Dascal, M. (2008). Dichotomies and types of debat e. In: F. H. van eme!en and ". #a!ssen (eds.

),
Controversy and Confrontation: Relating Controversy Analysis with Argumentation Theory (pp.
2$%&'). (mste!dam: )ohn "en*amins.
Dichotomies and +ypes of Debate
Ma!celo Dascal
+el (viv ,nive!sity
-. Int!od.ction
Dichotomies a!e .bi/.ito.s in delibe!ative thin0in1, in decision ma0in1 and in
a!1.in1 in all sphe!es of life.
-
2tic0in1 .ncomp!omisin1ly to a dichotomy may lead to
sha!p disa1!eement and pa!ado3, b.t it can also sha!pen the iss.es at sta0e and help to
find a sol.tion. Dichotomies a!e pa!tic.la!ly in evidence in debates, i.e., in
a!1.mentative dialo1ical e3chan1es cha!acte!i4ed by thei! agonistic nat.!e. +he
p!ota1onists in a debate 5o!th its name hold positions that a!e o! that they ta0e to be
opposed6 they a!1.e a1ainst each othe!7s positions6 and they defend thei! positions
f!om the adve!sa!y7s attac0s. In some cases, this may lead to a pola!i4ation of the
debate th!o.1h t!eatin1 it as 1!o.nded on one o! mo!e dichotomies. In othe!s, the
contende!s may const!.e the opposition as non%dichotomo.s and the!efo!e less
i!!econcilable. 8he!eas the fo!me! attit.de, 5hich leads to 9dichotomi4ation:, is li0ely
to !adicali4e a debate, !ende!in1 it diffic.lt ; sometimes impossible ; to !esolve, the
latte!, 5hich leads to 9de%dichotomi4ation:, opens possibilities of sol.tion of the
debate othe! than all o.t victo!y of one side and defeat of the othe!.
In addition to its effect on the o.tcome of a debate, the contende!s: attit.de(s)
to5a!ds dichotomies in the debate:s mana1ement has f.!the!, impo!tant implications.
It is int!insically connected 5ith the typolo1y of debates and thei! typical
a!1.mentative moves. Fo! the app!op!iateness of one o! the othe! of these attit.des fo!
best capt.!in1 the nat.!e of the anta1onism that .nde!lies a debate is in fact an
indicato! of the 0ind of debate it act.ally is o! is pe!ceived by the contende!s to be.
F.!the!mo!e, s.ch 9attit.des: a!e e3p!essed by the contende!s: p!efe!!ed choices of
a!1.mentative moves6 and these, in t.!n, can be !eco1ni4ed, in a 1iven debate conte3t,
as s.bse!vient eithe! to a dichotomi4in1 o! to a de%dichotomi4in1 st!ate1y vis%<%vis a
dichotomy (o! 9family of dichotomies:) ta0en to be at the !oot of the dive!1ence.
=onse/.ently, the identification of the type to 5hich a debate belon1s, of its !.les,
ass.mptions, p!oced.!es, and s.pposedly s.ccessf.l moves seem to be ti1htly !elated
to attit.des and a!1.mentative st!ate1ies vis%<%vis dichotomies. Mo!eove!, insofa! as
s.ch a meta%level identification la!1ely dete!mines the contende!s: concept.ali4ation
of the debate in 5hich they a!e en1a1ed, thei! attit.de to5a!ds dichotomies has indeed
a st!ate1ic !ole in thei! debatin1 behavio!.
It is this cl.ste! of inte!%!elations, 5hich !eveals the intimate connections
bet5een .sin1 dichotomies in debates and the nat.!e of the latte!, as 5ell as of the
fo!me!, that this a!ticle see0s to e3plo!e. I be1in 5ith a lo1ical definition of
dichotomy, 5hich the info!mal .se of this notion not al5ays !espects (2ection 2).
>lato, the o!i1inato! and 1!eat enth.siast of the method of dichotomo.s division is
1
then conside!ed, sho5in1 that he 5as a5a!e of the p!oblems !aised by this method
(2ection ?). +hese p!oblems, it is a!1.ed, may be ci!c.mvented by shiftin1 f!om a
semantic to a p!a1matic app!oach6 fo! this p.!pose 5o!0in1 definitions of the
st!ate1ies of 9dichotomi4ation: and 9de%dichotomi4ation: a!e p!oposed (2ection &) and
thei! .ses in contempo!a!y debates a!e e3emplified (2ection @). +he last th!ee sections
conside! the !ole of dichotomi4ation and de%dichotomi4ation at the theo!etical meta%
level, especially the typolo1y of debates, and disc.ss its effects on debatin1 behavio!.
2. Dichotomy and division
Ao1ically, a dichotomy can be defined as an ope!ation 5he!eby a concept, (,
is divided into t5o othe!s, " and =, 5hich e3cl.de each othe!, completely cove!in1
the domain of the o!i1inal concept. +hat is, if 3 B (, then eithe! 3 B " o! 3 B =, and if 3
B " then C(3 B =) and vice%ve!sa ; 5hich implies that = D C". +he appeal of
dichotomies lied, fo! >lato, in the fact that they p!ovided a !i1o!o.s method of
definin1 fo!ms o! ideas th!o.1h a s.ccession of dichotomo.s divisions of concepts.
>lato att!ib.ted so m.ch impo!tance to this method that he ma0es 2oc!ates decla!e in
the Phaedrus (see /.ote belo5) that he loves it beca.se it is 5hat ma0es him Eable to
thin0 and to spea0F. >e!haps one of the !easons fo! 2oc!ates%>lato:s enth.siasm is that
the 9method of division: (diaeresis) consists in a ve!y simple lo1ical p!oced.!e, 5hich
can be displayed by a dia1!am in the fo!m of a t!ee that t!anspa!ently and completely
!ep!esents the concept.al composition of concepts s.balte!n to a hi1he! 1en.s:
(
" C"
= C=
D CD
+G>2++H, >A(2 (DD +H AII2, (2 II +H (++(=HD #H(>H
+he method of division in fact defines a concept only .p to a point: D, fo!
e3ample, is defined in the above dia1!am as an (, 5hich is a ", 5hich is a = ; th!ee
components it sha!es 5ith CD, of co.!se. In o!de! to distin1.ish D f!om CD a f.!the!
component is !e/.i!ed, the so called differentia specifica, 5hich ; of the t5o
s.bdivisions of = ; only D possesses. +o be s.!e, the se!ies of divisions can be
p.!s.ed f.!the!: fo! instance, if the specific diffe!ence that sin1les o.t h.mans
amon1st all othe! animals is 9!ationality:, one can f.!the! dichotomi4e the concept
Eh.manF by distin1.ishin1 bet5een 9p!actical: and 9theo!etical: !ationality. In
p!inciple, the!e is no end to this p!ocess of concept.al s.bdivision. ".t as a method of
identifyin1 an entity, it comes to an end once one !eaches the so called infima species.
(t this point, acco!din1 to t!aditional lo1ic and metaphysics, cate1o!ical o!
conceptual divisions as s.ch no lon1e! diffe!entiate bet5een the entities s.bs.med in
a minimal species, namely the individuals that belon1 to it6 the !eason is that all of
them sha!e all the minimal species: definitional t!aits. +his limitation of diaeresis
2
implies th.s that it cannot s.ppo!t ; as >lato believed ; a p.!ely ideational o!
concept.al acco.nt of the 5hole o! !eality.
+his is not the only p!oblem of the lo1ical conception of dichotomy and its .se
in the >latonic method of division, as 5e shall see in the ne3t section. >!io! to that,
ho5eve!, it is impo!tant to !ecall that not eve!y opposition .s.ally !e1a!ded as a
dichotomy in fact possesses the co!!espondin1 lo1ical t!aits. =onside! the follo5in1
1!o.ps of familia! 9dichotomies:.
J K")=+ILM2,")=+IL, K"2HL(+IKIMII+H>H+(+IKI, ),2+IFI=(+IKIM
DI2=KLHG, =KI+N+%FHM=KI+N+%D>IDI+, ("2KA,+MHA(+IL
J F(=+ML(A,, I2MK,#H+, D2=HI>+ILMIKHM(+IL, =K#II+ILMMK+IL
J H(2KIMF(I+H, OIK8AD#M"AIF, AK#I=MMG2+I=I2M,
H(+IKI(AM2,>H2+I+IK,2, FHDKMMF(+(AI2M
J 2AFMK+HH, FHIIDMFK, "HK+HHM2+H(I#H, )8M#I+IA,
"AILHM(+HI2+, IIMK,+
J M(AMFM(A, K>>H22KHMK>>H22D, (H#,MI+(+ILM(22K=I(+IL
J AF+MHI#H+, P,(AI+GMIIP,(AI+G, ),2+I=MII),2+I=,
=KAA=+ILI2MMIIDILID,(AI2M, >(=IFI2+M"AAI#HI+,
AI"H(AM=KI2HL(+IL, +KAH(I+MII+KAH(I+
J "KDGMMIID, M(+HI(AM2>IHI+,(A, "H,+MII+AAI#I+,
(IIM(AI+GMH,M(II+G, M=H(II=(AM=H(+IL
J +HKHGM>H(NI2, OIK8AD#M>K8H, >,H 2=II=M(>>AID 2=II=,
2=II=M+=HIKAK#G, A(8MA(8 IFKH=MI+
Iotice, fi!st, that the lin0s connectin1 the membe!s of each 1!o.p a!e not st!ictly
lo1ical, and that the 1!o.ps ove!lap. +he 9dichotomy: bodyMmind does not entail no! is
necessa!ily associated 5ith b!.teMintelli1ent6 and leftM!i1ht may 5ell be pa!allel, fo!
some, 5ith intole!antMtole!ant !athe! than the othe! 5ay a!o.nd. =onse/.ently,
5hethe! these oppositions a!e vie5ed as dichotomies o! not by someone depends
.pon a va!iety of facto!s ; e.1., socio%c.lt.!al f!ame5o!0 (discipline, c.lt.!e,
hie!a!chy, a1e%1!o.p), basic beliefs (ideolo1y, metaphysics, epistemolo1y, !eli1ion),
pe!sonal inte!ests, a!1.mentative needs and p.!poses, histo!ical ci!c.mstances, etc.
