Enlightening Revolutions

Essays in Honor ofRalph Lerner

Edited by Svetozar Minkov
With the Assistance of Stephane Douard

Lllll!:Sll LCllllrgKt;;VOIUIlons
Essays in Honor ofRalph Lerner
LEXINGTON BOOKS
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Copyright 2006 by Lexington Books
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Enlightening revolutions: essays in honor of Ralph Lerner / edited by Svetozar Minkov
with the assistance of Stephane Douard.
p.cm.
"The writings of Ralph Lerner": P.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-0944-1 (cloth: alk. paper)
ISBN-tO: 0-7391-0944-8 (cloth: alk. paper)
Lanham, MD 20706
PO Box 317
Oxford
OX29RU,UK
Copyright 2006 by Lexington Books
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of the publisher.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
I. The Medieval Renaissance
IX
xi
1. The Moral Status of Teaching and Writing 3
Miriam Gals/on
2. Averroes on Law and Political Well-Being 23
Charles E. Butterworth
3. Prudence, Imagination, and Determination of Law in 31
Alfarabi and Maimonides
Joshua Parens
4. Averroes, Dante and the Dawn of Euronean Frrlj o hteriment ,7
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
IX
Xl
5
Law and Innovatio.ll in Machiavelli's
Prince
Nathan Tarcov
Machiavelli's Prince is notorious for its conspicuous denigrations of law and its
advocacy of force, violence, and absolute rule. Consider the two most well-
known statements about law in the book. Near the beginning of chapter XII
Machiavelli declares:
The principal foundations that all states have, new as well as old or mixed, are
good Jaws and good arms. And because there cannot be good Jaws where there
are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws, J
shall leave out the reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms .'
.Similarly, near the beginning of chapter XVIII he explains:
Thus, you Inust know that there are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the
other with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because
the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to the second.
first of these statements gives a reader the impression that since good arms
are the necessary and sufficient condition of good laws, to understand states one
',need only consider arms and can safely disregard laws. Since the second
.statement is followed by Machiavelli's famous recommendation that a prince
use the nature of the fox as well as that of the lion without further
'..mention of the nature of man, the implication seems to be again that law can be
f."disregarded in a world of princely bestiality. And Machiavelli's advice to
. princes on how to "ascend from a civil order to an absolute one" in chapter IX
-seems to replace the rule of law with absolute power.
Machiavelli's manifest demotion of law and lawful rule in The Prince, a
addressed to a ruler who titlp tA hi", 1-.. ..... +....
Nathan Tarcov
Machiavelli's Prince is notorious for its conspicuous denigrations of law and its
advocacy of force, violence, and absolute rule, Consider the two most well-
statements about law in the book. Near the beginning of chapter XII
Machiavelli declares:
The principal foundations that all states have, new as well as old or mixed, are
dressee and of the dependence of law, order, and stability on force, the extraor-
dinary, and innovation.
Let us begin by reconsidering the two statements quoted above. Although
the first statement gives the impression that good arms are the necessary and
sufficient condition of good laws, the correlations between good laws and good
arms that it stipulates could just as well result were good laws the necessary and
sufficient condition of good arms. Indeed, despite his assertion that he will leave
\ out reasoning on laws, Machiavelli explains shortly thereafter that a republic
should send its own citizens to command its armies, and that when one of them
turns out not to be a worthy man, it must replace him, but when one of them is a
worthy man, it must "check him with laws so that he does not step out of
bounds" and threaten the republic's liberty (49-50). Good laws thus tum out
after all to be the foundation or at least the safeguard of good arms in a republic.
Nor is the infamous statement about laws and force as the modes of combat
of men and beasts simply a denigration of laws. From Machiavelli's peculiar
perspective, with its emphasis on the ineluctability of conflict, to say that laws
are a means of combat is rather an elevation or appreciation of laws.iSo
understood, laws would be not the means by which individuals or classes
resolve their conflicts and achieve a common good or public interest, but
another means by which they wage their conflicts, compete for scarce goods,
pursue their private or class interests, and seek to avenge themselves and to
harm others. Further, by saying that laws "often" are not enough, Machiavelli
suggests that sometimes laws are enough and sometimes both laws and force are
needed. The shift that follows, from the distinction between the laws of men and
the force of beasts to that between the fraud of foxes andthe force of lions, does
not necessarily leave the laws of men behind, but on the contrary may interpret
them as a kind of fraud, one of the human means of combat equivalent to those
employed by the fox.
In making the distinction in chapter IX between a civil and an absolute or-
der, between one in which a prince commands by means of magistrates and one
in which a prince commands by himself, Machiavelli does not endorse or rec-
ommend the seizure of absolute authority, though neither does he mention as he
worthy man, it must "check him with laws so that he does not step out of
bounds" and threaten the republic's liberty (49-50). Good laws thus tum out
after all to be the foundation or at least the safeguard of good arms in a republic.
