KANTS CONCEPT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL

OBJECT
by Henry E. Allison, University of Florida
The proper Interpretation of Kant's concept of the transcendental object
(transzendentales Objekt or transzendentaler Gegenstand) has long been a subject
of considerable controversy. Since the general debate concerns its relation to
the thing in itself this is not surprising, and a catalogue of the basic, positions
on this question serves to define some of the main battle lines of Kant
scholarship. Thus, we find Kemp Smith arguing for the complete Identification
of these two concepts, and using this Identification s one of the chief Supports
of his "patdrwork theory": "*.. the doctrine of the transcendental object is a
pre-Critical or semi-Critical survival and must not be taken s forming part
of Kant's final and considered position
1
." Cohen likewise identifies the two,
although since he rejects any realistic Interpretation of the thing in itself,
viewing it instead s the idea of the totality of experience, this does not
bring with it any
<tf
un-Critical" connotations
2
. Others have endeavored without
much success to disringuish the two completely
s
, while the third, and dominant
line of Interpretation argues for a basic ambiguity in Kant's position, contending
that he sometimes identifies and sometimes distinguishes the two concepts, although
here again there is a great deal of divergence in regard to specific passages
4
.
1
Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kanfs 'Critique of Pure Reason
9
, Second
edition, New York 1962, p. 218.
f
Hermann Cohen, Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung, Second edition, Berlin 1885, pp.
502510. . ^
* The most interesring attempt in this direction is by Graham Bird, Kanfs Theory of
Knowledge, London 1962. See also Herbert Herring, Das Problem der Affektion bei
Kant, Kantstudien-Ergnzungshefte 67, 1963, and Georg Janoska, Der transzendentale
Gegenstand, Kantstudien 46 (19541955), pp. 193221. As M. J. Scott-Taggart points
out in his Recent Work on the Philosophy of Kant, American Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 3, No. 3, July 1966, p. 174, the basic difficulty with these interpretations is that
they select only those passages whidi fit their theory, and fail to give an account of
those passages where Kant uses the term "transcendental object" and "thing in itself"
s synonymous.
4
The classic Statement of this view is by Eridi Adidtes, Kant's Opus postumum,
Berlin 1920, pp. 675677, and Kant und das Ding an Sieb, Berlin 1924, pp. 99108.
A similar view is to be found in Paton, Kant's Metaphyslc of Experience, London
165
Thcre can bc littlc doubt that thc third alternative is in principlc the correct
one. Although thcrc are many passagcs where thc transcendental object can
only bc understood s cquivalcnt to the thing in itself, and onc (B366) where
thcy arc explicitly idcntificd, in the two passages in which the concept is
analyzed (A104110 and A250253) and in several less significant ones, it is
crucial that they be distinguished. This ambiguity was recognized by Adickes, who
treats the concept in some detail. However, rather than explaining this ambiguity,
he simply dismisses it s "unfortunate"

, and the general tendency of those who
recognize that Kant uses the concept in a twofold sense seems to be to regard
this simply s another instance of Kant's notoriously loose use of technical
terminology.
It is no doubt easy to read the Critique of Pure Reason in such a manner,
immediately dismissing all difficulties and apparent contradictions s either
vestiges of a "pre-Critical" position, or s cases of careless terminology, especialiy
since the Critique abounds with such carelessness. It does, however, seem
worth the effort to see if this undeniable ambiguity can be explained on other,
more philosophical grounds. That this is in fact the case is the main contention
of this paper. We shall try to show that far from being a "pre-Critical survival",
the concept of a transcendental object and the ambiguity of its meaning are
necessary consequences of Kant's transcendental enterprise.
CC
I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with
objects s with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far s this mode of
knowledge is to be possible a priori" (B25)
e
.
With these words Kant ushers his readers into the domain of transcendental
philosophy. The concern with the conditions of our knowledge of objects, and
especialiy^ our a priori knowledge, is to replace the concern of traditional meta-
physics with the objects themselves. The fambus "Copernican Revolution" is both
a condition and a consequence of this new concern. It is a condition in that the
supposition that "objects must conform to our knowledge" (Bxvi) provides an
obvious philosophical justification for this shift of emphasis, and it is a conse-
quence in that it constitutes Kant's critical solution to the problem of a priori
knowledge.
1936, Vol. I, pp. 420425, and Vol. II, pp. 442445. Robert Paul Wolff, in his
Kanfs Tbeory of Mental Activity, Cambridge Mass. 1967, offers a far more hesitant
Version of this thesis.
6
E. Adidkes, Kant und das Ding an Sich, p. 100.
The citarions are, with some modifications, taken from the Kemp Smith translation
of the Critique.
166
As we all know, the "Copernican Revolution" only succeeds in justifying
a priori knowledge at the cost of limiting such knowledge to the realm of possible
experience. Aside from our scientific knowledge of the worid of experience and
its necessary structures, there is, of course, transcendental philosophy, This, how-
ever, is not to be understood s. a "super-science" providing us with knowledge
of non-empirical or transcendental entities, but only s a body of second-order
reflective propositions about the nature, limits, and conditions of our ordinary
scientific knowledge
7
. Thi$ line of thought runs throughout the Critique, but
its clearest formulation is to be found at the beginning of the Transcendental
Logic:
And here I make a remark which the reader must bear well in mind, s it extends its
influence over all that follows. Not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called
transcendental, but that only by which we know that and how certain representa-
rions (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely a priori. The term
'transcendental* that is to say, signifies sudi knowledge s concerns the a priori
possibility of knowledge, or its a priori employment. Neither space nor any a priori
geometrical determination of it is a transcendental representation; what can alone be
entltled transcendental is the knowledge that diese representations are not of empirical
origin, and the possibility that they can yet relate a priori to objects of experience,
The application of space to objects in general would likewise be transcendental,
but, if restricted solely to objects of sense, it is empiricaL The disrincrion between the
transcendental and the empirical belongs therefore only to the cririque of knowledge;
it does jnot concern the relarion of that knowledge to its objects. (B80 81)
if the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical does not
concern the relation of that knowledge to its object, then it would appear that the
very idea of a "transcendental object" is a contradiction in tenns, and hence, that
our endeavor to get at the meaning which Kant gives to this concept by way
of an analysis of his "transcendental turn" has led us to a dead end, However,
Kant's transcendental philosophy is also a "transcendental idealism", and it is in
this context that the significance of the transcendental object is to be found. This
idealism follows from an analysis of the nature of a priori knowledge. The two
criteria of the a priori are universality and necessity. Since these cannot be
derived from experience, they must be imposed by the mind on experience, and
this leads Kant to what is perhaps the basic tenet of the Critique: ". . . we can
know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them." (Bxviii) How-
ever, if we know things only insofar s we determine them through the activity of
understanding, then we cannot know them s they are in themselves, but only
s they appear. But appearances are themselves not entities which exist indepen-
dently of being apprehended, but mere representations "in us", and thus, in the
last analysis, Kant's whole claim that the understanding is the "lawgiver of
nature" and that objects must necessarily conform to the conditions of our appre-
7
Cf. Bird, Kants Theory of Knowledge, p. 38.