+hat is to say, a list containin1 only .nive!sally .ndisp.ted membe!s of the e3tension
of the lo1ically defined concept EdichotomyF is li0ely to incl.de ve!y fe5 items.
,ltimately, the !eason fo! this is that fe5 ; if any ; candidates a!e .n/.estionably
1!o.nded on the lo1ical !elation of e3cl.sion. ven the appa!ently .nassailable
t!.eMfalse 9dichotomy:, acco!din1 to 5hich p is t!.e entails that not%p is false, t.!ns o.t
to be liable to disp.te, 5hich has yielded non%bivalent lo1ics. +his is not to deny that
the!e is 9opposition: bet5een the membe!s of the pai!s .s.ally conside!ed
dichotomo.s6 it is to !e*ect the p!es.mption that s.ch an opposition is of the
ins.!mo.ntable, fo!mal 0ind. (nd the concl.sion is that to t!eat the .s.al concept of
dichotomy fo!mally is pe!haps a se!io.s mista0e, fo! it is !athe! info!mal in nat.!e,
i.e., !elative and open%ended. (lte!natively, if one p!efe!s to pe!sist in conceivin1
dichotomy lo1ically, one m.st admit that the mista0e is to identify so many
oppositions a!o.nd .s as dichotomies. +hat 5e pe!sist in doin1 so, as 5e 5ill see, is
/.ite !evealin1 abo.t the aims and p!actices of va!io.s types of debate.
?. >lato:s p!edicament
+he diffic.lty of dete!minin1 5he!e to stop division (be it dichotomo.s o! not)
5hile at the same ens.!in1 it p!ovides a f.ll acco.nt of !eality, tho.1h pe!haps its
main metaphysical p!oblem, is not the only one pla1.in1 diaeresis. >lato himself 5as
a5a!e of othe! p!oblems 5ith his method. Kne of them, closely !elated to the
3
diffic.lty *.st mentioned, is ho5 to p!event the .se of .n!est!icted 1ene!ali4ation that
dis!e1a!d /.alifications o! modifie!s of a p!edicate, as a means to 1ene!ate neat " vs.
C" dichotomies. +his p!oblematic move is bea.tif.lly ill.st!ated in the follo5in1
passa1e of the Euthydemus (2'?b%d), a dialo1.e 5he!e the sophist b!othe!s
.thydem.s and Dionysodo!.s .nde!ta0e to teach 2oc!ates, amon1 othe! thin1s, the
5onde!s of dichotomi4ation:
2
Is the!e anythin1 yo. 0no5Q
Ges, many thin1s, tho.1h t!ivial ones.
Do yo. s.ppose it possible fo! any e3istin1 thin1 not to be 5hat it isQ
Heavens no, not I.
(nd do yo. 0no5 somethin1Q
Ges, I do.
+hen yo. a!e 0no5in1, if yo. !eally 0no5Q
Kf co.!se, as fa! as conce!ns that pa!tic.la! thin1.
+hat doesn:t matte!, beca.se m.stn:t yo. necessa!ily 0no5 eve!ythin1 if yo.
a!e 0no5in1Q
Ho5 can that be, 5hen the!e a!e many othe! thin1s I don:t 0no5Q
+hen if the!e is anythin1 yo. don:t 0no5, yo. a!e not 0no5in1.
In *.st that matte!.
(!e yo. any less not 0no5in1 fo! all thatQ (nd *.st no5 yo. said yo. 5e!e
0no5in1, 5ith the !es.lt that yo. a!e the man yo. a!e, and then a1ain yo. a!e
not, at the same time and in !espect to the same thin1s.
2oc!ates !i1htly st!esses the inte!nal .nity of each of the p!edicates 90no5s p: and
90no5s /:, 5hich a!e not dichotomo.s (since they do not e3cl.de each othe!),
5he!eas the sophists dismembe! them in o!de! to obtain the mo!e 1ene!al,
dichotomo.s pai! 9is 0no5in1: vs. 9is not 0no5in1:. (ltho.1h the non se/.it.! of
some of the latte!:s fo!m.lations a!e evident (e.1., Eif yo. a!e 0no5in1 yo. m.st
0no5 eve!ythin1F), the lo1ic of the infe!ences he!e involved had not been developed
by >lato:s time,
?
so that they m.st have been at least p.44lin1 fo! his !eade!s and fo!
the sophists: clientele. Hence thei! event.al pe!s.asive po5e!, 5hich the t5o b!othe!s
e3ploited systematically as a 1ene!al st!ate1y of c!eatin1 dichotomies and ma0in1 at
least !heto!ical p!ofit o.t of them: E(ll o.! /.estions a!e of this same inescapable so!t,
2oc!atesF (Euthydemus 2$?e). In spite of 2oc!ates:s commonsensical, *.stified and at
times /.ite pe!s.asive !esistance to the b!othe!s: infe!ences .nde!lyin1 these
/.estions, >lato in fact did not have an EinescapableF st!ate1y capable of 1ettin1 !id of
them once and fo! all.
Io! did he have a sol.tion to anothe! p!oblem he !aises conce!nin1 the c!ite!ia
fo! c.ttin1 a concept in t5o. (ll he p!ovides by 5ay of sol.tion is info!mal 1.idance
in the fo!m of an anatomical metapho! that spea0s of 9nat.!al *oints: alon1 5hich the
app!op!iate c.ts sho.ld be made:
2K=H(+2: RST to c.t .p each 0ind acco!din1 to its species alon1 its nat.!al
*oints, and to t!y not to splinte! any pa!t, as a bad b.tche! mi1ht do (Phaedrus
2U@e).
(n instance of not follo5in1 this 1.idance, !ec.!!ently 1iven by >lato, divides the
h.man !ace into #!ee0s and all the !est (sometimes called 9ba!ba!ians:)6 he s.11ests
4
that the mista0e lies in the blatant asymmet!y of the t5o classes. +his p!oblem is
ove!come in the follo5in1 instances:
LI2I+KH: the division 5o.ld be done bette!, mo!e by !eal classes and mo!e
into t5o, if one c.t n.mbe! by means of even and odd, and the h.man !ace in
its t.!n by means of male and female, RST (Statesman 2U2e).
( mo!e elabo!ate analysis of the vi!t.es of an instance of division of the 0inds
of madness disc.ssed in the Phaedrus, immediately afte! the anatomical metapho!
/.oted above, 1ives f.!the! hints ; tho.1h not definite c!ite!ia ; conce!nin1 5hat
ma0es a division 1ood o! bad:

2K=H(+2: In *.st this 5ay o.! t5o speeches placed all mental
de!an1ements into one common 0ind. +hen, *.st as each sin1le body has pa!ts
that nat.!ally come in pai!s of the same name (one of them bein1 called the
!i1ht%hand and the othe! the left%one one), so the speeches, havin1 conside!ed
.nso.ndness of mind to be by nat.!e one sin1le 0ind 5ithin .s, p!oceeded to
c.t it .p ; the fi!st speech c.t its left%hand pa!t, and contin.ed to c.t .ntil it
discove!ed amon1 these pa!ts a so!t of love that can be called Eleft%handedF,
5hich it co!!ectly deno.nced6 the second speech, in t.!n, led .s to the !i1ht%
hand pa!t of madness6 discove!ed a love that sha!es its name 5ith the othe! b.t
is act.ally divine6 set it o.t befo!e .s, and p!aised it as the ca.se of o.!
1!eatest 1oods.
>H(DH,2: Go. a!e absol.tely !i1ht.
2K=H(+2: 8ell, >haed!.s, I am myself a love! of these divisions and
collections, so that I may be able to thin0 and to spea0. (nd if I believe that
someone else is capable of disce!nin1 a sin1le thin1 that is also by nat.!e
capable of encompassin1 many, I follo5 Est!ai1ht behind, in his t!ac0s, as if he
5e!e a 1odF. #od 0no5s 5hethe! this is the !i1ht name fo! those 5ho can do
this co!!ectly o! not, b.t so fa! I have al5ays called them EdialecticiansF
(Phaedrus 2U@e%2UUc).
Ieve!theless, neithe! this enth.siastic mat.!e 2oc!ates, 5ho en*oys the .n!est!icted
s.ppo!t of >haed!.s, no! the Lisito! in the Statesman, 5hom the yo.n1 2oc!ates
p!ompts to spell o.t the p!oposed c!ite!ion in mo!e p!ecise te!ms, seem to be able to
delive! the 1oods:
GK,I# 2K=H(+2: P.ite !i1ht6 b.t this ve!y thin1 ; ho5 is one to see it
mo!e plainly RSTQ
LI2I+KH: (n e3cellent !esponse, 2oc!ates, b.t 5hat yo. demand is no li1ht
thin1. 8e have al!eady 5ande!ed fa! a5ay f!om the disc.ssion, and yo. a!e
tellin1 .s to 5ande! even mo!e. 8ell, as fo! no5, let:s 1o bac0 to 5he!e 5e
5e!e (Statesman 2U?a).
+hese and othe! p!oblems detected and left .nsolved by >lato himself sho5
that the .se of the notion of dichotomy as the fla1ship of his dialectical method is fa!
f!om bein1 able to p!ovide this method 5ith a !i1o!o.s fo!mal fo.ndation as that .se
5as p!es.med to do. +hey !eveal in fact loopholes in the method and its cent!al tool,
5hich its opponents 5ill t!y, time and a1ain, to e3ploit in thei! de%dichotomi4in1
5
moves, and its p!actitione!s 5ill t!y to bloc0 by eve! mo!e st!in1ent dichotomi4in1
demands.
