This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding a dispute over the applicability of a wage order. Specifically:
1. A wage order was issued granting workers in a region a Php12 daily cost-of-living allowance. However, the employees of NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE ANDSTEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI) were already earning above the minimum wage.
2. NIASSI refused to implement the wage order for its employees. This led to a case that went through the DOLE and arbitration. The arbitrator ruled the wage order applied to NIASSI employees.
3. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the wage order
This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding a dispute over the applicability of a wage order. Specifically:
1. A wage order was issued granting workers in a region a Php12 daily cost-of-living allowance. However, the employees of NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE ANDSTEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI) were already earning above the minimum wage.
2. NIASSI refused to implement the wage order for its employees. This led to a case that went through the DOLE and arbitration. The arbitrator ruled the wage order applied to NIASSI employees.
3. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the wage order
This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding a dispute over the applicability of a wage order. Specifically:
1. A wage order was issued granting workers in a region a Php12 daily cost-of-living allowance. However, the employees of NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE ANDSTEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI) were already earning above the minimum wage.
2. NIASSI refused to implement the wage order for its employees. This led to a case that went through the DOLE and arbitration. The arbitrator ruled the wage order applied to NIASSI employees.
3. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the wage order
G.R. No. 162411, June 30, 2008, NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE
ANDSTEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI), represented by RAMON M. CALO, petitioner, vs. NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (NELU)- ALU-TUCP,represented by DONELL P. DAGANI, respondent. FACTS: NIASSI is a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Respondent Nasipit Employees Labor Union (Union) was and may still be the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of NIASSI and is a local chapter of the Associated Labor Union. The dispute started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (Wage Board) of Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which granted an additional PhP12 per day cost of living allowance to the minimum wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly to NIASSIs failure to implement the wage order, the Union filed a complaint before the DOLE Caraga Regional Office for the inspection of NIASSIs records and the enforcement of WORXIII-02. A DOLE inspection team was accordingly dispatched and reported that WO RXIII-02 was not applicable to NIASSIs employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prescribed minimum wage. Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE Regional Director indorsed the case to the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch for further hearing, which in turn referred the case to the NCMB for voluntary arbitration. On February 22, 2002, Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Unions prayer for the implementation of WO RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit the grant of wage increase to employees earning above the minimum wage. On the contrary, Chavez said, the wage order specifically enumerated those who are outside its coverage, but did not include in the enumeration those earning above the minimum wage. He also held that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between NIASSI and the Union provides that wage increases granted by the company within one year from CBA signing shall not be creditable to future legally mandated wage increases. Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with the CA a petition for review, which affirmed the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. ISSUE: WON the wage order may be made to apply and cover Nasipits employees who, at the time of the issuance and effectivity of the wage order, were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prevailing minimum wage. DECISION: No. It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions of WO RXIII-02 and its IRR that only minimum wage earners are entitled to the prescribed wage increase. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.6 The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific nough to cover only minimum wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the prescribed minimum wage. The only situation when employees receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the WO RXIII-02 may still benefit from the order is, as indicated in Sec. 1 (c) of the IRRs, through the correction of wage distortions. Clearly then, only employees receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage increase set forth under WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, of course, to the grant of increase to correct wage distortions consequent to the implementation of such wage order. Considering that NIASSIs employees are undisputedly already receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the wage order, NIASSI is not legally obliged to grant them wage increase.CA reversed.** Petitioners reliance on the above quoted CBA provision and on the flawed arbitrators case disposition is really misplaced. Consider that in his decision, Chavez, after admitting that NIASSIs employees were receiving a wage rate higher than the prescribed minimum wage, proceeded to fault NIASSI for not presenting evidence to show that the overage or excess resulted from general wage increases granted by the company itself within one year from the effectivity of the CBA in 1997. By simplistically utilizing the adage "doubt is resolved in labor," instead of relying on the case records and the evidence adduced, the voluntary arbitrator extended the coverage of WO RXIII-02 to include those who, by the terms of the order, are not supposed to receive the benefit. If only the voluntary arbitrator was circumspect enough to consider the facts on hand, he would have seen that the CBA provision on non-creditability finds no application in the present case, because creditability is not the real issue in this case. And neither is the interpretation of the CBA provision. The real issue in this case, as discussed above, is the coverage and application of WO RXIII-02.While it 2