167
hcnsion, rcsts upon the fact that thesc objccts, and nature s a whole, are nothing
but rcprcscntations in the rnind
8
.
Transccndcntal idcalism, bowever, which is defined s the doctrine that
"... appearanccs are to be regarded s being, one and all, representations oniy,
not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible
forms of our Intuition, not determinations given s existing by theraselves, nor
conditions of objects viewed s things in themselves"(A 369), must be distinguished
from other, illegitimate forms of idealism. The basis for this disrinction lies in
the Kantian contention that the distinction between appearances and things in
themselves is transcendental and not empiricaL It is not the result of a direct
reflection upon the objects of our experience, but of a second-order analysis of
the necessary conditions .of their cognition. Thus, a transcendental idealism is
consonant with an "empirical realism", viz. the belief that objects s they are
presented to consciousness in experience really are in space and time. In the
Aesthetic this is argued in'terms of the thesis that space and time s a priori
forms of sensibility are empirically real and transcendentally ideal, but it finds
its clearest expression in the Fourth Paralogism of the First Edition (A367380).
This section constitutes Kant's first Version of the
cr
Refutation of Idealism"
and it provides a good introduction to the problem of the transcendental object.
His specific target is the empirical idealist, which is the name he attaches to the
proponents of the "theory of ideas", e. g. Descartes and Locke. The basic tenet
of this position is that we are immediately aware only of our own ideas or
states of consciousness, and consequently, that the existence of external objects
corresponding to these ideas is a matter of causal inference rather than immediate
apprehension. Kant's refutation essentially involves the demonstration that
empirical idealism implies a transcendental realism, and thus ultimately scepticism,
and in so doing, he is expressing the classical conception of the development of
philosophical thought from Descartes to Hume. Transcendental realism, which
Kant opposes to his own transcendental idealism, is the doctrine which holds
that space and time are given in themselves independently of the conditions of
human sensibility, and consequently, that objects in space and time are not
appearances but things in themselves. The empirical idealist is a transcendental
realist because his contention that we are only immediately aware of our own
ideas or states of consciousness is itself nothing but the result of the reflection
that we are not in fact immediately aware of those "real", i. e. non-mental entities,
whidi we must nevertheless presuppose s the cause of the ideas in the mind. In
other words, it is only because the empirical idealist begins with the assumption
that by "real things" we must understand things whidi exist independently of
the mind, i. e. things in themselves, that he is led to deny any direct access to
these things. From Kant's standpoint, such a position ultimately leads to
-
8
Cf. A127130.
168
scepticism, not only because of the uncertainty involved in all inference from
effect to cause, but more significantly, because: "If we treat outer objects s
things in themselves, it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive
at a knowledge of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the
representation whidi is in us." (A378)
The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, is also an empirical realist,
i. e. one who holds that we are immediately aware of things in space and time.
Since he regards space s nothing but the form of outer intuition, he can view
matter transcendentally s "a species of representations (intuition) whidi are
called external, not s Standing in relation to objects in themselves external, but
because they relate perceptions to the space in whidi all things are external to
one another, while yet the space itself is in us." (A370) On such a view it is
obvious* that we are s immediately aware of matter in space s of ourselves in
time, and Kant can therefore conclude that "our doctrine thus removes all
difficulty in the way of accepting the existence of matter on the unaided
testimony of our mere self-consciousness, or of declaring it to be thereby proved
in the same manner s the existence of myself s a thinking being* is proved."'
(A370) Thus, Kant's empirical realism is a logical consequence of his transcen-
dental idealism. We are immediately aware of things in space because space itself
and all things in it are nothing but a series of representations "in us".
As Kant proceeds to point out (A372373) the whole debate between the
empirical and the transcendental idealist turns upon the meaning of the terms
"external" and "in us". Viewed empirically they refer primarily to spatial
location. From an empirical, common sense standpoint an external object is one
whidi is located in space, a certain distance from me, and from other objects,
and sudi objects are to be sharply distinguished from ideas, whidi s determinate
psydiic entities are "in the mind". For the transcendental philosopher, however,
the tenn refers to the question of mind dependence. Since space itself is, when
viewed transcendentally, merely the form of outer intuition, external objects or
appearances in space are "in us", and a transcendentally external object would
be_one whidi exists entirely independently of the conditions of our sensibility,
it would be in short a thing in itself.
This being the case, it^is clear that the basic fallacy of empirical idealism is
that it takes "in us" in an empirical, and "external" in a transcendental sense,
thereby committing what would today be called a "category mistake". Moreover,
sudi a mistake is an inevitable consequence of the starting point of the theory. It
is, s we have seen, just because philosophers sudi asLodte beginwith theassumption
that "real" things must exist independently of the mind, that they were led to
their "empirical" thesis, that we are not immediately aware of these "real"
things, but only of ideas in the mind. What Kant shows in this section is that
this position is not only bad epistemology, since its logical consequence is (s
was shown by Hume) scepticism, but bad psydiology s well. Since we are in fact
169
immcdiately aware of things in space, thc thcory of ideas is simply empiricaliy
false, Howevcr, although cmpirically false, it is transcendentally true. It is indeed
truc that we arc only aware of rcprcsentations "in us", but this is to be understood
s the rcsult of transccndcntal analysis, and not empirical psychology. It follows
not from simple introspection, which contradicts it, but from the Copernican revo-
lution

. Thus, we are led to the conclusion, whidi is central to our further

analysis, that Kant does not so much reject the theory of ideas, s to re-interpret
it from his transcendental standpoint, and it is precisely this re-interpretation
whidi gives rise to the problem of the transcendental object. This is clearly
brought out in the following passage:
We can indeed admit that something, which may be (in the transcendental sense)
outside us, is the cause of our outer intuirions, but this is not the object of whidi we
are thinking in the representations of matter and of corporeal things; for these are merely
appearances, that is, mere kinds of representation, which are never to be met with save
in us, and the reality of whidi depends on immediate consciousness, just s does the
consciousness of my own thoughts. The transcendental object is equally unknown in
respect to inner and to outer intuitioiu But it is not of this that we are here
speaking, but of the empirical object, which is called an cxternal object if it is represented
in space, and an inner object if it is represented only in its time-relations. Neither
space nor rime, however, is to be found save in us. (A372373)
Here we see the notion of a transcendental object introduced by way of con-
trast with the empirical object, and this suggests that the idea of such an object
is a necessary consequence of Kant's distinction between the empirical and the
transcendental Standpoints. Just s the empirical proponents of the theory of
ideas believed that these ideas were caused by and corresponded to (at least
this was the case in regard to ideas of primary qualities) objects in the "external"
world, so the transcendental Idealist, who regards the whole "external" world
s merely a series of representations in the mind needs the notion of a tran-
scendental object to refer to the transcendentally external correlate of these re-
presentations. Unlike the empirical object, however, whidi the empirical idealist
mistakenly regards s transcendentally real, the truly transcendental object
is not encountered, but is simply the idea of an unknowable cause of our in-
tuitions, whidi "may", in the "transcendental sense" be outside us.
