes H is able to do A
2) It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal
course of events of his/her own accord
Essential Counts as an attempt to get H to do A

Declare Speech Act
Propositional content Any proposition (P)
Preparatory 1) S is in a position where she/he has the power to declare that P
2) P is not already in effect
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that P becomes the state of
affairs


48



Explain Speech Act
Propositional content Reason (R) for past A of S
Preparatory 1) S has done A
2) It is not obvious to H why S did A
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that R represents the actual
state of affairs

Require Speech Act
Propositional content Future A of H
Preparatory 1) H is able to do A
2) It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal
course of events on his/her own accord.
3) There is R for H to do A
Essential Counts as un undertaking to get H to do A in virtue of R.
Table 1: Different element in a speech act sequence (Vuori, 2008, pp. 77-89)

The framework of Vuori is helpful to analyse the internal logic of a speech act. A last
contribution of Vuori is the overall illocutionary point or perlocutionary aim of a
securitization actor to initiate a securitization move. Vuori designates the following strands
of securitization (Vuori, 2008, pp. 76-85). First there is securitization which aims to
legitimate future acts by requesting something. Second is securitization aimed to raise an
issue on the agenda by suggesting something. Third is securitization for deterrence based on a
future act by declaring something. Fourth is securitization for legitimating past acts or
reproducing the security status of an issue by explaining something. And last is a
securitization stance aimed for control.
Only the legitimizing securitization strand fits in a past temporality while the other are
based on future acts. These ideal types may vary in reality but are useful to distinguish
different forms of securitization. It has to be noted as outlined earlier this study analysis
desecuritization sequences in the same manner as the securitization strands. Therefor
different desecuritization attempts are analysed using the same framework (see Table 2).

49


Strand of
(de)securitization
Speech act sequence Illocutionary
point
Perlocutionary
aim
Temporality
Legitimating
future acts
Claim ->Warning ->
Request
Directive Legitimacy Future
Raising an issue
on the agenda
Claim ->Warning ->
Suggest
Directive Convincing Future
Deterrence Claim ->Warning ->
Declare
Declarative Intimidation/
Deterrence
Future
Legitimating past
acts or
reproducing a
security status
Claim ->Warning ->
Explain
Assertive Legitimacy Past
Control Claim ->Warning ->
Require
Directive Obedience/
Discipline
Future
Table 2: Four strands of securitization (Vuori, 2008, p. 76)

The second element in the discourse analysis regards the official position and authority of the
securitizing actor. This is a complex element since this element is partly intersubjectively
defined. E.g. a certain institutional arrangement is foremost a social construct rather than a
brute material fact. Nonetheless as outlined earlier some social factors can be regarded as
sedimented, which put actors in positions of power in certain political structures. In addition
analysing a securitization process will highlight on which power positions a securitizing actor
can build. Keeping in mind these power positions can change, an examination in hindsight
gives the ability to determine these positions given a certain moment in time and space. The
method used to study this power position concretely draws from analysing on which power
resources a securitizing actor draws, based on which authority. This could be technical
resources, certain knowledge claims, political competences etc.
The third and final part of the analysis will focus on the third facilitating actor which
is the wider context of a discourse. This factor focuses on the extra-linguistic domain in
which a speech act can succeed or fail to securitize a referent object. This dimension focuses
on whether a speech act draws on a shared understanding of a threat in a securitization
process. Which perlocutionary speech act will be accepted or rejected by an audience
depends predominantly on the intersubjective understanding. If a securitizing actor uses
50


discursive practices which draw on the representation of a threat which relate to a shared
understanding it is more likely a securitization move is accepted by an audience. These
discursive practices make use of various rhetorics or heuristic artefacts like metaphors,
emotions, stereotypes, gestures, narratives, silence and even lies (Balzacq, 2005, p. 172). But
essential in a perlocutionary speech act is whether an audience is convinced by a securitizing
actor whether action needs to be taken to avert a pending threat. This external element on
which a speech act draws is included in the discourse analysis by describing how a speech act
relates to these heuristic artefacts.
It has to be noted the resemblance of heuristic artefacts is difficult to determine given
the framework of analysis used in this study. To make this method more tangible the focus
will lie on non-discursive forms of a speech act which accompany the performative power of
a speech act such as images. Williams suggests a study on securitization should incorporate
extra-linguistic forms of communication because speech-acts are inextricable from the
image-dominated context in which they take place and through which meaning is
communicated (Williams, 2003, p. 525). In this view a speech act becomes a broader
performative drawing not only on a pure verbal act or linguistic rhetoric but also on more
symbolic or contextual resources (idem, p.526). This will indicate more precisely on which
heuristic artefacts a speech act draws in a broader discourse. To include the analysis of
images requires a broader technique for reading these visual speech acts.
2.2.2 Analysing extra-linguistic forms of a speech act
In general extra-linguistic forms of speech acts can be incorporated on the basis of the
original conception of a speech act. An image also expresses and represents something
which is used to make truth claims (Eaton, 1980, p. 18). In this regard an image thus possibly
harbours heuristic artefacts which can be used in a perlocutionary speech act to persuade an
audience. The conception of a speech act is thereby stretched to include non-discursive
structures. Keeping in mind the risk of conceptual overstretching; this study will only
include the analysis of images as being complementary or subordinate to speech acts.
51
This
means the primary focus lies on speech acts as discursive practices, but which secondly could
also draw or be supported by images or more specifically illustrations.
The method used to read illustrations which accompany the performativity of a
speech act in the extra-linguistic domain, will be a form of compositional interpretation
(Rose, 2001, p. 33). This means the content of an illustration is consciously described and
51
On conceptual overstretching see the work of (Sartori, 1970, p. 1034).
51



possible references to heuristic artefacts in the speech acts are highlighted. Some might say
this method seems slippery given the carefully balanced underlying framework of this study
which tries to avoid interpreting and examining the exact meaning of social facts, but
instead focuses on the performative power of speech acts by studying what they do. Agreed,
including images as extra-linguistic forms of a speech acts risks bringing in an interpretative
stance of the researcher through the backdoor. Yet this choice can be upheld given the fact
images are only analysed as second-order devices helping to carry a speech act. Secondly
these images are solely described in relation to the speech act they support and the broader
heuristic artefacts in a discourse they refer to. Interpretation is thus limited to a thin
observation of what the image represents. Thirdly these images are studied as being part of a
broader successful securitization process. Therefor it is already affirmed these images have
not obstructed the securitization process to say the very least. More likely is these images
would have positively influenced a securitization process by drawing on intersubjective
understandings of certain heuristic artefacts in a broader discourse.
Concluding the employment of a discourse analysis as analytical method in this study;
the most dominant aspect of the discourse analysis is the analysis of the internal logic of a
speech act building on the framework of Vuori. Secondly the analysis will reflect on the
(formal) authority and resources on which a securitizing actor draws in a securitizing process.
Thirdly the extra-linguistic domain or broader context of the discourse will be analysed.
Mainly by focussing on images supplementing a speech act, which can built on certain
heuristic artefacts in a broader discourse. These methods are used interchangeably during the
research process to analyse the different aspects of the securitization process in detail.
2.2.3 Data collection & presentation
The empirical data collected in this study will be foremost written documents.
Supplementing collected data will be audio-visual material and spoken text in audio-(visual)
material. All these types of data will be referred to as documents in this study. These
collected documents will vary by two groups. The first type of collected data will consists of
first order documents which will be mainly analysed on the internal linguistic structure of
speech acts present in the documents. These documents are primary sources of data of actors
in the securitization process; examples are official policy documents, website statements,
opinion articles or interviews of actors in a securitization process. The second order type of
data will be a broader group of documents which will not be analysed by their internal
structure of containing a speech act, but will help to analyse the facilitating conditions of a
52


securitization process. These types of documents are for example newspaper articles,
interviews and blogs. The second-order documents are used to analyse for example the
authority and resources of a securitization actor as the reference of a speech act to a broader
discourse.
To limit the scope of this study the selection of the documents is fixed in a specific
time-interval. The securitization under scrutiny has a specific start and end point namely the
WCIT-12 conference which took place from 3-14 December. In order to study the complete
securitization process the time interval has to encompass the run-op and aftermath of the
conference. Therefor the time-interval of this study is set from 1 May 2012 to 1 May 2013.
Encompassing one year with the WCIT-12 conference as focal point in the middle seems a
good balanced time-interval for this study.
52

The following criteria of selecting documents will be their social-spatial character.
First they have to be available in the public domain. Although this seems a quite straight-
forward criterion its operationalization brings some dilemmas. Namely the public domain
can differ through different social-spatial contexts. The public domain referred to in this
study are public sources which dont need a password or any credential to access.
53
And
they have to be easily accessible by using a computer with an internet connection.
54

