Pirates v economists

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21606882-new-weapon-against-somali-bandits-
free-trade-pirates-v-economists
SHIS navigating the lawless seas of the "#lf of $den m#st %eep a constant loo%o#t for Somali pirates. &he
roots of Somalia's maritime banditr( lie in its desperatel( poor coastal villages) where the choice between
fishing and pirac( is an eas( one for man(. *#t whereas plent( of attention has been given to pirates' own
economic motives) less has been paid to the +#estion of wh( infl#ential local clans p#t #p with the
mara#ders in their midst. ,ew research b( an economist at -ing's .ollege /ondon and a sociologist at the
0niversit( of 12ford sheds some light on that iss#e3and s#ggests a wa( in which the pirates co#ld be r#n
agro#nd for good.
$n4a Shortland and 5ederico 6arese mapped the locations of hi4ac%ed ships between 2007 and 2012. &he(
fo#nd that hi4ac%ed vessels were alwa(s anchored far awa( from regional trading ro#tes) and that big ports
were not prone to pirac(. &here is a reason for that. Somali clans control local trade b( iss#ing licences and
charging informal ta2es. &he researchers rec%on that comm#nities which can ta2 imports and e2ports ref#se
to protect pirates beca#se trade is a safer and more l#crative so#rce of reven#e than pirate earnings. 1nl(
clans that have no other income offer the pirates protection) in ret#rn for a share of their loot.
&he theor( seemed to hold #p d#ring a ban on Somali livestoc% imports imposed b( Sa#di $rabia between
2000 and 2008. 9ost Somalis are farmers and Sa#di $rabia is their main livestoc% mar%et) so the embargo
hammered the econom(. .lan leaders in heavil( hit cities s#ch as *osaso) in the coastal state of #ntland)
began offering ref#ge to pirates instead. $fter the ban was lifted and c#stoms d#ties began flowing again) the
pirates were promptl( loc%ed #p.
&he st#d('s a#thors thin% their findings offer a new wa( to sc#ttle Somalia's pirates. Hi4ac%ings off the Horn
of $frica have fallen sharpl( since shipping companies beefed #p their sec#rit( and international navies
#pped their patrols. 1nl( 17 incidents were reported off Somalia's coast last (ear) down from :7 in 2012 and
2;: in 2011. *#t those sec#rit( meas#res are e2pensive) and do not tac%le the #nderl(ing ca#ses of the
problem. $ more lasting sol#tion wo#ld be to b#ild new roads and ports) which wo#ld allow remote areas to
start trading. <ith alternative so#rces of income) fewer comm#nities wo#ld be willing to harbo#r pirates.
=onors %een to advance sha%( sec#rit( gains pledged aro#nd >1.7 billion to Somali reconstr#ction last (ear.
art of that co#ld be allocated to remote coastal areas) rather than big cities li%e 9ogadish#) which get the
lion's share. ?&he demand is there)@ sa(s 9s Shortland. $ former president of #ntland repeatedl( re+#ested
a road be b#ilt to A(l) a ro#gh-and-read( coastal town) as a +#id pro +#o for giving #p pirac(. His re+#est
was t#rned down) and pirac( contin#ed. &ime for donors to rethin% where the( spend their pieces of eight.
Piracy in Somalia
http://en.wi%ipedia.org/wi%i/irac(BinBSomalia
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a threat to international shipping since the second phase of the
Somali .ivil <ar in the earl( 21st cent#r(.
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Since 2007) man( international organiEations) incl#ding the
International 9aritime 1rganiEation and the <orld 5ood rogramme) have e2pressed concern over the rise
in acts of pirac(.
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irac( has impeded the deliver( of shipments and increased shipping e2penses) costing
an estimated >6.6 to >6.8 billion a (ear in global trade according to 1ceans *e(ond irac( F1*G.
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$ccording to the "erman Instit#te for Aconomic Iesearch F=I<G) a veritable ind#str( of profiteers has also
risen aro#nd the pirac(. Ins#rance companies) in partic#lar) have profited from the pirate attac%s) as
ins#rance premi#ms have increased significantl(.
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$ 0nited ,ations report and several news so#rces have s#ggested that pirac( off the coast of Somalia was
ca#sed in part b( illegal fishing.
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$ccording to the =I< and the 0.S. Ho#se $rmed Services .ommittee)
the d#mping of to2ic waste in Somali waters b( foreign vessels also severel( constrained the abilit( of local
fishermen to earn a living. In response) the fishermen began forming armed gro#ps to stop the foreign ships.
&he( event#all( t#rned to hi4ac%ing commercial vessels for ransom as an alternate so#rce of income.
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In
2008) a s#rve( b( <ardheer,ews fo#nd that appro2imatel( :0 percent of the local coastal comm#nities at
the time Jstrongl( s#pportCedD the pirac( as a form of national defense of the co#ntr(Ks territorial watersJ.
&he pirates also believed that the( were protecting their fishing gro#nds and e2acting 4#stice and
compensation for the marine reso#rces stolen.
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Some reports have s#ggested that) in the absence of an
effective national coast g#ard following the o#tbrea% of the civil war and the s#bse+#ent disintegration of
the $rmed 5orces) local fishermen formed organiEed gro#ps in order to protect their waters. &his is reflected
in the names adopted b( some of the pirate networ%s) s#ch as the National Volunteer Coast Guard) which
are testimon( to the piratesK initial motivations.
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However) as pirac( became s#bstantiall( more l#crative)
other reports have spec#lated that financial gain became the primar( motive for the pirates.
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.ombined &as% 5orce 170) a m#ltinational coalition tas% force) too% on the role of fighting pirac( off the
coast of Somalia b( establishing a 9aritime Sec#rit( atrol $rea F9S$G within the "#lf of $den.
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&he
increasing threat posed b( pirac( has also ca#sed concern in India since most of its shipping trade ro#tes
pass thro#gh the "#lf of $den. &he Indian ,av( responded to these concerns b( deplo(ing a warship in the
region on 2; 1ctober 2008. In September 2008) I#ssia anno#nced that it too wo#ld 4oin international efforts
to combat pirac(.
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Some reports have also acc#sed certain government officials in Somalia of complicit(
with the pirates)
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with a#thorities from the "alm#d#g administration in the north-central Hob(o district
reportedl( attempting to #se pirate gangs as a b#lwar% against Islamist ins#rgents from the nationKs so#thern
conflict Eones.
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However) according to 0, Secretar(-"eneral *an -i 9oon) both the former and c#rrent
administrations of the a#tonomo#s #ntland region in northeastern Somalia appear to be more activel(
involved in combating pirac(.
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&he latter meas#res incl#de on-land raids on pirate hideo#ts)
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and the
constr#ction of a new naval base in con4#nction with Saracen International) a 0--based sec#rit( compan(.
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*( the first half of 2010) these increased policing efforts b( Somali government a#thorities on land and
international naval vessels at sea reportedl( contrib#ted to a drop in pirate attac%s in the "#lf of $den from
86 a (ear prior to ;;) forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas s#ch as the Somali *asin and the wider
Indian 1cean.
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*( the end of 2011) pirates managed to seiEe onl( fo#r ships off the coast of Somalia)
22 fewer than the 26 the( had capt#red in each of the two previo#s (ears. &he( also attempted #ns#ccessf#l
attac%s on 72 other vessels) 16 fewer than the (ear prior.
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$s of 8 L#ne 201H) the pirates were holding one
large ship and an estimated thirt(-nine hostages.
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$ccording to another so#rce) there were 171 attac%s on ships in 2011) compared with 12: in 2010 M b#t onl(
27 s#ccessf#l hi4ac%s compared to H: in 2010. irates were holding 10 vessels and 178 hostages in 5ebr#ar(
2012. In 2011) pirates earned >1H6m) an average of >H.8: million per ship. $n estimated ;)000 to 7)000
pirates operatedN b( 5ebr#ar( 2012 1)000 had been capt#red and were going thro#gh legal processes in 21
co#ntries.
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$ccording to the A#ropean 0nion ,aval 5orce FA0 ,$651IG) intensified naval operations had
b( 5ebr#ar( 2012 led to a f#rther drop in s#ccessf#l pirate attac%s in the Indian 1cean) with the piratesK
movements in the region at large also significantl( constrained.
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$bo#t 27 militar( vessels from the A0
and ,$&1 co#ntries) the 0nited States) .hina) I#ssia) India and Lapan patrolled appro2imatel( 8.;9 %m
2
F;.2 million s+ milesG of ocean) an area abo#t the siEe of <estern A#rope.
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1n 16 L#l( 2012) the A#ropean
0nion la#nched a new operation) A0.$ ,estor. $n anal(sis b( the *r#ssels-based "lobal "overnance
Instit#te #rged the A0 to commit onshore to prevent pirac(.
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*( September 2012) the he(da( of pirac( in
the Indian 1cean was reportedl( over. *ac%ers were now reportedl( rel#ctant to finance pirate e2peditions
d#e to the low rate of s#ccess) and pirates were no longer able to reimb#rse their creditors.
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$ccording to
the International 9aritime *#rea#) pirate attac%s had b( 1ctober 2012 dropped to a si2-(ear low) with onl(
one ship attac%ed in the third +#arter compared to thirt(-si2 d#ring the same period in 2011.
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*( =ecember
201;) the 0S 1ffice of ,aval Intelligence reported that onl( 8 vessels had been attac%ed d#ring the (ear b(
the pirates) with Eero s#ccessf#l hi4ac%ings.
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.ontrol Iis%s attrib#ted this 80O decline in pirate activit(
from the corresponding period in 2012 to the adoption of best management practices b( vessel owners and
crews) armed private sec#rit( onboard ships) a significant naval presence) and the development of onshore
sec#rit( forces.
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Histor(
In the earl( 1880s) prior to the o#tbrea% of the civil war in Somalia) the Somali 9inistr( of 5isheries and the
.oastal =evelopment $genc( F.=$G la#nched a development program foc#sing on the establishment of
agric#lt#ral and fisher( cooperatives for artisanal fishermen. It also received significant foreign investment
f#nds for vario#s fisher( development pro4ects) as the Somali fishing ind#str( was considered to have a lot
of potential owing to its #ne2ploited marine stoc%s. &he government at this time permitted foreign fishing
thro#gh official licensing or 4oint vent#re agreements) forming two s#ch partnerships in the Ira+i-Somali
Siadco and Italian-Somali Somital vent#res.
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$fter the collapse of the central government in the ens#ing civil war) the Somali ,av( disbanded. <ith
Somali territorial waters #ndefended) foreign fishing trawlers began illegall( fishing on the Somali seaboard
and ships from big companies started d#mping waste off the coast of Somalia. &his led to the erosion of the
fish stoc%. /ocal fishermen s#bse+#entl( started to band together to protect their reso#rces.
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$fter
seeing the profitabilit( of ransom pa(ments) some financiers and former militiamen later began to f#nd
pirate activities) splitting the profits evenl( with the pirates.
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In most of the hi4ac%ings) the pirates have not
harmed their prisoners.
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.ombined &as% 5orce 170) a m#ltinational coalition tas% force) s#bse+#entl( too% on the role of fighting
pirac( off the coast of Somalia b( establishing a 9aritime Sec#rit( atrol $rea F9S$G within the "#lf of
$den.
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However) man( foreign naval vessels chasing pirates were forced to brea% off when the pirates
entered Somali territorial waters.