It is clear that if this object be understood s the transcendental, i. e. non-
empirical cause of our representations, then it must be identical with the thing in
itself, and this is precisely the sense in whidi it has in numerous passages in the
Critique, of whidi it is here only necessary to cite two examples.
Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer appearances nor that whidi
underlies inner Intuition, is in itself either matter or a thinking being, but a ground
(to us unknown) of the appearances which supply to us the empirical concept of tne
former s well s of the latter mode of existence. (A379380)
and again:
This whole analysis is greatly indebted to the excellent treatment of Bird, Kant's
Theory of Knowledge, pp. 4447.
170
The mudi-discussed question of the communion between the thinking and the exten-
ded, if we leave aside all that is merely fictitious, comes then simply to this: how in a
thinking subject outer Intuition, namely, that of space, with its filling-in of shape and
motion, 5 possible. And this is a question which no man can possible answer. This gap
in our knowledge can never be filled; all that can be done is to indicate it through the
ascription of outer appearances to that transcendental object which is the cause of
this species of representations, but of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever
and of which we shall never acquire any concept. (A393)
The idea of such a transcendentally real and unknown ground of our repre-
sentations is a necessary consequence of Kant's transcendental re-interpretation of
the "theory of ideas". It is indeed the thing in itself, but the thing in itself
s viewed from the standpoint of transcendental idealism, and thus, carefully
distinguished from the objects of experience. As such, Kant's references to such
objects serve to underline two of the central theses of bis transcendental idealism:
that our knowledge. is limited to possible experience, and that the whole world
of experience (the phenomenal world) is nothing but a series of representations
"in us".
We have also claimed, however, that there are passages in the Critique where
the transcendental object must be distinguished from the thing in itself, and
further, that the consequent ambiguity is not to be dismissed s mere carelessness,
but rather understood s the logical outcome of Kant's transcendental idealism.
This, ^s we shall see, is because this idealism is ultimately grounded in his
transcendental re-interpretation of the "theory of ideas", and it therefore, can
best be comprehended when Kantus position is compared with that of a typical
proponent of this theory, John Locke.
Like all empirical idealists, Locke regarded ideas not only s mental entities,
ultimately caused by objects in the external world, but also, at least in regard
to the ideas of "primary qualities", s representations of these objects. His
famous analysis of substance s a "something I know not what", his justification
of "sensitive knowledge", and his treatment of the "reality of knowledge" are
all based on this assumption. This emerges most clearly in relation to his analysis
of substance. Since we are only immediately aware of our own ideas, which he
regarded primarily s ideas of qualities of substances (he sometimes identifies
them with the qualities. themselves), the substance or thing to which they
refer must remain unknowable. Yet since it is only by reference to such a substance
or real thing that our ideas can be viewed s representative of objects, and thus,
our judgments based on these ideas s objectively valid, Locke found it necessary
to assume the existence of an "unknown Substrate" of these ideas. It is in light
of these considerations that he writes:
Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, s
horse, stone, & c., though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or.
collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to find
united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, because we cannot conceive bow they
sbould subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported
171
by somc common subjcct; whlch support wc dcnotc by the name substancc, though it be
ccruin wc havc no clcar or distinct idca of ihat thing wc suppose a support
10
.
The criticism of this doctrine by Berkeley and Hume and the consequent
reduction of a thing to a "collection of ideas" or Aggregate of impressions" is
well known, but it is one which Kant could not accept because it undermined
the distinction between a judgmcnt about the world and a merely subjective
play of representations. As a transcendental idealist for whom the world of
experience is merely a series of representation "in us", he had to explain the
objectivity of this world and of our judgments about it, that is to say, he had
to explain what is meant by an "object of our representations^*. Since the whole
empirical world is transcendentally ideal this could not be the empirical object,
and it must therefore be the transcendental object. Thus, s a direct consequence
of his transcendental idealism, Kant was led to regard the transcendental object
both s the cause and the object of our representations, and if in the former
sense it is identified with the thing in itself, it is clear that in the latter it
cannot be, without undermining the entire argument of the Critique.
II
Kant first deals with the problem of the "object of representations" in the
"preparatory" Version of the subjective deduction in the First Edition. His
concern in this section s a whole (A95114) is to delineate "in their transcen-
dental constitution, the subjective sources whidi form the a priori foundation of
the possibility of experience". (A97) Essentially this involves the demonstrarion
of the necessity of a three-fold transcendental synthesis for the explanation of
the possibility of knowledge.
Although the analysis is thus avowedly transcendental, Kant begins with, and
bases his entire argument upon the factual recognition of the temporal nature of
consdousness. Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they be
a priori or empirical, "they must all, s modifications of the mind belong to inner
sense", and since the Transcendental Aestbetic has already established that time
is the form of inner sense: "All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time,
... In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation." (A99)
This reference to representations s "modifications of the mind" (Modifikationen
des Gemts) appears to suggest that Kant is assuming the standpoint of empirical
idealism, but the whole point of the Transcendental Deduction is to show that
the problem engendered by this reflection, viz., how the mind can become
conscious of the unity or identityamongst its diverse andsuccessive representations,
10
John Lodce, An Essay concerning Human Understanding^ ed A. G, Frser, New
York 1959, Vol. I, p. 395.
172
and thus aware of an abiding object, cannot be resolved in empirical terms, but
requires the theory of the three-fold transcendental synthesis of apprehension,
reproduction and recognition.
It has often been pointed out that Kant is here speaking not of three distinct
syntheses, but of one synthesis which is analyzed into three aspects or momenta.