Next criterion for selecting documents is they have to be using the English language.
This choice has huge implications for the scope of this study but is legitimized for three
reasons. The first reason is a practical one and stems from the limited linguistic capabilities of
the researcher in this study. As the internal validity of this study could be compromised when
including documents the researcher would have difficulties to analyse due to limited language
skills. Second the lingua-franca of the internet is English.
55
For example most programming
languages of the internet (like HTML) use English as a working language. Studying the
regulation of the internet it is therefore sensible to limit the focus on documents in English-
language. Thirdly the securitization process takes place in an English-language saturated
52
Choosing this time-interval also comes forth of preliminary research on the empirical case. In this preliminary
research the contours of the securitization process have already been identified which make it sensible to pick
this time-interval.
53
Except for databases like Lexis-Nexis which need a password to access, the data in this database can be
considered as the public domain for the media in this database has already been published elsewhere.
54
A basic computer is used running Microsoft Windows 7 OS, along with typical software like Microsoft
Office and Mozilla Firefox. The Eduroam internet connection of the University of Amsterdam is used in this
study. There is no reason to assume documents cannot be selected through this connection because of filtering
or censorship (OpenNet Initiative).
55
As J anet Abbate notes the dominance of English as native language of the internet stems from the origination
of the internet in the United States. But is has to be reminded this dominance of the English language is not
without contestation as some perceive it as linguistic imperialism while other internet users whose native
language does not use the Roman alphabet have practical objections (Abbate, 2000, p. 212).
53



discourse. Studying how this securitization process is perceived in non-English discourses is
an interesting topic for other research projects but due to time and space constraints not a part
of this study.
To increase the reliability and replicability of this study the actual method of
collecting documents is outlined in more detail. All documents are collected through a
computer from the internet. Most first-order documents are collected from the official
websites of important actors in the securitization process, like for example the website of the
ITU (www.itu.int). These websites are searched for documents or audio-visual material
containing speech acts used in the securitization process. Second-order documents are mostly
collected by using search engines. The three biggest search engines in the world will be
used for this task namely Google, Baidu and Yahoo (Sullivan, 2013). Using different search
engines helps to prevent a bias in selecting second-order documents. Different search queries
are used to find relevant documents, most prominent are WCIT-12, ITU, ITRs, Internet
Governance and a combination or variation of these different search queries for example
spelled out completely. The same method is used searching the database of Lexis-Nexis for
searching news coverage publications which can be used as second-order documents.
Collecting and analysing data in this study is done in an iterative process.
56
Going
back and forth between collecting documents, analysing them and generating the findings
help to decide when the research has sufficiently answered the research question. But it
remains difficult to determine at which point enough data is collected and analysed, so
when to stop? This point is reached when the analysed documents tip a certain density
(Balzacq, 2011, p. 42). Which means new collected data reaches a saturation point in which
no new relevant contributions to the already generated findings can be given. When this point
is reached it seems data collection can be suspended with little risk that something relevant
has been missed out (idem).
Conclusively the results of this analysis will be presented in analogy of the
securitization process under study. This means the findings are presented diachronic in two
parts. The first part focuses on the run-up to the WCIT-12 conference. The second part
focuses on the WCIT-12 conference itself and its aftermath. Key moments in the
securitization process are highlighted, and the different aspects of the securitization process
will be outlined in greater detail when relevant. As the scientific backing of this study is
56
The distinction between the different phases of the research project is made to increase the insight of the
modus operandi in this study. In reality many of the different phases in the research process did overlap or took
place in an iterative process. Explicitly outlining the different phases of the research process is solely done to
increase the reliability and replicability of this study.
54



already legitimised in great detail, the findings of the research are presented in a more
narrative style. For example the internal logic of different speech acts are analysed using
Vuoris framework. But the findings of this analysis are not explicitly put in different tables
but are processed more naturally in a readable story. Hopefully this makes it more
comfortable for the reader to go through the findings of this study.

55


Chapter 3: Sound the alarm, the ITU plans an internet takeover!

3.1 Commencing the securitization move
Early August the United States government published its initial proposal for the WCIT,
which marks the first important step in the start of a securitization process.
57
The US
government announced it was concerned some proposals by some other governments could
lead to greater regulatory burdens on the internet. Any such proposals would be carefully
monitored by the US government. As the head of the WCIT delegation Ambassador Terry
Kramer stated We will not support any effort to broaden the scope of the ITRs to facilitate
any censorship of content or blocking the free flow of information and ideas (US
Department of State, 2012a) .
The US proposal for the WCIT showed a prototype hands-off interne governance
character. As it opposed any attempts to broaden up the defection of ICT regulation to
include the internet infrastructure. As stated in the proposal: [] the Internet has evolved to
operate in a separate and distinct environment that is beyond the scope or mandate of the
ITRs or the International Telecommunication Union (United States of America, 2012a, p. 1).
No surprise the US proposal putted forward minimal changes to the existing ITR regime.
Above all a new ITRs had to be flexible and voluntary in nature. The US government
clearly charted the limits of new International Telecommunications Regulations in its
proposal, by pointing out new ITRs required minimal, if any, changes (idem, p. 2).
The initial US proposal for the WCIT contains a speech act sequence based on
deterrence. The claim is made internet governance works fine without ITU intervention.
Therefore the US warns the ITU should not extent its focus on internet regulatory issues. A
third speech act declares other member states should not submit proposals which interfere
with these principles, as they will be opposed by the US. The aim of this speech act sequence
is perlocutionary as it tries to intimidate other member states to refrain from submitting
proposals which interfere with the hands-off vision by the US-government. By taking a firm
position based on intimidation and deterrence the US government puts a heavy burden on the
WCIT in an early stage. If other ITU-member states will not support to the US vision, a new
57
Some might argue the securitization process started as early as 2011 when Ambassador David Gross and
Ethan Lucarelli published an article containing securitization speech acts towards WCIT-12 (Gross & Lucarelli,
2011). Unfortunately the scope of this study is limited due to time and space constraint to include this
publication in the analysis. Albeit determining the exact starting point of the securitization process is less
relevant in this analysis, because the securitizing process in this study is a sequence of different securitization
strands which probably do not have a clear starting point.
56



ITR treaty is miles away seems to be the message. The performativity of this speech act
sequence is supported by the authority and resources of the US. As it has indirect controls
most critical internet resources, and has much expertise and knowledge on ICT issues.
3.1.1 Leaking WCIT-12 documents
While the initial US proposal for the WCIT was published in the public domain other ITU-
member states choose not to. The WCIT is accessible for all the members of the ITU (which
includes non-state actors). The ITU facilitate this process, but the proposals are only
accessible to members of the ITU. The ITU is not authorized to make these proposals public;
this is only reserved to members of the ITU. The ITU is therefore limited in its transparency
over the WCIT preparatory process, or it is as transparent as the member-states wants the
organisation to be.
Two academics/ internet-activists decided to illuminate the WCIT preparatory process
by launching a website called WCITLeaks.org.
58
This website aimed to make all WCIT
related documents public, by posting anonymously submitted WCIT-12 documents on their
website. WCITLeaks was launched in the summer of 2012 and soon contained all kinds of
leaked WCIT documents, including confidential submitted proposals on new ITRs by ITU
member states. One of the founders of the website Eli Dourado motivated because he didnt
know what would happen at the WCIT, he wanted to bring transparency to the ITU, by
publishing leaked WCIT documents (Dourado, 2012).
Apparently the US government was not opposed to the WCITLeaks website. Dourado
even joined the US WCIT delegation in Dubai at a later stage. According to the internet-
activist the US government never expressly condoned WCITLeakss activities, but it never
expressly condemned them, either (idem). The US toleration of the WCITLeaks activities
seems remarkable given the generally tense relationship of the Obama administration with
whistle-blowers. It can therefore be assumed leaking confidential WCIT proposals is not
inflicting US interests and their related hands-off vision on internet governance.
The impact of the WCITLeaks website has been profound. While it is not the direct
speech act of the WCITLeaks founders who contribute to a securitization process, the leaked
documents themselves indirectly played a pivotal role in the securitization process. A leaked
proposal of the Russian Federation showed for example a hands-on vision for a revised ITR
(Russian Federation, 2011). In this proposal far-reaching steps were proposed in which
58
WCITLeaks.org is launched by J erry Brito and Eli Dourado, who both work for the Mercatus Center, a
George Mason University based research center, see (WCITLeaks).
57



internet governance explicitly had to be incorporated in an ITU framework. This leaked
Russian proposal fed concerns that internet control would be passed on to the ITU (BBC
News, 2012). Which fed fears authoritarian and non-democratic governments would assert
greater control over internet governance issues. WCITLeaks thus supplied the ammunition
which could be used in a securitization process of the internet hands-off approach.
3.2 Campaigning against WCIT-12
The leaked proposals containing a hands-on approach in the internet governance debate soon
raised concerns by different civil society groups. In November 2012 two major international
civil society organisations joined the securitization process of the WCIT. The International
Trade Union Federation (ITUC) and Greenpeace international send an open letter to UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. In the joint letter the internet is claimed to be an
extraordinary global resource both as economic growth engine and supplier of open and
transparent information (Greenpeace; ITUC, 2012). This speech act followed by a typical
warning speech act: We believe the Internet as we currently know it is at risk from an
attempt by some governments to impose solely governmental control over this extraordinarily
valuable global resource, which has until now benefitted from a unique system of multi-
stakeholder direction (idem). This speech act both portrays the WCIT as dangerous as it
signifies governmental control over the internet, and second favours the current hands-off
approach to internet governance which is portrayed as a unique system of multistakeholder
direction.
The speech act sequence in the letter ends with a request for more transparency on the
WCIT process. Rather than a closed-door, traditional intergovernmental negotiation, the
civil society groups asked for more transparency and multi-stakeholder inclusion. The letter
is directed to Ban Ki Moon as UN SG, but the directed audience of the letter seems to be the
broader public. If the drafters of the letter would have had the illocutionary aim of requesting
a change of working procedure of the ITU in order to save the internet from government
control, it would probably have been more effective to directly send this request to
Hamadoun Tour, the SG of the ITU.
The choice to send the letter to Ban Ki Moon seems to originate from a broader
perlocutionary aim of the letter. The direct aim is not to request for change of the ITUs
working procedure, but to securitize the issue of internet governance at the WCIT. The
broader perlocutionary aim then becomes to raise this issue on the agenda. It marks why the
letter is public and sent to the generally known Ban Ki Moon instead of Hamadoun Tour.
58


Both civil society organisations know sending an open letter he UN-SG would receive media
attention based on their authority and resources, as they claim in their letter to represent 187
million members in 158 countries. The securitization sequence in the letter contribute to a
securitization process targeted to the general public mainly to raise the issue of WCIT as a
potentially very damaging change to the governance of the internet on the public agenda
(Greenpeace; ITUC, 2012).
3.2.1 Googles Take Action campaign
The securitization process of the WCIT gained real momentum when Google launched their
worldwide Take Action campaign in November, weeks before the WCIT would start. The
campaign is targeted at the general public of global internet users and uses a copybook
example of a securitization sequence, as already the name of the campaign contains a
performative utterance, namely take action. The heart of the campaign is a plain and simple
website using illustrations accompanied by short plain texts, on which Google explains
what is at stake (Google, 2012a). The website is read vertically and starts with a claim
speech act in which the internet is portrayed as a free and open place which is controlled by
no one and connects billion of people online. This speech act is accompanied by a colourful
illustration of the world on which dotted lines connect different persons with each other
around the globe.
The next speech act on the website is a new claim which prepares a warning speech
act. The speech act claims not all governments support the free and open internet. It argues
governments filter and censor content and enact laws which threaten online free
expression. This speech act is accompanied by a grey illustration of the world which is
censored by black bars. In the following speech act the securitization sequence expresses a
clear warning. Some of these governments are trying to use a closed-door meeting in
December to regulate the internet (idem). This speech act is accompanied by an illustration
of a calendar which 3 December (the start date of WCIT-12) encircled by a big red line. The
text further states the ITU will renegotiate a decades-old communication treaty. The focus
on decades-old subtle undermines the legitimacy of the WCIT-12, as it implies to be old
and out-dated. It refers to a cyber-libertarian vision of the internet as a sovereign space in
which governments are not wanted.
The two following speech acts continue to articulate the danger of WCIT-12. First is
warned a new treaty could increase censorship by governments, or could even allow them
to cut off internet access. WCIT-12 could also bring new tolls on online services, making
59


them limited accessible. This speech act is accompanied by an illustration of a woman sitting
behind a desk with a computer which sends some sort of signal, illustrated by colourful dots.
The signal apparently isnt able to reach its destination as it smashes against a big grey wall
with barbed wire. The world surrounded by the wall is grey, further away the world is still
green (Figure 4). The illustration seemingly carries the warning speech act by portraying
WCIT-12 as a threat to the open internet.