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&o address this) in L#ne 2008) following a letter from the Somalian
&ransitional 5ederal "overnment F&5"G to the resident of the 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil re+#esting assistance
for the &5"Ks efforts to tac%le acts of pirac( off the coast of Somalia) the 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil #nanimo#sl(
passed a declaration a#thoriEing nations that have the consent of the &ransitional 5ederal "overnment to
enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates.
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1n the advice of law(ers) the Io(al ,av( and other
international naval forces have often released s#spected pirates that the( have capt#red beca#se) altho#gh
the men are fre+#entl( armed) the( have not been ca#ght engaging in acts of pirac( and have th#s not
technicall( committed a crime.
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=#e to improved anti-pirac( meas#res the s#ccess of pirac( acts on sea decreased dramaticall( b( the end of
2011 with onl( fo#r vessels hi4ac%ed in the last +#arter vers#s 1: in the last +#arter of the preceding (ear.
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In response) pirates resorted to increased hostage ta%ing on land.
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&he government of the a#tonomo#s
#ntland region has also made progress in combating pirac() evident in recent interventions b( its maritime
police force F95G.
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In part to f#rther c#rtail pirac( activit() the /ondon Somalia .onference was convened in 5ebr#ar( 2012.
$ccording to the International 9aritime *#rea#) pirate attac%s in the Indian 1cean had b( 1ctober 2012
dropped to a si2-(ear low.
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$ttempted hi4ac%ings fell from 2;: in 2011 to :7 the following (ear) with
s#ccessf#l attac%s pl#mmeting from 28 in 2011 to 1H in 2012.
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$dditionall() onl( 1 ship was attac%ed in
the third +#arter of 2012 compared to ;6 d#ring the same period in 2011.
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S#mmar( of recent events
9ain article: /ist of ships attac%ed b( Somali pirates
Somali pirates have attac%ed h#ndreds of vessels in the $rabian Sea and Indian 1cean region) tho#gh most
attac%s do not res#lt in a s#ccessf#l hi4ac%ing. In 2008) there were 111 attac%s which incl#ded H2 s#ccessf#l
hi4ac%ings.
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However) this is onl( a fraction of the #p to ;0)000 merchant vessels which pass thro#gh that
area.
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&he rate of attac%s in Lan#ar( and 5ebr#ar( 2008 was abo#t 10 times higher than d#ring the same
period in 2008 and Jthere have been almost dail( attac%s in 9archJ)
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with :8 attac%s)
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21 s#ccessf#l) b(
mid-$pril. 9ost of these attac%s occ#rred in the "#lf of $den b#t s#bse+#entl( the pirates increased their
range and started attac%ing ships as far so#th as off the coast of -en(a in the Indian 1cean.
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*elow are
some notable pirate events which have garnered significant media coverage since 200:.
1n 28 9a( 200:) a .hinese sailor was %illed b( the pirates beca#se the shipKs owners failed to meet their
ransom demand.
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1n 7 1ctober 2008) the 0nited ,ations Sec#rit( .o#ncil adopted resol#tion 18;8
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calling on nations with vessels in the area to appl( militar( force to repress the acts of pirac(.
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$t the 101st
co#ncil of the International 9aritime 1rganiEation) India called for a 0nited ,ations peace%eeping force
#nder #nified command to tac%le pirac( off Somalia.
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F&here has been a general and complete arms
embargo against Somalia since 1882.G
In ,ovember 2008) Somali pirates began hi4ac%ing ships well o#tside the "#lf of $den) perhaps targeting
ships headed for the port of 9ombasa) -en(a.
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&he fre+#enc( and sophistication of the attac%s also
increased aro#nd this time) as did the siEe of vessels being targeted. /arge cargo ships) oil and chemical
tan%ers on international vo(ages became the new targets of choice for the Somali hi4ac%ers. &his is in star%
contrast to the pirate attac%s which were once fre+#ent in the Strait of 9alacca) another strategicall(
important waterwa( for international trade) which were according to maritime sec#rit( e2pert .atherine Para
Ia(mond) generall( directed against Jsmaller) more v#lnerable vessels carr(ing trade across the Straits or
emplo(ed in the coastal trade on either side of the Straits.J
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1n 18 ,ovember 2008) the Indian ,av( warship I,S &abar san% a s#spected pirate mothership.
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/ater) it
was claimed to be a &hai trawler being hi4ac%ed b( pirates.
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&he Indian ,av( later defended its actions b(
stating that the( were fired #pon first.
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1n 21 ,ovember 2008) **. ,ews reported that the Indian ,av( had received 0nited ,ations approval to
enter Somali waters to combat pirac(.
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1n 8 $pril 2008) fo#r Somali pirates seiEed the Maersk Alabama 2H0 na#tical miles FHH0 %mN 280 miG
so#theast of the Somalia port cit( of A(l.
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&he ship was carr(ing 1:)000 metric tons of cargo) of which
7)000 metric tons were relief s#pplies bo#nd for Somalia) 0ganda) and -en(a.
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1n 12 $pril 2008)
0nited States ,av( SA$/ snipers %illed the three pirates that were holding .aptain Iichard hillips hostage
aboard a lifeboat from the Maersk Alabama after determining that .aptain hillipsK life was in immediate
danger.
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$ fo#rth pirate) $bd#l <ali 9#se) s#rrendered and was ta%en into c#stod(.
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1n 18 9a() a
federal grand 4#r( in ,ew Qor% ret#rned a ten-co#nt indictment against him.
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1n 20 $pril 2008) 0nited States Secretar( of State Hillar( .linton commented on the capt#re and release of
: Somali pirates b( =#tch ,aval forces who were on a ,$&1 mission.
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$fter an attac% on the
Handytankers Magic) a petrole#m tan%er) the =#tch frigate De Zeven Provincin trac%ed the pirates bac% to
a pirate Jmother shipJ and capt#red them.
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&he( confiscated the piratesK weapons and freed 20 Qemeni
fishermen whom the pirates had %idnapped and who had been forced to sail the pirate Jmother shipJ.
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Since the =#tch ,aval 5orces were part of a ,$&1 e2ercise) b#t not on an A0 mission) the( lac%ed legal
4#risdiction to %eep the pirates so the( released them.
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.linton stated that this action Jsends the wrong
signalJ and that additional coordination was needed among nations.
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1n 2; $pril 2008) international donors pledged over >270 million for Somalia) incl#ding >1;H million to
increase the $frican 0nion peace%eeping mission from H);70 troops to 8)000 troops and >;H million for
Somali sec#rit( forces.
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Secretar(-"eneral of the 0nited ,ations *an -i-moon told delegates at a
donorsK conference sponsored b( the 0, that Jirac( is a s(mptom of anarch( and insec#rit( on the
gro#ndJ) and that J9ore sec#rit( on the gro#nd will ma%e less pirac( on the seas.J
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Somali resident
Sharif $hmed pledged at the conference that he wo#ld fight pirac( and to lo#d appla#se said that JIt is o#r
d#t( to p#rs#e these criminals not onl( on the high seas) b#t also on terra firmaJ.
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&he Somali
government has not gone after pirates beca#se pirate leaders c#rrentl( have more power than the
government.
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It has been estimated b( pirac( e2perts that in 2008 the pirates gained abo#t >80 million
thro#gh ransom pa(ments.
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1n 2 9a( 2008) Somali pirates capt#red the 96 Ariana with its 2H 0%rainian crew.
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&he ship was
released on 10 =ecember 2008 after a ransom of almost 0S>;)000)000 was paid.
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1n 8 ,ovember 2008) Somali pirates threatened that a %idnapped *ritish co#ple) the .handlers) wo#ld be
Jp#nishedJ if a "erman warship did not release seven pirates.
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1mer) one of the pirates holding the *ritish
co#ple) claimed the seven men were fishermen) b#t a A#ropean 0nion ,aval 5orce spo%esman stated the(
were capt#red as the( fired $--H: assa#lt rifles at a 5rench fishing vessel.
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&he .handlers were released
on 1H ,ovember 2010 after ;88 da(s of captivit(.
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$t least two ransom pa(ments) reportedl( over "*
700 000) had been made.
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In $pril 2010) the .entral Intelligence $genc( F.I$G all#ded to possible covert and overt action against the
pirates. .I$ officials had been p#blicl( warning of this potential threat for months. In a Harpers Magaine
article) a .I$ official said) J<e need to deal with this problem from the beach side) in concert with the ocean
side) b#t we donKt have an embass( in Somalia and limited) ineffective intelligence operations. <e need to
wor% in Somalia and in /ebanon) where a lot of the ransom mone( has changed hands. *#t o#r operations in
/ebanon are a 4o%e) and we have no presence at all in SomaliaJ.
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In earl( 9a( 2010) I#ssian special forces retoo% a I#ssian oil tan%er that had been hi4ac%ed b( 11 pirates.
1ne died in the assa#lt) and a wee% later I#ssian militar( officials reported that the remainder were freed
d#e to wea%nesses in international law b#t died before reaching the Somali coast. I#ssian resident =mitr(
9edvedev had anno#nced the da( the ship was reta%en that J<eKll have to do what o#r forefathers did when
the( met the piratesJ #ntil a s#itable wa( of prosec#ting them was available.
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1n 11 9a( 2010 Somali pirates seiEed a *#lgarian-flagged ship in the "#lf of $den. &he Panega) with 17
*#lgarian crew members aboard) was en ro#te from the Ied Sea to India or a%istan. &his was the first s#ch
hi4ac%ing of a *#lgarian-flagged ship. 1n 12 9a( 2010) $thens anno#nced that Somali pirates had seiEed a
"ree% vessel in the "#lf of $den with at least 2H people on board) incl#ding two "ree% citiEens and some
5ilipinos. &he vessel) sailing #nder the /iberian flag) was transporting iron from 0%raine to .hina.
1n 1H Lan#ar( 2011) while spea%ing to reporters) .ommodore 9ichiel Hi4mans of the Io(al ,etherlands
,av( stated that the #se of hi4ac%ed vessels in more recent hi4ac%ings had led to increased range of pirating
activities) as well as diffic#lt( to activel( thwart f#t#re events d#e to the #se of %idnapped sailors as h#man
shields.
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1n 17 Lan#ar( 2011 thirteen Somali pirates seiEed the !am"o #e$elry) a 9altese-flagged chemical carrier
operated b( Samho Shipping) 670 %m so#theast of 9#scat. &he Iep#blic of -orea ,av( destro(er C"oi
%oung shadowed the !am"o #e$lry for several da(s. In the earl( morning of 21 Lan#ar( 2011) 27 I1- ,av(
SA$/s on small boats la#nched from the C"oi %oung boarded the !am"o #e$elry while the C"oi %oungs
<estland S#per /(n2 provided covering fire. Aight pirates were %illed and five capt#red in the operationN the
crew of 21 was freed with the .aptain s#ffering a g#nshot wo#nd to the stomach.
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1n 28 Lan#ar( 2011) an Indian .oast "#ard aircraft while responding to a distress call from the .9$ ."9
Verdi) located two s%iffs attempting a pirac( attac% near /a%shadweep. Seeing the aircraft) the s%iffs
immediatel( aborted their pirac( attempt and dashed towards the mother vessel) 96 Prantalay &' M a
hi4ac%ed &hai trawler) which h#rriedl( hoisted the two s%iffs on board and moved westward. &he Indian
,av( deplo(ed the I,S Cankarso which located and engaged the mothership 100 na#tical miles north of the
9inico( island. 10 pirates were %illed while 17 were apprehended and 20 &hai and *#rmese fishermen
being held aboard the ship as hostages were resc#ed.
