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UMM AL-BARÂHIN
or
AL-`AQÎDAH AS-SUGHRÂ
of
Muhammad ibn Yûsuf as-Sanûsî (d. 1490)
translated by
Joseph Kenny, O.P.
INTRODUCTION
Muhammad ibn-Yûsuf as-Sanûsi (d. 1490) is one of the most important
representatives of late Islamic theology. Prom his own lifetime his works
became the most commonly taught manuals on this subject in North and
West Africa. They were used by 'Uthmân dan Fodiye, the founder of the
Sokoto Caliphate at the beginning of the 19th century. They continue to be
studied in Nigeria, where the Arabic text can be found in any well stocked
market stall of Islamic literature.1
This text is an example of kalâm, a kind of philosophical theology which
in vocabulary and teaching goes well beyond the formulations found in the
Qur'ân and Hadîth. In the first few centuries of Islam there were many
controversies about questions such as where to draw the line between a bad
Muslim and an unbeliever, God's determination of events in the universe,
particularly human choice of good or evil, the authority of an imâm as
compared with that of the scripture, the place of philosophy and rational
thought in general, and the unity of God and His attributes.
These questions, especially the last, were influenced by contact with non-
Muslim thought, particularly Platonic philosophy. Different positions were
taken on these issues by opposing schools of thought until, about 950 A.D.
Sunnism took shape with a more or less uniform teaching or orthodoxy on
most questions. The Ash'arite school, with its emphasis on divine
transcendence and totalitarian omnipotence, became the prevailing school.2
Al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111) threw his immense authority behind the Hanbalite
trend that saw all rationalization of the faith as useless and dangerous. He
maintained that only a few experts should study the details of law and kalâm,
but admitted that the masses should learn the basic essentials of both. As a
result, a simplified popular form of kalâm continued to be propagated by
authors who maintained that without some knowledge of it a person could not
be considered a Muslim. 'Uthmân dan Fodiye differed from his teacher
Shaykh Jibrîl, who said that a Muslim must not only know the basic dogmas
of faith but also be able to prove them with reasons. 3
The present catechism presents dogmas with "proofs" in scholastic
categories and a framework going back to the classical kalâm. As-Sanûsî
1
For further information see my Ph.D. thesis, Muslim theology as presented by Muhammad ibn-Yûsuf as-Sanûsî, especially in his
al`Aqîda al-wustâ (University of Edinburgh, 1970).
2
On the devolopment of kalâm, see W.M. Watt, The formative period of Islamic thought (Edinburgh: University Press, 1973).
3
See `Uthmân dan Fodiye, Bayân rujû` ash-shaykh as-Sanûsi `an at-tashdîd `alâ t-taqlîd (ms. copy with the Marafa of Sokoto,
also in the University of Ibadan library, 82/59 & 82/602/M11/53) and his Nasâ'ih al-umma al-Muhammadiyya in M. Hiskeet,
"An Islamic tradition of reform in the Western Sudan," B.S.O.A.S. 25 (1962), pp. 577-596, also in the Universtiy of Ibadan
library, 82/94.
4
For instance, M.W. Watt, op. cit., Louis Gardet, Introduction à la théologie musulmane (Paris, 1948), Dieu et la destinée de
l'homme (Paris, 1967), & H.A. Wolfson, The philosolphy of the Kalâm (Harvard Universtiy Press, 1976).
1. Preliminaries
Praise be to God, and blessing and peace be on the Messenger of God. Know
that a determination of intelligibility is restricted to three categories:
necessity, impossibility, and admissibility. Necessary is what is
inconceivable in its intelligibility as non-existent; impossible is what is
inconceivable in its intelligibility as existent; something admissible is that
whose intelligibility permits its existence or non-existence.
Every legally encharged person is obliged to know what is necessary
with regard to, our Lord –the Majestic and Mighty–what is impossible, and
what is admissible. Likewise he is obliged to know the same with regard to
the messengers –blessing and peace be upon them.