Figure 4: Fragment from the Google Take Action website (Google, 2012a).

In the following speech act Google seems to target anyone still not convinced WCIT-12
poses a threat to a free and open internet. The speech act warns the ITU is the wrong place
to make decisions about the future of the internet. It warns only governments have a voice at
the ITU, which is a secretive organisation. The accompanying illustration conclusively
pictures Googles warning of what the WCIT-12 entails (Figure 5). The illustration is set
mainly in grey and black tones with some red tones, and based on the ITU logos apparently
has to represent an ITU meeting. Five characters (three men and two women) sit on chairs at
a table which is pictured behind closed doors of glass. The rest of the room is partly visible
through venetian blinds. The persons have no visible facial expression which marks we do
not know who they are or what they are talking about. The logo of the ITU is pictured on the
glass doors (or in the room) in grey tones. The illustration clearly refers to the heuristic
60


artefacts in the warning speech act which warns the ITU is secretive and the wrong place to
make decisions about the internet.

Figure 5: Fragment from the Google Take Action website (Google, 2012a).

After the warning speech act Google highlights the perlocutionary aim of the Take Action
campaign. The first step is a declarative speech act which states internet policy should work
like the internet open and inclusive. The speech act continues to declare people around the
globe should decide on the future of the internet and not governments. The speech act is
supported by an illustration of doormat which writes welcome in six different languages.
Colourful figures surround the image. In the final speech act Google end the speech act
sequence in a requesting speech act, which asks the reader to add your voice in support of
the free and open internet. The request is accompanied by a text stating billions of people
around the globe have a voice. And an illustration on which a crowd is displayed holding
megaphones out of which the same colourful lines as used in the other illustrations escape.
The requesting speech act is made concrete by a petition on which an e-mail address and zip
code can be filled in. The website states 2.873.092 people around the world already signed
the petition and stood up for a free and open web (Google, 2012a).
The website states any submitted e-mail address will be used to send updates on
internet policy issues. In addition the given data will be used to publish the amount of
61


subscribers of the partition. The website does not tell whether the petition will be presented to
someone. Subscription to the petition is thus merely used for the Take Action campaign itself.
This marks the perlocutionary aim of the campaign, which is convincing the general public
whats at stake and take action. The illocutionary point in taking action at first sight is
only to sign a petition. In a broader context it signifies Google is trying to generate leverage
by mobilizing the broader internet community against the WCIT-12. This aim is further
articulating by a YouTube video published by Google. In this video people around the world
say a free and open web depends on me in their own language (Google, 2012b). The video
asks the viewer to take action by adding your voice referring to the petition on the Take
Action website. It fits in a securitization strategy of raising the stakes of taking part in WCIT
negotiations as a government, as constituencies convinced by the securitization process will
stand critical towards the WCIT negotiations.
In analogy of Googles campaign civil society organisation started their own anti-
WCIT-12 campaigns using petitions.
59
These petitions contain a similar securitization
sequence as Googles Take Action campaign. But the relevance of Googles Take Action
campaign seems more far-reaching due to their resources and authority in the field of internet
governance. Google as transnational company owns the most, and third-most, visited website
in the world (Google.com and YouTube.com) (Alexa, 2013). The company leads globally in
several web-based internet services like searching, e-mail and online video streaming. This
signifies in terms of financial resources, technical expertise and scope of activities Google is
an influential actor in the field of internet issues. Supported by their self-proclaimed core
value dont be evil the company claims authority in the field of internet governance to
support the cause of the internet users (who use their services). The choice of Google to jump
on the securitization bandwagon is therefor of great importance for the securitization process
of the hands-off interne governance approach at WCIT-12.
3.2.2 Continued securitization in the media
As the Google Take Action campaign echoed in the media
60
, different individual opinion
articles contributed to the securitization of the hands-off approach. To sketch a picture of
these different articles the first article outlined is by Chris Albon, a Ph.D. in political scientist
at the University of California. In an online opinion article titled Governments want to take
59
The Center for Democracy and Technology an online human rights NGO launched the Protect Global
Internet Freedom petition, signed by 1618 civil society organisation, 39.394 individuals from 192 countries
(Center for Democracy and Technology, 2012). Another petition launched by the website Equal Times entitled
Stop the net grab got 41.736 supporters (Equal Times, 2012).
60
See for example (BBC News, 2012).
62



over your internet: At stake at WCIT-12, Albon analysed the leaked proposals by member
states. Concluding: Make no mistake, this proposal was not some technocratic proposition to
improve network performance. It was an attempted coup by some of world's most
authoritative governments to take the commanding heights of the Internet (Albon, 2012)
Continuing warning: It will be a war for the freedom of the soul of the Internet from
government interference and control (idem).
The same securitization process based on convincing the audience on the looming
threat is used in an opinion article by Robert McDowell, an influential commissioner of the
US Federal Communications Commission. In the article titled The U.N. Threat to Internet
Freedom, McDowell declares: Enlightened nations should draw a line in the sand against
new regulations while welcoming reform that could include a nonregulatory role for the ITU
(McDowell, 2012a). As he warns We must awake from our slumber and engage before it is
too late. Not only do these developments have the potential to affect the daily lives of all
Americans, they also threaten freedom and prosperity across the globe (idem). The
McDowell article had a very alarmist tone which was picked up and much cited by other
commentators in the run-up of WCIT-12.
61

In a speech at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona McDowell stepped up his
securitization rhetorics one step further by stating: We are at a crossroads for the Internet's
future. One path holds great promise, while the other path is fraught with peril. [...] The peril
lies with changes that would ultimately sweep up Internet services into decades-old ITU
paradigms. If successful, these efforts would merely imprison the future in the regulatory
dungeon of the past. [...] It would be a travesty to create a world where the Internet is
partitioned between countries that live under an intergovernmental regulatory regime and
those member states who decide to opt out. [..] A balkanized Internet would be devastating to
global free trade and rising living standards. It would also render an engineering morass
(Fulton, 2012). In this securitization sequence McDowell explicitly builds on a warning
speech act with the perlocutionary aim to intimidate by referring to engineering morass
and a balkanized internet.
Another even more influential voice in this debate came from Vinton Cerf. His
opinion is influential given his authority in the field of internet governance. Cerf is
recognised by many as one of the fathers of the internet as he is co-designer of the TCP/IP
61
See for example the article by Forbes editor Larry Dowes titled Why is the UN Trying to take over the
Internet? (Dowes, 2012a) Or the blog by Dan Gillmor in the Guardian titled UN internet regulation talks in
Dubai threaten web freedom (Gillmor, 2012).
63



protocol. Later he became chairman of the ICANN, and currently he is vice president and
Chief internet Evangelist for Google. Cerf published an opinion article in the New York
Times titled Keep the Internet Open, it contains a prototypical claim, warning and
suggestion securitization sequence:

When I helped to develop the open standards that computers use to communicate
with one another across the Net, I hoped for but could not predict how it would
blossom and how much human ingenuity it would unleash. What secret sauce
powered its success? The Net prospered precisely because governments for the
most part allowed the Internet to grow organically [] The decisions taken in
Dubai in December have the potential to put government handcuffs on the Net. To
prevent that and keep the Internet open and free for the next generations we
need to prevent a fundamental shift in how the Internet is governed (Cerf, 2012)