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<ithin a wee% of its previo#s s#ccess) the Indian ,av( capt#red another hi4ac%ed &hai trawler) 96
Prantalay && and capt#red 28 pirates aboard in an operation #nderta%en b( the I,S (ir p#rs#ant to receiving
information that a "ree% merchant ship had been attac%ed b( pirates on board high-speed boats) altho#gh it
had managed to avoid capt#re. <hen I,S (ir ordered the pirate ship to stop and be boarded for inspection) it
was fired #pon. &he I,S (ir ret#rned fire in which ; pirates were in4#red and ca#sed the pirates to raise a
white flag indicating their s#rrender. &he I,S (ir s#bse+#entl( was 4oined b( ."S !amar of the Indian
.oast "#ard. 1fficials from the Indian ,av( reported that a total of 72 men were apprehended) b#t that 2H
are believed to be &hai fishermen who were hostages of the 28 $frican pirates.
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In late 5ebr#ar( 2011) pirac( targeting smaller (achts and collecting ransom made headlines when fo#r
$mericans were %illed aboard their vessel) the )uest) b( their captors) while a militar( ship shadowed them.
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$ federal co#rt in ,orfol%) 6irginia) sentenced three members of the gang that seiEed the (acht to life
imprisonment.
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1n 2H 5ebr#ar( 2011 a =anish famil( on a (acht were capt#red b( pirates.
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In 9arch 2011) the Indian ,av( intercepted a pirate mother vessel 600 na#tical miles west of the Indian
coast in the $rabian Sea on 9onda( and resc#ed 1; hostages. Si2t(-one pirates have also been ca#ght in the
operation carried o#t b( ,av(Ks I,S *alpeni.
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In late 9arch 2011) the Indian ,av( seiEed 16 s#spected pirates after a three-ho#r-long battle in the $rabian
Sea) &he nav( also resc#ed 16 crew members of a hi4ac%ed Iranian ship west of the /a%shadweep Islands.
&he crew incl#ded 12 Iranians and fo#r a%istanis.
C8:D
1n 7 Lan#ar( 2012) an SH-60S Seahaw% from the g#ided-missile destro(er 0SS *idd) part of the 0SS #o"n
C !tennis .arrier Stri%e "ro#p) detected a s#spected pirate s%iff alongside the Iranian-flagged fishing boat)
Al Molai. &he master of the Al Molai sent a distress call abo#t the same time reporting pirates were holding
him captive.
$ visit) board) search and seiE#re team from the *idd boarded the dhow) a traditional $rabian sailing vessel)
and detained 17 s#spected pirates who had been holding a 1;-member Iranian crew hostage for several
wee%s. &he Al Molai had been hi4ac%ed and #sed as a Jmother shipJ for pirate operations thro#gho#t the
ersian "#lf) members of the Iranian vesselKs crew reported.
C88D
irates
Profile
9ost of the pirates are (o#ng.
C88D
$n official list iss#ed in 2010 b( the Somali government of H0 apprehended
pirate s#spects noted that 80O F;2/H0G were born in SomaliaKs so#thern conflict Eones) while onl( 20O
F8/H0G came from the more stable northern regions.
C80D
$s of 2012) the pirates primaril( operated from the
"alm#d#g region in the central section of the co#ntr(.
C81DC82D
In previo#s (ears) the( largel( vent#red to sea
from ports in the northeastern #ntland province) #ntil the regional administration la#nched a ma4or anti-
pirac( campaign and established a maritime police force F95G.
C81D
$ccording to a 2008 **. report) the pirates can be divided into three main categories:
/ocal fishermen) considered the brains of the piratesK operations d#e to their s%ill and %nowledge of
the sea.
A2-militiamen) who previo#sl( fo#ght for the local clan warlords) or e2-militar( from the former
*arre government #sed as the m#scle.
&echnical e2perts) who operate e+#ipment s#ch as "S devices.
C8;D
&he closest Somali term for KpirateK is burcad badeed) which means Jocean robberJ. However) the pirates
themselves prefer to be called badaadinta bada" or Jsavio#rs of the seaJ Foften translated as Jcoastg#ardJG.
C8HD
Methodology
&he methods #sed in a t(pical pirate attac% have been anal(Eed.
C87D
&he( show that while attac%s can be
e2pected at an( time) most occ#r d#ring the da(N often in the earl( ho#rs. &he( ma( involve two or more
s%iffs that can reach speeds of #p to 27 %nots. <ith the help of motherships that incl#de capt#red fishing and
merchant vessels) the operating range of the s%iffs has been increased far into the Indian 1cean. $n attac%ed
vessel is approached from +#arter or sternN I"s and small arms are #sed to intimidate the operator to slow
down and allow boarding. /ight ladders are bro#ght along to climb aboard. irates then will tr( and get
control of the bridge to ta%e operational control of the vessel.
C87D
$ccording to S%( ,ews) pirates often 4ettison their e+#ipment in the sea before arrest) as this lowers the
li%elihood of a s#ccessf#l prosec#tion.
C2:D
Weaponry and funding
&he pirates get most of their weapons from Qemen) b#t a significant n#mber come from 9ogadish#)
SomaliaKs capital. <eapons dealers in the capital receive a deposit from a "a$ala dealer on behalf of the
pirates and the weapons are then driven to #ntland where the pirates pa( the balance.
C8;D
6ario#s
photographs of pirates in sit# indicate that their weapons are predominantl( $-9s) I"-:s) $-H:s) and
semi-a#tomatic pistols s#ch as the &&-;0.
C86DC8:D
$dditionall() given the partic#lar origin of their weaponr()
the( are li%el( to have hand grenades s#ch as the I"=-7 or 51.
&he f#nding of pirac( operations is now str#ct#red in a stoc% e2change) with investors b#(ing and selling
shares in #pcoming attac%s in a bo#rse in Harardhere.
C88D
irates sa( ransom mone( is paid in large
denomination 0S> bills. It is delivered to them in b#rlap sac%s which are either dropped from helicopters or
cased in waterproof s#itcases loaded onto tin( s%iffs. Iansom mone( has also been delivered to pirates via
parach#te) as happened in Lan#ar( 2008 when an orange container with >; million cash inside was dropped
onto the dec% of the s#pertan%er 96 !irius !tar to sec#re the release of ship and crew.
C88D
&o a#thenticate the
ban%notes) pirates #se c#rrenc(-co#nting machines) the same technolog( #sed at foreign e2change b#rea#s
worldwide. $ccording to one pirate) these machines are) in t#rn) p#rchased from b#siness connections in
=#bai) =4ibo#ti) and other areas.
C100D
Hostages seiEed b( the pirates #s#all( have to wait H7 da(s or more for
the shipsK owners to pa( the ransom and sec#re their release.
C101D
In 2008) there were also allegations that the pirates received assistance from some members of the Somali
diaspora. Somali e2patriates) incl#ding some members of the Somali comm#nit( in .anada) rep#tedl(
offered f#nds) e+#ipment and information.
C102D
$ccording to the head of the 0,Ks co#nter-pirac( division) .olonel Lohn Steed) the $l-Shabaab gro#p in
2011 increasingl( so#ght to cooperate with the pirate gangs in the face of dwindling f#nds and reso#rces for
their own activities.
C10;D
Steed) however) ac%nowledged that he had no definite proof of operational ties
between the pirates and the Islamist militants. =etained pirates also indicated to 0,1=. officials that some
meas#re of cooperation with $l-Shabaab militants was necessar() as the( have increasingl( la#nched
maritime raids from areas in so#thern Somalia controlled b( the ins#rgent o#tfit. $l-Shabaab members have
also e2torted the pirates) demanding protection mone( from them and forcing seiEed pirate gang leaders in
Harardhere to hand over 20O of f#t#re ransom proceeds.
C10HD
It has been s#ggested that al-Raeda have
received f#nding from pirate operations. $ maritime intelligence so#rce told .*S ,ews that it was
JKinconceivableK to <estern intelligence agencies that al Raeda wo#ld not be getting some financial reward
from the s#ccessf#l hi4ac%ingsJ. &he( go on to e2press concern abo#t this f#nding lin% being able to %eep
the gro#p satisfied as pirac( gains more p#blicit( and higher ransoms.
C107D
Affects and perceptions
Costs
*oth positive and negative effects of pirac( have been reported.
CHD
In 2007) a li+#efied petrole#m tan%er) MV
+eisty Gas) was hi4ac%ed and ransomed for >;17)000 after being held for abo#t two wee%s.
C106D
In 2008)
pirate income derived from ransoms was estimated at aro#nd H2.1 million e#ros Fabo#t >78 millionG)
C10:D
rising to >2;8 million in 2010.
C108D
&he average ransom had risen to >7.H million in 2010) #p from aro#nd
>170)000 in 2007.
C108D
However) b( 2011) pirate ransom income dropped to >160 million) a downward trend
which has been attrib#ted to intensified co#nter-pirac( efforts.
CHD
*esides the act#al cost of pa(ing ransoms) vario#s attempts have been made at ga#ging indirect costs
stemming from the pirac(N especiall( those reportedl( inc#rred over the co#rse of anti-pirac( initiatives.
CHDC110D
=#ring the height of the pirac( phenomenon in 2008) local residents complained that the presence of so
man( armed men made them feel insec#re and that their free spending wa(s ca#sed wild fl#ct#ations in the
local e2change rate. 1thers fa#lted them for e2cessive cons#mption of alcoholic beverages and %hat.
C8;D
$ 2010 report s#ggested that pirac( off the coast of Somalia led to a decrease of reven#e for Ag(pt as fewer
ships #se the S#eE canal Festimated loss of abo#t >6H2 millionG) impeded trade with neighboring co#ntries)
and negativel( impacted to#rism and fishing in the Se(chelles.
C108DC111D
$ccording to S%( ,ews) aro#nd 70O
of the worldKs containers passed thro#gh the Horn of $frica coastline as of 2012. &he A#ropean 0nion ,aval
5orce FA0 ,$651IG has a (earl( b#dget of over 8 million A#ros earmar%ed for patrolling the ;.2 million
s+#are miles.
C2:D
$ 2011 report b( 1ceans *e(ond irac( F1*G s#ggested that the indirect costs of pirac( were m#ch higher
and estimated to be between >6.6 to >6.8 billion) as the( also incl#ded ins#rance) naval s#pport) legal
proceedings) re-ro#ting of slower ships) and individ#al protective steps ta%en b( ship-owners.
CHDC108DC112DC11;D
$nother report from 2011 p#blished b( the cons#ltanc( firm "eopolicit( Inc. investigated the ca#ses and
conse+#ences of international pirac() with a partic#lar foc#s on s#ch activit( off the coast of Somalia. &he
paper asserted that what began as an attempt in the mid-1880s b( Somali fishermen to protect their territorial
waters has e2tended far be(ond their seaboard and grown into an emerging mar%et in its own right. =#e to
potentiall( s#bstantial financial rewards) the report h(pothesiEed that the n#mber of new pirates co#ld swell
b( H00 persons ann#all() that pirate ransom income co#ld in t#rn rise to >H00 million per (ear b( 2017) and
that pirac( costs as a whole co#ld increase to >17 billion over the same period.