2. Attributes of God
Among what is necessary to our Lord –the Majestic and Mighty– are twenty
attributes. These are: (1) existence, (2) being from eternity, (3) being
everlasting, (4) otherness from things that come into being, (5) self-
subsistency, that is, He does not need a subject-of-inherence nor a
determining agency, (6) oneness, that is, there is no duplication of His
essence, attributes or acts. The first of these six attributes, existence, pertains
to the essence itself, whereas the other five are negative attributes.
Then the Most High necessarily possesses seven attributes called
substantive attributes. They are: (7) power and (8) will, which are related to
all possible things, (9) knowledge, which is related to all necessary,
admissible and impossible things, (10) life, which is related to nothing, (11)
hearing and (12) sight, which are related to all existing things, and (13) speech,
which is without letters or sound, and is related to the same things knowledge is
related to.
Then [the Most High necessarily possesses] seven attributes called adjectival
attributes. They follow upon the first seven, and are the Most High's being: (14)
powerful, (15) willing, (16) knowing, (17) living, (18) hearing, (19) seeing, and
(20) speaking.
Among what is impossible regarding the Most High are twenty attributes, the
opposite of the first twenty. They are: (1) nonexistence, (2) coming into being,
(3) ceasing to be, (4) likeness to things that come to be, by being a body –that is,
for His Most High Essence to take an amount of space– or an accident inhering
in a body, by being in a direction towards a body or being Himself a direction
point for a body, by being measured by place or time, or for His Most High
Essence to be qualified by things that come into being, or qualified by being
large or small or by having motives in His actions or judgements. (5) Likewise it
is impossible for the Most High not to be self-subsistent, by being a quality
inhering in a subject or by needing a giver of form. (6) Likewise it is impossible
for the Most High not to be one, by being composed in His Essence, or by having
an equal in His Essence or in His attributes, or by there being in existence with
Him anything influencing any action whatsoever. (7) Likewise it is impossible
for Him to be incapable of effecting anything that is possible, and (8) for
anything in the world to come into being while He is opposed to its being, that is,
without the Most High's willing it, or through His weakness or inadvertence, or
because of casuality or nature. (9) Likewise impossible for the Most High are
ignorance, or its equivalent, of anything knowable, (10) death, (11) deafness,
(13) dumbness and (12) blindness. The opposites of the adjectival attributes are
clear from these.
What is admissible with regard to the Most High is the doing or omitting of
anything possible.
3. Proofs for God's attributes
5
This argument is based on the premise that the world had a beginning in time, a thesis that the kalâm authors propose to
demonstrate. Thomas Aquinas rejects the possiblity of such a demonstration. Cf. his Summa theologiae, I, q.46, a.2, ad 7.
Muslim philosphers, such as Ibn-Sînâ, also developed a cosmological argument based on motion, and an asrgument based on
contingency. The latter was known to kalâm authrs (See my thesis, p. 114), but was given littel attention, if at all it was
understood.
6
The preceding two paragraphs present a negative aspect of eternity, that of having no beginning or end. But this could apply
just as well to infinite time, whereas the real meaning of eternitiy excludes time altogether, being a "total and perfect possession
of life" (Thomjas Aquinas, op. cit. I, q.10, a.1).
7
Oneness in this context means the non-existence of other gods besides Allah. It does not deny composition in God, since the
Ash`arites maintain that God's Essence or Existence (the same) is really distinct, though inseparabel, from the seven substantive
and seven adjectival attributes listed in section 2. All these attributes, moreover, are distinct from one another. The opposite
position of the Mu`tazilite school, that everything in God is completely one and the same, is closer to Christian theology.
8
Note that Muslim theologians maintain that a prophet is immune from both error and sin, that is, he is both infallible and
impeccable.
9
The ;revious two paragraphs express a philosophical occasionalism based on the Ash`arite adoption of a Democritan world of
atoms, all under the direct rule of Allah.