Nor is the infamous statement about laws and force as the modes of combat
of men and beasts simply a denigration of laws. From Machiavelli's peculiar
perspective, with its emphasis on the ineluctability of conflict, to say that laws
are a means of combat is rather an elevation or appreciation of laws.iSo
understood, laws would be not the means by which individuals or classes
resolve their conflicts and achieve a common good or public interest, but
another means by which they wage their conflicts, compete for scarce goods,
pursue their private or class interests, and seek to avenge themselves and to
harm others. Further, by saying that laws "often" are not enough, Machiavelli
suggests that sometimes laws are enough and sometimes both laws and force are
needed. The shift that follows, from the distinction between the laws of men and
the force of beasts to that between the fraud of foxes andthe force of lions, does
not necessarily leave the laws of men behind, but on the contrary may interpret
78 Nathan Tarcov
79 Law and Innovation in Machiavelli's Prince
for his successors to hold even after his death, as the kingdom of Darius was for
Alexander and his successors. Alternatively, a prince might wish to order his
state like France so that it would be difficult to hold for anyone who attempted
to take it away from him or from his successors and might then revert to him or
his successors.
In presenting these distinctions in chapters IV and IX Machiavelli does not
mention law (in contrast to Discourses I 58.3-.4, where he distinguishes between
princes shackled or unshackled from the. laws and argues that both princes and
republics need to be regulated by laws), let alone say that princes who govern
with independent barons or magistrates govern more by means of law or are
more subject to law than princes who govern by ministers subject to their will.
The effectual nuth of what other writers might call rule of law is the existence of
independent intermediaries between a prince and his subjects who can turn
against or disobey him, Machiavelli explains that France is one of the "well-
ordered and governed" kingdoms of his times, and that the first of the "infinite
good institutions on which the liberty and security of the king depend" is the
parlernent and its authority. It was constituted as "a third judge" to secure the
people against the great without blame for the king (XIX 74-75). (Again in
contrast to the Discourses, it is not said that the parlement sometimes condemns
the kings in its verdicts or that the king cannot act otherwise than as the laws
order except as to arms and money; cf. I 16.5, 58.2, III 1.5.) Machiavelli
concludes that "This order could not be better, or more prudent, or a greater
cause of the security of the king and the kingdom." He thereby shows how
princes can rule more securely by providing the people with security through an
independent judiciary, the effectual truth of the rule of law.
The importance of a stable lawlike order is first suggested in The Prince by
the statement that it is enough for a hereditary prince not to depart from "the
orders of his ancestors" to maintain his state unless an extraordinary and
excessive force deprives him of it (11).
3
The first explicit acknowledgment of the
importance of laws is the recommendation that princes who acquire new states
ofthe same province and language as their old state should not alter the laws or
taxes of the new states (III 9). Peoples are attached to the laws to which they are
accustomed; laws provide a stability which is undermined by their alteration.
The title of chapter V is the only one that mentions laws: it announces that the
chapter is about how to administer cities or principalities that before they were
mention raw \10 contrast to Discourses 1 SH.3-.4, where he distinguishes between
princes shackled or unshackled from the . laws and argues that both princes and
repubhcs need to be regulated by laws), let alone say that princes who govern
with independent barons or magistrates govern more by means of law or are
more subject to law than princes who govern by ministers subject to their will.
The effectual truth of what other writers might call rule of law is the existence of
independent intermediaries between a prince and his subjects who can turn
against or disobey him, Machiavelli explains that France is one of the "well-
ordered and governed" kingdoms of his times, and that the first of the "infinite
good institutions on which the liberty and security of the king depend" is the
parlement and its authority. It was constituted as "a third judge" to secure the
people against the great without blame for the king (XIX 74-75). (Again in
r-nntract to thp ni(!r'fl11JC'0(1 1t 1(1 nnt +"h,.,.... _ ... _1--........_ ..... _+ - - -- ..J __
80 Nathan Tarcov
their old laws was recommended in the case of new acquisitions generally in
chapter III ("especially if they are not used to living free," 9), it is not
recormnended as the best mode for holding republics in chapter V, "for in truth
there is no secure mode to possess them other than to ruin them," so attached are
they to their ancient liberty and their ancient orders. It seems that princes can
safely leave their own laws only to those who are not used to being free and who
do not know how to live in freedom.
