Proceeding the 6th Civil Engineering Conference in Asia Region: Embracing the Future through

Sustainability
ISBN 978-602-8605-08-3
TS8-10

COLLAPSE ANALYSIS OF THE MAHAKAM II BRIDGE
Sindur P. Mangkoesoebroto

Institute of Technology Bandung, Jalan Ganesha 10, Bandung 40132,
E-mail: itbpauir@bdg.centrin.net.id

ABSTRACT
The Mahakam II Suspension Road Bridge was the longest suspension bridge in Indonesia. The bridge
had three spans of 100 + 270 + 100 meters, spanning a total of 470 meters. The bridge collapsed on
November 26, 2011, during the maintenance activity of its center portion of the main span. The collapse
was catastrophic in nature and left over questions of the bridge condition prior to the event.
In the paper, a collapse analysis was carried out to investigate the situation. Geometry and material non-
linearity were taken into account during the step-by-step direct time integration of the equation of motion
considering all possible transient phenomena for finite deformation. It turns out that the bridge underwent
premature collapse during some scenarios considered in the analysis, with the tower straps and the anchor
block foundation creep as two primary causes.
INTRODUCTION
The Mahakam II Bridge that connected the cities of Tenggarong and Samarinda side was located at the
coordinate 02639.96S, 117010.37E. The three main span of the bridge consisted of two side spans of
100 meters each and a main span of 270 meters, totalling 470 meters. On Saturday, November 26, 2011,
around 16:15 local time, the Indonesias longest suspension bridge (Wikipedia, 2012) collapsed into the
40-meter deep water causing fatalities. The collapse took place during the maintenance activity of its
centre portion of the main span. The event left over questions regarding its causes and whether there was
relation between the collapse and the maintenance activity.
The stiffening girder consisted of 9.5-meter apart twin steel plane trusses interconnected by bridge deck at
the lower and bracings at the upper sides. The girder ran continuously for 470 meters and was hung at
every 10 meters apart by hangers to the suspension cables except at four points. At its two ends the girder
rested on anchor blocks, and at points by the pylons, the girder was directly tied to the pylons by using
steel tower straps. The steel plane trusses forming the stiffening girder were of Warren type, but without
the vertical chords, with the distance between the bottom and top chords of 6.7 meters. The top and
bottom chords consisted of 5 meters segments and all of uniform wide flange built-up section
WF360.360.20.20, while the diagonal of WF340.250.12.8; all were of 355 and 490 MPas yield and
ultimate strengths, respectively, and 15% elongation (Mangkoesoebroto, 2012). Fig. 1 illustrates the
main components of the bridge; while Fig. 2 presents the condition of the tower straps after collapse.
Since the opening to traffic in 2001, the bridge had shown some signs of warnings; the most noticeable
one was the offset of the anchor block at Tenggarong end (Fig. 1) observed in 2006 (Indenes, 2006).
The other sign that was observable only recently about four years later was the slippage of the cable
bands against its hold to the suspension cables; these occurred particularly to few cable bands that were
located near the pylons (Bukaka, 2011). These two problems had caused excessive downward deflection
of the bridge that was indicated by the loss of bridge camber. The situation became so alarming that the
authority decided to do something with the bridge. The most practical measure was the attempt to raise
the bridge deck elevation to the initial state by tightening the hanger nuts located at the down ends of the
hangers; and this was exactly what was done to overcome the problem. The nut tightening was started
with one in the middle of the main span at the downstream side of the bridge, and was followed with the
upstream side, during which the bridge catastrophic collapse took place and left almost nothing but the
pylons and the suspension cables. Due to the event 23 were killed, 13 missing, 17 vehicles and 17
motorcycles plunged and mostly vanished into the 40 meter-deep river water. The event was covered
widely and the remaining task was to figure out what really happened prior to the event and how to avoid
it in the future.


S. P. Mangkoesoebroto
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Fig. 2: Tower straps were used to tie the stiffening girder directly to the steel pylons









































LOADS AND MATERIALS
The collapse analysis was performed for quasi-static dead and live loads. The dead load was estimated
based on the data of the as built drawing (DHSRD, 2002) as follows:

The weight of the stiffening girder: 11.5 MN;
The width of the road way: 7 meters two lanes for two-way;
The thickness of the concrete bridge deck: 290 mm at centre, 220 mm at sides;
Wearing surface thickness: 50 mm;
Sidewalks: 1 meter width on each side, 500 mm concrete thick.

