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CSOs react to ECOWAS leaders approval of EPAs
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COVER
CSOs condemn ECOWAS leader's approval
of EPAs................................................................................................ page 5
Economic integration is attainable with or without
single currency................................................................................... page 6
Africa's strategic approach to industrial
development...................................................................................... page 10
BITs a challenge to regional integration in Africa .................... page 13
TRADE
Investor-state arbitration system needs
'complete overhaul' .......................................................................... page 16
If US has its way, Doha Round is dead as dodo......................... page 19
DEVELOPMENT
UNCTAD calls for catalytic and strategic investment
to transform Africa's economies.................................................... page 22
African refugees: The untouchables of our time........................ page 24
INTERNATIONAL
Argentina: Once more on the map, invited by BRICS.............. page 24
ENVIRONMENT
Nature is talking and Africa's legislators are
listening............................................................................................... page 28
Africa's ecosystems: imperilled by mining frenzy...................... page 30
POLITICS
Continuity and little change as Southern Africa
goes to the polls................................................................................. page 32
The forgotten African soldiers in WWII
celebrations......................................................................................... page 34
SHORT STORY
The proposals..................................................................................... page 37
Contents
Africa's integration agenda has been on the
make for years but much like the mirage the
closer it looms the more distant it seems.
Topping the hurdles to be cleared for mean-
ingful and beneficial integration are self-
inflicted disjointed policies and signing of
bilateral investment agreements that derail
the very agenda of integration.
From the founding of the African
Union (then Organisation of African Unity
in 1963) integration has been the rallying
cry but five decades down the road Africa is
nowhere near integration. Regional
Economic Communities, RECs, were at
some point seen as building blocks but up
to now most of them have not fared too well
in carrying out their sub-regional integra-
tion agenda. Various initiatives like the
Lagos Plan of Action, The Abuja Plan,
NEPAD, and lately the Continental Free
Trade Area, are all aimed at ensuring an
integrated Africa but so far these seem not
to be working. Not necessarily because peo-
ple are not committed to having them work
but because there are just too many initia-
tives aimed at achieving the same goals so
that in the end not much gets done as ener-
gies, resources are dissipated.
The challenge is multifaceted. Apart
from individual countries adopting policies
that run counter to continental and region-
al integration efforts, the continental and
regional organizations themselves have
incoherent policies and initiatives that also
either derail progress or are simply out to
make nonsense of the integration agenda.
Paramount among these integration set-
backs are Bilateral Investment Treaties,
BITs, that African countries sign regardless
of the implications for the continent's inte-
gration agenda. (See page 5, BITs under-
mine regional integration in Africa). The
Economic Partnership Agreements, that
African countries are about to sign with the
European Union as individual RECs are
other spokes in the integration agenda of
Africa as they are a means to further disinte-
grate Africa. Unfortunately, and in spite of
the negative impacts the CARIFORUM
Economic Partnership Agreement, EPA,
with the European Union, has had on
Caribbean countries, African countries,
spearheaded by ECOWAS are on the brink
of signing the EPA.
Adoption of a variety of industrial
development plans aimed at integrating
Africa has also been bedevilled with not
only incoherence policies but also unrealis-
tic timelines, targets and unclear mandates
on who does what. (See Page 13, Africa's
strategic approach to industrial develop-
ment). Here again mention can be made of
such initiatives like Industrial Development
Decade for Africa (IDDA) in the '80s, fol-
lowed by African Capacities Initiative, then
Accelerated Industrial Development for
Africa (AIDA). All these are yet to produce
any meaningful result.
Another hurdle to be cleared is the
obsession with single currency as a sine qua
non of integration. Although studies and
reality have shown that Africa's or regional
integration efforts do not hinge on single
currency this has become for some the be-
all and end-all of integration by both
African governments and other regional
institutions. (See page 9, Economic inte-
gration is attainable with or without single
currency).
Whilst Africa is struggling to integrate,
the world especially the developed world is
working towards greater integration across
oceans and continents. The Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership are a few of the
mega trading blocs that are emerging on the
global stage. These involve the US and
mostly the European Union and the US and
its APEC (Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation) partners in general. Where
does Africa lie in all these? The bigger play-
ers on the global market are getting togeth-
er to ensure that their economies do not
lose out on opportunities whereas African
countries whose economies are weak and
need to be together are still fumbling.
Already, without these major devel-
oped countries coming together, African
countries suffer from the inefficiencies of
small, non-viable and incoherent policies
how much more when they face the mega
trading blocs that will result from the
emerging partnerships. The EPAs present a
clear danger to Africa's integration plans as
they face a much more well organized and
better resourced European Union whose
agenda of 'capturing' the African market is
clear.
An African 'market, that is fragmented
but offers the EU a ready and willing play-
ground to throw its products and services.
An African 'market' that thanks to its own
inability to take advantage of itself closes
doors to trade among its various countries
but is ready to open up to foreign 'partners'.
Intra-African trade is said to amount to less
than 10 per cent of the continent's total
imports and exports trade, whereas in the
EU 68 per cent of exports and 71 per cent of
imports are intra-regional.
Ultimately, what this means is that
African countries are not able to take advan-
tage of continental opportunities to trade
among themselves. What is preventing this
is presence of a plethora of initiatives, poli-
cies, international and bilateral agreements
that conflict with continental and regional
integration efforts. Time is now to consoli-
date these initiatives, stop signing inhibiting
bilateral agreements and adopt clear, realis-
tic, achievable and comprehensive policies
that inure to the benefit of Africans.
EDITORIAL
4 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.17 NO.3
Incoherent integration policies
The Economic Justice Network of Ghana
(EJN) unequivocally condemns the deci-
sion of the West African leaders to approve
the signing of the Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) with the European
Union. This deci-
sion, taken at 45th
Ordinary Session of
the ECOWAS
Authority of Heads of
State and
Government on July
10 2014 in Accra,
runs counter to the
long standing views
and positions
expressed by several
groups of stake-hold-
ers and ordinary citi-
zens and corroborat-
ed by institutions of
high repute such as
the United Nations
and the African
Union.
Faith-based organisa-
tions, trade unions,
farmer-based organi-
zations, women
groups and private
sector players have
repeatedly demon-
strated over the years
that the EPA are
against the funda-
mental developmen-
tal needs and impera-
tives of the
economies of West
Africa.
Judging by the
terms and provisions in the text approved
by the Heads of State, EPA will lead to the
collapse of the domestic manufacturing and
other productive sectors due to undue pres-
sure from the subsidized goods from
Europe and loss of revenue from trade
taxes.
The agreement also commits the Sub-
region to have developed, within 6 months
of its adoption, a road map and modalities
for an agenda of further liberalisation and
deregulation of a whole range of areas - such
as Services, Investment, Government
Procurement, Intellectual Property and
even other areas that have never been part
of the EPA negotiating agenda, such as
Capital Accounts, none of which are
required by any international rule or obliga-
tion undertaken by the government.
The cumulative effect of all these will
be to take away ability of West African gov-
ernments to deploy the range of policy
instruments that are critically needed for
development in our Region.
Furthermore the
agreement subjects
the dynamics of
West Africa's inter-
nal regional trade
and development, as
well as its relation-
ship with the other
regions of Africa and
the South to the
imperatives of its
dealing with the
European Union. It
is sad for the West
African leader to
make mockery of our
own regional inte-
gration agenda by
this decision.
All these nega-
tive consequences
inflicted on West
Africa are in return
for a paltry aid prom-
ised by the European
Union, as well as an
attempt to save a few
groups of exporters,
when indeed credi-
ble alternatives exist
which could have
addressed the con-
cerns and needs of all
stake-holders.
This agreement
cannot be accepted
by the ordinary men and women of this
country who struggle daily in the midst of
the precarious economic situation. Citizens
should call upon their elected representa-
tives in Parliament to demonstrate due
leadership when this inimical agreement is
presented to Parliament for ratification.
CSOs react to ECOWAS
leaders' approval of EPAs
Below is an extract from the final communiqu of the 45th ordinary session of the ECOW-
AS heads of state and government convened in Accra, Ghana on July 10, 2014 and
chaired by President John Mahama who is also current chair of the region group.The
regional leaders approved the controversial Economic Partnership Agreement with the
European Union.
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (EPA)
15. The Summit welcomes the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the
44th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government to consid-
er the technical concerns raised by some Member States and whose recommenda-
tions led to appropriate solutions on these issues.
16. On the basis of the consensual results reached by the Chief Negotiators on all
the issues (particularly on the market access offer, the EPA Development Programme
(EPADP) and the text of the Agreement), the Heads of State and Government deci-
sively approve the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiated and taking due
account of the technical concerns raised.
17. Consequently, the Heads of State and Government instruct the West African
Chief Negotiators to take all necessary steps to quickly start the process of signing
and implementing the Agreement.
18. In that regard, the Summit encourages them to sustain their efforts, particularly
by informing and raising awareness of the national and regional actors.
19. The Authority congratulates the Chief Negotiators and the Ministerial
Monitoring Committee for their resolve and sense of compromise that led, through
a constructive approach, to the conclusion of a fair, balanced and mutually beneficial
Agreement for both parties.
20. The Authority also reaffirms deep appreciation to His Excellency Macky Sall,
President of the Republic of Senegal, for the decisive and highly political role he
played in the successful conclusion of this development-oriented Agreement which
reinforces the West African integration process.
EXTRACTS FROM ECOWAS LEADERS' COMMUNIQU
COVER
COVER
THE issue of common currency or single
currency has become very contentious.
Common currency or currency unification
is a special case of monetary integration. As
such, the issue is often discussed as a partic-
ular case of the broader issues of monetary
and financial integration, exchange rate pol-
icy and so on.
In this regard, some economists distin-
guish between pseudo-exchange rate
unions and complete exchange rate
unions. Single currency regime is an
extreme case of fixed exchange rate regime.
Just as other aspects of economic integra-
tion, monetary integration is generally con-
sidered as an important element of eco-
nomic management policy. Scholars includ-
ing Copernicus (1526); Bodin (1577); Mill
(1894); Lerner (1951); Meade (1957);
Scitovski (1958); Mundell (1961, 1973);
Johnson and Swoboda (1973) and a large
number of modern economists have
explored the subject.
In modern history, however, the Treaty
of Rome in 1957 has been instrumental in
shifting the debate from an essentially aca-
demic field to the realm of economic poli-
cymaking.
So people have started thinking more
seriously about monetary integration and
what it means and eventually common cur-
rencies. But, there is no consensus among
economists particularly after the break-
down of the Bretton Woods system, which
has led to a generalised floating currencies
in the world.
Economic integration is attainable
with or without single currency
A high degree of economic integration can be achieved without single currency. However,
a well designed and well implemented, monetary integration can be highly helpful,
contends *Kodjo Evlo.
African leaders at the AU headquarters