New princes who acquire new states by their own arms and virtue, the
greatest examples of princes, neither simply rule arbitrarily and lawlessly nor
leave their peoples their old laws, but are forced instead to introduce new orders
and modes so as to found their state and their security (VI 23).4 Although
princes who go out with their armies to acquire the lands of others, like Cyrus,
Caesar, and Alexander, are glorified (XIV 60, XVI 64), new princes in new
principalities who introduce new laws and orders, like Moses, Cyrus, Theseus,
and Romulus, are the most glorious princes (VI 22-25, XXVI 103-104).5 They
can win the double glory of beginning a new principality and of having .adorned
and consolidated it with good laws, as well as with good arms, good friends or
allies, and good examples (XXIV 96). The book closes with an appeal for a new
prince to find new orders for Italy since "nothing brings so much honor to a man
rising newly as the new laws and the new orders found by him" (XXVI 103-
104). Thus the greatest princely virtue wins the greatest princely glory and
honor through introducing new laws, above all those fundamental laws
Machiavelli calls orders. Cesare Borgia, Machiavelli's modem example of a
new prince who acquires a new principality by the arms of others and fortune,
brought law and order to the Romagna, a province previously convulsed by
"robberies, quarrels, and every kind of insolence," and established a civil court
there, but he is not said to have introduced new orders and modes, only to have
renewed old orders through new modes (VII 29-30, 32).6 Liverotto da Fermo,
Machiavelli's modem example of a new prince who attains his principality
through crimes, in contrast, more closely resembles new princes who rise
through their own arms and virtue in that he "strengthened himself with new
r:lvil orders." though after a vear of rule he was stranzled bv Cesare
and modes so as to found their state and their security (VI 23).4 Although
princes who go out with their armies to acquire the lands of others, like Cyrus,
Caesar, and Alexander, are glorified (XIV 60, XVI 64), new princes in new
principalities who introduce new laws and orders, like Moses, Cyrus, Theseus,
and Romulus, are the most glorious princes (VI 22-25, XXVI 103-104).5 They
can win the double glory of beginning a new principality and of having .adorned
and consolidated it with good laws, as well as with good arms, good friends or
allies, and good examples (XXIV 96). The book closes with an appeal for a new
prince to find new orders for Italy since "nothing brings so much honor to a man
rising newly as the new laws and the new orders found by him" (XXVI 103-
104). Thus the greatest princely virtue wins the greatest princely glory and
honor through introducing new laws, above all those fundamental laws
Machiavelli calls orders. Cesare Borgia, Machiavelli's modem example of a
new prince who acquires a new principality by the arms of others and fortune,
brought law and order to the Romagna, a province previously convulsed by
"rnhhprlPC: everv kind of insolence." and established a civil court
Law and Innovation in Machiavelli's Prince 8)
judicial trial (the Roman emperor Alexander was praised because in the fourteen
years of his rule no one was ever put to death by him without a trial, XIX 77). A
prince should act so that a citizen does not fear to adorn or improve his
possessions from fear that they will be taken away from him or to start up a
trade from fear of taxes (XXI 91). A prince thus provides security for property
byremoving his subjects' fear of robbery or confiscation, not so much to secure
the stable possession of present property but to animate and encourage his
citizens' dynamic improvement or expansion of their old possessions and
acquisition of new ones. This result thus approximates the advantage of a
republic praised in the Discourses, where each citizen willingly procreates the
children he believes he can support, multiplies his patrimony without fear it will
be taken away, and seeks to acquire those goods he believes he can enjoy once
acquired (II 2.3; a prince cannot, however, without converting his principality
into a republic, obtain the rest of this advantage, that a citizen knows his
children will be born free and can through their virtue become princes.)
Law and order thus play important roles in the advice Machiavelli gives to
' princes, but not simply as an alternative to reliance on arms and force. On the
contrary, the laws and orders introduced by princes depend on arms and force to
be effective. New princes or prophets must, if their "constitutions" are to be
observed for long, "order" things in such a mode that the people can be made to
believe by force (VI 24). Thus orders or constitutions depend on force which in
tum must be ordered; orders must provide for the force needed for orders to be
observed. Anticipation of terrifying punishment makes men fear those who have
the laws on their side (VI 23, XIX 73). Princes can secure themselves by
punishing offenders (III 9), prevent killings and robberies through executions,
and make themselves feared through dread of punishment (XVII 65-67) and
esteemed through remarkable modes ofpunislunent (XXI 89).8
Not only are laws dependent on force but arms and force must be ordered
bylaws, As we saw in our reconsideration of the statement about arU15 and laws
from chapter XII, laws in well-ordered republics check the commanders of their
arms and keep them within bounds. The dependence of force on laws or orders
is also shown by the frequent emphasis in The Prince on the need for military
"orders.n Liverotto da Fermo, as we also saw, strengthened himself through new
military as well as civil orders (VIII 37). The free German cities can defend
themselves in part because they have many orders that maintain military
me statue possession ot present property but to animate and encourage his
citizens' dynamic improvement or expansion of their old possessions and
acquisition of new ones. This result thus approximates the advantage of a
republic praised in the Discourses, where each citizen willingly procreates the
children he believes he can support, multiplies his patrimony without fear it will
be taken away, and seeks to acquire those goods he believes he can enjoy once
acquired (II 2.3; a prince cannot, however, without converting his principality
into a republic, obtain the rest of this advantage, that a citizen knows his
children will be born free and can through their virtue become princes.)
Law and order thus play important roles in the advice Machiavelli gives to
' princes, but not simply as an alternative to reliance on arms and force. On the
contrary, the laws and orders introduced by princes depend on arms and force to
hp. pffprtivp 'l\TPUl nrinf'Pc nr l"u-onhpt" rnllC't ""r.... .. ......... n ", .. .0. +,.." 1...,...
Nathan Tarcov 82
57). War itself has "orders," which constitute the thought and art of a prince
(XIV 58). A prince must keep his troops "well ordered," know how to "order
battles," and get his army to "observe order" (XIV 59-60); the Italian new prince
addressed in the final chapter needs to order a new "order of infantry" (XXVI
104-105). The proper relation between law or order and force or arms is thus a
complex and dynamic one of mutual dependence.