The above specification yielded dead load of D= 50 kN/m. Based on the Code (DPW, 1992) live load of
L=15 kN/m was applicable.

Fig. 1: The main components of the Mahakam II Bridge

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As specified in the as built drawing, the material specifications of ordinary concrete and steel weights as
well as Poissons ratios of = 24 kN/m
3
, 78.5 kN/m
3
, = 0.2, 0.3, respectively, were used in the analysis.
More detail information is shown in Table 1.

Tab. 1: Material specification of the Mahakam II Bridge.
Material Specification Youngs Modulus
Suspension cable
(19 strands)
Galvanized spiral wire strand
f
y
=1,142 MPa & f
u
=1,631 MPa
T
y
=38.8 MN & T
u
=55.5 MN
167,875 MPa
Hanger f
y
= 555 MPa & f
u
= 700 MPa 200,000 MPa
Stiffening girder
SM 490 YB
f
y
= 355 MPa & f
u
= 490 MPa
200,000 MPa
Steel pylon
ASTM A-252
f
y
= 241 MPa & f
u
= 414 MPa
200,000 MPa

In the finite element model, the pylon, which consisted of lower reinforced concrete pedestal extended by
the upper concrete-steel composite column, was discreetized and numbered according to their element
groups, e.g., #402 for the concrete pedestal, #403 for the steel column, and # 401 for their connection. For
each element group a relation of moment vs. curvature (M-) was constructed for one level of axial force.
In total there were five M- relations for five levels of axial forces. The element group IDs are shown in
Table 2, and the M- relations in Fig. 3 (a) to (c). The remaining elements, such as the members of the
stiffening girder, hangers, and suspension cables, were modelled by truss element with bi-linear stress vs.
strain relation constructed based on the properties shown in Table 1, and typically presented in Fig. 3 (d)
for diagonal chord.

Tab. 2: Element group IDs for connection, concrete pedestal, and steel column
for five levels of axial forces
Element Group
Axial Force Level Connection
#401
Concrete Pedestal
#402
Concrete-Steel
Composite Column
#403
Neutral = 0
#4011 #4021 #4031
Compressive = 25%
[(A
g
-A
s
) 0.85 f
c
+ A
s
f
y
]
#4012 #4022 #4032
Compressive = 50%
[(A
g
-A
s
) 0.85 f
c
+ A
s
f
y
]
#4013 #4023 #4033
Compressive = 75%
[(A
g
-A
s
) 0.85 f
c
+ A
s
f
y
]
#4014 #4024 #4034
Tensile = 25% A
s
f
y
#4015 #4025 #4035
COLLAPSE ANALYSIS
The collapse analysis was performed by using ADINA 8.7 (Automatic Dynamic Incremental Nonlinear
Analysis) software. Basically the analysis was carried out for the actual condition of the bridge in the
aspects of material, dimensions, and geometry. The applicable loads were applied in small step
increments for dead load starting from time 0 to 50, live load from 50 to 100, and the foundation creep
was allowed to take place since the onset (time 0). The analysis was done for six scenarios detailed in
Table 3, and the results are shown in Fig. 4 (a) to (f).

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The analysis for Scenario 1, i.e., the actual model (with tower straps) plus foundation creep, demonstrated
the stiffening girders collapse as observed in reality. In the scenario the capacity of the hangers in the
main span was 1.2 MN (70%), and 0.9 MN (50%) for side span (when used 1.2 MN, the side span
hangers would not fail as observed). All hangers underwent progressive collapse, and therefore showed
that capacity reduction of the hangers due to geometric instability were 30-50%. The result is depicted in
Fig. 4 (a).
Scenario 2 was aimed at evaluating whether the stiffening girder was strong enough to resist dead and live
loads in case of no foundation creep. It turned out that even without foundation creep, the stiffening girder
could not resist the effect of dead and effective live loads (53% of the full design live load). The result is
shown in Fig. 4 (b).
Next exercise, is to raise the capacity of the stiffening girder just enough to resist the effect of dead and
live loads, without foundation creep (Scenario 3), and then apply the creep in the following scenario, to
see the effect of the foundation creep in the sufficiently strengthened stiffening girder (Scenario 4). Fig. 4
(c), corresponds to Scenario 3: shows no failure; while in Fig. 4 (d), for Scenario 4, failure is noticed.
This shows that foundation creep will cause failure even when the stiffening girder were designed
sufficiently strong for dead and live loads.