Essentially, the key question is why
should two or more countries adopt a single
currency which is an extreme case of fixed
exchange rate in a world of generalised
floating? The answer is simple, it is needed
for regional integration. So currency inte-
gration is part of the broad issue of econom-
ic integration. Regional integration is a
must but regional integration has so many
aspects and we have to be careful to adopt
the most appropriate mechanisms.
Currency or monetary integration is
part of broad economic integration.
Regional integration has become stylish
nowadays, especially since the appearance
of Euro in Europe the subject has become
so hot. There have been questions about
the role currency integration can play in the
broader process of economic integration
and more importantly in overall economic
performance and development (and that is
what matters) and the stage at which single
currency should be adopted,
Although the debate is far from settled,
it is fair to examine the role, benefits and
costs of common currencies. Essentially,
the role of single currency is the well-known
role of money in general in economic activ-
ity (as means of exchange; store of value;
etc). There are benefits and costs and these
have to be carefully weighed.
Single currency enhances the useful-
ness of money as a medium of exchange and
as a store of value. As a result, it makes
transactions between countries easier and
more efficient by eliminating conversion
costs and uncertainty about exchange rates
between national currencies.
The liquidity of currency increases
with the volume of transactions it is used in,
or the size of the area it covers. But the cur-
rency of a very small and open country may
lose some of its value as money to foreign
currencies, if this country faces the floating
exchange rate regime alone.
Moreover, currency unification is
believed to reduce the need for external
reserves. Mundell puts it very clearly by say-
ing that if two countries join in a monetary
union, they do not need reserves to do busi-
ness between them which is a very good
thing. This implies that the larger the cur-
rency area, the greater the reserve saving.
Also, there is the property of shock absorp-
tion which is associated with common cur-
rency. Monetary union enhances the shock
absorbing role of foreign reserves. The
pooling of reserves by member countries is
an application of the well-known principle
of risk pooling. So there are clearly known
benefits but there are also costs.
Cost of single currency
The first one is the loss of independ-
ence or sovereignty by national authorities
to a supranational authority and also how to
deal with instability issues arising from one
country that is a member of the monetary
union.
Often, developments would occur
from time to time that could push the rela-
tive cost of the participating countries out
of line, and even some that would tend to
push them progressively further and further
out of line and threaten the coherence or
the very existence of the union. Such possi-
bilities arise if the participating countries do
not harmonize or coordinate effectively
overall economic policy or do not converge
to some well-defined levels of key econom-
ic variables. A recent example is the case of
Greece in Europe.
Another issue is the giving up of alter-
native uses of the exchange rate as a policy
African Union chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and some of her lieutenants
COVER
8 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL. 17 NO.3
tool and the inevitable exposure of member
countries to disturbances arising from any
part of the union. Believe it or not there are
resources devoted to resolving internal con-
flicts within monetary unions.
There is also the tricky issue of
seigniorage. How do you manage seignior-
age even within the West African Monetary
Union for example? There have been from
time to time issues around how to share the
seigniorage in the region. Conflicts do arise,
fortunately most of those conflicts have
been resolved quietly by France and we do
not know much about them.
So under what conditions should
countries adopt a single currency given the
cost and the benefits? The question is what
are the conditions for two or more coun-
tries to come together to form a monetary
union or to have a single currency?
In many cases the answer to this ques-
tion does not rest on simple economic
grounds but instead, it is formulated taking
into account political, social, historical con-
ditions and considerations. But definitely
for the discussion to be made in favour of
currency unification, it is necessary that the
benefit should outweigh the cost however
they are defined.
It has often been argued that for coun-
tries to form monetary unions, there has to
be assured benefit of reducing transaction
cost. Indeed, very often, some of the most
convincing arguments that are advanced on
economic grounds in favour of currency
unification are the size of commercial and
financial transactions between the coun-
tries involved and the extent to which mem-
ber countries converge toward agreed levels
of key macro-economic indicators. Now if
you do not undertake transactions between
yourselves, is there a need to have a com-
mon currency? The point is that the larger
the commercial and financial transactions
between two countries or within a region,
the greater the benefits of common curren-
cy.
The other thing worth mentioning is
convergence criteria. Convergence criteria
are really necessary to make a monetary
union work. All regional economic commu-
nities (RECs) have defined convergence
criteria that potential members of the mon-
etary union being formed should follow
(see the Maastricht Treaty, the revised
ECOWAS Treaty, the UEMOA Treaty, the
COMESA Treaty and the SADC Treaty).
Very often, these criteria are not always
respected even in the case of the Eurozone,
because different member countries face
different socio-economic and political reali-
ties. For more than 15 years, ECOWAS
member countries and other African RECs
have been struggling to meet these criteria.
Most of these RECs have not even been
able to achieve the stage of Free Trade Area.
Regarding the size of intra-regional transac-
tions, the more countries are integrated, the
larger tends to be the size of the economic
transactions between them. In this particu-
lar regard, currency unification would be
more justified in an area such as the
Eurozone, where intra-regional trade is
about 60 per cent of total trade whereas in
African RECs sometimes it is less than 10
per cent.
But among African RECs, SADC coun-
tries are doing much better in this regard
than say COMESA countries where intra-
community trade is usually less than one-
tenth of total trade. And despite all efforts
or promises, the situation remains almost
unchanged over the last two decades. One
of the reasons is that the structure of output
is about the same in these African countries
so that they have very little to trade in.
However, the size of intra-regional eco-
nomic transactions and the degree of con-
vergence alone should not determine
whether countries should adopt single cur-
rencies or not. The costs should also be
taken into account. In European countries
or more developed countries, for example
between France and Germany it is a little
less than 10 per cent of bilateral trade but if
Regional integration arrangements take a variety of forms:
Preferential Trade Area (PTA): - is an arrangement in which mem-
bers apply lower tariffs to imports produced by other members than
to imports produced by non-members. Members can determine tar-
iffs on imports from non-members.
Free Trade Area (FTA): - a preferential trade area with no tariffs on
imports from other members. as in preferential trade areas, members
can determine tariffs on imports from non-members.
Customs Union: - a free trade area in which members impose com-
mon (external) tariffs (CET) on non-members. Members may also
cede sovereignty to a single customs administration.
Common market: - a customs union that allows free movement of
the factors of production (such as capital and labour) across national
borders within the integration area.
Economic union: - a common market with unified monetary and fis-
cal policies including common currency.
Political union: - the ultimate stage of integration, in which mem-
bers become one nation. National governments cede sovereignty
over economic and social policies to a supranational authority estab-
lishing common institutions and judicial and legislative processes
including a common parliament.
Countries can start with any of these arrangements, but most begin
by removing impediments to trade among themselves. they then
introduced deeper and wider integration mechanisms
Source: UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Afria, Addis Ababa, 2004, Page 10.
COVER
you compare Belgium and Luxembourg
you see that it is very high so those coun-
tries are very integrated compared to other
European countries. The United States and
Canada are about two of the most econom-
ically integrated countries in the world
today. Canada has about 40 per cent of its
trade with the US but based on trade only,
Canada doesn't feel the need to have a com-
mon currency with the US. So common
currency is a wonderful thing, it is conven-
ient, but it is not a prerequisite for regional
integration. What Africa needs is some type
of monetary integration, in particular, con-
vertibility among currencies. Between the
US and Canada, the currencies are so con-
vertible that the transaction costs are so
small, so tiny compared to the value of
transactions and so small compared to what
the countries may save as the cost of cur-
rency unification. So, common currency
can help in other fronts including economic
growth.
Clearly, regional integration provides
a strong argument for currency unifica-
tion. However, there is no consensus
among economists regarding the question
as to whether currency integration is
required for regional integration. Most of
them do think that monetary integration
is a possible part of economic integration.
But an important number of them believe
that currency unification could be a possi-
ble (but not necessary) part of the inte-
gration process of economic integration.
Africa's experience with single
currencies
Africa's experience with common cur-
rencies dates back to at least colonial
times during which both the British and
French colonial administrations instituted
currency boards that issued and managed
the currencies used in the colonies. Thus,
these colonies all experimented with sin-
gle currencies in their respective zones.
After independence, the currency boards
were dismantled in the former British
colonies but have survived and taken new
forms in the former French colonies,
which have progressively led to UEMOA
and CEMAC, two of the best-known
monetary unions in Africa today.
The respective single currencies of
these two monetary unions, the CFA franc
(franc de la Communaute Financiere
Africaine, in West Africa, and franc de la
Cooperation Financiere en Afrique
Centrale, in Central Africa) are just new
names of the colonial CFA franc (franc
des Colonies Francaise d'Afrique).
The creation of these single curren-
cies in the two monetary unions has noth-
ing to do with economic integration.
Rather, it is simply a remnant of the
French influence as the former colonial
power. In fact, intra-community econom-
ic transactions are less intensive within
UEMOA and CEMAC than within other
RECs such as ECOWAS, SADC and
SACU. Attempts by other African RECs
to move toward single currencies have yet
to materalise.
Single currency and economic
performance in Africa
Many people have written extensively
about the case of West African Union.
Devarjan and Melo came out with a very
bright paper that the CFA countries are
more stable than the other African coun-
tries. What the pair primarily looked at
were inflation rates and openness in the
context of the Washington Consensus.
Stanley Fischer did the same thing
and a few years later, they came back and
said that there is a paradox here.
Normally countries that are more stable
have to grow faster but we don't under-
stand the situation in CFA zone. The
problem was that, the issue of stability
simply based on inflation rate is not
enough.
There are other issues which are
deflationary pressures because they said
that in Europe, inflation rates have to be
less than three per cent (3%), so we have
to have less than two per cent (2%) in our
countries. But other scholars have shown
that in developed countries, so long as
inflation rate does not exceed 10 per cent
in some areas, it is not necessarily the
biggest problem. So we have had defla-
tionary pressures in West Africa which
have been detrimental to growth. Other
aspects pointed out include the variability
of the exchange rate itself and if you com-
pare, the variability of the inflation rate is
very high in the CFA area countries com-
pared to non-CFA area countries.
Variability of inflation can have a sig-
nificant negative effect on growth. It is obvi-
ous that there is no question CFA countries
have lower inflation rates than other coun-
tries. A look at the growth rate would show
that CFA countries perform poorly than
non-CFA area countries. So what lessons
can be drawn from these? Currency unifica-
tion is good, it is a good thing, it is conven-
ient but it does not necessarily mean good
performance. Currency unification does
not necessarily mean development, but
what Africa needs is convertibility and find-
ing a way to reduce those transaction costs
that are linked to multiple currencies.
In conclusion, Africa has a lot to learn
from the experience of CFA area countries
and the Euro zone, and currency unification
is a possible part of economic integration.
However, high degrees of economic inte-
gration can be achieved without single cur-
rency. A well designed and well implement-
ed, monetary integration can be highly
helpful.
Currency unification is thus not
required for rapid economic integration or
strong macroeconomic performance as can
be seen in the case of the West African mon-
etary union, UEMOA, and in particular in
the case of CEMAC. Currency unification
maybe desirable only after reasonable
progress is made in overall economic inte-
gration. At least the stage of common mar-
ket or even higher should be reached before
a policy of single currency can be success-
fully implemented. Finally, single currency
is not a compelling path, it can be a real
diversion, if it is not well designed or well
implemented.
*Prof Kodjo Evlo is a lecturer at the
University of Lome, Togo. These are
excerpts from a paper he delivered at a
Colloquium on Regional Integration jointly
organized by TWN-Africa and the UNECA,
in Accra, Ghana from May 6-8.
Currency unification is thus
not required for rapid econom-
ic integration or strong macro-
economic performance as can
be seen in the case of the West
African monetary union,
UEMOA, and in particular in
the case of CEMAC. Currency
unification maybe desirable
only after reasonable progress
is made in overall economic
integration.
COVER
Africa's strategic approach
to industrial development
Africa needs to have a strategic approach to industrial development as currently manufacturing
plays an insignificant role in the economies on the continent. In this article, *Patrick Osakwe
critiques and reflects on the way forward for Africa.
MANUFACTURING plays a very limited
role in African economies. What this means
is that the share of manufacturing in GDP is
very low in Africa compared to other
regions and also compared to the global
average.
Manufacturing has been declining in
Africa from 1990. In 1990, the share of
manufacturing value-added in GDP was
15.3 per cent. Just around the beginning of
the financial crisis it was 10.5 per cent. This
is a significant decline given that it had been
increasing since 1970. Manufacturing
value-added in GDP however, rose from
22.4 per cent in developing countries in
1990 to 23.7 per cent in 2008.
So while the average for developing
countries has been going up, the average for
Africa has been declining and that is why
people are speaking about industrialization
in Africa and is also a good reason for
African leaders to want to focus on the issue
of structural transformation because they
have realized that if they do not do some-
thing about it, Africa is going to be left
behind in the current globalization process.
This is one fact that any talk about industri-
al development in Africa cannot gloss over.
The second point worthy of note is
that at the global level, Africa is not a major
player in the market of manufacturing.
Africa's share in total manufacturing value-
added is very low. It is roughly about one
(1%) per cent (it fell from 1.2% in 2000 to
1.1% in 2008). The continent's share of
global manufacturing export is equally tiny.
It has been so for quite a number of
decades. It marginally rose from 1 per cent
in 2000 to 1.3 per cent in 2008. However, in
East Asia and the Pacific it rose from 9.5
per cent to sixteen per cent albeit in Latin
America it fell from five per cent to 4.5 per
COVER
cent over the same period.
The structure of manufacturing enter-
prises in Africa is dominated by small and
informal firms. Indeed, Africa's industrial
structure is weak both in terms of number
of firms operating and their average size. In
a study done recently on the average size of
firms across regions, it was observed that in
Africa, the average size of a manufacturing
firm is about 47 employees compared to
171 in Malaysia, 195 in Vietnam, 393 in
Thailand and 977 in China.
More importantly is the fact that it is
extremely difficult for these small firms in
Africa to grow into medium or large firms.
What does that mean? It means that when
you are a small firm in Africa you are more
likely to remain small and if you are a big
one you are more likely to stay there. This
is a big problem because if the firms are not
growing, then how are you going to exploit
the synergies between the different sizes of
firms?
There have been so many industrial
development initiatives in Africa. At least
since the 1980s, there was the Industrial
Development Decade for Africa (IDDA),
which was from 1982 to 1992, and it did not
work. Then came another one, from 1992
to 2003 it did not work either.
These were followed by the
African Productive Capacities
Initiative (2003/2004) which
was supposed to build supply
capacity but there are still prob-
lems of supply capacities in
Africa.
This was also again fol-
lowed by the Accelerated
Industrial Development for
Africa (AIDA) initiative which
was adopted by the heads of
state in 2008. Then at the
regional level, each regional eco-
nomic community (REC) has
its own industrial development
initiative. Sometimes they are
not well synchronized with the
continental initiative. Thus
there are so many initiatives in
Africa and so it is not surprising
they are not producing the
desired results. Unfortunately,
this is what Africa is becoming
known for, having so many ini-
tiatives as opposed to achieving
a very high level of industrializa-
tion and that is certainly a major drawback.
So Africa needs to spend more time think-
ing about how to industrialize as opposed
to coming up with new initiatives when half
of the old initiatives are yet to be imple-
mented.
Africa needs to have a strategic
approach to industrial development. Most
African policy makers, say they have a strat-
egy, but that, unfortunately is not a strategy.
These are invariably, half of the time, wish
lists and not strategies.
Most RECs and even the African
Union and other many regional organisa-
tions now have an industrial development
vision, but the vision is just one aspect of
developing a strategy. Where they are lack-
ing is on the how questions, things like
how will these things be done and how to
measure progress in a credible manner.
Another critique of the way Africa
approaches industrial development is the
tendency to look at industrial development
as if it is something that can actually be
done specifically at the continental level. A
continental industrial policy may not neces-
sarily make sense as it assumes that all
national governments have an incentive to
effectively support efforts to promote
regional industrial development.
A number of countries are not that
convinced. They are showing political sup-
port for it but effectively they are not doing
anything to make sure that there is progress
in terms of achieving industrial develop-
ment objectives and it is not surprising that
they are not showing the kind of interest
that one would have them show in the
process.
By definition, industrial development
goes with industrial policies and industrial
policy is something that makes more sense
at the national level and the reason is sim-
ple. Development and implementation of
industrial policies involve the mobilization
and allocation of resources.
To do this at the continental or region-
al level, one has to be able to state who is
going to do them, yet it is very difficult to
get agreement on these issues. Industrial
policies require making decisions on how to
mobilize and allocate resources and it is
challenging to make these decisions at the
continental level. For example it is not clear
who should make these decisions (AU,
RECs etc). Some people, obviously think
the African Union (AU) should do it but
are member states going to be willing to
give the AU full authority to make decisions
on industrial development and industrial
policy?
Then again, many of the countries are
not paying their dues and if they are not
paying these dues how they can effectively
COVER
give the AU the kind of effective support it
needs to make progress on this front. So,
that is another aspect of Africa's industrial
development framework that is trouble-
some. In some areas, it makes sense to have
initiatives at the regional level, but in some
other areas, that is not the most effective
way to do it.
Coherence of continental initiatives
requires taking into account the feasibility
of proposed actions and this is something
that has not been well thought-out and inte-
grated into existing continental industriali-
sation plans
Given the above, to make progress in
terms of promoting industrial develop-
ment, continental initiatives have to focus
on lifting binding constraints to industrial
development at the continental and region-
al levels. Things like building cross-border
infrastructure, providing access to long
term finance, removing barriers to regional
trade and investment, designing the foreign
investment code especially as it relates to
the environment because one can see the
harm that foreign investment is doing on
the environment in a number of African
countries.
Focusing on the regional and the conti-
nental level on some of these binding con-
straints, will make more progress as
opposed to coming up with an African com-
mon industrial policy, whose implementa-
tion may not be possible given the incentive
issues involved.
Africa approaches industrial develop-
ment with too heavy a focus on small and
medium enterprises. There is no country in
this world that has developed its industrial
structure on the basis of the SMEs.
Most people claim in the United States a
lot of the companies are SMEs, but they fail
to elaborate on the actual size of these
American SMEs. They are not what we call
SMEs in Africa. The size of SMEs in China
is made up of about 977 employees. That is
what they call a small firm. When it is said
that China developed on the basis of SMEs,
US developed on the back of SMEs, it must
be recognized that what they call SMEs are
not what Africans call SMEs because the
SMEs in Africa are way too small. Their
scale is so small to be able to exploit the
economies of scale that is needed to be
competitive in terms of promoting manu-
facturing.
The second point that needs to be
made is that SMEs in general are good in
terms of creating employments but they are
only good to the extent that they survive.
What we know about SMEs in Africa is that
they hardly survive. They come and go.
Very few of them tend to thrive for a long
time. So if their survival rate is low, poten-
tially they may be useful for creating
employment but if they are not in business
for long, how are they going to sustain this
employment?
And so what this tells us is that we have
to pay attention to the issue of size and in
particular when we are developing policies
for industrial development, the focus
should not be so much on promoting small
firms at the expense of the large ones. The
focus should be on how to create linkages
between the firms African countries already
have, irrespective of whether they are small
or large, they both need support.
SMEs are important but too much
emphasis on SMEs ignores the role of
economies of scale in industrial develop-
ment. Industrialisation requires firms of
certain minimum scale. This implies that
size and growth are important.
Africa is at a stage where much has not
achieved in terms of industrial development
and so there is the need to pay attention to
the existing firms irrespective of the size -
small, medium and large. The focus should
not be just on SMEs as was done in the past.
Africa also needs to be realistic in set-
ting goals and targets on industrialisation.
Most African countries all have visions:
Vision 2015, Vision 2020, Vision 2030 and
sometimes what they want to achieve over
the next ten years are unrealistic.
Some want to be the next South Korea
of the world in 10 years whilst they are not
putting in place anything that will get them
there. Realism is important in terms of
industrial development.
Africa needs to be realistic and should
not do things just because it is fashionable
to do them or say things because it is fash-
ionable to say them. Things should be said
and planned for because they can be
achieved.
The implementation mechanisms of
most initiatives are either weak or simply
not credible. For example, the institutional
arrangements for implementing
Accelerated Industrial Development for
Africa (AIDA) initiative relies heavily on
the African Union Commission (AUC) and
RECs which face severe challenges in mobi-
lizing resources to finance their existing
programmes.
The AIDA initiative is one area one can
see the issue of lack of realism played out
clearly. Implementation rests with the AUC
yet the countries are not providing the
funds for the clusters, so how is the AU
going to deliver on this? These are very
laborious projects and they require a lot of
money.
Africans cannot criticize the AU for not
delivering when their governments are not
providing the organisation the tools it
needs to do their job. If Africa is serious
about industrial development and using the
AU as an organ or as an instrument to
achieve it, it has to make sure that the AU is
provided the resources it needs to deliver
on some of these important issues.
Finally, Africa's relationship with
development partners has to be made con-
sistent with the objective of promoting
industrialisation on the continent.
Usually Africa comes up with its own
programmes and these programmes are
hijacked by external factors. This is a seri-
ous problem for Africa and especially when
it comes to the issue of industrial develop-
ment. Africa cannot rely on its development
partners to industrialise Africa, it is the
responsibility of African governments and
regional organisations.
The development partners can provide
support but Africa has to set the pace. Africa
should not allow development partners to
dictate what direction it is moving in as was
done in the past. Africa has to set the pace,
set the path and to the extent that this
development partners can fit into the pro-
gramme. There is no reason to follow their
(development partners') agenda. Africa has
to follow its own agenda and if the agenda
of the development partners is not consis-
tent with the objectives set by Africans,
then there is no point asking for their sup-
port particularly if they do not want to
move in the direction that Africa wants.
This is very important because it is easy to
get distracted and Arica is wasting a lot of
time on some of this development partner-
ship issues particularly in areas where it will
not make more impact in terms of promot-
ing industrial development in Africa.
*Patrick Osakwe, PhD, is chief, Trade and
Poverty Branch at United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in
Geneva, Switzerland. He made this presenta-
tion at a three-day colloquium on Africa's
Economic Integration from May 6-8, 2014 in
Accra, Ghana. The colloquium was jointly
organised by TWN-Africa and UNECA.
COVER
AFRICAN AGENDA VOL. 17 NO.3
13
OVER the past two decades, as part of the
push to attract foreign investment, African
countries have been signing international
investment agreements (IIAs), mainly
bilateral investment agreements (BITs)
with little attention to trade offs such as loss
of national and regional policy space.
IIAs also take the form of investment
provisions in Free Trade Agreements such
as in the CARIFORUM Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA). It has sec-
tions on investment, competition, services
all of which have investment protection
implications. The EPAs being negotiated
between the EU and various African region-
al groupings have Rendez - vous clauses for
negotiations on investment issues similar to
what is contained in the CARIFORUM
EPA. A number of North African countries
have Free Trade Agreements with Europe,
which could also be described as Free
Trade agreements with investment provi-
sion. Then there is a third category which is
Regional Investment Agreements. For
example, there is a COMESA investment
area agreement; the SADC protocol on
finance and investment, and the ECOWAS
Energy Protocol which is an obscure but
very important agreement.
So far African countries have signed
close to 1,000 BITs. According to UNC-
TAD by the end of 2013, Africa's bilateral
investment agreements amounted to 27 per
cent of the global BITs. Formally speaking
these state to state international investment
agreements are reciprocal frameworks for
International investment agreements especially Bilateral Investment Treaties, (BITs) that
have come to pre-occupy some African countries pose a major challenge to Africa's integration
agenda , writes *Yao Graham.
BITs a challenge to regional
integration in Africa
COVER
Flashback: A section of colloquium participants