Machiavelli's view of human law or order rests ultimately on his skepticism
\ about the existence of any kind of law or order of a transcendent natural or
divine origin. He does not even mention natural or divine law, but his skepticism
is not expressed merely through silence.
Machiavelli does not recognize or encourage his readers to recognize that
the moral qualities praised and held to be good have the binding force of law. A
prince should instead learn how not to be good and use this knowledge
according to necessity, at most to appear to have the qualities praised as virtues
and appear not to have those blamed as vices, but not to mind having and even
appearing to have those vices without which it is difficult to save his state (XV).
A chain of obligation unaccompanied by a dread of punishment is broken' at
every moment for the sake of utility (XVII 66-67), and there is no natural
punishment that enforces virtue or vice and thereby makes them truly obligatory.
On the contrary, "a man who wants to make a profession of good in all _,n
must come to ruin among so many who are not good" (XV 61). There is "no
court to appeal to" for judgment of the actions of princes (XVIII 71); they
subject to no higher law.
Machiavelli says in the Dedicatory Letter that in The Prince he discusses
and "gives rules" for the governments of princes, but the rules he gives hardly
have the status of natural laws. The first "rules" Machiavelli explicitly gives,
that a prince who has acquired a state in another province in addition to his old
one should go to live there, send colonies, defend the weaker powers, weaken
the greater powers, and prevent the entry of another powerful foreigner, are
swiftly followed by his excusing Louis XII for strengthening the already
powerful Venetians by dividing Lombardy with them so as to enter Italy and
then h 1.ouis for subsecuentlv weakeninz the Venetians and thereby
Machiavelli does not recognize or encourage his readers to recognize that
the moral qualities praised and held to be good have the binding force of law. A
prince should instead learn how not to be good and use this knowledge
according to necessity, at most to appear to have the qualities praised as virtues
and appear not to have those blamed as vices, but not to mind having and even
appearing to have those vices without which it is difficult to save his state (XV).
A chain of obligation unaccompanied by a dread of punishment is broken' at
every moment for the sake of utility (XVII 66-67), and there is no natural
punishment that enforces virtue or vice and thereby makes them truly obligatory.
On the contrary, "a man who wants to make a profession of good in all
must come to ruin among so many who are not good" (XV 61). There is "no
court to appeal to" for judgment of the actions of princes (XVIII 71); they
subject to no higher law.
Machiavelli says in the Dedicatory Letter that in The Prince he discusses
and "gives rules" for the governments of princes, but the rules he gives hardly
h-:"A nf Thp Machiavellj exnlicitlv zives.
83 Law and Innovation ill Machiavelli's Prince
this case he could well be, but it would not last long because that governor
wouldin a Sh011 time take away his state" (XXIII 95). The only general rule that
never fails is thus that there is no substitute for prudence, that there are no
foolproof general rules that can be given to govern the unwise. The advice
Machiavelli gives consists not in unfailing natural laws but only in prudential
variable rules of thumb depending on particulars (XX 83). His advice must be
observed prudently (XXIV 96). Far from being the application of natural laws or
moral virtues, this amoral prudence consists in recognizing evils in advance and
attacking before one is attacked (III 12-13), imitating great men (VI 22),
alternately giving others hope and fear (X 44), avoiding the infamy of dangerous
. vices but accepting that of useful ones (XV 62, XVI 63), avoiding excessive
.: confidence in others (XVII 66), breaking faith when it turns against one (XVIII
' 69), picking the less bad as good (XXI 91), and taking advantage of opportunity
102).
Machiavelli is at least equally far from recognizing the reality of a divine
lawor divine government of the world. Machiavelli does not limit his assertion
that there is "no court to appeal to" for judgment of the actions of princes by
-adding "in this world" (XVIII 71); heimplicitly denies the existence of a divine
tribunal or even of the imler court of conscience. to He says at first that Moses
.was an "executor of things ordered for him by God," but quickly adds that
Moses' actions and orders were no different from those of others who founded
kingdoms and who received only opportunity from fortune rather than orders
fromGod (VI 22). Accordingly, Machiavelli subsequently refers to the orders or
Moses used force to make men believe in as being Moses' own (VI
22, XXVI 102). II An unnamed figure in the last chapter could have been judged
to have been ordered by God for the redemption of Italy, but here too the
appearance of being ordered by God is illusory since he was repulsed by fortune
(XXVI 102). Machiavelli says there that the Medici family is "supported by
God," but indicates that this was so only in the same sense that He was friendly
toMoses, Cyrus, or Theseus, referring to them collectively without making any
distinction between the biblical and the pagan founders (XXVI 102-103).
avows that he will not speak of ecclesiastical principalities, such as
the Church then headed by the Medici pope Leo X, since they "subsist by
superior causes, to which the human mind does not reach" and are "exalted and
maintained by God," but he nonetheless proceeds to discuss the increase in the
ooserveo prudentty (xxr V 90). Far tram being the application of natural laws or
moral virtues, this amoral prudence consists in recognizing evils in advance and
attacking before one is attacked (III 12-13), imitating great men (VI 22),
alternately giving others hope and fear (X 44), avoiding the infamy of dangerous
vices but accepting that of useful ones (XV 62, XVI 63), avoiding excessive
confidence in others (XVII 66), breaking faith when it turns against one (XVIII
69), picking the less bad as good (XXI 91), and taking advantage of opportunity
102).