C11HD
$ccording to a 2012 investigative piece b( the Somalia Ieport) the 1* paper and other similar reports that
attempt to calibrate the global cost of pirac( prod#ce inacc#rate estimates based on a variet( of factors. 9ost
salientl() instead of comparing the act#al costs of pirac( with the considerable benefits derived from the
phenomenon b( the maritime ind#str( and local parties capitaliEing on capacit(-b#ilding initiatives) the 1*
paper conflated the alleged pirac( costs with the large premi#ms made b( ins#rance companies and l#mped
them together with governmental and societal costs. &he report also e2aggerated the impact that pirac( has
had on the shipping sector) an ind#str( which has grown steadil( in siEe from 27)000 billion tonnes/miles to
;7)000 billion tonnes/miles since the rise of Indian 1cean pirac( in 2007. 9oreover) the global costs of
pirac( reportedl( represent a small fraction of total maritime shipping e2penses and are significantl( lower
than more ro#tine costs) s#ch as those bro#ght on b( port theft) bad weather conditions or f#el-related iss#es.
In the 0nited States alone) the ,ational .argo Sec#rit( .o#ncil estimated that between >10M>17 billion
were stolen from ports in 200;) a fig#re several times higher than the pro4ected global cost of pirac(.
$dditionall() while the 1* paper alleged that pirate activit( has had a significantl( negative impact on
regional economies) partic#larl( the -en(an to#rism ind#str() to#rist-derived reven#e in -en(a rose b( ;2O
in 2011. $ccording to the Somalia Ieport investigation) the 1* paper also did not factor into its
calc#lations the overall decline in s#ccessf#l pirate attac%s beginning in the second half of 2011) a
downward trend largel( bro#ght abo#t b( the increasing #se of armed g#ards.
CHD
$ccording to $dmiral
&erence A. 9c-night) ransom demands and pa(ments have risen e2ponentiall( and the financers and pirates
decided the( are willing to wait as long as it ta%es to receive Jhigh seven-fig#re pa(o#tsJ.
C106D
Benefits
Some benefits from the pirac( have also been noted. In the earlier (ears of the phenomenon in 2008) it was
reported that man( local residents in pirate h#bs s#ch as Harardhere appreciated the re4#venating effect that
the piratesK on-shore spending and restoc%ing had on their small towns) a presence which often provided 4obs
and opport#nit( when there were comparativel( fewer. Antire hamlets were in the process reportedl(
transformed into boomtowns) with local shop owners and other residents #sing their gains to p#rchase items
s#ch as generators for #ninterr#pted electricit(.
C100D
However) the election of a new administration in 2008 in
the northeastern #ntland region saw a sharp decrease in pirate operations) as the provincial a#thorities
la#nched a comprehensive anti-pirac( campaign and established an official maritime police force F95G.
Since 2010) pirates have mainl( operated from the "alm#d#g region to the so#th. $ccording to the Somalia
Ieport) the significant infrastr#ct#ral development evident in #ntlandKs #rban centers has also mainl( come
from a combination of government development programs) internal investment b( local residents ret#rning
to their home regions following the civil war in the so#th) and especiall( remittance f#nds sent b( the siEable
Somali diaspora. &he latter contrib#tions have been estimated at aro#nd >1.;M>2 billion a (ear)
e2ponentiall( dwarfing pirate ransom proceeds) which total onl( a few million dollars ann#all( and are
diffic#lt to trac% in terms of spending.
C117D
$dditionall() impoverished fishermen in -en(aKs 9alindi area in the so#theastern $frican "reat /a%es
region have reported their largest catches in fort( (ears) catching h#ndreds of %ilos of fish and earning fift(
times the average dail( wage as a res#lt. &he( attrib#te the recent ab#ndance and variet( of marine stoc% to
the pirates scaring awa( predator( foreign fishing trawlers) which have for decades deprived local dhows of
a livelihood. $ccording to marine biologists) indicators are that the local fisher( is recovering beca#se of the
lac% of commercial-scale fishing.
C116D
irac( off the coast of Somalia also appears to have a positive impact on the problem of overfishing in
Somali waters b( foreign vessels. $ comparison has been made with the sit#ation in &anEania f#rther to the
so#th) which is also affected b( predator( fishing b( foreign ships and generall( lac%s the means to
effectivel( protect and reg#late its territorial waters. &here) catches have dropped to dramaticall( low levels)
whereas in Somalia the( have risen bac% to more acceptable levels since the beginning of the pirac(.
C11:D
Casualties
irac( off the coast of Somalia has reportedl( prod#ced some cas#alties. $ccording to man( interviewed
maritime sec#rit( firms) ship owner gro#ps) law(ers and ins#rance companies) fear of pirate attac%s has
increased the li%elihood of violent enco#nters at sea) as #ntrained or overeager vessel g#ards have resorted
to shooting indiscriminatel( witho#t first properl( assessing the act#al threat level. In the process) the( have
%illed both pirates and sometimes innocent fishermen as well as 4eopardiEed the rep#tation of private
maritime sec#rit( firms with their rec%less g#n #se. Since man( of the new maritime sec#rit( companies that
have emerged often also enlist the services of off-d#t( policemen and former soldiers that saw combat in
Ira+ and $fghanistan) worries of a J*lac%water o#t in the Indian 1ceanJ have onl( intensified.
C118D
1f the H)187 seafarers whose ships had been attac%ed b( the pirates and the 1)080 who were held hostage in
2010) a third were reportedl( ab#sed. Some captives have also indicated that the( were #sed as h#man
shields for pirate attac%s while being held hostage.
C118D
$ccording to Ie#ters) of the ;)700 capt#red d#ring a fo#r-(ear period) 62 died. &he ca#ses of death incl#ded
s#icide and maln#trition)
C120D
with 27 of the deaths attrib#ted to m#rder according to Intercargo.
C118D
In some
cases) the captives have also reported being tort#red.
C121D
9an( seafarers are also left tra#matiEed after
release.
C120D
Profiteers
$ccording to the "erman Instit#te for Aconomic Iesearch F=I<G) a veritable ind#str( of profiteers has also
risen aro#nd the pirac(. Ins#rance companies) in partic#lar) have profited from the pirate attac%s) as
ins#rance premi#ms have increased significantl(. =I< reports that) in order to %eep premi#ms high)
ins#rance firms have not demanded that ship owners ta%e sec#rit( preca#tions that wo#ld ma%e hi4ac%ings
more diffic#lt. 5or their part) shipping companies often do not compl( with naval g#idelines on how best to
prevent pirate attac%s in order to c#t down on costs. In addition) sec#rit( contractors and the "erman arms
ind#str( have profited from the phenomenon.
C7D
Sovereignt( and environmental protection
&he former 0, envo( for Somalia) $hmedo# 1#ld-$bdallah) has stated that Jbeca#se there is no FeffectiveG
government) there is ... m#ch irreg#lar fishing from A#ropean and $sian co#ntries)J
C122D
and that the 0, has
what he described as Jreliable informationJ that A#ropean and $sian companies are d#mping to2ic and
n#clear waste off the Somali coastline.
C12;D
However) he stresses that Jno government has endorsed this act)
and that private companies and individ#als acting alone are responsibleJ.
C12;D
In addition) 1#ld-$bdallah told
the press that he approached several international ,"1s) s#ch as "lobal <itness) to trace the illicit fishing
and waste-d#mping. He added that he believes the to2ic waste d#mping is Ja disaster off the Somali coast) a
disaster FforG the Somali environment) the Somali pop#lationJ) and that what he terms Jthis illegal fishing)
illegal d#mping of wasteJ helps f#el the civil war in Somalia since the illegal foreign fishermen pa( off
corr#pt local officials or warlords for protection or to sec#re co#nterfeit licenses.
C122D
1#ld-$bdallah noted
that pirac( will not prevent waste d#mping:
I am convinced there is d#mping of solid waste) chemicals and probabl( n#clear FwasteG.... &here is no
government FcontrolG and there are few people with high moral gro#ndC...D &he intentions of these pirates are
not concerned with protecting their environment. <hat is #ltimatel( needed is a f#nctioning) effective
government that will get its act together and ta%e control of its affairs.
3$hmedo# 1#ld-$bdallah) the 0, envo( for Somalia
C12;D
Somali pirates which capt#red 96 +aina) a 0%rainian ship carr(ing tan%s and militar( hardware) acc#sed
A#ropean firms of d#mping to2ic waste off the Somali coast and declared that the >8m ransom for the ret#rn
of the ship will go towards cleaning #p the waste. &he ransom demand is a means of Jreacting to the to2ic
waste that has been contin#all( d#mped on the shores of o#r co#ntr( for nearl( 20 (earsJ) Lan#na $li Lama)
a spo%esman for the pirates said. J&he Somali coastline has been destro(ed) and we believe this mone( is
nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas.J
C12;D
&hese iss#es have generall( not been reported in international media when reporting on pirac(.
C12HDC127D
$ccording to 9#ammar al-"addafi) JIt is a response to greed( <estern nations) who invade and e2ploit
SomaliaKs water reso#rces illegall(. It is not a pirac() it is self defence.J
C126D
irate leader S#g#le $li said their motive was Jto stop illegal fishing and d#mping in o#r waters ... <e donKt
consider o#rselves sea bandits. <e consider sea bandits Cto beD those who illegall( fish and d#mp in o#r seas
and d#mp waste in o#r seas and carr( weapons in o#r seas.J $lso) the independent Somali news-site
<ardher,ews fo#nd that :0 percent Jstrongl( s#pported the pirac( as a form of national defence of the
co#ntr(Ks territorial watersJ.
C12:D
Waste dumping
See also: &o2ic waste d#mping b( the K,drangheta
5ollowing the Indian 1cean ts#nami of =ecember 200H) there have emerged allegations that after the
o#tbrea% of the Somali .ivil <ar in late 1881) SomaliaKs long) remote shoreline was #sed as a d#mp site for
the disposal of to2ic waste. &he h#ge waves which battered northern Somalia after the ts#nami are believed
to have stirred #p tonnes of n#clear and to2ic waste that was illegall( d#mped in Somali waters b( several
A#ropean firms M front companies created b( the Italian mafia.
C128D
&he A#ropean "reen art( followed #p
these revelations b( presenting before the press and the A#ropean arliament in Strasbo#rg copies of
contracts signed b( two A#ropean companies3the Italian Swiss firm) $chair artners) and an Italian waste
bro%er) rogresso3and representatives of the warlords then in power) to accept 10 million tonnes of to2ic
waste in e2change for >80 million Fthen abo#t S60 millionG. $ccording to a report b( the 0nited ,ations
Anvironment rogramme F0,AG assessment mission) there are far higher than normal cases of respirator(
infections) mo#th #lcers and bleeding) abdominal hemorrhages and #n#s#al s%in infections among man(
inhabitants of the areas aro#nd the northeastern towns of Hobbio and *enadir on the Indian 1cean coast3
diseases consistent with radiation sic%ness. 0,A contin#es that the c#rrent sit#ation along the Somali
coastline poses a ver( serio#s environmental haEard not onl( in Somalia b#t also in the eastern $frica s#b-
region.
C128DC128D
In 1882) reports ran in the A#ropean press of J#nnamed A#ropean firmsJ contracting with local warlords to
d#mp to2ic waste both in Somalia and off SomaliaKs shores. &he 0nited ,ations Anvironment rogram was
called in to investigate) and the Italian parliament iss#ed a report later in the decade. Several A#ropean
JfirmsJ 3 reall( front companies created b( the Italian mafia 3 contracted with local Somali warlords to
ship h#ndreds of tho#sands of tons of to2ic ind#strial waste from A#rope to Somalia.