COVER
the management of investment flows
between countries. Between most African
countries and their partners in the BITs
however formal reciprocity does not mean
substantive reciprocity because most
African countries are not capital exporters
and usually sign these agreements as
Investment Attraction Agreements and the
Capital Exporting countries have signed
them as Investment Protection
Agreements. So different purposes have
driven the signing of these agreements.
The signing of BITs globally has been
declining since a peak in the mid-90s. The
African pattern of signing BITs mirrors the
global declining trend. This is not surpris-
ing because African countries are not
demandeurs of BITs but takers so if those
who are pushing for them slow down, it will
be reflected in what happens in Africa.
In recent times, however negotiations
have been initiated for a number of major
regional or bilateral investment agreements
the outcomes of which will have implica-
tions well beyond those directly involved.
These include the Trans-Pacific
Partnership which involves the US and a
number of major players in Asia, the negoti-
ations involving ASEAN, Australia, China,
India, Japan, New Zealand and Korea, the
EU-USA, Trans-Atlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, TTIP, and in
Africa there is the trilateral FTA, SADC,
EAC and COMESA. An African investment
treaty is also said to be in the offing. It has
been estimated that these agreements cover
76 countries and about half the world's pop-
ulation with a combined GDP of 90 per
cent of the world's GDP.
Germany has got the largest number of
BITs in Africa, 42, China has 34 and the UK
has 22. Despite the decline in the overall
push for BITs, Africa remains a target with
demands from Asian countries and notably
Canada which has been particularly aggres-
sive. In fact the Canadian foreign minister
early this year publicly celebrated the fact
that under the Harper Government, 2013
was Canada's most successful year for the
signing of BITs particularly in Africa. In
2013 they signed agreements with
Tanzania, Cote D'Ivoire, Cameroon,
Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia
and they have ongoing negotiations with
Ghana, Tunisia and Burkina Faso. The US
has also signed these BITs in Africa, with
Cameroon, DRC, Congo Rep., Egypt,
Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal and
Rwanda.
In addition to the bilateral investment
treaties, the US has been signing Trade and
Investment Framework Agreements
(TIFAs) which are understandings very
broadly put, but what they create really is a
political and legal framework within which
specific demands are made on the signatory
countries about the treatment of US invest-
ment. So although strictly speaking, they do
not belong to the classic category of inter-
national investment agreements the TIFAs
serve that purpose. The USA's AGOA, a
unilateral preferential market access frame-
work for qualifying countries, also contains
investment related conditionalities which
serve investment protection and invest-
ment liberalization functions.
A look at the pattern of actual invest-
ment flow into Africa shows most has gone
into resource extraction with large amounts
going into some of the most difficult coun-
tries - Nigeria hardly a model of stability,
particularly in the zones where oil extrac-
tion is taking place. Angola continued to
receive American investment during the
civil war even as the USA was arming the
opposition.
There are issues with so many of these
investment agreements. The broad effect is
the restriction on policy space as a quid pro
quo for expected investment inflows. There
is an imbalance between the rights of obli-
gations between the State and investors and
usually in favour of the investor. The state
agrees to give up a lot of its power to regu-
late investment even in regard to protecting
identified public policies. The institutional
management of these negotiations in many
countries is problematic in terms of the
analyses of the clauses. In many African
countries, there is a challenge of coherence.
This is not simply policy coherence across
sectors but also policy coherence even
across different BITs because usually each
capital exporting country comes with its
BITs with different demands, differences in
definitions and so on.
BITs establish very broad standards
which are subject to interpretation by tri-
bunals. The tribunal function is vested in
the investor-state dispute resolution mech-
anism which provides for treaty- based arbi-
tration which has been found to be very
intrusive and also with very expensive
enforcement. One of the things about that
mechanism is that it is one sided in disci-
plining the role of the state because it is
designed primarily to protect the investor
COVER
who can initiate an action under the arbitra-
tion provision. The threat of a suit or an
award can force the abandonment of
important public policy initiative because
the cost of arbitration is very high. Many
African countries have to hire and pay
expensive lawyers from outside the conti-
nent.
The wide coverage of definitions in the
BITs is a problem. The definition for exam-
ple of investment covers anything from
derivatives, to actual substantive, to estab-
lishment of a firm and concrete FDI invest-
ment. What is a state measure is defined
very widely. For example the Canada-
Benin BIT, says any law, regulation or pro-
cedure requirement or practice by any
branch of government at any level of the
state; district to national - very wide; the
Rwanda - USA BITs have the same provi-
sions. The wide definition of investment is
widespread. The US - Mozambique BIT
also contains some examples of this very
wide definition of investment which means
that there may be people who have even
acquired rights in a country who may not be
the horizon of the host state and its institu-
tions because of the way the investment is
defined.
The BIT being primarily about invest-
ment attraction has its own very narrow
logic which may not necessarily fit in with
where development policy is going. So
effectively it freezes the regulatory climate
for the country as of the time that the BIT is
signed and of course they are burdensome
obligations both in substance and in
process and their institutional challenges.
The reality is after signing these treaties
there is a lot of to work to do on what they
mean in terms of policy. In many cases,
nothing else is done until disputes arise and
people start scrambling to try and work out
what they mean and worst still realize the
prohibitive cost of litigation.
The substance of the treaties, pose a
number of questions. The issue of National
treatment is a constant, which means that
once somebody's investment has entered
into your country under the BIT, they are to
be treated like a national and cannot be dis-
criminated against in any way. National
Treatment has led to a number of problems
in some contexts. For example, when South
Africa introduced its Black Economic
Empowerment, it was sued by a number of
foreign investors under various BITs who
said the affirmative action to correct the ills
of Apartheid violated the National
Treatment non - discrimination provisions.
So anything about localisation, local pro-
curement rules and so on could potentially
run foul of these things.
The Most Favoured Nation is another
problem. The principle of fair and equitable
treatment which is one of the very wide pro-
visions which has become problematic is
another one. There are also restraints of
performance requirements which is to say
that if a country wants investors to be locat-
ed in a particular place, train so many locals,
transfer technology among others to con-
tribute to national development in a partic-
ular way it is no longer possible. North
American BITs in particular are very strong
in outlawing performance requirements. In
fact the Rwanda - USA BIT applies the pro-
hibition even to third party investors. So
even for non-US companies, Rwanda is
required not to impose those performance
requirements.
The German module BIT of 2008 has
the provision about National and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment as a single
clause, but many BITs have them as sepa-
rate clauses. The US-Rwanda BIT, the
Canada-Tanzania BIT also have similar
provisions and are quite extensive. The
effects of this National Treatment and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment are immense.
The World Bank did a study in 2012 in
which it is kind of moving back from its
original position of twenty (20) years ago
when it said that all that governments in
Africa should do is to encourage foreign
investment and hope that the firms will do
the rest. In this study, which in a way, was
driven by the African Mining Vision
(AMV), they made proposals for how local
content in mining can be increased in West
Africa particularly the input side.
Unfortunately, to undertake that as an affir-
mative action will be in breach of the
National Treatment provision in some of
these BITs. Some have argued that
Nigeria's local content legislation in petro-
leum possibly violates some of its BITs and
WTO principles.
Another effect therefore is that, if there
is a regional cooperation agreement, in say
West Africa or in Africa with special terms
to each other, unless there were some
exceptions in the BITs around regional
cooperation, the MFN will trigger enjoy-
ment by all foreign investors. So the MFN
in BITs can blunt the momentum for South
- South and regional cooperation.
The African Mining Vision, which has
this vision of minerals and industrialization
raises important questions about the coher-
ence between the ambitions expressed in it
and various initiatives in agriculture, indus-
trialisation and so on vis-a- vis the terms
accepted in these agreements. Things like
value addition, local enterprise ownership
and promotion are all called into question
by some of the terms of BITs.
It is obvious that the various BITs
being entered into by African countries
pose dangers to the declared intentions of
the same countries to integrate as the BITS
not only run counter to the national devel-
opment policies of these countries but also
conflict with regional and continental poli-
cies.
* Yao Graham is coordinator of Third World
Network-Africa and this an excerpt from a
presentation he made at a colloquium on
regional integration organized jointly by
Third World Network-Africa and UNECA
from May 6-8 in Accra, Ghana.
TRADE
Investor-State arbitration system
needs complete overhaul
A prominent international lawyer has launched a scathing critique of the international
arbitration system that deals with investor-State disputes, calling for its "complete overhaul",
writes *Fauwaz Abdul Aziz.
THE investor-State arbitration system fea-
tures strongly in bilateral investment
treaties and recent bilateral and plurilateral
trade agreements such as the controversial
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
Delivering the keynote address to the
Eighth Annual Juris Investment Treaty
Arbitration Conference held in
Washington, D.C. recently, George Kahale
III - who has been lead counsel in several of
the world's largest international arbitration
cases, including a pending claim against
Venezuela - also listed the top ten of what
he viewed were the most troubling aspects
of investor-State arbitration.
The chairman of the Curtis Mallet-
Prevost Colt & Mosle law firm has also
acted as lead counsel in some of the world's
largest and most publicised transactions
and infrastructure projects in the interna-
tional petroleum industry, representing
energy ministries and national oil corpora-
tions in many oil and gas producing coun-
tries.
At the conference, themed around the
question "New Developments in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Return to
Fundamentals?", Kahale said the pace and
scope of change in the area of international
trade and investment agreements, in partic-
ular, had overtaken the ability of govern-
ments to grasp the seriousness of the chal-
lenge, significance and impacts they posed.
This is in addition to the serious flaws
of the current international arbitration sys-
tem, such as its biasness and partiality in
favour of foreign investors as against states,
the use of private commercial arbitration
law principles and practices to decide on
TRADE
matters traditionally deliberated on the
basis of public international law, and the
susceptibility to abuse of substantial provi-
sions in international investment treaties,
such as the Most-Favoured- Nation and
Fair and Equitable Treatment standards.
Kahale also decried the preference in
international arbitration for "speed" and
finality" as opposed to due process and jus-
tice, the arbitrary and exorbitant claims and
awards against states that often exceed the
GDP of developing countries, the lack of a
credible and uniform standard of conduct
for arbitrators, and the recent phenomenon
of third-party funding.
Weapons of legal destruction
The first of the "top ten" concerns he
has with current international arbitration is
the fact that many governments are jump-
ing on to the bandwagon of investment
treaties - which Kahale described as
"weapons of legal destruction" - often with-
out scrutinising the serious implications
and significance of the obligations con-
tained therein.
Governments also often overlook the
changing nature of investment treaties -
which are expanding in breadth and ambi-
guity - in favour of investors with the corre-
sponding effect that more and more types
of State acts, gestures or Statements are
becoming liable to challenge and compen-
sation by foreign investors, said Kahale.
Secondly, a "club of international arbi-
trators" and a new body of international law
were being built up through the interna-
tional arbitration system, but arbitrators are
seldom trained in international law and
often have "other interests not necessarily
consistent with their functions as arbitra-
tors" nor their independence as supposedly
impartial 'judges' between parties to inter-
national disputes.
In such an environment, said Kahale,
"arbitrators are actually encouraged to trade
points as if they are bargaining in a Turkish
bazaar, acting more like party representa-
tives negotiating a settlement than arbitra-
tors deciding a momentous legal controver-
sy."
Emphasising that the issue lies beyond
the mere choice of which arbitrators are
picked by disputing parties to a dispute -
and acknowledging that "quite a few" arbi-
trators are competent and professional -
Kahale stressed that the system itself of
international arbitration is unsuitable for
investor-State disputes.
Abuse-prone standards
The third criticism Kahale raised was
that the provisions contained in bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) and other inter-
national trade and investment agreements,
such as Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN)
and Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)
standards, are themselves "susceptible to
abuse".
"Most of us intuitively sense that the
drafters of these 3,000 treaties had little or
no idea that FET meant anything other
than the minimum standard of treatment
under customary international law," for
example, whereas MFN is "a dangerous
provision to be avoided by treaty drafters
whenever possible" and has been used as if
it was a "magic wand" to impose obligations
on governments to give protections "never
imagined for virtually an entire world of
investors," said Kahale.
Fifthly, rather than "the proper admin-
istration of justice", he said the premium
placed in the international arbitration
process on "speed and finality" has turned
justice and due process into the main casu-
alties of the system.
He cited the example of the refusal of
the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Dispute's (ICSID) Annulment
Committee in 2007 to overturn an earlier
ICSID award of US$133 million against
Argentina despite finding "manifest errors"
in the original decision that "could have a
decisive impact on the operative part of the
award."
As Kahale noted, the Annulment
Committee nevertheless felt that it could
not annul the award because it exercised
jurisdiction under what it thought was a
"narrow and limited mandate conferred by
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention."
"How is Argentina supposed to feel
when it loses a case that the Annulment
Committee says was a product of manifest
errors of law?" he asked.
Mega cases
The sixth criticism of international
arbitration relates to the increasing normal-
isation of US$50-$100 million awards as
well as the increasing frequency of billion-
dollar "mega cases" and other claims
exceeding the GDP of many nations. Such
claims are being brought against States in
the same "cavalier" manner as if they were
the same as a "small demurrage claim under
a charter party," said Kahale.
The case of Occidental (oil corpora-
tion) versus Ecuador has seen not only a
foreign investor being awarded US$1.8 bil-
lion plus interest - which Kahale said is "the
largest known award in investment treaty
arbitration's history" - and is currently the
subject of annulment proceedings, but rais-
es questions as to how the tribunal arrived
at the decision to reduce the compensation
by 25 percent.
"Did the arbitrators just throw darts?
Did they sit around negotiating percent-
ages? 'How about 30, or maybe 40? No,
that's too high, let's make it 25'", he
quipped.
Kahale also noted that the decision
that had given rise to the Occidental versus
Ecuador dispute in the first place -
Ecuador's termination of a contract with
Occidental - was itself precipitated by
Occidental's violation of the prohibition
against assigning an interest in the project
to a third party without ministerial
approval, on which point Occidental had
actually lost.
"I can only assume that Ecuador was
and remains puzzled as to how it is that it
can win the underlying issue giving rise to
the case and still lose the largest award in
ICSID history. Can you imagine what the
US Congress would have done if a multi-
billion-dollar award had been rendered
against the United States for exercising its
right to terminate an oil lease for breach of
its terms?" he asked rhetorically.
A comedy of errors
On the controversial decision of
ConocoPhillips versus Venezuela, Kahale
cited the dissenting arbitrator's description
of the majority's findings as "a legal comedy
of errors on the theatre of the absurd, not to
say travesty of justice, that makes mockery
not only of ICSID arbitration, but of the
very idea of adjudication."
Arbitrators are actually
encouraged to trade points as
if they are bargaining in a
Turkish bazaar, acting more
like party representatives
negotiating a settlement than
arbitrators deciding a momen-
tous legal controversy.