&. Dichotomies as st!ate1ic a!1.mentative tools
>lato:s app!oach to dichotomies is 9!ealist: and 9semantic:, in the sense that
they co!!espond to a concept.al !eality that m.st be .nveiled and p!ope!ly desc!ibed,
independently of the a!1.mentative .ses they can be p.t to. +his app!oach mi1ht be
ade/.ate if the lo1ical condition of e3cl.sive dis*.nction 5e!e both s.fficient and
necessa!y fo! discove!in1, desc!ibin1, and .sin1 dichotomies. Get, 5e have seen that
this is not the case. >lato:s o5n condition of 9p!opo!tionality: bet5een the t5o halves
of a dichotomo.s division sho5s that e3cl.sive dis*.nction is not s.fficient fo!
identifyin1 a 9!eal: concept.al 9*oint:, not to mention a .sef.l one6 and the fact that the
oppositions .nde!lyin1 1ene!ally accepted 9dichotomies: do not imply e3cl.sive
dis*.nction sho5s this is not a necessa!y condition eithe!.
Kn the othe! hand, the phenomenon pa! e3cellence in 5hich dichotomies,
5hateve! thei! concept.al .nde!pinnin1s, a!e invo0ed and the!efo!e play some
obse!vable !ole a!e a!1.mentative episodes. +his s.11ests that an empi!ically based
app!oach to them sho.ld be based on the obse!vation and analysis of that !ole, i.e., not
on 5hat dichotomies a!e ass.med to be, b.t on ho5 a!1.e!s const!.e and .se them fo!
thei! a!1.mentative p.!poses6 in othe! 5o!ds, instead of a !ealist and semantic
app!oach, 5hat I am s.11estin1 is a const!.ctivist and p!a1matic one.
Kn this app!oach, the /.estion is not to dete!mine 5hat a!e 9t!.e dichotomies:
5hose .se is le1itimi4ed by thei! bein1 t!.e, b.t !athe! to investi1ate the
a!1.mentative aims and moves that eithe! const!.ct o! deconst!.ct an opposition as a
9dichotomy:. Iotice that, f!om this pe!spective, the deconst!.ction of any dichotomy
is al5ays possible. 2oc!ates: techni/.e of p!edicate /.alification in his !eplies to
.thydem.s ill.st!ates nicely this possibility.
2ince in the p!oposed app!oach p!io!ity is th.s 1!anted not to dichotomies /.a
entities, b.t to the st!ate1ies that c!eate s.ch entities and ma0e .se of them, let .s
concl.de this section 5ith a p!oposal of 5o!0in1 definitions of these st!ate1ies, fo!
5hich I have been .sin1 the 1ene!al ta1s 9dichotomi4ation: and 9de%dichotomi4ation:
; befo!e 5e e3amine some !ecent debates 5he!e these st!ate1ies loom la!1e:
DI=HK+KMIV(+IKI:
&
!adicali4in1 a pola!ity by emphasi4in1 the
incompatibility of the poles and the ine3istence of inte!mediate alte!natives,
by st!essin1 the obvio.s cha!acte! of the dichotomy as 5ell as of the pole that
o.1ht to be p!efe!!ed.
D%DI=HK+KMIV(+IKI: sho5in1 that the opposition bet5een the poles
can be const!.cted as less lo1ically bindin1 than a cont!adiction, th.s allo5in1
fo! inte!mediate alte!natives6 act.ally developin1 o! e3emplifyin1 s.ch
alte!natives.
@. Dichotomi4ation and de%dichotomi4ation in debate
@.- Iat.!al !i1ht vs. histo!icism
In the fi!st e3ample he!e analy4ed, dichotomi4ation is the cent!al move, b.t
one of the contende!s p!epa!es the 1!o.nd fo! avoidin1 its po5e! th!o.1h a 5ell%
6
0no5n p!elimina!y move: distin1.ishin1 bet5een the position attac0ed by the
adve!sa!y (the 9e3t!eme: o! 9st!on1: ve!sion) and his o5n position (the 9mode!ate: o!
95ea0: ve!sion). +his p!elimina!y move is desi1ned to set the 1!o.nd fo! de%
dichotomi4in1 the debate, as 5e shall see.
+he 2t!a.ss%2te!n conf!ontation that too0 place in mid%t5entieth cent.!y
conce!ns a basic iss.e in the philosophy of histo!y. +his debate is in fact a va!iant of
the absol.tism vs. !elativism debate, 5hich in this case deals 5ith the alle1ed
cont!adiction bet5een the idea of a%histo!ical nat.!al !i1ht and the histo!icist c!iti/.e
of a%histo!ical .nive!salism. Aeo 2t!a.ss defends the fo!me! and (lf!ed 2te!n the
latte!, in a se!ies of te3ts add!essed at each othe!. He!e a!e t5o /.otations that
s.ccinctly p!esent the t5o poles of the dichotomy that, acco!din1 to these a.tho!s,
pola!i4es thei! positions:
Histo!icism is an antithesis6 in o!de! to .nde!stand it, one has to 0no5 the
thesis 5hich it denies6 namely, nat.!al !i1ht, and its p!es.pposition, the
concept of a h.man nat.!e o! a h.man !eason conside!ed as .nchan1eable,
ete!nal, identical th!o.1ho.t the a1es, the nations, the civili4ations, the social
classes (2te!n -'U2, p. -?').
Iat.!al !i1ht isn:t possible if all that men can 0no5 abo.t it is that the
/.estion abo.t the p!inciples of *.stice allo5s fo! a va!iety of ans5e!s none of
5hich can be p!oved as bette! than the othe!s. Iat.!al !i1ht is not possible if
h.man tho.1ht, tho.1h impe!fect, is .nable to solve the p!oblem of the
p!inciples of *.stice in a t!.e 5ay, hence in a .nive!sally valid 5ay (2t!a.ss
-'@?, p. 2U).
In these statements, each of the p!ota1onists defines his position as incompatible 5ith
and antithetic to that of his opponent. F.!the!mo!e, no mention of a thi!d possibility is
made by eithe!. +he!efo!e, both seem to .n/.estionably accept the dichotomo.s
nat.!e of the iss.e, as 5ell as its conse/.ence, namely, that one has no option b.t to
adopt one position o! the othe!. ,nde! these conditions, none of the contende!s needs
to f.!the! dichotomi4e the debate. "oth can !athe! t!y to e3ploit pa!tic.la!ities of the
dichotomo.s positions as a!1.ments in thei! favo! o! a1ainst the adve!sa!y.
2t!a.ss, fo! e3ample, ma0es .se of alle1ed self%definin1 feat.!es of histo!icism
in o!de! to sho5 its abs.!d conse/.ences ; vi4., its self%defeatin1 cha!acte!. +his is
appa!ent in the follo5in1 tu quoque move:
Histo!icism claims that all h.man tho.1hts o! beliefs a!e histo!ical and
the!efo!e bo.nd to die6 b.t histo!icism itself is a h.man tho.1ht6 the!efo!e
histo!icism can only have limited validity, o! else it cannot be t!.e. +o asse!t
the histo!icist thesis means to do.bt it and, th.s, to t!anscend it. RST
Histo!icism th!ives on the fact that it inconsistently e3empts itself f!om its
o5n ve!dict on all h.man tho.1ht (2t!a.ss -'@?, p. 2U).
+he same is the case in the slippery slope move th!o.1h 5hich he claims that
histo!icism leads to nihilism (ibid.). "oth moves, in thei! ea1e!ness to demonst!ate the
.n5o!thiness of the opposite pole, in fact p!esent it as not bein1 a !eal, 5ei1hty
contende!6 the dichotomy is th.s tendentio.sly p!esented as .nbalanced (li0e the
#!ee0s vs. ba!ba!ians one)6 !athe! than a diffic.lt p!oblem to be solved, it is vi!t.ally
p!e%decided in favo! of the a!1.e!:s pa!ty. In this conte3t, the tu quoque and slippery
7
slope a!e, neve!theless, dichotomi4ation moves in so fa! as they e3a11e!ate the
pola!ity and ta0e advanta1e of s.ch an e3a11e!ation fo! facilitatin1 the a!1.e!:s
a!1.mentative tas0.
2tein, on the othe! hand, !eplies in a spi!it of mode!ation, albeit 5itho.t 1ivin1
.p the dichotomy 5hich is the a3is of the debate. He be1ins by concedin1 2t!a.ss:
point that histo!icism:s claim to validity cannot be .nive!sal:

RST let .s !athe! admit that histo!icism cannot claim timeless validity 5itho.t
violatin1 its ve!y p!inciple. RST "y vi!t.e of the cate1o!ies at o.! disposal at
this moment of histo!y, h.man tho.1hts, belief and val.es appea! histo!ically
conditioned RST 2ince, besides the cate1o!ies of o.! epoch, 5e have no othe!s
at o.! disposal RST 5e m.st say that, in o.! epoch, histo!icism appea!s to be a
5ell established theo!y. +he fact that 5e cannot affi!m the ete!nal, timeless,
t!ans%histo!ical validity of histo!icism does not e3cl.de the possibility of its
bein1 valid fo! the p!esent histo!ical epoch 5hich 1ave bi!th to it (2te!n -'U2,
pp. -82%-8?).