Machiavelli is at least equally far from recognizing the reality of a divine
lawor divine government of the world. Machiavelli does not limit his assertion
that there is "no court to appeal to" for judgment of the actions of princes by
adding "in this world" (XVIII 71); heimplicitly denies the existence of a divine
nr I"r.. ....... ..... ............ :"............... to LT..... _6. C':. __ L LL_L ll."' __
Nathan Tarcov
84
should not marvel at his invocation of Moses and the other great founders as
models for new princes (IV 16, 19, VI 21).12 The "miraculous losses" suffered
by Italian forces were not brought about by divine correction of the sins
denounced by Savonarola but were the ordinary consequences of Italian reliance
on mercenary arms, originating in the lack of knowledge of arms among the
Italian priests and people (XII 49, 52).13 In the final chapter, the "Exhortation to
Seize Italy and Free Her from the Barbarians," Machiavelli himself declares that
Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus were "marvelous," but immediately reminds us that
they were nonetheless human and God was no more friendly to them than to the
Medici. He testifies to "extraordinary things without example, brought about by
God," leading the way to the redemption of Italy by the Medici: "the sea has
opened; a cloud has escorted you along the way; the stone has poured forth
. water; here manna has rained" (XXVI 103). Whatever events in contemporary
Italy these words may allegorically refer to, far more extraordinary than
Machiavelli's description of those events in terms redolent of the divine
miracles of Exodus and Psalm 78, is his assertion that that they are
unprecedented, "without example," thereby denying that God performed such
miracles for Moses." Similarly, Machiavelli explains that it is "not a marvel"
that no previous Italian has done what it is hoped the Medici will do but the
result of the defectiveness of Italy's ancient orders; conversely, success would
be the non-miraculous result of new laws and orders (103).
Machiavelli seems about to address the issue of God's government of the
world explicitly at the beginning of chapter XXV: "It is not unknown to me that
many have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are so governed by
fortune and by God, that men carmot correct them with their prudence.l'" The
belief in the omnipotence of fortune or God leaves no room for the human
prudence that Machiavelli teaches. Machiavelli admits that he has sometimes
been partly inclined to this opinion but does not specify whether to that part or
version of the opinion that invokes government of the world by fortune or that .
which invokes divine government. Unfortunately, Machiavelli does not mention
God or His government of the world again in the chapter (returning to it only in
MedICI. He tesnhes '10'-1- __ in the
God," leading the way to the redemption of Italy by the Medici: "the sea has
opened; a cloud has escorted you along the way; the stone has poured forth
water; here manna has rained" (XXVI 103). Whatever events in contemporary
Italy these words may allegorically refer to, far more extraordinary than
Machiavelli's description of those events in terms redolent of the divine
miracles of Exodus and Psalm 78, is his assertion that that they are
unprecedented, "without example," thereby denying that God performed such"
miracles for Moses." Similarly, Machiavelli explains that it is "not a marvel"
that no previous Italian has done what it is hoped the Medici will do but the
result of the defectiveness of Italy's ancient orders; conversely, success would
be the non-miraculous result of new laws and orders (103).
Machiavelli seems about to address the issue of God's government of the
world explicitly at the beginning of chapter XXV: "It is not unknown to me that
many have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are so governed by
fortune and by God, that men carmot correct them with their prudence.?" The
- L" .c:.:: ...... - f"'!"A lAouPC! nn rnnm for the human
Law and Innovation in Machiavelli 's Prince 85
Though Machiavelli does not recognize a natural law or a divine law or
providence in The Prince, he does affirm a natural order of things. He declares
that "the order of things is such that as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a
province, all those in it who are less powerful adhere to him, moved by the envy
they have against whoever has held power over them" (III 11). This natural
order is the predictable interaction between human passions and the structure of
power; it may be precisely what explains the human attachment to the
supernatural. It seems to include the "natural difficulty" that men willingly
change their lords in the belief they will fare better only to see by later
experience that they have done worse, the "natural and ordinary necessity" for a
new prince to offend his subjects, and the "very natural and ordinary" desire to
acquire (III 7-8, 14). This is also the order involved when Machiavelli says that
Louis XII's second loss of Lombardy was not a miracle but "very ordinary and
reasonable" (III 16). More broadly, he explains that it is "in the order of things"
that "one never seeks to avoid one inconvenience without running into another,"
so that prudence consists in "picking the less bad as good" (XXI 91). Thus
featuring foreign invasion and conquest, subjects changing their lords, and
princes offending their subjects, this "order" of things is one not of the
constancy of law but rather of the "variability of things," the "variability of
views," even the "variability of the good," and, of course, the variability of
fortune and of the times (XIV 60, XVIII 70, XXIII 94, XXIV 97, XXV 98, 100).