Kahale said that many objections regis-
tered against the conduct of arbitrators have
been serious, but they did not succeed sim-
ply because the rules of the international
arbitration system ensure that arbitrator
conduct is not held to the same standards as
those of domestic judicial systems.
"We have to acknowledge," said
Kahale, "that conduct wholly unacceptable
for a federal judge in the United States is
commonplace in investor-State arbitra-
tion."
"I ask," he added, "Why should that be
so if, in fact, investor-State arbitration often
involves issues of international law having
an impact far beyond the individual case,
and matters of the highest public order and
national security for the States involved?
Under these circumstances, what possible
excuse is there for not holding arbitrators to
the highest, rather than the lowest, conflict
standards?"
A lack of standards
The lack of a credible standard of con-
duct is compounded by the finality of arbi-
trators' decisions as well as the related mat-
ter of issue conflicts, Kahale said further. In
most judicial systems around the world, he
stressed, even if a judge were to have dis-
played his/her bias for or against certain
issues, that judge would still be bound to
follow the interpretation of a higher judicial
authority, or otherwise risk reversal of
his/her decision.
"But in the world of investor-State arbi-
tration, where arbitrators feel free to follow
their preferred school of thought or even to
invent law without fear of appellate review,
issue conflict has to be taken more serious-
ly."
Related to the above criticism, Kahale
contended, is that many cases can be pre-
dicted by experienced practitioners on the
basis of the composition of the tribunal.
While this explains why it can take a
long time for parties to agree on the tribunal
of arbitrators for their dispute, the more sig-
nificant question is how such a state of
affairs can be squared with the notion of
impartiality, which Kahale said is universal-
ly agreed to be the bare minimum qualifica-
tion for arbitrators.
"The fact is that true impartiality is
almost impossible to achieve on issues, and
that's a dangerous thing when combined
with other features of the current system,
including the manner of appointing arbitra-
tors and the sovereignty of each tribunal."
Claimants have also demonstrated the
tendency to grossly exaggerate claims:
when ExxonMobil started its litigation
against Venezuela's State oil firm, it had ini-
tially sought US$12 billion in a claim
against Venezuela's State oil company
PDVSA (the tribunal awarded Exxon 5 per-
cent of that amount); ConocoPhillips
began its case against Venezuela claiming
over US$30 billion plus interest.
"Now, we've all heard the stories about
multi-million dollar claims based on coffee
spills. Gross exaggeration of a claim is noth-
ing new, but with investor-State arbitration,
it reaches a new level, first because of the
amounts involved and second, because
there is a greater chance that some tribunal
will actually take such a claim seriously than
there is in a national court which is subject
to more checks and balances."
The next "disturbing phenomenon"
connected to international arbitration is
that of third-party funding, said Kahale,
whereby commercial companies offer to
pay some or all of a claimant's legal fees and
expenses in exchange for payment of the
claimant's direct costs and a share of the
sum recovered by the claimant in the arbi-
tration (typically between 15% to 50%).
"One can wax eloquent about the posi-
tive role played by funders in getting justice
that would otherwise be denied," said
Kahale, "but I think we should all be frank
enough to admit that that isn't the kind of
investment BITs were meant to protect."
Bias against states
Kahale's final criticism was on "the per-
ceived bias against States" in the investment
arbitration system, which is a result of the
features discussed above as well as many
others that have not been mentioned.
While such bias does not mean that
States never win cases, that tribunals are
always tilted in favour of investors, or that
States never do wrong, Kahale said that
such figures cited by proponents of the cur-
rent international arbitration system show-
ing that States win more than 50 percent of
cases are "meaningless, if that figure hap-
pens to represent the percentage of cases
that never should have seen the light of day
or that would never survive a motion to dis-
miss in a national court."
"It is also cold comfort if 20 or 30 per-
cent of those cases involve manifest errors,
especially if some of those are mega cases."
In conclusion, Kahale said there are
some quarters who believe the criticisms
against the current international arbitration
system are merely isolated, fixable "mis-
takes" and exceptions to the general efficacy
and efficiency of the system.
"But I can assure you," Kahale pointed
out, "there is a very large segment of the
international community, including States,
international law scholars, and even stu-
dents trying to make heads or tails out of
these decisions, that believe otherwise. And
if that's the case, as it undoubtedly is, it calls
into question the legitimacy of the entire
system."
While not purporting to have any one
panacea for all the problems of the system,
they do call for immediate recognition and
attention, particularly since they are "seri-
ous problems that don't often get sufficient
air time."
"After all, the first step in solving a
problem is always becoming aware of its
existence," Kahale stressed.
According to a Curtis report on the
speech, it was not the first time that Kahale
has spoken out against investor-State arbi-
tration.
In New York in 2012, he argued that
ICSID suffered from a legitimacy problem,
and that the institution had strayed from its
original ambit.
His essay on the same subject, "Is
Investor-State Arbitration Broken?", won
the Burton Award in 2013 for distinguished
legal writing.
* This article was first published in SUNS
(#7801) TWN Info Service on Finance and
Development
TRADE
But in the world of investor-
State arbitration, where arbi-
trators feel free to follow their
preferred school of thought or
even to invent law without
fear of appellate review, issue
conflict has to be taken more
seriously.

TRADE
IT is becoming more and more clear that
the only leverage developing countries have
to force the United States and the European
Union to come to the table, and live up to
their Marrakesh and Doha Round commit-
ments on agriculture, will be for developing
countries to block further progress on the
draft Trade Facilitation accord.
Very little has come out of the closed-
door meeting outside of Geneva, but a
report in the Washington Trade Daily
(WTD) provides a comprehensive, and yet
concise report.
According to the report, those present
were envoys from the United States, the
European Union, China, Japan, Canada,
Australia, Brazil, South Africa, India,
Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Pakistan,
Norway, New Zealand, Jamaica and
Switzerland.
The WTO Director-General, Mr.
Roberto Azevedo, was not at the meeting,
his participation apparently was not accept-
able to all participants.
[The meeting of envoys of key coun-
tries among themselves, without the D-G,
had been a practice which began from
around the time of the failed Cancun
Ministerial meeting, and became more or
less systematised until very recently.
The 'retreat' last week was thus a return
to practice.]
It is notable that except for South
If US has its way, Doha
Round is dead as dodo
Judging by reports on the day-long closed door Swiss-hosted meeting of a select group of trade
envoys at the so-called 'retreat' to formulate and agree on a post-Bali work programme for con-
cluding negotiations on the Doha Development Round (DDR), it is apparent that the DDR Single
Undertaking may be as dead as a dodo writes *Chakravarthi Raghavan.
Former US trade representative Ron Kirk (l) and Michael Punke who is the US ambassador to the WTO

TRADE
Africa, there was no other African envoy.
Currently, Botswana is African Union coor-
dinator, Uganda is Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) coordinator, and Kenya
is the coordinator for the ACP (African,
Caribbean and Pacific) group, taking over
this year from Jamaica (the coordinator till
Bali) which was at the meeting.
According to the WTD report, the US
made clear at the meeting that it would not
take the 2008 agri-modalities text, even as
basis for further negotiations, since its
domestic constituencies will not accept
what is on the table in agriculture at this
juncture.
In what would put to shame a famous
information minister of an European coun-
try before and during World War II, the US
ambassador to the WTO, Mr. Michael
Punke, blandly insisted that new realities
must be taken into account, and asserted
that the 'new realities' was that China and
India are the subsiders distorting agricultur-
al trade.
According to the French civil society
activist, Jacques Berthelot, in a paper he has
posted on 16 April at the Solidarite website
(http://www.solidarite.asso.fr/Papers-
2014), the United States, from inception of
the WTO, has been consistently under-
notifying or not notifying its various subsi-
dies and support programs, and has placed
(contrary to WTO rulings) some of its ille-
gal subsidies into the new 'green box'.
In his paper, Berthelot shows that the
United States' actual annual total AMS sub-
sidies have exceeded the notified AMS by
an average of $2.563 bn from 1995 to 2000,
by $4.313 bn from 1995 to 2004 and by
$12.574 bn from 2005 to 2011.
Also, the actual total AMS has even
exceeded the bound allowed AMS of
$19.103 bn in 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2011
and the average margin of the allowed total
AMS less the actual AMS has shrunk from
$6.139 bn in 1995-2000 to $4.287 bn from
1995 to 2004 and has disappeared, at -$76
m, from 2005 to 2011 (p. 18 and Table 10,
pp18-19).
At the retreat, the United States, having
got what it wanted out of the Round at Bali,
in the shape of the Trade Facilitation
Agreement, subject only to the pending
exercise of adoption of the legal text and a
protocol for incorporating it into Annex IA
of the WTO Agreement, is refusing to con-
sider any give on its part in Agriculture, the
most heavily subsidised and trade-distort-
ing element - despite the various box-shift-
ing of the support programmes. The US
envoy, Mr. Punke, is reported as telling oth-
ers that the US does not even want to talk
about it till the US-mid-term elections in
2014.
It is clear that the US and EU, far from
reversing course on agricultural support, in
return for the onerous price paid in advance
at Marrakech by developing countries, has
just done some box-shifting to provide
increased support under various heads to its
dwindling minority employed on farms, and
now wants 'market access' for its heavily
supported agricultural products in China
and India, where the farmers are still
engaged in subsistence farming.
As far as the farmers in the developing
countries who are asked to compete, it
makes no difference to them from which
source of governmental actions the US
farmers (rather the giant agri-corporations
that benefit the most by these programs)
get support - money in the final analysis is
totally fungible.
According to the WTD report, the
industrialised country members at the
'retreat' -especially the United States - made
it clear that the Doha Round is not do-able
as along as it is based on the existing draft
modalities in agriculture, industrial goods
and services.
The WTD said that "elaborate" discus-
sions took place at the meeting on the three
agriculture pillars - domestic support, mar-
ket access and export competition - along
with a formula versus a request/offer nego-
tiating process in non-agricultural market
access. The Doha agriculture negotiations
chair, John Adank, reportedly offered mem-
bers his assessment on the continuing dif-
ferences among members over core agricul-
ture issues.
He lamented the fact that there has
been no change in members' positions
despite several attempts made during 2008
and 2011 and now. The ambassador
remarked that some members want "cre-
ative" solutions - though what would be
involved was not spelled out, the WTD said,
citing participants familiar with the meet-
ing.
According to the report, the US (sup-
ported by the EU and Canada) insisted that
its domestic constituencies will not accept
what is on the table in agriculture at this
juncture. It complained that India and
China, in particular, are not willing to pro-
vide real market access. Both countries'
insistence on "special products" and various
flexibilities in agriculture will undermine
market access by others. It also
faulted India for increasing its subsidy pay-
ments.
According to the WTD report,
the industrialised country
members at the 'retreat' -espe-
cially the United States - made
it clear that the Doha Round is
not do-able as along as it is
based on the existing draft
modalities in agriculture,
industrial goods and services.
TRADE
The WTD said that in a sharp rebuttal,
trade envoys from the Group-of-20 coali-
tion - including Brazil, South Africa and
China - reminded the United States that it is
baseless to say that developing countries
secured benefits for themselves in the 2008
draft modalities text while the industrialised
countries bore the brunt of reduction com-
mitments in domestic supports.
Developing-country trade envoys at
the meeting said upwards of 70 percent of
the Doha agriculture negotiations were
spent on arriving at specific flexibilities for
the United States in domestic supports -
particularly the carve out of new "blue box"
payments. A lot of negotiating time also was
spent on market access issues pushed by the
United States, the EU, Japan, Norway,
Switzerland and Canada.
And Switzerland, Norway and Japan man-
aged to secure flexibilities to shield some 12
percent of their tariffs on sensitive products,
the developing country envoys said.
Market access flexibilities for develop-
ing countries were only proportional to
what the industrialised countries got, one
developing-country envoy said.
The WTD said that during the discus-
sion on domestic supports, there were sharp
exchanges on increases in "amber box"
measures in both India and China and
trade-distorting effects of expanding "green
box" measures. Canada insisted that the
negotiations should not open up the "green
box" program.
However, WTD said, another Cairns
Group member reminded Canada that liter-
ature prepared by the group established
that continued shifting of payments to the
"green box" causes distortions in global
farm trade.
During the discussion on industrial
goods, non-agricultural market access nego-
tiations chair Remigi Winzap admitted to
no convergence by members on how to
bridge the gaps between bound and applied
tariffs, and that several industrialised and
some developing countries made it clear
that there will be no real market access in
major developing countries such as India,
Brazil, South Africa and China if the current
formula-flexibility approach is followed.
The EU, Japan, Australia, Mexico and
Canada, among others, supported the
United States in calling for new approaches
to remove the gap between bound and
applied tariffs.
In sharp response, Brazil, South Africa,
China and India said the level of ambition
in agriculture was set by industrialised
countries, followed by a "proportional" mar-
ket access approach in industrials.
Developing countries at the retreat said
they agreed in 2008 to make reforms in
market access for industrial goods in a cali-
brated manner based on the revised draft
modalities. The developing countries also
maintained that they have suffered heavily
due to the global financial crisis which
caused massive unemployment in their
countries.
On services, industrialised countries
pressed for securing new market access.
Developing countries - including Brazil and
South Africa - said they have no problems
with the current negotiating modalities that
allow for a request/offer approach, and that
there has been adequate progress in the
negotiations. Some developing countries
signalled their willingness to do more in
services, but only in line with parallel
progress in agriculture.
There was also reported criticism at the
meeting from some members on why the
plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement
(TISA) negotiations were being pursued
even though the overall level of progress in
the Doha services talks was acceptable to
most members. The industrialised coun-
tries assured that the TISA negotiations
results would not be imposed on WTO
members.
* Chakravarthi Raghavan is the Editor
Emeritus of the SUNS.
Shipping container terminal

DEVELOPMENT
IN the last decade, Africa's
economies have recorded high and
continuous economic growth rates
as compared to the rest of the
world. In spite of the high econom-
ic rates the growth has not been
transformative but characterised by
joblessness, growing inequality and
low productivity in most Africa
economies. The lack of transforma-
tion is partially a consequence of lack
of high investment in strategic and
productive sectors of the economies
in Africa. This was contained in its
annual report on economic develop-
ment in Africa for 2014 subtitled
'Catalysing Investment for
Transformative in Africa'.
The report calls for not only boost-
ing investment rates but also directing
investment into strategic and priorities
sectors such as agriculture and manufac-
turing that are vital for job creation and
sustained development. This can be
effective with an overhaul of the policy
logic undermining development in
Africa. There are structural challenges
confronting African economies. The
nature and pattern of Africa's growth has
also contributed to the current problems
of Africa. Despite the continent's high and
steady growth over the past decade, many
countries are yet to go through the normal
process of structural transformation charac-
terised by a shift from low to high produc-
tivity in sectors and across sectors as well as
a declining share in agricultural output and
employment and an increase in modern
services output. Development of produc-
tive capacities and structural transforma-
tion are the two elements vital for generat-
ing productive employment and laying the
foundation for sustained economic devel-
opment.
UNCTAD calls for catalytic and
strategic investment to transform
Africa's economies
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has called for strategic
investment for structural transformation of African economies, writes *Sylvester Bagooro.