He then !e%desc!ibes the !adicali4ed dichotomy as opposin1 9e3t!eme: !elativism and
absol.tism, none of 5hich co!!esponds to the ve!sion of 9mode!ate: histo!icism he
act.ally defends. F!om this point of vie5, 9e3t!eme histo!icism: is nothin1 b.t a
fi1ment of the ima1ination of opponents li0e 2t!a.ss, desi1ned fo! simplistically
dichotomi4in1 the iss.e and 5innin1 the battle, !athe! than solvin1 a tho!ny p!oblem.
+h.s dichotomi4ed, ho5eve!, the pola!ity becomes in fact easie! to de%dichotomi4e
than0s to the e3istence of a !easonable inte!mediate alte!native s.ch as 9mode!ate
histo!icism:.
@.2 Fact vs. val.e
(s o.! second e3ample, let .s conside! >.tnam:s (2002) head%on attac0 on an
old and ent!enched philosophical dichotomy. In addition to his c!iti/.e of a specific
dichotomy, >.tnam also c!itici4es the e3cesses of dichotomi4ation as a st!ate1y and
s.11ests ho5 to avoid them 5itho.t fallin1 in the opposite e3a11e!ation of
s.pp!essin1 alto1ethe! distinctions.
>.tnam:s specific ta!1et encompasses H.me:s famo.s is vs. o.1ht dichotomy,
as 5ell as its 20
th
cent.!y co.nte!pa!ts, s.ch as 2tevenson:s (-'U?) fact vs. val.e and
the lo1ical positivists: scientific vs. .nscientific. >.tnam p!epa!es his onsla.1ht by a
c!iti/.e of the analytic vs. synthetic dichotomy, 5hich is essential to lo1ical
positivism.
@
,p to a point, he sides 5ith P.ine:s (-'U-) a!1.ment, especially in that it
sho5s that the positivist notion of 9analytic: is ill defined. Get, he does not 1o all the
5ay 5ith P.ine in denyin1 any sense 5hatsoeve! to this notion and adoptin1 the
latte!:s holistic position.
U
+his, acco!din1 to >.tnam, 5o.ld amo.nt to th!o5in1 the
baby 5ith the bath:s 5ate!. +he baby is, in >.tnam:s te!minolo1y, a .sef.l distinction,
5hich 5e .nde!stand and .se, bet5een t5o 0inds of meanin1. (ltho.1h attempts to
define p!ecisely this distinction ; employin1, amon1 othe! means, its pola!i4ation into
a dichotomy ; have failed, this is no *.stification fo! th!o5in1 it o.t.
$
8hat one m.st
!e*ect a!e not val.able distinctions (amon1 5hich >.tnam !an1es also fact vs. val.e)
b.t thei! t!ansfo!mation into st!ict dichotomies:
+his is .ndo.btedly the case, *.st as it is .ndo.btedly the case that the!e is a
distinction to be d!a5n (and one that is .sef.l in some conte3ts) bet5een
8
chemical *.d1ments and *.d1ments that do not belon1 to the field of chemist!y
(>.tnam 2002, p. -').
8hat 5o!!ies >.tnam is that, 5hen a distinction becomes a dichotomy it
.s.ally ac/.i!es, in addition to p!es.med lo1ical p!ecision, also a metaphysical impo!t
it does not have as a me!e distinction.
8
Hence, the 5a!nin1:
ut nothing metaphysical follows from the e!istence of a fact"value distinction
in this (modest# sense (ibid.).
It is the ove!loo0in1 of s.ch a 5a!nin1 by lo1ical positivism, in spite of thei!
appa!ently ca.tio.s fo!m.lations s.ch as the one belo5, that pa!tic.la!ly i!!itates
>.tnam:
(ll statements belon1in1 to metaphysics, !e1.lative ethics, and (metaphysical
epistemolo1y) have this defect, a!e in fact .nve!ifiable and the!efo!e
.nscientific. In the Liennese =i!cle, 5e a!e acc.stomed to desc!ibe s.ch
statements as nonsense (afte! 8itt1enstein). +his te!minolo1y is to be
.nde!stood as implyin1 a lo1ical, not say a psycholo1ical distinction6 its .se is
intended to asse!t only that the statements in /.estion do not possess a ce!tain
lo1ical cha!acte!istic common to all p!ope! scientific statements6 5e do not
intend to asse!t the impossibility of associatin1 any conceptions o! ima1es
5ith these lo1ically invalid statements. =onceptions can be associated 5ith
any a!bit!a!ily compo.nded se!ies of 5o!ds6 and metaphysical statements a!e
!ichly evocative of associations and feelin1s both in a.tho!s and !eade!s
(=a!nap -'?&, p. 226 /.oted by >.tnam 2002, p. -8).
'
Fo!m.lations s.ch as a!e typical e3amples of 5hat >.tnam calls 9inflated:
distinctions. (s opposed to this, he !ecommends 9disinflation::
If 5e disinflate the factMval.e dichotomy, 5hat 5e 1et is this: the!e is a
distinction to be d!a5n (one that is .sef.l in some conte3ts) bet5een ethical
*.d1ments and othe! so!ts of *.d1ments (>.tnam 2002, p. -').
9Disinflation: is th.s needed 5hen a distinction dichotomi4ed to the point of
becomin1 an absol.te, .nc!itically applied dichotomy. Distinctions !e/.i!e, >.tnam
s.11ests, sensitiveness to the conte3t 5he!e they a!e applied, 5he!eas dichotomies:
cha!m lies p!ecisely in the fact that they a!e applicable 5itho.t s.ch a !elativi4ation.
=ombattin1 this disinflation temptation is th.s a typically de%dichotomi4in1 st!ate1y.
It involves a n.mbe! of moves >.tnam:s a!1.mentation in this pa!tic.la! case
ill.st!ates, moves that can be easily em.lated in analo1o.s cases.
@.? =ombinin1 dichotomi4ation 5ith de%dichotomi4ationQ
K.! ne3t e3ample is pec.lia! in that one of the contende!s ; 5hose moves I
5ill disc.ss in some detail ; .nde!ta0es the c!iti/.e of a dichotomy both 9f!om
5ithin: and 9f!om 5itho.t:, as it 5e!e6 in this 5ay, he places himself in a position to
p!opose an alte!native that 9t!anscends: the c!itici4ed dichotomy both th!o.1h
!efo!min1 and th!o.1h side%steppin1 it ; a /.ite o!i1inal fo!m of de%dichotomi4ation
o! some st!an1e fo!m of combinin1 it 5ith dichotomi4ationQ
9
8e a!e tal0in1 abo.t a 9pa!ticipato!y: app!oach to social science that has
p!ovo0ed intense cont!ove!sy. It has been d.bbed in the -'&0s 9action !esea!ch:, a
te!m that desi1nates the attempt to me!1e !esea!ch and action in the st.dy of social
phenomena. Impo!tant p!o*ects follo5in1 this app!oach have foc.sed on 5o!0
p!oced.!es, 5hich aim to investi1ate systematically Ethe 5ay in 5hich the activity of
the staff o! 5o!0e!s in a 1iven ente!p!ise cont!ib.tes, o! fails to cont!ib.te, to its
o.tcomesF. Kne of its cha!acte!istic feat.!es is that it is 9pa!ticipato!y: in the sense
that Ethe staff 5hose 5o!0 is bein1 st.died themselves plays a pa!t in the !esea!chF
(+o.lmin -''Ua, p. 2). (ction !esea!ch is f.!the! desc!ibed as a 9clinical a!t:, 5hose
ob*ective is not *.st desc!iption b.t imp!ovement ; a pa!allel that E!eminds .s that the
o.tcome of action !esea!ch is phronesis not episteme: p!actical 5isdom not theo!etical
1!aspF (+o.lmin -''Ub, p. 2-0).
Kne of the c!itics of action !esea!ch, (a1e "Wd1e! 2o!ensen, is !epo!ted to
have said EIt may be KO in its o5n 5ay, b.t don:t call it Hesea!chF (+o.lmin -''Ub,
p. 20?). +his and, p!es.mably, simila! !eactions p!ovo0ed a fie!ce co.nte!attac0 on
9mainst!eam social science and philosophy of science:, 5hich a!e cha!1ed 5ith
ma0in1 the 5!on1 choice on a se!ies of 1!o.ndin1 dichotomies ; theo!y vs. p!actice,
.nive!sal vs. pa!tic.la!, 1ene!al vs. local, ete!nal vs. timely, abst!act vs. conc!ete:
Mo!e !adically, 5e shall 1o on to co.nte!attac0 the ob*ections f!om
mainst!eam social science and philosophy of science. (s 5e shall a!1.e, the
s.b*ect matte! of social !esea!ch is not *.st p!actice !athe! than theo!y: its
foc.s is also pa!tic.la! not .nive!sal, local not 1ene!al, timely not ete!nal, and
; above all ; conc!ete not abst!act (+o.lmin -''Ua, p. ?).
+he debate bet5een the p!oponents of pa!ticipato!y action !esea!ch and the
!ep!esentatives of mainst!eam social science, vie5ed as !ep!esentatives of 9Hi1h o!
>.!e 2cience: (+o.lmin -''Ub, p. 20@) becomes, then, nothin1 less than a debate
abo.t the nat.!e of science and scientific method. +o.lmin:s stand in this debate is
decidedly a1ainst the mainst!eam position on all co.nts, as he fo!cef.lly p.ts it: E+he
ove!all theo!ies social scientists p.!s.ed fo! m.ch of the 20
th
cent.!y t.!n o.t, indeed,
to be d!eamsF (p. 2-@). (s a defende! of pa!ticipato!y action !esea!ch, in pa!tic.la!, he
st!esses the p!io!ity of p!actice ove! theo!y, on the 1!o.nds that Eappeals to theo!y a!e
themselves *.st one p!actice amon1 othe!sF (+o.lmin -''Ua, p. ?).