What is ordinary in the sense of being in accord with this order of things is
also reasonable in the sense of being accessible to human reason rather than
miraculous (III 16). Machiavelli describes his own activity in The Prince and
elsewhere as "reasoning" (II 6, VIII 34, XII 48, XIX 81) and his explanations as
"reasons" (III 15, IV 18-19, XXI 91), and he even calls "reasons" the misleading
teaching of "our ancients" who were esteemed wise (XX 84).16 He discusses
what is "reasonable" to do or to expect, carefully distinguishing what merely
appears reasonable from what is truly reasonable (II 7, IV 17, VII 26, X 44, XIV
58). Subjects that he says he will omit reasoning about (republics, Moses,
ecclesiastical principalities, and laws) he nonetheless reasons about even if they
supposed to be ones to which the human mind does not reach (II 6, VI 22, XI
XII 48).17 As he says in the Discourses, "it is good to reason about
everything"(I 18.1). L8
Machiavelli's denial of a natural or divine law or providence in favor of an
power; It "may be - precisely what explains the human attaclunent to the
supernatural. It seems to include the "natural difficulty" that men willingly
change their lords in the belief they will fare better only to see by later
experience that they have done worse, the "natural and ordinary necessity" for a
new prince to offend his subjects, and the "very natural and ordinary" desire to
acquire (III 7-8, 14). This is also the order involved when Machiavelli says that
Louis XII's second loss of Lombardy was not a miracle but "very ordinary and
reasonable" (III 16). More broadly, he explains that it is "in the order of things"
that "one never seeks to avoid one inconvenience without running into another,"
so that prudence consists in "picking the less bad as good" (XXI 91). Thus
featuring foreign invasion and conquest, subjects changing their lords, and
princes offending their subjects, this "order" of things is one not of the
ermstanr-v of hut nf t},p nt thinn,," thp "'u.::nit:llhilil-u ,....f'
And because he knew that past rigors had generated some hatred for him,21 to
purge the spirits of that people and to gain them entirely to himself, he wished
And because he knew that past rigors had generated some hatred for him,21 to
purge the spirits of that people and to gain them entirely to himself, he wished
to show that if any cruelty had been committed, this had not come from him but
from the harsh nature of his minister. And having seized this opportunity, he
had him placed one morning in the piazza at Cesena in two pieces, with a piece
of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The ferocity of this spectacle left the
people at once satisfied and stupefied. (VII 29-30)
Nathan Tarcov 86
rrlavfu] jrrmv arrv
hereditary prince may be forced to introduce new orders; though Machiavelli
does not mention it, Theseus and Cyrus (at least according to Xenophon) were
hereditary princes.20
Machiavelli is more explicit about the need to destroy old orders in the case
of Cesare Borgia in Chapter VII than in those of the great founder princes of
chapter VI. For Cesare (or his father, Pope Alexander VI), it was necessary to
upset the existing orders and to disorder the states of Italy so as to laythe
foundations of his power (VII 27). Cesare brought law and order to the
Romagna including a civil court, but only by first giving the fullest power and
excessive authority over the province to his minister, Remirro de Orco, "a
and ready" man, who apparently did not operate through the strictest legal
procedures. Machiavelli's dramatic account of Cesare's culminating action
having established his judicial system is worth quoting in full:
anyone for any "extraordinary" action that he uses to "order" a kingdom or
constitute a republic (1 9.2).19 New princes in new principalities to found their
states need to imitate the Roman emperor Severns, who was very cruel and very
rapacious, a very fierce lion and a very astute fox, a master of both force and
fraud (XIX 77-79, 82). Those qualities needed for founding are necessarily
contrary to those of the philosopher emperor Marcus Aurelius, who was of
modest life, a lover of justice, an enemy of cruelty, humane, and kind, qualities
.that are needed for conserving, yet these opposite qualities need to be combined
by a new prince who wants to conserve what he founds (76-77, 82). Just as a
founder must also act so as to conserve what he founds, a later and even a
hereditary prince may be forced to introduce new orders; though Machiavelli
does not mention it, Theseus and Cyrus (at least according to Xenophon) were
hereditary princes.20
Machiavelli is more explicit about the need to destroy old orders in the case
of Cesare Borgia in Chapter VII than in those of the great founder princes of
chapter VI. For Cesare (or his father, Pope Alexander VI), it was necessary to
upset the existing orders and to disorder the states of Italy so as to laythe
foundations of his power (VII 27). Cesare brought law and order to the
Romagna including a civil court, but only by first giving the fullest power and
excessive authority over the province to his minister, Remirro de Orco, "a
and ready" man, who apparently did not operate through the strictest legal
procedures. Machiavelli's dramatic account of Cesare's culminating action
having established his judicial system is worth quoting in full:
87 Law and Innovation ill Machiavelli 's Prince
territories because they hurt very few and keep all the others quiet by leaving
them, on the one hand, unharmed, and, on the other, afraid (III 10). The
character of security is made clearest by the dictum that it is better for a prince
to be feared than loved but he should still avoid being hated, which in practice
means he should leave men secure as regards their property and family yet
fearful for their lives (XVII 67). Machiavelli recommends that a prince should
employ men who are forced to be faithful because they know he suspects them
rather than those who would serve him "with too much security" (XX 85).