Cerf consciously uses his authority in the field of internet governance to make a securitization
move. The opinion article by Cerf concisely formulates the securitization of the hands-off
approach to internet governance. Referring repeatedly to proposals of authoritarian regimes
he warns the internet can be abused and its users harmed if the ITU would gain control
over the net (idem). He mainly disqualifies to include internet governance issues at the
WCIT-12, because of the hands-off internet governance vision he supports. The performative
aim of the article is therefor to convince the broader audience of the pending threat.
3.3 Parliamentary securitization contributions
At this point the securitization process had mainly aimed to raise the issue of the World
Conference on Telecommunications on the public agenda. By claiming, warning and
suggesting WCIT-12 could impose dangers to the dominant hands-off approach in internet
governance. The securitization process entered a new phase when the US congress and the
European Parliament (EP) adopted resolutions on the matter. Although both resolutions are
non-binding their inhibiting speech act possesses a performative power.
In November the EP adopted with a simple majority of votes a joint motion for
resolution, which was submitted by several EP-members on behalf of several political
groups in the EP (European Parliament, 2012). A motion for resolution is an explanatory
statement which expresses the vision of the EP on a specific matter. The EP asks the
President of the parliament to forward the resolution to the EU Council, Commission, and
64


different governments and parliaments of the EU member states. This marks the audience of
the resolution and containing speech acts are directive. Which marks the resolution performs
its power in illocutionary speech acts.
The resolution first regrets the lack of transparency and inclusiveness surrounding
the negotiations for WCIT-12. Thereafter the EP Believes that the ITU, or any other single,
centralised international institution, is not the appropriate body to assert regulatory authority
over either internet governance or internet traffic flows. This claim follows by a warning
speech act in which the EP stresses that some of the ITR reform proposals would negatively
impact the internet, its architecture, operations, content and security, business relations and
governance, as well as the free flow of information online. This warning end in a request
speech act, where the EP Calls on the Member States to prevent any changes to the
International Telecommunication Regulations which would be harmful to the openness of the
internet, net neutrality, the end-to-end principle, universal service obligations, and the
participatory governance entrusted to multiple actors.
The speech act sequence in the EP resolution predominantly directed to member
states, as they are the only ITU-members with voting power in WCIT-12. The securitization
process follows a structure in which the EP aims by uttering these sentences the member
states will refrain from supporting ITR proposals dealing with internet regulations issues. The
hands-off approach to internet governance is thus passed on to the decision-makers. Although
the position of the EP in European decision-making is limited due to limited capabilities,
resources and authority, the resolution nevertheless sends a securitization directive towards
the different EU-member states to take a hands-off position towards internet governance in
the WCIT-12 negotiations.
3.3.1 The US Congress concurrent resolution
The day before WCIT-12 would start the US House of Representatives approved a concurrent
resolution which further securitized the hands-off internet governance vision by the US-
government. The bi-cameral resolution was already approved by the US Senate in September.
The House of Representatives followed and approved the resolution with an unusual
unanimous vote of 397-0. A concurrent resolution lacks a force of law but in the highly
polarized political environment of the time the unanimous adoption was highly unusual, by
which the resolution gained strength and authority.
The resolution is explicitly directed to the US Secretary of State who is concerned
with US foreign affairs (US Congress, 2012). The illocutionary point of the speech act is
65


there for directive of nature, targeted to the US government to secure the hands-off internet
governance approach at the WCIT-12. The resolution build on a by now standard
securitization sequence. First a speech act claims the internet is for importance to the global
economy, democratization, free expression and access to information. Second the self-
governing and the current multi-stakeholder model that has enabled the internet to flourish
is threatened by government control. Ending in a declarative speech act which states in the
sense of the Congress the Secretary of State should continue working to implement the
position of the United States on Internet governance that clearly articulates the consistent and
unequivocal policy of the United States to promote a global Internet free from government
control and preserve and advance the successful multistakeholder model that governs the
Internet today (US Congress, 2012, pp. 2-3; US Department of State, 2012a) .
The US Congress resolution in essence performs an unadulterated declarative speech
act targeted to the US government to secure the hands-off vision of internet governance at
WCIT-12. The resolution which is not more than a sequence of speech act has no formal
legislative power but performs its power in the intersubjectively understanding of what is at
stake at the WCIT-12. The US Congress thus lifts the issue of internet governance out of the
ITU realm by proclaiming an inter-governmental framework is not appropriate, instead
internet governance has to be discussed in an multistakeholder model. When the
governments would gain control over internet governance issues it would be too late for the
internet to flourish. Which signifies the WCIT-12 is presented as an existential threat to the
free and open internet. This securitization move illustrates the US Congress lifts the issue of
internet governance out of the intergovernmental domain by proclaiming internet governance
needs a treatment with extraordinary means (multistakeholder model).
3.4 ITUs attempt to desecuritize WCIT-12
Faced with the rising controversy over WCIT-12 the ITU tried to initiate a desecuritization
strategy. In a leaked memo, the ITU notices a well-financed and well-organised media-
campaign is setup to discredit the ITU and WCIT (ITU, 2012d).
62
According to the ITU this
campaign is often misleading and getting out of control as direct attacks against WCIT
would turn into general attacks on the ITU as a whole. The organisation calls upon its
members to challenge and rebut the various misstatements meant to denigrate ITU and
62
The document is confidential and has been published by WCITLeaks.org. Because the authenticity of the
document is difficult to determine the content of this document is only used to illustrate the ITU position
towards the securitization process of WCIT-12. There is no reason to believe the document is altered or false,
but for validity reason the findings on the desecuritization attempt by the ITU will be solely based on other
public available documents.
66


WCIT. The ITU literally calls upon its members to initiate a counter-campaign in an effort
to reverse the securitization process (ITU, 2012d, p. 14).
On the official ITU blog website the ITU Head of Communications Paul Conneally
published two articles directed to debunk the securitization attempts by Google, and
Greenpeace and ITUC. In these articles Conneally uses the same desecuritization pattern
using the perlocutionary aim of convincing the desecuritization of WCIT-12 is flawed. First
he claims the raised issues by the securitization actors are misleading, inaccurate and
grounded in conjecture (Conneally, 2012a). Next he de-warns the ITU cannot empower
governments to exercise greater regulation of the internet, and the ITU will continue to fully
support the multi-stakeholder approach (idem.). In the following speech act he continues the
desecuritization attempt by stating the ITU Constitution which is rooted in different UN
human rights treaties, prevails over an ITR treaty. Governments are thereby limited to
impose the right to communicate (Conneally, 2012b). This speech act thus attempts to
debunk claims the WCIT will increase governmental control and censorship.
The other warning speech act Conneally tries to debunk is the lack of transparency of
WCIT-12. First he argues the ITU does not work behind closed-doors but is inclusive to 193
national delegations [...] private sector companies and civil society organizations (Conneally,
2012b). This signifies according to Conneally: The very thorough and inclusive preparatory
process leading up to the WCIT-12 has been completely transparent (idem). The ITU
spokesman continues stressing WCIT-12 is not a close-doors meeting by inviting civil
society leaders and non-members and Google, ITUC and Greenpeace to attend WCIT-12
(Conneally, 2012a). This desecuritization sequence ends with suggesting speech act which
aim to raise WCIT-12 on the agenda as a valuable opportunity to strengthen the important
role in ICTs [] as catalyst for socio-economic development (idem).
The desecuritization attempt by the ITU was picked up by different academics and
opinion-makers who shared the ITU stance. For example the academic Milton Mueller who
argued It would be wrong, and a bit silly, to talk about the ITU taking over the Internet. It
is, rather, the Internet that is taking over the world of telecommunications (Mueller, 2012).
Others continued de-warning the threat of internet takeover proposals: any country can
come up with ideas, suggestions and proposals, but that doesnt necessarily mean that such
proposals will be accepted (Budde, 2012). These speech acts apparently found their way in
the broader media when the New York Times wrote:
67

Time for a reality check. Documents prepared for the December meeting, which
leaked out last week yes, on the Internet show that there are no proposals to
hand governance of the Net to the I.T.U. The union insists that it has no desire to play
such a role. And even if some governments would like to give the agency increased
regulatory powers, the United States and other like-minded countries could easily
block them. (New York Times, 2012).

Hamadoun Tour the SG of the ITU contributed to the debunking campaign, by arguing
WCIT-12 would not examine the management of critical internet resources as these
functions are already performed by the ICANN. Instead Tour claimed WCIT-12 would
chart a globally agreed-upon roadmap that offers future connectivity to all (Tour, 2012a).
But in a WCIT-12 global media briefing the day before the conference would start Tour
seemed to realize the limited performative power of his desecuritization speech acts by
stating:

I hope, in preparation for this briefing, you have all read the excellent presentation
called WCIT Myth-Busters, which is available in six languages on ITUs website. If
you have, you will know that this conference CANNOT assign ITU with regulatory
powers. Despite repeating this many times, it seems that the message is not getting
through (Tour, 2012b).
63


Although the desecuritization attempt by the ITU echoed in the media and different
stakeholders acknowledges the ITU would and could not interfere with the internet
governance hands-off approach. The desecuritization attempt by ITU lacked for an important
part the needed resources and authority to counterweight the de-securitization process by
other more resourceful actors. As Tour noted: There is a misunderstanding in the debate, I
am trying to refocus it, but some people don't want to listen to it (O'Toole, 2012). The
speech acts trying to desecuritize became more a less a voice crying in the wilderness with
little performative power.
The failure to desecuritize the hands-off internet governance approach at WCIT-12
became once more visible days before the conference, when WCITLeaks published a
63
Part of the ITU desecuritization counter-campaign included a presentation on WCIT-12 in which the myths
and misinformation of the conference are busted (ITU, 2012e).
68



controversial joint-proposal by China, Russia and several Arabic states which proposed to
include several hands-on internet governance issues at WCIT-12 (WCITLeaks, 2012).
64
The
merged proposal provided new ammunition for the securitization process, and echoed
fiercely in the media. No wonder when the US-delegation send in its final proposal for
WCIT-12 a standard securitization sequence towards the hands-off approach was used, by
claiming the development of any international regulatory regime could risk and
undermine the growth of the internet. Therefor in an illocutionary speech act the US
conclusively directed: the United States will not support proposals that would increase the
exercise of control over Internet governance or content (United States of America, 2012b, p.
1).