Africa's growth is rather driven by con-
sumption. Although consumption is an
important source of domestic demand and
a driver of growth in Africa over the past
decade, a consumption-based growth strat-
egy cannot be sustained in the medium to
long run. This is because it often results in
over dependence on imports of consumer
goods, which presents challenges for the
survival of and growth of local industries,
the building of productive capacities and
employment creation.
From a comparative perspective Africa
has low investments rates relative to the
average for developing countries. On the
annual average rates basis, the investment
rate for Africa was about 18 per cent for the
period 1990-1999 compared to 24 per cent
for developing countries. Similarly in the
period 2000-2001, the average investment
rate was about 19 percent as compared to
26 per cent in developing countries. Africa's
investment levels are lower than optimal
levels in the sense that they are lower than
what is required to achieve sustained eco-
nomic development.
If Africa is to make any significant
progress in economic development, the
report asserts, it will have to sustain average
economic growth rates of about 7 percent
and above in the medium to long term. This
will require investment rates of 25 percent.
The facts suggest that slow progress for
African economies in achieving develop-
ment goals such as the millennium develop-
ment goals over the past decades is partly a
consequence of the fact the continent has
not made the level of investment required.
The decline in investment, especially public
investment, has a historical twist. Public
investment started declining in the 1980s as
a result of the external debt crisis and there-
after the structural adjustment reforms
spear-headed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. Governments ran out of financing in
their attempt to meet their debt obligations
public investment became a victim. Public
investment declined as expenditure com-
pressed mandated by debt stress and struc-
tural adjustment programmes. The bias
against public investment in Africa coun-
tries caused a great damage to Africa
economies. The short fall could be not filled
by private investment though the latter was
promoted over the last decades through the
counsel of international of international
financial institutions such as the World
Bank and IMF.
To turn round the situation, and catal-
yse investment for transformative growth
requires an overhaul of the policies under-
pinning economic growth in Africa. Firstly,
a balanced and coherent approach to
macroeconomic policy is needed.
Macroeconomic policy in Africa, tradition-
ally and typically, focuses on two narrow
goals such as price stability and public debt
sustainability. Under this framework the
primary focus of monetary policy has been
on containing domestic demand through
high interest rate. The result of this policy
orientation has been high cost of capital,
which depresses domestic lending and
reduces incentives for investment. While
price stability is important in every econo-
my it is crucial that this is not achieved at
the expense of other important goals such
as employment among others. In this
regard the traditional approach to macro-
economic policy is inconsistent with the
objective of promoting investment for
transformative growth.
Investment expansion will be deemed
inappropriate according to the traditional
ways of thinking but investment is some-
times needed to increase the economy's
productive capacity, create jobs and sustain
growth. Of course while an increase in
investment might be associated with a
short-run increase in the general price level,
the inflationary effects are likely to be mini-
mal in the medium to long run. As a result
growth strategy driven by investment
expansion is likely to exhibit stable combi-
nation of high and moderate inflation. But
this favours employment creation for the 15
million youth that are thrown into the job
market every year in Africa.
The report also calls for the need to
reverse the bias against public investment.
Efforts to boost investment have focused on
private investment in the context of market-
centred economic reforms. Hence, govern-
ments have been advised to focus on polices
that were expected to create an environ-
ment conducive for the private sector. The
market centred approach assumed that pri-
vate investment takes place in a vacuum.
The neglect of public investment has cost
Africa lots of damage as critical public
investments are needed to put in place pub-
lic infrastructure. This could be facilitated
by the revisit of the development banks in
Africa that provided financing especially for
long-term projects in Africa right after inde-
pendence but were privatised during the era
of structural reforms.
Another important aspect of catalysing
investment for transformative growth in
Africa is ensuring that investment goes to
the productive and strategic sectors
deemed crucial for sustained and transfor-
mative growth. Experiences have shown
that investment is likely to have more devel-
opmental impact if it goes to infrastructure
and productive sectors such as agriculture
and manufacturing which are crucial for job
creation and promotion of inclusive and
sustained growth. Direction of investment
can be done through proactive industrial
policy.
* Sylvester Bagooro is Programme Officer,
Political Economy Unit, TWN-Africa
DEVELOPMENT
From a comparative perspec-
tive Africa has low investments
rates relative to the average
for developing countries. On
the annual average rates basis,
the investment rate for Africa
was about 18 per cent for the
period 1990-1999 compared to
24 per cent for developing
countries. Similarly in the
period 2000-2001, the average
investment rate was about 19
percent as compared to 26 per
cent in developing countries.
Africa's investment levels are
lower than optimal levels in
the sense that they are lower
than what is required to
achieve sustained economic
development.

DEVELOPMENT
INMay, at least 17 people drowned when a
boat filled with hundreds of African
migrants sank in on its way from Libya to
Italy. The week before, at least 36 had died
attempting to make the same treacherous
journey in similarly overcrowded and
unseaworthy vessels.
The accounts of African migrants
dying in the Mediterranean Sea are horrify-
ing. But perhaps even more shocking is just
how commonplace such stories have
become. Over the course of just four days in
May, for instance, the Italian navy rescued
around 6,000 people as they attempted to
cross to Europe in crammed boats; full and
flimsy boats like those that faltered earlier
this month are reportedly leaving Libya
almost continuously; and there is no short-
age of people from various parts of sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East arriving
at Africa's northern shores to await their
turns to attempt the voyage. The EU's bor-
der agency Frontex suggests some 42,000
migrants have made the journey from
North Africa to Italy this year, a sharp rise
on the past two years. And this is before we
even mention the tragedy last October
when over 360 people drowned off the
Italian island of Lampedusa.
When the worst happens and migrants
die off the coasts of Libya or Italy, European
countries often express sympathy and grief.
After Lampedusa tragedy, for example,
there was a high degree of soul-searching
amongst European governments. However,
as has often been the case, a momentary
human concern soon evaporated and
European countries soon restarted their
well-worn strategies of rhetorically under-
mining the plight of asylum seekers through
clever but disingenuous arguments, of
emphasising the need to protect Fortress
Europe from 'invading African hordes', and
of trying as best they can to offload any bur-
den that might come with protecting
refugees onto poorer countries.
One way in which Western countries
justify their failure to protect asylum seek-
ers and discredit the plights of migrants is
through the notion of 'asylum shopping'.
This rhetoric works by implying that the
people who reach European shores are not
genuinely fleeing persecution, but are eco-
nomic migrants attempting to enter other
countries under the pretext of discrimina-
tion. True asylum seekers, it is suggested,
would simply apply for refuge in the first
country they reached.
This argument often plays well to
domestic audiences but rarely takes
account of the reality of many migrants' sit-
uations. Firstly, the distinction between
economic and political migrants is often a
false one. The rhetoric suggests that some
asylum seekers are 'bogus' because they
were motivated by economic choices, but
when it comes to the tens of millions of dis-
placed people from across Africa, there is
no meaningful distinction between eco-
nomic discrimination and political discrim-
ination, and little difference between eco-
nomic refugees and political ones. The false
dichotomy implies there is a choice
involved in economic migration unlike in
the face of political persecution, but the
reality for those embarking on risky jour-
neys to escape their homelands, there is no
such choice.
Secondly, these arguments hugely mis-
construe where most refugees actually end
up. Despite the hysteria that sometimes
accompanies debates around asylum seek-
ers in the West, Western countries take on
just a fraction of the world's displaced per-
sons. According to the UN Refugee
Agency, of the 21 countries that hosted
over 1 million refugees between 2003 and
2012, just one European country _ France
_ made the list, which is in reality dominat-
ed by the likes of Pakistan, Iran, Kenya,
Tanzania and Chad.
Thirdly, the notion that not applying
for asylum in the first country reached con-
stitutes 'asylum shopping' is similarly mis-
guided. For example, many of those who are
willing to risk their lives to reach Europe
begin their journeys in the deeply repressive
Eritrea, and for Eritreans there are few safe
havens in the whole East African region, let
alone in neighbouring countries.
Crossing over into Sudan, for example,
is hugely unsafe. There are numerous
human trafficking gangs that operate
around refugee camps in the east, abducting
displaced people to hold them for ransom,
while security forces are known to kidnap
Eritreans to return them home. Djibouti is
also hostile to asylum seekers and often
imprisons Eritreans claiming that they are
security threats. Libya meanwhile has been
a nightmare for African refugees both under
the rule of Muammar Gaddafi and since his
downfall, with many being discriminated
against and violently targeted.
The unstable situations in Somalia,
Egypt and South Sudan do not offer much
better options for Eritrean asylum seekers,
while Kenya _ on the other side of Ethiopia
_ appears to be growing increasingly intol-
erant of its own mostly Somali refugee com-
munity. Finally, relations between Eritrea
and Ethiopia are tense and Eritrean asylum
seekers risk getting sucked into the low-
level conflict that has continued between
the two countries since the 1998-2000 bor-
der war.
For Eritreans fleeing their home coun-
tries therefore, seeking asylum in the first,
second or even third country of arrival is
simply not a viable option.
As well as disingenuous rhetoric that
aims to undermine the legitimacy of asylum
seekers, European countries also attempt to
relieve themselves of the duty to protect
refugees through more concrete measures.
Europe may express sympathy with African asylum seekers in word, but this is often contradict-
ed by their actions in deed, writes *Yohannes Woldemariam.
African refugees: The
untouchables of our time

DEVELOPMENT
Some of these are more subtle, such as
through the funding of large refugee camps
outside their own borders, but some are far
more direct.
Before Gaddafi's overthrow, for exam-
ple, Italy and several other European coun-
tries maintained close links with Libya, part
of which were centred on cooperative meas-
ures to keep European shores free of
migrants. Under the Italian-Libyan
Friendship Pact of 2008, for instance, the
two countries significantly strengthened
border controls and Libya was encouraged
to intercept potential migrants. Italy was to
provide half the funding for the bolstered
system as well as the companies that would
be used for the initiatives, while the rest of
the money was to be sought from the EU.
Under a 2009 agreement, Libya also
agreed to allow Italian coastguard to stop
boatloads of African migrants on the seas
and forcibly return them to Libya. Italy was
not required to conduct any screening of
the travellers whatsoever _ potentially in
violation of international law _ before they
sent them to Libya where they faced a high
chance of discrimination and abuse.
Europe's reliance on Libyan complicity
in holding back asylum seekers became par-
ticularly clear in the final days of Gaddafi's
regime when the threatened dictator
warned that if he was deposed, "thousands
of people from Libya will invade Europe
and there will be no one to stop them." In
fact, Gaddafi made good on his promise
when, in May 2011, Libyan authorities
reportedly began putting non-Libyan citi-
zens on boats and sending them north to
Europe. According to one news report, "A
spokesman for Gaddafi suggested that
increased illegal immigration was the price
European nations would pay for their mili-
tary and political support of the rebels try-
ing to topple Libya's strongman."
There are a number of things the world
can do to begin correcting the iniquities of
the global asylum system, the unfair burden
it puts on certain countries and the huge
gaps in its protection of the world's most
vulnerable people. This change can start
with amendments to international treaties
and conventions.
To begin with, the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention is desperately out of date. 1951
is a long time ago and the world has
changed dramatically since then in terms of
communication access, mobility of individ-
uals and the places from which most
refugees derive. Most countries in Africa
were still colonies in 1951, and although the
convention was amended in 1967 to broad-
en its applicability to beyond Europe, little
else has been amended over the past six
decades. For example, the 1951 convention
still has no clear provision for burden-shar-
ing and defines refugees in outdated terms
that make little sense in today's world. As it
stands, the convention fails to protect
refugees. It was created in an environment
that has changed dramatically, and reflects a
time when the world was a bigger, more cer-
tain place and international flows of people
were on a much smaller scale.
The Dublin Regulation, which con-
tains the EU's rules on allocating responsi-
bility for processing asylum seekers, also
needs to be reviewed and updated to give
small countries such as Malta a fairer deal.
According to Dublin II, which has its ori-
gins in a 1990 intergovernmental conven-
tion, the obligation to examine an asylum
seeker's request rests on the country where
the application was first submitted. This
puts an unfair burden on countries situated
in the south and east of the EU.
Many asylum seekers would actually
prefer to be elsewhere in the EU where they
probably have relatives or contacts but
legally, countries such as Malta, Greece,
Italy and Spain are often obliged to keep
them. These frontline countries have tend-
ed to respond by warehousing potential
refugees and asylum seekers in often inhu-
mane conditions or in some cases by engag-
ing in 'refoulement' _ the returning refugees
to territories where their life or freedom
may be threatened.
In 2004, the European Community
produced its Qualification Directive, a
European Union-wide approach to refugee
protection that is broader in some ways
than the 1951 Convention. However, it is
nowhere near as generous as other regional
guarantees such as the 1969 African
Convention, the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration of the Organization of
American States or the 2001 Bangkok-
Principles. Part of the reason for this differ-
ence is that Europe has treated refugee pro-
tection as part of its immigration policy _
immigration law is about controlling entry;
refugee law should be about offering protec-
tion.
Changing a few conventions will not
protect asylum seekers and iron out the
inequalities and problems in the global asy-
lum system overnight, but it is a start. And
an urgently need one at that. After all, if the
world continues to rely on outdated defini-
tions and treaties to deal with Africa's
migrants, stories of rickety boats carrying
vulnerable people sinking in search of safer
shores will not stop any time soon.
* Yohannes Woldemariam is an academic and
writer. He grew up in Ethiopia but now lives in
the United States, where he is Associate
Professor of International Relations and
Environmental Studies at Fort Lewis College
in Colorado.
New arrivals : An African refugee in southern Europe