Machiavelli's Prince presents a dynamic interaction between law, order,
antiquity, stability, and security, on the one side, and force, the extraordinary,
innovation, variability, and fear, 011 the other. The memories and causes of
innovations (innovazioni) are eliminated in the antiquity and continuity of a
hereditary dominion (II 7), but a new prince who prudently observes what
Machiavelli writes will appear ancient and be more secure and steady in his state
than ifhe had grown old in it (XXIV 96). New princes are not the only ones who
think of innovating; barons, for example, may desire to innovate (innovare; IV
18); new princes are innovators iinnovatoriy who must keep others from
of innovating (VI 24, XXI 88). Innovation can succeed only by
acmevinz or simulating antiquity and security through law and order.
Machiavelli's conception of innovation as the introduction of new
laws and orders corresponds to the ancient conception of change of
regime (e.g., Plato's Republic VIII-IX and Aristotle's Politics V) but with an
emphasis on both novelty and law that resembles more closely modern
conceptions of revolution. He uses the term "revolt" (rivoltarsi) once more
narrowly to mean rebel when warning a prince that subjects will tum against
him when he 1110st needs them (XVII 66), and the term "revolutions"
(revo/uzioni) once more broadly to mean political changes when speaking of the
many changes in Italy (XXVI 103). The mode of political change to which he
devotes far more attention is instead conspiracy, attempts to kill the prince, the
subject (not announced in the title) of chapter XIX, the longest chapter in The
Prillce.
23
One is tempted to say that the comprehensive conception of political
change or revolution for Machiavelli would be conspiracy followed by
innovation.
The greatest kind of innovation is conducted not by any of the merely
political princes discussed in The Prince but by the writers who create the
, 'men wno are rorced to' be taitntul because they know he suspects them
rather than those who would serve him "with too much security" (XX 85).
Machiavelli's Prince presents a dynamic interaction between law, order,
antiquity, stability, and security, on the one side, and force, the extraordinary,
i:, innovation, variability, and fear, on the other. The memories and causes of
innovations iinnovazioni) are eliminated in the antiquity and continuity of a
hereditary dominion (II 7), but a new prince who prudently observes what
Machiavelli writes will appear ancient and be more secure and steady in his state
than ifhe had grown old in it (XXIV 96). New princes are not the only ones who
think of innovating; barons, for example, may desire to innovate (innovare; IV
<: 18); new princes are innovators (innovatorii who must keep others from
thinking of innovating (VI 24, XXI 88). Innovation can succeed only by
achieving or sjrrmlatino .. hyoru.."..... I ...." ......_"J _ _
Notes
Nathan Tarcov 88
1. All English quotations from The Prince are from the translation by Harvey
Mansfield, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 1998).
Parenthetical citations are by chapter and page numbers from this edition. Italian
are from the edition of Giorgio Inglese (Turin: Einaudi, 1995). All references to the
Discourses are by book, chapter, and paragraph numbers to the translation by Harvey C.
Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1996).
2. Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, """"v'"'v',.. ... v,
3. The Mansfield translation has "order" following some Italian texts, but the Italian
is plural in the edition of Inglese. In the Discourses Machiavelli distinguishes the
of the government or state, such as the authority of and mode of selecting the magistrates
and the mode of making the laws, from laws that check the citizens (I 18.2).
4. These new orders and modes are also referred to as their "constitutions"
tconstituziont, VI 24). I am not aware of any place where Machiavelli explains what he
means by modes as distinguished from orders, but modes seem to be something like
policies, though he frequently uses the term colloquially to mean "ways" or "means."
5. It is notable that Cyrus appears in both lists. In the Discourses Machiavelli says
that among all men praised the most praised are the heads and orderers of religions, next
the founders of republics or kingdoms, and after them the leaders of armies who have
expanded their kingdoms or fatherlands (I 10.1).
6. Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958, 1978), 58.
7. In the Discourses Machiavelli explains this more fully and in terms of laws: a
prince can live secure himself by making orders and laws providing universal security
1. All English quotations from The Prince are from the translation by Harvey C.
Mansfield, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 1998). '
Parenthetical citations are by chapter and page numbers from this edition. Italian citations
are from the edition of Giorgio Inglese (Turin: Einaudi, 1995). All references to
Discourses are by book, chapter, and paragraph numbers to the translation by Harvey C.
Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1996).
2. Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961,
ieacnmg those who WOUIO understand the rrum aOOUl rt:pUOlll;S auu
principalities and changing the qualities for which men and especially princes
are praised or blamed are the most fundamental kind of innovation, on the basis
of which future founders would introduce new laws and orders.
64.
64.
3. The Mansfield translation has "order" following some Italian texts, but the Italian
is plural in the edition of Inglese. In the Discourses Machiavelli distinguishes the orders
of the government or state, such as the authority of and mode of selecting the magistrates
and the mode of making the laws, from laws that check the citizens (I 18.2).