64
During the conference an unconfirmed source at the ITU would have declared the controversial proposal has
never been on the table because it was never officially put forward (TechWeekEurope, 2012)
69



Chapter 4: Stonewalling WCIT-12 and its aftermath

4.1 Dont mention the I-word
On 3 December 2012 the ten days WCIT-12 conference started. Immediately the effect of the
securitization process was noticeable when Hamadoun Tour (the SG of the ITU), seems to
consciously avoid to make any reference to internet regulation in his opening statement. The
only time Tour used the I-word was when he tried to desecuritize in an illocutionary
speech act, any claims WCIT-12 would compromise internet governance issues: What you
will notice, in this list, is that I have not mentioned controlling the Internet (Tour, 2012c).
In the rest of the opening statement Tour seemed to replace reference to the internet by
solely mentioning ICTs.
A second striking speech act in the statement is the explicit request for consensus. I
firmly believe that there are three keys to the success of this conference. They are:
Consensus; Consensus; and Consensus. [] I look forward to seeing how the spirit of
consensus, the spirit of compromise, and the spirit of multi-stakeholderism will come
together to deliver that win-win solution in the true ITU tradition. (Tour, 2012c). This
speech act seems to be made in the knowledge that the negotiations on a new ITR treaty will
be a difficult road ahead, due to the securitization process which securitized the hands-off
internet governance approach at the conference which will make it difficult to reach
consensus.
Based on the number of proposals submitted by member states, 1275 in total,
obviously it was not possible to discuss all these proposals in a plenary session with over
1400 delegates from all different member states. The ITU management team (Chairman and
Secretariat) decided to break up the discussions by topics, as is common in ITU conferences.
Different committees, working groups and ad-hoc sub-working groups discussed the different
proposals in more detail. In a hierarchal way the sub-groups reported back to the working
groups to resolve any outstanding issues. Issues which were identified as non-controversial
were brought back to the plenary sessions, and dealt with directly. Some parts of the ITRs
(the non-controversial ones) were thus already approved in the first week based on
consensus (Hill, 2014, pp. 55-56) .
70


4.1.1 Progress in the midst of controversies
Progress was made during the first week on new ITRs but the controversial issues remained
the elephant in the room. Naming the internet, or even implicitly making any reference to
the internet, became almost an anathema during WCIT-12. The controversial issues mainly
revolved around two sets of topics. The first was whether any provision to security and spam
in relation to ICT networks had to be made. Supporters of the hands-off approach feared this
could result in restrictions on freedom of speech and argued content is generally outside the
scope of the ITU (Hill, 2014, p. 64). The second set of issues mainly related to definitional
and legal issues in which any direct or indirect reference to the internet was made.
Practitioners of the hands-off approach argued the ITR treaty had to be minimally defined by
not including any reference to the internet.
65
In order to deal with the contentious issues they
were first aired during the plenary session (which were public) but quickly shunted away into
the smaller working-groups. The working-groups provided an informal and private setting to
discuss these issues, making compromises and reaching consensus more conceivable, at least
in the hope of ITU. In reality these working groups kept on discussion the sensitive issues
making little progress on a consensual outcome.
66

During the conference the US kept on pushing its securitization strategy, by
continuously using a directive illocutionary speech act trying to shield off any discussion on
internet related issues. For example Ambassador Kramer (head of the US delegation)
remarked in a briefing on the fourth day of the conference on a Russian proposal which
contained some hands-on internet governance issues: Weve looked at the proposal, but we
are not keen to get into a discussion about that proposal because, again, we think its out of
scope for the conference (US Department of State, 2012b). By solely saying the Russian
proposal wont even be discussed if its up to the US, the hands-off approach is directly
securitized. Kramer uses a directive illocutionary speech act by declaring any proposal going
against the hands-off approach is out of scope for this conference (idem). These non-
negotiable terms will make reaching consensus with member states adhering to include a
hands-on internet governance approach practically unattainable.
65
For a detailed overview of the different proposed articles and analysis of the compromise text see (Hill, 2014,
pp. 53-68).
66
Because the working groups were not public it was not possible to analyze the meetings in this study. For the
overall analyses of the securitization process of the hands-off approach during WCIT-12 can still be analyzed by
focusing mainly on the plenary sessions. These sessions were public and transcripts are available on ITUs
website (ITU, 2012f). The issues discussed in the working groups are reported back in the plenary sessions, this
gives the possibility to give a more in-depth analysis of the conference itself.
71



The outside world also actively reminded the WCIT-12 participants on the living
resentment towards the conference, when a hack attack was launched on one of the WCIT-
12 websites. The attack prevented delegates from accessing some online working documents
of the conference for a few hours on the third day. According to the ITU the disruption had
been claimed by cybercriminal groups (UN, 2012). The event was swiftly used by Tour to
utter a desecuritization declarative: It is ironic that the very people who claim to be fighting
for a free Internet are preventing those around the world trying to follow the event online
from getting access. Do they believe in one rule for them, and one for everyone else?
(idem). The US quickly downplayed the effect of this event speaking of hacker groups who
pulled a stunt by which Tour had to point out the irony (US Department of State, 2012c).
The securitization of the internet governance hands-off approach started to bear fruit.
All contributions containing hands-on internet governance proposals were identified as
sensitive by the WCIT chairman and further (exhaustively) discussed in the several working
groups. Without these issues prominent on the agenda the US delegation declared: we see
progresses and we need further progress to ensure a successful outcome (US Department
of State, 2012b). Explicitly the hands-off approach was further legitimized using an assertive
speech act: Now, were seeing several countries throughout the world that have been good
supporters of our position on keeping the internet out of this [] These are countries in a
variety of regions, specifically in Europe, in Latin America, and in the Asia Pacific (idem).
Based on the resources and authority in the field, the US clearly positioned itself as
the leader of the hands-off internet governance approach.
67
This is also illustrated by the
amount of participants in the US delegation, which is the second largest of all member states
delegations (see Table 3).
68
The first European member state in this list is the United
Kingdom with 31 participants. The biggest European delegation is thus four times smaller
than the US delegation. This makes is more plausible the US will play a leading role in
discussions simply by the fact there are more participants to share their expertise and
knowledge in the complex and technical issues discussed. It is also very plausible smaller
member-states have hitched a ride on the US input.


67
See also for example the opening of a US press release which explicitly refers to allies and talks about
standing firm: The United States and allies from Europe and the Western Hemisphere are standing firm
against proposals that might allow increased government regulation of Internet content and content providers
(US Department of State, 2012c).
68
To no surprise the UAE delegations is even larger than the US delegations as the conference is held in Dubai.
72



ITU member state

Number of participants in
WCIT-12 delegation
United Arab Emirates 164
United States of America 126
Nigeria (Federal Republic of) 72
Brazil (Federative Republic of) 55
South Africa (Republic of) 46
Russian Federation 44
India (Republic of) 35
China (People's Republic of) 33
Korea (Republic of) 32
Thailand 32
Table 3: Top-10 of biggest ITU member state delegations in number of participants at WCIT-12 (ITU, 2012c).

4.1.2 Measuring the temperature in the room
By the time the conference proceeded it became more and more clear reaching overall
consensus would be extremely difficult. Most member states had reconciled their attempts to
include far reaching hands-on internet governance issues in the new ITRs. Which indicated
the securitization of the hands-off approach had been successful to some extent. Still some
minimal issues remained as most member-states who wished for a more far-reaching treaty
did not withdraw all proposals concerning internet issues. In an attempt to seek a compromise
the Chairman (Sheikh Mohamed Nasser Al-Ghanim) proposed to draft a new non-binding
resolution that would include (minimal) provisions regarding hands-on internet governance
issues. This resolution became known as WCIT Resolution 3 and became part of a broader
compromise package, in which the hands-off approach would dominate the new ITR treaty
except from some minor issues and the non-binding resolution. Needless to say the proposed
resolution provoked great consternation. Even a relative narrow definition of the internet in a
non-binding part of the ITR treaty proved to be unacceptable to some member-states and
specifically the US.
With time running out the WCIT chairman nevertheless pushed on with the
controversial Resolution. Hoping to end the fruitless and inconclusive discussions on the
hands-on internet governance issues, the Chairman seemingly tried to force a breakthrough
late in the evening of the tenth day. First Tour tried to convince all member-states in order to
reach consensus on a new ITR it had to be possible to talk about the internet: it is not a crime
to talk about the internet in the ITU, it should not be a taboo (ITU, 2012k). The Nigerian
delegation agreed for them including the entire resolution was part of a package deal as these
73


things go hand in hand. But the US delegation quickly securitized their hands-off approach:
we did not come to this conference in anticipation of a discussion on the internet, there are
plenty of other forums for that, and we oppose this resolution (idem).
But instead of postponing the heated debate Chairman Al-Ghanim decided to have
the feel of the room (ITU, 2012f). In the early hours of 13 December he asked the plenary
session to raise the big boards when in favour for the new drafted resolutions. With some
delegations absent as it was late at night, in the following minutes different delegates hold
their signs while others didnt (Figure 6). After this the Chairman declared: the majority is
with the resolution. Applause rose from the room while others were left with astonishment.
The UK delegations asked: Could you clarify what just happened, in respect to the
resolution, have we just passed a resolution by majority?. Chair Al-Ghanim: The majority
agreed to adopt the resolution as amended. After which again applause raised from the
room. The Chairman thus pushed the resolution through using a directive illocutionary
speech act. Although the procedure might have been effective in terms of moving forward the
endless discussion, it created uncertainty and increased tensions between hands-off and
hands-on internet governance proponents.


Figure 6: Delegates of different ITU member states show boards in support of Resolution 3
as part of measuring the temperature in the room (ITU, 2012f).
74

4.1.3 Crumbling consensus
In the last working day of the conference chances to reach broad consensus had become very
slim. In a last plea Tour tried to reach a compromise by putting all the issues on the table
and propose a package deal in which everybody would be equally happy or unhappy (ITU,
2012g). The Chair argued 95% of the compromised document that is on the table is agreed
as compromised text [] Lets think about that, we are very close of making it (idem). The
compromised proposal was put forward and the chairman asked in the sake of time to leave
the text as it is, and move forward. This was accepted by a majority of member-states stating
to support consensus and in the spirit of compromise accept the compromised text. But to no
surprise consensus would be not the outcome of the final negotiation day.
After closing the debate the chair casted a vote by a show of hand to clarify whether
consensus had been reached on one of the most controversial parts of the new proposed ITR,
a new paragraph in the prelude.
69
This paragraph was a (vague) compromised text which by
critiques would extent the ITRs scope and give member states more control over ICT
networks; others have downplayed the importance of this new provision (See Hill, 2014, pp.
72-73). Anyhow the controversy concerning this paragraph conclusively marked the division
between the hands-off and hands-on advocates of internet governance. In a majority vote 77
voted in favour of the text, 33 voted against and 8 abstained, by which the text was adopted.
It painfully made clear the tradition and practice of reaching consensus in the ITU had been
thwarted. And immediately after the vote Ambassador Kramer, head of the US delegation,
reacted by which he reaffirmed the US hands-off stance:
It is with a heavy heart and a sense of missed opportunities that the US has to
communicate that it is not able to sign the agreement in the current form. The internet
has given the world unimaginable economic and social benefits, during this past
twenty four years, all without UN regulation. We cannot support an ITU treaty that is
inconsistent with a multistakeholder model of internet governance. As the ITU has
stated this conference is never meant to focus on internet issues. However today we
are in a situation where we still have texts in resolutions that cover issues on spam and
also provisions on internet governance (ITU, 2012j).
69
The third (new) paragraph of the prelude reads: These Regulations recognize the right of access of Member
States to international telecommunication services (ITU, 2012h)
75