INTERNATIONAL
ARGENTINA will attend the next meeting
of the emerging group of countries, the
BRICS this July in Forteleza, Brazil. This
invite to Argentina could be a step towards
this country's reinsertion in the global map,
after its ostracism from the credit markets
since the late 2001 debt default.
For now, there is no letter "A" in the
BRICS acronym, which stands for Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa. But
in Buenos Aires speculation is rife about
whether it should be called BRICSA,
ABRICS or BRICAS, if Argentina is admit-
ted.
The invitation for President Cristina
Fernandez to participate in the group's sixth
summit is seen as another sign that Latin
America's third-largest economy may be
incorporated, after India, Brazil and South
Africa indicated their interest.
"This is very significant for Argentina,"
Fernanda Vallejos, an economist at the
University of Buenos Aires (UBA), told
IPS. "It not only points to the recognition
by the rest of the members of Argentina's
importance and potential, but also opens a
door for our country to gain greater political
and economic clout on the international
stage."
Vallejos stressed the key role played by
BRICS over the last decade in the growth of
the global economy at a time of financial cri-
sis in the industrialised North.
The term BRICS was coined for the
world's major emerging markets in 2001 by
economist Jim O'Neill of investment bank
Argentina: Once more on the
map, invited by BRICS
As Argentina starts to mend fences with the international financial markets, the emerging
powers that make up the BRICS bloc invited it to their next summit, writes *Fabiana Frayssinet.
Brazilian President Dilma Roussefl (l) and Argentine President Cristina Fernandez

INTERNATIONAL
Goldman Sachs. Together, these countries
represent around one-quarter of global
GDP, 43 percent of the planet's population,
and 20 percent of global investment.
In addition, as Argentina's foreign min-
istry stressed, the five countries account for
45 percent of the world's labour force, hold
over three trillion dollars in combined for-
eign reserves, and produce two billion
tonnes a year of agricultural products.
Vallejos said that in a world where
blocs are playing a bigger and bigger role,
BRICS has a growing voice in international
forums, where the members are "demand-
ing participation in accordance with the
weight of their economies."
"The proposal set forth by India - with
which bilateral trade expanded 30 percent
in 2013 - and backed by Brazil and South
Africa also puts paid to the opposition's
tired complaint about our country suppos-
edly being isolated from the world," said
Vallejos, who is also a researcher at the
Energy, Technology and Infrastructure
Observatory for Development (OETEC).
The formal invitation to Fernandez
was issued by Russia, which also thus con-
firmed its support.
"I think this shows that Argentina is
fully inserted in international relations, not
'isolated from the world'," Nicolas
Tereschuk, a political scientist at UBA, told
IPS. "It simply doesn't toe the line with the
policies of the central countries at just any
cost or in any circumstances, as it used to do
at other times in its history."
Argentina's invitation from BRICS
came almost simultaneously with the May
28 announcement of an agreement reached
by the Fernandez administration and the
Paris Club, which this country owed 9.7 bil-
lion dollars since the default 13 years ago.
Some political sectors here see the pub-
lic debt contracted by the 1976-1983 mili-
tary dictatorship as illegitimate. But the cen-
tre-left Fernandez administration hopes the
agreement with the Paris Club will facilitate
the renewed flow of international credit and
investment.
Economist Diego Coatz said the agree-
ment and other measures adopted by the
government such as "improving" its eco-
nomic data, whose reliability was ques-
tioned by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), point to a "shift" by the authorities
aimed at "reintegration in the world in
financial terms... and at positioning the
country better on the international front."
Coatz, with the research centre of the
Argentine Industrial Union - the country's
leading industrial employer federation - said
that if Argentina is admitted to the BRICS
bloc, "it will once more be seen as an emerg-
ing developing country with great poten-
tial."
In addition, incorporation in the bloc
would open a new window for external
financing, when Argentina is in need of for-
eign exchange and investment, he said.
At the Fortaleza summit, a formal deci-
sion could be reached on creating a region-
al development bank as an alternative to
international financial institutions like the
IMF, World Bank or Inter-American
Development Bank.
The new bank would have a 50 billion
dollar fund for financing infrastructure in
the bloc's member countries. It would also
establish a joint foreign exchange reserves
pool of 100 billion dollars, "which would
serve as insurance against the volatility of
the markets," Vallejos said.
"Argentina could access financing at
very beneficial rates compared to the heavy
interest rates of other international institu-
tions" in order to finance infrastructure for
development, she underscored.
"The strengthening of international
trade by the possible admission to BRICS
means important possibilities for Argentina
to make significant progress towards a more
developed industrial sector, with insertion
in global production chains, the develop-
ment of strategic sectors and the industrial-
isation of the countryside," Vallejos said.
The interest would appear to be mutu-
al. "The invitation came after the turmoil in
emerging markets early this year, after
which the 'establishment' international
financial press talked about a 'decline' of
BRICS," Tereschuk said.
In addition, "growth in China is slow-
ing down, India is at a decisive moment,
with the dilemma of faster growth or stag-
nation, and the Brazilian economy is not
really flourishing at this time," the econo-
mist said.
So for them and the rest of the mem-
bers of the bloc, "joining together with a
periphery country that makes up the G20
[Group of 20] would seem to be a decision
of interest to the BRICS countries," he said.
The G20 block of leading industri-
alised and emerging economies "is in some-
what of a crisis itself, because of the crisis
that the central countries are still immersed
in."
For that reason, according to
Tereschuk, Argentina would be useful to
the BRICS so that the voice of their two
South American leaders, Argentina and
Brazil, "would be heard in unison in the
greatest number of places possible."
The political scientist said Brazil and
Argentina have led a "shift to the left with
growth, reduction of poverty and inequality
in a framework of democracy and greater
political, civilian and social rights for their
citizens.
"The other members of BRICS cannot
offer all of these characteristics combined,"
he said.
Vallejos, for her part, stressed
Argentina's role as a supplier of raw materi-
als. "We are an agricultural powerhouse,"
she pointed out.
In addition, "Argentina has the world's
second-largest reserves of lithium, one of
the biggest reserves of gold - nearly 10,000
tonnes - 500 million tonnes of copper, and
300,000 tonnes of silver, while we are
becoming the third-largest global exporter
of potassium," she said.
"We are sitting on the world's third-
largest platform of unconventional fossil
fuels. And to that you have to add our tech-
nological development, and the develop-
ment of nuclear energy for peaceful purpos-
es," she added.
So would it be "BRICAS", "ABRICS" or
"BRICSA"? At any rate, what is at stake is a
bit more than deciding on a new acronym.
*Fabiana Frayssinet writes for IPS from
Buenos Aires, Argentina.
"The strengthening of interna-
tional trade by the possible
admission to BRICS means
important possibilities for
Argentina to make significant
progress towards a more
developed industrial sector,
with insertion in global
production chains, the devel-
opment of strategic sectors
and the industrialisation of
the countryside."

ENVIRONMENT
THE Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), an emerging global actor in
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD+), has
been criticised because its REDD+ projects
are not supported by a legally binding
framework, leaving forest communities in a
legal void and vulnerable to economic
exploitation.
But Jean-Claude Atningamu, a legisla-
tor in the DRC, admitted that while his
country may have strategies and policies in
place, a law on REDD+ is yet to be devel-
oped.
We have just begun these processes
and we are grappling with many chal-
lenges, he told IPS.
He said that although indigenous com-
munities were not benefiting from climate
change financing, it was not because of a
lack of political goodwill to do so.
We do not have the full support from
the international community who are not
providing the funding necessary to help the
people of the DRC meet the economic
challenges that they are facing, he said at
the conclusion of the Global Legislators
Organisation (GLOBE International) sum-
mit that was held in Mexico from June 6 to
8.
He said that while the DRC has the
second-largest forest cover in the world we
are yet to receive REDD+ financing.
We are expecting to receive the first
60 million dollars from REDD+. With our
expansive forest cover we should be receiv-
ing at least one billion dollars in a year.
We need to have mechanisms set up
by parliament to help African countries to
access REDD+ financing. Without access to
this fund, we cannot implement the policies
that we are discussing at this GLOBE
Africa's climate change legislative frameworks, though a step in the right direction, have
come under fire for not being ambitious enough to meet the challenge of a changing climate
writes *Miriam Gathigah.
Nature is talking and Africa's
legislators are listening
Forest guards in Congo DR on patrol

ENVIRONMENT
Summit, Atningamu added.
He pointed out that in Africa the forest
was the wealth of the people, we need it to
feed our people, to get heat, to cook. You
cannot tell your wife to stop using firewood
and not provide an alternative source of
energy.
But a lack of access to climate financing
is not the only issue of concern for the
African block of legislators.
The resolutions agreed upon at the
summit also raised concerns. These include
an agreement to deliver robust legislation in
support of sustainable development, partic-
ularly climate change, natural capital and
forest/REDD as well as strengthening legis-
lators capacity to effectively exercise their
oversight responsibilities, especially over
the executive.
Simon Asimah, chair of the African
block at the summit and also GLOBE
International vice-president for Africa, said
that the resolutions were not comprehen-
sive enough to meet the legislative gaps that
Africa is facing.
How do developed and developing
countries compare in recent policy respons-
es to climate change?
How does your country compare in the
number and types of climate laws?
The Ghanaian legislator said that a
few clauses will be added to the final resolu-
tion to ensure that the African region the
position of Africa in climate security is fully
represented.
These recommendations were accept-
ed and clauses include the suggestion that
all countries in Africa should have GLOBE
chapters in their respective national legisla-
tures and establish an African regional sec-
retariat at GLOBE International to be
founded in one of the countries of Africa.
There are currently only four globe interna-
tional chapters in Africa - in Ghana, Nigeria,
the DRC and South Africa,
This is key for coordination purposes,
as well as to enhance the sharing of best
practices on climate change mitigation and
adaptation across Africa, according to the
legislators.
Although the summit resolutions
encouraged the development of legislation
on natural capital, Asimah said that the
African block had pushed to have all coun-
tries, particularly those in Africa, to legislate
on effective climate change laws, and in
these laws, recognise and incorporate natu-
ral capital accounting concepts in account-
ing for their natural resources as part of their
total national capital.
Joyce Laboso, Kenya's deputy speaker
in the national assembly, also raised con-
cerns over changing global perspectives and
the impact they were having on Africa.
Laboso told IPS that fossil fuel is
increasingly being discouraged at a time
when many African countries such as
Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola
are discovering oil and now we are being
told that we are now moving into renewable
energy that is going to be subsidised. How
are we then going to achieve sustainable
development if Africa cannot rely on its nat-
ural wealth?
The Ghanaian delegation emphasised
that developed nations such as the United
States and emerging economies like China
and Mexico were emitting the most carbon
yet Africa was not expected to exploit its
forests and become industrialised in the
same way Brazil had.
Asimah said that Africa was also not
being compensated enough or in some
cases not at all for its efforts to keep people
from exploiting the forests. Africa must
find a way to develop. But this is not a blame
game, climate change is a global problem
and it requires global solutions, he said.
But Jacob F. Mudenda, speaker of
Zimbabwe's national assembly said:
Industrialised countries must submit
themselves to climate change conventions,
without which there will not be any global
synergies.
The African legislators from countries
including, Nigeria, Cape Verde Islands,
Sudan and Uganda, said that they were con-
sidering making significant financial
demands on multinationals that were
exploiting Africa's natural wealth without
impacting significantly on their GDP.
In Zimbabwe, Mudenda said that envi-
ronment laws have now been anchored in
the constitution as human rights anyone
who feels that they are being exploited can
file a case at the constitutional courts.
Mudenda further said that besides
Zimbabwe, other countries like Botswana
are learning from Norway and imposing
revenue clauses on multinationals investing
in their countries that they must improve
the wealth of these African countries
through a 51 to 49 percent benefit sharing
ratio where the host takes the majority.
In spite of the concerns raised, African
legislators have said that the summit was a
step in the right direction, particularly as
they continued to forge global partnerships
on natural resources now that various glob-
al processes and goals were coming to an
end, especially the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals, and new
ones were beginning to take shape.
*Miriam Gathigah writes for the IPS.
Degraded forest

ENVIRONMENT
Africa's ecosystems
imperilled by mining frenzy
Africa sustains some of the most spectacular ecosystems on the planet. But those ecosystems
and their iconic wildlife are now facing their greatest peril, writes *William Laurance.
WHENsocial protection measures pass for
social policy that's what you get: mPads.
The United Nations projects that
Africa's population will nearly quadruple,
from 1.1 to 4.2 billion people, by the end of
this century.
This mineral-fueled feeding frenzy has
the potential to deliver direly needed eco-
nomic growth to a continent whose popula-
tion is still skyrocketing.
Yet the mining boom carries massive
risks for the African environment and soci-
eties. In a recent article in Conservation
Letters, 'Mining and the African environ-
ment', my colleagues and I summarize some
A mine site in Kitwe, Zimbabwe

ENVIRONMENT
key implications of this 'African avalanche'.
Mineral wealth
Africa contains around 30 per cent of
the world's minerals - including large quan-
tities of phosphate, platinum-group metals,
gold, diamonds, chromite, cobalt, man-
ganese and vanadium, and huge deposits of
aluminum, uranium, iron ore and coal.
But with just five (5%) per cent of all
global mineral exploitation taking place in
Africa, the potential for growth is enor-
mous.
Africa is now attracting a stampede of
foreign mining investment. China's invest-
ment in African mining quadrupled from
2000 to 2009, and now exceeds US$100 bil-
lion annually.
Investments from India, Brazil, Russia,
Canada and Australia are also pouring in.
For example, more than 230 Australian
mining companies are now involved in over
600 mining and mineral-processing projects
across 42 African countries.
This tsunami of mining is creating a
new optimism in Africa about economic
development and poverty alleviation, but it
is also occurring in a complex socioeconom-
ic context. Africa is the poorest continent
overall, lacks a skilled workforce and has sig-
nificant political instability and corruption.
Can African nations successfully manage
this feeding frenzy?
Environmental risks
Mining projects can have both direct
and indirect impacts on the environment.
The direct effects are generally limited to
the immediate vicinity of the project itself,
and can include intense impacts on land,
wildlife habitats and aquatic environments
from mines, tailing dumps, roads, pollution
and an influx of mining workers and
migrants.
But for the environment, the indirect
effects of mining can be far worse. Mining is
often linked to major infrastructure projects
such as roads and railways to move com-
modities from mines to smelters or sea-
ports, and hydroelectric dams.
For example, in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sicomines, a China-
Congolese joint venture, is pouring $9 bil-
lion into roads, railways and other infra-
structure in order to develop a massive cop-
per mine, the Dikulwe-Mashamba conces-
sion.
In Mozambique, the Brazilian mining
company Vale is investing US$4.4 billion to
rebuild a railway system from northern
coalmines to the city of Tete.
Pandora's Box
New roads and transportation projects
can promote economic growth, but they
can also unleash a Pandora's Box of envi-
ronmental problems.
Across the developing world, new
transportation projects often promote
large-scale deforestation, wildlife poaching
and an influx of illegal migrants and land
speculators. Local communities often suffer
as well from the sudden influx of oppor-
tunistic nomads and spikes in prices for
food and other goods.
The mining boom is a key driver
behind 29 massive 'development corridors'
that will criss-cross Sub-Saharan Africa.
These corridors will bring tremendous pres-
sures and land-use change to a continent
that may lack the technical and governance
capacity to manage such unprecedented
environmental and social challenges:
In Gabon, the Belinga iron-ore deposit
will require a 240 kilometre-long
railway that will penetrate deep inside
the Congo rainforest.
In Cameroon a 570-kilometre railway
will link the Mbalam iron-ore mine to
the Atlantic coast.
In Tanzania, a planned road to the
goldfields by Lake Victoria could bisect
Serengeti National Park and disrupt
one of the world's greatest surviving
wildlife migrations.
National parks at risk
The rush to exploit Africa's mineral
wealth is also threatening many protected
areas. At least five African nations have
already downsized or degazetted national
parks to promote mining projects.
Zambia, for instance, has downgraded
19 of its national parks to promote lime-
stone mining, and permitted a huge copper
mine in the heart of the Lower Zambezi
National Park. Tanzania has downsized
Selous Game Reserve for uranium mining,
while Guinea has downsized its Mt Nimba
World Heritage Site for iron-ore prospect-
ing.
And this might be just the tip of the ice-
berg. The potential for future threats is mas-
sive given that many valuable mineral
deposits in Africa are located near or within
protected areas.
The mining frenzy that is now engulf-
ing Africa presents the greatest environ-
mental threat the continent has ever seen.
There is a dire need for international
engagement to help African nations to
improve their capacity to
govern and regulate mining,
plan and manage rapid infrastructure
expansion,
create new protected areas and safe
guard those that already exist, and
use mining-offset and mitigation funds
effectively to protect crucial
ecosystems.
The challenge at hand could hardly be
greater or more urgent. Will the mining
explosion be a new dawn for African
economies, or an environmental and social
nightmare? No one yet knows, but the
stakes for the global environment could
hardly be any higher.
Credit - Third World Network Features.
* William Laurance is a distinguished research
professor and Australian laureate at James
Cook University in Cairns, Australia. He also
holds the Prince Bernhard Chair in
International Nature Conservation at Utrecht
University, Netherlands. The above article is
reproduced from the Ecologist.org, 24 June
2014.
The potential for future
threats is massive given that
many valuable mineral
deposits in Africa are located
near or within protected areas.
The mining frenzy that is now
engulfing Africa presents the
greatest environmental threat
the continent has ever seen.