3&ro( S. &homas) ,arlords rising- con.ronting violent non/state actors
C1;0D
0nder $rticle 8F1GFdG of the *asel .onvention on the .ontrol of &ransbo#ndar( 9ovements of HaEardo#s
<astes and &heir =isposal) it is illegal for Jan( transbo#ndar( movement of haEardo#s wastes or other
wastes: that res#lts in deliberate disposal Fe.g. d#mpingG of haEardo#s wastes or other wastes in
contravention of this .onvention and of general principles of international lawJ.
C1;1D
$ccording to ,ic% ,#ttall of the 0nited ,ations Anvironmental rogramme) JSomalia has been #sed as a
d#mping gro#nd for haEardo#s waste starting in the earl( 1880s) and contin#ing thro#gh the civil war thereJ)
and JA#ropean companies fo#nd it to be ver( cheap to get rid of the waste) costing as little as >2.70 a tonne)
where waste disposal costs in A#rope are closer to >1000 per tonne.J
C12;DC1;2D
Illegal fishing
$t the same time) foreign trawlers began illegall( fishing SomaliaKs seas) with an estimated >;00 million of
t#na) shrimp) and lobster being ta%en each (ear) depleting stoc%s previo#sl( available to local fishermen.
&hro#gh interception with speedboats) Somali fishermen tried to either diss#ade the d#mpers and trawlers or
lev( a Jta2J on them as compensation) as Seg#le $liKs previo#sl( mentioned +#ote notes. eter /ehr) a
Somalia pirac( e2pert at the 0niversit( of St. $ndrews) sa(s JItKs almost li%e a reso#rce swapJ) Somalis
collect #p to >100 million a (ear from pirate ransoms off their coasts and the A#ropeans and $sians poach
aro#nd >;00 million a (ear in fish from Somali waters.
C1;;DC1;HD
&he 0-Ks =epartment for International
=evelopment F=5I=G iss#ed a report in 2007 stating that) between 200; and 200H) Somalia lost abo#t >100
million in reven#e d#e to illegal t#na and shrimp fishing in the co#ntr(Ks e2cl#sive economic Eone b( foreign
trawlers.
C6D
$ccording to Ioger 9iddleton of .hatham Ho#se) J&he problem of overfishing and illegal fishing in
Somali waters is a ver( serio#s one) and does affect the livelihoods of people inside Somalia C...D the
d#mping of to2ic waste on SomaliaKs shores is a ver( serio#s iss#e) which will contin#e to affect people in
Somalia long after the war has ended) and pirac( is resolvedJ.
C1;7D
&o l#re fish to their traps) foreign trawlers
reportedl( also #se fishing e+#ipment #nder prohibition s#ch as nets with ver( small mesh siEes and
sophisticated #nderwater lighting s(stems.
C122D
0nder $rticle 76F1GFbGFiiiG of the /aw of the Sea .onvention:
JIn the e2cl#sive economic Eone) the coastal State has 4#risdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions
of this .onvention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environmentJ.
$rticle 7: of the .onvention in t#rn o#tlines the limit of that 4#risdiction:
J&he e2cl#sive economic Eone shall not e2tend be(ond 200 na#tical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is meas#redJ.
C1;6D
$ccording to $medeo olicante) a researcher from "oldsmiths .ollege) 0niversit( of /ondon: J&he
devastating effect of these t(pes of corporate-led form of capital acc#m#lation cannot be overstated in a
region where) according to the most recent reports of the 0,A) over ;0 million people are dependent on
maritime and coastal reso#rces for their dail( livelihoods. ,evertheless) there was little or no international
will to insist on the implementation of the 0nited ,ations .onventions on the /aw of the Sea) which banish
both over-fishing and to2ic d#mping in oceanic waters. &his form of illegalit( M despite the environmental
disr#ption and the high cost in h#man life it implied M was not perceived as an e2istential threat b( states and
it was therefore left #nchec%ed. 1nl( when pirac( appeared in the region the lac% of effective sovereign
control over the "#lf of $den was problematiEedJ.
C1;:D
Self-defense
&he fo#rth vol#me of the handboo%: 0est Management Practices to Deter Piracy o.. t"e Coast o. !omalia
and in t"e Arabian !ea Area F%nown as *9HG is the c#rrent a#thoritative g#ide for merchant ships on self-
defense against pirates. &he g#ide is iss#ed and #pdated b( a consorti#m of interested international shipping
and trading organiEations incl#ding the A0) ,$&1 and the International 9aritime *#rea#.
C87D
It is distrib#ted
primaril( b( the 9aritime Sec#rit( .entre M Horn of $frica F9S.H1$G M the planning and coordination
a#thorit( for A0 naval forces FA0,$651IG. *9H enco#rages vessels to register their vo(ages thro#gh
the region with 9S.H1$ as this registration is a %e( component of the operation of the International
Iecommended &ransit .orridor FII&.G Fthe nav(-patrolled ro#te thro#gh the "#lf of $denG. *9H also
contains a chapter entitled JSelf-rotective 9eas#resJ which la(s o#t a list of steps a merchant vessel can
ta%e on its own to ma%e itself less of a target to pirates and ma%e it better able to repel an attac% if one
occ#rs. &his list incl#des doing things li%e ringing the dec% of the ship with raEor wire) rigging fire-hoses to
spra( sea-water over the side of the ship Fto hinder boardingsG) having a distinctive pirate alarm) hardening
the bridge against g#nfire and creating a JcitadelJ where the crew can retreat in the event pirates get on
board. 1ther #nofficial self-defense meas#res that can be fo#nd on merchant vessels incl#de the setting #p of
manne+#ins posing as armed g#ards or firing flares at the pirates.
C1;8D
&ho#gh it varies b( co#ntr() generall( peacetime law in the 20th and 21st cent#ries has not allowed
merchant vessels to carr( weapons. $s a response to the rise in modern pirac() however) the 0.S.
government changed its r#les so that it is now possible for 0.S.-flagged vessels to embar% a team of armed
private sec#rit( g#ards. 1ther co#ntries and organisations have similarl( followed s#it.
C1;8D
&his has given
birth to a new breed of private sec#rit( companies who provide training and protection for crew members
and cargo and have proved effective in co#ntering pirate attac%s.
C1H0DC1H1D
&he 0S." leaves it to ship ownersK
discretion to determine if those g#ards will be armed.
C1H2DC1H;D
Se(chelles has become a central location for
international anti-pirac( operations) hosting the $nti-irac( 1peration .enter for the Indian 1cean. In 2008)
6S1S became the first a#thoriEed armed maritime sec#rit( compan( to operate in the Indian 1cean region.
C1HHD
<ith safet( trials complete in the late 2000s) laser daEElers have been developed for defensive p#rposes on
s#per-(achts.
C1H7D
&he( can be effective #p to H %ilometres F2.7 miG with the effects going from mild
disorientation to flash blindness at closer range.
C1H6D
In 5ebr#ar( 2012) Italian 9arines based on the tan%er 1nrica 2e3ie allegedl( fired on an Indian fishing
trawler off -erala) %illing two of her eleven crew. &he 9arines allegedl( mistoo% the fishing vessel as a
pirate vessel. &he incident spar%ed a diplomatic row between India and Ital(. 1nrica 2e3ie was ordered into
-ochi where her crew were +#estioned b( officers of the Indian olice.
C1H:D
&he fact is still sub 4uris and its
legal event#al o#tcome co#ld infl#ence f#t#re deplo(ment of 6=s) since states will be either enco#raged or
disco#raged to provide them depending on whether f#nctional imm#nit( is #ltimatel( granted or denied to
the Italians.
C1H8D
$nother similar incident has been reported to have happened in the Ied Sea between the coasts of Somalia
and Qemen) involving the death of a Qemeni fisherman allegedl( at the hands of a I#ssian 6essel rotection
=etachment F6=G on board a ,orwegian-flagged vessel.
C1H8DC170D
However) despite 6= deplo(ment being controversial beca#se of these incidents) according to the
$ssociated ress)
C171D
d#ring a 0nited ,ations Sec#rit( .o#ncil conference abo#t pirac( J0.S. $mbassador
S#san Iice told the co#ncil that no ship carr(ing armed g#ards has been s#ccessf#ll( attac%ed b( piratesJ
and J5rench $mbassador "erard $ra#d stressed that private g#ards do not have the deterrent effect that
government-posted marine and sailors and naval patrols have in warding off attac%sJ.
Military presence
&he militar( response to pirate attac%s has bro#ght abo#t a rare show of #nit( b( co#ntries that are either
openl( hostile to each other) or at least war( of cooperation) militar( or otherwise.
.#rrentl( there are three international naval tas% forces in the region) with n#mero#s national vessels and
tas% forces entering and leaving the region) engaging in co#nter-pirac( operations for vario#s lengths of
time. &he three international tas% forces which compose the b#l% of co#nter-pirac( operations are .ombined
&as% 5orce 170 Fwhose overarching mission is 1peration And#ring 5reedomG) .ombined &as% 5orce 171
Fwhich was set #p in 2008 specificall( to r#n co#nter-pirac( operationsG
C172D
and the A0 naval tas% force
operating #nder 1peration $talanta. $ll co#nter-pirac( operations are coordinated thro#gh a monthl(
planning conference called Shared $wareness and =econfliction FSH$=AG.
C17;D
1riginall( having
representatives onl( from ,$&1) the A0) and the .ombined 9aritime 5orces F.95G HR in *ahrain) it now
reg#larl( attracts representatives from over 20 co#ntries.
$s part of the international effort) A#rope pla(s a significant role in combating pirac( off the coast of the
Horn of $frica. &he A#ropean 0nion #nder the .ommon Sec#rit( and =efence olic( F.S=G la#nched A0
,$651I Somalia M 1peration $talanta Fin s#pport of Iesol#tions 181H F2008G) 1816 F2008G) 18;8 F2008G
and 18H6 F2008G of the 0nited ,ations Sec#rit( .o#ncil F0,S.GG. &his operation is wor%ing to protect
h#manitarian aid and red#ce the disr#ption to the shipping ro#tes and the de-stabilising of the maritime
environment in the region. &o date) 26 co#ntries have bro#ght some %ind of contrib#tion to the operation. 1;
A0 9ember States have provided an operational contrib#tion to A0 ,$651I) either with ships) with
maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft) or with 6essel rotection =etachment F6=G team. &his
incl#des 5rance) Spain) "erman() "reece) Sweden) ,etherlands) Ital() *elgi#m) 0nited -ingdom Falso
hosting the A0 ,$651I 1perational head+#artersG) ort#gal) /#2embo#rg) 9alta and Astonia. 8 other A0
9ember States have participated in the effort providing militar( staff to wor% at the A0 ,$651I
1perational Head+#arters F,orthwood Head+#arters M 0-G or onboard #nits. &hese are .(pr#s) Iomania)
*#lgaria) Slovenia) .Eech Iep#blic) H#ngar() oland) Ireland and 5inland. 5inall() H non-A0 9ember
States) ,orwa( Fwhich has also provided an operational contrib#tion with a warship reg#larl( deplo(ingG)
.roatia) 0%raine and 9ontenegro) have so far also bro#ght their contrib#tion to A0 ,$651I.
$t an( one time) the A#ropean force siEe fl#ct#ates according to the monsoon seasons) which determine the
level of pirac(. It t(picall( consists of 7 to 10 s#rface combatants Fnaval shipsG) 1 to 2 a#2iliar( ships and 2
to H maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. Incl#ding land-based personnel) 1peration $talanta
consists of a total of aro#nd 2)000 militar( personnel. A0 ,$651I operates in a Eone comprising the so#th
of the Ied Sea) the "#lf of $den and the western part of the Indian 1cean incl#ding the Se(chelles) which
represents an area of 2)000)000 s+#are na#tical miles.