This declarative speech act contains the standard securitization sequence of making a claim
on the internet, warning the ITU is not the right place to discuss internet issues and finally
declaring the US will not sign the new ITR treaty. By this declarative illocutionary speech act
the US announced walking away from the negotiations. After the US statement the United
Kingdom and Canada joined the US securitization move and also declared not being able to
sign the treaty. Other European countries like Sweden and Poland were milder, declaring to
postpone the signing until further notice. As these European delegations still considered to
sign the treaty but first wanted to consult with their capitals.
The Brazilian delegations at the other hand expressed their regret of the outcome
stating: We are not happy the so much sought consensus was not reached. The result of the
unwanted vote is that the world is more divided than it was yesterday (ITU, 2012i). By
which the ITU Secretary-General Tour repeated his familiar desecuritization sequence:
This treaty includes many gains and achievements. [] I have been saying in the run-up of
this conference, this conference is not about governing the internet (ITU, 2012i). After
which he noticed there are no provisions on the internet in the treaty. Only in a non-binding
resolutions which aims at fostering the development and growth of the internet.
4.2 WCIT-12 a failure or a success?
The WCIT ended in a mixed result. A new ITR treaty had been adopted, but not by all
member states which marked the aim for consensus had failed. In the final treaty the word
internet was completely excised, only in the much debated non-binding resolution the internet
can be found (ITU, 2012h, pp. 114-115). In this sense it seems the securitization of the hands-
off internet governance approach had been successful. The securitization process had led to
an environment in which only referring to the internet was enough to make an issue very
controversial. Most of the controversial proposals were shelved or brought back to
minimalistic proportions.
On the other hand an ITR treaty was adopted which included provisions not in favour
of the adherers of the hands-off approach. Even though member-states can make
reservations choosing to exclude the legal effects of certain parts of the treaty, the US and
other member states decided to reject the whole treaty. While for most parts the new ITR
treaty was built on overall consensus. But although it was very limited any reference to
internet hands-on governance issues stipulated signing the treaty was out of question. This
clearly marks the success of a hands-off securitization move.
76


4.2.1 Pointing the blame
During the closing-ceremony and after the conference the securitization process continued
unabated by finger pointing in acrimony. Tour regarded the outcome of the WCIT-12 as a
success, stating a clear majority of the member states has already signed the new treaty
(Tour, 2012d). Member states can always accede to the treaty at a later time as the new ITR
treaty goes into effect in 2015, many member states still had to decide on their position, or
had to ratify the treaty.
70
Tour requested member states to join the treaty using an
illocutionary requesting speech act: we understand that some Member States need to go to
their capitals and constituencies before they can accede to the new ITRs (idem).
Striking Tour did not mention in his closing statement the failure of reaching
consensus at WCIT-12. Instead he closed his speech with a series of assertive speech acts:
And this conference I know will not divide us. This is a start and nothing has ended here.
Indeed, WCIT is the beginning of something new. (Tour, 2012d). He thus tried to
reproduce a desecuritization status which thrived on consensus. He also warned mere
implicitly the securitizing strategy of the hands-off approach is not any helpful by quoting
Franklin D Roosevelt: We have nothing to fear but fear itself (idem).
Ambassador Kramer, the head of the US delegation had a different interpretation of
the outcome. The US delegation did not choose to join the closing ceremony signalling their
discontent with the new ITR treaty. In a press statement Kramer legitimised the US position
not to sign the new treaty by claiming: Other administrations have made it clear that they
believe the treaty should be extended to cover those [internet governance] issues, and so we
cannot be part of that consensus (US Department of State, 2012d) . In an illocutionary
speech act Kramer thus legitimised the US position as being the inevitable outcome in order
to secure the hands-off internet governance approach. Kramer reproduced the securitization
sequence but also explained it was not their fault consensus had not been reached:
Throughout the WCIT, the U.S. and other likeminded governments have worked
consistently and unwaveringly to maintain and enhance an environment for success []
(idem).
The securitization off the hands-off also echoed along familiar lines in the media.
Vincent Cerf continued to securitize the hands-off approach and argued the new ITR treaty
was a threat to this vision: The good guys did not winthe terms are defined in such a way
as to allow a significant amount of mischief in the Internet space (Farivar, 2012). Other
70
ITU member states who dont sign the new ITR treaty remain obliged by the old 1988 ITR treaty.
77


commentators celebrated the outcome publishing article with titles like Hooray, the UN
didnt take over the internet after all (Couts, 2012). And writing: Good news, everyone:
The United Nations didnt take over the Internet! After two weeks of heated negotiations
between 193 member states of the UNs International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
absolutely nothing is different, at least not if you live in the United States. And we have our
totally sweet federal government to thank for that no joke (idem). While others supported
the securitization of the hands-off approach but feared the WCIT-12 outcome could lead to a
balkanization of the internet. As Reuters quoted a European WCIT-12 delegate: This could
lead to a balkanization of the Internet, because each country will have its own view on how to
deal with over-the-top players and will regulate the Internet in a different way (Reuters,
2012).
McDowell, the commissioner of the US Federal Communications Commission who
had also been actively involved in the securitization process in the run-up of WCIT-12
declared the US delegation had stood strong at WCIT-12 not to sign the new treaty
(McDowell, 2012b) . But he warned the fight was not yet over: As egregious as todays
action was, many of the anti-freedom proposals were turned back - but the worst is yet to
come. The United States should immediately prepare for an even more treacherous ITU treaty
negotiation that will take place in 2014 in Korea (idem). In similar language the cofounder
of WCITLeaks Eli Dourado warned: the ITU could never again deny that it had designs on
the Internet, it could never again imply that those who were concerned about the possibility
of a takeover of some aspects of Internet governance by nation-states were misinformed
conspiracy theorists (Dourado, 2012). And reflecting back on WCIT-12 Dourado added the
battle lines are now drawn.
The securitization of the internet governance hands-off approached echoed
predominantly the media, which observed the WCIT-12 outcome might signify a digital cold
war (The Economist, 2012). The most important result of the conference has been to
demonstrate that the world now splits into two camps when it comes to the internet: one is
comprised of more authoritarian countries, which would like to turn back the clock and
regain sovereignty over their own national bits of the internet; the other wants to keep the
internet and its governance as it is (bearing in mind that some of its members motives may
not always be as pure as they pretend) (idem). In the same analogy other observers referred
to WCIT-12 as the digital equivalent Yalta which symbolises the beginning of a long
Internet Cold War between authoritarian and liberal-democratic countries (Klimburg, 2013).
Other contributed in the same Cold War rhetorics: The Internet Cold War just turned hot.
78

Thats the key take-away following the collapse of two weeks of intense negotiations in
Dubai. []The WCIT conference will go down as a turning point, when the world divided
into governments who recognize the value of an open Internet, managed, developed and
regulated by its users, and those who no longer feel obliged to pretend the spread of
information is in the best interests of their citizens (Downes, 2012b).
The critical analysis and continued securitization of the hands-off approach even
resulted in calls to de-fund the ITU. A launched activist website stated WCIT-12 had been
the stage of an attempt to seize control of the internet by several member states (De-fund
the ITU, 2013).
71
Their goal was a coup: to overthrow the open and transparent system of
Internet governance that ensures the Internets freedom and accessibility, and replace it with
their own central point of absolute control, through which policies of censorship and
repression could be enacted (idem). This assertive speech act subsequently called on internet
users to sign a petition asking the US government to cut its contributions on the ITU.
But also more critical opinions were aired which opposed the US securitization stance
of the hands-off approach. Milton Mueller remarked: The good guys (the US, and its allies
including Canada and the UK) succeeded in keeping the ITR away from the Internet, and yet
inexplicably chose to dump the whole thing at the end (Farivar, 2012). Trying to
desecuritize the whole hands-off approach Mueller analysed: the root of the problem lies in
a paranoid view of the ITU, a view concentrated in Internet industry figures such as Googles
Vint Cerf. These critics adhere to a view of the ITU that grossly exaggerates its significance
and power. I call this ITU-phobia [] (Mueller, 2012b). Other analysts shared Muellers
view, questioning the securitizing move of the hands-off approach: Although the US
arguments are fervent and sound coherent, many of them on closer examination are found to
have more holes than Swiss cheese. Indeed, much of the sanctimonious noise from the US is
mainly about protecting its national interest, and not genuine multi-stakeholderism (Touray,
2012).
The critical view towards the securitization process of the hands-off approach at
WCIT-12 also echoed in the press, a New York Times editor critically analysed: The
American delegation, joined by a handful of Western allies, derided the treaty as a threat to
Internet freedom. But most other nations signed it. And other participants in the two weeks of
talks here were left wondering on Friday whether the Americans had been negotiating in
good faith or had planned all along to engage in a public debate only to make a dramatic exit,
71
It is not clear who is behind this initiative. At the time of writing the website is offline (see www.
defundtheitu.org).
79