POLITICS
TWO decades ago, most countries in
Southern Africa experienced the political
phenomenon commonly referred to here as
the 'second winds of change', namely the
dismantling of one-party dictatorships and
the adoption of multiparty democracy char-
acterised by periodic free and fair elections.
The 'first winds' of change had blown
in the 1960s, leading to the decolonisation
of the continent from European rule.
With the 'second winds' blowing
through the 1990s, millions of citizens used
the ballot box to vote out leaders and sys-
tems that had stood in the way of their
dreams for decades. In 1991, Zambians
voted President Kenneth Kaunda out after
27 years in power and with little to show for
it. Malawians went to the polls in 1994 and
voted out dictator, Kamuzu Banda, who
had ruled for 30 years. Namibia became
independent in 1990, while South Africa -
whose story of a 'miracle' democratic transi-
tion is probably known across the world -
held its ever first democratic elections in
1994. Mozambique ended a bloody civil
war in 1992 and went to the polls shortly
thereafter.
It has been 20 years since these
momentous changes took place in the
region, and this year five major economies
in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) either have already
gone or will go to the polls to elect new gov-
ernments in an environment that's devoid
of the euphoria of the 1990s. South Africa
and Malawi have already held their elec-
tions in May, while Botswana and
Mozambique will go to the polls in
October. Namibia too will hold national
elections this year at a date yet to be
announced.
There are at least two sides to these
elections. The more positive one is that,
save for the case of Malawi where the elec-
tions were characterised by logistical chaos
and counting fraudulence, they are likely to
be generally free and non-violent.
The Sout h Af ri can el ect i on was
Continuity and little change as
Southern Africa goes to the polls
It has been 20 years since the sweeping political changes in Southern Africa and this year five
major economies in the region either will go or have already gone to the polls to elect new gov-
ernments in an environment devoid of the euphoria of the 1990s, writes * Wallace Chuma.
Peter Mutharika : newly elected Malawian President

POLITICS
declared both free and fair by both regional
and international observers. Since the end
of the civil war in Angola in 2002, Southern
Africa has been the most peaceful region in
Africa. Although the recent political and
economic crises in Zimbabwe and
Madagascar have been a cause for substan-
tial concern, the region compares
favourably to continental violent flash-
points such as Central African Republic,
Nigeria (Boko Haram terrorist threats),
Kenya (Somali terrorist threats), Somalia,
Egypt, and many others.
The other positive element of the elec-
tions is that there is unlikely to be any radi-
cal policy changes, especially economic pol-
icy, by the post-election governments. This
is largely because the incumbent liberation
party-led governments of South Africa,
Namibia, Mozambique and Botswana are
tipped to retain power as they command
majority support by large margins. In fact,
South Africa's governing ANC already won
a landslide 62 per cent of the May 7th vote.
Given that the combined economies of
these countries constitute over two thirds
of the US$600 billion worth of the regional
total GDP, continuity in the current politi-
cal leadership will also ensure continuity of
the current economic policies, which have
resulted in sustained growth over the past
decade, at least at the macro level.
The only uncertainty is Malawi.
President Peter Mutharika was declared
winner and sworn into office after now
defeated President Joyce Banda, who
trailed behind 74-year-old Mutharika and
one other contender declared the results
void, citing claims of massive vote rigging in
the May 20th election. Banda was eventual-
ly overruled by the country's courts because
the constitution does not give her that
power.
But there are also serious questions
about the meaning of these elections for
ordinary citizens of this part of Africa who
have seen their lives and wellbeing either
stagnate or deteriorate over the years in
spite of high economic growth rates.
Successive free and fair elections in
most parts of the region have delivered one
bunch of elites after another into govern-
ment, but haven't created conditions for
equitable participation of all or most citi-
zens in the economy. Malawi is one striking
example. The country gained independ-
ence from Britain 50 years ago, but the
independence has not brought any mean-
ingful change to the quality of life of the
average citizen. The country is now ranked
among the poorest by the United Nations
Human Development Index.
The adoption of multi-party democra-
cy in the country in 1994 has seen three
governments elected and served their
terms, but poverty levels rose on their
watch. President Joyce Banda assumed
office following the sudden death of
President Bingu Wa Mutharika in April
2012 (the newly elected President is the
younger brother of the late president).
Her first few months in office were
characterised by refreshing rhetoric of
change: she promised to shed the trappings
of wealth her predecessor had so indulged
in, such as a presidential jet and an exten-
sive fleet of luxury cars. She even re-
engaged Western donors who had pulled
out during the previous government, and
pledged to fight corruption and get the
country working again.
But the euphoria quickly died down
when it emerged that her government had
embezzled millions of donor money to fund
her party's political projects last year.
South Africa's election was the first to
be held without the mystique and unifying
personality of Nelson Mandela, who died
last December. Although the governing
African National Congress (ANC) was
retained with 62 per cent of the vote, this
was lower than the last election in 2009,
where it garnered above 65 per cent. As a
government, the ANC under President
Jacob Zuma has largely maintained the tra-
jectory of economic growth set by previous
leaders, but has been involved in numerous
corruption scandals, including the decision
to upgrade Zuma's private residence for
US$25 million. The increasing brutality
and violation of basic human rights by the
police, which among others resulted in the
massacre of 34 mineworkers in 2012, has
also alienated the government. When the
ANC expelled its youth leader Julius
Malema for insubordination last year, he
formed a new party, the Economic
Freedom Fighters (EFF), which positioned
itself to the left of the ANC. The new party,
hardly a year old, garnered six (6) per cent
of the vote, getting 25 seats in Parliament.
The EFF rhetoric about expropriation of
white-owned land and nationalisation of
mines and banks appealed to the country's
mostly unemployed black youth who
accuse the ANC government of selling out
to big business.
In Botswana, the governing party, the
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is likely
to retain power as it has done for the past 46
years since independence. The country,
currently led by President Ian Seretse
Khama, is often cited as an African success
story with a stable democracy and prosper-
ous economy.
However, with depleting stocks of dia-
monds, on which the country's economy
has been dependent for years, the prospects
for future economic growth sans diamond
revenue is likely to be a contested issue
among political parties ahead of this year's
elections.
Both Mozambique and Namibia will
have new Presidents after this year's elec-
tions as incumbents Armando Guebuza and
Hifikepunye Pohamba will have completed
their two terms in office. Both Frelimo in
Mozambique and Swapo in Namibia are
liberation movements-turned-governing
parties which still command majority sup-
port in their countries and are therefore
likely to be retained in power.
It has been two decades since the intro-
duction of multiparty democracy in most of
Southern Africa, and the region is much
better off both economically and politically
than before. But the experience of freedom
of elections that came with the new political
systems has not been matched with free-
dom and wherewithal to partake in the
economy for many of the region's citizens.
In short, the democratic dividend promised
has yet to materialise for the populace save
the small band of elite and big businesses.
Indeed, notwithstanding the statistical
indicators of positive growth, high levels of
unemployment, inequalities, economic
exclusion, corruption and poverty levels are
still high. For some countries, elections
have been reduced to a periodic ritual
where citizens are invited to give legitimacy
to one group of elites after another, with
very little or no meaning for the margin-
alised.
The 2014 elections in the SADC
region will largely ensure continuity on the
macro-economic and political trajectories,
which is positive for stability and foreign
direct investment. But the diffusion of eco-
nomic opportunities to the region's poor
majorities is unlikely to be achieved soon.
* Wallace Chuma, PhD, is a senior lecturer in
media studies at the University of Cape Town,
South Africa.
The recent celebration of the D-Day land-
ing and the multiple recollections of the
ageing participants in the battles of that war
issued in a period of recollection of the hor-
rors of that war and the bravery of the par-
ticipants, particularly by the survivors.
Celebrities from both the Axis and the
Allied Powers were there, even the French,
Russians and Italians who fought on both
sides of the war. The only ones missing
were the valiant African soldiers who fought
and died in these same battles, served at the
front and perished in the prisoner-of war
camps. Their heroism and dedication went
unnoticed and unregarded. This is a pity
and a great shame for the hosts of these cel-
ebrations. It should have been no surprise
to the Africans, however, as their treatment
after the war was a triumph of racist and dis-
criminatory behaviour towards them by
those whose homelands the Africans had
fought to save.
These African soldiers were many and
ubiquitous. They fought in Africa, the
Middle East, Europe and the Far East, espe-
cially Burma, Ceylon, and India. There
were over a million African soldiers
engaged in this war. For them the war start-
ed at its very beginning; not the attack on
Poland which triggered the European
response in 1939, but even earlier in 1935
when the Italian Fascist troops, backed by
African soldiers from Eritrea attacked
Ethiopia. African troops were engaged in
this war as a result of the colonial occupa-
tion of their countries and the compulsion
The forgotten African soldiers
in WWII celebrations
More than a million African soldiers were engaged in WWII, some as volunteers while most of
them were forcibly conscripted. They fought in Africa, the Middle East, Europe and the Far East.
But their contribution remains unacknowledged, writes *Gary K Busch.
POLITICS
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of the colonial powers on the
colonies to provide manpower for
the war effort. Some were volun-
teers but most were compelled to
become soldiers.
Each colonial power had a dif-
ferent method of conscription but
the end result was the same. In his
book, 'Fighting For Britain: African
Soldiers in the Second World War',
historian David Killingray says
more than half a million African
troops served with the British forces
between 1939 and 1945 - 289,530
of them with the King's African
Rifles from Uganda, Tanzania,
Kenya and Malawi. He describes it
as the largest single movement of
African men overseas since the slave
trade. Most of the Africans were told that
they had no choice. They were told that
they must fight and were picked up by
Army trucks from their home villages and
sent for basic training, often with the com-
plicity of the native chiefs and district
supervisors. The Belgians just rounded up
whomever they saw and dropped them off
at a local army base; usually after some ini-
tial brutality.
The French had created a body of
African soldiers earlier. Since 1857, the
French colonialists created a surrogate
army of African soldiers from the Africans
living in the several states composing the
AOF (French West Africa) and the AEF
(French Equatorial Africa). They called
these soldiers the Tirailleurs Senegalais
although they weren't limited to inhabitants
of Senegal. The Tirailleurs Senegalais were
created as the first permanent units of black
African soldiers under French rule in 1857.
These were not professional soldiers; they
were drawn from the ranks of the ex-slaves
and social outcasts who were sold to the
French by the local African chiefs. From
1857 to 1905 the main recruiting of these
soldiers was the rachat (repurchase) system
in which slaves were purchased from their
local owners by the French and turned into
mercenary soldiers. The practice of buying
slaves by the army was ended officially in
1882 but it was observed more in the
breach than the observance.
In 1905 the French colonies in Africa
were put under civilian rather than military
rule. However, this removal of French mili-
tary rule over the region meant that ever
more African proxies were needed for polic-
ing, fighting resistance forces, and as garri-
son troops. These surrogate troops were
used to put down local uprisings and
expand French rule. The Tirailleurs
Senegalais participated in the conquest of
Morocco in the early 1900s. In 1912 a new
partial-conscription law was passed, making
it easier for the French to recruit surrogates.
With the French entry into World War
I these Tirailleurs Senegalais were sent to
Europe to defend France. The number of
West African troops serving under French
command in World War I comprised about
170,891 men, and approximately 30,000 of
them were killed. In Senegal alone more
than a third of all males of military age were
mobilized and sent to France to fight. After
the war the French colonial authorities
passed the Conscription Law of 1919,
which called for universal male conscrip-
tion in peacetime as well as wartime.
Hundreds of thousands of the Tirailleurs
Senegalais were compelled to fight in
France's colonial wars and to provide
labour brigades for the colonial authorities.
During World War II these African
troops played an important role. The
Tirailleurs Senegalais troops were used in
even greater numbers, initially by Vichy
France and later by the Free French. In
1940, African troops comprised roughly 9
percent of the French army. The French
recruited more than 200,000 black Africans
during the war. Approximately 25,000 were
killed in battle. Many were also interned in
German labour camps and thousands of
black African Prisoners of War (POWs)
were murdered by the Wehrmacht in 1940.
One of those who escaped execution was
later President of Senegal, Leopold
Senghor. Despite his high level of education
and acquisition of French citizen-
ship in 1932, Senghor was enrolled
as a French army enlisted man (2me
Classe) in 1939 with the rank of pri-
vate within the 59th Colonial
Infantry division.
A year later, during the
German occupation of France, he
was taken prisoner by the Germans
and kept in several internment
camps. He ended up in Front Stalag
230 at Poitiers, which was reserved
for colonial troops. It was there that
the Germans engaged in mass exe-
cutions of African prisoners-of-war.
The main sport of the German
guards at that camp was to random-
ly pick out their African prisoners
almost daily and take them out to a
field for target practice. Literally thousands
were killed that way. Senghor escaped by
the skin of his teeth. Senghor was lucky to
avoid the daily executions. He was released
for medical reasons in 1942 and went back
to Senegal and his unit. He was then sent
with his unit to Algeria as part of the French
war against Algerian nationalists.
He has recounted some of his experi-
ences in the famous book of poetry
Hosties Noire, Black Hosts, published in
1948.
Not only was it difficult to be taken far
away from home and placed in great danger
on the front lines, but the French were
divided between Vichy and the Free
French. Both sides had large contingents of
African troops. The French were happy to
use African troops against other African
troops. Perhaps the best example was in
Operation Explorer.
During the Second World War the
Germans concentrated their Central Asian
policies on supporting the regime of Rashid
Ali and the colonels of the "Golden Square"
in Iraq. They were trying to block British
access to India and to the oil supplies of
Iraq, then under British influence. In the
spring of 1941 the French Government
(Vichy) granted permission for German
and Italian aircraft to refuel in the Levant en
route to Iraq. The French were still the
'Mandated' rulers of Syria and Lebanon.
The British were urged by the 'Free French'
under de Gaulle to intervene against the
Vichy French.
These Allies anticipated a quick knock-
out followed by immediate rallying of Vichy
Chadian WWII veteran : 15000 Chadian soldiers fought
to free France