,p to this point, the debate seems to ta0e place within the space defined by a
family of dichotomies, 5ith each contende! acc.sin1 the othe! of bein1 5!on1 in thei!
alle1iance to one of the poles. (ttac0in1 the 9mainst!eam: position fo! adoptin1 ", =,
D, etc., 5he!eas it sho.ld adopt, instead, C", C=, CD, etc. is not de%dichotomi4in1 the
debate, b.t !athe! at least p!ese!vin1 its dichotomo.s nat.!e and pe!haps even
!adicali4in1 it.
It is only 5hen the Eo.tcome of o.! !efle3ionsF on the cl.ste! of p!oblems he
identifies in the debate
-0
is depicted by +o.lmin as conve!1in1 to5a!ds one pa!tic.la!
iss.e that E.nde!lies the 5hole methodolo1ical debateF that de%dichotomi4ation
eme!1es as his dominant st!ate1y. Fo!, the .nde!lyin1 /.estion he !aises is:
RDToes the ph!ase 9scientific method: cove! a sin1le .nive!sal set of
p!oced.!es, applicable in investi1ations of all 0inds, !e1a!dless of the s.b*ect
matte! o! inte!ests involvedQ K! can scientific in/.i!ies 5ith diffe!ent s.b*ects
; h.man instit.tions (say) !athe! than s.batomic pa!ticles ; o! 5ith diffe!ent
inte!ests at sta0e ; clinical techni/.es !athe! than physiolo1ical theo!ies ;
1
0
employ diffe!ent sets of p!oced.!es, dependin1 on the special nat.!e of the
pa!tic.la! in/.i!yQ (+o.lmin -''Ub, p. 20&).
Kbvio.sly, the me!e act of 9as0in1: 5hethe! scientific method mi1ht not be pl.!al
!athe! than .nita!y amo.nts to s.11estin1 an alte!native to the poles of the
dichotomies that !emained .n/.estioned so fa!. (s soon as this step is ta0en, the de%
dichotomi4in1 o!ientation of +o.lmin:s a!1.ment p!evails and the debate:s a!ena is
not any mo!e within the space of options defined by the dichotomies 5ith 5hich the
9mainst!eam: vie5 ope!ates, b.t !athe! /.estions this space and p!oposes to en!ich it
5ith alte!natives it e3cl.des. lements fo! const!.ctin1 one o! mo!e of s.ch
alte!natives a!e s.ccessively p!esented and become the b.l0 of the a!1.ment:
9Methodolo1ical democ!acy: (pp. 20$%208), 9pa!ticipant obse!vation: and 9thic0
desc!iptions: in anth!opolo1y (p. 20'), the conte3t.ali4in1 of the choice of
methodolo1y to conc!ete cases and pa!tic.la! ci!c.mstances (pp. 2-0%2-?), the
va!iability of the notion of 9ob*ectivity: (pp. 2-@%2-8), etc. ,ltimately, th!o.1h this
conce!ted attac0 it is the idea of the .nity of science
--
; a1ain, a ma*o! tenet of lo1ical
positivism ; that is called into /.estion via the de%dichotomi4ation of the f.ndamental
dichotomo.s belief .pon 5hich it !ests: eithe! the!e is one method 5he!eby the
!eliability of science can be !eco1ni4ed 5hateve! the ob*ects and ci!c.mstances of
in/.i!y o! the!e is no s.ch a thin1 as 9science:.
-2

If I am not completely off the ma!0 in identifyin1 de%dichotomi4ation as the
basic st!ate1ic line of +o.lmin:s a!1.mentation, it is /.ite p.44lin1 5hy he sho.ld
int!od.ce the boo0 th!o.1h an a!1.mentative move that is nat.!ally .nde!stood as a
dichotomi4in1 one. 2ho.ld 5e conside! that, fo! +o.lmin, these t5o di!ections can be
someho5 cohe!ently combined, and that this 5as his intentionQ If this is the case, it is
no do.bt 5o!th e3aminin1 as a possibility, beca.se it 5o.ld demonst!ate that
dichotomi4ation and de%dichotomi4ation a!e not incompatible, i.e., they do not
constit.te a dichotomy in the st!ict lo1ical sense and the opposition bet5een them is
!athe! of the info!mal 0ind.
+his inte!p!etation is s.ppo!ted by the .se of the spatial metapho! 9"eyond N:
in the boo0:s title, 5he!e N D +heo!y.
-?
( title s.ch as this hi1hli1hts the idea that N is
an obstacle that bloc0s the 5ay to5a!ds !eachin1 some 5o!thy aim, and as s.ch m.st
be ove!come. ( boo0 bea!in1 this 0ind of title, the!efo!e, is e3pected to contain both,
a c!iti/.e of N and at least a s0etch of 5hat lies ahead, once N is !emoved. In o.!
case, the obstacle to be c!itici4ed and ove!come in o!de! to .nbloc0 the 5ay to a
p!ope! social science is the t!aditional vie5 that science means theo!etical science.
+he most di!ect 5ay to achieve this seems to be a f!ontal attac0 on 9+heo!y:. ".t s.ch
an attac0 5o.ld be liable to p!esent the boo0 as acceptin1 an e3tant dichotomy and
adoptin1 its opposed pole ; p!es.mably 9>!actice:. +his 5o.ld be, ho5eve!, a !athe!
mea1e! 9beyond: achievement fo! a boo0 that attempts to ove!come the
theo!yMp!actice and othe! dichotomies, c!eatin1 instead hyb!id concepts s.ch as
9action !esea!ch:. 2ince this is 5hat the boo0 act.ally t!ies to do, its main tas0 is to
!emove not only one pole, b.t the 5hole dichotomy and its 0ey st!ate1y is de%
dichotomi4ation. ".t then, the title is misleadin1, f!om an a!1.mentative vie5point. It
sho.ld contain, ne3t to the N, a G ma0in1 th.s clea! ; as in Iiet4sche:s eyond $ood
and Evil ; 5hat is the dichotomy that m.st be de%dichotomi4ed in o!de! to open
!adically ne5 ho!i4ons. +he!efo!e, +o.lmin:s 9metapho!ically and a!1.mentatively
co!!ect: title sho.ld have been 9"eyond +heo!y and >!actice:.
-&
U. Dichotomi4ation at the meta%level
1
1
( theo!y of debates, i.e., the meta%level that deals 5ith debates /.a ob*ects of
investi1ation, is not f!ee of debates, of co.!se. (s s.ch, it sho.ld be e3pected to find
at this level too dichotomies in the concept.ali4ation and typolo1y of debates and,
conse/.ently, dichotomi4in1 and de%dichotomi4in1 st!ate1ies in defendin1 o!
attac0in1 these theo!etical p!oposals. In this and the follo5in1 sections, 5e move to
the meta%level, foc.sin1 in pa!tic.la! on the ta3onomy of debates. Ho5eve!, as 5e
have seen, a !easonable case can be made fo! de%dichotomi4in1 the theo!yMp!actice
opposition (see 2ection @.?)6 the!efo!e, it sho.ld be e3pected that the meta%level
cate1o!i4ation of a debate 5ill infl.ence the act.al cond.ct of that debate.
2.ch an infl.ence can be obse!ved 5ith !espect to the dichotomi4ation of the
types of debate and the application by the contende!s of the !es.ltin1 dichotomy in
inte!p!etin1 the adve!sa!y:s moves and decidin1 abo.t thei! o5n follo5in1 steps. In
the te!minolo1y I have adopted, the t5o ideal types of debate t!aditionally vie5ed as
dichotomo.sly !elated a!e 9disc.ssion: and 9disp.te:.
-@
( discussion is the ideali4ed fo!m of a scientific debate. Its aim is dete!minin1
5hich of the positions in conf!ontation is t!.e, the othe! bein1 pe!fo!ce mista0en6 a
p!oced.!e accepted by the (comm.nity of) disc.ssants is ass.med to be able to yield
an .n/.estionable decision, to 5hose t!.th 5inne! and loose!, /.a !ational debate!s,
a!e committed in advance6 and the p!ivile1ed a!1.mentative move in this p!oced.!e is
lo1ical, mathematical o! e3pe!imental p!oof. ( dispute, at the othe! pole of the
dichotomy, is the ideali4ed fo!m of a battle of 5its. Its aim is victo!y ove! the
adve!sa!y6 no p!oced.!e capable of decidin1 the iss.e so as to f.lly and decisively
convince the (comm.nity of) disp.tants is available6 and no const!aints limit the 0inds
of a!1.mentative st!ata1ems desi1ned to lead to the desi!ed victo!y, ho5eve!
momenta!y it may be.
2eve!al dichotomies .nde!lie and yield s.ppo!t to the dichotomi4ation of the
pai! discussionMdispute, both at the theo!etical level and its .se in act.al debates:
Disc.ssion Disp.te
The t!.th %y t!.th
Iss.e can be decided Iss.e cannot be decided
Ao1ical Hheto!ical
Hational I!!ational
Debate abo.t contents Debate abo.t attit.des
Gields opinion chan1e Does not yield opinion chan1e
Knce contende!s pe!ceive the concepts of discussion and dispute as !adically opposed
on so many 1!o.nds, i.e., as m.t.ally e3cl.sive and e3ha.stively cove!in1 all possible
debates, they a!e compelled to vie5 the pa!tic.la! debate in 5hich they a!e involved
as either a discussion or a dispute6 and this choice 5ill dete!mine thei! e3pectations,
inte!p!etations, and behavio! in the debate. ( contende! may stic0 to hisMhe! initial
choice of cate1o!y o!, in the li1ht of event.al violations by the adve!sa!y of hisMhe!
e3pectations o! inte!p!etations of the adve!sa!y:s moves, shift to the othe! and !eact
acco!din1ly. +his flip%flop effect that admits no inte!mediate alte!native is not
.n.s.al.