All three aspects are necessarily involved in the explanation of how the mind
comes to apprehend a manifold s a manifold. Since an Intuition, here under-
stood s an act of intuiting, lasts through time, it follows that the mind cannot
apprehend an object (the manifold s a manifold) without holding before itself
representations given at different times. In Kant's own words, the manifold must
be "run through and held together", and this act is called the "synthesis of
apprehension". (A99)
This,' however, is impossible unless the mind is able to reproduce past
representations. Without such reproduction, which is here regarded s the fun-
damental activity of the Imagination "not even the purest and most elementaiy
representations of space and time could arise". (A102) Kant illustrates this
contenrion inregard to both space and time. The attempt to drawa line in thought
or to think the time from one noon to the next obviously requires the apprehension
of representations successively intuited. 'TBut", Kant reflects, "if I were always
to drop out of/thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line,
the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the Order represented),
and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete
representation would never be obtained: ...". (AI 02) Thus, we are led to the
conclusion that reproduction is a necessary element in apprehension, and that
both are "to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind". (A102)
Yet apprehension and reproduction, taken by themselves, are not sufficient
to account for the consciousness of a unified manifold. Unless the mind were
conscious of the identity of its reproduced representations with the original model,
mere reproduction would never yield the awareness of a whole. But since these
representations (the original and the reproduction) are given to the mind at
different times, the only way in which it can be aware of their identity is if it is
conscious of the rule whereby they are reproduced in the Imagination. Kant
calls this consciousness the "synthesis of recognition in a concept", although it
is clearly not an additional synthesis, but merely a reflection of the need for the
mind to be able to become conscious of its own synthetic activity, a point whidi
in the
<f
Metaphysical Deduction" was formulated s the need "to bring the
synthesis to concepts". (B104)
The upshot of this analysis is that the mind is the source of the unity of the
manifold whidi it apprehends, and that this unity is the unity of its own
activity. Indeed this follows necessarily from Kant's starting point, for since
f
the manifold is given successively any unity therein must be imposed by the
mind and not simply found. The mind is, of course, not always conscious of
173
its generative activity, and is usually aware only of its result. Nevertheless, Kant
concludes, "... such consciousness, howevcr, indistinct, must always be present;
without it, concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are altogether impos-
sible."(A104)
With thls last assertion, Kant clearly goes beyond everything which he has
said so far. Previously he had been talking simply about the problem of the
relation of representations in consciousness, and describing the necessary
conditions for the recognition of their unity or identity.Now,however, he suggests
that these same conditions (the unlfying activities of consciousness) are also the
ground of our concepts, and hence our knowledge of objects. Ultimately, s we
shall see, knowledge of an object will be identified with the recognition of
the necessary synthetic unity of our representations, but before this can be
established, and in order to justify the shift from a discussion of representations
in the mind to one of objects in the worid, Kant must first determine what
is meant by an "object of representations", or s he also expresses it, "an object
corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge". (AI 04)
Kant regards it s obvious that this object can only be thought s a "something
in general =X". This is highly reminiscent of Locke's conception of substance s
a "something I know not what", and both men were led to their conceprions by
a similar diain of reasoning. If we are, in fact, only aware of our own represen-
tations or ideas (the question of whether this be taken in the empirical or
trahscendental sense is here irrelevant), then it follows that the norion of some-
thing corresponding to, and hence distinct from, these representations must
remain completely indeterminate.
It is tempring to dismiss, with Berkeley and Hume, such a vacuous concept s
utterly meaningless. But Kant*s main point is that thfc concept is necessarily
involved in all our empirical knowledge. The central feature in our conception of
the relation between knowledge and its object is necessity, and "the object is
viewed s that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard
or arbitra,ry, and whidi determines them a priori in some definite fashion."(AI 04)
It is only insofar s it relates them to an object that the mind can relate its
representations necessarily to one another. Thus, it is only in terms of the idea
of this relation that the mind, which is acquainted only with its own representa-
tions, is able to distinguish between the subjective connection of ideas in the
Imagination and the objective connection of qualities in a thing. Since the latter
connection is characterized by necessity, it cannot be explained a la Hume in
terms of association. Rather, s Kant is at great pains to show in his several
treatments of the difficult doctrine of "transcendental affinity", the subjective
connection of ideas through association is only possible on the basis of an
objective connection
n
.
11
Cf. A100, A112113, A122.
174
Kant's problem is thus to explain what is meant by objective connection, or
what amounts to the same thing, show what is involved in the relation of re-
presentations to an object. Locke had viewed this relation in realistic terms,
regarding the unknown object of our representations s a substance in the
"external" world, a position which, we have seen, leads inevitably to scepticism.
For Kant, however, it is not the object, viewed realistically s the cause of our
representations, which serves s the ground of their objectivity, but rather the
concept of the object, which turns out on analysis to be nothing more than the
concept of the necessary synthetic unity of the representations themselves. We
have already seen that the unity of representations is to be explained in terms
of the unity of consciousness, and thus, all that Kant has now to do is show
that this likewise accounts for the unity of the object represented. This is under-
taken in-the next paragraph where Kant asserts:
But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our represen-
tations, and since that (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us r
being, s it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations the unity
whidi the object makes necessary can be nothing eise than the formal unity pf conscious-
ness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. (A105)
Thus, the connection is established between the "synthesis of recognition in
a concept", and knowledge of an object. Since our conception of an object is
exhausted by the synthetic unity of representations, the recognition of this syn-
thetic unity is'precisely what is meant by knowledge of an object. Moreover, since
this unity is a result of the mind's own activity in the synthesis of its represen-
tations, the unity which "it "finds" in the object turns out to be one which it
has itself produced. But since it has been established that the mind can only
produce unity in its representations insofar s it synthesizes them in accordance
with a rule, Kant can* conclude:
iC
But this unity is impossible if the Intuition
cannot be generated in accordance with a rule by means of such a function of
synthesis s makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary, and renders
possible a concept in. which it is united." (AI05)
Here we find a clear expression of the fll implications of the "transcendental
turn". The unity of the object is explained completely in terms of the unity of
the rule whereby it is constructed in the imagination, and the concept of the ob-
ject is nothing but the consciousness of this rule. Kant will go on to argue that
the categories, s "concepts of an object in general"
12
, are the rules or "functions
of synthesis" which are necessarily involved in the awareness of any object. Here,
however, he illustrates this basic contention in regard to a triangle, which
strictly speaking is not an object at all, but merely the form of a possible object.
Kant*s point is simply that when we think of a triangle s an object we are
conscious of the combination or synthesis of three straight lines in accordance
with a rule, and that the Intuition of a triangle can always be produced by.
12
Cf. B128, B146.