POLITICS
forces to the Free French. This did not hap-
pen, although the Vichy forces were small
and without sufficient reserves or supplies.
Their ground forces were tough and well-
trained, and their small air force actually
maintained air superiority for much of the
campaign.
Instead of a quick victory, the
Australian, Indian, British, and Free French
forces slugged it out with the Vichy defend-
ers and suffered several serious setbacks
before the ceasefire on 12 July. The reason
that the Free French and the Vichy French
showed such valour was that they were both
made up of Senegalese troops and Foreign
Legionnaires. There were very few French
actually involved, Free or otherwise. By July
most of the Free French forces and the
Vichy forces (especially the Senegalese),
had enough of killing their countrymen,
and refused to continue. When the cam-
paign ended, with an Allied victory only
some 5,700 (out of about 26,000) Vichy
troops elected to join de Gaulle. The
remainder were evacuated by sea to French
North Africa under Allied supervision. The
Senegalese were tired of fighting other
Senegalese and went home. The War in the
Lebanon was much quicker as the French
soldiers quit after six days because they had
run out of Senegalese. An armistice was
signed in Acre on July 14, 1941.
The war in Europe continued and large
numbers of African soldiers continued to
die. By late 1944 it became clear that an
Axis victory was unlikely. It was a matter of
time before the invasion of the German
heartland would end with a German defeat.
The Italians had already changed sides and
DeGaulle was installed as the leader of the
Free French. Vichy had disappeared.
DeGaulle and his generals decided that it
was time to whiten the French Army.
They extended their gratitude to the
African soldiers who were returning to
West Africa in 1944 after the Liberation of
France. De Gaulle, when he saw that the
Allies had pushed the Germans out of
France decided that it was too dangerous to
continue to use these African troops. He
ordered a whitening of the troops by
replacing 20,000 Africans which were in
battle at the front with white French sol-
diers. This event caused hatred and dislike
between the white and the blacks at war.
These Tirailleurs Senegalais troops were
segregated in French demobilising centres
waiting to go back home. While at the cen-
tres these African soldiers faced discrimina-
tory treatment. They barely got the food
and resources they needed and did not have
any kind of shelter. The French refused to
pay them the money they owed them and
informed them that, as they weren't French,
they would not be entitled to any pensions
or benefits from their contribution to the
Liberation of France. They were then trans-
ported out of France to holding camps in
Africa, near Dakar in Senegal.
In December 1944, humiliated and
without having been given what they were
promised, the soldiers at the camp at
Thiaroye protested for the back pay to
which they were entitled. The protest was
seen by the French as defiance against the
French military and the general in charge,
with the help of the gendarmerie, ordered
the "white" French military to deploy
machine guns and opened fire on the
African soldiers which resulted in thirty-five
Africans killed, hundreds wounded and
many sent to jail.
It was known as the Thiaroye Massacre
. It is not in any French history books but it
isn't forgotten among African soldiers.
There is a good film on the subject by
Ousmane Sembene, Camp de Thiaroye
made in 1988. Despite this, the Tirailleurs
Senegalais were compelled by the French to
participate in the French counterinsur-
gency war in Algeria in the 1950s, fighting
Algerian nationalists.
The French felt obliged to use African
troops in Algeria because the large numbers
of Algerian troops who had fought for
France were outraged at the behaviour of
the French on VE day in 1945, where forty-
five thousands of their relatives and coun-
trymen were massacred in one weekend.
On May 8, 1945, a day chosen by the allies
to celebrate their victory over Nazi
Germany, thousands of Algerians gathered
near the Abou Dher El-Ghafari mosque in
Setif for a peaceful march - for which the
sous-prefet had given permission. It was a
market day. At 9am, led by a young scout
Saal Bouzid, whose name had been drawn
for the honour of carrying the national flag,
the demonstrators set off.
A few minutes later the crowd, chanti-
ng 'vive l'independance' and other national-
ist slogans, came under fire from troops
commanded by General Duval and brought
in from Constantine. Saal Bouzid fell dead,
becoming a national martyr. The scene
soon turned into a massacre - the streets
and houses being littered with dead bodies.
Witnesses claim terrible scenes, that legion-
naires seized babies by their feet and dashed
their heads against rocks, that pregnant
mothers were disembowelled, that soldiers
dropped grenades down chimneys to kill
the occupants of homes, that mourners
were machine gunned while taking the dead
to the cemetery.
A public record states that the
European inhabitants were so frightened by
the events that they asked that all those
responsible for the protest movement
should be shot. The carnage spread and,
during the days that followed, some 45,000
Algerians were killed. Villages were shelled
by artillery and remote hamlets were
bombed with aircraft. A Colonel in charge
of burials being criticized for slowness told
another officer 'You are killing them faster
than I can bury them.'
These incidents led to the upsurge of
the PPA and ultimately, 17 years later, to
the country's independence. In the retalia-
tory violence that immediately followed
104 Europeans were assassinated, but by
the end several thousands were to die.
These incidents were particularly hard for
the Algerian Tirailleurs who had fought the
Nazis alongside the French forces, some of
whom came home to find that their families
had been decimated by the troops of
General de Gaulle.
Perhaps it is these memories of French
barbarism which have prevented the access
of African troops to the ceremonies cele-
brating the 70th anniversary. The troops
fared a bit better under British rule, but they
too returned to a colonial system in which
they found it hard to rejoin their former
lives. The British, too, were not forthcom-
ing with the pensions they thought they had
earned and occasionally, as in Ghana in
1948 the British responded to a protest by
African soldiers that they had not received
their back pay by instructing the police
force to open fire on the protestors.
The Africans, wrenched from their
homes by colonial conscription laws, the
rachat and kidnapping fought bravely and
well during the Second World War. It was a
pity and a shame that their contribution to
the war effort, marked in lives lost, injuries
suffered, and harsh conditions should have
been allowed to go unrecognised at the cer-
emonies. Not one African country was
invited to participate. It is an insult to the
memory of these brave African soldiers.
*Credit to Pambazuka News
LAWRENCE Kwarteng had lost his job as a
secretary at the cultural centre. Like others
who had lost their jobs, they had become
people forever scouring the newspapers,
looking for opportunities. One morning he
was going through the papers when sud-
denly, something caught his eyes. It was an
advert titled: REQUEST FOR PROPOS-
ALS. The Ministry of Education was asking
for the submission of proposals for the
review of the syllabus on culture for junior
secondary schools.
Kwarteng's heart
soared. His interest
peaked as he read on.
In terms of
course content, the
advert was asking for
the history of ethnic
groups, their political
organization, lineage
systems, naming sys-
tems, festivals, music,
drumming and
dance. The advert
listed a number of
requirements such as
educational history,
employment history,
age and other routine
requirements. Here,
Kwarteng was alright.
Over the next
few weeks, Kwarteng
got busy on his lap-
top, typing and edit-
ing. He was surprised by the breadth of his
knowledge about the numerous ethnic
groups. As he typed, his elation soared
Often he would get up, pacing around the
living room while he read the manuscript
out aloud, a satisfied look on his face as he
imagined the impact his words were going
to have on the selection panel.
All the time he had painfully restrained
from his joy with his wife Araba whose
hopes had been dashed more than once.
Besides, once in her more playful moments
she had called him Commissioner of
Oaths Licensed Letter Writer.
Finally, he finished typing his manu-
script. He gave it a final check, making sure
he had his address correctly typed. He then
secured the manuscript in his suitcase. For
trips like going to the ministries, Kwarteng
had a special black suit and a pair of black
shoes, it was thus clad that he set off for the
Ministry of Education.
Soon he was at the Ministry. He intro-
duced himself and announced his mission
to the lady at the front desk. The lady called
out Francis several times. Finally, a man
arrived. He was dressed in a non-matching
safari suit and a pair of worn-out sandals.
He was redolent of cheap local gin.
The lady remonstrated with him for
sleeping on duty. She then asked him to
take Kwarteng to Abban's office.As they
turned to go, Kwarteng could see her cring-
ing her nose at the smell of alcohol that
Francis had left behind.
They came to a door with an inscrip-
tion: SYLLABUS REVIEW COMMIT-
TEE. The door opened to a room with a
long table. Around the table were seated
several men and women.
Seeing his documents, one corpulent
woman, said, Proposals?
Kwarteng said, Yes
She took the manuscript and placed it
on top of a stack in the middle of the table.
Kwarteng winced at the size of the
stack but he was reassured at the woman's
smile. Furthermore, he felt that if so many
people had submitted their proposals
before him, that could only mean they had
not been as meticulous as he had been. In
any case he was within the closing date.
Kwarteng went home. All he had to do
now was to wait.
The days began to
pass by. And the days
turned to weeks.
Soon one month had
passed by. Kwarteng
began to get jittery,
but there was nothing
he could do since
according to the
advert, respondents
had to wait for the
Ministry to corre-
spond with them.
However, after two
months, Kwarteng
told himself there
must have been a
mix-up somewhere,
so sure was he sure of
his proposals. He set
off for the Ministry
with his proposals
once more. This time
there were visible
signs of change, some
of which intimidated him. First of all,
through open windows, he could see a num-
ber of white people speaking in an
American accent. At Syllabus Review
Committee office there was, standing
before the door, nobody but good old
Francis.
Half asleep, Francis seemed to be fight-
ing hard to stay on his feet.
At Kwarteng's greeting, he responded,
Yash?
I've come to inquire about my propos-
als, said Kwarteng pointing at the door.
Oh, shilabosh proposals! He asked
Kwarteng's name.Kwarteng told him. He
opened the door and disappeared.
SHORT STORY
A short story by Kwao Tordzro
THE PROPOSALS
SHORT STORY
At the head of the table was S.K.
Abban, Chairman of the Syllabus Review
Committee, a no-nonsense old bureaucrat
who had spent several years fending off the
hopes of dreamers like Kwarteng. A t the
sight or rather the odour of Francis, he
barked, Open the door, Francis, please,
and leave the door open too. Let the air cir-
culate.
Kwarteng complied, facing Abban, '
name be Kwarteng,' he said, His name
is
His name can be Pope Francis for all I
care, hissed Abban. ' Francis, he said your
work is outside this office, not inside. Your
duty is to sack all those pests. They are sup-
posed to go home and wait to hear from us.
How many times am I to tell you this? Go
and tell the monkey to go and read the
advertisement all over again. He is to wait
till he hears from us. If he doesn't hear from
us, it means his proposals have been reject-
ed.'
Kwarteng went home again, more than
dejected. Time passed and he decided to go
again, this time telling himself it would be
the very last time. This time he didn't go
with a copy of the manuscript. Neither did
he carry the briefcase nor wear the suit.
This time, Kwarteng noted that the
workers at the Ministry were in a relaxed,
even a festive mood. On the flooor which
housed the offices of the Syllabus Review
Committee, there were people milling
about on the porch. Kwarteng was looking
all over the place, searching for Francis.
Suddenly, he saw a man who seemed to be
beckoning to him come over. In appear-
ance, the man stood out among the others,
for he was not dressed like anybody around.
Instead of the usual long-sleeved shirt, this
man was wearing a round collared shirt
made of African wax-print material. With
his trimmed goatee and moustache, he
looked altogether, like someone you might
meet at a nightclub, not at the premises of a
ministry.
Are you one of those who've fallen into
the old trap? the man asked
What? Kwarteng asked, apprehen-
sive.
You've submitted proposals, haven't
you? Without waiting for an answer, he
continued, I know, because I've been see-
ing you going to that office.
Kwarteng thought he could detect a
sarcastic stress on the designation of the
office. However, he answered in the affirma-
tive.
Obviously, they've not written to you
but you keep on going and coming because
you have faith in your proposals. Here, the
man gave a little laugh.
Kwarteng was deep in thought. How
could this man have been so observant?
How could he have so much knowledge
about the workings of the bureaucracy and
how could he be so sure that he Kwarteng
stood no chance? At that moment, Francis
materialized in front of them Morning
Shah,' said Francis.
Just then, Kwarteng's attention was
momentarily distracted by two ladies who
were passing by. One of the ladies said,
How I pity him he doesn't seem to ever get
tired. Keeps on coming and coming.
The other said, 'If I were him I would
go and find an honest job I hear Chairman
Abban has named him Monkey. That's
what all those people on the Committee call
him.
Kwarteng turned to Francis and said,
Morning , Francis, can you kindly'
Mashah, said Francis, I can but for
kindly you mush and twiddled his
thumb and middle finger , indicating that if
Kwarteng wanted him to kindly ran any
errand for him then some money had to
change hands. Kwarteng handed over some
notes.
Suddenly the man, looking at his
watch, sad, Hey it's news time. Why don't
we go and listen to it together?
Hardly had he said this than they were
in a small cubicle of an office. The office was
scantily furnished. There was only a desk
with two chairs and a shelf. There was a
small radio on the shelf, sounding at a low
volume. The man picked the radio and
raised the volume. The tune that heralded
the news came on. Then the newscaster
said: First, the headlines. The United States
Agency for International Development
(USAID) has donated comic books to the
Ministry of Education for the reading pleas-
ure of Ghanaian schoolchildren.
The man made a noise of contempt.
What nonsense. But excuse my manners. I
forgot all about self-introduction. I'm Kwasi
Edusei I actually belong to the Ministry of
Culture but I've been sent here temporarily
to assist with this syllabus thing.' Kwarteng
introduced himself in turn
What's happening today? Kwarteng
asked . 'It seems everybody is so happy.'
'Oh, it's one of the syllabus review peo-
ple's days. They've cashed one of their
checks. Everybody's going to celebrate
today. Of course, Abban's going to get the
lion's share, the rest of the committee are
going to be well compensated, secretaries,
everybody.
But, said Kwarteng, 'they've not even
reviewed the syllabus yet, not to talk of
looking at proposals.'
You don't seem to know anything
about the workings of the bureaucracy,
said Edusei. Here, the cart is always put
before the horse. But we've forgotten all
about the radio. He had remembered just
in time, because just then the radio said,
And now, the details. At the ceremony to
launch the introduction of comic books to
junior secondary school libraries, the
Chairman of the Syllabus Review
Committee of the Ministry of Education,
Mr. S.K. Abban expressed the gratitude of
the government of..
'That is what the whole hullabaloo
about syllabus review is about,' said Edusei.
'The committee and all its auxiliary offices
are all involved in drawing budgets related
to the distribution of books about Mickey
Mouse, Donald Duck and Brer Rabbit.'
'What about the proposals?
The whole thing was decided long
before the advert was placed in the papers.
Indeed?
Yes, the whole contract for review of
the cultural content of the syllabus of junior
secondary schools of Ghana has gone to
Professor Adjei Boafo, fellow lodge mem-
ber of Mr. S.K. Abban, Chairman of you
know what.
Finally, he finished typing his
manuscript. He gave it a final
check, making sure he had his
address correctly typed. He
then secured the manuscript in
his suitcase. For trips like
going to the ministries,
Kwarteng had a special black
suit and a pair of black shoes,
it was thus clad that he set off
for the Ministry of Education.

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