as they did near midnight on Thursday as the signing deadline approached. (Franer, 2012).
And asking Given that the United States achieved many of its stated goals in the
negotiations, why did it reject the treaty [] (idem). Other commentators joined the attempt
to desecuritize the hands-off securitization process at WCIT-12: Yes, there were indeed a
number of stupid proposals put forward for the ITU to regulate in areas beyond its
competence [] None of these proposals succeeded, and not all even officially made it to the
table. With the sustained opposition of the United States, Google and other powerful
stakeholders, there was never any likelihood that they would (Malcolm, 2013).
4.2.2 Controlling the hands-off approach
Although the critical marks on the continued securitization of the hands-off approach, the
view continued to dominate the view of the non-signing member states. Direct after WCIT-12
some European states had reservations signing the treaty but did not conclusively rejected it
like the US and the United Kingdom did. But during the following months more and more
European states declared not to sign the new ITR. As for example Sweden uttered in an
illocutionary speech act: Together with the United States and most other EU countries chose
not to sign the revised regulations. This may be no practical consequences for the Swedish
part, but should be seen as an important standpoint for Sweden along with many other
countries who cherish a free and open Internet (Sweden Ministry of Industry, 2012).
Also the European Commission (EC) stepped in to the securitization process of the
hands-off approach. However the EC cannot be a party in the new ITR treaty, it spoke on
behalf of its member states, declaring that the EU will remain 100% committed to
supporting the open internet, and therefor EU member states will not sign the new ITR treaty
(European Commission, 2012). After which the EC affirmed final discussions introduced
proposals unacceptable to EU Member States. Backed up by the resources and authority of
the EC this speech act for an important part controlled the future securitization off the
hands-off approach towards internet governance in European member states. Namely by
requesting member states using an illocutionary speech act not to sign the new ITR treaty.
In the US a legislative procedure had started to control the securitization of the
hands-off internet governance approach. A congressional hearing initiated by several US
Congress committees was setup named Fighting for internet freedom: Dubai and Beyond,
aiming to examine the implication of Dubai but also draft legislation in turning last years
resolution [the US Congress Concurrent Resolution] into law (Committe on Energy and
Commerce; Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 2013). In the opening
80


statement of the hearing committee chairman and representative of the House, Greg Walden
declared:

Governments traditional hands-off approach has enabled the Internet to grow at an
astonishing pace and become perhaps the most powerful engine of social and
economic freedom and job creation our world has ever known. [] Buttressed by this
resolution and facing a treaty that subjected the Internet to international regulation,
even though conference organizers had promised Internet issues were not going to be
on the agenda, the U.S. delegation and 54 other nations refused to sign. Unfortunately,
89 nations did sign the treaty, and this is likely the start, not the end, of efforts to drag
the Internet within the purview of the international regulatory bodies (Committe on
Energy and Commerce; Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives,
2013, p. 3)

During the congressional hearing numerous securitization claims of the internet governance
approach were made in the openings statements by different representatives. For example:
Ladies and gentlemen, the Internet is quite simply under assault. [...] Our experience in
Dubai is a chilling foreshadow of how international Internet regulatory policy could expand
at an accelerating pace (Committe on Energy and Commerce; Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives, 2013, pp. 17-18). And: The idea that the U.N. ought to be
controlling the Internet, to me, is like putting the Taliban in charge of womens rights (idem.
p. 11). But also: Currently, the Internet is regulated, as we all know, under a multistake-
holder system in which both agencies and private organizations, mostly American, play
various roles. Russia and China and a host of other nations with poor human rights records
have objected to this multistakeholder system and American influence. Some of these
countries objecting to the current system have refused to recognize that fundamental
freedoms, [] In December of last year, Russia, China, and 87 other countries signed a treaty
at the world conference of the ITU in Dubai. The treaty touches on vital issues of Internet
governance in ways our country objected to, and I am glad we did (idem. p. 9).
During the congressional hearing a repeated securitization sequence of speech act was
made that claimed the ITU was used by authoritarian countries to gain control over the
internet. Therefor it was legitimized the US did not sign the new ITR treaty. But to make sure
the hands-off internet governance approach was safeguarded for the long term the speakers
pushed for a controlling securitization strand. As a result the congressional hearing
81


committees drafted a bill which indefinitely formalizes the securitizing process. The drafted
bill contains an illocutionary assertive which directs US policy regarding internet
governance: It is the policy of the United States to preserve and advance the successful
multistakeholder model that governs the Internet (US Congress, 2013, p. 4). At the time of
writing the bill has passed the House of Representatives, and had been reported to the Senate
for reading (Library of Congress, 2013). Based on the intensive securitization process
chances the Bill will become law are considerable, it would signify the final chord in a
securitization process of the hands-off internet governance approach.

82


Conclusion

As Hannah Arendt reminds us; Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to
the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about
than the participants (Arendt, 1958, p. 192). The same conclusion can be drawn in the light
of this study. Looking back upon the run-up and WCIT-12 itself, the securitization of the
hands-off internet governance approach prospered by different actors, clearly interfered with
the negotiations on a new ITRs treaty. As naming the internet almost became an anathema at
WCIT-12. As a results most indirect and direct reference to internet regulation issues where
shelved in the new ITRs treaty.
An (unusual) coalesce of actors joined forces to push for a securitization move of the
hands-off approach at WCIT-12. This peculiarity cooperation is for example visible in the
choice of the US WCIT-12 delegation, to include an internet activist who leaks confidential
documents on a website named WCITLeaks. Another important actor who stepped in to the
securitization process was Google. By actively unfolding a Take Action campaign, the
internet corporation used its resources in helping securitize the issue in the perception of the
general public.
In the weeks before WCIT-12 started the securitization of the hands-off internet
governance approach dominated in the public debate. Attempts by the ITU to desecuritize the
probability WCIT-12 would deal with internet regulation issues did not manage to thwart the
on-going securitization process. Instead the securitization move gained a more formal
character when both the European Parliament and the US Congress adopted a resolution
which contained securitization sequences of the hands-off approach directed to the
participating ITU member states at WCIT-12.
During the WCIT-12 continuously securitization moves, predominantly pushed by the
US delegation, raised the stakes to levels reaching an acceptable compromise for all ITU-
members became impossible. Another factor for the crumbling consensus at WCIT-12 was
the limited time. The ITU hoped shelving the delicate issues in smaller private ad-hoc
working groups would made it easier to reach a compromise. In reality the delicate issues
continued to dominate the agenda on the conference without making much progress. Simply
because of the securitization move of the internet governance hands-off approach made any
compromise unacceptable. The WCIT-12 was not the right place for discussion on any
internet governance related issues, according to the hands-off advocates. Therefor these
83


issues had to be shelved of WCIT-12 at all costs, and dealt with by extra-ordinary means (in a
multistakeholder model), according to the propagators of he hands-of approach towards
internet regulation.
The ITU tried nevertheless to force a breakthrough at one of the last days of the
conference by proposing a compromised package deal. The ITU tried to persuade the room
the proposed ITRs contained for the most part (95%) already overall agreed text. Shelving the
controversial internet governance provision in a non-binding resolution was an attempt to
meet the objections of the hands-off supporters. But the controversial adoptions of the
resolution by a measurement of the temperature in the room only added more resent to
hands-off advocates, as they believed even adding a reference to internet regulation in non-
binding resolution was a no-go. When a majority vote decided to add a controversial
paragraph to the pre-amble of the new ITRs treaty, all hope on the possibility of reaching
consensus had been abandoned. The US-delegation and other delegations immediately
decided not to sign the new ITRs treaty. The US was first to announce walking away form
the conference a day before WCIT-12 would end, starting their legitimizing securitization
speech act of their action.
After the conference the blame game initiated. The propagators of the hands-off
approach continued uttering their securitization claims by stating the ITU had attempted to
gain control over internet regulation issues. Analysts in the same tradition argued a new
digital cold war had started which dangerously could lead to a balkanization of the
internet. But on the other hand also more critical voices were aired towards the heavy
securitization of the hands-off approach at WCIT-12, leaving commentators to wonder
whether the US-delegation had acted in good-faith at the conference, or only planned to take
advantage of the securitization move in order to strengthen their position in the internet
governance domain.
The securitization of the hands-off approach of internet governance which peaked
during WCIT-12, continued to prosper after the conference. Perhaps the current securitization
speech act warning on future ITU meetings are even more radical than before WCIT-12.
Hitherto the securitization process resulted in a controlling securitization sequence in the US,
aimed to consolidate the hands-off approach towards internet governance and transform it
into legislation.
84


6.1.1. Theoretical conclusions and future research
The study of the securitization process using an adapted form of securitization theory proved
to be fruitful. A securitization process seems to be applicable in a case were multiple actors
push for a securitization at different levels. For example some actors push on the individual
level for securitization by building a website, while other actors are involved in the meta-
level negations of the WCIT-12. It concluded securitization can be used to study a
securitization move by a coalescence of actors.
The used framework of Vuori is useful to study the internal structure of a speech act.
Moreover the different securitization strands help to identify different phases in a
securitization process. Securitization is not a simple linear A to B sequence. But merely
involves different incremental steps which succeed each other. Adding the perlocutionary
securitization speech act involving an audience, proved to be indispensable in this study in
order to analyse all different forms of securitization sequences. In addition extending the
scope of securitization theory to include extra-linguistic forms of a speech act provided an
interesting extra dimension to the securitization process.
The complex theoretical foundations of this study did not hinder a comprehensive
analysis of a securitization process. On the contrary future research can be inspired by the use
of securitization theory in this study. As it proofs he basic principles of the original
securitization framework are able to render interesting findings. Discarding the normative
aim of securitization theory helps to give a more neutral understanding of the securitization
process. By implementing desecuritization in the analytical framework of securitization, a
useful refinement of studying an integral securitization process is provided.
The conceptualisation of internet governance as a global governance architecture was
helpful to overcome the programmatic dilemma between the hands-on/hands-off internet
governance approaches. The broad conceptualization of internet governance proved key in
being able to distinguish and use the different approaches to internet governance in analysing
how they conflicted during WCIT-12. The broad understanding is also helpful to include
different approaches towards internet governance, which dissolves the stratified use of the
term which dictates most IR literature.
This study has exclusively focussed on the securitization of the hands-off approach at
WCIT-12, which turned out (as probably already expected) to be prospered for the most part
by the United States. It is there for the findings predominantly focus on US actors, as these
actors seem to lead the hands-off approach. It would be interesting for future research to
analyse other perspectives. For example by conducting the same study but analysing whether
85