175
such a synthesis. But if this is thc case, then thc unity of the trianglc, the ground
of its "objectivit/
1
is nothing but the unity of the rule whereby it is constructed
in the imagination, and consequently: "The concept of this unity is the re-
presentation of thc object =x, which I think through the predicates, above
mcntioned, of a triangle." (A105)
If, however, the unity of the object known is to be explained in terms of the
unity of the knowing consciousness, then this unity must be regarded s a
necessary condition of experience. As such it cannot be explained in empirical or
psychological terms but like all necessity must be grounded in a "transcendental
condition", Kant calls this condition transcendental apperception, and is careful to
distinguish it from empirical apperception, which he here identifies with inner
sense. Both are modes of self-consciousness, but while the latter yields a
merely empirical awareness of the flux of inner appearance, and hence, no
abiding seif, the fonner refers to that unity of consciousness which must be
presupposed throughout all experience. The one is a datum of introspective
psydbology, the other the result of transcendental analysis. Thus, in effect
what Kant is saying is that if we view the seif in empirical terms, we must,
like Hume, find nothing but a perpetual flux of representations, but that if we
adopt the transcendental standpoint, whereby the whole of experience is
nothing but a series of representations "in us", then the unity or idenrity of the
seif must be presupposed s the ultimate ground of the unity of its representations.
Kant, however, not only regards this transcendental unity of apperception s
a formal condition of all thought and hence experience, but also s an activity
necessarily involved in all experiencing. "This transcendental unity of appercep-
tion forms out of (macht aus) all possible appearances, which can stand alongside
one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according
to laws." (AI 08) It is not easy to see just how a formal condition can "do"
anything, but Kant's aim seems to be to show that this unity of the knowing
consciousness, s well s the unity of the object known are results of the mind's
activity. Xhis is suggested by the reflecrion that the requisite unity of consciousness
is only possible insofar s the mindbecomes conscious of the idenrity of its function
"whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge". Thus, it is only by
becoming aware of the unity or identity of its own activity in knowing, i. e.
the rule at work in the determination of'the object, that the mind becomes aware
not only of the unity of the object, but of itself s well. The unity of consciousness
and the consciousness of unity are sirnply two sides of the same coin, and both are
products of the synthesizing activity of the mind. We "recognize in a concept",
i. e. a rule of synthesis, not only the unity of representations, and of the object
represented, but the unity of the representing seif s well. Here Kant articulated
the thesis which was to provide the very starting point of German idealism; viz.
that consciousness of the seif and the consciousness of an object are not isoiated
facts, but mutually conditions of one another.
176
The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the seif is thus at
the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all
appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make
them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition,
that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. (AI08)
This explicit correlation between consciousness of seif and consciousness of
an object brings Kant back fll circle to the problem with which we began;
viz. what is meant by an "object of representations" or an "object in general"?
, It was the initial concern with this problem which led Kant to the recognition that
the unity of the object known must be understood in terms of the unity of
i the knowing consciousness, and that this unity of consciousness is only possible
j insofar s its representations stand in relation to an object, that is insofar s it is
|a knowing consciousness. But if this connection is to make any sense Kant
Imust determine more precisely than he has hitherto done the nature of this
j j mysterious "relation to an object", and this in effect means that he must provide
: |a transcendental account of the meaning of objectivity.
f This account begins with an affirmation of the dual nature of representations,
i and it is here that we shall find the clearest expression of Kant's transcendental
re-interpretation of the theory of ideas. Representations, he admits, in apparent
agreement with the empirical idealists, are not only objects of consciousness
or mental entities, but s the very term suggests, they likewise have a referential
function, i. e. they refer to or "have objects". From an empirical standpoint this
duality* offers no great problem. "Appearances", Kant asserts, "are the sole
objects' which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates
immediately to the object is called intuition." (AI 09) Thus, since appearances
are empirically real, we can affirm that we are immediately aware, not of our
own ideas, but of "real things" in space and time, and that it is these "real things"
which we regard s the objects of pur representations. However, when we
view the Situation transcendentally and recognize that these "real things" are
appearances and hence nothing but representations "in us", then we see that
they themselves must have an object. This need to assign an object to our
representations is an obvious consequence of the contention that it is only insofar
s they. stand in relation to an object that these representations can be brought
to the unity of consciousness. But since the object cannot be intuited, for then
it would be simply aiiother representation, Kant concludes: "TLe object of
our representations may be entitled, "the non-empirical, that is transcendental
object = ." ( 109)
Thus, the transcendental object, the object of our representations regarded s
transcendentally ideal, which we first encountered s the unknown cause of our
representations, now emerges in a new role s the ground of their objectivity.
This role is clearly defined in the next paragraph:
The pure concept of a transcendental object, which is in reality one and the same =
X throughout all our knowledge, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts
the general relation to an object, that is, objective vlidity. (AI09)
177
This is csscntially nothing but a slightly more cxplicit restatement of the earlier
argument with the "object of representarions" now dcfinitively characterized
s the "transcendental object =x", The Identification of "relation to an object"
with "object validity" is a necessary, and by now familir, consequence of
Kant's transccndental idcalisra. Sincewe are onlyaware ofourown representations,
and therefore cannot compare them with any transcendently real object, the rela-
tion of these representations to an object must be understood s a necessary
relation among the representations themselves. But this implies that the concept
of the transcendental object = s the ground of objectivity cannot refer to any
real entity, and therefore certainly not to the thing in itself, but only, s Kant
states: "to that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge
which Stands in relation to an object". (AI 09) As the idea of that unity, the concept
of the transcendental object constitutes the very idea or formula of objectivity.
It alone can confer on our representations relation to an object precisely because
it alone defines what is meant by an object. Furthermore, it is because it does not
refer to an entity but to the fonnula for objectivity that Kant can maintain that
it remains identical throughout our knowledge.
Finally, since this necessary synthetic unity of representations has already
been identified with the unity of consciousness, and since this unity is itself
grounded in the unity of the rule or function whereby the manifold was synthesiz-
ed, we can see that the proclaimed necessity of the relation to a transcendental
object is simply another way of stating, this time from the side of the object,
what must be regarded s the fundamental thesis of uieTranscendentalDeduction:
... all appearances, in so far s through them objects are to be given to us, must
stand under those a priori mies of syntherical unity whereby the inter-relating of these
appearances in empirical Intuition is alone possible. In other words, appearances in
experience must stand under the conditions of the necessary unity of apperceprion, just
s in mere Intuition they must be subject to the formal conditions of space and of time.