4. These new orders and modes are also referred to as their "constitutions"
(constuuzioni, VI 24). I am not aware of any place where Machiavelli explains what
means by modes as distinguished from orders, but modes seem to be something like
policies, though he frequently uses the term colloquially to mean "ways" or "means."
5. It is notable that Cyrus appears in both lists. In the Discourses Machiavelli says
..... .. t t
89 Law and Innovation in Machiavelli's Prince
day of his wrath" and "execute judgment among the nations" (Revised Standard
Version).
11. In the Discourses Machiavelli says Moses was able to form laws for the purpose
of the common good and since he wished "his laws and his orders" to go forward was
forced to kill infinite men opposed to "his plans," without any mention of executing
things ordered by God (19.3, III 30.1).
12. Finding things marvelous seems characteristic of the people rather than of those
who consider things carefully: whereas the people found Caracalla "marvelous," whoever
"minutely examines" the actions of his vastly superior father Severus "will not marvel"
that he held so much power (XIX 79).
13. Machiavelli says mercenaries have "no fear of God, no faith with men" (XII 48),
buthe traces the human consequences not the divine punishment of this fearlessness and
infidelity.
14. See Strauss, Thoughts Oil Machiavelli, 73-74. Hugo Jaeckel argues that
Machiavelli refers to the invasion of Italy by the French king Francis I in August J515
and highlights the parallels between his wording and that of Psalm 77 (in the Vulgate, 78
inthe Revised Standard Version). See "What is Machiavelli Exhorting in his Exhortatio?
The Extraordinaries," in Niccolo Machiavelli Politico Storico Letterato: Atti del
Convegno di Losanna 27-30 settembre 1995, ed. Jean-Jacques Marchand (Rome: Salerno
Editrice), 59-84. Although Machiavelli opens by saying these extraordinary things were
about by God, his wording of the events is passive in contrast to the active
of the Psahn ("he wrought marvels"; "he divided the sea"; "he led them with a
"he made streams come out of the rock"; "he rained down upon them manna").
- 15. For an argument that Machiavelli addresses the modes of God's government of
the world implicitly in chapter III, see Tarcov, "Machiavelli and the Foundations of
Modernity. "
16. He also describes Liverotto da Fermo, Philopoemen, and Pope Julius II as
"reasoning" or engaging in "reasonings." Whereas the two moderns engage in reasonings
with their enemies to deceive them, the ancient reasons with his friends so as to have the
remedy for every accident (VIII 36-37, XIV 59-60, XXV 100).
17. The exception is the "altogether contemptible" Heliogabalus, Macrinus, and
Julianus, whom Machiavelli does "not want to reason about" (XIX 81). Nonetheless, he
did reason earlier about the downfall of Julianus in reasoning about the rise of Severus
(XIX 78). In the Discourses Machiavelli discusses Macrinus's assassination of Caracalla
(III 6.11) but not Heliogabalus's assassination of Macrinus or the assassination of
Heliogabalus.
18. See also I 58.1, "I do not judge nor shall I ever judge it to be a defect to defend
any opinionwith reasons, without wishing to use either authority or force for it."
19. In The 1!rincc:. Machiavelli does not go so.far as tQj<)eo\ify . "
who consider things carefully: whereas the people found Caracalla "marvelous," whoever
"minutely examines" the actions of his vastly superior father Severus "will not marvel"
that he held so much power (XIX 79).
13. Machiavelli says mercenaries have "no fear of God, no faith with men" (XII 48),
buthe traces the human consequences not the divine punishment of this fearlessness and
.infidelity.
14. See Strauss, Thoughts Oil Machiavelli, 73-74. Hugo Jaeckel argues that
. Machiavelli refers to the invasion of Italy by the French king Francis I in August J515
,;' and highlights the parallels between his wording and that of Psalm 77 (in the Vulgate, 78
. inthe Revised Standard Version). See "What is Machiavelli Exhorting in his Exhortatio?
The Extraordinaries," in Niccolo Machiavelli Politico Storico Letterato: Atti del
Convegno di Losanna 27-30 settembre 1995, ed. Jean-Jacques Marchand (Rome: Salerno
Editrice), 59-84. Although Machiavelli opens by saying these extraordinary things were
hrnl10ht h\l hie- n,n. .. -- . __ .L-_ : - - - - - - '
Nathan Tarcov
90
22. The explanation Machiaveiii gives in the Discourses for why the carr-unon utility
drawn from a republic's free way of life is not appreciated while it is possessed may
apply also to why the security a prince may provide is not appreciated if his subjects are
not reminded of the alternative: enjoying one's things freely, without any suspicion, not
fearing for the honor of wives and children, and not being afraid for oneself are not
appreciated because "no one ever confesses he has an obligation to one who does not
offend him" (I 16.3). See also III 1.
23. Conspiracy is also the subject (announced in the title) of the longest chapter
\ the Discourses, III 6.
24. Consider also the mentions of the "learning" of David and Savonarola in
DiscoursesI 11.5 and 19.2.