behooves the Court to accord protection to the working class, tilting the balance of justice in its favor whenever appropriate, it is not possible to resolve every dispute to further the cause of labor. In every case, justice is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of established facts and the applicable law and doctrine, DISMISSED for lack of merit. Philam v Arnaldo G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994 J. Quiason
Facts: One Ramon Paterno complained about the unfair practices committed by the company against its agents, employees and consumers. The Commissioner called for a hearing where Paterno was required to specify which acts were illegal. Paterno then specified that the fees and charges stated in the Contract of Agency between Philam and its agents be declared void. Philam, on the other hand, averred that there Paterno must submit a verified formal complaint and that his letter didnt contain information Philam was seeking from him. Philam then questioned the InsuranceCommissions jurisdiction over the matter and submitted a motion to quash. The commissioner denied this. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency falls within the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ratio: According to the Insurance code, the Insurance Commissioner was authorized to suspend, directors, officers, and agents of insurance companies. In general, he was tasked to regulate theinsurance business, which includes: (2) The term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance business," within the meaning of this Code, shall include (a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract; (b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of aninsurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any business insubstance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2[2]) The contract of agency between Philamlife and its agents wasnt included with the Commissoners power to regulate the business. Hence, the Insurance commissioner wasnt vested with jurisidiction under the rule expresio unius est exclusion alterius. The respondent contended that the commissioner had the quasi-judicial power to adjudicate under Section 416 of the Code. It stated: The Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be answerable under any kind of policy or contract of insurance, or for which such insurer may be liable under a contract of suretyship, or for which a reinsurer may be used under any contract or reinsurance it may have entered into, or for which a mutual benefit association may be held liable under the membership certificates it has issued to its members, where the amount of any such loss, damage or liability, excluding interest, costs and attorney's fees, being claimed or sued upon any kind of insurance, bond, reinsurance contract, or membership certificate does not exceed in any single claim one hundred thousand pesos. This was, however, regarding complaints filed by the insured against the Insurance company. Also, the insurance code only discusses the licensing requirements for agents and brokers. The Insurance Code does not have provisions governing the relations between insurance companiesand their agents. 3
Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines v. Social Security Commission- that aninsurance company may have two classes of agents who sell its insurance policies: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the company; and (2) registered representatives, who work on commission basis. The agents under the 2 nd sentence are governed by the Civil Code laws on agency. This means that the regular courts have jurisdiction over this category. MONTOYA V. ESCAYO, G.R. NO. 82211-12, MARCH 21, 1989, 171 SCRA 442 FACTS: All formerly employed as salesgirl s in Montoyas store, the "Terry's Dry Goods Store," separately filed complaints for the collection of sums of money against the petitioner for alleged unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and service leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and attorney's fees. Montoya moved for the dismissal of the complaints claiming that among others, salesgirls failed to refer the dispute to the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and to secure the certification required from the Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the Labor Arbiter. These actions were allegedly violative of the provisions of P.D. No. 1508. ISSUE: WON P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) is applicable to labor disputes? HELD: No. The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes before the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or other government offices are not applicable to labor cases. Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before the barangay courts would defeat the very salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the proper court or office to decide it finally, the position taken by the petitioner would only duplicate the conciliation proceedings and unduly delay the disposition of the labor case.
PRIVATE ACTS AND CONTRACTS STATUTE EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent G. R. No. 189755July 04, 2012Sereno, J. FACTS In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA)and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C- 350099wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space ISSUE Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open space as defined in P.D. 1216. RULING Yes, t he aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space. The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under other similar facilities and amenities since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to includeor to be restricted tothings akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.