Only thus can any knowledge become possible at alL (AHO)
This Interpretation of objectivity in terms of the necessary synthetic unity
of representations quite obviously implies a coherence theory of truth, and sudi
a theory is indeed the logical consequence of Kant's transcendental re-interpre-
tation of the theory of ideas. The empirical idealist, since he is also tran-
scendental realist, posits the existence of an external object corresponding to the
ideas in his mind. The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, since he regards
all appearances s representations *in us", cannot meaningfully talk about such an
external, corresponding object, and thus he naturally judges the objectivity of
appearances in terms of their internal coherence. However, the perplexing thing
about the whole discussion, and the basic reason why some commentators have
equated the transcendental object with the thing in itself, and thus rejected the
whole argument s "pre-Critical", is that it is fonnulated in the language of a
correspondence theory. The object is regarded in the first instance s something
corresponding to, and hence distinct from our representations, and this sounds
178
very mudi s if Kant is here referring to a transcendentally real entity, i. e. a
thing in itself.
Yet this procedure becomes easily explicable when we view it in the context of
Kant's polemicwithempirical idealism, which is not found solely in the"Refutation
of Idealism", but throughout theCritique s a whole. Kant's problem in thepresent
instance is to explain what is to be understood by the claim that a judgment
has objective validity. He admits, in agreement with Locke, that this involves
the claim of relation to an object, and therefore that one cannot explain the
nature of judgment in the radically subjectivistic manner of Berkeley and Hume.
Locke, however, went astray because he viewed this relation in realistic terms,
regarding the object corresponding to our ideas s a mere "something I know not
what". Hence, Berkeley and Hume were right in pointing out that from the
standpoint of empirical idealism such a notion was meaningless, but since they
had nothing to replace it with the ultimate consequence of the whole line of
i thought was scepticism.
But if such be the case, then it is clear that Kant cannot simply reject the
notion of relation to an object, but rather must re-interpret it in a manner
consistent with his transcendental idealism. It is for the.reason that he introduces
the notion of a transcendental object, which is here intended s the critical
corrective for Locke's concept of substance. Since it is intended to do the Job
which Locke's concept of substance failed to do, Kant introduces it in the language
of correspondence, but s we soon see, the whole point of the argumeent is to show
that when we distinguish between representations and their objects, we are not
distiriguishing between two kinds of entities, one in the mind, and the
other "out there", but between two ways in which we can regard our represen-
tations, or in other words, that the notion of objectivity must be re-interpreted
in terms which are immanent to consciousness,
Thus, far from being a "pre-Critical" survival, surrepritiously introduced,
and externally linked to the rest of the text, the discussion of the transcendental
object can be viewed s the bridge over which Kant leads his readers into the
domain of transcendental philosophy. It is by means of this analysis that he
endeavors to show. that the meaning of objectivity, and hence of an object of our
representations, must be understood in transcendental and not in realistic terms
Moreover, when we view the teaching in this sense, there is no need to be surprised
that we find no mention of the categories, and we shall no longer be tempted,
like the proponents of the "patchwork theory", to view the whole discussion
s an initial and inadequate stage of the Deduction
13
.
It is a point often overlooked by such interpretations that the entire dis-
cussion of the transcendental object is contained in the section which Kant specifi-
cally asserts is "intended rather to prepare than to instruct the reader". (A98) The
ia
This is not only maintained by Kemp Smith, but also by Wolff, Kant's Theory of
Mental Actlvtty, pp. 111118.
179
catcgories, s the rulcs of thc ncccssary synthetic unity of the manifold, or, s
what wc can now sce comes to thc same thing, the concepts of an object in
gcncral, arc inclccd implicit in the whole discussion, and thus we cannot agrce
that this scction is contradictcd by what comes later
u
.They are not mentioned
for the simple reason that Kant feit it advisable to introduce bis readers to the
transcendental theory of objectivity before spelling out its details.
III
A further elucidation of the concept of the transcendental object and the pro-
Wem of its relation to the thing in itself and the noumenon is to be found in the
First Edition Version of the chapter entitled: The Ground of the Distinction of
all Objects in General into Pbenomena and Noumena. The chapter serves
essentially s a summary of the results of the Analytic and an introduction to
the Dialectic. As Adickes points out, the existence of things in themselves is
presupposed throughout, and the issue concerns the question of their knowabil-
ity
1
. Kant's concern is simply to reinforce his basic claim that human knowledge
and consequently the real use of the categories is limited to the phenomenal
worid, or in other words, that the categories have only an empirical and not
a transcendental employment.
14
Here Wolff, again following Kemp Smith, points to Kant's use of "empirical
concept" in this context. According to WolfPs construction of the relevant passage,
Kant's aim at this "stage" is to prove that the unity of consciousness, and therefore
consciousness itself, is only possible through the "applicarion" to the given manifold
of the pure concept of an object =x, and that since this concept has no content it must
work by empirical concepts.However, since according to the Kantian doctrine empirical
concepts are themselves formed by abstraction from experience, Wolff can condude: "So
it would appear that empirical concepts are ingredients in the very mental acdvity
(unification of consciousness) whereby they first become possible. liey both provide
and depend upon consciousness" Wolff, pp. 117118. Now if this were in fact
Kant's intent, WolfPs criricism would indeed be devastaring.However, Kant's concern is
not to argue that the "application" of the pure concept of an object in general to
empirical concepts is a necessary condition of consciousness, but simply to off er a
preliminary account of what is involved in the distinction between an objecrive and
subjecrive connection of representations. Finally, Kant's use of "empirical concepts" is
not to be understood in the expression of an earlier position whidi he eventually
abandoned, but s a reflection" of his task in this preparatory section to lead the
reader to the transcendental standpoint. As sudi he naturally begins with ordinary
empirical concepts, and enquires into the ground of their objectivity. Kant's position,
to be sure, is that the given data of consciousness (empirical intuitions) or sensations
only become apprehended s qualities of an object, and thus adiieve the Status of
empirical concepts when synthesized in accordance with the categories, and s the
First Analogy shows, when viewed s accidents of an abiding "substance phenomenon".
But the position is the result of the entire analysis and cannot simply be assumed in
advance.
15
Cf.p.96.
180
The argument begins with definitions of the relevant terms:
Appearances, so far s they are thought s objects according tp the unity of the
categories, are called phaenomena. But if I postulate things whidi are mere objects of
understanding, and whidi, nevertheless, can be given s sudi to an Intuition, although not
to one that is sensible given therefore coram intuitu intellectuali sudi things would
be entitled noumena (intelligibilia). (A249)
Thus, the concept of a noumenon is given an initially problematic Status.