$dditionall() 1ther non-,$&1 and non-A0 co#ntries have) at one time or another) contrib#ted to co#nter-
pirac( operations. $#stralia) .hina) India) Iran) Lapan) So#th -orea) 9ala(sia) a%istan) I#ssia) &hailand)
and Sa#di $rabia have all sent ships) s#rveillance aircraft or personnel to the region) sometimes 4oining with
the e2isting .&5s) sometimes operating independentl(.
C17HD
there are) and have been) several naval
deplo(ments b( non-m#ltinational tas% forces in the past. Some notable ones incl#de:
1n 28 9a( 2008) $#stralia pledged its s#pport) redirecting $#stralian warship H9$S ,arramunga from
d#ties in the ersian "#lf to assist in the fighting of pirac(.
C177D
Io(al $#stralian $ir 5orce /oc%heed -;
1rion s#rveillance planes patrol the ocean between the so#thern coast of 1man and the Horn of $frica. &he
anti-pirac( flights are operated from 0$A.
C176D
1n 12 L#ne 2008) *#lgaria also anno#nced plans to 4oin the anti-pirac( operations in the "#lf of $den and
protect *#lgarian shipping) b( sending a frigate with a crew of 1;0 sailors.
C17:D
1n 26 =ecember 2008) .hina dispatched two destro(ers Haikou F1:1G) ,u"an F168G and the s#ppl( ship
,eis"an"u F88:G to the "#lf of $den. $ team of 16 .hinese Special 5orces members from its 9arine .orps
armed with attac% helicopters were on board.
C178DC178D
S#bse+#ent to their initial deplo(ment) .hina has
maintained a three-ship flotilla of two warships and one s#ppl( ship in the "#lf of $den b( assigning ships
to the area on a three-month basis.
&he =anish Instit#te for 9ilitar( St#dies has in a report
Cdead linkD
proposed to establish a regionall( based
maritime #nit: a "reater Horn of $frica Sea atrol) to carr( o#t s#rveillance in the area to sec#re free
navigation and ta%e on tas%s s#ch as fisher( inspection and environmental monitoring. $ "reater Horn of
$frica Sea atrol wo#ld comprise elements from the coastal states M from Ag(pt in the north to &anEania in
the so#th. &he #nit wo#ld be established with the s#pport of the states that alread( have a naval presence in
the area.
C160D
In 5ebr#ar( 2010) =anish special forces from the Absalon freed 27 people from the $ntig#a and *arb#da-
flagged vessel Ariella after it was hi4ac%ed b( pirates off the Somali coast. &he crew members had loc%ed
themselves into a store-room.
C161DC162D
&o protect Indian ships and Indian citiEens emplo(ed in seafaring d#ties) the Indian ,av( commenced anti-
pirac( patrols in the "#lf of $den from 2; 1ct 8. $ total of 21
C16;D
I, ships have been deplo(ed in the "#lf of
$den since 8 1ct. In addition to escorting Indian-flagged ships) ships of other co#ntries have also been
escorted. 9erchant ships are c#rrentl( being escorted along the entire length of the FH80 nm long and 20 nm
wideG Internationall( Iecommended &ransit .orridor FII&.G that has been prom#lgated for #se b( all
merchant vessels. $ total of 1181 ships F1HH Indian flagged and 10;: foreign flagged from different
co#ntriesG have been escorted b( I, ships in the "#lf of $den since 8 1ct. =#ring its deplo(ments for anti-
pirac( operations) the Indian naval ships have prevented 17 pirac( attempts on merchant vessels.
In response to the increased activit( of the I,S (abar) India so#ght to a#gment its naval force in the "#lf of
$den b( deplo(ing the larger I,S Mysore to patrol the area. Somalia also added India to its list of states)
incl#ding the 0.S. and 5rance) which are permitted to enter its territorial waters) e2tending #p to 12 na#tical
miles F22 %mN 1H miG from the coastline) in an effort to chec% pirac(.
C16HD
$n Indian naval official confirmed
receipt of a letter acceding to IndiaKs prerogative to chec% s#ch pirac(. J<e had p#t #p a re+#est before the
Somali government to pla( a greater role in s#ppressing pirac( in the "#lf of $den in view of the 0nited
,ations resol#tion. &he &5" government gave its nod recentl(J.
C167D
India also e2pressed consideration to
deplo( #p to fo#r more warships in the region.
C166DC16:D
1n 1H 9arch 2011) the Indian nav( reportedl( had
seiEed 61 pirates and resc#ed 1; crew from the vessel) which had been #sed as a mother ship from where
pirates la#nched attac%s aro#nd the Indian 1cean. 9eanwhile) a *angladeshi ship hi4ac%ed b( pirates last
(ear was freed after a ransom was paid.
C168D
1n 28 Lan#ar( 2008) Lapan anno#nced its intention of sending a naval tas% force to 4oin international efforts
to stop pirac( off the coast of Somalia. &he deplo(ment wo#ld be highl( #n#s#al) as LapanKs non-aggressive
constit#tion means Lapanese militar( forces can onl( be #sed for defensive p#rposes. &he iss#e has been
controversial in Lapan) altho#gh the r#ling part( maintains this sho#ld be seen as fighting crime on the high
seas) rather than a Jmilitar(J operation. &he process of the rime 9inister of Lapan) &aro $so) giving his
approval is e2pected to ta%e appro2imatel( one month.
C168D
However) the Lapanese 9aritime Self-=efense
5orce FL9S=5G and the Lapanese government face legal problems on how to handle attac%s b( pirates
against ships that either have Lapanese personnel) cargo or are #nder foreign control instead of being #nder
Lapanese control as c#rrent $rticle 8 reg#lations wo#ld hamper their actions when deplo(ed to Somalia.
C1:0D
It was reported on H 5ebr#ar( 2008) that the L9S=5 was sending a fact-finding mission led b( "en
,a%atani to the region prior to the deplo(ment of the Murasame -class destro(er L=S DD/&56 !amidare and
the (akanami -class destro(er L=S DD/&&7 !aanami to the coast of Somalia with a 1;-man team composed
of Lapanese 9inistr( of =efense personnel) with members coming from the 9inistr( of 5oreign $ffairs and
the L9S=5 to visit Qemen) =4ibo#ti) 1man) and *ahrain from 8 to 20 5ebr#ar(.
C1:1DC1:2D
*oth L9S=5 vessels
are #nits of the 8th Ascort =ivision of the Hth Ascort 5lotilla based in -#re) Hiroshima refect#re.
C1:;D
&he
L9S=5Ks special forces #nit) the Special *oarding 0nit is also sched#led to potentiall( deplo( to Somalia.
C1:HDC1:7D
&he S*0 has been deplo(ed alongside the two destro(ers to Somalia on 1H 9arch 2008.
C1:6D
$ccording to L9S=5 officials) the deplo(ment wo#ld Jregain the tr#st of the shipping ind#str() which was
lost d#ring the war.J
C1::D
&he L9S=5 tas% force wo#ld be deplo(ed off the coast of Somalia for H months.
C1:8D
In its first mission) the (akanami -class destro(er L=S DD/&&7 !aanami was able to ward off pirates
attempting to hi4ac% a Singaporean cargo ship.
C1:8D
In addition) L9S=5 -;.s are to be deplo(ed in L#ne
from =4ibo#ti to cond#ct s#rveillance on the Somali coast.
C180DC181D
&he Ho#se of Iepresentatives of Lapan has
passed an anti-pirac( bill) calling for the L9S=5 to protect non-Lapanese ships and nationals) tho#gh there
are some concerns that the pro-opposition Ho#se of .o#ncillors ma( re4ect it.
C182D
&he =iet of Lapan has
passed an anti-pirac( law that called for L9S=5 forces to protect all foreign ships traveling off the coast of
Somalia aside from protecting Lapanese-owned/manned ships despite a veto from the Ho#se of .o#ncillors)
which the Ho#se of Iepresentatives has overt#rned.
C18;D
In 2008) the destro(ers Har#same and ==-17H
$magiri left port from Qo%#s#%a to replace the two destro(ers that had been dispatched earlier on 9arch
2008.
C18HD
0nder c#rrent arrangements) Lapan .oast "#ard officers wo#ld be responsible for arresting pirates
since S=5 forces are not allowed to have powers of arrest.
C187D
&he So#th -orean nav( is also ma%ing plans to participate in anti-pirac( operations after sending officers to
visit the 0.S. ,av(Ks 7th 5leet in *ahrain and in =4ibo#ti.
C186D
&he So#th -orean cabinet had approved a
government plan to send in So#th -orean nav( ships and soldiers to the coast of Somalia to participate in
anti-pirate operations.
C18:D
&he I1-, was sending the C"ungmugong %i !un/sin class destroyer DDH 896
Munmu t"e Great to the coast of Somalia.
C188D
&he .heonghae 0nit tas% force was also deplo(ed in Somalia
#nder .&5 171.
C188D
,orwa( anno#nced on 2: 5ebr#ar( 2008) that it wo#ld send the frigate H,o9S +ridt4o. Nansen to the coast
of Somalia to fight pirac(. Io(al ,orwegian ,av( +ridt4o. Nansen 4oined A0 ,$651IKs international
naval force in $#g#st.
C180D
In 2008 a%istan offered the services of the a%istan ,av( to the 0nited ,ations in order to help combat the
pirac( in Somalia Jprovided a clear mandate was given.J
C181D
&he hilippine government ordered the dispatch of a ,aval "#nfire /iaison 1fficer to wor% with the 0.S.
,av(Ks 7th 5leet as part of its contrib#tion against pirac(.
C182D
In $pril 2011) the ort#g#ese $ir 5orce contrib#ted to 1peration 1cean Shield b( sending a -;.
C18;D
which
had earl( s#ccess when on its fifth mission detected a pirate whaler with two attac% s%iffs.
C18HD
I#ssia also chose to send more warships to combat pirac( near Somalia following the anno#ncement from
the International 9aritime *#rea# terming the menace as having gone Jo#t of control.J
C187D
=#e to their pro2imit( to Somalia) the coast g#ard of Se(chelles has become increasingl( involved in
co#nter-pirac( in the region. 1n ;0 9arch 2010) a Se(chelles .oast "#ard &rin%at-class patrol vessel
resc#ed 2: hostages and san% two pirate vessels.
&he Spanish $ir 5orce deplo(ed -;s to assist the international effort against pirac( in Somalia. 1n 28
1ctober 2008) a Spanish -; aircraft patrolling the coast of Somalia reacted to a distress call from an oil
tan%er in the "#lf of $den. In order to deter the pirates) the aircraft flew over the pirates three times as the(
attempted to board the tan%er) dropping a smo%e bomb on each pass. $fter the third pass) the attac%ing pirate
boats bro%e off their attac%.
C186D
/ater) on 28 9arch 2008) the same -; p#rs#ed the assailants of the "erman
nav( tan%er Spessart) res#lting in the capt#re of the pirates.
C18:D
&he Swiss government calls for the deplo(ment of $rm( Ieconnaissance =etachment operators to combat
Somali pirac( with no agreement in arliament
C188D
as the proposal was re4ected after it was voted.
C188D
Lavier
Solana had said that Swiss soldiers co#ld serve #nder the A0Ks #mbrella.
C200D
&he 0.S. .oast "#ard and 0.S. ,av( both s#pport the actions of the .ombined &as% 5orce 171 in their anti-
pirac( missions in the area.