the securitization process also resound in other language saturated discourses. Or whether the
same securitization move is made but used to securitize the hands-on internet governance
approach at WCIT-12.
6.1.2 Implications of the findings for the internet governance debate
The findings of this study indicate the hands-off internet governance approach is dominant in
the global internet governance architecture. WCIT-12 seemed to have only intensified the
dominance of this approach. With the drafting of new law in the US which aims to root the
hands-off approach in legislature as a striking exemplification of this occurrence. The role of
the US in the securitizing process is salient. The US government seems to favours its shadow
of hierarchy position in internet governance issues, by defending the hands-off approach
fiercely. Second noticeable finding is the international cooperation between civil society
groups, individuals and trans-national corporations in defending the hands-off approach.
While all these groups might support different vision of hands-on internet governance, in
practice they cooperate and defend the current status-quo. Even self-alleged hacker groups,
who normally are wary to choose the camp of the US government, during WCIT-12 actually
aligned with the US government by expressing their dissatisfaction in attacking ITUs
websites.
These observations create a useful thinking space to start a more nuanced discussion
on what it is means to support a securitization attempt of ITU/WCIT-12 initiatives. The
reader has to decide whether the securitization move is legitimized by judging whether the
claimed threat of an ITU internet takeover resembles the truth. This study deliberately
refrained from going to much in to depth on whether the securitization claim was true or
false. This is up to the reader to decide. What the reader can take away in any case from this
study is how a group of actors made a threat real, no matter whether this threat had any
ontological existence. Namely the securitization of the hands-off internet governance
approach stonewalled the WCIT-12 negotiations on a new ITRs treaty, which caused division
in a traditionally consensus-driven specialized UN-agency.
86

References

All online retrieved documents, images and websites have been last accessed on 27 April
2014, which marks the retrieval date of all online sources.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: ITU member states and WCIT-12 attendance
72

ITU member state


Number of
participants in WCIT-
12 delegation
Signatory/
nonsignatory of the
WCIT-12 Final Acts
Afghanistan 4 Signatory
Albania (Republic of) 7 Nonsignatory
Algeria (People's Democratic
Republic of) 21 Signatory
Andorra (Principality of) 2 Nonsignatory
Angola (Republic of) 4 Signatory
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentine Republic 7 Signatory
Armenia (Republic of) 12 Nonsignatory
Australia 2 Nonsignatory
Austria 3 Nonsignatory
Azerbaijan (Republic of) 11 Signatory
Bahamas (Commonwealth of the)
Bahrain (Kingdom of) 12 Signatory
Bangladesh (People's Republic of) 5 Signatory
Barbados 3 Signatory
Belarus (Republic of) 2 Nonsignatory
Belgium 3 Nonsignatory
Belize 1 Signatory
Benin (Republic of) 8 Signatory
Bhutan (Kingdom of) 2 Signatory
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana (Republic of) 4 Signatory
Brazil (Federative Republic of) 55 Signatory
Brunei Darussalam 6 Signatory
Bulgaria (Republic of) 10 Nonsignatory
Burkina Faso 11 Signatory
Burundi (Republic of) 7 Signatory
Cabo Verde (Republic of) 2 Signatory
Cambodia (Kingdom of) 3 Signatory
72
Of the total 193 ITU member states, 161 member states send a delegation of participants to the WCIT-12
(ITU, 2012c) . Total signatories: 89. Total non-signatories: 55 (ITU, 2012b). Combined 104 member states of
the ITU did not sign the WCIT-12 Final Acts on the spot; all ITU member states are able to join the WCIT-12
treaty at a later stage.
102



Cameroon (Republic of) 13 Nonsignatory
Canada 23 Nonsignatory
Central African Republic 4 Signatory
Chad (Republic of) 5 Nonsignatory
Chile 8 Nonsignatory
China (People's Republic of) 33 Signatory
Colombia (Republic of) 12 Nonsignatory
Comoros (Union of the) 4 Signatory
Congo (Republic of the) 10 Signatory
Costa Rica 4 Nonsignatory
Cte d'Ivoire (Republic of) 10 Signatory
Croatia (Republic of) 4 Nonsignatory
Cuba 4 Signatory
Cyprus (Republic of) 7 Nonsignatory
Czech Republic 9 Nonsignatory
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea
Democratic Republic of the Congo 13 Nonsignatory
Denmark 4 Nonsignatory
Djibouti (Republic of) 5 Signatory
Dominica (Commonwealth of)
Dominican Republic 2 Signatory
Ecuador
Egypt (Arab Republic of) 18 Signatory
El Salvador (Republic of) 1 Signatory
Equatorial Guinea (Republic of) 2 Nonsignatory
Eritrea
Estonia (Republic of) 3 Nonsignatory
Ethiopia (Federal Democratic
Republic of)
Fiji (Republic of)
Finland 9 Nonsignatory
France 11 Nonsignatory
Gabonese Republic 17 Signatory
Gambia (Republic of the) 1 Nonsignatory
Georgia 5 Nonsignatory
Germany (Federal Republic of) 18 Nonsignatory
Ghana 17 Signatory
Greece 6 Nonsignatory
Grenada 1 Nonsignatory
Guatemala (Republic of) 1 Signatory
Guinea (Republic of) 18 Nonsignatory
Guinea-Bissau (Republic of) 1 Nonsignatory
103


Guyana 2 Signatory
Haiti (Republic of) 3 Signatory
Honduras (Republic of)
Hungary 5 Nonsignatory
Iceland
India (Republic of) 35 Nonsignatory
Indonesia (Republic of) 13 Signatory
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 14 Signatory
Iraq (Republic of) 22 Signatory
Ireland 2 Nonsignatory
Israel (State of) 3 Nonsignatory
Italy 9 Nonsignatory
J amaica 4 Signatory
J apan 23 Nonsignatory
J ordan (Hashemite Kingdom of) 6 Signatory
Kazakhstan (Republic of) 9 Signatory
Kenya (Republic of) 18 Nonsignatory
Kiribati (Republic of)
Korea (Republic of) 32 Signatory
Kuwait (State of) 7 Signatory
Kyrgyz Republic 6 Signatory
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Latvia (Republic of) 4 Nonsignatory
Lebanon 6 Signatory
Lesotho (Kingdom of) 7 Signatory
Liberia (Republic of) 6 Signatory
Libya 9 Signatory
Liechtenstein (Principality of) 2 Nonsignatory
Lithuania (Republic of) 5 Nonsignatory
Luxembourg 5 Nonsignatory
Madagascar (Republic of)
Malawi 5 Nonsignatory
Malaysia 15 Signatory
Maldives (Republic of)
Mali (Republic of) 8 Signatory
Malta 2 Nonsignatory
Marshall Islands (Republic of the)
Mauritania (Islamic Republic of) 3 Nonsignatory
Mauritius (Republic of) ? Signatory
Mexico 21 Signatory
Micronesia (Federated States of) 2 Nonsignatory
Moldova (Republic of) 2 Nonsignatory
104

Monaco (Principality of)
Mongolia 11 Nonsignatory
Montenegro 2 Nonsignatory
Morocco (Kingdom of) 12 Signatory
Mozambique (Republic of) 13 Signatory
Myanmar (Union of) 2 Nonsignatory
Namibia (Republic of) 1 Signatory
Nauru (Republic of)
Nepal (Federal Democratic Republic
of) 8 Signatory
Netherlands (Kingdom of the) 4 Nonsignatory
New Zealand 5 Nonsignatory
Nicaragua
Niger (Republic of the) 4 Signatory
Nigeria (Federal Republic of) 72 Signatory
Norway 6 Nonsignatory
Oman (Sultanate of) 18 Signatory
Pakistan (Islamic Republic of) 3 Nonsignatory
Panama (Republic of) 5 Signatory
Papua New Guinea 6 Signatory
Paraguay (Republic of) 7 Signatory
Peru 3 Nonsignatory
Philippines (Republic of the) 15 Nonsignatory
Poland (Republic of) 19 Nonsignatory
Portugal 4 Nonsignatory
Qatar (State of) 20 Nonsignatory
Romania 8 Nonsignatory
Russian Federation 44 Signatory
Rwanda (Republic of) 4 Signatory
Saint Kitts and Nevis (Federation of)
Saint Lucia 1 Signatory
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa (Independent State of)
San Marino (Republic of)
Sao Tome and Principe (Democratic
Republic of)
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of) 8 Signatory
Senegal (Republic of) 12 Signatory
Serbia (Republic of ) 5 Nonsignatory
Seychelles (Republic of)
Sierra Leone 5 Signatory
Singapore (Republic of) 9 Signatory
Slovak Republic 3 Nonsignatory
105
Slovenia (Republic of) 5 Nonsignatory
Solomon Islands 1 Nonsignatory
Somalia (Federal Republic of) 6 Signatory
South Africa (Republic of) 46 Signatory
South Sudan (Republic of) 4 Signatory
Spain 15 Nonsignatory
Sri Lanka (Democratic Socialist
Republic of) 6 Signatory
Sudan (Republic of the) 8 Signatory
Suriname (Republic of) 1 Nonsignatory
Swaziland (Kingdom of) 3 Signatory
Sweden 16 Nonsignatory
Switzerland (Confederation of) 7 Nonsignatory
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan (Republic of) 3 Nonsignatory
Tanzania (United Republic of) 10 Signatory
Thailand 32 Signatory
The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia 6 Nonsignatory
Timor-Leste (Democratic Republic
of)
Togolese Republic 10 Signatory
Tonga (Kingdom of) 1 Nonsignatory
Trinidad and Tobago 8 Signatory
Tunisia 3 Signatory
Turkey 19 Signatory
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda (Republic of) 12 Signatory
Ukraine 18 Signatory
United Arab Emirates 164 Signatory
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland 31 Nonsignatory
United States of America 126 Nonsignatory
Uruguay (Eastern Republic of) 6 Signatory
Uzbekistan (Republic of) 3 Signatory
Vanuatu (Republic of)
Vatican City State
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 22 Signatory
Viet Nam (Socialist Republic of) 5 Signatory
Yemen (Republic of) 3 Signatory
Zambia (Republic of) 9 Nonsignatory
Zimbabwe (Republic of) 7 Signatory
106