Noumena are not given, but postulated, and access to them depends on the
possession of a non-sensible, i. e. intellectual Intuition, a faculty whidi Kant goes
to great pains to show is not possessed by any finite being. This, however, does
not lead to the rejection of the concept, for s Kant goes on to argue: "The
concept of appearances, s limited by the Transcendental Aesthetic, already of
itself establishes the objective reality of noumena and justifies the division of
objects into pbenomena and noumena, and so of the world into a world of the
senses and a world of the understanding." Moreover, this distinction is not to be
understood in the Leibnizean sense, s a distinction in the logical form of our
knowledge, of one and the same thing, but rather it refers "to the difference in
the manner in whidi the two worlds can be first given to our knowledge, and
in conformity with the difference, to the manner in whidi they are themselves
generically distinct from one another." This follows from the very nature of
appearance.,-'
Foif if the senses represent to us something merely s it appears, this something
must' also in itself be a thing, and an object of a non-sensible Intuition, that is, of
the understanding. In other words, a [kind of] knowledge must be possible,. In whidi
there is no sensibility, and whidi alone has reality that is absolutely objective.
Through it objects will be represented s they are, whereas in the empirical employment
of our understanding things will be known only a$ they appear. (A250)
This is essentially the argument whidi Kant used in his Inaugural Disser-
tation in justification of metaphysics, i. e. knowledge of the intelligible world
16
.
The basic point in both instances is the doctrine of the distorting diaracter of
sensibility. Since sensible ^ apprehension depends on the subjective constitution
of the percipient, it cannbt yield a knowledge of the object s it is in itself.
Hence, if sudi knowledge is to be possible it can only be through a purely
intellectual apprehension. (Kant seems to simply assume that sudi apprehension
would not distort the nature of its object.) But the object of sudi an intellectual
apprehension is by definition a noumenon, and thus this concept can be identified
with the thing in itself regarded s the object of a possible super-sensible
knowledge.
It is clear, however, that the affirmation of sudi knowledge contradicts the
entire teadiing of the Critique, and therefore Kant is forced to retrace some
of his Steps. This is accomplished by means of a further analysis of the
16
Cf. De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principns, Section II, 4.
181
transccndcntal object, Thus, Kant argucs, it is true that the understanding refers
all our reprcsentations to somc object, and further, since transcendental idealism
has shown that appearances themselves arc nothing but representations, these
too must be referred by the understanding to some object. This explicit parallel-
ism between represcntations in the first instance (obviously viewed empirically
s ideas in the mind) and appearances viewed transcendentally s representations
"in us" is further evidence for our contention that the whole problem of, and
need for, the concept of a transcendental object grew out of the fact that Kantus
transcendental philosophy was grounded in a re-interpretation of the theory of
ideas. Just s representations in the first sense have an empirical object, so
appearances viewed s representations must likewise have their object.
But this something, thus conceived, is only die transcendental object; and by that
is meant a something =X, of which.we know, and with the present constiturion of our
understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which, s a correlate of the unity
of apperccption, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. By
mcans of this unity the understanding combines the manifold into the concept of an
object. This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensible data, for nothing
is then left through which it might be thought. Consequently it is not in itself an object
of knowledge, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an
object in general a concept whidi is determinable through the manifold of these
appearances. (A250 251)
have quoted this passage at length because it not only provides us with the
clearest Illustration of the ambiguity of Kant's treatment of the transcendental
object, but also suggests the manner in which this ambiguity can be made
comprehensible. The ambiguity is quite obviously grounded in the fact that
Kant moves without warning from a vague conception of a transcendental object
s an unknown, transcendent entity in general, to the object conceived or inter-
preted by the transcendental philosopher s the object to which we refer
appearances. The transcendental object "thus conceived" (insofern} or, s
Kant himself describes it in a marginal notation in his own copy of Critique:
"Something s the object of Intuition in general"
17
, is the mere "something =
X" already encountered in the Transcendental Deduction. This can indeed be
regarded s the "correlate of apperception" because it refers to that consciousness
of unity which is necessarily correlative with the unity of consciousness. Since
it is this unity which constitutes the concept of an object, the transcendental
object =X is, s we have seen, the idea of, or formula for, objectivity rather
than a determinate entity. As such it obviously cannot be separated from the
sensible data, nor made into an object of knowledge.
Yet to say that the transcendental object =X is not an object of knowledge,
or that we can only conceive of such an object in terms of the unity of our
representations, is not to deny that there may be transcendentally real entities,
i. e. things in themselves. In fact Kant had just argued that the existence
17
Adidces, Kant und das Ding an Sich, p. 103.
182
of such entities must be inferred from an analysis of sensibility. Kant wants
to hold to both, and it is this desire which is the basic cause of the ambiguity
in his treatment of the transcendental object. Thus, in the very same paragraph
in whidi his main concern has been to distinguish between the idea of the
transcendental object qua object of our representations, and the idea of a tran-
scendent entity, he proceeds to assert that due to "the present constitution of
our understanding" (here referring to our ladt of intellectual Intuition) such
objects must remain unknowable. This obviously makes sense only if it refers,
not s the context suggests, to the correlate of apperception, but to the thing
in itself, and we thus find the notion of the transcendental object used in a
two-fold sense in one and the same sentence! Kant's fonnulation is extremely
clumsy to say the least, but his intent seems to be to suggest that the equation
for our concept of a transcendental object with the idea of an indetenninate
"something =X" .is not to be taken s a denial of their existence, but merely s
a means of emphasizing the fact that due to the finitude of our knowledge, our
concept of a transcendentally real entity remains necessarilyempty,and hence does
not signify a "true object". .
This Interpretation is confirmed by the final paragraphs of the section where
we find precisely the same ambiguity. Kant's concern here is to distinguish bet-
ween the transcendental object and the noumenon in order to show that the
recogqition of the necessity of referring appearances to a non-sensible object
does not bring with it any access to the intelligible worid. Thus, he argues that
although the very concept of appearance already indicates a relation to something
which is not an appearance, i. e. the thing in itself, the object to which we refer
appearances (the transcendental object) cannot be entitled the noumenon.
".. for I know nothing of what it is in itself, and have no concept of it save s
merely the object of a sensible Intuition in general, and so s being one and the
same for all appearances. I cannot think it through any category, for a category
is valid only for empirical Intuition, s bringing it under a concept of object
in general." (A253) /. .? . -
Although it is hardly free from ambiguity, this is the clearest Statement to be
fond of the distincrion, implicit-throughout the First Edition of the Critique
berween the transcendental object s it is in itself or an $ich and s it is fr uns.
We know s a result of an analysis of sensibility that there are transcendently
real objects, i. e. things in themselves, which underlie or "cause" our representations,
and in a passage cited earlier we saw that Kant distinguished between the
transcendental object "which underlies outer appearances" and "that which under-
lies inner Intuition". But since we can have no Intuition of a transcendental
object "it*' cannot be known through the categories, and thus, the transcendental
object fr uns, or in Kant's terms, according to our conception, remains
completely indeterminate, a mere "something =X" which is therefore."one and
the same for all appearances".