C201D
*rian 9#rph( F$ssociated ressG reported on 8 Lan#ar( 2008 that Iear $dmiral &erence A. 9c-night) 0.S.
,av() is to command a new m#lti-national naval force to confront pirac( off the coast of Somalia. &his new
anti-pirac( force was designated .ombined &as% 5orce 171 F.&5-171G) a m#ltinational tas% force of the
.ombined 9aritime 5orces F.95G. &he 0SS !an Antonio was designated as the flagship of .ombined &as%
5orce 171) serving as an afloat forward staging base F$5S*G for the following force elements:
1H-member 0.S. ,av( visit) board) search) and seiE#re F6*SSG team.
C202DC20;D
8-member 0.S. .oast "#ard /aw Anforcement =etachment F/A=A&G H07.
C202DC20;D
Sco#t Sniper latoon) 2nd *attalion) 6th 9arine Iegiment) 26th 9arine A2peditionar( 0nit F26
9A0G cross-dec%ed from the 0SS :$o #ima F/H=-:G.
C20HD
;rd latoon of the 2nd *attalion) 6th 9arineKs J"olfJ Infantr( .ompan() a militar( police
detachment) and intelligence personnel.
C20;D
5leet S#rgical &eam 8 with level-two s#rgical capabilit( to deal with tra#ma) s#rgical) critical care
and medical evac#ation needs.
C20;D
$ppro2imatel( :7 9arines with si2 $H-1< S#per .obra and two 0H-1, H#e( helicopters from the
9arine 9edi#m Helicopter S+#adron 26H FH99-26HG of the 26th 9A0 cross-dec%ed from the 0SS
:$o #ima.
C207D
&hree HH-60H helicopters from Helicopter $nti-S#bmarine S+#adron ; FHS-;G cross-dec%ed from
the &emplate:0br /SS.
C20;DC206D
Initiall() .&5-171 consisted of the !an Antonio) 0SS Ma"an F=="-:2G) and H9S Portland F5:8G) with
additional warships e2pected to 4oin this force.
C20:D
In Lan#ar( 2012) 0.S. militar( forces freed an $merican and a =anish hostage after a g#n battle with pirates
d#ring a night-time helicopter raid in Somalia. &wo 0.S. helicopters attac%ed the site where the hostages
were being held) 12 miles north of the town of $dado. ,ine pirates were %illed. &here were no 0.S.
cas#alties.
C208D
In 9a( 2012) A0 ,avfor cond#cted their first raid on pirate bases on the Somali mainland) destro(ing 7
pirate boats. &he A0 forces were transported b( helicopter to the bases near the port of Harardhere) a well-
%nown pirate lair. &he operation was carried o#t with the f#ll s#pport of the Somali government.
C208DC210D
So#thern $frican waters are becomingl( an increasingl( attractive alternative to the more protected Aastern
$frican sea lanes. &he recent rise in co#nter-pirac( patrols is p#shing more pirates down the coast line into
#nprotected areas of the Indian 1cean) which will re+#ire the 4oint naviesK c#rrent patrols to widen their
search area.
C211D
$ maritime conference was also held in 9ombasa to disc#ss the rising concern of regional pirac( with a
view to give regional and world governments recommendations to deal with the menace. &he International
&ransport <or%ers 5ederation FI&<5G organised the regional $frican maritime #nionsK conference) the first
of its %ind in $frica. "odfre( 9atata 1n(ango) e2ec#tive secretar( of the ,orthern .orridor &ransit
.oordination $#thorit( said) J<e cannot ignore to disc#ss the pirac( menace beca#se it poses a h#ge
challenge to the maritime ind#str( and if not controlled) it threats to chop off the regional internal trade. &he
cost of shipping will definitel( rise as a res#lt of the increased war ins#rance premi#m d#e to the high ris%
off the "#lf of $den.
Somalia
Puntland
*etween 2008 and 2010) the government of the a#tonomo#s #ntland region in northeastern Somalia
enacted a n#mber of reforms and pre-emptive meas#res as a part of its officiall( declared anti-pirac(
campaign. &he latter incl#ded the arrest) trial and conviction of pirate gangs) as well as raids on s#spected
pirate hideo#ts and confiscation of weapons and e+#ipmentN ens#ring the ade+#ate coverage of the regional
a#thorit(Ks anti-pirac( efforts b( both local and international mediaN sponsoring a social campaign led b(
Islamic scholars and comm#nit( activists aimed at discrediting pirac( and highlighting its negative effectsN
and partnering with the ,$&1 alliance to combat pirates at sea.
C277D
In 9a( 2010) constr#ction also began on
a new naval base in the town of *andar Si(ada) located 27 %m west of *osaso) the commercial capital of
#ntland.
C21D
&he facilit( is f#nded b( #ntlandKs regional government in con4#nction with Saracen
International) a 0--based sec#rit( compan() and is intended to assist in more effectivel( combating pirac(.
&he base will incl#de a center for training recr#its) and a command post for the naval force.
C21D
&hese
n#mero#s sec#rit( meas#res appear to have borne fr#it) as man( pirates were apprehended in 2010)
incl#ding a prominent leader.
C20D
#ntlandKs sec#rit( forces also reportedl( managed to force o#t the pirate
gangs from their traditional safe havens s#ch as A(l and "arKad)
C276D
with the pirates now primaril( operating
from Hob(o) Al =anaan and Harardhere in the neighboring "alm#d#g region.
C276D
5ollowing a &ransitional 5ederal "overnment-#ntland cooperative agreement in $#g#st 2011 calling for
the creation of a Somali 9arine 5orce) of which the alread( established #ntland 9aritime olice 5orce
F95G wo#ld form a part) the #ntland administration res#med training of 95 naval officials.
C27:D
&he
#ntland 9aritime olice 5orce is a locall( recr#ited) professional maritime sec#rit( force that is primaril(
aimed at fighting pirac( off the coast of Somalia) safeg#arding the nationKs marine reso#rces)
C27:D
and
providing logistics s#pport to h#manitarian efforts.
C278D
S#pported b( the 0nited $rab Amirates)
C27:D
95
officials are also trained b( the Lapanese .oast "#ard.
C278D
Galmudug
"overnment officials from the "alm#d#g administration in the north-central Hob(o district have also
reportedl( attempted to #se pirate gangs as a b#lwar% against Islamist ins#rgents from so#thern SomaliaKs
conflict EonesN
C260D
other pirates are alleged to have reached agreements of their own with the Islamist gro#ps)
altho#gh a senior commander from the HiEb#l Islam militia vowed to eradicate pirac( b( imposing sharia
law when his gro#p briefl( too% control of Harardhere in 9a( 2010 and drove o#t the local pirates.
C260DC261D
*( the first half of 2010) these increased policing efforts b( Somali government a#thorities on land along
with international naval vessels at sea reportedl( contrib#ted to a drop in pirate attac%s in the "#lf of $den
from 86 a (ear prior to ;;) forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas s#ch as the Somali *asin and the
wider Indian 1cean.
C20DC22DC2;D
!omaliland
&he government of Somaliland) a self-declared rep#blic that is internationall( recogniEed as an a#tonomo#s
region of Somalia)
C262D
has adopted stringent anti-pirac( meas#res) arresting and imprisoning pirates forced to
ma%e port in *erbera. $ccording to officials in Hargeisa) SomalilandKs capital) the Somaliland .oast "#ard
acts as an effective deterrent to pirac( in waters #nder its 4#risdiction.
C26;DC26HD
Arab League summit
5ollowing the seiE#re b( Somali pirates of an Ag(ptian ship and a Sa#di oil s#pertan%er worth >100 million
of oil) the $rab /eag#e) after a meeting in .airo) has called for an #rgent s#mmit for co#ntries overloo%ing
the Ied Sea) incl#ding Ag(pt) Sa#di $rabia) S#dan) Somalia) Lordan) =4ibo#ti and Qemen. &he s#mmit
wo#ld offer several sol#tions for the pirac( problem) in addition to s#ggesting different ro#tes and loo%ing
for a more sec#re passagewa( for ships.
$nother possible means of intervention b( the Ied Sea $rab nationsK nav( might be to assist the c#rrent
,$&1 anti-pirac( effort as well as other navies.
C267D
nited !ations
In L#ne 2008) following a letter from the Somalian &ransitional 5ederal "overnment F&5"G to the resident
of the 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil re+#esting assistance for the &5"Ks efforts to tac%le acts of pirac( off the coast
of Somalia) the 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil #nanimo#sl( passed a declaration a#thoriEing nations that have the
consent of the &ransitional 5ederal "overnment to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates.
C;8D
&he
meas#re) which was sponsored b( 5rance) the 0nited States and anama) lasted si2 months. 5rance initiall(
wanted the resol#tion to incl#de other regions with pirate problems) s#ch as <est $frica) b#t were opposed
b( 6ietnam) /ib(a and most importantl( b( veto-holding .hina) who wanted the sovereignt( infringement
limited to Somalia.
C266D
&he 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil adopted a resol#tion on 20 ,ovember 2008) that was proposed b( *ritain to
introd#ce to#gher sanctions against Somalia over the co#ntr(Ks fail#re to prevent a s#rge in sea pirac(.
C26:D
&he 0S circ#lated the draft resol#tion that called #pon co#ntries having naval capacities to deplo( vessels
and aircraft to activel( fight against pirac( in the region. &he resol#tion also welcomed the initiatives of the
A#ropean 0nion) ,$&1 and other co#ntries to co#nter pirac( off the coast of Somalia. 0S $lternate
Iepresentative for Sec#rit( .o#ncil $ffairs Iosemar( =i.arlo said that the draft resol#tion Jcalls on the
secretar(-general to loo% at a long-term sol#tion to escorting the safe passage of <orld 5ood rogramme
ships.J
C268D
Aven SomaliaKs Islamist militants stormed the Somali port of Harardheere in the h#nt for pirates
behind the seiE#re of a Sa#di s#pertan%er) the 96 !irius !tar. $ clan elder affiliated with the Islamists said
J&he Islamists arrived searching for the pirates and the whereabo#ts of the Sa#di ship. I saw fo#r cars f#ll of
Islamists driving in the town from corner to corner. &he Islamists sa( the( will attac% the pirates for
hi4ac%ing a 9#slim ship.J
C268D
1n 1: =ecember 2008) the 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil #nanimo#sl( adopted a to#gher resol#tion) allowing for the
first time international land and sea occ#pations in the p#rs#it of pirates.
C2:0D
5o#r ships) a .hinese fishing
boat) a &#r%ish cargo ship) a 9ala(sian t#g) and a private (acht were seiEed b( pirates that same da(.
C2:1D
Iesol#tion 1871 ta%es c#rrent anti-pirac( meas#res a step f#rther.
C2:2D
$ I#ssian drafted resol#tion) Sec#rit( .o#ncil Iesol#tion 1818) adopted on 2: $pril 2010) called on all
states to criminalise pirac( and s#ggested the possibilit( of establishing a regional or international trib#nal to
prosec#te s#spected pirates.
C2:;D
#rs#ant to resol#tion 18:6 and resol#tion 2017) both adopted in 2011) the 0nited ,ations Sec#rit( .o#ncil
has called for more str#ct#red international s#pport for SomaliaKs &ransitional 5ederal "overnment as well
as #ntland and other regional a#thorities in Somalia in creating co#nter-pirac( special co#rts) laws) prisons
and policing capabilities. Iesol#tion 18:6 also enco#rages regional and federal actors to engage in more
effective marine reso#rce defence against illegal fishing and to2ic waste d#mping in areas #nder their
4#risdiction.