Figure 3. Sectional properties of the related structural components
(c) Moment vs. curvature relations for
concrete-steel composite column
(b) Moment vs. curvature relations for
concrete pedestal
(a) Moment vs. curvature relations for pylon
connection
(d) Stress vs. strain relations for truss element.
Positive for tension.
Fig. 3: Sectional properties of the related structural components

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The effect of tower straps is investigated next. For the actual condition with foundation creep but without
the presence of tower straps the scenario is referred to as Scenario 5. The scenario is similar to Scenario 1
with the tower straps removed. The result is shown in Fig. 4 (e) which shows partial, but not catastrophic,
failure. In the scenario, the hangers were assigned to their full capacity of 1.7 MN since there was no
clamp instability. (Note: clamp was a mechanical connection of the hanger to the suspension cable, and
used in all hangers) The clamp capacity was known to be affected by the stability of load transfer from
hanger to the cable (Mangkoesoebroto, 2012).
Scenario 6 is to see the effect of foundation creep, for when in Scenario 5 the creep is omitted, no failure
is noticed (see Fig. 4 (f)). From the last two scenarios, Scenario 5 and 6, it is obvious that the effect of
tower strap is detrimental.

Tab. 3: Scenario in the collapse analysis
No Scenario Load/condition Failure type Illustration
1
Actual model (with tower straps) &
foundation creep*
Dead + live + creep
(D+L+C)
Catastrophic Fig. 4 (a)
2
Actual model (with tower straps), no
creep
Dead + live (D+L) Catastrophic Fig. 4 (b)
3 Strengthened model, no creep Dead + live (D+L) None Fig. 4 (c)
4 Strengthened model, with creep
Dead + live + creep
(D+L+C)
Catastrophic Fig. 4 (d)
5
Actual model, with creep, no tower
strap
Dead + live + creep
(D+L+C)
Partial Fig. 4 (e)
6 Actual model, no creep, no tower strap Dead + live (D+L) None Fig. 4 (f)
Note: The effective live load (L) was 53% of full design live load;
* foundation creep of anchor block at Tenggarong side.

The six scenarios considered in Table 3 show that two primary factors, i.e., the presence of the tower
straps and the creep of the anchor block, have major effect on the type of failures. Moreover, progressive
failures were always noticed and propagated from the members located close to the tower straps, or from
the members at the mid of the main span in case of no tower strap. This shows that the negative effect of
the tower straps is worse than that of the foundation creep.
CONCLUSIONS
Collapse scenarios to investigate the cause of failure of the Mahakam II Bridge were carried out. In
scenario without tower strap nor foundation creep, no failure was observed; and in case of no tower strap
but with creep only partial failure was noticed. This showed that the presence of tower straps and
foundation creep were the two major factors causing the collapse of the bridge.
The six scenarios considered showed that progressive failures were always initiated by the components
located near the tower straps, or at the middle of the main span in case of no tower strap. This indicated
that tower straps had negative effect to the stiffening girder as a whole, worse than that of the creep of the
anchor block.
The internal forces generated in Scenarios 1 and 2, i.e., actual model (with the presence of tower straps)
with and without creep of the anchor block, were always exceeding those of their capacities. This showed
that the stiffening girder was not designed sufficiently strong to resist the working loads in the presence of
tower straps.
S. P. Mangkoesoebroto
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REFERENCES
Bukaka Teknik Utama, PT (2011). Field Inspection Survey Report. Maintenance Project of Kutai
Kartanegara Bridge Tenggarong East Kalimantan. (In Indonesian)
Department of Human Settlement and Regional Development (2002). As Built Drawing Stage III,
Kartanegara Bridge Tenggarong Regency of Kutai East Kalimantan. (In Indonesian)
Department of Public Works (1992). Bridge Management System - Provision for Bridge Engineering. (In
Indonesian)
Indenes Utama Engineering Consultant, PT (2006). Monitoring Report of the Stability of Kartanegara
Bridge, Kutai Kartanegara Regency. February. (In Indonesian.)
Mangkoesoebroto, S.P. (2012). Forensic Investigation of the Collapse of Kartanegara Bridge,
Tenggarong, East Kalimantan, Saturday, November 26, 2011. Revised Edition, April. Research Report -
Structural Mechanics Laboratory - Institute of Technology Bandung. (In Indonesian)
Wikipedia, 2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kutai_Kartanegara_Bridge.
S.P. Mangkoesoebroto
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Fig. 4: Illustrations of the bridge at time step 300