183
As wc havc sccn, however, this rcfcrcncc to a vague "something =X" turns
out to bc of dccisive significancc, providing the basis upon which Kant argues
for a cohcrence theory of truth and his idealistic conception of objectivity. The
argumcnt began with the common sense reflcction that it is the relation to an
object which distinguishes a nccessary, and hence objectively valid, connection
of representations in a judgment from a merely haphazard association in the
imagination. But since we are only aware of our own representations, and thus,
cannot intuit any transcendent entity corresponding to them, we can only under-
stand this relation of our representations to an object s a necessary relation
between the representations themselves. Thus, the consciousness of an object,
and therefore ultimately the awareness of an objective phenomenal worid, is,
when viewed transcendentally, reduced to the consciousness of the necessary
synthetic unity (coherence) of our representations. Finally, since the categories
are the rules for this necessary synthetic unity, which is in itself nothing more
than "the formal unity of consciousness", Kant can go on to argue that they
are necessarily involved in the consciousness of an object, and are therefore
necessary conditions of the possibility of experience.
Thus, we can conclude that although Kant does not express himself in this
manner, the whole of the "preparatory" version of the Transcendental Deduction,
ultimately rests upon the distinction between the two senses of the transcenden-
tal object. It is precisely because we can have no Intuition of an object correspond-
ing to our representations (the transcendental object s it is fr sich), that
we have to Interpret the relation between representations and their object s a
relation between the representations themselves. (The transcendental object s it is
fr uns.) It is therefore not, s is generally supposed, the case that Kant
simply has two distinct notions of a transcendental object: one of a thing in it-
self underlying'lappearances, the other of the necessary synthetic unity of these
appearances, whidb he somehow manages to confuse. Rather, his whole concern
is to show that since the former are unknowable, the idea of an object correspond-
ing to appearances must be taken in the latter sense.
However, although this may serve to explain the ambiguity of Kant's language,
it also brings into focus the very real philosophical difficulty whidi this posirion
entails. In its simplest terms this difficulty is that Kant wants at one and the
same time botb to affirm the existence of transcendental objects or things in
themselves corresponding to appearances; and, since these objects are unknowable,
to hold that by our concept of an object corresponding to appearances we
cannot mean such entities, but merely the necessary synthetic unity of the
appearances themselves. The obvious objection is that if this is indeed what is
meant by an object corresponding to appearances, it hardly makes any sense
to claim that there are in fact transcendental objects distinct from these appearan-
ces. It is one thing to argue that by an object underlying appearances we mean
nothing but the necessary unity of these appearances, and quite another to say,
184
s Kant seems to, that we mean this because we can have no Intuition of the
objects whidi actually do. The first is merely a Statement of the coherence
theory of truth, while the latter involves an existential claim whidi this theory
renders absurd.
Kant's problem is that he feels it necessary to posit the existence of things
whidi on his own principles must remain unknowable, and this is, of course,
the old problem of the thing in itself, the traditional stumbling block of the
"Critical Philosophy". However, this problem emerges in a new light when
approadied from the standpoint of the transcendental object, for this approach
leads us bade to the reflection whidi was the outcome of our analysis of the
Fourtb Paralogism, viz. that Kant's transcendental idealism can best be viewed
s a re-interpretation of the "theory of ideas".
Seen in this light, we can fruitfully compare Kant's problem with a parallel
difficulty in Lo&e's empirical idealism. Like Kant, Locke found it necessary to
posit the existence of unknowable entities. He wanted to maintain both that
ideas constitute the content of consciousness and that there are "real things"
corresponding to thesedeas, Thus, not only does, s we have seen, his whole
account of the objectivity, or reality of knowledge, but also his physiological
explanation of sense perception, presuppose the existence of a world of corporeal
substance with the appropriate powers, whidi in terms of his "theory of ideas"
must necessarily remain inaccessible to the human understanding. The fundamental
inconsistency finds its expression in Statements like the following: . .
Every man's reasoning and fcnowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own
mind; whidi are truly, every one of them, particular existences and our knowledge and
reason about other things
1B
is only s they correspond with those our particular ideas.
So that the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas, is
the whole and utmost of our knowledge
10
.
The whole point of the Fottrth Paralogism is to show that this position with
its implicit scepticism, is the inevitable consequence of an empirical idealism, and
thus, Kant of fers, his transcendental idealism, whidi being consonant with an
empirical realism, allows him to claim that we are immediately aware of "real
things". Now, howeyer, we can see that this transcendental re-interpretation of
the ideality of the objects of consciousness does not fully overcome the difficul-
ties of the Lodtean position. The epistemological problem is indeed solved by
the limitation of knowledge to appearances, and the consequent coherence theory
of truth. But this very limitation of knowledge to appearances, and the apparent
desire to distinguish between his position and the subjective idealism of Berkeley,
leads Kant to posit transcendently real, yet unknowable entities s the "cause"
of these appearances. In short, Kant's transcendental idealism is only half-
emancipated from the theory of ideas, and it is just this whidi constitutes its
greatest difficulty.
18
Italics mine.
10
Lodce, An Essay conceming Human Understariding, Vol. II, p. 404.
185
Kant's own awarencss of this problcm may well have bcen one of the reasons
why thc thrcc scctlons in which thc transccndental object received an extensive
discussion wcrc complctely rewritten in the Second Edition, with no furthermention
madc of the concept. Ccrtainly, the new "Refutation of Idealism" is intended
to correct, or at least more clearly Interpret some of the subjectivistic impiications
of the first version. Thus, the new treatment of the problem omits all reference
to the notion of transcen dental ideality, and consequently, transcendental objects,
and argucs instead on the basis of the First Analogy, that the awareness of
ourselves s beings existing throughout time presupposes the awareness of
things in space. Likewise, the new Statement of the Transcendental Deduction
begins not with the consciousness of time, but with the general problem of
the nature of combination or synthesis. Finaliy, the re-statement of the distinction
between phenomena and noumenor does not concern itself with the problem
of what is meant by an "object of representations", but rather with the distinc-
tion between the merely negative, limiting concept of a noumenon s a being
whidb is not the object of sensible Intuition, and the positive but problematic
conception of a noumenon s the object of a non-sensible Intuition. It is
largely because of these dianges that the problem of the transcendental object
has been overshadowed by that of the thing in itself. However, since the
"Critical Philosophy" is, in essence, a transcendental re-interpretation of the
theory of ideas, these problems are ultimately identical, and thus, although Kant
no 'longer referred to the concept of the transcendental object, he was still
faced with the problem of reconciling his ideal ism with the assertion of the
existence of transcendentally real entities.
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