C2:HDC2:7D
1n 18 ,ovember 2012 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil held an open meeting disc#ss pirac(. &he debate) which was
the first held b( the Sec#rit( .o#ncil abo#t this s#b4ect) was called b( Indian $mbassador Hardeep Singh
#ri and heard more than H0 spea%ers from different co#ntries and international organiEations.
C171DC2:6D
Private initiatives
&here have been reports of pirates repelled b( private initiatives. 1ne s#ch case wo#ld have occ#rred b( the
end of 2008) b( armed personnel of transportation entreprene#r *arthe .ortes.
C2::DC2:8D
6S1S) a Se(chelles
based compan( was a#thoriEed in 2008 b( the a#thorities of Se(chelles to operate armed maritime sec#rit(
g#ards. 5rom this strategic h#b the compan( e2tends its operations thro#gho#t the Indian 1cean.
C2:8D
1ther vessel owners and shipping line companies have also hired private sec#rit( o#tfits for assistance. 1ne
s#ch firm is Aspada /ogistics and Sec#rit( "ro#p based in San $ntonio) &e2as) whose sec#rit( officers
provide on-board protection from a shipKs point of entr( to its point of destination. &he( also offer anti-
pirac( training en ro#te to the "#lf of $den)
C280DC281D
and have teamed #p with $frican Shipping /ines) a
leading international shipping line compan() to provide sec#rit( to vessels traveling along the coast of Aast
$frica.
C282D
$nother private vent#re is 90S.) which specialiEes in co#nterpirac( and ship sec#rit(.
C28;D
$s of 21 9a( 2012) ,ic% 9aro#%is of &riton Iis% 9SS states that not a single vessel with armed privatel(
contracted maritime sec#rit( contractors has been s#ccessf#ll( hi4ac%ed b( the pirates. $ table of incidents
from 1ctober to =ecember 2011 shows pirate s#ccesses against armed and #narmed vessels.
C28HD
irates have
steadil( vent#red f#rther across the /lo(dKs Loint <ar .ommittee FL<.G designated high ris% area FHI$G in
order to evade naval patrols and search for easier targets. &his is 4#st one e2ample of how pirates adapt their
tactics to co#nter-pirac( meas#res. &riton Iis% 9SS has prod#ced a short anal(sis which highlights other
probable shifts in pirate tactics) techni+#es and proced#res in 2012/1;.
C287D
&he maritime sec#rit( ind#str(
has been activel( tr(ing to introd#ce self-reg#lation for private contracted armed sec#rit( companies
F.$SG since 2010. 9ain ind#str( actors are: Sec#rit( $ssociation for the 9aritime Ind#str( FS$9IG and
the International $ssociation of 9aritime Sec#rit( rofessionals FI$9SG. "overnmental initiatives incl#de
the 0,Ks International 9aritime 1rganiEation FI91G and the Swiss governmentKs International .ode of
.ond#ct FI.1.G initiative. $s of spring 2012) one of the largest ship owners/operators organiEations)
*I9.1) has la#nched another initiative to bring standards into the maritime sec#rit( ind#str( tho#gh #se of
.$S contracts for its members Fcalled "0$I=.1,G and IS1 accreditation and certification standards
for .$Ss.
/egislation
"urisdiction
In L#ne 2008) following a letter from the &ransitional 5ederal "overnment of Somalia F&5"G to the
resident of the 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil re+#esting assistance for the Somali a#thoritiesK efforts at tac%ling acts
of pirac( in the Indian 1cean) the 0, Sec#rit( .o#ncil #nanimo#sl( passed a declaration a#thoriEing
nations that have the consent of the Somali government to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates.
C;8D
S#spected pirates capt#red in international waters have been tried in vario#s co#ntries. &he Somali
government +#estioned the a#thorit( of foreign co#ntries to prosec#te the pirates abroad. In response) the
A#ropean 0nion attempted to foc#s the prosec#tions closer to the Horn of $frica littoral b( involving nearb(
territories.
C286D
In Lan#ar( 2011) a report b( 0, Special $dvisor on pirac( Lac% /ang proposed that two special anti-pirac(
co#rts sho#ld be established in the stable northern #ntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia. It also
recommended that a Somali e2traterritorial trib#nal be created in neighbo#ring &anEania. &his prospective
co#rt wo#ld be s#b4ect to Somali law and f#nction) b#t wo#ld be based o#tside Somalia d#e to the conflict
that was then ta%ing place in the so#thern part of the co#ntr(. However) the latter proposal was re4ected b(
the Somali a#thorities. &his) along with legal) financial and sec#rit(-related concerns) prompted the 0S
government to also oppose the recommendation of a Somali e2traterritorial trib#nal. $ *ritish Ho#se of
.ommons 5oreign $ffairs .ommittee report iss#ed in Lan#ar( 2012 li%ewise re4ected the idea as well as that
of an international co#rt) and recommended instead that special anti-pirac( co#rts operating #nder national
laws in nearb( states sho#ld be established.
C28:D
In 2011) the a#tonomo#s #ntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia each reached a sec#rit(-related
memorand#m of #nderstanding with the Se(chelles. 5ollowing the framewor% of an earlier agreement
signed between the &ransitional 5ederal "overnment and the Se(chelles) the memorand#m called for the
transfer of convicted pirates to prison facilities in #ntland and Somaliland.
C288D
&he &5" and the two
regional administrations later signed a similar cooperative agreement with 9a#riti#s in 2012) with the island
nation sched#led to ta%e on pirate s#spects for trial and prosec#tion starting in L#ne of the (ear.
C288D
-en(a conc#rrentl( began serving as an additional location for trials of pirate s#spects. In 1ctober 2012) its
.o#rt of $ppeal stated that the co#ntr(Ks co#rts co#ld tr( pirates capt#red on international waters) as
#niversal 4#risdiction permitted all states to do so.
C280D
In Lan#ar( 201;) the Somali government indicated that
pirates interned in -en(a wo#ld be transferred to Somalia. &he plan was conceived b( the Somali
a#thorities) altho#gh no specific date for the transfer was anno#nced.
C281D
$s Somalia f#rther develops its co#rts and prison facilities in coordination with the 0,1=. .o#nter irac(
rogram) pirates held in other territories are e2pected to be transferred for domestic detention.
C282D
#rials
In 9a( 2010) a Qemeni co#rt sentenced si2 Somali pirates to death and 4ailed si2 others for 10 (ears each)
for hi4ac%ing a Qemeni oil tan%er) %illing one cabin crew member and leaving another missing in $pril 2008.
C28;D
In 9a( 2010) another Somali) $bd#wali 9#se) pled g#ilt( in a ,ew Qor% federal co#rt to seiEing a 0nited
States-flagged ship Maersk Alabama and %idnapping its captain and was sentenced to ;; (ears
imprisonment.
C28HD
&he first A#ropean trial of alleged Somali pirates opened in the ,etherlands in 9a( 2010. &he( were
arrested in the "#lf of $den in Lan#ar( 2008) when their high-speed boat was intercepted b( a =anish frigate
while allegedl( preparing to board the cargo ship !amanyolu) which was registered in the =#tch $ntilles.
C287D
&he pirates were sentenced to five (ears in prison) which was less than the ma2im#m possible sentence. It is
#nli%el( the men will be ret#rned to Somalia after their sentence) as Somalia is considered too dangero#s for
deportation. 1ne of the five has alread( applied for as(l#m in the ,etherlands. .onse+#entl() there are
concerns that trials in A#ropean co#rts wo#ld enco#rage) rather than deter) pirates.
C286D
However) trials are
contin#ing in A#rope. 9ore recentl( in aris) ,ovember 2011)
C28:D
five men were sentenced to between fo#r
and eight (earsN one man was ac+#itted. $ trial also contin#es in Hamb#rg) "erman(.
C288D
In Ital() nine
Somali pirates had been tried and sentenced to prison terms of 16 and 18 (ears.
C288D
&he( had been fo#nd
g#ilt( of attempted %idnapping for e2tortion and illegal possession of firearms) in connection with 10
1ctober 2011 attac% and seiE#re of an Italian-owned cargo vessel) the 9ontecristo.
C;00D
1n 1 $pril 2010) the 0SS ,icholas F55"-H:G was on patrol off the Somali coast when it too% fire from men
in a small s%iff. $fter chasing down the s%iff and its mothership) 0S militar( capt#red five Somalis.
C;01D
L#dge Ia(mond $. Lac%son) a 5ederal =istrict .o#rt 4#dge in ,orfol%) 6irginia threw o#t the pirac( charge)
which dates from enactment in 1818 when pirac( was defined onl( as robber( at sea. &he penalt( for pirac(
is mandator( life in prison. &he 0.S. government appealed the r#ling.
C;02D
In 9arch 2011 the five Somalis
were sentenced to life for pirac( to r#n consec#tivel( with the 80-(ear term.
C;0;D
In the same month 1;
Somalis and one Qemeni s#spected of hi4ac%ing and %illing fo#r $mericans aboard a (acht made their first
appearance in federal co#rt in ,orfol%.
C;0HD
1n 28 Lan#ar( 2011) p#rs#ant to the naval engagement of the pirate mother vessel 96 rantala( Fa hi4ac%ed
&hai trawlerG b( the I,S .an%arso) the Indian ,av( and the Indian .oast "#ard %illed 10 pirates and
apprehended 17) while resc#ing 20 &hai and *#rmese fishermen that were held aboard the ship as hostages.
&he resc#ed fishermen were sent to -ochi while the 17 pirates) of Somali) Athiopian and -en(an origin)
were ta%en to 9#mbai. &he 9#mbai olice confirmed that the( registered a case against the pirates for
attempt to m#rder and vario#s other provisions #nder the Indian enal .ode and the assports $ct for
entering the Indian waters witho#t permission.
C81D
In 9a( 2012) a 0.S. federal appeals co#rt #pheld the convictions of five pirates) a decision which
prosec#tors described as the first 0nited States-based pirac( convictions in 180 (ears.
C288D
In 1ctober 201;) 9ohamed $bdi Hassan FJ$fwe(neJG was arrested in *elgi#m for having allegedl(
masterminded the 2008 hi4ac%ing of the *elgian dredge vessel Pompei) abd#cted its crew) and participated
in a criminal organiEation. $ccording to federal prosec#tor Lohan =elm#lle) Hassan was responsible for the
hi4ac%ing of doEens of commercial ships from 2008 to 201;.
C;07D
He is c#rrentl( awaiting trial in *r#ges) the
first prosec#tion of a pirate leader b( the international comm#nit(.
C;06D
201; collapse of pirac(
*( =ecember 201;) the 0S 1ffice of ,aval Intelligence reported that onl( 8 vessels had been attac%ed
d#ring the (ear b( the pirates) with Eero s#ccessf#l hi4ac%ings.
C;1D
.ontrol Iis%s attrib#ted this 80O decline
in pirate activit( from the corresponding period in 2012 to the adoption of best management practices b(
vessel owners and crews) armed private sec#rit( onboard ships) a significant naval presence) and the
development of onshore sec#rit( forces.
C;2D
In Lan#ar( 201H) the 96 Maroo;a" initiall( sent o#t a distress signal indicating that it was #nder attac% b(
pirates in the Ied Sea. However) the container vessel t#rned o#t instead to have been seiEed b( Aritrean
militar( #nits as it entered AritreaKs territorial waters.
C;0:D