( noto!io.s e3ample of this phenomenon is the clash bet5een Isaac Ie5ton
and Hobe!t Hoo0e. +hese !eno5ned scientists, both membe!s of the Hoyal 2ociety,
1
2
both mathematically o!iented e3pe!imentalists, en1a1e in a violent debate abo.t the
theo!etical inte!p!etation of Ie5ton:s p!ism e3pe!iment, 5hich becomes a decade
lon1 all%o.t conf!ontation on many f!onts. (cco!din1 to Ie5ton, the!e can be no
do.bt that his obse!vations demonst!ate the t!.th of his theo!y of li1ht:s composition.
".t Hoo0e, 5ho does not /.estion Ie5ton:s obse!vations, does /.estion his claim
that all theo!ies othe! than his a!e !.led o.t by s.ch !es.lts. Hoo0e a!1.es that his o5n
hypothesis is compatible 5ith the !es.lts and c!itici4es Ie5ton:s notion of
e!perimentum crucis as capable of p!ovidin1 decisive e3pe!imental p!oof of a theo!y.
Ie5ton, de!isive of hypotheses, dismisses Hoo0e:s a!1.ments as .nscientific. If the
debate be1ins as a civili4ed discussion bet5een t!.th%sea!chin1 scientists, it soon
becomes a bitte! dispute, 5he!e hidden motives and ab.se a!e not !a!e.
-U
+he lac0 of at least one theo!etically *.stified and 1ene!ally ac0no5led1ed
inte!mediate cate1o!y le1itimi4es a patte!n of concept.ali4in1 debates that ind.ces a
p!oc!.stean simplification of the alte!natives in the debated iss.es, a !ed.ctionism that
c.ts do5n details, comple3ity and p!ecision, and the ill.sion of easy .nde!standin1
and e/.ally easy choice bet5een the dichotomo.s options. In p.blic debates,
especially .nde! the additional const!aint of time limitations in assemblies,
p!ofessional con1!esses, o! the media, this patte!n is f.lly ope!ative and !eco1ni4able.
Get, p.blic debates also bea! 5itness, occasionally, to the need to ove!come the
na!!o5, dichotomi4ation%imposed patte!n: fo! a 5hile ; typically in 9open disc.ssion:
time ; yesMno /.estions a!e no lon1e! heeded to, in spite of fo!mal anno.ncements,
!e/.ests of p!evio.s p!epa!ation, and insistence by the chai! o! the inte!vie5e!6
.nfo!eseen alte!natives a!e imp!ovised on the spot and non%conventional ans5e!s
become th.s s.ddenly possible6 it is as if comple3ity e!.pts f!om no5he!e, !evealin1
the e!sat4 cha!acte! of !eady%made simplified dichotomo.s options.
In a la!1e p!ofessional con1!ess, 5he!e I had the oppo!t.nity to spea0 and
obse!ve (as a cont!ove!sies !esea!che!), the Fi!st 8o!ld =on1!ess on =ont!ove!sies in
Ie.!olo1y ("e!lin, U%' 2eptembe!, 200$), the sessions dealin1 5ith the c.!!ently most
cont!ove!sial iss.es in the field ; e.1., m.ltiple scle!osis (M2) ; 5e!e st!.ct.!ed in a
clea! dichotomi4ed fo!m: a yesMno /.estion and t5o spea0e!s pic0ed .p as defende!s
of each of the possible ans5e!s. ".t the debate!s not al5ays complied 5ith this
fo!mat:s const!aints. Fo! e3ample, to the /.estion E=linically Isolated 2ynd!omes
(=I2): +o t!eat o! not to t!eatQF, one of them !eplied E2ta!t ea!lyF and the othe! EDon:t
h.!!yF. +hey th.s employed a 5ell 0no5n p!a1matic device to convey both thei!
a1!eement (as a p!es.pposition) and disa1!eement, the!eby fo!e1!o.ndin1 the /.estion
of timin1 and ci!c.mstances of the t!eatment as the iss.e 5o!th debatin1. In anothe!
case, a compo.nd /.estion, EIs M2 a sin1le nosolo1ic entity d.e to an a.to%imm.ne
mechanismQF, became the occasion to foc.s the debate on one of its components: the
ca.sal claim. (1ain, neithe! the EGesF no! the EIoF ans5e!s denied the p!esence of
inflammato!y b!ain o! spinal cho!d a.to%imm.ne !esponses in M26 b.t both shifted
the iss.e to 5hethe! these p!ocesses can e3plain the clinical synd!ome and the co.!se
of the disease, and the!efo!e can be conside!ed the main ta!1et of d!.1 development
and t!eatment. In both e3amples, the 9comple3ification: of the iss.e p!events the easy
dichotomi4ation of the debate.
$ De%dichotomi4ation at the meta%level
+he e3amples above clea!ly indicate the ins.fficiency of a dichotomo.s
conception of debates fo! handlin1 comple3 scientific ; and ce!tainly also p!actical ;
iss.es. +hat is, they sho5 that the models of discussion and dispute alone a!e not
1
3
s.fficient fo! an acco.nt of all va!ieties of debates. Get, altho.1h e3amples s.ch as
these a!e /.ite common in the histo!y of debates, it is only !ecently that the de%
dichotomi4ation of the still dominant meta%level .mb!ella, the discussionMdispute
dichotomy, has be1.n.
In my o5n case, besides the desc!iptive inade/.acy of this dyadic scheme and
the .nnat.!al flip%flop effect it fo!ces .pon debate!s, 5hat p!ompted my sea!ch fo! at
least one additional ideal type to add to the ta3onomy 5as the enco.nte! 5ith a
diffe!ent app!oach to cont!ove!sy in the 5o!0 of #. 8. Aeibni4 ; an app!oach vi!t.ally
i1no!ed by a t!adition that hi1hli1hted, instead, his p!o*ect of developin1 an
al1o!ithmic p!oced.!e fo! solvin1 all cont!ove!sies.
-$
+his hithe!to ove!loo0ed
app!oach s.11ested a type of cont!ove!sy 5he!e not the decision (be it the
dete!mination of the t!.th o! of the 5inne!) is the p!ima!y 1oal, b.t !athe! the
const!.ction o! eme!1ence of a sol.tion th!o.1h the dialectic coope!ation of the
debate!s.
Het!ospectively, I no5 see the move that !es.lted f!om these b!iefly desc!ibed
ci!c.mstances as a classical de%dichotomi4ation move, 5hich led to the elabo!ation
and mise en valeur of the concept of a ne5 ideal type of debate and to the
t!ansfo!mation of an ea!lie! dyadic ta3onomy into a t!iadic one. +ho.1h the ne5
cate1o!y, ch!istened 9cont!ove!sy:, o5es some of its feat.!es to Aeibni4, neithe! it no!
the ta3onomy of 5hich it is pa!t and pa!cel, is to be fo.nd in his 5!itin1s. 8hat
act.ally defines controversy is the set of s.bstantial diffe!ences that distin1.ish it
f!om both discussion and dispute. (nd its *.stification and val.e m.st be *.d1ed by its
desc!iptive and e3planato!y po5e!.
In a controversy, .nli0e in a dispute, the ob*ective is not victo!y, b.t !ational
pe!s.asion6 each contende! does not ass.me a priori that the adve!sa!y is enti!ely
5!on1 5hile he is enti!ely !i1ht, th.s abandonin1 f!om the o.tset any hope of
!ationally pe!s.adin1 the othe! to chan1e his mind. 3te!nal inte!vention (e.1., by a
t!ib.nal) can dissolve the dispute, b.t .s.ally does not chan1e the contende!s: belief
in the co!!ectness and *.stice of thei! positions. Kn the othe! hand, controversy diffe!s
f!om discussion in that, 5hile it is p!edicated .pon the possibility of !ational
pe!s.asion, it does not ass.me that this can only be achieved th!o.1h the acceptance
by the contende!s of the .n/.estionable !es.lts of the application of a method they
.nconditionally accept. In controversy, the /.estionin1 of basic ass.mptions of all
so!ts is al5ays possible. +his leads to a 5ide span of disa1!eements that can be /.ite
!adical ; incl.din1 do.bts abo.t the alle1ed ce!tainty of the decision p!oced.!es.
Hence, !ational pe!s.asion in controversy has not the po5e! of the d!amatic !evelation
of the t!.th as it is s.pposed to have in discussion.
In s.m, controversy diffe!s f!om dispute and f!om discussion in its aim and in
the details of each of its 0ey pa!amete!s6 b.t f!om the point of vie5 of this pape!, the
f.ndamental diffe!ence to be st!essed is the fact that its definin1 pa!amete!s, cont!a!y
to those of its pa!tne!s in the t!iad, a!e all non%dichotomo.s in nat.!e. +his feat.!e of
controversy 1!ants it a fle3ibility, an open%endedness, a challen1in1 attit.de vis%<%vis
established beliefs and p!actices, a non%do1matic !ationality that acco.nt fo! its
special cont!ib.tion to the 1!o5th of 0no5led1e and its e3planation: the c!eation of a
space 5he!e !adical innovation 5ithin !ational bo.nda!ies becomes possible.
8. He%dichotomi4in1 a de%dichotomi4ed t!iadQ
If the ve!y distinction bet5een the definitional p!ope!ties of the pai!
discussionMdispute and of controversy t.!ns o.t to be based on 5hethe! these
1
4
p!ope!ties a!e dichotomo.s o! not, and if dichotomi4ation and de%dichotomi4ation
play indeed a dete!minant !ole in the st!.ct.!e and cond.ct of debates at the
theo!etical, st!ate1ic, and tactical levels, it is nat.!al to inco!po!ate them in the t!iadic
scheme, at least as an additional pa!amete! fo! cha!acte!i4in1 the types of debate (as
in the table belo5):
DISPUTE CONTROVERSY DISCUSSION
&'CT(R) PERS*AS'(+ TR*T,
(IM
-(CA-'.E/ $E+ERA-'.E/ -(CA-'.E/ N+I2IKI
+( '+TER+A-
%ET,(/
%ET,(/
0*EST'(+A-E
/EC'S'(+
%ET,(/
>HK=D,H
STRATA$E% AR$*%E+T PR((1 +G>I=(A MKL
DICHOTOMIZ2 DE-DICHOTOMIZ2 DICHOTOMIZ2 STRATEGY
/'SS(-*T'(+ RES(-*T'(+ S(-*T'(+ IDII#
+he addition of the Est!ate1yF !o5 is both s.11estive and p.44lin1. Kn the s.11estive
side, it leads one to in/.i!e 5hethe! the!e a!e not t5o 0inds of cont!ove!sy 5hich
employ diffe!ent fo!ms of de%dichotomi4ation, *.st as the!e a!e t5o types of debate
that employ diffe!ent fo!ms of dichotomi4ation6 in fact, a positive ans5e! is not fa!
fetched, fo! indeed de%dichotomi4ation may lead to one o! mo!e disc!ete alte!natives
o! to a contin..m of possible alte!natives bet5een the poles of the c!itici4ed
dichotomy. F.!the!mo!e, since ; as 5e have seen ; the choice of st!ate1y nat.!ally
o!1ani4es the types of debates in a ne5 dichotomy, 5hose c!ite!ion is a p!ope!ty
.nde!lyin1 these types: feat.!es as desc!ibed in the othe! !o5s, s.ch a choice s.!ely
occ.pies a hi1he! hie!a!chic position than the othe! !o5s. +he 1!aph belo5 depicts
these he.!istic e3plo!ations:
STRATEGY
DICHOTOMIZATION
DE-DICHOTOMIZATION
DISCUSSION
DISPUTE CONTROVERSY
DISCRETE CONTINUUM
1
5
".t this 1!aph also calls attention to the p.44lin1 side of the e3plo!ation it
helps to pict.!e. Haven:t 5e ended .p !e%dichotomi4in1 5hat 5e .nde!too0 to de%
dichotomi4eQ Kn the face of it, yes, of co.!se. ".t in the co.!se of o.! investi1ation,
5e lea!ned somethin1 abo.t dichotomies in 1ene!al and abo.t the dichotomi4ationMde%
dichotomi4ation one in pa!tic.la!, somethin1 that mi1ht help to ove!come this
appa!ent ci!c.la!ity. 8e lea!ned that dichotomies a!e not absol.te 1ivens, b.t p.!pose%
dependent const!.cts, i.e., p!a1matic, not semantic entities. (s s.ch, they can al5ays
be de%dichotomi4ed, p!ovided someone finds s.ch an .nde!ta0in1 of s.fficient
inte!est in o!de! to spend in it the !e/.i!ed ene!1y. 2.ppose, ho5eve!, the p.44le is
p.!s.ed and it is f.!the! s.11ested that it is an inevitable feat.!e of o.! thin0in1 that
5e cannot 1et !id alto1ethe! of dichotomies, especially at the hi1he! (o! deepe!) levels
of abst!action. +o this I, fo! one, 5o.ld !eply that these levels a!e too fa! f!om my
!each as yet, and I am pe!fectly happy 5ith livin1 in a p!a1matic concept.al .nive!se
pop.lated by dichotomies 5e a!e still able to de%dichotomi4e.
Hefe!ences
(ye!, (. ). (-'U$). -anguage3 Truth and -ogic. Aondon: Licto! #ollanc4.
=a!nap, H. (-'?&). The *nity of Science. Aondon: Oe1an >a.l, +!ench, H.bne!.
=!emaschi, 2. X M. Dascal. Malth.s and Hica!do on conomic Methodolo1y. ,istory
of Political Economy (-''U) ?, &$@%@--.
=!emaschi, 2. X M. Dascal (-''8). Malth.s and Hica!do: +5o styles fo! economic
theo!y. Science in Conte!t --(2), 22'%2@&.
Dascal, M. (-'$-). mpi!ical si1nificance and !elevance. Philosophia -, 8-%-0U.
Dascal, M. (-''U). +he "eyond nte!p!ise. In: ). 2te5a!t (d.), eyond the Sym4ol
%odel: Reflections on the Representational +ature of -anguage (pp. ?0?%??&), (lbany,
IG: 2,IG >!ess R!ep!. as =hap. -- of M. Dascal, 'nterpretation and *nderstanding,
(mste!dam: )ohn "en*amins, 200?T.
Dascal, M. (-''8a). +ypes of polemics and types of polemical moves. In: 2. =me*!0ova,
). Hoffmannova, K. M.lle!ova X ). 2vetla (ds.), /ialogue Analysis &', vol. - (pp. -@%
??), +Ybin1en: Ma3 Iiemeye!.
Dascal, M. (-''8b). +he st.dy of cont!ove!sies and the theo!y and histo!y of science.
Science in Conte!t --(2), -&$%-@&.
Dascal, M. (-''8c). =ont!ove!ses et polZmi/.es. In M. "lay X H. Halle.3 (ds.), -a
Science Classique3 5&'e65&'''e: /ictionnaire Critique (pp. 2U%?@), >a!is:
Flamma!ion.
Dascal, M. (200-). Ho5 !ational can a polemic ac!oss the analytic%continental
9divide: beQ Inte!national )o.!nal of >hilosophical 2t.dies '(?): ?-?%??'.
#!ice, H.>. X 2t!a5son, >.F. (-'@U). In defence of a do1ma. The Philosophical
Review U@, -&-%-@8.
Ha!e, H.M. (-'@2). The -anguage of %orals K3fo!d: K3fo!d ,nive!sity >!ess.
Aeibni4, #.8. (200U). The Art of Controversies. d. by M. Dascal. Do!d!echt:
2p!in1e!.
Aloyd, #..H. (-''2). Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early
$ree7 Thought. Indianapolis: Hac0ett >.blishin1 =ompany.
Ie5ton, I. (-'$8) 'saac +ewton8s Papers and -etters on +atural Philosophy (ed. ".
=ohen). =amb!id1e, M(: Ha!va!d ,nive!sity >!ess.
1
6
>lato (-''$). Complete 9or7s. d. by ).M. =oope!. Indianapolis: Hac0ett >.blishin1
=ompany.
>ombo, K. (200U). *nidade da Ci:ncia: Programas3 1iguras e %et;foras. =ha!neca
da =apa!ica (>+): di[\es D.a!te Heis.
>.tnam, H. (2002). The Collapse of the 1act " &alue /ichotomy and (ther Essays.
=amb!id1e, M(: Ha!va!d ,nive!sity >!ess.
P.ine, 8.L.K. (-'U-). +5o do1mas of empi!icism. In: 1rom a -ogical Point of &iew,
2
nd
ed. (pp. 20%&U), =amb!id1e, M(: Ha!va!d ,nive!sity >!ess.
2no5, =.>. (-'U?). The Two Cultures and a Second -oo7. =amb!id1e: =amb!id1e
,nive!sity >!ess.
2te!n, (. (-'U2). Philosophy of ,istory and the Pro4lem of &alues. +he Ha1.e:
Mo.ton.
2tevenson, =.A. (-'U?). 1acts and &alues: Studies in Ethical Analysis. Ie5 Haven:
Gale ,nive!sity >!ess.
2t!a.ss, A. (-'@?). +atural Right and ,istory. =hica1o: +he ,nive!sity of =hica1o
>!ess.
+o.lmin, 2. (-''Ua). Int!od.ction. In: 2. +o.lmin X ". #.stavsen (ds.), eyond
Theory: Changing (rgani<ations Through Participation (pp. -%&), (mste!dam: )ohn
"en*amins.
+o.lmin, 2. (-''Ub). =oncl.din1 methodolo1ical !eflections: ]litism and democ!acy
amon1 the sciences. In: 2. +o.lmin X ". #.stavsen (ds.), eyond Theory: Changing
(rgani<ations Through Participation (pp. 20?%22@), (mste!dam: )ohn "en*amins.
Lon 8!i1ht, #.H. (-'$-). E!planation and *nderstanding. Aondon: Ho.tled1e X
Oe1an >a.l.
1
7
-
+he basis fo! this a!ticle is my 0eynote speech, EDichotomy in DebateF, at the 2i3th =onfe!ence of the Inte!national
2ociety fo! the 2t.dy of (!1.mentation (I22(), held in (mste!dam, ).ne 200U. I am 1!atef.l to F!ans van eme!en and the
othe! membe!s of the committee that 1!anted me the (!1.mentation (5a!d fo! 200& and the oppo!t.nity to add!ess the
pa!ticipants in the =onfe!ence and to benefit f!om thei! enli1htenin1 comments. I 5ish to than0 also my collea1.es of the
Inte!national (ssociation fo! the 2t.dy of =ont!ove!sies (I(2=) fo! thei! contin.o.s s.ppo!t. +o my st.dents at the 1!ad.ate
semina! on EDichotomies in >hilosophyF, held at +el (viv ,nive!sity in the fall of 200@%200U, I am 1!atef.l fo! the e3citin1
mate!ials they b!o.1ht into foc.s and fo! the /.ality of the disc.ssion. In this pape! I have made .se in pa!tic.la! of the
p!esentations in the semina! by !e4 Fi!t, li (mit, and Iit4an Meital. I e3tend my than0s also to #eoff!ey Aloyd fo!
ma0in1 available to me his 5o!0 on both #!ee0 and =hinese modes of a!1.mentation and fo! en1a1in1 5ith me in a f!.itf.l,
on1oin1 c!itical dialo1.e on the ta3onomy of debates, dichotomies, and !elated topics. My than0s a!e also d.e to an
anonymo.s !efe!ee, 5hose !ema!0s and p.44les cont!ib.ted m.ch to the imp!ovement of the te3t yo. a!e abo.t to !ead. Aast
b.t not least, La!da as al5ays 5as of 1!eat help in sha!in1 5ith me he! insi1hts on this comple3 s.b*ect.
2
2oc!ates is !epo!tin1 his conve!sation 5ith .thydem.s to =!ito. I s.pp!ess the !epo!ted speech Ehe saidF, EI saidF, so as to
ma0e the clash mo!e c!ispy.
?
Iot even in (!istotle:s syllo1istic lo1ic, 5hich t!eats p!edicates as sin1le .nits that cannot be pa!titioned. +his disallo5s
any infe!ence f!om 90no5s p: to 90no5s: o! 9is 0no5in1:, as 5ell as f!om 90no5s p: to 90no5s t: (even 5hen p entails t).
8ithin s.ch a f!ame5o!0, the !elational infe!ence E? ^ 2, 2 ^ -, the!efo!e ? ^ -F cannot be p!oven, beca.se it involves t5o
diffe!ent, .n!elated p!edicates (9^ 2: and 9^ -:). Io! can the infe!ence EMa!y is =h!ist:s mothe!, =h!ist had t5elve disciples,
the!efo!e Ma!y is the mothe! of someone 5ho had t5elve disciplesF be p!oven. +h!o.1ho.t the Middle (1es lo1icians
disc.ssed the p!oblems s.ch infe!ences ; involvin1 steps leadin1 f!om the 9di!ect: to the 9obli/.e: o! vice%ve!sa ; !aised fo!
(!istotelian lo1ic. 2eventeenth cent.!y lo1icians, s.ch as ).n1i.s and Aeibni4, 5e!e still conce!ned 5ith them (cf. Aeibni4
200U: =hapte! ?-#).
&
+he anonymo.s !efe!ee as0s 5hy not .se, instead of the a505a!d 9dichotomi4ation:, the sho!te! and familia! 9pola!i4ation:
(and its co!!espondin1 9de%:), 5hich is anyho5 .sed in the definiens. (nd sMhe s.11ests pa!t of the ans5e!: 9pola!i4ation:
does not have Ethe heavy associations that dichotomies have in lo1icF. I 5o.ld add the impact of the neolo1ism to achieve
the desi!ed effect of the st!ate1y, namely, to ma0e f.ll .se of these Eheavy associationsF so that the a!1.ment seems to be
st!ictly lo1ic
@
It sho.ld be !ecalled that lo1ical positivism had in fact !e%dichotomi4ed the opposition bet5een 9analytic: and 9synthetic:,
5hich Oant had de%dichotomi4ed th!o.1h the int!od.ction of the tertium 9synthetic a p!io!i:.
U
#!ice X 2t!a5son (-'@U), in thei! !eaction to P.ine:s a!ticle, adopt a simila! st!ate1y. +hey accept P.ine:s c!iticism of the
definitions of analyticity p!oposed in the positivists: 5!itin1s, b.t st!ess that, even tho.1h this notion !esists fo!mal
definition, it co!!esponds to an int.ition sha!ed by spea0e!s of nat.!al lan1.a1es, and hence is meanin1f.l and o.1ht to be
p!ese!ved.
$
(nothe! ; not .n!elated ; e3ample of a lo1ical positivist concept that !esisted attempts of fo!mal definition is the concept
Eempi!ical si1nificanceF. Fo! an analysis of this fail.!e, see Dascal (-'$-). +he int.itive idea that a theo!etical statement is
abo.t the 5o!ld if the!e a!e obse!vation statements that a!e E!elevantF eithe! to its *.stification o! to its !ef.tation, a basic
int.ition of empi!icism, 5hich lo1ical positivism (also called 9lo1ical empi!icism:) attempted to develop into a fo!mal
c!ite!ion of (empi!ical) meanin1f.lness o! ve!ifiability, p!oved to be !esilient to these attempts ; in pa!t d.e to the lo1ically
9soft: nat.!e of the notion of !elevance. Ho5eve!, this fact did not ma0e this idea lose its meanin1 no! its .sef.lness,
altho.1h it sho.ld ce!tainly have made it lose its appeal as the basis fo! the !i1id dichotomy bet5een scientific and non%
scientific statements.
8
Kf co.!se one co.ld be 5o!!ied as 5ell by othe! so!ts of si1nificance ; e.1., political, ethical, !eli1io.s, epistemolo1ical,
etc. ; a distinction mi1ht ac/.i!e 5hen conceived as a dichotomy.
'
Iotice the incl.sion of 9!e1.lative ethics: in the 1!o.p of statements that a!e defective beca.se they do not satisfy the
c!ite!ion of ve!ifiability. +his position leads to the sea!ch of some othe! 0ind of meanin1 fo! ethical statements, e.1.,
9emotive: meanin1 ((ye! -'U$6 2tevenson -'U?), 9!ecommendin1: !athe! than 9statin1: (Ha!e -'@2).
-0
+he list incl.des: E-. the claims of Hi1h 2cience, 5ith its 1oal of abst!act, .nive!sal theo!ies6 2. the distinction bet5een
(abst!act) +heo!y and (conc!ete) >!actice6 ?. the cont!ast bet5een the 1ene!al, timeless la5s of (say) >hysics, and the 9local:
o! 9timely: conce!ns of (say) (nth!opolo1y o! Histo!y6 &. the va!yin1 demands of ob*ectivity, in diffe!ent !esea!ch fields6
and @. the implications of pa!ticipation in !esea!ch p!o*ects by the ve!y s.b*ects of the !esea!chF (+o.lmin -''Ub, p. 20&).
--
2ee the section E+he d!eam of a .nita!y theo!yF (+o.lmin -''Ub, 2-?%2-@).
-2
+he development of the 9social sciences: has, since its inception by the end of the -8
th
cent.!y, posed a challen1e to the
notion of a .nita!y science: can Iet5onianism, the pa!adi1matic method of the nat.!al sciences, be simply applied to the
social sciences, !e/.i!in1 only sli1ht adaptationsQ +he histo!y of this debate, 5hich contin.es to this day (as +o.lmin
himself points o.t), is a 1ood e3ample of the m.tations dichotomies can .nde!1o in evolvin1 dialectical conte3ts. Hecall, fo!
instance, the follo5in1 si1nificant episodes in the debate in /.estion: the cont!ove!sy bet5een Malth.s and Hica!do that,
beyond the fo.ndations of political economy, has in vie5 the ve!y nat.!e and method of a social science (see =!emaschi X
Dascal -''U, -''8)6 the er7l=ren vs. verstehen debate, initiated by Dilthey, and !e0indled by von 8!i1ht and the positivists
(see von 8!i1ht -'$-)6 and the Et5o c.lt.!esF disp.te (see 2no5 -'U?). Fo! a comp!ehensive disc.ssion of the .nity of
science, see >ombo (200U).
-?
I have analy4ed this .bi/.ito.s spatial metapho!, 5ith special !efe!ence to titles of (mainly) philosophical 5o!0s, in
Dascal (-''U), to 5hich I !efe! the !eade! fo! the details.
-&
E8hat I am s.11estin1 is, simply, that 5e !e1a!d social science as a clinical science, and action !esea!ch as one
co!!espondin1 clinical p!acticeF (+o.lmin -''Ub, p. 2-2). +his statement comes close to my s.11estion, b.t it is some5hat
ambivalent: on the one hand, the modifie! 9clinical: s.bstantially chan1es both the concepts of science (notice that +o.lmin
does not employ 9theo!y: he!e) and of p!actice, and th.s cont!ib.tes to 5ea0enin1 the theo!y vs. p!actice dichotomy6 on the
othe!, the statement !elies on this dichotomy as a means of e3plainin1 the p!oposed distinction. >e!haps this ambivalence is
.navoidable 5hen de%dichotomi4ation ope!ates by hyb!idi4ation of the poles of the dichotomy it see0s to s.pp!ess.
-@
Fo! this te!minolo1y and the typolo1y to 5hich it belon1s, see Dascal (-''8a, -''8b).
-U
He!e a!e some e3ce!pts of thei! co!!espondence (see Ie5ton -'$8, passim). Ie5ton: EFo! this is to be decided not by
disco.!se, b.t by ne5 t!yal of the 3pe!imentF6 E".t this, I conceive, is eno.1h to enfo!ce it, and so to decide the
cont!ove!syF6 E+he!e a!e yet othe! =i!c.mstances Ri.e., othe! e3pe!iments, M.D.T, by 5hich the +!.th mi1ht have been
decidedF.
Hoo0e: E".t, ho5 ce!tain soeve! I thin0 myself of my hypothesis (5hich I did not ta0e .p 5itho.t fi!st t!yin1 some
h.nd!eds of e3pe!iments), yet I sho.ld be ve!y 1lad to meet 5ith one e!perimentum crucis f!om M!. Ie5ton, that sho.ld
divo!ce me f!om it. ".t it is not that, 5hich he so calls, 5ill do the t.!n6 fo! the same phaenomenon 5ill be solved by my
hypothesis, as 5ell as by his, 5itho.t any manne! of diffic.lty o! st!ainin1: nay, I 5ill .nde!ta0e to she5 anothe! hypothesis,
diffe!in1 f!om both his and mine, that shall do the same thin1F. I analy4e anothe! e3ample of flip%flop bet5een the poles of
this dichotomy, the debate bet5een the analytic philosophe! )ohn 2ea!le and the post%mode!n philosophe! )ac/.es De!!ida,
in Dascal (200-).
-$
Fo! details of Aeibni4:s hithe!to ove!loo0ed app!oach, see the Int!od.cto!y ssay and the Aeibni4ian te3ts t!anslated and
commented in Aeibni4 (200U).